if 

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LAW     BOOKS 

257  So.  Spring  St.,  Room  210 
Mutual  4473 


THE  LIBRARY 
,       OF 
THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


tfj 


* 


V 


A  TREATISE  ON  THE  LAW 


OF 

Taxation  by  Local  and 
Special  Assessments 

INCLUDING 

Assessments  for  Streets,  Sidewalks,  Alleys,  Sewers  and  all  other  City 
Improvements,  as  well  as  Assessments  for  all  Rural  Im- 
provements, such  as  Roads,  Ditches,  Drains, 
Bridges, Viaducts, Water  Systems 
and   Irrigation 

BY 

WM.  HERBERT   PAGE 

of  the  Columbus,  Ohio,  Bar,  Author  of  Page  on  Wills  and  Page  on  Contracts 

AND 

PAUL  JONES 

of  the  Columbus,  Ohio,  Bar,  formerly  Citij  Solicitor,  Columbus,  Ohio 
IN    TWO    VOLUMES 

Vol.  I 


CINCINNATI 

THE   W.    H.   ANDERSON   COMPANY 

1909 


/SOD 


Copyright    1909 

BY 

THE   W.    H.   ANDERSON  CO. 


^ 

^ 


PREFACE. 


In  this  work,  the  authors  have  attempted  to  do  what  has 
never  been  done  before — to  cover  the  whole  field  of  what  is 
properly  the  law  of  Taxation  by  Local  and  Special  Assessment  in 
a  thorough  and  exhaustive  manner.  They  have  given  an  analysis 
of  the  substantive  law  of  Assessments  in  a  way  never  approached 
in  any  other  work — and  they  have  also  discussed  with  especial 
care  and  detail  the  practical  questions  of  the  method  by  which 
the  public  corporations  may  enforce  Assessments  and  the  meth- 
ods whereby  the  property  owner  may  seek  relief.  Great  care 
and  study  has  been  given  to  the  subject  of  Rights  and  Remedies, 
including  Pleading,  Parties,  Evidence  and  Procedure. 

The  subject  of  Taxation  by  Assessment  has  become  a  very 
important  one,  occupying  the  attention  of  Courts  and  Attorneys 
in  a  great  number  of  cases.  This  work  has  been  in  preparation 
for  a  number  of  years,  and  every  effort  has  been  made  to  make 
it  as  valuable  to  the  busy  lawyer  as  possible.  The  Table  of 
Contents  is  a  minute  analysis  of  the  whole  subject.  It  not  only 
gives  a  comprehensive  scope  of  the  subject,  but  also  enables  the 
reader  readily  to  turn  to  the  particular  section  in  which  any 
given  point  is  treated.  The  index  is  very  full  and  complete.  The 
citation  of  authorities  is  very  exhaustive,  and  parallel  references 
to  other  than  the  official  reports  are  given.  The  date  of  the  lead- 
ing case  is  always  specified,  and  cases  are  cited  down  to  final 
revision  of  page  proof. 

The  present  treatise  is  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  gather  to- 
gether and  state  in  connected  form,  the  principles  of  the  law  of 
Taxation  by  Local  and  Special  Assessments,  established  by  ad- 


66V633 


11 


PREFj4CE 


judications  as  they  have  been  worked  out  in  detail  in  the  courts, 
for  it  is  thus    that  the  law  grows  and  will  continue  to  grow,  not- 
withstanding all  attempts  at  generalization  and  condensation. 
The  arrangement  and  text  are  the  work  of  Mr.  Wm.  Herbert 

Page. 

AVm.  Herbert  Page. 
Paul  Jones. 

Columbus,  Ohio,  January  10,  1909. 


1 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  1. 

Natuke  of  Assessment  and  Place  in  Law. 
SECTION.  page. 

1.  Derivation   of   assessment 1 

2.  Technical  meaning  of  assessment  outside  of  taxation 1 

3.  Technical  meaning  of  assessment  in  general  taxation 3 

4.  Meaning    of    assessment    as    here    discussed — Assessment    based    on 

benefits    4 

5.  Asisessment  for  performance  of  legal  duty 5 

6.  Assessment  for   property   furnished  at  request 7 

7.  Definition   of  assessment 11 

8.  Assessment  for  benefits  a  form  of  taxation 13 

9.  Assessment  for  legal  duty  not  taxation 15 

10.  Assessment  for  goods  furnished  not  taxation 16 

11.  Theory  underlying  doctrine  of  assessment  for  benefits 16 

12.  Divergent  theories  of  assessments  for  benefits 22 

13.  Theory  underlying  doctrine  of  assessment  for  legal  duty 26 

14.  Theory  underlying  doctrine  of  assessment  for  goods  furnished  at  re- 

quest      28 

15.  Asisessment  for  benefits  not  based  on  contract 29 

TO.     Theory  of  contract  invoked  in  assessment 31 

17.  Special  contract  to  pay  assessment 33 

18.  Assessment  not  based  on  quasi-contract 35 

19.  Assessment  for  legal  duty  not  based  on  contract 39 

20.  Assessment  for  goods  furnished  based  on  contract 39 


CHAPTER  11. 

History  of  Local  Assessments, 
section.  .  page. 

21.  Early  analogies  to  local   assessment — Feudal   exactions ■♦ 41 

22.  Work   on    roads 42 

23.  Origin    of    assessments    in    drainage 43 

24.  Statute,  23  Hen,  VIIL  c.  5 43 

25.  Efi'ect  of  statutory  assessment  on  prescriptive  duties 40 

26.  Questions   arising  under   early   statute 47 

27.  Assessment  extended  to  street  improvements 48 

28.  Early   colonial    legislation — Pennsylvania 49 

iii 


iv  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

29.  Xew  York    51 

30.  South   Carolina    52 

31.  Other  colonial  and  state  legislation 53 

32.  Assessment  not  recognized  by  common  law 54 

33.  Statutory  assessment  held  valid 54 

34.  Development  of  constitutional   restraints 56 

CHAPTER.   III. 

Relation  Between  Assessment  and  General  Taxation. 

SECTION.  pagp:. 

35.  General   distinction  between   tax  and  assessment 59 

36.  Exaction  on  political  unit  according  to  value  held  tax 6.*^ 

37.  Exaction   on  assessment  district  according  to   benefits,   frontage   or 

area   held  assessment 63 

38.  Exaction  on  assessment  district  according  to  valuation 64 

39.  Term  "tax"  prima  facie  excludes  local  assessment 67 

40.  Essential   nature   of   charge   controls , 68 

41.  Term   "tax"   as   including   assessment 69 

42.  Assessment  not  tax  within  provisions  for  exemption 70 

43.  Assessment  not  tax  within  provisions  for  equality  and  uniformity.  .  74 

44.  Special  views  of  certain  states 76 

45.  Assessment  as  tax  within  provisions  for  collection 78 

46.  Assessment  as  tax  within  jurisdictional  provisions 80 

47.  Assessment  as  tax   under  restrictions  on   taxation 81 

48.  Assessment  as  tax  under  other  provisions 82 

49.  Assessment   as   tax    in   conveyances 83 

50.  Special    tax     86 

51.  Special  taxation   in   Illinois 87 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Form   of   Exaction   in   Assessment, 
section.  page. 

52.  Option  to  owner  to  construct  improvement 91 

53.  Power  and   duty  to  grant  option 92 

54.  Option  to  do  work  in  assessment  for  benefits 95 

55.  Option  to  do  work  in  iierformance  of  legal  duty 96 

56.  Primary  duty  upon  city 98 

57.  Repairs    99 

58.  Removal    of   ice   and   snow 100 

59.  Lighting 103 

60.  Liability  of  street  railway  company  for  paving  between  tracks 104 

61.  Apportionment  of  expense  between   public   corporations 106 

62.  Deduction  of  benefits  from  damages  an  indirect  form  (ff  assessment.  .  107 

63.  Combination   of   eminent   domain   and    special    assessment 108 


CONTENTS.  V 

SECTIOX.  PAGE. 

64.  Deduction  of  benefits  from  compensation  for  land  taken  in  eminent 

domain    110 

65.  Distinction  between  general   and  special  benefits Ill 

66.  Eft'ect  of  distinction  between  general  and  special  l)enefits 112 

67.  Benefits  chargeable  but  once 114 

68.  Eight  to  deduct  benefits  not  dependent  on  statute 116 

69.  Doctrine  that  special  benefits  cannot  be  deducted  from  value  of  land 

taken    116 

70.  Doctrine   that   special  benefits  can  be   deducted   from   value  of  land 

taken    118 

71.  Special  benefits  deducted  from  damages   to  land  not  taken 120 

72.  Deduction  not  allowed  if  tracts  distinct 123 

73.  Deduction  of  damages  from  special  assessment  for  benefits 123 

74.  Special  contract  for  set-ofT 126 

75.  Statutory  provision  for  deduction  of  value  of  land  donated 127 

76.  Deduction  of  certain  benefits  and  assessment  for  others 128 

77.  Method  of  computation  of  benefits  and  damages 129 

CHAPTER  V. 

COJfSTITUTIOXAL     RESTBTCTIOXS     APPLICABLE     TO     ASSf.SSMEXT. 
SECTIOX.  PAGE. 

78.  Justice  and  fairness  of  local  assessments 131 

79.  Rule  for  determining  constitutionality  of  .statute 132 

80.  Efi'ect  of   unconstitutional    statute 133 

81.  Efi'ect  of   partial   unconstitutionality 134 

82.  Constitutionality  as  aflfected  by  facts  of  specific  case 136 

83.  By  whom  question  of  constitvitionality  can  be  raised 138 

84.  Estoppel   to  attack  constitutionality  of  statute 139 

85.  Effect  of  change   in  constitutional  provisions 139 

86.  Assessment  not  prohibited  by  American  constitutions 140 

87.  Xature  of  power  of  assessment — in  general 144 

88.  Classes  of  assessments 144 

89.  Assessments  on  basis  of  benefits  referred  to  power  of  taxation 145 

90.  Assessment  referred  to  legislative  power 148 

91.  Assessment   referred  to  judicial   power 140 

92.  Assessments  based  on  benefits  not  referable  to  police  power 1.50 

93.  Assessments  for  legal  duty  referred  to  police  power 151 

94.  Classification  of  specific  types  of  improvement 153 

95.  Streets    153 

90.     Sidewalks     154 

97.  Sewers   and   drainage 156 

98.  Other   types   of   imjirovement 157 

99.  Attempt  to  base  assessments  on  power  of  eminent  domain 158 

100.  Assessment  not  based  on  power  of  eminent   domain 160 

101.  Theory  that  assessment  is  referable  to  power  of  eminent  domain.  .  .    161 

102.  Confusion  of  assessment  with  power  of  eminent  domain 163 


VI  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

103.  Specific  grant  of  power  of  assessment . 164 

104.  Grant  held  to   imply  restrictions 166 

105.  Grant  held  not  to  imply  restriction 169 

106.  Provisions  requiring  legislature  to  restrict  power  of  assessment.  .  .    173 

107.  Provisions   forbidding  assessment 174 

108.  Equal   protection  of   law 175 

109.  Provisions  forbidding  taking  property  without  just  compensation — 

Specific  provisions 179 

110.  Constitutional  rule  as   to  just  compensation    lield   not   to  apply  to 

assessments   181 

111.  Constitutional    rule    as    to    just    compensation    held    to    api)ly    to 

assessments   183 

112.  Confusion  as  to  true  constitutional   principle  involved 185 

113.  Special  grounds  for  confusion 185 

114.  Due  process  of  law — Specific  provisions 190 

115.  Scope  and  meaning  of  "due  process  of  law" 192 

116.  Sale  of  property  as  taking  without  due  process 195 

117.  Due  process  of  law  requires  taking  for  public  use 195 

118.  Due  process  of  law  requires  apportionment  according  to  benefits.  .  .    197 

119.  Due  process  of  law  requires  notice  and  hearing 203 

120.  Theory  that  notice  is  not  a  constitutional  right 207 

121.  Legislative  discretion  as  to  nature  and  kind  of  notice 207 

122.  Legislative  discretion  as  to  time  of  notice '. 209 

123.  Notice  not  necessary  as  to  matters  which  legislature  may  determine  210 

124.  Notice  not  necessary  if  liability  optional  with  owner 212 

125.  Notice   of  preliminary   steps  not   necessary 213 

126.  Notice  of  preliminary  steps  not  sufliicient 216 

127.  Necessity  of  personal  notice 217 

128.  Notice   after   determination   of   amount    insufficient 218 

129.  Notice  of  proceeding  to  determine  validity  of  assessment 218 

130.  Notice    of   confirmation 219 

131.  Notice   for   hearing  objections 220 

132.  Notice  of  proceedings  to  enforce  assessment 220 

133.  Right  to  court  review 222 

134.  Riglit  of  appeal  as  supplying  want  of  notice 223 

135.  Effect  of  notice   in  fact  where  none  provided  for 224 

136.  Riglit  of  each  land-owner  to  notice ' 226 

137.  Effect  of  omission  of  notice 226 

138.  Statute  making  certain  steps  prima  facie  evidence  of  validity.  .  .  .    227 

139.  Statute  making  certain  steps  conclusive  evidence  of  validity 227 

140.  Issuance  of  bonds 228 

141.  Restriction  upon  time  of  making  objection 229 

142.  Appeal  not  essential  to  due  process  of  law 231 

143.  Right  of  appeal 232 

144.  Right  of  protest  not  essential   to  due  process  of  law 233 

145_.  Con.stitutional    provisions    restricting    taxation    not    applicable    to 

local    assessment    233 

146.     Specific  provisions  for  equality  and  uniformity  of  taxation 234 


CONTENTS.  Vll 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

147.  Provisions  requiring  uniformity  and  equality  of  taxation  not  appli- 

cable to  local  assessments 246 

148.  Theory  that  such  provisions  are  entirely  inapplicable 248 

149.  Theory  that  such  provisions  are   partially  applicable 250 

150.  Special   Views  of   different  jurisdictions — Alabama ,  .  .  .   250 

151.  Arkansas    253 

152.  Colorado     255 

153.  Illinois   257 

154.  Kentucky 25!) 

155.  Louisiana     261 

156.  Massachusetts   264 

157.  jNIiehigan    265 

158. Minnesota    265 

159.  South  Carolina 266 

160.  Tennessee ,  267 

161.  Virginia     268 

162.  West   Virginia 270 

163.  Wisconsin    270 

164.  Restriction  of  purposes  of  taxation 271 

165.  Specific  provisions  protecting  the  obligation  of  contracts 272 

166.  Assessment  not  a  contract  within  such  provisions 273 

167.  Changes  in  procedure  and  remedies  not  prevented  by   such   provis- 

ions       274 

168.  Change  relieving  property  owner  at  expense  of  public  corporation.  .    275 

169.  Change  increasing  burden  of   property  owner 277 

170.  Other  forms  of  statutory  change 280 

171.  Contracts  concerning  assessments  protected  by  such  provision 281 

172.  Contract  for  exemption  from  assessment 282 

173.  Change  of  law  assumed  to  be  prospective  only 284 

174.  Change  of  judicial  decision  as  impairing  obligation  of  contract.  .  .  .    285 

175.  Provisions  forbidding  retroactive   legislation 289 

176.  Provisions  forbidding  special  legislation ]7(i 

177.  Provisions   for    incorporating   by  general    laws 177 

178.  Provisions    forbidding    special    legislation    where    general    laws    are 

applicable 291 

179.  Provisions  requiring  notice  of  application  for  s])('eial  legislation...    291 

180.  Effect  of  specific  constitutional   provisions — California 292 

181.  Illinois   294 

182.  Iowa    : 295 

183.  Kentucky 296 

184. Louisiana     296 

185.  Minnesota    296 

186.  Missouri 298 

187.  New   Jersey 299 

188.  New    York 300 

189.  Ohio 301 

190.  Pennsylvania     306 

191.  Wisconsin     308 


Viii  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

192.  Specific   provisions   restricting   statute  to  one   subject   expressed   in 

title    310 

193.  Purpose  of  sucli  provisions 312 

194.  Form  of  title 312 

195.  Illustrations  of  titles  expressing  subject-matter 313 

196.  Illustrations  of  titles  not  expressing  subject-matter 316 

197.  View  that  such  provision  is  directory 317 

198.  Statute  may  provide  for  means  of  accomplishing  general  purpose.  .  318 

199.  Combination  of  improvements  in  one  general  plan ,.  319 

200.  Provisions  concerning  form  of  tax  laws 320 

201.  Specific  provisions  securing  right  of  trial  by  jury 321 

202.  Provisions  not  applicable  to  local  assessments 323 

203.  Provisions  applicable  to  eminent  domain  combined  with  assessment  323 

204.  Specific  provisions  for  separation  of  governmental   powers 324 

205.  General  efi'ect  of  such  provisions 325 

206.  Co-operation  of  courts  in  levy  of  assessment 325 

207.  Action  of  administrative  board  as  reviewing  body 327 

208.  Grant  of  taxing  power  to  executive  officer 330 

209.  Restriction  on  power  to  incur  debts 330 

210.  Constitutional   provisions   for  exemption  from   taxation 332 

211.  Constitutional    restrictions    on   amount    of    taxation — Specific    pro- 

visions      333 

212.  Application  of  such  provisions  to  local  assessments 334 

213.  Constitutional  provisions  for  exemption  from  sale 335 

214.  Referendum  and  emergency   provisions 335 

215.  Home  rule  provisions 215 

216.  Provisions  concerning  method  of  amending  constitution 338 

217.  Provisions   concerning   form    of   amending    statute 339 

218.  Constitutional  provision  regulating  jurisdiction 340 

219.  Law  dependent  for  efl^ect  on  future  action 342 

220.  Provisions  securing  redress  for  injury  to  j^roperty 342 

221.  Other  constitutional  provisions 343 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Necessity  of  Statutoby  Authority  for  Assessment. 
section.  page. 

222.  Assessment  not  inherent  power 346 

223.  Power  to  assess  for  benefits  must  be  conferred  by  written  law 346 

224.  Consent  of  voters  not  sufficient 350 

225.  Consent  of  voters  necessary  by   specific   provision 350 

226.  What  is  statute 351 

227.  Change  of  statute 351 

228.  General  principles  of  statutory  construction 352 

229.  Statutes  conferring  power   construed   strictly 356 

230.  Construction   of   statutes   authorizing   assessments    for    performance 

of   legal   duty 357 


CONTENTS.  IX 
SECTIOX.                                                                                                                                                                PAGE. 

231.  Power  to  construct  improvement  does  not  confer  power  to  assess.  .  358 

232.  Power  to  levy  general  tax  does  not  confer  power  to  assess 359 

233.  Power  to  levy  assessment  does  not  confer  power  of  general  taxation  359 

234.  Statute  conferring  power  to  be  followed  strictly 3G0 

235.  Discretionary  power  as  to  assessment  or  taxation  possessed  by  tlie 

legislature    364 

23().     Discretionary  power   as  to  assessment  or  taxation  given  to   public 

corporation    3G4 

237.  Power  to  tax  does  not  abrogate  power  to  assess 365 

238.  Power  to  assess  does  not  abrogate  power  to  tax 367 

239.  Discretionary  power  to  combine  assessment  and  general  taxation..  367 


CHAPTER  VII. 

By  What  Authority  Assessments  may  be  Levied. 

section.  page. 

240.  Questions  involved  in  discussion  of  power  to  levy  assessments.  .  .  .    369 

241.  Power  of  legislature  to  levy  assessments 369 

242.  Specific  provisions  restricting   power  of   legislature  to   levy   assess- 

ments        371 

243.  Power  of  congress  to  levy  assessments 372 

244.  Legislative  delegation  of  power  to  levy  local  assessment 373 

245.  Specific  corporations   to   which   power   of   levying   local   assessment 

may   be  given — Existing   municipal   corporations 375 

246.  De  facto  municipal  corporations 378 

247.  Assessment  districts   378 

248.  Assessment  district  including  parts  of  other  political  corporations.  .  382 

249.  Assessment  districts  formed  on  petition  of  property  owners 383 

250.  Power  of  assessment  exercised  by  officers  elected  by  district 384 

251.  PoM'er  of  assessment  not  exercised   by   elective   officers — Local   self 

government    386 

252.  Power  of  legislature  to  prescribe  specific  improvement 388 

253.  Public  character  of  assessment  districts 390 

254.  De  facto  districts 391 

255.  Assessment  by  private  corporations 393 

256.  Effect  of  specific  constitutional  provisions — Arkansas 395 

257.  Illinois — Restrictions  on  legislative  power 396 

258.  Upon  what  corporations  power  of  local  assessment  may  be  conferred  397 

259.  Who   are  corporate   authorities 399 

260.  Minnesota    402 

261.  Nebraska    403 

262.  Washington   404 

263.  Statutory  provisions  conclusive  as  to  officers  by  whom  assessment 

may  be  levied 404 

2li4.     Council    407 


X  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

265.  Boards  of  revision  or  review 407 

266.  Administrative  boards    408 

267.  Other  officers    412 

268.  Combined  action  of  public  officers 414 

269.  Interest  of  public  officers 415 

270.  Exercise  of  aiithority  by  public  officers 416 

271.  Action  of  court  in  levying  assessment 417 

272.  Jury    • 419 

273.  Delegation  of  discretionary  power 421 

274.  Delegation  of  non-discretionary  power 422 

275.  Adoption  or  ratification  of  acts  of  subordinates 423 

276.  Assessment  by  de  facto  officers 424 

277.  Method  of  attacking  authority  of  officers 425 

278.  Necessity  and  authority  of  special  commissioners ;  .  .  .  .   425 

279.  Appointment  and  compensation  of  commissioners 427 

280.  Qualifications  of  commissioners 430 

281.  Oath   of   commissioners 436 

282.  Exercise  of  power  by  commissioners 437 


CHAPTER  Vlll. 
Impkovemexts  for  which   Assessments   may  be  Levied. 

A. 

General  Nature  of  Improvement.  * 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

283.  Nature  of   improvements  in   assessment   for   benefits — ]\Iust   be   for 

public  use   439 

284.  Improvement  must  confer  special  local  benefit 441 

285.  Permanency   442 

286.  Meaning  of  "local  improvement" 442 

287.  Definition  of  local    improvement 442 

288.  Nature  of  improvement  in  assessment  for  legal  duty 443 

289.  Nature  of  improvement  in  assessment  for  goods  sold 443 

B. 
Effect  of  Legislative  Determination. 

290.  Conclusiveness     of     legislative    determination    in    assessments     for 

benefits   444 

291.  If    improvement    clearly    improper,    legislative    determination    inef- 

fectual      445 

292.  Finality  of  legislative  determination  if  improvement  may  be  proper  446 

293.  Delegation  of  discretion  to  public  corporation  as  finality 447 

294.  Delegation  of  discretion  to   specific  officers 450 


CONTENTS.  XI 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

295.  Unreasonable  and  oppressive  ordinances 450 

296.  Unreasonable  sidewalk  improvement  ordinances 453 

297.  Other  unreasonable  improvement   ordinances 455 

298.  Review  of  exercise  of  discretion 450 

290.  Conclusiveness  of  legislative  determination  in  assessments  for  legal 

duty    458 

300.  Conclusiveness  of  legislative  determination  in  assessments  for  goods 

sold   .: 458 

C. 

Specific  Examples   of   Original  Improvements. 

301.  Streets    459 

302.  Doctrine  in  South  Carolina 463 

303.  Constitutional  restriction  in  Virginia 464 

304.  Thoroughfares     465 

305.  Boulevards 468 

306.  Street  in  wiiich  street  railway  is  located 471 

307.  Streets,  driveways  and  boulevards  in  parks 472 

308.  Opening  street   472 

309.  Widening  street    479 

310.  Extension    of    street 481 

311.  Appropriation  of  land  in  whicli  ]niblic  has  easement 482 

312.  Abandonment   of    easement 483 

313.  Grading    484 

314.  Paving    487 

315.  Curbing  and  guttering 490 

316.  Retaining  walls 492 

317.  Intersections    492 

318.  Crossings    494 

319.  Culverts     494 

320.  Vacation  of  street 494 

321.  Alleys   494 

322.  Roads    495 

323.  Sidewalks     497 

324.  Sewers    501 

325.  Storm  and   drainage   sewers 505 

326.  U.se  of  natural  stream  as  sewer 500 

327.  Main  sewers    506 

328.  Lateral  sewers    507 

329.  Assessment    for    outlet 507 

330.  Pumping  station    508 

331.  Sewer   without  lateral   connections 509 

332.  Charge  for   privilege  of  making   sewer   connection 509 

333.  Private  sewer    510 

334.  Drainage  a  special  local   benefit 510 

335.  Theory  of  benefit  to  public  health 511 


xii  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

33G.     Theory  of  benefit  to  public  highways 512 

337.  Extent  of  special  benefit  does  not  constitute  public  benefit 513 

338.  Theory  of  public  interest  in  condition  of  land 515 

339.  Drainage  assessments  held  part  of  common  law 517 

340.  Drainage  held  proper  purpose  for  assessment 518 

341.  Purposes    auxiliary   to    drainage 521 

342.  Preventing  accumulation  of  stagnant  water 522 

343.  Levees    524 

344.  Illinois  doctrine  concerning  levees 526 

345.  Tennessee  doctrine  concerning  levees 528 

346.  Waterworks  and  water  pipes 528 

347.  Water   pipes    529 

348.  Connections,  hydrants  and  valves 530 

349.  Defective  apportionment  of  assessment  for  water  pipes 531 

350.  Special  views  in  certain  jurisdictions 532 

351.  Pumping  station    534 

352.  Wells  and  cisterns : 530 

353.  Water  rates  as  charges  for  water  vised 537 

354.  Other  meaning  of  water  rates 540 

355.  Irrigation     541 

356.  Public  parks   542 

357.  Public   squares    545 

358.  Public  market  place 546 

359.  Bridges  and  viaducts 547 

360.  River  and  harbor  improvements 551 

361.  Canals    554 

362.  Docks    555 

363.  Fences     556 

364.  Union  station   559 

365.  Railroads     559 

.366.     Location  of  public  buildings  and  institutions      561 

667.     Temporary  improvements    561 

368.  Lighting   streets    563 

369.  Lighting  railway  crossings 565 

370.  Cleaning,  sweeping  and  sprinkling  streets 566 

371.  Removal  of  ice  and  snow 569 

372.  Removal  of  garbage „ 509 

D. 

Repairs. 

373.  General  principles  involved  in  assessments  for  repairs 571 

374.  Repair  of  streets,  roads  and  sidewalks 573 

375.  Repair  of  sewers,  drains,  ditches  and  levees 574 

376.  Repair  of   waterworks  system 574 

377.  Doctrine  of  repairs   in   Illinois 575 

378.  Doctrine  of  repairs  in  Pennsylvania 576 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 


E. 

I{eco7istruction. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

379..    Reconstruction  wiiere  original   ini])ruvement  not  subject  for  assess- 
ment      570 

.380.     Reconstruction  where  original  improvement  is  in  had  condition.  .  .  .  577 

.381.     Examples  of   reconstruction 578 

382.  Penn.sylvania  doctrine  as  to  reconstruction 581 

383.  Original  construction  of  streets  in  Pennsylvania 582 

384.  Reconstruction    of    sewers 585 

385.  Reconstruction  of  sidewalks ...  585 

380.     Illinois  doctrine  as  to  reconstruction 585 

387.  Reconstruction  where   original  construction   is   in  good  condition — 

Theory  that  court  can  review 580 

388.  Theory  that  determination  of  city   is  final 58i) 

389.  Nature  of   assessment   involved 591 

Location   of  Improvements. 

390.  Location  of  improvement — Land  in  which  public  has  interest 591 

391.  Interest  acquired  by  eminent  domain 592 

392.  Interest  acquired  in  other  ways 593 

393.  Improvement  on  land  in  which  ])id)]ic  has  no  interest 595 

394.  Location  of  street — Land  acquired  by  eminent  domain 598 

395.  Location  of  street  on  land  acquired  in  other  manner 602 

396.  Location  of  street  on  land  in  which  public  has  no  interest 005 

397.  Improvement  of  toll  road 610 

398.  Appropriation  by  mistake 611 

399.  Location  of  sidewalks  and  roads 611 

400.  Location   of   sewers 612 

401.  Sewer  without  outlet 616 

402.  Outlet  in  stream 618 

403.  Location  of  drains  and  ditclies 618 

404.  Location  of  other   improvements 019 

405.  Presumption  of  validity  of  public  acts 620 

G. 

Time    of    Making    Iviprovement    icith    Refereyice    to    Assessment. 

406.  Asses.sments  for  pre-existing  improvements — General  nature 621 

407.  Assessments   for  pre-existing  improvements   held  valid 621 

408.  Statutes  authorizing  assessments  for   improvements  made  when   no 

statutory   authority   for   as.ses.sments   exists 022 

409.  Such   statutes  held  invalid 625 

410.  Assessments  for  impi-ovement  under   invalid  contract  upheld 620 

411.  Purcba.se  of  private  improvement 628 

412.  Conversion  of  toll  road  into  public  road 628 

413.  Assessments  without  valid  ordinance 630 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

414.  Re-assessments  held  valid 630 

415.  Contract  may  precede  assessment 03H 

410.     Payment  by  city  does  not  invalidate  assessment 034 

417.  Benefit  dependent  on  future  action ".   035 

418.  Assessments  for  future   improvements 030 

H. 

Classes  of  Improvements   iritii  lieference  to  Types  of  Assess»ienl. 

419.  Classes   of    improvements    for   which    assessments    for    honefits    may 

be   levied    03S 

420.  Classes  of  improvements  for  which  assessments  for  legal  duty  may 

be  levied    (i4() 

421.  Classes    of    improvements    fur    which    assessments    for    goods    sold 

may   be   levied 043 


CHAPTER  IX. 
Statutory  Provisioxs  Coxcerm.xg  PriiLic  Improvement. 

SECTION.  PA(iE. 

422.  Construction  of  legislative   provisions   with   reference  to  public    im- 

provements      645 

423.  Cost  of  pre-existing  improvements 040 

424.  Improvement  constructed   without  proper   ordinance 648 

425.  Expense  of  appropriation  of  projierty  for  public  use 649 

420.  Value  of  land  approjjriated 650 

427.  Value  of  building  taken  by  appropriation G53 

428.  Damage   caused  by  appropriation 053 

429.  Irregularities  in  appropriation   proceedings 654 

430.  Interest  and  costs  in  ap])ropriation  proceedings.  . ' 655 

431.  Highways   included  in  term  "street" 657 

432.  Other  improvements  included  in  "street" 059 

433.  Location  of  street  to  be  improved 662 

434.  Opening  and  vacating  street 002 

435.  Widening  street    004 

430.  Power  to  grade  street (i04 

437.  Power  to  ];ave  street 00() 

438.  Distinction  between  grading  and  paving 608 

439.  What  is  included  in  paving 009 

440.  Intersections    670 

441.  Curbing  and  guttering 073 

442.  Alleys    (ijf, 

443.  Sidewalks     Cur> 

444.  Sewers    (jys 

445.  Public  sewer    (-,81 

440.  Main  and  lateral  sewers (;S2 

447.  Outlet  to  sewer CS;} 


CONTENTS.  XV 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

448.  House  connections,  niaii-lioles  and  catch-basins 684 

449.  Drains 68G 

450!  Bridges    687 

451.  \A'ater    pipes    and    mains 688 

45'2.  Lighting    689 

453.  Filling  and  grading  hits 690 

454.  JMarkct   place    691 

455.  Improvement   on   private   land 691 

456.  River  and  harbor  improvements 691 

457.  Removal  of  ice  and  snow 692 

458.  Sprinkling  streets    693 

459.  Other  types  of  improvement 694 

460.  Temporai:y   improvements    695 

4G1.  Repairs   695 

462.  What  constitutes  original  construction 697 

463.  Distinction  between  repairs   and   reconstruction 702 

464.  Reconstruction    705 


CHAPTER  X. 
Specific    Itejis    Included    ix    Assessment. 

SECTION.  page. 

465.  Necessity  of  statutory  authority  to  include  items  in  assessment .  .  .  708 

466.  Assessment  limited  to  cost  of  improvement  and  incidental  items.  .  .  709 

467.  Credit  for  material  used  by  contractor 710 

468.  Compensation  of  surveyor  and  engineer 711 

469.  Expense  of  levying  assessment 713 

470.  Printing    715 

471.  Advertisement  and  notice 716 

472.  Cost   of   collection 717 

473.  Penalties   for    delinquency 719 

474.  Excess  charges  due  to  failure  to  pay  cash 719 

475.  Interest    721 

476.  Damages     728 

477.  Cost  of  defective  prior  assessment 728 

478.  Contingent  expenses    729 

479.  Effect   of   including   improper   items 729 

480.  Immaterial  errors  in  including  items 733 

CHAPTER  XI. 
The    lAtPROVEjiENT   Contract. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

481.  Power   to   lot  contract 736 

482.  Necessity  of  letting  contract 737 

483.  Necessity  of  valid  contract 739 

484.  Effect   of    fraud 74 1 


Xvi  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

485.  Nature  of  fraud 743 

486.  Constructive  fraud    747 

487.  Certificate  of  freedom  from  fraud 749 

488.  Mistake    750 

489.  Form   of   contract 751 

490.  Incorporation  of  document  in  the  contract 751 

491.  Time  within  which  contract  must  be  entered  into 753 

492.  Execution  of   contract 754 

493.  Vote  necessary  to  validity  of  contract 755 

494.  Parties  to  contract 757 

495.  Letting  contract  on  competitive  bidding 759 

496.  Advertising    for    bids 766 

497.  Discretionary  power  to  determine  bidder 768 

498.  Form  and  contents  of  bid 769 

499.  Method  of  awarding  contract 770 

500.  Method  of  giving  notice  for  bids 772 

501.  Contents  of  notice  for  bids 776 

502.  Proof  of  publication  for  bids 778 

503.  Effect  of  failure  to  give  notice  for   bids 778 

.504.     Power  to  order  or  to  dispense  with  advertisement  for  bids 780 

505.  Statutes  requiring  appropriation  or  sufficient  funds  in  treasury.  .  .  .    781 

506.  Necessity  of  collecting  assessment  in  advance  of  contract 782 

507.  Constitutional  or   statutory  limit  of  indebtedness 783 

508.  Other    restrictions    on    indebtedness 785 

509.  Necessity  of  contractor's  giving  bond  or  security 785 

510.  Contract  must  conform  to  resolution  or  ordinance 787 

511.  Substantial  compliance  sufficient 792 

512.  Effect  of  invalid  terms 796 

513.  Terms  fixed  by  law 797 

514.  Provisions  with  reference  to  labor 797 

515.  Patented  or  monopolized  articles 801 

516.  Covenant  for  maintenance  of  improvement^Effect  of  specific  statu- 

tory provisions 804 

517.  Covenant  for  maintenance  construed  as  guaranty 805 

518.  Illustrations  of  covenant  for  maintenance  construed  as  guaranties.  .    807 

519.  Covenants  for  maintenance  construed  as  covenants  to  repair 809 

520.  Restrictions  on  contract  price 812 

521.  Option  to  property  owner   to   do   work   or   to   select  contractor   or 

materials    813 

522.  Time  of  performance 817 

523.  Se])aration  and  combination  of  contracts 818 

524.  Effect  of  provision  for  liquidated  damages 819 

525.  Necessity  of  completion  of  improvement 820 

526.  Assessment  upon  basis  of  estimated  cost 826 

527.  Necessity  and  nature  of   substantial   performance 830 

528.  Excuses   for    failure   to    perform 836 

529.  Amount  of  recovery  in  case  of  defective  performance 838 

530.  Quasi  contractual  rights  in  case  of  defective  performance 839 


CONTENTS.  XVU 

SECTION.  PAGE, 

631.     Acceptance  by  public  corporation  conclusive 840 

532.  Efl'ect  on  rights  of  property  owner  of  acceptance  by  public  corpo- 

ration        842 

533.  Acceptance    by    public    corporation    final    unless    diii'erent    improve- 

ment constructed   843 

534.  Acceptance  induced  by  fraud  or  mistake ...  846 

535.  Acceptance  by  public  corporation  not  final 847 

536.  Acceptance  or  rejection  of  work  as  affecting  contractor 847 

537.  Official   certificate   of   performance 847 

538.  Necessity  of  performance  within  time  limited 852 

539.  Remedies  for  defective  performance  if  assessment  held  valid 860 

540.  Effect  of  abandonment  of  prior   contract 861 

541.  Modification  of   contract , 863 

542.  Extras    867 

543.  Impossibility   869 

544.  Assignment  of  improvement  contract 869 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Property  Subject  to  Assessment. 
section.  page, 

545.  Corporeal  real  property 871 

546.  Easements 873 

547.  Interest  of  owner  in  land  subject  to   jniblic  easement 874 

548.  Personal  property   875 

549.  Property   benefited   svibject   to   assessment   in   absence   of   statutory 

restrictions    879 

550.  The  assessment  district 884 

551.  Description  of  assessment  district 888 

552.  Legislative  discretion  in   laying  out  assessment   district 891 

553.  Power  of  legislature  to  determine  what  lands  are  benefited 892 

554.  Legislative  determination  conclusive  as  to  subordinate  officials....  898 

555.  Delegation  of  power   to   public  corporation 902 

556.  Grant  of  power  to  public  officers  or  boards 905 

557.  Crant  of   power    to   commissioners   or  jury 907 

558.  ]\Iethod  of  reviewing  determination  as  to  land  benefited 909 

559.  By  whom  correctness  of  determination  can  be  questioned 910 

560.  Assessment  district  consisting  of  property  benefited  in  fact 911 

561.  Land   benefited   by   street 913 

5'"2.  Land  benefited  by  sidewalk 916 

5C3.  Land  benefited  by  sewer 916 

564.  Land  benefited  by  ditch  or  drain 923 

5R5.  Land  benefited  by  water   pipes 929 

566.  Land  benefited  by  levees 929 

567.  Land  benefited  by  other   improvements 930 

568.  land  benefited  by  combination  of  improvements 931 

569.  Combination    of    streets 932 


Xviii  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

570.  Combination  of  parts  of  entire  street  improvement 935 

571.  Sidewalks 938 

572.  Sewers     930 

573.  Other  improvements    941 

574.  Separation    of    improvement 942 

575.  Lateral   division   of   improvement 945 

570.  Property  on  part  of  improvement  for  which  assessment  is  not  levied  048 

577.  Improvement  of  varying  width  and   cost 040 

578.  Peculiar  use  of  land  as  affecting  benefits 051) 

570.     Land  belonging  to  United  States 054 

580.  Public  property  not  belonging  to  United  States 954 

581.  Property  belonging  to  state 957 

582.  Property  belonging  to  county 050 

583.  Property  belonging   to  townsliip 901 

584.  Property  belonging  to  city 901 

585.  Assessment  of  city  for  benefit  received  as  a  whole 904 

580.     Public  school  property 965 

587.  Streets  and  roads 907 

588.  Property   owned   by   religious   bodies 971 

589.  Property  owned  by  charitable  organizations 974 

500.     Property   belonging   to   educational    institutions 970 

591.     Property  used  for  fairs  and  exhibitions 977 

502.  Cemetery    property    _ 077 

503.  Property  of  public  service  corporations 070 

594.  Railroad  projjerty   980 

595.  Effect  of  use  to  which  railroad  property  is  put — Piglit  of  way 983 

590.  Property  other  than  right  of  way 980 

507.     Effect  of  interest  held  by  railroad   in  land 990 

598.  Sjwcific   type   of   improvement   as   affecting   assessment   of   right    of 

way 901 

500.     Exaction  against  street  railway  based  on  charter  provisions 000 

000.  Statutory  duty  of  street  railway  to  pave 098 

001.  Assessment  upon  street  railway  based  on  benefits 999 

002.  Contractual  liability  of  street  railway 1002 

003.  Construction  of  liability  of  street  railway 1003 

604.  Liability  of  street  railway  enui'es  to  benefit  of  i)ro];erty  owners.  .  .  .1007 

605.  Method  of  enforcing  liability  of  street  railway 1010 

000.     Street  railway  property  other  than  right  of  way 1010 

007.  Homestead   1011 

008.  Vacant   land    1012 

009.  Unplatted    land    1013 

010.  Agricultural    property    1015 

Oil.     Power  of  legislature  to  exempt  from  assessment 1017 

012.  Necessity  of  express  exemption 1019 

013.  Effect  of  exemption  from  taxation 1020 

614.  Construction   of   exemptions 1025 

615.  Power  of  legislature  to  authorize  contracts  for  exemption 1028 

010.     Necessity   of   statutory  authority   for   exemption   contracts. 1020 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

SECTIOX.  PAGE. 

617.  Construction  of  contracts   for   exemption 1031 

618.  Construction  of  special  statutes  for  exemption  and  commutation ...  1033 

619.  Property  not  in   pliysical  contact  with  improvement 1034 

620.  Abutting    property    103<i 

621.  Adjoining  property    1046 

622.  Adjacent   property 1048 

623.  Contiguous    property     1050 

624.  Property   fronting  on    improvement 1053 

625.  Effect  of  assessment  according  to  frontage 1057 

626.  Bordering,  bounding  and  binding  property,  and   property   in   neigh- 

borhood of   improvement 1050 

627.  Other   methods    of    describing   property 1062 

628.  Assessment  district  consisting  of  blocks  or  parts  of  blocks 1004 

629.  As.sessment   district  consisting  of   land   within  certain   distance   of 

improvement     107 1 

630.  Meaning  of  lot ... 1075 

631.  Effect  of  platted  lines 1077 

632.  Assessment  of  strips  of  land 1081 

633.  Property  benefited   by  future   improvement 1083 

634.  Land  on  which  improvement  is  not  located 1083 

635.  Condition  of  property  when  proceedings  are  begun  controls 1084 

636.  Improvement   outside    of    taxing    district 1085 

637.  Property  outside  of  public  corporation  which  levies  assessment ....  1088 

638.  Land  in  two  or  more  assessment  districts 1091 

639.  Unauthorized   omission  of   land   benefited 1093 

640.  Omission  to  impose  proper  charge  on  street  railway 1096 

641.  Omission  of  land  not  subject  to  asses.sment 1097 

642.  Omission    by    legislative    determination 1099 

643.  Presumption  of  propriety  of  omission 1099 

644.  Omission  not  operative  if  not  prejudicial 1100 

645.  Remedies  for  improper  omission 1102 

646.  Effect  of  construction  of  improvement  by  property  owner 1104 

647.  Property  on  which  owner  has  paid  invalid  assessment 1106 

648.  Land  already  assessed  for  similar  improvement 1106 

649.  Title    not    involved 1108 

650.  Change  of   statute  pending  assessment   proceedings.  . 1109 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

Apportionment. 
sectio^.  page. 

651.  Theory   of   apportionment 1111 

652.  Nature   of   benefit 1113 

653.  Increase   in   price  as  test  of  benefit 1113 

654.  General    and   special   benefits. 1117 

655.  Special  use  as  afl'ecting  benefits 1119 

656.  Benefits  from  combination  of  improvement  or  division  thereof.  .  .  .  1120 


XX  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  P.^CE 

657.  Benefits  enuring  from  street  improvement 1121 

658.  Benefits  enuring  from   sewer 1124 

659.  Benefits  enuring  from  drains 1125 

660.  Benefits   enuring   from    levee 1126 

661.  Damages   caused   by   public   improvements 1126 

662.  Option  to  assess  or  tax  for  local  improvement 1129 

663.  Apportionment  between  public  corporation  and  property  owners.  .  1131 

664.  Apportionment   between   different    public   corporations 1138 

665.  Benefits  as  theoretical  limit  of  assessment  and  basis  of  apportion- 

ment      1139 

666.  Power  of  legislature  to  determine  existence  and  amount  of  benefits  1144 

667.  Legislative   determination    held   ineffective 1153 

668.  Legislative  determination  held  final   if  no  injustice  results  there- 

from      1 154 

669.  Legislative  determination  made  subject  to  review 1155 

670.  Determination  by  public  corporation  of  existence  and  amount  of 

benefits   1 156 

671.  Power   of   public   boards    to    determine    existence    and    amount    of 

benefits    1160 

672.  Determination  by  commissioners  of  existence  and  amount  of  benefits  1161 

673.  Determination  by  court  of  existence  and  amount  of  benefits 1162 

674.  Prima  facie  validity  of  apportionment 1162 

675.  Power  of  court  to  review  existence  and  amount  of  benefits 1164 

676.  Jury  trial  as  to  existence  and  amoimt  of  benefits 1166 

677.  Assessment  limited  to  benefits  in  fact 1167 

678.  Value  of  land  as  limit  of  assessment 1170 

679.  Restrictions  on  amount  of  assessment 1171 

680.  Restrictions  based  on  actual  value  of  property 1173 

681.  Restrictions  based  on  tax  valuation 1175 

682.  Combination  and   division  of   tracts  with   reference   to   restriction 

on   assessment    1177 

683.  Eff"ect  of  limiting  lien  to  certain  depth 1178 

684.  Division  of  improvement  or  of  payments 1178 

685.  \Yaiver  of  statutory  restrictions 1179 

686.  Efi'ect  of  exceeding  statutory  limit 1180 

687.  Change  of  statutory  restriction 1182 

688.  Xecessity  of  apportionment 1183 

689.  Apportionment   a    mere    approximation 1184 

690.  Apportionment  according  to  benefits  in  fact 1185 

691.  Construction  of  statutes  as  to  apportionment  on  basis  of  benefits.  1188 

692.  Construction  of  assessment  as  to  apportionment  on  basis  of  benefits  1192 

693.  Compliance  with  statute  requiring  apportionment  on  basis  of  bene- 

fits— Assessment  according  to  frontage 1103 

694.  Assessments  upon  other  bases  of  apportionment 1195 

695.  Apportionment  on  a   "proportionate"   basis 1197 

696.  Apportionment  on  a  "just  and  equitable"  basis 11 98 

697.  Apportionment  according  to  A'alue 1200 

698.  Apportionment  according  to  frontage  held  valid 1202 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

SECTION.  PAcr. 

G99.     Apportionment   according    to    frontage    held    valid    if    limited    by 

statute  to  benefits 1206 

700.  Apportionment  according  to  frontage  held  invalid  if  not  in  excess 

of  benefits  in  specific  case 1210 

701.  Apportionment  according  to   frontage   held   invalid 1211 

702.  Apportionment  according   to   frontage  as   affected  by   Xorwood   v. 

Baker    1212 

703.  Frontage  as  affected  by  varying  depth  or  value 1216 

704.  Frontage  in  case  of  corner  lots 1217 

705.  Frontage  as  affected  by  irregular  shape  of  ]ots 1218 

706.  Use  of  land  as  affecting  apportionment  according  to  frontage 1219 

707.  Construction  and  application  of  statutes  requiring  apportionment 

according  to  frontage 1220 

708.  Assessment  of  fixed  sum  per  front  foot 1222 

709.  Entire  cost  of  improvement  apportioned  according  to  frontage.  .  .  1223 

710.  Apportionment  by  squares  or  Idocks 1229 

711.  Apportionment  according  to  area 1230 

712.  Apportionment  by  combination  of  frontage  and  area 1233 

713.  Apportionment  according  to  work  done  in  front  of  eacli  lot 1233 

714.  Effect  of  'Statutes  requiring  other  forms  of  apportionment 1236 

715.  Apportionment  of  special  assessment  or  special  taxation  in  Illinois  1237 

716.  Apportionment   of   cost   of   street   intersections 1241 

717.  Apportionment  of  assessment  for  performance  of  legal  duty 1241 

718.  Apportionment   of  charges   for   voluntary   use   of    public    improve- 

ment or  for  goods  furnished 1244 

719.  Duplication  of  assessment 1246 

720.  Credit   for   work   done 1248 

721.  Credit  for   land   donated 1250 

722.  Credit  for  payment  of  prior  assessment 1250 

723.  Who  can  complain  of  defective  apportionment 1251 

724.  Effect  of  statutory  provisions  for   method  of  objecting  to  appor- 

tionment    1256 

725.  Change  of  statute  with  reference  to  apportionment 1257 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

NOTTCE. 
SECTION.  PAGE. 

726.  Constitutional  necessity  of  notice 1259 

727.  No  constitutional  right  to  notice  of  each  step  in  levy  of  assessment  1261 

728.  Notice  and  hearing  in  case  of  legislative  determination 1261 

729.  Notice  and  hearing  if  question  not  one  of  legislative  determination  1265 

730.  What   constitutes    sufficient   notice 1266 

731.  Necessity  of  hearing  upon  amount  of  assessment 1266 

732.  Effect  of  giving  notice  in  fact 1269 

733.  Necessity  of  notice  in  case  of  charge  for  legal  duty 1270 

734.  Necessity  of  notice  in  case  of  charge  for  goods  furnished 1271 


Xxii  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  •                                                  PAGE. 

735.  Effect  of  statutory  provisions  with  reference  to  notice 1271 

736.  Construction  of  statutory  provisions  concerning  notice 1274 

737.  Xotice  of  option  to  property  owner  to  do  work. 1274 

738.  Sufficiency  of  notice  of  commencement  of  improvement  proceeding.    127() 

739.  Notice   of   improvement 1278 

740.  Notice  of   resolution  of   intention 1280 

741.  Notice   of   ordinance 1282 

742.  Notice  of  contract 1283 

743.  Notice  of  hearing  to  determine  assessment  district 1283 

744.  Notice  of  otlier  proceedings  in  assessment 1284 

745.  Notice  of  hearing  after  levy  of  assessment 1285 

746.  Notice   of   collection 1287 

747.  Time  for  which  notice  must  be  given 1288 

748.  To  whom  notice  must  be  given 1292 

749.  By  whom  notice  must  be  ordered 1295 

750.  Form  and  contents  of  notice 1295 

751.  To  whom  notice  to  be  addressed 1298 

752.  By  whom  notice  must  be  signed 1299 

753.  Time  and     place  of  hearing  in  notice 1299 

754.  Description  of  improvement  in  notice 1300 

755.  Description   in  notice  of   land  assessed 1302 

756.  INIethod  of  service  of  notice 1303 

757.  Personal    service    1303 

758.  Service  by  mailing  notice 1304 

759.  Service  by  jrosting  notice  or  by  leaving  notice  on  premises 1305 

760.  Service    by    publication 130G 

701.     In  what  newspaper  publication  may  be  had 1308 

762.  Official  newspaper    1309 

763.  Time  and  number  of  publications   necessary 1312 

764.  Proof  of   service   of  notice 1316 

765.  Necessity  that  service  of  notice  appear  of  record 1320 

766.  Presumption  of  sufficiency  of  notice 1321 

767.  Change  of  statute  as  affecting  pending  proceedings 1322 

768.  Who  can  complaiii  of  want  of  notice 1323 

769.  Effect  of  notice 1324 

770.  Effect  of  want  of  proper  notice 1324 

771.  Waiver  of  insufficiency  of  notice 1325 

772.  Determination  of  public  official  as  to  sufficiency  of  notice 1327 

773.  Action,  appeal  and  injunction  as  substitutes  for  notice 1329 

774.  Knowledge  as  substitute  for  notice 1330 


CHAPTER  XV. 

Method  of  Levyii^g  Assessment. 
section.  page. 

775.  Necessity  of  statutory  authority  for  power  to  levy  assessment...    1331 

776.  General  rules  of  statutory  construction 1333 


CONTENTS.  XXlll 

SFXTIOX.  PAGE.  ■ 

777.  Degree  of  compliance  with  statutes  necessary 1338 

778.  Assessment  not  resting  on  theory  of  (juasi  contract 1342 

77!l.  Consent  of  property  owners  not  necessary  in  absence  of  statute.  .  .  1342 

7S0.     Consent  of  j)roperty  owners  necessary  l)y  statute 1345 

781.     Necessity  of  petition  of  property  owners 1346 

7S2.     Specific  provisions  as  to  efl'ect  of  omitting  petition 1349 

783.  Petition  as  alternative  method 1349 

784.  Necessity  of  petition  in  certain  classes  of  improvements 1351 

785.  Classes  of  persons  eligible  as  petitioners.  . 1353 

786.  \Yho  may  sign   petition — Owner 1356 

787.  Agent 1358 

788.  E.xecutor,   administrator    and   guardian 1360 

789.  Number  of  persons  by  whom  petition  must  be  signed 1361 

790.  Combination  of  improvements 1362 

791.  Methods  of  estimating  majority 1363 

792.  Signatures  obtained  by  fraud  or  mistake 1365 

793.  Form   of   signature 1366 

794.  Withdrawal    from    petition 1366 

795.  Determination  of  sufficiency  of  petition 1366 

796.  Form    of    petition 1369 

797.  Filing  of   petition 1370 

798.  Contents  of  petition 1370 

799.  Necessity  that  petition  appear  of  record 1371 

800.  Petition   as   restricting  kind  of    improvement 1372 

801.  Acting  u])on  petition 1375 

802.  Bond     1376 

803.  Remonstrance  of  property  owners 1376 

804.  By  whom  remonstrance  may  be  signed 1378 

805.  Number   of   remonstrants   necessary 1379 

806.  Withdrawal  from  remonstrance 1380 

807.  Form  of  remonstrance 1381 

808.  Filing  remonstrance    - 1381 

809.  Time   for   presenting  remonstrance 1382 

810.  Effect    of    remonstrance 1383 

811.  Determination   of  sufficiency   of   remonstrance 1385 

812.  Effect  of  failure  to  remonstrate 1386 

813.  Necessity   of   estimate 1386 

814.  By  whom  estimate  to  be  made 1390 

815.  When  estimate  must  be  made 1391 

816.  Contents   of   estimate 1392 

817.  Estimate  must  refer  to  specific  improvement 1394 

818.  Presumption  of  suflSciency  of  estimate 1395 

819.  Efl'ect  of  estimate 1390 

820.  Estimate  as  part  of  record  of  resolution 1398 

821.  Necessity   of    plans 1398 

822.  Sufficiency   and   effect  of   plans 1400 

823.  Specifications     1401 

824.  Diagrams  and    plats 1403 


xxiv  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

825.  Determination  of  amount  of  benefits 14()o 

826.  Determination  of  cost  of  improvement 1400 

827.  Necessity  of  ordinance  or  resolution 1407 

828.  Recommendation  of  improvement  by  public  official 1408 

829.  Option   to  property  owners  to   construct   improvement 140!l 

830.  Resolution  of  intention •-  •  •  1410 

831.  Contents  of   resolution — Description   of   improvement 1412 

832.  Declaration   of   necessity : 141(i 

833.  Otber  questions  as  to  contents  of  resolution 1417 

834.  Record   of   resolution 141!) 

835.  Method  of  enacting  resolution 1420 

836.  Publication    of    resolution 1421 

837.  Necessity  of  ordinance 1424 

838.  Effect  of  resolution  instead  of  ordinance 1427 

83!).  Conformity  of  ordinance   to  preliminary  resolution  or   to  general 

ordinance    1 42S 

840.  Improvement  must  conform  to  resolution  or  ordinance 1430 

841.  At  what  session  ordinance  may  be  passed 1432 

842.  Necessity   of   quorum 1434 

843.  Vote  necessary  to  passage  of  ordinance 1435 

844.  Time  of  enacting  ordinance 1437 

845.  Effect  of  violation  of  rules  of  parliamentary  law 1441 

846.  Reconsideration    1442 

847.  Approval  of  ordinance  by   mayor 1442 

848.  Publication  of  ordinance 1443 

849.  Incorporation  in  ordinance 1446 

850.  Amendment   of   ordinance 1446 

851.  Repeal  of  ordinance 1447 

852.  Effect   of  repeal 144S 

853.  Record  of  ordinance 144!) 

854.  Caption  and  subject  of  ordinance ." 1450 

855.  General    plan   of    improvements 1451 

856.  Description  of  improvement  in  ordinance 1452 

857.  Ordinance  must  describe  improvement  with  sufficient  certainty.  .  .  1454 

858.  Description    in    resolution 145!t 

859.  Location   of   improvement 1460 

860.  Construction  of  improvement  where  necessary 1463 

861.  Construction  of  improvement  where  not  in  existence nci") 

862.  Necessity  of  fixing  grade 1405 

863.  Ordinance  fixing  grade  of  street 1469 

864.  Description    of    material 1470 

865.  Dimensions    of    improvement 1480 

866.  Waiver   of   objections 1482 

807.     Delegation   of  authority  to   inferior  agent 1483 

868.  Ratification  of  act  of  inferior  agent 1480 

869.  Construction  as  to  description  of  improvement 148!) 

870.  Combination    of    improvements    in    ordinance ]4!)0 

871.  Necessity  of  fixincr  time  ot  ppil'urmaiice  In-  oidiiiimcc 1 4;:0 


CONTENTS.  XXV 
SECTION.                                                                                                                                                                 PAGE. 

872.  Determination  of  necessity  and  benefits  by  ordinance 1490 

873.  Determination  to  proceed   on  assessment  plan 1492 

874.  Determination   of   assessment   district 1493 

875.  Other  matters  as  to  which  ordinance  is  necessary 1494 

876.  Other  questions  which   may  be   determined  by  ordinance 1495 

877.  Assessment    ordinance    1495 

878.  Time  within  which  assessment  may  be   levied 1497 

879.  Levy  of  assessment  as  dependent  upon  construction  of  improvement  1498 

880.  Assessment  to  be  in  writing 1499 

881.  Caption  of  assessment 1500 

882.  Date    of    assessment 1500 

883.  Statement  in  assessment  of   amount  assessed 1500 

884.  Report  must  show  compliance  with  statute  and  ordinance 1501 

885.  Contents  of  report  as  to  benefits  and  land  benefited 1503 

886.  Description   of    land 1505 

887.  Necessity  of  stating  name  of  owner 1512 

888.  Who  is  to  be  regarded  as  owner ...  1513 

889.  Assessment   to   unknown   owners ". 1515 

890.  Assessment  against   deceased  owner 151(5 

891.  Error  in  name  of  owner 1516 

892.  Necessity  of  finding  as  to  value  of  property 1518 

893.  Report  must  show   principle  on  which  assessment   is  made 1518 

894.  Necessity  of  showing  apportionment  prescribed  by  law 1519 

895.  Apportionment  of  assessment  among  different  tracts 1521 

896.  What  constitutes  entire  tract 1524 

897.  Objection  to  assessment  as  entire  tract 1526 

898.  Necessity  of  exercise  of  judgment  by  commissioners 1526 

899.  Necessity  of  actual  view  of   premises 1527 

900.  Necessity  of  joint  action  of  commissioners 1528 

901.  Necessity  of  inianimous  action  of  commissioners 1529 

902.  Signature   of    report 1530 

903.  Signature  as  indicating  identity  of  commissioners 1531 

904.  Certificate    1532 

905.  Affidavit     1532 

906.  Filing   report    ■ 1532 

907.  Necessity  of  record 1534 

908.  Loss  or  destruction  of  assessment  roll  or  ordinance 1537 

909.  Amendment   of   assessment 1537 

910.  Nature  and  necessity  of  confirmation 1542 

911.  By  what  body  confirmation  may  be  had 1543 

912.  Parties  and   procedure  in  confirmation 1545 

913.  Notice    of    confirmation 1549 

914.  Proof  of  publication 1552 

915.  Objections    1553 

916.  Time  of  making  objections 1555 

917.  Form   and  contents  of  objections 1550 

918.  Failure   to   object   as   waiver 1558 

919.  To  whom  objections  must  be  presented 1563 


Xxvi  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

920.  Issue  at  confirmation 1564 

921.  Hearing  at   confirmation 15(36 

922.  Evidence   at   confirmation 1508 

923.  Burden   of    proof 1572 

924.  Charge,  finding  and  verdict 1574 

925.  Judgment  or   decree  of   confirmation 157(5 

920.  Power  to  amend  or  set  aside  judgment 1579 

927.  Effect   of    confirmation 1580 

928.  Jurisdictional    and    non-jurisdictional    defects 1585 

929.  Defective    ordinance     1585 

9.30.  Defective  notice    1587 

931.  Defects  in   petition 1588 

932.  Defects  in  estimate 1588 

933.  Objections  to  amount  of  assessment 1589 

934.  Objection   to  apportionment 1589 

935.  Objections    to   commissioners 1590 

930.  Objections   to   assessment   roll 159(t 

937.  Objecti'ons   to   nature  of   improvement 1591 

938.  Errors  in   description   of    property 1591 

939.  Eflfect  of  judgment  in  eminent  domain 1592 

940.  Defects   in   performance 1592 

941.  Other  defects  prior  to  confirmation 1593 

942.  Defects  in  confirmation  proceedings 1594 

943.  Judgment  of  confirmation  conclusive  against  public  corporation..  1594 

944.  Confirmation  binding  only  upon  parties 1595 

945.  Confirmation  not  operative  as  to  facts  not  before  the  court 1595 

940.  Statutory  provisions  as  to  effect  of  confirmation 1597 

947.  Effect  of  decree  of  confirmation  as  against  direct  attack 1597 

948.  Conckisive  effect  of  other  steps  in  assessment 1599 

949.  Bill  of  costs 1000 

950.  Effect  of  change   of  statute 1001 

951.  Presumption  as  to  regularity  of  assessment  proceedings 1005 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

Supplemental  and   Proportional   Assessments. 

section.  page. 

952.  Power  to  levy  supplemental  assessment  dependent  on  statute.  .  .  .  1608 

953.  Supplemental  assessment  levied  only  in  case  of  deficiency 1610 

954.  Effect  of  original  assessment 1611 

955.  Method  of  levying  supplemental   assessment 1612 

CHAPTER  XVII. 

Re-assessment. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

9,56.  Power  of  legislature  to  provide  for  re-assessment 1615 

957.  Re-assessment  statute  must  itself  be  constitutional 1617 


CONTENTS.  XXVU 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

958.  Power  to  re-assess  dependent  on   statute 1618 

959.  Retroactive  effect  of   re-assessment    statutes 1619 

960.  Necessity  of   invalidity  of  original   assessment 1621 

961.  Original    assessment    unconstitutional 1622 

962.  Original  assessment  in  violation  of  statutory  provisions 1623 

963.  Change  of  statute  pending  re-assessment 1626 

964.  By  what  body  re-assessment  may  be  levied 1627 

965.  Necessity  and  eli'ect  of  judgment  of  invalidity 1628 

966.  Effect  of  judgment   in  original   proceeding 1631 

967.  Effect  of  payment  of  original  invalid  assessment 1632 

968.  Adjustment  of  arrears 1635 

969.  Method  of  levying  re-assessment 1636 

970.  Re-assessment  not  limited  to  property  originally  assessed 1638 

971.  Effect  of  conveyance  to  hona  fide  .grantee 1639 

972.  Time  at  which  re-assessment  may  be  levied 1040 

973.  Whether  assessment  is  entire  or  severable 1641 

974.  For  whose  benefit  re-iassessment  may  be  had 1642 

975.  Items  for  which  reassessment  may  be  levied 1643 

976.  Effect   of    re  assessment ■ 1644 

977.  Power  of  court  to  iix  amount  of  assessment 1644 

978.  Correction  and  reformation  of  defective  proceedings 1647 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Curative   Statutes. 

SECTION.  page'. 

979.  Power  of  legislature  to  i)rescribe  effect  of  irregularities 1649 

980.  Curative  act  must  be  constitutional 1050 

981.  Construction  and  application  of  curative  statute 1651 

982.  Curative  statutes  not  applicable  in  case  of  fraud 1654 

983.  Retroactive  effect   of  curative   statutes 1655 

984.  Curative  ordinances  and  resolutions 1661 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
Estoppel. 

A. 

Estopiirl   hi/  Deed. 

SECTION.  page. 

985.  Estop])el  by  deed  in  assessment  pioceedings 1662 

B. 

Estoppel  of  Ueeord. 

986.  Adjudication  of   court  as   estoppel 1664 

987.  Adjudication   conclusive   as   to    all    facts  wliich    might   have    lu'eji 

submitted     1068 


XXviii  CONTENTS. 


SECTION. 


PAGE. 


1608 


988.  Adjudication  not  conclusive  as  to  facts  upon  which  court  refused 

to    pass    

989.  Adjudication  not  conclusive  as  to  facts  upon  which   court  could 

not   pass    1669 

990.  Adjudication  in  original  assessment  as  affecting  re-assessment..  1071 

991.  Adjudication    in    original    assessment    as    affecting   supplemental 

assessment   liul 

992.  Adjudication  not  conclusive  if  court  has  no  jurisdiction 1672 

993.  Estoppel  to  deny  jurisdiction 1G73 

994.  Effect   of   reversal 1674 

995.  Parties  as  to  whom  adjudication  is  conclusive 1675 

996.  Questions  as  to  which  adjudication  is  conclusive 1677 

997.  Judgment  in  eminent  domain  as  estoppel 1680 

998.  Conclusive  effect  of  judgment.in  proceeding  to  enforce  assessment  1081 

999.  Election    of    remedies 1684 

1000.  Distinction  between    direct   and   collateral    attack 1684 

1001.  Doctrine   of   stare   decisis 1685 

1002.  Conclusive  effect  of  admissions  of  record 1680 

1003.  Legislative  determination  not   subject  to  collateral   attack 1087 

1004.  Conclusive  effect  of  confirmation  by  administrative  body 1088 

1005.  Conclusive  or  prima  facie  effect  of  determination  of  administra- 

tive officers    1089 

1000.     Necessity  of  jurisdiction  to  make  finding  of  ])ublic  officials  oper- 
ative   1691 

1007.  Illustratio7is  of  jurisdictional    and  non-juri.sdictional    defects.  .  .  .  1691 

1008.  Collateral   attack  upon  existence  of   public   corporation 1693 

1009.  Collateral  attack  upon  right  to  public  office 1695 

C. 

Estoppel  in  Pais. 

1010.  Operation  of  doctrine  of  estoppel  in  pais 1695 

1011.  Estoppel  against  owner  who   causes   improvement  on  assessment 

plan    1697 

1012.  Estoppel    against    petitioner .'   1698 

1013.  Petitioner  not  estopped  to  set  up  subsequent  irregularities 1701 

1014.  Estoppel  by  acting  in  official   capacity 1703 

1015.  Estoppel  by  acquiescence 1703 

1010.     Delay  as  laches 1707 

1017.  Estoppel  by  acquiescence  in  case  of  want  of  jurisdiction  or  fraud   1708 

1018.  Estoppel  by  acquiescence  in  case  of  irregularities 1709 

1019.  Estoppel   as  to  constitutionality  of  statute 1709 

1020.  Estoppel  to  attack  validity  of  ordinance 1710 

1021.  Estoppel   as   to   notice 1710 

1022.  Estoppel  as  to  validity  of  contract  and  performance 1711 

1023.  Estoppel  as  to  other   defects 1712 

1024.  Effect  of  protest  or  objection 1712 

1025.  Estoppel   at  law  and  in  equity 1713 


CONTENTS.  XXIX 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1026.  Failure   to   file  objections 1714 

1027.  Failure  to  object  in  manner  jirescribed  by  statute  as  estoppel  or 

waiver     1715 

1028.  Circumstances  under  which  failure  to  object  is  not  waiver 1716 

1029.  Objection  on  specified  grounds  as  waiver  of  other  grounds 1718 

1030.  Failure  to  appeal   as  waiver 1720 

1031.  Failure  to  appeal  not  waiver  of  jurisdictional  defects 1722 

1032.  Use  of  improvement  as  waiver 1723 

1033.  Waiver  or  estoppel  by  express  contract 1724 

1034.  Waiver  by  entering  into   improvement  contract 1726 

1035.  Payment  of   installment   as   waiver 1726 

1036.  Formal  certificate  as  waiver   or  estoppel 1728 

1037.  Estoppel   against   public   corporation 1729 

1038.  Necessity   of   pleading   estoppel 1730 


CHAPTER  XX. 

Nature   of   Liability   Created   by   Assessment. 

SECTION.  page. 

1039.  Theory  that  personal  liability  cannot  be  imposed  for  benefits.  .  .  1731 

1040.  Special  theories  as  to  validity  of  personal  liability 1733 

1041.  Theory  that  personal  liability  can  be  imposed 1734 

1042.  Compromise  theories  of  validity  of   personal   liability 1735 

1043.  Personal  liability  on  special  contract 1736 

1044.  Personal  liability  for  assessments  under  police  power 1738 

1045.  Personal   liability   for  goods  sold 1738 

1046.  Personal   liability  as  affected  by  federal  constitution 1739 

1047.  Personal  liability  non-existent  in  absence  of  statute 1739 

1048.  Personal   liability  as  affected  by  statutory  construction 1740 

1049.  Validity   of   statutes   imposing  lien 1741 

1050.  Lien  non-existent  in  absence  of  statute 1743 

1051.  Liens   of   sub-contractors  and   material-men 1744 

1052.  Invalid  assessment  not  lien 1744 

1053.  L'pon  whose  interest  an  assessment  is  a  lien — Heir  and  executor.  1745 

1054.  Interest  of  lessor  and  lessee 1746 

1055.  Interest  of  particular   tenant  and  remainder-man 1753 

1056.  Interest   of    co-tenants 1757 

1057.  Equitable   interests    1758 

1058.  Interest  of  vendee 1760 

1059.  Assessment  a  lien  upon  separate  lots 1760 

1060.  Assessment  both   personal   liability   and  lien 1762 

1061.  Statute  controls  as  to  method  of  acquiring  lien 1763 

1062.  Certificate  of  engineer 1763 

1063.  Filing  claim 1704 

1064.  Filing  assessment    1767 

1005.     Other   methods   of   acquiring   lien 1767 

1066.     Statute  controls  as  to  time  when  lien  attaches 1708 


XXX  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

10C7.  When  lien  attaches — Specific  provisions 1768 

1008.  Priority  between  lien  of  assessment  and  liens  of  otlier  classes..  1770 

1069.  Priority  between  assessment  lien  and  tax  lien 1773 

1070.  Priority  between  different  a.ssessment  liens 1773 

1071.  Priority    between    assessment    and    homestead 177.? 

1072.  Priority  as  between  assessment  and  subsequent  grantee  or  vendee  1774 

1073.  Liens   upon   special   classes  of   property — Enforcement   of   assess- 

ment against  United  States  property 1781 

1074.  Enforcement  of  assessment  against  property  of  state 1782 

1075..  Property  of  public  corporation 1783 

1076.  Highways   1784 

1077.  School  property   1784 

1078.  Railroads    1785 

1079.  Homesteads    1786 

1080.  Other 'special  interests 1786 

1081.  Change  of  statute  as  affecting  liens  and  personal  liability 1780 

1082.  Loss   of  lien 1788 

1083.  Invalid  assessment  not  discharge 1788 

1084.  Assignment  for  benefit  of  creditors 1788 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

Payment  and  Delinquency  of  Assessment, 
section.  page. 

1085.  Payment    in    installments 1789 

1086.  Medium  of  payment 1796 

1087.  Payment   as   discharge 1797 

1088.  Payment  by  third  person 1797 

1089.  Payment  by  city 1799 

1090.  Payment  by  set-off 1799 

1091.  To  whom  payment  can  be  made 1799 

1092.  Effect  of   satisfaction   of   record 1800 

1093.  Payment  of  part  of  assessment 1800 

1094.  Application   of   over-payments 1801 

1095.  Application  of  proceeds  of  assessment 1801 

1096.  Presumption    of    payment 1801 

1097.  Commutation  of  payment 1802 

1098.  Effect  of  payment  as  to  right  in  improvement 1802 

1099.  Payment  as  affecting  property  rights 1802 

1100.  Payment    as    estoppel 1803 

1101.  When  assessment  becomes  due 1804 

1102.  When   assessment   becomes    delinquent 1805 

1103.  Interest  determined  by   statute 1806 

1104.  Interest  upon   installments 1808 

1105.  Interest  on  defective  assessments 1808 

1 106.  From  what  time   interest  runs IgOy 


CONTENTS.  XXXI 

SECTION.  PACK. 

1107.  Interest  on  judgments 1810 

1108.  Costs    1810 

1109.  Penalties    1811 

1110.  Attorney's    fees    1812 

1111.  Commissions    1813 


CHAPTER  XXII. 

Collection   and    Enforcement    of    Assessment, 
section.  page. 

1112.  Power  of   legislature   over  metlind  of   collection 1814 

1113.  Change  of  statute  as  to  collection 1814 

1114.  Construction  of  statutes  with  reference  to  collection 1816 

1115.  Provisions  concerning  collection  of  taxes  not  applicable  to  assess- 

ments      1817 

111(5.  Adoption  of  provisions  concerning  collection  of  taxes 1817 

1117.  Necessity  of  uniform  methods  of  collection 1819 

1118.  Collection  dependent  on   validity   of  assessment 1819 

1119.  Who  may   collect  assessments 1819 

1120.  Diversity  of  statutory  provisions  concerning  collection 1820 

1121.  Public  corporation  must  order  collection 1820 

1122.  Power  of  city  to  provide  means  of  collection 1820 

1123.  Power  to  collect  assessments  under  the  police  power 1821 

1124.  Provisions   in  franchise   concerning  collection .  1822 

1125.  Putting  assessment  on  tax  duplicate 1822 

1126.  Return  and  publication  of  delinquent  assessments 1823 

1 127.  Collection  by  execution 1825 

1128.  Collection   by   warrant 1825 

1 129.  Parties  to  warrant 1826 

1 130.  Contents  of  warrant 1826 

1131.  Return  of  warrant 1827 

1132.  Certificate  of  assessment  roll 1828 

1 133.  Nature  of  tax  bill 1828 

1134.  Who  may  issue  tax  bill 1829 

1135.  Prima  facie  validity  of  bill  or  certificate 1829 

1136.  Tmie  and  method  of   i.ssuing  tax  bill 1830 

1137.  Contents    1830 

1 138.  Xew  or  amended  tax  bill 1832 

1139.  Alteration  of  tax  bill 1832 

1140.  Collection  of  bill 1832 

1141.  Collection  of  assessment  by  action  or  suit 1832 

1 142.  Collection  by  action  at  law 1834 

1143.  Distress     1834 

1144.  Nature  of  proceedings  in  equity  to  collect  assessment 1835 

1145.  Collection  by  proceedings  in  equity 1835 

1 140.  Suit  foreclosing  other   lien 1836 

1 147.  Venue  of  action 1837 


XXXil  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1148.  Court  in  which  action  or  suit  may  be  brought 1838 

1140.  Notice  of  proceeding  to  enforce  assessment 1838 

1 1-50.  Necessity    of    demand 1839 

1151.  By  whom  demand  may  be  made 1S40 

1152.  Compensation  for  serving  notices 1840 

1 153.  Method  of  making  demand 1840 

1154.  Affidavit   of    demand 1842 

1155.  Amount  for  which  demand  should  be  made 1842 

1156.  Method  of  trial 1843 

1157.  Endorsement  by   scire  facias 1843 

1158.  Defenses    1S44 

1 159.  Affidavit    of    defense 1S45 

1 160.  Service  and  return  of  writ 1846 

1161.  Attachment  and  deduction  from  award 1847 

1162.  Mandamus  and  mandatory  injunction 1847 

1163.  Period  of  limitations  fixed  by   statute 1S4S 

1164.  Period  of  limitations  as  fixed  by  implication 1849 

1165.  Period  of  limitations  as  fixed  by  special  statute 1851 

1166.  Construction  of  statutes  applicable  to  limitations 1851 

1167.  Waiver   of   limitations 1852 

1168.  When  period  of  limitations  begins  to  run 1852 

1169.  Efl'ect  of  bringing  suit  on  statute  of  limitations 1853 

1170.  Special    statutory    provisions 1854 

1171.  Efl'ect  of  lapse  of  period  of  limitations 1854 

1 172.  Change  of  statutes  of  limitations 1854 

1173.  Power  to  sell  to  satisfy  lien  of  assessment 1855 

1174.  Compliance  with  statutory  provisions  necessary 1856 

1175.  Amount  of  land  subject  to  sale 1856 

1176.  By  whom  sale  is  to  be  made 1857 

1177.  Time   and    place    of    sale 1857 

1 178.  Notice  of   sale 1857 

1179.  Public   corporation   as   purchaser   at   sale '. 1858 

1 180.  Amount  for  which  land  is  to  be  sold 1859 

1181.  Certificate  of  sale 1859 

1182.  Form  of  judgment  or   decree  of  sale 1860 

1183.  Application  for  judgment  of  sale 1862 

1184.  Notice  of  application  for  judgment  of  sale 1864 

1185.  Who  may  apply  for  judgment. 18G6 

11F6.  Form    of    application 1867 

1187.  Form  of  objections 18(:7 

1188.  Term  of   court nv.'A 

1189.  Rendition    of   judgment 18(i8 

1190.  Summary   sale    1870 

1191.  Precept    for    sale 1870 

1 192.  Affidavit  for   precept 1871 

1193.  Notice  of   summary   sale 1871 

1194.  Sale  as   discharge  of  lien 1872 

1195.  Effect  of  sale  upon  title  to  realty 1873 


CONTENTS.  XXXIU 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1196.  Effect  of  sale  if  assessment  invalid 1874 

1197.  Right   of    redemption 1875 

1198.  Method  of  redeeming 1S7G 

1199.  Amount   payable   on   redemption 187G 

1200.  Notice   of   expiration   of   redemption 1877 

1201.  "Notice  of  application   for  deed 1878 

1202.  Deed  given  on  sale  for  assessment 1878 

1203.  Property  rights  of  vendee  at  judicial  sale 1879 

1204.  Property  rights  of  vendee  at  summary  sale 1881 

1205.  Evidence   in  ejectment 1882 

1206.  Right   of   vendee   at   void    sale   to   recover    payment   from    public 

corporation    1882 

1207.  Right  of  purchaser  at  invalid  sale  as  against  owner  of  realty.  .  .  1885 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 
P2VRTIES,    Pleading    and   Procedure   in   Enforcement    of    Assessment. 

SECTION.  •  PAGE. 

1208.  statutory   provision  conclusive  as   to   plaintiff 1887 

1209.  State   as   plaintiff 1887 

1210.  City     1888 

1211.  City  to  use  of  contractor 1888 

1212.  County    1889 

1213.  Assessment    district    1889 

1214.  Special  officer    1S!)0 

1215.  Contractor   1890 

1216.  Assignee  of  contractor 1891 

1217.  Bond-holders    1893 

1218.  Holder  of   improvement   certificate 1893 

1219.  Owner  of  property  as  defendant 1893 

1220.  Co-owners     1894 

1221.  Representatives  of  deceased  or  insane  owner 1894 

1222.  Dower,  homestead  and  community  interests 1895 

1223.  Mortgagees    1895 

1224.  City  as  defendant 1895 

1225.  Effect  of  proceedings  upon  one  not  party  thereto 1896 

1226.  Joinder  of  causes  of  action 1897 

1227.  Necessity  of  formal   pleadings 1898 

1228.  Necessity   of   filing   pleadings 1898 

1229.  Contents  of  complaint 1898 

1230.  Allegation  of  facts  whicli  are  presumed 1899 

1231.  Method  of  stating  facts 1!)00 

1232.  Averments  as  to  plaintiff 1!)01 

1233.  Averments  as  to  defendant 1001 

1234.  Averments  as  to  improvement in02 

1235.  Averments  as  to  contract 1902 


XXXiv  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1236.  Averments  as  to  performance 1904 

1237.  Averments  as  to  notice 1904 

1238.  Averments  as   to  apportionment 1905 

1239.  Averments  as  to   property  assessed 190G 

1240.  Averments  as  to  demand  and  notice  of  payment 1907 

1241.  Averment  of  special  contract  to  pay  assessment ".  1908 

1242.  Other   averments 1908 

1243.  Statutory  provisions  as  to  contents  of  complaint 1909 

1244.  Exhibits    1909 

1245.  Amendment     1910 

1246.  Prayer    1911 

1247.  Aveiments  as  to  petition  for   improvement 1911 

1248.  Averments  as  to  order  or  resolution 1912 

1249.  Averments   as   to   ordinance 1912 

1250.  Averments  as  to  procedure 1913 

1251.  Averments  as  to  making  assessment 1914 

1252.  Necessity  of  answer 1915 

1253.  Method  of  averring  facts 1915 

1254.  Answer   not   setting   up   valid   defense 1916 

1255.  General  denial    1917 

1256.  liul   tiel   record 1917 

1257.  Special  denials   1918 

1258.  Admissions 1918 

1259.  Plea  of   payment 1919 

1260.  Verification   1919 

1261.  Cross-petition    1919 

1262.  Reply    '. 1919 

1263.  Demurrer 1920 

1264.  Demurrer   does   not  lie   if   pleading   equivocal 1920 

1265.  Demurrer  lies  if  pleading  clearly   defective 1921 

1266.  Demurrer  as  admission 1922 

1267.  Effect  of  subsequent  facts  on  right  to  demur 1922 

1268.  Motions    1922 

1269.  Motions  for   new   trial,   to   set   aside  judgment   and  to   set   aside 

■stipulation   1923 

1270.  Continuances   1924 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

E^^DENCE  IN   Actions  to   Enforce  Assessmeitt. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1271.  Evidence  must  correspond   to  pleadings 1925 

1272.  Evidence  must  be   confined  to  issue 1926 

1273.  Evidence  must  support  issue  on  part  of  party  offering  it 1927 

1274.  Necessity  of  offering  evidence 1928 

1275.  Who  may  offer  evidence 1928 

1276.  Competency  and   interest   of   witnesses 1928 


CONTENTS.  XXXV 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1277.  Burden   of   proof 1929 

1278.  Failure   of   proof 1933 

1279.  Presumption  as  to  propriety  of  official  action 1934 

1280.  Presumption  as  to  validity  of  ordinance 1935 

1281.  Presumption  as  to  validity  of  assessment 1936 

1282.  What  presumption  as  to  validity  of  assessment  includes 1938 

1283.  Presumption  as  to  validity  of  report 1939 

1284.  Presumption  as  to   validity   of   tax   bill 1940 

1285.  Presumption  as  to  action   of   courts 1941 

1286.  Presumption  as   to   appointment  of   commissioners 1942 

1287.  Presumption  as  to  order  of  steps  in  assessment.' 1942 

1288.  Presumption   as   to   re-assessment 1942 

1289.  Presumption  as  to  action  of  board 1943 

1290.  Presumption    as    to    contract 1943 

1291.  Presumption  as  to  location  of  improvement 1944 

1292.  Presumption  as  to  notice  and  hearing 1944 

1293.  Return  of  demand  for  payment  as  prima  facie  evidence 1945 

1294.  Presumptions  as  to  description  and  ownership  of  land 1946 

1295.  Improvement    certificate    1946 

1296.  Delinquent    tax    list 1946 

1297.  Tax  deed  or  certificate  of  sale  as  presumptive  evidence 1947 

1298.  Presumption  as  to  omission  of  land  from  assessment 1947 

1299.  Admissibility    of    certificate 1948 

1300.  Admissibility   of   affidavit 1950 

1301.  Statutes  as  evidence  of  facts  recited  therein .  .  .  .  1951 

1302.  Ordinance  as  evidence  of  facts  recited  therein 1951 

1303.  Admissibility  of  record   to  prove   truth   of   statements   contained 

therein    1951 

1304.  Necessity    of    record 1953 

1305.  Evidence    explaining    record 1955 

130G.     Evidence  contradicting   record 1956 

1307.  Admissibility   of   record  of  court 1957 

1308.  Primary   evidence    1958 

1309.  Lost   and  destroyed   records 1958 

1310.  Evidence  as  to  necessity  of  improvement 1954 

1311.  Evidence  as  to  existence  of  contract 1959 

1312.  Evidence  as  to  performance  of  contract 19G0 

1313.  Evidence    as    to    benefits 1960 

1314.  Evidence   as    to   apportionment 1962 

1315.  Evidence  as  to  execution  of  protest I!;,y2 

1316.  Evidence  as  to  interest  of  officials 1962 

1317     Judicial   notice  •. 1962 

1318.  Opinions     1903 

1319.  Admissions    1964 

1320.  Declarations    19(55 

1321.  Hearsay 1965 

1322.  View   of   premises 1965 

1323.  Order  of  introducing  evidence  and  repetition 1966 


XXXvi  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1324.  Sufficiency    of    evidence 19GG 

1325.  Weight  of  evidence 1968 

1326.  Cross-examination    1968 

1327.  Rebuttal     ^ 1968 

1328.  Instructions     1969 

1329.  Form  of  verdict 1970 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 
Remedies  of  Property  Owners  in   Resisting  Assessment. 

A. 

Defenses. 

section.  page. 

1330.  Who  may  object  to  assessment 1971 

1331.  Defenses    to   assessment 1972 

1332.  Contract   and   performance 1973 

1333.  Benefit  to   property   and  apportionment 1974 

1334.  Notice   1975 

1335.  Methods  of  ordering  improvement  and  levying  assessment 1976 

1336.  Defenses  precluded  by  statute 1977 

1337.  Defenses  not  made  at  stage  required  by  statute 1978 

1338.  Defenses  precluded  by  determination  of  public  officers 1984 

1339.  Defenses  precluded  by  former  adjudication 1985 

1340.  Defenses  precluded  by  decree  of  confirmation 1986 

1341.  Efi'ect  of  want  of  jurisdiction  to  confirm 1987 

1342.  Facts  subsequent  to  jiulgment  of  confirmation 1988 

1343.  Judgment   for   installment   preckiding   defenses 1989 

1344.  Judgment  in  eminent  domain  as  precluding  defenses 1989 

1345.  Defenses  precluded  by  express  waiver 1989 

1346.  Set-off     1989 

B. 

Ajjpeal. 

1347.  Appeal  dependent  on  statutory  provisions 1992 

1348.  Parties   to   appeal 1994 

1349.  Joint  and  several  appeals 1995 

1350.  Issue  on  appeal 1095 

1351.  Trial  de  novo  on  appeal 1996 

1352.  Hearing  limited  to  certain  issues 1997 

1353.  Time  of  taking  appeal 1098 

1354.  To  what  body  appeal  to  be  taken 1098 

1355.  Notice  of  appeal 1009 

1356.  Method  of  taking  appeal 2000 


CONTENTS.  XXXVll 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1357.  Dismissal   of  appeal 2001 

1358.  Necessity   of    appeal 2002 

1359.  Cases  in  which  appeal  not  necessary  to  preserve  rights 2003 

1360.  Effect    of   appeal 2005 

1361.  Power  of  appellate  tribunal  to  modify  assessment 2005 

1362.  Evidence     2006 

1363.  Method  of  trial 2007 

1364.  Costs.   2007 

1365.  Revision     2007 

1366.  Judgment  on  appeal 2008 

C. 

Error. 

1367.  Nature  of  error  proceedings 2009 

1368.  Right  to  prosecute  error  dependent  on  statute 2010 

1369.  Jurisdiction  in  error  with  reference  to  assessments 2012 

1370.  Jurisdiction  of  Supreme  Court  of  United  States  with  reference  to 

error   2014 

1371.  Order  to  which  error  will  lie 2016 

1372.  Pre.sumption  as  to  error 2018 

1373.  Materiality  of  error 2019 

1374.  Of  what  record   consists .' 2022 

1375.  Necessity  of  objections  and  exceptions 2022 

1376.  Form  of  bill  of  exceptions 2025 

1377.  Necessity  of  bill  of  exceptions 2026 

1378.  Necessity  and  form  of  findings  of  fact 2027 

1379.  Effect  of  findings  of  fact 2028 

1380.  Conclusions  of  law 2030 

1381.  Reversal  not  granted  if  evidence  conflicting 2030 

1382.  Reversible  error 2031 

1383.  Error    in   form    of   judgment 2032 

1384.  Parties    to    error    proceedings 2033 

1385.  Pleadings   in   error 2034 

1386.  Necessity  of  brief 2035 

1387.  Notice  of  proceedings   in  error 2035 

1388.  Time  of  bringing  error  proceedings .^ 2036 

1389.  Nature   of   judgment    of   rever.sal 2036 

1300.     Effect   of    reversal    and    afhrmance 2038 

1391.  Several  nature  of  error  proceedings 2040 

1392.  Waiver  of  right  to  prosecute  error 2041 

D. 

Certiorari. 

1393.  Nature     of    certiorari 2041 

1394.  Certiorari   as  a   remedy   in   assessment 2042 


Xxxviii  CONTENTS. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1395.  Scope  of  certiorari   with   reference   to   assessments 2043 

1396.  Certiorari  lies  where  jurisdiction  is  wanting 2044 

1397.  Discretionary   nature   of   writ 2045 

1398.  Who    may    have    writ . 2045 

1399.  Against  whom  writ  may   issue 2046 

1400.  Pleading     2047 

1401.  Assignment  of  error 2047 

1402.  Contents  of  record  and   return 2047 

1403.  Certiorari   granted  only   in   cases   of   substantial   injustice 2048 

1404.  Defects  for  which   proceedings  will   be  quashed 2049 

1405.  Defects  for  which   proceedings  can   not  be  quashed 2050 

1406.  Eflfect  of  record  and  return 2051 

1407.  Incomplete   record 2053 

1408.  Effect    of    laches 2053 

1409.  Statute   of   limitations 2055 

1410.  Judgment    2056 

E. 

Equitable  Relief. 

1411.  Equitable  relief  given  only  if  no  adequate  remedy  at  law 2057 

1412.  Opportunity  to  defend  as  preventing  equitable  relief 2058 

1413.  Eight  to  sue  at  law  as  preventing  equitable  relief 2059 

1414.  Right  of  appeal   as  precluding  equitable  relief 2059 

1415.  Right  to  bring  certiorari  as  affecting  equitable  relief 2061 

1416.  Right  to  bring  error  as  affecting  equitable  relief 2062 

1417.  Right  to  bring  quo  warranto  as  afl'ecting  equitable  relief 2062 

1418.  Effect  of  payment  and  right  to  recover  payment 2063 

1419.  Discretionary     nature     of    injunction 2063 

1420.  Equitable  relief  generally  available  against  invalid  assessments..   2064 

1421.  Injunction  as  regular  method  of  testing  validity  of  tax 2064 

1422.  Effect    of    statutory    provisions 2064 

1423.  Equitable  relief  refused  except  on  special  grounds 2065 

1424.  Multiplicity  of  suits  and  irreparable  injuries 2066 

1425.  Assessment   as   cloud   on   title 2066 

1426.  Equitable  relief  granted  if  cloud  on  title  exists 2068 

1427.  Nature  of  cloud  on  title 2069 

1428.  Statutes  affecting  the  right  to  sue  to  quiet  title .■ 2071 

1429.  Doctrine  of  collateral  attack  as  precluding  suit  to  quiet  title.  .  .   2072 

1430.  Exercise  of  discretion  of  public  officers  as  affecting  equitable  relief  2073 

1431.  Comparative  effect  of  jurisdictional  defects  and  technical  irregu- 

larities     2074 

1432.  Specific    defects 2075 

1433.  Defective  performance  of  improvement  contract 2081 

1434.  Effect  of  curative  statutes 2083 

1435.  Necessity  of  tendering   amount   fairly   due 2083 

1436.  At    what    stage    of    improvement    proceedings    injunction    can    be 

had — Effect  of  delay  till  performance 208G 


CONTENTS.  XXxix 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1437.  Right  to  sue  before  assessment  is  levied 2088 

1438.  Effect    of    confirmation 2090 

1439.  Estoppel   by   decree 2090 

1440.  Limitations   2091 

1441.  Laches    2092 

1442.  Parties    plaintiff * 2092 

1443.  Parties    defendant 209.5 

1444.  Pleadings— Bill  2097 

1445.  Answer    and    other    pleadings 2101 

1446.  Jurisdiction  and  conditions  precedent 2103 

1447.  Decree 2103 

1448.  Procedure     2104 

1449.  Power    to    ennipel    performance 2104 

1450.  Evidence     2105 

F. 

Statutory    Suits    to    Vacate    assessment. 

1451.  Nature   and    scope    of    statutory    provisions    for   suits    to    vacate 

assessments    2107 

1-^52.     Legal     irregularity 2108 

1453.  Substantial    error 2109 

1454.  Fraud     2110 

1455.  Specific  facts  authorizing  vacation 2111 

1450.     Vacation    of    assessments    for    repaving 2112 

1457.  Effect  of  confirmation  upon  proceedings  to  vacate 2113 

1458.  Reduction  of  assessment 2113 

1459.  In    what   court    action    to    be    brought 2114 

1400.  Parties    to    suit    to    vacate 2115 

1461.  Time  within  which  suit  is  to  be  brought 2110 

1462.  Effect  of  payment 2116 

1463.  Pleadings     2117 

1464.  Notice     2118 

1465.  Procedure    2118 

1466.  Evidence     2119 

1467.  Nature  and  effect  of  decree 2120 

G. 

1468.  Nature  and  scope  of  mandamus 2120 

1469.  Cases    in    whicii    mandamus    is    granted 2121 

1470.  Necessity    of    judgment    at    law 2124 

1471.  Cases  in  which  mandamus  is  not  granted 2124 

1472.  Mandamus    not    means    of    controlling    discretion 2126 

1473.  Parties    in    mandamus 2126 

1474.  Pleadings    2128 

1475.  Statute  of  limitations 2128 

1476.  Procedure    7 2129 


Xl  CONTENTS. 


H. 
Quo  Warranio. 

SECTION.  PAGE. 

1477.  Quo  Warranto 2129 

I. 

■Recovery  of  Payment  of  Assessment. 

1478.  General   principles  applicable  to  recovery  of  payment 2131 

1479.  Recovery  not  allowed  for  technical  irregularities 2132 

1480.  Recovery   not   allowed    where    property   owner   has   waived   legal 

rights    2133 

1481.  Statutory  provisions  limiting  right  to  vacate  assessment 2134 

1482.  Effect  of   statutory   provision   for   repayment 2134 

1483.  Voluntary  repayment  of  voluntary  payment 2135 

1484.  Recovery  of  payment  inider  duress — What  constitutes   duress.  .  .  2135 

1485.  Doctrine    of    necessity    of    cloud    on    title 2138 

1486.  Necessity    of    vacating    assessment 2139 

1487.  What  constitutes  vacation  of  assessment 2140 

1488.  Payment  under  mistake 2141 

1489.  Payment   induced   by   fraud 2142 

1490.  Recovery  on  theory  of  failure  of  consideration 2142 

1491.  Recovery  of  deposit  under  special  contract 2144 

1492.  Statute    of    limitations 2144 

1493.  Laches 2146 

1494.  Who   may   recover    payment 2146 

1495.  Who  is  liable  to  refund 2147 

1496.  Pleadings 2148 

1497.  Evidence 2149 


CHAPTER    XXVI. 

Liability  of  Pltblic  Corporation  or  Officer  Arising  out  of  Assessment 

Proceedings, 
section.  page. 

1498.  Liability  of  public  corporation  upon  contract  in  absence  of  con- 

tractual  or   statutory    restriction 2151 

1499.  Liability    if    contract    invalid 2153 

1500.  Liability  for  improvement  not  required  by  contract 2154 

1501.  Liability     in    case    of    non-performance 2155 

1502.  Liability  upon  bonds 2156 

1503.  Liability  of   public  corporation  on  warrants 2158 

1504.  Restrictions  on  indebtedness  of  public  corporation 2100 

1505.  Statutory  provisions  against  personal  liability 2162 

1506.  Contractual  provisions  against  personal  liability 2164 

1507.  Effect  of  provisions  for  payment  of  contractor  bv  assessments.  .  .  .  2167 


CONTENTS.                                           •  xli 

SECTION.  PAfiE. 

1508.  Liability  for  failure   to   exercise   power   to  levy  assessment 2168 

1509.  Liability  for  levying  invalid  assessment 2170 

1510.  Liability   for    delay    in   levying   assessment 2171 

1511.  Liability  for  failure  to  collect  assessments 2172 

1512.  Liability   of   city   for    assessments    paid   in 2173 

1513.  Liability  as  affected  by  power  to  re-assess 2175 

1514.  Cliange   of   statute   as    to    liability   of    city.  .  ' 2175 

1515.  Amount  of  recovery 217U 

1510.  Assignment  by  contractor 2177 

1517.  Liability  to   sub-contractors 2177 

1518.  Mandamus  as  remedy  for  failure  to  levy  assessment 2178 

1519.  Liability    of    public    corporation    for    property    appropriated....  2171) 

1520.  Liability  of  city  to  public  officers 2183 

1521.  Liability  for  sale  of  property  to  pay  void  assessment 2184 

1522.  Liability    of    public    officers 2184 

1523.  Liability    of    abstractor 2185 

1524.  Parties   2185 

1525.  Pleadings    2186 

1526.  Limitations    2187 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


f References  are  to  sections.] 


Abascal   v.   Bouny    ( .37   La.   Ann.  538 

[1885]),  248,  270,  637,  665,  666. 
Abbott     V.     Inhabitants     of     Cottage 
City   (143  Mass.  521,  58  Am.  Rep. 
143,  10  N.  E.  325   [1887]),  64,  65, 
70,  309,  575,  654. 
Abbott   V.    Ross    (9    App.    D.    C.   289 
[1896]);     86,    119,    244,    308,    419, 
425,   553,   556,   557,   663,   672,    709, 
1066. 
Aberdeen,  City  of  v.  Lucas   (37  Wash. 
190,  75  Pac.  632   [1905]),  301,  747, 
927,  930,   1004,   1012,  1145,   1337. 
Abernetliy  v.   Town   of  jMedical   Lake 
(9  Wash.  112,  37  Pac.  306  [1894]), 
246,  301,  414,   983,   1501,   1518. 
Abney    v.    Texarkana,    Slireveport    & 
Natchez    Railroad    Company     ( 105 
La.  446,  29  So.  890   [1901]'),  71. 
Abraham  v.  City  of  Louisville   (Ky.) 
(23  Ky.  LawR.  375,  62  S.  W.  1041 
[1901]),  86,  352. 
Acklin  V.  Parker    (29  Ohio  C.  C.  625 

[1907]),  451,  839. 
Aeord   v.  St.  Louis  Southwestern   Ry. 
Co.    (113    Mo.    App.   84,    87    S.    W. 
537),  363. 
Adams,    In    the   Matter   of    the    Peti- 
tion    of     (13     Hun      (N.     Y.)     355 
[1878]),  679. 
Adams  v.  City  of  Ashland   ( —  Ky. 

,   80   S.  W.    1105,   20  Kv.   Law 

Rep.    184    [1904]),   402. 
Adams  v.  Bay  City,  78  :\Iich.  211,  44 
N.  W.   138    [1889]),  690,  692,' 894. 
1484. 


x\dams    V.    City   of   Beloit    (105   Wis. 

363,  47  L.  R.  A.  441,  81  X.  W.  869 
[1900]),    191,    219,    373,    374,    380, 

381,  464. 
Adams  v.  Fisher    (75  Tex.  657,   6   S. 

W.  772  [1890]),  113,  118.  293.  373, 

381,  670,  702. 
Adams      v.      Fisher      (63      Tex.      651 
[1885]),    5,    18,    93,    95,    120,    147, 

314,   420,    713,    726,    728,   737,   746, 

779,  819,  1178. 
Adams   v.    Green    (74   Mo.    App.    125 

[1898]),  666,   698,  709,   714. 
Adams  v.  Joyner    ( —  N.  C.  ,  60 

S.   E.   725  '[1908]),  737,  894,   1149. 
Adams    v.    Lewellen     (117    Mo.    App. 

319,  93  S.  W.  874   [1906]),  1092. 
Adams     v.     Lindell      (72     Mo.      198 

[1880]),  43,   147,   148. 
Adams   v.    Lindell,    (5    Mo.    App.    197 

[1878]),  43,    147,   148,  263. 
Adams  v.  .County  of  Piscataquis    ( 87 

Me.  503,  33  Atl.  12)   245. 
Adams    v.    City    of    Shelbyville     ( 154 

Ind.   467,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  484,  49 

L.  R.  A.  797,  57  N.  E.  114  [1899]), 

3,  108,  113,  118,  247,  248,  250,  305. 

314,   315,   431,   553,   570,   620,    663, 

665,   669,    670,   677,   691,  699,   709, 

720,  731,  732. 
Adams    v.     St.     Joimsbury     &     Lake 

Cliamplain  R.   R.  Co.    (57   Vt.  240, 

25     Am.     &     Eng.     R.     Cases     172 

[1884]),  70. 
Adams  v.  Wisher    (75  Tex.  657.  (i  S. 

W.  772   [1890]).  374. 

xliii 


xliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Adams  v.  City  of  Roanoke    ( 102  Va. 

53,  45  S.  E^  881    [1003]),   115,  123, 

125. 
Adams,  County  of  v.  City  of  Quincy, 

( 130  111.  566,  6  L.  R.  A.  155,  22  N. 

E.  624    [1889]),  8,  35,  42,  51.  314, 

432,   568,   580,   582,    612,   613.   623, 

670,   715,   813,   856,   859.   865,   907. 
Adcock  V.   City  of  Chicago    (172   111. 

24,    49    X:    E.    1008    [1898]),    323, 

912,    956,   969,    1274. 
Adcock   V.   City  of  Chicago    (160   111. 

611,    43    N.    E.    589    [1896]),    900, 

912. 
Adden  v.  White  Mt.s.  X.  H.  Railroad 

(55    X.    H.    413,   20    Am.    Rep.    220 

[1875]),  66,  70. 
Addyston   Pipe   &    Steel    Co.    v.    City 

of  Corry    (197  Pa.   St.   41,  80  Am. 

St.  Rep"  812,  46  Atl.  1035   [1900]), 

415,  507,  1498,  1504. 
Adkins    v.    Case     (81    Mo.    App.    104 

[1899]),   1043,  1067,   1167. 
Adkins    v.    Quest     (79    Mo.    App.    36 

[1898]),  886,   1137,   122'). 
Adkins   V.   Toledo    (27   Ohio   Cir.   Ct. 

R.   417    [1905]),   81,  423,   468,  471, 

775. 
Adler  v.  \Yhitbeck   (44  O.  S.  539,  564, 

9  X.  E.  672  [1886]),  7. 
Adriance    v.    ]McCafferty     ( 25    X.    Y. 

Sup.    Ct.    Rep.    (2    Robertson)     153 

[1864]),  750,  762,  777,  1174,   1204. 
Afield  V.  City  of  Detroit   (112  Mich. 

560,  71  X.  W.  151   [1897]),  1505. 
Ager  V.    State   ex   rel.    Heaston    (162 

Ind.    538,    70    X.    E.    808    [1903]). 

340,  886,  909,  978,  1002,-1319. 
Agnew,  In  the  Matter  of   (4  Hun.  435 

[1875]),  740,  770,   982,   1452. 
Ahern  v.  Board  of  Im])rovement  Dis- 
trict Xo.  3  of  Texarkana    (69  Ark. 

68,  61  S.  W.  575  [1901]),  103,  151, 

245,    249,    580,    588,   593,    596,    607, 

653,  691,  697,   786,  788,   791,   1337. 
Aherns  v.  City  of  Seattle   (39  Wash. 

168,    81     Pac.    558     [1905]),     1347, 

1351,   1362. 
Akers  v.   Kolkemeyer  &  Co.    (97  Mo. 

App.    520,    71    s".   W.    536    [1902]). 

267,   276,   324,   401,   444,    445,   447. 

837,  867. 


Alameda   Macadamizing   Co.    v.    Huff 

(57  Cal.  331    [1881]),  500,  763. 
Alameda   Macadamizing   Co.   v.   Prin- 

gle    ( 130  Cal.  226,  80  Am.  St.  ]^ep. 

124,  52   L.  R.  A.  264,  62  Pac.  394 

[1900]),  519. 
Alameda   Macadamizing   Co.   v.   Will- 
iams    (70    Cal.    534,    12    Pac.    530 

[1886]),  437,  523,  568,   1153,   1303, 

1372. 
Alameda,  City  of  v.  Cohen    (133  Cal. 

5,  65  Pac.  127   [1901]),  1330,  1519. 
Albany  Street,  In  the  Matter  of    (11 

Wend.      149,     25     Am.     Dec.     618 

[1834]),  677,  885. 
Alberge^  v.   Mayor  and   City  Council 

of  Baltimore  (64  Md.  1,  20  Atl.  988 

[1885]),    380,    381,    501,    525,    568, 

063,  666,  098,  699,  709. 
Albertson  v.  Town  of  Cicero  (21  X.  E. 

815     [1890]),    280,    281,    329,    636, 

776. 
Albertson  v.   State  ex  rel.  Wells    (95 

Ind.    370     [1883]),    340,    916,    918, 

1237,  1250,  1281. 
Albrecht    v.    City    of    St.    Paul     (47 

Minn.  531,  50  X.  W.  608    [1891]). 

1411,  1412,  1445. 
Albuquerque,  Town  of  v.  Zeiger  ( 5 

X.  M.  674,  27  Pac.  315  [1891]). 

301,  777,   1118,   1426. 
Alcorn     v.     Hamer     (38     Miss.     652, 

[I860]),    37,    147,    225,    248,    343, 

407,  408,  711. 
Alcorn  v.   City   of   Philadelphia    (112 

Pa.    St.    494,    4    Atl.    185    [1880]), 

382,    383,   462.    . 
Alden    v.     City    of    Springfield     (121 

Mass.  27   [1876]),  656,  657,  1365. 
Aldis    V.    South    Park    Commissioners 
(171     HI.     424,     49     X.     E.     565 
[1898]).    308,    405,    467,    525,    763, 

772,  918,   923,   1291. 
Aldridge  v.  Essex  Public  Road  Board 

(46  X.  J.  L.   (17  Vr.)    126  [1884]), 

1408. 
Alexander  v.  Baker   (74  0.  S.  258.  78 

X.  E.  366   [1906]),  781,  785,  789. 
Alexander  v.  ]\Iayor  and  City  Coimcil 

of  .Baltimore  "(5    Gill.    (Md.)    383, 

46  Am.  Dec.  630    [1847]),   86.   147. 
Alexander  v.   Dennison    (2   !McArthur 

(D.  C.)    562   [1876]),  223,   1426. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


xlv 


[Reforences  are  to  sections.] 


Alexander    v.     City    of     Diiluth     (77 

Minn.    445,    SO    N.    \Y.    023),    185, 

237. 
Alexander    v.     City    of     Tacoma     (35 

Wash.    360,    77    Pac.    080    [1904]), 

519,    600,    070,    090.    093,   099,    738, 

812,  911. 
Alexandria,    Mayor    and    Commonalty 

of   V.   Hunter'  (16    Va.    (2    Munf.) 

228  [1811]),  314,  1178,  1193,  1278. 
Alfalfa   Irrigation   District,   Directors 

of   V.   Collins    (40   Xeb.   411,   04   X. 

W.  1086),  147,  355. 
Alkire  v.   Timmons  Ditching  Co.    (51 

Ind.  71   [1875]),  1244,  1251. 
Allegheny,    City   of    v.    Black's    Heirs 

(99    Pa.    St.*  152    [1881]),    65,    70, 

653,  657. 
Allegheny   City  v.   Blair    (74  Pa.   St. 

(24    P.    F.'  Smith)     225     [1873]), 

541,  570. 
Allegheny  City  v.  West  Penna.  R.  Co. 

(138  Pa.  375,  21  Atl.  703   [1S90]), 

578,   597,  598,   665,   1078. 
Allen   V.   City   of   Buffalo    (39   X.    Y. 

380   [1868]),   1425,   1427. 
Allen    V.    City    of    Charlestown     (109 

Mass.   243    [1872]),   05,   70,   284. 
Allen    V.    City    of    Chicago    (176    111 

113,  52  X\'e.  33  [1898]),  278,279, 

396,  557,  912,  923,   1283,   1379. 
Allen  V.  City  of  Chicago    (57  111.  204 

[1870]),   745.   703,  704,    1299. 
Allen  V.  Davenport,  City  of   (132  Fc-^]. 

209,   05   C.   C.  A.   04i    [1904]).    1.-^. 

778,  981. 
Allen  V.   City  of   Davenport    (107   la. 

90,  77  X.  "w.  532  [1898]),  12,  18, 

118,  301,  610,  614,  438,  405.  475, 

479,  507,  517,  518,  677,  837,  847, 

853,  862,  1020.  1280,  1435.  1  130. 

1437,  1504,  1505,  1512. 
Allen  V.  Drew  (44  Vt.  174  [1872]). 

8,  11,  78,  86,  89,  100,  110,  347,  353, 

354,  008,  000.  008.  070,  077,  689, 

700,  708,  709,   1041,   1143,   1282. 
Allen     V.     Galveston      (51     Tex.     302 

[1879]),  43,  45,  147.   148,  223.  23+, 

713,    777,    1112,    1115,    11 H,    1173, 

1190. 
Allen  V.   City  of  Janesville    ( 35   Wis. 

403    [1874]),   228,   238,   775. 


Allen  V.  Ivrenning  (23  Mo.  App.  501 
[1886]),  50,   561,  679,  684. 

Allen  V.  La  Force  (95  Mo.  App.  32-1, 
60  S.  W.   1057    [1902]),   522,  538. 

Allen  v.'Labsap  (188  Mo.  092.  87  S. 
W.  920    [1905]),  538. 

Allen  V.  McKay  &  Co.  ( 120  Cal.  332, 
52  Pac.  828  [1898]),'  3 

Allen  V.  jNIayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(4  E.  b.  Smith  (X.  Y.  C.  P.)  404 
[1855]),    1488,    1497. 

Allen  V.  Rogers  (20  Mo.  App.  290 
[1880]),   495,  542,  841,  867. 

Allen  V.  City  of  Portland  (35  Or.  420. 
58  Pac.  509  [1899]),  223,  234,  777. 

Allen  Co.,  Board  of  Commissioners  oi 
V.  Silvers  (22  Ind.  491  [1864]), 
324,  444,  837,   1350,   1352. 

Allentown,  City  of  v.  Adams  (5  Sad- 
ler (Pa.)  253,  8  Atl.  430  [1887]), 
349,   610,   700. 

Allentown  v.  Henry  (73  Pa.  St.  404 
[1873]),  37,  255,  347,  549,  696. 

Allentown,  City  of  v.  Hower  (93  Pn. 
St.  (12  Xorris)  332  [1880]).  347. 
670,  708,  886,  1063,   1157. 

Allerton  v.  Monona  County  (111  In. 
500,  82  X.  W.  922),   142. 

Alley  V.  City  of  Lebanon  (140  Ind. 
125,  44  X'.  E.  1003  [1890]),  203, 
324,  327,  444,  483,  825,   1414. 

Alley  v.  Lyon  (14  D.  C.  (3  Mackey ) 
457  [1885]),  570,  880,  907,  10.37, 
1007. 

Allison  Land  Company,  Pros.  v.  May- 
or and  Council  of  Borough  of  Ten- 
afly  (69  X.  J.  L,  (40  Vr.)  587. 
55  "Atl.  39   [1902]),  019,  090,   1015. 

Allison  Land  Co.  v.  Borough  of  Tena- 
fly  (08  X.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.)  205.  52 
Atl.  231   [1902]),  019,  090;  1015. 

Allman  v.  District  of  Colum])ia  1 3 
App.  D,  C.  8  [1894]),  11,  HI,  119. 
223,  234,  244,  323,  441,  549,  620. 
720,  729,  777,  780,   1390. 

Allum  V.  Dickinson  (9  Q.  B.  D.  032 
[1882]),   1054. 

Alpers  V.  San  Francisco  (32  Fed. 
503),    372. 

Alpin  V.  Fisher  (84  :Mich.  128,  47 
X.  W.  Rep.  574   [1890]),  786,  788, 


xlvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Alspaugh   V.    Ben    Franklin    Draining 

Association    (51   Ind.   271    [1875]), 

1251. 
Alstad   V.    Sim    (15    X.    D.    629,    109 

N.    W.    66    [1906]),   340,*  525,    556, 

670,   801,    1015,    1431. 
Alter  V.  Bader    (56  0.  S.  718,  47  N. 

E.   564    [1897]),   1418. 
Alter  V.  City  of  Cincinnati   (56  O.  S. 

47,   35   L.   R.  A.   737,  46   N.  E.   69 

[1897]),  124,  353. 
Altheimer  v.  Plum  Bayou  Levee  Dist. 

(79     Ark.     229,     95     S.     W.     140 

[1906]),  343,  1502. 
Alton,  City  of  v.  Foster   (207  111.  150, 

69  N.  E.  783   [1904]).  1518. 
Alton   V.    Foster    (106    111.   App.    475 
.      [1902]),  1518 
Alton,  City  of  v.  Foster   (74  111.  App. 

511     [1897]),    413,    424,    837,    873, 

962,  1506,  1513. 
Alton,   City   of   v.   Middleton's  Heirs, 

(158  111.' 442,  41  N.  E.  926  [1895]), 

837,  849,  856,  857,  866. 
Alvey  V.  City  of  Asheville    ( —  N.  C. 

,   59    S.    E.    999    [1907]),    301, 

569,  663. 
Alvord  V.  City  of  Syracuse  ( 163  N. 

Y.  158,  57  N.  E.  310  [1900]),  347, 

451,    717,    837,     1181.    1202,     1426, 

1427. 
Amberson     Ave.,     Appeal     of     Chikls 

(179     Pa.     St.     634,     35     Atl.     354 

[1897]),    323.    382,    404,    466,    770, 

983,  1271,  1272. 
American    Brewing    Co.    v.    St.    Louis 

(—  Mo.  ,   108   S.  W.   1    [1907, 

1908]),  6,  353,   1491. 
American    Brewing    Co.    v.    St.    Louis 

(187  Mo.  367,  86  S.  W.  129),  1491. 
American  Hide  &  Leather  Co.  v.  City 

of  Chicago    (203   111.  451,  67  N.  E. 

979  [1903]).  60,  604,  640,  723,  909, 

1390. 
American     Steel     Dredge     Works     v. 

Board  of  Commissioners  of  Putnam 

County    (—Ind.   ,    85    N.    E.    1 

[1908]),    1384. 
Amery  v.  City  of  Keokuk   (72  la.  701, 

30   N.    W.  "780    [1887]),    119,    123, 

437,  620,   728. 
Amsterdam,    In    the    Matter    of    the 

Common  Council  of  ( 126  N.  Y.  158, 


27  X.  E.  272  [1891]),  121,  549, 
560,  730,  731. 

Amsterdam,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  (55 
Hun  270,  8  X.  Y.  Supp.  234 
[1889]),  119,  136,  137,  619,  729, 
748. 

Anderson,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of,  to  Vacate  an  Assessment 
(109  X.  Y.  554  [1888]),  16,  977. 

Anderson,  In  the  Matter  of  (00  X.  Y. 
457    [1875]),  740,  762,   1453. 

Anderson,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  (47  Hun  (X.  Y.)  203 
[1888]),  495. 

Anderson,  In  the  Matter  of  (60  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  375  [1871]),  467,  693,  714, 
895. 

Anderson,  In  the  Matter  of  ( 48  How- 
ard, 279   [1874]),  702. 

Anderson,  In  the  Matter  of  ( 39  How- 
ard (X.  Y.)  184  [1870]),  467,  672, 
693,  895. 

Anderson  v.  Caldwell  (91  Ind.  451, 
46  Am.  Rep.  613),  202. 

Anderson  v.  Claman  (123  Ind.  471, 
24  X.  E.  175  [1889]),  266,  270, 
1030,   1360,   1430. 

Anderson  v.    Cortelyou    ( —  X.   J.    L. 

,  68  Atl.  118  "[1907]),  173.  322, 

026,  776,  950. 

Anderson  v.  De  Urioste  (96  Cal.  404, 
31  Pac.  266  [1892]),  324,  538,  747, 
703,   1216.  ' 

Anderson  v.  Endicott  (101  Ind.  539 
[1884]),   1008. 

Anderson  v.  Fuller  (51  Fla.  380,  41 
So.  684  [1906]),  483,  495. 

Anderson  v.  Grand  Valley  Irrigation 
District,  35  Colo.  525,  85  Pac.  313 
[1906]),   194,  195,  355. 

Anderson  v.  Hill  (54  Mich.  477,  20 
X.  W.  549   [1884]),  80,  116,  224. 

Anderson  v.  Holland  (40  INIo.  600 
[1867]),   1067. 

Anderson  v.  Hid)ble  (93  Lid.  570,  47 
Am.  Rep.  394   [1883]),  1015. 

Anderson  v.  Lower  Merion  Township 
(217  Pa.  St.  309,  66  Atl.  1115 
[1907]),   147,  245,  279,  400,  706. 

Anderson  v.  INIessenger  ( 158  Fed.  250 
[1907]),   119,  726. 


TABLE   OF    CAS.es. 


xlvii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Anderson  v.   Tui-beville    ( G   Cold.    ( 46 

Tenn.)    150    [1868]),    117. 
Anderson    v.    ^Yhal•ton    County     (27 

Tex.   Civ.  App.    115,  65   S.  W.   643 

[1901]),    1318. 
Anderson,  City  of  v.  Bain    ( 120  Ind. 

254,   22   N.   E.   323    [1889]),    1519. 
Andrew  v.   Settle    (5   Ohio  N.  P.  394 

[1897]),  1017. 
Andrews  v.  City  of  Chicago    (57   III. 

239    [1870]),   860. 
Andrews   v.   Love    (50   Kan.    701,    31 

Pac.    1094    [1893]),    1437. 
Andrews   v.    People    ex   rel.    Kochers- 

perger    (173  111.  123,  50  N.  E.  335 

[1898]),  244,  775,  1085. 
Andrews   v.   People   ex   rel.    Kochers- 

perger    (164  111.  581,  45  N.  E.  965 

[1897]),    1085. 
Andrews  v.  People  ex  rel.  Miller    (83 

111.  529    [1876]),   996. 
Andrews    v.    People    ex    rel.    Rumsey 

(84    111.    28    [1876]),    70,    71,    308, 

426,  429,  520,  763,  952,  955. 
Andrews    v.    People    ex    rel.    Rumsey, 

83  III.  529    [1876]),  219,  259,  305, 

308,   356,   429,   763,   927,   933,   986, 

1184. 
Angell   V.   Cortright    (111   Mich.   223, 

69    X.    W.    486    [1896]),    375,   461, 

527,   840. 
Angus  V.  City  of  Hartford   ( 74  Conn. 

27,  49  Atl.   192    [1901]),  223,   234, 

244,   739,   754,   776. 
Ankeny   v.   Hennigsen    (54   la.    29,    6 

N.  W.   65    [1880]),  223,  229,   1109, 

1116. 
Ankeny    v.    Palmer     (20    ]\Iinn.    477 

[1874]),  464,  466,   708,    1426. 
Anketell  v.  Hayward   (119  IMicli.  525, 

78    X.    W.    557    [1899]),   340,    477, 

978. 
Annapolis,   ^layor.   Recorder   and   Al- 
dermen   of    the    City    of    v.    Har- 

wood    and    Wife     (32    Md.    471,    3 

Am.    Rep.    151     [1870]),    231,    232. 

626,    1306,    1447. 
Annie    Wright    Seminary    v.    City    of 

Tacoma     (23    Wash.    109,    62  "p.a-3. 

444    [1900]),    408,    465,    473,    475, 

479,   670,    677,    724,   918,   927,   933, 

1004,  1026,  1141,  1145,  1337,  1435. 


Anselm  v.  Barnard   (2  Keb.  675 

(Trin.  22  Car.  II),  26,  564. 
Anthony  Avenue,  In  re   (95  X.  Y.  S. 

77,  46  Misc.  Rep.  525  [1905]),  593, 

603. 
Appleby  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  In 

the   Matter   of    (26   Hun.    (X.   Y.) 

427   [1882]),  604,  723. 
Appleton    V.     County     Com.mipsioners 

(80  Me.  284,   14  Atl.  281    [1S8S]), 

844. 
Arbuckle-Ryan    Co.    v.    Grand    Ledge 

(122    Mich.    491,    81    X.    W.    358). 

1015. 
Archbishop      (Roman      Catliolic)      of 

San  Francisco  v.  Shipman   ( 79  Cal. 

288,    21    Pac.    830     [1889]),    r^25. 

1432. 
Arctic  Ditchers  v.  Coon    (47  Ind.  201 

[1874]),    1252,    12.03. 
Ardrey   v.    City    of    Dallas    (13    Tex. 

Civ.     App.     442,     35     S.     W.     726 
[1896]),  223,  234,  495,  725,  777,  813, 

815,  950,   1013,   1015,   1435. 
Arends  v.   City  of   Kansas   City    (57 

Kan.    350,   46   Pac.   702),    141. 
Argenti  v.  City  of  San  Francisco    ( 16 

Cal.    256    [1860]),   486. 
Argentine,    City   of   v.    Simmons    (54 

Kan.  699,  38  Pac.  181),  141. 
Argo     V.      Barthand      (80      Ind.      63 

[1881]),    1000,    1431. 
Armstrong    v.    Auger     (21     Ont.     98 

[1891]),    1072. 
Armstrong    v.    City    of    Chicago     (61 

111.    352    [1871]),    764,    1299. 
Armstrong  v.  Police  Jury  of  Madison 

(6    La.    Ann.    177     [1851]),    1508- 

1509. 
Armstrong  v.   Ogden   City    ( 12   L'tah, 

476,  43  Pac.  119   [189,5]),  314,  584, 

739,    750,   760,   805,   806,   811,    836, 

1006,    1007,    1415,   1418,   1432. 
Armstrong    v.    Ogden    City     (9    L'tah 

255,   34   Pac.   53    [1893]'),    1415. 
Armstrong   v.    City    of   St.    Paul    (30 

Minn.  299,   15  X.  W.   174   [1883]), 

316,   432v 
Arndt  v.  City  of  Cullman    (132  Ala. 

540,   90  Am.   St.   Rep.   922,   31  So. 

478),   419-420. 
Arnold,  In  the  IMatter  of    (60  N.  Y. 

26    [1875]),   570-1451. 


dviii 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Arnold    v.    City    of    Cambridge     ( 106 

Mass.   352    [1871]),   571. 
Arnold     v.     Decatur     (29     Mich.     77 

[1874]),   825. 
Arnold  v.   City  of   Fort  Dodge,   Iowa 

(111     La.     152,     82     N.     W.     495 

[1900]),    121,    528,    570,    742,    754, 

763,    766,    1011,    1015,    1292. 
Arnold    v.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Knoxville    (115   Tenn.    195,    220,   3 

L.    E.    A.    (N.    S.)    837,   90    S.    W. 

469    [1905]),   44,   78,  86,   118,    IGO, 

690,  698,   1425. 
Arnott  V.  City  of  Spokane    (6  Wash. 

442,   33    Pac.    1063    [[1893]),    489. 
Asberry  v.   City  of  Roanoke    (91   Va. 

562,    42    L.    R.    A.    636,    22    S.    E. 

360     [1895]),     11,     118,    161,     701, 

1039,    1040. 
Asheville,  City  of  v.   Wachovia   Loan 

&  Trust  Co.   (143  N.  C.  360,  55  S. 

E.    800    [1906]),    11,    63,    229,    232, 

245,   435,   406,   550,   555,    639,   665, 

666,  674,  709. 
Asheville,   Commissioners  of   v.   Jolm- 

ston   (71  N.  C.  398   [1874]),  66-70. 
Ashton    V.     Ellsworth     (48    111.     299 

[1868]),   838. 
Ashton  V.  City  of  Rochester   (60  Him. 

372,    14   K    Y.    Sup.   855    [1891]), 

846-1468. 
Asphalt    &    Granitoid    Const.    Co.    v. 

Hauessler   (201  Mo.  400,  100  S.  W. 

14    [1907]),   301,    629,    683. 
Asphalt    &    Granitoid    Const.    Co.    v. 

Hauessler    ( —  Mo.   App.   ,   80 

S.  W.  5   [1904]),  301,   629,  683. 
Assessment  of  School  Property.    (See 

School   Property). 
Assesssor  of  Taxes  of  Town  of  Green- 
burg  V.  .      (See  Greenburg. ) 

Astor,   In  the   Matter   of    (53    N.   Y. 

617    [1873]),  381,  982-1456. 
Astor,   In   the   Matter   of    (50   N.   Y. 

363    [1872]),   194,   195,   762. 
Astor,  Petition  of    (2  Sup.  Ct.    (T.  & 

C.)    488    [1874]),   462,    1456. 
Astor  V.  Miller   (2  Paige  Ch.   (N.  Y.) 

68    [1830]),    1054. 
Astor  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(62    N.    Y.    567    [1875]),    259-271- 

901. 


Astor  V.  The  Mayor,  Alderman  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 
York  (62  N.  Y.  580  [1875]),  279. 
280.  308,  309,  570,  927,  935,  982, 
1451,   1455. 

Astor  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York 
(39  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  120 
[1875]),'  759-1422. 

Astor  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(37  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  (5  J.  & 
S.)  539  [1874]),  8,  89,  236,  279, 
394,  414,  553,  666,  744,  745,  770, 
900,  910,  911,  927,  983,  986,  1425, 
1427,    1429,   1432. 

Astoria  Heights  Land  Company  v. 
City  of  New  York  (179  N.  Y."579, 
72  N.  E.  1139  [1904]),  251,  525, 
539,   1433,    1498. 

Astoria  Heights  Land  Co.  v.  City  of 
New  York  (89  App.  Div.  512^  86 
N.  Y.  S.  651  [1903]),  251,  525, 
539,   1433,   1498. 

Atchison,  City  of  v.  Bartholow  (4 
Kan.  124,  141   [1866]).  79,  1450. 

Atchison,  City  of  v.  Byrnes  (22  Kan. 
65    [1879]),   1508,   1375. 

Atchison,  City  of  v.  Leu  (48  Kan. 
138,  29  Pac.  467  [1892]),  416,  423, 
1498. 

Atchison,  City  of  v.  Price  ( 45  Kan. 
296,  25  Pac.  605  [1891]),  387, 
416,  423,  468,  550,  551,  554,  555, 
563,  635,  803,  895,  896. 

Atchison  Board  of  Education  v.  De 
Kay  (148  U.  S.  591,  37  L.  573,  13 
S.    706    [1893]),   838. 

Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Peterson  (5  Kan.  App. 
103,  48  Pac.  877  [1897]),  42,  553, 
557,   596,    013,    1041,    1078. 

Atkins  V.  City  of  Boston  (188  Mass. 
77,  74  N.  E.  292  [1905]).  324,  329, 
444,   500,   563. 

Atkinson  v.  City  of  Great  Falls  (16 
Mont.  372,  40  Pac.  877  [1895]), 
1504. 

Atlanta,  Mayor  and  Council  of  the 
City  of  v.  Central  Railroad  & 
Banking  Company  (53  Ga.  120 
[1874]),  69,  71. 

Atlanta,  City  of  v.  First  Presbyter- 
ian Church    (86  Ga.  730,   12  L.  R. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


xlix 


[Il,':'('i-('iices  are  to  sections.] 


A.   852,    13   S.  E.  252    tl8i)()]),   42, 

570,   588,   613,    1478. 
Atlanta,  City  of  v.   Gabbett    (93   Ga. 

266,    20    S.    E.    306    [18!)3]),    632, 

848. 
Atlanta,  City  of  v.  Green   (67  Ga.  380 

[1881]),   69. 
Atlanta,  City  of  v.  Hamlein    (96  Ga. 

381,  23  S.  E.  408  [1895]),  11,  118, 

632,   666,   668,   689,   705,   709. 
Atlanta,  City  of  v.  Hamlein   (101  Ga. 

697,  29  S.  E.  14  [1897]),  632,  651, 

653,    665,    666,    705,    709. 
Atlanta,    City   of    v.    Smith     (99    Ga. 

462,    27    S.    E.    Rep.    696    [1896]), 

785,   786,   789. 
Atlanta  Consolidated   Street  Railway 

Company   v.    City   of  Atlanta    (111 

Ga.  255,"  36  S.  e'.  667   [1900]),  602. 
Atlanta     First     Methodist     Episcopal 

Church   V.   Atlanta    (76    Ga.    181), 

145. 
Attorney  General   on  the   Relation  of 

Cook  "v.  City  of  Detroit    (26  Mich. 

263    [1872]),  314,   495,   742,   864. 
Attorney    General    v.    McClear     ( 146 

Mich.   45,    109   N.    W.    27    [1906]), 

251,   266,    340. 
Atwell   V.    Barnes    (109   Mich.    10,   66 

N.   W.   583    [1896]),    1015,   1436. 
Auburn,  City  of  v.  Paul   (84  Me.  212, 

24   Atl.   8*17    [1892]),    11,   43,    147, 

324,   651,   653,   677,   747,  771. 
Auburn,  City  of  v.  State  ex  rel.  First 

National    Bank     ( —    Ind.   ,    83 

N.   E.    997    [1908]),   530,    1471. 
Auclimuty,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Pe- 
tition   of    (90   N.   Y.    085    [1882]), 

479,    1458. 
Auchmuty,     In    the    INIatter    of      (18 

Hun.   324    [1879]),    271,    465,    479, 

645,  646,  977,  1458. 
Auchmuty,     In    the    IMatter    of      (11 

'Hun.    '(X.    Y.)     76     [1877]),    487, 

570,    646. 
Auditor  General  v.  Chase   (132  Mich. 

630,    94   N.    W.    178    [1903]),    380, 

381,   784,   819,   833. 
Auditor   General   v.    Crane    ( —  Mich. 

,  115  N.  W.  1041),  1000,  1337. 

Auditor    General     v.     Hoffman     ( 132 

Mich.   198,  93  N.  W.  2^0    [1903]), 


130,    135,   730,    732,   745,   835,   910, 

951,    1292. 
Auditor    General    v.    Stoddard     ( 147 

Mich.  329,   110  N.  W.  944   [1907]), 

541,   840,    1024. 
Augusta,    City    of    v.    McKibben    ( — 

Ky.    ;    60    S.   W.    291,    22    Ky. 

Law  Rep.   1224),  443,   862. 
Augusta,  City  Council  of  v.  Murphy 

79   Ga.    loi,  3    S.   E.   326    [1887])", 

40,  232. 
Aumann    v.    Black     ( 15    W.    Va.    773 

[1879]),  353,    1479. 
Aurora,  Town  of  v.  Cliicago,  Burling- 
ton    &    Quincy    Railroad     (19     111. 

App.   360    [1885]),    1512. 
Austin   V.   City   of   Seattle    (2   Wash. 

667,  27  Pac.  557  [1891]),  147,  148, 

301,   698,   1502. 
Averill  v.  City  of  Boston   (193  Mass. 

488,    80    N."    E.    583     [1907]),    73, 

1519. 
Ayars,   Appeal   of    (122    Pa.   St.    266, 

2     L.     R.     A.     577,     16     Atl.     356 

[1888]),    190,  961. 
Aver    V.    City    of    Chicago     (149    111. 

262,  37  N.   E.  57),  74,  394,  616. 

Ayer    v.     ]Mayor    and    Aldermen     of 

"Somerville  *(  143   Mass.    585,    10    N. 

E.  457    [1887]),  563,  620,  723. 
Ayers  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  In  re   (118 

La.  640,  43  So.  262   [1907]),  485. 
Ayers    v.    Adair    Co.     (61    la.    728), 
■  ^146. 
Ayers  v.   Schmohl    (86  INIo.   App.   349 

"[1900]),    522.    538,    871. 
Ayers  v.  Toledo    (26   Ohio   C.  C.   767 
"[1904]),    680,    1304. 


B 


Babbitt  v.  Woolley  (66  Ky.  (3  Bush.) 
703  [1868]).  352,  1249,  1269. 

Babcock,  In  the  Matter  of  (23  How- 
ard 118  [1862]),  1466. 

Bacas  v.  Adler  (112  La.  806,  36  So. 
739  [1904]),  89,  314,  503,  540,  517, 
519.  780,  1012,  1015,  1022,  1033, 
1035.  1047,  1049,  1160,  1337. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Bacon    v.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Savannah    ("l05    Ga.    62,    31    S.    E. 

127     [1898]),    175,    475,    587,    654, 

723,  967,  978,   1103,   1104. 
Bacon    v.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Savannah    (91    Ga.    500,    17    S.   E. 

749     [1893]),    245,    620,    632,    663, 
.707,   713,  777,   1277,   1328,   1382. 
Bacon    v.    Mayor    and    Aldermoi    of 

Savannah    (86    Ga.    301,    12    S.    E. 

580    [1890]),    118,    437,    552,    570, 

577,   856,    1127,   1193,    1331. 
Bacon  v.  City  of  Seattle    (15   Wash- 
ington 701,"^  47  Pac.   1102),  408. 
Badger    v.    Inlet    Drainage    District 

(141  111.  540,  31  X.  E.  170  [1893]), 

223,   249,   258,   271,   424,   506,   665, 

666,   676,   677,   731,   739,   745,    813, 

995,   1032,    1271,   1273,    1347,    1351, 

1505. 
Baffnet     v.     Gough      (36     Cal.      104 

[1868]),    1039. 
Bagg    v.    City    of    Detroit     (5    Mich. 

336    [1858]),    306,    390,    397,    431, 

1442. 
Bailey  v.  ]\Iayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  New 

York   (3  Hill   (N.  Y.)    531,  38  Am. 

Dec.   669    [1842]),   251. 
Bailey  v.  People  of  the  State  of  Illi- 
nois   (158    111.    52,    41    X.    E.    784 

[1895]),    1086. 
Bailey   v.   Pinker    (146   Ind.    129,   45 

N.  E.  38),  1444. 
Bailey  v.  City  of  Zanesville   (20  Ohio 

C.  "C.   236 '[1900]),    106,   609,   683, 

700,  776,  956,   964. 
Baily    v.    City    of    Sioux    City     (133 

Iowa  276,   ilO  X.  W.  839   [1907]), 

686. 
Baird   v.   Monroe    (150    Cal.    560,   89 

Pac.    352     [1907]),    1174. 
Baisch  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids    (84 

Mich.   666,  48  X.  W.   176    [1891]), 

275,   494,    823,    1015. 
Baker    v.    Arctic    Ditchers     (54    Ind. 

310    [1876]),   1227,    1252. 
Baker  v.  French    (18  Ohio  C.  C.  420 
[1899]),     473,     1049,     1080,     1084, 

1109. 
Baker    v.    Gartside     (86    Pa.    St.     (5 

Xorris)    498),   347,   565,   620. 
Baker    v.    Meacham    (18    Wash.    319, 

51  Pac.  404  [1897]),  1085,  1095. 


Baker    v.    Village    of    Xorwood     (74 

Fed.    997     [1896]),    11,     112,    118, 

119,  308,  426,  430,  702. 
Baker   v.   Schott    (10   Ohio   C.    C.   81 

[1894]),    561,    625,    685,    704,    783, 

1012,    1013. 
Baker   v.    City   of    Seattle    {2    Wash. 

576,    27    Pac.    462     [1891]),    1504, 

1519. 
Baker  v.  Selvage    ( 7  Ky.  L.  P.  838 ) , 

628,   710. 
Baker  v.  Tobin   (40  Ind.  310   [1872]), 

783.   843. 
Baker  v.  City  of  Utica  ( 19  X.  Y.  326 

[1859]),    i520. 
Bakman,     Pros.    v.    Hackensack     Im- 
provement   Commission    (70,  X.    J. 

L.     (41     Vr.)     499,     57     Atl.     141 

[1904]),   271,  950. 
Baldwin  v.  City  of  Buffalo   (29  Barb. 

(X.    Y.)    396    [1859]),    1425,    1427. 
Baldwin  v.   City  of  Elizabeth    (42  X. 

J.   Eq.    (15    Stew.)    11,   6' Atl.   275 

[1886]),    968,    1428. 
Baldwin  v.  City  of  Xewark  (38  N^.  .} 

L.    (9    Vr.)     158    [1875]),    70,    73, 

166,    167,    1113. 
Baldwin  v.  City  of  Oswego    (2  Keyes 

(X.  Y.  Ct.  App.)    132   [1865]),  47, 

679,   1509. 
Balfe  V.   Bell    (40   Ind.   337    [1872]), 

559,  644,  723. 
Balfe     V.     Johnson      (40     Ind.     235 

[1872]),  631,  895. 
Balfe  V.  Lammers    (109  Ind.   347,   10 

X.   E.   92    [1886]),    526,    650,    818, 

843,  886,  927,  986,  996,  1015,  1017, 

1020,  1030,   1414,   1432. 
Ball  V.   Balfe    (41   Ind.   221    [1872];, 

301,  649. 
Ball    V.    City    of    Yonkers    (78    JTun. 

196,  28  X.  Y.  S.  947   [1894]),  751. 
Ballard  v.  City  of  Appleton   (26  Wis. 

67    [1870]),   503,    1026,    1437. 
Ballard    v.    Hunter     (204    U.    S.    241, 

51  L.  461,  27  S.  261   [1907]),  121, 

747,   760,  773,   887,   1182,   1370. 
Ballard  v.  Hunter    (74  Ark.    174,   85 

S.  W.   252    [1905]),   119,   121,  747, 

760,   773,  887. 
Ballard,   City  of   v.   Ross    (38  Wash. 

209,  80  Pac.  439    [1905]),   1069. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[K'.'fd'ci  ees  are  to  sections.] 


Ballard,  City  of  v.  Way  (34  Wash. 
116,  101  Am.  St.  Rep.'nOS,  74  Pao. 
1067    [1904]),    1194. 

Ballard,  City  of  v.  West  Coast  Im- 
provement Co.  (15  Wash.  572,  46 
Pac.    1055),    244,    246,    1002,    1164. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Boyd  (64  Md.  10,  20  Atl. 
1028    [1885]),    786,    788. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Clunet  (23  Md.  449  [1865]), 
219,    244,   867,    1354. 

Baltimore,  ^layor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Eschbach  (18  Md.  276 
[1861]),   781,   789,    1499. 

Baltimore,  The  Mayor  of  v.  The 
Grand  Lodge  of  INIaryland  of  the 
Independent  Order  of  Odd  Fellows 
(44  Md.  436  [1875]),  735,  754, 
770,  848,   1030,    1427,   1431. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Proprietors  Green  Mount 
Cemetery  (7  Md.  517   [1855]),  110. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
<;f  V.  Hook  "(62  Md.  371  [1884]), 
393,  396. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  V.  *Horn  (26  Md.  194 
[1866]),  414,  965,  983. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Hughes'  Adm'r.  (1  Gill.  & 
J.  (Md.)  480,  19  Am.  Dec.  243 
[1829]),  11,  18,  86.  314,  437,  553, 
652,  657,  670,  677,  1333. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Johns  Hopkins  Hospital  (56 
Md.  1  [1880]),  8,  86,  89,  100,  244, 
245,  274,  292,  381,  553,  555,  626, 
663,  666,  675,  077.  698,  699,  726, 
13.33. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Johnson  (62  Md.  225  [1884]), 
496,  500,  1420,  1432. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Little  Sisters  of  tlie  Poor  (56 
Md.  400  [1881]),  308,  739,  747, 
754,  763,   844. 

Baltimore,  ]\Iayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Moore  &  Johnson  ( 6  Harris 
&  Johnson  375  (Md.)  [1825]),  11, 
89,    223,    234,    314,    437,    553,    657. 

Baltimore,  IMayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.   Porter    (18   :\Id.   284.   79    Am. 


Dec.  686  [1861]),  234,  426,  433, 
1420,    1431. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Raymo"^  (68  Md.  569,  13  Atl. 
383  [1888]),  437,  511,  527,  532, 
538. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Smith  &  Schwartz  Brick  Com- 
pany (80  Md.  458,  31  Atl.  423 
[1894]),  651,  653,  657,  1277,  1303, 
1313,   1318,  1350. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Stewart  (92  Md.  535.  48  Atl. 
165    [1901]),   666,  698,  699,   709. 

Baltimore,  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  V.  Ulman  (79  Md.  469,  30  Atl. 
43  [1894]),  118,  119,  134,  244, 
414,  626,  641,  647,  648,  666,  690, 
767,  959,   962,   967,   1122. 

Baltimore  County,  County  Commis- 
sioners of  V.  Board  of  Managers 
of  the  ^Maryland  Hospital  for  the 
Insane  (02  Md.  127  [1884]),  580, 
581,    612. 

Baltimore  &  Oliio  Railroad  Co.  v. 
City  of  Bellaire  (60  O.  S.  301,  54 
N.  E.  263  [1899]),  264,  629,  1156, 
1367. 

Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Daegling  (30  Ind.  App.  180,  65 
K    E.    761    [1902]),    1244,    1386. 

Baltimore  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, Wheeling  &  Kentucky  R.  R. 
Co.  (17  W.  Va.  812  [1881]),  119, 
135,   732. 

Baltimore  &  0.  and  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ke- 
tring  ( 122  Ind.  5,  23  N.  E.  527 ) ,  202. 

Baltimore  &  0.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  North 
(103  Ind.  486,  3  X.  E.   144),  1444. 

Bambrick  v.  Campbell  (37  Mo.  App. 
400  [1889]),  504,  817,  875.  1216, 
1324. 

Banaz  v.  Smitli  (  133  Cal.  102.  65 
Pac.  309  [1901]),  16,  82,  207,  553, 
600,  824,   830,  831,  8.32,  867.   1215. 

Bancroft  v.  City  of  Boston  (115  ^lass. 
377  [1874]),  76,  308,  309,  657,  719. 

Bank  of  Montreal  v.  Fox  (6  Practice 
Rep.    (Ont.)    217   [1875]).   1072. 

Bank  of  Commonwealtli  v.  Mayor, 
etc..  of  the  City  of  New  York  (43 
N.  Y.  184   [1870]),   1486. 


Hi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Bank    of    Columbia    v.    Portland    (  41 

Or.    1,   67   Pac.   1112    [1902]),   750, 

763,   830,   833,    836,   918. 
Bank   v.   City  of  Spokane    ( 17  Wash. 

315,  38  L."^R.  A.  259,  47  Pac.  1103, 

49  Pac.  542    [1897]),   1468. 
Bank    of    Woodland    v.    Webber     (52 

Cal.   73    [1877]),    1478. 
Bank  v. .     (See  full 

name  of   bank.) 
r.annister    v.    Crassy    Fork    Ditcliiig 

Association    (52   Ind.    178    [1875]), 

279,  340,  760,   768,  825,  900.   1229, 

1254,  1303. 
Banta,  In  re   (60  N.  Y.  165  [1875]), 

342,  781,  784. 
Barber  v.  City  of  Chicago  (152  111. 

37,    38    N.  'e.    253     [1894]),    32 1, 

631,   651,    723,   864,   867,   884,   895, 

902,  922,  1283. 
Barber    v.    Board    of    Sup?rvisors    of 

the  City  and  Couuty  of  Sail  I'ran- 

cisco   (42  Cal.  631   [1872]  >,  53,  521, 

617,  641,  917,   1354,   1356. 
Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.    v.    City 

of   Denver    (72    Fed.    Rep.    336,    19 

C.   C.   A.    139,   36   U.   S.    App.    499 

[1896]),   1498,   1509. 
Barber    Asphalt    Paving   Company   v. 

Edgerton,    125    Ind.    455,   25    N.    E. 

436     [1890]),    142,    293,    245,    437, 

673,  729,   731,   777,  832,  981,   1005,- 

1347. 
Barber   Asphalt   Paving   Co.   v.    Field 

(188     Mo.     182,     86     S.     W.     860 

[1905]),  485,  515,  521. 
Barber    Asphalt   Paving  Company    v. 

Field    (—   Mo.   App.   ,    111    S. 

W.  907   [1908]),  245. 
Barber   Asphalt    Paving    Company    v. 

French,  158  Mo.  534,  58  S.  W."  934 

[1901]),    86,    118,    123,    244,    245, 

293,   301,   314,   437,   517,   518,   553, 

666,  670,  702,  728,  746,  1040,  1049, 

1149. 
Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Company    v. 

Gaar    (115  Ky.  334.  73  S.  W.  1106, 

24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  2227    [1903]).  301, 

437,  610,  675,  723,1015,  1330. 
Barber    Asphalt    Paving   Company    v. 

Gogreve    (41    La.   Ann.    251,    5    So. 

848    [1889]),    100,    110,    1.55,    212, 


314,   475,    513,   515,   537,   663,   779, 

789,  791. 
Barber   Asplialt    Paving   Company    v. 

City   of   Harrisburg    (64    Fed.   283, 

12    C.    C.    A.    100,    28    U.    S.    App. 

108    [1894]),    1498,    1508. 
Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Companj'    v. 

City    of   Harrisburg    (62    Fed.    565 

[1894]),     1498. 
Barber   Asphalt   Paving   Company    v. 

Hezel    (155   Mo.   391,   48   L.   R.   A. 

285,    56    S.    W.    449    [1899]),    517, 

518. 
Barber    Asplialt   Paving   Company   v. 

Hezel    (76  -Mo.   App.    135    [1898]), 

517,   518. 
Barber   Asphalt    Paving   Company    v. 

Hunt     (100    Mo.    22,    18    Am."  St. 

Rep.    530,   8    L.    R.    A.    110,    13    S. 

W.  98   [1890]),  515. 
Barber   Asphalt    Paving   Company    v. 

Kiene   (99  Mo.  App.  528,  74  S.  W. 

872   [1903]),  625,  998. 
Barber   Asphalt    Paving    Company    v. 

Muchenberger     ( 105    Mo.    App.    47, 

78    S.   W.    280    [1903]),    380,    381, 

461,  463,  763,  848. 
Barber   Asphalt    Paving   Company    v. 

Munn   ( 185  Mo.  552,  83  S.  W.  1062 

[1904]),    118,    141,    538,    620,    714, 

916,   1337. 
Barber   Asphalt    Paving    Company    v. 

Peck    ( 186  Mo.   506,   85  S.  W."  387 

[1905]),  475,   890,   1109,   1225. 
Barber    Asphalt   Paving    Company    v. 

Ridge   (169  Mo.  376,  68  S.  W.  1043 

[1902]),   141,  538,  916,   1337,   1369. 
Barber    Asphalt   Paving    Company   v. 

City   of   St.   Joseph    (183  Mo.   451, 

82  "S.   W.   64   [1904]),  42,  50,  209, 

210,   314,   475,   584,   613,   614,    663, 

1075,    1107.    1498. 
Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Company   v. 

Ullman    ( 137    Mo.    543,    38    S."^  W. 

458    [1896]),   437,    529,   864. 
Barber    Asphalt   Paving    Company   v. 

Watt    (51    La.    Ann.    1345,    26*  So. 

70     [1899]),    223,    234,    314,    517. 

519,   624,   629,   666,    707,   709,   710, 

777,    800,    1047,    1049,    1144. 
Barclay,   In   the   INIatter   of   the    Peti- 
tion   of    to    Vacate    an    Assessment 

(91    N.   Y.    430    [1883]),   320,    434. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


liii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Barfield  v.  Gleason  (111  Ky.  491, 
23  Ky.  Law  R.  128,  63  S.  W.  964 
[1901]),  86,  113,  118,  123,  125, 
274,  293,  298,  394,  462,  494,  519, 
540,  553,  666,  668,  728,  1061,  1128, 
1234,   1281,   1346. 

Barker  v.  City  of  Omaha  ( 16  Neb. 
269,  20  N.  W.  382  [1884]),  726, 
1435,    1436. 

Barker  v.   Southern  Construction   Co. 

—  Ky.  ,  47  S.  W.  608,  20  Ky. 

L.   R.   796),   1039. 

Barker  v.  State  (18  Ohio  514 
[1849]),    548. 

Barker  v.  Commissioners  of  Wyan- 
dotte County  (45  Kan.  681,"  26 
Pac.  585  [1891]),  107,  393,  399, 
455,    1431. 

Barkley  v.  Levee  Commissioners  (93 
U.  S.  258,  23  L.  893   [1876]),  1518. 

Barkley  v.  Oregon  City  (24  Ore.  515, 
33  Pac.  978  [1893]),  511,  740,  760, 
7C6,  781,   791. 

Barlow  v.  City  of  Tacoma  ( 12  Wash. 
32,  40  Pac.  382  [1895]),  771,  918, 
1010,    1029. 

Barnert  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  the 
City  of  Paterson  (69  N.  J.  L.  (40 
Vr.')  122,  54  Atl.  227  [1903]),  393, 
396,   1469. 

Barnes  v.  City  of  Beloit  (19  Wis. 
93    [1S65]),   971,    1442. 

Barnes  v.  Drainage  Commissioners  of 
Drainage  District  No.  7,  etc.  (221 
111.  627,  77  N.  E.  1124  [1906]), 
84,   340,   1002,    1008,    1405,    1406. 

Barnes  v.  Dyer  (56  Vt.  469  [1884]), 
11,   666,   696. 

Barnes  v.   City  of  Parsons    ( —  Kan. 

,    94    Pac.    151     [1908]),    862, 

1431,    1432. 

Barnett's    Case     (28    Pa.    Super.    Ct. 

.      361    [1905]),   428. 

Barnet  v.  Board  of  St.  Louis  Pub- 
lic Schools  (01  Mo.  App.  539 
[1895]),  896. 

Barney,  Matter  of  (53  Hun.  (N.  Y.) 
480,   6  N.  Y.   Sup.  401),   1460. 

Barney  v.  City  of  Dayton  ( 8  Ohio 
C.  C.  480  [1894]),  561,  620,  625, 
626,  704. 

Barre  Water  Co.,  In  re  (72  Vt.  413, 
48   Atl.   653),   417. 


Barron    v.    Iviebs    (41    Kan.    338,    21 

Pac.  235    [1885]),  838. 
Barron  v.  City  of  Lexington   ( —  Ky. 

,  105  S.  W.  395    [1907]),  301, 

635,   1072,    1141,   1203. 
Barrow  v.  Helpler    (34  La.  Ann.  362 

[1882]),    9,    39,    47,    95,    212,    266, 

322,   374,   420,   717. 
Bartlett     v.     Adams      (43     Ind.     447 

[1873]),   363. 
Bartlett     v.     City     of     Boston      (182 

Mass.   460,   65  "n.   E.   827    [1902]), 

1488. 
Bartnett's  Executor  v  Board  of.  Pub- 
lic    Schools      (60     Mo.     App.     539 

[1894]),    896,    1054. 
Barton  v.  Kansas  City   (110  Mo.  App. 

31,    83    S.    W.    1093    [1904]),    234, 

324,  331,  446,  448,  510. 
Bartram   v.    City   of   Bridgeport    (55 

Conn.    122,    10    Atl.    470     [1887]), 

02,  245,  275. 
Bass    V.    City    of    Chicago     (195    111. 

109,    62    N.    E.    913    [1902]),    739, 

813,    817,   978. 
Bass  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond   (203 

111.    206,    67    N.    E.    806    [1903]), 

308,   391,   394,    746,    771,   825,   920, 

927,    939,    986,     996,     1029,,     1183, 

1340. 
Bass    V.    South    Park    Commissioners 

171  111.  370,  49  X.  E.  549    [1898]), 

51,    391,    396,    405,    020,    623,    670, 

715,   923,    1279. 
Bassett   v.    City   of    New   Haven    (76 

Conn.  70,  55  Atl.  579    [1903]).  62, 

245,   275,   324,   327,   446,    663,    665, 

666,   670,   677,   093,   699,    722,   867. 
Bassford,  In  the  Matter  of   (63  Barb. 

161     [1872]),    740,    741,    763,    836, 

1406. 
Batchelor  v.  Borough  of  Avon-by-the- 

Sea   (—  N.  J.  L.  ,  68  Atl.   124 

[1907]),   280,  964. 
Bate  V.  Sheets   (64  Ind.  209   [1878]), 

166,    170,  335,  337,  340,  549,   1217, 

1235. 
Bate  V.  Sheets    (50  Ind.  329   [1875]), 

1239,   1309. 
Bates     V.    District    of    Columbia      ( 7 

Mackey    (D.  C.)    76   [1889]),   1002, 

1012,   1056,   1442. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Bates   V.   People's   Savings   and   Loan 

Association   (42  0.  S.  655  [1885]), 

1057. 
Bates  V.  Twist   {138  Cal.  52,  70  Pac. 

1023    [1902]),   318,    440,    511,    523, 

568,   574,   754,   759,  831,   840. 
Batterman  v.  City  of  New  York   (65 

App.  Div.    (N.   Y.)    576,   73   X.   Y. 

Supp.    44    [1901]),    347,   376. 
Batty   V.   City  of  Hastings    (63  Neb. 

26^  88  N.'W.  139  [1901]),  985, 

1012,  1016,  1072,  'll95,  1442. 
Bauman  v.  Ross  (167  U.  S.  548,  42 

L.  270,  17  S.  966  [1897]),  11,  67, 

70,  86,  119,  140,  243,  244,  308,  419, 

425,  553,  556,  557,  663,  672,  709, 

1066.  ■ 
Bauman   v.   Ross    (9   App.   D.   C.   260 

[1896]),  67,  70,  86,   119,  244,  308, 

419,   425,   553,   556,   557,   663,    672, 

709,   1066., 
Bay  Rock  Company  v.  Bell    (133  Cal. 

150,  65  Pac.  299  [1901]),  510,  831, 

857,  858. 
Bayha  v.   Taylor    (36   INIo.   App.    427 

[1889]),    401,    447,    1425,    1427. 
Baylis     v.    Jiggens      (2    Q.    B.     315 

[1898]),    1054. 
Bayonne,   ]\layor   and   Council    of   the 

City   of    V.'   Morris    (61    X.    J.    L. 

(32  Vr.)   127,  38  Atl.  819   [1897]), 

380,  381,  563.  572,  722,  967,   1486. 
Bays      V.      Lapidge      (52     Cal.      481 

[1877]),    1215. 
Beach    v.    City    of    Chicago     (193    111. 

369,    61   N.*  E.    1015    [1901]),    864. 
Beach   v.   City  of  Meriden    (46   Conn. 

502    [1878]),    1354. 
Beach    v.    IVIayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Jersey  City' (71  N.  .J.  L.    (42  Vr.) 

87,   51    Atl.    81    [1904]),    729,   731, 

744,  745,  913. 
Beach    v.    People    ex   rel.    Kern    (157 

111.    659,    41    N.    E.    1117    [1895]), 

572,  636,   856,  925. 
Bealu    Street,    In   the   Matter    of    the 

proceedings  to  change  the  grade  of 

in    the    City    and    County    of    San 

Francisco     (39    Cal.    495*    [1870]), 

63,   266,  425.   556,  862,   1338. 
Beals     V.    Inhabitants    of     Brookline 
(174  Mass.  1,  54  N.  E.  339  [1899]), 


326,  340,  449,  564,  654,  920,  923. 
1002,   1277,   1281,   1347,   1365. 

Beals  V.  James  (173  Mass.  591,  54 
N.  E.  245  [1899]),  326,  340,  549. 
558,  564,  643,  659,  748,  751,  764. 
766,   1292,   1406. 

Beals  V.  Providence  Rubber  Com- 
pany (11  R.  I.  381,  23  Am.  Eep. 
472' [1876]),  49,   613,   1054. 

Beams,  In  the  Matter  of  ( 17  How- 
ard Pr.  (N.  Y.)  459  [1859]),  167, 
170,  844,   1458. 

Beard  v.  City  of  Brooklyn  (31  Barb. 
142   [I860]),  1508. 

Beaser  v.  City  of  Ashland  (89  Wis. 
28,  61  N.  'W.  77  [1894]),  1415. 
1426,   1427. 

Beaser  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Company  (120  Wis.  599,  98  N.  W. 
525    [1904]),  494,   507,    1431,   1436. 

Beatrice,  City  of  v.  Brethren  Church 
of  Beatrice  (41  Neb.  358,  59  N. 
W.  932   [1894]),  42,  588,  613,  614. 

Beaudry  v.  Valdez  (32  Cal.  269 
[1867]).  439,  441,  510,  831,  835, 
869,  1039,  1049,  1086,  1129. 

Beaumont  v.  Wilkes-Barre  City  ( 142 
Pa.  St.  198,  21  Atl.  888  [1891]), 
147,  173,  370,  570,  666,  698,  709, 
738,   739,  747,   1029,   1450. 

Becher  v.  City  of  Columbus,  Ohio 
(4  Ohio  C.*C.  305  [1890]).  821. 
823,  977. 

Beck  V.  Holland  (29  IMont.  234,  74 
Pac.  410  [1903]),  396,  554,  555, 
639.  693,  700,  723,  904,  1279,  1287, 
1444. 

Beck  V.  Obst  (75  Ky.  (12  Bush.) 
268  [1876]),  574,  617,  641,  646, 
666,   709,   710,   722. 

Beck  V.  Tolen  (62  Ind.  469  [1878]), 
340.  884,  899,  907,  1041,  1268, 
1299. 

Ik-cker  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  South- 
western Railway  Company  (17 
Ind.  App.  324,  46  N.  E.  Rep.  685 
[1897]),  11,  549,  631,  886,  895, 
909,    1052,    1059. 

Becker  v.  City  of  Chicago  (208  111. 
126,   69  N.  *E.   748    [1904]),  820. 

Becker  v.  City  of  Henderson  ( 100 
Ky.  450,  38  S.  W.  857  [1897]), 
1216. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Iv 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Beckert  v.  City  of  Allegheny  (85 
Pa.  St.  (4  Norris)  101  [1877]), 
80,    196,    1015. 

P.eckett  V.  City  of  Chicago  (218  111. 
97,  75  N.  E.  747  [1905]),  804, 
1308,    1390. 

IJeckett    V.   Morse    (4    Cal.   App.    228, 
b7     Pac.     408     [1906]).     501,     624, 
650,    1085,    1358. 
Heckman's    Petition     (  19    Abb.    Prac. 
244    [1865]).   525,    1452. 

l^edard  v.  Hall  (44  111.  91  [1867]), 
43,  44,  101,  113.  153,  226,  690,  701. 

Bedford    Commercial   Insurance    Com- 
pany   V.     Parker     (2    Pick.     1,     13 
Am.  Dec.  388   [1823]),  2. 
Bedford    Union    v.    Commissioners    of 

Bedford    (7   Exch.   777).   614. 
Beebe    v.    Magoun    (122    la.    94,    101 
Am.     St.     Rep.     259,     97     N.     W. 
986     [1904]),    119,    122,    135.     136. 
137,   726,   729. 

Beecher  v.  City  of  Detroit  (92  ilich. 
268,  52  N.  W.  731  [1892]),  308, 
548,   555,   690,    691,   695,    1049. 

Beechwood  Avenue  Sewer  ( 1 )  Pitts- 
burg'-s  Appeal  (1),  (179  Pa.  St. 
490,  36  Atl.  209  [1897),  549,  554, 
563,  020,  651,   658,   1333. 

Beechwood  Avenue,  //)  re,  Appeal  of 
O'Mara  (194  Pa.  St.  86,  45  Atl. 
127  [1899]),  236,  237,  301,  307, 
356,  416,  443,  561,  603.  719,  795, 
800,   873,    1089,   1358. 

Beechwood  Avenue  Sewer,  ( 2 )  Pitts- 
burg's Appeal,  (2)  (179  Pa.  St. 
494,  36  Atl.  210  [1897]),  610. 
1347. 

Beeckman's  Petition  (  19  Abb.  Pr.  244 
[1865]),    279. 

Beekman's  Case  (11  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)    164    [I860]),  206,  844. 

Beekman,  In  the  ISIatter  of  (31  How- 
ard 16  [1865]),  279,  525,  526,  876, 
879,  901. 

Beekman,  In  the  matter  of  (19  How- 
ard (N.  Y.)  518  [1800]),  170,  206, 
844,    1451,    1459. 

Beekman,  In  the  flatter  of  ( 18  How- 
ard (N.  Y'.)  460  [1859]),  484, 
485,  534,  982.   1454. 

Beekman's  Petition  ( 1  Abb.  Pr.  449 
[1865]),   279,    485,   525. 


Beers  v.  Dalles  City    (16  Or.  334,   18 

Pac.    835     [1888]"),    244,    293,    236, 

324,   662,    775. 
Beggs   v.    Paine    (15    X.   D.    436,    109 

X.   W.  322    [1906]),  36. 
Bell   V.   Balfe    (41    Ind.   221    [1872]), 

909. 
Bell   V.    Johnson    (207    :\I().    281,    105 

S.   W.   1039    [1907]),    1239. 
Bell   V.    City   of   Newton    (783    Mass. 

481,  67  X.  E.  599   [1903]),  74,  305. 
Bell    V.    City   of    Norwood    (28    Ohio 

C.  C.  809  [1906]),  1168. 
Bell    V.    City    of    Yonkers     (78    Hun 

196,  28  N.  Y.  S.  947   [1894]),  639, 

723,  745,  748,  874,  1373. 
Belleville.  City  of  v.  Perrin    (225  111. 

437,    80    X.    E.    270    [1907]),    295, 

917,   918. 
Bellevue  Improvement   Co.   v.   Village 

of  Bellevue   (39  Xeb.  876,  58  X\  W. 

446    [1894]),    223,    525. 
Bellevue,  Town  of  v.  Peacock   (89  Ky. 

495,   25    Am.    St.    Rep.    552,    12    S. 

W.   1042   [1890]),  981. 
Bellingham   Bay   &   British   Columbia 

Railroad  v.  Xew  Whatcom   ( 172  U. 

S.     314,     43     L.     460,     19     S.     205 

[1899]),    119,    121,    122,    570,    747, 

760,  959. 
Bellingham   Bay   Improvement   Co.   v. 

City  of   Xew  \Yhatcom    (20  Wash. 

53,^54  Pac.  774   [1898]),  207,  927, 

1347. 
Bellows      V.      Weeks      (41      Vt.      590 

[1868]),   117,  407,  408. 
Belleview,    Ti  iistees    of    v.    Holm    ( 82 

Ky.    1    [1884]  ),    1499. 
Belmont,   In  the  Matter  of    (12  Hun. 

(X    'Y.)     558     [1878]),    432,    437, 

770,   982. 
Belser   v.   Allman    (134    Cal.   399,   66 

Pac.    492     [1901]),    301,    504,    742, 

749_,    1281,    1373. 
Belser     v.     Holl'schneider     (104     Cal. 

455,     38    Pac.    312     [1894]),     915, 

1354,   1366. 
Beltzhoover     Borough     v.     Heirs     of 

Beltzhoover    (173    Pa.    St.   213,    33 

Atl.    1047     [1896]),    42.    592,    613. 

1063. 
Beltzhoover,     Borough    of    v.     Maple 

(130     Pa.    St.     335,    18    Atl.     650 


Ivi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


[1889]),    323,    521,    608,    660,    698, 

709,   895,   1109. 
Benliam    v.    City    of    Cincinnati     ( 26 

Ohio  C.   C.   17    [1904]),   1430. 
Beniteau  v.  City  of  Detroit  (41  Mich. 

lie,    1    N.    W.    899    [1879]),    314, 

440,   468,    471,    498.    501,   555,    663. 
Bennett's  Case   (12  Abb.  Pr.    (N.  Y.) 

127    [1861]),    495,    844,    982,    1460. 
Bennett   v.    City    of    Butlalo     (17    N. 

Y.  383    [1858]),  361,  729. 
Bennett   v.   City  of   Emmetsburg    ( — 

la.   ,   115   N.   W.   582    [1908]), 

409,    496,   510,   551,   563,   735,   857, 

1431. 
Bennett    v.    Hall     (184    Mo.    407,    83 

S.  W.  439   [1904]),  70. 
Bennett  v.   City  of  Marion    [106    la. 

628,   76  N.   W.   844    [1898]),  70.' 
Bennett   v.  New   Bedford    (110   Mass. 

433    [1870]),   855. 
Bennett   v.   Mayor,   etc.,   of   the   City 

of   New   York    (3    N.    Y.    Sup.    Ct. 

Rep.  485  [1848]),  1150,  1154,  1200, 

1206,  1293. 
Bennett  v.  Seibert  ( 10  Ind.  App.  369, 

35  N.  E.  35,  37  N.  E.  1071  [1894]), 

584,    663,   1075,    1215. 
Bennison    y.    City    of    Galveston     ( 18 

Tex.    Civ.    App.    20,   44    S.    W.    013 

[1898]),  301,  867,  873,  1041,  1060. 
Bensinger  v.  District  of  Columbia    ( 6 

Mack.     (D.    C.)     285    [1888]),    119, 

347,   735,  883,   886,   902,    1278. 
Benson    v.    Bunting     (141     Cal.    462, 

75    Pac.    59    [1903]),    549,    554. 
Bentley  v.  Toledo   (7  Ohio  N.  P.  388 

[1900]),  625,   704. 
Benton    v.    Inhabitants    of    Brookliiie 

(151     Mass.    250,    23    X.    'E.     846 

[1890]),   64,  65,   67,   76,   308. 
Benton    v.    Hamilton     (110    Ind.    294, 

11  N.  E.  238   [1886]),  480. 
Benton  Harbor,  City  of  v.  St.  Joseph 

and  Benton  Harbor  Street  Railway 

Co.    (102   Mich.    386,    26   L.    R.   A. 

245,    60    N.    W.    758    [1894]),    60, 

599,   605,    1162,    1471. 
Benton    Street,    Opening    of     ( 9    La. 

Ann.    446     [1854]),    33,     113,     155, 

622,  674,  690. 
Berdel    v.    City   of    Chicago    (217    111. 

429,    75    N.    E.    386    [1905]),    309, 


358,    665,   666,   672,    675,   677,   709, 

1368. 
Bergen   v.    Anderson    ( 62    Minn.    232. 

64   N.    W.    561    [1895]),    746,   747, 

1200. 
Bergen,  Town  of,  in  County  of  Hvid- 

son  V.  State,  Van  Home,  Pros.    (32 

N.  J.  L.    (3  Vr.)   490   [1865]),  720, 

973,   1410. 
Bergen     County     Savings     Bank     v. 

Township   of    Union    (44   N.   J.    L. 

(15   Vr.)    599    [1882]),    229. 
Berger  v.  Multnomah  County   (45  Or. 

402,    78    Pac.    224     [1904]),    1053, 

1069,   1179,  1195,  1203. 
Bernheimer,    In    tlie    Matter    of     (47 

Hun  567   [1888],  987,  1465. 
Bernstein    v.    Downs    (112    Cal.    197, 

44  Pac.  557   [1896]),  17,  538,  1033, 

1216,    1324,    1345,   1381. 
Berry   v.    City    of   Cliicago    (192    III. 

154,    61    N."^   E.    498    [1901]),    818. 

828,    1280. 
Berry    v.    City    of    Des    Moines    (115 

la.  44,  87  N.  W.  747   [1901]),  604. 

1348,   1373,   1384. 
Berwind    v.    Galveston    and    Houston 

Investment  Company    (20  Tex.  Civ. 

App.    426,    50    S.    W.    413    [1899]), 

527,  535,    1218,   1331. 
Best  V.   Wohlford    (144   Cal.   733,    78 

Pac.    293    [1904]),    355,    1202. 
Bettis  V.  Geddes    (54  Mich.  60S;   sub 

nomine    Bettis    v.    Probate    Judge 

(20   N.   W.   608    [1884]),   744. 
Bettis   V.   Probate  Judge.      See  Bettis 

v.    Geddes. 
Betts  V.  City  of  Naperville    (214   III. 

380,    73    N.    E.    752    [1905]),    270. 

280,    347,    348,    469,   521,    526,    672, 

814,    1009,    1033,    1283,    1323. 
Betts    V.    City    of    Williamsburg     i  15 

Barb.     (N.    Y.)     255     [1853]),    67, 

70,    113,    478,    811,    1415. 
Betz  V.   City  of  Canton    (18   Ohio   C. 

C.   676    [1893]),   561,   625,   704. 
Beveridge    v.    Lewis     ( 137    Cal.    619, 

92  Am.  St.  Rep.    188,  59  L.  R.  A. 

581,  70  Pac.  1083   [1902]),  66. 
Beveridge  v.  Livingstone    (54  Cal.  54 

[1879]),   174,  538. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ivii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Bevier,  City  of  v.  Watson  ( ]  13  ^^lo. 
App.  500,  87  8.  W.  G12  [lOOr,]), 
814,    1211. 

Beygeh  v.  City  of  Chicago  (65  111. 
189  [1872]),  763,  764,  954,  1278, 
1281,    1299,    1304. 

Bibel  V.  The  People  for  use  of  tlie 
City  of  Bloomingtnn  (67  111.  172 
[1873]),  272,  279,  665,  666,  670. 

Bickerdike  v.  City  of  Chicago  (203 
111.  636,  08  X".  E.  161  [1903]), 
816,  820,  833. 

Bickerdike  v.  City  of  Cliicago  ( 185 
111.  280,  56  N.'  E.  1096  [1900]), 
143,  295,  297,  328,  401.  444,  563, 
609,  652,  675,  856,  895,  1347,  1367, 
1368. 

Bidwell  V.  Coleman  (11  Minn.  78,  11 
Cil.    45    [1865]),    44,    158. 

Bidwell  V.  Huff  (103  Fed.  362 
[1900]),  118,  314,  600,  677,  700 
728,    1057,    1432,    1444. 

Bidwell  V.  City  of  Pittsburg  (85  Pa. 
St.  (4  Norris)  412,  27  Am.  Rep. 
662  [1877]),  610,  706,  1010,  1011, 
1014. 

Big  Lake  Special  Drainage  District, 
Commissioners  of  v.  Commission- 
ers of  Higliways  of  Sand  Ridge 
(199  111.  132,'  64  X.  E.  1094 
[1902]),  587,  1031,  1076,  1142, 
1224,   1271,   1273,   1333,   1359. 

Big  Rapid.s,  City  of  v.   Board  of  Su- 
pervisors   of    Mecosta    County     i !' 
Mich.   351,   58   X.   W.   358    [1894]). 
580,  582,  012. 

Bigelow  V.  City  of  Cliicago  ( 90  111. 
49  [1878]),  153,  309,  553,  557,  574, 
576,  642,  070.  723,  920,  922,  1271, 
1273,   1313. 

Biggins'  Estate  v.  People  e>c  rel. 
Tetherington  (193  111.  601,  01  X. 
E.  1124  [1901]).  55,  803.  989, 
1131. 

Billings  V.  City  of  Chicago  ( 107  111. 
337,  47  X.  E.  731  [1897]),  259, 
526,  574,  604,  637,  638,  663,  672, 
675,  723,  912,  926,  1375. 

Bingaman  v.  City  of  Pittsburg  (147 
Pa.  St.  353,  23  Atl.  395  [1892]), 
18,  53,   737,  961,  969. 

Bingham,   State  for  use  of  v.  Turvey 
(99    Ind.    599    [1884]),    1251. 


Bingliampton,    City   of   v.    Binghamp- 

ton     &     Port     Dickinson     Railway 

Company    (01    Hun   479,    10    X.    Y. 

Supp.  225    [1891]),   003,  832. 
Bird   ex    rel.   Hudson   v.    City   of   De- 
troit   (—   Mich.    ,    116    X.    W. 

1065  [1908],  514. 
Birdseye     v.    Village    of    Clyde      (01 

Ohio  St.  27,  55  X.  E.  109*  [1899]  ). 

679,   686,    1013,    1432. 
Birdseye    v.     Village    of     Clj'de     (  14 
•Ohio   C.   C.   510    [1897]),   679,   08i;, 

1013. 
Birket    v.    City    of    Peoria     (185    111. 

3G9,  57  X'.  E.  30  [1900]),  264,  271. 

070,  715,  748,  768,  875,  1056. 
Birmingliam,     j\Iayor    and     Aldernuii 

of  V.   Klein    (89   Ala.   401,   8   L.   R. 

A.  369,  7   So.  380   [1889]),   11,  35. 

43,    111,    113,    150,    212,    323,    690, 

702. 
Bishop  V.  Peo]de  of  the  State  of  Illi- 
nois    (200    111.    33,    05    X.    E.    421 

[1902]),    637,    038,    797. 
Bishop  V.  Tripp    (  15  R.  I.  466,  8  Atl. 

692    [1887]),  8,  202,  324,  400,  419, 

610,  620,   631,  705,  706,  712,   1361. 
Bitzer  v.   O'Bryan    (107    Ky.   590,   54 

S.  W.  951  '  I  1900]),  1234,  1269, 

1281,  1309. 
Bi.Kby  V.  Goss  (54  Mich..  551,  20  X. 

w!^    587     [1884]),    739,    748,    1396, 

1404. 
Bixler  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  the 

County     of    Sacramento     (59     Cal. 

698,    [1881]),    11,  35,   86,   .340,  549, 

564,    909,    1394. 
Black   V.   Thomson    (107    Ind.    162,    7 

X.  E.   184),   1351. 
Blackie    v.    Hudson     (117    :\Iass.    181 

[1875]),   309,  700,    1067,   1072. 
Blackwe.U    E.    &    S.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Cxist 

(18  Okl.  516,  90  Pac.  889    [1907]), 

320. 
Blackwell  v.  Village  of  Coeur  D'Alene 

(13      Idaho      357.      90      Pac.      353 

[1907]).  910,  1050,  1085,  1337. 
Blair  v.  City  of  Atchison  (40  Kan. 

353,  19  Pac.  815  [1883]).  5.55,  570. 

028.   000,   709. 
Blair    v.    Luning     (76    Cal.     134,     18 

Pac.    153    [1888]),   479,   542,    1337. 


Iviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Blake     v.     Baker      (115     Mass.     188 

[1874]),   49,   1054. 
Blake  v.  City  of  Brooklyn    (26  Barb. 

301   [1857]),  453,  1423,  1427. 
Blake  v.   People  for   use   of   Caldwell 

(109   111.   504    [1884]),  41,   80,   83, 

103,    104,    194,    198,   219,   247,   250, 

254,   271,   344,   375,   744,    745,   747, 

759,  781,  918,  927,  983,  987,   1000, 

1008,  1125,  1183. 
Blanchard  v.  City  of  Barre  (77  Vt. 

420,  60  Atl.  970  [1905]),  223,  670, 

693,    1427,    1450. 
Blanchard  v.   Beideman    (18  Cal.  261 

[1861]),    234,    374,    381,    464,    737, 

775,   777. 
Blanchard    v.     Ladd     ( 135    Cal.    214, 

67     Pas.     131     [1901]),     301,    824, 

1305,   1379. 
Blanchett  v.   Municipality  No.  2    ( 13 

La.    322     [1839]),    155,    236,    271, 

278,  308,  309,   657,  672,  675,   1283, 

1333. 
Blasingame   v.    City    of    Laurens    ( — 

S.     C.    .    61 '    S.    E.    96.     

[1908]),    488. 
Blatner      v.      Davis       (32      Cal.      328 

[1867]),  887. 
Bleecker    v.    Ballou     (3    Wend.     (N. 

Y.)    263    [1829]),   1054. 
Blemel    v.    Shattuck     (133    Ind.    498, 

33    N.    E.    277    [1892]),    923,    951, 

1269. 
Bliss    V.    City    of    Chicago     ( 156    111. 

584,    41    N.    E.    160    [1895]),    636, 

925. 
Bliss  V.  Kraus   (16  0.  S.  54   [1864]). 

5,  19,  93,  97,  342,  453,  474,  481. 
Bloch   V.    C4odfrey    (26    Ohio    Cir.    Ct. 

R.  781    [1904]),  711,  549,  643,  644 

896,    1015. 
Blochman  v.  Spreckles   ( 135  Cal.  662, 

57    L.    R.    A.    213,    67    Pac.    1061), 

512,  1378. 
Blodgett,   In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion   of     (91    N.     /.    117     [1883]), 

482. 
Bloomington,  City  of  v.  Blodgett    (24 

111.    App.    650  "[1886]),    819,    945, 

1411. 
Bloomington,    City    of    v.    Chicago    & 

Alton   Railroad  Company    ( 134    111. 

451,  26  N.  E.  366  [1891]),  51,  293, 


295,  359,  420.  549,  920,  921,  937, 
1268. 

Bloomington,  City  of  v.  Latham  ( 142 
111.  462,  18  L."r.  a.  487,  32  N.  E. 
506  [1892]),  8,  51,  70,  89,  111, 
308,   425,   426,   547,   651,    670,   715. 

Bloomington,  City  of  v.  Phelps  ( 149 
Ind.  596,  49  N.  E.  581  [1897]), 
495,    765,    1004,    1015,    1022,    1304. 

Bloomington,  City  of  v.  Pollock  (141 
111.  346,  31  N.  E.  146   [1893]),  71. 

Bloomington,  City  of  v.  Reeves  ( 177 
111.  161,  52  N.  E.  278  [1898]), 
•569,  781,  785,  790,  791,  795,   1347. 

Bloomington  Cemetery  Association  v. 
People  of  the  State  (139  111.  16, 
28  N.  E.  1076  [1893]),  592,  613, 
614,   636,   997,    1080,    1189,    1373. 

Blount  V.  City  of  Janesville  (31  Wis. 
648  [1872]"),  8,  89,  380,  381,  438, 
440,  461,  463,  464,  475,  552,  576, 
641,  646,  663,  720,  781,  792,  795, 
950,  975,  977,  981,  983,  1083,  1183, 
1361. 

Blount  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond 
(188  111.  538,  59  N.  e".  241 
[1901]),  857,   866,   927,   986,   1340. 

Blue  V.  Wentz  (54  O.  S.  247,  43  N. 
E.   493    [1896]),   564. 

Blue  Island,  Village  of  v.  Eames 
(155  111.  398,  40  N.   E.  615),  351. 

Bluffton,  City  of  v.  Miller  (33  Ind. 
App.  521,  70  N.  E.  989  [1904]), 
223,  2.34. 

Board  of  Commissioners  v.  Gardiner 
Savings  Institution  (110  Fed.  36), 
1370. 

Board  of  Commissioners  v.  Vurpillot 
(22  Ind.  App.  422,  53  N.  E.  1049), 

nil. 

Board  of  Commissioners  of  

County  v.  .      (See  name 

of    County. ) 

Board  of  Directors  v.  Houston  (71 
111.    318    [1874]),    259,    344. 

Board  of  Education  v.  Kanawha  & 
M.  R.  Co.  (44  W.  Va.  71,  29  S. 
E.  503   [1897]),  70. 

Board  of  Education  v.  City  of  To- 
ledo (48  O.  S.  87,  26  N.  E.  404 
[1891]).   586. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


lix 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Board  of  Education  of  City  of  Clii- 
cago  V.  People  ex  rel.  Commission- 
ers of  Lincoln  Park  (219  111.  83, 
7G  N.  E.  75  [1905]),  58G,  612, 
613,  927,  986. 

Board  of  Health  v.  Gloria  Dei  (23 
Pa.  St.  (11  Harr.)  259  [1854]), 
546,   649,   888,   1157,    1158,    1333. 

Board  of  Improvement  District.  ( See 
Improvement  District.) 

Board  of  Levee  Commissioners  v.  Lo- 
rio  Bros.  (33  La.  Ann.  276 
[1881]),    39,    46,    218. 

Board    of    Public    Works    of    City    of 

Niles    V.    Pinch     ( —    Mich.    , 

116  N.  W.  408  [1908]),  6,  353, 
1045,   1142. 

Board  of  Street  Opening,  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  (74  Hun  561,  26  N.  Y. 
Supp.   855    [1893]),   427,   468,   628. 

Board  of  Street  Opening,  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  (64  Hun  59,  18  N.  Y. 
Supp.   727    [1892])     427,  628. 

Boas  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  Xew  York 
(85  Hun  (X.  Y.)  311,  32  N.  Y.  S. 
967   [1895]),   1488. 

Boatman  v.  Macy  (82  Ind.  490 
[1882]),   1241. 

Bobb  V.  Wolff  (54  Mo.  App.  515 
[1893]),    1055. 

Bockoven  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Lincoln  Township,  Clark  County 
(13  S.  Dak.  317,  83  N.  W.  335 
1900]),   1328. 

Bode  V.  City  of  Cincinnati  (9  Ohio 
C.  C.  382   [1895]),  835,  977. 

Bodley  v.  Finley  (111  Ky.  618,  64 
S.  "w.  439,  23  Ky.  L."  Rep.  851 
[1901]),  73,  396,  1346. 

Bodman  v.  Lake  Fork  Special  Drain- 
age District  (132  111.  439,  24  N. 
E.  630  [1891]),  558.  564,  1008, 
1417,  1432,   1477. 

Boeres  v.  Stradev  ( 1  Cin.  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.   57    [1870]),  578. 

Boers  v.  Barrett  (2  Cin.  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.   67    [1870]),   1054. 

Boehm  v.  Mayor  of  Baltimore  (61 
Md.  259),  372. 

Boehme  v.  City  of  :Monroe  (106 
Mich.  401,  64  N.   W.  204   [1895]), 


550,   551,    555,   595,   620,   655,   663, 
723,  874,   1442. 

Bogart  v.  City  of  Passaic  (38  N.  J. 
L.    (9  Vr.)    57   [1875]),   1409. 

Bogert  V.  City  of  Elizabeth  (27  N. 
J.  Eq.  (12  C.  E.  Green)  568 
[1876]),  11,  627,  665,  666,  667, 
696,  709,   1428. 

Bogert  V.  City  of  Elizabeth  (25  N. 
J.  Eq.  (10  C.  E.  Green)  426 
[1874]),  627,  665,  666,  667,  696, 
709,    1428. 

Bohm,  Matter  of  (4  Hun  (N.  Y.) 
558    [1875]),   1465. 

Bohm  V.  Metropolitan  Elevated  Rail- 
way Company  (129  N.  Y.  576,  14 
L.  R.  A.  344,  29  N.  E.  802  [1892]). 
69. 

Boiling  V.  Stoloes  (29  Va.  (2  Leigh) 
178,  21  Am.  Dec.  606  [1830]), 
1054. 

Bolton  V.  City  of  Cleveland  (35  0. 
S.  319  [1880]).  740,  950,  1101, 
1444. 

Bolton  v.  Gilleran  ( 105  Cal.  244,  45 
Am.  St.  Rep.  33,  38  Pac.  881 
[1894]),   273,   1425,   1426,    1427. 

Bond  V.  City  of  Kenosha  (17  Wis. 
284   [1863]),   163,  360,  456. 

Bond  V.  INIayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  Newark  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  (4  C. 
E.  Green)   376   [1869]),  529. 

Bonfoy  v.  Goar  (140  Ind.  292,  39  K. 
E.   56),   142. 

Bonnet  v.  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco  (65  Cal.  2,30,  3  Pac.  815 
[1884]),  301,  432,  461,   1500. 

Bonney  v.  Bridgewater  (31  N.  J.  L. 
(2  Vr.)    133),   166,   167. 

Bonsall  v.  ]Mayor,  Recorder  and  Trus 
tees  of  the  Town  of  Lebanon  (19 
Ohio,  418  [1850]),  .53,  110,  147. 
323. 

Bookman  v.  Xew  York  Elevated  Rail- 
road Company  (137  X.  Y.  302.  33 
X.  E.  333   [1893]),  69. 

Boone  v.  Xevin  ( —  Ky.  — ■ — ,  15  Ky. 
L.  Rep.  547,  23  S.  W.  512  [1893]), 
628,   666,   709,   770. 

Boonville,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Cosgrove  v. 

Rogers    ( —  Mo.  App.  ,   101    S. 

W.  1120  [1907]),  479. 


Ix 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Boonville,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Cosgrove  v. 

Stephens    (—  ]\Io.  App.  ,  95  S. 

W.  314  [1906]),  510,  840. 
Boorman    v.    City   of    Santa    Barbara 

(65    Cal.   313,  4   Pac.   31    [1884]), 

119,  726,  729,  790,  791. 
Booth  V.  Pittsburg   ( 154  Pa.  St.  482, 

25  Atl.  803   [1893]),  475,  1515. 
Bordages  v.  Higgins  ( 1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

43,    19    S.    W.    446,    20    S.    W.    184, 

726   [1892]),   986,  998,   1141,   1145. 
Borger   v.   Columbus    (27    Ohio   C.   C. 

R.  812   [1905]),  653,  1013. 
Borgman  v.  City  of  Antigo   (120  Wis. 

296,    97   N.   W.    936    [1904]),    19], 

219,  370,  781. 
Borgman   v.    Spellmire    (7    Ohio    Dec. 

344),    1054. 
Boskowitz    V.     Thompson     (144     Cal. 

724,  78  Pac.  290  [1904]).  271.  35.3, 

1225,   1261,   1430,   1445. 
Postman     v".     Macy,      (82     Intl.     490 

[1882]),   886. 
Boston,  Inhabitants  of  v.  Brazer    ( 1 1 

Mass.  447    [1814]),   17,   1033,   1043. 
Boston,  City  of   v.   Boston   &   Albany 

Railroad   Company    ( 170   Mass.   95, 

49  N.   E.  95    [1898]),   11,  595.  613, 

620. 
Boston    &    A.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Hampden 

County    Commissioners    (116  ^lass. 

73),   359. 
Boston  &  L.  Ry.  v.  Winchester    !l56 

Mass.  217,  30  N.  E.  1139),  359. 
Boston   &  Maine  R.  R.  v.   County   of 

Middlesex    (83  Mass,    (1   All.)    324 

[1861]),  596. 
Boston,  etc..   Railroad  v.   Folsom    (46 

X.  H.  64),  771. 
Boston    Seamen's    Friend    Society    v. 

Mayor    of    City    of    Boston     (116 

Mass.   181,    17   Am.   Rep.    153),   42, 

86,   308,   613,   614. 
Boston   Water   Power   Co.   v.   City  of 

Boston    (194   Mass.   571,   80   N.    F. 

598    [1907]),   74,    1519. 
Boswell    V.    City   of   Alarion    i —    Ind. 

,  79  N.  "e.   1056    [1907])     275, 

918,    1029. 
Bothwell  V.    Millikan    (104  Ind.    162, 

2  N.  E.  959,  3  N.  E.  816   [1885]). 

1190. 


Boul    V.    The    People    ex    lel.    Baker 

(127  111.  240,  20  N.  E.   1   [1890]), 

407,  692,  955. 
Boulat   y.   Municipality   Nuniber   One 

(5  Lt.  Ann.  363   [1850]),  155. 
Bouldin   v.   ISIayor   and   City   Council 

of  Baltimore'  (15   Md.    18    [1859]), 

780,   781,  789,  791,   1432. 
Boulton     V.     Blake      (12     Ont.      532 

[1886]),   1054. 
Bountiful  City  v.  Lee    (27  Utah   183, 

75  Pac.  368   [1904]),  319,  717. 
Bouton  V.  City  of  Brooklyn   ( 15  Barb. 

(N.  Y.)    375    [1853]),   1424. 
Bow   V.    Smith    (9   Mod.   94    [Easter, 

10  Geo.  1]),  26,  564,  887. 
Bowditch  V.  City  of  New  Haven    (40 

Conn.    503    [1873]),   604,   621,    644, 

723,   1330,   1356. 
Bowditch  V.  Superintendent  of  Streets 

of  Boston   (168  :Nrass.  239,  46  N.  E. 

1046    [1897]),    490,    496,    509,    840. 
Bowen   v.    Atlantic    &    French    Broad 

Valley   R.    R.    Co.    (17    S.    C.    574,      • 

14     Am.     &     Eng.     R.     Cases     332 

[1882]),  69. 
Bowen  v.  City  of  Chicago   (61  111.  268 

[1871]),  954. 
Bowen   v.    Hester     (143    Ind.    511,    41 

N.    E.   330    [1895]),    322,   556,   629, 

642,  674,   1026,   1306,   1358. 
Bowersox   v.   Watson    (20    0.    S.   496 

[1870]),  142,  1347. 
Bowery,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Exten- 
sion  of    the    (12    Howard    (N.    Y.) 

224   [1856]),  911,   1347,  1373. 
Bowery  National  Bank  v.  Maj'or,  etc., 

of  the   City  of  New  York    (8  Hun 

(N.   Y.)    224    [1876]),    1382,    1508. 
Bowler    v.    Biddinger    Free    Turnpike 

Co.,  6  W.  L.  B.  (Ohio)  404  [1881]), 

549,  553,  666. 
Bowles  V.  State  of  Ohio   ( 37  0.  S.  35 

[1881]),  38,  82,  248,  697. 
Bowlin    V.    Cochrane     (161    Ind.    486. 

69  N.  E.  153),  322. 
Bowling   Green,    Town    of    v.    Hobson 

(42  Ky.   (3  B.  Mon.)    478   [1843]), 

574. 
Bowman    v.    Colfax     (17    \^'ash.    344, 

49  Pac.  551    [lS!t7]).   1165.   116S. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixi 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Bowman  v.  The  People  ex  rel.  Baker, 

Collector    (137    111.    436,    27    iV.    E. 

598   [1892]),   74(5,   750,   1101.   1102. 

1126,  1178,  1184,  1283. 
Bowns  V.  May  (  120  X.  Y.  357,  24  X. 

E.  947  [1890]),  968,  1006,  1007, 

1484. 
Boyce    v.    Tuliey     (  163    Iivl.    .^02,    70 

N,   E.   531    [i904]|,   324.   919.   927, 

1004. 
Boyd  V.  City  of  :Milwaukco    (92  Wis. 

456,    66    N.    W.    603    [189;)]),    191, 

244,    380.    381.    519,    575,    656,    783, 

832,  980. 
Boyd  V.  Borougli  of  Wilkins')ur;;,   1S3 

Pa.    St.    198,   38   Atl.   592    [1S97]), 

II,  651,  656.   1271,   1272. 
Boyden    and    Herrick    v.    Village    of 

Brattleboro     (65    Vt.    50 1,    27    Atl. 

164     [1893]).    444,    549,    563,    658, 

1351. 
Boyer   v.   Beading   City    (151    Pa.    St. 

isS,  24  Atl.    1075). '382. 
Boyle    V.    Hitclicock     (66    Cal.    129.    4 

Pac.   1143   [1884]),  468,  470,   1337. 
Boyle  V.  Tibbey    (82  Cal.  11,  22  Pac. 

il28   [1889]),  .324.  549. 
Boylston  Market  Association  v.   City 

of  Boston,   113  Mass.  528    [1873])", 

86. 
Boynton  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern    ( 159 

in.  553,  42  X.  E.  842   [1896]),  323, 

393.  394,  396,  399,  1183,  1346. 
P.iynton  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern    (155 

III.  66,  39  X.  E.  622  [1895]),  278, 
752,  770,  772,  913,  914,  927.  930, 
993,   1003,   1306.   1341. 

I'ozarth  V.  ^McGilliciiddy  (19  Ind.  App. 
26,  47  X.  E.  397,  48  X.  E.  1042 
[1897]),  301,  500,  574,  728,  1156, 
1192,   1236,  1207.  1373. 

lirackett  v.  People  of  Weinnett  (115 
111.  29,  3  X.  E.  723  [1886]),  965, 
988,  989,  1066,  1189,  1296,   1317. 

Bradford  v.  City  of  Chicago  (25  111. 
349,  79  Am."  Dec.  333  [1861]), 
1484,    1490. 

Bradford  v.  City  of  Pontiac  ( 165  111. 
612,  46  X.  E.  794  [1897]),  475, 
552,  574,  676,  771,  860,  865,  867, 
920,  921,  1033,  1085,  1106,  1367, 
1375,    1392. 


Bradley,  In  re  ( 108  la.  476,  79  X.  W. 

280)",  202. 
Bradley's    Estate    (3    Pa.    Dist.    Rep. 

359  "[1894]),   1055. 
Bradley  v.   Fallbrook   Irrigation   Dis- 
trict    (68    Fed.    948     [1895]).    119, 

121,   249,   355,   670,   697,    718,   726, 

728,   760,   1370. 
Bradley    v. "  City    of     Frankfort     ( 99 

Ind.    417    [1884]),    280,    918,    1027, 

1252. 
Bradley  v.  Jacques   ( —  Ky.  ,  110 

S.   W.   836    [1908])    486. 
Bradley  v.  IMcAtee  ( 7  Bush.  ( 70  Ky. ) 

667,'3    Am.    Rep.    309    [1870]),"  8, 

86,    89,     100,     172,    245,    301,    380, 

381,  462. 
Bradley    v.    Pittsburg     (130    Pa.    St. 

475,"  18  Atl.    730),   194,    195,    1108. 
Bradley    v.    Village    of   West    Duluth 

(45  "Minn.  4,  47  X\  W.  166  [1890]  ), 

238,  416. 
Bradley-Ramsay   Lumber    Co.   v.   Per- 
kins'  (109    La.    317,    33    So.    351), 

365. 
Brady,   In   the   Matter   of    (85   X.   Y. 

268   [1881]),  462,   1456,  1466. 
Brady  v.  Ball    (14  Ind.  317    [I860]), 

363. 
Brady     v.     Bartlett      (56     Cal.     350 

[1880]),  485,  495,   537,   1332. 
P>rady    v.    IMayor    etc.,    of    Brooklyn 
d'   Barb.     (X.    Y.)     584     [1847]"), 

542,    1498. 
Brady  v.   Burke    (90   Cal.   1,  27   Pac. 

52  [1891] ), 174,  538,  740,  770, 1046, 

r052.   1070,   1194,    1202.    1204,   1225, 

1370,   1378,    1390. 
Brady  v.  Feisel    (53  Cal.  49   [1878]), 

501,    754. 
Brady    v.    Ilayward     (114    :\lich.    326, 

72"  X.    W.    233    [1897]).    340,    666, 

690.  789. 
Brady  v.  Kelley  (.52  Cal.  371   [1877]), 

895,  1175,  1182. 
Brady  v.   King   (53  Cal.   44   [1878]), 

169,    242,    409,    414,    538,    665.   831, 

857,  980,  983. 
Brady  v.  IMayor  of  X'ew  York    (20  X. 

Y."312    [1859]).   495. 
Brady   v.   Tlie   IMayor   of   tlie   City   of 

X>w  York  (35  Howard,  81  [1868]), 

241,  503,   1443. 


Ixii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of 
New  York  (18  Howard,  343 
[1859]),  234,  495,  944,  1499. 

Brady  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monaity  of  New  York  (16  How. 
Pr.    (N.  Y.)   432),  495,  944. 

Brady  v.  New  York  (7  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)    234),   18,   495,  497. 

Brady  v.  Page  (59  Cal.  52  [1881]), 
781,   786,  787,   788,  795,  824,   1317. 

Brady  v.  Pvogers  (63  Mo.  App.  222 
[1895]),   527,  800. 

Brainerd,  Matter  of  (51  Hun,  380,  3 
N.  Y.  Sup.  889  [1889]),  401,  821, 
927,    1455. 

Brandenburg  v.  District  of  Columbia 
(26  App.  D.  C.  140  [1905]),  321, 
665,  666,  690,  691. 

Brandhuber  v.  City  of  Pierre    ( —  S. 

D.   ,    113   N.   W.   569    [1907]), 

440,  709. 

Brands  v.  City  of  Louisville  (111  Ky. 
50,  63  S.  W.  2  [1901]),  223,  234, 
203,  268,  363,  586,  598,  776,  780, 
1478,   1488. 

Brass  v.  Rathbone  (153  N.  Y.  435, 
47  N.  E.  905),  124. 

Bravard  v.  Cincinnati,  H.  &  I.  R.  Co. 
(115  Ind.   1,   17  N.   E.   183),   1015. 

Breath,  Guardian  v.  City  of  Glalves- 
ton  (92  Tex.  454,  45  S.  W.  575 
[1899]),   223,  278,   497,   777,    1235. 

Breed  v.  City  of  Alegheny  (85  Pa.  St. 
(4  Norris)  214  [1877]),  397,  437, 
927,  937,  958,  1026,  1157,  1337. 

Breen  v.  City  of  Troy  (60  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  417  [1871]),  223,  233,  381, 
461,  464. 

Brehm  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(104  N.  Y.  186,  ^0  N.  E.  158 
[1887]),  989,  1375.  1484.  1487, 
1492. 

Brehm  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(39  Hun  (N.  Y.)"  533  [1886]), 
1484,    1492. 

Brenchweh  v.  Drake  (31  0.  S.  652 
[1877]),   1164,   11G9. 

Brennan  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  44  Minn. 
464,  47  N.  W.  55  [1890]),  631, 
635,  896. 


Brethold  v.  Village  of  Wilmette  (168 
111.  162,  48  N.  E.  38  [1897]),  278, 
1306. 

Breuer  v.  Gibson  (29  Ohio  C.  C.  266 
[1906]),    1012. 

Breevoort  v.  Detroit  (24  Mich.  322 
[1872]),  296,  314,  325,  437,  500, 
574,  628,  868,  958,  959,  962,  963, 
1448. 

Breevoort  v.  Randolph  ( 7  How.  Pr. 
398),   1057. 

Brewer  v.  Village  of  Bowling  Green, 
Ohio  (7  Ohio  C.  C.  489  [1893]), 
223,  263,  271,  570,  837,  877. 

Brewer  v.  Bridges  (164  Ind.  358,  73 
N.  E.  811    [1905]),  482. 

Brewer,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Elizabeth 
(66  N.  J.  L.  (37  Vr.)  547,  49  Atl. 
480  [1001]),  891,  909,  964,  1015, 
1361,  1403,  1408. 

Brewer  v.  City  of  Springfield  (97 
Mass.  152  [1867]),  324,  649,  663, 
697,   763,  887,   1141,   1423. 

Brewster  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Newark  ( 1 1 
N.  J.  Eq.  (3  Stockton)  114 
[1856]),  53,  55,  737,  760,  981. 
1450. 

Brewster  v.  City  of  Peru  (180  111. 
124,  54  N.  E.  233  [1899]),  862. 
1278. 

Brewster  v.  City  of  Syracuse  ( 19  N. 
Y.  116  [1859]),  15*  89,  100,  166, 
169,  252,  410,  414,  424,  483. 

Brick  &,  Terra  Cotta  Co.  v.  Hull 
(49  Mo.  App.  433  [1892]),  301, 
528,  544,  601,  621,  630,  650,  1011, 
1015. 

Bridge  Proprietors  v.  Hoboken  Com- 
pany (1  Wall.  (U.  S.)  116  [1863]), 
715. 

Bridgeport,  City  of  v.  Giddings  (43 
Conn.  304  [1876]),  280,  738,  745, 
907,   1389. 

Bridgeport,  City  of  v.  New  York  and 
New  Haven  Railroad  Company  (36 
Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869]), 
4,  8,  11,  35,  42,  89,  147,  284,  322. 
594,  613,  652,  657. 

Bridgford,  Matter  of  (65  Hun,  227, 
20  N.  Y.  Sup.  281  [1892]),  527, 
918,  979,   1337,   1443. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixiii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Brientnall  v.  City  of  Philadelphia 
103  Pa.  St.  150  [1883]),  227,  293, 
483,  503,  555,  779,  1005,  1007,  1157, 
1158,    1338. 

Briggs  V.  Union  Drainage  District 
No.  1  (140  111.  53,  29  N.  E.  721 
[1893]),  202,  340,  549,  564,  630, 
921,   952,   955,    1283,    1351,    1362. 

Briggs  V.  Whitney  { 159  Mass.  97, 
34  N.  E.   179    [1893]),   356,  573. 

Brighton  Ry.  Co.  v.  St.  Giles  ( 4  L.  R. 
(Exch.   Div.)    239),   597. 

Britten  v.  City  of  Philadelphia  (32 
Pa.  St.  (8'Casey)  387  [1859]), 
347,  525,  1157,  1158,  1332. 

Broad  Street,  Sewickley  Methodist 
Episcopal  Church's  Appeal  (165 
Pa.  St.  475,  30  Atl.  1007  [1895]), 
42,  588,  013,   1012. 

Broadway  Widening,  In  the  Matter  of 
(63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  572  [1872]), 
269,  549,  550,  744,  902. 

Broadway  in  the  City  of  New  York, 
In  the  Matter  of  Widening  of  ( 01 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  483  [1872]),  130, 
170,   1368. 

Broadway  in  the  City  of  New  York, 
In  the  Matter  of  Widening  (42 
Howard  (N.  Y.)  220  [1872]),  130, 
170,  950,   1347. 

Broadway  Baptist  Church  v.  McAtee 
(71  Ky.  (8  Bush.)  508,  8  Am. 
Rep.  480  [1871]),  53,  118,  121,  223, 
234,  244,  292,  373,  374,  380,  381, 
462,  553,  501,  588,  013,  028,  005, 
606,  678,  709,  710,  829,  844,  979, 
981,   1026,   1112. 

Broadwell  v.  Banks  (134  Fed.  470 
[1905]),   1054. 

Brock  V.  Luning  (89  Cal.  310,  26 
'  Pac.  972  [1891]),  15,  483,  510, 
522,  777,  1031,  1337,  1359. 

Brockschmidt  v.  Ca vender,  3  Mo.  App. 
508    (50,  895,   1182,  13?3. 

Bromwell  v.  Flowers  (217  111.  174, 
75  N.  E.  400  [1905]),  200,  293, 
1472. 

Brookbank  v.  City  of  Jeffersonville 
(41  Ind.  400  [1872]),  475,  490, 
742,  808,  842,   1103,   1182,   1350. 

Brookfield  v.  City  of  Sterling  (214 
111.  100,  73  N.  E.  302  [1905]), 
781. 


Brooklyn,  In  the  Matter  of  the  City 

of    V.    Lott    (2    Hun     (N.    Y.)    028 

[1874]),  037. 
Brooklyn  Park  Commissioners  v.  Arm- 
strong   (45  N.   Y.  234,  0  Am.   Rep. 

70   [1871]),  356. 
Brooks  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 

Baltimore    (48    Md.    205)     [1877]), 

86,    100,    110, 
Brooks  V.   City   of   Chicago    (168   111. 

60,  48  N.  E.  136  [1897]),  501,  023, 

909,  920,  921. 
Brooks   V.   Hyde    (37    Cal.  376),   180. 
Brooks    V.    Village    of    Norwood     ( 12 

Ohio  C.  C.  257   [1896]),  686,  1432. 
Brooks    V.    City   of    San   Luis   Obispo 

(109  Cal.  50,  41  Pac.  791    [1895]), 

309,  472. 
Brooks    V.     Satterlee     (49     Cal.     289 

[1874]),  500,  759. 
Brophy  v.  Harding    (137   111.   621,  27 

N.   E.  523,  34   N.   E.   253    [1892]), 

882,  909,   1200. 
Brophy   v.    Landman    (28    0.    S.   542, 

[1870]),  494,   828. 
Brosemer  v.  Kelsey    (106  Ind.  504,  7 

N.   E.   569    [1886]),  726,   735,   886, 

887. 
Brown   to   Vacate   an   Assessment,   In 

the   Matter   of   the  Petiton   of    (14 

Daly    (N.  Y.)    103    [1886]),   1036. 
Brown   v.    Beatty    (34   Miss.    227,    09 

Am.  Dec.  389 '[1857]),  71. 
Brown  v.  Central  Bermudez  Co.    ( 162 

Ind.    452,    09    N.    E.    150    [1903]), 

108,    301,   472,   493,    099,   731,   749, 

919,  1003,  1004,  1030,  1110. 
Brown  v.  City  of  Chicago  (117  111. 

21,  7  N.  E.  108  [1887]),  703,  700, 

913,  925,  1026,  1292,   1439,  1444. 
Brown  v.  City  of  Chicago   ( 62  111.  289 

[1871]),  745,  703,  704,   1185,  1299. 
Brown    v.    City    of    Denver    (7    Colo. 

305,  3   Pac. '455   [1884]),  119,  152, 

720,  729. 
Brown     v.      Drain      (112     Fed.     582 

[1901]),    118,    119,    134,    239,    301, 

1030,  1414. 
Brown    v.     Eagle    Creek    and     Little 

White  Lick  Gravel   Road  Company 

(78  Ind.  421  [1881]),  80,  322. 


Ixi^ 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  iire  to  sections.] 


Brown    v.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Fitchburg   (128  Mass.  282   [1880]), 

413,  444,  813,    1404. 
Brown  v.   Hammond    ( 2   Chan.   Cases, 

249      [1678]),     1015,     1054,      1426, 

1430. 
Brown  v.  Jenks    (98  Cal.  10,  32  Pac. 

701    [1893]),    519. 
Brown  v.  City  of  Joliet    (22  111.  123 

[1859]),  883,  909,  1039,  1350,1351. 
Brown    v.     Keener     (74    N.    C.     714 

[1876]),  5,   19,  54,  341,  711. 
Brown   v.   Milwaukee  and  Prairie   du 

Chien  Ry.  Co.   (21  Wis.  39,  91  Am. 

Dec.  456  [1866]),  363. 
Brown  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the   City  of  New  York 

(63   N.   Y.    239    [1875]),   487,   958, 

982. 
Brown  v.  Otis    (90  N.  Y.  S.  250,  98 

App.    Div.    554    [1904]),    890,    917, 

1026. 
Brown  v.  City  of  Saginaw  (107  Mich. 

643,  65  N.  W.  601),  555,  776,  911, 

927,  934,  935,  939. 
Brown  v.   Town   of   Union,    65   N.   J. 

L.     (36     Vr.)     601,     48     Atl.     562 

[1900]),  324,  408,   964,   1361. 
Browne  v.   Palmer    (66   Neb.   287,   92 

N.  W.  315   [1902]),  615,  617. 
Brownell   v.  Board   of    Supervisors  of 

Gratiot  County    (49   Mich.  414,   13 

N.  W.  798   [1882]),  340,  581,  956, 

1072,  1469,  1471,  1473,  1474. 
Browning  v.  City  of  Chicago  (155  111. 

314,  40  N.  E.  Rep.  565  [1895]), 

909,   918,   921,   925,   926. 
Bruecher   v.  Village   of  Port   Chester, 

(101     N,     Y.     240,     4     N.     E.  272 

[1886]),  1484,  1486. 
Bruecher  v.   Village  of  Port   Chester 

(31    Hun     (N.    Y.)     550     [1884]), 

1484. 
Bruecher   v.    Village    of   Port   Chester 

(17  Abb.  N.  C.  361    [1886]),   1484. 
Brnner    v.    Bay   City    (46   INIich.    236, 

9  N.  W.  263    [1881]),  1442. 
Bruner    v.   Palmer    (108    Ind.    397,    9 

N.  E.  354   [1886]),  363. 
Bruning  v.   Chadwick    (109  La.    1067, 

34    So.    90    [1903],    118,   492,    713, 

836,  1277. 


Brush   V.   City   of   Detroit    (32   Mick 

43    [1875]  i,   391,   394. 
Bryan    v.    City    of    Chicago     (60    111. 

507   [1871]),  860,  861. 
Bryant's   Appeal    (104   Pa.   St.    372), 

il08,   1146. 
Bryant  v.  Bobbins    (70  Wis.   258,  35 

N.    W.    545    [1887]),    93,    97,    191, 

278,  335,  340,  420,  550. 
Bryant  v.   Russell    (127   Mo.   422,   30 

S.  W.  107  [1894]),  308,  1197,1373. 
Buchan    v.     Broadwell     (88     Mo.    31 

[1885]),  86,  779. 
Buchanan   v.   Kansas   City    (208    Mo. 

674,  106  S.  W.  531),  1067. 
Buckley  v.   Commissioners   of   Lorain 

County   (I  Ohio  C.  C.  251   [1885]), 

564,  1421,  1452. 
Buckley  v.  City  of  Tacoma   (9  Wash. 

253,  37  Pac.  441  [1894]),  229,  413, 

424,   754,   824,    830,   833,   837,   838, 

984. 
Buckley  v.  City  of  Tacoma   ( 9  Wash. 

269,     37     Pac.     446     [1894]),   .810, 

1280. 
Buckman  v.   Cuneo    (103   Cal.   62,  36 

Pac.    1025    [1894]),    537,    538,    907, 

1061,    1002. 
Buckman   v.   Hatcli    (139   Cal.    53,   72 

Pac.  445    [1903]),  831,   1229,   1248, 

1263,    1265. 
Buckman  v.   Landers    (111    Cal.   347, 

43  Pac.  1125  [1896]),  301,  538,  645, 

723,  724,  1150,  1151,  1153,  1281, 

1290,  1358,  1379,  1385. 
Bucknall  v.  Story  (46  Cal.  589,  13 

Am.  Rep.  220  [1873]),  309,  887, 

986,    1030,    1052,   1347,    1426,    1427, 

1478,    1484,    1488. 
Bucknall      v.      Story      (36      Cal.      67 

[1868]),   1109,   1202,   1205,   1297. 
Buckner    v.    Sugg    (79   Ark.    442,    96 

S.   W.    184    [1906]),   343,   609. 
Bucroft  V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs   (63 

la.  646,  19  N.  W.  807),  438,   1498. 
Budd    V.    Reidelbach     (128    Ind.    145, 

27  K  E.  349   [1890]),  340,  1350. 
Buddeeke     v.     Ziegenheim     ( 122    Mo. 

239,    26    S.    W.    696    [1894]),    311, 

1411. 
Budge  V.  City  of  Grand  Forks    ( 1  N. 

D.  309,   10  L.  R.  A.   105,  47  X.  W. 

390    [1890]),    974,    1206,    1207. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixv 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Buell  V.  Ball  (20  la.  282  [ISGO]),  53, 
55,   323,  549,   555,   030. 

Buell  V.  Trustees  of  the  Village  of 
Lock-port  (11  Barb.  002  [1852]), 
927,   998,    1142. 

Buess,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  West  Hobo- 
ken  (51  N.  J.  L.  (22  Vr.)  267,  17 
Atl.    110    [1889]),   894. 

Buffalo,  Matter  of  the  City  of  ( 78  X. 
K  Y.  362    [1879]),   781. 

Buffalo  Cemetery  Association  v.  City 
of  Buffalo  (118  N.  Y.  61,  22  X.  E. 
962  [1889]),  313,  592,  614. 

Buffalo  City  Cemetery  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo (46  X.  Y.  506  [1871]),  11, 
42,  323,  420,  592,  613,  614,  888. 

Buffalo  Union  Iron  Works  v.  City  of 
Buffalo  (13  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)"l41 
[1870]),   360,  456,   717. 

Buhler,  In  the  Matter  of  (32  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)    79   [1859]),  438,  570,  780. 

Buhlcr,  In  the  Matter  of  (19  How- 
ard, 317    [1859]),  1452. 

Bunce  v.  West  (62  la.  80  [1883]), 
1146. 

Buras  Levee  District,  Board  of  Com- 
missioners for  V.  Mialegvieh  ( 52 
La.  Ann.  1292,  27  So.  790  [1900]). 
548. 

Burck  V.  Davis  ( 35  Ind.  App.  048, 
73  X.  E.   192    [1905]),  363. 

Burgdorf  v.  District  of  Columbia  (7 
App.  D.  C.  405  [1896]),  347,  373, 
376. 

Burgess  v.  City  of  Jefferson  (21  La. 
Ann.  143),  515. 

Burgett  v.  Xorris  (25  0.  S.  308 
[1874]),   781. 

Burggreve  v.  City  of  Cincinnati  ( 1 
Ohio  X.  P.  80   [1894],  625,  704. 

Burguieres  v.  Sanders  (111  La.  109, 
35  So.  478  [1903]),  38,  118,  340, 
697. 

Burhans  v.  Village  of  Xorwood  Park 
(138  111.  147,  27  X.  E.  1088 
[1892]),  393,  396,  401,  663,  670. 
715,  916,  921,  922,  923,   1375. 

Burk  v.  Altschul  (66  Cal.  533,  6  Pac. 
393    [1885]),   441,    470,   570. 

Burk  V.  Ayers  (19  Him  (X.  Y.)  17 
[1879]),   101. 

Burke,   In   the   Matter  of    (62   X.   Y. 


224  [1875]),  381,  432,  437,  462, 
762,    982,    1054,    1456,    1460,    1463. 

Burke  v.  Lukens  ( 12  Ind.  App.  648, 
54  Am.  St.  Rep.  539,  40  X.  E.  641 
[1895]),  11.  1070. 

Burke  v.  Turney  (54  Cal.  486 
[1880]),    521,    1332. 

Burke  v.  City  of  Water  Valley  (87 
Miss.  732,  112  Am.  St.  Rep.  468, 
40  So.  820  [1905]),  6,  20,  353, 
1054. 

Burlington,  City  of  v.  Gilbert  (31 
la.  356,  7  Am.  Rep.  143  [1871]), 
570,   800,    1012,    1013. 

Burlington,  City  of  v.  Quick  (47  la. 
222  [1877])',  86,  274,  275,  301, 
308,  416,  423,  666,  098,  709,  777, 
977,    979,    9S1,    1049,    1000. 

Burlington,  Independent  School  Dis- 
trict of  V.  Citv  of  Burlington  ( CO 
la.  500,  15  "  X.  W.  Rep.  295 
[1883]),   873. 

Burlington  Sav.  Bank  v.  City  of 
Clinton,  Iowa  (  106  Fed.  "  269 
[1901]),  118,  301,  690,  Oni,  995, 
1502,  1525. 

Burmeister,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment (76  X.  Y.  174  [1879]),  315, 
432,  437,  441,  462,  762,  836,  982, 
1456. 

Burmeister,  In  the  ^Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  (56  Howard  (X.  Y.) 
416  [1879]),  381,  537,  740,  762, 
1456. 

Burmeister,  In  the  Matter  of  (12 
Hun  (X.  Y.)  478  [1878]),  762,  861. 

Burmeister,  In  the  ^Matter  of  (9 
Hun  613  [1877]),  432,  437,  441, 
462,    762,    836,    9o2,    1456. 

Burnes  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Atchison  (2  Kan.  454  (original 
edition)  2  Kan.  448  (second  edi- 
tion) [1864]),  22.  38,  250,  666, 
697,    098. 

Burnes  v.  Ballinger  (76  Mo.  App. 
58    [1898]),    1085.    1105,    1168. 

Burnet  v.  Corporation  of  Cincinnati 
(3  Ohio  73,  17  Am.  Dec.  582 
[1827]),   1420. 

Burnett,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Town  of  Boonton  ( —  X.  J.  L. 
,  70  Atl.  67   [1908]),  837,  840. 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Burnett  v.  Town  of  Boonton    (73  N. 

J.  Law    (44  Vr.)    102,  63  Atl.  995 

[1906]),    1407. 
Burnett     v.      Mayor     and      Common 

Council   of   the   City   of   Sacramen- 
to   (12   Cal.   76,   73   Am.   Dec.   518 

[1859]),  43,  86,  110,  147,  148,  235, 

236,   549,   622,   666,   805,   809,   844. 
Burnham   v.   City   of  Milwaukee    (98 

Wis.   128,  73  N.  W.   1018   [1897]), 

191. 
Burnish    Street,   Widening  of,   Potts- 

ville    Borough     (140    Pa.    St.    531. 

21  Atl.  500  [1891]),  223,  234,  776. 
Burns  v.   City  of   Duluth    (96  Minn. 

104,   104  N.  W.   714    [1905]),   245, 

416,  423,   468,  469,   719,   873. 
Burns    v.    Mayor    of    New    York     ( 3 

Hun   212    [1874]),   263,   266,   492. 
Burns    v.    Patterson     (2    Handy    271 

[1855]),   18,  977,  1215,   1224. 
Burns     v.     Spratley      (5     Kan.     551 

[1870]),   45,    1173. 
Burr  V.  Veeder   (3  Wend.  412),  1057. 
Burris  v.  Baxter    (25  Ind.  App.   536, 

58   N.    E.   Rep.    733    [1900]),    7S3, 

843,    1248. 
Burt    V.    Hasselman     (139    Ind.    190, 

38  N.  E.  598    [1894]),   1191. 
Burton,  v.    City  of    Chicago    (62    111. 

179    [1871]),  745,  913,  914,  978. 
Burton   v.    City   of   Chicago    (53    III. 

87    [1869]),   731,   747,   913,   91G. 
Busbee    v.    Commissio?iers    of    Wake 

County   (93  N.  C.  143   [1885]),  11, 

35,  38,  39,  147,  567. 
Busenbark     v.     Clements      (22     Ind. 

App.   557,   53   N.   E.    665    [1899]), 

229,  735,  739,  777,  930,  1004,  1010, 

1015,   1019. 
Busenbark   v.    Etchison   Ditching   As- 
sociation    (02     Ind.     314     [1878]), 

1244,    1251. 
Bush  V.  City  of  Cincinnati    (18  0^'io 

C.   C.   605    [1899]),   794,   797,   801. 
Bush    V.    City    of    Dubucue     (69    la. 

233,  28  N.  W.  542  [1886]),  342, 

737,  1404,  1408. 
Bush  V.  City  of  Peoria  (215  111.  515, 

74  N".  E.  797  [1905]),  381,  386, 

461,  463,  464. 
Butchers'     Slaughtering     &     Melting 

Association        v.        Commonwealth 


(169     Mass.    103,    47    N.    E.     599 

[1897]),  70,   578,   654. 
Butler    V.    City    of    Chicago    (56    111. 

341    [1870]),   764,    772,   914,    1299. 
Butler   V.   Detroit    (43   Mich.    552,    5 

N.     W.     1078    [1880]),     194.     195, 

415,   483,   525,   538,   541,   813,   828, 

1432,    1447. 
Butler  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of 

the  Town  of  Keyport   ( 64  N.  J.  L. 

(35  Vr.)    181,  44  Atl.  849  [1899]), 

391,  394. 
Butler  V.  Nevin   (88  111.  575  [1878]), 

51,  1044,  1060,  1112. 
Butler    V.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Saginaw       Co.       (26      Mich.       22 

[1872]),    1469. 
Butler    V.    City    of    Toledo     (5    0.    S. 

225     [1855]),    313,    408,    414,    436, 

^54,    1072. 
Butler    V.    City    of    Worcester     (112 

Mass.  541     [\873]),    80,    244,    272, 

324,   326,   444.    563,    627,    645,    695. 

697,     745,    771,    773,    1347,     1478, 

1480. 
Butte,  City  of  v.  School  District  No. 

1     (29    Mont.    336,    74    Pac.    869 

[1904]),  11,  50,  286,  291.  370,  586, 

653,   657. 
Button    V.    Kremer     (114    Ky.    463, 

71  S.  W.  332,  24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1193 

[1902]),    628. 
Butts  V.  Common  Council  of  Roches- 
ter   (5  Lansing  142    [1871]),   1406. 
Bye,   Pros.   v.    Atlantic    City    (73   N, 
'j.    L.    402,    64    Atl.    1056    [1906]), 

523,    1568. 
Byram  v.  City  of  Detroit    (50  Mich. 

56,   14  N.   W.   698,    12   N.   W.   912 

[1883]),  959,  1012,  1016,  1411, 

1434,  1436. 
Byram  v.  Foley  (17  Ind.  App.  629, 

47  N.  E.  351  [1897]),  328.  549, 

563,  620,  648,  658,  1004,  1005. 
Byrne  v.  Drain  ( 127  Cal.  663,  60 
•   Pac.  433  [1900]),  1425,  1427. 


Cabell  V.  City  of  Henderson  ( —  Ky. 

,  88  S.  W.  1095,  28  Ky.  L.  R. 

89  [1905]),  301,  843,  844,  951, 
1141,  1145,  1244,  1249. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


Ixvii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Cadmus  v.   Fagan    (47   X.   J.   L.    (18 

Vr.)      549,    4    Atl.      323      [1885]), 

1072. 
Cady  V.  City  of  San  Bernardino    ( — 

Cal.    \    94    Pac.    242     [1908]), 

495,    509. 
Cahn    V.    Metz     (101    N.    Y.    S.    302 

[1906]),  510,  527. 
Cain     V.     Commissioners     of     Davie 

County    (86   N.   C.   8    [1882]),   38, 

43,    147,    148,    363.    567. 
Cain  V.   City  of   Elkins    (57    W.   Va. 

9,  49  S.   E.  898    [1905]),  231,  444, 

446,    1420,    1432. 
Cain  V.  City  of  Omaha   (42  Neb.  120, 

60    N.    W.    368    [1894]),    11,    629, 

665,   666,   729. 
Cairo    and    St.    Louis    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Peoples    (92   111.    97,    34   Am.    Rep. 

112   [1879]),  363. 
Caldwell  v.  Village  of  Carthage    (49 

O.   S.   334,   31    N.   E.   602    [1892]), 

90,    113,    119,    133,    308,    700,    728, 

736,   739. 
Caldwell     v.    Rupert      (73    Ky.      (10 

Bush.)    179   [1873]),  223,  234,  554, 

628,    775,    776,    777,    981,    1505. 
California   v.   ■ .      (See 

People    of    State    of    California    v. 

.) 

California    Improvement   Company   v. 

Moran    (128  Cal.  373,   60  Pac.  969 

[1900]),   301,   504,   761,   762,    1031, 

1292,    1337. 
California   Improvement   Company   v. 

Quinchard    (119    Cal.    87,    51    Pac. 

24    [1897]),   521. 
California   Improvement   Company   v. 

Reynolds     (123    Cal.    88,    58    Pac. 

802    [1F08]),    273,    759,    763,    867, 

1235,    1281. 
California    Reduction  Co.  v.    Sanitary 

Reduction    Works   of    San    Francis- 
co.    (199    U.    S.    306,    26    S.     100 

[1905]),    372. 
California  Reduction  Co.  v.  Sanitary 

Reduction   Works   of   San   Francis- 
co   (126    Fed.   29,   61    C.    C.    A.    91 

[1903],    372. 
Calkins  v.  Spraker    (26  111.  App.   159 

[1877]),  731,  772,  927,  930. 
Calkins   v.   City  of   Toledo    (12   Oliio 

C.   C.   202    [1896]),   561,   625,    704. 


Call  Publishing  Co.  v.  Lincoln  (29 
Neb.  149,  45  N.  W.  245  [1890]), 
486. 

Callender  v.  Patterson  (06  Cal.  356, 
5  Pac.  610   [1885]),   1034. 

Callister  v.  Kochersperger  ( 168  111. 
334,  48  N.  E.  156  [1897]),  531, 
533,   539. 

Callon  v.  City  of  Jacksonville  ( 147 
111.  113.  35  N.  E.  223  [1894]), 
329,   447,   663,   857,   911. 

Cambria  Street  (75  Pa.  St.  (25  P. 
F.   Smith)    357),  281. 

Camden,  City  of  v.  Camden  Village 
Corporation  (77  Me.  530,  1  Atl. 
689),  580. 

Camden,  Treasurer  of  the  City  of 
v.  Mulford  (26  N.  J.  L."  (2 
Dutch.)    49    [1856]),  91,  927. 

Cameron,  In  the  Matter  of  (50  N. 
Y.    502    [1872]),    826. 

Camp  v.  Township  of  Algansee  (50 
Mich.  4,  14  N.  \N.  072  [1883]), 
1495. 

Camp  V.  Neuscheler  (67  X.  J.  L. 
(38  Vr.)  21,  50  Atl.  597  [1901]), 
475.   1103. 

Campau  v.  Charbenenu,  Drain  Com- 
missioner (105  Mich.  422,  63  N. 
W.    435    [1895]),    748,    751. 

Campbell  v.  Dwiggins  (83  Ind.  473 
[1882]),    79,    115.  • 

Campbell  v.  Board  of  County  Com- 
missioners of  Monroe  County 
(118  Ind.  119,  20  N.  E.  772 
[1888]),   677,   952,   954,    1347. 

Campbell  v.  Park  (32  0.  S.  544 
[1877]),  785,  786,  787,-788,  789, 
795,   796,    1282. 

Campion  v.  City  of  Elizabeth  (41 
N.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  355  [1879]), 
229,    909,    967,    1486,    1487. 

Canal  and  Walker  Streets,  In  the 
Matter  of  Extending  (12  N.  Y. 
406  [1855),  910,  911,  1347. 

Canal  Street,  Matter  of  (11  Wend. 
(N.    Y.)     154    [1834]),    206. 

Canal  Street,  In  the  Matter  of  Open- 
ing (8  Barb.  N.  Y.)  505  [1850]), 
909. 

Canaseraga,  Village  of  v.  Oreen  (88 
X.   Y.   S.   539    [1903]).   354,   451. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References,  are  to  sections.] 


Canriell  v.  Smith  (34  Wis.  381 
[1874]),  781,  789,  1006,  1007, 
1432,   1445,   1450. 

Canton,  Lity  of  v.  Wagner  (54  Ohio 
St.  329,  45  X.  E.  953  [189G]), 
740,    754. 

Capitol  National  Bank  of  Lincoln 
V.  First  National  Bank  of  Cadiz 
(172   U.   S.   425,    19    S.    202),   715. 

Capron  v.  Hitchcock  (98  Cal.  427, 
33  Pac.  431  [1893]),  244,  486, 
521,  776,  811,  985,  1006,  1007, 
1337,    1379. 

Carey  v.  City  of  East  Saginaw  ( 79 
Mich.   73,  44  N.  W.   168),   1015. 

Carey  v.  Gundlefinger  ( 12  Ind.  App. 
645,  40  N.  E.  1112  [1895]),  1058, 
1072. 

Carlin  v.  Cavender  (56  Mo.  280 
[1874]),   522,  871,   1040. 

Carlisle  v.  City  of  Cincinnati  (29 
Ohio  C.  C.  81  [1906]),  71,  308, 
1012. 

Carlisle  v.  Hetherington  (47  O.  S. 
235,  24  N.  E.  488  [1890]),  38, 
147,  322,  629. 

Carlisle  v.  Yoder  (69  Miss.  384,  12 
So.    255),    343. 

Carleton  Street  between  ]\Iain  and 
Jefl'erson  Streets  in  the  City  of 
Buffalo,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Tak- 
ing of  Lands,  etc.,  for  widening 
16    Hun    497    [1879]),    308. 

Carlyle,  City  of  v.  County  of  Clin- 
ton (140  111.  512,  30  N.  E.  782 
[1893]),  223,  234,  413,  424,  775, 
777,   837,   873. 

Carpenter  v.  Cook  (67  Vt.  102,  30 
Atl.   998    [1898]),   363. 

Carpenter  v.  Board  of  County 
Com'rs  of  Hennepin  County,  5G 
Minn.    513,    45    Am.    St.    Rep".    494, 

58  N.    W.    295    [1894]),    393. 
Carpenter     v.     Mayor     and     Council 

of  the  City  of  Hoboken    (33  N.  J. 

Eq.    (6   Stew.)    27    [1880]),  G,   353, 

1054,   1443. 
Carpenter   v.    City   of    St.    Taul    (23 

Minn.   232    [1876]),   391,   394,   500, 

555,   556,   670,   956,   959,   997. 
Carpenter    v.    Wilson     (100    Md.    13. 

59  Atl.    186    [1904]),    1054. 


Carr  v.  Dooley  (119  Mass.  294 
[1875]),   1067*. 

Carr  v.  Duhnie  (167  Ind.  76,  78 
N.  E.  322    [1906]).  269,  340,   1009. 

Carr  v.  People  ex  rei.  Goedtner  (224 
111.  160,  79  N.  E.  648  [1906]), 
247,   258,    1030,    1348,    1366. 

Carroll  v.  City  of  Marshall  (99  Mo. 
App.  464,  73  S.  W.  1102  [1903]), 
67. 

Carroll  v.  City  of  St.  Loui^s  (4  Mo. 
App.  191  [1877]),  393,  396,  1509, 
1518. 

Carron  v.  Martin  (26  N.  J.  L.  (2 
Dutch.)  594,  69  Am.  Dec.  584 
[1857]),  229,  394,  425,  777,  781. 
785,  789,  796,  1004,  1006,  1007, 
1060,    1196,    1204,    1335. 

Carry  v.  Gaynor  (22  0.  S.  584 
[1872]),   1216. 

Carson  v.  Brockton  Sewerage  Com- 
mission (182  U.  S.  398,  45  L. 
1151,  21  S.  860  [1901]),  124,  292, 
332,  373,  375,  421.  666,  718,  734, 
1045. 

Car.son  v.  St.  Francis  Drainage  Dis- 
trict (59  Ark.  513,  27  S.  W.  590 
[1894]),  79,  97,  102,  103,  105,  131, 
132,  177,  178,  247,  251,  253,  256, 
343,  566,  660,  691. 

Carson  v.  Sewerage  Commissioners 
of  Brockton  (175  Mass.  242,  48 
L.  R.  A.  277,  56  N.  E.  1  [1900]), 
6,  20,  124,  292,  332,  373,  375,  421, 
666,   718,   734,   1045. 

Carter  v.  Cemansky  (126  la.  506, 
102  N.  W.  438  [1905]),  18,  778, 
918,   985,    1016,    1072,    1441. 

Carter  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 57  111. 
283    [1870]),   296,   323,   1430. 

Carter  v.  Wright  (3  Dutch.  207), 
412. 

Cartersville  Water  Works  Company 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Car- 
tersville (89  Ga.  689,  16  S.  E.  70 
[1892]),   73. 

Carthage,  City  of  ex  rel  Carthage 
National  Bank  v.  Badgley  (73  Mo. 
App.  123  [1897]),  313.  436,  873, 
1135,    1284. 

Carthage,  Village  of  v.  Frederick 
(122   N.   Y.   268,    19   Am.    St.    Rep. 


II 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixix 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


490,    10    L.    R.    A.    178,    25    X.    E. 

480   [1890]),  58,  457. 
Caseaden    v.    City   of   Waterloo    ( 106 

la.    673,    77    X.    W.    33-3    [1898]), 

827. 
Case  V.   Fowler    (65  Ind.   29   [1878]). 

501. 
Case     V.      .Johnson      (91      Ind.      477 

[1883]),  223,  234. 
Case   V.    City   of    Sullivan    (222    111. 

56,  78  N.  E.  37  [1906]),  536,  537, 

840. 
Case  V.  Inhabitants  of  City  of  Tren- 
ton   (—    X".    J.    ,    68    Atl.    57 

[1907]),   497,   498. 
Casey    v.    City   of    Leavenworth     (17 

Kan.    189    [1876]),    275,   313,   621, 

1326,    1506. 
Casey   v.   People   ex   rel.   Kochersper- 

gei-      (165     111.    49,     46    X.    E.      7 

[1P97]),   764,   772,   914,   930,   1372, 

1379. 
Casey   v.   People  ex   rel.    Kochersper- 

ger    (159    111.    267,    49    X.    E.    882 

[1896]),  903,   1340. 
Caskey    v.    City    of    Greensburg     ( 78 

Ind.    233    [1881]),    281,    738. 
Cason    V.    Harrison     ( 135    Ind.    330, 

35   X".    E.    268    [1893]),    1360. 
Cason  V.   City  of  Lebanon    (153   Ind. 

567,   55    X\    E.    768),    60,    85,   245. 

293,   301,   306,   431,   486,   507,    783, 

843,  1000,  1030,  1031,  1430,  1431. 
Cass  V.  Dicks  (14  Wash.  75,  53  Am. 

St.  Rep.  859,  44  Pac.  113  [1896]), 

105. 
Cass  V.  Dillon   (2  0.  S.  607   [1853]), 

162. 
Cass    V.    People    ex.    rel.    Kochersper- 

ger    (166    111.    126,    46    X.    E.    729 

[1897]),    763,    857,    864,    867.    929. 

986,    1019,    1033,    1183. 
Cass   County,   Board  of   Commission- 
ers   of    V.    Plotner     (149    Ind.     116, 

48  X^  E.  635    [1897]),   1015.   1019, 

1033. 
Ca>s  Farm  Company  v.  Detroit   (181 

U.    S.    396,    45    L.'  914,    21    S.    644, 

645    [1901]),    118.   314,   702. 
Cass    Farm    Co.    v.    City    of    Detroit 
(124    Mich.    433,    83*  X^    W.     108 

[1900]),    lis,    314,    524,    G98,    702. 


Cassady  v.  Hammer  (62  la.  359,  17 
X.  W.  588),  1054. 

Cassitt   Land    Co.   v.   Xeuscheler    ( — 

X.  J.  ,   60   Atl.    1128    [1905]), 

314. 

Gathers    v.    Moores     ( —    Xeb.    . 

110  X.  W.  689,  113  X.  W.  119 
[1907]),    1499. 

Catlettsburg,  City  of  v.  Self  (115 
Ky.  6C9,  74  s!  W.  1064,  25  Ky. 
Law.    Rep.    161     [1903]),    462. 

Cattell  V.  Putnam  (73  Ohio  St.  147, 
76  X.  E.   390   [1905]),   1067,   1072. 

Cauldwell  v.  Curry  (93  Ind.  363 
[1883]),    1030,   1444. 

Cavanaugii    v.    Sanderson    ( —    Mich. 

• .   115  X.  W.  955   [1908]),  270. 

1015,    1027,    1414,    1437. 

Cawker    v.    City    of    Milwaukee     ( — 

Wis.  ,  113  X.  W.  419  [1907]). 

962,    1442. 

Cedar  Park,  In  re  ( 1  How.  Pr.  X.  S. 
257  [1885]),  557,  594,  598,  639, 
723. 

Cemansky  v.  Fitch  ( 121  la.  186.  96 
X.  W.  754  [1903]),  323,  1066, 
1067,    1072. 

Cemetery  of  'Sit.  Auburn,  Proprie- 
tors of  the  v.  Ma.vor  and  Alder- 
men of  Cambridge  ( 150  Mass.  12, 
4  L.  R.  A.  836,  22  X.  E.  66 
[1889]),    86. 

Center  &  Warren  Gravel  Road  Co. 
V.  Black  (32  Ind.  468  [1870]). 
322,    1125,    1431. 

Central    Covington,   Town   of   v.    Bus- 

se     (—    Ky.    ,    80    S.    W.    210, 

25  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2179  [1904]!, 
•656. 

Central  Irrigation  District  v.  De 
Lappe  (79  Cal.  352.  21  Pac.  825), 
551. 

Central  Oliio  Railroad  Comj)any  v. 
City  of  Bellaire  (67  Ohio  St.  297, 
65  X.  E.  1007   [1902]),  1125,  1210. 

Central  Park,  In  the  INIatter  of  the 
Application  of  the  Commissioners 
of  the,  to  Confirm  the  Rejiort  of 
tlio  Commissioners  of  Estimate 
and  Assessment  for  Opening  Riv- 
erside Park  (63  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
282    [1872]),    356,    459,    594,    598. 


Ixx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Central  Park,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Oommissioners  of  (61  Barb.  40 
[1871]),  911,   1347,   1354. 

Central  Park,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Application  of  the  Commissioners 
of  the,  for  and  in  Behalf  of  the 
City  of  New  York,  Relative  to 
the  Opening  of  Certain  New  Ave- 
nues, Roads  and  Public  Squares 
or  Places  as  Laid  Out  by  the  Com- 
missioners of  Central  Park  (60 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  132  [1870]),  356, 
909,   927. 

Central  Savings  Bank  of  Baltimore, 
The  V.  The  ISIayor  and  City  Coun- 
cil of  Baltimore  (71  Md.  515,  18 
Atl.  809,  20  Atl.  283  [1889]),  266, 
309,    310,    763,    1317. 

Central  R.  R.  Company  of  Xew  Jer- 
sey, Pros.  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the 
City  of  Bayonne  (51  N.  J.  L.  (22 
Vr.)  428,  17  Atl.  971  [1889]), 
771. 

Central  R.  Co.  of  Xew  Jersey  v. 
State    (32  N.  J.  L.  220),  359. 

Centre  Street,  In  re.  Vacation  of 
(115  Pa.  St.  247,  8  Atl.  56 
[1886]),  8,  86,  89,  100,  320,  1041. 
1049,   1210. 

Chadwick  v.  Kelly  (187  U.  S.  540, 
23  S.  175  [1903]),  46,  118,  314, 
514,  529,  544,  549,  620,  663,  666, 
689,  698,  702,  1015,  1047,  1144, 
1333,   1370. 

Chaffee  v.  City  of  Detroit  (53  Mich. 
573,  19  X.  *W.  191  [1884]),  1426, 
1427. 

Chaffee  v.  Granger  (6  Mich.  51 
[1858),   1512. 

Challis  V.  Parker  (11  Kan.  384 
[1873]),   323,    1176. 

Cliamberlain  v.  Cleveland  (34  0.  S. 
551  [1878]),  11,  111,  113,  118, 
308,   549.   956,   962,    1447. 

Chamberlain  v.  Cit.y  of  Evansville 
(77  Ind.  542    [1881]),   301,   776. 

Chamberlain  v.  Gleason  (163  X.  Y. 
214,  57  X.  E.  487  [1900]),  49, 
1055. 

Chambers  v.  Chambers  (20  R.  1.370, 
39   Atl.  243   [1898]),  1055. 

Chambers  v.  Satterlee  (40  Cal.  497 
[1871]),    8.     11,    39,    43,    86,    100, 


110,  145,  147,  223,  234,  235,  283, 
549,  622,  747,  777,  836,  862,  1215, 
1306,    1337. 

Chambers  v.  South  Chester  Bor. 
(140  Pa.  St.  510,  21  Atl.  409 
[1891]),    71. 

Chambliss  v.  Johnson  (77  la.  611, 
42  X.  W.  427  [1889]),  142,  343, 
549,  556,  558,  660,  670,  724,   1337. 

Champer  v.  City  of  Greencastle  ( 138 
Ind.  339,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  390, 
24  L.  R.  A.  768,  35  X.  E.  14 
[1894]),  92. 

Chance  v.  City  of  Portland  (26  Ore. 
286,  38  Pac.  68   [1894]),  531,  532, 

Chancellor  of  State  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth (66  X.  J.  L.  (37  Vr.)  688, 
52  Atl.  1130  [1901]),  147,  545, 
581,   1074. 

Chancellor  of  State  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth (65  X.  J.  L.  (36*  Vr.)  479, 
47  Atl.  454  [1900]),  147,  545,  581, 
1074. 

Chandler  v.  Heisler    ( —  Mich.  , 

116   X".   W.    626    [1908]),   244. 

Chandler  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kochsper- 
ger  (161  111.  41,  43  X.  E.  590 
[1896]),  745,  763,  764.  772,  913, 
993,    1183,    1341. 

Chaney  v.  State  e.x  i-el.  Ely  (118 
Ind.  494,  21  X\  E.  Rep.  45 
[1888]),  909,  996,  1067,  1072, 
1254. 

Chapman  v.  Ames  ( 135  Cal.  246,  67 
Pac.    1125    [1901]),    118,   301,   702. 

Chapman  v.  City  of  Brookljoi  (40 
X\   Y.    372    [1869]),    1206. 

Chapman  v.  Sollars  (38  0.  S.  378 
[1882]),    1109,    1207. 

Chapin  v.  Osborn  (29  Ind.  99 
[1867]),    1474. 

Chapin  v.  Worcester  ( 124  Mass. 
464),    308. 

Chariton,  City  of  v.  Holliday  (60 
la.  391,  14  X\  W.  775  [1882]), 
18,  760,  768,  777,  849,  851,  852,  856, 
857,  875,  977,  979,  981,  1006,  1007. 

Charles  v.  City  of  Marion  (100  Fed. 
538  [1900]).  108,  111,  699,  702, 
731. 

Charles  v.  City  of  Marion  (98  Fed. 
166    [1899]),    1432. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxi 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Charleston,  City  of  v.  Cadle  ( 166 
111.  487,  46  X.  E.  1120  [1897]), 
1085. 

Charleston,  City  Council  of  v.  Wer- 
ner (46  S.  C.  323,  24  S.  E.  207 
[1895]),    342. 

Charleston  v.  Werner  (38  S.  C.  488, 
37  Am.  St.  Rep.  776,  17  S.  E.  33 
[1892]),  5,  19,  93,  97,  245,  342, 
483,    679,    1015. 

Charnock  v.  Levee  District  (38  La. 
Ann.  323),  4,  16,  37,  38,  39,  47, 
147,    155,    343,   660,   665,   666,    711. 

Chase  v.  Arctic  Ditchers  (43  Ind. 
74    [1873]),   247,    340,    10()4,    1067. 

Chase  v.  Chase  (95  X.  Y.  373 
[1884]),    1001,    1072,    1451,    1467. 

Chase  v.  City  of  Evanston  (172  111. 
403,    50    X.    E.    241     [1898]),    280. 

Chase  v.  City  of  Portland  (86  Me. 
362,  29  All.  1104  [1894]).  65.  68, 
71. 

Chase  v.  Scheerer  ( 136  Cal.  248,  68 
Pae.   768   [1902]),  867,   1426,   1427. 

Chase  v.  City  Treasurer  of  City  of 
Los  Angeles  (122  Cal.  540,  55 
Pac.  414  [1898]),  761,  762,  867, 
1359,    1425,    1427,    1435. 

Chase  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of 
Springfield  (119  Mass.  556 
[1876]),  367,  432,  443,  527,  695, 
840,  862,  894,  1304,  1400.  1401, 
1405,   1407. 

Chase  v.  Trout  ( 146  Cal.  350,  80 
Pac.  81  [1905]),  131,  138,  141, 
301,  795,  857,  979,  987,  1005.  1007, 
1085,    1337. 

Chatliam  County,  Commissioners  of 
V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Railway 
Comi)any  (  133  X.  C.  216,  45  S. 
E.  566  [1903]).  3S.  363,  548,  594, 
595,   598. 

Chattanooga,  flavor  and  Aldermen 
of  V.  Geiler  (81  Tenn.  (13  Lea.) 
611,  7  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  534 
[1884]),   66,   71. 

Cheaney  v.  Hoover  (48  Ky.  (9  B. 
Mon.)    350    [1848]),    779/ 

Cheeseborougli,  In  tlie  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  to  Vacate  an  A>:s('ss- 
ment  (78  X.  V.  232  [1879]),  393, 
396,  400,  403,  564,   1455- 


Cheeseborough,  In  the  Matter  of  tlie 
Petition  of  to  Vacate  an  Assessment 
for  Underground  Drains  between 
One  Hundred  and  Eighty-third 
Streets,  the  Kings  Bridge  Road 
and  the  Hudson  River  (56  How- 
ard  460    [1878]),    1016. 

Cheney  v.  City  of  Beverly  (  188 
Mass.  81,  74  X\  E.  306  [1905]), 
103,   324,   677,  689,   700,   1403. 

Cherry  Creek,  Town  of  v.  Becker 
(123  X.  Y.  161,  25  X^.  E.  369 
[1890]),   795,   1006,   1007. 

Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Mullins  (94  Ky.  355,  22 
S.  W.  558  [1893]),  119^  121,  323, 
737,  760. 

Chester,  City  of  v.  Black  (132  Pa. 
St.  568,  6  L.  R.  A.  802,  19  Atl. 
276  [1890]),  11.  147,  148,  166, 
414,  961,  983. 

Chester,  City  of  v.  Bullock  (  187  Pa. 
St.  544,  41  Atl.  452  [1898]).  918, 
1026,    1157,    1158,    1337. 

Chester,  City  of  v.  Evans  (32  Pa. 
Super.   Ct.   641    [1907]),   3S2. 

Chester,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Ro>;s  v. 
Eyre  ( 181  Pa.  St.  642,  37  Atl. 
837    [1897]),  896. 

Chester,  City  of  v.  Pennell  ( 169  Pa. 
St.  300,  32  Atl.  408    [1895]).  961. 

Chestnut  Avenue  ( 68  Pa.  St.  ( 18 
P.  F.  Smith)  81  [1871]),  308, 
576,   626,   627. 

Chew  V.  People  ex  rel.  Ra.ymond 
(202  111.  380,  66  X.  E."  1069 
[1903]),  927.  929,  986,   1183,   1340. 

Chicago,  City  of  v.  Adock  (168  111. 
221,  48  X.  E.  155  [1897]),  549, 
563,    651,   659,   665,   666. 

Cliicago,  City  of  v.  Adams  (24  111. 
492),    680. 

Chicago,  City  of  v.  Ayers  (212  Hi. 
59,  72  X.  E.  32   [1904]),  533,  840. 

Chicago,  City  of  v.  Baer  (41  111.  306 
[1866]),  44,  101,  104,  153,  257. 
314,  545,  5-IS,  601.  615.  639.  665, 
666,   720. 

(  hica-o.  City  of  v.  P.aldwin  (227 
111.  r,?[.  SI  X.  K.  542  [1907]), 
952,   955. 


Ixxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[Keferences  are  to  sections.] 


Chicago,  City  of  v.  Baptist  Theologi- 
cal  Union    (115   111.   245,   2   N.   E. 

254    [1886]),   210,   611. 
Chicago,    City   of   v.   Blair    {149    111. 

310724  L.  R.  A.  412,  36  N.  E.  829 

[1894]),    4,    7,    11,    223,    236,    286, 

291,  370,-377,  458,  715. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.   Becker    (233   111. 

189,    84    N.    E.    242    [1908]),    750, 

913. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Borden    (190  111. 

430,   60   K   E.   915    [1901]),    1035. 
Chicago,    City  of  v.   Brede    (218    111. 

528,    75    X.    E.    1044    [1905]),    51, 

104,   245,   258. 
Chicago,   City  of  v.   Brown    (205   111. 

568,  69  N.  E.  65    [1903]),  387. 
Chicago,   City  of   v.    Burkhardt    (223 

111.   297,  79  N.  E.  82   [1906]),  53, 

521,  737,  754. 
Chicago,   City  of   v.    Biirtice    (24   111, 

489    [I860]),   680,   946,    1004,   1283, 

1331,    1333. 
Chicago,    City   of    v.    Carpenter     (201 

111.    402,    66    N.    E.    362     [1903]), 

637,   638. 
Chicago,    City   of   v.    Town   of    Cicero 

(210     111.'   290,     71     X.     E.     356 

[1904]),  66,  353,  637. 
Chicago,   City  of   v.    Clark    (233    111. 

404,    84   X.    E.    363    [1908]),    485. 

820,  969,  991. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Colby  (20  111. 

614  [1858]"),  39,  45,  613,  1173. 
Chicago  V.  Cook  (204  111.  373,  08 

X^.  E.  538  [1903]),  430,  955. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Cook  ( 105  111. 

App.  353  [1903]),  430,  955. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Corcoran  (190 

111.  146,  63  X.  E.  690  [1902]), 

297,  328,   448. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Crosby    (111    111. 

538    [1885]),    57,    323,    377. 
Chicago,    City   of  v.    Cummings    ( 144 

111.  446,  33  X.  E.  34   [1893]),  604, 

816. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.   Farrell    ( 100  111. 

App.    204    [1902]),    1506. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Fishburn     (189 

111.  367,  59  X.  E.   791    [1901]),  3. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Fisk     (123    111. 

App.   404    [1905]),   526,    1490. 


Chicago,    City   of   v.    Gage    (232    111. 

169,    83    X.    E.    663    [1908]),    813, 

969,   979. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Gait    (225    111. 

368,    80    X.    E.    285     [1907]),    53, 

55,   737,   758,  986. 
Chicago,   City  of  v.   Goodwillie    (208 

111.    252,    70    X.    E.    228    [1904]), 

851,  986. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Habar     (02    111. 

283    [1871]),    886. 
Chicago,    City    of   v.    Hay  ward     ( 176 

111.     130,    52    X.    E.    26     [1898]), 

1039,  1519. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Hayward  (60 

111.  App.  582),  1039. 
Chicago.  City  of  v.  Holden  (194  111. 

213,  62  X.  E.  550  [1902]),  864, 

1305. 
Chicago,  City  of   v.   Hulbert    ( —  111. 

,  85  X.  E.  222    [1908]),   1376, 

1377. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Hulbert   (234  111. 

321,    84    X.    E.    922    [1908]),    862. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Hulbert   (205  111. 

346,    68    X.    E.    786    [1903]),    475, 

479,    514,   531,    533,   955,    956,    962, 

965,  969,  978,  987,  990,  1367,  1390. 
Chicago,     City     of     v.     Kerfoot     and 

Company    (208   111.    387.   70   X.   E. 

349    [1904]),    813,    819. 
Chicago,   City    of   v.   Earned    (34    111. 

203     [1864]),    44,     101,     104,     113, 

153,   257,   615,  666,  690,   701. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Law    ( 144    111. 

569,    33    X.    E.    855    [1893]),    223, 

231,    291,    360,   417,    456,    775. 
Chicago,    City  of   v.   Le   Moyne    (119 

Fed.  662,  56  C.  C.  A.  278'[1902]), 

66. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Lonergan     ( 196 

111.    518,    63    X.    E.    1018    [1902]), 

66. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  McCormick    (124 

111.    App.    639    [1906]),    526,    1490. 
Chicago,   City  of   v.   McGovern    (226 

111.    403,    80    X.    E.    895     [1907]), 

1478,    1490. 
Chicago,    City   of   v.    McXichols     (98 

111.   App.   447    [1900]),   1512. 
Chicago,     The     City     of    v.     Middle- 

brooke    ( 143  111.  265,  32  X.  E.  457 

[1893]),    1099. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxiii 


[References  are  to  i^ections. ] 


C'liicago.  Oty  of  v.  Xodeck  ( 202 
III.  257,  67  X.  E.  39  [1903]).  273. 
598,  604,  813,  817.  927.  929.  941, 
965,  967,  992,   1273.    1341. 

Chicago,  City  of  v.  Xoonan  (210  111. 
18,   17  X.'^E.  32   [1904]),  953. 

C  liicago,  City  of  v.  Xorthwestern 
Mutual  Life  Insurance  Co.  (218 
111.   40,    1    L.    R.   A.    (X.   S.)    770, 

75  X.   E.  803    [1905]),   6,  20,  353. 
1037,    1082,    1484. 

Chicago,  City  of  v.  O'Brien  (HI  111. 
532,  53  Am.  Rep.  640  [1884]),  58, 
457. 

Cliicago,  City  of  v.  Paulsen  (  125 
111.    App.   595    [1906]),    1490. 

Chicago.  City  of  v.  Peo])le  (215  111. 
235,  74  X".  E.  137  [1905]).  475, 
1103. 

Chicago,  Board  of  Education  of  City 
of  V.  People,  ex  rel.  Commission- 
ers of   Lincoln   Park    (219   111.   83, 

76  X.    E.    75     [1905]).    586,    612, 
613,.  927,   986. 

Chicago,    City    of    v.    People    ex    rel. 

Union  Trust  Co.    (215   111.  235,  74 

X.    E.    137      [1905]).     475,     1085. 

1104. 
Chicago.    City    of    v.    People    ex    rel. 

Union    Trust    Co.     (116    111.    App. 

564    [1904]),    475,    1103. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    People    of    the 

State     of  'Illinois      (56     111.     327 

[1870]),   570,   615,   952,   968,    1507, 

1508,  1511,  1518. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Richardson  (213 

111.  96,  72  X.  E.  791  [1904]),  525, 

953. 
Chicago.    City    of    v.    Rosenfold     (24 

111.   495    [I860]).    410,   915,    13.30. 
Chicago     V.    Sheldon     (76    U.    S.      (9 

Wall.)   50,  19  L.  594   [1869]).  602, 

603,   615,   617. 
Chicago,  City   of   v.   Shepard    (8    111. 

App.  602  [1881]),  74. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Slierman     (212 

111.    498,    72    X.    E.    396     [1904]). 

314,   533,   956,   962,   965,   978,   990. 
Chicago,    City    of    v.    Sherman     (  192 

111.    576.    61     X.    E.    850     [1001]), 

864,    1305. 
Chicago,    City   of    v.    Sherwood     (104 


111.    549     [1882]),    495,    570,     646, 

861,   1281. 
Chicago,   City   of   v.   Silverman    ( 156 

111.   601,  41   X.   E.   162).   636,   856. 
Cliicago,  City  of   v.   Singer    (202   111. 

75,    66    X'!    E.    874     [1903]),    864, 

917,    1368. 
Chicago,   City  of   v.    Singer    (116    111. 

App.   559  "[1TO4]),   525,   526,    1490. 
Chicago,   City  of   v.    Smythe    (33    111. 

App.    28    [1888]).    1519. 
Chicago    V.    Union    Building    Associa- 
tion    ( 102    111.    379,    40    Am.    Rep. 

598    [1882]),    1098. 
Chicago,   City  of  v.   Walker    (24   111. 

494    [I860]),    883,    884.    909,    1305. 
Chicago,   City  of  v.   Walsh    (203   111. 

318,    67    X.    E.    774    [1903]),    735, 

739,    819,    926,    992,    1035,    1100. 
Chicago,   City  of  v.   Ward    (36   111.   9 

[1864]),     's,     153,    271,    310.     958. 

965,   968,   990. 
Chicago,    City   of   v.    Webb    (  102    III. 

App.    232  '[1902]),    71. 
Chicago,   City   of   v.    Weber    (94    111. 

App.    561    [1900]),   245.   540,    1508. 
Chicago,  City  of  v.  Wheeler    (25   111. 

396.  79  Am.  Dec.  342   [1861]),  63, 
280,    680,   997,    1519. 

Chicago,  City  of  v.   Wilder    ( 184  111. 

397,  56    X.    E.    395    [1900]),    731, 
739,  819. 

Chicago,  City  of  v.   Wilson    (  195   111. 

19,  57  L.  R.  A.   127,  62  X.  E.  843 

[1902]),    323,   381,    386,    388. 
Chicago,    City   of   v.    Wright    (SO    III. 

579    [1875]),   969. 
Chicago,   City   of   v.    Wright    (32    111. 

192     [186.3]),    63.    234,    244,    777. 

825. 
Chicago.    City   of,    in   Trust    for   Use 

of  Schools  V.  City  of  Chicago    ( 207 

111.   37,  69  X'.  E.'  580   [1904]),   42. 

586,    612,    613,    1077. 
Chicago    Title    and    Trust    Company 

V.    Town    of    Lake    View    (187    111. 

622,    58    X.    E.    597     [1900]),    86. 
Chicago    Union    Paving    Company    v. 

City   of  Chicago    (202    111.   576*.   67 

X.    E.   383    [1903]).    314. 
Chicago    &    Alton    Railroad    Company 

V.   City  of  .loliet    (153   111.   649.  39 

X.    E.     1077     [1S94]).    .")0.    51.    89. 


Ixxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


100,    103,    104,    118,   202,   272,   549, 
555,   578,   598.   653,   666,   670,   698, 
715,   921. 
Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  R.  Co. 
V.  City  of  Chicago   ( 106  U.  S.  226 

17  S.'581),  715. 

Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Eail- 
road  Company  v.  Nebraska  ex  rel. 
Omaha    (170  U.   S.'57,  42   L.   948, 

18  S.  513  [1898]),  359,  717. 
Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  State  of  Nebraska  (47 
Neb.  549,  53  Am,  St.  Rep.  557,  41 
L.  R.  A.  481,  66  N.  W.  624 
[1896]),   359,   717. 

Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Ry. 
Co.  V.  People  (212  111.  103,  72  N. 
E.    219    [1904]),    334,    335,    449. 

Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Rail- 
road Company,  The  v.  City  of 
Quincy  (139  111.  355,  28  N.  E. 
1069    [1893]),    293.    298.    306,    431. 

Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  Quincy 
(136  111.  563,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  334, 
27  N.  E.  192  [1892]),  293,  314, 
431,  623,  865. 

Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincj'  Rail- 
road Company  v.  South  Park 
Commissioners  (11  Bradwell 
(111.)    502    [1882]),   595,  620. 

Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Village  of  Wil- 
ber  (63  Neb'  624,  88  N.  W.  660 
[1902]),  3. 

Chicago  City  Railway  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago  (90  111.  573,  32  Am.  Rep. 
54   [1878]),  309,  601,  603. 

Chicago  Consolidated  Traction  Co. 
V.  Village  of  Oak  Park  (225  111. 
9,  80  N.  E.  42  [1907]),  271,  480, 
862,  1291,  1367,  1368. 

Chicago,  Danville  &  Vincennes  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Smith  (62  111.  268,  14  Am. 
Rep.  99),  365. 

Chicago  &  Erie  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Keith  (67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R.  A. 
525,  65  N.  E.  1020  [1902]),  55, 
101,  113,  115,  117,  119,  291,  337. 
549,   726,    729,    773. 

Chicago  &  Evanston  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Blake  '116  111.  163 
ri8861).   65. 


Chicago  and  Evanston  Railroad 
Company  v.  Jacobs  (110  111.  414), 
661. 

Chicago  Great  Western  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Kansas  City  Northwestern  Ry.  Co. 
(75  Kan.  167,  88  Pac.  "  1085 
[1907]),   1054. 

Chicago,  Indianapolis  and  Louisville 
Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Crawfordsville  (164  Ind.  70,  72  N. 
E.  1025  [1904]),  59,  93,  98,  369, 
420,    869. 

Chicago,  Indianapolis  &  St.  Louis 
Short  Line  Co.  v.  People  ex  rel. 
McCormick  (225  111.  519,  80  N.  E. 
336    [1907]),   322. 

Chicago  &  Michigan  Lake  Shore  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Sanford  (23  Mich.  418 
[1871]),    825. 

Chicago,  ^Milwaukee  and  St.  Paul  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Dumser  '109  111.  402 
[1884]),  363. 

Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Milwau- 
kee (89  Wis.  500,  28  L.  R.  A.  249, 
62  N.  W.  417  [1895]),  301,  596, 
598,   614,   620,   630,    1078. 

Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Phillips  (111  la. 
377,  82  N.  W.  787  [1900]),  12, 
548,  549,  553,  595,  651,  606,  1414. 
1431,    1443,    1445. 

Chicago  &  Northern  Pacific  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  Chicago 
(174  111.  439,  51  'n.  E.  596 
[1898]),    862. 

Chicago  &  Northern  Pacific  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  Chicago 
(172  111.  66,  49  N.  E.  1006 
[1898]),  293,  374,  380,  381,  386, 
570,  574,  604,  723,  857,  859,  922, 
1373,    1382. 

Chicago  &  Northwestern  Railroad 
Company  v.  Village  of  Elmhurst 
(165  111.  184,  46  N.  E.  .  1152 
[1897]),  50,  89,  100,  103,  104,  110, 
118,  314,  555,  594,  595,  596,  598, 
623,  670,  698,  715,  1078. 

Chicago  &  Northwestern  Railwa.v 
Company  v.  Forest  County  (95 
Wis.  80*   70  N.   W.   77    [1897]),  3. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxv 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Chicago  and  Northwestern  Railway 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Seip  ( 120  111. 
104,  11  X.  E.  418  [1889]),  305, 
356,   594,   598,   927,   933,   986,   996. 

Chicago  and  Northwestern  Railroad 
Company,  The  v.  The  People  ex 
rel.  Miller,  Collector  (83  111.  467), 
267,   472,   927,   986,    1126. 

Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  West 
Chicago  Park  Commissioners  (151 
111.  204.  25  L.  R.  A.  300,  37  N.  E. 
1079),   259. 

Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa  (94  U.  S. 
155,   24   L.   94),    180. 

Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Buel,  (56  Neb. 
20.5,   76  N.  W.   571    [1898]).   66. 

Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific  R. 
R.  C,  The  V.  Chicago  (139  111. 
573,  28  N.  E.  1108  [1893]),  301, 
549,  560,  595,  596,  623.  631,  643, 
723,    896,    1283,    1330,    1373. 

Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  City  of  Moline  ( 158 
111.  64,  41  N.  E.  877  [1895]),  594, 
595,    598,    623,    670,    1117,    1144. 

Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Ottumwa 
(112  la.  300,  51  L.  R.  A.  763,  83 
N.  W.  1074  [1900]),  100,  594, 
595,  597,  598,  630,  748,  751,  891, 
977,  979,  981,  1043,  1054,  1078, 
1375. 
Chicago,  St.  L.   &  New  Orleans  R. 

Co.    V.    Rottgering    ( —    Ky.    , 

83  S.  W.  584,  26  Ky.  L.  R.  1167), 
69. 

Chicago  Street  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago  (178  111.  339,  53 
N.   E.    112    [1899]),    602. 

Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Chicago  (217 
111.  343,  75  N.'  E.  499  [1905]), 
138,    308,    1283. 

Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  Ry.  Co. 
V.  City  of  Chicago  (184  Ili.  154, 
56  N.  E.  410  [1900]),  817,  863, 
1291. 

Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago  (  178  111. 
429,  53  N.  E.   361    [1899]),  596. 

Chicago  Union   Traction   Company   v. 


City  of   Chicago    (215   111.   410,   74 
N.  E.  449   [1905]),  578,  606,   1278. 

Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.,  The  v. 
City  of  Chicago  (209  111.  444,  70 
N.   E.    659    [1904]),    820. 

Chicago  Union  Traction  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago  (208  111.  187,  70 
N.  E.  234  [1904]),  295,  317,  440, 
465,   479,    674,    715,   719. 

Chicago  Union  Traction  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago  (207  111.  544*,  69 
N.  E.  849  [1904]),  314,  578,  606. 
053,   655,   896,    1281,    1282. 

Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.,  The  v. 
City  of  Chicago  (204  111.  363,  68 
N.  E.  519  [1903]),  549,  578,  606. 
1054. 

Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.  v.  City 
of  Chicago  (202  111.  576,  67  N. 
E.   383    [1903]),  578,   606,   655. 

Chicago  and  W.  I.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago  (230  111.  9,  82  N.  E.  399 
[1907]),  816,  909,  966,  986. 

Chicago  West  Di\'ision  Railway 
Company,  The  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Kern  (154  111.  256,  40  N.  E.  342 
[1894]),  636,  748,  751,  758,  764, 
772,  927,   930,   993. 

Child  V.  Boston   (4  All.  41),  73. 

Childers  v.  Holmes  ( 95  Mo.  App. 
154,  68  S.  W.  1046  [1902]),  54, 
714,   723,   867. 

Childs  V.  New  Haven  &  Northamp- 
ton Company  ( 133  Mass.  253 
[1882]),   65,  ^66. 

Christ's  Church,  Wardens  and  Ves- 
try of  V.  City  of  Burlington  (39 
la.    224    [1874]),    223,    9.50. 

Church,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appli- 
cation of,  etc.  (92  N.  Y.  1  [1883]), 
188,  239,  245.  266,  .308,  663,  671, 
1519. 

Church  of  the  Holy  Sepulclier,  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the  Rec- 
tor, Church  Wardens  and  Vestry- 
men of  the  (61  Howard  (N.  Y.) 
315  [1880]).  403,  563,  613,  681, 
883. 

Church  Street  from  Fulton  Street 
to  Morris  Street,  in  the  City  of 
New  York,  Matter  of  the  Exten- 
sion   of     (49    Barb.     (N.    Y.)     455 


Ixxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


[1867]),    278,    293,    310,    557,        4, 

901,  920. 
Cliurch  V.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 

ger    (179    111.    205,   53    N.    E.    554 

[1899]),   324,   527,   572,    1277. 
Church  V.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 

ger    (174    111.    366,    51    N.    E.    747 

[1898]),    533,    837,    840,    945,    989, 

1183. 
Churchman    v.    City    of    Indianapolis 

(110     Ind.     259,     11     N.     E.     301 

[1S86]),  8,  89,  223.  229,  587,  641, 

681,  723,  775,  776,  777,  1455,  1460, 

1478,   1483. 
Chytraus    v.    City    of    Chicago     ( 160 

111.     18,    43    N.     E.     335     [1896]), 

1283,    1322,    1323. 
Cicero,  Town  of  v.   Andren    (224   111. 

■617,    79    N.    E.    962    [1907]),    900, 

953. 
Cicero,   Town   of   v.    Green    (211    111. 

241,    71    N.    E.    884    [1904]),    347, 

432,   451,    475,    510,   542,   927,   952, 

954,    955,    991,    1513. 
Cicero,    Town    of    v.    Hill     (193    111. 

226,   61   N.   E.    1020    [1901]),   526, 

955. 
Cic&ro     &     Pix)viso     Street     Railway 

Company  v.   City  of   Chicago    (176 

111.    501,    52    N.    E.    866     [1898]), 

545,   601. 
Cincinnati,   City  of  v.  Anchor  White 

Lead   Co.    (44   0.   S.   243,   7   N.   E. 

11),  495,  822,  867. 
Cincinnati,    City    of    v.    Batsche    (52 

O.  S.  324,  27  L.  R.  A.  536,  40  N. 

E.   21    [1895]),   90,    113,   309,   575, 

620,   626,  700,   1432. 
Cincinnati,  City   of,   for   use   of  Ash- 
man    V.     Bickett      (26     0.     S.     49 

[1875]),    324,    493,    563,    760,    761, 

835,   977. 
Cincinnati,  City  of,  for  Use  of  Wirth 

V.    Cincinnati    and    Spring    Grove 

Avenue    Company     (26    0.    S.    345 

[1875]),   525,   527. 
Cincinnati,    City    of    v.    Connor     (55 

0.    S.    82,    44    N.    E.    582    [1896]), 

324,   555,   666,   670,   679. 
Cincinnati,    City    of    v.    Coombs    ( 16 

Ohio    181    [1847]),    234,    911. 
Cincinnati    v.    Davis    (58    0.    S.    225, 

50    X.    E.    918    [1898]),    263,    321, 

471. 


Cincinnati,  City  of  v.  Diekmeier   (31 

O.    S.   242    [1877]),   686,  995,   998, 

1498,    1507. 
Cincinnati,    City  of   v.    Emerson    (57 

0.   S.    132,   48   N.   E.   667    [1897]), 

987. 
Cincinnati,    City   of,   for   the   Use   of 

Wilson  v.    Fugman    ( 5   Ohio   N.   P. 

14    [1897]),   432,    684. 
Cincinnati,    City    of    v.    Holmes     ( 56 

Ohio      St.      104,     46     N.     E.      514 

[1897]),    505. 
Cincinnati,   City   of  v.   James    (55   O. 

S.   180,  44  n".  E.  925   [189G]),  561, 

635,    1035,    1094,    1109,    1432, 
Cincinnati,  for  Use,  etc.  v.  Jung,    (7 

Ohio  N.  P.  665    [1900]),  570,  684. 
Cincinnati,  City  of,  for  Use  of  Jonte 

V.     Kasselmann      (23     W.     L.     B. 

(Ohio)    392    [1890]),   563. 
Cincinnati,     City    of    v.     Lingo     ( 13 

Ohio   C.   C.   334    [1897]),  987,  998, 

1146. 
Cincinnati,    City   of,    for    Use   of    De- 
ters V.  McDuffie    (1   Ohio  N.  P.   53 

[1894]),    1229. 
Cincinnati,   City  of  v.  Manss    ( 54   0. 

S.  257,  43  N.  E.  687   [1896]),  700, 

707,    1012,    1094,    1492. 
Cincinnati,   City  of   v.   Oliver    (31    0. 

S.   371    [1877]),   680. 
Cincinnati    v.    Seasongood    (46    0.    S. 

296,  21   N.  E.   630),   169,  650,   700, 

725. 
Cincinnati,    City   of   v.    Steadman    (8 

Ohio   C.    C.    407    [1894]),    1515. 
Cincinnati,  City  of  v.   Steinkamp  ( 54 

0.   S.   284,   43    N.   E.   490    [1896]), 

189. 
Cincinnati,    City    of    v.    Taf  t     ( 63    O. 

S.   141,  58  n".   E.  63    [1900]).   189. 
Cincinnati,    City    of    v.    Wynne     ( 19 

Ohio  C.  C.  747   [1900]),  635,  1059, 

1072. 
Cincinnati,     Hamilton     and     Dayton 

Railroad  v.  Sullivan   (32  0.  S."  152 

[1877]),  59,  93,  98,  369,  717. 
Cincinnati,     Lebanon     and     Northern 

Railway  Company   v.   City  of  Cin- 
cinnati   (62  0.  S.  465,  49  L.  R.  A. 

566,  57  N.  E.  229   [1900]),  89,  90, 

113,   118,   308,   314,   426,   430. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


Ixxvi 


[Referpnces  are  to  sections.] 


Cincinnati,     Xew     Orleans     &     Texas 

Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth 

(81    Ky.   492    [1883]),    750. 
Cist    V.    City    of    Cincinnati     (S    Ohio 

N.  P.  559    [1901]),  571,  831. 
Citizens'  Bank  of  Des  Moines  v.  City 

of    Spencer    (126    la.    101,    101    N. 

W.    643    [1904]),   965,    1513,    1526. 
Citizens'  Saving  Bank  &  Trust  Com- 
pany  V.   City  of  Cliicago    (215   111. 

235,"   74    X. 'e.    115    [1905]),    119, 

259,    267,    726,   926. 
Citizens'    State    Bank    v.    Jess     (127 

la.    450,    103    X.    W.    471    [1905]). 

1140,    114G. 
City  of  V. . 

(See  name   of   City.) 
City    to    Use    of    Lancaster    v.    Arm- 
strong  (56  Mo.  298   [1874]),  1101. 
City  to  the  Use  of   Peters  v.  Arrott 

('s    Phil.    (Pa.)    41     [1870]),    541. 
City  to   Use  of  McGratli   v.  Clemens 

(49    Mo.    552     [1872]),    525,    527. 

539.    707. 
City  V.   Commonwealtli    (  1   Duv.   296, 

17   Ky.   Law   Rep.   445),   612. 
City   V.    Crump    (  1    Penn.    Dis.    Rep. 

698    [1890]),   748,    1063. 
City    V.    Ellis    (67    Va.     (26    Gratt.) 

224    [1875]),    120. 
City    to    Use    of    O'Rourke    v.    Hays 

('93      (12      Xorris)      Pa.      St.      72 

[1881]),   483,   511. 
City  for  U.-e  of  Wilson   v.   He-s    ( 19 

Ohio   C.   C.    252    [1900]),    563. 
City    to    Use    of    Brooks    v.    Lea     (9 

I'liila.      (Pa.)      106     [1872]),     441. 

569. 
City  V.   Lea    (5   Phila.   77).   234. 
City  V.  Lewis    (4  Pliila.   13.-)    [1S6()]). 

1194. 
City,    Tlie    v.    Lukins     (3     Phil.    333 

[1859]),   1197. 
City    V.    McCalmont      (6     Pliil.     543 

[1868]),    347,    451. 
City   Council   v.    Pinekncy    ( 1    'I'read- 

way    (S.   C.)    42]),    159,    621,    726. 

7.35,    1432. 
City  to  Use   of   Fox   v.    Sclioencmann 

(52   Mo.    348    [1873]).   324,   414. 
City  V.  Wood    (4   Pliil.    156   [I860]). 

1063. 


City   V.   Wood    (3   Phil.    145    [1858]), 

1211. 
City    Bank   of   Xew    Orleans   v.    Huie 

(1    Rob    (La.)    236    [1842]),    1049, 

1067. 
City    Bond    Com)>any    v.    Bruner    ( 34 

Ind.     App.     659,     73     X.     E.     711 

[1904]),    1360. 
City    Bond    Co.    v.    Wells     (34    Ind. 

App.    675,    73    X.    E.    713    [1904]), 

1360. 
City    Improvement    Co.    v.    Broderick 

125  Cal.   139,  57  Pac.  77()   [1899]), 

496. 
City  Street  Improvement  Co.  v.  Bab- 
cock    (139    Cal.    690,    73    Pac.    666 

[1903]).     15,    223,    229,    234,    244, 

482,    776,   803,   805,   807,   808,   810. 
City  Street  Improvement  Co.  v.  Bab- 

o.jck    (123    Cal.    205,    55    Pac.    762 

[1898]),    810.   830. 
City    Street    Improvement    Company 

v.  Emmons    (138  Cal.  297,  71  Pac. 

332    [1902]),  958,  960,   1131,   1269. 
City      Streot      Improvement      Co.      v. 

Laird    (138    Cal.    27,    70    Pac.    916 

[1902]).    301.    492.    499,    803,    810, 

811,   1290. 
City  Street  Imprnvomont  Co.  v.  Ron- 

tiit      (140    Cal.    55,    73    Pac.     729 

[1903]),  318,  803,   1129,   1257. 
City    Street    Improvement    Company 

V.    Ta.vlnr    (138    Cal.    364,    71    Pac. 

446    [1903]).    315,    439.    479.    1359. 
Clallin   V.   City  of   Chicago    (178   111. 

549,    53    X.'e.    339    [1899]),    570, 

862,   864. 
Claiborne    Street,    flatter    of    (4    La. 

Ann.   7    [1849]),   155. 
Clap])  V.  City  of  Hartford    ( .?5  Conn. 

66      [1868]),    119,    324,    444.     549, 

560,    563,    588,   608,    655,    666,    694, 

701,   709,   728,    1317,   1361. 
Clapp   V.  :\lacfarland    (20  App.  D.  C. 

224    [1902]),    70,    1373,    1381. 
Clapp     V.     Minnesota     Grass     'iwine 

Company   (81  Minn.  511.  84  X.  W. 

344      [1900]),      340,      1049.      1066, 

1072. 
Clapton  V.  Ta.vlor    (49  :Mo.  App.    117 

[18921).     5.3.    497,     500.    620.    622, 

631,  6:M.   737.  862.  ^63.   1059. 


Ixxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Clark,    In    the    Matter    of    (31    Hun 

(N.    Y.)    198    [1883]),    1463. 
Clark    V.    City   of    Chicago     (229    111. 

363,    82    N.    E.    370    [1907]),    690, 

1279. 
Clark   V.    City   of  Chicago    (214    111. 

318,    73    N.    E.    358    [1905]),    418, 

549,   563,   690,   918,    1392. 
Clarke  v.  City   of   Chicago    (185   111. 

354,    57    N.    E.    15     [1900]),    119, 

731,  739,  817. 
Clark   V.    City   of    Chicago    (166    111. 

84,    46    N.    E.    730     [1897]),    578, 

610,  633,   670,   920. 
Clark   V.   City   of    Chicago    (155    111. 

223,    40    N.    E.    495    [1895]),    817, 

1373,   1375. 
Clark  V.   City  of  Cleveland    ( 1   0.   S. 

139    [1853]),  431,  620,  626,  819. 
Clark      V.      Colidge      (8      Kan.      189 

[1871]),   1054. 
Clark  V.  Village  of  Dunkirk    (75  N. 

Y.  612    [1878]),  545,   141.i,  1430. 
Clark     V.    Village    of    Dunkirk      (12 

Hun    181   [1877]),  545,  1415,  1425, 

1427,    1430,    1444. 
Clark   V.   City    of    Elizabeth    (61    N. 

J.   L.    (32   Vr.)    566,   40   Atl.   616, 

737  [1898]),  71,  313,  425,  1519. 
Clark    V.    Mead     (102    Cal.    516,    36 

Pac.  .862    [1894]).   228,   753,   1181, 

1201,   1297,   1450. 
Clark   V.    Nash    (198    U.    S.    361,    25 

S.   676    [1905]),   355. 
Clark    V.    The    People    ex    rel.     (146 

111.  348,  35  X.  E.  60   [1893]),  772, 

930,   993,    1341. 
Clark      V.      Porter       (53      Cal.      409 

[1879]),   1056,   1383. 
Clark    V.     City     of    Worcester     (125 

Mass.  226   ["l878]),  66, 
Clay   V.    City  of   Grand   Rapids    (60 

Mich.  451,  27  X.  W.  596    [1886]), 

247.    324,    326,   552,   555,    639,    658. 
Clay    City,    Town   of    v.    Bryson    ( 30 
Ind.     App.     490,     66     N.     E.     498 
[1902]),   223,    482,    1015,    1022. 
Cla.vburgh    v.    City    of    Chicago     (25 
111.  535,  79  Am.'  Dec.  346   [1861]), 
1519. 
Clayton,     Sheriff     v.     Lafargue      (23 
Ark.   137    [1861]),  343,  1415,   1430, 
1444. 


Clemens  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore,  use  of  Volkmar  ( 16 
Md.  208  [I860]),  46,  314,  1042, 
1043,    1142,    1241,    1319. 

Clemens  v.  Lee  (114  Ind.  397,  16 
N.  E.  799  [1887]),  771,  772.  1192, 
1252,    1263,   1265,   1337. 

Clements  v.  Village  of  Norwood  (2 
Ohio  N.  P.  274  [1895]),  561,  631, 
1435. 

Cleneay  v.  Norwood  ( 137  Fed.  962 
[1905]),   402,   563,   642,   723,    1444. 

Clerk  V.  City  of  Chicago  ( 155  111. 
223.  40  N."e.  495   [1895]),  813. 

Clerk  V.  The  People  ex  rel.  Kern 
(146  III.  348,  35  N.  E.  60  [1893]), 
927. 

Cleveland  v.  Tripp  (13  R.  I.  50 
[1880]),  89,  118,  119,  123,  135, 
147,  324,  408,  424,  520,  010,  665, 
666,  706,  708,  712,  728. 

Cleveland,  City  of  v.  Wick  (18 
0.  S.  303  [1868]),  73,  90,  118, 
308,   426,   430,   700. 

Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  and 
St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of  Con- 
nersville  (147  Ind.  277,  62  Am. 
St.  Rep.  418,  37  L.  R.  A.  175,  46 
N.  E.  57«   [1896]),  369. 

Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  &  St. 
Louis  Railway  Co.  v.  The  Edward 
Jones  Co.  (20  Ind.  App.  87,  50 
N.  E.  319  [1897]),  777,  1006, 
1061,   1229,    1331. 

Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  &  St. 
Louis  Railway  Co.  v.  O'Brien  (24 
Ind.  App.  547,  57  N.  E.  Rep.  47 
[1899]),    886,    1239. 

Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  &  St. 
Louis  R.  R.  Co.  V.  People  (212  111. 
638,  72  N.  E.  725  [1904]),  208, 
267. 

Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Cliicago  &  St. 
Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter  (210  U. 
S.  177, '28  S.  647  [1908]),  119. 
121,   122,   629,  998. 

Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  &  St. 
Louis  Railway  Co.  v.  Porter  (38 
Ind.  App.  2"26,  74  N.  E.  260 
[1905]  :  petition  for  rehearing  over- 
ruled in  76  N.  E.  179),  119,  121, 
472,  629,  989,  998,  1110,  1244. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxix 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Clifton   Campbell   County,   District  of 

V.   Schneider    (106   Ky.   605,   51    S. 

W.    13    [1899]),    1101. 
Cline  V.   People  ex  rel.   Barlow    (224 

111.    360,    79    N.    E.    663     [1906]), 

324,  393,  400,  405,  1324. 
Cline  V.    City   of   Seattle    (13    Wasli- 

ington   444,   43    Pac.    367    [1896]), 

408,   550,   725,   962,   963. 
Cline   V.   City  of  Tacoma    (11   Wash. 

193.    39    Pac.    453    [1895]),    833. 
Clingnian  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond 

(183     111.     339,     55     N.     e".     727 

[1899]),   540,   1183,   1342. 
Clinton    Avenue,    In    re,    in    City    of 

New  \ork    (185   X.  Y.   601,   7l5   X. 

E.  1101,  106  App.  Div.  31   [1906]), 

309,   657. 
Clinton,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Thornton 

V.    Henry    County     (115    Mo.    557, 

37  Am.  St.  Rep.  415,  22  S.  W.  494 

[1893]),  42,  50,  212,  301,  580,  582, 

612,    613,    614,    1040,    1075,     1144, 

1505. 
Clinton  v.   City  of  Portland    (26   Or. 

410,     38    Pac.     407     [1894]).     490, 

501,   735,   739,   761,   765,    810,   830, 

832,     836,    857,     951,     1005,     1015, 

1279,  1281. 
Clinton   v.    Shugart    (126    Iowa    179, 

101     N.     W.     785     [1904]),     1054, 

1072. 
Clinton,  City  of  v.  Walliker    (98   la. 

655,    68   N.    W.    431    [1896]),   507, 

983,    1504. 
Clinton    Township    v.    Teachout     (150 

Mich.      124,      111      X.      W.      1052 

[1907]),     556,     558,      1347,      1348. 

1432. 
Close    V.    City   of    Chicago     (217    111. 

216,    75    N.    E.    479    [1905]),    324, 

330,    866,    917,    1375. 
Clover    V.    People    ex    rel.    Raymond 

(188     111.     576,     59     X.     E.     429 

[1901]),   927,   1000,    1332. 
Clowes     V.      flavor,     Aldermen      and 

Commonalty    of    the    City    of    Xow 

York    (47   Hun   539    [1888]),    1440. 
Cluggish     v.    Koons     (15    Ind.     App. 

599,   43    X.   E.    158),    528. 
Coates   V.    Campbell    (87    Minn.    498, 

35   N.   W.   366),  396. 


Coates    V.    Village    of    Xorwood     ( 16 

Ohio  C.   C.   196    [1898]),  309,  555, 

619,    629. 
Coates  V.  Xugent    ( —  Kan.  ,  92 

Pac.    597    [1907]),    293,    328,    553, 

563. 
Cobb     V.     Corporation     of     Elizabeth 

City    (75  X.  C.   1    [1876]),  548. 
Coburn     v.    Bossert     ( 13    Ind.     App. 

359,    40    X.    E.    281     [1895]),    328, 

563,   666,   698,   719,    1222. 
Coburn  v.   Liiclnleld    ( 132   ^lass.    440 

[1882]).  956,  1083. 
Cochran     v.     Collins     (29     Cal.     130 

[1865]),    521,   537,    835,    1216. 
Cochran    v.    Village    of    Park    Road^ 

(138     111.     295,     27     X.     E.     939 

[1893]),    244,    329,    393,    401,    439, 

447,   804. 
Codman  v.   Johnson    (104   Mass.   491 

[1870]),  49,   1054. 
Cody    V.    Town    of    Cicero     (203    III. 

322,    67    X.    E.    859    [1903]),    912, 

952,    954,    955,   991,    1324. 
Cogueshall     v.    City    of    Des     Moines 

(78  la.  235,  41  'x.  W.  617,  42  X. 

W.  650  [1889]),  314,  495,  496, 

508,  956,  902.  1017. 
Cohen  v.  City  of  Alameda  (124  Cal. 

504,  57  Pac.  377  [1899]),  118, 

119,   130,  308,  310,  644,  891,   1330. 
Cohn    V.    Parcels     (72    Cal.    367,    14 

Pac.    26    [1887]),    570,    1443. 
Coit   V.    City   of   Grand   Rapids    (115 

Mich.  493,   73   X.  W.   811    [1898]), 

015,    1015,    1033. 
Colburn   v.   :McDonald    (72   Xeb.   431, 

100   X.   W.   961    [1904]),   365. 
Cole    V.    Hunter     (5    Ohio    X.    P.    13 

[1897]),    684. 
Cole  V.   City   of   St.   Louis    (132   Mo. 

633,    34    S.    W.    469     [1895]),    66, 

653. 
Cole   V.    Skrainka    (105   Mo.    303,    16 

S.   W.   491    [1891]),  234,   437,  511, 

766. 
Cole    V.    People    (101    111.    16,    43    X. 

E.  607    [1890]),  517. 
Coleman  v.  Rathbun    (40  Wash.  303, 

82   Pac.   5-10    [1905),    1435. 
Coleman  v.  Shattuck   (68  X.  Y.  349), 

480,  1373. 


Ixxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Ueferences  are  to  sections.] 


Colfax,    Commissioners    of    Highwaj's 

of   the   Town  of  v.   Commissioners 

of  East  Lake  Fork  Special   Drain- 
age  District    (127    111.    581.   21    X. 

E.  206   [1890]),  104,  247,  248,  336, 

340,    549,   564,    587,    636,    692,    724, 

748,    927,    1030,    1076,    1229,    137.1, 

1469,    1470. 
College   Street,   In   the   Matter  of    (8 

R.    I.    474    [1867]),    42,    301,    590, 

613. 
Collier    v.    Frierson     (24    Ala.    100), 

216. 
Collier  Estate   v.   Western   Paving  & 

Supply    Company     (180    Mo.    362, 

79    S.    W.    947    [1904]),    234,    314, 

620,    621,   624,   628,   631,   663,   666, 

709,    711,    728,    1026. 
Collins   V.   Holyoke    (146   Mass.    298, 

15    X.    E.    908    [1888]),    125.    728. 
Columbia,    Corporation    of    v.    Hunt 

(5  Rich.   (S.  C.)   550   [1852]),  315. 
Columbia  Bottom   Levee   Company  v. 

Meier     (39    Mo.    53     [1866]),    253, 

343,   532,   549. 
Columbus,    City    of    v.    Sclmeider     ( 7 

Ohio  N.  P.   619    [1900]),    1179. 
Columbus,  City  of  v.  Sohl    (44  O.  S. 

479,    8    N.    E.    Rep.    299    [1886]), 

787,   1012. 
Columbus,  City  of  v.  Storey   ( 35  Ind. 

97"    [1871]).     5.50,    555,  '560.    639, 

723. 
Combs      v.      Etter       (49      Ind.      535 

[1875]),  280,   1250. 
Combs  V.  Smith   (78  Mo.  32,  20  Am. 

&  Eng.   R.   Cases  209    [1883]),  70. 
Commercial    National    Bank    v.    City 

of  Portland    (24  Ore.   188,  41   Am. 

St.  Rep.  854,  33  Pac.  532   [1893]), 

1510,    1511. 
Commissioners    of    Public    Parks,    In 

the     Matter     of      (47      Hun     302 

[1888]),    923. 
Commissioners    v.    Snyder     (45    Kan. 

636,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  742,  26  Pac. 

21    [1891]),   366. 
Commissioners    v.     Stall     (50    O.     S. 

653,  35  N.  E.  887    [1893]),   189. 
Commissioners       of       Highways       of 

Town  of  Dix  v.  Big  Four  Drainage 

District   of   Ford   County    (207   111. 

17.  69  N.   E.   576    [1904]),   51,   61, 


585,  928,  993,  1075,  1162,  1469, 
1470,    1474,    1476. 

Commissioners  of  the  Town  of  Colfax 
V.  Commissioners  of  East  Lake 
Fork  Special  Drainage  District 
(127  111.  581,  21  N.  E.  206  [1890J. 
(  See  Colfax,Commis'sioners  of  High- 
ways of  the  Town  of  v.  . ) 

Commissioners  of  Sewers  v.  New- 
burg  (3  Keb.  827  (29  Car.  II.), 
672. 

Commissioners    of    Sinking    Fund    of 

Jersey   City  v.  .    (See 

Jersey    City.) 

Commissioners    of    Sinking    Fund    of 

X^w  Jersey  v. .     ( See  New 

Jersey  v.  . ) 

Commissioners  of  Spoon  River 
Drainage  District  in  Champaign 
County  v.  Conner  (121  111.  App. 
450    [1905]),   340,  549,  564,   659. 

Commonwealth  v.  Justices  of  the 
Sessions  for  the  County  of  Mid- 
dlesex   (9   Mass.    388    [1812]),    70. 

Commonwealth  v.  Justices  of  the 
Court  of  Sessions  for  the  County 
of  Norfolk  (5  Mass.  435  [1809]), 
68,   70. 

Commonwealth  to  use  of  Allegheny 
City  V.  Marshall  (69  Pa.  St.  (19 
P.  F.  Smith)  328  [1871]),  228, 
414,   574,   853,   950,    9G3. 

Commonwealth  v.  Patton  ( 85  Pa. 
St.   258),    190. 

Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburg  (41  Pa. 
St.   278),   365. 

Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Whelen  v.  Se- 
lect  and  Common  Councils  of  the 
City  of  Pittsburg  (88  Pa.  St.  (7 
Norris)    66    [1878]),    1502. 

Commonwealth  v.  Watson  (97  Mass. 
562    [1867]),  58. 

Commonwealth  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Williamstown  ( 156  Mass.  70,  30 
N.   E.  472),   365. 

Commonwealth  for  Use,  etc.  v. 
Woods  (44  Pa.  St.  (8  Wright)  113 
[1862]),  308,  324,  555,  672. 

Commonwealth  v.  Eagle  Grove  City 
(133  Iowa  589,  111  N.  W.  51 
[1907]),  324,  496,  500,  511,  742, 
833,    981,    1006,    1007,    1031,    1442. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxi 


[Refi'rt'uces  ;ii-e  to  Keetious.] 


Comstock  V.   Incorporated   Village  of 

Xelsonville     (61    Ohio    St.    288,    50 

N.    E.    15    [1899J),    505. 
Conde   v.   City   of    Schenectady    ( 164 

N.  Y.   258,  58   N.   E.    130    [IflOO]), 

380,   381,   440,   464,   509,   698,   800, 

981,    1012,    1085,    1426,    1427. 
Conde  v.  Schenectady    (29  App.   Div. 

604,  51  N.  Y.  S.  854).  1085. 
Cone  V.  City  of  Hartford    (28   Conn. 

363     [1859]),    324,    325,    400,    402, 

434,  651,  670,  1056,  1281,  1479. 
Conger  v.  Bergman  ( —  Ky.  ,  11 

S.  W.  84,  10  Ky.  L.  R.  899 

[1889]),  322. 
Conger    v.    Graham     ( —    Ky.    , 

11    S.    W.    467,    11    Ky.    L.    R.    12 

[1889]),   322. 
Conley,    In   the   Matter   of    (22    Hun 

(N.    Y.)     603    [1880]),    985,    1460. 
Oonlin  v.  People  ex  rel.  Lassig   ( 190 

111.    400,    60    X.    E.    55     [1901]), 

795,  927,  986,  996,  1183,  1340. 
Conlin  v.  Seamen   (22  Cal.  546 

[1863]),  538,  887,  1153,   1240, 

1358.    1359. 
Connecticut    v.    .       ( See 

State    of    Connecticut    v.    . ) 

Connecticut    Mutual    Life    Insurance 

Company  v.   City  of  Chicago    (217 

111.    352,    75    N.    E.    365     [1905]), 

301,   324,   609,   816,   863,   864,   880, 

909. 
Connecticut    Mutual    Life    Insurance 

Company  v.   City  of   Chicago    ( 185 

111.    148,    56    N.    E.    1071     [1900]), 

413,  424,   837,   873. 
Connecticut    Mutual    Life    Insurance 

Co.    V.    People    ex    rel.    Kocherspor- 

ger     (172    111.    31,    49    N.    E.    989 

[1898]),    520,    945,    1183. 
Connell    v.    Hill     (30    La.    Ann.    251 

[1878]),    323,    6G3. 
Conner    v.    City    of    Cincinnnti     (11 

Oiiio   C.   C.   3*36    [1890]),   324,   555, 

666,   670,   679. 
Connersville,    City    of   v.    Merrill    (It 

Ind.     App.    303,     42    N.    E.     1112 

[1895]),    53,    323.    500,    617,    641, 

720.  747,  812,  856,  864,  1026,  1112, 

1125,    1249. 
Connor  v.  City  of  Paris    (87  Tex.  32, 


27  S.  W.  88   [1894]),  86,   179,  223, 

234,  475,  720,  775,  777,  872,   1104. 
Connor    v.    Town    of    West    Chicago 

(102     111.     287,     44     X.     E.     1118 

[1896]),    1085. 
Consolidated      Cannel      Company      v. 

Central  Pacific  Railroad  Company, 

(51   Cal.   269    [1876]),   117. 
Constantine   v.    City   of   Alhion    (148 

Mich.      403,      111      X.      W.      1068 

[1907]),   983,    1434. 
Conway,  In  the  Matter  of   (02  X.  Y. 

504  '[1875]),  740,  702. 
Conway  v.  City  of  Chicago    (219   111. 

295,^70    X.    E.    384    [1905]),    924, 

954,   1104,   1325. 
Conway,  In  the  INIatter  of  v.  Mayor. 

etc.,  of  the  Town  of  Xew  York    (4 

Hun  (X.  Y.)   43   [1875]),  740,  762. 
Con  well    V.    Tate     (107    Ind.    171,    8 

X.   E.    36    [1886]),    1277. 
Cook   V.    City  of   Ansnnia    ( 66    Conn. 

413,  34  Atl.    183    [1895]),  71,  313. 
Cook    V.    Covert    (71    ]\Iieh.    249,    39 

X\  \V.  47   [1888]),  745,  1012,  1018. 
Cook  V.   Gage   County    (65   Xeb.   611, 

91   X.   W.   559    [1902]),   763. 
Cook    V.    City   of    Independence    ( 133 

Iowa  582,  110  X".  W.  1029  [1907]), 

1271,    1280. 
Cook  V.  Morea  (33  Ind.  407   [1870]), 

303. 
Cook    V.    City    of    Portland     (35    Or. 

3S3,  58  Pac.  353   [1899]),  374,  805, 

810. 
Cook    V.    Port    of    Portland     (20    Or. 

580,   13  L.   R.  A.  533,  27   Pac.  263 

[1891]),  360. 
Conk    V.    City    of    Racine     (49    Wis. 

243,    5    X.    W.    352     [1880]),    479, 

4S4.  485,  1432,  1435,  1430. 
Cook  V.  Slocum  (27-  Minn.  509,  8 

X.  W.  755  [1881]),  309,  057,  825, 

872,  885. 
Cook    V.    South    Park    Com.     (61    111. 

115),   350. 
Cook    V.     Sudden     (94    Cal.    443,    29 

Pac.    949    [1892]),    396,    1320. 
Cook    V.    State    for    Use    of    Whitten 

(101   Ind.  446    [1884]),  1065,   1067, 

1008. 


Ixxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Cook  County  v.  City  of  Chicago   ( 103 

111.    646    [1882]),    6,    10,    353,    582, 

612. 
Cook    Farm    Co.    v.    City    of    Detroit 

(124    Mich.    426,    83    X.    W.     130 

[1900]),  251,  347. 
Coombs  V.  MacDonald    (43  Neb.  G32, 

62  N.  W.  41),  372. 
Coomes  v.  Burt   (22  Pick.  422),  336. 
Cooper   V.    Arctic   Ditchers    (56    Ind. 

233    [1877]),   253,   341,   802,    1229. 
Cooper  V.   Nevin    (90   Ky.   85,    13   S. 

W.    841    [1890]),    628,    710. 
Copcutt  V.  City  of  Yonkers    ( S3  Hun 

(N.    Y.)     178,    31    N.    Y.    S.    659 

[1894]),   557,   639,   723,   859,   1304, 

1432. 
Copcutt  V.  City  of  Yonkers    (59  Hun 

(N.  Y.)    212,   13   N.  Y.   Supp.  452 

[1891]),  394. 
Copeland  v.  Packard    (33   Mass.    (16 

Pick.)    217    [834]),   771. 
Copeland  v.  Mayor   and  Aldermen  of 

Springfield    (166   Mass.   498,  44   N. 

E.    605    [1896]),   31    228,   663. 
Corbin     v.     Davenport,      (9     la.     239 

[1859]),   1206. 
Corcoran   v.    Board   of    Aldermen    of 

•Cambridge    ( —  Mass.  ,   85  N. 

E.   155    [1908]),  370,  608. 
Cordes    v.    Brooks     ( 18     Ohio    C.    C. 

801    [1895]),   1085. 
Corey    v.    City    of    Ft.    Dodge     (133 

Iowa   666,    111    N.    W.   6    [1907]). 

314,   440,  579,   679,  719,   1498. 
Corliss  V.  Village  of  Highland  Park 

(146    Mich.    597,    110    N.    W.    45 

[1906]),   684,    1085. 
Corliss  V.  Village  of  Highland   Park 

(132    Mich.    152,    93    N.    W.    254, 

93  N.  W.  610   (Affirmed  on  rehear- 
ing,   95    N.    W.    416     [1903),    269, 

324,   416,   423,   079,   686,   722,   723, 

950,    962,    1085. 
Cornell    v.    Commissioners   of    Frank- 
lin  County    (67    0.    S.    335,   65   N. 

E.  998    [1902]),   629. 
Cornell    v.    People    ex    rel.     ( 107    111. 

372    [1883]),  259. 
Corrigan  v.  Bell   (73  Mo.  53  [1880]), 

1195,    1203,    1225. 
Corrigan     v.     Gage      (68      Mo.     541 

[1878]),  293,  296,  549,  555. 


Corry    v.    Campbell     (25    0.    S.    134 

[1874]),  86,  529,  1007,  1312,  1370, 
Corry  v.   City  of  Cincinnati    (6   Ohio 

N.'  p.    325    [1899]),    787. 
Corry    v.    Foltz,    O'Brien    &    Co.     (29 

0.   S.   320    [1876]),   681,   682,   895. 
Corry     v.    Gaynor      (22    O.    S.     584 

[1872]),    266,    468,    471,    781,    795, 

1006,  1033,  1113,  1215. 
Corry  v.  Gaynor   (21  0.  S.  277 

[1871]),  1041,  1048,  1445. 
Corsicana,  City  of  v.  Kerr,  89  Tex. 

461,  35  S.  W.  794  [1896]),  824, 

910. 
Oortelyou  v.  Anderson    (73  N.   J.  L. 

427,    63    Atl.    1095     [1906]),    173, 

322,  626,   775,   776,   950, 
Corwin,   In  the  Matter  of    ( 14   Hun, 

34    [1878]),    740,    762,   763,    1279. 
Corwith  V.  Village  of  Hyde  Park   ( 14 

Brad.      (111.)      635     [1844]),     308, 

1525. 
Cosner    v.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Colusa      County       (58      Cal.      274 

[1881]),   1503. " 
Ooster   V.   Tide  Water    Company    ( 18 

N.    J.    Eq.     (3    C.    E.    Green)     54 

[1886]),     13,     113,     117,    255,    338, 

665. 
Cossitt   Land    Co.    v.    Xeuscheler    ( — 

X.     J.     L.     ,     60     Atl.      1128 

[1905]),   552,   561,    620,   665. 
Costello  V.   Wyoming    (49   0.   S.   202, 

30  X.   E.   613    [1892]),   189. 
Cotton  V.  Watson    (134  Cal.  422,   66 

Pac.   490    [1901]),   301,   907,    1353. 
Cotton    V.    Wiscasset,    W'aterville    & 

Farmington  R.  R.  Co.    (98  Me.  511, 

57    Atl.    785    [1904]),   363. 
C'oulin  V.  People  ex  rel.  Lassig    ( 190 

III.  400,  60  N.  E.  55   [1901]),  931. 
Ooulter    V.    Phoenix    Brick    &    Con- 
struction Co.,    ( —  Mo.   App.  , 

110  S.  W.  655   [1908]),  831. 
Council   v.    Moyamensing    (2    Pa.    St. 

(2   Barr.)    224   [1845]),   631,    1047, 

1164. 
Council    Bluffs,   City  of   v.   Omaha   & 

Council    Bluffs    Street    Railway    & 

Bridge   Company    (114   la.    141,   86 

X.  W.  222   [1901]),  603,  620. 
Counterman  v.  Dublin  Township    (38 

0.  S.   15),   1012. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CAgES. 


Ixxxiii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Covington,  City  of  v.  Boyle   (69  Ky. 

(0   Bush.)    204    [1869]),   842,   860, 

867,  887,   1072. 
Covington,    City    of    v.    Bullock     ( — ■ 

Ky.  ,   103   S.  W.   276    [1907]), 

463. 
Covington,  City  of  v.   Casey    ( 66  Ky. 

(3   Bush.)    698    [1868]),   783,   843. 
Covington,   City  of   v.   Dressman    ( 69 

Ky.    (6    Bush.)    210    [1869]),    459, 

517,  518,   888,    1072. 
Covington,    City    of    v.    Matson     ( — 

Ky.  — ,  34  S.  W.  897,  17  Ky.  L. 

R*    1323     [1896]),    620,    663,    666, 

709. 
Covington,   City  of  v.   W.   T.   Xoland 

(—    Ky.    ,    89    S.    W.    216,    28 

Ky.   L."^  R.   314    [1905]),   324,   775. 
Covington  v.  Southgate    (15  B.  ]\lon. 

(Ky.)    491),   150. 
Covington,    City    of    v.    Worthington 

(88  Ky.  206,  27  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 

Cases,    187,    11    S.   W.    1038,    10   S. 

W.   790    [1889]),   73,   86,   110,   236, 

308,   662. 
Cowan   v.   Village  of   West  Troy    (43 

Barb.    (X.   YO    48    [1864]),   981. 
Coward    V.    Xorth    Plainfield     (63    X. 

J.    L.     (34    Vr.)     61,    42    Atl.    805 

[1899]),  667,  1410. 
Cowley  V.  City  of  Spokane  (99  Fed. 

840  [1900]),  111,  112,  702.  1019. 
Cox  V.  Bird  (88  Ind.  142  [1882]), 

986,  1182,  1443. 
Cox  V.  Mignery  &  Co.  (126  ]Mo.  App. 

669,  105  S.  W.  675  [1907]),  1015. 
Coyne  v.  City  of  Memphis  (118  Tenn. 

651,  102  S.  W.  355  [1907]),  73, 

661. 
Craft     V.     Kocherspergor      (173     III. 

617,    50   X.    E.    1061    [1S9S]),    525, 

531,  533,   746,   773,   925,   927.   942, 

1426,    1427,    1433,    1439. 
Craig    V.    Board    of    Improvement    of 

Busselville  Water  Works   Improve- 
ment   District     v  84    Ark.    390,    105 

S.  W.   867    [1907]),   103,   225,   779. 
Craig  V.  Ileis    (30  0.  S.  550   [1876]), 

322,    1067,    1072. 
Craig    V.    Peoj)le    ex    rel.    Ciannaway 

(193     111.     199,     61     N.     E.     1072 

[1901]),     525,     862,      1065,      1101, 

1102. 


Craig    V.    City    of    Philadelphia     (89 

Pa.    St.     (8    X^orris)     265    [1879]), 

118,   304,   610,  665,  666,  706,   1157, 

1158,   1310. 
Ciaighill    V.    Van    Riswick     (8    App. 

D.    C.    185    [1896]),    86,    243,    356, 

1420,    1425. 
Cram,   In  the  Matter  of   the  Petition 

of,    to    Vacate   an   Assessment    ((iO 

X.   Y.   452    [1877]),  479,   679,   686. 
Cram   v.    City   of    Chicago    ( 139    111. 

265,    28    N..    E.    758    [1893]),    313, 

380,   386,   631,  920. 
Cram  v.  Munro    (1   Ed.  Ch.    (X.  Y.) 

123    [1831]),    1054. 
Cramer    v.    City   of    Charleston    (176 

111.  507,  52  X.  E.  73   [1898]),  314, 

070,  098,  715,   772,  862,  947,   1377. 
Crandell    v.    City    of    Taunton     (110 

Mass.   421    [1S72]),   309,   918,   920, 

921,  1002,  1348,   1365. 

Crane   v.    Cummings    (137    Cal.    201, 

09     Pac.     984     [1902]),     301,     99S, 

1141,  1145,  1105,  1171,  1170.  1429. 
Crane  v.  Forth  (95  Cal.  88,  30  Pac. 

193  [1892]),  1258,  1372,  1377. 
Crane  v.  French  (50  Mo.  Ai)p.  307 

[1892]),  624. 
Crane  v.  Mallinckrodt  [9  Mo.  App. 

316),  1137,  1377. 
Crane  v.  Siloam  Springs  (67  Ark. 

30,  55  S.  W.  955  [1899]),  86,  103, 

105,  244,  245,  247,  248,  250,  251, 

256,    351.    684. 
Crane    v.    West    Chicago    Park    Com- 

missioners    ( 153   111.   348,   26  L.   R. 

A.  311,  38  X.  E.  943    [1894]),  291 

377,    461. 
Cratty   v.    City   of    Chicago    (217    111. 

453,    75    X."  E.    343    [1905]),    475, 

922.  925,   963,    1002,    1103. 

Craw    v.    Village   of   Tolono    (96    111. 

255,     36    Am.    Rep.     143     [1880]), 

153,    295,   323,    1039,    1144,    1432. 
Crawford's    Estate    (14    Phila    (Pa.) 

323),    347,   608. 
Crawford    v.    Hodrick     ( 9    Ind.    App. 

356,    36    X.    E.    771     [1893]),    171, 

375,   1113. 
Crawford  v.  Mason    (123   la.  301,  98 

X.    W.    795    [1904]),    18,    51,    527, 

837,   974,   1501,    1518. 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Crawford  v.  The  People  ex  rel.  Rum- 

sey   (83  111.  557   [1876]),  263,  266, 

278,   556,   665,   666,   670,   677,   872. 
Crawford   v.   Taylor    (27    Ohio   C.    C. 

245     11905]),    93,     119,    373,    375, 

860. 
Crawfordsville    Music    Hall    Associa- 
tion   V.    Clements     ( 12    Ind.    App. 

464,   39   N.   E.   540,   40   N.   E.    742 

[1894]),   693. 
Creamer   v.   Allen    (3   Mo.   App.    545 

[1877]),    50,    147,    148,    324,    400, 

711,    1137. 
Creamer     v.     Bates      (49     Mo.     523 

[1372]),   527,   529,   698,   714. 
Creamer     v.     McCune     7     Mo.     App. 

91    [1879]),  546,   632,   645. 
Creed  v.  McCombs    (146  Cal.  449,  80 

Pac.   679    [1905]),   531,   956,    1355, 

1356,    1361,    1366. 
Creighton    v.    Manson     (27    Cal.    614 

[1865]),    43,    79,     101,     113,    223, 

234,  549,  654,  777,  835,  838,   1039, 

1049,    1050. 
Creighton    v.    Pragg     (21     Cal.     115 

[?862]),    1113,    1215. 
Creighton    v.    Board    of    Supervisors 

of    tne    City    and    County    of    Snn 

Francisco     (42    Cal.    446     [1871]), 

1514. 
Creighton    v.    Scott     (14    0.    S.    43S 

[1863]),    301,    313,    317,    440,    552, 

574,   576,    620. 
Creighton  v.   City   of   Toledo    (18   0. 

S.    447    [1869]*),    1506,    1507,    1511. 
Creole   v.    City    of    Chicago     (56    111. 

422    [1870]),    410,    424,    701,    939, 

1187,  1314,  1331,  1333. 
Crescent  Hotel  Co.  v.  Bradley  (81 

Ark.  286,  98  S.  W.  971  [1906]), 

248,  636,  813,  1324,  1495. 
Cribbs  v.  Benedict  ( 64  Ark.  555,  44 

S.  W.  707  [1897]),  39,  87,  97,  101, 

108,  111,  145,  164,  256,  340,  549, 

560,  564,  619,  651,  654,  666,  690, 

691. 
Crist  V.   State  ex  rel   Whitmore    ( 97 

Ind.    389    [1884]),    270,    278,    637, 

1244. 
Croft  V.   Chicago   Great  Western  Ry. 

Co.    (72   Minn.   47,   74  N.   W.   898, 

80   N.  W.  '628    (1898]),   363. 


Crofut  V.  City  of  Danbury    ( 65  Conn. 

294,  32  Atl.  365),  223."  229,  234. 
Cronan  v.  Municipality  No.  1    (5  La. 

Ann.  537    [1850]),   1498. 
Cronin,    Pros.    v.    Mayor    and    Alder- 
men of  Jersey   City    (38   N.   J.   L. 

(9   Vr.)    410    [1876]),    860. 
Crosby    v.    Brattleboro    (68   Vt.    484, 

35    Atl    430    [1896]),    1356. 
Cross    V.    County    of    Plymouth    ( 125 

Mass.    557    [1878]),    64,    65,    66. 
Cross  V.  Zane    (47   Cal.   602    [1874]), 

860,   867. 
Crossley  v.  City  of  Findlay  ( 10  Ohio 

C.   C.   286    [1895]),   681. 
Crowe  V.  Corporation  of  Charlestown 

(—    W.    Va.    ,    57    S.    E.    330 

[1907]),   73,   661. 
Crowell   V.   Jaqua    (114   Ind.   246.    15 

N.   E.   242),    1112,    1113,    1191. 
Crowley   v.   Copley    (2   La.   Ann.   329 

[1847]),  38,  42,  54,  343,  612,  613. 
Cruger,   In   the   Matter   of    the   Peti- 
tion of,   to   Vacate    an    Assessment 

(84   N.   Y.   619    [1881]),   557,   661, 

1453. 
Cruikshanks  v.   City   Council    ( 1   Mc- 

Cord     (S.    C.)     360    [1821]),    118, 

223,    275. 
Crume    v.    Wilson     (104    Ind.    583,    4 

N.   E.    169    [1885]),   794. 
Culbertson  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    (16 

Ohio,   574    [1847]),   223,   234,   777, 

911,    1431. 
Culbertson  v.   Knight    (152   Ind.   121, 

52    N.    E.    700    [1898]),    549,    560, 

564,   619,    659. 
Cullen,    Matter    of    (119    N.    Y.    628, 

23   N.   E.    1144),   407. 
Cullen,    In    the    Matter    of    (53    Hun 

(X.     Y.)     534,     6    N.    Y.    S.     625 

[1889]),  407. 
Cullen  V.  Strauz  (124  Ind.  340,  24 

N.  E.  883  [1890]),  1101,  1102, 

1203. 
Culver   V.   City  of   Chicago    (171    111. 

399,    49    N.    E.    573    1898]),    308, 

549,   569,   643,   723,   856,   872,   921. 
Culver    V.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Jersey  City   (45  N.  J.  L.    (16  Vr.) 

256   [1883]). 


1 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxv 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Culver  V.  People  ex  rel.  Kocliersper- 
ger  (IGl  111.  89,  43  X.  E.  Rep. 
812  (1896]),  305,  837,  927.  9 JO, 
959,    1085,    1113,    1341,    1381. 

Cumberland  v.  Keariis  (18  t)nt.  151 
[1889]),   1072. 

Cuming  v.  Gleason  ( 140  Mich.  195, 
103  N.  W.  537  [1905]),  52,  53, 
55,   828. 

Cuming  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids  (40 
Mich.  150,  9  N.  W.  141  [1881]), 
266,  275,  301,  468,  470,  490,  569, 
816,  831,  1377,   1379,  1444,   1450. 

Cummings  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  Brooklyn  (11 
Paiges'  Chan.  Rep.  596  [1845]), 
1508,  150!). 

Cummings  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 144 
111.  563,  33  N.  E.  854  [1893]),  181, 
1085. 

Cummings  v.  Hyatt  (54  Neb.  35,  74 
N.  W.  411    [1898]),  355. 

Cummings  v.  Kearney  ( 141  Cal.  156, 
74  Pac.  759  [1903]),  301,  1026, 
1414,    1436. 

Cummings  v.  People  ex  rel.  Han- 
berg  (213  HI.  443,  72  N.  E.  1094 
[1904]),  1116,  1119,  1172,  1186, 
1189. 

Cummings  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners  (181  HI.  136,  54 
N.  E.  941  [1899]),  51,  305,  314, 
407,  414,  431,  546,  569,  715,  795, 
800,  956,  959,  902,  1302,   1370. 

Cummings  v.  City  of  Williamsport 
84  Pa.  St.  472  [1877]),  308,  1348, 
1360. 

Cunningham  v.  City  of  Peoria  ( 157 
HI.  499,  41  X.  E.  1014  [1895]), 
587,   630,    723. 

Curncn  v.  Mayor,  Aldernien  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  X^ew 
York  (79  X.  Y.  511  [1880]), 
1036,  1037. 

Curnen  v.  The  Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of 
New  York  (7  Daly  (X.  Y.)  544 
.[1878]),  1036. 

Currie  v.  School  District  ( 35  ^Slinn. 
163,   27   X.  W.   922    [1861[),   486. 

Curtice  v.  Schmidt  (202  Mo.  703, 
101  S.  W.  61  [1907]),  324,  514, 
515. 


Curtis    V.     Pierce     (115     Mass.     180 

[1874]),  49,    1054. 
Cushing     V.     City     of     Boston     144 

Mass.    317,    11    X\    E.    93    [1887]), 

661, 
Cushing     V.     Powell     ( —     ilo.     App. 

,     109     S.    W.     1054     [1908]), 

1255. 
Cushman     v.     Smith      (34     Me.     247 

[1852]),  71. 
Cypress    Pond   Draining   Company   v. 

Hooper     (2    Mete.     (59    Ky.)     350 

[1859]),   89,   111,   255. 


D 


D,    In    re    Avenue,    in    City    of    X"ew 

York    (—   X.    Y.    ,    84    X.    E. 

956    [1908]),   680. 
D,    In    re    Avenue,    in    City    of    Xew 

York    (106   X.   Y.   S.   889    [1907]), 

679,  680,  1372. 
Dahlman  v.   City  of  INLilwaukee    ( 131 

Wis.   427,    110   XL   W.   479,   111    X. 

W.    675    [1907]),   900,    1422,    1443, 

1503. 
Daiber  v.   Toledo    (7   Ohio   X.  P.   389 

[1900]),  625,  704. 
Daily     v.      Swope      (47      Miss.      367 

[1872]),  40,  43.   86,    147,    148,  343, 

549,    613,   665,    666,    097. 
Dallas,    City   of   v.    Brown    ( 10    Tex. 

Civ.     App.     612.     31     S.     W.     298 

[1895]),    1512. 
Dallas,  City    of   v.    Ellison    (10    Tex. 

Civ.     App.     28,     30     S.     W.     1128 

[-895]),    169,    223,    234.    725,    813, 

815,  950,   1013. 
Dallas,  City  of  v.  Kalm    (9  Tex.  Civ. 

App.   19,"  29  S.  W.  98   [1894]),  65, 

06,  651,   655. 
Dallas,  City  of   v.   Kruoeel    (95   Tex. 

43,   04  S!  W.  922    [1901]).   1492. 
Dalrymple  v.  City  of  Milwaukee    (53 

Wis.    178,    10   X.   W.    141    [1881]), 

41,    163,    1337. 
Dalton  V.  City  of  Poplar   Bluff    (173 

Mo.    39,    72    S.    W.    1068    [1902]), 

1500. 
Daly   V.    Gubbins    (—   Ind.   ,    82 

X.  E.  659   [1907]).  301,  983,   1234, 

1240,  1254,  1336,  1337,  1340. 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Daly   V.   Gubbins    (35    Ind.   App.    86, 

73    N.    E.    833    [1904]),    735.    745. 

772,  1229,  1334,  1375. 
Daly  V.  Morgan  ( 69  Md.  400,  1  L.  R. 

A.  757   [1888]),  7,  11. 
Daly    V.    City    and    County    of    San 

Francisco     (72    Cal.    154,    13    Pac. 

321    [1887]),   777,    1499. 
Damkoehler    v.    City    of    Milwaukee 

(124    Wis.     144.    'lOl    X.    W.    706 

[1905]),  620,  624. 
Dampe    v.    Town   of   Dane    (29    Wis. 

419    [1872]),   781. 
Dancer   v.   Town   of  ilannington    ( 50 

W.  Va.  322,  40  S.  E.  475   [1901]), 

118,   314,   663,   781,   791. 
Dancy    Drainage    Dist.,    In    re     (129 

Wis.   129,   108  X.  W.  202   [1900]), 

340,    449. 
Danenhower  v.   District  of   Columbia 

(7    Mackey     (D.    C.)     99    [1889]), 

952,  967. 
Danforth  v.  Villagg  of  Hinsdale   (177 

111.    579,    52    X.    E.    877     [1899]), 

526,    819,    1085. 
Daniels    v.    Keeler     (10     0.     S.     169 

[1859]).    86,  553. 
Daniels     v.     Smith,     38     Mich.     060 

[1878]),    735,    739,    1396.    1404. 
Daniels   v.    Tearney    (102    U.    S.   415, 

1012, 
Dann    v.    WoodrnfT     (51     Conn.    203 

[1883]),    545,    555,    651,    654,    674, 

724,    872,    1055,    1067,    1163,    1358. 
Darlington  v.   Commonwealth  to  Use 

of   City   of   Allegheny    (41   Pa.   St. 

(5  Wright)    68    [186*^1]),  395,  467, 

485,    748,    1304. 
Darnell  v.  Keller    (18  Ind.  App.  103, 

45    X.    E.    676    [1897]),    73,    323, 

531,    532,    1005,    1019,    1047,    1230, 

1337,    1346. 
Darst  V.  Griffin    (31  Xeb.  6G8,  48  X. 

W.  819   [1891]),  51,  103,  105,  245, 

261,    777,     781,    802,     1431,    1435, 

1436. 
Dasey    v.    Skinner     (33    X.    Y.    State 

R.'l5,  11  X.  Y.  Supp.  821   [1890]), 

347,  354,  578,  608. 
Dashiell   v.   Mayor   and   City  Council 

of  Baltimore  Use  of  Hax    (45  IMd. 

615    [1876]),    244,    314,    394,    405, 

472,    511,   527,    532,    543,    649,    771, 


776,  795,  850,  1042,  1211,  1277, 
1358. 

Dassler,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of,  for  a  Writ  of  Habeas 
Corpus  (35  Kan.  678,  12  Pac.  130 
[1880]),  40. 

Daugherty  v.  Brown  (91  :Mo.  26,  3 
S.   W.   210    [1886]),   70. 

Davenport,  City  of  v.  Allen  (120 
Fed.  172  [1903]),  18,  314,  530, 
990. 

Davenport,  City  of  v.  Boyd  (109  la. 
248,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  ^536,  80  X. 
W.  314   [1899]),  1037. 

Davidson  v.  City  of  Chicago  (  178 
111.  582,  53  X.  E.  367  [1899]), 
864. 

Davidson  v.  Xew  Orleans  (96  U.  S. 
97,  24  L.  616  [1877]),  108,  112, 
115,  119,  122,  127,  140,  142,  340, 
587,  719,  952,   1046,   1083. 

Davidson  v.  Wight  (16  D.  C.  App. 
371  [1900]),  86,  243,  310,  663, 
666,  690,  702,  709,  760,  1010,  1011. 

Davie's  Executors  v.  City  of  Gal- 
veston (16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  13,  41 
S.  W.  145  [1897]),  818,  830,  1279, 
1287,    1478,    1484. 

Davies  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids  ( 105 
Mich.  529,^63  X.  W.  530  [1895]), 
822. 

Davies  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles  (86 
Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771  [1890]),  118, 
119,  121,  134,  195,  207,  250,  308, 
525,  526,  553,  570,  639,  666,  674, 
723,  750. 

Davies  v.  City  of  Saginaw  (87  Mich. 
439,  49  X.'  W.  667  [1891]),  500, 
555,   831,   845,   857,   868,   927. 

Davis  V.  Cincinnati  (36  0.  S.  24 
[1880]),    1041,    1043,    1054. 

Davis  V.  City  of  Des  Moines  (71  la. 
500,  32  X.'W.  470),   1504. 

Davis  V.  Lake  Shore  &  Michigan 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  (114  Ind.  304, 
16  X.  E.  639  [1887]),  735,  996, 
986,  '1015,  1019,  1030,  1431,  1436. 
1443. 

Davis  V.  City  of  Litchfield  (155  111. 
384,  40  X.  E.  Rep.  354  [1895]), 
259,  271,  279,  413,  424,  555,  670, 
676,   722,    723,   850,   967,    1085. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


lxxx\ii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Davis  V.  City  of  Litclifield  (145  III. 
313,  21  L.  R.  A.  5G3,  33  X.  E. 
888  [1893]),  103,  105,  153,  173, 
179,  223,  234.  245,  247,  256,  258, 
266,  295,  323,  343,  466,  469,  472, 
555,  571,  577,  623,  639,  648,  666, 
714,    715,    776,    777. 

Davis  V.  City  of  Lynchburg  (84  Va. 
861,  6  S.  E.  230^  [1888]),  43.  86, 
119,  120,  135,  161,  301,  314,  698, 
728. 

Davis  V.  ilayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Newark  (54  N. 
J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  595,  25  Atl.  336 
[1892]),  61,  71,  313,  416,  425, 
465,  479,  554,  559. 

Davis  V.  City  of  Newark  (54  N.  J. 
L.  (25  Vr.)  144,  23  Atl.  276 
[1891]),  313,  475,  547,  603,  644. 
723,   986,   996,  997,   1281,    1368. 

Davis  V.  Northwestern  Elevated 
Railroad  Company  ( 170  111.  595, 
48   N.  E.   1058    [1897]),   71.    • 

Davis  v.  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco  (115  Cal.  67,  46  Pac. 
863    [1896]),    1482. 

Davis  V.  Siiverton  (47  Ore.  171,  82 
Pac.   16    [1905]),  313,  398,   1432. 

Davison  v.  Campbell  (28  Ind.  App. 
688,  63  N.  E.  779  [1901]),  57, 
375,    735,    829. 

Dawson  v.  City  of  Pittsburg  (  L59 
Pa.  St.  317,  27  Atl.  951  [1893]), 
653. 

Day  v.  Town  of  New  Lots  (  107  N. 
Y.  148,  13  N.  E.  915  [1887]), 
1072,    1088,    1146,    1494. 

Day  V.  Town  of  New  Lots  (36  Hun, 
263),    1494. 

Dayton,  City  of  v.  Bauman  (66  O. 
S.  379,  64  N.  E.  433  [1902]),  90, 
113.    118,    308,   314.   426,   430. 

Dayton  v.  Drainage  Commissioners 
128  111.  271.  21  N.  E.  198  [1890]), 
564. 

Dayton  v.  City  of  Lincoln  (39  Neb. 
74,   57    N.    W.    754    [1894]),   66. 

Dayton  v.  Quigley  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  (2 
Stewart)    77),    1072. 

Dayton,  City  of  v.  Taylor's  Adminis- 
trators (62  0.  S.  11,  56  N.  E. 
480),    449,    038. 

Dawley  v.  City  of  Antigo   ( 120  Wis. 


302,   97  N.   W.    1119    [1904]).    191, 

370,   781. 
Dawson    v.    Pittsburg     ( 159    Pa.    St. 

317,   27   Atl.   951    [1893]),    654. 
De  C'lercq  v.   Barber  Asphalt  Paving 

Company    (167    111.   215,   47   N.   E. 

367   [1897]),   11,  35,  49,  665,   1054. 
De  Clercq  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 

Co.     (66    111.    App.     596     [1896]), 

35,   49,    1072. 
De  Grilleau  v.  Frawley   (48  La.  Ann. 

184,  19  So.   151    [1896]),  393,  396, 

431. 
De  Haven  v.  Berendes,   135  Cal.   178, 

67    Pac.    786     [1901]),    410,    413, 

424,  720,  1031,  1337,  1372,  1379, 

1380. 
De  Koven  v.  Lake  View  (131  111. 

541,  23  N.  E.  240  [1890]),  920, 

923,    1283. 
DeKoven  v.  City  of  Lake  View   ( 129 

111.    399,    21  'n.    E.    813     [1890]), 

547,   587,   631,   674,   896. 
De  Las  Casas,  Petitioner   ( 178  Mass. 

213,    59    N.    E.    664    [1901]),    350, 

664. 
I    De     ]\Iontcaulnin     v.     Mayor,     Alder- 
men and  Commonalty  of   the   City 
I        of      New      York       (46      Hun,      188 
I        [1887]),    1481. 

I  DePeyster,  In  the  Matter  of  (80  N. 
I  y/565  [1880]),  121,  266,  324,760. 
I    De  Peyster  v.  Murphy   (66  N.  Y.  622 

[1876]),    1067,    1072. 
De    Peyster    v.    Murphy     (39    N.    Y. 

Sup.'  Ct.    Rep.    255    [1875]),    912, 

1041,   1049,    1066.    1067.    1150. 
DePierris,   In   the   Matter   of    (82   N. 

Y.   243    [1880]),   740,   8.36,   844. 
DePuy  V.   City  of  Wabash    (133  Ind. 

336,   32   N.   E.    1016    [1892]).   795. 

986.    1005,    1007.    lOIo.    iniO.    14,30, 

143G. 
De   Soto,    City   of    v.   Showman    (  100 

Mo.     App.  '  323.     73     S.     W.     257 

[1903]),   367,   813,   819. 
Deady    v.    Townsend     (57     Cal.    298 

[1881]),   437.    479.    831.    857.    1293, 

1337. 
Dean    v.    Borchsenius     (30    Wis.    236 

[1872]),    103,    106,    223,    234,    314, 

437,   439,   465,   479,   483,   496,   515, 

679,  956,  961,  962,  964,  1196,  1426. 


Ixxxviii 


T^VBLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Dean  v.  Charlton  27  Wis.  522 
[1871]),  199,  414,  495,  515,  956, 
960. 

Dean  v.  Charlton  (23  Wis.  590,  99 
Am.  Dec.  205   [1869]),  408,  962. 

Dean  v.  City  of  Madison  (9  Wis.  402 
[1859]),  781,  1426,  1427. 

Dean  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the 
City  of  Paterson  (68  X.  J.  L.  (39 
Vr.')  664,  54  Atl.  836  [1902]), 
690,    1368,    1379,   1381. 

Dean  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the 
City  of  Paterson  (67  N.  J.  L.  (38 
Vr.)  199,  50  Atl.  620  [1901]), 
601,   643,   883. 

Dean  v.  Treasurer  of  Clinton  Coun- 
ty (146  Mich.  645,  109  N.  W.  1131 
[1906]),  340,  414,  461,  550,  952, 
1503. 

Deane  v.  Indiana  Macadam  &  Con- 
struction Company  (161  Ind.  371, 
68  X.  E.  686  [1903]),  118.  142, 
143,  276,  301,  620,  669,  670,  699. 
709,  731,  745,  1234.  1237,  1347, 
1368,   1375,   1377. 

Dear  v.  Varnum  (SO  Cal.  86,  22 
Pac.    76    [1889]),    1478. 

Dehlois  v.  Barker  ( 4  R.  I.  445 ) ,  323, 
420,   713. 

Dederer  v.  Voorhies  (81  X.  Y.  154 
[1880]).  982,  1009,  1116,  1277, 
1426,   1427,    1429,   1432,   1438. 

Deegan  V.  State  for  use  of  Stoddard, 
108  Ind.  155,  9  X.  E.  148  [1886]). 
340,   927,    1247,    1427. 

Deer  v.  Sheraden  Borough  ( —  Pa. 
St.  ,  69  Atl.  814   [1908]),  862. 

Deerfield,  Township  oi  v.  Harper 
(115  Mich.  678,  74  X.  W.  207 
[1898]),    1271. 

Deering,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of,  to  Vacate  an  Assessment 
(93  X.  Y.  361  [1883]),  283,  313, 
436,  465,  479.  480,   1373. 

Deering,  In  the  Matter  of  ( 85  X.  Y. 
1    [1881]),   266,   433,    1467. 

Deering,  In  the  Matter  of  ( 55  How. 
(X.  Y.)  296  [1878]),  356,  475, 
853,    1067,   1106,   1455. 

Deering  In  the  Matter  of  (14  Daly 
(X.  Y.)  89  [1886]),  475,  878,  950, 
982. 


Deering   v.   Peterson    (75   Minn.    118, 

77   X.   W.   568),   410. 
Dehail    v.    Morford    (95    Cal.    457,    30 

Pac.    593    [1892]),    551.    777,    833, 

1024,    1031.    1432. 
Deisner    v.     Simpson     (72     Ind.    435 

[1880]),    1068,    1225. 
Delamater    v.    City   of   Chicago    ( 158 

111.  575,  42  X.  E.  Rep.  444  [1895]), 

244,    775,   857,   925,    1375. 
Delaney,    In    the    Matter   of    ( 52    X. 

Y.    80    [1873]),    1454,    1460,    1467. 
Delaney    v.    Gault     (30    Pa.    St.     (6 

Casey)      63      [1858]),     995,     1063, 

loss,    1144.    1159,    1488. 
Delano     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty   of    the    City   of    Xew 

York      (32     Hun      (X.     Y^)      144 

[1884]),   604,   723,    1486. 
Delaware     and     Hudson     Canal     Co., 

Matter  of    (129   X.   Y\    105,   29   X. 

E.    237    [1891]),    1458. 
Delaware    and      Hudson    Canal     Co., 

In  the  flatter  of  tlie   (60  Hun  204, 

14   X.   Y.   Supp.   585    [1891]),   241, 

485,   495,    983. 
Dehiware     and     Hudson     Canal     Co., 

President,  Managers  and  Company 

of    the    V.    Atkins,    Collector    (121 

X.    Y.    246.    24    X.    E.    319),    276, 

724,    1411,    1413.    1415. 
Delaware     and     Hudson     Canal     Co. 

V.    City    of    Buffalo     (167    X.    Y. 

589,   60   X.   E.    1119    [1901]),   360. 
Delaware    and    Hudson    Canal    Co.    v. 

City  of  Buffalo   (39  App.  Div.    (X. 

Y.)    333.  56  X.  Y.  Sup.  976),  360. 
Delaware   and   Hudson   Canal    Co.   v. 

Von    Storch.    196    Pa.    St.    102,    46 

Atl.    375    [1900]).   49.    1054. 
Delker    v.    Owensboro    (Ky.)     (98    S. 

W.      1031.     30     Ky.     L.     R.      440 

[1907]),    1055. 
Dempster    v.    City    of    Chicago     (175 

111.    278.    51    X.    E.    710    [1898]), 

393,    400,    417.    947,    1432. 
Dempster  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern   ( 158 

HI.    36,    41    X.    E.    1022    [1895]), 

1039,    1175,    1187,   1304. 
Denman  v.  Steinbach    (29  Wash.  179 

69   Pac.   751    [1902]),   1207. 
Dennett,   Petitioner    (32   Me.   50S,   54 

Am.  Dec.   602).  216. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ixxxix 


[INferiMices  nre  to  sections.] 


Dennis,   In   the   Matter   of    ( 22    Hun 

(X.  Y.)    607    [1880]),    14.52. 
Dennison  v.  City  of  Kansas    ( 95  ^lo. 

416,    8    S.    VV.    429     [1888]),    781, 

1005,    1432. 
Dennison  v.  City  of  New  York    ( 182 

N.  Y.  24,  74' N.  E.  486  [1905]), 

1492. 
Denny  v.  City  of  Spokane  (79  Fed. 

719,  25  C.  C.  A.  164,  48  U.  S.  App. 

282    [1897]),    301,    1504,    1510. 
Denver,    City   of   v.    Bayer    (7    Colo. 

113,    2    Am.    &    Eng.    Corp.    Cases, 

465    [1883]),   65,   70. 
Denver,    City    of     v.     Campbell      (33 

Colo.    162,    80    Pac.    142     [1905]), 

108,    118,    141,   245,    496,    666,    698, 

700,   1085,   1337. 
Denver,  City  of  v.  Diimars    (33  Colo. 

94,  80  Pac.    114    [1904]),   135,   325. 

497,    '6G6,     711,     772.     1005,     1007, 

1337. 
Denver,  City  of  v.  Dunning  (33  Colo. 

487,  81    Pac.   259    [1905]),    1440. 
Denver,   City  and  County  of  v.  Hin- 

dry    (—  Colo.  ,   90   Pac.    1028 

[1907]),  530,   1505. 
Denver,     City     of     v.     Kennedy     (33 

Colo.  80,  80  Pac.   122,  80  Pac.  467 

[1905]),    86.     131,     152,    359,    521), 

549,    555,    560,    651,    666,    692,    709. 

726,   1435. 
Denver,  City  of  v.  Knowles   (17  Colo. 

204,   17  L.  R.  A.   135,  30  P;ic.   1041 

[1892]),    11,  44,  92,    118,    152,   315, 

am,  698,  703. 
Denver,    City    of    v.    Londoner     ( 33 

Colo.    104,  "^80  Pac.   117),    119,   130, 

245,   251,   266,   314,   620,   629,   632. 

666,    698,   705,   723.   731,    795,   828, 

1005,    1007,    1435,    1442. 
Department  of   Public   Parks,   In   the 

Matter    of    the,    to    Acquire    Lands 

85  X.  Y.  459    [1881]),  9S9,   1375. 
Department  of  Public  Works,  In  tlie 

Matter    of    (13    Hun     (N.    Y.)    483 

[1878]),    919. 
Derby    v.    West   Chicago    Park    Com- 
missioners   (154   111.  215.  40   X.   E. 

438    [1894]),    731,    739.    986.    1000, 

1372,    1439. 
Des   Moines,   City   of   v.    Casady    (21 

la.  570   [1866]),  735.   737.   Ifl47. 


Des  Moines  Brick  Manufacturing 
Co.  V.  Smith  (108  la.  307,  79  X. 
W.  77  [1899]),  475,  1070,  1103, 
1109. 

Deslauries  v.  Soucie  (222  111.  522, 
113  Am.  St.  Rep.  432,  78  X.  E. 
799    [1906]),    1015,    1023,    1408. 

Detroit,  City  of  v.  Chapin.  (See 
Detroit,  City  of  v.  Judge  of  Re- 
corder's Court.) 

Detroit,  Board  of  Water  Commis- 
sioners of  City  of  v.  Commission- 
ers of  Parks  and  Boulevards  ( 126 
Mich.  459,  85  X.  W.   1132),  353. 

Detroit,  City  of  v.  Judge  of  Record- 
er's Court  (112  Mich.  588,  71  X. 
^V.  149;  sub  nomine,  Detroit,  City 
of  V.  Chapin  (42  L.  R.  A.  638 
[1897]),  11,  118,  308,  663,  665, 
666,   709. 

Detroit,  City  of  v.  Daly  (68  Mich. 
503,  37  X.  W.  11  [1888]),  11,  69, 
118,  247,  308,   668,  709. 

Detroit,  City  of  v.  Macier  (117  'Slich. 
76,  75  X.  W.  Rep.  285  [1898]), 
891. 

Detroit  v.  Parker  (181  U.  S.  399.  45 
L.  917,  21  S.  624,  645  [1901]), 
118,    121,    702. 

Dewey  v.  Des  :Moines  (173  U.  S. 
193,  43  L.  665,  19  S.  379  [1899]), 
12,  127,  304,  549,  666,  677,  715, 
1046,    1370. 

Dewey  v.  C  ity  of  Des  :M(>i!i('s  (  101 
la.  415,  70  X.  W.  605  [1897]), 
12,  127,  298,  304,  549,  'mW,  677,' 
1041,    1046,    1182,    1370. 

Dewey  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
the  County  of  Xiagara  ( 2  Hun 
X.  Y.  392  "^[1874]),    14SC,    1495. 

DeWitt,  County  of,  v.  City  of  Clin- 
ton (194  Ili.  521,  62  X.  E.  780 
[1902]).   857.  859.   860,   867. 

DeWitt  v.  City  of  Elizabeth  (56  X. 
J.  L.  (27  Vr.)  119,  27  Atl.  801 
[1893]).  324,  414.  446,  549,  560, 
563,   666,  977,   979. 

Dexter  v.  City  of  Boston  (176  ^lass. 
247,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  306.  57  >\ 
E.  379  [1900]).  82,  103,  563,  627, 
(i(i().  700.   1484. 


xc 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections. ] 


Diamond   Street,  Pittsburg    (196   Pa. 

St.  254,  46  Atl.  428   [1900]),  1393, 

1406. 
Diamond    v.    City    of    Mankato     ( 89 

Minn.  48.  61   L.  R.  A.  448,  93  N. 

W.    911     [1903]),    314,    781,    783, 

784. 
Dick    V.    Philadelphia    (197    Pa.    St. 

467,  47  Atl.  750  [1901]),  383,  462. 
Dick  V.   City  of  Toledo    (11   Ohio   C. 

C.  349  [1896]),  440,  584,  587,  663, 

725. 
Dickenson    v.    Inhabitants    of    Fitch- 
burg     (79    Mass.     (13    Gray)     546 
[1859]),    65,    66. 
Dicker  son  v.  Peters    (71   Pa.   St.    (21 

P.     F.    Smith)     53     [1872]),    521, 

1471,  1472. 
Dickey  v.  City  of  Chicago  (164  111. 

37,"  45    X.  'e.    537     [1896]),    865. 

912,  917,   918,    1350. 
Dickey  v.   City  of   Cliicago    ( 152   111. 

468",    38    X.    E.    932     [1894]),    394, 

760. 
Dickey    v.    Holmes     ( 109    Mo.    App. 

72ll    83    S.    W.    982    [1904]),    413. 

496,    821,    857,    864,   984. 
Dickey     v.     People     ex     rel.     Kocher- 

sperger     (  160    111.    633,    43    X.    E. 

606    [1896]),    747,    764.    772,    930, 

993,  1183. 
Dickey    &    Baker    v.    People    ex    rel. 

Hanberg     (213    111.    51,    72    X.    E. 

791     [1904]),    1029,    1184,    1189. 
Dickey    v.    Porter     (203    Mo.    1,    101 
.     S.   W.   586    [1907]),  324,  495,  864, 

1137. 
Dickinson    v.    City   of    Detroit     (111 

Mich.  480,  69  X.  W.   728   [1807]), 

305,  387,  463,  464. 
Dickinson    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

Commonalty    of    the    City    of    Xew 

York      (92^  X.     Y.     584     [1883]), 

1492. 
Dickinson    v.    City    of    Trenton     ( 35 

X.   J.  Eq.    (8   Stew.)    416    [1882]), 

1164. 
Dickinson  v.  Van  Wormer    ( 39  Mich. 

141    [1878]),    1278. 
Dickinson   v.    City    Council    of    Wor- 
cester    (138     Mass.    555     [1885]), 

323,  443,  693,  695,  813,  821,   1400. 


Dickson  v.  Omaha  and  St.  L,  R.  Co. 

(124    Mo.    140,    46    Am.    St.    Rep. 

429,    25    L.    R.    A.    320,    27    S.    \V. 

476),    363. 
Dickson  v.   City  of  Racine    (65   Wis. 

306,    27    N.    W.    58    [1880]).    359, 

418,  947,   1277. 
Dickson  v.   City  of  Racine    (61   Wis. 

545,   21    X.    W.    620    [1884]),    142, 

672,  674,  675,   1347,   1352. 
Dieckamann     v.     Sheboygan     County 

(89     Wis.     570,     62  '  X.     W.     410 

[1895]),   783,   843,   844. 
Diefenthaler     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen 

and     Commonalty     of     Xew     York 

(111    X.    Y.    331,     19    X.    E.    48 

[1888]),   1418,   1462,   1486,   1492. 
Diefenthaler     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen 

and    Commonalty    of    the    City    of 

Xew   York    (47   Hun    (X.    Y.)'  627 

[1888]),   1451. 
Dietz    V.    City    of    Xeenah    (91    Wis. 

422,   64  X.  W.   299,   65   X.   W.  500 

[1895]),    80,    119,    122,    231,    726. 

729,  775,  1196,  1425,  1426,  1427. 
Diggins  V.  Brown  (76  Cal.  318,  18 

Pac.  373  [1888]),  323,  551,  554, 

555,  574,  617,  628,  639,  646,  714. 
723,  861,  1359. 

Diggins  V.  Hartshorne  ( 108  Cal.  154, 
41  Pac.  283  [1895]).  301,  396, 
537,  698,  703,  824,  886,  1030,  1182, 
1216,    1239,    1317,    1337,    1381. 

Dikeman  v.  Dikeman  (11  Paiges' 
Chan.  Rep.  484  [1845]),  171,  1055. 

Dime  Deposit  and  Discount  Bank  of 
Scranton  v.  Scranton  (208  Pa.  St. 
383,   57   Atl.   770   [1904]),    1511. 

District  of  Clifton,  Campbell  Coun- 
ty V.  Schneider  (106  Kj-.  605,  51 
S.  W.    13    (1899]),   1085. 

District  of  Columbia  v.  Amies  (8 
App.  D.  C.  393  [1896]),  67,  70, 
86,    119,    244,    308,    419,    425,    553, 

556,  557,  663,  672,  709,  1066. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Burgdorf    ( 7 

App.   D.   C.   405),    119. 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Burgdorf    ( 6 

App.  D.  C.  465    [1895]),.  119,   125. 

234,   347,   666,-  711,   735,  777. 
District    of    Columbia    v.    Sisters    of 

Visitation     (15    App.    D.    C.    300), 

590,    611.    614. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XCl 


[ri'f(  ff  iif "?;  are  to  secti>>ns.] 


District  of  Columbia  v.  Weaver  ( 6 
App.  D.  C.  482  [1895]),  223,  234, 
735. 

District  of  Columbia  v.  Wormley  (  15 
App.  D.  C.  58  L1899]),  119,"^  244, 
323,   727,   729,   735,  956,   902. 

District  No.  110  v.  Feck  (60  Cal. 
403    [1882]),  409,  423,   1226,  1264. 

Dittoe  V.  City  of  Davenport  (74  la. 
06,  36  X.  W.  895  [1887]).  18,  40, 
329,  679,  698,  711,  728,  777,  849, 
876,  977,  979,  981,  1122,  1334, 
1479. 

Diven    v.    Burlington    Savings    Bank 

(—  Ind.  App.  ,  82  X.  E.   1020 

[1907]),  629,  760. 

Diver  v.  Keokuk  Savings  Bank  ( 126 
la.  691,  102  X\  W.  542  [1905]), 
486,    918,    1004,    1431,    1432,    1436. 

Dix,  Commissioners  of  Highways  of 
Town  of  V.  Big  Four  Drainage 
District  of  Ford  County  (207  111. 
17,  69  X.  E.  576  [1904]).  51,  61, 
585,  928,  993,  1075.  1162.  1469, 
1470,    1474,    1476. 

Dixon  V.  City  of  Cincinnati  (11 
Ohio  C.  C.  629,  5  Ohio  C.  D.  301 
[1894]),  308,  309,  396,  398,  428. 
700. 

Dixon  V.  City  of  Detroit  (86  :\Iich. 
516,  49  X.  W.  628  [1891]).  484, 
485,   531,   532,    1432. 

Dixon  V.  Labry    ( —  Ky.  ,   78   S. 

W.  430.  25  Ky.  L.  R.  1679,  deny- 
ing rehearing  of  24  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
697,  69  S.  W.  791  [1902]).  340, 
637,  907.   1168,   1246,   1251. 

Doane  v.  Houghton  (75  Cal.  360,  17 
Pac.  426  11888]).  440,  443,  865, 
1234,    1245. 

Dobler  v.  Village  of  \\arr('n  (  174 
111.  92,  50  X.  E.  1048  [1898]), 
469,    1108. 

Dobsnii  v.  Duck  Pond  Ditcliing  Asso- 
ciation (42  Ind.  312  [1873]).  254, 
1232. 

Dockrill  v.  Sclionk  ( :?7  111.  App.  44 
[1890]),    1054. 

Dodge  V.  City  of  (  hicago  (2itl  HI. 
68,  66  X.  E.  367  Ll!»(t3]l.  82S, 
83.5. 

Dodge    V.   Van    Burcn    Circuit    .Jud^iP 


(118    Mich.    189,    76    X.    \V.    315), 

365. 
Dodge  County  v.  Acorn    (72  Xeb.  71, 

100    X.    W.    136    [1904],    61    Xeb. 

376,   85    X.   W.    292    [1901]),    142, 

340,  877,   1367. 
Dodsworth  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    ( 18 

Ohio    C.    C.    288,    10    Ohio    C.    D. 

177    [1899]),    118,    308,    309,    426, 

702. 
Dolan  v.   The   Mayor,   Aldermen   and 

Commonalty   of    the    City    of    New 

York    (62  X.  Y.  472   [1875]),  740, 

927,  930,  986,  996,   1457. 
Dolan   v.    Mayor,   etc.,   of   New   York 

(4    Abb.    Pr.    X.    S.     (X.    Y.)    397 

[1868]),   515. 
Dolese    v.    McDougall     ( 182    111.    486. 

55  X.  E.  547    [1899]),   1516. 
Dolese    v.    McDougall     (78    HI.    App, 

629    [1897]),  424,  874,    1506,   1510. 
Dollar   Savings   Bank    v.    Ridge    ( 183 

Mo.    506,    82    S.    W.    56     [1904]), 

273,  841,  878,  951,  972,  1016,  1136, 

1279,    1280,    1281,    1284. 
Dollar    Savings    Bank    v.    Ridge     (62 

Mo.    App.    324    [1895]),    266,    273, 

837,  841. 
Dollar    Savings    Bank    v.    Ridge    ( 79 

Mo.    App.    26     [1898]),    847,    878, 

1136. 
Dollar      Savings      Bank      v.      United 

States    (19   Wall.    227    [1873]).    3. 
Donley    v.    Pittsburg     ( 147     Pa.    St. 

348,  30  Am.   St.   Rep.  738,  23  Atl. 

394  [1902],  414,  961. 
Donnelly  v.  Decker  (58  Wis.  461.  46 

Am.  Rep.  637,  17  X.  W.  389 

[1883]),  5,  19,  97,  334,  338,  340, 

717. 
Donnelly    v.    Howard     (60    Crl.    291 

[1882]),    413.    465,    479.    510.    542. 

840,    1359. 
Donnelly    v.     Tillman      (47     Cal.     40 

[1873]),  499,  742.  74!t. 
Doiiolinc    v.    P.rotlierton     (7    Ohio    X. 

P.     3(17     [1900]),    413.    424,     1057, 

lodS. 
Dniidvaii    v.   Coles    (33   Mo.    App.    161 

[ISSS]  ),   358,  454. 
Donovan     v.     Citv     of     Oswet'o      (39 

-Misc.  291,  79  X.  Y.  S.  562  [1902]), 

693,  699,  703,  780. 


XCll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Be'erences  are  to  sections.] 


Dooley    v.    Town    of    Sullivan     (112 

Ind'   451,   2   Am.   St.   Rep.   209,    14 

X.    E.   566),   323. 
Dooling,  Pros.  v.  Ocean  City    ( 67  X. 

.J.   L.    (38    Vr.)    215,    50 'Atl.    621 

[1901]),  643,  690,  693,  699. 
Doppes    V.    City    of    Cincinnati     ( 16 

Ohio  C.  C.  183  [1898]),  085,  1012. 
Doran   v.    Barnes    (54   Kan.   238,    38 

Pac.   300   [1894),   141,   1337. 
Doran  v.    City  of  Murphysboro    ( 225 

111.    514,    80    X.    E.    323     [1907]), 

816. 
Dorathy  v.   City  of  Chicago    (53   III. 

79     [1869]),  '  410,    424,    527,    720, 

837. 
Doremus    v.     City    of    Chicago     (212 

III.  513.  72  X.  E.  403   [1904),  972. 
Doremus    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kochers- 

perger    (173   111.   63,  50  X.   E.   686 

[1898]),    228,    925,    1128,    1132. 
Doremus   v.   People   ex   rel.    Kochers- 

perger    (161  111.  26,  43  X.  E.  Rep. 

701    [1896]),   912,   927,   986,    1183, 

1340. 
Dorgan  v.  City  of  Boston    ( 94  Mass. 

(12   All.)    223    [1866]),   8,    64.    6.5. 

70,    89,    103,    113,    308,    309.    570, 

590,    695. 
Dorland  v.  Bergson    (78  Cal.  637.  21 

Pac.   537    [1889]),   479,   570,    1155, 

1299. 
Dorland  v.   Hanson    (81   Cal.  202.   15 

Am.     St.     Rep.     44.     22     Pac.     552 

[1889]),    1165. 
Dorland     v     McGlynn      (47     Cal.     47 

[1873]).     824,     1169,     1281,     1306, 

1337. 
Dorman   v.   City   of  Jacksonville    (13 

Fla.  538.  7  Am.  Rep.  253   [1870]), 

70. 
Dorrance    Street,    In    the    Matter    of 

(4  R.  I.  230  [1856]),  86,  100,  111, 

147,    148,   301,   323,   663,   666,  698, 

709. 
Dorsey's  Appeal    (72   Pa.   St.    (22   P. 

r.   Smith)    192   [1872]),   1015. 
Dougherty  v.  Coffin   (69  Cal.  454,   10 

Pac.  672   [1886]),  538,   1031,   1337, 

1373. 
Dougherty    v.     Foley     (32     Cal.     403 

[1867])",   540,   830. 


Dougherty   v.   Harrison    (54   Cal.  428 

[1880]  I.    810,    1277. 
Dougherty     v.     Henarie     (47     Cal.     9 

[1873])',   166,    169,    170.   475.    1070, 

1103,    1169,    1194.    1385. 
Dougherty     v.     Hitchcock      (35     Cal. 

512    [1868]).    223,    234,    510,    527, 

574,   831,   902,    1332. 
Dougherty     v.     Miller     (36     Cal.     83 

[1868]),   624,    632,    635.   896.    1059. 
Dougherty  v.  Xevada  Bank    (81   Cal. 

162,    22    Pac.     513     [1889]),    538, 

1366,    1378. 
Doughten  v.  City  of  Camden    ( 72  X. 

J.  L.   (43  Vr.)'  451,  3  L.  R.  A.    (X. 

S.")    817,    63    Atl.    170    [1905]),    5 

349,  420,  464,  708. 
Doughten  v.  City  of  Camden    (71   X. 

J.    L.    (42    Vr.)    426,    .59    Atl.    106 

[1904]),    5,    349,    464. 
Doughty    v.    Hope    (3    Den.     (X.    Y.) 

249    [1846]),    407,    415,    525,    813, 

911. 
Douglas,  In  re  (46  X.  Y.  42   [1871]), 

740,   762,   836. 
Douglas,  In  the  Matter  of    (58  Barb. 

174,     40     Howard,     201      [1870]), 

735,    747,    762,   763,   836. 
Douglas,   In  the  Matter  of    (12   Abb. 

Pr.    161    [1871]),    762,    763. 
Douglass,  Matter  of    (9   Abb.   Pr.   X. 

S.   84   [1870]),  223,  234,  740,   770. 
Douglass   V.    City   of    Cincinnati    (29 

0.   S.    165    [1876]),    620,   632,   635, 

1067,    1072. 
Douglass  V.  Craig    (4  Kan.   App.  99. 

46  Pac.   197   [1896]),  670. 
Douglass   V.   Town  of   Harrisville    (9 

W.    Va.     162,    27     Am.    Rep.    548 

[1876]).     43,     85.    '96.     162,     323, 

1423. 
Dousman    v.    City    of    St.    Paul     (23 

Minn.   394    [18*77]),   760,   916,  918, 

1436. 
Dowden    v.     State    for    use    of    Bull 

106  Ind.   157,  6  X.  E.  136   [1885]). 

1147. 
Dowell    V.    City  of   Portland    (13   Or. 

248,  10  Pac.  308  [1880]),  951.  958. 

1206,   1279. 
Dowell    V.    Talbot    Paving    Co.     (  138 

Ind.  675,  38  X.  E.  389),  170.  1110. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XClll 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


DoAvlan     v.     County     of     Sibley     (36 

Minn.  430,  31   X.   W.  517   [1887]), 

103,  245,  260. 
Dowling  V.   Conniflf    (103   Cal.   75,   36 

Pac.      1034      [1894]),      180,      1030, 

1215,    1281,    1337,    1.347,    1366. 
Dowling  V.   Hibernia   Loan   and   Sav- 
ings   Society     ( 143     Cal.     425,    77 

Pac.    141    [1904]),    570,    759,    764, 

834,   1281,   1305. 
Downey    v.    Mississippi    River    &    B. 

T.   Ry.   Co.    (94   Mo.   App.    137,   67 

S.  W.  945),   363. 
Downey   v.    People    ex    rel.    Raymond 

205  ill,  230,  68  X.  E.  807   [1903]). 

531,    533,    986,     998,     1035.     1985, 

1338. 
Downing  v.  City  of  Des  ^Ir)in('s   ( 124 

la.    289,    99    X.    W.    10U6    11004]  I, 

305.    437,    657. 
Downs  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of 

Wyandotte   Co.    (48    Kan.    640,    29 

Pac.     1077     [1892]),     1012,     lOl."), 

1436. 
Dows    V.    Village    of     Irvington     ( 6(i 

Howard    (X.   Y.)    93    [1883]),   269, 

276,   277,   645,   927,   1009,    1027. 
Doyle      V.      Austin      (47      Cal.      353 

[1874]),    40,    474,    475,    653,    690, 

691,   723. 
Doyle  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 

of    City  of    Xewark    (34   X.    J.    L. 

(5  Vr.)    236   [1870]),  959. 
Doyle  &   Co.   v.   Mayor   and  Common 

Council    of    the    City    of    Xewark 

(30  X.  J.  L.    (1   Vr.)    303    [1863]), 

1409. 
Drainage  of  Lands,  In   re    ( 35   X.   J. 

L.    (6  Vr.)   497   [1872]),  336. 
Drain    Commissioner    v.    Baxter    (57 

Mich.    127;    suh   nomine,   Robertson 

v.  Baxter    (23  X.  W.   711    [1885]), 

226,  228,  270. 
Drainage    of    Great    Meadows.       ( See 

Great  Meadows.) 
Drainage    Commissioners    of    District 

Xo.    1    v.    Village   of    Cerro    Gordo, 

217  111.  488,  75  X.  E.  516   [1905]), 

340,  585,   1031. 
Drainage    Commissioners    v.    Hudson 

(109    111.    659    [1885]),    340,    1026, 

13.50,  1362.  13G4.   1372,   1377,   1385. 


Drainage  Commissioners  of  District 
X'o.  3  V.  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  (158  111.  3.53,  41  X.  E. 
1073  [1895]),  557,  594,  595,  659, 
1328. 

Drainage  Ctommissioners  District 
Xumber  Two  v.  Kinney  (233  111. 
67,  84  X.  E.  34  [1908]),  953, 
1424. 

Drainage  Commissioners  of  Union 
Drainage  District  X'o.  1  of  Mahn- 
aman  and  Montmorency  Towti- 
ships  of  Whiteside  County  v.  Mil- 
ligan  (227  111.  303,  81  X\  E.  382 
[1907]),   1347. 

Drainage  Commissioners  of  Drain- 
age District  Xo.  2  v.  Drainage 
Commissioners  of  Union  Drainage 
District  Xo.  3  (211  111.  328,  71 
X.  E.  1007  [1904]),  340,  564,  659, 
665,  666,   1032,   1313 

Drainage  Commissioners  of  Drainage 
District  Xo.  2  v.  Drainage  Com- 
missioners of  L^nion  Drainage 
District  Xo.  3  (113  HI.  App.  114), 
340,  564,  659,  665,  666,  1032, 
1313. 

Drainage  District  X'o.  15  of  Skagit 
County  V.  Armstrong  (44  Wash. 
23,  87  Pac.  52   [1906]),  340,   1033. 

Drainage  District,  Commissioners  of 
V.  Griffin  (134  HI.  330,  25  X.  E. 
995   [1891]),   748,  768. 

Drainage  District  Xo.  3  v.  People  ex 
rel.  Baron  (147  111.  404,  35  X^. 
E.  238  [1894]),  245.  247,  340, 
.504,    771. 

Drainage  Ditch  Xo.  6,  In  re  (  1 09  X. 
W.   993    [1906]),   594,   614. 

Drake,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Applica- 
tion of  (69  Hun  (X.  Y.)  95,  23 
X.  Y^  S.  264  [1893]),  662,  786, 
800,    1503. 

Drake  v.  Cincinnati  (25  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  373   [1903]),  684. 

Drake  v.  Grout  (21  Ind.  Aiip.  534, 
52  X.  E.  775  [1898]).  554,  575, 
639,   723,    1252.    1333. 

Drake  v.  Schoenstedt  (149  Ind.  90, 
48   X.   E.  629    [1897]),   564. 

Draper  v.  City  of  Atlanta  ( 126  Ga. 
649,  55  S.  E.  929  [1906]),  73,  293, 
298,    1015,    1346. 


XCIV 


TA3I.E   OF    CASeS. 


[F.cfpi-pucos  are  to  sections.] 


Dreake    v.    Beasley     (26    0.    S.    315 

[1875]),  322,   1047,  1142. 
Drennen   v.   People    (222   111.   592.    78 

X.  E.  937   [1906]),  1126. 
Dressman  v.   Simonin    ( 104   Ky.  693, 

47    S.    W.    767,   20   Ky.   L.   R.    868 

[1898]),  324,  1068. 
Drew  V.   Town   of   Geneva    ( 159   Ind. 

364,   65   N.   E.   9    [1902]),    15,  489, 

1235. 
Drexel  v.  Town  of  Lake    (127  111.  54, 

20    N.    E.    38     [1890]),    324,    330, 

572. 
DriscoU    V.     Howard     (63     C'al.     438 

[1883]),    1220. 
Driver  v.  Keokuk  Savings  Bank,   126 

la.    091,    102    X.    W.    542    [1905]), 

486. 
Driver  v.  Moore    (81   Ark.   80,  98   S. 

W.    734     [1906]),    665,    666,    672, 

766,   784,   799,  927,   1005,   1285. 
Diiane   v.    City   of   Chicago    (198   111. 

471,   64   N.   E.    1033    [1902]),   297, 

328,    448.    563,    642,    859. 
Dvibuque,    City    of    v.    Harrison     ( 34 

la.   163    [1872]),  40,  50,   1122. 
Dubuque,  City  of  v.  Wooton    (28   la. 

571    [1870]'),   747,   760,  836. 
Duffield  V.  City  of  Detroit    ( 15  Mich. 

474    [1867]),  77. 
Duffy,  In  the  Matter  of    (133   N.  Y. 

512,  31  N.  E.  517   [1892]),  1461. 
Duffy  V.  City  of  Saginaw   ( 106  Mich. 

335,   64  N.  W.  581    [1895]),   1015. 
Dugger   V.   Hicks    (11    Ind.   App.  374, 

36   N.    E.    1085    [1894]),    301,    527. 

1249. 
Dugro,  In  re   (50  X.  Y.  513   [1872]), 

236. 
Duke   V.   O'Bryan    (100   Ky.    710,    39 

S.   W.   444,   824,    19   Ky!   L.   R.   81 

[1897]),   70,    101. 
Duker  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co. 

(Ky.)     (25   Ky.   Law  Rep.   135,   74 

S.  W.   744    [1903]),   301,  610,   678. 
Dukes     V.     Working      (93     Ind.     501 

[1883]),    812. 
Dulaney   v.    Figg    ( —    Ky.    ,    29 

Ky.   Law   Rep.   678,   94^  S.   W.   658 

[1906]),    396. 
Duluth,     City    of     v.     Davidson     (97 

Minn.  378,  107  X.  ^Y.  151  [1906]), 

324,   693,   714. 


Duluth,  City  of  v.  Dibblee   ( 62  Minn. 

18,    63    N.   W.    1117    [1895]),    130, 

324,   367,   726,    732,   770,   910,   911, 

914,  947. 
Duluth,  City  of  v.  Miles    (73   Minn, 

509,  76  X.  W.  259),  1126. 
Dumesnil  v.   Hexagon  Tile  Walk   Co. 

(—   Ky.    ,   58    S.    W.    705.    23 

Ky.   L.   R.    144),    1249,    1317. 
Dumesnil      v.      Louisville      Artificial 

Stone   Co.    (109    Ky.    1,   58    S.   W. 

371    [1900]),    323,    464,    574,    617, 

641,    646,    723,    724,    1330,    1336. 
Dumesnil    v.    Shanks     (97    Ky.    354, 

30     S.     W.     654,     31     S.     W.     864 

[1895]),   628. 
Duncan  v.   City  of  Elizabeth    (25   X. 

J.     Eq.     (10     C.     E.     Green)     430 

[1874]),  895,  1197,  1199,  1426. 

1432. 
Duncan  v.  Lankford  ( 145  Ind.  145, 

44  XL  E.  12  [1896]),  927,  933, 

955,  986,   1432. 
Duncan  v.  Ramish    (142  Cal.  686,  76 

Pac.    661     [1904]),    73.    301,     485, 

537,    550,    553,    555,    558,   561,   570, 

624,    668,    670,    723,    724,   812,    918, 

1026,    1027,    1337,    1414. 
Dunham  v.   City  of   Chicago    (55    111. 

357    [1870]),' 173. 
Dunham    v.    People    ex    rel.    McCrea, 

96   111.  331    [1880]),   103,   104,  247, 

249,   253,    259,   266,   356. 
Duniway    v.    Portland    (47    Or.    103, 

81  Pac.  945   [1905]),  414,  424,  531, 

534,    738,   760,   956,   974. 
Dunker  v.   Stiefel    (57  Mo.   App.   379 

[1894]),    380,    381,    577,    648,    714. 
Dunkirk,     City    of    v.    Wallace     (19 

Ind.     App.  "  298,     49     X.     E.     463 

[1897]),    1508. 
Dunkirk    Land    Company    v.    Zehner 

(35   Ind.  App.  694,   74  X.  E.   1099 

[1905]),   17,   886,   1033. 
Dunkle  v.   Herron    (115   Ind.   470,    18 

X.   E.    12    [1888]),  223,   950,    1113. 
Dunlap   V.   Gosnell    ( 18   Ky.   Law   R. 

8,  35  S.  W.  108   [1896]),  86. 
Dunn  V.  McXeely    (75  Mo.  App.  217 

[1898]),  490,  511. 
Dunne     v.     AJtschul      (57     Cal.     472 

[1881]),    515,    537,    1290. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XCV 


[Kfcferences  are  to  sections.] 


Dunning,  In  the  Matter  of   { 60  Bail). 

(N.   Y.)    377    [1871]),   919,    1452. 
Dunning   v.    Calkins    (51    Mich.    556, 

17   N.   W.   54    [1883]),   1125,   1373. 
Durkee  v.  City  of  Kenosha    (59  Wis. 

123,   48   Am.    Rep.   480,    17    X.   W. 

677    [1883]),   1196,   1521. 
Durrell  v.  Dooner    (119   Cal.   411,  51 

Pac.  628    [1897]),  223,  234,  637. 
Durrell  v.  City  of  Woodbury    ( 74  N. 

J.    L.    (45    Vr.)    206.   65    Atl.    198 

ri906]),    245,    301,   549,   560,    1015. 

1020. 
Durrett    v.    Davidson    ( —    Ky.    , 

(8   L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.)    546,    93    S. 

W.  25   [1906]),  168,  950. 
Durrett   v.    Kenton   County    ( —   Ky. 

,   27    Ky.    Law   Rep*.    1173,    87 

S.  W.  1070 '[1905]),  549,  650,  653. 
Dupont     V.     Highway     Commrs.     of 

Hamtranick         (28        Mich.        362 

[1873]),    1278. 
Dusenbury    v.    Mayor    and    Common 

Council  of  the  City  of  Newark   (25 

N.    J.    Eq.     (10    "C.    E.    Gr.)     295 

[1874]),    528,    1015.    1423,    1436. 
Dyar   v.    Farmington    Village    Corpo- 
ration    (70    Me.    515     [1378]),    9, 

365,  677. 
Dyer      v.      Barstow      (53      Cal.      81 

[1878]),    1113, 

Barstow      (50     Cal.      652 
1226. 
Bro<jan 


Dyer     v. 

[1875] 

Dyer      v 

"[1881] 

Dyer    v. 


234 


(57      Cal. 
I,    1293,    1382,   1389. 
Brogan     (70    Cal.     136,    11 

Pac.    589    [1886]),    1306,    1378. 
Dyer      v.      Cliase       (52      Cal.      440 

[1877]),    432,    465,    479,    510,    831, 

869,   1154,    1155. 
Dyer     v.     Harrison      (63      Cal.     447 

[1883]),    574,    639,    723,    824,    886. 
Dyer  v.  Hudson   (65  Cal.  374,  4  Pac. 

231    [1884]),   570.  574,  831,  862. 
Dyer    v.    Martinovicii     (63    Cal     353 

[1883]),  624. 
Dyer      v.       Miller       (58       Cal.       585 

[1881]),   784. 
Dyer   v.    City   of    Newport,    Ky.    (26 

Ky.  L.  204,  80  S.  W.  1127  [1904]), 

47,   212,   508. 
Dyer  v.  North    (44  Cal.   157   [1872]), 


313,  749,  783,  784,  830,  836,  1215, 
1237. 

Dyer  v.  Parrott  (60  Cal.  551 
[1882]),    1358. 

Dyer  v.  Pixley  (44  Cal.  153 
"[1872]),    1210,    1215. 

Dyer  v.  Scalmanini  (69  Cal.  637,  U 
Pac.  327  [1886]),  479,  964,  9G5. 
1002. 

Dyer  v.  Woods  (166  Ind.  44,  76  N. 
E.  624  [1906]),  119,  125,  323,  521, 
831,    859,    1439,    1444. 

Dyker  Meadow  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  V.  Cook  (159  N.  Y.  6, 
53  N.  E.  690),  557,   1072. 


Eager,    In    the    Matter    of    the    Peti- 
tion  of     (46    N.    Y.    100    [1871]), 

479,     515,    724,    867,     1451,      1452. 

1455,    1458. 
Eager,    In    the    Matter    of     (41    How. 

107     [1870]),    472,    484,    485.    540, 

542,    1458. 
Eager,    In   the   flatter   of    (58    Barb. 

557     [1871]),    167,    472,    525,    540, 

977,  983,   1455. 
Eager,    In    the    Matter   of    (12    Abb. 

Pr.     151     [1871]),    472,    511,    515, 

867. 
Eager,    In    the    Matter    of     (10    Abb. 

Pr.    N.    S.     (N.    Y.)     229    [1871]), 

223,    234,    540,    542,    1452,    1455. 
Eagle   Fire  Ins.   Co.  v.   Pell    (2   Edw. 

Ch.  631),  1057. 
Eagle     ^lanufacturing     Company     v. 

City    of    Davenport     (101    la."  493, 

38  'l.    R.    a.    480,    70    N.    W.    707 

[1897]),  314,  620,  632,   1050,  1067, 

1072. 
Fames  v.  f-^alem  and  Lowell  R.  R.  Co. 

(98    Mass.    560,    96    Am.    Dec.    676 

[1868]),   363. 
Earhart   v.   Farmers'   Creamer.v    ( 148 

Ind.    79,    47    N.    E.    226     [1897]), 

886,   915,    1362. 
Early   v.   City  of   Ft.   Dodge    (—   la. 

-^,  113  N.  W.  766  [1907]),  695, 

1351,  1361. 
East  133rd  Street,  In   re    (95  N.  Y. 
S.  76  [1904]).  603. 


XCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


East  Street,  Evans'  Appeal    (210  Pa. 

St.  539,   60   Atl.    154    [1904]),  383, 

462. 
East  Grand   Forks,    City   of   v.   Luck 

(97  Minn.  373,  6  L.  R.  A.   (X.  S.) 

198,  107  N.  W.  393   [1900]),  6,  20. 

353,   1045. 
East    Jordan    Lumber    Company    v. 

Village  of  East  Jordan   ( 100  Mich. 

201,   58    N.   W.    1012),    1015. 
East  Orange,   City  of  v.  Hussey    ( 72 

N.  J.  L.    (43  Vr.)   71,  59  Atl".  1060 

[1905]),    166,    168,    223,    340,    414. 
East  Orange,  City  of  v.  Hussey    (70 

N.    J.    L.     (41    Vr.)     244,    57    Atl. 

1086    [1903]),    340,    1368. 
East    Saginaw    and    St.    Clair    R.    R. 

Co.     V.     Benham      (28     Mich.     459 

[1874]),    771. 
East   St.   Louis,    City   of   v.   Albrecht 

(150     111.     506,     37     N.     E.     934 

[1894]),   413,   424,   837. 
East     St.    Louis,    City    of    v.    Davis 

(233     111.     553,     84     N.     E.     674 

[1908]),   297,    752,   770,   848. 
East   St.    Louis,    City   of   v.    Wittich 

(108   111.    449    [1884]),    911. 
Eastern  Texas  Railroad  Company   v, 

Eddings    (30    Tex.    Civ.    App.    170, 

70   S.   W.   98    [1902]),    66.  • 
Ebensburg    Borough     v.     Little      (28 

Pa.   Super.   Ct.   4*69    [1905]),    1012. 
Eckert  v.  Town  of  Walnut    (117   la. 

629,    91    X.    W.    929    [1902]),    827. 
Eddy    V.    City    of    Omaha     (72    Xeb. 

550,   101    X".    W.    25    [1904] )  ;    102 

X^.  W.  70,  103  X.  W.  692   [1905]), 

505,  521,   739,   771,   985,    1445. 
Ede    V.    Cogswell     (79    Cal.    278,    21 

Pac.    767    [1889]),    109,    244,    523, 

538,  574,  831,  840. 
Ede  V.  Cuneo    (120  Cal.  107,  58  Pac. 

538    [1899]),    223,    234,    775,    777, 

958,    960,    1231,    1242. 
Ede  V.  Kni'^ht   (93  Cal.   159,  28  Pac. 

860    [1892]),    169,    171,    538,    782, 

824,    886,    1153,    1155,    1281,    1375, 

1389. 
Edgerton    v.    Mayor    and    Aldermen 

of  the  Town  of  Green  Cove  Springs 

(19  Fla.   140   [1882]),  83,  86,   118, 

147,   308,   425 


Edgerton  v.  Huntington  School 
Township  (126  Ind.  201,  26  X.  E, 
150     [1890]),    579,    580,    586,    012. 

Eclmands  y.  City  of  Boston  ( 108 
Mass.   535    [1871]),   70. 

Edward  C.  Jones  Co.  v.  Perry  ( 20 
Ind.  App.  554,  57  X\  E.  583 
[1900]),    1043,    1085. 

Edwards  v.  Berlin  (123  Cal.  544, 
50  Pac.  432  [1899]),  415,  499, 
538,   831,   834,   861,   1281,    1304. 

Edwards  v.  Bruorton  ( 184  ]\Iass. 
529,  09  X\  E.  328  [1904]),  81, 
103. 

Edwards  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 140 
111.  440,  30  X.  E.  350  [1893]), 
417,   418,   549,   558,   563,   570,   920. 

Edwards  v.  City  of  Colun.bus  ( 7 
Ohio  X.  P.  614  [1900]),  700,  707. 
1012. 

Edwards  v.  Cooper  ( 168  Ind.  54,  79 
X.  E.  1047  [1907]),  17,  550,  556, 
825,    872,    1024,    1149,    1240. 

Edwards  v.  Jersey  City  (40  X".  J. 
L.   176),   958. 

Edwards  v.  Lesueur  (132  Mo.  410, 
31  L.  R.  A.  815,  33  S.  W.  1130), 
210. 

Edwards  House  Co.  v.  City  of  Jack- 
son    ( —    Miss. ,    45    So.     14 

[1907]),  147,  301,  663,  809,  833, 
857,    1502. 

Edwards  &  Walsh  Construction 
Company  v.  .Jasper  County  (117 
la.  365,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  301,  90 
X.  W.  1006  [1902]),  11,  16,  42,  89, 
475,  514,  580,  581,  582,  012,  613, 
620,  834,  849,  888,  918.  1015,  1022, 
1075,  1103,  1108,  1109,  1215,  1303, 
1309. 

Eel  River  Draining  Association  v. 
Carriger  (30  Ind.  213  [1868]), 
247. 

Eel  River  Draining  Association  v. 
Topp  (16  Ind.  242  [1861]),  340, 
525,  886,  923,  1232,  1236,  12S3, 
1317. 

Egyptian  Levee  Co.  v.  Hardin  ( 27 
Mo.  495,  72  Am.  Dec.  276  [1858]), 
43,    147,   148,   343,   711. 

Ehni  V.  City  of  Columbus  (3  Ohio 
C.  C.  494  [1889]),  441,  561,  775, 
950,    1435. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCVli 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


East  Eighteenth   Street,  in  the  Town 

of   Flatbusli,   In  the   Matter  of  tlie 

Assessment      for      Improving       ( 75 

Hun    (N.  Y.)    603,  27  N.  Y.  Supp. 

591     [1894]),     53,    617,     641,    646. 

720,    1403. 
Eightieth    Street,    In    the    [Matter    of 

(31    Howard    (N.   Y.)    99    [1865]), 

241,    441,    484,   982,    1454. 
Eightieth  Street,  Matter  of   (17  Abb. 

Pr.   (N.  Y.)    324   [1864]),  484,  485, 

495,   1397,   1451. 
Eilert   v.   Ciiy  of   Oshl<osh    (14   Wis. 

586    [1861]'),    1506,    1511. 
Ek  V.  St.   Paul   ^'ermanent  Loan  Co. 

(84     Minn.     245,     87     N.     W,     844 

[1901]),    194,    195. 
El   Paso,  Citj'  of  V.   Mundy  Brotliers 

85  Tex.  316,  20  S.  W.  140   [1892]), 

663,   688,   775,    1050. 
Elder    v.    Fox     (18    Colo.    App.    263, 

71    Pac.    398    [1903]),    1036,    1072. 
Eidridge    v.    Trezevant     (160    U.    S. 

452,    40    L.    490,    16    S.    345),    343. 
Eleventh     Avenue,    ^Matter    of    Open- 
ing    (49    How.    Pr.     (N.    Y. )     208 

[1875]).   919. 
Elgin,     Joliet     &     Eastern     l\aihv:'y 

Company    v.    Hohenshell     (193    111. 

159,    6l"  N.    E.    1102    [1901]),    69, 

340,  739,  756,  758,  760,  1002,  1183, 

1184,    1272,    1319,   1346. 
Elizabeth,    Report    of    Commissione:  s 

of    (49   X.  J.  L.    (20  Vr.)    488,   10 

Atl.    363    [1887]),    187,    198,    271, 

414,  950,  956,  9(50,  968,  1066,   1072, 

1083,    1113. 
Elizabeth,    City    of    v.    Hill     (39    N. 

J.    L.    (10    Vr.)    555    [1877]),   967, 

1486. 
Elizabeth,  City  of  v.   Shirley    (35  N. 

J.    Eq.    (8    Stewart)    515*  [1882]), 

971,   1036.    1037,    1072. 
Elizal)eth,    City    of    v.    State.    Meker, 

Pros.    (45    X.    J.    L.    (16    Vr.)     157 

[1883]  ),  408,  95t),  964,   1361. 
Elkhart,    (  ity    of    v.    Wickwire    (121 

Ind.    331,    22    X.    E.    342    [1889]), 

264,    279,    416,    423,    686.    741.    875, 

986.  1030,  1031,  1085,  10S9.  1210, 

1435,  1450. 
Ellinghouse  v.  Taylor   (19  :\Iont. 

462,    48    Pac.    757    [1897]),    355. 


f   Elliott     V.     Berry      (41     0.     S.     110 

[1884]),   38,  574. 
Elliott    V.    Cale     (113    Ind.    383,    14 

X.   E.   708    [1887]),   1053. 
Ii:iliott    V.    City    of    Chicago    (48    111. 

293    [1868]),   556,   1005. 
Ellis     V.     Pontchartrain    Levee     Dis- 
trict   (43  La.  Ann.  33,  8   So.  914), 

155. 
Ellis    V.    Witmer     (134    Cal.    249.    GO 

Pac.    301     [1901]),    500,    504,    951, 

1103,  1106,  1184,  1279,  1290,  1435. 
Ellis  V.  Workman  (144  Cal.  113,  77 

Pac.   822   [1904]),   1197,   1473, 

1474. 
Ellison      V.      Branstrator      (34      Ind. 

App.    410,    73    X.    E.    146    [1904]), 

340,  950,  1113,  1199,  1206. 
Ellwood  V.  City  of  Rochester  (122 

X.  Y.  229,  25  XT.  E.  238  [1890]), 

554,    555,    723,    884,    885. 
Elma,   Town  of  v.   Carney    (9   Wasli. 

466,     37    Pac.    707     [1894]),     313, 

531,   534,   693,   709,   713,   832,   839. 
Elma,   Town   of   v.   Carney    (4    Wasli. 

418,     30    Pac.    732     [1892]),     313, 

887,    1219,    1230. 
Elmendorf    v.     City    of    Albanv     (17 

Hun    (X.    Y.)    81     [1879]),    323. 
Elmore    v.    Drainage    Commissioners 

135   111.   269,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  363, 

25   X.   E.   1010    [1890]),   8,  63,  89, 

253,   283,   291,   337,    1519. 
Elmore    v.    Overton     (104    Ind.    548, 

54    Am.    Rep.    343,    4    X.    E.    197), 

207. 
Elsberry,   City  of  v.   Black    (120  Mo. 

App.  20,  9()'  S.  W.  256  [1906] ) ,  482, 

495. 
Elston    V.    City    of    Chicago    (40    111. 

514,  89  Am.  Dec.  361    [1866]),  360, 

450,    986,    1478,    1484,    1488. 
Elwood     V.    City    of    Rochester      (43 

Hun,    102    [1887]),    308,    415,    416, 

525,   581,   593,   614,   630,   672,   675, 

693,    703,    719,    813,    825,    832.    894, 

950,    979,    981. 
Ely,  Case  of  Isle  of    (10  Rep.    141a), 

387. 
Ely    V.    City    of    Grand    Rapids     (84 

Mich.   336,  47  X.   W.  447    [1890]), 

541. 


XCVIU 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Elyton  Land  Co.  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
City  of  Birmingham  (89  Ala.  477, 
7   So.   901),    150. 

Emery  v.  Bradford  (29  Cal.  75 
[1865]),  15,  532,  537,  1005,  1007, 
1039,    1049,    1337,    1338. 

Emery  v.  San  Francisco  Gas  Com- 
pany (28  Cal.  346  [1865]),  8,  86, 
88,  89,  100,  110,  147,  148,  313, 
436,  437,  541,  570,  624,  666,  831, 
840,    857,    862. 

Eniiorant  Industrial  Savings  Bank, 
Mattpr  of  Petition  of  (75  N.  Y. 
388  [1878]),  273,  433,  482,  495, 
496,  867. 

Emmert  v.  City  of  Elyria  (74  O.  S. 
185,  78  N.  E.  269   [1906]),  864. 

Emmert  v.  Elyria  (27  Ohio  C.  C. 
R.  353   [1905]),  864,  866. 

Emporia,  City  of  v.  Bates  ( 16  Kan. 
495  [1876]),  414,  958,  959,  962, 
965,  990. 

Emporia,  City  of  v.  Norton  (13  Kan. 
569  [1874]),  106,  414,  570,  813. 
956,  965,  983. 

Englebret  v.  McElwee  (122  Cal.  284, 
54  Pac.  900  [1898]),  889,  1153, 
1240,    1265. 

English  V.  City  of  Danville  (150  111. 
92,  36  N.  E.  994  [1894]),  293, 
298,    1085. 

English  V.  Territory    ( —  Ariz.  , 

89  Pac.  501,  90  iPac.  601  [1907]), 
301,  555,  724,  1030,  1109,  1110, 
1209,    1252,    1337,    1358. 

English  V.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  Wilmington  ( 2  Marv. 
(Del.)  63,  37  Atl.  158  [1896]), 
86,  118,  123,  134,  324,  553,  666, 
708,  709,  712,  745. 

Eno  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(68  N.  Y.  214  [1877]),  167,  466, 
484,  485,  540,  1451,  1452,  1454, 
1490. 

Eno  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(7  Hun  (N.  Y.)  320  [1876]),  167, 
540. 

Eno  V.  Mayor,  etc.  (53  Howard  382 
[1877]),    167,   740,   762,   836. 

Enos  V.  City  of  Springfield    (113  111. 


65  [1886]),  51,  153,  295,  323,  670. 
715,   776. 

Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  O'Brien  ( 55 
Neb.  735,  76  N.  W.  417  [1898]). 
825,    1277. 

Erie  v.  Bootz  (72  Pa.  St.  (22  P. 
F.  Smith)  196  [1872]),  762,  795, 
1159. 

Erie  to  Use  v.  Brady  (150  Pa.  St. 
462,  24  Atl.  641   [1892]),  816,  981. 

Erie,  City  of  for  Use  v.  Brady  (127 
Pa.  St.  169,  17  Atl.  Rep.  885 
[1889]),    813,    981,    1253. 

Erie,  City  for  Use  v.  Butler  (120 
Pa.  St.  374,  14  Atl.  153  [1888]), 
527,    1159,   1211,   1253. 

Erie,  City  of  v.  First  Universalist 
Church  (105  Pa.  St.  278  [1884]), 
42,   588,   613. 

Erie,  City  of  v.  Griswold  (184  Pa. 
St.  435.  39  Atl.  231  [1898]),  147, 
148,  611,  641,  648,  720. 

Erie,  City  of  for  Use  Erie  Paving 
Co.  v.  Moody  (171  Pa.  St.  610, 
33  Atl.  378  [1895]),  437,  527, 
604. 

Erie,  City  of  v.  Piece  of  Land  Front- 
ing on  State  Street  (175  Pa.  St. 
523,  34  Atl.  808  [1896]),  596, 
598,    1078,    1159,    1333. 

Erie  City  v.  Reed  (113  Pa.  St.  468, 
6  Atl.   679),  414,  983. 

Erie,  City  of  v.  Russell  (148  Pa. 
St.  384,  23  Atl.  1102  [1892]),  11, 
382,  384,  665,  666,  677. 

Erie  City  v.  Willis  (26  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  459   [1903]),  53,  55,  737,  1063. 

Erie  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Paterson  (72 
N.  J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  83,  59  Atl.  1031 
[1905]),    594,    595,    613. 

Ericks'on  v.  Cass  County  (11  N.  D. 
494,  92  N.  W.  841  [1902]),  118, 
119,  125,  140,  196,  244,  340,  403, 
475,  549,  564,  586,  651,  652,  659, 
729,  735,  1011,  1012,  1034,  1085, 
1104,   1411,   1436. 

Erisman  v.  Board  of  Chosen  Free- 
holders of  the  County  of  Burling- 
ton (64  N.  J.  L.  (35  Vr.)  516, 
45  Atl.  998  [1900]),  322,  624,  626, 
1394,    1396. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


XCIX 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ernst     V.     Kiinkie      (5     0.     S.     521 

[18.56]),    86,    89.    544,    700.    1216, 

1346. 
Eschbach      v.      Pitts       (6      Md.      71 

[1854]),    1042,    1049,    1060. 
Espert   V.  City   of   Chicago    (201    111. 

264,    66    N.    E.    212     [1903]).    75, 

721, 
Espy     Estate     Company     v.     Pacific 

County   (40  Wash.  67,  82  Pac.  129 

[1905]),    340,    525,    1468,    1469. 
Ess  V.  Bouton   (64  Mo.   105   [1876]), 

1284. 
Essex    Public   Road    Board,    Pros.    v. 

Skinkle   (49  N.  J.  L.   (20  Vr,)   641, 

10  Atl.  379    [1887]),   15,   166,   167, 

253,  9G8,   1113,   1179. 

Essex  Public  Road   Board  v.   Skinkle 

(49   N.  J.   L.    (20   Vr.)    65,   0   Ati. 

435    [1886]),    166,    167,    253,    968, 

1113,  1179, 
Essroger  v.  City  of  Chicago  (1S5  111. 

420,  56  X.  E.  1086  [1900]),  864, 

1392. 
Esterbrook   v.   O'Brien    (98   Cal.   671, 

33   Pac.   765    [1893]),   1431,   1435. 
Estes  V.  Owen   (90  Mo.  113,  2  S.  W. 

133    [1886]),    314,    373,   374,   461. 
Etchison      Ditching      Association      v. 

Busenback    (39    Ind.    362    [1872]), 

254,  1232,    1264. 

Eltchison     Ditch'ing     Association     v. 

Hillis    (40   Ind.    408    [1872]),   254, 

340,    719.   777,   883,   891,   956,   981, 

1229,  1232,  1242,   1264,  1277,  1279, 

1288,    1369. 
Etchi'^on     Ditching      Association      v. 

Jarrell    (33  Ind.   131    [1870]),  340, 

883,   886,  1238,   1239. 
Euphrosine     Street,     Opening    of     ( 7 

La.  Ann.  72   [1852]),  63,  113,  155. 
Eustace    v.    People    ex    rel..    Hanberg 

(213     111.     424,     72     N.     E.     1089 

[1905]),    533. 
Eutaw,  Town  of  v.  Botnick    ( —  Ala. 

.  43  So.  739   [1907]),  73,  661. 

Evans    v.    City   of   Denver    ( 26    Colo. 

193,     57    Pac.    606     [1899]),     959, 

965. 
Evans  v.  Lewis    (121   111.   478,   13  N. 

E.     246     [1889]),     254,    558,     564, 

1008,    1417,    1432,    1477. 


Evans    v.    Tlie    People    ex    rel.    Kern 

(139     111.    552,    28     N.    E.      1111 

[1893]).   763,   764,   913,   914,   1299. 
Evans      v.      Sharp      (29      Wis.      564 

[1872]),  199,  896,  970,  1041,  1059. 
Evansville,    City  of   v.   Pfisterer    (34 

Ind.   36,   7   Am.   Rep.   214    [1870]). 

301,    528,    1015,    1022,    1435.    1436. 
Evart  v.  Village  of  Western  Springs 

(180     111.     318,     54     X.     E.     478 

[1899]),    900,    902,    922. 
Everett  v.  Deal    (148   Ind.  90,  47   X. 

E.    219    [1897]),    483,    1347,    1352. 

1358. 
Everett    v.    Marston     (186    Mo.    f^'^7, 

85  S.  W.   540),   1072. 
Ewart  V.  Village  of  Western  Springs 

(180      111.     318,     54     X.    E.     478 

[1899]),  279,  368,  452,  978. 
Ewing    V.    McXairy     (20    O.    S.    315 

[1871]),   998. 
Excelsior    Springs,    City    of,    to    Use 

of    McCormick    v.    Ettepson     ( 120 

Mo.     App.     215,     96     S.     W.     701 

[1906]),    138,    245,    301,    468,    538, 

777,   1284. 
Excelsior  Draining  Co.  v.  Brown   (38 

Ind.   384    [1871]),  254,   1232,    1264. 
Excelsior  Paving  Co.  '<'    Ueach   (Cal.) 

34   Pac.    116),   519. 
Excelsior   Planting  &   Manufacturing 

Company    v.    Green    ( 39    La.    Ann. 

455,   1   So.  873    [1887]),  4,   11,   37, 

39,  43,  100,  103,  110,  113,  117,  147, 

155,    184,    194,    198,   209,  237,   245, 

343,  545,   548,   711. 
Exchange    Alley,    flatter    of     (4    La. 

Ann.   4    [18491),    155. 
Exchanjte    Bank    v.    Ault     ( 102    Ind. 

322,    1   X.   E.  .'^62),   1444. 
Eyerman    v.    Blaksley     (78    Mo.     145 

[1883]),    118,    186,    244,    324,    401, 

447,  473,  475,  550,  923,  1109,  1284. 
Eyermann  v.  Blakesley    (13  Mo.  App. 

"407    [188-'*]),   523.   574,   1138. 
Eyermann  v.   Blakesley    (9  Mo.   App. 
"231     [1880]),    293,    401,    447,    475, 

523,   872,    1282,   1284. 
Eyerman  v.  Hardy    (8  Mo.  App.  311 
"[1880]),    511,    574,    666,    698,    707, 

709.   714,   894,    1052,    1137. 
Eyerman  v.   Payne    ( 28   Mo.   App.    72 

[1887]),    1134,    1249,    1284,    1317. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Hyermann    v.    Provenchere     ( 15    Mo. 

App.    256    [1884]),    324,    475,    511, 

527,  531,  537,  781,  840,  1103,  1150. 
Eyermann   v.    Scollay    ( 16   Mo.    App. 

"498   [1885]),  887,  998,   1137,   1138, 

1169,    1221,    1245. 


Fagan  v.  City  of  Chicago  (84  111. 
227  [1876]),  104,  153,  236,  396, 
426,  428,  455,  570,  578,  579,  643, 
661,  662,  G70,  676,  723,  920,  921, 
923,  92.5,  1273,  1277,  1283,  1313, 
1318. 

Fahnestock  v.  City  of  Peoria  (171 
111.  454.  49  N.  E.  496  [1898]),  65, 
308,   653,   922,    1313,    1379. 

Fair  Haven  and  Westville  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven 
203  U.  S.  379  [1906]),  172,  599, 
603. 

Fair  Haven  -t  Westville  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven 
(77  Conn.  667,  60  Atl.  651 
[1905]),    172,    479,    519,    599,    603. 

Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven 
(77  Conn.  494,  59  Atl.  737 
[1905]),  7,  8,  223,  229,  234,  263, 
601,    776. 

Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven 
(77  Conn.  219,  58  Atl.  703 
[1904]),    60,    519,    603. 

Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven 
(75  Conn.  442,  53  Atl.  960 
[1903]),  60,  86,  172,  244,  245,  314, 
599,   600,   691,   699,   738. 

Fairbanks  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  Fitchburg  (132  Mass.  42 
[1882]),  444,  563,  568,  847,  848, 
1400. 

Fairchild  v.  City  of  St.  Paul  (40 
Minn.  540,  49  N.  W.  325  [1891]), 
308,    747. 

Fai^-field's  Appeal  (57  Conn.  167), 
359. 

Fairfield,  City  of  v.  Ratcliff  (20  la. 
396  [1866]),  35,  231,  232,  443, 
775. 


Fajder  v.  Village  of  Aitkin  (87 
Minn.  445,  92  N.  W.  332,  934 
[1902]),   1116,   1411,   1412. 

Falch  V.  The  People  ex  rel.  John- 
son (99  111.  137  [1881]),  51,  86, 
236,   245,   258,    670,    715,    1379. 

Falch  V.  People  ex  rel.  ( 8  Bradwell 
(111.)    351    [1880]),    764,    1299. 

Fall  Creek  and  Warren  Township 
Gravel  Road  Co.  v.  Wallace  (39 
Ind.   435    [1872]),   322,   459,    1094. 

Fallbi"ook  Irrigation  District  v. 
Bradley  ( 164  U.  S.  112,  41  L.  369, 
17  S.  "56  [1896]),  115,  117,  119, 
121,  122,  131,  140,  249,  355,  556, 
670,  697,  718,  726,  728,  730,  760, 
1370. 

Falloon  v.  City  of  Hiawatha  (66  Kan. 
769.  71  Pa'c.  1127  [1903]),  1381, 
1436. 

Fanning  v.  Bohme  (76  Cal.  149,  18 
Pac.    158    [1888]),   313,   784,    1279. 

Fanning  v.  Foley  (99  Cal.  336), 
33   Pac.    1098    [is93]),    1149,   1225. 

Fanning  v.  Leviston  (93  Cal.  186, 
28  Pac.  943  [1892]),  1030,  1109, 
1281,    1337,    1381. 

Fanning  v.  Schammel  (68  Cal.  428, 
9  Pac.  427  [1886]),  169,  171,  538, 
983. 

Farlin  v.  Hill  (27  Mont.  27,  G9  Pac. 
237    [1902]),    637. 

Farmers'  Bank  v.  Orr  (25  Ind.  App. 
71,  55  N.  E.  35  [1900]),  1033, 
1035,    1091,    1259. 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Company  v. 
Borough  of  Ansonia  (61  Conn.  76, 
23  Atl.  705    [1891]),  60,  601,  605. 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Company  v. 
Hastings  (2  Neb.  LTnofficial,  337, 
96  N.  W.  Rep.  104  [1902]),  223, 
234,   777,    1386. 

Farniss,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of,  to  Vacate  an  Assessment 
(4  Hun  624   [1875]),  308,   1453. 

Farraher  v.  City  of  Keokuk  (111 
la.  310,  82  N.  W.  773  [1900]), 
463,    464,    784. 

Farr  v.  City  of  Detroit  (136  Mich. 
200,  99  N.  W.  19  [1904]),  1023. 
1436. 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


CI 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Farr  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Commis- 
sioners (167  111.  355,  46  N.  E.  893 
[1897]),  465,  477,  479,  623,  965, 
975,  990. 

Farrar  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (SO  Mo. 
379  [1883],  47,  147,  148,  212,  374, 
380,   381,   665,   666. 

Farrell  v.  City  of  Cliicago  (198  III. 
558,  65  N.  E.  103  [1902]),  1469, 
1473,    1506,    1518. 

Farrell  v.  Eeminelkamp  ( 64  Mo. 
App.  425    [1895]),  463,  1135,   1284. 

Farrell  v.  City  of  St.  Paul  ( 62  Minn. 
271,  54  Ain.  St.  Rep.  641,  29  L. 
R.  A.  778,  64  X.  W.  809  [1895]), 
989.   995,    1047,   1144. 

Farrell  v.  Town  of  West  Chicago 
(162  111.  280,  44  X.  E.  527),  1085, 
1113. 

Farrell  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners (181  U.  S.  404.  45  L. 
924,  21  S.  609,  645  [1901]),  314, 
702. 

Farrell  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners (182  111.  250,  55  X.  E. 
325  [1899]),  314,  559,  560,  650. 
670,  714,  715,  723,  965,  1269,  1271, 
1272,    1308. 

Farrington  v.  City  of  'Sit.  Vernon 
(166  X.  Y.  233,  59  X.  E.  826 
[1901]),   244,   438,   551,   620,   777. 

Farson  v.  City  of  Sioux  City  ( 106 
Fed.  278    [1901]),  301,   1508,   1512. 

Farwell  v.  Cambridge  (77  Mass.  (11 
Gray)    413    [1858]),   284. 

Farwell  v.  Des  Moines  Brick  Manu- 
facturing Company  (97  la.  286, 
35  L.  R.  A.  63,  66  X.  W.  176 
[1896]),  42,  315,  610,  614,  985, 
1041,    1043,    1048,    1060. 

Fass  V.  Seehawer  (CO  Wis.  525,  19 
X.  W.  533  [1884]),  53,  55,  121, 
538,  620,  632,  737,  747,  760,  781, 
785,    1006,    1338. 

Faure  v.  Winans,  Hopk.  Cli.  (283), 
1057. 

Fay,  In  the  IMatter  of  (12  Hun  490 
[1878]),   982. 

Fay  V.  City  of  Chicago  (194  111.  136, 
62  N.   E.   530    [1902]).   864. 

Fay  V.  Reed  (128  Cal.  357,  60  Pac. 
927  [1900]),  510,  831,  857,  858, 
864,  1229. 


Fay  V.   City  of   Springfield    ( 94   Fed. 

409     [1899]).     11,     118,    119,    132, 

666,    702,   709.    715,   728. 
Fayette,    City    of,    ex    rel.    Crews    V. 

Rich    ( 122  Mo.  App.   145,  9a  S.  W. 

8    [1907]),  850,  909,  956,  962. 
Fayssoux  v.  Denis    (48  La.  Ann.  850, 

19   So.    760    [1896]),    15,   155,   218, 

323,    1369. 
Feliler    v.    Gosnell     (99    Ky.    380,    35 

5.  W.   1125    [1896]),  479,  519,  844, 
1039. 

Fehringer    v.    City    of    Chicago    ( 187 

111.    416,    58    X_    E.    303     [1900]), 

859,   864. 
Felker  v.  City  of  Xew  Whatcom    (16 

Wash.    178,'   47    Pac.    505    [1896]), 

525,  526,  739,  747,  754,  887,   1182, 

1202. 
Fell    V.    Philadelphia,    to    the    use    of 

Cunningham     (81    Pa.    St.     (31    P. 

F.    Smith)     58    [1876]),    234,    314, 

521,  527,  528,  537,  543,  777. 
Fellows     V.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty    of    the    City    of    Xew 

York      (17      Hun      (X.      Y.)      249 

[1879]),    1515. 
Felt    V.    City    of    Ballard    (38    Wash. 

300,     80    Pac.    532      [1905]),     624, 

628. 
Felthousen     v.    City    of     Amsterdam 

(69   Hun  505,  23  X.  Y.   Supp.  424 

[1893]),   223,    234,    777,   887. 
Fenelon'a     Petition     (7    Pa.    St.      (7 

Barr.)    173    [1847]),   63,    113,   308, 

950,   1049. 
Fenwick    Hall    Company    v.    Town    of 

Old    Saybrooke     (69    Conn.    32,    36 

Atl.   10(58    [1897]),  308,   907,   1433. 
Fergus    Falls,    City    of    v.    Boen    (78 

Minn.   186,  80  X.  W.  961    [1899]), 

6,  20,   1032. 

Ferguson    v.    Cit.v   of    CoflVvvillo    ( — 

Kan.   ,   94    Pac.    1010    [1908]), 

531. 
Ferguson  v.  Quinn   (123  Pa.  St.  337, 

16     Atl.    844    [1889]),    992,     1157, 

1160. 
Ferguson     v.    Borough    of     Stamford 

(60      Conn.      432,      22      Atl.      782 

[1891]).  11.  66,  118,  147,' 284,  324, 

651,  654,   1358. 


Cll 


TABLE   OF    CxVSES. 


[References   are   to  sections.  J 


Ferry  v.  Ridge  (56  Mo.  App.  615 
[1893]),   841. 

Ferris  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 162  111. 
Ill,  44  N,  E.  436  [1896]),  533, 
884,   912. 

Ferry  v.  City  of  Tacoma  (34  Wasli. 
652,  76  Pac.  277  [1904]),  679,  681, 
682,    918,    1027. 

Ferson's  Appeal  (96  Pa.  St.  (15 
Norris)  140  [1880]),  610,  665, 
666,  706,  1012,   1014. 

Feiist,  In  the  Matter  of  (121  X.  Y. 
299,   24   N.   E.   479    [1890]),    1458. 

Fidelity  Trust  and  Safety  Vault 
Company  v.  Voris,  Exrs.  (110 
Ky.  315,  61  S.  W.  474  [1901]), 
629. 

Field  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.  (194  U.  S.  618,  24  S.  784, 
48  L.  1142  [1904]),  108,  144,  388, 
464,  485,  515,  779,   1370. 

Field  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.  (117  Fed.  925  [1902]),  108, 
144,  313,  314,  387,  388,  436,  438. 
464,  480,  485,  515,  698,  779,  1026, 
1130,   1324,   1370,   1414. 

Field  V.  City  of  Chicago  (198  111. 
224,  64  N.  E.  840  [1902]),  166, 
386,  463,  511,  551,  555,  570,  739, 
747,  762,   828,   874,   913,  950. 

Field  V.  Inhabitants  of  the  Town- 
ship of  West  Orange  (39  N.  J. 
Eq.  (12  Stew.)  60  [1884]),  968, 
1171,    1447. 

Fields  V.  The  Commissioners  of 
Highland  County  (36  O.  S.  476 
[1881]),    11,    38,    147,    1421. 

Fifth  Avenue  Sewer,  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Contract  for  the,  in  the 
City  of  Pittsburg  (4  Brewster 
(Pa.)  *364  [1870]),  388,  444,  468, 
549,    558,   563,    867. 

Fifty-fourth  St.,  Pittsburg's  Appeal 
(165  Pa.  St.  8,  30  Atl.  503 
[1894]),  554,   620,  626,  627. 

Figg  V.  Louisville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
(116  Ky.  135,  75  S.  W.  269,  25 
Ky.  L.  R.  350  [1903]),  594,  595, 
597,   598,   630. 

Findlay,  City  of  v.  Frey  (51  0.  S. 
390,  38  N.  E.  114  [1894]),  561, 
577,  625,  681,  689,  700,  704. 


Findley   v.   Hull    (13    Wash.   236,   43 

Pac.  28    [1895]),  313,   1505. 
Findley  v.  City  of  Pittsburg   (82  Pa. 

St.    (1   Xorris)    351    [1876]),   497. 
Findley    v.    City   of   Pittsburg    (Pa.) 

11  Atl.  678),  53,  55,  323,  527. 
Finlayson   v.   Vaugh    (54  Minn.   331, 

56  N.  W.  49),  365. 
Finnegan  v.   City  of  Fernandina    ( 15 

Fla.      379,      2^1      Am.      Rep.      292 

[1875]),    73. 
Finnell   v.   Howells    (2   Cin.   Sup.   Ct. 

(Ohio)     1.50    [1872]),    171,    687. 
Finnell     v.     Kates      (19     0.     S.     405 

[1869]),  120,  728,  740. 
Finney  v.  City  of  Oshkosh    (18   Wis. 

209    [1864]),    1512. 
First   Division   of   the    St.    Paul    and 

Pacific    Railroad   Company    v.    City 

of      St.      Paul       (21      Minn.      52*6 

[1875]),    172,    594,    614. 
First  Draining  District,  In  the  Mat- 
ter   of    the    Commissioners    of    the 

(27  La.  Ann.  20  [1875]),  119,  127, 

340.    952. 
First     Methodist     Episcopal     Church 

South.  V.  City  of  Atlanta    (76  Ga. 

181    [1886]),   613. 
First     National      Bank     of     Kansas 

City    V.    Arnoldia     (63    Mo.    229), 

1335. 
First   National    Bank   of    Sterling   v. 

Drew    (93    111.    App.    630    [1900]), 

409. 
First     National      Bank     of     Kansas 

City      V.      Nelson      (64     Mo.      418 

[1877]),   570,    575,   656,    1335. 
First    Presbyterian    Church    of    Fort 

Wayne  v.  City  of  Fort  Wayne   (36 

Ind.  338,  10  Am.  Rep.  35   [1871]), 

588,    613. 
First    Presbyterian    Church    v.    City 

of  Lafayette   (42  Ind.  115   [1873]), 

1191,   1215,   1245,   1356,   1373. 
Firth  V.  Broadhead    (7  Mo.  App.  563 

[1879]),    171,    1081. 
Fischback    v.    People   ex    rel.   Tether- 

ington   (191   111.   171,  60  N.  E.  887 

[1901]),    296,    927,    937,    986,    996. 

1183,  1340. 
Fishburn  v.  City  of  Chicago  (171 

111.  338,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  236,  39 

L.  R.  A.  482,  49  N.  E.  532),  515. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cm 


[Reference.>   are   to   sections.] 


Fisher   v.    City   of   Chicago    (213    111. 

268,    72    N.    E.    680    [1904|),    324, 

330,  917,  918,  1375. 
Fisher  v.  Georgia  Vitrified  Brick  and 

Clay    Company    (121    Ga.    621,    49 

S.    E.    679    [1905]),    519,    1432. 
Fisher     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen      and 

Commonalty  of  New   York    ( 67   N. 

Y.  73    [1876]),   73,  910,  925,   1067, 

1096,    1309. 
Fisher  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  tlie  City  of 

New    York'   (6    Hun     (X.    Y.)     64 

[1875]),    1009,    1286. 
Fisher  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of  New 

York  (3  Hun   (X.  Y.)   648  [1875]), 

73,   1090,    1096,    1161,   1259. 
Fisher  v.   City  of  Rochester    ( 6   Lan- 
sing   225    [1872]),    280,    467,    526. 
Usher   V.   ^Mayor,   etc.,   of  Xew  Y'ork 

(4  Lansing  451    [1871]),  64,   1469. 
Fisher    v.    People   ex   rel.    Kern    (  157 

111.  85,  41  X.  E.  615    [1895]),  531. 

986,   996. 
Fisher  v.   City  of  St.  Louis    (44   Mo. 

482    [1869]"),    1309. 
Fiske     V.    People    ex    rel.     Raymond 

(188  III.  206,  52  L.  R.   A.  291,  58 

X.   E.    985    [1900]).   514,   927,   986, 

992,   1183,   1375. 
Fitch     V.     Keeler      (10     0.     S.     169 

[1859]  ),   86,  553. 
Fitzgerald     v.    City    of    Sioux     City 

(125     la.     396,    'lOl     X.     \V.     268 

[1904]),      670,     707,      1035,      1082, 

1165,   1194. 
Fitzgerald   v.    Walker    (55    Ark.    148, 

17    S.    W.    702     [1891]),     16,     151, 

209,    249,    266,    314,    475,    531.    540, 

686,   1015,   1022,   1035. 
Fitzlnigh     V.     Ashwortli      (119     Cal. 

393,     51    Pac.    635     [1897]),     324, 

468,    541,    821,    833,    840. 
Fitzhugh   V.   City  of   Bay    City    (  109 

Mich.   581,  67   X.   ^V.   904    [1896]), 

1015,    1436. 
Filzhugli     V.     City     of     Dulutli      ( 5S 

Minn.    427.    59    X.    \\.    1041).    367. 

914. 
Fitzhugh   V.   Levee  District    (54   Ark. 

224,    15    S.    W.    455     [1891]),    73. 

.343,   1.346. 
Flanagan    v.    City    of    St.    Paul     (65 


Minn.   347,    68   X.   W.   47    [1896]), 

746,    747,    1200. 
Flatbush,    In    the    Matter   of    the   As- 
sessments of  Lands  in  the  Town  of, 

for  the  Extension  of  Prospect  Park 

in  the  City  of  Brooklyn    (60  N.  Y. 

398    [1875"]),   409,   425,   637. 
Flatbush    Avenue    in    City   of   Brook- 
lyn,   In    the    Matter    of     ( 1    Barb. 
(X.    Y.)     286     [1847]),    661,    889, 

890,   922,    1276. 
Fleener  v.  Claman    ( 126  Ind.   166,  25 

X".   E.   900),   266,   270. 
Fleet    V.    Borland     (11    Howard     (X. 

Y.)    489    [1854]),    1055. 
Fleetwood   v.    City   of   New    York    ( 4 

X.   Y.    Sup.    Ct.   Rep.   475    [1849]), 

1174,    1484,    1485. 
Fleming   v.    Hull    (73   la.   598,  35   X. 

W   673),  337. 
Fleniniing    v.    :Mayor    and    Council    of 

the   City  of  Holjoken    (40   X".  ,1.  L. 

(11    Vr.)     270    [1878]),    1510. 
Fletcher    v.    Oliver     (25    Ark     281), 

639. 
Fletcher     v.     City     of     Oshkosh      (18 

Wis.  228    [1864]).  974,   1069,   1469, 

1505,    1518. 
Fletcher    v.    Pratlier     (102    Cal.    413, 

36    Pac.    658    [1894]),    324,    ,509. 
Flewellin   v.    Proetzel    (80    Tex.    191, 

15   S.    W.   Rep.    1043    [1891]),    171, 

223,   234,   775,    777,   878,   879,   910. 
Flickinger  v.   Fay    (119   Cal.  590.   51 

Pac.    855    [1893]),    495,    500,    1437. 
Flinn    v.    Gouley     (139    Cal.    ()23,    73 

Pac.    542    [1903]  ),    1233. 
Flinn  v.  Peters    (3  Cal.  App.  235,  84 

Pac.    995    [1906]),   514. 
Flinn    v.   Strauss    (4    Cal.    App.    245, 

87    Pac.    414    [1906]),   498. 
Flint  V.  Webb   (25  Minn.  93  [1878]), 

420,  735,  745,  910,  913,  1067,  1202. 
Flora   V.  Cline   (89   Ind.  208   [1883]), 

1015.    1033,   1043,   1242. ' 
Florer   v.   Mc.^fl'ee    (135   Ind.   540,   35 

X.    E.    277    [1893]).    1085,    1101. 
Florida    v. .       (See    State 

of    Florida    v.    — ) 


Fh.urnoy  v.  (  ity  of  .TcflVrsonvillp 
(17  Ind.  Iti9.  <!)  Am.  Dec.  468), 
15.  86,  134,  570,  1112,  1113,  1211, 
1.346. 


CIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[•suojpas   o;  eao   saonajajdy] 


Floyd  V.  Atlanta  Banking  Co.  (109 
Ga.  778,  35  S.  E.  172  [1899]), 
17,    1033,   1436. 

Flushing  Avenue,  In  the  Matter  of 
(98   N.   Y.   445    [1885]),   918,   989. 

Flynn  v.  Canton  Company  of  Balti- 
more (40  Md.  312,  17  Am.  Rep. 
603    [1874]),   56,   58. 

Flynn  Township  v.  Woolman  (133 
Mich.  508,  95  N.  W.  567  [1903]), 
340,    1431. 

Fogg  V.  Hoquiam  (23  Wash.  340,  63 
Pac.    234    [1900]),    1165. 

Foley  V.  Bullard  (97  Cal.  516,  32 
Pac.    574    [1893]),    1384. 

Folmsbee  v.  City  of  Amsterdam 
(142  N.  Y.  118,  36  N.  E.  821 
[1894]),  510,  781,  829,  837. 

Folsom,  In  the  Matter  of  (56  N.  Y. 
.  60    [1874]),   762. 

Folsom,  Petition  of  (2  S.  (T.  &  C.) 
55    [1873]),   745. 

Folz  V.  City  of  Cincinnati  (2  Handy 
(Ohio)  261  [1855]),  413,  424, 
1509. 

Foote  V.  City  of  Milwaukee  (18  Wis. 
270  [1864]),  484,  485,  521,  538, 
737,  747,  1006,  1335,  1338,  1450. 

Forbes  Street  (70  Pa.  St.  (20  P. 
F.   Smith)    125    [1871]),   113,   427. 

Forbis  v.  Bardbury  (58  Mo.  App. 
506   [1894]),  804,  810,  1024. 

Ford,  In  the  Matter  of  ( 6  •  Lansing 
(N.  Y.)  92  [1872]),  47,  200,  495, 
550,    745,    770,    864,   874,   981. 

Ford  V.  Delta  and  Pine  Land  Com- 
pany (164  U.  S.  662,  41  L.  590, 
17  S.  230  [1897]),  42,  343,  612, 
613,   617,    1092. 

Ford  V.  Delta  &  Pine  Land  Co.  (43 
Fed.    181    [1890]),   42,   343,   613. 

Ford  V.  Town  of  North  Des  Moines 
(80  la.  626,  45  N.  W.  1031 
[1890]),'  119,  135,  728,  729,  732, 
1026. 

Ford  V.  City  of  Toledo  (64  O.  S.  92, 
59  N.  E.  779  [1901]),  324,  327, 
446,   549,   563,   578,   608,   641,   663. 

Forgey  v.  Northern  Gravel  Co.  (37 
Ind.  118  [1871]).  639,  723,  1432, 
1444. 


Forry    v.    Ridge     (56    Mo.    App.    615 

[1893]),  621,  631,  698,  709. 
Forsyth  v.  Wilcox    (143  Ind.   144,  41 

N."^  E.   371    [1895]),    70,    86,    113. 
Fort  Chartres  &  Ivy  Landing  Drain- 
age &  Levee  Dist.  No.  5  v.  Smalk- 

and     (70    111.    App.    449     [1897]), 

223,   234,    739,   776,    813,    815. 
Ft.    Dodge    Electric    Light    &    Power 

Co.  V.  City  of  Ft.  Dodge    (115  la. 

568,  89  n!  W.   7    [1902]),   12,   118, 

301,   507,   603,   640,   G66,   698,    709, 

1414,    1504,    1508,    1509. 
Fort  Scott,  City  of  v.  Kaufman    (44 

Kan.      137,    24    Pac.    64     [1890]), 

447,  636. 
Fort    Smith,    School    District    of    v. 

Board    of    Improvement     ( 65    Ark. 

343,    46    S.    W.    418    [1898]),    586, 

1077. 
Fort    Street    &    Elmwood    R.    R.    Co. 

V.       Schneider        ( 15       Mich.       74 

[1866]),   438. 
Fort    Wayne,    City    of    v.    Cody     (43 

Ind.    197    [1873]),  555. 
Fort  Wayne,  City  of  v.   Shoaff    (  106 

Ind.  66,  5  N.  E.  403    [1885]),  358, 

454. 
Foss    v.    City    of    Chicago     (184    111. 

436,   56   N.   E.    1133    [1900]).   912. 

1183. 
Foss  V.  City  of  Chicago  (56  111.  354 

[1870]),  860,  1337. 
Foster  v.  City  of  Alton  (173  IH. 

587,  51  N.  E.  76  [1898]),  956, 

962,  1513. 
Foster    v.    Cape    May    (60    N.    J.    L.. 

(31   Vr.)    78),  280. 
Foster    v.     Park     Commissioners    of 

Boston    (133  Mass.  321),  356,  525. 
Foster     v.     Park     Commissioners     ol 

Boston    (131    Mass.    225),    356. 
Foster     v.     Paxton      (90     Ind.     122 

[1883]),    1030,    1414,    1431. 
Foster     v.     Commissioners     of     Wood 

County    (9  0.  S.   540    [1859]),   89, 

189,  255,  322,  538,  711. 
Foimtain     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

Covmcil  of  the  City  of  Newark   (57 

N.   J.   E(i.    (12   Dick.)    76,   40   Atl. 

212    [1898]).    958,    959,    968,    1066, 

1083.    1447. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Fountain  Head  Drainage  District 
Commissioners  of  v.  Wright  (228 
111.  208,  81  X.  E.  849  [1907]), 
822,  952,   1382. 

Fowler,  Matter  of  (53  X.  Y.  GO), 
142. 

Fowler  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph  ( 37 
Mo.  228  [186(5]).  423,  525,  527, 
707,  714,  1059,  1113,  1427,  1432. 
1442,    1502. 

Fox  V.  Middlesborough  Town  Co. 
(96  Ky.  262,  20  S.  W.  776 
[1894])".  439,  527,  561,  574,  628, 
666,  709,   710,  735,  741,  848,   1015. 

Fralicli  v.  Barlow  (25  Ind.  App. 
383.  58  XL  E.  271  [1900]),  301. 
526,  '843,  1235,  1236,  1272,  1303, 
1324,    1375. 

Frank  v.  City  of  Chicago  (216  111. 
587,  15  X.  E.  213  [1905]),  1375. 
1376,    1377. 

Fi*ankfort,    Board    of    Councilmen    of 

City   of   V.   Brislin    ( —   Ky.    , 

104  S.  W.  311,  31  Ky.  L.  R.  867 
[1907]),    1346. 

Frankfort,  Board  of  Councilmen  of 
V.  Mason  &  Foard  Company  (100 
Ky.  48,  37  S.  W.  290  [1896]), 
52,   55,   227,   956,   963. 

Frankfort,  Board  of  Councilmen  of 
City  of  V.  Murray  (99  Ky.  422, 
36  "S.   W.    180    [1896]),   53, '55. 

Frankfort,  City  of  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Ross  (128  Ind.  438.  27  X.  E.  1115 
[1891]),   578,   587,   629. 

Franklin  v.  Hancock  (204  Pa.  St. 
110.  53  Atl.  044  [1902]),  147,  148, 
314,  437,  622,  624,  698.  709,  1041, 
1094. 

Franklin.  Mayor  of  v.  Mabery  (6 
Ilumpli.  (Tenn.)  368,  44  Am.  Dec. 
315),    1123. 

Franklin  County,  Board  of  Commis- 
sionoi-s  of  V.  Gardiner  Savings  In- 
stitution (119  Fed.  36  [1902]), 
1498. 

Franklin  County,  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  V.  City  of  Ottawa  ( 49 
Kan.  747,  33  Am."  St.  Rep.  390,  31 
Pac.  788  [1892]).  301.  580.  582, 
1075. 

Franklin    Park.   Villaoe  of  v.   Frank- 


lin (231  111.  380,  83  X.  E.  214 
[1907]),  921,   1270. 

Franklin  Park,  Village  of  v.  Frank- 
lin (228  111.  591,  81  X.  E.  1132 
[1907]),    1376. 

Frantz,  Jr.  v.  Jacob  (88  Ky.  525, 
11  S.  \A\  654  [1S89]),  3o"4,  662. 
1103.    1437. 

Fraser  v.  Mulany  (129  Wis.  377, 
109  X.  W.  139' [1906]),  340,  554, 
556,  564,  639,  723,  907. 

Frazer  v.  State  for  Use  of  Inger- 
man  (106  Ind.  471,  7  X.  E.  203 
[1886]),   340,    1147,    1232. 

P^rederick  Street,  Hanover  Bur- 
rough's  Appeal  (150  Pa.  St.  202, 
24  Atl.  Rep.  669  [1892]),  244,  776. 

Frederick  v.  City  of  Seattle  (19 
Wash.  428,  43  Vac.  364  [1896]), 
408,   782,   956,  962,   965,  990,   1399. 

Freeport  Borough  v.  Robert  Mil- 
ler's Estate  (34  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
395    [1907]),    1063. 

Freeport  Street  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Freeport  (151  111.  451,"  38 
X.  E.  137  [1894]),  413,  623,  837, 
879,    956,    962,    967,    991,    1100. 

Fremont,  City  of  v.  Hayes  (4  Ohio 
X.  P.  379),"   1125. 

French  v.  Barber  Asplialt  Co.  (181 
U.  S.  324,  45  L.  879,  21  S.  625 
[1901]),  86,  118,  123,  244,  245. 
293,  301,  314,  516.  553,  666,  702. 
728,   1049,   1370. 

French  v.  Kirkland  (1  Paige  (X. 
Y.)     117),    336. 

French  v.  Cit.v  of  Lowell  (117  Mass. 
363    [1875]  ),   76,   312,   654. 

Frenna  v.  Sunnyside  Land  Company 
(124  Cal.  437,  57  Pac.  302 
[1899]),    537,    1052,    1062. 

Frevert,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Council 
of  the  City  of  Ba.vonne  (63  X.  J. 
L.  (34  Vr.)  202,  42  Atl.  773 
[1899]).  667,   1404.   1408. 

Frey  v.  City  of  Findlay  (7  Ohio  C. 
C.  311    [1893]),  561,  "577,  681,  704. 

Frick  V.  Morford  (87  Cal.  576,  25 
Pac.  764  [1891]),  465.  479.  510. 
537,  631,  831.  960.  965.  1030.  1358, 
1359.    1471. 


CVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Fricke  v.  City  of  Cincinnati  ( 1  Ohio 
N.  P.  98  \l894]),  475,  975,  977, 
1105. 

Friedenwald  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore  (74  Md.  116, 
21  Atl.  555,  24  Atl.  156  [1891]), 
309,  432,  654,  816,  1349,  1363, 
1414,    1432. 

Friedrich  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  (118 
Wis.  254,  95  X.  W.  126  [1903]), 
674,  923,   1005,   1283. 

Friedrich  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  (114 
Wis.  304.  90  X.  W.  174  [1902]), 
71,  639,  661,  1519. 

Fresh  V.  City  of  Galveston  (73  Tex. 
401,  11  S.  W.  402  [1889]),  223, 
234,   777,   813,   815,   830. 

Frost  V.  Leatherman  (55  Mich.  33, 
20  X.  W.  705  [1884]),  781,  859, 
867,    1049,    1052,    1426,    1427,    1443. 

Fruin-Bambrick  Construction  Com- 
pany V.  Geist  (37  Mo.  App.  509 
[1889]),  223,  234,  628,  777,  804, 
811,   1303. 

Frush  V.  City  of  East  Portland  ( 6 
Or.   281    [1877]),   1512. 

Frye  v.  Town  of  Mount  Vernon  (42 
Wash.  268,  84  Pac.  864  [1006]), 
301,  972,  1475. 

Fuchs  V.  St.  Louis  (167  Mo.  620, 
57  L.  P.  A.  130,  67  S.  W.  610), 
324. 

Fuess  V.  Kansas  City  and  the  Brook- 
lyn Avenue  Railway  Co.  (191  Mo. 
692,  90  S.  W.  1029  [1905]),  66, 
6.54,   1373. 

Fulkerson  v.  City  of  Bristol  ( 105 
Va.  555,  54  S.  E.  468  [1906]), 
107,   161,   168,   639,   645,   688. 

Fuller  V.  City  of  Elizabeth  (42  N. 
J.  L.  (13  Vroom)  427  [1880]). 
927,    1003,    1486. 

Fuller  V.  City  of  Grand  Eapids  ( 105 
Mich.  529,"^  63  X.  W.  5.30  [1895]), 
526,    839,    859,    865,    1057. 

Fulton  Street,  In  the  Matter  of  (29 
Howard  Pr.  429  [1865]),  461,  403, 
464. 

Fulton  V.  Town  of  Dover  (8  Houst. 
(Del.)  78,  6  Atl.  633,  12  Atl.  394, 
31  Atl.  974   [1888]),  70. 

Fulton  County,  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners   of    V.    Board    of    Commis- 


sioners of  Henry  County  (64  Ohio 
St.  160,  59  X.  E.  883  [1901]), 
1371. 

Furman  Street,  Matter  of  (17 
Wend.    (N.  Y.)    649),  653. 

F.  V.  Smith  Contracting  Co.  v.  City 
of  Xew  York  (100  N.  Y.  S.  756, 
115    App.    Div.    180    [1906]),    538. 


Gable    v.    Altoona    (200    Pa.    St.    15, 

49     Atl.    367    [1901]),    844,     1502, 

1511. 
Gaertner      v.      Louisville      Artificial 

Stone  Co.    (114  Ky.   160,   70  S.  W. 

293    [1902]),   443,   862,    1249. 
G'affney     v.     Gough      (36     Cal.      104 

[1868]),   1049,   1151. 
Gafney   v.    City    and   County   of   San 

Francisco     (72    Cal.    146,    13    Pac. 

467    [1887]),    856,    862,    865,    1509, 

1515. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago     (225    111. 

218,    80    X.    E.    127    [1907]),    121, 

266,  748,  758,  1039,  1279. 
Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago  (225  111. 

135,  80  X."^E.  86  [1907]),  726. 
Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago.  (223  111. 

602,  79  X.  E.  294  [1906]),  758, 

764. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago     (216    111. 

107,    74    X.    E.    726    [1905]),    886, 

909,  1085,  1104,  1391. 
Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago  (211  111. 

109,  71  X.  E.  877  [1904]),  918. 
Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago  (207  111. 

56,  69  X.  E.  588  [1904]),  266, 

831,   857,   858,  864,   1279,   1289. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago     (203    111. 

2^6.  67  X.  E.  477  [1903]),  317,  440, 

1377. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago    (201    111. 

93,  66  X."  E.  374  [1903]),  511, 

570,  750,  831,  839,  864,  866,  918, 

987,  1000,  1377. 
Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago  ( 196  111. 

512.  63  X.  E.  1031  [1902]),  323. 

469,  739,  747,  835,  864. 
Gage    V.    City   of    Chicago     ( 195    111. 

490,    63    X.    E.    184    [1902]),    328, 

448,   469,    835,    950,    1373. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cvn 


[Kefereuces   are   to   sections.] 


Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago    (193    111. 

108,    61    X.    E.    850    [1001]),    852, 

978,  994,   1390. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago     (192    111. 

586,    61    X.    E.    849    [1901]),    317, 

323,   440,   835. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago     (  191    111. 

210,    60    X"^.    E.    890    [1901]),    295. 

297,    328,   401,   417,    418,    859. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago     (179    111. 

392,    53    X.    E.    742    [1899]),    864. 
Gage    V.    City    of    Chicago     (162    111. 

313.    44    X.    E.    729    [1896]),    912, 

947,    1281,    1372,    1377. 
(iage    V.    City    of    Chicago     ( 146    111. 

499,   34   X.    E.    1034    [1893]),    308. 

311,  391,  394,  426,  920. 
Gage   V.    City    of   Chicago    (  143    111. 

157,  32  X.  E.  264   [1893]),  857. 
Gage  V.  Dupuy    (137   111.   652,  24  X. 

E.  541,  26  X.  E.  386   [1892]),  746, 

750,    1184,    1196,    1448. 
Gage      V.      Graham      (57      111.      144 

[1870]),    105,   259,   344. 
Gage      V.      Parker       ( 103      111.      523 

[1882]),  927,  986,   1199,   1429. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanherg   (225 

111.  144,  80  X.  E.  90   [1907]).  471, 

472,  950,   1108,   1113. 
Gage  V.   People    (221    111.  527,   77  X. 

E.  927   [1906]),   1132. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg   (219 

111  219,  76  X".  E.  834  [1906]),  526, 

826,  1103,  1189,  1330. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  (219 

111.  369,  76  X.  E.  498  [1906]), 

471,  925,  950,  1113,  1183. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg   (219 

HI.  20,   76  X.   E.   56    [1905]),   883, 

1183. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg   (213 

111.    468,    72    X.    E.    1108    [1905]), 

491,  986,   996,    1183,    1290,    1372. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg    (213 

111.    457,    72    X.    E.    1099    [1905]), 

301,    1189,    1389. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg   (213 

111.    410,    72    X.    E.    1084    [1904]), 

986,  998,   1184,    1343. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg   (213 

111.    347,    72    X.    E.    1062    [1904]). 

491,    1324. 


Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg   (207 

111.    377,    69    X.    E.    840     [1904]), 

469,    723,   820,   909,   921,   927,   932, 

996,  1183,  1340,  1389,  1390. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  ( 207 

111.  61,  69  X.  E.  635  [1904]). 

514,  818,  927,  986,  996,  1183,  1189. 

1332. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  (205  111.  547, 

69  X.  E.  80  [1903]),  746.  1101, 

1108,    1178,    1299. 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond    ( 200 

HI.    432,    65    X.    E.    1084    [1903]), 

531,    533. 
Gage     V.     People     ex     rel.     Raymond 

(193  111.  316,  56  L.  R.  A.  916,  61 

X.     E.     1045     [1901]),     533,     989, 

1342. 
Gage    V.    People    ex    rel.    Kochersper- 

ger     (163    111.    39,    44    X.    E.    819 

[1896]),  311,  986,  996,  1183,  1340. 

1379. 
Gage  V.   Springer    (211   III.   200,    103 

Am.    St.    Rep.    191,    71    X.    E.    860 

[1904]),  484,   539. 
Gage  V.   Springer    (112  111.  App.    103 

[1904]),    484,    539. 
Gage  V.   \Yaterman    (121    111.    11.5.    13 

X.    E.    543    [1889]),    51,    746.    748, 

764,   1178,    1207,    1448. 
Gage   V.    \Yebb    (141    111.   533,   31    X. 

E.   130  [1893]),  746,  748.  760,  764, 

888,    1184,    1444. 
Gage    V.    Village    of    Wilmette     ( 230 

111.    428,    82    X.    E.    656     [1907]), 

324,   469.  472. 
Galbreath    v.    Xewton    (30   Mo.   App. 

381     [1888]),     18.    496,    5.30,     541, 

856,   1028,   1137,  1138. 
Galesburg,    City    of    v.    Searles     (114 

111.    217,    29*  X.    E.    686     [1886]), 

51.    153,    271,    279.    295,    324,    670. 

715. 
Gallagher   v.    Bartlett    (64    Mo.    App. 

258     [1896]),     1135,     1137,     1243, 

1284. 
GalJaher    v.    Garland     (  126    la.    206, 

101    X.   \V.   867    [1904]),   479.    740, 

777,   962,    1028,    1196. 
Gallaher    v.    City    of    Jefferson     (  125 

la.    324.    101   "x.    \V.    124    [1904]), 

313,    432. 


CVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Gait  V.  City  of  Chicago  (174  111. 
605,  51  N.  E.  653  [1898]),  314, 
388,   527,   663,   672,   675,   850,   912. 

Galveston,  City  of  v.  Guaranty 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York  ( 107  Fed. 
325,  46  C.  C.  A.  319  [1901]),  45. 
301,    1080,    1101,    1164,    1165. 

Galveston,  City  of  v.  Heard  (54  Tex. 
420  [1881]),  119,  120,  123,  132, 
323,  474,  475,  485,  507,  521,  728, 
737,  760,  763,  773,  779,  815,  1047, 
1049,   1163. 

Galveston  v.  Loonie,  54  Tex.  517 
[1881]),    1504. 

Gans  V.  City  of  Philadelphia  (102 
Pa.   St.  97    [1883]),   1063. 

Gantz,  In  re,  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment (85  N.  Y.  536  [1881]), 
1072,    1460,    1463. 

Gantz,  In  the  Matter  of  (23  Hun 
(N.  Y.)    350   [1880]),   1460. 

Garden  City,  City  of  v.  TijiiTg  (57 
Kan.  632,  47  Pac.  524  [1897]), 
1498. 

Gardiner  v.  Street  Commissioners 
of  the  City  of  Boston  ( 188  Mass. 
223,  74  N.  E.  .341  [1905]),  425, 
426,   480,   514,   723,   979,   981. 

Gardner,  In  the  Matter  of  (41  How- 
ard, 255  [1871]),  313,  693,  699, 
714,  900. 

Gardner,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Pe- 
tition of  (6  Hun.  (X.  Y.)  67 
[1875]),    500. 

Garrett  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (25  Mo. 
505,  69  Am.  Dec.  475  [1857]),  8, 
70,   86,   89,    110,   308,   690,   697. 

Garrick  v.  Chamberlain  (97  111.  620 
[1881]),    173,    1049,    1185. 

Garrison  v.  City  of  New  York  ( 88 
U.  S.  (21  Wall.)  196,  22  L.  612 
[1874]),  166,  170,  1337. 

Gartside  Coal  Company  v.  Turk  (1-17 
111.  120,  35  N.  e'  467  [1894]), 
927,    1145. 

Garvey,  In  the  Matter  of  (77  N.  Y. 
523    [1879]),    464,    781. 

Garvey  v.  Inhabitants  of  Revere  ( 187 
Mass.  o45,  73  N.  E.  664  [1905]), 
67,    76. 

Garvin  v.  Dussman  (114  Ind.  429, 
5  Am.  St.  Rep.  637.  16  N.  E.  826 
[1887]).    119.    1:52.    301.    726,    731, 


773,  777,  979,  981,  1122,  1141, 
1145,   1337. 

Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.  v.  City  of  New 
Albany  (158  Ind.  268,  63  N.  E. 
458  [1901]),  11,  63,  70,  71,  102, 
324,  887,  997. 

Gaston  v.  Merriam,  33  Minn.  271, 
22   N.   W.   614    [1885]),    1200. 

Gaston  v.  City  of  Portland  (48  Or. 
82,  84  Pac.  1040  [1906]),  967,  974, 
1088,    1207. 

Gaston  v.  Portland  (41  Or.  373,  69 
Pac.  34,  445  [1902]),  62.  63,  70, 
308,  1010. 

Gatch  V.  City  of  Des  Moines  (63  la. 
718,  18  N.  W.  310  [1886]),  12, 
119,  135,  666,  677,  717,  726,  729, 
732. 

Gately  v.  Leviston  (63  Cal.  365 
[1883]),    781,    783,   828. 

Gates  V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids  ( 134 
Mich.  96,  "95  N.  W.  998  [1903]), 
293,  324,  325,  432,  441,  1015,  1436. 

Gates  V.  City  of  Toledo  (57  O.  S. 
105,  48  N.  E.  500  [1897]),  1515. 

Gates  V.  City  of  Toledo  (10  Ohio  C. 
C.   160   [1895]),  1515. 

Gates  V.  Toledo  (7  Ohio  N.  P.  389 
[1900]),   1515. 

Gatling  v.  Commissioners  of  Cart- 
eret County  (92  N.  C.  536,  53  Am. 
Rep.    432     [1885]),    73. 

Gauen  v.  Moredock  and  Ivy  Land- 
ing Drainage  District  No.  1  (131 
HI.  446,  23  N.  E.  633  [1890]),  41, 
223.  247,  284,  549,  550,  554,  556, 
557,  564,  641,  642,  915,  920,  927, 
1008,  1049,  1112,  1114,  1116,  1141, 
1145,   1213,   1337. 

Gault's  Appeal  (33  Pa.  St.  (9  Ca- 
sey)   94    [1859]),   8,  89,   171.    1197. 

Gedge  v.  City  of  Covington    ( —  Ky. 

,  80   S*.   W.    1160,  26  Ky.  Law 

Rep.    273    [1904]),    423,    1502. 

Geiger  v.  Bradley  (117  Ind.  120,  19 
N.  E.  760   [1880]),  423,  878,  1113. 

Geiszler  v.  DeGraaf  (166  N.  Y.  339. 
82  Am.  St.  Rep.  659,  59  N.  E.  993 
[1901]),    1072. 

Genet  v.  City  of  Brooklyn  (99  N.  Y. 
296,  1  N.  E.  777  [1885]),  70,  89, 
111,  308,  309,  381,  555,  556,  666, 
709,  884. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CIX 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Genet  v.  City  of  Brooklyn    (94  X.  Y. 

645    [1884]),    73. 
Gens    V.    City    of    Philadelpliia     (102 

Pa.  St.  97    [1883]).   1()()3. 
George  v.  Yoiinii;    (45  La.  Ann.   1232, 

14    So.    137    [1893  1).    37,    147,   212. 

343,  548,  553,  660,  689,  711. 
German  Bank  v.  Brose   (32  Ind.  Ap]). 

77,    69    N.    E.    300     [1903]),    997, 

1099. 
German    Protestant    Orphan    Asylum 

V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.    (26 

Ky.   Law  Rep.    805,   82    S.    VV.    632 

[1904]),   709,  710. 
German    Savings    &    Loan    Society    v. 

Ramish    (138  Cal.   120,  69  Pac.  89, 

70  Pac.  1067   [1902]),  73,  485,  521, 

550,   551,    555,    570,   619,    781,    795, 

801,  874,   1346. 
German-American     Savings    Bank    v. 

City    of    Spokane     (17    Wash.    315, 

38    L.    R.    A.    259,    47    Pac.    1103, 

49    Pac.    542    [1897]),    1468.    14(i9, 

1473,    1504,    1510,    1518. 
Germania    Bank   v.    City   of   St.    Paul 

(79     Minn.     29,     81*  N.     W.     542 

[1900]),  525,  526,  527,   1490. 
Germond     v.     City     of     Tacoma      (6 

Wash.    365,    33  '  Pac.    961    [1893]), 

140,   141,  475,   1103,   1337. 
Gest    V.    City    of    Cincinnati     (26    0. 

S.  275    [1875]).   86,  475.  544,   975, 

977,   1041,   1210.   1216. 
Gibbons  v.  District  of  Colunibiii    (116 

U.  S.  404,  6  S.  427),  243. 
Gibbs     V.     Pt'o])]e's     National     Bank 

(198     111.     307,     64     X.     E.      1060 

[1902]),    49. 
Gibler  .V.    City   of    :\rntt. )nn    (167    111. 

18,    47    X.'  E.    319     [1S971  ),    925, 

1384,    1391. 
Gibson    V.    City    of    Cliiciigo     (22    111. 

567    [1859])',    468,    472.    883,    1270. 
Gibson  V.  City  of  Cincinnati    (9  Ohio 

C.   C.    243  "[1894]),   561,    625,    704, 

1013. 
Gibson   v.    Farrcll     (  106    :\ro.    437,    17 

S.   \v.   497    11891]),   89. 
Ciibson  v.  Ka.\scr"3  Executor    (16  Mo. 

App.    404    [1885]),    315,    317.    381, 

438,    440.    714.     . 
Gibson    v.    Owens     (115    Mo.    258.    21 

S.  W.  1107    [1S92]),  499. 


Gibson  v.   Zimmerman    (27  Mo.  App. 

90    [1887]),   437,    862,    1140,    1278, 

1284,    1382. 
Gifford  V.  Rei)ublican  Valley  &   Kan- 
sas   Railroad    Company     (20    Neb. 

538,   31   N.   W.   11    [1886]),   2. 
Gifford   Drainage    District   v.    Shroer 

(145  Ind.  572,  44  X.  E.  636),  291, 

337. 
Gilbert  v.  Hall    (115   Ind.  549,   18   X^. 

E.  28    [1888]),  916,   1337. 
Gilbert  v.  Havemeyer    (4  N.  Y.   Sup. 

Ct.    506     [1849]),    244,  .278,    1041. 

1053,    1054,    1130. 
Gilbert   v.   City   of    New    Haven    (40 

Conn.   102    [1873]),  616,   1304. 
CJilbert   v.    City   of   New    Haven    (39 

Conn.    467    [1872]  ) .   293,   644,   723. 

7.38.    1352. 
Gilchrist's  Appeal    (109  Pa.  St.  600), 

637. 
Gilcrest   v.    McCartney    (97    la.    138, 

66    X.    W.    103    [1896]),    552,    574, 

620. 
Gilfeather  v.  Grout   (91  X.  Y.  S.  533. 

101    App.    Div.    l.iO    [190.5]),    475, 

1035,    1097. 
Gilfillan   v.    Eddy    (123    :\Io.    546,   27 

S.   W.   471).    174.   595. 
Gilfillau    V.     :\Iorris     (43     Mo.     App. 

590),    174. 
Gilkerson     v.      Scott      (76     i:i.      509 

[1875]).    272,    639.    688,    771,    9;)9, 

1351. 
Gilkeson    v.    Frederick    Justices     (13 

Gratt.    (Va.)    577),   43,    162. 
Gill    V.    City    of    Oakland    (124    Cal. 

335,     57     Pac.     150     [1899]),     310, 

731.     744.     9.V2.     1444,     1481.     1482, 

1484,    1485. 
(iill    V.    I'attou    (lis    Iowa,  SS,   !)l    X. 

W.     904     [1902]).     895,    956,     959, 

962. 
Gilles])io    V.    Police    .Jury    of    Concor- 
dia   (5    Lc.    Ann.   4O3'[1850]),   37. 

343.    711.    9S:',. 
Gillett     V.     McLaughlin      (69     Mich. 

547.    37    X.   W.   551),    142,    1012. 
Gillette     V.     Denver     (21     Fed.    822), 

123. 
(;illis    V.    (  leveland    (87    C:;l.    214,    25 

Pac.   .^51    [1890]).   !t98.    1039,    1049. 

1059.    1062.    1131. 


ex 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Gilman  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  (61 
Wis.  588,  21  X.  W.  640  [1884]), 
367,   800,   835,   U44. 

Gilman  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  ( 55 
Wis.  328,  13  X.  W.  266  [1882]), 
356,  357,  549,  555,  636,   1098. 

Gilman  v.  City  of  Sheboygan  ( 2 
Black  (67  U.  S.)  510,  17  L.  305 
[1862]),   548. 

Gilmore  v.  Fox  (10  Kan.  509 
[1872]),   1028,    1442,   1443. 

Gilmore  v.  Hentig  (33  Kan.  156,  5 
Pac.  781  [1885]),-  11,  119,  134, 
135,  324,  415,  526,  563,  670,  677, 
690,  697,  731,  732,  750,  760,  819, 
1420,   1432. 

Gilmore  v.  Norton  (10  Kan.  491 
[1872]),  81,  177,  409,  410,  414, 
649,  815,  816,  980,  1231,  1268, 
1294,   1450. 

Gilmore  v.  City  of  Utica  (131  X.  Y. 
26,  29  N.  E.  841  [1892]),  237, 
373,  374,  501,  604,  770,  822,  918, 
1290,    1375. 

Gilpin  V.  City  of  Ansonia  ( 68  Conn. 
72,  35  Atl.  777  [1896]),  223,  245, 
950,    1525. 

Gilson  V.  Munson  (114  Mich.  071, 
72  X.  W.  994   [1897]),  363. 

Gilsonite  Construction  Co.  v.  Arkan- 
sas M'Alester  Coal  Co.  (205  Mo. 
49,  103  S.  W.  93  [1907]),  509, 
797,   821,   828,   867,   1085,   1168. 

Ginn  v.  Moultrie,  Coles  and  Douglas 
Drainage  District  (188  111.  305, 
58   X.   E.   988    [1900]),  66. 

Girvin  v.  Simon  (127  Cal.  491,  59 
Pac.  945  [1900]),  531,  1355,  1356, 
1357,   1360. 

Girvin  v.  Simon  (116  Cal.  604,  48 
Pac.  720  [1897]),  301,  497,  1030, 
1235,   1258,   1267,   1337,   1372. 

Givins  v.  City  of  Chicago  (188  111. 
348,  58  X.  E.  912  [1900]),  103, 
104,   257,   259,   293,   801,   857,   920. 

Givins  v.  City  of  Chicago  (186  111. 
399,  57  X."e.  1045  [1000]),  781, 
789,  815,  833,  863,  864,  895. 

Givins  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond 
(194  111.  150,  88  Am.  St."  Rep. 
143,  62  X.  E.  534  [1902]),  495, 
497,  514,  515,   1015,   1022,   1332. 

Gladstone,    City    of    v.    Throop     (71 


Fed.  341,  18  C.  C.  A.  61,  37  U.  S. 

App.    481    [1895]),    570,    1502. 
Glass   V.    Gilbert    (58   Pa.   St.    (8   P. 

F.   Smith)    266    [1868]),  886. 
Glassell   v.   O'Dea    (—   Cal.  App.  — , 

95    Pac.    44    [1908]),   512. 
Gleason  v.  Barnett   (115  Ky.  890,  61 

S.    W.    20    [1903]),    462,^787,    835, 

838,    844. 
Gleason    v.    Barnett     (106    Ky.     125, 

50    S.    W.    67     [1899]),    314,    437. 

555,   561,   570,   628,   629,   666,   709. 

710,   844,    1249. 
Gleason    v.    Waukesha    County     ( 103 

Wis.   225,   79   X.   W.   249    [1899]). 

283,  347,  348,  451,   1431. 
Glenn    v.    Mayor    and    City    Council 

of  Baltimore    (67  Md.  390,    10  Atl. 

70    [1887]),    1054. 
Glenn    v.     Waddel     (23     0.     S.     605 

[1873]),  944,    1004,   1431,   1442. 
Glos   V.   Cannata    (121    111.  App.   215 

[1905]),   927,   929,   992,    1207. 
Glos    V.    Collins    (110    111.    App.    121 

[1903]),   837,   1183,    1390. 
Glos  V.  Gleason    (209  111.  517,  70  X. 

E.   1045    [1904]),   1126. 
Glos  V.  Hanford    (212  111.  261,  72  X. 

E.    439    [1904]),    1126,    1443,    1444. 
Glos   V.   Woodward    (202   111.   484,  67 

X.   E.   3    [1903]),    1126. 
Glover    v.    People    ex    rel.    Raymond 

(201     111.     545,     06     X.     E.     820 

[1903]),    514,    1263. 
Glover    v.    People    ex    rel.    Raymond 

194  111.  22,  61  X.  E.  1047   [1901]), 

1085. 
Glover    v.    People    ex    rel.    Raymond 

(188     111.     576,     59     X.     E.     429 

[1901]),    764,    772,    914,    930,    986, 

993,   1183,   1340. 
Godbey  v.   City  of   Bluefield    (—  W. 

Va.  ,  57  S.  E.  45   [1907]),  73, 

661. 
Godbold    V.     City    of     Chelsea     (111 

Mass.   294    [1873]),   76,   244,    1372. 
Goddard,    Petitioner     (33    Mass.     (16 

Pick.)      504,     28     Am.     Dec.     259 

[1835]),  58,  96,  323,  457. 
Godkin     v.     Rutterbush     (147     Mich. 

116,  110  X.  W.  505   [1907]),  1495. 
Goff  v.   McGee    (128   Ind.   394,  27  X. 

E.   754    [1891]).   375,    1414. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXI 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Goldstein  v.  Village  of  Milford  (214 
111.  528,  73  X.  E.  758  [1005]), 
1391. 

Goodale  v.  Fennell  (27  0.  S.  420.  22 
Am.  Rep.  321  [1875]),  171,  687, 
150G,  1514. 

Goodrich  v.  City  of  Chicago  (218  111. 
18,  75  N.  E.  805  [1905]),  956, 
905. 

Goodrich  v.  Detroit  (184  U.  S.  432, 
46  L.  627,  22  S.  397  [1902]),  118, 
125,  308,  669,  670,  690,  709,  728, 
729,    833,    1370. 

Goodrich  v.  City  of  Detroit  ( 123 
Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255  [1900]), 
118,  125,  308,  549,  550,  555,  500, 
619,  626,  669,  670.  690,  091,  095, 
709,    728,    729,    833,    1370. 

Goodrich  v.  City  of  Minonk  (62  111. 
121  [1871]),  341,  550,  564,  619, 
643,  735,  764,  771,  1271,  1272, 
1299,   1323,  1374,  1377. 

Goodricli  v.  City  of  Omaha  (10  Xeb. 
98,  4  X.  W.  424  [1880]),  231.  313, 
428. 

Goodwillie  v.  City  of  Detroit  ( 103 
Mich.  283,  61  N.  W.  526  [1894]), 
260,  314,  494,  816,  1015,  1029, 
1430,    1436. 

Goodwillie  v.  City  of  Lake  View 
(137  111.  51,  27  N.  E.  15  [1892]), 
223,  308,  393,  394,  396,  426,  429, 
472,  603,  665,  666,  676,  677,  744, 
745,  764,  813,  909,  913,  914,  916, 
917,  920,  922,  954,  991,  1328,  1372, 
1377,   1379,  1433. 

Goodwine  v.  Leak  (127  Iml.  509  (27 
X.  E.  161  [1890]),  277,  340,  723, 
1002,   1375. 

Goodwine  v.  Leak  (114  Ind.  499,  10 
X.  E.  816  [1887]),  739,  748,  809, 
916. 

Ciordon  v.  City  of  ChicaL-'o  (201-111. 
023,  60  X.  "e.  823  [1903]).  347, 
1310. 

Gordon  v.  Commissioners  of  Iligli- 
ways  of  Road  District  Xo.  3  (109 
111."  510,  48  X.  E.  451  [1S97|), 
69,  71. 

Gorman  v.  State  ex  rel.  Koester  (157 
Ind.  205,  60  X.  E.  1083  [1901]), 
738,  916,   918.   927,    1005,   1026. 


Gormley's    Appeal     (27    Pa.    St.     (3 

Casey)    49   [1858]),  1068. 
Gorton   v.   City   of  Chicago    (201    111. 

534,    66    X.'e.    541    [1903]),    917, 

956,  902,  905,   1385,   1390. 
Gosnell    v.    City    of    Louisville     ( 104 

Ky.  201,  46  S.   W.   722,  20  Ky.  L. 

R.  519    [1898]),   43,   147,   154,  475, 

519,  613,  1105,  1108,  1104,  1520. 
Gotthelf  V.  Stranahan  (138  X.  Y. 

345,  20  L.  R.  A.  455,  34  X^.  E.  280 

[1893]),   11,  49,   1058,   1072. 
Gotthelf    V.     Stranahan     (19    X.    Y. 

Supp.   J61),   1058. 
Gould  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 

Baltimore     (59    Md.    378    [1882]), 

8,   45,   314,    1042,   1053,    1115,    1140, 

1164. 
Gould  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 

Baltimore     (58    Md.    46     [1881]), 

1042,  1043,   1057,   1169. 
Graden    v.     City    of    Parkville,     114 

Mo.     App.     527,     90     S.     \V.     115 

[1905]),  838,  1432. 
Grafius    Run,    In    re     (218    Pa.    St. 

632,  67   Atl.   982    [1907]),  627. 
Grafius'  Run   (31   Pa.  Super.  Ct.  638 

[1906]),  560. 
Graham  v.  City  of  Chicago    (187  111. 

411,    58    X.    E.    393    [1900]),    517, 

518,   670,   675,   709,   872,    1308. 
Graham  v.  Conger   (85  Ky.  582,  4  S. 

W.  327,  9  Ky.  L.  R.   133    [1887]), 

111,  322. 
Graham    v.    ]\layor,    etc.,    of    City    of 

Pater  son     (37    X.    J.    L.     (8    Vr.) 

380   [1875]),   1408. 
Grams    v.    Murphy    ( —   Minn.    , 

114  X.  W.   753* [1908]),  509. 
Grand    Island    Gas    Co.   v.   West    (28 

Xeb.    852,    45    X.    W.   242    [1890]), 

480. 
(irand     Rapids     v.     De     Vries      (  123 

.Midi.   570.   82   X.    W.   209),   372. 
Grand  Rapids.  City  of  v.  Lake  Shore 

and  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.    (130  Mich.  238. 

97    Am.    St.    Rep.    473,    89    X.    W. 

932),   1081. 
Grand    Rapids    &    Indiana    Railroad 

Company    v.    Horn     (41    Ind.    479 

[1873]  )i  69. 


CXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Grand  Rapids  School  Furniture  Co. 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids  (92  Mich. 
564,   52    N.    W.    1028    [1892]),    86, 

110,  135,   245,   301,   555,   556,   653, 
670,  '690,  709,  736,  886,  1299. 

Granger  v.  City   of   Buffalo    (6   Abb. 

N.    C.    (X.   Y.)    238    [1879]),    252, 

410,  483,  808,  982,   1280. 
Grant  Avenue,  In  tlie  Matter  of  Op- 
ening   (175    X.    Y.    509,    67    N.    E. 

1083    [1903]),   672,   693,   1351. 
Grant   v.    Barber    (135    Cal.    188,    67 

Pac.    127    [1901]),    823,    831,    864, 

867,    1248. 
Grant  v.  Bartholomew   ( 58  Neb.  839, 

80  N.   W.   45    [1899]),   1013,   1277. 
Grant  Park.  Village  of  v.  Trah    (219 

111.  516,    75    X.    E.    1040    [1905]), 
67. 

Grant  Park,  Village  of  v.  Trah    (115 

111.  App.  291    [1904]),  67. 
Graves  v.  Otis    (2   Hill    (X.  Y.)    466 

[1842]),   781. 
Gray,  Appeal  of    ( —  Conn.  ,  67 

Atl.      891      [1907]).      1350,      1352, 

1362. 
Gray  v.   Board   of  Aldermen   of   Bos- 
ton  (139  Mass.  328,  31  X.  E.  734). 

420. 
Gray  v.  Boveles   (74  Mo.  419  [1881]), 

679,     895,     897.     997.     998.     1059, 

1203. 
Gray  v.  Burr   (138  Cal.   109,  70  Pac. 

1068   [1902]),  803,  810. 
Gray    v.    Town    of    Cicero     (177    111. 

459,  53  X.  E.  91   [1899]),  15,  223, 

234,   329,  448,  555,   775,   950. 
Gray  v.   City  of   Detroit    (113   Mich. 

657,   71   X.  W.    1107),   1179,   1194. 
Gray  v.  Lucas   (115  Cal.  430,  47  Pac. 

354    [1896]).   537,   965. 
Grey  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond   ( 194 

111.    486,    62    X.    E.    894    [1902]), 

514,   1290. 
Gray  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh    (  147  Pa. 

St.  354,  23   Atl.  395   [1892]).  981. 
Gray    v.    Richardson     (124    Cal.    460, 

57     Pac.     385     [1899]).     483,     823, 

1471. 
Gray  v.   Stiles    (6  Okl.   455.   49   Pac. 

1083   [1897]),  3. 
Graydon    and    Hammill,    In    re     (20 

Oiit.    199    [1890]),   1072. 


Great    Falls    Ice    Co.    v.    District    of 

Columbia    (19   D.   C.   327    [1890]), 

542,  726,  902,  983. 
Great  Meadows  on  Pequest  River,  In 

Matter   of   Drainage   of    (42   X.   J. 

L.    (13  Vr.)    553    [1880]),   12,  101, 

108,    119,   338,   339,   341,   449,   677, 

717,  956,  962,  1370. 
Great  Meadows  on  Pequest  River,  In 

Matter  of   Commissioners  to   drain 

the     (39    X.    J.    L.     (10    Vr.)     433 

[1877]),    32,    101,    339,    525,    958, 

962. 
Greeley  v.   Town  of   Cicero    (148   Hi. 

632,'  36    X.    E.    603    [1894]),    665, 

666.   677,   922,   943,   9.54,   955,   991. 

1307. 
Greeley    v.    People    of    the    State    of 

Illinois    (60    111.    19    [1871]),    181, 

245,   674,   677,   715. 
Green    v.    City    of    Fall    River     (113 

Mass.  262   [1873]),  70,  76. 
Green    v.    City    of    Springfield     (130 

111.  515,  22  X.  E.  602    [1890]),  86 

620.   663.   672,   698,   715.   877,   920, 

1005,   1271,   1272,  1373. 
Green  v.   Tidball    (26   Wash.   338,  55 

L.  R.  A.  879.  67  Pac.  84    [1901]), 

313,   1066,   1072,   1149. 
Green  v.  Ward    (82  Va.  324  [1886]), 

161,   223,   234,   264,   268,   438,   570, 

663,   713,    1040,    1143. 
Green    County,    Commissioners    of    v. 

Commissioners    of    Lenoir    County 

(92    X.    C.    180    [1885]),    11,    363, 

665,   666. 
Green    Bay    and    Mississippi     Canal 

Co.   V.   Patten   Paper   Co.    (172    U. 

S.  58.   19   S.  97),  715. 
Green     River     Asphalt    Company     v. 

City   of    St.    Louis    (188    Mo.  *  576, 

87  'S.   W.   985    [1905]),   517,    1500. 
Greencastle,    City    of    v.    Allen     ( 43 

Ind.   347    [1873]),   974,   1518. 
Greencastle   &   Bowling   Green   Turn- 
pike   Company   v.    Albin    (34    Ind. 

554    [1870]),   554,    629,   639,    1432. 
Greendale,  Town  of  v.  Suit  ( 163  Ind. 

282,  71  X.  E.  658  [1904]).  55,  229. 

323,  420,  609,  630,  717,   1038,  1242. 
Greene   County,   Commissioners  of  v. 

Harbine    (74   0.    S.   318,   78   X.   E. 
521    [1906]),   341,   449. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXlll 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Greenfield   Avenue,   In   re,  Appeal   of 

the  City  of  Pittsburg,   191    Pa.  St. 

290,  43  Atl.  225   [1899]),  217,  779. 
Greenfield,    City   of    v.    State   ex   rel. 

Moore   (113  Ind.  597,  15  N.  E.  241 

[1887]),   483,   826,    1471. 
Greenhood  v.  MacDonald    ( 183  Mass. 

342,    67    ISr.    E.    330    [1903]),    1415, 

1421,    1425. 
Greenlawn,    City    of    v.    Levers     (200 

Pa.    St.    56,    49    Atl.    980    [1901]), 

1159. 
Greensboro,  City  of  v.  McAdoo    (112 

X.   C.   359,    17    S.   E.   178    [1893]), 

223,  231,  234,  244,  323,  777,  950. 
Greensburg     Borough     of     v;     Laird 

(138     Pa.     St.     533,     21     Atl.     9b* 

[1890]),  223,  234,  382,  1157,  1159. 
Greensburg,  Borough  of  v.  Young  ( 53 

Pa.  St.  280   [1866]),  230,  237,  295, 

662,   670,   713,    1346. 
Greensburg    City    of    v.    Zoller     (28 

Ind.     App.     126,     00     X.     E.     1007 

[1901]),  301,  833,  918,   1000. 
Greentree     Avenue,     In    re     (21     Pa. 

Super.  Ct.    177    [1902]),   98S. 
Greenville,    City    of    v.    Harvie     ( 79 

Miss.     754,    31     So.     425     [1901]), 

236,  831,  873. 
Greenville    &    Columbia    R.    R.    Com- 
pany  V.    Partlow    (5    Rich.    L.    (S. 

Car')    428    [1852]),    70. 
Greenwood     v.     Chandon     (130     Cal. 

467,     62    Pac.     736     [1900]),    301, 

537,  907. 
Greenwood     v.     Morrison     ( 128     Cal. 

350,    60    Pac.     971     [1900]),    267, 

499,  509,  070,  867,   1337. 
Greenwood,  Town  of  v.  State  ex  rel. 

Lawson    (159    Ind.    267,    64    X.    E. 

849    [1902]),    266,    531,    840,'  909. 
Gregory  v.  City  of  Ann  Arbor    (127 

i'ich.  454,  86  X.  W.  1013   [1901]), 

719,   886. 
Gregory    v.    City   of    Bridgeport    (52 

Conn.    40    [1884]),    2^5,    264,    739. 
Grideley  v.  City  of  Bloomington    (88 

111.  554,  30  Am.  Rop.  566   [1878]), 

5^,  457. 
Griffin    v.    City   of    Chicago    (57    111. 

317    [1870])',   764,  914,   1299,   1326. 
Griffin      v.      Dogan       (48      Miss.      11 

[1873]),    110. 


Griffith   V.   Pence    (9    Kan.    App.    253, 

59  Pac.  677),  142. 
Griggs  V.  City  of  St.  Paul   (11  Minn. 

308,   [1866]),  323,  813,  829. 
Griggsry     Construction     Company    v. 

Freeman,  108  La.  435,  58  L.  R.  A. 

349,   32   So.  399    [1902]),  36. 
Grimes   v.   Coe    (102   Ind.    400,    1   X. 

E.  735  [1885]),  559,  586,  723,  748, 

768,   825. 
Grimm   v.    Shickle    (4   Mo.   App.   585 

[1877]),    395,    905. 
Grimmell  v.  Cit.v  of  Des  Moines    (57 

la.    144,    10    X.    W.    330     [1881]), 

248,    324,   550,   555,   572,   831,   838, 

843,    1435. 
Groesbeck  v.   City  of   Cincinnati    (51 

Ohio     St.     305,     37     X.     E.     707 

[1894]),   400,   520,    1492. 
Groff  V.  Mayor,   Aldermen  and   Com- 
mon Council  of  Frederick  City   (44 

Md.  07   [1875]),   100,   110. 
Gross    V.    Village    of    Grossdale     ( 176 

111.    572,    52    X.    E.    370     [1898]), 

281,  998,   1085,    1377. 
Gross    V.     People    ex     rel.     Raymond 

193   111.  200,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  322, 

01    X.    E.    1012    [1901]),    406,    918, 

986,  987,  998,  1000,  1029,  1085, 

1183,  1343. 
Gross  V.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 

ger  (172  111.  571,  50  X.  E.  334 

[1898]),  313,  856,  803,  866.  998, 

1183. 
Gross  V.  People    ( 109   111.   635,  48   X. 

E.  1108),  998. 
Grover  v.  Cornet   (135  Mo.  21.  35  S. 

W.   1143    [1896]),   71. 
Groves  v.  Slaughter   (15  Pet.    (40  U. 

S.)    449,    10   L.   800    [1841]),    162. 
Grunewald   v.   City  of   Cedar   Rapids 

(118    Iowa,    222,    91    X.    W.    1059 

[1902]),    50,    324,    507,    563,    689, 

697,  719,   1504. 
Guckien  v.   Rothrook    ( 137   Ind.    355, 

37    X.    E.     17     [1893]).     118.     119, 

120,  729,  885,  905,   1431. 
Guerin      v.      Reese      (33      Cal.      292 

[1807]),    1039,    1061,    1002,    1153. 
Guest    v.    City    of    Brooklyn     (09    N. 

Y.  500  [1877]).  709,  "761,  1085, 

1415,  1423,  1424,  1425,  1427. 


CXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Guest   V.    City   of   Brooklyn    (8   Hun 

(N.  Y.)   97  [1876]),  200. 
Guild  V.  City  of  Chicago   (82  111.  472 

[1876]),  11,  51,  108,  131,  194,  219, 

223,  619,  623,  715,  776,  925. 
Guilder  v.  Town  of  Otsego    (20  Minn. 

74,  20  Gil.  59    [1873]),   61,  359. 
Guinotte  v.  Ridge    (46  Mo.  App.  254 

[1891]),    15,    229,    500,    527,    779, 

1028,  1236. 
Gulick  V.  Connely  (42  Ind.  134 

[1873]),  524,  535,  541,  1277,  1290, 

1352. 
Gurnee   v.    City   of   Chicago    (40    111. 

165),  281,  381,  386,  464,  476,  478, 

765,   825,  886,  962,   1129. 
Guthrie    &    Western    Railway    Co.    v. 

Faulkner     (12    Old.    532,    73    Pac. 

290   [1903]),  66,  69. 
Guy    V.    District    of    Columbia     (25 

App.    D.    C.    117    [1905]),    1408. 
Guyer  v.    City   of   Rock   Island    (215 

111.    144,    74    N.    E.     105     [1905]), 

849,   856,   862,   863,   864,   867,   923, 

1279,   1282. 
Gwynn    v.    Dierssen     ( 101    Cal.    563, 

36  Pac.    103   [1894]),   1195. 


H 

Haag  V.  Ward  ( 186  Mo.  325,  85  S. 
W.  391  [1904]),  186,  215.  323, 
479,    860,    865,    867,    1149,    1284. 

Hacker  v.  Howe  (72  Neb.  385,  101 
N.  W.  255  [1904]),  3. 

Hackett  v.  State  for  use  of  Martin- 
dale  (113  Ind.  532,  15  N.  E.  799 
[1887]),  340,  539,  739,  768,  1085. 
1237,   1332,   1449. 

Hackworth  v.  Louisville  Artificial 
Stone  Co.  (106  Ky.  234,  50  S.  W. 
33    [1899]),  380,  381,  864,   1055. 

Hackwortli  v.  City  of  Ottumwa  (114 
la.  467,  87  K  W.  424  [1901]), 
100,    118,   314,   620,   698,   709. 

Haddington  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church  V.  City  of  Philadelphia  to 
Use,  etc.  (108  Pa.  St.  466  [1885]), 
1047,  1165. 

Hadley  v.  Dague  (130  Cal.  207,  62 
Pac.    500     [1900]),    82,    118,    301, 


537,   553,   666,   668,   698,   709,   824, 

833,    1216,    1282,    1366,    1502. 
Haegele    v.     Mallinckrodt      (46     Mo. 

577    [1870]),   864,    1135,   1284. 
Haegele  v.  Mallinckrodt   (3  Mo.  App. 

329    [1877]),   570,   675,   857,   1137, 

1389. 
Hagaman    v.    Moore     (84    Ind.     496 

[1882]),  70. 
Hagar  v.   Gast    (119  Ky.   502,   84   S. 

W.  556,  27  Ky.  L.  R.  129  [1905]), 

210,   581,   613. 
Hagar    v.    Reclamation    District    No. 

108    (111   U.   S.   701,   28  L.   469,   4 

S.  663   [1884]),  108,  115,  118,  119, 

121,    122,    131,    132,    135,    142,    147, 

172,   251,   334,   335,   338,   340,   618, 

665,  666,  728,  732,   760,  773,   1086, 

1370. 
Hagar    v.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Yolo  County   (51  Cal.  474   [1876]), 

223,  234,  952. 
Hagar    v.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Yolo  County   (47  Cal.  222  [1874]), 

43,   79,  86,  97,   101,   147,   148,  228, 

252,    335,    338,   340,   343,   355,   549, 

564,  618,  1002,  1294,  1403,  1405, 

1408. 
Hageman  v.  City  of  Passaic  (51  N. 

J.  L.  (22  Vr.)  544,  18  Atl.  776 

[1889]),   745. 
Hageman's    Appeal     (88    Pa.    St.     (7 

Norris)     21     [1878]),    1047,    1068, 

1144,    1216. 
Hagemeyer,  In  re    (99  N.  Y.   S.  369, 

13    App.    Div.    472    [1906]),    1085, 

1104,    1451. 
Hager  v.  City  of  Burlington    (42  la. 

661    [1876]),    783,   795,    843,    1028, 

1432. 
Hagerstown,    Mayor    and    Council    of 

v.  Startzman   (93  Md.  606,  49  Atl. 

838    [1901]),    45,    314,    1111,    1116. 
Haggard    v.   Independent   School   Dis- 
trict   of    Algona    (113    la.    486,    85 

N.  W.  777   [1901]),  69. 
Haines  v.  Board  of  Chosen  Freehold- 
ers  of   Burlington   County    ( 73   N. 

J.    L.     (44    Vr.)     82,    62 '  Atl.    186 

[1905]),    173. 
Haines      v.      Kent       (11      Ind.       126 

[1858]),    363. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxv 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Haisch  v.  City  of  Seattle    ( 10  Wash. 

435,    38    Pac.    1131     [1894]),    510, 

534,   535,    554,    555,    1024. 
Hale   V.    City   of    Kenosha    (29    Wis. 

^99     [1872]),    35,     163,    322,    3G0, 

365,   456. 
Hale   V.   Moore    (82    Ark.   75,    100   S. 
'      W.    742     [1907]),    340,    927,    986, 

996,    1358. 
Haley  v.  City  of  Alton   (152  111.  113, 

38    X.    E.    750    [1894]),    223,    314, 

531,  568,  840,   911,  912,  922,   1002, 

1312,    1338. 
Hall     V.     Street     Commissioners     of 

Boston     (177    Mass.    434     [1901]), 
■  86,    103,    117,    380,    381,    407,    408, 

414,    666,   725. 
Hall   V.   City  of   Chippewa  Falls    (47 

Wis.    267,    2    N.    W.    279    [1879]), 

740,  813,  844,  1505. 
Hall   V.    City    of   Meriden    (48    Conn. 

416    [1880]),    416,    1361. 
Hall    V.    Moore    (3    Xeb.    UnofY.    574, 

92   X.    W.   294    [1902]),    875,    877, 

1006,    1007,    1011. 
Hall  V.  Slavbaugh    (69  Mich.  484,  37 

X.    W.    545),    1012. 
Hallett    V.     United    States     Security 

and    Bond    Co.    (—   Colo.   ,   90 

Pac.    683    [1907]),    135,    555,    751, 

1435. 
Hallock  V.  City  of  Lebanon    (215  Pa. 

St.   1,   64  Atl.   302    [1906]),  509. 
Halspy   V.    Town  of   Lake   View    (188 

111.    540,    59    X.    E.    234     [1901]), 

07,    153,    368,    452,    475,    517,    518, 

719,   837,  866,   927,  952,   955,    1106, 

1373. 
Halstead  v.   City   of   Attica    (28   Ind. 

378    [1867]), "l353. 
Halton    V.    City    of    Milwaukee     (31 

Wis.   27    [1872]),   322. 
Hamar  v.   Leiliy    (124  Wis.   205,    102 

X.  W.  568    [1905]),  596,   598,  895, 

1337. 
Hamilton,    Town    of    v.    Chopard     (9 

Wash.    352,    37    Pac.    472    [1894]), 

483,    837,    951,    1281. 
Hamilton  v.  Cit.v  of  Fond  du  Lac   (25 

Wis.   490    [1870]),   456,   631,   895. 
Hamilton  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond 

(194     HI.      133,     62     X.     E.     533 

[1902]),   514. 


Hamilton   v.   Valiant    (30   Md.    139), 

1206. 
Hamilton     Avenue,     Matter     of      ( 14 

Barb.    (X.    Y.)    405    [1852]),   918. 
Hamilton   Company  v.   ^lassachusetts 

(6    Wall.     (U.  "s.)     632     [1867]), 

715. 
Hammett    v.    Philadelphia     {ii^    Pa. 

St.    (15   P.   F.   Smith)    146,   3   Am. 

Pvep.    615     [1869,    1870]),    28,    34, 

291,   304,   378,   382,   384,   387,   462, 

549. 
Hammond  v.  Carter    (161  III.  621.  44 

X.   E.   274    [1896]),   377,   909,   945. 

1196. 
Hammond,  Village  of  v.  Leavitt   (181 

III.    416,    54    X.    E.    982    [1899]), 

781,  782,  918,  992,  1002,  1208. 
Hammond    v.    People    for    Use     (178 

111.  254.  52  X.  E.  1030),  340,  1108, 

1141,    1145,    1182. 
Hammond  v.  People  for  Use,  etc   (109 

HI.    545,    48    X.    E.    573     [1897]), 

340,  525,   819.   927,   932,   986.   996, 

1089,    1141,    1145,    1183.    1340. 
Hancock    Street,     Extension    of     (18 

Pa.  St.   (6  Harr.)   26   [1851]),  267, 

278,   310,   557,   560,    626,   653,   690, 

692. 
Hancock  v.  Whittemore    (50  Cal.  522 

[1875]),  8,  40,  1039,  1042,  1053, 

1067. 
Hand   v.    Fellows    (148    Pa.    St.    456, 

25    Atl.     1126     [1892]),    244,    706, 

776,  784. 
Handy     v.     Collins      (60     Ind.      229 
.    [1883]),    1042. 
Hannewinkle      v.      Georgetown       (15 

Wall.    (82   U.   S.)    547.   21    L.   231 

[1872]),    308,    1423,    1426,    1427. 
Hannibal,    City    of    v.    Pvichards    (82 

Mo.  330   [1884]),  342. 
Hanscom  v.  City  of  Omaha    (  1 1   Xeb. 

37,   7   X.   W.  "739    [1881]),    11,   35, 

324,    326,    327,    418,    549,   555,   563, 

729. 
Hansen    v.    Hammer    ( 15    Wash.    315, 

46     P-c.     332     [1896] ),~   103,     105, 

121.    U7.   247,   249,   262,    665,   666, 

760. 
Harbach  v.   City  of  Omaha    (54  Xeb. 

83,   74  X.  W".   434    [1898]),  93. 


CXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Hardin  v.  City  of  Chicago    (186   111. 

424,    57    N.    E.    1048    [1900]),    803, 

917. 
Hardwick  v.  Danville  and  North  Sa- 
lem   Gravel     Road    Company     (33 

Ind.    321    [1870]),    554,    629,    639, 

723,  884,  885,  899. 
Hardwick    v.    City    of    Independence 

(—  la.  — ,  Iu'n.  W.   14   [1907]). 

324,  799,  833,  837. 
Hardy    v.    McKinney    (107    Ind.    364, 

8  N.  E.   232),   1351. 
Hare   v.    Kennerley    (83   Ala.    608,    3 

So.  683),   150. 
Harkness  v.   Board  of   Public   Works 

(1  McArthur   (D.  C.)    121   [1873]), 

1411,    1423. 
Harkness  v.   Schiely    (13   Ohio   C.    C. 

177   [1896]),  1054. 
Harman   v.   People   ex   rel.    Munster- 

man    (214   111.   454,   73   N.    E.   760 

[1905]),    927,    931,    935,    986,    996, 

1085,    1183,    1340,    1391. 
Harmon  v.  Dallas    (165   Ind.  710.  75 

N.  E.  823   [1905]),  276. 
Harmon  v.  City  of  Omaha    (53   Neb. 

164,   73    N.   W.    671    [1897]),   223, 

234,   778,    1104,    1420. 
Harney    v.    Applegate    (57    Cal.    205 

[1881]),    1245. 
Harney  v.  Benson    (113   Cal.   314,  45 

Pac.    687    [1896]),    324,    401,    670, 

674,   724,   812,   1005,    1007,   1358. 
Harney     v.      Heller      (47      Cal.      15 

[1873]),    301,    811,   '812,    821,    823, 

833,  858. 
Harper,  Appeal  of    (109   Pa.  St.  9,   1 

Atl.    791     [1S?5]).    413,    424,    496, 

777,   1359. 
Harper  v.  Dowdney    (113  N.   Y.    644, 

21   N.   E.   63    [1889]),   1072. 
Harper     v.     City    of     Grand    Rapids 

105     Mich.     ,551,     63     N.     W.     517 

[1S95]),    531. 
Harper     v.     Commissioners    of     New 

Hanover    County    (133    N.   C.    106, 

45  S.  E.  526   [1903]),  38,  147,  363, 

549,   567,   665,   666. 
Harriman    v.    City    of    Yonkers    (181 

N.  Y.  24,  73  N.  E.  493),  308,  550, 

555,    1375. 
Harriman  v.  City  of  Yonkers   ( 95  N. 


Y.     S.     816,     109     App.     Div.     246 

[1905]),  624,   1463. 
Harriman  v.  City  of  Yonkers   (81  N. 

Y.     S.     823,     82     App.     Div.     408 

[1903]),    308,   550,   555,    1375.     * 
Harris  v.  City  of  Ansonia    (73  Conn. 

359,  47  Atl.  672   [1900]),  223,  234, 

204,  777,  841,  983. 
Harris    v.'  City    of    Chicago    162    111. 

288,    44    N.    E.    437     [1896]),    633, 

057,   989,    1183,    1313.    1342. 
Harris  v.  City  of  :Macomb    (213   111. 

47,    72    N.    E.    762    [1904]),    602, 

603,   604. 
Harris  v.  People  ex  rel.  Knight   (218 

111.    439,    75    N.    E.    1012    [1905]), 

51,  202,  323,  921,  1120. 
Harris  v.  Ross    (112  Ind.  314,   13  N. 

E.    873    [1887]),   340,   375,    1444. 
Harris  v.  City  of  Tacoma   (39  Wash. 

185,    81    Pac.    691     [1905]),    1355, 

1356. 
Harris,   County  of  v.  Boyd    (70  Tex. 

237,  7   S.  W.   713   [1888]),  39,  40, 

50,   145,   301,  582. 
Harriott  Avenue    (24   Pa.   Super.  Ct. 

597    [1904]),   560,   601,   620,    1047. 
Harrisburg   v.   Baptist    ( 156   Pa.    St. 

526,    27    Atl.    8    [1893]),   485,    527, 

803,   1012,   1159. 
Harrisburg    v.     Funk     (200    Pa.     St. 

348,  49  Atl.  992   [1901]),  291,  382, 

383,   402. 
Harrisburg,    City    of    v.    M'Cormick 

(129    Pa.    St.    213,    18    Atl.    126), 

632. 
Harrisburg   v.    ]\IcPherran    (200    Pa. 

St.  343,  49  Atl.  988    [1901]),   118, 

660,  698,  709. 
Harrisburg,     City    of    v.     Segelbaum 

151   Pa.   St.   172,  20  L.  R.  A.  834, 

24  Atl.  1070   [1892]),  86,  382,  383, 

462. 
Harrisburg,   City  of  v.   Shepler    ( 190 

Pa.   St.   374,   42   Atl.   893    [1899]), 

274,   314,   505,   867. 
Harrison    Brothers    v.    City    of    Chi- 
cago   (163   111.    129,   44   N.   E.   395 

[1896]),  314,  857,  865.  902,  903. 
Harrison  v.  City  of  Chicago    (61   III. 

459   [1871]),  770,  908. 
Harrison   Brothers  v.   City  of  Chica- 
go  (60  111.  360   [1871]),  1185. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxvu 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Harrison   v.   City  of   Milwaukee    (49 

Wis.    247,    5    N.    W.    320    [1880]), 

1414,    1480,    1484,    1489. 
Hart    V.     Levee    Commissioners     ( 54 

Fed.   559),   343. 
Hart  V.  City  of  Omaha   ( 74  Neb.  836, 

105  N.   VV.   546    [1905]),   305,  549, 

558,  560,  619. 
Hart    Bros.    v.    West    Chicago    Park 

Commissioners     ( 186    111.    464,    57 

N.  E.  1036   [1900]),  143,  774.  913, 

1368. 
Hartford,  City  of  v.  Mechanics'  Sav- 
ings  Bank    (79    Conn.    38.    63    Atl. 

658      [1906]),     1049,     1050,     1064, 

1163,    1164. 
Hartford,     City     of    v.     Taleott     (48 

Conn.     525,     40     Am.     Rep.      189 

[1881]),   56. 
Hartford,    City    of    v.    West    Middle 

District     (45    Conn.    462,    29    Am. 

Rep.    087    [1878]),    549,    580,    586, 

652. 
Hartig  v.  People  ex  rel.   Kochersper- 

ger  (159  111.  237,  50  Am.  St.  Rep. 
.  102,  42  N.  E.  879  [1896]),  1285. 
Hartman   v.    Hunter    (56    0.    S.    175, 

46  N.   E.   577    [1897]),   1164. 
Harton    v.    Town    of    Avondale     ( 147 

Ala.   458,  41    So.   934    [1906]),   82, 

118,   301,   441,   663,   665,   606,   668, 

700,   714,   864,   1406. 
Harts   V.   People   ex   rel.   Kochersper- 

ger    (171    111.    458,    49    N.    E.    539 

[1898]),    291,    347,    348,    351,    451, 

886,  985. 
Hartsuir   v.    Hall     (58    Xeb.    417,    78 

N.  W.  716   [1899]),   1277. 
Hartwell     v.    Armstrong     ( 19     Barb. 

(N.    Y.)     166     [1854]),    101,     113, 

324,   444,   855. 
Harvard    Avenue,    North    In    re    ( — 

Wash.  ,   92   Pac.   410   [1907]), 

657,    1282,   1338. 
Harvard   College,   President   and   Fel- 
lows  of    V.    Board    of    Aldermen    of 

the    City    of     Boston     (104     Mass. 

470    [1870]),   8,    64,    80,   590,    614, 

1054. 
Harward     v.     St.     Clair     &     Monroe 

Levee   Drainage   Company    (51    111. 

130   [1869]),  105,  259,  344. 
Harwood  v.  Street  Commissioners  of 


the  City  of  Boston    (183  Mass  348, 

67    N.    E.    362    [1903]),    103,    234, 

667,  709. 
Harwood  v.  Donovan   ( 188  Mass.  487, 

74  N.  E.  914  [1905]),  82,  103,  665, 

066,  695,   1403. 
Harwood     v.     Drain     Commissioners 

51     Mich.     639,     17     N.     W.     216 

[1883]),   1436. 
Harwood  v.  Huntoon    (51   Mich.  039, 

17  N.  W.  210  [1883]),  1012,  1034. 
Haskel    v.    City    of    Burlington     (30 

la.   232),    182. 
Haskell     v.     Bartlett     (34    Cal.     281 

[1807]),     15,    50,    223,     234,     475, 

701,   763,   836,    1052. 
Hassan  v.   City  of  Rochester    (67   N. 

Y.   528    [1876]),   42,   86,   555,   580, 

581,   612,   613,   614,   639,   644,   723, 

884,  941,   1004,   1282,   14.35,   1438. 
Hassan  v.  City  of  Rochester   ( 6  Lan- 
sing,   185    [^1871]),   979,   981. 
Hassen  v.   City  of   Rochester    (65  N. 

Y.  516   [1875]),  554,  555,  581,  wl2, 

613,  639,  723. 
Hastings  v.  Columbus    (42  O.  S.  585 

[1885]).    380,    381,    407,    500,    515, 

517,   518,   527,   529,   542,   760,   763, 

977,   1215,   1224. 
Hatch  V.   City   of   Buffalo    (38   N.   Y. 

276   [1868]'),  1425. 
Hatch   V.   Nevills    ( —   Cal.   ,    95 

Pac.  43   [1907]),  512. 
Hatch    V.    Mayor,    etc.,    of    the    City 

of  New  York    (45   N.   Y.   Sup.   Ct. 

Rep.  599    [1879]),   1495. 
Hathaway    v.    Detroit,    T.    &    M.    Ry. 

Co.    (124  Mich.  610,  83  N.  W.  598 

[1900]),    363. 
Hatzung    v.    City    of    Syracuse     (92 

Hun,  203,  36  N.  Y.  S.  521   [1895]), 

414,  983. 
Haubner  v.   City  of  Milwaukee    ( 124 

Wis.   153,   loi   N.  W.   930.  r^-hear- 

ing  denied,  102  N.  W.  578  [1905]), 

110,   220,   417,   700,  899,  959. 
Haughawout    v.    Hubbard     (131    Cal. 

675,    63    Pac.    1078    [1901]),    324, 

831,  857,  867. 
Haughawout  v.  Raymond  ( 148  Cal. 

311,  83  Pac.  53  [1905]),  558,  838, 

1026,  1337. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Hause  v.  City  nf  St.  Paul    (04  Minn. 

115,   102  N.   W.   221    [1905]),  927, 

1003. 
Haven  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  tlie   City  of  New  York 

(173    N.    Y.    611,    66    N.    E.    1110 

[1903]),    531,    537,    1319,    1487. 
Havens  v.  City  of  New  Yorlc    (73  N. 

Y.  S.  678,  07  App.  Div.  90  [1901]), 

537,    1319. 
Havens     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty    of    the   City   of    New 

York    (()7   App.   Div.   90,   73   N.   Y. 

S.   678    [1901]),  531,   1487. 
Haviland    v.    City    of    Columbus    (50 

0.   S.   471,   34  N.   E.   679    [1893]), 

561,  020,  625,  704,   1028. 
Hawes  v.   City   of   Chicago    ( 158   111. 

653,    30    L.    Pv.    A.    225,    42    N.    E. 

373    [1895]),   387. 
Hawes    v.    Fliegler     (87    Minn.    319, 

92   N.    W.    22^3    [1902]),   370,    746, 

763,    1184,    1204. 
Hawkins    v.    Horton    (91    Minn.    285, 

97   N.  W.    1053    [1904]),   783,  789, 

927,  931,  992. 
Hayden   v.    City    of   Atlanta    (70   Ga, 

817    [1883])!   73. 
Hawley    v.    Mayor    and    City    Council 

of  Baltimore' (33  Md.  270  [1870]), 

308,   709,   723,   1384. 
Hawthorne  v.  City  of  East  Portland 

(13  Or.  271,   lo"  Pac.  342    [1880]), 

223,   234,   754,   777,   860,   887,    889, 

890,   1011,   1047,   1049,   1064. 
Hawver   v.   City   of  Omaha    ( 52   Neb. 

734,   73   N.   W.   217    [1897]),    392, 

395,  <)97. 
Hay  V.  City  of  Baraboo   (127  Wis.  1, 

3  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    84,   105  N.  W. 

654    [1906]),   56. 
Hay  V.  McDaniel    (26  Ind.  App.  683, 

60  N.   E.  Rep.   729    [1901]),    1055. 
Ha.vday,    Pros.    v.   Borough   of    Ocean 

City'   (69    N.    J.    L.     (40    Vr.)     22, 

54   Atl.    813    [1903]),    314,    968. 
Hayden   v.    City   of   Atlanta    (70    Ga. 

817   [1883]),'  35,  43,   100,  110,   147, 

148,  570,  663,  OOfl,  098,  709. 
Hayden,   Pros  v.   Ocean   City    ( 67   N. 

i.    L.    (38    Vr.),    155.   50 '  Atl.    584 

[1901]),    897,   908,   986. 
Hayes   v.   Douglas   County    (92   Wis. 


429,    53    Am.    St.   Rep.    926,   31    L. 

R.  A.  213,  65  N.  W.  482   [1896]), 

134,   141,  693,  699,  700,  979,   1337, 

1414,    1432,    1435. 
Hayes  v.  Missouri   ( 120  U.  S.  68,  30 

L.  578    [1877]),   108. 
Hayes    v.    State   ex    rel.    Murray    (96 

Ind.   284    [1884]),    758,   763,' 1292, 

1324. 
Haj'ford  v.  City  of   Belfast    (69   :Me. 

63  [1879]),  735,  737,  1479. 
Hays  V.  City  of  Cincinnati    (62   Ohio 

St.    116,    56    N.    E.    658     [1900]), 

685,  783,  950. 
Ha.vs  V.  Jones   (27  0.  S.  218   [1875]), 

781,    1502. 
Hays  V.  Tippy   (91  Ind.  102  [1883]), 

141,  809,  9i6. 
Hays  V.   City  of  Vincennes    ( 82    Ind. 

178    [1882]),  309,  859,   1252,    1203. 
Haywood   v.   City  of   Buflfalo    (14   N. 

Y.   534    [1856]),    1426,    1427,    1444. 
Hazleton,   In   the   Matter   of   the   Pe- 
tition of    (58   Hun,    112,   11   N.  Y. 

S.    557    [1890]),    681,    1026,    1461. 

1462. 
Head     v.     Amoskeag     Manufacturin'^ 

Company  (113  U.  S.  9,  5  S.  441,  28 

L.   889),  336,  338. 
Heard     v.     Walton     (39     Miss.     388 

[I860]),    1197. 
Hearn,   In   the  Matter  of    (96   N.   Y. 

378   [1884]),  266,  273,  983. 
Heath  v.   McCrea    (20  Wash.  342,   55 

Pac.    432     [1898]),    207,    244,    265, 

416,   423,   475,   545,    670,   677,   719, 

724,  927,  933,  964,  975,  1004,  1066, 

1083,  1085,  1141,  1145,  1337,  1435. 
Heath  v.  Manson  (147  Cal.'  694,  82 

Pac.  331  [1905]),  57,  266,  292, 

373,  374,  381,  461,  463,  481,  521. 
Hebrew    Benevolent    Orphan    Asj'lum, 

In   the   Matter   of    (70   N.    y"   476 

[1877]),   475,   589,   681,    1466. 
Hebrew  Benevolent  and   Orphan  Asy- 
lum,    Matter     of      (10     Hun,     112 

[1877]),   681,   686,   1466. 
Heckman    v.     Mayor,    etc.,     of    New 

York      (22      Hun,      (N.     Y.)      590 

[1880]),    1422. 
Hedges  v.  Roeike    (—  Ky.  .   100 

S.    W.    267,    30    Ky.    L.    R.    1092), 

844. 


I 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CXIX 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Heerman's   Heirs  v.   Municipality  Xo. 

2    (15    Curry     (La.)     597    [1840]), 

280,    1333. 
Heil'ner    v.    Cass    and    Morgan    Coun- 
ties  (193  111.  439,  58  L.  R.  A.  353, 

62  K   E.  201    [1901]),  335,  449. 
Hefl'ner    v.     City    of    Toledo     (75    0. 

S.   413,   80  ]S\   E.   8),  854,   1502. 
Heft  V.  Payne   (97  Cal.   108   (31  Pac. 

844      [1892]),     538,      1029,      1033, 

1043. 
Hegeman  v.   City  of   Passaic    (51   N. 

J.    L.     (22    Vr.)     544,    18    Atl.    770 

[1889]),  744,  913. 
Hegeman,    Pros.    v.    Mayor    and    t  ity 

Council  of  the  City  of  Passaic    (51 

N.  J.  L.    (22  Vr.)    109,   16  Atl.  62 

[1888]),    909. 
Heick    V.    Voight    (110    Ind.    279,    11 

N.    E    306    [1886]),    11,    336.    549, 

673,  677.   1005. 
Heim   v.    Figg    ( —   Ky.   ,   89    S. 

W.     301,    28    Ky.    Law    Rep.     396 

[1905]),   462. 
Heine    v.    Levee    Commissioners     (86 

U.   S.    (19   Wall.)    655,    22   L.    223 

[1873]),  343,   1518. 
Heine    v.    Levee    Commissioners     ( 1 1 

Fed.  Cas.  1033,  1  Woods  246),  343, 

1518. 
Heinroth   v.   Kocliersperger    ( 173    111. 

205,    50    N.    E.    171    [1898]),    324, 

-148,   484,   533,   539,   541,   550,   563, 

645,  723,  1420,  1432,  1433,  1443, 

1468. 
lleinz  V.  Buckliam  ( —  Mich.  , 

116  N.  W.  736  [1908]),  119.  731, 

1404. 
Heiple    v.    City    of    Washington    (219 

111.    604,    76    N.    E.    854    [1906]), 

520,    750,   814,   912,   920. 
Hoiser     v.      Mayor,      Aldermen      and 

Commonalty    of    the    City    of    New 

York    (104"X.   Y.   68,   9  N.   E.   866 

[1887]),    266,     1411.     1423.     1432. 
Helena,    City   of    v.    Kent    (32    Mont. 

279,   80   Pac.   258    [1905]),   58,   92, 

457. 
Hellenkamp  v.  City  of  Lafayette   (30 

Ind.   192   [1868]).  541,   1015,   1350, 

1352,    1430. 


Heller    v.    City   of   Garden    City    (58 

Kan.    203,    48    Pac.    841     [1898]), 

305,    1115,    1200,    1508. 
Hellman  v.   Shoulters    (114  Cal.   136, 

44  Pac.  915,  45  Pac.  1057   [1896]), 

79,    86,    118,    140,    245,    475,    1085, 

1103,   1170,   1281,   1304. 
Helm    v.    Witz     (35    Ind.    App.    131, 

73    X.    E.    846    [1904]),    414,    561, 

575,   620,   626,   639,    650,   956,   962, 

1239,    1244. 
Heman    v.    Allen    (156    Mo.    534,    57 

S.    W.    559    [1900]),   86,    118,    120, 

123,    244,    245,    283,    324,   445,    077, 

702,    741,    728,    1238. 
Heman  v.   Parish    (97  Mo.  App.  393, 

71   S.  W.  382    [1902]),  1134,   1135, 

1284. 
Heman  v.  Gerardi    (90  Mo.  App.  231. 

09   S.   W.    1009    [1902]),   527,   538, 

1338. 
Heman  v.   Gilliam    (171   Mo.   258,  71 

S.   W.    103    [1902]),   118,   321,  442, 

524,  538,    549,   620,    666,   698,    709, 
1139,  1284. 

Heman     v.    Handlan    (59    Mo.     App. 

490    [1894]),    327.    444.    446,    662. 
Heman  v.  Larkin   (  108  Mo.  App.  392, 

83   S.   W.    1019    [1904]),    18,   530. 
Heman   v.   Payne    (27   Mo.   App.   481 

[1887]),    401,    447,    1249,    1284. 
Heman    v.    Ring    (95    Mo.    App.    231 

[1900]),   293,   388,   464. 
Heman   v.   Schulte    ( 100   Mo.    409,   06 

S.    W.    103    [1901]),    8,    100,    110, 

293,   298.  400,  549,   555,  503,   1003. 
Heman  v.  St.  Louis  ilerchants  Land 

Improvement     Company      ( 75     ^lo. 

App.    372     [1898]),    57.    374,    521, 

829. 
Heman   v.    Wolff    (33    Mo.    App.   200 

[1888]),    324,    555,    079,    1284. 
Heman's    Heirs    v.    ^Iiniicipalit.v    Xo. 

2,    15    La.    597    [18-10]),    923. 
Heman    Construction     Co.     v.     Loevy 

(179     Mo.     544,     78     S.     W.     013 

1903]),    274,    275,    511.    524,    838, 

807,    1040,    1007,    1182. 
Heman     Construction     Co.     v.     Loevy 

(04    Mo.    App.    430    [1895]),    511, 

525,  031,    865,    867,    1284. 


cxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Heman     Construction     Company     v. 

McManus    (102   Mo.    App.   649,    77 

S.    W.    310    [1903]),    53,    55,    317, 

443,   620,    717. 
Heman   Construction   Co.   v.    Wabash 

Ey.   Co.    (206  Mo.    172,   104  S.   W. 

67    [1907]),   7,   8,   11,   43,   89,   147, 

595,   1040,    1049. 
Heman  v.  City  of  Ballard   (40  Wash. 

81,  82  Pac.  277    [1905]),  245,  663, 

1503. 
Heming  v.   Stengel    (112  Ky.  906,  66 

S.  W.  41,  67  S.  W.  64,  23  Ky.  Law 

Rep.    1793    [1902]),   651,    1381. 
Hemingway   v.    Chicago    ( 60    111.    324 

[1871]),    308,    321,    42G,    675,    735, 

745,  754,   764. 
Hempfield   Township   Road    (122    Pa. 

St.   439),   909. 
Henderson  v.  Mayor  and   City  Coun- 
cil of  Baltimore,  Use  of  Eschbach 

(8   Md.   352    [1855]),    15,   80,   223, 

234,  314,  323,  525,  781,  786,   1067, 

1282,    1335. 
Henderson,    City   of    v.    Lambert    ( 77 

Ky.     (14     W.     P.     D.     Bush.)     24 

[1878]),    223,    234,    52.i,    527.    531, 

541,  775,  776. 
Henderson   v.    City    of    South    Omaha 

(00     Xeb.     125,     82     X.     W.     315 

[1900]),   781,   789,   791,   931. 
Hendersonville,      Commissioners      of 

Town  of  V.  Webb    (—  X.  C.  . 

61    S.    E.    670    [1908]).    1504. 
Hendrick    v.    Crowley     (31    Cal.    471 

[1866]),   835,    1215,    1210. 
Hendricks   v.   Gilchrist    (76    Ind.   369 

[1881]),  323,   644,   723,   887,   1283. 
Hendrickson     v.    Borough    of     Point 

Pleasant   (65  X".  J.  L.  535,  47  Atl. 

465    [1900]),    280,    281,    309,    847, 

894. 
Hendrickson    v.    City    of    Toledo     (23 

Ohio    C.    C.    256    [1901]).    17,   795. 

1012,    1033,    1450. 
Hendrie     v.     City     of     Boston      (179 

Mass.    59,    GO    X.    E.    386    [1901]), 

616,    1033. 
Henkel  v.   City  of  Cincinnati    (58   0. 

S.    726,    51  "x.   E.    1098),   90,   308. 
Henning    v.    Stengel     (112    Ky.    906, 

66  S.  W.  41,  67  S.  W.  64.  23  Ky. 

L.  R.   1796).  666.   679.   inll. 


Henningsen  v.  City  of  Stillwater    (81 

Minn.  215,  83  X.  W.  983   [1900]), 

1195,  1337. 
Hennepin    County    v.    Bartleson     ( 37 

Minn.    343,    34    X.    W.    222),    121. 

733. 
Hennessy     v.     Douglas     County      (99 

Wis.   129,   74   X.   W.   983    [1898]), 

119,    140,   301,   323,   324,   553,   620. 

621,   622,   693,   694,   723,   733,   737. 

751. 
Hennessy    v.    City    of    St.    Paul     (44 

Minn."  306,  46  "x.   W.  353    [1890]), 

391,   394. 
Hensley  v.   City  of  Butte    (33  Mont. 

206,  83  Pac.  481   [1905]),  805,  807. 

808,    810,    1432. 
Hensley  v.   Reclamation   District  Xo. 

556      (121    Cal.    96,    53    Pac.     401 

[1898]),  247,  775,  1505. 
Hentig  v.   Gilmore    (33   Kan.   234,   6 

Pac.  304*  [1885]),  11,  50,  223,  232, 

281,   436,   438,   505,   677,   814,    816, 

817,  840. 
Herhold  v.   City  of  Chicago    (  100  111. 

547    [1883])",    1369. 
Hering    v.     Chambers     ( 103    Pa.    St. 

172   [1883]),  980,  1157,  1160. 
Herman  v.  City  of  Oconto   ( 100  Wis. 

391,  76  X.  W.  364   [1898]),  1503. 
Hermann  v.   State  ex   rel.    (54   0.   S. 

506,  32  L.  R.  A.  734,  43. X.  E.  99i^ 

[1896]),  421,   1032. 
Hershberger     v.     City     of     Pittsburg; 

(115     Pa.     St.     78,     8     Atl.     381 

[1886]),   119,  726,  735,  979,  981. 
Her.see   v.    City   of    Buffalo    (1    Shel- 
don     (X.    Y.)     445     [1874]),     22:^ 

234,   410,   568,    790.   843. 
Herter  v.   Chicago,   Milwaukee  &   St. 

Paul    Railway    Company     (114    la. 

3.30,   86   X.   W.    206    [1901]),    596. 
Hertig  v.   People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 

ger    (159  111.  237,  50  Am.  St.  Re]\ 

162,    42    X.    E.    879    [1896]),    772, 

927,    930,     986.    993. 
Hess   V.   Potts    (32   Pa.    St.    (8   Casey 

407    [1859]),   1197.    1198. 
Hessler    v.    Drainage    Commissioners 

(53    111.    105).    105.    259.    344. 
Heth    V.    City    of    Radford     (96    Va. 

272,  31   S.'e.   8    [1898]),   115. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXl 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Heubner   v.   City  of  Milwaukee    (124 

Wis.   153,   101   X.  W.  930   [1904]). 

899. 
Hewes   v.   Glos    (170   III.   436,   48   N. 

E    922),   313,   347,   348,   351. 
Hewes    v.   Village    of    Winnetka     ( 60 

111.    App.    654    [1895]),    223,    234, 

500,  742,   759,   774,   777,  824,   88G, 

889,   998,   1184,   1444. 
Hewetson    v.    City    of    Chicago     ( 172 

111.    112,    49    X.    E.    992     [1898]), 

917. 
Hewitt's    Appeal     (88    Pa.    St.    55), 

414,  983. 
Heywood  v.    City   of   Buffalo    (14   X. 

Y.   534    [1856]),    1423. 
Hibben  v.  Smith    (191   U.   S.  310,  24 

S.   88    [1903]),   108,   115,   132,   133, 

142,   280,    301,   670,   675,   699,   730, 

731,  927,  956,  1005,  1067,  1083, 

1370. 
Hibben  v.  Smith  (158  Ind.  206,  62 

X.  E.  447  [1901]),  86,  108,  115, 

132,  133,  280,  301,  670,  675,  699, 

730,  731,  927,  956,  1004,  1005, 

1066,  1067,  1083,  1370. 
Hicks  V.  City  of  Bristol  (  102  Va. 

861,  47  S.'e.  1001  [1904]  I.  107, 

303. 
Higgins  V.  Bordages  (88  Tex.  458, 

53  Am.  St.  Rep.  770,  31  S.  W.  52, 

803   [1895]).  42.  174,  213,  607, 

998,    1141,    1145. 
Higgins   V.   City   of   Chicago    ( 18   III. 

276     [1857])',    39,    308,    545,    581, 

584,    613,    995,    1041,     1067,    1162, 

1469,    1518. 
Highland    v.    City    of    Galveston    (54 

Tex.  527   [1881]),  323,   1049,   1053, 

1521. 
Highlands   v.    Dallas    (165    Ind.    710, 

75    X.    E.    824    [1905]),    1085. 
Highlands,    City    of    v.    .Johnson    (24 

Colo.    371.    51    Pac.    1004    [1897]), 

45,  324,  1115,  1119,  1128.  1141, 

1142,  1145,  1423. 
Higman  v.  City  of  Sioux  City  ( 129 

la.  291,  105  X.  W.  524  [1906]), 

301,  472,  849,  886,  887.  1026,  1304. 
Hilbourne  v.  County  of  Suffolk    ( 120 

Mass.      393,     21  '  Am.      Rep.     522 

[1876]),   64,   65. 
Hildebrand    v.    Toledo     (27    Ohio    C 


C.  R.  427    [1905]),  549,  563,   1012, 

1015. 
Hilgert    v.    Barber    Asuhalt    Paving 

Company    (173  Mo.   319,  72   S.   W. 

1020),     1369. 
Hilgert    v.    Barber    Asplialt    Paving 

Company    (107    Mo.    App.    385,    81 

S.  W.  496  [1904]),  538. 
Hill  V.  Fontenot  (46  La.  Ann.  1563, 

16  So.  475  [1894]),  37,  47,  111, 

147,  155,  343.  553,  566,  666,  689, 

711. 
Hill    V.    Higdon     (5    0.    S.    243,    67 

Am.  Dec.  289  [1855] ),  7,  35,  79,  8G, 

89,  90,  105,  106,  110,  113,  147,  690, 

1041. 
Hill    V.    Swingley    (159    Mo.    45,    60 

S.   W.    114    [1900]),   324,   505.   520, 

1282. 
Hill  V.  Tohill   (225  III.  384,  80  X.  E. 

253    [1907]),    363. 
Hill-0'Meara    Construction    Company 

V.   Hutchinson    (100  Mo.  App.   294, 

73   S.    W.   318    [1903]),   538. 
Hill-0'Meara     Construction     Co.     v. 

Sessinghaus     (  106    Mo.    App.     163, 

80    S.    W.    747    [1904]),    896,    1040, 

1137,    1377. 
Hille    V.    Xeale    (32    Ind.    App.    341, 

69    X.    E.    713     [1904]),    57,     119, 

128,  983,   1017,    1072. 
Hillhouse  v.  City  of  Xew  Haven    ( 62 

Conn.    344,    26    Atl.    393    [1892]), 

234,    443. 
Hilliard    v.    City    of    Asheville    (US 

X.   C.   845,   24   S.   E.   738    [1896]), 

8,  100,  118,  119,  147,  148,  247,  248, 

250,  301,  363,  620,  663,  732,   1418. 
Hills  V.   City  of  Chicago    (60   III.   86 

[1871]).    173,    1185. 
Hilton   V.   Dumphey    (113   Midi.   241, 

71    X.   W.   527    [1897]),   340,    1116, 

1179. 
Hilltown     Road     (18    Pa.     St.     233), 

909. 
Himmelmann    v.    Bateman     (50    Cal. 

11    [1875]),    824,    880. 
Himmelmann   v.    Booth    (53    Cal.    50 

[1878]),   1153,   1381. 
Himmelmann  v.   Byrne    (41   Cal.   500 

[1871]),    504. 
Himmelmann    v.    Calm    (49    Cal.    285 

[1874]),    500.    742.    759.    824,    886. 


cxxn 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Himmelmann  v.  Carpentier    (47   Cal. 

42    [1873]),    502,    742,    770,    11G9, 

1281,    1292. 
Himmelmann  v.  Cofran   (36  Cal.  411 

[18(J8]),    958,    964,    1469. 
Hinmielmann  v.   Danos    (35   Cal.   441 

[1868]),    223,    234,    777,    824,    907, 

1061,   1062,   1153,  1229,  1230,  1281. 
Himmelmann    v.    Hoadley     (44    Cal. 

213    [1872]),    301,    436,    479,    485, 

510,     889,     904,    982,     1062,     1151, 

1293,   1317,    1337,   1375. 
Himmelmann  v.   Oliver    ( 34   L  al.   246 

[1867]),    475,    540,    1107. 
Himmelmann   v.    Reay    (38    Cal.    163 

[1869]),    1154,    1216,    1346,    1379. 
Himmelmann    v.    Satterlee     (50    Cal. 

68     [1875]),    432,    439,    499,     510, 

742,   749,   831,  869. 
Himmelmann    v.    Spanagel     ( 39    Cal. 

389     [1870]),    48,    73,    1253,    1346, 

1379. 
Himmelmann  v.  Steiner    (38  Cal.  175 

[1869]),    649,    889. 
Himmelmann    v.    Townsend    (49    Cal. 

150    [1874]),    1153,    1235. 
Himmelmann    v.    Woolrich     (45    Cal. 

249    [1873]),  301,  1151,   1251. 
Hinchman    v.     City    of     Detroit      (9 

Mich.    103    [I860]),    830. 
Hinckley     v.     City     of     Seattle     (37 

Wash.    269,    79    Pac.    779    [1905]), 

1164. 
Hines    v.    City    of    Leavenworth     ( 3 

Kan.    186     (original    edition),    180 

(second  edition   [1865]),  3,  7,  103, 

106,    147,    437,    711,    959,    1507. 
Hinkley    v.    Bishop     ( —    Mich.    , 

114  N.  W.   676    [1908]),  659,   728, 

748,  786,  792,  798,  1432. 
Hinsdale,     Village     of     v.     Shannon 
(182     HI.     312,     52     N.     E.     327 

[1899]),    324,    572.    854.    859,    864, 

1085. 
Hintze    v.    City    of    Elgin     (186    HI. 

251,    57    N.    E.    856    [1900]),    771, 

864,    1029. 
Hitchcock     v.    Galveston     (96    U.     S. 

341,  24  L.  659    [1877]),  780,   1012, 

1504,  1508. 
Hitclicock     V.     Galveston      ( 12     Fed. 

Cag.    218,   2    Woods   272).    780. 
Hitchcock   V.    Board   of   Aldermen   of 


Springfield  (121  Mass.  382 
[1876]),   878. 

Hitner  v.  Ege  (23  Pa.  St.  (11  Har- 
ris)   305    [1854]),   1054,   1055. 

Hixon  V.  Oneida  County  ( 82  Wis. 
515,  52  N.  W.  445  [1892]),  80, 
1425,    1436. 

Hixson  V.  Burson  (54  0.  S.  470, 
43  N.  E.  1000  [1896]),  174,  189, 
224,    252. 

Hoagland  v.  State,  Simonton,  Pros. 
(43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  456 
[1881]),  12,  101,  108,  119,  338, 
339,  341,  449,  677,  717,  956,  962, 
1370. 

Hoagland  v.  Wurts  (41  N.  J.  L.  (12 
Vr.)  175  [1879]),  32,  101,  .339, 
525,  659,  956,  902. 

Hobart  v.  City  of  Detroit  (17  Mich. 
246,   97   Am.   Dec.    185),   437,   515. 

Hobbs  v.  Board  of  Commissioners 
of  Tipton  County  (116  Ind.  376, 
19  X.  E.  186  [1888]),  322,  781, 
795,   951,    1450. 

Hobbs  V.  Board,  etc..  County  of  Tip- 
ton (103  Ind.  575,  3  N.E.  263), 
726. 

Hoboken  Manufacturers  R.  Co.  v. 
Mayor,    etc.,    of    City    of    Hoboken 

(—   N.    J.   L.    ,    68    Atl.    1098 

[1908]),  6,  20,  353,  986,  1050, 
1469, 

Hoefgen  v.  State  ex  rei.  Brown  (17 
Ind.  App.  537,  47  N.  E.  28 
[1896]),  340,  907,  1236,  1237, 
1238,   1251,   1252. 

Hoertz  v.  Jefferson  Southern  Pond 
Draining  Company  (119  Ky.  824, 
84  S.  W.  1141,  27  Ky.  L.  R.  278 
[1905]),  121,  166,  255,  340,  760, 
910,   950. 

Hoff'eld  V.  City  of  Buffalo  (130  N. 
Y.  387,  29  N.  e.  747  [1892]),  545, 
557,  651,  672,  675,  697,  1415. 

Hoffman    v.    Shell     (—    Mich.    . 

115  X.  W.  979   [1908]),  770,   1432. 

Hoke  V.  City  of  Atlanta  (107  Ga. 
416,  33  S."  E.  412  [1899]),  1484. 

Hoke  V.  Perdue  (62  Cal.  545 
[1881]).  554,  645.  1432. 

Holbrook  V.  Dickinson  (146  111.  285 
[1867]),  44,  153,  701,  1121,  1174, 
1297. 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


CXXIU 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Holden  v.   City  of  Chicago    (212  111. 

289,    72    N.    E.    435    [1904]),    864, 

13U5,    1390. 
Holden  v.   City  of  Chicago    (172   III. 

263,    50    N.    E.    181    [1898]),    857, 

864. 
Holden     v.     City     of     Crawfordsville 

(143     Ind.     558,     41     N.     E.     370 

[1898]),  293,  308,  1352,  1519. 
Holdom  V.  City  of  Chicago  (169  111. 

109,  48  N.  E.  164  [1897]).  418, 

511,  560,  561,  623,  643,  652,  657, 

676,    723. 
Holland  v.  People  ex  rel  Miller    ( 189 

111.    348,    59    N.    E.    753     [1901]), 

906,   949,  981,   1005. 
Holland   v.   Spell    (144   Ind.    561,   42 

N.   E.    1014    [1895]),   906. 
Holley    V.   County    or    Orange     (106 

Cal.  420,  39  Pac.  790   [1895]),  35, 

38,  47,   548,   779,   780. 
Holliday  v.  City  of  Atlanta    (96  fta. 

377,    23    S.    E.    406    [1895]),    234, 

393,   400,   409,   423,    777,   778,   959, 

965. 
Hollingsworth      v.      Thompson,      Tax 

Collector      (45    La.    Ann.    222,     40 

Am.     St.     Eep.     220,     12     So.     116 

[1893]),   37,   549,   566,    711. 
Hollister,   In  the  Matter  of    (180  N. 

Y.  518,  72   N.   E.    1143),   407,  637, 

956,   970. 
Hollister,  In   re    (98    App.   Div.   501, 

89   N.  Y.   Supp.   518    [1904]),  407, 

637,    956,   970. 
Ilolloran   v.    Mornian    ( 27    Ind.    App. 

.309,    59    X.    E.    869    [1901]),    531, 

532,    646,    720. 
Holmes     v.    Village     of    Hyde     Park 

121  111.  128,  13  X.  E.  540   [1889]), 

113,   393,   396,   400,   455,   527,   570, 

920. 
Holmes    v.    Jersey    City     (12    X.    J. 

Eq.    (1    Beas.)    299),'  395,    1406. 
Holmquist     v.     Anderson      (67     Kan. 

861,    74    Pae.    227     [1903]).    1437, 

1440. 
Holt  V.  City  of  East  St.  Ix)uis    ( 150 

111.    530,    37    X.    E.    927     [1894]), 

440,   570,   587,   630,   643,    670.   714, 

715,   723. 
Holt    V.    Figg     (—    Ky.    ,    94    S. 


W.  34,  29  Ky.  Law  Rep.  613 
[1906]),  321,  628,  1059,  1141, 
1145,   1246. 

Holt  V.  City  Council  of  Somerville 
(127  Mass.  408  [1879]),  86,  356. 
549,  560,  618.  620,  651,  654,  694, 
695,   844,    1406. 

Hoi  ton  V.  City  of  Milwaukee  (31 
Wis.  27  [1872]),  8,  11,  62,  70,  360, 
719. 

Holzhauer  v.  City  of  Xewport  (94 
Ky.  396,  22  S.  W.  752  [1893]), 
147,  154,  155,  209,  324,  508,  613, 
1504. 

Holtzman  v.  United  States  ( 14  App. 
D.    C.    454    [1899]),    58. 

Homan  v.  ^McLaren  (28  Mo.  App. 
654    [1888]),   1134. 

Home  for  Aged  Protestant  Women 
V.  Borough  of  Wilkinsburg  (6  L. 
R.  A.  531);  see  Wilkinsburg  Bor- 
ough Home  for  Aged  Women  (131 
Pa.  St.  109,  18  Atl.  937   [1890] ) ,  96. 

Hook  V.  Chicago  and  Alton  Rail- 
road Company  ( 133  Mo.  313,  34 
S.  W.  549  [1895]),  308,  596,  598, 
651,    657,    1318. 

Hood  V.  Finch  (8  Wis.  381  [1859]), 
737. 

Hood  V.  Trustees  of  the  Town  of 
Lebanon  (15  S.  W.  (Ky.)  516,  12 
Ky.  L.  R.  813  [1891])',  323,  528, 
610. 

Hoover  v.  People  ex  rel.  Peabody 
(171  111.  182,  49  X.  K.  367 
[1898]),  663,  670,  737,  747,  849, 
886,  895,  1039,  1052,  1126,  1144, 
1175,   1182,    1278,   1281,   1334. 

Hopkins  v.  Citj^  of  Butte  (16  Mont. 
103,  40  Pac'.  171  [1895]),  1478, 
1484. 

Hopkins  v.  ]\Iason  (61  Barb.  469 
[1871]),    196,    223,    234,   280,    731. 

750,  980,  983,  1026,  1113,  1196. 
1205. 

Hopkins  v.  ilason  (42  Howard  115 
[1871]),    223.    234,    280,    414,    735, 

751,  777,  927,  983.  1000.  1174, 
1196. 

llorbach  v.  City  of  Omalia  (54  Xeb. 
83,  74  X.  W.  434  |1S9S]).  5.  19, 
97,  342.  735,  737,   1426,  1427,  1432. 


CXXIV 


TABLE   OF    CxVSES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Horiston  v.  City  Council  of  Charles- 
ton     (1      McCord      (S.      C.)      345 

[1821]),    118,   223,   263,    776. 
Horn's    Case    (12   Abb.    Pr.    (X.    Y.) 

124    [1861]),   485,   495,   995,    1452, 

1463. 
Horn   V.    City   of   Columbus    ( 1    Ohio 

C.  C.   337    [1886]);   1125,    1211. 
Horn    V.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Livingston      County      ( 135      Mich. 

553,  98  N.   W.   256    [1904]),   1394, 

1409. 
Horn  V.   Town  of   New   Lots    (83   X. 

Y.   100,  38  Am.  Rep.  402    [1880]), 

81,    1088,    1484,    1486,    1493,    1494. 
Hornsey     Urban    District    Court     v. 

Hennell   (2  K.  B.  73,  71  L.  J.    ( K. 

B.)    479,  80  L.  T.  423,  50  Weekly 

Rep.    521,    66    J    P.    613    [1902]), 

1048. 
Hornung   v.   McCarthy    (126   Cal.    17, 

58   Pac.   303    [1899]),   73,  89,    100, 

269,   965',   974,    1062,    1346. 
Hosnier    v.    Hunt    Drainage    District 

(134      111.     360,     26     X.     E.     584 

[1891]),    271,    377,    566,    738,    912, 

925,    1376,    1388. 
Houghton,    Appeal    of     (42    Cal.    35 

[1871]),   8,   89,    1368. 
Hougliton  v.  Burnham    (22  Wis.   289 

[1867]),   864. 
Houk     V.      Barthold      •;73      Ind.     2L 

[1880]),    1375. 
House    V.    City    of    Dallas     (96    Tex. 

594,   74   S.   W.   901    [1903]),   1214. 
House   Resolutions  concerning   Street 

Improvements,     In     re     ( 15     Colo. 

598,  26  Pac.  323   [1890]),  44,   152, 

666. 
Houseman    v.    Kent    (58    Mich.    364, 

25   X.   W.   369    [1885]),   977. 
Houstania,    Inhabitants    of    the    Vil- 
lage  of   v.    Grubbs    (80    Mo.    App. 

433    [1899]),    53,    55,    1044,    1050. 
Houston,  City  of  v.  Bartels   (36  Tex. 

Civ.     App.     498.     82     S.     W.     323 

[1904]),   65,    651,    654. 
Houston     v.     City    of     Chicago     (191 

111.    559,    61    X.    E.    396     [1901]), 

293,    859,    864,    865,   912,   920,    922, 

1271,    1282,    1310,    1381. 
Houston   V.    McKenna    (22    Cal.    550 


[1863]),  169,  266,  433,  538,  697, 
698,  725. 

Howard  Avenue,  In  re,  Xorth,  in 
City  of  Seattle  (44  Wash.  62,  86 
Pac.  1117  [1906]),  210,  308,  586, 
612,   613,   614,  626. 

Howard  v.  Brown  (197  Mo.  36,  95 
S.    W.    191    [1906]),    1202,    1203. 

Howard  v.  The  First  Independent 
Church  of  Baltimore  (18  Md.  451 
[1862]),   86,   780,   792. 

Howard  Savings  Institution  v.  May- 
or and  Common  Council  of  City 
of  Xewark    (52  X.  J.  L.    (23  Vr.) 

I,  18  Atl.  672  [1^89]),  407,  959, 
965,   990. 

Howard  St.,  Vacation  of,  Philadel- 
phia    (142    Pa.    St.    601,    21    Atl. 

974    [1891]),    11,   28,   86,    89,    111, 

113,   278,   320,   434,   580,   665,    666, 

1041. 
Howe     V.    City    of    Cambridge      (114 

Mass.    388   "[1874]),    86,    118,    202, 

315,    323,    441,   549,   670,    695,    714. 
Howe   V.    City    of    Chicago     (224    111. 

95,    79    X.'  E.    421     [1906]),    387, 

839,  861,  912,  922. 
Howe  V.  Ray   (113  Mass.  88   [1873]), 

70. 
Howell  V.  Bristol   (8  Bush.    (71  Ky.) 

493     [1871]),    100,    154,    304,    437, 

662,   665,   678,   784. 
Howell  V.  City  of  Buffalo    (37  X.  Y. 

267),    100,   408. 
Howell  V.  City  of  Buffalo    (15  X.  Y. 

512    [1857),'  952,   1481. 
Howell    V.    Philadelphia    (38    Pa.    (2 

Wright)     471     [1861]),    584,    570, 

1498. 
Howell  V.  Tacoma    (3  Wash.   711,  28 

Am.     St.     Rep.     83,    29     Pac.     447 

[1892]),    141,    666,    688,    697,    812, 

1026,    1414,    1435. 
Howes    V.    City   of   Racine    (21    Wis. 

514    [1867]),    1166,    1435. 
Hoyt   V.   City  of   East   Saginaw    ( 19 

Mich.   39,   2  Am.   Rep.   76    [1809]), 

II.  86,  245,  549,  555.  556,  690,  692, 
830. 

Hubbard    v.    Garfield    (102    Mass.    72 

[1869]),  958. 
Hubbard    v.    X'orton     (28    O.    S.    110 

[1875]),    301.    538.    662,    828. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXV 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Hubbell    V.    Campbell     (56    Cal.    527 

[1880]),    1202. 
Hiiddleston    v.    City    of    Eugene     ( 34 

Or.   343,   43  L.   R.   A.  444,   55   Pac. 

8G8   [1899]),   11,  601. 
Hudson   V.    Bunch    (116    Ind.    63,    18 

X.   E.   390    [1888]),   270.   637,   917. 
Hudson    V.     People     ex     rel.     McKee 

( 188  III.  103,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.   166, 

58  X.  E.  964   [1900]),   1049,   1088. 
Hudson    County    Catholic    Protectory 

V.    Board   of    Township    Committee 

of   the    Township   of    Kearney    (56 

N.    J.    L.     (27    Vr.)     385,  -28    Atl. 

1043    ([1894]),  589,  Oil,  014,  950. 
Hudson    Trust    and    Savings    Institu- 
tion   V.    Carr-Curran    Paper    Mills 

Co.    (58   X.  J.   Eq.    (13   Dick.)    59, 

43   Atl.  418    [1899]),   986,    10.50. 
Huelefeld   v.   City   of    Covington    ( — 

Ky.   ,    60   S.    W.    296,    22    Ky. 

L.'  Rep.    1188     [1901]),    390,    397, 

431. 
Huesman    v.    Dersch    ( —    Kv.    , 

109   S.   \Y.   319    [1908]),   723,   844, 

1330,    1369. 
Hull'    V.     City     of     .Jacksonville     (39 

Fla.    1,    2l'  So.    776    [1897]),    323, 

737,   741,   829,    1049,    1145. 
Hughes,  In  the  Matter  of    (93  X.  Y. 

512   [1883]),  1462. 
Hughes   V.    Alsip    (112    Cal.    587,    44 

Pac.    1027    [1896]),  472,   1110. 
Hughes    V.    Board    of    Commissioners 

of   the   Caddo   Levee  District    (  108 

La.  146,  32  So.  218,   [1901,  1902]). 

.')08.   548,    553. 
Hughes  V.  City  of  Momence    (164  111. 

10.    45    X.    E.    302    [1896]),    351. 
Hughes  V.  City  of  Momence   ( 163  111. 

535,    45    X.'e.    .300    [1896]),    347, 

348,   351,   451. 
Iltighes  V.   Parker    (148   Ind.   692,  48 

X.   E.   243    [1897]),   507,    1330. 
Hulbert  v.   City  of   Chicago    (202  U. 

S.    275,    26    S.    617    [1906]),    117. 

1085,  1104,  1370,  1375. 
Hulbert  v.  City  of  Chicago  (217  111. 

286,    75    X.  'e.    486    [1905]),    140. 

1085,    1104,    1375. 
Hulbert  v.  City  of  Chicago    (213   111. 

452,   72   X.    E.    1097    [1905]),    140, 

475,    1085.    1104. 


Hull  V.  Baird    (73  la.  528.  35  X.  W. 

613),  337. 
Hull    V.   Brearley   Run    Draining    As- 
sociation    (58     Ind>    520     [1877]), 

1043. 
Hull    V.    City    of    Chicago     (156    III. 

381,    40    X.    E.    Rep.    937    [1895]), 

864,  912. 
Hull   V.   People    (170   111.   246,   48   X. 

E.   984),   715. 
Hull    V.    Sangamon    River    Drainage 

District  219  III.  454,  76  X.  E.  701 

[1906]),   203. 
Hume     V.     The     Little     Flat     Rock 

Draining  Association    ( 72   Ind.  499 

[1880]),     795,     1005,     1007,     1350, 

1430,    1432. 
Hull    V.    West    Chicago  .Park    Com- 
missioners    ( 185    111.     150,    57    X. 

E.   1    [1900]),   816,   856,   1390. 
Hun,   In   the  Matter  of  the   Petition 

of    (144   X.   Y.   472,   39   X.    E.   376 

[1895]),    1043,    1047,    1049,     1053, 

1144. 
Hundley    &    Rees    v.    Commissioners, 

etc.,  of   Lincoln   Park    (67   111.   559 

[1873]),    153,    217,    218,    356,    549, 

636,   637,   664,   666,   690,   884. 
Hunerberg   v.   Yillage   of   Hyde   Park 

( 130     111.      156,     22     X.  '  E.     486 

[1890]),   396,   918,    1375. 
Hungerford    v.    Hartford     (39    Conn. 

279    [1872]),    324,    326,    444,    549, 

560,    563,    658,    709. 
Hunsaker    v.    Wright    (30    III.    146), 

615. 
Hunt    v.     City    ot    Cliicago     (60    III. 

183    [1871] K   269. 
Hunt  V.  Hunter    (  14   Ohio  C.   C.   503 

[1897]),    679. 
Hunt   V.   Hunter    (11    Ohio    C.    C.    69 

[1895]),  55,  684. 
Hvmt    V.    State    for    Use    of    Downey 

(26   Ind.  App.   518,  58  X.   E.  Rep. 

557   [1900]),  895,   1028. 
Hunter     v.     Earl      (51     O.     S.     573 

[1894]),  726,  873. 
Hunter   v.   Freeman    (51     O.    .S.    574 

[1894]),   873. 
Hunter  v.   Kansas  City  Safe  Deposit 

and   Savings    Bank    ( 158   Mo.    262, 

58  S.  W.  1053  [1900]),  1221,  1432. 


CXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Huntington  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    (2 

Ohio   N.   P.   35    [1895]),   309,   575, 

639. 
Huntington,    City    of    v.    Force    ( 152 

Ind.    368,    53    X.    E.    443    [1898]), 

1500,    1506. 
Huntington   v.    Worthen    (120   U.    S. 

97,  7   S.  469    [1887]),   3. 
Hurford   v.   City   of   Omaha    (4   Neb. 

336   [1876]).  3,   103,  105,  106,  147, 

239,   570,   666. 
Hurt    V.    City    of    Atlanta    (100    Ga. 

274,  28  S.  E.  65   [1896]),  71,  359, 

653. 
Huston     V.      Clark      (112      111.      344 

[1885]),    77,    104,    206,    245,    249, 

258,   259,   272,   344,   825,   909,   918, 

1359,   1377. 
Huston    V.    Tribbetts     (171    111.    547, 

63  Am.  St.  Rep.  275,  49  N.  E.  711 

[1898]),   7,   8,   51,   89,   653,    1055. 
Hutchins     v.     Vandalia     Levee     and 

Drainage    District     (217    111.    561, 

75   N.   E.   354    [1905]),   2,   203. 
Hutchinson    v.    City    of    Omaha     (52 

Xeb.   345,   72   N.   W.   218    [1897]), 

143,   229,   568,   569,   620,   775,   790, 

800,  884,  1028,  1414,  1435. 
Huteninson  v.  Pittsburg    (72  Pa.   St. 

(22    P.    F.    Smith)     320     [1872]), 

511,  631,   646,   745,  895,  918,   1095, 

1211. 
Hutchinson  v.   City  of  Rochester    (92 

Hun   (N.  Y.)   393,  36  X.  Y.  S.  766 

[1895]),    1041,    1087. 
Hutchinson  v.   Storrie    (92   Tex.   685, 

71   Am.  St.  Rep.   884,  45  L.  R.  A. 

289,    51    S.    W.    848    [1899]),    113, 

118,  119,    122,    137,    141,   667,   728, 
670,  677,  691,  702,  713. 

Hutson  V.  Woodbridge  Protection 
District  Xo.  1  (79  Cal.  90,  21 
Pac.     435,    16    Pac.    549      [1889]), 

119,  132,  340,  726,  729,  773. 
Hutt    V.    City    of    Chicago     (132    111. 

352,   23   X.   E.    1010    [1891]),   417, 

418,  490,  633,  849. 
Hyde  Park,  Village  of  v.  Borden    (94 

III.  26  [1879])^  324,  392,  393,  396. 

400,  857,  859. 
Hyde     Park,    Village    of    v.     Carton 

^132     111.     100,     23     X.     E.     590 

[1891]),    446,    857. 


Hyde    Park,    Village    of    v.    Corwith 

(122     111.      441,      12     X.     E.     238 

[1889]),   308,   986,   996,    1519. 
Hyde    Park,    Village    of    v.    Speiicor 

(118  111.  446,  8  X.  E.  846   [1888]  ). 

104,    244,   247,   248,   259,    330,    341. 

373,   375,   377,   461,   857,   859,   864. 
Hyde   Park,   Village   of   v.   Waite    (2 

'ill.    App.    443     [1878]),    347,    965, 

990. 
Hyde   Park,   Village   of   v.    Washing- 
ton    Ice    Company     (117    HI.     233 

[1886]),   66,  69. 
Hydes   v.   Joyes    (67    Ky.    (4   Bush.) 

464,  96  Am.  Dec.  311   [1868]),  264, 

273,   293,  323,   420,  857,  867. 
Hyland    v.    President    and    Trustees 

of   Village  of  Ossining    (107   X.  Y. 

S.   225    [1907]),   748. 
Hyman  v.   City  of  Chicago    (188  III. 

462,     59    X.    E.    10    [1900]),     130, 

323,   381,   387,   399,   443,   511,   571, 

864,    1330,    1368. 
Hymes    v.    Aydelott    (26    Ind.    431). 

180. 
Hynes   v.   City   of   Chicago    (175    111. 

"^56,  51  X.  E.  705  [1898]),  324,  857. 

864. 


Her    V.   Ross    (64   Xeb.    710,   97   Am. 

St.   Rep.   676,  57   L.  R.  A.  895,  90 

X.  W.  869    [1902]),  372. 
Illinois    Central    Railroad    Company 

V.    City   of   Chicago    (141    111.   509, 

30   X.   E.    1036    [1893]),   578,   597, 

643,   655,   920,   924. 
Illinois    Central    Railroad    Company 

V.   Decatur    (147   U.   S.   190,   37   L. 

132,   13   S.   293    [1891]),  7,   11,  35, 

553,   594,   597,   613,   614,   670,   715. 
Illinois    Central     Railroad    Company 

V.   City   of    Decatur    (154    111.    173. 

38  X.  E.  626  [1894]),  11,  283,  284, 

286,    293,    298,    594,    613. 
Illinois    Central    Railroad    Company 

V.    City    of    Decatur    (126    111.    92, 

1     L.    R.    A.    613,     18    X.    E.     315 

[1890]),   11,  35,  42,  594,  597,  613, 

614. 


i 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXVU 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
V.  Commissioners  of  East  Lake 
Fork  Special  Drainage  District 
129  111.  417,  21  N.  E.  925  [1890]), 
340,  587,  594,  598,  659,  665,  666, 
690,    1352,    1364. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
V.  City  of  Effingham  (172  111.  607, 
50   X.   E.    103    [1898]),   859,   864. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
V.  City  of  Kankakee  ( 164  111.  608, 
45  N.  E.  971  [1897]),  594,  598, 
623,   923,   947,    1283,    1387. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
V.  County  of  McLean  (17  111.  291), 
615. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
V.  City  of  Matt  m  (141  111.  32, 
30  N.  E.  773    [1893]),  594,  613. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Alexander  ( 161 
111.  244,  43  X.  E.  1107  [1896]), 
1039,    1183,    1189,    1281. 

Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Seaton  (189  111.  119,  59 
N.  E  609  [1901]),  594,  595,  598, 
747,  763,  772,  914,  927,  930,  986, 
996,  1059,  1183,  1184,  1188,  1285, 
1373. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
V.  City  of  Wenona  (163  111.  288, 
45  N.  E.  265    [1896]),  950. 

Illinois  and  Michigan  Canal,  Trus- 
tees of  the  V.  City  of  Chicago  ( 12 
111.  403  [1851]),  11,  35,  39,  153, 
308,    430, -549,    581,    582,    584,    613. 

Improvement,  Board  of,  District  No. 
60  V.  Cotter  (71  Ark.  536,  76  S. 
W.  552  [1903]),  249,  251,  785, 
1337. 

Improvement,  Board  of,  District  No. 
5  of  Texarkana  v.  OfTenhauser  (84 
Ark.  257,  105  S.  W.  265),  329, 
549,  555,  626,  720,  744,  1229,  1277, 
1337,    1346. 

Improvement,  Board  of  v.  School 
District  (56  Ark.  354,  35  Am.  St. 
Rep.  108,  16  L.  R.  A.  418,  19  S. 
W.  969    [1892]),   580,  586. 

Improvement,  Board  of,  Paving  Dis- 
trict No.  5  V.  Sisters  of  Mercv  of 
Female    Academy    of     Ft.     Smith, 


(—    Ark.    ,    109    S.    W.    1165 

[1908]),    39,    42,    613,    614. 

Independence,  City  of,  to  the  Use 
of  Smith  V.  Briggs  (58  Mo.  App. 
241    [1894]),  432,  816,  819. 

Independent  School  District  of  Bur- 
lington V.  City  of  Burlington  (60 
la.  500,  15  N.  W.  295  [1883]), 
223,   232,   234,  980. 

Indiana  Bond  Co.  v.  Bruce  (13  Ind, 
App.  550,  41  N.  E.  95S  [1895]), 
1086,    1317. 

Indiana  Bond  Company  v.  Shearer 
(24  Ind.  App.  622,  57  N.  E.  Rep. 
276    [1900]),   907,   910. 

Indianapolis,  City  of  v.  Gilmore  (30 
Ind.  414  [1868]),  394,  399,  1072, 
1432. 

Indianapolis,  City  of  v.  Holt  ( 155 
Ind.  222,  57  N.  E.  966,  998,  1100 
[1900]),   132,   699,   732,   773,    1444. 

Indianapolis,  City  of  v.  Imberry  (17 
Ind.  175  [186\]),  489,  496,"^  526, 
662,  783,  826,  877,  1050,  1121, 
1350,   1352. 

Indianapolis,  City  of  v.  Patterson 
(33  Ind.  157  [1870]),  526,  1192, 
1472,    1474. 

Indianapolis  and  Cincinnati  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Parker  (29  Ind.  471 
[1868]),  363. 

Indianapolis  and  Cumberland  Grav- 
el Road  Co.  V.  Christian  (93  Ind. 
360),   202. 

Indianapolis  and  Cumberland  Grav- 
el Road  Co.  V.  State  ex  rel.  Flack 
(105  Ind.  37,  4  N.  E.  316  [1885]), 
340,  539,  587,  739,  748,  759,  986, 
996,    1254,    1332. 

Indianapolis,  Peru  and  Chicago 
Railroad  Company  v.  Rnss  (47 
Ind.  25  [1874]),"  30-1,  594.  598, 
623. 

Indianapolis  &  Vincennes  Railway 
Company  v.  Capitol  Paving  & 
Construction  Company  (24  Ind. 
App.  114,  54  N.  E.  1076  [1899]), 
575,    601,   626,    630. 

Inge  V.  Board  of  Pulilic  Works  of 
Mobile  (135  Ala.  187,  93  Am.  St. 
Rep.  20.  33  So.  678  [1902]),  118, 
314,  483,  497,  514,  653,  665,  691, 
1437. 


CXXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ingersoll    v.    Buchanan     (1     W.    Va. 

181    [1865]),    1212. 
Ingraliam,   In  the  Matter  of    ( 64   !^'. 

Y.     310     [1876]),     400,     405,     572, 

1455,    1466. 
Ingraham,  In   the  Matter   of  the  Pe- 
tition   to    Vacate    an    Assessmerit 

on    Eighty-eightli    and    Ninety-first 

Streets     '(4     Hun      (X.     Y.)'     495 

[1875]),  400,  405,  572. 
Ingram    v.     Colgan     (106    Cal.     113. 

46  Am.  St.  Rep.   221,  28  L.  R.  A. 

187,     38    Pac.     315,    39    Pac.     437 

[1895]),  92. 
Inhabitants    of    .       ( See 

name  of  town  or  city.) 
Tola  Electric   R.   Co.   v.   Jackson    ( 70 

Kan.    791,   79   Pac.   662),   363. 
Iowa  Pipe  &  Tile  Company  v.  CaHa- 

han    (125    Iowa   358,    106   Am.    St. 

Rep.  311,  67  L.  R.  A.  408,   101  X. 

W.     141     [1904]),    677,    705,    754, 

1435,   1509. 
Iowa    Railroad    Land    Co.    v.    Soper 

(39   la.   112),  182. 
Ireland    v.    City    of    Rochester     (51 

Barb.   414    [1868]),   8,   79,   86,   89, 

119,    136,   520,   726,    729,   748,   819, 

833,     955,     966,     989,     1005,     1279. 

1426,    1427,    1442,    1445. 
Iroquois      and      Crescent      Drainage 

District    Xo.    1    v.    Harroun     (222 

111.    489,    78    X\    E.    780    [1906]), 

340.   403,   821,   923,    1330. 
Irvin      v.      Devors      (65      Mo.      625 

[1877]),   837,   1249. 
Irwin,    Succession    of     ( 33    La.    Ann. 

63    [1881]),   1041,   1149. 
Irwin  V.   Mayor,   etc.,   of  Mobile    (57 

Ala.  6   [1876]),  150,  301,  794,  950, 

1372. 
Isle  of  Ely,   Case  of    (10   Rep.   141), 

26,  549,  659. 
Isom    V.     Mississippi     Central     Rail- 
road   Co.    (36    Miss.    306    [1858]), 

71. 
Ittner  v.  Robinson    (35  Xeb.    133.   52 

N.    W.    846    [1892]),    1054. 
Ivanhoe    v.    City    of    Enterprise     (29 

Ore.   245,   35  L.  R.  A.   58,  45  Pac. 

771    [1896]),   1048,   1049. 


Ives  V.  Irey  (51  Xeb.  136,  70  N. 
W.  961  [1897]),  737,  747,  1426, 
1427. 


J.  &  A.  ]McKechnie  Brewing  Com- 
pany V.  Trustees  of  Village  of 
Canandaigua  (162  X.  Y.  631,  57 
X\   E.   1113    [1900]),   100. 

J.  &  A.  McKechnie  Brewing  Com- 
pany V.  Trustees  of  the  Village 
of  Canandaigua  ( 15  App.  Div. 
139.  44  X.  Y.  Supp.  317  [1897]), 
100. 

Jackson  v.  City  of  Denver  ( —  Colo. 
,  92  Pac.  690),   1337. 

Jackson  v.  City  of  Detroit  ( 10  Mich. 
248    [1862]),    1033,    1436. 

Jackson  v.  Healy  (20  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 
495   [1823]),  755,  886. 

Jackson  v.  McHargue    ( —  Ky.  , 

106    S.   W.    871    [1908]),    1039. 

Jackson  v.  Smith  (120  Ind.  520,  22 
X.  E.  431  [1889]),  264,  324,  390, 
394,  405,  444,  549.  1005,  1000, 
1015,   1324,   1429,  1435. 

Jackson  v.  State  for  Use  of  Dyar 
(104  Ind.  516,  3  N.  E.  863 
[1885]),  772,   1008. 

Jackson  v.  State  for  Use  of  Lindley 
(103  Ind.  250,  2  X.  E.  742 
[1885]),   735,   1237,   1244. 

Jackson  County  v.  Waldo  (85  Mo. 
637    [1885]),   70,   308. 

Jackson  Fire  Clay  Sewer  Pipe  & 
Tile  Company  v.  Snyder  (93  Mich. 
325,  53  X.  W.  359   [1892]),  475. 

Jacksonville,  City  of  v.  Hamill  (178 
111.  235,  52  X.  E.  949  [1899]), 
271,  663,  672,  675,  909,  953,   1368. 

Jacksonville  Railway  Company,  The 
V.  City  of  Jacksonville  {lU  111. 
502,  2  X.  E.  478  [1886]).  381, 
386,  507,  623,  837,  856,  864,  807, 
927,  929,   1054. 

Jacobs  V.  City  of  Chicago  (178  111. 
500,  53  X.'  E.  363  [1899]),  864, 
1373,    1384. 

Jaeger  v.  Burr  (30  0.  S.  164 
[1880]),  479,  688,  977. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXIX 


[References  are  to  tiections.] 


Jaicks  V.  Merrill  (201  :\r<i.  91,  98 
S.  W.  753  [1900]),  1015,  1018, 
1085,  1135,  1242,  1284. 
Jaicks  V.  Middlesex  Inv.  Co.  (201 
Mo.  Ill,  98  S.  W.  759  [190()]), 
491. 

Sullivan    (128  Mo.   177,  30 
890     [1895]),     1137,     1144, 


Jaicks 

S.    W. 

1225. 
James    v. 

W.   912 
James   v. 

4   S.   ^^ 


Louisville     (Ky.)     (40    S. 

19   Ky.   L.    R.    447),   678. 

Pine   Blufi"    (49    Ark.    199, 

760    [1887]),   55,   86,   93, 

96,    151,    230,    293,    296,    298,    639. 
James  v.   City  of  Seattle    ( —  Wash. 

,   95   Pac.   273    [1908]),  085. 

Jamison  v.  City  of  New  Orleans    (12 

La.    Ann.    346    [1857]),    927,    934, 

986,   1487. 
Janvrin  v.  Poole    (181  Mass.  403,   03 

X.   E.    1006    [1902]),    322. 
Jardine     v.     Ma.vor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonaltv   of    the    City    of    New 

York    (11    Daly    116    [1882]),   740, 

836,   1499. 
Jarrett   v.   City   of  Chicago    (181   111. 

242,  54  N.  E.  946   [1899]),  864. 
Jassen  v.   Pierce    (25   Ind.   App.   222, 

57   N.   E.   941    [1900]),   1091. 
Jatunn    v.    O'Brien    (89    Cal.    57,    26 

Pac.   635    [1891]),    1205. 
Jebb    V.    Sexton     (84    111.     Ai)p.     45 

[1899]),  985,  980. 
JeflVrson,  City  of  v.  Jennings   Bank- 
ing  and    Trust 

App.    74,    79    S. 

305. 
Jefferson,    Count.v 

Vernon  ( 145  111. 

[1893]),    203.    2 

884,  917,   1375. 
Jeffersonville,    City    of    v.    Patterson 

(32   Ind.    140    [1869]),   1191,    1432. 
Joliff   V.    Newark    (49   N.    J.   L.    (20 

Vr.)    2.39,    12    Atl.    770),    381. 
Jelly     v.     Dils      (27     W.     Va.     207 

[1885]),    114. 
Jenal    v.   Green    Island    Draining   Co. 

(12     Xeb.     103,     10     X.     W.     547 

[1881]),   337.   343,   449. 
Jenkins    v.    Board    of    Rui)ervisors    of 

Rock  County    (15  Wis.  11    [1802]), 

021,  895,   li75,   1426,   1427. 


Co. 

(35    Tex.    Civ. 

w 

.    870     [1904]), 

of 

V.   City  of   :\It. 

80, 

33X.'e.    1091 

64, 

437,    850,    81)5. 

Jenkins  v.  Stetler  (118  Ind.  275,  20 
X.  E.  788  [1888]),  407,  537,  538, 
541,  820,  1015,  1018,  1192,  1252, 
1272,    1337. 

Jenkintown  Borough  v.  Firmstone 
(2  Penn.  Dist.  Rep.  124  [1892]), 
880,    1063. 

Icnks  V.  City  of  Chicago  (56  111. 
397    [1870]),  860,  867. 

Jenks  V.  City  of  Chicago  (48  111. 
290  [1868]),  672,  693,  724,  703, 
764,    918,    1005,    1184,    1292;    1299. 

Jennings  v.  Le  Breton  ( 80  Cal.  8, 
21  Pac.  1127  [1889]),  537,  698, 
1281,   1290,    1358. 

Jennings  v.  LeRoy  ( 03  Cal .  397 
[1883]).   700,    1281. 

Jennings  Banking  and  Trust  Co.  v. 
City  of  Jefferson  (30  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  534,  70  S.  W.  1005  [1902]), 
365. 

Jerome  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 62  111. 
285  [1871])",  771,  918,  947,  1187, 
1272. 

Jerrell  v.  Etchison  Ditching  Associa- 
tion (62  Ind.  200  [1878]),  1251, 
1263,    1265. 

Jersey  City.  Mayor,  etc..  of  v.  Car- 
son (43  X.  i.  L.  (14  Vr.)  004 
[1881]),    909. 

Jersey  City,  Mayor,  etc.,  of  v.  Green 
(42  X.  J.  "l.  (13  Vr.)  027 
[1880]).    907,    1319.    1480,    1492. 

Jersey  City,  ^layor  and  Aldermen 
of  V.  O'Callaghan  (41  X.  J.  L.  (12 
Vr.)    349   [1879]),  907,  1478,   1486. 

Jersey  City,  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  V.  Riker  (38  X.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.) 
225,  20  Am.  Rep.  380  11870]), 
1478.    1486. 

Jersey  City.  !Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  V.  State,  Howeth,  Pros. 
(30  X.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  521  [18o;>]), 
395,   754,  840,    1400. 

Jersey  City,  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  V.  State,  Vreeland,  Pros.  (43 
X.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  638  [1881]), 
6,   20,   349,   608,   660. 

Jersey  City.  Commissioners  of  Sink- 
ing Fund  of  V.  Inhabitants  of  the 
Township  of  Linden  in  the  Coun- 
ty of  Union  (40  X.  J.  Eq.  (13 
Stewart)    27   [1885]),   1008. 


cxxx 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Jersey  City  and  Bergen  Railway 
Company,  In  the  Matter  of  tlie, 
for  a  Summary  Determination  as 
to  Certain  Property  Assessed  by 
Jersey  City  and  also  by  the  State 
Board  of  Assessors  (G6  N.  J.  L. 
37  Vr.)  501,  49  Atl.  437  [1901]), 
596. 

Jessing  v.  City  of  Columbus  ( 1  Ohio 
C.  C.  90  [1885]),  313,  314,  431, 
570,    783,   843,    1249. 

Jetter,  In  the  Matter  of  (14  Hun 
(N.    Y.)    93    [1878]),    1451,    1465. 

•Jex.  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(111  N.  Y.  339,  19  K  E.  52 
[1888]),    1486,    1492. 

•Jex  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
103  N.  Y.  536,  9  N.  E.  39  [1886]), 
781,    1481,    1486. 

Job  V.  City  of  Alton  (189  III.  256, 
82  Am.  St.  Rep.  448,  59  N.  E.  622 
[1901]),  51,  118,  130,  295,  323, 
•  670,  698,  715,  745,  1183. 

•Job  V.  People  ex  rel.  Tetherington 
(193  111.  609,  61  N.  E.  1079 
[1901]),   441. 

John  V.  Connell  (64  Neb.  233,  89 
N.  W.  806  [1902]),  677,  693,  699, 
731,  911. 

John  V.  Connell  (61  Neb.  267,  85 
N.  W.  82),  677,  693,  699,  731,  911. 

John  Kelso  Co.  v.  Gillette  ( 136  Cal. 
603,  69  Pac.  296  [1902]),  538,  952. 

Johnson,  In  the  Matter  of  (103  N. 
Y.  260,  8  N.  E.  399  [1886]),  283, 
444,  468,  487,  495,  948,  1279,  1372. 

Johnson  v.  Village  of  Avondale  (1 
Ohio  C.  C.  229  [1885]),  324,  563, 
572. 

Johnson  v.  District  of  Columbia  (6 
Mackey  (D.  C.)  21  [1887]),  223, 
234,    621,    1050. 

Johnson  v.  Duer  (115  Mo.  366,  21 
S.  W.  800  [1892]),  324,  393,  400, 
401,  447,  495,  555,  659,  563,  711, 
723,   777,   1005,   1007,   1435. 

Johnson  v.  Lewis  (115  Ind.  490,  18 
N.   E.   7    [1888]),    726,    756. 

Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  (88 
Wis.  383,  60  N.  W.  270  [1894]), 
79,  191,  244,  432,  444. 


Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  (40 
Wis.  315  [1876]),  86,  163,  322, 
360,   620,  693,   1420,   1432. 

Johnson  v.  Oregon  Short  Line  Co. 
(7  Ida.  355,  53  L.  R.  A.  744,  63 
Pac.    112    [1900]),   363. 

Johnson  v.  City  of  Oshkosh  (21  Wis. 
184  [1866]),  53,  737,  981,  1432, 
1434,    1444. 

Johnson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 
ger  (177  111.  64,  52  N.  E.  308 
[1898]),  549,  927,  934,  986,  1183, 
1340,    1367. 

Johnson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ra.vmond 
(189  111.  83,  59  N.  E.  515  [1901]), 
857,  864,  866,  927,  929,  986,  996, 
1183,    1340. 

Johnson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Reed  (202 
111.  306,  66  N.  E.  1081  [1903]), 
723,  927,  987,  1000,  1183,  1340. 

Johnson  v.  State  for  Use  of  David- 
son (116  Ind.  374,  19  N.  E.  298 
[1888]),   340,  795,   1008,   1247. 

Johnson  v.  City  of  Tacoma  (41 
Wash.  51,  82  Pac.  1092  [1905]), 
301,   316,   549,   560,   561,   646,   720. 

Johnston  v.  Louisville  (74  Ky.  (11 
Bush.)    527    [1875]),  39. 

•Joliet,  City  of  v.  Spring  Creek 
Drainage  Dist.  (222  111.  441,  78  N. 
E.  836  [1906]),  62,  203,  270,  340, 
547,   556,   587. 

Jonas  v.  City  of  Cincinnati  (18  Ohio 
318    [1849]),    368,    508. 

Jones,  In  tlie  Matter  of  (18  Hun 
(N.    Y.)     327    [1879]),    1460. 

Jones  V.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  the 
City  of  Boston  (104  Mass.  461 
[1870]),  64,  65,  86,  100,  103,  244, 
308,  415,  466,  515,  555,  650,  696, 
775,  879,  885,  920,  921,  950,  1279, 
1404,    1406,    1407. 

Jones  V.  Cardwell  (98  Ind.  331 
[1884]),  1442. 

Jones  v.  City  of  Chicago  (213  111. 
92,  72  N.  E.  798  [1904]),  321, 
828,   831,   856,   864. 

Jones  V.  City  of  Chicao:o  (206  111. 
374,  69  N.  E.  64  [1903]),  1275, 
1318,    1327,    1382. 

Jones  V.  District  oi  Columbia  (3 
App.  D.  C.  26  [1894]),  321,  663, 
709,   731. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXl 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Jones  V.  Gable  (150  Mich.  30,  113 
N.  W.  577  [1!)07]),  90(5,  1411, 
1414,    1415,    143G. 

Jones  V.  Holzapfel  (11  Okl.  405,  68 
Pac.  511  [1902]),  43,  89,  145,  147, 
244,  324,  481,   707,   713,   776,   1435. 

Jones  V.  Town  of  Lake  View  (151 
111,  663,  38  N.  E.  688  [1894]), 
73,  103,  194,  198,  245,  258,  259, 
307,  308,  396.  556,  557,  672,  675, 
690,  813,  814,  828,  909.  920,  922, 
925,    1317,   1391. 

Jones  V.  Landis  Township  (50  N.  J. 
L.  (21  Vr.)  374,  13  Atl.  251), 
166,    167,    1113. 

Jones  V.  Metropolitan  Park  Commis- 
sioners (181  Mass.  494,  64  N.  E. 
76    [1902]),   305,   508,   525. 

Jones  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Newark  (UN. 
J.  Eq.  (3  Stock.)  452  [1857]), 
324,    1431. 

Jones  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
37    Hun    513    [1885]),    1462,    1486. 

Jones  V.  Scluilmeyer  (39  Ind.  119 
[1872]),    526,    1057,    1067,    1072. 

Jones  V.  City  of  Seattle  (23  Wasli. 
753,  63  Pac.   553    [1901]),   70. 

Jones  V.  lown  of  Tonawanda  (158 
N.  Y.  438,  53  N.  E.  280  [1899]), 
322,  381,  726,  731,  779,  780,  956, 
962,  9C9,  976,  1050. 

Jones  V.  Town  of  Tonawanda  ( 35 
App.   Div.    151),   779. 

Jones  V.  Board  of  Water  Commis- 
sioners of  Detroit  (34  Mich.  273 
[1876]),   347,   353,   608. 

Jonesboro  L.  C.  &  E.  P.  Co.  v.  Board 
of  Directors  of  St.  Francis  Levee 
District  (80  Ark.  316,  97  S.  W. 
281    [1906]),  247,  343,   1231,   1251. 

Joplin,  City  of,  ex  rel.  v.  Freeman 
(125  Mo.  App.  717,  103  S.  W.  130 
[1907]),  479,   620,   832,   909,    1249. 

Joplin,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Carthage  Di- 
mension &  Flag  Stone  Co.  v.  IIol- 
lingshead  (123  Mo.  App.  602,  100 
S.  W.  506  [1907]),  323,  662,  836, 
864.  873,  1133,  1135,  1216,  1230, 
1284. 

Joplin    Consolidated    Mining    Co.    v. 


Joplin     (  124    Mo.    129,    27    S.    W. 

406),    142. 
Jordan     v.     Hyatt      (3      Barb.     275 

[1848]),   117,  726,  735,   1056,  1175. 
Jordan    Ditching    and    Draining    As- 
sociation   V.    Wagoner    (33    Ind.    50 

[1870]),   340,   886,   1232. 
Joyce    V.    Barron    (67    0.    S.    264,    65 

N.    E.    1001    [1902]),    735,    740. 
Joyes    V.     Shadburn     ( —    Ky.    . 

13   S.  W.  361,   11   Ky.  L.  Rep.  892 
.   [1890]),   411,    707,    709,    710.    802, 

1335. 
Judson     V.    City    of    Bridgeport     (25 

Conn.   426    [1857]),   280,   425,   429, 

1484. 
Junction  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia   (88    Pa.    St.    424,    32   Am. 

Rep.  417   [1879]),  598. 
Justice    V.    Robinson     ( 142    Cal.    199. 

75    Pac.    776    [1904]),    1478,    1482. 

1484. 
Juvinall       v.      Jamesburg      Drainage 

District    (204    111.    106,    68    N.    E. 

440    [1903]),    71. 


K 


Kadderly   v.   Portland    (44   Ore.    118, 

74  Pac.   710,  75  Pac.  222   [1903]), 

43,    106,    147,    148,    214,    216,    665, 

666,    1425,    1431. 
Kafl'erstein    v.    Knox     (56    Mo.     186 

[1874]),    1055,    1139,   1284. 
Kahl   V.   Love    (37   X.   J.  L.    (8   Vr.) 

5    [1874]),   1036. 
Kaiser  v.  Weise   (85  Pa.  St.    (4  Xor- 

ris)     366     [1877]),    118,    610,    665, 

666,  706,   1072,  1163. 
Kalamazoo,  City  of  v.  Franeoi^e   (115 

.Mich.  554,   73  X.  W.  801    [1898]), 

118,  551,  698,  874. 
Kalbrier    v.    Leonard     (34    Ind.    497 

[1870]),   323,   610,   614. 
Kammann    v.    City   of   Chicago    ( 222 

111.  63,  78  X.  E.  16   [1906]),  1406. 
Kankakee,    City    of    v.    Potter     (119 

111.    324,    lo'  X.    E.    212    [1888]), 

862. 


Cxxxu 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Kankakee  Drainage  District  v.  Com- 
missioners   of    Lake    Fork    Special 
Drainage    District     (130     111.    201, 
22   N.   E.    607    [1890]),    564. 
Kankakee   Stone  and  Lime  Company 
V.  City  of  Kankakee   ( 128  111.   173. 
20    X."    E.    670    [1890]),    661,    924, 
1328. 
Kansas     City     to     the    Use,    etc.     v. 
American  Surety  Co.   (71  Mo.  App. 
315    [1897]),   1172,   1249. 
Kansas   City   ex  rel.   Xeill   v.   Askew 
(105   Mo.   App.    84,   79    S.    W.   483 
[1904]),   527. 
Kansas  City  v.  Bacon    ( 157  Mo.  450, 
57    S.    W.    1045    [1900]),    71,    284. 
356,   557,   586,   588,   589,   594,   652, 
663,   675,   676,   690,   1328,   1381. 
Kansas  City  v.  Bacon    (147  Mo.  259, 
•      48    S.    W.    860    [1898]),    47,    212, 
215,   264,   272,   356,   508,   554,   557, 
613,   642,   665,   666,   676,   679,   885. 
12G9,   1282,   1333,   1375,   1381. 
Kansas   City   v.    Baird    (98   Mo.    215 

[1889]),   1333. 
Kansas  City  v.  Block    (175  Mo.  433, 
74   S.   W."  993    [1903]),   636,    1252, 
1291. 
Kansas    City,    City    of    v.    Breyfogle 
(8    Kans.'  App.    270,    55    Pac.    508 
[1898]),    781,    1006,    1007,    1440. 
Kansas    City,    City    of    v.    Cullinan 
65  Kan.  68,  69  Pac.   1099   [1902]), 
787,  815. 
Kansas   City,   City  of  v.   Gibson    (66 
Kan.    501,    72  " Pac.    222     [1903]), 
86,    118,    141,    247,    248,    250,    324, 
549,    553,    555,    627,   642,    689,    702. 
'  Kansas    City,    City    of    v.    Gray    (62 
Kan.    198^,    61    Pac.    746     [1900]), 
141,   787,   818,   1337. 
Kansas  City,  City  of  v.  Hanson    ( 60 
Kan.    833,    58    Pac.    474    [1899]), 
517. 
Kansas   City,    City   of   v.    Hanson    (8 
Kans.     App.      290,     55      Pac.      513 
[1898]).   517,    1384,    1443. 
Kansas,  City  of  v.  Hill    (80  Mo.  523 
[1883]),   62,  272,   308,   1322,   1328, 
1382. 
Kansas,   City  of  v.  Johnson    (78  Mo. 
661    [1883]),    86. 


Kansas    City    v.    Kansas    City    Belt 
Railway    Company     ( 187    Mo.    146 
86  S.  W.   190    [1905]),  598,  661. 
Kansas    City    v.    Kansas    City,    Fort 
Scott    &    Memphis    Railroad    Com- 
pany   (189    Mo.   245,    88    S.    W.   45 
[1905]),    1330. 
Kansas  City,  City  <ii  v.  Kimball    ( 60 
Kan.  224,  56  Pac.  78   [1899]),  141, 
1337. 
Kansas    City   v.    McGrew    ( —    Kan. 

,  96   Pac.   484    [1908]),    141. 

Kansas   City  v.   Marsh   Oil   Co.    ( 140 

Mo.  458,  41   S.  W.  "43),  215. 
Kansas  City  v.  Mulkey  (176  Mo.  229, 
75    S.    W.    973    [1903]  ),    851,    966. 
986. 
Kansas    City    v.    Xapiecek     ( —    Kan. 

,    92*  Pac.    827     [1907]),    2'->8, 

551,    619,    661,    886. 
Kansas    City    v.    O'Connor     (82    Mo. 
App.    655*  [1899]),    291,    370,    45^, 
465,  479,  657. 
Kansas    City    v.     Ratekin     (30    Mo. 

App.    416),    401,    447. 
Kansas    City,    The    City    of,    to    the 
Use    of    Enright    v.    City    of    Rice 
(89  Mo.  685,  1  S.  W.  749   [1886]), 
1211. 
Kansas    City,    City    of,    to    the    Use 
of     Adkins    v.    Richards     (34     Mo. 
App.    521    [1889]),    236,    293,   295, 
297,   324,   327,   670. 
Kansas  City  v.  Silver    (74  Kan.  851, 
85  Pac.  805  [1906]),  414,  956,  962. 
Kansas  City  v.  Smart   ( 128  Mo.  272, 
30    S.    W.    773    [1895]),    263,    308, 
824. 
Kansas   Citv,   City   of   v.   Smiley    (62 
Kan.    718,    04    Pac.    613     [1900]), 
1437. 
Kansas  City,  City  of,  to  the  Use  of 
the   Frear   Stone  &   Pipe  Manufac- 
turing Company  v.  Swope   (79  Mo. 
446    [1883]),   401,  447,   777. 
Kansas   City,    City   of   v.    Trotter    (9 
Kans.     App.      222,     59     Pac.     679 
1900] ),    1440. 
Kansas  City  v.  Ward    (134  Mo.   172, 
35    S.    W.    600    [1896]),    38,    100. 
111.    121,    215,    350,    507,    549,    619. 
634,    697,    760. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXlll 


[ Uefei-ences  are  to  sections.] 


Kansas      City      Exposition      Driving 

Park     V.    Kansas    City     (174     Mo. 

425,    74    S.    W.    979  "^[1903]),    42, 

210,   591,  613,   614. 
Kansas    City    Grading    Company    v. 

Holden    (107    Mo.    305.    17    S.'   W. 

798     [1891]),    553,    554.    555,    670, 

724,   1338. 
Kansas    City    Grading    Company    v. 

Holden   (32  Mo.  App.  490   [1888]), 

523,  569,  675. 
Kansas    City    Transfer    Company    v. 

Ruling   (22  Mo.  App.  654   [188G]), 

495,  515. 
Kansas,    State    of    v.    . 

(  See  State  of  Kansas  v. . ) 


Kansas  Town  Co.  v.  City  of  Argen- 
tine (5  Kans.  App.  50,  47  Pae. 
542  [1896]),  816,  819,  839,  844, 
1015,    1020,    1411,    1432,    143tt. 

Karsten  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  ( 106 
Wis.  200,  48  L.  R.  A.  851,  81  N. 
W.    1103,    948    [1900]),    699. 

Kaufman  v.  Tacoma,  Olympia  & 
Gray's  Harbor  Railroad  Company 
(11  Wasli.  632,  40  Pac.  137 
[1895]),   71. 

Kean  v.  Asch  (27  X.  J.  Eq.  (12  C. 
E.  Greene)  57  [1875]),  735,  1432, 
1435. 

Keane  v.  Cushing  (15  ^lo.  App.  96 
[1884]),    496,    504,    742,    838,    848. 

Keane  v.  Klausman  (21  ^Mo.  App. 
485  [1886]),  410,  424,  837,  1015, 
1249. 

Kearney  v.  City  of  Chicago  (163  111. 
293,  45  X.  E.  224  [1896]),  745, 
765,  772,  914,   1379. 

Kearney  v.  City  of  Covington  (58 
Ky.  (1  Metcalf)  339  [1858]), 
998,   1508,   1.509,   1525. 

Kearney  v.  Post  (3  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.    105    [1847]),   1054. 

Kearney  Street  (See  Xorth  Beach 
and  Mission  R.  R.  Co.,  Appeal  of; 
Reese's    Appeal.) 

Kodzie  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners (114  111.  280,  2  X.  E. 
182  [1886]),  244,  248,  253,  259, 
266.  305,  356,  735,  776,  986,  987, 
1439.  1444. 

Keehn     v.     [McGillicuddv      (19     Ind. 


App.   427,   49   X.    E.    609    [1898]), 
1486. 
Keeler   v.   People   e.x   rel.   Kern    ( 160 

111.  179,  43  X.  E.  342  [1896]), 
745,  926,  927,  942,  986,  1196. 

Keene  v.   City  of   Seattle    (31   Wash. 

202,    71    Pac.    769    [1903]),    1069. 
Keese    v.    City    of    Denver    ( 10    Colo. 

112,  15  Pac.  825  [1887]),  44,  93, 
97,  152,  223.  2.34.  274,  666,  711, 
717,  867. 

Kefferstein  v.   Holliday    ( 3  Mo.   App. 

569),  50,  895. 
Keifer  v.   Bridgeport    (68   Conn.   401, 

36     Atl.    801      [1896]),    223,     777, 

1006,  1035,  1100. 
Keigher  v.  City  of  St.  Paul  (69 

Minn.    78,    72*  X.    W.    54    [1897]), 

370,  415,   525,   1510. 
Keighley's      Case       ( 10      Rep.      139a 

(Mich.    7   Jac.    1),   21,    24,   25,   26, 

549,   557,   696. 
Keigwin    v.    Drainage    Commissioners 

of    Hamilton    Township     (115    111. 

347,    5    X.    E.    575    [1886]),    254, 

340,   1008,    1,358,    1417,   1432,   1477. 
Keiser    v.    :\Iills     (162    Ind.    366.    69 

X.  E.  142   [1903]),  888,  950,   1362, 

1372. 
Keith  V.   Bingham    (100  Mo.   300,    13 

S.  W.  683  "[1889]),  8,  50,  73,  86. 

100,  110,  555,  1135,  1136,  1137. 

1284,  1346. 
Keith  V.  City  of  Philadelphia  (126 

Pa.  St.  575,  17  Atl.  883  [1889]), 

610,  635,  706.  989,  995,   1307. 
Keithsburg      &       Eastern      Railroad 

Company    v.    Henry     (79    111.    290 

[1875])*   71. 
Kellenkamp  v.  City  of  Lafayette    (30 

Ind.   192    [1868]"),   1253. 
Kellogg  V.  Ely   (15  0.  S.  64   [1864]), 

340,    1015,    1436. 
Kellogg  V.   Village  of   Janesville    (34 

:Minn.   132.  24  X.  W.  359   [1885]), 

244.  775. 
Kellogg      V.      Price      (42      Ind.      360 

[1873]),  280. 
Kelly  V.  Chadwick    (104  La.   719.  29 

So.  295   [1901]),  46,  118,  314,  514, 

529,    544,   549,    620,    651,    663,    666, 

6F9,  698.  702.  1047,  1144,  1333, 

1369,  1370,  1373. 


CXXXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Kelly   V.    City   of    Chicago    (193    111. 

324,  61  N.  E.   1009    [1901]),   1305, 

1379. 
Kelly    V.    City   of    Chicago     (148    111. 

90,  35  N.  E.  752   [1894]),  324,  557, 

563,  864,  918,  920,  922,  925,   1372, 

1377,   1391. 
Kelly  V.   The   City  of   Cleveland    (34 

O.   S.   468    [1878]),   228,   550,  553, 

554,   560,   619,   620,   626,   670,   692, 

977. 
Kelly    V.    Luning     (76    Cal.    309,    18 

Pac.    335    [1888]),    409,   423. 
Kelly   V.    Mendlesohn    (105    La.    490, 

29    So.    894     [1901]),     1144,    1195, 

1219,    1432. 
Kelly      V.      Minneapolis      City    '  ( 57 

Minn.    294,   47   Am.    St.    Rep.   605, 

26    L.    R.    A.    92,    59    N.    W.    304 

[1894]),   125,   278.   359,   727,    1347, 

1411,    1412. 
Kelly    V.    Pittsbnrg    (104    U.    S.    78, 

20    L.    658),    610. 
Kelly   V.    City   of   Pittsburg    (85   Pa. 

St.   170,  27  Am.  Rep.  633    [1877]), 

414,   610,   983. 
Kelly     V.    City    of    St.     Joseph     (67 

Mo.    491    [1878]),    1505. 
Kelsey   v.   King    (11    Abb.    Prac.    (X. 

Y.)    180    [I860]),    1431. 
Kelso  V.  Cole   (121   Cal.  121,  53  Pac. 

353    [1898]),    223.    234,    538,    775, 

777,   952. 
Kemper   v.   King    {11    Mo.   App.    116 

[1881]),    420,    443,    540.    574,    631, 

895. 
Kemper    v.    Village    of    St.    Bernard 

(14   Ohio  C.   C.    134    [1897]),   685, 

786,    1054. 
Kendall,    In    the    Matter    of     (85    X. 

Y.  302  [1881]),  276,  281,  487,  495, 

982. 
Kendig  v.  Knight    (60  la.  29,   14  N. 

W.  78   [1882]),  315,  552,  573,  574, 

620,   649,   698,   831.    848,   849,   891, 

1049,  1445. 
Kennedy  v.  Board  of  Health  (2  Pa. 

St.  (2  Barr.)  366  [1845]),  342, 

372,  420,   1063,   1157. 
Kennedy  v.  Indianapolis    ( 103   U.   S. 

599,    26    L.    5.50    [1880]),    70,    86, 

361. 
Kennedy    v.    Indianapolis     ( 14    Fed. 


Cases    314,    11     Biss.    13     [1878]), 

70,  361. 
Kennedy   v.   Newman    (3   N.   Y.   Sup. 

Ct.     187    [1848]),    368,    837,     853, 

1072,  1174,  1196,  1303. 
Kennedy  v.  State  ex  rel.  Dorsett  ( 124 

Ind.  239,  24  N.  E.  748  [1890]), 

271,   739,   1067,   1247. 
Kennedy    v.    State    for    Use    of    Dor- 
sett    (109    Ind.    236,    9    N.    E.    778 

[1886]),  735,   1237. 
Kennedy  v.   City  of  Troy    (77  N.  Y. 

493    [1879]),   545,   549,   639,    1415. 
Kenny    v.    Kelly    (113    Cal.    364,    45 

Pac.  699   [1896]),  719,   1031,  1337. 
Kensington,     Commissioners     of     the 

District  of  v.  Keith    (2  Pa.  St.    (2 

Barr.   218    [1845]  ),    686. 
Kent  V.   Common  Council  of  City  of 

Binghampton    ( 94    App.    Div.    522, 

88  N.  Y.  S.  34   [1904]),  602. 
Kent  V.  City  of  St.  Joseph    (72  Mo. 

App.  42    [1897]),   71. 
Kentucky   Railroad    Tax    Cases    (115 

U.    S."  321,    29    L.    414,    6    S.    57 

[1885]),    108. 
Kenyon   v.    Board    of   Supervisors   of 

Ionia  County    (138   Mich.  544,   101 

N.  W.  851    [1904]),   1406,  1409. 
Keokuk,  City  of  v.  Independent  Dis- 
trict   of    Keokuk    (53    la.    352,    36 

Am.     Rep.     226,     5     N.     W.     503 

[1880]),   52,   55,   56,   96. 
Kepley    v.    Fouke    (187    111.    162,    58 

X.  E.  303   [1900]),  1126. 
Kepley  v.  Scully    (185   111.  52,  57  N. 

E.   187    [1900]),    1126. 
Kepple   V.    City    of    Keokuk    (61    la. 

653,  17  N.  W.   140   [1882]),  838. 
Kerfoot  v.  City  of  Chicago    ( 195  111. 

229,    63    N.    E.    101    [1902]),    298, 

469,  523,  741,  848,  922,  1276,  1306, 

1326,    1382. 
Kerker  v.  Bocher   ( —  Okla.  ,  95 

Pac.  981   [1908]),  1015,  1020. 
Kerr     v.     Butz     (34     111.     App.     220 

[1889]),    321,    677,    699,    709,    781, 

783,   964,   967,    1087,    1414,   1490. 
Keszler     v.     City    of     Cincinnati     (3 

Ohio  C.  C.  223   [1888]),  686,  1507. 
Keteltas,  In  the  Matter  of   (48  How- 
ard    (N.    Y.)      116     [1874]),    762, 

1466. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxxxv 


[References  :ire  ti)  sections.] 


Kettle    V.    City    of    Dallas     (35    Tex. 

Civ.     App.   "632,     80     S.     W.     874 

[1904]),    11,    119,    213,    549,    607, 

665,   666,   1079. 
Keys  V.  City  of  Xeodesha    ( 64   Kans. 

681,  68   Pac.  625   [1902]),  38,  313. 

436,   1024,   1436. 
Keyser,    Matter    of     (10    Abb.    Prae. 

481    [I860]),    484,    485,    837,    1402, 

1463. 
Kidson    v.    City   of    Bangor    ( 99    ^le. 

139,   58   Atl.   900    [1904]).    1099. 
Kiernan,  In  the  Matter  of    (62  N.  Y. 

457   [1875]).  795.  1005,  1007,  1457. 
Kiley      v.      Cranor       (51      Mo.      541 

[1*873]).    424,    437.    525,    837.    864, 

984,  1134,   1136,   1138. 
Kiley  v.  Forsee   (57  Mo.  ,391   [1874]), 

213,   264,   872,    1040,    1134,    1381. 
Kiley  v.  City  of  St.  Josepli    (67  Mo. 

491    [1878]).    1498,    1518. 
Kilgallen    v.    City    of    Cliicairo     (206 

111.    557.    69    X.    E.    586     [1904]). 

820. 
Kilgour    V.    Drainage    Commissioners 

(HI  111.  342  [1885]),  39,  104,  130, 

145,   207,   247,    250.    259,   340,    771, 

998,    1029.    1043.    1049,    1142.    1254. 

1255,  1334.  1356. 
Kilgus   V.   Trustees  of   Orphanage   of 

Good    Sheplierd     (94    Ky.    439,    22 

S.  W.   750    [1893]),  589",  613. 
Kimball  v.  Mobile   (14  Fed.  Cas.  489, 

3  Woods,  555),  36.  360. 
Kimble    v.    City    of    Peoria    ( 140    111. 

157.    29    X.    E.    723    [1893]).    279, 

469,  570.  663.  848,  857.  860,  876. 
Kinealy    v.    (Jay     (7    'Slo.    App.    203 

[1879]  ),  569,'817. 
King  V.  Commissioners  of  Sewers  for 

Essex     (1    Barn.    &■  Cress.    477.    2 

How.  &   Byl.   700    [1823]).  25.   26. 
King   V.   (  ity  (if   Frankfort    (2   Kans. 

Ap]).    531),    43     I'ac.    983     [1895]), 

1503.    1526. 
King  V.  Lamb    (117  C:i1.  401.  49  Pac. 

561     [1897]).    315.    740.    749.    761, 

864,    1311. 
King  V.  City  of  Portland    (184  U.  S. 

61,   46   L.   431.   22    S.  290    [1902]), 

118,    125.    134.    147.    301.    670.    713. 

728,    1379. 


King  V.  City  of  Portland  (38  Or. 
402,  55  L."  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2 
[1900]),  11,  43,  89,  111,  118,  119, 
121,  122,  125,  134,  135,  147,  148. 
241,  301.-317.  359,  666,  668,  670, 
677,  695,  699,  700,  713,  728,  729, 
732,  740,  747,  756,  836,  1337,  1379. 

King  V.  Portland  (2  Or.  146  [1865]), 
43,  86,  100.  125.  147.  148,  301,  666. 
668.  690.  700. 

King  Hill  Brick  Co.  v.  Hamilton  (51 
Mo.  App.  120  [1892]).  273,  527. 
840,  867. 

Kingman,  Petition  of  ( 153  Mass. 
566,  12  L.  R.  A.  417,  27  N.  E.  778 
[1891]),  61,  356,  525,  664,  696. 

Kingsbiiry  v.  ^Missouri,  Kansas  & 
Texas  Ry.  Co.  (156  Mo.  379,  57  S. 
W.  547  "[V900]).  363. 

Kinnie  v.  Bare  (68  Mich.  625,  36  X\ 
W.   672),   291.   337. 

Kiphart  v.  Pittsburgh,  Cincinnati, 
Chicago  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  (7 
Ind.  App.  122,  34  X\  E.  375 
[1893]),   772,   735,   1006. 

Kipley  v.  People  of  State  of  Illinois 
(170   U.    S.    182,    18   S.   550),   715. 

Kirby  v.  Boylston  Market  As-ocia- 
tion  (80  Mass.  (14  Cray)  249.  74 
Am.   Dec.   682    [1859]  l.   58. 

Kirby  v.  Citizens  Railway  Compan.v 
(48  Md.  168,  30  Am,  Rep,  455). 
483. 

Kirby  v.  Village  of  Winton  Place  (7 
Ohio   X\   P.    169    [1899]),   740. 

Kirchman  v.  Peojde  ex  rel.  Kocher- 
sperger  (159  111.  321.  42  X.  E.  883 
[1896]!.  772.  927,  930.  9S6.  993. 
1341. 

Kirkendall  v,  (ity  of  Omaha  (39 
Xeb.  1.  57  X,  W,  752  [1894]),  65, 
651,    654, 

Kirkland  v.  Board  of  Public  Work-; 
of  the  'City  of  Indianapolis  (142 
Ind.  123,  41  X.  E.  374  [1895]). 
325,  432.  805. 

Kirkpatrick  v.  Taylor  (118  Ind,  329. 
21  X.  E.  20  [1888]).  267.  293. 
294.  375,  558.   1351.   1408.   1409, 

Kirksville,  City  of,  ex  rel,  Fleming 
^faiiufacturing  ('om])an.v  v.  Cole- 
man (103  :\lo.  App.  215.  77  S.  W. 
120).    777.    813.    S17,    831, 


CXXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Kirst    V.    street     Improvement    Dis- 
trict  Xo.    120    (—   Ark.  ,    109 

S.  W.  526   [1908]  ),  697,  909. 

Kirtland   v.   Parker    ( —   X.   J.   , 

68    Aitl.     913     [1908]),     693,    9.51, 
1405.     . 
Kirwan   v.   Fislier    ( 4   Mo.   App.    574 

[1877]),   725,  950. 
Kirwin  v.  Xevin   (111  Ky.  682,  64  S. 
W.  647,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  947   [1901]). 
18,    1164,    1194,    1207,   1526. 
Kittinger    v.    City    of    Buffalo     (148 
X.  Y.   332,  42  *X.   E.  803    [1896]). 
266,  356,  459,  636. 
Kizer    v.    Town    of    Winchester     (141 
Ind.    694,    40    X.    E.    265    [1895]), 
119,   324,   1005,    1282. 
Klein  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    ( 7   Ohio 

C.  C.  266    [1893]),   1-18. 
Klein    v.     Xugent    Gravel     Company 
(162     Ind.     509,     70     X.     E.     801 
[1903]),    575,    620,    626,    656.    929. 
1004. 
Klein    v.     Xugent    Gravel    Company 

(—  Ind.  App.  ,  66  X.  E.   486 

[1903]),    118,   575,   626,   929,   1004. 
Klein  v.  Tuhey    (13  Ind.  App.  74,  40 
X.   E.    144    [1895]),   555,   750,   751, 
763. 

Kline  v.  Hagey   ( —  Ind.  ,  81  X. 

E.  209   [1907]),  950. 
Kline  v.   City  of  Tacoma    (11   Wash. 
193,     39    Pac.     453     [1895]),    229, 
1006,    1007. 
Klinger   v.   The   People   ex   rel.    Con- 
kle    (130    111.    509,    22    X.    E.    600 
[1890]),  247,  564.  573,  692. 
Knapp   V.   City   of   Brookl.yn    (97    X. 
Y.   520    [1884]),    1422,    1451,    1463, 
1486,   1489. 
Knapp  V.  City  of  Brooklyn   (28  Hun, 

500    [1882]"),    1422,   1451. 
Knapp     V.     Heller      (32     Wis.     467 

[1873]),   1436. 
Knapp  V.  Mayor  and  Council  of  City 
of  Hoboken    (38   X.   J.   L.    (9  Vr.) 
371      [1876]),     1218.      1508.     1511. 
1518,    1525. 
Knaiist,   In   the  Matter   of   the   Peti- 
tion of    (101    X.   Y.    188,   4   X.   E. 
338    [1886]).   266,  495,  837. 
Kneeland   v.    Furlong    (20    Wis.    437 
[1866]),    1432 


Kneeland  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  (18 
Wis.  411  [1864]).  53,  223,  234, 
821,  823,  1432. 
Knell  V.  City  of  Buffalo  ( 54  Hun 
(X.  Y.)  80,  7  X.  Y.  Sup.  233 
[1889]),  1442. 
Knickerbocker     v.     People     (102     111. 

218),  180. 
Knoppi  V.  Gilsonite  Roofing  &  Pav- 
ing Company  ( 92  Mo.  App.  279, 
[1901]),  806,  811. 
Knowles  v.  Scale  (64  Cal.  377.  1 
Pac.  159  [1883]),  367,  437,  574. 
862. 

Knowles  v.   Temple    ( —  Wash.  . 

96    Pac.     1     [1908]).     1066,     1067, 
1072. 
Knowlton  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Rock  County    (9  Wis.  410  [1859]), 
35. 
Knox  V.  Police  Jury  of  West  Baton 
Rouge     (4    La.    Ann.    62     [1849]), 
1511. 
Knox   County   v.    Xichols    ( 14    0.    S. 

260),   365. 
Kodderly    v.    Portland     (44    Or.    118, 
74  Pac.   710,   75  Pac.  222   [1903]), 
956. 
Koehler   v.    Hill    (60    la.    543,    14    X. 

W.  738,   15  X.  W.  609),  216. 
Koestenbader   v.    Peirce    (41    la.    204 

[1875]),   72. 
Kohler    Brick    Co.    v    City    of    Toledo 
(29   Ohio   C.   C.   5.99    [1907]),   609, 
629,  741,  848. 
Kokomo,  City  of  v.  Mahan    ( 100  Ind. 

242    [1884]),   388. 
Koller    V.    City    of    La    Crosse     ( 106 
Wis.   369,   82   X.   W.    341    [1900]), 
67,  70,  77,  308,  1521. 
Koons    V.    Lucas    (52    la.    177,    3    X. 
W.  84   [1879]),  380,  381,  463,  601. 
Kootenai    County    v.    Hope    Lumber 
Co.    (13    Idaho,    262.    89    Pac.    1054 
[1907]),  22. 
Kotheimer    v.    Louisville    Interurban 
R.    R.    Co.     (Ky.)     89    S.    W.    104, 
28  Ky.   L.  R.   298    [1905]),   2. 
Kramer  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles   ( 147 
Cal.  668,  82  Pac.  334  [1905]).  324. 
326,  400.  426. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXVll 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Kraut    V.    City    of    Dayton    ( —    Ky. 

.  97  S.  W.  1101  '[190a]),  1168, 

1195,    1203. 
Kreling   v.    Miiller    (SO    L'al.    46.5,    25 

Pac.    10    [1890]  I,    684. 


Kretsch 

[18741). 

1.352. 
Kretsch 

[1871]), 


Helm      (45      Intl. 
500.     948.      1337, 


438 
1350. 


101 


.      Helm,      38      Ind. 
496,    1350,    1352. 
Krumberg  v.   City  of  Cincinnati    (29 

0.    S.    69     [1875]),    90,     113,    422, 

425,    426,    548,    574,    828.    832. 
Krutz  V.  Gardner    (25   Wash.  396,  65 

Pac.  771    [1901]).  1068,  1195,  1225. 
Krutz    V.    Gardner     (18    Wash.    332, 

51    Pac.    397     [1897]),    995.    1179, 

1204,    1223,    1225,    1243. 
Kuehner  v.  City  of  Freeport   ( 143  111. 

92,  17  L.  R.'  A.  774,  32  X.  E.  372 

[1893]),    103,    104,    236,    601,    623, 

665,  666,  670,  688,  715,  876. 
Kuester  v.  City  of  Chicago    (187  111. 

21,    58    X.    E.    307     [1900]).    864, 

1305,    1379. 
Kuhna    v.  'City   of    Omaha    (55    Xeb. 

183,    75   X.   W.   562    [1898]  I,    308. 

430.  570.  620,  622,  653,   1381. 
Kumnier   v.   Cincinnati    (27   Ohio   C. 

C.   R.   683    [1905]).   051.    654,    690. 

693,    699. 
Kunst  V.    People   ex   rel.   Kochersper- 

ger     (173    HI.    79,    50    X.    E.     168 

[1898]),  927,  928,  987,  1000,   1183. 
Kutchin  v.    Engolln-et    ( 129   Cal.   035. 

62  Pac.  214  [1900]).  510,  639.  641. 

840. 


L,    In    re    Avenue,    in    City    of    Xew 

York    (95   X.   Y.   S.   245."  107    Apj). 

Div.   581    [1905]).  427,   018. 
L'Hote    V.    Village    of    Milford     (212 

HI.  418,   103  Am.  St.  Rep.  234,  72 

X.  E.  ,399    [1904]),  181,  784. 
La  Veine  v.  Cit.v  of  Kansas  City   ( 07 

Kan.    239.    72    Pac.    774     [1903]). 

516.  570. 
Laakman   v.    Pritchard    (100   Ind.   24. 

66  X.   E.    153    [1902]  I.  877.    1007. 


Labs    V.    Cooper     (107    Cal.    656,    40 

Pac.   Rep.    1042    [1895]),   824,   886. 
Lacey   v.   City  of   Marslialltown    (99 

la.   367,  68  X.   W.   726),   603,  604, 

640. 
Lacey     Levee     &     Drainage     District. 

Commissioners      of     v.      Langellier 

(215     HI.     271,     74   X.     E.      148 

[1905]),    340,    1371. 
Lackland    v.    Walker     (151    Mo.    210. 

52  S.   W.  414   [1899]),  1053.   1057. 
Lacoste  v.  City  of  Xew  Orleans    (119 

La.   469,   44"  So.   267    [1907]),   515. 
Ladd    V.    Gambell     (35    Ore.    393,    59 

Pac.    113),    147. 
Ladd    V.    City    of    Portland     (32    Or. 

271,  67  Ani.   St.   Rep.  526,  51   Pac. 

654    [1898]),    166,    172,    373.    374, 

380,  381,  617,  648. 
Ladd    V.    Spencer     (23    Ore.    123,    31 

Pac.  Rep.  474),  223,  234,  501,  735, 

749,  754,   777,  848,  864. 
Lafayette,    City    of    v.    Fowkr     ( 34 

Ind.    140    [1870]!.    204,    388,    416. 

464,   783. 
Lafayette,   City   of   v.   The   ilale   Or- 
phans'    Asylum      (4     La.     Ann.     1 

[1849]),  42,   155,  589,   613. 
Lafayette.  City  of  v.  Shultz   (44   Ind. 

97    [1873]),'   1519. 
Laflin    v.    City    of    Chicago     (48    HI. 

449     [1868]"),    475.    477,    950.    902. 

908,  975. 
Laguna  Drainage  District  v.   Charles 

Martin    (  144  Cal.  209.  77  Pac.  933 

[1904]),    83,    292,    335,    030.    059. 

670,    708. 
Laimbeer    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

Commonaltv   of    the    City   of    Xew 

York  (0  X.  \^  Sup.  Ct."  Rep.  109 

[1850]),  279,  281,  813,  886,  1375. 
Lake  v.  City  of  Decatur  (91  111. 

596  [1879]),  51,  103,  104.  550. 

553,   553,   623,   642.    723,   862,   867. 
LaKe    V.    Trustees   of   the    Village   of 

Williamsburg        (4        Denio.       520 

[1847]),    1506. 
Lake   Erie  «&   Western   Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Bowkcr    (9   Ind.   App.  428. 

36    X.    E.    Rep.    864    [1893]).    324, 

594.   590.  598.  886.   891.  918.    1026. 

107s.    1224.    1305 


CXXXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Lake  Erie  &  Western  Railroad  Co. 
V.  Cluggish  (143  Ind.  347,  42  N. 
E.   743    [1895]),   661. 

Lake  Erie  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Walters  (13  Ind.  App.  275,  41  N. 
E.  465   [1895]),  543. 

Lake  Erie  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watkins 
(157  Ind.  600,  62  X.  E.  443),  142, 
1347. 

Lake  Fork  Special  Drainage  Dis- 
trict, Commissioners  of  v.  The 
People  ex  rel.  Bodman  ( 138  111. 
87,  27  N.  E.  857  [1892]),  340,  564, 
1477. 

Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern 
Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago (148  111.  509,  37  "x.  E.  88 
[1894]),  228,   229,   426. 

Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern 
Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago (144  111.  391,  33  X<  E.  602 
[1893]),  495,  497,  804. 

Lake  Shore  &  ^Michigan  Southern 
Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids, 102  Mich.  374,  29  L.  R.  A. 
195,    60    X.    VV.    767     [1894]),    42. 

314,  594,   595,   598,   614,   1078. 
Lake  Street  Elevated   Railroad  Com- 
pany V.   City   of  Chicago    (183   111. 
75,  47  L.  R.  A.  624,  55  X.  E.  721 
[1899]),   601,  617. 

Lake  Washington  Waterway  Co.  v. 
Seattle  Dock  Co.,  (35  Wash.  503, 
77  Pac.  845    [1904]),    124. 

Lakeview  Avenue,   In  re,   in   City  of 

S.eattle    (—   Wash.    ,    89    Pac. 

156   [1907]),  697. 

Lamar  Water  &  Electric  Light  Co.  v. 
City  of  Lamar,  128  Mo.  188,  32 
L.  R.  A.  157,  26  S.  W.  1025.  31 
S.  \N.  756  [1895]),  8.  39,  47,  50. 
145,  212. 

Lamb  v.  City  of  Chicago  (219  111. 
229,    76    X.    E.    343    [1906]),    295, 

315,  387,  464,  670,  715,  920,   1375. 
Lamb   v.   Elizabeth   City    (131   X.   C. 

241,  42  S.  E.  603   [1902]),  67. 
Lambert  v.   Bates    (148   Cal.    146.  82 

Pac.   767    [1905]),   301,   531,    1366. 
Lambert  v.   Bates    (137   Cal.   676,   70 

Pac.    777),    531,    537,    1005,    1007, 

1030,   1337. 


Lambert    v.    Marcuse     ( 137    Cal.    44, 

69  Pac.  620   [1902]),  315,  831,  864. 
Lambert    v.    Mills    County     (58     la. 

666,    12   X.    W.   715),    142. 
Lambertville,      Inhabitants      of      the 

Town    of    V.    Clevinger    ( 30    X.    J. 

L.    (1    Vr.)    53    [1862]),    71. 
Lammers     v.     Balfe      (41     Ind.     218 

[1872]),  526,  964,  983,   1118,  1191, 

1377,    1392. 
Landes  v.  State  ex  rel.   ^latson    (  KiO 

Ind.    479,    07    X.    E.    189    [1903]). 

845. 
Lands,    Owners    of    v.    People    ex    rel. 

Stookey     (113     111.     290     [1880]), 

119,   249. 
Lane     v.     Burnap      (  iO     Midi.     730 

[1878]),     747.     764,      1003,      1278. 

1402. 
Lane   v.    ]\Iorrel    (3    Edward's    Chan. 

Rep.  185   [1838]),  887,   1059,   1008. 
Lanfersiek  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    (28 

Ohio  C.  C.  822'[1904]),  657,  1432. 
Lang  V.  Kiendl   (27  Hun  66   [1882]), 

961. 
Langan   v.    Bitzer    ( —   Ky.   .    82 

S.    W.    280,    20    Ky.    L.    Rep.    579 

[1904]),    323.    420,"^  475,    575,    891, 

977,    979,    981,    1330. 
Lange,    In    the    Matter    of    the    Ap- 
plication   of    to    Vacate    an    Assess- 
ment   (85  X.  Y.  307    [1881]),  265, 

482,  495,  496,  989,   1455. 
Langhor     v.     Smith      (81      Ind.     495 

[1882]),    1191,    1297,    1450. 
Langlois   v.    Cameron    (201    111.    301, 

66    X.    E.    332    [1903]),    136,    263, 

620,   623,   631,    751.    895,    1196. 
Langmead  v.   City  of  Cincinnati    ( 29 

Ohio    C.    C.    64*^  [1906]),   417,   658. 
Langsdale   v.    Xicklans    (38   Ind.    289 

[1871]),    526,    1067. 
Lanning   v.    Palmer    (117    Mich.    529. 

76  X.  W.  2   [1898]),  373,  375,  738. 
Lanphere    v.    City    of    Chicago     (212 

111.    440,    72    X.    E.    426     [1904]), 

570.   804. 
Lansing  v.   Cit.v  of  Lincoln    ( 32  Xeb. 

457,    49    X.    W.    650    [1891]).    321, 

619,    713. 
Lansing,  City  of  v.   Van   Gorder    ( 24 

Midi.   456    [1872]),    1512. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXXXIX 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Lanster  v.  Meyers    ( —  Ind. ,  84 

X.    E.    1087    [1908]),    1384. 
Lantz     V.    Fishburn      ( —    C'al.     App. 

,    91    Pac.    81G    [1900]),    1112, 

1174,   1177,   1181,    1200. 
Laporte    County,    Board    of    Commis- 
sioners of  V.  Wolff    ( —  Ind.  , 

72   N.   E.    860    [1904]),    .534.    1449. 
Large  v.   Kien's   Creek   Draining  Co. 

(30    Ind.    263,    95    Am.    Dec.    696 

[1868]  ),   340,    905,    1231. 
Larned    v.    Maloney     (19    Ind.    App. 

199.   49   X.   E.   278    [1898]),   509. 
Larson  v.   City  of   Chicago    (172   111. 

298,  50  X.'e.  179  [1898]).  772, 

900,  927,  935,  936,  947.  986.  996. 

1183,  1340.  1379. 
Larson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kochcrsper- 

ger  (170  111.  93.  48  X.  E.  443 

[1897]),  745.  765,  902,  927,  930, 

936.  986,  993,  996,  1183,  1340, 

1379. 
Lasbury  v.  McCague  ( 56  Xeb.  220, 

76  X.  W.  862  [1898]),  342,  1072, 

1431,    1450. 
Latham   v.  Village  of  Wilmette    (168 

111.    153,    48    X.    E.    311     [1897]), 

517,  518.  557,  657.  672,  923,   1085, 

130f),   1333. 
I.<athrop   V.   Citj'^  of  Buffalo    ( 3   Abb. 

Ct.  App.    (X.  Y.)    30   [1861]),  223, 

234,   569,   785. 
Lathrop  v.  City  of  Racine   (119  Wis. 

461,    97    X.    W.    192    [1903]),    92, 

98,  3()2,  713,  717. 
Lathrop    Township,    /»    re,    Road    in 

(84     Pa.      St.      (3      Xorris)      126 

[1877]),   925. 
Laverty    v.    State   ex    rel.    Hill    (109 

Ind.  217,  9  X.  E.  774   [1886]),  73, 

340.  403.    1156.   1251,   1346. 
Laubach   v.   O'Meara    (107   Mich.    29. 

()4  X.   W.  865   [1895]),  403. 
Laughlin     v.     Avers      (66     Ind.     445 

[1879]),  280, "l250. 
Law   V.    Johnston    (118    Ind.    261.    20 

X.   E.   745    [1888]),    119.   301.    773, 

1141. 
Law  V.  ]\Iadison.   Smyrna  &   Graham 

Turnpike     Company     (30     Ind.     77 

[1868]),   11,  43,  89.    145.  284.  322. 

639.    651,   654.   665.   666.   688. 
Lawrpjic(>,     (  itv     of     v.     Killam     (11 


Kan.    499     [1873])     323,    440,    474. 

486,    562,     620,     663,     1431,     1432, 

1435. 
Lawrence     v.    People    ex    rel.     Foote 

(188      111.      407,     58     X.      E.     991 

[1900]),   525,    1183,    1469. 
Lawrence,    City   of    v.    Webster    (167 

Mass.   513,   46   X.   E.    123),   756. 
Le  Breton  v.  Morgan   ( 4  Mart.   ( La. ) 

X.    S.    138,    142    [1826]),    155. 
Le    Moyne    v.   City   of    Chicago    (175 

111.    356,    51    X.    E.    718     [1898]), 

381,   386,   943,   966,   995. 
Le    !Moyne    v.     West    Chicago     Park 

Commissioners    (116    111.   41,    4    X. 

E.   498.   6   X.   E.   48    [1886]),   745, 

763,   913,   918,   986,    1340, 
LeRoy     v.      ]\Iayor,     Aldermen      and 

Commonalty    of    the    City   of    Xew 

York    (20   John    Sup.    Ct.    430,    11 

Am.    Dec.    289    [1823]),    557,    558, 

1394. 
Lea   V.   City   of   Memphis    (68   Tenn. 

(9     Baxter)      103     [1877]),     1439, 

1483. 
Leake   v.    City   of   Philadelphia    (171 

Pa.  St.   125,  32  Atl.   1110   [1895]), 

291,    382,   383.    1431. 
Leake   v.    Philadelphia    (1.50   Pa.    St. 

643,  24  Atl.  351  [1892]),  383,  1411. 
Leake   and   Watts   Orphan   Home,   In 

the   Matter  of   the  Petition  of   the 

Trustees    of    the,    in    the    City    of 

Xew    York    to    Vacate    an    Assess- 
ment   (92  X.  Y.   116   [1883]),   194. 

195.   324.    432,    479,   482,    484,   485, 

1454. 
Leakman   v.   Pritchard    (160   Ind.   24, 

66   X.   E,   153    [1902]),   531. 
Lear     v.     Halstead     (41     0.     S.     566 

[1885]),   629,    781,    1028, 
Leary    v,    Gardnei     (63    X,    Y.    624), 

1460, 
Leavenworth,    Cit.v    of    v.    .lones     (69 

Kan.    857,    77   "Pao.    273     [1904]), 

1440, 
Leavenworth,    City    of    v.    Laing     (6 

Kan.   274    [1870]),  580. 
Leavenworth.     City    of    v.     Mills     (6 

Kan.   288   [1870]),   538.  950,    1375, 

1508. 
Leavenworth,    City    of    v.    Stille     (13 

Kan.    539    [1874])      1.5(18. 


cxl 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Leavenworth  County  v.  Miller  ( 7 
Kan.  479,   12  Am.'  Rep.  425),  365. 

Leavitt  v.  Bell  (55  Xeb.  57,  75  N. 
W.  524  [1898]),  745,  763,  775, 
781,   884,   911,   1057,   1304. 

Lebanon  &  Northern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cin- 
cinnati (02  0.  S.  465.  49  L.  R.  A. 
566,    57    N.    E.    229    [1900]).    700. 

Leeds  v.  Defrees  (157  Ind.  392,  61 
K  E.  930  [1901]),  86,  119,  301, 
620,  690,  699,  745,  781,  1060,  1244, 
1375. 

Leeds  v.  City  of  Richmond  ( 102  Ind. 
372,  1  N.  E.  711  [1885]),  245,  293, 

392,  400,   476,    1005,    1007. 
Lefevre    v.    Mayor,    etc.,    of    Detroit 

(2     Mich.    586    [1853]),    42,     314, 

415,   525,   588,   613,   614,   886,   887. 
Legsett     V.     City     of     Detroit     (137 

Mich.  247,  100  X.  W.  566   [1904]), 

616. 
Lehigh    Valley    Coal    Co.    v.    City   of 

Chicago    (26  Fed.  413   [1880])",  71. 
Lehmaier  v.  Jones   (91  N.  Y.  S.  687, 

100   App.    Div.    495    [1905]),    1054. 
Lehman    v.    McBride    (  15    0.    S.    573 

[1864]),   189. 
Lehmer  v.  People  ex   rel.   Miller    (80 

111.     601     [1875]),    393,    396.     455, 

927,  937,   986,    1340. 
Lehmers  v.  City  of  Chicago    (178  111. 

530,    53    X.    E.    394    [1899]).    570, 

862,  865. 
Leighton   v.    Ricker    I  173    Mass.    564, 

54  X.   E.   254).    1072. 
Leindecker     v.     The     People     ex     rel. 

Johnson     (98    111.     21),    45,     1126, 

1176,   1188. 
Leinen    v.    Elter    (43    Hun     (X.    Y.) 

249    [1887]),   1056. 
Leitch  V.  Village  of  La  Grange    (138 

lU.    291,    27    X.    E.    917    [1892]). 

324,    610,   653,   6.55,    658,   603,   670. 
Leitch    V.    People   ex    rel.    Gannaway 

(183     111.     569,     56     X.     E.      127 

[1900]),  745,   769,  772,  927,  928. 
Leman   v.    City   of   Lake   View    (131 

111.    388,    23    X\    E.    346    [1890]). 

393,  390,   547,   587,   775,   909. 
Lembeck  v.   Mayor   and  Aldermen   of 

Jersey     City  "  ( 30     X\    J.    Eq.      ( 3 
Stew.)    554    [1879]).    141.5. 


Lemont,  Village  of  v.  .Jenks  ( 197 
111.  303,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  172,  64 
X.  E.  362  [1902]),  6,  98,  354,  708, 
717,   1039. 

Lennon  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 
York  (55  X.  Y.  361  [1874]),  166, 
167,   983,    1337,    1451. 

Lennon  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of 
Xew  l^ork  (o  Daly  (X.  Y.)"^  347 
[1874]).  983,  1113,  1196,  1426, 
1427. 

Lenon  v.  Brodie  (81  Ark.  208,  98 
S.  W.  979  [1906]),  553,  5.55,  795, 
801,    1277. 

Lent  V.  Tillson  ( 140  U.  S.  316,  35 
L.  419,  11  S.  825  [1891]).  119, 
121,  133,  250,  251,  252,  266,  292, 
309,  553,   728,  760,   761,   1370. 

Lent  V.  Tillson    (72  Cal.  404,  14  Pac. 

71  [1887]),  86,  119,  125,  244,  247, 
250,  251,  252,  266,  292,  293,  -298, 
309,  553,  726,  728,  745,  751,  760, 
761,  918,  1015,  1026,  1333,  1337, 
1370,    1414,    1431. 

Lentz  V.  City  of  Dallas   ( 96  Tex.  258, 

72  S.  W.59  [1903]),  93,  96,  323, 
419,  420,  702,  717. 

Leominster,  Inhabitants  of  v.  Con- 
ant    (139   Mass.   384,    2   X.    E.    690 

[1885]),    324,    367,    527,    625,    6.58. 

707,  8.34,  855,   1067,   1130. 
Leonard  v.   City  of  Brooklyn    (71   X. 

Y.   498,   27  Am.   Rep.  80  h  580. 
Leonard  v.  Sparks   (63  Mo.  App.  585 

[1895]).   735,   747,   770. 
Leslie   v.   City   of   St.   Louis    (47   Mo. 

474    [1871]).    .308,    391,    394.    426, 

1426,    1430. 
Lester,    In    the   ]Matter    of    (21    Hun 

(X.    Y.)     130    [1880]),    205,    1455. 
Lester  v.    City  of  Seattle    (42  Wash. 

539,  85  Pac.   14    [1900]),  301.  965, 

990,    1447. 
Levee    Commissioners,    Board    of    v. 

Lario     Bros.     (33    La.     Ann.     276 

[1881]),   343. 
Lever.     In    re     (1     Ch.     32    [1897]), 

1055. 
Levi    V.    Louisville    (97    Ky.    394,    28 

L.  R.  A.  480,  30  S.  W.  973).  613. 
Levy.   In   the  Matter  of    (4  Hun  501 

[1875]),  740.   747. 


I 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxli 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Levy    V.    City    of    Chicago     iW.i    111. 

050    [1886]),   313,   804. 
Levy  V.  Superior  Court  of  San  Fran- 
oisco    (lt)7   U.   S.    175.    17   S.   769). 
715. 
Levy    V.    Wilcox     (96    Wis.     127.    70 

N.    W.    1109    [1897]).    3. 
Lewis,    In    the    Matter    of    (51    Barb. 
(N.     Y.)      82     [1868]),     469,     505. 
1455. 
Lewis,  In  the  matter  of   ( 35  Howard 
162     [1868]),    266,    469.    485.    505, 
532,   537.   740,  843,  844,  848,   1452. 
Lewis    V.    Albertson     (23    Ind.    App. 
147,   53   X.   E.    1071    [1899]).   301, 
405,     568,     728.     831,     1150,     1;229, 
1234,   1235.-  1240,   1242,   1249,   1262, 
1275. 
Lewis    V.    City    of    Elizabeth     (25    N. 
J.  Eq.   (IOC.  E.  Gr.)    298   [1874]), 
515,  570,  1432. 
Lewis    V.    Laylin     (46    O.    S.    663,    23 
N.   E.    288    [189911,   322.    672,   690, 
1416. 
Lewis    V.    City    of    Xew    Britain     (52 

Conn.   568    [1885]),   323. 
Lewis,  In  the  Matter  o-f  the  Petition 
of   V.    Mayor,   etc.,   of   the   City   of 
New    xork    (35  How.    (X.  Y.)    162 
[1868]),   374.    381. 

Lewis   V.    Schmidt    ( —   Ky.   ,    43 

S.   W.   433,    19   Ky.    L.   kep.    1315), 
431. 
Lewis   V.   City   of   Seattle    (28   W3sh. 
639.     69    Pac.     393     [1902]),      166. 
263.    268,    414.    440,    569.    666.    670. 
690,  725.   961.  969,   1169. 
Lewis   V.    Symnies    (61    0.    S.   471.'  76 
Am.    St.    Pep.    428,    56    X.    E.    194 
[1899]).   174.   189,  252. 
Lewis    County    v.   Gordon    (20    Wash. 

80.   54  Pac.   779    [1898]  ).   338. 
Lexington,    City    of,    on    A])peal     (96 
Ky.    258.    28    S.    W.    665     [1894]), 
209.  508.   1502. 
Lexington,   City  of  v.   Bowman    (119 
Ky.    840.    84    S.    W.    1161.    27    Ky. 
Law    Rep.    286    [1905]);     (petition 
for    rehearing    overruled    in    85    S. 
W.    1191,   27    Ky.   Law  Pep.    651), 
1021.    1167. 
Lexington,    Citv    of,    ex    rel.    ^Menefee 


V.  Commercial  Bank   ( —  Mo.  App. 

,  108  S.  W.   1095   [1908]),  499. 

830. 
Lexington,    City    of    v.    Headley     (68 

Ky.    (5    Bush.)    508    [1869])"^.    843. 

951,    1279,    1280,    1304. 
Lexington,   The   Mayor,   etc.,   of  City 

of   V.    Long    (31    Mo.    369    [1861]). 

309.    698,    716,    1366. 
Lexington,     City     of     v.     McC^uillan's 

Heirs    (39    Ky.    (9    Dana)    513.    35 

Am.   Dec.    159    [1839]),    12,  22,   34. 

86,    100,    111,    147,    154,    245,    301. 

308,   628.   662,   688,    710,   779,    781, 

791,  843. 
Lexington,  City  of  v.  Walby   ( —  Ky. 

,   109  S.  VV.   299    [1908]),  527. 

Lexington  Avenue.  Matter  of    (92   X. 

Y.   629    [1883]),   188. 
Lexington     Avenue,    Matter    of      (29 

Hun    303    [1883]),   188. 
Lexington   Avfenue,    In   the  MattiM-  .>f 

Opening    (50  Howard    (X.   Y.)    114 

[1874]).   855,    1016. 
Libbey  v.   Elsworth    (97   Cal.   316,   3Z 

Pac'.    228    [1893]),   491,   522,    1235. 
Ljijeity    Township    Draining    Associa- 
tion    V.     Watkins      (72     Ind.      !59 

[1880]),    564,    1273,    1337. 
Liebermann     v.     City     of    Mihvaukea 

(89     Wis.     33(),     61     X.     W.     1112 

[1895]),    62,    266.    428,    777,    862, 

981,    1196,    1426,    1427. 
Liebstein     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

Council  of  the  City  of  Xewark    (24 

X.     .1.     Eq.     (9    C\    E.     Gr.)      200 

[1873]),    16,    531,    534,    536,    1015, 

1423,    1424,    1436. 
Lien    v.    Board    of    County    Commis- 
sioners    of     X'orman     Count.v      (80 

:\Iinn.  58,  82  X.  W.    1094    [1900]). 
86,  97,   194,  335,  340,  449. 
Lienen    v.    Elter     (43    Hun     (X.    Y. ) 

249  [1887]),  1443. 
Ligare  v.  City  of  Chicago  (  i;j9  111. 
46,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  179,  28  X. 
E.  934),  298. 
Lightner  v.  City  of  Peoria  (150  ill. 
80,  37  X.  E.  69  [1894]),  51,  245, 
250,  258,  555,  574,  587.  601,  603, 
604.  623.  643.  651.  CA\V>,  670,  677, 
68S.    715.    72.'!.    872.     1()^'5.    1333. 


cxlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Lill  V.  The  City  of  Chicago    (29  111. 

31     [1862]),    223,     234,    554,     620, 

670,    707,   941,    1341. 
Lima    v.    Cemetery    Association     (42 

0.     S.      128,     51     Am.     Rep.     809 

[1884]),   11,  35,  42,  301,  592,  613, 

614,   1277. 
Linck  V.   City  of  Litchfield    (141   111. 

469,    31    N.    E.    123    [1893]),    181, 

245,  258,  281,  764,  883,  1183,  1299. 

1303,   1305,    1317,   1372. 
Lincoln  v.   Board  of   Street   Commis- 
sioners of  the  City  of  Boston   ( 176 

Mass.  210,  57   N.   E.   356    [1900]), 

64,  65,  66,  103,  118,  156,  350,  549, 

556,   572,   642,   645,   651,   654.   656, 

666,  695,  702,   724,  893. 
Lincoln,  City  of  v.  Janesch    (63  Neb. 

707,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  478,  56  L.  R. 

A.  762,  89  N.  W.  280   [1902]),  90, 

420. 
Lincoln    Avenue,    In    re,    Jenkinson's 

Appeal    (193   Pa.    St.   435,   44   Atl. 

1102   [1899]),  383. 
Lincoln  Ave.,  In  re  Rodger's  Appeal 

(193    Pa.    St.    432,    44    Atl.     1102 

[1899]),  462. 
Lindenberger  Land  Co.  v.  R.  B.  Park 

&  Co.    (—  Ky.  ,  85  S.  W.  213, 

27   Ky.   L.  Rep.   437    [1905]).   301, 

541,  575,  656,   822. 
Lindsay  v.  City  of  Chicago    (115  111. 

120,  3  N.  E.  443   [1886]),  837,  843, 

923,   951,    1280.    1281,    1299,    1304. 
Lindsay     v.    Commissioners    (2     Bay 

(S.  C.)    38   [1796]),  359. 
Lindsey   v.    Brawner     ( —    Ky.    , 

97   S.   W.   1,   29   Ky.   L.   Rep.    1236 

[1906]),   301,   462,"  524. 
Lingenfelter    v.    Danville    and    Xorth 

Salem    Gravel    Road    Co.    (33    Ind. 

133    [1870]),   723. 
Lingle   v.    City   of  Chicago    (172   111. 

170,    50    N."  E.    192    [1898]),    223, 

234,  266,  765,  914,   1304. 
Lingle   v.    City   of   Chicago    (212   111. 

512,  72  N.'  E.  677  [1904]),  913, 

914,  1368. 
Lingle  v.  City  of  Chicago  (210  111. 

600,  71  N.  E.  590  [1904]).  1348, 

1356. 
Lingle   v.   West    Chicago    Park    Com- 


missioners   (222  111.  384,   78  N.  E. 

794    [1906]),    293,    348,    356,    368, 

418,  451,   653,  920. 
Linne    v.    Bredes    ( 43    Wash.    540,    6 

L.  R.  A.    (X.  S.)    707,  86  Pac.  858 

[1906]),   1050.  1072. 
Linneus,    City    of   v.   Locke    (25   Mo. 

App.    407    [1887]),    1135,    1137. 
Linville    v.   State    ex    rel.     (130    Ind. 

210,  29  X.   E.    1129),  267,  814. 
Lipes   V.   Hand    (104    Ind.   503,    1   X. 

E.  871,  4  X.   E.   160   [1885]),  202, 

284,   287,   340,   341,   549,   564,   654. 
Lippert  v.  Parker    (76  0.  S.   568,  81 

N.  E.   1189    [1907]),  839. 
Lippert   v.   City  of   Toledo    (29   Ohio 

C.    C.   345    [1906]),  839. 
Lisbon  Avenue  Land  Co.   v.  Town  of 

Lake    (—   Wis.    .    113    X.    W, 

1099     [1907]),    93,    96,    374,    717. 

867. 
Lister  v.  City  of  Tacoma    ( 44  Wash. 

222,     87    Pac.     126    [1906]),     301. 

541,    1085. 
Litchfield    v.    McComber     (42    Barb. 

288    [1864]),   8,   89,    1214. 
Litchfield   v.   Vernon    (41    X^.   Y.    123 

[1869]),   11,   100,   110,  781. 
Litchfield   &   Madison   Railway   Com- 
pany V.  People,  ex  rel.  McCormick 

(225     111.     301,     80     X.     E.     335 

[1907]),  322. 
Little,   In   the   Matter   of    (60   X.   Y. 

343    [1875]),    740,   762,    836,    1466. 
Little,  In  the  Matter  of   (3  Hun   (X. 

Y.)    215    [1874]),    740,    836,    1466. 
Little    V.    City    of    Chicago     (46    111. 

App.  534   [i892]),  601,  1080,  1277, 

1469,    1506,    1518. 
Little   V.   City  of   Portland    (26   Ore. 

235,     37    Pac.     911    [1894]),     507. 

1504,    1508,   1510,   1511. 
Little  V.  City  of  Rochester    (87  Hun 

493,  34    X.    Y.    S.    1010    [1895]), 
721,    1037,    1090. 

Little  Rock,  City  of  v.  Board  of  Im- 
provements, etc.  (42  Ark.  152 
[18S3]),  89,  103,  105,  151,  247, 
249.  256,   266,  268,   1469. 

Little    Rock    v.    Fitzgerald    (59   Ark. 

494,  28  L.  R.  A.  496,  28  S.  W.   32 
[1894]).  55,   313,  443,  713. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxliii 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Little  Rock  v.  Katzenstein  ( 52  Ark. 
107,  12  S.  W.  19S  [18S9]),  103, 
151,  548,  549,  G19,  621,  626,  651, 
653. 

Little  Eock  &  Ft.  Smitli  Railway 
Company  v.  Allister  (68  Ark.  600, 
60  S.  W.  953   [1901]),  66. 

Livingston,  In  the  Matter  of  tlie  Pe- 
tition of  to  Vacate  an  Assessment 
(121  N.  Y.  94,  24  X.  E.  290 
[1890]),  16,  263,  271,  484,  485, 
584,    670,    981,    1451,    1454,    1463. 

Livingston  v.  Xew  York  (8  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  85,  22  Am.  Dec.  622), 
73,   110,   147. 

Loan  Association  v.  Topeka  ( 87  U. 
S.  (20  Wall.)  655,  22  L.  455), 
283. 

i^oekwood  v.  Gehlert  (53  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  15,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  20  [1889]), 
1181,   1197. 

Lockwood  V.  City  of  St.  Louis  (24 
Mo.  20  [1856]'),  11,  78,  147,  324, 
588,  612,  613,   1420,   1426. 

Locust  Avenue,  In  the  Matter  of 
Opening,  in  Village  of  Port  Ches- 
ter (185  X.  Y.  115,  77  X.  E.  1012 
[1906]),   477,   663,   776,   783. 

Locust  Avenue,  Matter  of  (97  X.  Y. 
S.  508,  110  App.  Div.  774  [1906]). 
477,   783. 

Locust  Avenue,  In  re  (87  X.  Y.  S. 
798,  93  App.  Div.  416  [1904]), 
263,   775. 

Loeb  v.  Columbia  Township  Trustees 
(179  U.  S.  472,  45  L.  280,  21  S. 
174  [1901]),  189,  698,  702,  1374, 
1502. 

Loeb  v.  Trustees  of  Columbia  Town- 
ship, Hamilton  County,  0.  (91 
Fed.  37  [1899]),  81,  118,  189,  666, 
698,  702,  709,   1374,   1502. 

Loeser  v.  Redd  &  Bro.  (77  Ky.  (14 
Bush.)    18    [1878]),  629,  977. 

Loesnitz  v.  Seelinger  (127  Ind.  422, 
25  X.  E.  1037,  26  X.  E.  887 
[1890]),  266,  268,  270,  322,  416, 
423,  432,  465,  479,  540,  739,  951, 
1004,    1337,   1366,    1435. 

Loew,  In  the  Matter  of  (90  X.  Y. 
666   [1882]),  1373. 

Logansport,  City  of  v.  Humphrey 
(84  Ind.  467),  1206. 


Logansport,  City  of  v.  Legg   (20  Ind. 

315   [1863]),  843. 
Logansport,    City    of    v.    Shirk     (129 

Ind.    352,    28    X.    E.    538    [1891]), 
101,    119,    126,   729,   748. 
Logansport,  City  of  v.  Uhl    (99  Ind. 

531,     50    Am."    Rep.    lOJ      [1884]), 

1015. 
Lohrum    v.    Eyermann     (5    Mo.    App. 

481    [1878]),    11,    1346. 
Lombard  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners   (181    U.    S.    33,    45    L. 

731,    21    S.    507    [1901]),    51,    314. 

356,  407,  414,  715,  959,  962,   1370. 
London     and     Xorthwest     American 

Mortgage   Company   v.   Gibson    (77 

Minn.    394,    80     X.     W.    205,    777 
[1899]),     986,     998,      1149,      1180, 

1440. 
Londoner    v.     City     and     County    of 

Denver    (210   U.   S.   373,  28   sl  708 

[1908]),    119,    251,   629,   731. 
Long    V.    lona    Probate    Judge     ( 130 

Mich.    338,    89    X.    W.    938),    1348. 
Long    V.    O'Rourke     (10    Phil.     129), 

521. 
Long   V.    Ruch     (  148    Ind.    74,    47    X. 

E.    156),    1444. 
Long    Branch    Police,    Sanitary    and 

Improvement    Commission    v.    Dob- 
bins   (61    X.   J.   L.    (32   Vr.)    659, 

40     Atl.     599     [1898]),     699,     925, 

956,  973,    1282,    1366. 
Lougwell     V.    Kansas    City    (69     Mo. 

App.   177   [1896]),  394,"  757. 
Longworth  v.  Cit.y  of  Cincinnati    (34 

O.   S.    101    [1877]),    316,   432,   468, 

511,  542,  822. 
Long;s-ear  v.   Toolan    (209   IT.   S.   414, 

28    S.    506    [1908]),    119. 
Loomis   v.   City  of  Little  Falls    (176 

X.    Y.    31,    68    X.    E.    105    [1903]). 

141,    1337. 
Loomis   V.    City   of   Little    Falls    (72 

X.    Y.    S.    774,    66    App.    Div.    299 

[1901]),   141.   1337. 
Lord,    In    the    Matter    of    (78    X.    Y. 

109    [1879]),  381,  479,   1016,   1461. 
Lord,  In  the  Matter  of   (21  Hun  555 

[1880]),    1016,    1461. 
Lord   v.   Mayor   and   Council   of   City 

of  Bayonne   (65  X.  J.  L.    (36  Vr.) 

127,  46  Atl.  701   [1900]),  956,  959. 


cxHv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Lorden  v.  Coffey    (178  Mass.  489,  60 

N.   E.    124    [i901]),   82,    103,    623, 

667,  677,  695,  709,  1067. 
Lorenz    v.    Armstrong     ( 3    Mo.    App. 

574),   393,   396. 
Los  Angeles,  City  of  v.  Amidor    (140 

Cal.    400,    73    Pac.     1049     [1903]), 

1490,    1496. 
Los    Angeles    Lighting    Company    v. 

City  of  Los  Angeles   ( 106  Cal.  156, 

39    Pac.    Rep.    535     [1895]),    804, 

805,  810,  831. 
Louchheim    v.    Citj'    of    Philadelphia 

(218      Pa.      100,      66      Atl.      1121 

[1907]),   495. 
Louisiana,     City     of     v.     ilcAllister 

(104  Mo.  App.   152.   78   S.   W.   314 

[1903]),  748,  768. 
Louisiana     v.     Miller     (06     Mo.     467 

[1877]),   323,   837,   1040. 
Louisiana    v.    Pillsburj'     ( 105    U.    S. 

278,   26  L.    1090    [1881]),    1469. 
Louisiana,   City   of   v.   Shaffner    ( 104 

Mo.     App.     101,     78     S.     W.     287 

[1903]),   53.   55,   501,  510,   840. 
Louisiana    Improvement    Company    v. 

Baton  Rouge  Electric  &   Gas  Com- 

pany     (114    La.    534,    38    So.    444 

[1905]),  599,  663,  725,   1028,  1215, 

1216,   1224,  1503. 
Louisville,      City      of     v.      American 

Standard     Asphalt     Co.      ( —     Ky. 

,    102    S.   W.    806,    31    Ky.    L. 

R.  133   [1907]),  628,  666,  709,^^710, 

977,  979,   1505. 
Louisville,    City    of    v.    Bitzer     (115 

Ky.    359,    61    L.   R.    A.   434,   73    S. 

W.    1115,    24    Ky.    Law    Rep.    2263 

[1903]),  651,  674,   678. 
Louisville,   City   of   v.   Henderson    (5 

Bush.    (68  Ky.)    515    [1869]),  517, 

518,    1224. 
Louisville,  City  of  v.  Hyatt   (41  Ky. 

(2   B.   :Monroe)    177,   36   Am.   Dec. 

594     [1841]),    86,     147,    245,     301, 

488,    783,   789,  '843,    1509. 
Louisville,    City    of    v.    Leatherman 

(99     Ky.     213,     35     S.     W.     625 

ri896[)',     586,     612.      1077,      1498, 

1508. 
Loiiisville,  Cit.y  of  v.  Louisville  Roll- 
ing    Mill    Company      (66    Ky.      (3 


Bush.)      416,     96     Am.     Dec.     243 

[1867]),   71,   111,   678. 
Louisville,    City    of    v.    MeXaughton 
(114     Ky.     333,     70     S.     W.     841 

[1902]),'  1164,    1526. 
Louisville    v.     Xevin     (73     Ky.      (10 

Bush.)      549,      19      Am.      Rep.      78 

[1874]),   42. 
Louisville,    City    of    v.    Osborne    (73 

Ky.    (10  Bush.)    226   [1874]),   352, 

628. 
Louisville,    City    of    v.    Selvage    ( 106 

Ky.   730.  ol's.   W.   447,   52   S.  W. 

809    [1899]),    465,    479,   519,    628, 

629,  675,  909,  710,  84^,  1108. 
Louisville,  City  of  v.  Tyler    (111  Ky. 

588,   64   S.   W.   415,   65   S.   W.   125 

[1901]),   462. 
Louisville,  City  of  v,  Wible    ( 84  Ky. 

290,    1   S.   W.   605),   372. 
Louisville   &    Nashville    R.   R.    Co.   v. 

Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.     ( 197 

U.  S.  430,  25  S.  466   [1905]),  115, 

118,   570,   594,  595,   598,    628,   702, 

1370. 
Louisville   &   Nashville   R.   R.   Co.   v. 

Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.     (116 

Ky.    856,    76    S.    W.    1097,   25   Ky. 

L.  R.  1024  [1903]),  118',  570,  594, 
•  595,  597,  598,  628,  630,  702,  1370. 
Louisville     and     Nashville     Railroad 

Company     v.      County      Court     of 

Davidson     County     ( 33     Tenn.     ( 1 

Sneed.)      637,     62     Am.     Dec.     424 

[1854]),    365. 
Louisville     and     Nashville     Railroad 

Company  v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis 

134  111.  *656,  25  "n.  E.  962   [1891]), 

223,    234,   293,    298,    359,    490,    561, 

597,  619,  776,  816,  849,  857,  895. 
Louisville   &    Nashville   Railroad   Co. 

V.     Thompson      (57     Ky.      (18     B. 

Mon.)    735    [1857]),   69,   71. 
Louisville,    New    Albany    &    Chicago 

Ry.   Co.  V.   State  for  Use  of  Beek- 

man    (122    Ind.   443,   24   N.   E.   350 

[1889]),     340,     598,      1065,     1078, 

1145,   1380. 
Louisville    Ry.    Co.    v.    Southwestern 

Alcatraz    Asphalt    &    Construction 

Co.    (—  Ky.   ,   74   S.   W.   237. 

24    Ky.    Law    Rep.    2380    [1903]), 

628,   629,   709,   710. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxlv 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v.  An- 
derson   {—    (Ky.)    ,   57   8.   W. 

617,   22   Ky.   L.'  Rep.    397).   352. 

Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v.  Meh- 
ler  (112  Ky.  438,  64  S.  W.  390,  64 
S.  W.  652,"  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1335 
[1901]),  73,  313,  314.  394,  431, 
436,  438,  1346. 

Lounsbury  v.  Potter  {37  X.  Y.  Sup. 
Ct.  57  *[L'*''41),   1072. 

Love  v.  Howard  (6  R.  I.  110 
[1859]  ).   49. 

Lovell  V.  City  of  St.  Paul  ( 10  Minn. 
290  [1805]),  746,  763,  1103,  1104. 
1177,   1178,   1512. 

Lovenberg  v.  City  of  Galveston  (1? 
Tex.  Civ.  App."l62,  42  S.  W.  1024 
[1897]).  42,  108,  118.  147.  245, 
301,   607.    1041.   1079. 

Low  v.  Dallas  (165  Ind.  392,  75  X. 
E.  822  [1905]),  301.  740.  1229. 
1240.    1242.    1279. 

Low  V.  Madison.  Smyrna  &  Graham 
Turnpike  Company  (30  Ind.  77 
[1808]  I.    35. 

Lowden,  In  tlie  flatter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  to  Vacate  an  Assessment  ( 89 
X.  Y.  548  [1882]).  119,  121,  324. 
468,  480,  663,  727,  729.  732.  750. 
915.  1455. 

Lowden,  In  the  flatter  of  to  Vacate 
an  Assessment  (25  Hun  (X.  Y. ) 
434    [1881]),    468. 

Lowden  v.  City  of  Cincinnati  (2  Dis- 
ney (Ohio)  "203  [1858]),  50,  849, 
1122,    1508. 

Lowe  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
Howard  County  (94  Ind.  553 
[1883]),    35,   580,   582,    1075. 

Lowell  v.  City  of  Boston  (111  Masft. 
454,    15   Am.   Rep.   39),   336.   410. 

Lowell,  City  of  v.  Hadley  (49  Mass. 
(8    Met.)'    180    [1844])",    323,   420. 

Lowell,  City  of  v.  Wentworth  (6!) 
Mass.  (OCush.)  221  [1850]).  745, 
748,   981. 

Lower  Chatliam  and  Little  Falls,  In 
the  Matter  of  tlie  Application  for 
Drainage  of  Lands  between,  in 
the  Counties  of  Passaic,  Essex  and 
Morris  (35  X.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  497 
[1872]),  101,  340,  677,  090,  691, 
887. 


Lower  Kings  River  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict Xo.  531  V.  McCullah  (124 
Cal,  175,  56  Pac.  887  [1899]),  129, 
269,  426,  486,  556,  773,  886,  895, 
1387. 

Lower  Kings  River  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict Xo.  531  V.  Phillips  (108  Cal 
306,  39  Pac.  630,  41  Pac.  335, 
[1895]),  118,  119,  123,  254,  280, 
340,  677,  770,  886,  923,  951,  1004. 
1005.  1006,  1008,  1277,  1313.  1331. 
1339. 

Lowerre  v.  Mayor  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 
York  (46  Hun  (X.  Y.)  253 
[1887]),    70,    308,    030. 

Loweree  v.  City  of  Xewark  ( 38  X. 
J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  151  [1875]),  70,  86. 
113,   308,  651,   1372. 

Lucas  v.  McCann  (50  Mo.  App.  638 
[1892]),   49. 

Lucas  County  v.  Hunt  (5  0.  S.  488. 
67  Am.  Dec.  303   [1856]),  486. 

Lucas,  Turner  &  Co.  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco (7  Cal.  403  [1857]).  16,  301, 
812,  830,  984,  1049,  1498,  1504. 
1512. 

Ludlow,  City  of  v.  Cincinnati  South- 
ern Railway  Company  ( 78  Ky.  357 
[1880]),   301,   594,   598,   612." 

Ludlow  v.  Union  Township  Gravel 
Road  Co.  (77  Ind.  409  [1881]), 
1125,   1350. 

Lufkin  V.  City  of  Galveston  (58  Tex. 
545  [1883]),  42,  174,  213.  323, 
607,    1049,    1272.    1277. 

Lumsden  v.  Cross  (10  Wis.  282), 
163,   370. 

Lumsden  v.  Milwaukee  ( 8  Wis.  485 
[1859]),  737. 

Limdberg  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 183 
111.  572,  50  X.  E.  415  [1900]), 
804. 

Lundbom  v.  City  of  Manistee  (93 
Mich.  170,  53"  X.  W.  161),  956, 
1015. 

Lusk  V.  City  of  Chicago  (176  111. 
207.  52  X.  E.  54  [1898]),  857, 
864. 

Lusk  V.  City  of  Chicago  (211  111. 
183,  71  X.  E.  878  [1904]),  947, 
952.  955,  988,  1002,  1390. 


cxlvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Lutes  V.  Briggs    (5  Hun    (X.  Y. )    67 

[1875]),  492,  510,  840,  1423,  1443. 
Luther    v.     Borden     (48     U.     S.     (7 

How.)    1,  12  L.  581),  216. 
Lutman    v.    Lake    Shore   &    ^lichigan 

Southern   R.    R.   Co.    (56    Ohio   St. 

433,   47   N.   E.   248    [1897] ),    1437. 
Lux  and  Talbott  Stone  Co.  v.  Donald- 
son   (162  Ind.   481,   68  X.  E.   1014 

[1903]),    73,    373,    374,    380,    381, 

387,   413,   464,   528,   531,   534,   646, 

720,  837,  927,  1005,  1011.  1012, 

1015,  1022,  1249,  1258,  1267,  1335. 

1346,  1385.  1386. 
Luzadder  v.  State  for  Use  of  Rhine 

(131  Ind.  598,  31  X.  E.  Rep.  453 

[1891]),  886,  978. 
Lyman  v.   City  of   Chicago    (211    111. 
^209.    71    X.'e.    832    [1904]),    927, 

986.    1411.    1414,    1416,    1432,    1439, 

1450. 
Lyman    v.    Howe     (64    Ark.    436.    42 

S.  W.  830   [1897]),  3. 
Lyman  v.  Plummer    (75   la.   353,   39 

X.  W.  527  [1888]),  119,  121,  760. 
Lynch  v.  City  of  Kansas  City  (44 
■    Kan.  452,  24  Pac.  973    [1890]),   3, 

433,  511,  569,  870,   1337. 
Lynde  v.  Inhabitants  of  Melrose   (10 

"aU.    (Mass.)    49),    1206. 
Lvon    V.    Allev    (130    U.    S.    177,    32 

'l.  899,  9  S.  480   [1889]),  570,  880, 

907,    1037.    1067. 
Lyon  V.  City  of  Brooklyn    (28  Barb. 
(N.    Y.)     609     [1858]),    672,    675, 

689,  690. 
Lyon  V.  District  of  Columbia    (20  D. 

C.   484    [1892]),    1511. 
Lyon    V.    Town    of    Tonawanda     (98 

*Fed.  361    [1899]),  118,  570,  702. 
Lyth    V.    City    of    Buffalo     (48    Hun 
(X.    Y.)     175     [1888]),    747,    770, 

776,  927,  930,   1026,   1431,   1450. 


M' 

M'Causland  v.  Leuffer  (4  \Yharton 
(Pa.)    175    [1839]),   1050. 

M'Comb  V.  Bell  (2  Minn.  295 
[1858]),  234,  665,  777,   1277. 


M'Gonigle  v.   City   of   Allegheny    (44 

Pa.  St.   118    [1862]).  570. 
M'Kusick   V.   City   qf   Stillwater    (44 

Minn.  372,  46  X.  W.  769    [1890]). 

762,   818,  918.  927,  932.  981. 
M'Maken    v.    Hayes    (29    Ohio    C.    C. 

535   [1907]),  631. 
!M'Masters      v.       Commonwealth       ( 3 

Watts     (Pa.)     292     [1834]).     111. 

308. 

Mac 

]\Iacfarland    v.    Byrnes     ( 19    App.    D. 
C.   531    [1902])",  961,    1354. 


Mc 

McAboy  V.  Gosnell    (—  Ky.  ,  63 

S.  W.  961,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.   1187 

[1901]),  1235. 
McAllister    v.     City    of    Tacoma     (» 

\Yash.     272,     37     Pac.     447,     658 

[1894]),  465,  479,  510,  519. 
:\IcAuley  v.  City  of  Chicago    (22  111- 

563    [1859]),   738,   766,   947,    1281. 
McAunich   v.   ^lississippi,   etc.,   R.   R- 

Co.    (20  la.   338),   180. 
McBean   v.    Chandler    (24    Am.   Rep. 

308    [1872]),    35,   44,   89,   96,   420, 

700. 

(See  also  Taylor  McBean  &  Co.  v. 

Chandler. ) 
McBean   v.    Martin    (96   Cal.    188,   31 

Pac.   5    [1892]),    1153,    1240. 
McBrian    v.    City    of    Grand    Rapids 

(56  Mich.  95,  22  X.  ^Y.  206),  495. 
!McBride  v.  State  for  Use  of  Clandy 

(130     Ind.     525,'    30     X.     E.     699 

[1891]),  247,  340,  1008. 
MoCague  v..  City  of  Omaha    (58  Xeb. 

37,    78    X.    W".    463    [1899]),    1206. 
McCain  v.   City  of  Des  Moines    (128 

Iowa  331,  103  X'.  W.  979   [1905]), 

534,   1433. 
McCaleb    v.    Cool   Run   Drainage   and 

Levee    District     (190    111.    549,    60 

X.  E.  898   [1901]),  909. 
McCall   V.   City  of  Rochester    (89  X. 

Y.     S.     766,     44    Misc.     Rep.     129 

[1904]),    1484,    1486. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlvii 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


MoCann   v.   City   of   Albany    (158   X. 

Y.     634,    53    X.     E.    673     [1899]), 

1375. 
McC'ann     v.    Albany    (11    App.     Div. 

378),   1375. 
McCarty   v.    Brick    (11    X.    J.   L.    (6 

Halst.)    27    [1829]).  249,   340,  711, 

777,  824,  884,   1330.   1478. 
McCauley  v.  The  People  ex  rel.  Huek 

(87   111.    123    [1877]),    1184. 
McCausland    v.     Leuli'er     (4    Wliart. 

(Pa.)    175    [1839]).   15. 
McChesney   v.    City   of   Chicago    (226 

111.    238,    80    X.    E.    770    [1907]), 

347,   864,   926. 
McChesney   v.   City   of   Chicago    (213 

111.    592.    73    X.    E.    368     [1905]), 

347,  475,  505,   603,   864,   1104. 
AlcChesney   v.   City  of   Chicago    (205 

111.  OIL  69  X.  E.  82   [1903]),  570, 

739,   811,   819,  828,  864,   1289. 
McChesney    v.    City  of    Chicago    ( 205 

111.  528*  09  X.  E.  38   [1903]),  469. 

909,  978,    1390. 
McChesney   v.   City  of   Chicago    (201 

111.    344.    66    X.    E.    217     [1903]), 

469.    472,    570,    739,    747,   800.    810, 

820,    828,   832,   835,   839,   859,   802, 

865. 
McChesney   v.   City   of   Cliicago    ( 188 

111.    423,    58    X^    E.    982    [1900]), 

819,  852,  943,  966,  986. 
McChesney   v.    City  of   Chicago    ( 173 

111.  75, '50  X.  E.  191   [1898]),  857, 

862. 
McChesney   v.   City   of    Chicago    (171 

111.    25.3,    49    X.    E.    548     [1898]), 

298,   857,  859,  862. 
McChesney   v.   City  of   Chicago    (161 

111.      110,     43     X.     E.     Rep.     702 

[1896]),   852,   926,   942,   966,  986. 
McChesne.v    v.    City   of    Chicago    (159 

III.    22.3.    42    X.    E.    894    [1896]), 

194.  195.  281.  923.  1281.  1299, 
1376. 

McChesney  v.  City  of  Chicago  (159 
111.  22.3,  42  X.  E.  894  [1896]), 

195,  281. 

McChesne.v  v.  City  of  Chicago  (152 
III.  543,  38  X".  E.  707  [1894]). 
236.  347,  451,  816,  867,  1274. 

McChesney  v.   Chicago    (151   111.   307. 


37    X.    E.    Rep.    872    [1894]).    920, 

1377. 
McChesney  v.   Village  of  Hyde   Park 

(151      ill.     634.     37     X."  E.     858 

[1894]),    103.    104,    271,    330,    377, 

920,  922. 
McChesney  v.  People  ex  rel.  Johnson 

(99     Ili.     210     [1881]),     181,    356, 

540,   1085,   1323. 
McChesney    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kern 

(148     ill.     221,     35     X.     E.     739 

[1894]),  '223,    234,    704,    913.    770. 

772,  776,  777,  914,  993. 
McChesney    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kern 

(145      ill.      014.     34     X.     E.     431 

[1893]),    758,    759,    763,    704,    705. 

766,   772.   883,   880.   887.   913.    914, 

993,    1299. 
^IcChesney  v.  Peoi)le  ex  rel.  Koclier- 

sperger'    (174     111.     46,    50    X.     E. 

1110    [1898]).    1126. 
^leChesney  v.  People  ex  rel.  Koclier- 

sperger   (171  111.  267,  49  X.  E.  491 

[1898]),   912,   1108,   1132. 
^IcChesney    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray- 
mond   ("200   111.   146,   65  X.  E.   626 

[1902]),  514,  994,    1183,   1390. 
:\IcChesney   v.    People    (99    111.    216), 

1103. 
McClave     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

Council  of  Cit.y  of  X'ewark    (31   X. 

J.     Eq.     (4     Stew.)     472     [1879]), 

1196.    1428. 
McClellan    v.     District    of    Columbia 

(7    Mackey     (D.    C.)     94    [1889]), 

405,  479,  880. 
McCollum   V.   Uhl    (128   Ind.   304,   27 

X.   E.    152,   725    [1890]),   748,   768, 

992,  1031,  1067,  1009,  1225.  1444. 
McComb     V.      Bell      (2      Minn.      295 

[1858]),  8,  89,   100,  223,  313.  1117. 
IMcConville   v.   Citj'  of   St.   Paul    (75 

Minn.    383,    74   Am.    St.    Rep.    508, 

43    L.    R.    A.    584.    77    X.    W.    993 

[1899]),   525,   562,    1490. 
McCormack,    In    the    Matter    of     (60 

Barb.    128    [1870]),   472,   479.   503. 

515.  527.  977,  982,  1452,  1458. 
McCormack,  Matter  of    (10   Abb.   Pr. 

X.    S.    (X.   Y.)    234    [1870]).    437, 

472,     479,     503,     515,     604,     1452, 

1454. 


cxlviii 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


McCormack   v.   Patchin    (53   Mo.   33, 

14  Am.  Rep.  440    [1873]),  11,  293, 

373,   380,   381,   388,  461,  666. 
McCormick    v.    City    of    Omaha     ( 37 

Neb.   829,   56   N.   W.   626    [1893]), 

308,   549,   576,   620,  '622, 
McCormick     v.     Tate      (20     111.     334 

[1858]),   363. 
McCrea    v.    Leavenworth     (46     Kan. 

767,   27   Pac.    129    [1891]),    1445. 
McCrowell    v.    City    of    Bristol     (89 

Va.  652,  20  L.  R.  A.  653,   16  S.  E. 

867     [1893]),    161,    223,    234,    314, 

432,  865,  867,   1047,   1049. 
McCullough  V.  Village  of  Campbells- 
port    (123  Wis.  334,  101  N.  W.  709 

[1904]  ),  236,  238. 
MoCutclieon    v.    Pacific    Railroad    Co. 

(72    Mo.    App.    271     [1897]),    45, 

594,  598,   1078,   1115. 
McDermott    v.    Mathis     (21    Ark.    60 

[I860]),   343,   556,   566. 
McDonald    v.    Connitl"    (99    Cal.    386, 

34  Pac.  71    [1893]),   138,   180,  552, 

617,  624,  645,  646,  720,  824,   1030, 

1281,    1337,    1358. 
McDonald  v.  Dodge    (97   Cal.   112,  31 

Pac.    Rep.    909    [1893]),    803,    843, 

847,  1372. 
McDonald    v.    Littlefield     (5    Mackey 

(D.     C.)    574     [1887]),    735,     745, 

747. 
McDonald    v.    Mazes     (107    Cal.    492. 

40     Pac.    808     [1895]),    479,     510, 

512,  527,  542,  831,   840.  950,   1522, 
McDonald  v.   Patterson    (54  Cal.  245 

[1880]  ),   221,   506,   813. 
McDonald  v.   Peojjle   ex  rel.   Hanberg 

(206     111.      624,      69     N.     E.     509 

[1904]),   1035,   1183,   1343. 
McDonnell    v.    City    of    Chicago     (60 

111.  350   [1871])",  860. 
McDonnell    v.    Gillon    (134    Cal.    329, 

66    Pac.    314    [1901]),   864. 
McDowell    V.    City   of   Asheville    (112 

N.  C.   747,    17    S.   E.   537    [1893]), 

62,  988,  989,  1469. 
McElroy  v.  Kansas  City  &  Independ- 
ence   Air    Line    (172    Mo.    546;   72 

S.  W.  913   [1903]),  70. 
McEneney  v.  Town  of  Sullivan    (125 

Ind.    407,    25   N.    E.    540    [1890]), 


142,   726,   781,    795,   843,   986,   996, 

1005,  1007,  1030,  1031,  1347,  1431. 
McEwan    v.     City    of    Spokane     (16 

Wash.    212,    47    Pac.    433    [1896]), 

1510. 
McEwen     v.     Gilker      (38     Ind.     233 

[1871]),     496,     948,      1235,      1337, 

1350,    1352. 
McFarlane   v.    City   of   Chicago    ( 185 

111.  242,  57  N.  E.   12   [1900]),  387, 

561,    604,    640. 
McGee   v.   Board   of   County   Commis- 
sioners   of    Hennepin    County     ( 84 

Minn.    472,    88    N.    W.    6    [1*901]), 

103,   104,  698. 
McGee     v.     Mathis      (71     U.     S.      (4 

Wall.)    143,  18  L.  314  [1866]),.  15, 

151,   172,   207,   256,   618, '711. 
McGehee     v.     Mathis     (21     Ark.     40 

[I860]),     15,    39,     145,     151,     172, 

207,  256,  266,  343,  618,   711,   1338. 
McGill     V.     Bruner      (65     Ind.     421 

[1879]),   324,   390,   393,  649,   1242, 

1268,    1352. 
McGilvery   v.    City   of   Lewiston    ( 13 

Idaho    338,    90    Pac.    348    [1907]), 

468,  550,   619,  690,   763,  836,   1085. 
McGlynn  v.  City  of  Toledo    (22  Ohio 

C.    C.    34    [1901]),    313,    428,    467, 

471,  479,   480,  517,  518,  532,   1013. 
McGonigle  v.   City  of  Allegheny    (44 

Pa.    St.    (8    Wright)     118    [1862]), 

713. 
McGown,    In    the    Matter    of    the   Pe- 
tition of,  to  Vacate  an  Assessment 
.  (18    Hun     (N.    Y.)     434     [1879]), 

392,  400,   1019. 
McGrew  v.  City  of  Kansas  City    (64 

Kan.  61,  67  Pac.  438   [1902]),  293, 

314,   437,    575,    609,   620,    628,    629, 

631. 
McGrew    v.    Stewart     (51    Kan.    185, 

32    Pac.   896    [1893]),    323. 
McGuinn   v.    Peri    (16    La.    Ann.    326 

[1861]),    789. 
McGuire  v.   Brockman    (58  Mo.   App. 

307    [1894]),   35. 
McGuire  v.  District  of  Columbia    (24 

App.    D.    C.   22    [1904]),   58. 
McHenry  v.  Selvage    (99  Ky.  232,  35 

S.   W.'  645    [1896]),    138,"  397,   462, 

628,  723,   1281. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cxlix 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Mclnery      v.      Reed       (2.3      la.      410 

[1867]),    1141,    1145,    1173,    1190. 
Melntire  v.    Staie    (5   Blackf.    (Ind.) 

384    [1840]),  86,   70,   113. 
McKee    v.    Town    of    Pendleton     (162 

Ind.    667,    69    X.    E.    997    [1904]), 

301,    699,   809,    1411,    1412,    1432. 
McKee    v.    Town    of    Pendleton     ( 1.54 

Ind.    652,    57    X.    E.    532    [1900]), 

699,    1431. 
McKeesport  Borough,   to  Use  of  Mc- 

Keesport   City  v.    Busch    (166   Pa. 

St.    46,    31    Atl.    49    [1895]),    313, 

396,    455,    795,    ll58. 
McKeesport   v.    Fiddler    (147    Pa.    St. 

532,   23   Atl.    799).   45.    1112.    1142. 
McKeesport,    City    of    v.    Soles    ( 178 

Pa.   St.   363,   35   Atl.   927    [1896]), 

610. 
McKeesport    v.    Soles     ( 165    Pa.    St. 

628,    30    Atl.    1019     [1895]),    610, 

706. 
McKeever   v.   Jenks    (59   la.    300,    13 

X.  W.  295   [1882]),  363. 
McKinney  v.  State  for  Use  of  Xixon 

101     Ind.    355     [1884]),    340.    986, 

1027,   1209,   12.52,   1254,   1337. 
McKnijrht   v.    City    of   Pittsburor    (91 

Pa.   St.    (10  Xorris)    273    [1879]), 

531,   862. 
McKusick  V.   City   of   Stillwater    (44 

Minn.  372,  46  "x.  W.  769   [1890]), 

63,   81,   113,  280,  308,   1027. 
McLaufihlin  v.  City  of  Chicago    (198 

111.    518,    64   XL    E.    1036    [1902]), 

878. 
MeLaiv'hlin     v.    Miller     (124    X.     Y. 

510,    26'   K.    E.    1104    [1891]),    86, 

119,   123,  244,   245,   301,    309,    726. 

728,  729,  1035,   1072. 
McLaiiren    v.    City    of    Grand    Forks 

(6     Dak.     397,"    43     X.     W.     710 

[1889]),    223,    234,    735,    777,    803, 

830,    1013. 
McLean,      County      of      v.      City      of 

Bloomington         (106        111.        209 

[1883]),    580,    582,    584,    612,    613, 

1075,  1469,   1470. 
McLennan   v.    City   of    Cliicago    (218 

111.  62,  75  X\  E.  762   [1905]),  831, 

857,   858,   912,    924,    1385. 
McLoon's      Administrator     v.      Cuni- 

mings    (73   Pa.   St.   98    [1873]),   2. 


MeMaken    v.    Hayes    (29    Ohio    C.    C. 

535   [1907]),   (525,  653. 
McMakin    v.    City    of    Cincinnati     (7 

Ohio  X.  P.  203    [1900]),  432,  653. 
McManus  v.  Hornaday    (124   la.  267, 

100    X.    W.    33    [1904]),    18,    965, 

983,    984. 
McManus    v.    Hornaday    (99    la.    507, 

68   X.    W.    812    [1890]),    367,    838, 

862. 
McManus     v.     People     ex     rel.     Ray- 
mond   (183   III.   391,  55   X.   E.   886 

[1899]),    533,    782,    795,    927,    931, 

940,  986,  996,   1183,   1340. 
McMasters      v.      Commonwealth       ( 3 

Watts    (Pa.)    292    [1834]),    89. 
McMillan  v.  City  of  Butte   (30  Mont. 

220,     70     Pac."    203     [1904]),     118, 

301,   553,   666,   709,   711. 
McMillan    v.    Fond    du    Lac    County 

(—    Wis.    ,    114    X.    W.    11  lb 

[1908]),  463,  979. 
McMillan    v.    Board   of   County    Com- 
missioners    of      Freeborn      County 

(93     Minn.    16,     100    X.    W.     384, 

1125    [1904]),    118,    373,   375,   414, 

955. 
McMillan    v.    Richards     (9    Cal.    365, 

70  Am.   Dec.   655),    1478. 
McMillan    v.    City    of    Tacoma     (26 

Wash.    358,    67    Pac.    68),    1069. 
McMillen   v.  Anderson    (95   U.   S.   37, 

24   L.    335    [1877]),    115,    119,   133. 

773. 
McXair    v.    Ingebrigsten     (36    Wash. 

186,    78    Pac.    789     [1904]),    1141, 

1145,   1222. 
McXair  v.   Ostrander    (1    Wash.    110, 

23     Pac.    414     [1890]),    244,     313, 

314,   436. 
McXamee     v.     Cit.v    of    Tacoma     ( 24 

Wash.    .591,    64    Pac.    791    [1901]), 

86,    111,    301,    408,    414,    670,    690. 

744,    918.    956,     1026.     1020,     1141. 

1145. 
McXutt   V.   Brooks    (42   III.   App.  554 

[1891]),    1072. 
McPike  V.  City  of  Alton    (187  111.  62, 

58  XL   E.   301    [1900]),  510,  840. 
McQuiddy     V.     Brannock      (70     Mo. 

App.    535     [1897]),    18,    530,    538, 

867. 


cl 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


McQuillen  v.  Hatton    (42   0.   S.   202. 

[1884]).    117,    337. 
McQuiddv    v.    Smith     (67    Mo.    App. 

205    [18901),   73,   394,   744,   825. 
McQuiddy  v.  Vineyard    (60  Mo.  App. 

6.10    [1894]),   273,    784,   841. 
McQuinn    v.    Peri    (16    La.    Ann.    320 

[1801]),  781. 
McRae,    McMillanet,    In   re   v.    Board 
of      Commissioners      of      Freeborn 
County     (100     N.     W.     384,     1125 
[1904]). 
(See    McMillan    v.    Board    of    Com- 
missioners  of    Freeborn    County.) 
McSherry    v.    Wood     (102    Cal.    647, 
36    Pac.    1010     [1894]),    381,    552. 
646,    720,    895,    1030,    1093,    1298, 
1337. 
McVerrv   v.    Boyd    (89    Cal.    304.    26 
Pac.  "^885    [1891]),    380,    381,    464, 
492,  538,  602,  004,   640,   723,   1030. 
1281,   1298,   1337. 
McVerry     v.    Kidwell     (03    Cal.     246 

[1883]),   527,   537. 
McVey  v.   City  of  Danville    (188   111- 
428,    58   N.    E.    955    [1900]),    314. 
787,   789,   923,    1282. 
McVey    v.    Lanier     (50    Ark.    384,    8 
S.   W.    141    [1887]),   73. 


M 

Mabee    v.    Drain    Commissioner     (45 

Mich.   508,  8  N.  W.   578),   1012. 
Mace  V.    Trustees    of   the   Village   of 
Xewburg   (15  Howard   (X.  Y.)    161 
[18.57]),    1423. 
Mack   V.   City   for   Use   of   Moore    (1 

W.   L.   B.  'S4    [1876]),    1346. 
Mack    V.    Polecat    Drainage    District 
(216  111.  56,  74  N.  E.  691   [1905]), 
254,  1008,   1375. 
Mackay   v.   Hancock   County    ( —   la. 

,     114     N.     W.     552     [1908]), 

1015!    1019,   1029. 
Mackin    V.    Wilson    (45    S.    W.    003, 

20  Ky.  L.  R.  218).  462. 
Macklot    V.    City    of    Davenport    (17 

la.   379    [1864]),   1026.  • 

Macomber   v.   Hunter    (7   Ohio   X.   P- 
385    [1900]),   679. 


Macon,  Town  of  v.   Patty    (57   Miss. 
378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451   [1879]),  11, 
12,   13,   33,  34,   35,  43,   55,  92,   93, 
95,    96,    118,    147,    148,    323,     420, 
548,  665,  698,  717,  779.  1039,  1049. 
Madderom    v.    City    of    Chicago    ( 194 
111.    572,    62    X.    E.    840     [1902]), 
244,   818,    1287,    1289. 
Madera    Irrigation    District,     In    the 
Matter    of    the    Bonds    of    the    (92 
Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.   106,   14 
L.    R.    A.    755,    28    Pac.    272,    675 
[1891]),    11,    12,   79,   86,    105,    119, 
125,    134.    147,   209,   212,   249,   254, 
355,   551,    .553.    642,    666,   784,   927, 
1008,  1085,   1303,  1333.  1337,  1502. 
Magee     v.     Commonwealth,     for     the 
Use  of  the   City   of  Pittsburg    (46 
Pa.  St.    (10  Wright)    358   [1863]), 
414,   574,   620,   666,   698,   709,   983. 
Magoun  v.   Illinois   Trust  &   Savings 
Bank    (170  U.   S.   283,  42   L.    1037 
[1898]),    108. 
Maguire    v.    Smock     (42    Ind.     1,    13 

Am.    Rep.    353    [1873]).    792. 
Mahaffey  v.   Beech   Creek  R.   R.    (163 
Pa.   St.    158,   29  Atl.   881    [1894]), 
66. 
Maher    v.    City    of    Chicago     (38    111. 

266    [1865]),   360,   1498,   1509. 
Mahlstadt    v.     Blanc     (34    Cal.    577 

[1808]),   1228,    1372. 
Malioney     v.     Brauerman      (54     Cal. 

505),'  147. 
Main   v.   Ft.    Smith    (49   Ark.   480,   5 
S.   W.   801    [1887]),   275,   301,  494, 
857,   807,  868. 
Main  Street,  Big  Run  Borough    ( 137 
Pa.    St.   590.   20   Atl.    711    [1890]), 
280,   576,   620. 
Main  St.,  In  re,  in  Borough  of  Xich- 
olson      (27     Pa.     Super.     Ct. .    570 
[1905]),  271. 
Makemson    v.    Kauffman     (35    0.    S. 

444),  248,  029,  792,  790,  785. 
Maklev  v.  Whitmore  (61  0.  S.  587, 
50  X.  E.  401  [1899]),  1085,  1101, 
1140. 
Malchus  V.  District  of  Highlands  (67 
Ky.  (4  Bush.)  547  [1809]),  322, 
711. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cli 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Maley   v.    Clark    (.33    Ind.    App.    149. 

70'x.    E.    1005    L1903]),   805. 
Mall    V.    City    of    Portland     (35    Or. 

89,  56  Pac.  654   [1899]  ).  475,  1085, 

1104. 
Malone    v.    Water    Commissioners    oi 

Jersey  City    (30   X.  J.   L.    (1   Vr.) 

247   [1863]),  1408. 
Maloy  V.  City  of  Marietta    (11   0.  8. 

636     [I860]),    100,    106,    301,    549, 

620,    1041. 
Maltby    v.    Tautges    (50    ^ilinn.    248, 

52   "x.    W.    858    [1892]),    61,    158. 

359. 
Manhattan    Savings     Institution,     In 

the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the, 

to   Vacate    an   Assessment    ( 82    X. 

Y.    142    [1880]),    495,    1454,    1461. 
Manice   v.   City   of   Xew   York    (8   X. 

Y.   120   [1853]),   1509. 
Manistee,     City     of     v.     Harley      ( 79 

Mich.  238,  44  X.  W.   603    [1S90]), 

18,  234,  688,  777,  778. 
Manley   v.   p]mlen    (46   Kan.   655,   27 

Pac."    844    [1891]!.    315,    323,    805, 

956,  962. 
Mann  v.   Board   of   Education  of  Un- 
ion   Free    District    Xo.    2,    of    the 

Town    of    Onondaga     (53    Howard 

(X.    Y.)    289    [1877]),    1442. 
Mann    v.    District    of    Columbia     ( 22 

App.   D.   C.   US    [1903]),   372. 
Manning    v.    Den    (90    Cal.    610,    27 

Pac.    435    [1891]),    492,    509,    521, 

742,  1031,  1039,  1141,  1145,  1182, 

1311,  1337. 
Manning  v.  City  of  Devil's  Lake  (13 

X.  D.  47,  112  Am.  St.  Rep.  652, 

99   X.   W.   51    [1904]),   404. 
Manns     v.    City    of    Cincinnati      (10 

Ohio  C.  C.   549    [1895]),  561,   625, 

704,  988,   1013,   1094,   1492. 
Ma^- Nr    V.    Board    of    Commissioners 

of  Jay  Co.   (137  Ind.  367,  34  X.  E. 

959,   36   X.   E.    1101    [1893]),   322, 

466,   469.   471,   732,   738,    781,   951, 

952.    955.    904.    1209.     1303,     1351, 

1360.    1373. 
Mansfield     v.    People     ex    rel.     Wells 

(164     111.     611,     45     X.     E.     976 

[1897]).   864.   865,    1382. 
Mansur  v.   Countv   Commissioners  of 


Aroostook    County     (83    Me.    514, 

22  Atl.  358   [1891]),  434,  844. 
]Maple     V.     Borough     of     Beltzhoover 

(18    Atl.    650     [1899]),    666.    698, 

709,  895. 
^lappa    V.    City    Council    of    the    City 

of     Los     Angeles      (61      Cal.      309 

[1882]),   538. 
Marengo   v.   Great   Xorthern   Ry.   Co. 
•      (84    Minn.    397,    87    Am.    St.    Rep. 

369,   87   X:  W.    1117    [1901]),  363. 
^larietta.    City   of   v.    Slocomb    (6    O. 

S.    471    [1856]),    1478,    1484. 
[Marion  v.  ^Moody's  Executors   ( 25  la. 

163),   1122. 
:\Iarion    Bond     Co.     v.     Blakely     (30 

Ind.    App.    374,    65    X.    E.    291,    66 

X.  E.  71   [1902]),  1085,  1092. 
Marion    Bond    Co.    v.    Johnson     (29 

Ind.     App.     294,     64     X.     E.     626 

[1902]),    11,    653,    669,    670,    677, 

699,    709,    1000,    1141,    1145,    1333. 
Marion     County     v.     Louisville     and 

Xashville  R.  Co.    ( —  Ky.  ,   78 

S.    W.    437,    25    Ky.    L.    R.     1600 

[1904]),   365. 
Marion    Road    Co.     v.    McClure     (66 

Ind.   468),    1113. 
Marion    Township    Gravel    Road    Co. 

V.   Sleeth    (53    Ind.    35).    169. 
IMarion     Township     Union     Draining 

Co.      V.      Xorris       (37      Ind.      424 

[1871]),    1500. 
Marion  Trust  Co.  v.  City  of  Indian- 
apolis   (37   Ind.   App.   672,   706,   75 

X.    E.   834,   836    [1905]).   622,   656, 

775,   776. 
Marion    Water    Company    v.    City   of 

Marion     (121     la.    306.    96    X.'   W. 

883    [1903]).  50. 
Marion   &    ^Monroe   Gravel    Road    Co. 

V.   McClure    (66    Ind.   468    [1879]), 

166,    169,    983.    102S.    1445. 
Marionville,    City   of.    to    the    Use   of 

Grubaugh  v.  Henson    (65  Mo.  App. 

397    [1895]  I.    293,    296,    374,    571, 

714,   723,   784. 
Market    Street.     In     tiie     Matter    of 

Opening  and  Grading   (49  Cal.  546 

[1875]),   8,   11,   283.  409.   410.  423, 

1498. 


clii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Markley  v.  City  of  Chicago  (190  111. 
276,  60  X.  E.  512  [1901]).  263, 
864,  866,  956,  962,  963,  965,  978, 
1002. 

Markley  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 167  111. 
626,  48  X.  E.  1056  [1897]).  1384. 
1392. 

Markley  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kocher- 
sperger  (171  111.  260,  63  Am.  St. 
Rep.  234,  49  X.  E.  502  [1898]), 
986,   998. 

Markley  v.  Rudy  (115  Ind.  533,  18 
X.  e".  50   [1888]),  269,   1351. 

Marsh  v.  The  City  of  Brooklyn  1 50 
X.  Y.  280  [1874]),  891,  951.  142.-), 
1426,    1427. 

Marsh  v.  City  of  Chicago  (62  IM. 
115   [1871])',  763,  764,   1185,   1299. 

Marsh,  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  In 
the  Maitter  of  the  Petition  of  (83 
X.  Y.  431   [1881]),  495,  816,  1453. 

Marsh.  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  (21  Hun  (X.  Y.)  582 
[1880]),   487.   495,  948. 

Marshall    v.    Barber    Asphalt   Paving 

Co.    (—   Ky.   ,    66    S.    W.    734, 

23  Ky.  L."r.  1971  [1902]),  sub- 
stitute for  opinion  in  66  S.  W. 
182,  which  modified  52  S.  \Y.  1117. 
21   K}-.  L.   R.   712).  441,   628,  707. 

Marshall  v.  Commonwealth  to  the 
Use  of  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Allegheny 
City  (59  Pa.  St.  (9  P.  F.  Smith) 
455    [1868]),  540,  541,  570,  834. 

Marshall  v.  Davies  (78  X.  Y.  414. 
Robinson  v.  Ryan.  25  X.  Y.  320). 
1057. 

Marshall  v.  City  of  Leavenworth  (44 
Kan.  459,  24  Pac.  975  [1890]), 
805,   1337. 

Marshall  v.  People  ex  rel.  Smit!i 
219  111.  99,  76  X.  E.  70  [1905]), 
323,  533,  918,  986,  987,  1000,  1126. 

Marshall,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Jacoby 
V.  Rainey  (78  Mo.  App.  416 
[1898]),  502,  800,  818,   1290. 

Marshall  town  Light,  Power  &  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Marshall- 
town  (127  la.  637,  103  X.  \Y.  1005 
[1905]),  602,  603,  917.   1026.   1350. 

Martin  v.  Carron  (26  X.  J.  L.  2 
Dutch.)  228  [1857]).  3'-'4.  781, 
789.  997,    1004.    lOr.O.    119,;.    1204. 


Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  (205 
U.  S.  135,  51  L.  743,  27  S.  440 
[1907]),    321,    665,    666,    690,    691. 

Martin  v.  District  of  Columbia  (26 
App.  D.  C.  146  [1905]),  321,  665, 
666,  690,  691. 

Martin  v.  Greenwood  ( 27  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  245    [1905]),   1068. 

Martin  v.  MoCormick  (8  X.  Y.  331 
[1854]),    1200. 

;\Iartin  v.  City  of  Oskaloosa  ( 126  la. 
680,  102  x'.  W.  529  [1905],  origi- 
nal opinion  in  99  X.  W.  557 
[1904],  withdrawn  on  rehearing, 
223.  725,  766,  777,  827,  837,  838, 
962,  965. 

Martin  v.  Roney  (41  O.  S.  141 
[1884]).  986,  996. 

Martin  v.  Tyler  (4  X.  D.  278,  25 
L.  R.  A.  838,  60  X.  E.  392),   140. 

Martin  v.  Wagner  (120  Cal.  623,  53 
Pac.   167   [1898]),  549. 

Martin  v.  Wills  (157  Ind.  153,  60 
X.  E.  1021  [1901]),  110,  118,  620, 
699,    1122,    1141,    1145,    1191. 

^lartindale  v.  Palmer  (52  Ind.  411 
[1875]),  301,  437,  511,  840,  847, 
856,  895.  897.  1191,  1256,  1350, 
1352. 

Marysville,  Village  of  v.  Schoonover 
(78    111.    App.    189    [1898]),    1503, 

[Mascall  V.  Commissioners  Drainage 
District  (122  111.  620,  14  X.  E.  47 
[1889]),  549,  676,  920,  921,  1351, 
1363. 

:\lasnn  V.  Austin  (46  Cal.  385 
[1873]),    618,    1269,    137'd.    1381. 

]\Iason  V.  City  of  Chicfigo  (178  111. 
J99,  53  X.'  E.  354  [1899]),  324, 
01)3,  619.  10S5,  1088. 

Mason  V.  City  of  Chicago  (48  111. 
420    [1868])',    1088. 

Mason  v.  City  of  Des  Moines  ( 108 
la.  658,  79  X.  W.  389  [1899]), 
484,  485,  527,  748.  768,  974,  1355, 
1375,   1391.   1501. 

Mason  v.  t  ity  of  Independence  (61 
Kan.  188.  "59  Pac.  272  [1899]), 
1437. 

Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls  (2 
S.  D.  640,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  802, 
51  X.  W.  770  [1892]),  223,  234, 
313,   395,    436.   479.    510.    831,    856. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


cliii 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Mason  v.   Spencer    (35  Kan.  512,   11 

Pac.    402     [1886]),    40,    414,    689, 

697,  983. 
Mason   v.    Police   Jury   of    Parish    of 

Tensas    (9   La.   Ann.   368    [1854]), 

38,   697. 
Mason    and    Tazewell    Special    Drain- 
age  District,    Commissioners   of   v. 

Griffin   (134  111.  330,  25  X.  E.  995 

[1891]),  249,  266,  564,  1396,  1399, 

1404,    1406. 
Masonic      Building      Association      v. 

Brownell     (164    Mass.    306,    41    X. 

E.   306    [1895]),  86,  266,  309.  434. 

525,   649,  886,  887,   890,    1406. 
Massing     v.     Ames      ( 37     Wis.     645 

[1875]),    191,    194,    198,    324,    813, 

815,  887. 
Masters  v.  City  of  Portland    (24  Or. 

161,  33   Pac'  540    [1893]),   43,   86, 

147,    148,   555,   644,   666,   690,   723. 
Mathews  v.  Wagner   ( —  Wash.  , 

94    Pac.    759     [1908]),    950,    1113. 

1207. 
Mattes    V.    Great    Northern    Ry.    Co. 

(95     Minn.    386,     104    X.    W.     234 

[1905]),   363. 
Mattliews   v.   Kimball    (70   Ark.   451, 

66  S.  W.  651,  69  S.  W.  547).  356. 
Mattingly    v.    District    of    Columbia 

(97  U.  S.  687,  24  L.  1098  [1878]  ). 

243,   245,    301.    324,    663,    666,    707. 

709,  725,  964,  983. 
Mauch   Chunk,  Borough  of  v.   Shortz 

(01   Pa.  St.    (11   P.  F.  Smith)    399 

[1869]),    223,    231,    234,    444,    775, 

1050. 
Mauldin     v.     Hanscombe     (12     Colo. 

204,  20  Pac.  619;,  363. 
Mauldin    v.   City    Council    of    Green- 
ville    (53    S.    C.    285,    69    Am.    St. 

Rep.   855,   43   L.   R.   A.    101,   31    S. 

E.  252  [1898]  (overruling.  42  S. 

C.  293,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  723,  27 

L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S.  E.  842  [1893]). 

44,  86,  118,  159,  250,  302,  323, 

379. 
Mauldin    v.    City    Council    of    Green- 
ville   (42   «.    C.    293,    46    Am.    St. 

Rep.  723,  27  L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S.  E. 

842    [1893]),    30,   44,    95,    96.    118, 

159,  302,  323,  324,  420. 
Mawell     v.     Auditor     General      (  125 


Mich.  621,  84  X.  W.  1112  [1901]). 

995,   1443. 
Maxwell  v.  City  of  Chicago   (185  1.1. 

18,    56    X,    E.    1101    [1900]),    745. 

747,  758,  764,  856,  912,  913,   1374. 
May     V.     Holdridge      (23     Wis.     93 

[1868]),  959. 
Mayall    v.     City    of     St.     Paul      (30 

Minn.  294,   15  X.  W.   170   [1883]), 

509,   854,   1006,   1412. 
Maybin  v.   City  of  Biloxi    (77   Miss. 

6^73,  28   So.   560    [1900]),  236.  304. 

662. 
ilaydwell  v.   City  of  Louisville    (116 

Ky.    885,    105*  Am.    St.    Rep.    245. 

63   L.    R.   A.    655,    76   S.    W.    1091 

[1903]),  370,  458. 
flayer  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the   City  of  Xew   York 

(101     X.    Y.     284,  '  4    N.     E.     33<) 

[1886]),    308,    469,   475,    927,    986. 

1003,    1438,    1490. 
ilayer  v.   ^laj^or.   Aldermen   and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  Xew  York 

(28    Hun    587    [1883]),    309,    475, 

1490. 
Mayo    V.   Ah    Loy    (32    Cal.    477,    91 

Am.    Dec.    595^  [1867]),    223,    234, 

775,     887,     889,    998,     1112,     1149, 

1182. 
Mayor,   In  the  Matter  of    (50  X.   1'. 

504   [1872]),   194,  821. 
Mayor,    Matter    of     (11    Johns.     (X. 

Y.)    77),  594. 
:\Iayor  v.  Huff    (00  Ga.  221),  486. 
Mayor  v.  Board  of  Commissioners  ol 

Jay   County    (137    Ind.    367,   36   X. 

E.    1101,    34    X.    E.    959     [1893]). 

200. 
Mayor     and     Aldermen     v.     ilaberrv 

(25    Tenn.     (6     Humpli.)     368,    44 

Am.    Dec.    315    [1845]),   5.    19,    44. 

53.   55.   93.  96.    iOO.   323.   420,   713. 

717. 
Maypother    v.    da-t     i —    Ky.    . 

110  S.  W.  308   1190SI),  1145.  1146, 

1392. 
Maysville,    City    of    v.    Maysville    St. 

R.     and     Transfer     Co.      ( —     Ky. 

,   108  S.  W.  960   [190«]),  601, 

630. 


cliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Maywood  Co.  v.  Village  of  Maywood 

(140     111.     21G,     29     N.     E.     704 

[1893]),    329,    393,    400,    636,    857, 

920,  921,  924. 
Meachem      v.      Fitchburg      Railroad 

Company   (58  Mass.   (4  Cush.)   291 

[1849]),  64,  65,  66,  71. 
Mead    v.    City    of    Chicago    (186    111. 

54,    57    N".    E.    824    [1900]),    570, 

663,   670,   675,   817,   863,   864,   917. 

I3C7,   1368,   1385. 
Mead,    In    the    Matter    of     (13    Hun 

N.     Y.     394      [1878]),      166,     194, 

479,     484,     485.    982,     1337,     1453, 

1458. 
Meade,   In  the   Matter   of    (74   N.   Y. 

216    [1878]),    106,    479,   679,    1389, 

1458,    1463. 
Meadville,    City   of   v.    Dickson    (129 

Pa.    St.    1,    18    Atl.    513     [1889]), 

190,  223,  234,   775,   1050. 
Meanor   v.   Goldsmith    (216   Pa.   489, 

10  L.  R.   A.    (X.   S.)    342,   65  Atl. 

1084     [1907]  ),     93,    96,    323,     737, 

1055,   1203. 
Mecartney    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray- 
mond   '(202   Hi.   51,   66   X.   E.   873 

[1903]).    1172. 
Mechlem    v.    City    of    Cincinnati,    28 

Ohio  C.  C.  211    [1905]),  1430. 
Medical   Lake,  Town  of  v.   Smith    ( 7 

Wash.    195,   34    Pac.    835    [1893]), 

244,   246,    1010. 
Medland  v.  Connell    (57   Xeb.    10,   77 

X.  W.  437    [1898]),  745,  762,   763, 

825. 
Medland  v.   Linton    (60  Xeb.   249,  82 

X.   W.    866    [1900]),    11,   245,   549, 

570,   609,   745,   750,   762,   775,   884, 

1304. 
Meeeli  v.   City  of  Bufl'alo    (23  X.  Y. 

198    [1864]),  324,  952. 
Meggett   V.    City   of   Eau   Claire    (81 

Wis.   326,   5l' X.   W.   566    [1892]), 

118,   119,    123,   132,    163,   314,   324, 

549,   555,   570,   624,   666,   670,   698, 

709,   747,   773,    1149,    1435,    1444. 
Mehrbach,   In   the   :Matter  of    (97   X. 

Y.    601     [1885]).    1462. 
Mehrbach.     In     the    Matter     of     (33 

Hun     (X.    Y.)     136    [1884]).    1462. 
Meier  v.   Citv  of  St.  Louis    (180  Mo. 

391,  79   S."  W.   955    [1903]),  8,  43. 


89,    123,    125.    147,    148,    212.    215, 

224,   247,   248,   250,    301,    553.    555, 

620,    621,   624,    628,    631,   666.    698, 

728,   729,  776,   1333. 
Meissner  v.  City  of  Toledo   (31  0.  S. 

387    [1877]),'    310,    620.    622,    623. 

672,  692. 
Melrose  Park,   Village  of   v.   Dunnel- 

beeke    (210   111.   422,   71  X.  E.  431 

[1904]).  279,  775. 
Memphis,     City     of     v.     Bolton      (9 

Heisk.     (oe'Tenn.)     508     [1872]), 

69,   655. 
Memphis,    City   of   v.   Hastings    (113 

Tenn.   142,  69   L.   R.  A.   750,  86  S. 

W.  609    [1904]),  356. 
Memphis    Land    &    Timber    Company 

V.   St.   Francis   Levee   District    ( 64 

Ark.   258,   42    S.    W.    763    [1897]). 

343,  566,  578,  694,  750,  1277,  1281. 
Mendenhall    v.    Clugish    (84    Ind.    94 

[1882]),  435,   573,   1238. 
Menefee    v.    Bell     (62    Mo.    App.    659 

[1895]),   537,  855,   1134,   1255. 
Menzie    v.    City    of    Greensburg     ( — - 

Ind.     App.     ,     85     X.     E.     484 

[1908]),  499,   742. 
Mercantile    Trust    Co.    v.    Xigoreman 

(119    Mo.   App.   56,   96   S.   W.   293 

[1906]),   1067,   1136. 
Merchants'    Xational    Bank    of    San 

Diego  V.  Escondido  Irrigation  Dis- 
trict   (144    Cal.    329,    77    Pac.    937 

[1904]),     15,    169,     171,    355,    548, 

1081. 
Merchants'   Realty   Company   v.    City 

of  St.  Paul    (77   Minn.   .3*43,   79   X. 

W.   1040    [1899]),   1200,   1206. 
Mercy    Hospital    v.    City    of    Chicago 

(187     111.     400,     58  '  X.     E.     353 

[1900]),    675,    1368. 
Meredith    v.    City    of    Pertli    Amboy 

(63  X.  J.  L.    (34  Vr.)    523,  44  Atl. 

1101    [1899]),   391,.  394. 
Meriden,  City  of  v.  Camp    (46  Conn. 

284    [1878]),    392,    395,    423,    526, 

1030,  1031,  1163,  1168,  1387. 
IMerine  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 

Co.  (125  Mo.  App.  623,  103  iS.  W. 

508   [1907]),  538. 
Meriwether    v.    Garrett     (102    U.    S. 

472,  26   L.    197    [1880]),    1518. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clv 


rRefprenccs   are   to   sections.] 


Meniam,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion  of,   to   Vacate   an   Assessment 

(84   N.   Y.   596    [1881]),   324,   465, 

468,    479,   485,    495,   541,   663,    674, 

752,     901,    913,    917,     1324,     1^54, 

1455,    1458. 
Merriam    v.    Moody's    Executors     ( 25 

la.     163     [1868])      40,     223,     229, 

1122. 
Merriam    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kocher- 

sperger     (160    111.    555,    43    N.    E. 

705    [1896]),  772,  930,   1085,   1113, 

1372. 
Merrick    v.     Amherst     (12     All.     (94 

Mass.)    504),   150. 
Merrill     v.     Abbott      (62      Ind.     549 

[1878]),  223. 
Merrill    v.    Schibel    (185   Mo.    551,   83 

S.  W.    1133    [1904]),   538. 
Merrill    v.    Shields    (57    Xeb.    78,    77 

N.    W.    368     [1898]),     825,     1277, 

1303. 
Merritt  v.  City  of  Duluth    ( —  ]klinn. 

,     114    X.     W.     758     [1908]), 

1437. 
Merritt    v.    Village   of    Port    Chester 

(71  X.  Y.  309,  27  Am.  47   [1877]). 

223,  234,   281,   735,   744,   745,   75), 

770,  771,  777,  1029. 
Merritt   v.    Village    of    Port    Clliester 

29  Hun    (N.  Y.)   619   [1883]),  26G, 

273,  275,  391,  394. 
Meserole     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

Council     of     Brooklyn     (8     Paige's 

Chan.    198    [1840])."  672,   927,   986, 

996,  1430,  1519. 
Metcalf    V.    Carter     (19    Ohio    C.    C. 

196    [1900]),    561,    625,    635,    783, 

843,    1035,    1432,    1436. 
Methodist    Episcopal    Church,    In    re 

(66   X.  Y.   395    [1876]),  42. 
Methodist   Episcopal   Church  of  Har- 
lem V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of 

Xew    York'    (55    Howard     (X.    Y.) 

67     [1877]),    679,    686,    927.    934. 

1432,   1438. 
Metropolitan    Gas     Light     Ciiiii));uiy, 

In    the    Matter    of    the     (23    Hun, 

327   [1880]),  948,  975. 
Metropolitan    Railroad     Company    v. 

Macfarland     (20    App.    D.    c'  421 

[1902]).  601.   1372. 
Metropolitan     West     Side      Elevated 


Railway  Company  v.  Stickney   ( 150 

111.  362,  26  L.  R.  A.  773,  37  X.  E. 

1098   [1894]),  65,  66,  71. 
Meuser     v.     Risdon      (36     Cal.     239 

[1868]),    500,    504,   540,   867,    958, 

984. 
Meyer   v.   Wright    (19   Mo.   App.   283 

fl885]),  527,  529. 
Mexico,  City  of  v.  Lakeman   ( —  Mo. 

App.  — — ,  108  S.  W.  141   [1908]), 

747,    1140,    1226,    1230. 
Mej'er    v.    Covington     ( 103    Ky.    546 

45  S.  W.  769,  20  Ky.  L.  R."  239), 

1039. 
Meyer  v.  Wright  (  18  Mo.  App.  283 

[1885]),  1236. 
Michael  v.  City  of  Mattoon  (172  111. 

394,  50  X.  E.  155  [1898]),  471, 

472,  750,  764,  947,  1085,  1372, 

1373,  1379. 
Michael  "v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (112 

Mo.    610,    20  "S.    W.    666    [1892]). 

293,  311,   394,   557,  927,  997,    1424, 

1442. 
Michaels    v.    Keane     (8     Wash.     648, 

36    Pac.    681     [1894]),    1059,    1072. 
Michener     v.     City     of     Philadelphia 

(118     Pa.    St.  '535,     12    Atl.     174 

[1888]),  55,   86,   293,   384,   555. 
Michigan  Central   Railroad   Company 

V.  Spring  Creek  Drainage  District 

(215  111.  501,  74  X.  E.^696),  203. 
Michigan   City,   Mayor   and   Common 

Council  of  V.  Roberts    (34  Ind.  471 

[1870]),    293. 
Middaugh    v.    City    of    Chicago     ( 187 

111.  230,  58  X.  k.  4.")9   [19()()|),  675. 

709,  872. 
Middle    Kittitas    Irrigation    District, 

Board   of   Directors  of  v.    Peterson 

(4  Wash.  147,  29  Pac.  995  [1892]  I, 

105. 
Miles   v.    r.iadford     (22    Md.    170,    85 

Am.   Dec.   643),   216. 
Miles    V.     McDermott     (31     Cal.     271 

[1866]),    763,    836,    1231. 
Milford     v.     Cincinnati.     Milfonl     & 

Loveland  Trac.  Co.    (26  Ohio  C  C. 

271    [1904]),   463. 
:Mill    Creek    Sewer,    In    re    (196    Pa. 

St.    183,  46  Atl.   312    [1900]),  324, 

426.  444.  46(). 


clvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Miller,    In    the   Matter   of    (24    Hun 

(N.  Y.)    637,   [1881]),  475. 
Miller's  Case    (12   Abb.   Pr.    (N.   Y.) 

121    [1861]),    482,    484,    485,    541, 

1444,    1454,    1463. 
Miller's  Estate    (Tucker    (N.  Y.)   346 

[1867]),   1055. 
Miller    v.    City    of    Amsterdam    ( 149 

N.  Y.   288,  43   N.  E.   632    [1896]), 

7'81,  795,  927,  945,  1007. 
Miller  v.  Anheuser    (2  Mo.  App.   168 

[1876]),   324,    393,   400,   872. 
Miller  v.   City  of  Asheville    (112   N. 

C.  769,   16 'S.   E.   765    [1893]),   77. 
Miller    v.    Atlantic    City     (—    X.    J. 

— ,  68  Atl.  64   [1907]),  538. 
Miller     v.     City    of    Cincinnati     ( IS 

Ohio  C.  C.  869    [1898]).  563. 
Milkr     V.     Goodwin      (70     111.     659 

[1873]),   1512. 
Miller     v.     Graham      (17     O.     8.     1 

[1866]),    337,    414,    832,    977,    983. 
Miller  v.  Hixson   (64  0.  S.  39,  59  X. 

E.   749    [1901]),   38,  697. 
Miller  v.  Mayo   (88  Cal.  568,  26  Pac. 

364    [1891]),    509,    554,    624,    707, 

759,   1237,   1239,    1337. 
Miller  v.  City  of  Toledo   (12  Ohio  C. 

C.  706   [1894] I.  563,  619. 
Miller  v.   Toledo    (7    Ohio  X.   P.    477 

[1900]),   387,   563. 
Miller    v.    Wisener     (45    W.    Va.    59, 

30  S.  E.  237   [?-898]),  73. 
Milligan    v.    City    of    Lexington     ( — 

Mo.    App.    — —,    105    S.    W.    1104 

[1907]),   '837. 
Millikan    v.    Wall     (133    Ind.    51,    32 

X.  E.  828   [1892]),  375,  461,   1030, 

1414,    1433. 
Million    V.    Board    of    Commissioners 

of     Carroll     County      (89     Ind.     5 

[1883]),    927,    1004. 
Millisor    v.    Wagner     ( 133    Ind.    400. 

32    X.    E.    927    [1892]),    781,    801, 

909. 
Mills    V.    Charleton    (29    Wis.    400,    9 

Am.    Rep.   578    [1872]),    117,    199, 

407,   408,   414,    437,   515,   958,    963, 

965,  983,   1435. 
Mills    V.    City  of   Detroit    (95    Mich. 

422,    54    X.    W.    897    [1893]),    813. 
^Mills  V.  Village  of  Xorwood    (6  Ohio 


C.  C.  305  [1892]),  296,  575,  1430, 
1446. 

Milton   V.   Stell    (—   X.    J.   ,   65 

Atl.    1118    [1907]),   988,  990,    1410. 

Milton  V.  Stell  (73  X.  .1.  Law  (44 
Vr.)  261,  62  Atl.  1133  [1906]), 
989,  990,   1410. 

Milwaukee  Electric  Railway  &  Elec- 
tric Light  Company  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee (95  Wis.  42,  69  X.  W.  796 
[1897]),   50,   103,   106,   601,  611. 

Milwaukee,  etc.,  R.  R.  C.  v.  Eble  (3 
Pinney   (Wis.)   334  [1851]),  284. 

Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beck- 
with  (129  U.  S.  26,  32  L.  585,  9 
S.   207),   363. 

Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Em- 
mons (149  U.  S.  364,  37  L.  769, 
13   S.   870]),   363. 

^Minneapolis  &  'St.  Louis  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Lindquist  (119  la.  144,  93 
X.  W.  103  [1903]),  118,  324,  325, 
555,  596,  598,  612,  620,  666,  694, 
699,  711,  812,  1078,  1358,  1414, 
1444. 

Minnesota  and  'SI.  Land  and  Im- 
provement Co.  V.  City  of  Billings 
(111  Fed.  972,  50  C.  C.  A.  70 
[1901]),  119,  247,  248,  250,  324, 
550,  555,  609,  630,  636,  645,  670, 
709,   729. 

Minnesota  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Palmer 
(20  Minn.  468,  20  Gil.  424 
[1874]),  104,  350,  464,  460,  639. 
708,   1417,   1425,   1426. 

Minnetonka  Lake  Improvement,  Car- 
penter, In  re  v.  Board  of  County 
Commissioners  of  Hennepin  Coun- 
ty (56  Minn.  513,  45  Am.  St.  Rep. 
494,  58  X.  W.  295  [1894]),  360, 
404. 

Minor  v.  Daspit,  Sheriff  (43  La. 
Ann.  337,  9  So.  49  [1891]),  4,  7, 
37,   147,  668,  689,   711. 

Minor  v.  Board  of  Control  of  the 
City  of  Hamilton  (20  Ohio  C.  C. 
4    [1899]),   787,  800. 

Miservey  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond 
(208*  111.  656.  70  X.  E.  678 
[1904]).    51.    949. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clvii 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Missouri,    Kansas    &.    Texas    Railway 

Company     v.     Cambern     (G6     Kan. 

3G5,  71  "Pac.  800   [1903]).  26(5,  343, 

1078. 
Missouri,    K-ansas    &    Texas    Ry.    Co. 

of  Texas  v.  Wetz    (97  Tex.  »81,  80 

S.   W.   988    [1904]).   363. 
^Missouri   Pacific  R.   Co.   v.  Ilarrelson 

(44  Kan.  253,  24  Pac.  46.5),  363. 
Mitchell   V.   Lane    (62   Hun    (X.   Y.) 

253,   16  X.   Y.  Supp.   707    [ISfll]). 

449.  4G5,  479,  986.   1204. 
Mitchell    V.    City   of    Xegaunce    (113 

Mich.    359,    67    Am.    St.   Rep.    468, 

38    L.    R.    A.    157.    71    X.    W.    646 

[1897]),  368,  608. 
MitclicU    V.  Tliornton    (21   Gratt.    164 

[1871]),    69. 
Mittel    V.  lity   of  /'liicago    (9    P,rad- 

well    ;ill.)  "534    [1881]),   549.   653, 

6.74. 
Mix  V.  Peo^ile  ex  rol.  Sliaw   {  106   HI. 

425    [1883]),   525. 
Mix    V.    Ross    (57    111.    121    [1870]), 

11,   35,   45,   613,    1039,    1048,    1115. 
Moale  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 

Baltimore  '  (61    Md.    224     [1883]). 

440,   475,   521,   570.   626,  631,   632, 

696,  698,  705,  739,  867,  890,   1042, 

1049,   1060,   1444. 
Moale  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 

Baltimore     (5     Md.     314,    61     Am. 

Dec.  276   [1854]),  86,  100,   110. 
Moherly   v.    Hogan    (131    Mo.    19,    32 

S.  W.  1014   [1895]),  8,  50,  89,  562, 

620,  625,  674,  698,  704,  1040,   1049, 

1135,    1182,   1249,    1284,    1383. 
Moherry  v.  City  of  Jefi'ersonville    (38 

Ind.    198     [1871]).    223.    234,    264. 

396,  433,  496.  7(>0.  948.   1337,   1350, 

1352,    1356. 
Mobile.   Mayor,   Aldermen,  etc.,  of  v. 

Dargan    (45  Ala.  310   [1871]).  113, 

150.  323,  690,  701. 
Mobile.    County    of    v.    Kimball     (102 

U.   S.   691,   26   L.   238    [1880]).   36. 

360. 
Mobile,    City    of    v.    Mobile    Light    & 

Railroad   Company    ( 141    Ala.   442. 

38  So.   127   [1904]).  739,  748,  758. 

Mobile,  Mayor,   Aldermen,   etc.,  of  v. 

Royal     Street     Railroad     Company 


(45    Ala.    322    [1871]),    111,-    113, 

150,  323,  690,  701. 
Mock  V.  City  of  Muncie   ( 9  Ind  App. 

536,    37    X.    E.    281    [1893]),    301, 

549,  553,  619,  626,  642.  654.  723. 
Mocker  v.   Cincinnati    (7   Ohio   X.   P. 

279    [1900]),   956.   764. 
Modesto     Irrigation    District,     Board 

of  Directors  of  v.  Tregea    (88  Cal. 

33*4,    26    Pac.    237     [1891]),     129, 

1370,   1477. 
^loerlein    Brewing   Co.    v.    ^Yestmeier 

(4   Ohio   C.   C.   296    [1890]).    1067, 

1068,  1085,  1146,   1224. 
Moffitt   V.   Jordan    (127   Cal.   622,   60 

Pac.    173    [1000]),    301,    537.    726. 

907,  1062,  1150.  1153,  1154.  1269, 

1281,  1334. 
Mogg  V.  Hall  (83  Mich.  576.  47  X. 

\Y.  553),  340,  1041,  1047,  lOSl. 
Mohr  V.  City  of  Chicago  (114  111. 

App.  283  [1904]),  495,  541.  1437. 

1442. 
Moll  V.  City  of  Chicago    (194  111.  28. 

61    X'.    e"    1012    [1901]).   759,    764, 

864. 
.Molt    V.    Baumann     (65    X"^.    Y.    App. 

Div.  445    [1901]),   1072. 
Monaghan     v.    City    of     Indianapolis 

(37    Ind.   App.    280,    76   X.   E.   424, 

reversing  on  rehearing  75  X.  E.  33 

[1905]),  515. 
Monroe    v.     City    of     Cleveland     (29 

Ohio  C.   C.   6.33    [1907]).  685,   687, 

1015. 
Monroe    Countv.    Board    of    Commis- 
sioners of  V.  Fullen    (118   Ind.   158. 

20  X.  E.  771    [1888]  ).   1350. 
Monroe,    Board   of   Commis<ioners   of 

County    of    v.    Ilarrell     (  147     Ind. 

500,  46  X.   E.    124    [1876]).   8.   11. 

40,    50,     147.    247,    248,    253,    550. 

553,  665,  666,  672.  677,  697,   1505. 
^lonroe.   County   of   v.   City  of  Roch- 
ester   (88    Hun.    164,   34   X.   Y.    S. 

533    [1895]),    1361. 
Moore    v.    Citv    of    Paola     (63    Kan. 

867.  66  Pac.   1040  |19()1]).  86.  314. 

697. 
^loore    V.    People   ex    rel.    Lewis    (  106 

111.    376     [1883]),    104,    153,    340, 

896,  918,  927,  955. 


clviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Moore  v.  Simonson  (27  Or.  117,  39 
Pac.    1105    [1805]),    1055. 

Moorewood  v.  Corporation  of  N'ew 
York  (6  Howa'rd,  386  [1851]), 
728. 

Moran  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Jersey  City  (58  N.  J.  L.  (29  Vr.) 
653,   35   Atl.   950    [1896]),    1368. 

Moran  v.  Thompson  (20  Wash.  525, 
56  Pac.  29    [1899]),  347,   495. 

Moran  v.  City  of  Troy  (9  Hun  (N. 
Y.)  540  [1877]),  89,  110,  381,  414, 
464. 

Morange  v.  Mix  (44  N^.  Y.  315 
[1871]),  888,   1523. 

Morewood  Avenue,  Chamber's  Ap- 
peal (159  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl.  123 
[1893]),  8,  11,  284,  382,  554,  620, 
626,  627,  666,  672,  709. 

Morewood  Avenue,  Ferguson's  Ap- 
peal (159  Pa.  St.  39,  28  Atl.  130 
[1893]),  223,  234,  744,  906. 

Morey  v.  City  of  Duluth  (75  Minn. 
221,  77  N.-  W.  829  [1899]),  301, 
394,  915,  927,  939,  986,  996,  1057, 
1183,   1348,   1358. 

Morford  v.   Unger    (8   la.    82).    150. 

Morgan  v.  Pueblo  &  Arkansas  Val- 
ley Railroad  Company  (6  Colo. 
478    [1883]),   73. 

Morgan  Civil  Township  v.  Hunt  ( 104 
Ind.  590,  4  X.  E.  299  [1885]),  744, 
807,  1384. 

Morgan  Park,  Village  of  v.  Galian 
(35  ni.  App.  646  [1890]),  496. 
738,   1499. 

Morgan  Park,  Village  of  v.  Wiswall, 
(155  111.  262,  40  X.  E.  611 
[1895]),  284,  291,  351,  451. 

Morley  v.  Carpenter  (22  Mo.  App. 
640    [1886]),   380,  381,  464. 

Morley  v.  Weakley  (86  Mo.  451), 
314.*^ 

Morning  Park  Side  Case  ( 10  Abb. 
Pr.  (X.  S.)  338  [1870]),  909.  927. 
986. 

Monroe,  County  of  v.  City  of  Roch- 
ester (154  X.  Y.  570,"  49  X.  E. 
139  [1898]),  672,  724,  1415,  1423. 
1427,    1431. 

Monroe  Avenue,  Chamber's  Ap 
peal  (159  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl.  123 
[1893]),    898. 


Monroe  Avenue,  Ferguson's  Ap- 
peal (159  Pa.  St.  39.  28  Atl.  130 
[1893]),    916. 

^lonticello.  Town  of  v.  Banks  (48 
Ark.  251,  2  S.  W.  852  [1886]), 
151,   608,   639,   697,   701. 

Montgomery,  City  Council  of  v.  Bar- 

nett     (—    Ala.    ,    43     So.    92 

[1907]),  519,   1432,   1437. 

Montgomery,  City  Council  of  v.  Bird- 
song  (126  Ala.  632,  28  So.  522 
[1699]),  111,  118,  132,  150,  653, 
690,    702,    1183,    1395,    1432,    1444. 

Montgomery  City  Council  of  v.  Fos- 
ter  (133  Ala.  587,  32  So.  610 
[1901]),  323,  432,  653,  677,  702. 

Montgomery,  Citj^  Council  of  v. 
Moore  (140  Ala.  638,  37  So.  291 
[1903]),  118,  194,  195,  314,  665, 
666,  698,  702,  709. 

Montgomery  v.  Wasem  (116  Ind. 
343,  19  X.  E.  184,  15  X.  E.  795 
[1888]),  531,  770,  772,  1008,  1015, 
1018,    1292,   1431,   1435,   1436. 

Montgomery  County,  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  V.  Fullen  (118  Ind. 
158,  20  X.  E.  771  [1888]),  465, 
468,   469,   477,   479,    1350,    1371. 

Montgomery  County,  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  V.  Fullen  (111  Ind. 
410,  12  X.  E.  298  [1887]),  16,  263, 
266,  278,  322,  477,  549,  561,  666, 
709,  738,  776,  7'81,  952,  955,   1513. 

Moody  &  Co.  V.  Chadwick  (52  La. 
Ann.  1888,  28  So.  361  [1900]), 
525,  707,  714,  1047,  1371. 

Moore  v.  City  of  Albany  (98  X.  Y. 
396  [1885]),  393,  396,  398,  403, 
995,   1001. 

Moore  v.  Barry  (30  S.  C.  530,  4  L. 
R.  A.  294.  9  S.  E.  589  [1889]), 
16,   1012,   1033,  1043. 

Moore  v.  City  of  Chicago  (60  111. 
243    [1871]),   8t)0. 

Moore  v.  Melntyre  (110  Mich.  237, 
68  X.  W.  130"[1896]),  1015.  1394, 
1436. 

Moore  v.  City  of  Mattoon  (163  111. 
622,  45  X."  E.  567  [1896]),  900. 
902. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


clix 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Moore  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(73  N."^  Y.  238,  29  Am.  Rep.  134 
[1878]),  7G8,  789,  848,  1028,  1444, 
1498. 

Morewood  v.  Corporation  of  New 
York  (6  Howard  (N.  Y.)  38G 
[1851]),  927,  935,   1004,    1005. 

Morewood  Avenue,  Chamber's  Ap- 
peal (159  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl.  123 
[1893]),  287. 

Morrell  v.  Union  Drainage  District 
No.  1,  (118  111.  139,  8  N.  E.  675 
[1887]),  254,  340,  670,  709,  952, 
955,    1008,    1030,    1414,    1438,    1444. 

Morrilton  Waterworks  Improvement 
District  v.  Earl  (71  Ark.  4,  69  S. 
W.  577,  71  S.  W.  666  [1903]), 
16,  266,  268,  351. 

Morris  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of  the 
City  of  Bayonne  (62  N.  J.  L.  (33 
Yt[)  385,^41  Atl.  924  [1898]), 
1368,    1379. 

Morris  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of  Ba- 
yonne (2o'n.  J.  Eq.  (10  C.  E. 
Green),  345   [1874]),  55,  829,  1437. 

Morris  v.  City  of  Chicago  (11  111. 
650    [1850])"^,    430,    465,    480,    1369. 

Morris  v.  Lalaurie  (39  La.  Ann.  47 
[1887]),  73. 

Morris  v.  Merrill  (44  Neb.  423,  62 
N.  W.  865   [1895]),  266.  270.   1420. 

Morrison  v.  Austin  State  Bank  (213 
111.  472,  104  Am.  St.  Rep.  225,  72 
N.  E.   1109    [1905]),   1503. 

Morrison  v.  City  of  Chicago  '  ( 142 
111.  660,  32  N.  E.  172  [1893]),  223. 
234,  271,  699,  777,  880,  906,  908, 
910,   922,   925,   927,   930,    1309. 

Morrison  v.  Hershire  (32  la.  271 
[1871]),  301,  561,  562,  575,  620. 
677,  838,   1116,   1173,   1435. 

Morrison  v.  Morey  (146  Mo.  543, 
48  S.  W.  629*  [1898]),  38,  47, 
97,  111,  147,  343,  507,  679,  717, 
1085. 

Morrison  v.  City  of  St.  Paul  (5 
Minn.   108    (Gif.  83)    [1861]),  813. 

Morrow  v.  Geeting  (23  Ind.  App. 
494,  55  N.  E.  787    [1899]),  475. 

Morrow  v.  Geeting  (15  Ind.  App. 
358,  41  N.  E.  848.  44  N.  E.  59 
[1896]),   375,   550.   674,   690,   1282. 


Morse  v.  City  of  Buffalo  (35  Hun 
(N.  Y.)  613  [1'885]),  707,  723, 
886,  1432. 

Morse  v.  Charles    ( —  ^lass.  ,  83 

N.  E.  891  [1908]),  480,  663,  950. 
Morse  v.  City  of  Omaha  (67  Xeb. 
426,  93  N.  W.  734  [1903]),  223, 
234,  670,  699,  781,  795,  951,  1004, 
1432. 
Morse  v.  .Stocker    (83  ]Mass.    (1  All.) 

150    [1861]),  -396. 
Morse  v.  City  of  West  Port   (110  Mo. 
502,    19    S.    W.    831    [1892]),    314, 
517,  518. 

Morton  v.  Sullivan   ( —  Ky.  ,  29 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  943,  96  S.  W.  807 
[1906]),  236,  301,  313,  549,  620, 
686,  1215,  1224,  1298,  1524. 
Moseley  v.  Boush  (25  Va.  (4  Ran- 
dolph) 392  [1826]),  1040,  1050, 
1055. 
Moss    V.    City   of    Fairbury    (66   Neb. 

671,  92  N.  W.  721    [1902]),  313. 
Mott  v.   Hubbard    (59   0.   S.    199,  53 
N.  E.  47   [1898]),   189,  1011,   1012, 
1013. 
Mott    V.    City    of    Detroit    (18    Mich. 
494    [1869]),   43,   89,   92,    95,    118, 
157,   317,   419,   437,   515,   531,   532, 
570,   665,   666,   688,   698,   709,   713, 
1012,  1015,  1020,  1060. 
Mound    City    Construction    Company 
V.   Macgurn    (97   Mo.   App.   403,   71 
S.  W.   460    [1902]),  545,   622,  681. 
Mound    City    Land    &    Stock    Co.    v. 
Miller    (170   Mo.    240,   94   Am.   St. 
Rep.   727,   60   L.   R.   A.    190,   70   S. 
W.  721    [1902]).   15,  202,  229,  247, 
253,  335,  340,   666,   711. 
Mt.  Auburn,  Proprietors  of  the  Cem- 
etery of  V.  City  of  Cambridge   ( 150 
Mass.  12,  4  L.  R.  A.  836,  22  N.  E. 
66    [1889]),  8,   11. 
Mt.  Carniol.  City  of  v.  Friodrich   (141 
111.  3(i9,  31   N.  E.  21    [1893]),  911. 
918. 
:\Ioujit  Morris   Square.  Matter  of    (2 

Hill    (N.  Y.)    14   [1842]),  206. 
Mount   Pleasant  Avenue,  In  re    (171 
Pa.   St.   38,   32   Atl.    1122    [1895]), 
1347,    1354,    1363. 


clx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


]\It.  Pleasant  Boroiigli  v.  Baltimore 
&  Ohio  Railroad  Company  (138 
Pa.  St.  365,  11  L.  R.  A.  520,  20 
Atl.  1052  [1890]),  52,  53,  55,  231, 
596,   598,   737,   829. 

Mt.  Vernon,  In  re  Petition  City  of, 
to  Assess  Cost  of  Local  Improve- 
ments, etc.  (147  111.  359,  23  L.  R. 
A.  807,  35  K  E.  533  [1894]),  35, 
581,  910,   1074,  1219. 

Mt.  Vernon,  City  of  v.  State  of  Ohio 
ex  rel.  Berry  (71  0.  S.  428,  104 
Am.  St.  Rep.  783,  73  N.  •  E.  515 
[1904]  ,   1012,   1015,  1019,  1472. 

Moxley  v.  Lawler    ( —  Ky.   ,   97 

S.  W.  365  [1906]  ,  301,  1049,  1072. 

Moyamensing,  Commissioners  and 
Inhabitants  of  the  District  of,  to 
the  use  of  the  City  of  Philadel- 
phia V.  Flanigan  (3  Phil.  458 
[1859]),  1063. 

Mudge  V.   Walker    (—  Ky.  ,   90 

S.  W.  1046,  28  Ky.  Law  Rep. 
996   [1906]),   432,   462,  528. 

Muire  v.  Falconer  (51  Va.  (10 
Gratt.)    12    [1853]),  771. 

Mullane  v.  City  of  Newark  ( —  N. 
J.  ,  68  Atl.  412    [1905]),  495. 

Mulligan  v.  Smith  (59  Cal.  206 
[1881]),  781,  786,  787,  788,  791, 
795,   1006,   1204. 

Mullikin  v.  City  of  Bloomingtoh  ( 72 
Ind.  161  ,  246. 

Mullins  V.  Shaw  (77  Miss.  900,  28 
So.   958    [1900]  ,  906. 

Municipal    Securities    Corporation   v. 

Gates    (—  Mo.  App.  ,    109   S. 

W.  85   [1908]),  865. 

Municipal    Securities    Corporation    v. 

Gates    (—  Mo.   App.   ,    105   S. 

W.  85    [1908]),  18. 

Municipality  Number  Two,  Praying 
for  the  Opening  of  Benton  Street 
V.  White  (9  La.  Ann.  446  [1854]), 
33,  113,  155,  622,  624,  690. 

Municipality  No.  2,  for  Opening  Eu- 
phrosine  Street  (7  La.  Ann.  72 
[1852]),  63,  113,  155. 

]\Itinicipality  No.  1,  Praying  for  the 
Opening  of  Orleans  Avenue  (8  La. 
Ann.   377    [1853]),   745,   765,    1299. 

Municipality    Number    Two,    for    the 


Opening  of  Roffignac  Street   (7  La. 

Ann.    76     [1852]),    155,    308,    311, 

426. 
Municipality   Number    One   v.   Young 

(5  La.  Ann.  362   [1850]),  155. 
Municipality    Number    Two    v.    Cur- 

rell    (13  La.  318   [1839]),  1054. 
Municipality    Number    Two    v.    Dunn 

(10  La.  Ann.  57   [1855]),  155. 
jNIunicipality     Number    Two     v.    Mc- 

Donough"     (10      La.       Ann.       533 

[1840]),   434. 
Munn,  In  the  Matter  qf    (165  N.  Y. 

149,   58    N.    E.    881    [1900]),    672, 

675,     888,    927,    979,     1337,     1369, 

1371,    1455. 
Munn,    In   the    Matter    of    (49    App. 

Div.    232),    927,    979,    1337,    1369, 

1371,  1455. 
Munson    v.    Board   of    Commissioners 

of    The    Atchafalaya    Basin    Levee 

District     (43    La.    Ann.    15,    8    So. 

906    [1891]),   35,  37,  89,   145,   147, 

155,   343,    549,   651,    711,   779,   780. 
Murdock    v.    City   of    Cincinnati    (44 

Fed.  726   [1891]),  771,   1012,   1033, 

1046,   1141,   1370. 
Murdock    v.    City   of    Cincinnati     (39 

Fed.    891     [1889]),    119,    132,    726. 

773. 
Murnane   v.   City   of   St.   Louis    (123 

Mo.    479,    27  "S.    W.    711    [1894]), 

186. 
Murphey    v.    Mayor    and    Council    of 

\\'ilmington      "(5      Del.      Ch.      281 

[1879]),  649,   890,    1430. 
Murphy,   In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion  of,   to   Vacate  or   Reduce   As- 
sessments   (20    Hun    (N.    Y.)    346 

[1880]),  317,  440,  831,   1455. 
Murphy    v.    City   of    Albina    (20    Or. 

379,  26  Pac.   234   [1891]),   1500. 
Murphy  v.    Beard    (138   Ind.   560,   38 

N.  E.   33    [1894]),   766,   1068. 
Murphy  v.  City  of  Chicago    (186  111. 

59.  57  N.  E.  847   [1900]),  279,  282. 
iMurpliy    v.     Inhabitants    of    Clinton 

(182    Mass.     198,     65     N.     E.     34 

[1902]),  324,   1116.   1119,   1152. 
Murphy   V.   Dobben    (137    Mich.    565, 

100   N.  W.   891    [1904]),  226,  340. 

776,  1497. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxi 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


(  — 
593 

(72 
494, 

Neb. 
680 

I.    11 


(119  111. 
244,  271, 
43-2,  444, 
775,   911, 

Ct. 


^Murphy  v.  City  of  Long  Brand 

X.     J.     Sup."    ,     61     Atl. 

[1905]),   305,  433,   570. 
Murphy    v.    City    of    Louisville 

Ky.  '(9    Bush.)     189    [1872]). 

1499. 
Murj)hy    V.    City   of   Omaha    ( 1 

(UnolV. )      488,      95      X.      W. 

[1901]  ),    14'o2,    1490. 
Murphy   v.    People    (120    111.    23 

X.  E.  202),   153,  347. 
Murphy    v.    People   ex    rel.    Raymond 

183  ill.  185,  55  X.  E.  078   [1899]), 

1183. 
Murphy   v.    City   of   Peoria 

509,  "9  X.  E.  895  [1888]) 

270,   293,    295,    305,, 431, 

549,   560,   570,   748,   771, 

918. 
Murphy   v.    Sims    (27    Olrio    Cii 

R.   825    [1905]),    1012. 
Murpliy  V.  ^layor  and  Council  of  the 

City     of     Wilmington      ( 0     Houst. 

(Del.)       108,     22      .Am.     St.      Rep. 

345    [1880]),    80,    230,    245,    1423, 

1425. 
ilurr  V.  City  of  Xaperville    (210   III. 

371,    71    X.    E.    380    [1904]),    280, 

348,  451,  922,   1316. 
^Murray  v.   C'ity  of  Chicago    ( 175   111. 

340/51    X.    E.    054     [1898]),    905, 

972,  990. 
^lurraj^  v.  Graham    (0  Paige  Ch.    ( X. 

Y.)     622     [1837]),    557,    927,    941, 

986,  996,   1414. 
Murray     v.     Tucker      (73     Ky.      (10 

Bush.)    240    [1874]),' 223,  229,  2*34, 

273,    527,    531,   541,    775,    770,    807. 
Murtland   v.   City  of   Pittsburg    ( 189 

Pa.   St.  371,  41   Atl.   1113    [1899-]), 

1035,  1491. 
Mu-c'tino.   (  ity  of  v.   Chicago,  Rock 

Island    &   Pacific    Ry.   Co.    (88    la. 

291,  55  X.  W.  100)'  575,  594,  59.1, 

597.     598,    630,    077,     1028,     1105, 

1100,    1303. 
Muscatine    City    of    v.    The    Chicago, 

Rock  Island  &   Pacific  Ry.  Co.    ^79 

la.    645,    44    X.    W.    909    [1890]), 

1000. 
Muscatine,  Cit.y  of  v.  Keokuk  Xorth 

ern    Line    Packet    Cb.     (45    la.    185 

[1876]),   827. 


Muskego,  Town  of  v.  Drainage  Com- 
missioners (YS  ^Yis.  40,  47  X.  W. 
11  [1890]),  93,  97,  239,  340,  420, 
585,  004,  739,  750,  798,  909,   1299. 

^Nkitual  Life  Insurance  Company  of 
Xew  Yoi  k  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, In  the  flatter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  the  (89  X.  Y.  530  [1882]  ). 
323,  436,  443,  480,  805,   1453. 

Mutual  Life  Insurance  Company  of 
Xew  York  v.  ^layor.  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  X'ew 
York  ( 144  X.  Y.  494,  39  X.  E.  386 
[1895]),   495,    1486,   1488. 

^Mutual  Life  Insurance  Company  of 
Xew  York  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalt.v  of  the  City  of  Xew 
York  (79  Hun  (X.  Y.)  482,  29  X. 
Y.  S.  980   [1894]),  496,  1488. 

Myer  v.  Burns  (4  Phil.  314  [1801]), 
1146,    1194. 

Myers  v.  City  of  Chicago  (196  111. 
591,  03  X.  E.  1037  [1902]),  295, 
297,   298,   347,   348,   005,   006,   670. 

M.vers  V.  Dodd  (9  Ind.  290,  68  Am. 
Dec.  624),  363. 

^il.vrick  V.  City  of  La  G^rosse  (17 
Wis.  442  [186-3]),  53,  54,  737,  813, 
981,   1420,   1432. 


N 

X'.  p.  Perine  Contracting  &  Paving 
Company  v.  City  of  Pasadena  (110 
Cal.   0.  '17    Pac."  777    [1897]),   777. 

X'.  P.  Perine  Contracting  Co.  v. 
Quackenbush  (104  Cal.  084.  38 
Pac.  533  [I894]f?  314,  4>'?7,  499, 
515,  867,  1086,  1141,  1145.  1235, 
1205. 

Xaegely  v.  Cit.v  of  Saginaw  (  101 
Mich*.  532,  00  X.  W.  M>  [1894]), 
843,  844,  851,  861. 

Xagle  V.  :MeMurray  (84  Cal.  539.  24 
Pac.  107  [1890]),  1024,  1020, 
1033. 

Xalle    V.    Cit.v    of    Austin     ( —    Tex. 

Civ.    Ap]).    ,     103    S.    \V.    825 

[1907]),   43,   986. 


clxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Naltner    v.     Blake     (56     Ind.   •127), 

[1877]),  432,  465,  479,  1181,  1196, 

1207. 
Napa,   City   of   v.   Easterby    ( 76   Cal. 

222,  18  Pac.  253  [18S8]),  741,  838, 

849,  854,  862. 
Napa,   City  of   v.   Easterby    (61   Cal. 

509    [1882]),    367,    436,    627,    741, 

749,  837,  848,  854,  862,  1281,  1292. 
Nash    V.    Clark    (27    Utah,    158,    101 

Am.   St.  Rep.  953,   1   L.  R.  A.    (N. 

S.)   208,  75  Pac.  371   [1904]),  355. 
Nash    V.    Kenyon     (Mich.    ,    115 

N.   W.   45    [1908]),   482. 
Nash   V.   Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of 

New   York    (9    Hun    (N.    Y.)    218 

[1876]),  1478,   1484. 
Nash    .-.   City  of   St.   Paul    (8   Minn. 

172    [1863]),   313. 
Nashville,    Mayor    and    City    Council 

of  V.  Berry   (2  Shan.  Cas.    (Tenn.) 

561),  55,  86,  96,  160,  245,  323,  420, 

717. 
National  Bond  &  Security  Co.  v.  City 

of  St.   Paul    (91   Minn.  223,  97  N. 

W.   878    [1904]),   1195,   1206. 
National    Fertilizer    Co.    v.    Lambert 

(48   Fed.   458),   372. 
National  Life   Insurance  Co.   v.   But- 
ler   (61  Neb.  449,  87  Am.  St.  Rep. 

462,    85    N.    W.    437    [1901]),    49, 

1057. 
National    Tubeworks    Co.    v.    Cham- 
berlain   (5  Dak.  54,  37  N.  VV.  761 

[1889]),   838. 
National    Water    Works    Co.   v.    City 

of  Kansas    (28   Fed.   921]),  483. 
Naugatuck    Railroad    Co.    v.    City   of 

Waterbury    (78   Conn.    193,  61   Atl. 

474    [1905]),   594,  596,  598. 
Neal  V.  Vansickel    (72  Neb.  200,   100 

N.   W.    200    [1904]),    677,    729. 
Neenan    v.    Donoghue     (50    Mo.    493 

[1872]),  437,  537. 
Neenan     v.      Smith      (60     Mo.     292 

[1875]),  465,  479,  707,  1284,   1335. 
Neenan     v.     Smith      (50     Mo.      525 

[1872]),    79,    314,    698,    707,    714, 

1040,   1182. 
Neenan     v.      Smith      (30     Mo.     525 

[1872]),   707. 
Neff  V.  Bates   (25  O.  S.  109   [1874]), 

245,    395,    1015. 


Neff  V.  Covington  Stone  and  Sand 
Co.  (108  Ky.  457,  55  S.  W. 
697,  56  S.  W.  723  [1900]),  492, 
574,  679,  684,   1141,  1145,   1182. 

Nehasane  Park  Association  v.  Lloyd 
(167  N.  Y.  431,  60  N.  E.  741 
[1901]),  223,  234,  1190. 

Neill  V.  Trans-Atlantic  Mortgage 
Trust  Company  (89  Mo.  App.  644 
[1901]),   18,  530. 

Neilson  v.  Chicago,  Milwaukee  & 
Northwestern  Railway  Company 
(58  Wis.  516,  14  Ami!  &  Eng.  R. 
Cases,  239,  17  N.  W.  310  [1883]), 
71. 

Neiman  v.  State  ex  rel.  Dickey  (98 
Ind.   58    [1884]),   1250,    1251." 

Nell  V.  Power    (—  Ky.  ,   107  S. 

W.  694   [1908]),  527. 

Nelson  v.  City  of  Chicago  (196  111. 
390,  63  N."  E.  738  [1902]),  301, 
523,  741,  844. 

Nelson  v.  City  of  Saginaw  (106 
Mich.  659,  64  N.  W.  499  [1895]), 
690,   692,   927. 

Neltner  v.  Blake  (56  Ind.  127 
[1877]),    1204. 

Neptune  v.  Taylor  (108  Ind.  459,  8 
N.  E.  566  [1886]),  322,  1371. 

Nesbit  V.  People  (19  Colo.  441,  36 
Pac.   221),   216. 

Neustadt  v.  Illinois  Central  Rail- 
road  (31  111.  484),  615. 

Nevada,  City  of,  to  use  of  Gilfillan 
v.  Eddy  (123  Mo.  546,  27  S.  W. 
471),  234,  264,  273,  596,  838,  867, 
877,    1134. 

Nevada,  City  of,  to  the  use  of  Gil- 
fillan V.  Morris  (43  Mo.  App.  586 
[1891]),  273,  502,  570,  698,  1284, 
1304. 

Nevada  National  Bank  of  San  Fran- 
cisco v.  Poso  Irrigation  District 
(140  Cal.  344,  73  Pac.  1056 
[1903]),  579,  1072,  1073,  1261, 
1380,   1426,  1427. 

Nevada  National  Bank  v.  Board  of 
Supervisors  of  Kern  County  (5 
Cal.  App.  638,  91  Pac.  122 
[1907]),  242,  259,  469,   1085. 

Neversorry  v.  Duluth  South  Shore 
and  Atlantic  R.  Co.  (115  Mich. 
146,  73  N.  W.  125),  363. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxiii 


[References  are  to -sections.] 


Nevin  v.  Allen    ( —  Ky.  ,  26   S. 

W.  180,  15  Ky.  Law  Rep.  830 
[1894]),   569,   607,   622,    1197. 

Nevin  v.  City  of  Dayton  (4  Ohio  X. 
P.  203   [1897]),   1012. 

JSTevin  v.   Gaertner    ( —   Ky.  ,  48 

S.  W.  153,  20  Ky.  L."  R.  1022), 
1249,  1317. 

Nevin  v.  Roach  (86  Ky.  492,  5  S. 
W.  546  [1887]),  119,  132,  134, 
275,  296,  301,  553,  628,  666,  709, 
710,    773,   844,   867,    1356,    1370. 

Nevins  &  Otter  Creek  Township 
Draining  Company  v.  Alkire  ( 36 
Ind.  189  [1871])'.  340,  554,  560, 
639,  723,  745,  956,  960,  1011,  1254, 
1262. 

New  V.  Village  of  New  Rochelle  (91 
H-n  (N.  Y.)  214,  36  N.  Y.  S.  211 
[1895]),  1484,  1485,  1488. 

New  Albany,  City  of  v.  Conger  (18 
Ind.  App.  230,  47  N.  E.  852 
[1897]  ),  626,  1505. 

New  Albany,  City  of  v.  Cook  (29 
Ind.  220  [1867]"),  11,  78,  549,  624, 
631,   651,  657. 

New  Albany,  City  of  v.  Sweeney  ( 13 
Ind.  245   [1859]),   1511. 

New  Albany  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co. 
V.  Crunibo  (10  Ind.  App.  360,  37 
N.  E.  1062  [1894]),  1015,  1018. 

New  Castle  City  v.  Jackson  (172  Pa. 
St.  86,  33  Atl.  236  [1895]),  42, 
592,   613. 

New  Castle  &  Richmond  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Brumback  (5  Ind.  543 
[1854]),   69. 

New  Eel  River  Draining  Association 
V.  Durbin  (30  Ind.  173  [1868]), 
253,  254,  479,  1338. 

New  En'rland  Hospital  for  Women 
and  Children  v.  Street  Commis- 
sioners of  the  City  of  Boston  ( 188 
Mass.  88,  74  N.  E.  294  [1905]), 
307,   309,   310,   358,   424,   525,   570. 

New  England  Safe  Deposit  &  Trust 
Company  of  ^Missouri  v.  James  (77 
Mo.  App.   616    [1898]),  538. 

New  Haven,  City  of  v.  Fair  Haven 
&  Westville  Railroad  Company 
(38  Conn.  422,  9  Am.  Rep.  399 
[1871]),    11,    600,    601,    602,    1359. 

New  Haven,  City  of  v.  Whitney    (36 


Conn.  373  [1870]).  228.  229,  464, 
776. 

New  Haven  &  Ft.  Wayne  Turnpike 
Co.  v.  Bird  (33  Ind. '325  [1870]), 
255,  5,54,   629,   639,  723,  886,   1432. 

New  Iberia,  ]\Iayor  and  Board  of 
Trustees  of  the  Town  of  v.  Fon- 
telieu  (108  La.  460,  32  So.  369 
[1901]),  5,  19,  52,  53,  55,  57,  93, 
96,  230,   443,   570. 

New  Jersey,  State  of  v.  (See 

State).  Chancellor  of  (See  Chan- 
cellor) . 

New  Jersey,  Commissioners  of  the 
Sinking  Fund  of  v.  Inhabitants  of 
the  Township  of  Linden  ( 40  N.  J. 
Eq.  (13  Stewart)  27  [1885]),  959, 
1057. 

New  London,  City  of  v.  ^Miller  (60 
Conn.  112,  22 "  Atl.  499  [1891]), 
8,  35,  89,  1056. 

New  Orleans,  City  of.  Praying  for 
Opening  of  Casacaloo  and  Moreau 
Streets  (20  La.  Ann.  497  [1868]), 
43,   155,   308,   560,   634,   698. 

New  Orleans,  City  of.  Praying  for 
the  Opening  of  Dryades  Street  (11 
La.  Ann.  458  [1856]),  731,  745. 

New  Orleans,  City  of.  Praying  for 
the  Opening  of  Piiillip  and  Other 
Streets  (10  La.  Ann.  313  [1855]), 
308,  430. 

New  Orleans,  Application  of  Mayor 
and  First  Municipality  of,  for  Ex- 
tension of  Barrack  Street  (2  Rob- 
inson   (La.)    491     [1842]),    1519. 

New  Orleans,  Second  Municipality  of 
v.  Botts  (8  Robinson  (La.)  198 
[1844]),  263,  413,  837,  873. 

New  Orleans,  City  of  v.  Estate  of 
Burthe    (26  La.  Ann.  497),   155. 

New  Orleans,  City  of  v.  Elliott  (10 
La.  Ann.  59  [1855]),  155,  625. 
663,  666,  089.  698,  713. 

New  Orleans,  Second  Municipality  of 
V.  McDonogli  (9  Robinson  (La.) 
408    [1845]),  234. 

New  Orleans,  City  of  v.  New  Orleans 
Water  Works  Company  ( 36  La. 
Ann.  432   [1884]),  73. 

New  Orleans,  City  of,  for  the  Use 
of  Nicholson  &  Co.  v.  Stewart  (18 
La.   Ann.   710    [1806]),  314,  806 


clxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


New  Orleans  v.  Warner  (180  U.  S. 
199,  45  L.  597,  21  S.  353  [1901], 
modified  on  rehearing,  176  U.  S. 
92,  44  L.  385,  20  S.  280),   1508. 

New  Orleans  v.  Warner  (175  U.  S. 
120,  44  L.  96,  20  S.  44  [1899J, 
modified  on  rehearing,  176  U.  S. 
92,  44  U  385,  20  S.  280),  16,  580, 
587,  1010,  1075,  1508. 

Xew  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Louisiana  ex  rel. 
City  of  Xew^  Orleans  ( 157  U.  S. 
219,  39  L.  679,  15  S.  581  [1895]), 
60,    166,    167,   599,   605,   1162. 

New  Orleans  Drainage  Co.  praying 
for  the  confirmation  of  a  tableau, 
(11  Lf,  Ann.  338  [1856]),  8,  43, 
111,  155,  255,  653. 

New  Orleans  Gas  Co.  v.  Drainage 
Commission  of  New  Orleans  (197 
U.  S.  453,  49  L.  831,  25  S.  471 
[1905]),    483. 

New  Orleans,  Jackson  &  Great 
Northern  Railroad  Co.  v.  iloye 
(39   Miss.   374    [I860]),   71. 

New  Whatcom,  City  of  v.  Belling- 
ham  Bay  Improvement  Co.  ( 18 
Wash.  181,  51  Pac.  360  [1897]), 
301,  670,  918,  927,  1004,  1141, 
1145. 

New  Whatcom,  City  of  v.  Belling- 
ham  Bay  Improvement  Company 
(16  Wash.  131,  47  Pac.  236 
[1896]),  119,  121,  122,  301,  570, 
670,  693,  699,  747,  760,  962,  965, 
969,  1026,  1141,  1145,  1179,  1299, 
1303,  1307,  1337,  1346. 

New  Whatcom,  City  of  v.  Belling- 
ham  Bay  Improvement  Company 
(10  Wash.  378,  38  Pac.  1024 
[1894]),  1017. 

New  Whatcom,  City  of  v.  Belling- 
ham  Bay  Improvement  Company 
(9  Wash.  639,  38  Pac.  113 
[1894]),  223,  234,  713,  714,  777, 
951,   1304,   1450. 

New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the  City 
of  (190  N.  Y.  350)  ;  sub  nomine,  In 
re  Water  Front  in  City  of  'New 
York  (83  N  E.  299  [1907]),  86, 
241,  245,  622. 

New    York,    Mayor,    Aldermen    and 


Commonalty  of.  Matter  of  the  ( 180 
N.  Y.  237,  78  N.  E.  952  [1906]). 
426. 

New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Ap- 
plication of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of 
(178  X.  Y.  421,  70  N.  E.'  924 
[1904]),  680,  892. 

New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Pe- 
tition of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of,  for 
Enlarging,  Extending  and  Improv- 
ing Beckman  Street  in  Said  City 
(20  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  209  [1822])', 
206,   271,   358. 

New  York,  Case  of  ^layor.  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of, 
in  the  flatter  of  Enlarging  and 
Extending  Harman  Street  in  the 
City  of  New  York  ( 18  John.  Sup. 
Ct.'  231  [1819]),  271.  304,  919. 
1300. 

New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Ap- 
plication of  the  Mavor  and  Alder- 
men and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of,  for  tlie  Enlarging  and  Improv- 
ing a  Part  of  Nassau  Street  in  the 
Said  City  (11  Johns.  77  [1814]  K 
35,  42,  147,  578,  588,  612,  613, 
G14. 

New  York,  In  the  flatter  of  the  Cit.v 
of,  for  Opening  Avenue  D  ( 106 
N.  Y.  S.  889,  122  App.  Div.  410 
[1907]),   680. 

New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Citv 
of.  North  River  Water  Front  ( 105 
N.  Y.  S.  750,  120  App.  Div.  849), 
86,   622. 

New  York,  In  re  City  of  ( 100  N.  Y. 
S.   140   [1906]),  1480. 

New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Ap- 
plication of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of 
(99  N.  \.  569    [1885]),  356. 

New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the  City 
of  (106  App.  Div.  31,  94  N.  Y.  S. 
146    [1905]),    657. 

New  York,  In  re  City  of  ( 94  N.  Y. 
S.  146    [1905]),  309. 

New  York,  In  re  City  of  (93  N.  Y. 
S.  84,  103  App.  Div.  496  [1905]), 
680,   721. 


TxVBLE   OF    CASES. 


clxv 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


New  York,  In  re  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
(89  X.  Y.  S.  6,  95  App.  Div.  552 
[1904]).  119,  320,  356,  430,  475, 
618,  680,  729,  892,  947.  050.  1452, 
1457. 

New  \oik.  In  the  Matter  of  the  Citj' 
of.  Grant  Avenue  (78  N.  Y.  S. 
737,  76  App.  Div.  87  [1902]),  672, 
(593,    1351. 

New  York,  In  re  City  of  (78  X.  Y. 
S.  51,  38  Misc.  Rep.  600  [1902]), 
584,  684,  693. 

Xew  York,  Matter  of  (28  X.  Y.  App. 
D.   143),  320. 

Xew  York,  In  the  flatter  of  the  Ap- 
plication of  the  Board  of  Street 
Opf^ning  and  Improvement  of  the 
City  of,  Relative  to  Acquiring  Ti- 
tle to  Forest  Avenue  in  the  Twen- 
ty-third \Yard  of  the  City  of  Xew 
YorK  (74  Hun,  561,  26  X.  Y.  Supp. 
855   [1893]),  639,  723. 

Xew  York,  In  the  Matter  of  \VideTi- 
ing  Broadway  in  the  City  of  (42 
Howard  (X\  Y.)  220  "^[1872]), 
1347. 

Xew  York,  In  the  ^Matter  of  the  Ap- 
plication of  the'  Board  of  Street 
0|)ening  and  Improvement  of  the 
City  of,  to  Acquire  Title  to  Forest 
Avenue  (64  Hun  (X.  Y.)  59,  18 
X.  Y.  Supp.  727   [1892]),  308,  627. 

Xew  York,  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  (  ity  of  v. 
(ashman  (10  Johns.  (X.'  Y.)  96 
[1813]),   1054. 

Xew  York,  ^layor,  Aldormm,  etc., 
of  V.  Colgate  (12  X.  Y.  140 
[1854]),    1049,   1088,    1164,    1206. 

X>w  York,  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  v.  Colgate  (9  X. 
Y.  Sup.  Ct  Rep.  1  [1853]),  lt)49, 
1068,   1164. 

Xew  York,  ilayor,  etc.,  of  the  C'itv 
of  V.  Corneir(9  Hun  (X.  \.)  215 
[187(5]),  472,   1108. 

Xew  York,  Mayor,  Al  'ermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  v.  Tif- 
fany (68  liun  (X.  \.)'  158.  22  X. 
Y.   S.   604    [1893]  ).   663. 

Xew  York,  ilayor,  etc.,  of  v.  Wliit- 
ney  (7  Barb."(X.  Y.)  485  [1849]), 
360,   453,   549. 


Xew  York  Institution,  In  the  !Mat- 
ter  of  the  Petition  of  the,  for  In- 
struction of  the  Deaf  and  Dumb 
to  Vacate  Assessments  (121  X.  Y. 
234,  24  X.  E.  Rep.  378  [1890]), 
228,  244,  663.  . 

X'ew  Y'ork  &  X.  E.  R.  Co.  Appeal 
(62  €onn.  527).   359. 

X^ew  York  &  X'.  E.  R.  Co.'s  Appeal 
(58  Conn.  532),  359. 

Xew  York  Protestant  Episcopal 
School,  In  the  flatter  of  tlie  (75 
X.  Y.  324),  479,  485.  492,  645, 
1371,    1458. 

Xew  York  Protestant  Episcopal 
School,  ^Matter  of  Trustees  of  (31 
XL  Y.  574    [1864]),  910. 

New  York,  Chicago  &  St.  Louis  Ry. 
Co.  v.  City  of  Hammond    ( —  Ind. 

,   83   X.   E.   244    [1908]),   7.   8. 

100,   119,   131,  301,  1352. 

Xew  York  &  Harlem  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Town  of 
Morrisania  (7  Hun  652  [1876]), 
594,  598,    1078,   1426,   1444. 

Xew  York  Life  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Brest  (71  Fed.  815  [1896]),  291, 
370,  458,  657. 

New  \ork  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Bristol 
(151    U.   S.   556,   38    L.   269),   359. 

New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford 
Railroad  Company'  v.  City  of  New 
Britain  (49  Conn.  40  [1881]),  324. 
596,  597. 

New  York  &  New  Haven  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven 
(42  Conn.  279,  19  Am.  Rep.  534 
[1875]),    59(3. 

New  York  Security  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
City  of  Tacoma  "(30  ^Vash.  6!;i.  71 
Pac.    194    [1903]),   1512,   1526. 

X'^ewark  v.  Delaware,  L.  &  ^V.  R.  Co. 
(42  X.  J.  Eq.   196),  359. 

Xewark  v.  Schuli  (34  X.  J.  Eq.  (7 
Stew.)    262   [1881]),   956,   M2S. 

X'^ewark,  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  V.  State,  Batten.  P'-os.  (32 
X.  J.  L.  (3  Vr.^  -153  [1865]),  392. 
395.  979.  981.   1291. 

Xewark,  (  ity  of  v.  State.  Edwards. 
Pros.  (34  X.  .7.  L.  (5  Vr.)  523 
[1870]),    1055. 


clxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Newark,   IMayor   and    Common   Coun- 
cil of  V.   Weeks    (70  N.   J.   L.    (41 

Vr.)    166,   56  Atl.   118    [1903]),   2. 
Newby    v.    Platt«    County     (25    Mo. 

258   [1857]),   31,  33,  62,  70. 
Newcomb   v.   City   of   Davenport    (86 

la.    291,    53    X.    W.    232    [1892]), 

1479. 
Newell    V.    Wheeler     (48    X.    Y.    486 

[1872]),    223,    234,    777,    891,    951, 

1196,   1426. 
Newman  v.  City  of  Chicago   ( 153  111. 

469,   38   N.   E.    1053    [1894]),   311, 

663,   677,   857,  886,   997,   1374. 
Newman    v.    City    of    Emporia     (41 

Kan.    583,    2r  Pac.    593     [1889]), 

147,   414,   475,   727,    729,   959,   962, 

969. 
Newman    v.    City    of    Emporia     (32 

Kan.    456,    4  '  Pac.    815     [1884]), 

413,  424,  832,  837,  838,  989,   1432. 
Newman    v.    Supervisors    of    Living- 
ston     County      (45      N.      Y.      676 

[1871]),   I486. 
Newport  &   Cincinnati   Bridge   Co.   v. 

Douglass    (75  Ky.    (12  Bush.)    673 

[1877]),   73. 
Newton    County    Draining    Company 

V.  Nofsinger    (43  Ind.  566  [1873]), 

254,   1008. 
Nichol    V.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Nashville     (28    Tenn.     (9    Hump.) 

252),    365. 
Nicholes  v.  City  of  Chicago    ( 184  111. 

43,  56  N.  E.'351    [1900]),  926. 
Nicholes    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kocher- 

sperger   (171  111.  376,  49  N.  E.  574 

[1898]),    849,    856,    857,    927,    929. 

1029,    1187. 
Nicholes    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kocher- 

sperger     (165    111.    502,    46    N.    E. 

237    [1897]),  746,  771,   1183. 
Nicholes     v.     Bridgeport     (23     Conn. 

189,   60  Am.   Dec.    636    [1854]),   8, 

70,  86,  89,   100,   110,  119,  147,  245, 

308. 
Nichols  v.  City  of  Chicago    (192  111. 

290,  61  N.  E.  435   [1901]),  804. 
Nichols  V.   Dallas    (165   Ind.   710,   75 

N.  E.  824   [1905]),   1149. 
Nichols    V.    New    England    Furniture 

Co.    (100  Mich.  230,  59  N.  W.   155 

[1894]),   1099. 


Nichols    V.    Voorhis     (74    X.    Y.    28 

[1878]),    1049,    1369,    1459. 
Xichols   V.   Voorhis    (18   Hun    (X.  Y. 

33    [1879]),   1176,    1202,    1297. 
Xichols  V.  Voorhis    (9   Hun    (X.  Y.) 

171   [1876]),  1425. 
Nicholson   v.   Xew  York  &   Xew   Ha- 
ven  Railroad   Company    (22   Conn. 

74   [1852]),  70. 
Xieholson  Borough,  Main   Street    (27 

Pa.    Super.    Ct.    570     [1905]),    72. 

895. 
Xieholson    Pavement    Co.    v.    Painter 

(35    Cal.    699     [1868]),    223,    234, 

437,  483,   515,   777,   781,   1086. 
Xicodemus  v.   City  of   East  Saginaw 

(25  Mich.  456  [1872]).  1012,  1484. 
Xiklaus    V.    Conkling    (118    Ind.   289, 

20   X.    E.    Rep.    797    [1888]),    229, 

629,    776. 
Xiles,     Board     of     Public     Works     of 

City  of  V.   Pinch    (—  Midi.   , 

116    X.    W.    408    [1908]),    6,    1045, 

1142. 
Xinth    Avenue   and    Fifteenth    Street, 

In    the   Matter    of    (45    X.    Y.    729 

[1871]),    426,    661. 
X'^ixon  V.   City  of  Burlington    ( —  la. 

,   115  X.  W.  239    [1908]),  499, 

843,  858,  1027,  1414,  1432. 
Noland  v.  Mildenberger  ( —  Ky.  — , 

97  S.  W.  24  [1906]),  324,  867, 

981. 
Noonan    v.    People    ex    rel.    Hanberg 

(221      111.     567,     77     N.     E.     930 

[1906]),    89,    301,    314,    552,    553. 

594,    595,   597,   598,    620,    ()30.    666, 

688,    700,   818,   927,   932,   986,   996, 

1008,  1078,  1130,  1183,  1215,  1340. 
Noonan  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond 

(183  111.  52,  55  N.  E.  679  [1899]), 

295,  317,  440,  715,   719,  947,   1372. 
Noonan    v.    City    of    Stillwater     (33 

Minn.   198,  53  Am.  Rep.  23,  22  N. 

W.  444),   158,  350. 
Norfolk,  City  of  v.  Chamberlain    (89 

Va.    196,    16    S.    E.    730    [1892]), 

12,    33,    67,     161,    308,    309,,  435, 

719. 
Norfolk   V.   Ellis    (67   Va.    (26   Grat- 

tan)   224  [1875]),  86,  96,  118,  161, 

244,  314,  666,  698,  709. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxvii 


[References  ai-e  to  sections.] 


Norfolk,  City  of  v.  Young  ( 97  Va. 
728,  47  L.  R.  A.  574.  34  S.  E. 
880  [1900]),  89,  115,  119,  122,126, 
726,  729,   731. 

Norsworthy  v.  Beryli  (  1 6  Howard 
(N.  Y.)   315   [1858J).  1055. 

North  Alton,  Village  of  v.  Dorsett 
(59  111.  App.  612   [1895]),  62,  661. 

North  Beach  &  Mission  R.  R.  Co., 
Appeal  of,  in  the  Matter  of  Wid- 
ening Kearney  Street  { 32  Cal. 
500  [1867]),  118,  228,  304,  309, 
595,  597,  598,  601,  603,  690,   1372. 

North  Jersey  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Jersey  City  ^68  N.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.) 
140,  52  Atl.  300  [1902]).  560,  601. 
630. 

North  Kiver  Bank  v..  State  for  Use 
of  Busenberg  (91  Ind.  476 
[1883]),    1067. 

North  River  Meadow  Co.  v.  Christ's 
Ciiureh  at  Siirewsbnry  ( 22  N.  J. 
L.  (2  Zab.)  424.  53  Am.  Dec.  258 
[1850]),  902. 

Nortlianipton's  Petition  ( 158  Mass. 
209,   33    N.    E.   5()8),    359. 

Northern  Indiana  Land  Co.  v.  Ty- 
ler   (—    Ind.    ,    84    N.    E.    828 

[1908]).    917. 

Northern  Liberties  v.  Coates'  Heirs 
(15  Pa.  St.  (3  Harr.)  245 
[1850]),  347,  890.  1003. 

Nortliern  Liberties  v.  St.  John's 
Cluirch  (15  Pa.  St.  104),  347.  588, 
013.   1108. 

Nortliern  Liberties  v.  S't.  Jolin's 
Church  (13  Pa.  St.  107),  28.  451, 
472,  588,  012,   1109. 

Nortliern  Pacific  Lumbering  &  Man- 
ufacturing Co.  V.  p]ast  Portland 
(14  Ore.  3,  12  Pac.  4  [1880]),  10, 
223,   234,    1372,    1377,    1509. 

Northern  Pacific  Railway  v.  Du- 
luth  (208  U.  S.  583  [1908]),  52, 
93.    98,    359,    420,    717,    1162. 

Nortliern   Pacific   Ry.    Co.    v.    City   of 

Seattle    (—    Wash.    .    91    Pac. 

244    [1907]),   301,  555,  595,  598. 

Northern  Railroad  Co.  of  New  Jer- 
sej%  Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  City 
Council    of    Englewood     (02    N.    J. 


L.    188,  40  Atl.   Rep.   053    (1898]). 

783. 
Xorthport,     City     of     v.     Northport 

Townsite    Co.     (27    Wash.    543,    08 

Pac.   204    [1902]),    486,    1017. 
Northwestern     Lumber     Co.     v.     City 

of    Aberdeen     (20    Wash.     102,    54 

Pac.  935   [1898]),   1510. 
Northwestern   Mutual   Life   Insurance 

Co.    V.    Butler     (57    Neb.    198,    77 

N.  W.  667   [1898]),  49,  1057. 
Northwestern    &     Pacific    Hypofflieek 

Bank     v.     City     of     Spokane     ( 18 

Wash.  456,   51    Pac.    1070    [1898]), 

697,     724,     927.     934.     1004,     1141, 

1145,    1337. 
Northwestern    L^niversity    v.    Village 

of    Wilmette     (230    111.    80,    82    N. 

E.    615    [1907]),    284,    325,   920. 
Norton  v.  City  of  Boston    (119  Mass. 

194    [1875]"),   1411,    1423. 
Nortfui     V.    Courtney      (53    Cal.     691 

[1879]),    824,    907. 
Norton  v.  Fisher    (33  Ind.  App.  132. 

71    N.    E.    51     [1903]),    324,    670, 

679,  690. 
Norwich     Savings     Society,     The     v. 

City    of    Hartford     (48    Conn.    570 

[1881]),  245,  904,  906,  1064,  1163. 
Norwood   V.    Baker    (172   U.    S.   269, 

19    S.    187    [1898]),    11.    104,    111. 

112,    118,    119.    308.   350.    408,   426. 

430,   666,   702,   709,   713.   715. 
Norwood,  Selectmen   of  v.   New   York 

&     New     England     Railroad     Com- 

])any     (161     Mass.    259,    37    N.    E. 

199" [1894]),   11. 
Norwood,    Villa<j;e    of    v.    Ogilen     ( 15 

Ohio  C.  C.  539,   18  Oliio  C.  C.  869, 

8    Ohio    C.    D.    383    [1898]),    118, 

308,  426,  430. 
Nottage  v.  City  of  Portland    (35  Or. 

539,   76   Am.   St.   Rep.  513,  58   Pac. 

883),   983. 
Nowlen    v.    'Cit>'    cf    Benton    Harbor 

(134     Midi.    401,    96    N.    W.     4.i0 

[1903]),    ti81,    1015,    1435,    1436. 
Nowlin    V.    People    (216    111.    543,    75 

N.    E.    209    [1905]),    1126. 
Noyes    v.    City    of    Cliicago     (218    I'd. 

45.   75   N.   K.  81)7    [19051  ).  990. 


clxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Nugent  V.  City  of  Jackson  (72  Miss. 
1040,  18  So.  493  [1895]),  5.  19, 
33,  43,  93,  95,  96,  147,  148,  230, 
293,  323,  420.  732,  737,  740,  803, 
805,  836. 

Null  V.  Zierle  (52  Mich.  540.  18  N. 
W.    348    [1884]),    1396. 

Nulsen  v.  City  of  Cincinnati  (27 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  383  [1905]).  693. 
699. 

Nunnemachcr  v.  City  of.  LouisvlUe 
(98  Ky.  334,  32  S.  W.  1091),  486. 

Nutwood  Drainage  and  Levee  Dis- 
trict V.  Eeddish  (234  111.  130,  84 
N    E.  750   [1908]).  280,  935,  1375. 


O' 

O'Brien    v.    Bradley     (28    Ind.    App. 

487,    61    N.    E.    942    [1901]).    324, 

1068,    1203. 
O'Brien  v.  Marldand    (9  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

773,   6   S.   W.   713    [1888]),   575. 
O'Brien  v.  Wheelock   ( 184  U.  S.  450, 

46  L.   636,   22   S.   354   [1902]).   18. 

149,  -344,   665,    666,    1019,    1163. 
O'Brien    v.    \Ylieelock     (95    Fed.    883, 

37   C.   C.   A.    309    [1899]).    18,    149. 

344,  665,  666,  1019,  1163. 
O'Brien  v.   Wlieelock    (78   Fed.   673), 

18,    344,    665,    666,    1020,    1163. 
O'Bryne    v.    City    of    Philadelphia,    to 

Use    of    Adams     (93    Pa.    St.     (12 

Norris)     225     [1880]),     746.     759, 

764,    1149,    1157,    1160,    1174. 
O'Dea  V.  Mitchell    (144   Cal.  374,   77 

Pac.   1020    [1904]),   313,   624,   642, 

723,  1062,   1299. 
O'Hara    v.    Scranton    City     (205    Pa, 

St.  142,  54  Atl.  713   [1903]),  1511. 
O'Hare,   In   the   Matter   of   the   Peti- 
tion    of      (5     Hun      (N.     Y.)      287 

[1875]),    686,    826,    979,    981. 
O'Leary     v.     Sloo     ( 7     La.     Ann.     25 

[1852]),    155,    244,    323,    420,    441, 

443,   627,   663. 
O'Mahoney   v.    Bullock    (97    Ky.    774. 

31    S.   W.   878).    147. 
O'Mallev   V.    Olyphant   Borough    (198 

Pa.   St.   525, '48   Atl.   483    [1901]), 

507,    1028,    1441. 


O'ileara  v.  Grreen  (25  Mo.  App.  198 
[1887]).    380,    381,    461,    463. 

O'Meara  v.  Green  (16  Mo.  App.  118 
[1884]),    380,    381,   461,   463.    1382. 

O'Neil  -V.  People  ex  rel.  Kocher.sper- 
ger  (166  111.  561,  46  N.  E.  1096 
[1897]),  291,  347,  348,  351,  451, 
857,  864,  927.  929.  940,  992,  1183. 
1341. 

O'Neill  V.  City  of  Hoboken  (73  N. 
J.  L.  (44  Vr.)  189,  63  Atl.  986 
[1906]),   235. 

O'Neill  V.  City  of  Hoboken  (72  N. 
J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  67,  60  Atl.  50 
[1905]),  166,  168,  235,  335,  408, 
983,   1081,   1505. 

O'Reiley  v.  Kankakee  Co.  (32  Ind. 
169),'  97,  336,  859. 

O'Reillcy  v.  City  of  Kingston  (114 
N.  Y."  439,  2rN.  E.  1004  [1889]), 
280,  314,  438,  601,  621,  626,  630, 
670.   675,   1271.   1444. 

O'Reilly    v.     City     of     Kingston     (39 
Hun'  (N.    Y.)'    285     [1886]), 
604,   690,   693,   703,  723,   1430. 


o 


Oak    Park,   Village   of   v.    Gait    (231 

111.    482,    83    N.    E.    212     [1907]), 

816,  864. 
Oakey  v.   Mayor    (I   La.    1    [1830]), 

43,'  89,    155,   232,    323,    713. 
Oakland    Cemetery    v.    City    of    Y'on- 

kers     (182    N.  \\    564,  "  75    N.    E. 

1432    [1905]),  592,  614. 
Oakland    Cemetery    v.    City    of   Yon- 

kers    (71    N.    Y^    S.    783,    63    App. 

Div.   448),   592,   614. 
Oakland    Paving    Co.    v.    Bagge     (79 

Cal.    439,    21     Pac.     855     [1889]), 

1380. 
Oakland    Paving    Company    v.     Bar- 
stow      (79    Cal.     45,    21 "  Pac.     544 

[1889]),   229,  538. 
Oakland    Paving   Company   v.    Hilton 

(69    Cal.    479,    11    Pac' 3    [1886]), 

216,  506,  570. 
Oakland     Paving    Company    v.     Rier 

(52    Cal.    270     [1877]),"  252.    292. 

381,   431,    439,   483,    492,    511,    537. 

665.  698,  830.  831,  836,  867,   1358. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxix 


[References  are  to  seetioiis.  ] 


Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Tompkins 
(72  Cal.  5,  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  17,  12 
Pac.   801),   216,  221,   50G. 

Obermeyer  v.  Patterson  (  130  Cal. 
.331,  62  Pac.  020  [1900]),  537, 
1203. 

Odell  V.  Xgw  York  Elevated  Rail- 
road Company  (130  X.  Y.  690.  29 
X.  E.  998   [1892] i,  71. 

Odenwelder  v.  Frankenfield  (153  Pa. 
St.  526,  26  Atl.  97),  363. 

Ogden  V.  Town  of  Lake  View  (121 
111.  422,  13  X.  E.  159  [1887]). 
864,   912. 

Ogden  Cit.v  v.  Armstrong  (  168  V. 
S.  224,  42  L.  444,  18  S.  98 
[1897]),  314,  760,  811,   1415,  1418. 

Oliio  V.  Commissioners  (41  0.  S. 
423),   336. 

Oil  City  V.  Lay  (164  Pa.  St.  370, 
30    Atl.    289   "[1894]),    739,    785. 

Oil  (  ity  V.  Oil  (  ity  Boiler  Works 
(152  "  Pa.  St.  348.  25  Atl.  549 
[1893]),    86. 

Oil  City  Building  &  Loan  Associa- 
tion V.  Shanfelter  (29  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.   251    [1905]),    1072. 

Olcott  V.  Fond  du  Lac  County  (83 
U.  S.  (16  WaU.)  678,  21  L.  382), 
365. 

Old  Colony  and  Fall  River  Railroad 
Company  v.  Inhabitants  of  the 
County  of  Plymouth  (80  Mass. 
(14  Gray)  155  [1859]).  60.  596, 
C57. 

Olds  v.  Erie  City  (79  Pa.  St.  (29 
P.  F.  Smith)  380  [1875]),  747, 
752,  763,  795,  848,  1006,  1157, 
1158. 

Olive  Cemetery  Co.  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia (93  Pa.  St.  (12  Xorrig) 
129,  39  Am.  Rep.  732).  42.  589. 
613. 

Oliver  v.  Monona  County  (117  Iowa 
43,  90  X.  W.  510  [1902]),  12,  115, 
119,  126.  142,  291,  335,  337,  340, 
549,  550.  553,  .558,  5(i4.  651,  653, 
666,  726,  727,  730,  950.  1008,  1347, 
1350,     1352. 

Oliver    v.    City   of    Xewberg    ( —    Or. 

,    91    Pac.    470    [1907]),    301, 

620.   698.   707. 


Olmsted    v.    Dennis     (77    X\    Y.    378 

[1879]),    278,    393,   403,   1522. 
Olmstead    v.    Tarsney     (69    Mo.    396 

[1879]  ),    1195,    1225. 
Olsson   V.   City   of   Topeka    (42   Kan. 

709,  21  Pac'  219  [1889]),  553,  570, 

619,   628,  697,  709,  814,   816.    1450. 
Olympia,  City  of  v.  Knox    ( —  Wash. 

^ ,  95  Pac.  1090   [1908]),  972. 

Olyphant    Borough    to    Use    v.    Egre- 

ski       (29      Pa.      Super.      Ct.      116 

[1905]),  89,    1194. 
Omaha,  City  of  v.  Cochran    (30  Xeb. 

637.   46   X.   W.    920    [1890]),   69. 
Omaha.    City   of   v.   Gsanter    (4    Xeb. 

Unoff.   52,   93    X.    W.   407    [1903]). 

315,    439.    441.    570.    620. 
Omaha,    Cit.v    of    v.    Howell    Lumber 

Co.    (30    Xeb.    633,    46    X.    W.    919 

[1890]),  69,   71. 
Omaha,  City  of  v.  Megeath    (46  Xeb. 

502,   64  X.   W.   1091    [1895]).   615, 

617,    1432. 
Omaha,  City  of  v.   Schaller    (26  Xeb. 

522,    42    X.    W.    721     [1889]),    65, 

66,  313,  651,  654. 
Omaha,  City  of  v.  State  of  Xebraska 

ex    rel.    Metzger     (69    Xeb.    29.    94 

X.   W.   979    [1903]),    1519. 
Omega   Street,   Travers'  Appeal    ( 152 

Pa.    St.    129,   25   Atl.   528    [1893]), 

969,    1026. 
One        Hundicd       and        Fiity-eighth 

Street,    East,    In   re    (SO    X.    Y.    S. 

594,   39   Misc.  598    [1903]),   475. 
Opening  of  East   176th   Street,  In  re 

(83  X.  Y.  S.  433,  85  App.  Div.  347 

[1903]).   588,  672,   920,  922.    1324. 
Opening    of     178th    Street,    City    of 

Xew  York,  In  re   (94  X.  Y.  S.' 838. 

107    App.     Div.    22     [1905]).    426. 

429. 
One       Hundred       and       Thirty-eighth 

Street.    In    the    Matter   of   Opening 

(61  Howard    (X.  Y.)    284    [1881]). 

923.   1463. 
One  Hundied   Twent.\-sevcnth    Street, 

In    the    Matter    of    (56    How.     (X. 

Y.)    60    [1878]).  97.   113.  393.  400, 

427,  455,  661,   1453. 
Orange     Street,     In     the     Ma.tter     of 

Opening     (50    How.     (X.    Y. )     244 

[1875]),    754.   8.39. 


clxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Reffi'ences  are  to  sections.] 


Oregon    &    California    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

City  of  Portland    (25   Or.   229,   22 

L.  R.  A.  713,  35  Pac.  452   [1894]), 

118,  549,  555,   674,   690,   692. 
Oregon    Central    R.    R.   Vo.    v.    Wait 

(3    Ore.    91    [1869]),    69. 
Oregon   Real    Estate    Co.    v.    Gambell 

(41    Or.    61,    66   Pac.    441    [1901]), 

805,  983. 
Oregon     Real     Estate     Company     v. 

Portland    (40    Or.   56,   66   Pac.   442 

[1901]),   803,   805,   810,   981,   983. 
Oregon  Transfer  Co.  v.  Portland    (47 

Ore.    1,    81    Pac.    575,    82    Pac.    16 

[1905]),  574. 
Orkney   Stret,   In   the   :Matter   of   the 

Opening  of,    Appeal  of  the  City  of 

Philadelphia    (194   Pa.   St.   425,  48 

L.  R.  A.  274,  45  Atl.  314   [1900]), 

576,  620. 
Orleans   Avenue,   Municiiiality   No.    1 

praying     for    opening     of     ( 8     La. 

Ann.   377    [1853]),   745,   765,    1299. 
Ormsby  v.  Jamison   (Ky.)    (9  Ky.  L. 

R.   325),   462. 
Orr  V.  City  of  Omaha   (2  Neb.  Unoff. 

771,  90  N.   W.   301),   781. 
Orth   V.    Park   &   Co.    (117   Ky.    779, 

80    S.    W.    1108,    26    Ky.    L.    Rep. 

184    [1904]),  denying  rehearing  of 

79   S.  W.   206    (decree  modified   26 

Ky.    L.    R.    342,    81    S.    W.    251), 

301,    1039,    1144,    1372. 
Osborn     v.     Maxinknckee     Lake     Ice 

Co.    (154    Ind.    101,    56    N.    E.    33 

[1899]),    340,    564,    747,    952,    955, 

1371. 
Osborn  v.  People   (103  111.  224 

[1882]),  558,  564.  1008,  1477. 
Osborn  v.  Sutton  (108  Ind.  443,  9 

N.  E.  410  [1886]),  279,  280,  507, 

795,   906,   927,   1004. 
Oskaloosa    Street    Railway    &    Land 

Company  v.  City  of  Oskaloosa   (99 

la.    496,    68    N.    W.    808    [1896]), 

603. 
Oshkosh    City    Railway    Company    v. 

Winnebago    County  "(89    Wis.    435. 

61  N.   W.   1107    [i895]),  223,   234, 

601,  605,  656. 
Oster  V.    City   of   Jefferson    (57    Mo. 

App.    485    [1894]),    231,   233,    437, 

1498,    1508. 


Oswald  V.  Gilfert   (11  Johns   (N.  Y.) 

443    [1814]),    49,    1054. 
Otis  V.  City  of  Chicago   ( 161  111.  199, 

43  N.  E.  715   [1896]),  368,  864. 
Otis   V.   De   Boer    (116    Ind.    531,    19 

N.  E.  317   [1888]),  340,  772,  1008. 

1047,   1144,   1219,   1233. 
Otis  V.   City   of   St.   Paul    (94  Minn. 

57,  101  N.  W.   1066   [1904]),  1206. 
Otis    V.    W^eide    (98    Minn.    227,    107 

N.  W.  540   [1906]),  998,  1196. 
Ottawa,  City  of  v.   Barney    ( 10  Kan. 

270    [1872]),    147,    554,    619,    628, 

639,   723,   1432,   1435. 
Ottawa,    City   of    v.    Chicago       Rock 

Island    Railroad    Co.     (25     111.    29 

[I860]),    1026,    1414. 
Ottawa,    City    of    v.    Fisher    (20    111. 

422    [1858]),   925. 
Ottawa,  City  of  v.  Macy    (20  111.  413 

[1858]),  "248,    553,    554,    690,    751. 

1126. 
Ottawa,  The   City   of  v.  Spencer    (40 

111.    211     [186(5]),    42,    44,    92,    96. 

101,    104,   113,    153,   257,   690,   701. 
Ottawa,    City   of   v.    Trustees   of   the 

Free  Church    (20   111.   424    [1858]), 

588,    613. 
Ottawa   County   v.   Nelson    ( 19   Kan. 

234,  27  Am.  Rep.   101),  147. 
Otter  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Co.    ( —  Ky. 

,    96    S.    W.    862    [1906]),    12. 

292,   301,   678. 
Ottis   V.    Sullivan    (219    111.    365,    76 

N.  E.  487   [1906]),  895,  978,  1002, 

1059,    1279,   1386. 
Ottumwa    Brick    &    Construction    Co. 

V.   Ainley    (109    la.   386,   SO   N.   W. 

510     [18*99]),    18,     495,    554,     574, 

581,   620,   631,   662,   663,   977,   979. 

981. 
Ouray,    City   of    v.    Corson    ( 14    Colo. 

App.  345,  59  Pac.  876),  372. 
Overmann   v.    City   of    St.    Paul    (39 

Minn.    120,   39   N.   W.   66    [1888]), 

119. 
Overshiner  v.  Jones  (66  Ind.  452 

[1879]),  229,  489,  670,  1229,  1235. 

1238. 
Overstreet   v.    Levee    Dist.    No.    1    of 

Conway   County    (80  Ark.   462,  97 

8.  W.'qIQ    [1906]),   271,  343,  485, 

672,   819,    1109,    1141,    1145. 


T^VBLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxf 


[Ueferences  are  to  sections.] 


Owen  V.  City  of  Chicago    ( 53  111.  95 

[1809]),   769,   913. 
Owen   V.   City  of  Sioux   City    (91    la. 

190,     59    N.    W.     3    [1894]),     108, 

182. 
Owens    V.    City    of    Marion     (127    la. 

409,   103   N.   W.   381    [1905]),  314, 

315,   439,    490,   501,    080,   090,    742, 

747,   754,   763,   765,   766,   831,   836, 

809,  927,   1337,   1431,   1450. 
Owens    V.    City    of    Milwaukee     (47 

Wis.  461,  3  X.  W.  3   [1879]),  437, 

663,  723,  1444,  1519. 
(^)wens  V.  Yazoo  &  Mississippi  Valley 

Railroad  Co.   (74  Miss.  821,  21  So. 

244    [1897]),   566. 
Owensboro,  City  of  v.  Hope   ( —  Ky. 

,    110   S.   W.   272    [1908]),   18, 

32,    1044,    1047,    1102. 
Owensboro  &  X.  R.  Co.  v.  Todd    (91 

Ky.    175,    11    L.   R.   A.   285,    15    S. 

W.    56,    45    Am.    &    Eng.    Railroad 

Cases,   461),   363. 
Owensboro  &   X.   R.  Co.  v.  Townsend 

(107  Ky.  291,  53  S.  W.  662),  363. 
Owners    of    Groiind     v.    Albany     (15 

Wend.     (X.    Y.)     374),    357^^    578, 

593. 
Owners    of    Land    v.    People    ex    rel. 

Stookey     (113     111.     296     [1886]), 

177,    178,    181,   207,   258,   259,   266, 

344,  989,  998,  1350. 
Oxley    Stave    Co.    v.    Butler    County 

(166  U.  S.  648,  17  S.  709),  715.  ' 


Pabst  Brewing  Co.  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 126  Wis.  110,  105  N.  W. 
503  [1905]),  62,  956,  1015,  1025. 
1493. 

Pacific  Bridge  Co.  v.  Kirkhani  (54 
Cal.   558    [1880]),   .396,   404. 

Pacific  Paving  Co.  v.  Bolton  (97 
Cal.  8,  31  Pac.  625  [1S92]),  1248, 
1374,   1384. 

Pacific  Paving  Co.  v.  (iallott  ( 137 
Cal.  174,  69  Pac.  985  [1902]), 
805.   808,   809,    1305. 

Pacific;    Paving    Co.    v.    Geary     (136 


Cal.    373,    68    Pac.    1028     [1902]), 

777,   805,   810,   811. 
Pacific  Paving  Co.  v.  Mowbray    ( 127 

Cal.    1,   59   Pac.   205    [1899]),   301, 

805,    811,    1281,    1372,    1379. 
Pacific    Paving    Co.    v.    Sullivan    Es- 
tate   Company     (137    Cal.    261,    70 

Pac.    86     [1902]),    301,    803,    810, 

830. 
Packard    v.    Xew    Limerick     (34    Me. 

206),    1206. 
Packwood  v.   Briggs    (25   Wasli.   530, 

Ho  Pac.  846),   1207. 
Paducah,   City  of.    Petition    ex   parte 

(28    Ky.   Law  Rep.   412,    89    S.    W. 

302    [1905]),   495,    804. 
Paducah    &    Memphis    Railroad    Com- 
pany    v.     Stovall     (59     Tenn.     (12 

Heisk.)    1    [1879]),   71. 
Page   V.   :Mayor   and    City    Council   of 

Baltimore     (34    Md.    558    [1871]), 

281,  311,  425,  745,  747,  766,   1292, 

1347,  1354,  1358. 
Page  V.  City  of  Chicago  (60  111.  441 

[1871]),  604,  639,  640,  723,  861, 

1298. 
Page    V.    Chicago,    Milwaukee    &    St. 

Paul    Railway    Co.     (70    III.    324), 

203. 
Page   V.   City   of   St.   Louis    (20    Mo. 

136   [1854]),  38,  324,  697,   1442. 
Page  V.  W.   W.    Chase  Co.    (145  Cal. 

578.    79    Pac.    278    [1904]),    1169, 

1225. 
Paillet  V.   Youngs    (0  X".   Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

Rep.    50    [1850]).    3t)3.    8S7.    1150. 

1190,    1200,    1283. 
Paine     v.     Spratley      (5     Kan.     525 

[1870]).  42,  45,  613,   1173,  1174. 
Palmer's    Petition     (1    Abb.    Pr.     (X. 

S.)    30   [181!.-)]),  680.  686,   1026. 
Palmer,    In    tlie    Matter    of,   to    Have 

Assessment   for   Building   Sewer    in 

34th  St.  Vacated    (31    Howard    (X. 

Y.)    42   [1865]),  265,  680,  911,  946. 

Palmer  v.   City  of  Danville    (166   Til. 

42,  46  X.  E."  629  [1897]  ).  347.  485. 

520,    594,   598,    623,   698,    725,   921, 

950,  903,  964.   1113. 
Palmer  v.  City  of  Danville    (154   III. 

156,  38  X.  E.   1007    [1894]),  8,   11, 

283,    295.   328,   347,   348,   713. 


clxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Palmer  v.  McMahon    (133  U.  S.  660, 

33  L.  772,   10  8.  324    [1890]),   119, 

122. 
Palmer    v.    Xolting     { 13    Iml.    App. 

581,  41  N.  E.   1045),  370,  458,  475, 

1103,    1110. 
Palmer  v.   City   of  Port   Huron    (  139 

Mich.  471.  102  X.  W.  996   [1905]  I, 

748,   751. 
Palmer     v.     Stumpli      (29     Ind.     329 

[18083),-  86,     111,     147,    223,    698, 

950,   1081,   1350,   1352. 
Palmer      v.      Way       (6      Colo.      106 

[1881]),  44.  so'  145.  152,  323,  420, 

472,  666. 
Palmyra,     Inhabitants     of    Town     of 

V.    Morton    (25    Mo.    593    [1857]), 

55,  96,   100,   110,  314,  713,   1210. 
Panton  v.   Duluth   Gas  &   Water   Co. 

(50    Minn.    175,    36    Am.    St.    Rep. 

635,   52   N.  W.   527    [1892]),    1484. 
Paola,    City    of    v.    Russell    (75    Kan 

826,     SOPac.     651      [1907)],     324, 

1435. 
Pardee  Works   v.   City  of  Perth   Am- 

boy    (59  N.  J.  L.  335,  36  Atl.  666 

[1896]),    973. 
Pardridge   v.   Village   of    Hyde   Park 

(131     HI.     537,     23     X.     E.     345 

[1890]),  972,   1191,  1202,   1297. 
Paret  v.   City  of  Bayonne    (39  X.  J. 

L.  (10  Vr.)   559  [1877]),  894. 
Parham    v.    Justices   of    the    Inferior 

Court    of   Decatur    County    (9    Ga. 

341    [1851]),    117. 
Parish  v.  Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.    ( — 

Ky.   ,   78    S.    W.    186,    25    Ky. 

L."^R.   1524    [1904]),  363. 
Park  V.  City  of  Chicago    (22  HI.  578 

[1859]),  "720. 
Park  Avenue,   Opening  of,  Aj^peal  of 

Luce  Bros    (83  Pa.  ^St.    (2  Xorris) 

175    [1876]),  4,   11,   675,   677,   927. 
Park  Avenue,  In  re  Opening  of,  Hui- 

dekoper's    Appeal     (S3    Pa.    St.     (2 

Xorris)    167    [1876]),    8.    03.    101. 

627,  1361. 
Park  Avenue   Sewer,   In  re    ( 169   Pa. 

St.  433,  32  Atl.   574   [1895]),  327, 

446,   554,   560,    563,    620,   633,    658, 

665,   666,   709. 
Park     Avenue     Viaduct     Assessment, 


hi   re    (78    X.    Y.    Supp.    1030,    77 

App.    Div.    136    [1902]),   359. 
Park    Ecclesiastical    Society,    The    v. 

City    of    Hartford     (47   Conn.     89 

[1879]),    324,   388,   444,    493,    563. 

648,  658,  709,  779. 
Parke   County   Coal   Co.   v.   Campbell 

(140  Ind.  28,  30  X.  E.  149  [1894]), 

549,  550,  564. 
Parker  v.  City  of  Atchison   ( 48  Kan. 

574,    30   Pac.   20),   306. 
Parker    v.    Burget-t    (29    0.    S.    513), 

785. 
Parker     v.     Challiss      (9     Kan.      155 

[1872]),   323,  571,   624,   1431. 
Parker   v.  City  of  Detroit    (103  Fed. 

357   [1900]),  118,  121,  702. 
Parker  v.  Village  of  LaGrange    (171 

111.    344,    49    X.    E.    550     [1898]), 

314,  912,  1085,  1377. 
Parker    v.    City   of    Philadelphia    ( — • 

Pa.  St.  .  69  Atl.  670   [1908]). 

495. 
Parker  v.  Reay   (76  Cal.   103,  18  Pac. 

124    [1888]),    318,    549,    628,    716, 

1335. 
Parkersburg,     City     of     v.     Tavenner 

(42    W.    Va.    486,   26    S.    E.    179), 

86,  118,  162,  324. 
Parkinson  v.  INIeredith    (  158  Mo.  457, 

59   S.  \N.   1099    [1900]),    1221. 
Parkland,  Town  of  v.  Gains    (88  Ky. 

561,  11  S.  W.  649   [1889]),  36,194. 

195,  610. 
Parmalee  v.  City  of  Chicago    (60  III. 

267    [1871]),  309,  602,  603,  615. 
Parmalee    v.    Youngstown    ( 43    0.    S. 

162,  1  X.  E.  319   [1885]),  675,680, 

683. 
Partridge  v.   Lucas    (99   Cal.  519.   33 

Pac.    1082    [1S93]),   413,    437,   439, 

465.  479,  510,  740,  531,  1216,  1220. 

1252,    1300,    1359. 
Parks    v.    County   of    Hampden    (120 

Mass.   395    [1876]),   64,   65,   70. 
Parsons  v.  City  of  Columbus    (50  0. 

S.   460,  34  X.  E.  677    [1893]),  53, 

106,  189,  314,  387,  646. 
Parsons     v.     District     of     Columbia 

(170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943,  8  S.  521 

[1898]),    119,    123,    241,    243,    252. 

292,    347,    373,   376.   466,    553,   666, 

69S,  70s,  728,   1369. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Cb 


[  Uelereiices  are  to  seclious.  ] 


Parsons   v.    District   of   C'oliinil)ia    ( 8 

App.  D.   C.   391    [181)6]),   119,  347, 

373,   376,   698,   708,    1369. 
Parsons    v.    City    of    Grand    Rapids 
(141    Mich.    467,    104    N.    W.    730 

[1905]),    293,    324,    325,    432,    728, 

729,  735,  896. 
Parsons     v.    City    of    Rochester      (43 

Hun  258    [1887]),   620,   639,    1492. 
Passaic,    Village    of    v.    State,    Dela- 
ware,     Lackawanna      &      Western 

Railroad    Company,    Pros.     (37    N. 

J.    L.     (8    Vr.)     538    [1875]),    79, 

313,   666,   677,   690,    691,   699,   894. 
Paterson,    President   and    Council    of 

the   City   of   v.   Society   for   Estab- 
lishing   Useful    Manufactures     (24 

Jf.      J.      L.       (4      Zabriskie)       385 

[1854]),  42,  590.  614. 
Patrie   v.    Oregon    Short   Line   R.   Co. 

( 6  Ida.  448,  56  Pac.  82 ) ,  363. 
Patterson     v.    Baumer    (43    la.     477 

[1876]),    337,    416,    423,    495.    531. 

532,    781.    1003.    1015,    1018,    1431. 
Patterson    v.    Calhoun   Circuit   Judge 

(144    Mich.    416,    lOS    X.    W.    351 

[1906]),   1108. 
Patterson  v.   Chicago.  R.   I.   &   P.   R. 

Co.    (99  Minn.  454),  594,  614. 
Patten    V.    City    of    Springfield     (09 

Mass.  627   [1868]),  658,  663,  1313, 

1365,  1367,  1389. 
Paul  V.  Conqueror  Trust  Co.  (125 

Mo.  App.  483,  102  S.  VV.  1070 

[1907]),    538. 
Paul    V.    City   of    Detroit    (32    Mich. 

108     [1875]  I.     63,     125,     308,     321, 

728. 
Paulsen   v.   Portland    (  149   U.   S.   30, 

37  L.   637,   13   S.   750    [1803]),  97, 

115,    121,    125,    131,    135,   278,   324, 

549,   555,   670,   674.    695,   732,   760, 

1442. 
Paulson     V.    City     of    Portland      (  16 

Ore.   450,    1   l"   R.   A.   (i7:i,    19    Pac. 

450     [1888]).    !)7,     115.    11!).     121. 

135,   278.    324,    549.    555,   670,    674, 

695,    732,    1442. 
Paving    District    v.    = .       (  See 

Board  of  Improvement  v.  . ) 

Paxson    v.    Sweet    (  13    N.    .J.    L.    196 

[1832]),    53,    86. 


Paxton,    City    of    v.    Bogardus     (201 

111.    628,    66    X.    E.    853     [1903]). 

413,   424,    837,   840,   856,   857. 
Pajme  v.  City  of  Brooklyn    (52  Hun 
(X.    Y.)    390,    5    X.    Y.    Supp.    281 

[1889]),    1520. 
Payne    v.    Village    of    South    Spring- 
field   (161    111.    285,    44   X.    E.    105 

[1896]),    51,    328,    393.    401,    572. 

594,  598,   643,   670,   698,   715. 
Payson     v.    People    ex    rel.    Parsons 

(175     111.     267,     51      X.     E.     588 

[1898]),    69,    271,    748,    772,    927, 

928,  930,  992,  993. 
Pay  ton    v.    Village    of    ]\Iorgan    Paik 

(172     111.     102,     49     X.     E.     lOO:] 

[1898]),  555. 
Peake    v.    Xew    Orleans     (139    U.    S. 

342,  35  L.  131,  11   S.  541    [1891]). 

587.    1010,    1508. 
Peake    v.    City   of   Xew    Orleans    (38 

Fed.   779    [1889]).  587.    1508. 
Pearce  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park    ( 126 

ill.    287,     18    X.    E.'  824     [1890]). 

280.  330,  864. 
Pearsall,  Matter  of    (9  Abb.    Pr.    (X. 

S.)    203    [1870]).   911. 
Pearson  v.  City  of  Chicago    (l(i2   ill. 

383.    44    X.    E.    739    [1896]),    3U). 

417,    456,   862,    864,   912,    922,   965. 

1282.    1327.    1390. 
Pease    v.    City    of    Chicago     (21     III. 

500),   410,   720,   1337. 
Peay    v.    City    of    Little    Rock     (32 

Ark.    31     [1877]).     151.    314,    639, 

701. 
Peck     v.     City     of     Bridgeport      (75 

Conn.    417.    53    Atl.    S93     [1903]), 

748,    890,    1358. 
Peck     V.    City    of     Chicago    (22     111. 

578),   410. 
Peck   V.    City   of   Orand    Rapids    (125 

Mich.  416,  84   X.   W.   614    [1900 1), 

432,  436,  510,  S31. 
Peck     V.    Sherwood      ( 5(!    X.    Y.     615 

I  1S74  1  ).    1055. 
Peebles    v.     City    of    Pittsburg     (  KM 

Pa.     St.     304.     4  7     Am.     Hep.     714 

[1882]).    1478,    1484. 
JVlls    V.    City   of     Paxtini    (176     111. 

318.     52    X.    E.    64     [1898]).     413, 

424.  S37,  873. 


clxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Pells    V.    People    ex    rel.    Holmgrain 

(159     111.     580,     42     N.     E.     784 

[1896]),    510,    633,    817,    840,    852, 

945,  989. 
Pelton,   In  the  Matter   of    (85  X.  Y. 

651    [1881]),  475,  495,   1454,   1458. 
Pelton  V.  Bemis    (44   0.   S.   51,   4  N. 

E.    714    [1886]),    1168,    1496.    ' 
Pennel's  App.    (2   Pa.   St.    (2  Barr.) 

216   [1845]),  713,  895. 
Pennie,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition 

of,      to      Vacate      an      Assessment 

(108     N.    Y.    364,    15    X.    E.     611 

[1888]),    223,    234,   496,    777,    985, 

1072,   1453,   1460. 
Pennie,    In   the   Matter   of    the    Peti- 
tion   (45    Hun    391     [1887]),    496, 

500,  985,   1453. 
Pennie,   In   the  Matter   of    (19    Abb. 

N.    C.    117),    500,    735,    742,    747, 

770,   985,    1453. 
Pennington   v.   Woolfolk    (79   Ky.    13 

[1880]),  3. 
Pennock    v.    County   of   Douglas    (39 

Neb.  293,  27  L.  R.  A.  121,  42  Am. 

St.     Rep.     579,     58     X.     W.      117 

[1894]),  1206. 
Pennock   v.   Hoover    ( 5   Rawle    ( Pa. ) 

291    [1835]),    886,    895,    1068. 
Pennsylvania   Co.    v.    Cole    ( 132   Fed. 

668    [1904]),    227,    415,    423,    725, 

879,  886,  891,  983,  984,  1017,  1028. 
Pennsylvania     Company    v.    City     of 

Tacoma    (36    Wash.    656,    79    Pac. 

306    [1905]),    1069,    1194,    1225. 
Penrose      Ferry      Avenue      (27      Pa. 

Super.   Ct.  341    [1905]),   62. 
People  V.  or  People  ex 

rel.  V.  


(See    also    State    v.    

or    State    ex    rel.    v. 

.) 

People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex 
rel.  Western  XevF  York  and  Penn- 
sylvania Railroad  Company  v. 
Adams  (88  Hun  122,  34  X.  Y.  S. 
579    [1895]),   359,   594,   598. 

People  ex  rel.  Hallett  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners  of  Arapa- 
hoe County  (27  Colo.  86,  59  Pac. 
733   [1899]),  3. 

People  ex  rel.  Ward  v.  Asten  (6 
Daly    18    [1875]),   263,  266. 


People    ex    rel.    McCrea    v.    Atchison 

(95     111.    452     [1880]),    305,     878, 

1049,    1164. 
People    ex    rel.    Do.vle    v.    Austin    (47 

Cal.     353    [1874]),    40,    578,     579, 

581,    584,    641. 
People  ex  rel.  Day  \.  Bergen   ( 6  Hun 

(X.   Y.)    267    [1875]),    1085,    1101, 

1146. 
People    v.    Boston   &    A.    R.    Co.    (70 

X.   Y.   569),   359. 
People    ex    rel.    Price    v.    Bridgeman 

(218     111.     568,     75     X.     E.     1057 

[1905]),   314,  510,  533. 
People   ex   rel.   Miller   v.   Brislin    (80 

ni.    423     [1875]),    103,    104,    194, 

227,   247,   253,   259,   269,   356,   986, 

996,   1183,   1185,   1340,   1385. 
People    ex     rel.     Hayes     v.     City    of 

Brooklyn    (71   X.   Y.   495    [1877]), 

781,  98*^1. 
People    ex    rel.    Markey    v.    City    of 

Brooklyn    (65   X.   Y.   349    [1875]), 

374,  381,  603,  604,  781. 
People  ex  rel.   Griffin  v.  Mayor,  etc., 

of  Brooklyn    (4  X.  Y.  419*,  55  Am. 

Dec.    266    [1851]),    8,    11,    29,    31, 

73,   86,  89,  99,   110,    118,   125,   147, 

161,   248,   250,   301,   308,   553.   555, 

570,   613,  651,   690. 
People  on   the   Relation  of   Dikeman 

V.    President    and    Trustees   of    the 

Village  of  Brooklyn   (1  Wend.    (X. 

Y.)   318,  19  Am.  Dee.  502   [1828]), 

1519. 
People    ex    rel.    Reynolds    v.    City   of 

Brooklyn    (49    Barb.    (X.    Y.)     136 

[1867]),    282,    969,    1393,    1399. 
People    ex    rel.    .Tohnson    v.    City    of 

Brooklyn    (23    Barb.    180    [1856]), 

223,  234,  443,  950,   1113. 
People    ex     rel.    Marvin    v.     City    of 

Brooklyn    (23    Barb.    (X.    Y.)    166 

[1856]"),    418,    563. 
People  ex  rel.  Grilfing  v.  Mayor  and 

Common    Council    of    the    City    of 

Brooklyn     (9    Barb.     (X.    Y.)     535 

[1850]"),    86,    690,    910,    1394. 
People    ex    r-el.    Post    v.    Mayor,    etc.. 

of  Brooklyn   (6  Barb.    (X."  Y.)   209 

[1849]),     86,    99,     110,    250,     553, 

690. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxv 


[References  are  to  Keetions.] 


People  ex  rel.  Ackerly  v.  City  of 
Brooklyn  (8  Hun  56  [1876]), 
570,    1394,    1408. 

People  ex  rel.  Brooklyn  Park  Com- 
missioners V.  City  of  Brooklyn  (3 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  590  [1875]),  911, 
1037,   1279,   1285,   1338,   1469. 

People  ex  rel.  Russell  v.  Brown  (218 
111.  375,  75  X.  E.  989  [1905]), 
301,  866,  911,  927,  937,  986,  996, 
1183,    1340. 

People  ex  rel.  Bull  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo (166  N.  Y.  004,  59  N.  E.  1128 
[1901]),   378. 

People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex 
rel.  Lehigh  Valley  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Buffalo  (147  X. 
Y.  675,  42  X.  E.  344  [1895]),  360, 
560,    576,    690,    692,    1410. 

People  V.  City  of  Buffalo  (107  X. 
Y.   S.   689    [1907]),   507. 

People  V.  City  of  Buffalo  (107  X. 
Y.   S.   281    [1907]),   700. 

People  ex  rel.  Bull  v.  City  of  Buffalo 
(52  App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  157,  65 
X.  Y.  Supp.  103   [1900]),  373. 

People  ex  rel.  Herman  v.  Bug  River 
Special  Drainage  District  (189 
111.  55,  59  X.  E,  605),  340,  551, 
564,   1330. 

People  ex  rel.  Livermore  v.  Burnap 
(38  Mich.  350  [1878]),  704,  1278, 
1402. 

People  ex  rel.  Becker  v.  Burton  (65 
X.  Y.   452    [1875]),   771. 

People  V.  Carr  (231  111.  502.  83  X. 
E.  269  [1907]),  841,  842,  853, 
089. 

People    V.    Carroll     (—    ]\Iicli.    , 

115    X.    W.    442    [1908]),    509. 

People  ex  rel.  Fisher  v.  Carter  (210 
111.  122,  71  X.  E.  309  [1904]), 
921,  1376. 

People  ex  rel.  Barber  v.  Chapman 
(128  HI.  496,  21  X.  E.  507 
[1890]).    646,    720,   000,    1026. 

People  ex  rel.  Barber  v.  Ciiapman 
(127  111.  387,  19  X.  E.  872 
[1890]),  123,  340,  558,  645,  692, 
724,   738,   921,   923,   1187,   1337. 

People  ex  rel.  v.  Chicago  &  Alton 
Railway  Co.  (228  111.  102,  81  X. 
E.    813    [1907]),   22. 


People  ex  rel.  v.  Chicago,  Burling- 
ton &  Quincy  R.  Co.  (231  111.  112, 
83  X.  E.  120   [1907]),  1156. 

People  ex  rel.  Keeney  v.  City  of 
Chicago  (152  111.  546,  38  X.  E. 
744    [1894]),    228,    229,    526,    1490. 

People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Church 
(192  111.  302,  '  61  X.  E.  496 
[1901]),   324,   527,   533,   840. 

People  of  the  City  and  County  of 
San  Francisco  v.  Clark  (47  Cal. 
456    [1874]),   860,   867. 

People  ex  rel.  Little  v.  Clayton  (ll-l 
111.  150,  4  X.  E.   193   [1880]),  340, 

747,  1085,    1101,    1184. 

People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger  v.  Clif- 
ford (160  111.  165,  46  X.  E.  770 
[1897]),  886,  927.  938,  1183, 
1341. 

People  ex  rel.  Troy  and  Lansingburg 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Coffey  (66  Hun  100, 
21  X.  Y.  Supp.  34  [1892]),  00, 
602,   603,   666,   751,    1028. 

People  V.  Coghiil  (47  Cal.  361 
[1874]),  278,  899,  900. 

People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  v.  Cohen 
(219  111.  200,  76  X.  E.  388 
[1900]),  119,  130,  142,  143,  810, 
927,  941,   1347. 

People  ex  rel.  Davidson  v.  Cole  ( 128 
III.  158,  21  X.  E.  6  [1890]),  564, 
039,   041,  092,  711,   735. 

People  ex  rel.  Rodgers  v.  Color  (166 
X.  Y.  1,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  605,  52 
L.   R.  A.  814,  59  X.   E.  710),  514. 

People  ex  rel.  Russell  v.  Cidegrove 
(218  III.  5-15.  75  X.  E.  991 
[1905]  ),  866,  1180. 

People  ex  rel.  Kocliersperger  v.  C'ol- 
vin  (105  111.  67,  46  X.  E.  Rep. 
14  [1S07]),  815,  926,  927,  932, 
986,  996. 

Peo])le  ex  rel.  Kochersperger  v. 
Cook  (ISO  111.  341,  54  X.  E.  173 
[1899]),   609,   631,  895. 

People  ex  rel.  Samuel,  Sr.  v.  Cooper 
(139  111.  461,  29  X.  E.  872 
[1893]),    269,    340,   557,    564,    739, 

748,  759,     764,    844,     1005,     1299, 
1477. 

People  ex  rel.  Besse  v.  Village  of 
Crotty    (93   HI.   180   [1879]),  827. 


clxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


People  of  the  State  of  New  York  e.v 
rel.  Cayadii'tta  Plank  Road  Com- 
pany V.  Cummings  (166  X.  Y.  110, 
59  N.  E.  703  [1901]),  397,  431, 
587. 

People  ex  rel.  Keim  v.  Desmond 
(186  N.  Y.  232,  78  X.  E.  857 
[1906]),  549,  563,   575.   1402. 

People  ex  rel.  Keim  v.  Desmond  ( 97 
X.  Y.  S.  79o,  111  App.  Div.  757 
[1906]),  549,  563,  575,  1402. 

People  ex  rel.  Board  of  Park  Com- 
missioners V.  Common  Council  of 
Detroit  (28  Mich.  228,  15  Am.  Rep. 
202   [1873]),  251. 

People  of  the  City  and  County  of 
San  Francisco  v.  Doe  (48  Cal. 
560   [1874]),   1219.   1239. 

People  ex  i-el.  Rnediger  v.  Drain 
Commissioner  of  Wayne  County 
(40  :\Iich.  745  [1879J).  1015, 
1034. 

People  ex  rel.  etc.,  v.  Drainage 
Commissioners,  District  Xo.  1  of 
Town  of  Young  America  (143  111. 
417,  32  X".  E.  688  [1893]).  247. 
249,   258,   259,   266,   340,   564. 

People  ex  rel.  Phillips  v.  Drainage 
District,  Xo.  5  (191  111.  023,  61 
X.  E.   381    [1901]),  564. 

People  ex  rel.  Baron  v.  Drainage 
District,  Xo.  3,  of  Martinton 
Township  (155  III.  45,  39  X.  E. 
613    [1894]),   564. 

People  ex  rel.  Selby  v.  Dyer  ( 205 
111.  575,  69  X.  E.  70  [1903]),  254, 
558,    1183,    1337,    1477. 

People  ex  rel.  Kocliersperger  v.  Eg- 
gers  (164  111.  515,  45  N.  E.  1074 
[1897]),  886,  927,  938,  986,  992, 
1183,    1186,    1189,    1340,    1341. 

People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Field  ( 197 
111.  508,  64  X.  E.  544  [1902]), 
229,   305,    422. 

People  of  the  '  State  of  Xew  York 
ex  rel.  Rector,  etc.,  of  St.  Ann's 
Church  of  Morrisania  v.  Fitch  (87 
Hun  (N.  Y.)  391,  34  X.  Y.  S. 
368    [1895]),    588,    592,    711. 

People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Fuller 
(204  111.  290,  68  X.  E.  371 
[1903]),  851,  927,  986,  996,  1183, 
1340. 


People  ex  rel.  v.  Ci^ge    (83   111.  486), 

259,   267,   356,  636. 
People  ex  rel.   Carroll   v.   Gary    ( 105 

111.  332    [1883]),  308,  915. 
People     ex    rel.    Davidson    v.     Gilon 
(126    X.    Y.    147,    27    X.    E.    282 
[1891]),    603,    1406. 
People    ex    rel.    Davidson     v.     Gilon 
(58    Hun     (X.    Y.)     76,    11    X.    Y. 

Supp.    439    [1890]),    603,    140B. 
People    ex    rel.    GanaAvay    v.    Glasco 
(203     111.     353.     67     X.     E.     499 

[1903]),   1347. 
People   V.   Glenn    (207   111.    50.   69   N. 

E.    568    [1903]).   883,   981.    1304. 
People   V.   Gordon    (81    Mich.   306,   21 

Am.  St.  Rep.  524,  45  X.  W.  658). 

372. 
People    ex    rel.    Doyle    v.    Green     (3 

Hun    7'55    [1875]),    428.    438,    439. 

925. 
People  ex  rel.  Mannen  v.  Green    ( 158 

111.    594.    42    X.    E.    163     [1895]), 

314,   507,   531,   532,   533,   539,   663. 

886,    927,    929,   938,   987,    986,    996. 

1000,  1183,  1330,  1342,  1469. 
People  ex  rel.  McKown  v.  Green  (50 

How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  500  [1875]). 

1472. 
People    ex    rel.    Church    of    the    Holy 

Communion    v.    The    Assessors    of 

Taxes  of  Town  of  Greenberg    ( 106 

X.   Y.   671,   12  X^.  E.   794    [1887]). 

1395. 
People    ex    rel.    Raymond    v.    Grover 

(203  III.  24,  67  X.  E.  165  [1903]), 

525,  707,  714. 
People  v.  Hagar    (66  Cal.  59.  4  Pac. 

951),   142. 
People  of  the   State  of   California  v. 

Hagar    (52  Cal.   171    [1877]),  253, 

340,   475,   618,   690,   724,   786,   899, 

951,  1049,  1086,  1103,  1110,  1116, 

1255,  1299,  1306,  1373,  1378. 
People  v.   Hagar   (49  Cal.  229 

[1874]).   278.   899,   900,   1331. 

1335. 
People    ex    rel.    Williams    v.    Haines 

(49   X.  Y.   587    [1872]),   393,   403, 

958,  1486,  1495. 
People  of  the   State  of  California  v. 

Hastings     (34    Cal.    571     [1868]), 

883,   909,  983,   1304. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Cb 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


People     V.     Houston      (54     C'al.     530 

[1880]),    242. 
People    V.    Hiilbert     (71    ( al.    72,    12 

Pae.   43    [1886]),    15,   340. 
People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger  v.  Hur- 

iord    (167    111.   220,   47    X.    E.    308 

[1897]),    857,    867,    880.    927.    929. 

991,   1183. 
People  ex  rel.  Thatcher  v.  Village  of 

Hyde  Park    (117   111.  402.  6   N.   E. 

33      [1887]),    236.    293.    425.     555, 

662,    1472,    1476. 
People    ex    rel.    Merrinian    v.    Illinois 

Central     Railroad     Co.      (213     111. 

367,    72   N.    E.    1069    [1904]).    324, 

927,   928,  986,  993,   1341. 
People    ex     rel.     Parker     v.     County 

Couvt  of  Jeil'erson    (55   X.   Y.   604 

[1874]),   692,   694,   711,   923,    1351. 
People    ex    rel.    Wood    v.    Jones    (137 

111.  35,  27  X.  E.  294  [1892]),  254, 

416,  423.  558,  504,  784,  1008,  1417, 

1432,  1477. 
People   ex   rel.    Thompson    v.    Judsoii 

(233     111.     280,     84     X.     E.     233 

[1908]),   933,   952,   953,   986. 
People  ex  rel.  Walkhill  Valley  Rail- 
road  Company  v.    Keator    (101    X"^. 

Y.  610,  3  X.  E.  903   [1885]),  1371, 

1388. 
People  ex   rel.   Funk   v.   Keener    ( 194 

111.    16,    61    X.    E.    1069    [1901]), 

1183,   1187,   1277,    1279. 
People    of    the    State    of    Xew    York 

ex   rel.   Jessup  v.   Kelley    (33   Hun 

389    [1884]),    283,    444,   480,    1403. 
People    V.    Common    Council    of    City 

of    Kingston     (189    X.    Y.    66,    81 

X.  E.  557    [1907]),  495,  569. 
People   V.    Common    Council    of    City 

of  Kino-ston    (99  X.  Y.  S.  657,   114 

App.    Div.    326    [1906]),   495,   569, 

624.   696,   1337. 
People    of    tlie    City    and    County    of 

San     Francisco     v.     Kinsman      (51 

Cal.   92    [1875]).   983,   1113. 
People    ex    rel.    Whitlock    v.    Lamon 

(232     111.     587,     33     X.     E.     1070 

[190S]),    523. 
People    ex    rel.    Ravmond    v.    Latham 

(203  111.  9.  67  X.  E.  403   [1903]). 

525,   098,   715. 


People    ex    rel.    Crowell    v.    Lawrence 

(41    X.   Y.    137    [1869]),    100,    110. 
People    ex    rel.    Crowell    v.    Lawrence 

(36    Barb.    (X.    Y.  i     178    [1862]), 

111,    118,    194,    312.    459.    553,    690, 

699,   795,    1216,    1406,    1511. 
People  ex  rel.   Kochersperger  v.  Lin- 

gle      (165    111.     65,    46    X.    E.     10 

[1897]),    857,    866,    902,    903,    927, 

980,   987.   992,   996,   1183,    1340. 
People  of  the  State  of  X'^ew  Y^ork  ex 

rel.  Gage  v.  Lohnas    (54  Hun  604, 

8    X.   Y.    Supp.    104    [1889]).    188. 

206,   309,  556,    1406. 
People    of    the     State    of    California 

V.     Lynch     (51      Cal.    15      [1875]), 

169,    242,   244,    245,   409.    414.    538, 

554,  639,  670,  698,  980,  983. 
People    ex    rel.    Price    v.    Lyon     (218 

111.    577,    75    X.    E.    1017"  [1905]), 

510,   922,    1379. 
People    of    the    City    and    Coimty    of 

San   Francisco   v.  ^IcCain    (50  Cal. 

210   [1875]).  763,  836. 
People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex 

rel.   Decker   v.   McCue    (173   X.   Y. 

347,   66   X.   E.    15    [1903]),   911. 
People   ex  rel.   Decker   v.   McCue    (74 

App.    Div.   40),   911. 
People     V.     McCune      (57     Cal.     153 

[ISbO]),  169,  665,  983. 
People    e.x   rel.    Kilmer    v.    ^IcDonald 

(69   X.   Y.   302    [1877]),   278,   279. 

309,    414,    880.    983,    1304,    1405. 
People  ex   rel.   Hanberg  v.   Mc^Iahon 

224  111.  284.  79  X.  E.  G45   [1900]). 

526,  744. 
People    e.x     rel.    ^IcCormack     v.     Mc- 

Wethy    (  177  111.  334.  52  X.  E.  479 

[1898]),    466,    510,    526,    527,    857, 

1183,    1186. 
People    ex    rel.     McCormack    v.     Mc- 

Wethy    (165  111.  222,  46  X.  E.  187 

[1897]),    400.    520,    540,    852,    926, 

927.  945.   1183. 
People      ex      rel.      Kochersjierger      v. 

Markley     (100    111.    48,    40    X.    E. 

742    [1897]).    570.    752.    857.    859. 

8()5.  900.  927.   936.  986.   996,    1183. 

1340. 
People  ex   rel.   Ijams  v.  Me^e's    (124 

111.  95.   16  X.E.  89    [1889]),   692, 

994.    1183. 


clxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


People  ex  rel.  Trustees  of  Amity 
Baptist  Church  v.  Monroe  (81  X. 
Y.  S.  972,  40  Misc.  Rep.  286 
[1903]),  589,  613. 

People  ex  rel.  Martin  v.  IMyers  ( 13.5 
N.  Y.  465,  32  N.  E.  241  [1892]), 
1395. 

People  ex  rel.  Cook  v.  Xearing  (27 
X.  Y.  806  [1863]),  958. 

People  of  the  State  of  X'ew  York  ex 
rel.  Spencer  v.  Village  of  Xew 
Rochelle  (83  Hun  (X.  Y.)  185,  31 
X.  Y.  S.  592  [1894]),  726,  746, 
1178,  1394. 

People  ex  rel.  Smith  v.  The  Com- 
missioners of  Taxes  of  Xew  York 
(101  X.  Y.  651,  4  X.  E.  752), 
1108 

People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex 
rel.  Dean  v.  Board  of  Assessors  of 
the  City  of  Xew  York  (59  Hun 
407,  13  X.  Y.  Supp.  404  [1891]), 
73. 

People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex 
rel.  Bobbins  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of 
Xew  York  (20  Hun  (X.  Y.)  73 
[1880]),   1399. 

People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex 
rel.  Law  v.  Commissioners  of  Tax- 
es and  Assessments  of  County  of 
Xew  York  (9  Hun  (X.  Y.)  609 
[1877]),  1399. 

People  ex  rel.  Monroe  v.  The  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  City  of  Xew  York  (5 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  43  [1848]),  279, 
813,  815,  910,   1394,   1397. 

People  ex  rel.  v.  Xortrup  (232  111. 
303,    83   X.   E.   843    [1908]),    663. 

People  ex  rel.  v.  O'Xeil    (51   Cal.  91 

[1875]),  983,   1113,    1357. 
People    V.    Owens    (231    111.    311,    83 
X.   E.    198    [1907]),   886. 

People  ex  rel.  McCrea  v.  Palmer  (2 
Bradwell    (111.)    295    [1878]),  1092. 

People  ex  rel.  President,  Mana- 
gers and  Company  of  the  Dela- 
ware &  Hudson  Canal  Company 
-v.  Parker  (117  X.  Y.  86.  22  X. 
E.  752  [1889]),  279,  900,  1399. 
People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  v.  Patton 
(223  111.  379,  79  X.  E.  51  [1906]), 
53,  263,   443,   1065. 


People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  v.  Peyton 
(214  111.  376,  73  X.  E.  768 
[1905]),  51,  52,  53,  55,  223,  234, 
949. 

People  V.  Phinney  (231  111.  180,  83 
X.  E.  143  [1907]),  745,  770,  1187, 
1189. 

People  ex  rel.  Huck  v.  Pierce  ( 90 
111.   85),  223,   1126,   1166. 

People  ex  rel.  Scott  v.  Pitt  (169  X. 
Y.  521,  58  L.  B.  A.  372,  62  J^.  E. 
662  [1902]),  118,  123,  125,  241, 
324,  666,  698,  099,  708,  709,  714, 
728. 

People  ex  rel.  Talbot  Paving  Co.  v. 
City  of  Pontiac  (186  111.  437,  56 
X.  E.  1114  [1900]),  867,  956,  962, 
963,  905,  990,   Um. 

People  of  the  Stale  of  Xew  York  ex 
rel.  The  Xew  York  Central  &  Hud- 
son River  Bailroad  Company  v. 
Priest  (169  X.  Y.  432,  62  X.  E. 
567   [1902]),  3. 

People  ex  rel.  Young  v.  Prust  (219 
111.  116,  70  X.  E.  68  [1905]),  340, 
1126. 

People  of  the  City  and  County  of 
San  Francisco  v.  Quackenbush  (53 
Cal.  52   [1878]),  824,  886. 

People  of  the  City  and  County  of 
San  Francisco  v.  Reay  (52  Cal. 
423    [1877]),    746,    1149.    . 

People  ex  rel.  Jeffries  v.  Record 
(212  111.  62,  72  X.  E.  7  [1904]). 
880,    909,   949,    1183,    1278. 

People  ex  rel.  Connelly  v.  Reis  (96 
X.  Y.  S.  597,  109  App.  Div.  748 
[1005]),  554,  557,  584,  039,  093, 
758,    1400. 

People  ex  rel.  Tietjen  v.  Reis  (96  N. 
Y.  S.  601,  100  App.  Div.  919 
[1905]),  554,  557,  584,  603. 

People,  etc.,  ex  rel.  Butts  v.  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  City  of  Roches- 
ter (5  Lansing  142  [1871]),  404, 
674,   731,   841,   981. 

People  ex  rel.  Locke  v.  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Rochester 
(5  Lans.  (X.  Y.)  11  [1871]),  393, 
563,  745,  754,  836,  841,  845,  846, 
1280. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxix 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


People    ex    rel.    Kern    v.    Ryan     ( 156 

111.    620,    41    X.    E.    ISo"  [1895]). 

772,   986,  996,   1340. 
People  on  the   Relation  of   Butler  v. 

Board   of    Supervisors  of    Saginaw 

County      (26     Mich.     22      [1872]), 

8,  89,119,  283,  291,  337,  396,  403, 

729,  983,  1469,  1471,  1474. 
People    ex    rel.    Wilson    v.    Salomon 

(51    111.   37),   227,   259,   344. 
People  of  the  State  of  California   ex 

rel.    Macpherson    v.    Board    of    Su- 
pervisors   of    City    and    County    of 

San       Francisco        (43       Cal.       91 

[1872]),  03,  909,   1301. 
People     V.    San    Francisco     ( 27     Cal. 

655),  365. 
People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger  v.   Sass 

(171      111.     357,     49     X.     E.     501 

[1898]),  393,  396. 
People   ex   rel.    Miller   v.    Scott    (132 

111.  427,  23  X.  E.   1119),  247,  248. 

550,   564,   638. 
People    ex    rel.    Hanberg    v.    Second 

Ward  Savings  Bank    (224  111.   191, 

79    X.    E.   6(28    [1906]),    927,    928. 

986,  993. 
People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Sherman    (83 

111.   105   [1870]),  51,  103,  104,  230, 

237,   239,   245,   258,   323,   573,    740, 

771,    1184. 
People    ex    rel.    Green   v.    Smith     (55 

X.  Y.   135    [1873]),  781. 
People    ex    rel    Thompson    v.    Smytlie 

(232     111.     629,     83     X.     E.     1080 

[1908]),   1182. 
People   ex    rel.   Thompson   v.    Smythe 

(232     111.     621,     83     X.     E.     1083 

[1908]),  1182. 
People   ex   rel.   Thompson   v.    Smythe 

(232     111.     576,     83     X.     E.      ioO() 

[1908]),    1182. 
People    ex    rol.    Thompson   v.    Smythe 

(232     111.     575,     83     X.     E.      1000 

[1908]),  1182. 
People   ex    rel.   Thompson    v.    Smythe 

(232     111.     507.     83     X.     E.     1003 

[1908]),    1182. 
People    ex    rel.    Thompson    v.    Smythe 

(232  111.  259,  83  X.  E.  828  [1908]), 

1182. 
People   ex    rel.   Thompson   v.    Smythe 


(2.32     111.     348,     83     X.     E.     858 
[1908]),    1182,    1184,    1389. 

People  ex  rel.  Thompson  v.  Smythe 
(232  111.  242,  83  X.  E.  821 
[1908]  ),    1182,    1184,    1389. 

People  ex  rel.  Rogers  v.  Spencer  (53 
X.  Y.   1),  781. 

People  ex  rel.  Johnson  v.  S[)ringer 
106  111.  542  fl883]),  41,  356, 
1165,    1270,    1809. 

People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  v. 
Starkweather  (42  X,  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  325  [1877]),  472,  989,  995, 
1111,  1520. 

People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  v.  Stearns 
(213  111.  184,  72  X.  E.  728 
[1904]),  671,  707. 

People  ex  rel.  Vj,nderbilt  v.  Still- 
well  (19  X.  Y.  531  (1859]),  1397, 
1410. 

People  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  Stone  ( 141 
111.  281,  31  X.  E.  502  [1893]), 
1390. 

People  ex  rel  Pollard  v.  Swi  ert 
(130  111.  608,  22  X.  E.  787 
[1890]),    140,   234,   5G4,   692,    1502. 

People  ex  rel.  Ready  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Syracuse  (144 
X.  Y.  63,  38  X.  E.  1000  [1894]), 
974. 

People  ex  rel.  Howlett  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  City  of  Syra- 
cuse (63  X.  Y.  291  [1875]),  279, 
280,   588,   651,   653,   657,   663,   696. 

People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex 
rel.  Ready  v.  Ma^'or  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Syracuse 
(05  Hun  (X.  Y.)  321.  20*  X.  Y. 
Supp.  230  [1892]),  537,  974,  1409, 
1473,    1518. 

reo])le  ex  rel.  Thompson  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  tlie  City  of  Syracuse  (6 
Hun  05*2  [1870]),  314!  523.  909, 
950.    1405,    1400. 

People  v.  Mayor  of  Syracuse  ( 2  Hun 
(X.  Y.)    433),  594,'  663. 

P(M)p]e  ex 'rel.  Raymond  v.  Talmadge 
(194  111.  67.  01  X.  E.  1049 
[1901]),    393.   ,394,   455.   980.   996. 

People  ex  rel.  Little  v.  Trustees  of 
Schools  (118  III.  52,  7  X.  E.  262), 
586,   612. 


clxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


People  of  the  State  of  New  York  v. 

Turner     (117    N.    Y.    227,    15    Am. 

St.     Rep.      'OS,     22     N.     E.     1022 

[1889]),    744. 
People    ex    rel.    Kerber    v.    City    of 

Utica    (7  Abb.  N.   C.  414   [1879]), 

223,  234,  776,  777,   1304. 
People   ex;   rel.   Trundy   v.   Van   Nort 

(05    Barb.     (X.    Y.)    331    [1873]), 

487,   510,   515. 
People      ex      rel.      Kocliersperger      v. 

Wadlow    (166    111.    119,    46    N.    E. 

775    [1897]),   1390. 
People  V.  Walsh   (96  111.  232,  36  Am. 

Rep.  135),  259. 
People  ex  rel.  Kocliersperger  v.  War- 

neke     (173    111.    40,    50    N.    E.    221 

[1898]),    857,    806,    807,    927,    929, 

992,   1183. 
People    ex    rel.    v.    Warren     (231    111. 

518,    83    N.    E.    271    [1907]),    771, 

853. 
People    ex    rel.    Roediger    v.    Commis- 
sioner     of      Wayne      County      (40 

Mich.     745      [1879]),     1012,"^     1403, 

1408. 
People    V.    Weaver,    (100    U.    S.    539 

[1879]),  3. 
People    V.    Weber     (164    111.    412,    45 

N.   E.    723    [1897]),   345,   475,  986, 

996,   1033,    1071,   1085,   1103,    1183, 

1222,    1223,    1340. 
People    V.    Western    Society    (87    111. 

246    [1871]),  42. 
People    ex    rel.    Raymond    v.     Whid- 

den   (191  111.  374,"  50  L.  R.  A.  905, 

01    N.    E.    133    [1901]),    531,    532, 

533,  539,  927,  945,  989,  1182,  1342, 

1449. 
People  V.  Whyler    (41    Cal.  351),   38. 
People  ex  rel.  Price  v.  Wi^mers    ( 225 

111.   17,  80  X.  E.  45    [1907]),  850, 

866,  927,  929.  940. 
People  V.  Williams    (51   Til.  63),  356. 
People    ex    rel.    Nostra nd    v.    Wilso'\ 

(119    N.    Y.    515,    23    N.    E.    1064 

[1890]),  554,  927,  989,   1004,   1408, 

1409,   1473. 
People     ex    rel.     Gleason    v.     Yancey 

(167     111.     255.     47     N.     E.      521 

[1897]),  244,  323,  698,  770. 
People    ex    rel.    Knox    v.    Village    of 


Yonkers     (39    Barb.    266     [1863]), 

359,  465,  478,  499,  538,  572. 
People's    National    Bank    of    Brattle- 

boro,   Vermont,    v.    Ayer    (24    Ind. 

App.    212,   56    N.    E.   267    [1899]), 

328,  1085. 
Peoria  v.  Kidder    (20   111.  351),   101, 

013. 
Peoria,   City  of  v.   Ohl    (209   III.   52, 

70    N.    E."    632    [1904]),    816. 
Peoria,    City    of    v.    Smith     (232    III. 

561,   83   N.   E.    1061    [1908]),   663, 

1368. 
Pepper    v.    City   of   Philadelphia     to 

Use  of  Horter    (114   Pa.   St.   96,  6 

Atl.    899     [1886]),    483,    527,    529, 

535,  610,   1029. 
Request   River    (Matter   of   Drainage 

of   the  Great  Meadows   on    (42   N. 

J.  L.    (13  Vr.)   553   [1880]).      (See 

Great  Meadows.) 
Perdue    v.    Big    Four    Draina'i;e    Dis- 
trict   of     Ford     County     (117     111. 

App.  000   [1905]),  1328. 
Perdue  v.   Mayor,  etc.,  of  New   York 

(12   Abb.    Prac.    31    [1861]),    1490. 
Ferine    v.    Erzgraber     ( 102    C  al.    234, 

30     Pac.     585     [1894]),    575,    754, 

1281. 
Ferine   v.   Forbush    (97   Cal.   305,   32 

Pac.    220    [1893]),    431,    485,    491, 

513,   537,   574,   575,   602,   604,   607, 

723,  1030,  1031,  1079,  1229,  1235, 

1337. 
Ferine  v.  Lewis  (128  Cal.  236,  60 

Pac.  422,  772  [1900]),  7e3,  907, 

1001,  1062,  1229,  1239,  1359,  1389. 
Perisho  v.  People  ex  rel.  Gannaway 

(185  111.  334,  56  N.  E.  1134 

[1900]),  927,  931,  980,  990,  1183, 

1340. 
Perkinson  v.  Hoolan  (182  :Mo.  189, 

81  S.  W.  407  [1904]),  798,  1013, 

1019. 
Perkinson   v.   Partridge    ( 7   Mo.  App. 

584    [1879]),   821,  '^823. 
Perkinson  v.  Partrids-e    (3   Mo.  App. 

60    [1870]),  813,  821. 
Perkinson     v.     Schnaake      ( 108     Mo. 

App.   255,   83    S.   W.   301    [1904]), 

461,   463,    1104,    1284. 
Fe'kinsnn    v.    McGrath    (9    Mo.    App. 

26    [1880]),   813,   1028,   1133. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxi 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Perry  Avenue,  In  re,  in  City  of  Xew 

York    (103  N.  Y.  S.   1009^  [1907]  ) , 

592,    661. 
Perry,    City   of    v.    Davis    &    Younger 

(18      Okla.      427,      90      Pac.      80.5 

[1907]),   781. 
Perry     v.     Otay     Irrigatio'.i     Tii'iiet 

(127  C'al.  oOij,  60  Pac.  40   [19001). 

355,    1520. 
Perry  v.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg   (206 

111.  334,  69  X.  E.  63   [1903]),  866, 

986,   996,    1183. 
Perry    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kern    (155 

111.    307,    40    X.    E.    408     [1895]), 

763,  764,   772,  913,   947,   1299. 
Perrysville    Avenue.    Marshall's    Ap- 
peal   (210  Pa.  St.  537,  60  Atl.  l60 

[1904]),  310,  1011,  1015. 
Persson  v.   City  of  Bangor    ( 102  Me. 

397,    06    Atl.    1019    [1907]),    1347. 
Peru,    City    of    v.    Bartcls     (214    111. 

515,    73"  X.    E.    755    [1905]),    670, 

677,    715. 
Peru   and    Indianapolis    Railroad    Co. 

v.    Hanna     (68    Ind.    502    [1879]), 

301,   594,   597,   598,   886,    1052. 
Pctaluma   Paving   Company    v.    Sing- 
ley     ( 136    Cal.    010,    69    Pac.    420 

[1902]),   301,   528,   818,   822,   1030, 

1277,   1380. 
Peters    v.   City   of    Chicago    (192    111. 

437,    01    X.    E.    438    [1901]),    324, 

857,   804. 
Peters    v.    Mayor,    etc.,    of    the    City 

of  Xew  York    (8  Hun    (X.  Y.)    405 

[1876]),    1519. 
Peterson  v.   City  of   Ionia    ( —  ilich. 

,   116  X.  *W.  502   [1908]),  742, 

1015. 
Pettlgrevv  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City 

of    Xew   York'  (17    How.    (X.    Y.) 

492    [1859]),   223,   234,   488. 
Pettit    V.    Duke     (10    Utah    311,    37 

Pac.  568   [1894]),  7,  291,  370,  458. 
Peugnet,    In    the    Matter    of     (67    X. 

Y.  441    [1876]),  374,  381,  487,  740, 

762,  948,  982,  983,   1372. 
Pe.vser      v.     Mayor,      Aldermen      and 

Commonalty    of    the    City    of    Xew 

York    (70  X.  Y.  497,   26*  Am.  Rep. 

624    [1877]),   1486. 
Peyser    v.    Mayor,    etc.,    of    the    City 


of  Xew  York   (8  Hun   (X.  Y.)    413 

[1870]),    1478. 
Peyser   v.    Xew   York   Elevated   Rail- 
road    Co.     (12     Abb.     X.     C.     270 

[1883]),  1098. 
Peyton    v.    Village    of    Morgan    Park 

"(172     111.     102,     49     X.     E.     1003 

[1898]),  293,   295,   314,   923,   1282. 
Pfafiinger   v.   Kremer    (115   Ky.   498, 

74   S.   W.   238,  24   Ky.   L.   R.   2368 

[1903]),    619,    628,    678,    711,    715, 

1039. 
Phelan    v.    Dunne     (72    Cal.    229.    13 

Pac.      602      [1887]),      1049,      1141. 

1145,  1221. 
Phelps,  In   re    (96  X.  Y.  S.  862,  110 

App.  Div.  69  [1905]),  575,  700, 

1406. 
Phelps     V.      ]\Iayor,     Aldermen      an<l 

Commonalt.v    of    the    City    of    Xew 

York    (112'x.   Y.   216,   2  L.   R.  A. 

620,    19    X.    E.    408    [1889]),    504, 

807,  1478,   1485,  1488. 
Philadelphia,    (  ity   of   to   Use   of   Pe- 
ters   V.   Arnott    (8    Phil.    (Pa.)    41 

[1870]),  541. 
Philadelphia    to   Use    v.    Baker    (140 

Pa.    St.    11,    21    Atl.    238    [1891]). 

383,   387,   640,   1159. 
Philadelphia,  City  of,  to  Use  v.  Ball 

(147     Pa.    St.    243,    23     Atl.     504 

[1892]),    393,    396,    431,    433,    527. 
Pliiladelpliia,     City     of,     to     Use     of 

O'Rourke  v.  Bowman    ( 175   Pa.   St. 

91,   34   Atl.   353    [1890]),   004. 
Philadelphia    to    Use   of    O'Rourke    v. 

Bowman    (100  Pa.  St.  393,  31   Atl. 

142    [1895]),    604,    1333. 
Philadelphia    to    the   Use   of   Dyer    v. 

P.rooke     (81     Pa.     St.     (31     P.     V. 

Smith)      23      [1876]),      527,      538. 

1158. 
Philadelphia,    C  ity   of   v.   Burgin    (50 

Pa.  St.    (14   Wright)    539   [1805]). 

482. 
Philadelphia  v.  Church  of  St.   James 

(134     Pa.    St.    207,    19     Atl.     497 

[1890]),   588,   613. 
Pliiladelphia,    City    of   v.    Cooke    (30 

Pa.     St.    (0     Casey)    56     [1858]), 

347,  1068,  1146,  1194,  1484. 


clxxxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 
[References   are   to  sections.] 


Philadelirhia    to   Use   v.   Cooper    (212 

Pa.  30G,  61  Atl.  926  [1905]),  1157. 

1160. 
Pbiladelpliia    to    Use    v.    Cooper     (27 

Pa.  Super.   Ct.  552    [1905]),   1160. 
Philadelphia    v.     Ooulson     (118     Pa. 

St.  541,  12  Atl.  604   [1888]),  1182. 
Philadelphia  v.   Cox    ( 1    Penna.    Dis. 

Eep.   280    [1892]),   1194. 
Philadelphia  to   Use  v.   Dibeler    ( 147 

Pa.   St.   261,   23   Atl.   567    [1892]), 

383,  462. 
Philadelphia,     City    of    v.    Eastwick 

(.3'5  Pa.  St.  75   [I860]),  624. 
Philadelphia  to  Use  of  Mack  v.  Ed- 

dleman    (169   Pa.   St.   452,   32  Atl. 

639   [1895]),  437,   1159. 
Philadelphia,     City     of,     to     Use    of 

Winmill    v.    Edwards    (78    Pa.    St. 

(28  P.  F.  Smith)    62   [1875]),  53, 

55,   737,  759. 
Philadelphia   to    Use   v.    Evans    (139 

Pa.   St.   483,  21   Atl.   200    [1891]), 

383,   437,   462,   520,   599. 
Philadelphia.     City     of,     to     Use     of 

Mack  V.  Gorges    (180  Pa.  St.  296, 

36    Atl.     868     [1897]),    314,     383, 

462,  531,  532,  610,  635,  706. 
Philadelphia   to   Use   v.   Gowen    (202 

Pa.    St.    453,    52    Atl.    3     [1902]), 

397,  431,  610,  706,   1320. 
Philadelphia,   City   of  v.   Gratz  Land 

Co.    (38   Pa.   St.   359    [1861]),   342, 

1063. 
Philadelphia,   City  of,   to   Use   v.   H. 

C.   Nichols   Company    (214   Pa.   St. 

265,  63  Atl.  886  "[1906]),  509. 
Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Hay   (20  Pa. 

Super.     Ct.      480      [1902]),      1113, 

1172. 
Philadelphia    to    Use    of    Parker    v. 

Henry    (161    Pa.    St.    38,    28    Atl. 

946    [1894]),   387. 
Philadelphia,     City     of,     to     Use     v. 

Hood    (211    Pa.'  189,    60    Atl.    721 

[1905]),   491. 
Philadelphia  v.  Jenkins    (162  Pa.   St. 

451,   29    Atl.    794),    121. 
Philadelphia    to    use    v.    Jewell     (140 

Pa.  St.  9,  21  Atl.  239  [1891]),  483, 

527,  531. 
Philadelphia    to    use    v.    .Jewell     (135 

Pa.   St.    329,    19   Atl.   947    [1890]), 


292,   293,   483,    520.   522,    527,   538. 

839,    1335. 
Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Keith   ( Pa. )  . 

(2  Atl.  Rep.  207),  610,  706. 
Philadelphia,  City  of,  to  use  v.  Kel- 
ly     (2      Penn.'     Dist.      Rep.      143 

[1892]),  1063. 
Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Ladies'  United 

Aid    Society     (1    Penna.    Dist.    Ct. 

249    [1892]'),    589. 
Philadelphia    to    use    v.    MacPherson 

(140  Pa.  St.  5,  21  Atl.  227  [1891]). 

1063,   1277,   1281. 
Philadelphia,   City  of   v.   Manderfield 

(32    Pa.    Super.    Ct.    373    [1907]), 

706. 
Philadelphia,    City    of    v.     Matchett 

(116     Pa.     St.     103,     8     Atl.     854 

[1887]),   1036,   1037,   1072,   1092. 
Philadelphia    to    use    of    Holgate    v. 

Meager     (67    Pa.    St.     (17    P.    F. 

Smith)     345    [1871]),    1068,    1070, 

1146,   1194. 
Philadelphia   to  use  v.  Meighan  ( 159 

Pa.   St.   495,   28    Atl.   304    [1894]), 

323,   713,  737. 
Philadelphia    v.     Meighan      ( 27     Pa. 

Super.    Ct.    160    [1905]),   384,   563. 
Philadelphia  v.  Merz    (28  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.   227    [1905]),   1091,   1160. 
Philadelphia     to     use    v.     Monument 

Cemetery  Co.    (147  Pa.  St.   170,  23 

Atl.    400    [1892]),    298,    378,    1325, 

1333,  1382. 
Philadelphia    to     use     v.     Xell      (31 

Super.    Ct.    78     [1906]),    1,    1063, 

11  GO. 
Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Xell    ( 25  Pa. 

Super,   tt.  347    [1904]),  451,   1157. 
Philadelphia   to   use    of   Yost   v.   Odd 

Fellows'  Hall  Association    (168  Pa. 

St.   105,  31   Atl.  917    [1895]),  324, 

563. 
Philadelphia     to    use     v.      Pemberton 

208     Pa.     St.     214.     57     Atl.     516 

[1904]),  314,  431,  517,  518,  651. 
Philadelphia     to    use    t.    Pemberton 

(25    Pa.    Super.    Ct.    323    [1904]), 

314,  517,  518. 
Philadelphia   v.    Pennsylvania    Hospi- 
tal for  the  Insane    (154  Pa.  St.  9, 

25  Atl.   1076),  613. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxxiii 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Philadelphia  v.  Pennsylvania  Hospi- 
tal (143  Pa.  St.  367,  22  All.  744 
[1891]),  42,  93,  96,  323,  420,  589, 
G13. 

Philadelphia  v.  Peyton  (25  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  350   [1904])",   1219. 

Philadelphia,  City  of.  to  use  of  Mc- 
Cann  v.  Philadelpliia  i!t  Reading 
Railroad  Company  (177  Pa.  292, 
34  L.  R.  A.  564,  35  Atl.  610 
[1896]).  40,  324.  595.  596,  598. 
612,  1182.  1203. 

Philadelphia,  Citj^  of  to  use  of 
O'Rourke  v.  Philadelphia  &  Read- 
ing Railroad  Company  (88  Pa.  St. 
(7  Xorris)  314  [1879]),  521,  603. 
723. 

Philadelphia,  City  of,  v.  Philadel- 
phia, Wilmington  &  Baltimore  R. 
R.  Co.  (33  Pa.  St.  (9  Casey)  41 
[1859]),  594,  595,  598. 

Philadelphia  v.  Provident,  etc..  Trust 
Co.  (132  Pa.  St.  224,  18  At!.  1114 
[1890]),  372. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Richards 
(124  Pa.  St.  '303,  16  Atl.  802 
[1889]),  223.  234,  737,  775,  777. 
1063,   1372. 

Philadelphia  v.  Ridge  Avenue  Pas- 
senger Ry.  Co.  (143  Pa.  St.  444, 
22  ^tl.  695   [1891]),  602,  603. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  to  use  of  John- 
son V.  Rule  (93  Pa.  St.  (12  Nor- 
ris)  15  [1880]),  527,  610,  665, 
666,  706,   1312. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Sciple  (31 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.'  64  [1906]),  1063, 
1165. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Scott  (93 
Pa.  St.  (12  Xorris)  25  [1880]), 
1160,   1165,   1170. 

Philadelphia  to  use,  etc.,  v.  Sheri- 
dan (148  Pa.  .^t.  532,  24  Atl.  80 
[1892]),    610,    706. 

Philadelphia  to  use  of  Xestor  v. 
Spring  Garden  Farmers'  Market 
Company  (161  Pa.  St.  522.  29  Atl, 
286  [1894]),  223,  549,  598,  611, 
640,   723,   775. 

Philadelpliia  to  use  v.  Spring  Gar- 
den    Farmers'     Market     Company 


(154  Pa.  St.  93,  25  Atl.  1077 
[1893]),  604,   1157,   1159,   1333. 

Philadelphia  v.  Stevenson  ( 132  Pa. 
St.  103,  19  Atl.  70  [1890]).  55, 
596,    1063. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Steward  (31 
Pa.  Super.  Ct.  72   [1906]),  1063. 

Philadelphia,    City   of   v.    Sutter    (30 

-  Pa.  St.  (6  Casey)  53  [1858]), 
1063,    1157. 

Philadelphia,  -City  of  v.  Union  Buri- 
al Ground  Society  of  the  City  and 
County  of  Philadelphia  ( 178  Pa. 
St.  533.  36  L.  R.  A.  263,  36  Atl. 
172    [1896]),   42,   347,   592,   613. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  to  use  of  Mc- 
^lanus  V.  Unknown  Owner  ( 149 
Pa.  St.  22.  24  Atl.  65  [1892]), 
1033,    1063. 

Philadelphia  v.  Wistar  (92  Pa.  St. 
(11  Norris)    404),  382,   383. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Wistar  (35 
Pa.  St.  427  '[I860]).  481,  531, 
1158,    1210. 

Philadelphia,  City  of  v.  Yewdall 
(190  Pa.  St.  412,  42  Atl.  956 
[1899]),  382.  383,   1052. 

Philadelpliia  Company's  Petition 
(210  Pa.  St.  490.  "  60  Atl.  93 
[1904]).   190. 

Philadelphia  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co. 
V.  City  of  New  Whatcom  ( 19 
Wash.  225,  52  Pac.  1063  [1898]), 
475,  975,  1047,  1092,  1411.  1469, 
1508. 

Philadelphia  &  Reading  Coal  &  Iron 
Co.  V.  City  of  Chicago  (1.58  111. 
9,  41  X.  E.'ll02  [1895]),  280,  308, 
636,  652,  656.  856,  921.  925,  965, 
967,   1279.    1286,   1348,   1349. 

Philadelpliia,  Wilmington  &  Balti- 
more Railroad  Com])any  v.  Ship- 
ley (72  Md.  88,  19  Atll  [1890]), 
266.  308,  763,  918,  1142,  11.50, 
1231.    1240,   1266,   13.50,    1356.   1469. 

Pliilbrook  v.  Inhabitants  of  the 
County  of  Kennehec  (17  Me.  196 
[1840]).   396,  399,    1-199. 

Phillips,  Matter  of  (60  X.  V.  16 
[1875]),  373,  380,  381,  432,  437, 
462,  762,  982,  1456. 


clxxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Phillips,  In  the  ^Matter  of  v.  Mayor, 
Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of  New 
York  (2  Hun  (N.  Y.)  212 
[1874]),  762,  951,  1279,  1442, 
1450. 

Phillips  V.  City  of  Hudson  (31  N.  J. 
L.  (2  Vr.)  143  [1864]),  1200. 
1206. 

Phillips  V.  JoUisaint  (7  Ind.  App. 
458,  34  X.  E.  653),  1113,  1373. 

Phillips  V.  Lewis  (109  Ind.  62,  9  N. 
E.   395    [1886]),   223,   950,    1262. 

Phillips  V.  City  of  Olympia  (21 
Wash.  153,  57  Pac.  347  [1899]  i. 
972,  974,  976,  1037,  1469. 

Phillips  V.  People  ex  rel.  Goedtner 
(218  111.  450,  75  N.  E.  1016 
[1905]),  533,  745,  930,  986,  996, 
1183. 

Phillips  Academy,  Trustees  of  v.  In- 
habitants of  Andover  ( 175  Muss. 
118,  48  L.  R.  A.  550,  55  N.  E.  841 
]1900]),  89,  570,  666,  700,  709. 

Phoenixville  Borough  v.  Miller  ( 34 
Pa.    Super   Ct.    16    [1907]),   441. 

Pickering  v.  State  for  use  of  Dyar 
(106  Ind.  228,  6  N.  E.  611),  726, 
735,  770,   1237,  1244,   1251,  1444. 

Pickett  V.  School  District  (25  Wis. 
551,  3  Am.  Rep.   105    [1870]),  48G. 

Pickton  V.  City  of  Fargo  (10  X.  D. 
469,  88  X.  W.  90   [1901]),  119. 

Piedmont  Paving  Company  v.  All- 
man,  130  Cal.  88,  68  Pac.  493 
[1902]),  495.  510,  542,  840,  S56, 
857,  864. 

Pier  V.  Fond  du  Lac  County  (53  \\'is. 
421,  10  N.  W.  686  [1881]),  956, 
1066,  1072,  10S3.  1442. 

Pierce  v.  Aetna  Life  Insurance  Com- 
pany (131  Ind.  284,  31  X.  E.  68 
[1891]),  1068. 

Pierce  v.  Bronnenberg's  Estate  ( — • 
Ind.  App.  ,  81  X.  E.  739,  re- 
hearing denied,  82  X.  E.  126 
[1907]),  1067. 

Pierce  v.  Bronnenberg's  Estate  ( — 
Ind.  App.  ,  82  X.  E.  126;  de- 
nying rehearing  of  81  X.  E.  739), 
756. 

Pierce  v.  iCounty  Commissioners  of 
Franklin     County      (63     Me.     252 


[1872]),  52,  53,  54,  234,  399,  525, 

729,  1404. 
Pierson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Walter   (204 

111.    456,    68    X.    E.    383     [1903]), 

51. 
Pike  V.  City  of  Chicago   ( 155  111.  656. 

40    X.    E.    567    [1895]),    278,   293, 

381,  386,  672,  715,  920,  922,   1313, 

1318,  1322. 
Pike    V.    Cummings.    36    0.    S.    213 

[1880]),  686,   1085. 
Pike   Street,   Matter   of,    Seattle    (42 

Wash.  551 ;   suh  nomine  In  re  C!ity 

of  Seattle,  85  Pac.  45   [1900]),  f3. 

271,  309,  601,  663,  675,  997. 
Pim     V.     Xicholson     (6     0.     S.     176 

[1856]),  197. 
Pinchbeck  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City 

of  Xew  York   (12  Hun  (N.  Y.)  55*6 

[1878]),  1488,  1494. 
Pinckney,  In  the  Matter  of   (22  Hun, 

474    [1880]),    485,    511,   840,    1026, 

1454. 
Pine  Tree  Lumber  Co.  v.  City  of  Far- 
go   (12   X.   D.   360,   96   X.   W.   357 

[1903]),  238,   1512. 
Pinkstafl'    v.    Allison    Ditch    District 

Xo.  2  of  Lawrence  County   (213  111. 

186,    72    X.    E.    715    [1904]),    340, 

661,  923,  924,    1274,    1277,   1282. 
Pioneer   Irrigation   District  v.   Brad- 
ley   (8  Ida.  310,   101   Am.  St.  Rep. 

201,  68  Pac.  295),  118,  355. 
Piper's  Appeal  in  the  Matter  of  Wid- 
ening Kearney  Street   (32  Cal.  530 

[1867]),    110,    292,    309,   345,   549, 

556,   559,    560,    657.    670,    690,   694. 

697,  947,  1381. 
Pipher   v.   People    ex    rel.    Gannawa.\ 

(183  111.  426,  56  X.  E.  84  [1900])'. 

927,  931,  986,  996,  1183,   1340. 
Pittelkow  V.   City  of  Milwaukee    ( 94 

Wis.  651,  69  x'.  E.  803  [1897]),  62. 

266,  661,  690,  783,  844,  899,  979. 
Pittman  v.   Mayor,   etc.,  of  the  City 

of  Xew  York  ^  3  Hun,  370  [1875]), 

279,  1026. 
Pittsburg  V.  Brace  Bros   (158  Pa.  St. 

174,  27  Atl.  854   [1893]),  353,  037. 

1049,   1050. 
Pittsburg  V.  Cluloy    (74  Pa.  St.    (24 

P.    F.    Smith)     262    [1873]),    280, 

856,  927.  935,  1009.  1337. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxxv 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Pittsburg  V.  Chiley    (G6   Pa.  St.    (16 

P.    F.    Smith)     449     [1870]),    441, 

10G3. 
Pittsburg  v.-  Coursin   ( 74  Pa.  St.    ( 24 

P.  F.  Smith)   400   [1873]),  735. 
Pittsburg,    City    of    v.    Harrison    (91 

Pa.   St.    (10   Norris)    206    [1879]), 

1210,  1211,  1346. 
Pittsburg,    City    of   v.    Irwin's    Exec- 
utors    (85    Pa.    St.    420     [1877]), 

1519. 
Pittsburg,   City   of   v.   Knowlson    (92 

Pa.   St.    (11   Norris)    116    [1879]), 

1163,  1168. 
Pittsburg  V.  Logan  (165  Pa.  St.  516, 

30  Atl.  1017  [1S95]),  967,  1035, 

1100. 
Pittsburg,    'City     of     v.     MacC'onnell 

(130    Pa.     St.    463,     18    Atl.     645 

ri889]),  527,  1159. 
Pittsburg,   City  of  v.   [NleKnight    (91 

Pa.     St.     (10    Xorris)     202,     1157, 

1158,   1373,   1384. 
Pittsburg,   City   of  v.   Maxwell    (179 

Pa.   St.   553,   36  Atl.    158    [1897]), 

1391. 
Pittsburg  V.  Shaffer    (66  Pa.  St.    (10 

P.  F.  Smith)   454  [1870]),  387. 
Pittsburg      V.      Sterrett     Subdistrict 

School    (204  Pa.  St.  635,  61   L.  R. 

A.  183,  54  Atl.  463   [1903]),  8,  89, 

586. 
Pittsburg  V.  ^Yalter    (69   Pa.  St.    (19 

P.    F.    Smith)     365     [1871]),    234, 

781,  951,   1150,   1281. 
Pittsburg,  Appeal  of  tlie  City  of   (118 

■Pa.   St.   458,    12   Atl.    366*  [1888]  i, 

1435. 
Pittsburg,  Appeal  of  the  City  of    (40 

Pa.   St.    (4   Wright)    455  '[1861]), 

106-S,    1146. 
Pittsburg's    Appeal    (70    Pa.    St.    (20 

P.    F.    Smith)     142    [1871]),    1068, 

1146,    1194. 
Pittsburg   City   District    (2   Watts  & 

€.   320    [1841]),   427. 
Pittsburg's     Petition     for     Board     of 

Viewers    (138  Pa.   St.  401,  21    Atl. 

757,    759,    761     [1890]),    81,     19(1, 

278,  961,  1505. 
Pittsburg,   Bradford   &    BuiValo   Rail- 
way   Company    v.    ^IcCloskey    (110 

Pa.  St.  436.  1  Atl.  555   [188.5]),  70.   ^ 


Pittsburg,  Cincinnati,   Chicago  &  St. 

Louis   Ry.   Co.   v.   Town   of   Crown 

Point   (150  Ind.  536,  50  N.  E.  741 

[1897]),  783,  843.  951,   1000,   1030, 

1031,    1431. 
Pittsburg,  Cincinnati,   Chicago  &  St. 

Louis    Ry.    Co.    V.    Fish    (158    Ind. 

525,  63  N.  E.  454  [1901]),  86,  108, 

301,   598,   832,    1078,   1110,   1277. 
Pittsburg,  Cincinnati,   Chicago   &   St. 

Louis   Ry.    Co.    v.    Hays    (17    Ind. 

App.    261,   44   X.    E.    .375    [1896]), 

82,  594,  598,   1078,   13tJ9. 
Pittsburg,   Cincinnati,   Chicago   &   St. 

Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Machler   ( 158  Ind. 

159,    63    N.    E.    210    [1901]),   598, 

659,  918,  987,  1313. 
Pittsburg,  Cincinnati,  Cliicago  &   St. 

Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oglesby   (165  Ind. 

542,    76    N.    E.    165     [1905]),    245, 

263,  616,  895. 
Pittsburg,  C,  C.  &  St.   L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Taber   (168  Ind.  419,  77  N.  E.  741 

[1906]),    108,    301,    594,    595,    598, 

620,   669,   670,   699,   709,   731,   745, 

956,  978,   983,    1078,   1085,   1110. 
Pittsburg,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  &  St. 

Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Town  of  Wolcott 

(162     Ind.     399,     69     X.     E.     451 

[1903]),   70,   832. 
Pittsburg,   Ft.   Wayne   &   Chicago   R. 

R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Chicago    (53  111. 

80    [1869]).    1183. 
Pittsburg  R.  Co.  v.  Harden   (137  Ind. 

486,  37  X.  E.   324),  365. 
Piatt     V.      Stewart      (S      Bnr!>.     493 

[1850]),   890,  902. 
Pleasant  Hill,  Village  of  v.  Commis- 
sioners  (71  O.  S.  133,  72  X.  E.  896 

[1904]),    223,    234,   270,    449,    638, 

775. 
Pleasant  Hill.  City  of  v.  Dasher   (120 

Mo.    675,    25    S".    W.    566    [1893]), 

323,    1040.   1049. 
Pleasant  Township  v.  Cook    (160  Ind. 

533,    67    X.    E.    262    [1902]),    583, 

587,  664,  727,  729,  738,  886,   1076. 
Pleasants  v.  City  of  Shreveport    (110 

La.    1046,    35    So.    283    [1903]),    8, 

46,   484.   531,  5.53,    1299,    1369. 
Plympton  v.  Boston  l^isjieiisary    ( lOG 

Mass.  544   [1871]),  1055. 


clxxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Pochila   V.    Calvert,    Waco   &    Brazos 

Valley  Railway   Co.    (31   Tex.  Civ. 

App.   398,   72   S.   W.   255    [1903]), 

60. 
Poillon,   Pros.   v.  Brunner    (66  N.  J. 

L.    116,  48  Atl.   541    [1901]),   986. 

1085,    1168. 
Poillon  V.  Mayor  and  Council  of  the 

Borough  of  Rutherford    (05   N.   J. 

L.      (36     Vr.)     538,     47     Atl.     439 

[1900]),    119,    667,   699,    735,    766, 

894. 
Police  Jury  v.  Mitchell    (37  La.  Ann. 

44),  218. 
Polk   County   Savings  Bank   v.   State 

of  Iowa   ((]9  la.  24,  28  N.  W.  416 

ri886]),  501,  1074,  1509. 
Pollock    V.    Sowers    (137    Mich.    368, 

100  N.   W.   596    [1904]),  340,  965, 

990. 
Pomeroy  Coal  Co.  v.  Emlen   ( 44  Kan. 

117,  24  Pac.  340  [1890]),  3. 
Pontiac,  City  of  v.  Talbot  Paving  Co. 

(94  Fed.  65,  36  C.  C.  A.  88,  48  L. 

R.  A.  326  [1899]),  1518. 
Pooley  V.  City  of  Buffalo   (124  X.  Y. 

206,    26    N.    E.    624    [1891]),    919, 

1478,  1485,  1497. 
Pooley  V.  City  of  Buffalo   ( 122  N.  Y. 

592,  26  N.  E.  16  [1890]  ),  744,  745, 

747,  915,  1484,  1485,  1488. 
Poplar     Bluff,     City     of,     to    use    of 

Wheeler  v.  Hoag   (62  Mo.  App.  672 

[1895]),  438,  873. 
Porphyry  Paving  Co.  v.  Ancker   ( 104 

Cal.    340,    37    Pac.    1050    [1894]), 

747,  1264. 
Port   Angeles,  City   of   v.   Lauridsen 

(26     Wash.      153,     66     Pac.     403 

[1901]),  416,  956,  965,  974. 
Porter   v.   City   of   Chicago    (176    111. 

605,    52   N.    E.    318    [1898]),    923, 

1029,   1277. 
Porter  v.  Midland  Ry.  Co.    ( 125  Ind. 

476,  25  N.  E.  556),  1015. 
Porter  v.   Purdy    (29   N.   Y.    106,   86 

Am.   Dec.   283    [1864]),   280,    1009, 

1521. 
Porter   v.    City  of   Tipton    (141    Ind. 

347,   40  N.  "e.   802    [1895]),   1506. 

Portland   v.   Bituminous   Paving   Co. 

(33  Ore.  307,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  713. 


44  L.  R.  A.  527,  52  Pac.  28 
[1898]),  373,  483,  519. 

Portland,  City  of  v.  Kamm  (5  Ore. 
302    [1874]),   77,    1349-,    1351. 

Portland  v.  Oregon  Real  Estate  Co. 
(43  Or.  423,  72  Pac.  322  [1903]), 
805,  810,  981. 

Portland  Lumbering  &  Manufactur- 
ing Co.  V.  City  of  East  Portland 
(18  Or.  21,  0  L.  R.  A.  290,  22 
Pac.   536    [1889]),  245,    1498. 

Portsmouth  iSav.  Bank  v.  City  of 
Omaha  (67  Neb.  50,  93  N.  W.  231 
[1903]),   763,   911,    1004. 

Post  v.  Kearney  (2  N.  Y.  394,  51 
Am.  Dec.  303   [1849]),  1054. 

Post  V.  City  of  Passaic  (56  N.  J.  L. 
(27  Vr.)  421,  28  Atl.  553  [1894]), 
1408. 

Post  V.  Supervisors  ( 105  U.  S.  667 
[1881]),   1512. 

Poth  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(77  Hun  (N.  Y.)  225,  28  N.  Y. 
S.   365    [1894]),   1481. 

Poth  V.  Ma.yor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
(151  N.  Y.  16,  45  N.  E.  372 
[1896]),  465,  479,  496,  1481,   1484. 

Pott's  Appeal    (15  Pa.  St.  414),  909. 

Potter  V.  Village  of  Norwood'  (21 
Ohio  C.  C.  461  [1901]),  387,  563, 
1437,  1444. 

Potter  V.  City  of  Whatcom  (25 
Wash.  207,  65  Pac.  197  [1901]), 
670,  927,  933,  1004,  1030,  1337, 
1511. 

Potwin  V.  Johnson  (108  111.  70 
[1883]),  194,  195,  245,  258,  736, 
1112,  1317. 

Potwin  V.  Johnson  ( 106  111.  532 
[1883]),  41,    1369. 

Poundstone  v.  Baldwin  ( 145  Ind. 
139,  44  N.  E.  191  [1896]),  373, 
375,  781,  784. 

Powell  V.  Brunswick  County  ( 150 
U.  S.  433,   14  S.   166),  715*. 

Powell  V.  Clelland  (82  Ind.  24 
[1882]),   1030,   1519. 

Powell  V.  City  of  Duluth  (91  Minn. 
53,  97  N.  W.  450    [1903]),  353. 

Powell  V.  City  of  St.  Joseph  (31  Mo. 
347    [1861]"),  437. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxxvii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Power  V.  City  of  Detroit   ( 139  Mich. 

30,    102   N.   W.    288    [1905]),   308, 

465,   479,   549,   552,   555,   578,   629, 

663,  670,   1085,   1103. 
Powers,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appeal 

of  (29  Mich.  504  [1874]),  63,  229, 

272,  550,  747,  777,  825. 
Powers   V.   Barr    (24   Barb.    (N.   Y.) 

142    [1857]),   1108,   1175. 
Powers  V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids   (98 

Mich.  393,  57  N.  W.  250    [1894]), 

314,  561,  578,  651,  655. 
Powers  V.  Town  of  Xevv  Haven   ( 120 

Ind.    185,   21   X.   E.    1083    [1889]), 

489 
Praigg  V.  Western  Paving  and  Sup« 

ply    Company     (143    Ind.    358,    42 

N.  E.  750   [1895]),  79,  628. 
Pratt  V.  City  of  Milwaul^ee   ( 93  Wis. 

658,    68    N.    W.    392    [1896]),    41, 

425,  429,  1116,  1173,  1181,  1195, 

1196,    1337. 
Pray  v.  Northern  Liberties    (31   Pa. 

St.  69),  45,   166,   1063,   1113. 
Prendergast  V.  Richards   (2  Mo.  App. 

187    [1876]),    324,    542,    636,    990, 

1138,  1221. 
Presbytery    of    New    York,     In     the 

Matter  of  the  Trustees  of  the    (54 

Howard   (N.  Y.)   226   [1877]),  504, 

867,   1453,    1459. 
Prescott  V.   City  of  Cliicago    (60  111. 

121     [1871]),'    194,    195,    355,    390, 

394,  405,  997,   1291 
President,  etc.,  of v. 

.      ( See  name  of  Cori>ora- 


tion   or   Institution.) 

Preston  v.  Board  of  Water  Commis- 
sioners of  Detroit  (117  Midi.  589, 
76  N.  W.  92),  353. 

Preston  v.  Rolierts  ( 7.")  Ky.  ( 12 
Busii.)  570  [1877]),  301,  527,  628, 
629,  635,  710,  777,  1015,  1255, 
1375. 

Preston  v.  Rudd  (84  Ky.  156,  7  Ky. 
L.  R.  806  [1886]),  301,  555,  065, 
770,   678. 

Prezinger  v.  Harness  (114  Ind.  491, 
16  N.  E.  495  [1887]),  340,  528, 
679,  684,  772.  lOOS.  1015,  1018, 
1427,   1435. 

Price  v.  City  of  Toledo   (25  Ohio  Cir. 


Ct.  R.  017    [1903]),   189,  651,  653, 
918,    1436. 

Prince  v.  City  of  Boston  (111  Mass. 
226  [1872]),  76,  86,  244,  309,  415, 
525,    738,    879,    1334. 

Prindiville  v.  Jackson  (79  III.  337 
[1875]),    8,    11,    348,   421. 

Prindle  v.  Campbell  (9  :Minn.  212 
[1864]),  735,  770,  981,   1178. 

Prior  v.  Buehler  &  Coney  Construc- 
tion Company  (170  Mo.  439,  71 
S.  W.  205  [1902]),  118,  324,  329, 
553,    555,    666,    698,    709,    711. 

Proprietors  of  Locks  and  Canals  v. 
Nashua  &  Lowell  Railroad  Corpo- 
ration (64  Mass.  (10  Cush.)  385 
[1852]),  66. 

Protestant  Episcopal  Public  School, 
In  the  Matter  of  the  (86  N.  Y. 
396    [1881]),    821,    1451.    1405. 

Protestant  Episcopal  Public  School, 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Application 
of  the  (40  Howard  (N.  Y.)  198 
[1870]),  541.  550.  821,  824,  840, 
855. 

Protestant  Orphan  Asylum  of  Pitts- 
burg and  Alleghen}%  Appeal  of  the 
(111  Pa.  St.  135,  3  Atl.  217 
[1885]),   382,   462. 

Prout  V.  People  ex  rel.  Miller  (83 
III.  154  [1876]),  508,  772,  927, 
942,    1183,    1184,    1372. 

Provident  Institution  for  Savings  v. 
Allen  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  (10  Stew.) 
627    [1883]),  349,  353,   1049,   1068, 

Provident  Institution  for  Savings  v. 
Allen  (37  N.  .J.  Eq.  (10  Stew.) 
36  [1883]),  6.  20,  349.  353.  354, 
608,   665,   666,   690,   717,    1031. 

Provident  Institution  for  Savings  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Jersey  City  (113 
U.  S.  506.  28  L.  11()2,  5  S.  612 
[1885]),  6.  20,  124,  353,  1049. 
1068. 

Public  Park-i,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Department  of  (85  N.  Y.  459 
[1881]),   945. 

Pueblo,  City  of  v.  Rubiiison  (12 
Colo.  593!  21  Pac.  899  [1899]), 
44,   152,  324,  420,  674. 

Pugh  V.  Miller  (126  Ind.  1S9.  25 
N,  E.   1040    [1890]),    1522. 


clxxxviii 


T^VBLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Pulaski    County,    Board    of    Commis- 

sionei'S    of    v.    Vurpillat     (22    Ind. 

App.   422,  53   X.   E.    1049    [1899]), 

472. 
Purdy    V.    Drake     (Ky.)     (32    S.    \Y. 

939,    17    Ky.    L.    R.    819     [1896]), 

73,   1346. 
Pursell     V.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty    of    the    City   of    Xew 

/ork   (85  X.  Y.  330  [1881]),  1054, 

1467,    1487. 
Pusey's    Appeal,    In    the    Matter    of 

Charles  Street  (83  Pa.  St.   (2  Xor- 

ris)    67    [1876]),    70,    1437. 
Putnam  v.   Grand   Rapids    (58   Mich. 

416,    25    X.    W.    330    [1SS5]).    368, 

1437,    1442. 
Putnam    County,     Commissioners    of 

V.  Krauss    (53  0.  S.  628,  42  X.  E. 

831    [1895]),    1026,   1433. 
Putnam    County,     Commissioners    of 

V.   Young    (36   0.   S.   288    [1880]). 

248,   322,   539,   564,   569,   629,    785, 

790,    796. 


Quarles  v.  Town  of  Sparta    ( 2  Tenn. 

Ch.   App.    714    [1902]),   263,   827. 
Quarry  Road,  In  re,  Opening  of    ( 82 

N.    Y.    S.    965,    84    App.    Div.    418 

[1903]),    263. 
Queen   City   Foundry   Co.   v.   City  of 

Cincinnati     (8     Ohio     X\     P.  "  167 

[1901]),  677,  693,  700 
Quest     V.      Johnson      ( 58      Mo.      54 

[1894]),    18,   530. 
Quick   V.    Parrott    (167    Ind.    31,    78 

X.  E.  232   [1906]),  340,   1506. 
Quick     V.    Village    of    River     Forest 

(130     111.     323,     22     X.     E.     816 

[1890]),   771,   918.   1306. 
Quick  V.  Templin    (—   Ind.  ,   85 

X.   E.    121    [1908]),   1442. 
Quill    V.    City   of    Indianapolis    ( 124 

Ind.  292,  V  L.  R.  A.  681,  23  X. 

E.  788  [1890]),  11,  139,  209,  301, 

507,  651,  663,  665,  666,  731,  739, 

1033,  1085,  1504,  1506. 
Quinlan  v.  Myers   (29  0.  S.  500 

[1876]),   1007,   1432. 


Quinn   v.   City    of    Buffalo    (26    Hun 

(X.   Y'.)    234    [1882]),    1508,    1516. 
Quinn    v.    City    of    Cambridge     ( 187 

Mass.   507,   73  X.   E.  661    [1905]), 

878. 
Quinn    v.    James    (174    Mass.    23,    54 

X.   E.   343    [1899]),  326,   654,   750. 
Quint  V.   Hoffman    (103   Cal.   506,  37 

Pac.    514    [1894]),    253.    254,    355, 

1432,    1435. 
Quint    V.    McMullen     (103    Cal.    381, 

37    Pac.    381     [1894]),    355,    1389. 

1426. 
Quirk   V.   City  of  Seattle    (38   Was''. 

25,    80    Pac.    207    [1905]),    69,    7". 

308,    611,    613. 


R 


R.   B.   Park  &   Co.   v.   Cane    (—  Ky. 

,   24    Ky.   Law   Rep.   2294,    73 

S.  W.  1121  '[1903]),  628,  666,  709, 
710. 

Rabel  v.  City  of  Seattle  (-14  Wash. 
482,  87  Pac.  520  [1906]),  549, 
1054. 

Racer  v.  State  for  Use  of  Rhine  (131 
Ind.  393,  31  X.  E.  81  [1891]), 
340,   525,   532,    1254. 

Rackliffe   v.    Duncan    ( —    Mo.    App. 

,     108    S.    W.    1110     [1908]), 

463,  616,  841. 

Rader  v.  Township  of  Union  (44  X. 
.1.  L.   (15  Vr.)   259),  166,  167. 

Rader  v.  Township  Committee  of 
Union  (39  X.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.)  509), 
168,   1081. 

Rae  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of 
Xew  York  ( 39  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
192    [1875]).    1422. 

Railroad  Avenue,  East,  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  Application  of  the 
Commissioners  of  Public  Parks, 
etc.,  relative  to  opening  (47  Hun 
(X.    Y.)    302    [18S8]),    308,    601. 

Railway  Company  of  Illinois  v.  Com- 
missioners of  East  Lake  Fork  Spe- 
cial Drainage  District  (134  111. 
384,  10  L.  R.  A.  285,  25  X.  E.  781 
[1891]),   1477. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxxxix 


[References   are   to  sections.^ 


Railroad    Company    v.    Foreman    (24 

W.  Va.   662    [1884]),   65. 
Railroad   Companj'  v.   flavor,   Alder- 
men and  Commonalty  of   tlie   City 

of  New  York    (63  Hun  271,   17  X. 

Y.    Supp.    903    [1892]),    1422. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Porter    (38  Ind.  App. 

226,  76  X.  E.   179    [1905]).    (over- 
ruling petition  for  rehearing  in  74 

N.  E.   260),   1110. 
Railroad    Company    v.    Wagner     (43 

0.  S.  75.  1  X.  E.  91   [1885]),  72  \ 

735,   977. 
Ivaisch     V.     Hildebrandt      (  146     Cal. 

721,     81    Pac.     21    [1905]),     1277, 

1281. 
Raleigh,    City   of    v.    Peace    (110    X. 

C.   32,   17   L.   R.   A.   330.    14   S.   E. 

521   [1892]),  7,  11,  39,  79,  82,  100. 

1.06,    145,    147,    148,   231,    241,    244, 

245,  363,   665,   666,  668,   1039. 
Ramish   v.    Hartwell    (126    Cal.    443, 

58    Pac.    920     [1899]),     139,    522, 

670,  871,  948.  1116,  1173,  1179, 

1337,  1469. 
Ramsey    County   v.   Robert   P.   Lewis 

Co.  '(53  L.  R^.  A.  421   [1901]),  104, 

118,   350,   630,   702,   708. 
Ramsey   County  v.    Robert   P.   Lewis 

Co.   (42  L.  R.  A.  639   [1898]).  104, 

118,    350,   549,    609,    630,    702. 
Randolph    v.     Bayue     (44     Cal.     366 

[1872]),    1039, ' 1169. 
Randolph    v.    Gawley     (47    Cal.    458 

[1874[),   860,   867' 
Raritan    Township    v.    Port    Reading 

R.  Co.    (49  X.  J.  Eq.   11),  359. 
Rasmussen    v.    People   ex    rel.    Kern 

(156    111.   574,   42   X.   E.   Rep.    161 

[1895]),    925. 
Rasmussen    v.    People    ex    rel.    Kern 

(155  111.  70,  39  X^.  E.  606  [1895]), 

763,  913. 
Rauer    v.    Lowe     (107    Cal.    229.    40 

Pac.    337    [1895]),    273,    324,    512. 

537,    740.    747,    907,     1052,     1062, 

1281,   1293,   1522. 
Rawlins   v.    Britr-^rs    L.    R.     (3    C.    P. 

Div.  368    [1878]),   1054. 
Rawson  v.   City  of  Chicago    (185  111. 

87,  57  X.  E."  35   [1900]),  620,  029, 

683,  781,  800,   857. 


Rawson  v.   City  of  Des  Moines    (133 

la.    514,    110    X.    W.    918    [1907]), 

629. 
Ray  V.  City  of  Jeflfersonville  (90  Ind. 

567    [1883]),    111,    217,    267,    301, 

549,   619,   627,   650,   728,   781,   783, 

814,  843,   1192,   13-47. 
Raym.ond,  In  the  Matter  of   (21  Hun 

229    [1880]),   484,    485. 
Raymond  v.  Cleveland    (42  O.  S.  522 

[1885]),   7,    11,   86,    106,   308.   5-50, 

551,   622,   623,   956,   962,   963,   970, 

1447. 
Rayne,  Town  of   v.   Harrel    (119  La. 

652.  44  So.  330«[1907]),  777.  1050, 

1114. 
Reading,    City    of    v.    O'Reilly     (169 

Pa.   St.   366,   32   Atl.   420    [1895]), 

610.  620,  817,  824.   1056. 
Reading,  City  of  v.  Savage    ( 124  Pa. 

St.  328,   16  Atl.   788   [1889]),   190, 

244,  961. 
Reading,  City  of  v.  Savage   (120  Pa. 

St.    198,   13   Atl.   919    [1888]),   190, 

776,   961. 
Real     Estate     Corporation     of     Xew 

York   City   v.    Harper    ( 174   X\   Y. 

123.   60   X.   E.    660    [1903]),    1067, 

1072. 
Reamer    v.    Hogg    (142    Ind.    138,    41 

X.  E.  353    [1895]),  340,  526. 
Reasoner     v.    Creek     (101    Ind.     482 

[1884]),    804. 
Reclamation     District     No.     537     of 

Yolo   County   v.    Burger    ( 122   Cal. 

442,    55    Pac.     156     [1898]),    253, 
'254,   343,   670,   694,   713,   788,   795, 

951,   1008,   1318. 
Reclamation     District     Xo.      124     v. 

Coghill      (56     Cal.     607      [1880]), 

1269. 
Reclamation     District     X"o.      108     v. 

Evans    (61   Cal.    104    [1882]).   132, 

340,    773. 
Reclamation   District   X'o.    3   v.   God- 
man     (61     Cal.     2(t5     [1882]),    48, 

244.    776. 
Reclamation    District   Xo.   3   v.   Gobi- 
man     (65    Cal.    635,    4    Pac.    676 

[1884]).    132.    247,    266.    527.    541, 

554.  557.   042.   773.  980,  998.    1213, 

1390. 


cxc 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[^leferences   are   to  sections.] 


Reclamation     District     Xo.      124     v. 

Gray     (95    Cal.    (501    30    Pac.    779 

[1892]),    247,    249,    253,    254,    340, 

983,    1008,    1301. 
Reclamation     District     No.      108     v. 

Hagar     (66    Cal.    54,    4    Pac.    945 

[1884]),-   86,    132,    172,    244,    247, 

248,   270j   340,   472,   549,    564,   618, 

637,  666,  952,  1086,   1213,   1330. 
Reclamation     District     No.      108     v, 

Hagar    (4   Fed.   366    [1880]),    118, 

132,    147,   172,   334,   335,   340,   618, 

665,  666,  773,  1086,  1370. 
Reclamation     District     No.     536     v. 

Hall    (131    Cal.   662,   63  Pac.    1000 

[1901]),  340,  1085. 
Reclamation   District   No.    3   v.   Ken- 
nedy    (58    Cal.    124    [1881]),    223, 

234,  254,  409. 
Reclamation   District   No.    3    v.   Par- 

vin      (67     Cal.     501,     8     Pac.     43 

[1885];,  340,  899,  900,   1213. 
Reclamati"on     District     No.     551      v. 

Rmiyan   (117  Cal.  164,  49  Pac.  131 

[1897]),  340,  951,  1477. 
Rector  v.  Board  of  Improvement    ( 50 

Ark.    116,    6    S.    W.    519    [1887]), 

245,  '636,  781,  786,  788,   1017. 
Rector  of  Trinity  Church  v.  Higgins 

(27  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1  [1866]), 

279,   832. 
Redden    v.    Town    of    Covington     (29 

Ind.  118),  246. 
Redding  v.  Esplen  Borough    (207  Pa. 

St.  248,  56  Atl.  431    [1903]),  50Z 

1278. 
Red  fork   Levee   District  v.   St.   Louis 

Railway   Co.     (80    Ark.    98,    96    S. 

W.    117    [1906]),  886. 
Redick   v.    City   of   Omaha    (35   Neb. 

125,  52  N.  "W.   847    [1892]),    1431, 

1435,    1436. 
Redmond  v.  Maj'or,  etc.,  of  the  City 

of  New  York    (58  N.  Y.  iSup.    Ct. 

Rep.  348,  11  N.  Y.  S.  782   [1890]), 

762,  1484,  1485,  1488. 
Redmond     v.    Mayor,    etc.,    of     New 

York    (26  Abb.  N.  C.  341    [1891]), 

1478,   1484,   1488. 
Red  River   Furnace   Co.  v.  Tennessee 

Central    Railway    Co.     (113    Tenn. 

697,  87  S.  W.  1016),  365. 
Reed   v.   Bates    (115   Kv.    ^.'!7.   74    S. 


W.  234,  24  Ky.  L.  R.  2312  [1903]  ), 
725. 

Reed   v.    City   of   Cedar    Rapids    ( — 

Iowa     ,      111      N.      W.      1013 

[1907]),  418,  652,  658,  754,  821. 

Reed  v.  City  of  Cincinnati  ( 8  Ohio 
C.  C.  393    [1894]),  950,  983,  1373. 

Reed  v.  Erie  (79  Pa.  St.  (9  P.  F. 
Smith)    346   [1875]),  78,  362,  431. 

Reed  v.  City  of  Toledo  (18  Ohio  161, 
[1849]),  232,  434. 

Reelfoot  Lake  Levee  District  v.  Daw- 
son (97  Tenn.  151,  34  L.  R.  A. 
725,  731,  36  S.  W.  1041  [1896]), 
8,  44,  89,   97,   160,   345. 

Rees  v.  Watertown  (86  U.  S.  (19 
Wall.)   107,  22  L.  72  [1873]),  1518. 

Reese's  Appeal  in  the  Matter  of  Wid- 
ening Kearney  Street  ( 32  Cal.  568 
[1867]),  309,"  1054. 

Reeves  v.  Grottendick  (131  Ind.  107, 
30  N.  E.  889  [1891]),  142,  267, 
631,  722,  723,  814,  887,  948,  962, 
1192,  1227,  1330,  1337,  1347,  1350, 
1352. 

Reeves  v.  Treasurer  of  Wood  County 
(8  0.  S.  333  [1858]),  35,  90,  loi, 
117,  147,  245,  291,  294,  335,  337, 
613. 

Regan  Land  Co.  v.  City  of  Carthage 

(—  Mo.  App.  ,   108  S.  W.  589 

[1908]),  6,  353,   1443,   1444. 

Regenstein  v.  Atlanta  (98  Ga.  167, 
25  S.  E.  428  [1896]),  388,  1411, 
1412,    1430. 

Reid  v.  Clay  (134  Cal.  207,  66  Pac. 
262  [1901]),  301,  472,  492,  537, 
570,  861,  907,  969,  1062,  1110, 
1216,  1281,  1279,  1282,  1288,  1.303, 
1324. 

Reilley  v.  City  of  Philadelphia  (60 
Pa.  St.  (lb  P.  F.  Smitli)  467 
[1869]),  18,  234,  410,  413,  521, 
778. 

Reilly  v.  City  of  Albany  (40  Hun 
405    [1886]"),    537,    10o'5,    1508. 

Reinken  v.  Fuehring  (130  Ind.  382, 
30  Am.  St.  Rep.  247,  15  L.  R.  A. 
624,  37  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  354, 
30  N.  E.  414  [1891]),  43,  111, 
113,  118,  119,  1-13,  147,  370. 

Reis  V.  GraflF  (51  Cal.  86  [1875]), 
499.  742,  749,  9S3,   1081. 


Il 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXCl  • 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Remish    v.    Hartwell    (126    Cal.    443, 

58  Pac.  920   [1899]),  301. 
Remsen,    Matter    of     (59    Barb.     (X. 

Y.)    317    [1871]),    167. 
Remsen  v.  Wheeler    (121   N.  Y.  685, 

24   N.   E.   704    [1890]),   888.    1478, 

1497. 
Remsen  v.  Wheeler    (105   X.  Y.  573, 

12    N.    E.    5G4    [1887]),    119,    121, 

351,   354,   726.   729,  734,   1491. 
Renard     v.     City     of     Spokane      ( — 

Wash.  ,  93   Pac.   517    [1908]), 

807,  809,   1027,   1347,   1348. 
Reock  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil   of    Xewark     (33    N.    J.    L.     (4 

Vr.)    129    [1868]  I,  974. 
Rettinger  v.  City  of  Passaic    (45  X. 

J.  L.    (16  Vr.)    146   [1883]),   1409. 
Reuting    v.    City    of    Titusville    (175 

Pa.  «t.   512,   34   Atl.   916    [1896]), 

723. 
Reyburn  v.  Wallace    (93   Mo.   326,   3 

vS.  W.  482    [1887]),   1055. 
Reynolds    v.    Green     (27    0.    S.    41G 

[1875]),   1168. 
Reynolds     v.     Milks     Grove     Special 

Drainage    Di.strict     (34    III.    App. 

302    [1889]),   1430. 
Reynolds  v.   X^ewton    ( 14   Ohio   C.   C. 

433    [1893]),  985,  995,   1037,   1099. 
Reynolds    v.    Schweinefus    (27    0.    S. 

311    [1875]),   828,   1279,   1289. 
Reynolds    Street    Sewer,    In    re     ( 34 

Super.   Ct.   209    [1907]),   272,   426. 
Rhinelander,    In    the    Matter    of    the 

Petition   of,   to   Vacate   an   Assess- 
ment   (68  N.  Y.  105   [1877]),  393, 

396,  400. 
Rhinelander   v.   Ma.vor,   etc.,   of   X>\v 

York     (24    Howard     (X.    Y.)     304 

[1862]),   233,   431. 
Rhodes  v.  Board  of  Public  Works  of 

the  City  of  Denver    ( 10  Colo.  App. 

99,  49  Pac.  430   [1897]),  521,  781, 

800. 
Rhoades   v.   City   of   Toledo    (6    Ohio 

C.  C.  9  [1890]),  111,  118,  308,  310. 

426,  430. 
Rhodes    v.    Mummery     (48    Ind.    216 

[1874]),  363. 
Rhode   Island   Hospital   Trust   Co.   v. 

Babbitt   (22  R.  1.   113,  46  Atl.  403 

[1900]),  49,    1055. 


Rice   V.    Mayor    and    Council    of   Ma- 
con   (117    Ga.    401,    43    S.    E.    773 

[1903]),    144,    1412. 
Rich's     Case      (12     Abb.     Yr:Q.     118 

[1861]),  485,  663.  800,  1452,  1463. 
Rich  V.  Braxton    (158  U.  S.  375,  39 

L.  1022,  15  S.  1006   [1895]),  1425. 
Rich    V.    City    of    Cb'cago     (187    111. 

396,    58    X.    E.    306    [1900]),    864, 

866,  927,  929,  943,  986,  132-i. 
Rich    V.    City    of    Chicago     (152    111. 

18,    38    X.    E.    255    [1894]),    228, 

244,   263,   292,    324,    402,    444,   545, 

547,   548,   549,   561,   587,   594,   597, 

598,    619,    630,   641,    643,   653,   676. 

690,   694,   696,   771,   864,   867,   924, 

1029,  1328,  1348. 
Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago  (59  111.  286 

[1871]),  ^32,    174,    202,    281,    762, 

764,  783,  843,  910,  939,  1304,  1374. 
Rich    V.    Woods     (118    Ky.    865,    26 

Ky.   Law  Rep.   799,   82   S.   W.   578 

[1904]),    563. 
Richard  v.   Cypremort  Drainage  Dis- 
trict    (107*   La.     657,     32     So.     27 

[1901-1902]),   551.   564. 
Richards   v.   City   of    Cincinnati    (31 

0.   S.   506    [1877]),   306,   311,   431, 

467,  527,  616,   620. 
Richards  v.  City  of  JerseyWlle    (214 

111.  67,  73  X.  E.  370   [1905]),  828 

912,  1281. 
Richards  v.  Low    (77  X^  Y.   S.   1102, 

38    Misc.    Rep.    500    [1902]),    265, 

671. 
Richardson  v.  City  of  Brooklyn    ( 34 

Barb.   569    [1861]),   1511. 
Richardson    v.    City    of    Denver     (17 

Colo.    398,    30    Pac.    333     [1892]), 

1206. 
Richardson    v.    Hydenfeldt     (46    Cal. 

68    [1873]),   867. 
Richardson  v.  Mehler    (111   Ky.  408, 

63    S.    W.    957,    23    Ky.    Law   Rep. 

917     [1901]),    183,    490,    494.    501. 

522,   537,   570,   765,   837,   857,   981, 

1281,  1312. 
Richardson  v.  ^lorgan  (16  La.  Ann. 

429  [1862]).  38,  39,  43,  147,  239, 

343,   663,   697. 
Richardson    v.    City    of    Omaha     (— > 

Xeb.  ,  110  X.  W.  648   [1907]), 

748,    911,    1430. 


CXCll 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


(References   are   to   sections.] 


Richcieek  v.  Moorman    { 14  Intl.  App. 

370,    42    X.    E.    943     [1895]),    886, 

1033,  1101. 
Rich  Hill,  City  of  v.  Donnan  (82 

Mo.    App.    38^6    [1900]),    813,    814, 

864. 
Richman    v.    Supervisors    of    Musca- 
tine  County    (77   la.   513,   14   Am. 

St.   Rep.   308,   4  L.   R.   A.   445,   42 

X.  W.  422    [1889]),   194,  343,  956, 

983. 
Richmond,  City  of  v.  Williams    (102 

Va.  733,  47  S.  E.  844  [1904]),  131, 

728,  748. 
Richmond  &   Allegheny  R.  R.  Ck).  v. 

City    of    Lynchburg     (81    Va.    473 

[lS'i6]),  43,   161,  347,  611,  641. 
Richter  v.  Merrill    (84  Mo.  App.   151 

[1900]),  141,  533,  916,  1017,  1026, 

1133,   1337,   1369. 
Ricketts  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park  ( S5 

111.    110     [1877]),    10*3,    121,    236, 

347,   410,    531,   539,    541,    573,   662, 

763. 
Ricketts    v.    Spraker     (77    Ind.    371 

[1881]),  474,  642,  672,   1010,  1283, 

1298,   1430,   1435. 
Ridenour  v.   Saffin    (1   Hand.    (Ohio) 

464     [1855]),    35,    106,    110,    147, 

148,   317,   436,   531,   537,   576,   700, 

776,   1330. 
Riebling  v.   The   People   for   the   Use 

of  the  Columbian  Levee  and  Drain- 

age   District    (147    111.    120,   35   X. 

E.  467   [1894]),  344,  941,  986. 
Righter,  In  the  Matter  of   (92  X.  Y. 

Ill    [1883]),  484,  485,   1454,   1466. 
Rigney,  Trustees  v.  Fischer   (113  Ind. 

31*3,    15    X.    E.    594    [1887]),    449, 

1471. 
Riker  v.  IMayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  Xew  York 

(3  Dafy   (X.  Y.)    174   [1869]),  68, 

825,  927,  998. 
Riley  v.  Stewardt    (50  Mo.  App.  594 

[1892]),   1133,   1138,   1245,   1375. 
Risdon  v.  Shank    (37  la.  82  [1873]), 

323,    1041,    1048,   1215. 
Risley  v.   City  of  St.  Louis    (34  Mo. 

404    [1864]").  527,   505,  725,  950. 
Ritter    V.    Draina<ie    District    X'^o.    1, 

Poinsett  County    (78  Ark.   580,  94 

S.  W.   711    [1906]),   105,   111,  121, 


256,   340,   618,   651,   665,   666,   690, 

691,  1381. 
Ritterskamp   v.   Stifel    ( 59   Mo.   App. 

510   [1894]),  463. 
River   Forest,   Village   of   v.   Chicago 

and    Xorthwestern    Railroad    Com- 
pany   (197    111.    344,   64   X.   E.   364 

[1902J),   594,    595,    598,    1318. 
River    Rendering    Co.    v.    Behr     ( 77 

Mo.   91,    46    Am.    Rep.    6    [1882]), 

372. 
River  Rendering  Co.  v.  Behr    ( 7  ^lo. 

App.    345    [1879]),   372. 
Roach    V.    City    of    Eugene     (23    Or. 

376,    31    Pac.    825    [1893]),   501. 
Robbins    to    Vacate    an    Assessment, 

In   the   Matter  of   the   Petition   of 

(82  X.   Y.    131    [1880]),   305,   482. 
Robbins     v.     Sand     Creek     Turnpike 

Company     (34    Ind.    461     [1870]). 

554,  629,  639,  723,  1472. 
Roberts,  In  the  Matter  of   (81   X'.  Y. 

62     [1880]),    264,    265,    407,    415, 

423,  813,  873,  877,  911. 
Roberts,   In  the  Matter  of    (53   Hun 

338,   6.   X.   Y.   Supp.    195    [1889]), 

1016,  1460,  1461. 
Roberts  v.  Board  of  County  Commis- 
sioners of  Brown  County   (21  Kan. 

247    [1878]),   65,   66. 
Roberts    v.    City    of    Evanston     (218 

111.    296,    75    X.    E.    923    [1905]), 

619,  748,  824,  912. 
Roberts    v.    First   Xational    Bank    of 

Fargo   (8  X".  D.  504,  79  X\  W.  1049 

[1899]),    86,    118,    649,    666,    698, 

709,   888. 
Roberts     v.    Gierss     (101    Ind.     408 

[1884]),  825,   1375. 
Roberts    v.    Smith    (115    Mich.    5,    72 

X.  W.  1091   [1897]),  100,  118,  125, 

280,     293,     449,     7.28,     1385,     1394, 

1406. 
Robertson   v.    Baxter    ( 57   Mich.    127, 

23   X.   W.    711    [1885]),   226,   228, 

270,   1395. 
Robertson     v.    City    of    Omaha      ( 55 

Xeb.   718,  44  L.'  R.  A.  534,   76   X. 

W.   442    [1898]),   461,  463, 
Robeson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Curry   (161 

111.    176,    43    X\    E.    619    [1896]  i, 

223,    234,    271,    272,   344,   735,   921. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CXCIU 


[References   are   to   sections.] 


Robinson  v.   City  of   Burlington    (.50 

la.    240     [1878]),    8,     1U2S,     10.3.5, 

1483. 
Robinson    v.    Logan     (31     0.    S.    4(JG 

[1877]),   800. 
Robinson  v.  Merrill    (87   Cal.   11,   25 

Pac.  162  [1890]),  1220,  1257,  1277, 

1141,    1145. 
Robinson   v.    City  of   Milwaukee    (01 

Wis.   585,   21   X.   W.    (510    [1S84J), 

324,    549,    503,    1452. 
Robinson  v.  Rippey  (HI  Inil.  112.  12 

X.  E.   141),   lli3. 
Robinson    v.    City    of    S't.    Paul     (10 

Minn.  228,  41  X.  W.  950   [1889J), 

1308. 
Rollnscn  v.  City  of  Valparaiso    ( 130 

Ind.    616,    36    X.    E.    644    [1893]), 

1030,    1430,    1433,    1506. 
Roby    V.    Colehour     (140    U.    S.    153, 

13  S.  47),  715. 
Roche   V.   The   City  of   Dubuque    ( 42 

la.    250    [1875]),   747,   700. 
Roche  V.   Waters    (72  Md.   264,   7   L. 

R.    A.    533,    19    Atl.    535    [1890]), 

1055. 
Rochester,  City  of  v.   Campbell    (123 

X.   Y.   405,   20   Am.   St.   Rep.    760, 

10   L.    R.    A.    393,    25    X.    W.    937 

[1890]),  56. 
Rochester,  City  of  v.  Rochester  Rail- 
way   Company    (182   X.   Y.   99,   70 

L.  R.  A.  773,  74  X.  E.  953  [19l)5]), 

GO,   89,  95,  599,   600,  617. 
Rochester,  City  of  v.  Rochester  Rail- 
way Co.   (96  X.  Y.  S.  152,  109  App. 

Div.    638    [1905]),    1085. 
Rochester     Railway    Co.    v.    City     of 

Rochester    (205  V.   S.   236,   182   X. 

Y.  99),  617. 
Rock   Creek  Township  v.   Strong    (96 

U.  S.  271,  24  L.  815),  365. 
Rockland  Lake  Trap  Rock  Co.  v.  Vil- 
lage   of    Port    Chester     (185    X.    Y. 

5C9,   78  X.  E.   1111    [19001),    1051. 
Rockland  Lake  Trap  Rock  Co.  v.  \il- 

lage  of  Port  Chester    (92   X.   V.   S. 

G."l,    102    App.    Div.    300    [1905]), 

1051. 
Roemheld    v.    Cit.v    of    Cliicago     (231 

111.    407,    83    X.    E.    291     [1907]), 

5-12. 
Roffignac  Street,  ilunicipality  Xo.  2, 


for    Opening    of     ( 7    La.    Ann.    76 

[1852]),    155,  308,  311,  426. 
Rogers    v.    Hej-de/tstaedt     (65    Minn. 

229,    68    X.  'W.    8    [1896]),    1183, 

1186. 
Rogers   v.    City   of    Keokuk    ( 154   U. 

S.  546,  18  L.  74,   14  S.  1162),  365. 
Rogers    v.    Milwaukee    (13    Wis.    610 

[1861]),   53,    737,    1444. 
Rogers    v.    St.    Charles    (54    Mo.    229 

-[1873]),   308. 
Rogers  v.  City  of  St.  Paul   (22  Minn. 

494  [1876]),  11,  103,  104,  125,  142, 

158,   260,   268,   284,   286,   298,   304, 

437,   520,   553,   555,   556,   670,   822, 

823,  864,   1490. 
Rogers    v.    Venis    (137    Ind.    221,    36 

X.   E.   841    [1893]),   923,    1277. 
Rogers    v.    Voorhees     (124    Ind.    409, 

24  X.  E.  374   [1890]),  340. 
Rogge    V.    City   of    Elizabei  ii     (64    X. 

J.  L.  491.  40  Atl.- 164  [1900]),  313, 

1408. 
Rogue     V.    People     ex    rel.     GUiedtner 

(224     111.     449,     79     X.     E.     662 

[1906]),  247,  258,  496,  1008,  1183, 

1332,    1339. 
Rollo    V.    City    of    Chicago    (187    111. 

417,  58  X.  E.  455   [1900]),  817. 
Rolph    V.    City    of    Fargo     (7    X"^.    D. 

640,    42    L.'r.   A.    646,    76    X.    W. 

242    [1898]),    118,    147,    314,    653, 

666,  677,  098,  709,  1333. 
Roly   V.   Shunganunga   Drnina'jc   Dis- 
trict   (—   Kan.   -^ .    95    Pac.    399 

[inOS]),  504,  659. 
Romig  V.  City  of  Lafayette    (33  Ind. 

30    [1870])',    621,    631,    895,    1351, 

1356. 
Ronan     v.     People     ex     rel.     Shafter 

(193      111.     631.      01     X.     E.      1042 

[1901]).    51,    323,    443.    551,    698, 

715.   785,   789,   815,   857,   870.   949, 

1005. 
Roman    Catholic    Archbishop   of    San 

Francisco     v.    Shi])nian     (79     Cal.. 

288.    21    Pac.    830     [1889]),    1225, 

1432. 
Rood     V.    Board    of    Supervisors     of 

Mitchell.  Co.    (39    la.   444    [1874]), 

3. 
Rooke's    Case     (5    Rep.    99    b.     ( Hil. 

40   Eliz.),   21,   25,   619,  639. 


CXCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Rooney  v.  Brown  (21  La.  Ann.  51 
[1&69]),    46,   218,    570,    613,    1369. 

Rooney  v.  City  of  Toledo  (9  Ohio 
C.  C.  267  [1894]),  561,  625,  704, 
1028. 

Roosevelt  Hospital  v.  Mayor,  Alder- 
men and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of  New  York  (84  N.  Y.  108 
[1881]),  42,  324,  589,  613,  681, 
821,    855. 

Roosevelt  Hospital  v.  Mayor,  Alder- 
men and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of  New  York  (18  Hun  582 
[1879]),   589,   613. 

Roper  V.  City  of  New  Britain  (70 
Conn.  459,^39  Atl.  850  [1898]), 
63,  1348. 

Ropes  V.  Essex  Public  Road  Board 
(37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  335  [1875]), 
909,  1408. 

Rork  V.  Smith  (55  Wis.  67,  12  N. 
W.  408  [1882]),  521,  737,  958,  962, 
995. 

Rose  V.  Trestrail  (62  Mo.  App.  352 
[1895]),  15,  229,  234,  538,  771, 
777,  813,   871,   1433. 

Rosell,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Coun- 
cil of  Neptune  City  (68  N.  J.  L. 
(39  Vr.)  509,  53  Atl.  199  [1902]), 
665,  677,  1015,  1020,   1402. 

Rosenbaum,  In  the  Matter  of  (119 
N.  Y.  24,  23  N.  E.  172  [1890]), 
479,  496,  503,  977,  979,  995,  1401, 
1467. 

Rosenbaum,  In  tne  Matter  of  (53 
Hun  478,  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  184),  496, 
1467. 

Rosetta  Gravel,  Paving  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  v.  Jollisaint  (51  La.  Ann. 
804,  25  So.  477),  155,  698,  1047, 
1144. 

Rosetta  Gravel,  Paving  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  v.  Kennedy  (51  La.  Ann. 
804,  26  So.  477  [.1899]),  314,  1166, 
1377. 

Ross  v.  Davis  (97  Ind.  79),  202. 
Ross  v.  Gates  (183  Mo.  338,  81  S. 
W.  1107  [1904]),  70,  108,  113, 
118,  314,  451,  521,  649,  606,  69^, 
709,  1085,  1163,  1165,  1168,  1169, 
1369. 
Ross   V.    Gates    (117   Mo.    App.    237, 


93   S.   W.   856    [1906]),   631,   1059, 

1165,  1168. 
Ross     V.    Mayor    of     New    York      (3 

Wend.   (N.  Y.)   333),  360. 
Ross  V.   City  of   Portland    (105   Fed. 

682   [1901]),  10i6,   1436. 
Ross  V.   Prante    ( —  N.  D.  ,   115 

N.   W.    833    [1908]),    272,   989. 
Ross    V.    Stackhouse     (114    Ind.    200, 

16    N.    E.    501     [1887]),    11,    500, 

528,  549,   1015,   1018. 
Ross  V.  S'tate  for  Use  of  Zenor   (119 

Ind.  90,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  345  [1888]), 

886,    1244. 
Ross    V.    Van   Natta    (164    Ind.    557, 

74    N.    E.    10    [1905]),    465,    479, 

746,  1335. 
Ross     V.     Board    of    Supervisors     oi 

Wright  County   (128  la.  427,  1  L. 

R.  A.   (N.  S.)    431,  104  N.  W.  506 

[1905]),    119,    125,    126,    142,   414, 

525,   727,   729,   748,   767,  774,   983, 

1285. 
Rossiter  v.  City  of  Lake  Forest  (151 

111.    489,    38'  N.    E.    359     [1894]), 

324,  527. 
Roswell,  Town  of  v.  Dominice   (9  N. 

M.   624,   58   Pac.   342),   781. 
Roter  V.  City  of  Superior    (115  Wis. 

243,  91  N.  W.  651    [1902]),   1509. 
Roth  V.   Forsee    (107   Mo.   App.   471, 

81    S.    W.   913    [1904]),    550,   739, 

772,    781,    795. 
Roth     V.     Hax     (68     Mo.     App.     283 

[1896]),    490,    500,   821,   849. 
Rothschild  v.  Begole    (105  Mich.  388, 

63  N.  W.  309   [U95]),  3. 
Roudenbush    v.    Mitchell     ( 154    Ind. 

616,    57    N.    E.    510     [1900]),    57, 
111,    113,    118,   119,    134,   375,   550, 

564,   731,  773,  989. 
Rounds    V.    Mumford     (2    R.    I.    154 

[1852]),  238,  244,  323. 
Rounds     V.     Whatcom     County      (22 

Wash.    106,    60   Pac.    139    [1900]), 
322,   1517. 
Roundtree   v.   City  of   Galveston    (42 

Tex.  612   [1875]'),  43,  100,  110,  147, 
148,   713. 
Rousseau,  Succession  of  ( 23  La.  Ann. 
1   [1871]),  1049,   1163. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXCV 


[References   are   to  sections.] 


Rowe,  Pros.  v.  Commissioners  of  As- 
sessments, East  Orange  ( 69  N. 
J.  L.  (40  Vr.)  GOO,  55  Atl.  649 
[19031),  280,  771.  798,  1012,  1409. 

Roxbury  v.  Boston  &  P.  R.  Corp. 
(6  Cush.  424),  359. 

Roxbury,  City  of  v.  Nickerson  (114 
Mass.    544    [1874]),    1047,    1049. 

Royal  Insurance  Company  v.  South 
Park  Commissioners  (175  111.  491, 
51  N.  E.  558  [1898]),  391,  396, 
405,   745,   763,   913,  923,    1279. 

Royce  v.  Town  of  Aplington  (90  la. 
352,  57   N.  W.  868),  323. 

Royse  v.  Evansville  &  Terre  Haute 
■Railroad  Company  ( 160  Ind.  592, 
67  X.  E.  446   [1903]),  449. 

Rubright  v.  City  of  Pittsburg  (147 
Pa.  St.  355,  23  Atl.  579  [1892]), 
961. 

Rude  V.  Town  of  St.  Marie  (121 
Wis.  634,  99  N.  W.  460  [1904]), 
5.  19,  97,  100.  335,  338,  373,  420, 
717. 

Rue  V.  City  of  Cliicago  (06  III.  256 
[1872]), "715,  763,  764,  914,  1299, 
1304,   1321,    1406. 

Rumsey  v.  City  of  Buffalo  (97  N. 
Y.  114  [1884]),  951,  1200,  1281, 
1426. 

Ruscomb  Street.  In  re  (33  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  148   [1907] K  320. 

Rusk  V.  Berlin  (173  111.  634,  50 
..V.   E.    1071    [1898]),   311. 

Russell  V.  Adkins  (24  Mo.  App.  605 
[1887]),  367,  375,  460,   1379. 

Russell  V.  Stansell  (105  U.  S.  303, 
26  L.   989    [1881]),   1369. 

Russell  and  Allison  Drainage  Dis- 
trict V.  Benson  (125  111.  490,  17 
N.  E.  814  [18891),  776,  1388. 

Rust,  In  the  Matter  of,  to  Reduce 
an  Assessment  (24  Hun  (X.  Y.) 
229    [1881]),    1085,    1094. 

Rutherford  v.  :Maynes  (97  Pa.  St. 
78),  340. 

Ryan  v.  Altsc^nil  (103  Cal.  174.  37 
Pac.  339  [1894]),  479.  570,  575, 
639.  656,  725,  1030,  1031,  1337, 
1359. 

Ryan  &  Company  v.  City  of  Cincin- 
nati (1  Cin.  Su,).  Ct.  245  [1871]), 
686,   1506. 


Ryan  v.  Lynch   ( C8  111.  160   [1873]), 

1512. 
Ryan   v.   Sumner    (17   Wash.   228,  49 

Pac.    487    [1897]),    576,    610,    620. 

024,    705,   956,    965,   990. 
Ryder's  Estate  v.  City  of  Alton   ( 175 
'ill.  94,  51  N.  E.  821   [1898]),  278, 

401,   444,   663,    670,   698,   715,    907, 

920,    1306. 
Ryers,    Matter    of    (72    X.    Y.    1,    28 

Am.   Rep.   88),    101,   119,   335. 
Ryerson,    Pros.    v.    City    of    Passaic 

(38  X.  J.  L.    (9  Vr.)'  171    [1875]), 

1408. 
Ryerson     v.     I'tley     (16     Mich.     269 

[18681),    150. 


S.  D.  Mercer   Co.   v.  City   of   Omaha 

(—    Xeb.    ,    112  "x.    W.    617 

[1907]).    786.    791. 

S.  D.  Mercer  Co.  v.  City  of  Omaha 
(—  Xeb.  -^-,  107  X.  W.  565 
]1906]),  414,  956,  959. 

S.  D.  Moody  &  Co.  v.  Chadwick  ( 108 
La.  66.  32  So.  181  [1901-1902]), 
1369. 

S.  D.  ]\Iood_v  &  Co.  V.  Sewerage  and 
Water  Board  (117  La.  360,  41  So. 
649    [1906]),   479,   537,    1069. 

S.  D.  Moody  &  Co.  v.  Spotorno  (112 
La.  1108,"  36  So.  836  [1904]),  324, 
666,   698.   707,   709. 

Sackett.  Douglass  and  De  Graw 
Street.  In  the  Matter  of  (74  N. 
Y.  95  [1878]).  194.  199.  252,  309, 
407,  408,  424,  678.  950,  956. 

Sackett  Street  'n  the  City  of  Brook- 
lyn. In  the  flatter  of  the  Report 
of  the  Commissioners  of  Assess- 
ment for  Orading.  Pavins.  etc.  (4 
Hun  92    [1875]),  8.  89.  248. 

Sago  V.  (  ity  of  Brooklvn  (89  X.  Y. 
189    [1882]),   62,   79,  .309,   loio] 

Sage  V.  City  of  Brooklyn  (8  Abb. 
279    [1880]).    1519. 

St.  Benedict's  Abbey  v.  Marion  Coun- 
ty     ( —    Or.     ,     93    Pac.     231 

[1908]),  431,  553,  555,  560,  622, 
629.  677,   690,  1411,   1414. 


CXCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References   nve   to   sections.] 


St.  Bernard,  Village  of  v.  Kemper 
(60  0.  S.  244,  45  L.  K.  A.  662,  54 
N.  E.  267  [1899]),  649,  685,  786, 
1054. 

St.  Charles,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Budcl 
V.  Deemar  ( 174  Mo.  122,  73  S.  W. 
469  [1902]),  lis,  301,  666,  698, 
709. 

St.  John  V.  The  City  of  East  St. 
Lonis  (136  111.  207*,  27  X.  E.  543 
[1892]),  527,  837,  840. 

St.  John  V.  City  of  East  St.  Louis 
(50  111.  92  [1869]),  153.  239.  666, 
677,    701,   715,    1183,    1351. 

St.  Joseph's  Asylum  in  the  City  of 
New  York,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of,  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment (69  X.  Y.  353  [1877]),  475, 
589,   613,   681. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of  v.  Anthony  (30 
Mo.  537  [1860]).  147,  245,  437, 
527,  535,  777. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Forseo 
V.  Baker  (113  Mo.  App.  691,  83 
S.  W.   1122   [1905]),  1138,   1169. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Forsee 
V.  Baker  (86  Mo.  App.  310 
[1900]),    1219. 

St.  Joseph,  Citv  of  v.  Crowther  (142 
Mo.  155,  43^  S.  W.  786  [1897]), 
118,    308,    426,    557,    675,    721. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Danaher 
V.  Dillon  (61  Mo.  App.  317 
[1895]),  401,  447,  4Q5,  479,  563, 
1028. 

St.  Joseph,  The  City  of,  to  Use  of 
Gibson  v.  Farrell  (106  Mo.  437, 
17  S.  W.  497  [1891]),  8,  50,  324, 
444,  446,  550,  098,  709,  711,  893, 
1284. 

St.  Joseph,  'City  of,  e\  rel.  Gibson 
V.  Forsee  (lio  Mo.  App.  237,  84 
S.  W.  1138  [1905]),  475,  1105, 
1109,    1137,    1284. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Swen- 
son  V.  Forsee  (110  Mo.  App.  127, 
84  S.  W.  98  [1904]),  1135,  1137, 
1195,  1203,  1219,   1284. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of,  to  Use  of  the 
Saxton  National  Bank  v.  Lan'Ms 
(54  Mo.  App.  315  [1893]),  223, 
234,  324,  392,  400,  500,  776,  777, 
840,  849,  856. 


St.  .Joseph,  City  of,  ex  rel.  King  Hill 
Brick  Manufacturing  Company  v. 
McCabe  (58  Mo.  App.  542  [1894]), 
539. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of  v.  O'Donoghu.' 
(31   Mo.   345    [1861]),   110. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of  v.  Owen  (110 
Mo.  445,  19  S.  W.  713  [1892]), 
43,  47,  147,  148,  212,  324,  387,  563, 
658,  840,  857,  864. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of  v.  Truckenmiller 
(183  Mo.  9,  81  S.  W.  1116  [1904]  ), 
121,  743,  760. 

St.  Joseph,  City  of  v.  Wilshire  (47 
Mo.  App.  125),  401,  447,  479,  483, 
777,  838,  864,  867,  984. 

St.  Louis,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Seilx^rt 
V.  Allen  (53  Mo.  44  [1873]),  473, 
475,    1040,    1107. 

St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Annex  Realty 
Company  (175  Mo.  63,  74  S.  W. 
961  [1903]),  308,  391,  394,  663. 
724,  997,    1164,    1344. 

St.  Louis,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Cor- 
nelli  V.  Armstrong  (38  Mo.  167 
[1866]),  138,  475,  1103.  1106, 
1284. 

St.  Louis  to  Use  of  Stadler  v.  Arm- 
strong (.38  Mo.  29  [1866]),  1135, 
1211,    1284. 

St.  Louis,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Cream- 
er V.  Bernoudy  (43  Mo.  552),  1049, 
1135,   1137,   1284. 

St.  -bouis,  'City  of  v.  Brinckwirth 
(204  Mo.  280,  102  S.  W.  1091 
[1907]),  620,  754,  910,  911,  946, 
997,   1140,  1255,   1278,  1344. 

St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Brown  (155 
Mo.  545,  56  S.  W.  298  [1899]), 
557,    580,    582,    584,    909. 

St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Clemens  (.49 
Mo.  552  [1872]),  301,  698,  1040, 
1211. 

St.  Louis,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Mc- 
Grath  v.  Clemens  (36  Mo.  467 
[1865]),  86,  475,  525,  570,  1040, 
1211,    12G2,    1346. 

St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Connecticut  Mu- 
tual Life  Insurance  Company  (107 
Mo.  92,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  402,  17 
S.  W.   637),   56. 


TA3LE    OP    CASES. 


CXCVll 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


St.    Louis,    City    of,    to    tlie    Use    of 

Lal<rum     v.     Coons      ( 37     Mo.     44 

[1865]),     138,     437,     1135,     1211, 

1284. 

St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Cruikshank   (16 

Mo.  App.  495   [1885]),  394,  837. 
St.  Louis,  City  of,  to   Use  of  Rotch- 
ford    V.    De    Noue     (44    Mo.    136), 
525,    1040,    1137,    1379. 
St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Excelsior  Brew- 
ing   Co.     (96    Mo.    677,    10    S.    W. 
477    [1888]),    309,    553,    557,    951, 
995,    1135,    1283,    1375,    1382. 
St.  Louis,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Carroll 
V.    Hardy     (35    Mo.    261     [1864]), 
437,    1211,    1235. 
St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Koch    ( 169   Mo. 
587,    70    S.    W.    143    [1902]),    223, 
234,  322,  743,   755. 
St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Lang    (131  Mo. 
412,  33  S.  W.  54   [1895]),  85,  173, 
781,   825,   837,   912,   916,   918,   950, 
1231,    1249. 
St.    Louis,    City    of    v.    Lawton     (189 
Mo.  474,  88  S.  W.  80   [1905]),  63, 
909,  1361. 
St.    Louis,    City    of    v.    Xelson    ( 169 
Mo.    461,    69    S.    W.    466    [1902]), 
63,  925,  1391. 
St.   Louis   to   use   of   Deppellieuer   v. 
Newman    (45  Mo.  138   [1869]),  73, 
1040,   1049,   1164,  1211,   1524. 
St.  Louis,  City  of,  to  Use  of  Cream- 
er V.  Oeters    (36  Mo.  456   [1865]), 
186,    324,    475,    781,   923,   950,    951, 
1135,   12S4. 
St.  Louis.  City  of  v.  Provencliere   (92 
Mo.  66,  4  8.  W.  410    [1887]),  895. 
St.  Louis  V.  Ranken    (96  Mo.  497.  9 
S.   W.   910    [1888]),    119,    123,    125, 
247,   248,   250,   553,   726,   728,   7--9, 
1229,  1333. 
St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Ranken   (95  :Mo. 
189,    8    S.  "W.    249     [1888]).    31)9, 
1318,  1328. 
St.    Louis,    City    of    v.    Riclicson    (76 

Mo.   470    [1882]),   308,   773. 
St.  Louis.  City  of  v.   Speck    (67  Mo. 
403    [1878]).   8,   89,   308.   022,  OCs" 
666,   1338. 
St.   Louis,    City   of   v.    Stoddard    (15 


Mo.    App.    173    [1884]),    244,    246, 
1113,   1249. 
St.  Louis,  City  of  v.  Weber    (44  Mo 

547).  293. 
St.    Louis,    Alton    &    Terre    Haute    R. 
Co.   V.   People    (224  111.    155.   79   N. 
E.    664    [1906]),   22. 
St.    Louis,    Arkansas    &    Texas    Rail- 
road   V.    Anderson     (39    Ark.     167 
[1882]),   66. 
St.   Louis  County  Court   v.   Uriswold 

(58, Mo.   175),'  356. 
St.    Louis,    Keokuk    &    Northwestern 
Railroad  Company  v.  Knapp-Stout 
&    Company    (160^  Mo.    396,    61    S. 
W.  300   [1900]),  71. 
St.    Louis,    Oak    Hill    and    Carondeht 
Railway  Comjjany   v.    Fowler    ( 142 
Mo.   670,   10   Am.   &   Eng.   R    Cases 
X.   S.   405,  44   S.   W.   771    [1890]), 
71. 
St.    Louis    Quarry    and    Construction 
Company   v.    Frost    (90    Mo.    App. 
(ill   [1901]),  514,  517,  518. 
St.    Louis    Quarry    and    Construction 
Company    v.    Von    Versen    (81    Mo. 
App.   519    [1899]),  514. 
St.   Louis   Public   Schools  v.   City  of 
St.    Louis     (26    Mo.    468     [1858]), 
42,   580,   586. 
St.  Mark's  Church,  Wardens,  etc.,  of 
V.    Mayor,   etc.,   of   Brunswick    (78 
Ga.  541,  3  S.  E.  561    [1887]),  314, 
5S8. 
St.  Marys,  Village  of  v.  Lake  Erie  & 
Western  R.  R.   Co.    (60  O.  S.   136, 
53   X.   E.   705    [1899]),   59,   93,   98, 
360,   717,   737,    1302. 
St.  Paul,  City  of  v.  :\riillen  (27  :\linii. 
78,  6  X.  W.  424   [1880]),  103,  104* 
158,  4fiS,  471,  962,  965. 
St.  Paul,  City  of  v.  Xickl    (42  Mhm. 
262,  44  X.  W.  59   [1890]),  63,  119, 
125,  728,  739,   1347,   1361. 
St.     Paul,    City    of     v.    Rogers      (22 

Minn.   492    [1876]),    1269'. 
St.  Paul,  City  of  v.  St.  Paul  &  Simx 
City  Raihoad  Company    (23  Minn 
469    [18771),   147.    172.'  594,  614. 
St.    Paul    and    Pacific    Railroad    Co. 

(First  Division  of)    v.  

See    First    Division. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


St.    Paul,    Minneapolis    &    Manitoba 

Railway      Company      v.      City      of 

Minneapolis    (35  Minn.   141,  27   N. 

W.  500    [1886]),   73. 
Salem,    Town    of    v.    Henderson     (13 

Ind.     App.     63,     41     N.     E.     1062 

[1895]),  620,  707. 
Salem,  City  of  v.  Mulford    (22  Ohi  > 

€.  C.  397   [1899]),  679,  686,   1085. 
Salter  v.  Reed   (15  Pa.  St.   (3  Hair.) 

260     [1850]),     1146,     1195,     1219. 

1225. 
Sample  v.  Carroll    (132   Ind.  496,   32 

N.   E.   220    [1892]),   293.   .340.   793. 

886,   918,   1294,   1377. 
Samuels    v.    Drainage    Commis-ioners 

( 125  111.  536,  17  N.  E.  829  [1889]  ) , 

4:,  104,  276,  340,  1112,  1119,  1141, 

1145,    1176. 
San  Antonio,  City  of  v.  Sullivan    (23 

Tex.    Civ.    App.    658,    57    S.    \V.    45 

[1900]),  62,  308,  825,   1432. 
San  Diego,  City  of  v.  Linda  Vista  Ir- 
rigation District   (108  Cal.  189,  35 

L.  R.  A.  33,  41   Pac.  291    [1895]), 

35,  42,   147,  610,   613. 
San    Diego    Investment   Co.    v.    Sliaw 

(129     Cal.     273,     61      Pac.      1082 

[1900]),    15,    223,    234,    575,    624, 

656,  775,  777. 
San   Francisco,   City   and    County   of 

V.  Buckman    (111   Cal.  25,  43  Pac. 

Rep.  369    [1896]),  740,  829,  836. 
San   Francisco,   City   and   County   of 

V.    Certain    Real    Estate    (42    Cal. 

513   [1872]),  983,   1347,   1357. 
San    Francisco,    People    of    the    City 

and   County  of   v.   Clark    (47    Cal. 

456    [1874]),   860,   867. 
San    Francisco,    People    of    the    City 

and    County    of    v.    Doe     (48    Cal. 

560   [1874]'),   1219,    1239. 
San   Francisco,   City   and   County   of 

V.  Kiernan    (98    Cal.    614,    33    Pac. 

720  [1893]),  1373,  1384. 
San  Francisco,  People  of  the  City  of 

v.   Kinsman    (51    Cal.   92    [187*5]), 

983,  1113. 
San   Francisco,    City    and    County   of 

V.   McCain    (50  C'al.    210    [1875]), 

763,  836. 
San    Francisco,   City    and    County   of 


v.      Quackenbusli       (53      Cal.      32 

[1878]),  824,  886. 
San    Francisco,    City    and    County    of 

V.  Reay   (52  Cal.  "423   [1877]),  746. 

1149. 
San    Francisco,    Alameda   &   Stockton 

Railroad  Company  v.  Caldwell    ( 31 

Cal.   367    [1866]  )i  70. 
San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  City  of  San 

Francisco     (6     Cal.     190    '[1856]). 

838. 
San    Francisco    Paving   Co.    v.    Bates 

(134   Cal.   39,   66   Pac.   2    [1901]), 

118,   301,   492,   702,    1281,    1290. 
San  Francisco  Paving  Co.  v.  Dubois 

(2     Cal.     App.     42,     83     Pac.     72 

[1905]),  301,  574,   624,   646,   1272. 
San    Francisco    Paving    Co.    v.    Egan 

(146      Cal.      635,      80      Pac.     1076 

[1905]),    1131,    1151,   1375. 
San  Jose    Improvement   Co.   v.  Auze- 

rais    (106    Cal.    498,    39    Pac.    859 

[1895]),  831,  864. 
San   Luis   Obispo,    City   of   v.    Pettit 

(87  Cal.  499,  25  Pac.  694   [1891]), 

7,  777,  837,  849,  962. 
San  Luis  Obispo,  County  of  v.  White 

(91  Cal.  432,  27  Pac.  756,  24  Pa-. 

864   [1891]),  50,  1212. 
Sanborn  v.  City  of  Mason  City    (114 

la.  189,  86  X.  W.  286  [1901]'),  525, 

1432. 
Sand    Creek    Turnpike    Company    v. 

Robbins    (41   Ind.  79   [1872]),  723, 

909,  950. 
Sanders   v.   Brown    (65   Ark.   498,   47 

S.  W.  401    [1898]),  49,  1049,  1067, 

1072,  1085. 
Sanderson  v.  Herman  (108  Wis.  662, 

84  N.  W.  890,  85  N.  W.  141 

[1901]),  86. 
Sandrock  v.  Columbus   (51  0.  S.  317, 

42  N.  E.  225  [1894] ) ,  561,  620,  625, 

635,  704. 
Sandrock    v.    City    of    'Columbus     (8 

Ohio  C.  C.  79   [1894]),  625. 
Sanford   v.   Mayor,  etc.,   of   tlie   City 

of    New    York     (20    Howard,     298 

[I860]),  1478. 
Sandford  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City 

of   New   York"   (33    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

147    [I860]),    495,   528,   927,    1026. 

1479,   1480. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CXCIX 


[  Ilel'f rence.s  aie  to  nections.  ] 


120 


Va. 


Sanford  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  New  York 

(12  Abb.  Pr.  23   [1800]),  485,  777, 

1026,  1478,  1479,  1480. 
Sanford  v.  Village  of  Warwick    (181 

N.  Y.  20,  73  X.  E.  490  [1905]  ).  52. 

55,   720. 
Sanford   v.   Village   of   Warwick 

X.    Y.    S.    466,    83    App.    Div. 

[1903]),  52,  55,  720. 
Sands  v.   City  of  Richmond    ( 72 

(31    Grattan)     571,    31    Am.    Rep, 

742   [1879]),  55,  86,  161,  244,  314, 

323,  562,   843.   850. 
Sanger  v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Ry.  Ci>. 

(102  Va.  86,  45  S.  E.  750   [1903]), 

363. 
Sanger   v.   City  of   Chicago    (169  111. 

286,    48    X."e.    309    [1897]),    857, 

805. 
Sanger  v.  Rice   ( 43  Kan.  580,  23  Pac. 

633     [1890]),    40,    41,    437,     1116. 

1173,   1202. 
Sanitary  District  of  Chicago  v.  C  ity 

of   Joliet    (189    111.    270,   59   X.    E. 

566    [1901]),    549,    578,    055,    G93, 

699. 
Sanitary  Reduction  Works  v.  Califor- 

nia    Reduction    Co.     (94    Fed.    093 

[1899]),  372. 
Santa    Cruz    Fair    Building    Associa- 
tion  V.   entrant    (104    Cal.    306,    37 

Pac.   1034   [1894]),  1419. 
Santa    Cruz    Rock    Pavement    Co.    v. 

Bowie    (104  Cal.  280,  37   Pac.   934 

[1894]),  527,  1039,  1049,  1141. 

1145,  1150.  1252,  1209,  1278.  1375, 

1376. 
Santa  Cruz  Rock  Pavement  Company 

V.  Broderick  (113  Cal.  028.  45  Pac. 

803  [1S90]),  403. 
Santa  Cruz  Rock  Pavement  Company 

V.  Heaton  (105  Cal.  102,  38  Pac. 

093  [1894]).  314.  821,  837,  8.38, 

807. 
Santiago  Lima.  In  tlie  flatter  of   ( 77 

X.  Y.   170   [1879]),  1451,   1402. 
Sarber  v.   Rankin    (154   Ind.   236.   56 

X".   E.   225    [1899]).   270.  340.   527, 

532.  700,  777.  1005,  1007,  1431. 

1433,  1444. 
Sargent  v.  City  of  Evanston  (  154 


ill.  208,  40  X.  E.  Rep.  440  [1894]  (. 

271,  279,  036,  856.  912,  925,  1279, 

1285,  1305,  1372,  1373. 
Sargent  &  Company  v.  City  of  New 

Haven  (62  Conn.  510,  26  At'. 

1057    [1893]  ),  324,  563. 
■Sargent    &    Comjjany    v.    Tuttle     (O; 

Conn.  162,  32  L.  R.  A.  822,  34  A:l. 

Rep.    1028    [1895]),    1;    8.    15.    4.->. 

223,  229,  234,  475,  525,  770,   lio:;. 

1109. 
Satterlee  v.  Matthewson    ( 16  Serj.'.  & 

Raw.  169   [1827]),  71. 
Saunders,  In  the  flatter  of    (21   IIiiii 

(X.  Y.)    579    [1880]),   1460. 
Saunderson  v.  Herman    (95  Wis.   48. 

69   X.    W.    977    [1897]).    428,   862, 

880,    1304. 
Savage   v.    City   of    Buffalo    ( 59   Hun 

000,   14  X.  Y.  S.   101    r  18911),  3S5, 

554,   039,   003,   874. 
Savanna.    City    of    v.    Loop     (47    III. 

App.  214   [i892J  ).  02. 
Savannah,    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

V,  Weed   (96  Ga.  070,  23  S.  E.  900 

[1895]),    314.    437.    508,    003,    060. 

707,  709. 
'Savannah    F.   &    W.    Ry.    Co.    v.    C  ity 

of  Savauniih    ( OO  (Ja".  OSO.  23  S.  ¥.. 

847),   119. 
Saw    !Mill     Hum     I.ridgc.    Ballentine's 

Appeal,     //(     re     ( S5     Pa.     St.     103, 

[1877]  I,  359. 
Sawj-er  v.   City  of  C  liicap)    (  183   111. 

57,  55  X.  E.645   [1899]).  439.  570, 

004,   040,    723. 
Saxton      V.      Beacli       (50      Mo.      48S 

[1872]  I,  847. 
Saxton  V.  City  of  St.  Josej)!!    (00  Mo. 

153    [1875]"),  437,  847,  1499. 
Saxton    Xational    Bank    v.    Haywood 

(62    Mo.    App.    550     [1895]).    431, 

527,  576,  594,   598. 
Sayward    v.    Denny    (158    U.    S.    18t, 

15  S.  777),  715. 
Scammon   v.  (ity  of   Chicago    (42    111. 

192),  278,  377,  584,  013.   094,   7111, 

723,  892,   1129. 
S<ainnion  v.  City  of  Chicago    (40  111. 

140    [1806]),"  223,    23(4,    735,    703, 

777.   1174.   1178. 


cc 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Schaefer  v.  Werling    (188  U.  S.  516, 

47  L.  570,  23  S.  449   [1903]),  108, 

118,   570,   G69,   670.   677,   691,   699, 

709,  1010,  1370. 
Schaefer   v.    Werling     (156    Ind.    704, 

60    N.    E.    149    [1900]),    108,    118, 

570,   669,   670,   677,   691,   699,   709, 

1010,  1370. 
Schafer  v.   Gerl)ers    (234   IH.  468,   84 

N.  E.  1064   [1908]),   1377. 
Sclieer    v.    Cincinnati     ( 15    W.    L.    B. 

(Ohio)    66   [1886]),   174,   189. 
Schell,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition 

of    (76    N.    Y.    432    [1879]),    479, 

681. 
Schell,    In    the    :\latter    of     (16    Hun, 

283   [1878]),  681. 
Schemiclc   v.    Chicago     (151    111.    336, 

37    N.    E.    Rep.    888    [1894]),   281, 

764,  766,  909,  913,  956.  969,   1299, 

1372,   1384. 
Scliencl<     V.     City     of     .JefTersorville 

(152  Ind.  204,"  52  X.  E.  212),  366. 
Schenectady,    City    of   v.    Trustees    of 

Union   College  "( 144  N.   Y.  241.   2(i 

L.  R.  A.  614,  39  N.  E.  67   [1894]), 

440,  587.  627,  630. 
Sclienectady.   City   of   v.   Trustees   of 

Union    College"   (66    Hun    (X.    Y.) 

179,  21   N.   Y.   Supp.  .147    [1892]), 

138,  437,  440,  517.  518,  587,  773. 
Schenley    v.    Commonwealth    for    tiss 

of  the   City  of  Allegheny    (36   Pa. 

St.    (12    Casey)    64    [1859]),    267, 

414,   467,   485,    532,    569,    666,   709, 

886,  983,   1063,   1157,   1312. 
Schenley  v.  Commonwealth  for  use  of 

the  (i'ity  of  Allegheny    (36  Pa.  St. 

(12  Casey)   62  [1859]),  1158. 
Schenley    v.    Commonwealth    for    viS3 

of  the   City   of  Allegheny    (36   Pa. 

St.   29,   78   Am.   Dec.   359    [1859]), 

11,    315,    392,    395,    486,    541,    867, 

895,  956,  958,   1063,   1163. 
Schenley    v.    City    of    Allegheny     (25 

Pa.    iSt.     (1    Casey)     128     [1854]), 

308. 
Scherm     v.     Garrett's     Administrator 

(118    Ky.   296.   80    S.   W.    1103,    26 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  186   [1904]),  52,  55, 

1067,  1072. 
Scherm   v.    Short    (Ky.)     (77    S.    W. 


357,     25      Ky.      Law     Rep.      1108 

[1903]),  537,  1039,  1144. 
Schertz  v.  The  People  ex  rel.  Taylor 

(105  Hi.  27  [1882]  ),  927,  965,  986. 

988. 
Schibel   v.   Merrill    (185   Mo.   534,   S3 

S.  W.  1069  [1904]),  141,  538,  1337. 
Schintgen   v.    City   of  LaCrosse    (117 

Wis.    158,    94  'x.    W.    84    [1903]), 

301,   414,   620,   621,   648.   962,   974, 

1217. 
Scliirmer     v.     Hoyt      (54     Cal.     280 

[1880]),  479,  895,   1154,   1155. 
Schmelz  v.  Giles    (75  Ky.    (12  Bush.) 

491    [1877]),  628. 
Schmidt    v.    City    of    Cincinnati     ( 1 

Ohio  X.  P.  48   [1894]),  625,  704. 
Schmidt  v.  Village  of  Elmwood  Place 

(15  Ohio  C.  C.  351   [1897]),  53,  55, 

737,   740,   977. 
Schmidt  v.  Market  Street  &  Willow 

Glenn   R.   R.    Co.    (90    Cal.    37,   27 

Pac.    61     [1891]),    599,    602,    754, 

1124,  1215,  1231,  1264,  1375. 
Schmitt  V.  City  of  Xew  Orleans  (4ft 

La.  Ann.  1440,  21  So.  24  [1896]), 

380,    381,    464. 
Schneider    v.    City    of    Detroit     (135 

Mich.  570,  98  X.  V7.  258   [1904]), 

359,    1179,   1194,   1195. 
Schneider  v.  District  of  Columbia   (7 

Mackey    (D.  C.)    252   [1889]),  527, 

541. 
Schneider   Granite   Company   v.   Tay- 
lor    (64     Mo.     App.     37'   [1895]), 

1056. 
Schoenberg    v.    Field     ( 95    AIo.    App'. 

241   [1902]),  515,  864. 
Scholle,    In    the    Matter    of    (14    Hun 

(X.  Y.)    14  [1878]),  681. 
Scholtz    V.    Smith     (119    Mich.    634, 

78    X.    W.    668    [1899]),    263,    266. 
School     District    of     Fort     Smith    v. 

Board    of    Improvement     ( 65    Ark. 

343,  46  S.  W.  418    [1898]),  586. 
School    Property,    Assessment    of     (7 

Ohio   X.   P.    568    [1900]),   586. 
Schott  V.  City  of  Cincinnati    (3  Ohio 

X.   P.   311    [1895]),   707. 
Schreiber,   In  the  Matter  of    (3   Abl). 

X.   C.   68    [1877]),   830.   834,    1357. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCl 


[References  are  fo  sections.] 


Schroder  v.  Overman   (01  0.  S.   1,  47 

L.  R.  A.  156,  55  X.  E,  158  [1899]), 

111,    113,    118,    314,    G))8.   082.    700, 

702,  709,  894.  895. 
Schroeder  v.  City  of  Jolict    (1S9   111. 

48,  52   L.  R.  A.   (534,  5!)   X.   E.  550 

[19011).  71. 
Schroeder    v.    Overman    (18    Ohio    C. 

C.  385   [1899]),  111.   118,  631,  682, 

702,   895. 
Scliruni    V.   Town   of   Salem    (  13    Ind. 

App.    115.   39   X.   E.    1050    [1895]), 

323. 
Schiiltze    V.    De^Menil     (4    ilo.    App. 

595    [18771  ).   1135.    1284. 
Schultze     v.-    [Mayor,     Ahlermen     and 

Commonalty    of    the    City    of    Xew 

York   (103  X.  Y.  307,  8  X.  E.  528 

[188bj),  995,  1486,   1494. 
Schumacker    v.    Toberman     ( 56    Cal 

508     [1880]),    242,    394,    414,    549, 

624,  983,  1411,  1437.  1442. 
Schumm   v.   Seymour    ( 24   X^.   J.   Eq. 

(9    C.    E.    Gr.)     143     [1873]),    16, 

534,   536,   1017.    1433. 
Schwiesau   v.   Mahon    (128    Cal.    114. 

60     Pac.     683     [1900]),     831,     857, 

864. 
Schwiesau   v.    ]\Iahon    (110    Cal.    543, 

42    Pac.    Rep.    1065     [1895]).    223, 

234,  483,  495,  777,   1050. 
Scohey   v.    Decatur    County    ( 72    Ind. 

55 1'  [1880]),  73. 
Scofiehi   &    Cavir    v.    City   of   Council 

Bluffs    (68    la.    695.   28    X.   W.    20 

[1886]),   436,   438,    1500.    1515. 
Scofield  v.  City  of  Lansing   (17  ^lieli. 

437  [1868])*,  273,  663.  1426,  1427. 
Scott  V.  Rrackett  (89  Ind.  413),  403. 
Scott  V.  Hayes    (162  Ind.  548,  70  N. 

E,     879     [1903]),     301,     472,     475, 

1033,  1085,  1121,  1141,  1145,  1217, 

1242,  1274,  1502. 
Scott  V.  Onderdonk  (14  X.  Y.  9 

[1856]),  1425,  1427. 
Scott  V.  People  ex  rcl.  l>ewis  (  120 

111,  129,  11  X.  E.  408  [1889]), 

247,  340,  1309. 
Scott    V.    Society    ff    Ivus^inn    Israel- 
ites   (59   Xeb!    571,    81    X.    W.    624 

[1900]),   1054. 
Scott  V.  State  for  use  of  Buseiilmrc' 


(89    Ind.    368    [1883]).    765,    907, 

1067,   1250,    1265. 
Scott  V.  Stringley    (132   Ind.   378,   31 

X.   E,   953    [1892]),   375,   461,   466, 

479,  482,  495,  550,   1281,   1362. 
Scott  V.  City  of  Toledo   (36  Fed.  385, 

1  L,   R,  A.   6s8    [1888]),   118,   119, 

122,    125,    126,    132,    308,    426,   430, 

702,  728,  738. 
Scott    County    v.    Hinds     (50    Minn. 

204,    52    X. 'W.    523    [1892]),    103, 

323,   621,   624,   631,   895,    1125, 
Scovill    v.    City   of    Cleveland     (1    0. 

S.    126    [1853]),   89,    100,    110,    147, 

279,  431,  620,  626,  750. 
Scranton    City    v.     Ansley     ( 34     Pa. 

Super.    Ct.  "l33    [1907]'),    190. 
Scranton  v.  Arndt    (148  Pa.  St.  210, 

23    Atl.    1121    [1892]),    324,    1063, 

1113. 
Scranton     City    v.     Clarke     (34     Pa. 

Super.  Ct.  i28   [1907]),  1063. 
Scranton  City  v.  Bush    (160   Pa.   St. 

499,  28  Atl.  926  [1894]),  313,  670. 

690,  706,  862. 
iScranton    v.    Jermyn     (156    Pa.     St. 

107,  27  Atl.  66  [1893]).  8,  89,  120, 

483,  795,  1007,  1337,  1338. 
Scranton  v.  Koehler  ( 200  Pa.  St. 

126,  49  Atl.  792  [1901]),  118,  604, 

698,   714. 
Scranton,  City  of  v.  Levers   (200  Pa. 

St.   56,   49  "Atl.   980    [1901]),   554, 

627,  639,   723,   1157. 
Scranton,    City    of    v.     Pennsylvania 

Coal  Co.   (105  Pa.  St.  445  [1884]), 

322,  610.  706. 
Scranton,    City   of   v.   Robertson    ( 28 

Super.  Ct.  55   [1905]),  1063.   1142 
Scranton,   City  of  v,   Stokes    (28  Pa 

Super.  Ct.  434   [1905]),  1113.1169 
Scranton  v.  Citv  of  Sturges   ( 202  Pa 

St.   182,  51   Atl,   764   [1902]),  291 

382,   462,    1047,    1142. 
Scranton  v.  Wliite   (148  Pa.  St.  419) 

120. 
Scranton   Sewer.    In    re    (213    Pa.    4 

62  Atl.  173   [1905]),  324,  510,  822 

1388. 
Scranton     School     District's     Appeal 

City   of    (113    Pa.   St.    176.   6    Atl 

158    [1886]),   190. 


ceil 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Scudder  v.   Jones    (134   Ind.   .547,   32 

N.  E.  221    [1893]).    119,   771,   774, 

1015,   1021,   1038.   1242. 
Scudder     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty   of    the    City    of    New 

York   ( 146  N.  Y.  245,  40  N.  E.  734 

[1895]),  1428. 
Scully  V.  Ackmeyer    (2  Cin.  Sup.  Ct. 

Rep.  296   [1872]),  1211. 
Scully  V.  City  of  Cincinnati    ( 1   Cin. 

Sup.  Ct.  Rep.   (Ohio)    183   [1871]), 

75,  656. 
Seaboard  National   Bank   v.   Woesten 

(176  Mo.  49,  75  S.  W.  464  [1903]  ), 

8,  22,   301,   1109. 
Seaboard     National     Bank     of     New 

York    V.    Woesten     ( 147    Mo.    467, 

48    L.    R.    A.    279.    48    S.    W.    939 

[1898]),    484,    485,   495,    517,    518. 
Seaman   v.    City   of   Camden    (66   N. 

J.   L.    (37    Vr.)    516,    49    Atl.    977 

[1901]),  633. 
Seaman    v..  Hicks    (8    Paiges'    Clian. 

Rep.   655    [1841]),   1037. 
Seanor  v.  Board  of  County   Commis- 
sioners  ( 13  Wash.  48,  42  Pac.  552 

[1895]),    11,     105,    206,    245,    262, 

322,  723. 
Searcy    v.     Patriot    and     Barkworks 

Turnpike    Company     ( 79    Ind.    274 

[1881]),  414,  965,^983,   1447. 
Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 

•City    of    Boston     (180    Mass.    274, 

62    L.    R.    A.    144,    62    N.    E.    397 

[1902]),    103,    283,    284,    287,   309, 

364,  392,  395,  573,  656. 
Sears    v.    Street    Commissioners      of 

Boston    (173  Mass.   350,  53   N.   E. 

876    [1899]),    103,    119,    122,    134, 

726,  729. 
Sears  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  City 

of  Boston   (173  Mass.  71,  43  L.  R. 

A.  834,  53  N.  r..  138,  1  Mun.  Corp. 

Cas.  497   [1899]),  04,  89.  275.  370, 

700,  868. 
Seattle,  In  re  City  of   ( — •  Wash.  — . 

94  Pac.  1075   [i908]),  60.  74.  001. 

616,  630,  837. 
Seattle,  In  re  City  of    ( —  Wash.  — , 

91  Pac.  548  [1907]),  301,  651.  672. 

692,   694,   894. 
Seattle,  hi  re  City  of   (42  Wasli.  551, 


So     Pac.     45     [1906].      (See     Pike 

Street,  In  the  Matter  of.) 
Seattle,    City   of   v.    Board   of    Home 

Missions    of    Methodist    Protestant 

Church   ( 138  Fed.  307,  70  C.  C.  A. 

597    [1905]),  62,   66,  71,  313,  545, 

653,    1313. 
Seattle,    City    of    v.    De    Wolfe     ( 17 

Wash.    349,   49    Pac.   553    [1897]), 

1164. 
Seattle.   City   of  v.   Doran    (5    Wash. 

482,    32    Pac.    105,    1002     [1893]), 

747,  765,   766.  841,  847,  908,    1299, 

1304,    1309. 
Seattle,    City   of   v.    Hill    (23    Wash. 

92,  62  Pac.  446   [1900]),  475,1012. 

1072,    1105. 
Seattle,    City    of   v.   Hill    (14    Wasli. 

487,   35   L.   R.   A.    372,   45   Pac.    17 

[1896]),    1068. 
Seattle,   City  of  v.  Kelleher    (195  U. 

S.  351,  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904]), 

117,    392,    395,   407,   408,   414,   424, 

437,    542,    576,    619,   620,   C9S,   956, 

962,   971,   1072.   1370. 
Seattle,    City    of    v.    O'Connell     (  16 

Wash.    625,    48    Pac.    412    [1897]), 

1168. 
Seattle    v.    Seattle    Electric    Co.    (  — 

Wash.  ,   94   Pac.    194    [1908]), 

601,   630. 
Seattle,   City   of  v.   Smith    (8   Wash. 

387,  36  Pac.  280  [1894]),  766,  9.30, 

1230,  1281,   1292. 
Seattle,   City    of    v.    Whittlesey     (17 

Wash.   292,   49    Pac.    489    [1897]), 

45,  475,   1103. 
Seattle,   City  of  v.   Yesler    ( 1   Wash. 

Terr.    577    [1878]),    86,    244,    245, 

666.  697,  709,   1047,   1049. 
Seattle   Dock    Co.   v.    Seattle  &    Lake 

Washinjiton     Waterway     Co.     (195 

U.  S.  624,  25  S.  789    [1904]),   124, 

360,   421,   1049,   1072,   1074. 
Seattle    &    Lake    Washington    Water- 
way   Co.   V.   Seattle   Dock   Co.    ( 35 

Wash.    503,    77    Pac.   845    [1904]), 

124,   360,   421,    1049,    1072,    1074. 
Seavey  v.  City  of  Seattle    (17  Wash. 

36l",   49   Pac.  517    [1897]).    1519. 
Secombe  v.  Kittleson    (29  Minn.  555, 

12   N.   W.    519).   216. 


TABl.E    oy    CASES. 


CClll 


[References  ;ire  to  sections.] 


w 


Don- 
.   950 


Second  Avenue  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church,  In  re  (06  X.  Y.  395 
[1876]),  223,  234,  588.  589.  613, 
679,  681,  775,  777,   1452. 

Second  Municipality  v.  Duncan  (2 
La.    Ann.    182    [1847]).    37,    155. 

Second  Municipality  of  the  C  ity  of 
New  Orleans  v.  McFarlane  ( 3  Rob- 
inson   (La.)    406    [1843]),  475. 

Second  Municipality  of  New  Orleans 
V.  Botts  (8  Robinson  (La.)  19S 
[18441  I.   275,   424,   735. 

Second  Municipality  of  New  Orleans 
V.  McDonogh  (9  Rob.  (La.)  408 
[1845]),  223,  434. 

The  Second  National  Bank  of  Lan- 
sing V.  Lansing  (25  ^lich.  207 
[1872]),   1505,   1518. 

Second  Universalist  Society  in  Prov- 
idence V.  City  of  Providence  (6 
R.  I.  235  [1859]),  42.  308,  588, 
013,  891,  1011,  1099.  1479. 

Security  Savings  Trust  Co. 
nell  (145  Mo.  431,  46  S. 
[1898]),    1172,    1369. 

Security   Savings   Trust   Co. 
nell     (81    Mo.    App.    14^ 
1172,   1369. 

Security  Trust  Co.  v.  Heyderstaedt, 
(64  Minn.  409,  67  N.  W.  219 
[1896]),    1174,    1180,    1189. 

Security  Trust  &  Safety  Vault  Co. 
V.  city  of  Lexington  (203  U.  S. 
323    [1900]),    133,   1277,    1361. 

Sedalia,  City  of,  to  use  of  Taylor  v. 
Abell  (103  Mo.  App.  431,  76  S. 
W.  497    [1903]).  313,  436,  873. 

Sedalia,  City  of  v.  Coleman  (82  Mo. 
App.  560"  [1899]).  317.  624.  709, 
716,   952,   955. 

Sedalia.  (  ity  of,  to  use  of  Sedalia 
Xatiiinal  Bank  v.  Donohue  (191) 
Mo.  App.  407,  89  S.  W.  386 
[1905]),  174,  229,  245.  264. 
525,  837,  807,  877. 

Sedalia,    City   of   v.    Gallie    (49 
App.    392    [1892]).    756,   760, 

Sedalia,  City  of  ex  rel.  Gilsonite  Con- 
struction Co.  V.  Jlontgomery  ( 109 
Mo.  App.  197,  88  S.  W."  1014 
[1904]),  301.  804,  806.  811.  845, 
1315.  1331.  1335. 


Don- 

[1899]), 


273. 


Mo, 
887. 


Sedalia,    City    of,    ex    rel.    Gilsonite 

Construction     Co.     v.     Scott     (  104 

Mo.     App.     595,     78     S.     W.     27  u 

[1903]),   804.  806,   811,  845,   1306. 
Sedalia.    City    of.    ex    rel.    Taylor    v. 

Smith    (206  Mo.  346,  104  S."  W.   15 

[1907]).    147,  538,  873. 
Sedgley  Avenue,  In   re    (217  Pa.  313, 

66  Atl.  546   [1907]  ),  73,  661. 
Seeds,    In    tlie   :Matter   of    (53    X.    Y. 

400    [1873]).  500;    1454. 
Seeley    v.    Thomas     (31     O.    S.     301 

[1877]),    197. 
Seely    v.    City    of    Pittsburg    (82    Pa. 

St.    (1    XoVrisl    300.    22    Am.   Rep. 

760    [1876]).    118,    322.    610,    605, 

666,   700. 
Seely  v.  Sebastian   (4  Or.  25),  340. 
Sefton    V.    Board    of    Commissioners 

of  Howard   County    ( 160   Ind.   357, 

66    X.    E.    891     [1903]).    234,    237, 

322.   062.   776. 
Seibert     v.     Allen      (61      Mo.     482), 

[1876]  I.    395.    1284,    1323,    1329. 
Seibert    v.     Cavender     (3     Mo.    App. 

421    [1877]).   813,   837. 
Sei]:ert  v.  Copp   (62  Mo.  182  [1876]), 

1040.   1113.   1172. 
Seibert    v.    Tiflf'any    (8    Mo.    App.    33 

[1879]),    73.    293,    657,    666,    670, 

698.  707,  709,  821,  823,  1284,  1346. 
Seifert     v.     Brooks      (34     Wis.     443 

[1874]),    737. 
Seits  v.   Sine!    {&2    Ind.   253    [1878]), 

280,    1250. 
Sennott   v.   ^loredock    and    Ivy   Land- 
ing  Drainage   District   Xo.    I    (  155 

111.  96.  39  X.  E.  567   [1895]  ).  1141. 

1145,    1209.    1213. 
Serrill,    In    the    Matter    of    (9    Hun, 

233    [1876]).   381,   462,    1456. 
Sessions  v.  Crunkilton    (20  0.  S.  349 

[1870]),    5,    19,    90,    93,    97,    113, 

245.   340,   665,   666.   760.   802.   977. 

1361. 
Setzler     v.     Pennsylvania     Scliuylkill 

Valley  Railroad  Compan.v  (112  Pa. 

St.    56,   24   Am.   &    Eng."    R.    Cases 

280.   4   Atl.   370    [1886]).    70. 
Sewall    V.    St.    Paul     (20    Minn.    511 

[1874]).   735.   763.   770,  981.    1425, 

1432. 


CCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Seward  v.  Rheiner   (2  Kan.  App.  95, 

43  Pac.  Rep.  433  [1S9.5]),  293.  290. 

388,   775,   1431. 
Sexton      V.      Beach       (50      :Mo.      48S 

[1872]),   1134. 
Seyberger  v.  Calumet  Drainage  Com- 
pany   (33    Ind.    330    [1870]).    247, 

340,"^  859. 
Shady  Avenue,  In  re    ( 34  Pa.  Super. 

Ct.'  327   [1907).  569. 
Shafer     v.     Moriarty      (40      Ind.      9 

[1874]),    1500. 
Shaffner    v.    City    of    St.    Louis    (31 

Mo.  204  [1860^]),  1519. 
Shinier  V.  McAleese    ( — •  X.  J.  Eq.  — , 

08  Atl.  416   [1907]),  7,  8.  89.  228. 

301,   419,    1008. 
Shank   v.    Smith    (157    Ind.    401,    55 

L.  R.  A.  564,  61  X.  E.  932  [1901]  ), 

314,   517,   518,   528,   670,   731,   910, 

927,  1004. 
Shanley  v.  People  ex  rel.  Goedtner 

(225  111.  579.  80  X.  E.  277 

[1907]),  558,  504,  1008,  1337, 

1477. 
Shannon  v.  Village  of  Hinsdale  ( 180 

111.  202,  54-  X.  E.  181  [1899]), 

319,  388,  459,  479,  527,  531.  539, 

865,  1333,  1361,  1409. 
Shannon  v.  City  of  Omaha  ( 73  Xeb. 

507,  103  X.  W.  53,  100  X.  W.  592 

[1905]),  324,  381,  444,  550,  555, 

693,  699,  771,  955,   1029. 
Shannon  v.  City  of  Omaha    (72  Xeb. 

281,   100  X.  \V.   298    [1904]),   745, 

747,   763,   768. 
Shannon  v.    Portland    (38    Ore.    382, 

02  Pac.  50  [1900]),  732,  1444. 
Sharp.    In   the    flatter   of    the    Peti- 
tion  of,   to   Vacate   an  Assessment 
(56   X.   Y.   257,    15  Am.   Rep.   415 

[1874]),    381,    1013. 
Sharp     V.     Curtiss      (15     Conn.     520 

[1843]),   363. 
Sharp   V.    Johnson    (4   Hill     (X.    Y.) 

92,  40  Am.  Dec.  259   [1843]).  031. 

735,  895,   1041,  1154. 
Sharp   V.   Spier    (4   Hill   70    [1843]), 

42,   352,    781,    1047.    1173. 
Sharp   V.   United   States    (191    U.    S. 
341,  48  L.  211,  24  S.  114  [1903]), 
72. 


Sharpe   v.   United    States    (112    Fed. 
893,  57  L.  R.  A.  932,  50  C.  C.  A, 

597  [1902]),    72. 

Sliarpless    v.    Philadelphia     (21     Pa. 

St.   147,  59  Am.   Dec.  759),  305. 
Shattuck    V.    City    of    Cincinnati     ( 1 

Ohio  X.  P.  394    [1895]),  625,  704. 
Shaver     v.     Starrett     (4     0.     S.    494 

[1855]),   117. 
Shaw  V.  Des  Moines   County    ( 74   la. 

079,  39  X.  W.   101),   1122,   1125. 
Shaw  V.  State  of  Indiana  for  use  of 

Whitmore     (97     Ind.    23     [1884]), 

234,   1147,   1229. 
Shaw  V.  City  of  Ypsilanti   ( 140  Midi. 

712,   110  X.   W.  40   [1906]),   1015. 
Sheafe  v.  City  of  Seattle    (18  Wash. 

298,  51   Pac.  385    [1897]),   1511. 
Sheboygan    County    v.    City    of    She- 
boygan    (54    Wis.    415.    11    X.    W. 

598  [1882]).  41.   1116. 

Sheehan     v.     Fitchburg     (131     ^Ia>s. 

523   [1881]),  855. 
Sheehan    v.     Gleason     (40     Mo.     100 

[1870]),   804. 
Sheehan    v.     Good     Samaritan     Hos- 
pital   (50    Mo.    155,    11    Am.    Rep. 

412   [1872]),  42,  589,  013,  014. 
Sheehan  v.  Martin   ( 10  Mo.  App.  285 

[1881]),    324,    783,   813,   828,   832. 
Sheets   v.   Paine    (10   X.    D.    103.   86 

N.  W.  117  [1901]),  3. 
Sheffield  Water  Works   v.   \Mlkinsoii 

(4   C.   P.  D.   410]),   1072. 
Shelby    v.    City   of    Burlington    ( 125 

Iowa,  343,  101  N.  W.  101   [1904]). 

74,  236,  015,  721. 
Shelby ville.  City  of  v.  Cleveland,  Chi- 
cago &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.   (140  Ind. 

06,    44    X.    E.    929     [1896]),    369, 

804. 
Sheley  v.   City  of  Detroit    (45  Mich. 

43L  8  X.  W.  52  [1881]).  118.  000. 

698. 
Shepard  v.  Barron  ( 194  U.  S.  553, 

48  L.  1115,  24  S.  737  [1904]), 

118,  189.  541,  1019,  1033,  1345. 
Shepard  v.  Colton  (44  Cal.  628 

[1872]),  504,  742,  748.  1278,  1292. 
Shepard  v.  McXeill  (38  Cal.  73 

[1869]),  537.  964,  1337. 


TAB'^E   or    CASES. 


ccv 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Shepard   v.    People   ex    rel.   Raymond 

(200     111.     508,     65     N.     E.     1068 

[1903]),   862,   866,   986,   996,    1164, 

1183. 
Sheridan    Street,    Opening,     Bellevue 

Borough    (138  Pa.  St.  264,  22  Atl. 

22    [1890]),   927,   997,    1365. 
Sheridan    v.    City    of    Chicagj     (175 

111.  421,  51  N.  E.  898  [1898]  ),  764. 

914. 
Sheridan    v.    Empire    City     (45    Ore. 

296,  77  Pac.  393   [1904]),   1035. 
Sheridan    v.    Fleming     (93    Mo.    321, 

5    S.    W.    813     [1887]),    340.    819, 

1469,    1473. 
Sheriff'    v.    Lafargiie     (23     Ark.     137 

[1861]),    1415. 
Sheriff.-  v.  City  of  Chicago    (213  111. 

620,    73    X.    E.    367    [1905]),    525, 

943,  954,  991. 
Sherwood    v.     City    of     Duluth     (40 

Minn.   22,   41   N.   W.   234    [1889]), 

444,   1394. 
Sherwood    v.    Rynearson     (141    Mich. 

92,    104    X.    W.    392    [1905 |),    525, 

1468. 
Shiloh  Street,   Appeal  of  McCormick 

(165  Pa.  St.  386,  44  Am.  St.  Rep. 

671,  30  Atl.  986  [1895]),  837,  863. 
Shiloh   Street,   Wilson's   Appeal    ( 152 

Pa.   St.   136,   25  Atl.   530    [1893]). 

959,  962,  969,  1375. 
Shimer  v.   Easton  Railway  Company 

(205    Pa.     St.     648,    55    Atl.     769 

[19031),   66. 
Shimmons    v.    Sity   of   Saginaw    ( 104 

Mich.  511,   62  X.   W.  725    [1895]). 
•     267,   275,   293,   298,   373,   374,   381, 

555,   765,  950,   978,   1279,    1282. 
Shiner    v.    Village    of    Xorwood     (17 

Oliio    C.    C.    631    [1898]),    635. 
Shipley     v.     P>allini()ro     &      Potomac 

Railroad     Coin])any     (34    ^Nld.    336 

[1871]),   69,    71. 
Shipman   v.   Forbes    (97   Cal.  572,   32 

Pac.    Rep.    599    [1893]).    223,    234, 

777,  882.   11.30. 
Shirk   V.  Ihipji    (167   Ind.  509.   78  X. 

E.  242,  79  X.  E.  490   [1900]),   108, 

313,   500,   501.   560,   575.   742.   763, 

1049,  1215,   1217,   1502. 
Shirk   V.   Whitton    (131    Ind.   455,   31 

N,  E.  87   [1891]  ).  l(li;S. 


Shirley    v.    City    of    Waukesha    ( 124 

Wis.  239,   102  X.  W.  576    [1905]), 

1462. 
Shoemaker  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    (68 

0.  S.  603,  68  X";  E.  1   [1903]),  174, 

189,  314.   ()77.   693.   700,  702.    1001, 

1425. 
Shoemaker    v.    Harrisburg     ( 122    Pa. 

St.   285,    16   Atl.   366    [1888]),    147. 

190. 
Shoemaker  v.  Ignited  States    ( 147   U. 

S.    282,     37     L.     170,     13     S.     361 

[1893]),    207.    243.    356,    549,    556, 

665.   666. 
Shoenberg    v.    Heyer     (91    Mo.    Apj). 

389   [1902]),  527,  538. 
Shoolbred  v.  Corporation  of  the  City 

of   Charleston    (2   Bay    (S.   C.)    (53 

[1796]),   118. 
Shreve   v.    Town    of    Cicero    (129    111. 

226,    21    X.    E.    815    [1890]).    280, 

281,  329,  636,  776,   1308. 
S'hreveport,    City    of    v.    Prescott    (51 

La.    Ann.    1895,    46    L.    R.    A.    193, 

26  So.  664  [1899]  ),  15,  35,  46.  155. 

314.  603,  723.   1369. 
Slireveport,     City    of     v.     Shreveport 

Belt    Railway   Company    ( 107    La, 

785.     32     So".     189     [1901,     1902]), 

600. 
Shriner    v.    Village   of   Xorwood    (  17 

Ohio   C.   C.   631    [1898]).    1059. 
Shrum    v.    Town    of    Salem     (  13    Ind. 

App.    115.   39   X.    E.-  1050    [1895]), 

53.    55,    521.    750. 
Shuford   V.  Commissioners  of  CJaston 

County    (86  X.  C.  552   [1882]).  43. 

147,    148,   225,   363,   779. 
Shultes  V.  Eberly,  82  Ala.  242.  2  So. 

345),    150. 
Shumate   v.    Heman    (181    U.    S.   402, 

45  L.  922,  21  S.  645    [1901]),   118,' 

324,   702,   708. 
Shurtleft"  v.  City  of  Chicago   (190  III. 

473,  60  X.  E.  870   [1901]),  65,  75, 

308,   549,    561,    617,    619,    657,    920, 

1098. 
Sidenberg  v.  Ely  ( 90  X.  V.  257,  43 

Am.  Rep.  163  [1882]),  1055,  1057. 
Siegel  V.  City  of  Chicago  (223  III. 

428,  79  X'.  E.  280  [1906]),  495, 

496.  515,  843. 


CCVl 


TABLE   OF    C4SES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Silkman   v.    City   of   Milwaukee    (31 

Wis.  555   [1872]),  1512. 
Silkman  v.  Board  of  Water  Commis- 
sioners of  City  of  Yonkers   ( 152  N. 

Y.  327,  37  L.  R.  A.  827,  46  X.  E. 

612    [1897]),   124,  353,   734. 
Silva    V.    City    of    Newport    ( —    Ky. 

— .    104   S.   W.   314,  ,31   Ky.   L,  R. 

314    [1907]),   776. 
Simmons    v.    City    of  Gardner    ( 6    R. 

I.  255   [1859]),  754,  757. 
Simmons  v.  City  of  Millville    ( —  X. 

J.   L.   ,    66    Atl.    895    [1907]), 

553,   639,   688. 
Simonds   v.    Turner     ( 120    Mass.    328 

[1876]),   1054. 
Simons  v.  Drake    (179  111.   62,  53  X. 

E.  574    [1899]),   1435. 
Simonton     v.     Hayes     (88     Ind.     70 

[1882]),  294,  531,  539,  1005,  1204. 
Simpson  v.  Commissioners    ( 84  X.  C. 

158),   363. 
Simpson  v.  City  of  Kansas  City    ( 52 

Kan.  88,  34  Pac.  406  [1893])",  141, 

1015,   1475. 
Simpson  v.  City  of  Kansas  City   ( 46 

Kan.  438,  26"Pac.  721   [1891]),  11. 
Sims  V.  Hines    (121   Ind.  534,  23  X. 

E.    515     [1889]),    73,    541,     1330, 

1337,   1346,   1350,  1352,   1356. 
Sinclair  v.  Brightman    ( —  Mass.  — , 

84  N.  E.  453   [1908]),  1512. 
Sioux    City,    City   of    v.    Independent 

School    District    (55    la.    150,   7   X. 

W.  488   [1880]),  580,  586,   1077. 
SioiLX  City  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Sioux  City 

(138    U.   S.   98,    34   L.    898.    11    S. 

226   [1891]),  89,  95,  599,  600. 
Sirgi  V.  Matthews    (24  La.  Ann.  613 

[1872]).  223,  234. 
Sisson    V.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Buena  Vista  County   (128  la.  442, 

70   L.   R.   A.    440,    104   X.    W.    454 

[1905]),    108.    340,    666.    690.    691, 

1033,   1085. 
Sixth      Avenue      Railway      Company, 

The   V.   The   ^layor,   Aldermen  and 

Commonalty    of    the    City   of    New 

York   (63  Hun.  271,  17  X\  Y.  Supp. 

903    [1892]).  601,   1422. 
Sixty-fifth   Street,   In   the   Matter   of 

the  Proceedings  to  Open   (23  How- 


ard    (X.    Y.)     256     [1862]),    927, 

1353. 
Skelton   v.   Sharp    (161   Ind.   383,   67 

X.  E.  535  [1903]),  340,  1000,1050, 

1116,  1196,  1202,  1207,  1297,  1426, 

1427,  1450. 
Skinker  v.  Heman  (148  Mo.  349,  49 

S.  W.  1026  [1898]).  293.  296,  388, 

464,   717,   1333,   1412. 
Skinker  v.  Heman,  64  Mo.  App.  441 

[1895]),    293,    296,    388,    464,    717, 

1333. 
Skinner  v.  Chicago    (42  111.  52),  223, 

234,  244,   1129. 
Skrainka   v.   Allen    (2   Mo.  App.   387 

[1876]),    392,   395. 
Slack   V.    Maysville    &   Lexington   R. 

R.    Co.    (52    Ky.    (13    B.   Mon.)    1 

[1852]),  85,  162,  779. 
Sleeper     v.     Bullen      (6     Kan.     300 

U870]),  223,  234,  781,  1006,  1007, 

1015,  1033,  1037,  1043,  1375,  1436, 

1498,   1509. 
Sleight   V.   Roe     (125    Mich.    585,    85 

X.   W.   Rep.    10    [1901]),   886. 
Sligh   V.    City   of    Grand   Rapids    (84 

Mich.   497.  47   X.  W.   1093),   119. 
Sloan  V.  Beebe  (24  Kan.  343  [1880]), 

420,  817. 
Sloan  V.   Faurot    (11    Ind.  App.   689, 

39   X.   E.   539    [1894]),    1244. 
Slocum    V.    Selectmen    of    Brookline 

(163    Mass.     23,     39     X.     E.     351 

[1895]),   408,   411,   424,   445,   620. 
Slocum  V.   Dallas    (165   Ind.   710,   75 

X.  E.  S23    [1905]),  269. 
Slusser     v.     Ransom     ( 39     Ind.     506 

[1872]),  815,  1235. 
Smadbeck  v.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon  ( 109 

X.    i'.  S.  70   ["l908]),  278. 
Small  V.  Chicago.  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co. 

(50  la.  338  [1879]),  363. 
Smiley  v.   McDonald    (42  Xeb.   5,  47 

Am.  St.  Rep.  684,  27  L.  R.  A.  540, 

60  X.   W.   355),   372. 
Smith,   In   the  Matter  of    (99   X.   Y. 

424,  2  X.  E.  52   [1885]).  781,  784. 

1456, 
Smith,   In   the  Matter   of    (52   X.   Y. 

526   [1873]),  740,  762. 
Smith,   In   the   Matter   of    (65   Barb. 

283   [1893]),  741,  762. 


I 


TABLE    :JF    CASES. 


CCVll 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Smith,    In   the   Matter   of    ( 67   How- 
ard    (N.    Y.)     501     [1884]),    14.35, 

1466. 
Smith    V.    Corporation    of    Aberd^n 

(25    Miss.   458    [1853]),    86. 
Smith     V.     Abington     f^avings     Bank 
(171     Mass.     178,    50     X.     E.    545 

[1898]),   324,    490,    745,    773,    859, 

956,   1067,   1072,   1083,    1305,   1309. 
Smith     V.    Abington     Savings     B.mk 

(165    Mass.    285,    42    X.    E.    1133 

[1896]),  49,   1072. 
Smith  V.   City  of  Allegheny    (92   Pa. 

St.    (11    Norris)    110    [1879]),   73, 

1287,   1346. 
Smith   V    Atlantic   &   Great   Western 

R.  R.  Co.    (25   0.   S.  91),   81,   113, 

343. 
Smith    V.    Boese     (39    Mo.    App.     15 

[1889]),   1169. 
Smith  V.  City  of  Boston    (194  Mass. 

31,  79  X.  E.  786   [1907]),   1484. 
Smith   V.   City   of   Boston    (61   Mass. 

(7  Cush.)   254  [1851]),  64,  65. 
Smith  V.  City  of  Buflalo   ( 159  X".  Y. 

427,  54  X.  E.  62  [1899]),  266,  587, 

641,  983,   1379. 
Smith   V.    City   of   Buffalo    (90   Hun, 

118,  35  X.  Y.  S.  635   [1895]),  275, 

587,  641,   1298. 
Smith   V.   City    of   Buffalo    (44    Hun 

(X.   Y.)    156    [1887]),    1508,    1510. 
Smith   V.   Carlovv    (114  Mich.   67,   72 

N.  W.   22    [1897]),   558,   649,   887, 

1005,    1007,  .1015,    1478. 
Smith    V.    City    of    Chicago     (57    111. 

497    [1870]'),    368,    452^,    764,    837, 

839,   914,    1187,   1189. 
Smith  V.  C  ity  of  Cincinnati    ( 6  Ohio 

X.  P.   175  V898]),  552,  577. 
Smith     V.      Clifford      (99     Tnd.      113 

[1884]  ),   1000,   1248. 
Smith      V.      Cofran      (34     Cal.      310 

[1867]).   223,   234,   777,  887,   1358, 

1359,    1509. 
Smith  V.  Davis   (30  Cal.'537  [1866]), 

234,   777,   887,   889. 
Smitli  V.     ity  of  Des  :Moines   (10>-  la. 

590,    76   X.    W.    836    [1898]),    301, 

620,  626,  631,  1047.  1049,  1072, 

ir9,  11-72,  1141,  1445. 
Smith  V.  City  of  D.-t'-nit  C>?0  M\ch. 

572,    79    X.    \V.    SOS    [1899]),    308, 


394,  956,  962,  965,  990,  997,   1057. 
Smith   V.   Duck  Road  Ditching  Asso- 
ciation   (54  Ind.  235    [1876]),  247, 

415,  525,  677,  813,  886,  1238. 
Smith      V.      Duncan      (77      Ind.      92 

[1881]),  862,  864,  867. 
Smith  V.  City  of  Frankfort    (2  Kan. 

App.    411,    42    Pac.    1003    [1895]), 

1179. 
Smith   V.   Hazard    (110    Cal.    145,    42 

Pac.    465    [1895]),    313,    763,    803, 

1030,    1337. 
Smith    V.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Jersey  City '(52  X.  J.  L.   (23  Vr.) 

784,    18    Atl.    1050    [1889]).    1482, 

1492. 
Smith  V.  Kingston  Borough   (120  Pa, 

St.  357,   14  Atl.   170    [TsSS]),  323, 

378,  385,  420,  462,  717. 
Smith  V.  Kochersperger  (173  In.  201, 

50  X'.  E.   187    [189S]  ),   1443. 
Smith     V.     City    of     Milwaukee     (18 

Wis.    63     [1804]),    342,    420,    453, 

999,   1436. 
Smith    V.    City    of    ^Minneapolis     (95 

Minn.  431,  104  X\  W.  227   [1905]), 

1494. 
Smith  V.  Minto    (30  Or.  351,  48  Pac. 

106    [1897]),    223,    2.34,    292,    464, 

777,  832,   1017. 
Smith  V.  ^layor.  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  Xew  York 

(82   Hun    (X.   Y.)    570,    31    X.   Y. 

Supp.   783    [1894]),  482.  ■ 
Smith  V.  !Mayor  and  Common  Council 

of   the   City  of   X'ewark    (32   X.   J. 

Eq.   (5  Stew.)    1    [1880]),  239,  663, 

666,  696,   1428. 
Smith   V.    City   of    Omaha    (49    Xeb. 

883,  09  X.  W.  402   [1896]),  11,  71, 

6C5,  666,  697,  729,  775,  884,   1277, 

1304. 
Smith    V.    City    of    Portland    (25    Or. 

297,  35  Pac".  665   [1894]),  468,  541, 

542. 
Smith   V.   The   Peojde  ox   rel.   D;'trick 

(140  111.  355,  29  X.  E.  676  [1S93]), 

103,    166,    168,    247,   253,   271,   276, 

279,   1477. 
Smith  V.  People  ex  rel.  lluck    (87  111. 

74   [1877]),  356,  1126. 
Smith   V.  The  People  ex  rel.   IJuTusey 

(75   111.  30    [1S74]).    1126.    1183. 


ccvin 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Smith    V.    Petree     (—    Ky.    71> 

S.  W.  251,  25  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2014 

[1904]),  890,   llie,   1196,   1207. 
Smith  V.  City  of  St.  Paul   (69  Minn. 

2/6,    72    N.    W.    104,    210    [1897]  i, 

391,  394. 
Smith  V.   City  of  Seattle    (25   Wash. 

300,  65  Pac.  612  [1901]),  347,.  451, 

507,  1504. 
Smith    V.    Sherry    (54    Wis.    114,    11 

N.  W.  465),  611,  1196. 
Smith    V.    Small    (50   Mo.    App.    401 

[1892]),  413,  551,  840. 
Smith  V.  Tobener    (32  Mo.   App.   601 

[1888]),    244,    381,    464,    782,    841, 

979,  981,   1448. 
Smith   V.   City   of   Toledo    (24    O.    S. 

126     [1873]),    223,    234,    552,    576, 

620,  830. 
Smith  V.  City  of  We-^tport    (105  M3. 

App.   221,^75    S.    W.    725    [1904]), 

538,  541,  831. 
Smith  V.  Willis   (78  Miss.  i43,  28  So. 

878    [1900]),    343,    549,    553,    566, 

660. 
Smith   V.   Worcester    (182  :\Iass.   232, 

59    L.    R.    A.    728,    65    N.    E.    40 

[1902]),    103,    324,    375,    444,    461, 

553,  627,  666,  695,  702. 
Smyth   V.    State   ex   rel.    Brauu    ( 158 

Ind.    332,    62    X.    E.    449    [1901]), 

322,    1125,   1366. 
Smythe  v.  City  of  Chicago    (197   111. 

311,    64    X.    E.    361     [1902]),    324, 

328,  448,  859,  864. 
Smythe    v.    People    ex    rel.    Hanberg 

(219  111.  76,  76  X.  E.  82   [1905]), 

1126,  1184,  1186. 
Snell  V.  City  of  Chicago  (133  111. 

413,  8.  L.  R.  A.  858,  24  X.  E.  532), 

259. 
Snouffer  v.  Grove    ( —  la.  ,    116 

X.  W.   1056   [1908]),   18. 
Snow  V.  City  of  Fitchburg  (136  Mass. 

83    [1883]),   324,   667,  697. 
Snydacker   v.   Village  of   West  Ham- 
mond   (225    111.    154,    80    X.    E.    93 

[1907]),  446,  563,  641,   1314. 
Snyder  v.  Foster    (77  la.  638,  42  X. 

W.  506),  396. 
Society    v.    Mayor   and    Aldermen    of 

Boston     (116    Mass.    181,    17    Am. 

Rep.  153  [1874]),  76. 


Society     v.     City     of     Hartford      (48 

Conn.   570    [1881]),    1064. 
Society    for    Savings   v.    Xew    London 

(29*  Conn.    174),  365. 
Soens    V.    City    of    Racine     (10    Wis. 

271    [I860]),  35,  89,  322,  360,  901. 
Soran    v.     Commissioners     of     LTnioii 

Drainage    District   Xo.    1    (215    111. 

212,  74  X.  E.  129   [1905]),  803. 
Sorchan  v.   City   of  Brooklyn    ( 62  X. 

Y.  339   [1875]),  679,  813*,  814,  818, 

1279,   1289. 
Sorchan  v.  City  of  Brooklyn    ( 3  Hun 

(X.    Y.)    562    [1875]),    826,    1347, 

1353. 
Soule  V.  Town  of  Ocosta    ( —  Wasli. 

— — ,   95   Pac.    1083    [1908]  i,    1503, 

1505. 
Soule    V.    City    of    Seattle    (6    Wash. 

315,    33    Pac.    384,    1080     [1893]), 

238,  1504,  1508,  1510,  1514,  1515. 
Soullier  v.  Kern  (69  Pa.  St.  (19  P. 

F.  Smith)  16  [1871]),  314,  735, 

772,  889,  908,  1056,  1203. 
South   Bethlehem   Borough  v.   Laufer 

(1    Penn.    Dist.    Ct.    756     [1892]), 

1157,   1272. 
South  Chicago  City  Ry.   Co.  v.   City 

of  Chicago   (196  111.' 490,  63  X.  E. 

1046    [1902]),    309,   311,   391,    C94, 

426,  429,  912,  952,  955. 
South    Highland    Land    Improvement 

Company  v.  Kansas  City   (172  Mo. 

523,  7  S.  W.  944  [1902]),  324,  327, 

401,  444,  447,  549,  550. 
South   Omalia,   City   of   v.   McGavock 

(72    Xeb.     382,     100     X.     W.    805 

[1904]),    1482. 
South  Omaha,  City  of  v.  Ruthjen   (71 

Xeb.    545,   99    X.   \Y.   240    [1904]), 

05,  66,   654. 
South   Omaha,   City   of   v.  Tighe    (67 

Xeb.   572,   93   X.'   W.   946    [1903]), 

223,  781. 
South    Ottawa,    Town    of    v.    Perkins 

(94  U.  S.  200  [1876]),  1512. 
South    Park    Commissioners    v.    The 

Chicago,    Burlington    &    Quincy    R. 

R.   Co.    (107   111.   105    [1883]),  620, 

623. 
South    Park    Commissioners    v.    Dun- 
levy    (91   HI.  49   [1878]),  259. 


T.VBr.E    OF    CASES. 


CCIX 


[Refprences  .ire  to  spctions.  ] 


Southeim  v.  City  of  Chicago   (56  111. 

429    [1870]),    665,    666.    670.    1331, 

1333. 
Southern    California    IJailway    Co.    v. 

Workman    (146    Cal.    80.    79    Pac. 

586,  82  Pac.  79    [1905]),  594,  595, 

598. 
Southern  Ry.   Co.   v.   Cherokee  Coun- 
ty     (144     Ala.     579,     42     So.     60 

[1905]),  36. 
Southern  Railway  Co.  v.  Ka.y   (62  S. 

C.  28,  39   S.  E.   785    [1901]),  3. 
Southport,     Wilmington     &     Durham 

Railroad    Company    v.    Owners    of 

the  Piatt  Land   ( ^33  N.  C.  266,  45 

S.  E.  589  [1903]),  66,  70. 
Sower    V.    City    of    Philadelphia     (35 

Pa.   St.    (11    Casey)    231    [I860]), 

S38. 
Spades  v.  Phillips    (9   Ind.  App.  487, 

37    N.    E.    297    [1893]),    324,    720, 

736,  1229,  1234,  1239. 
Spalding  v.  City  of  Denver  (33  Colo. 

172,  80  Pac.  126  [1905]),  405,  475, 

479,  555,  558,  711,  723,  781,  874, 

1015,  1023,  1027,  1414,  1435,  1436. 

Spalding  v.  Forsee  ( 109  Mo.    App. 

■675,  S3  S.  W.  540  [1904]),  538, 

541. 
Spangler    v.    The   City    of    Cleveland 

(35    0.   S.   469    [1880]),   308,   472, 

547,  631,  707,  896. 
Sparks   v.   Villa  Rosa   Land   Co.    (99 

Mo.     App.     489,     74     S.     W.     12.t 

[1903]),  538,  867. 
Spaulding    v.    Baxter    (25    Ind.    App. 

485,    58    N.    E.    551     [1900]),    324, 

413,  423,  502,   745,  832,  836,   1028, 

1235. 
Spaulding    v.    Bradley    (79    Cal.    449, 

22  Pac.  47   [1889])*,  396. 
Spaulding  v.   Mott    (167   Ind.   58,   76 

X.   E.   620    [1906]),   322,   629,   637. 
Spaulding    v.    North    San    Francisco 

Homestead  &  Railroad  Associaiio;i 
(87  Cal.   40,   25   Pac.   249,  24  Pac. 

600    [1890]),    313,    483,    540,    541, 

795,  812,  1026,  1358,  1478,  1480. 
Spaulding   v.   Wesson    (115   Cal.    441, 

47  Pac.  249   [1890]),  395,  396,  476. 
Spaulding  v.  Wesson  (84  Cal.  141,  24 
Pac.   377    [1890]),   313,   783,    1182, 
1253,    1378. 


Speakman  v.  Speakman  ( 1  Washing- 
ton Law  Reporter  (D.  C. )  214), 
1281. 

Spear  v.  Drainage  Commissioners 
(113  111.  632  [1886]),  344,  659, 
1313,  1318,  1364. 

Specht  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co. 

(—   Ky.  ,   80   S.   W.    1106,   26 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  193  [1904]),  628, 
709,  710,    1246. 

Speer  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of  Alli- 
ens (So  Ga.  49,  9  L.  R.  A.  402,  11 
S.  E.  802  [1890]),  43,  96,  100,  110. 
118,  147,  148,  179,  323,  420,  553. 
620,  632,  726,  765,  1304. 

Speir  V.  Town  of  Xew  Utrecht  (121 
X.  Y.  420,  24  X.  E.  692  [1890]  i, 
392,   395,   396,    1017,    1019,    1035. 

Speir  V.  Town  of  Xew  Utrecht  (49 
Hun  (X.  Y.)  294,  2  X.  Y.  S.  426 
[1888]),  392,  395,  396. 

Spence    v.    City    of    ^Milwaukee     ( — 

Wis.  ,   113  X.  W.  38    [1907]), 

653,   1414. 

Spencer  v.  Merchant  ( 125  V.  S.  345. 
31  L.  763,  8  S.  921  [1888]),  86, 
115,  118,  119,  121,  122,  123,  125, 
130,  142.  241,  414,  553,  570,  648, 
666,  725,  728,  738,  959,  961,  962. 
964,   969. 

Spencer  v.  Merchant  ( 100  X.  Y.  585. 
3  X.  E.  682  [1885]),  86,  118,  119, 
121,  123,  125,  131,  241,  380,  381, 
414,  553,  570,  648,  666,  725,  728. 
738,  959,  961,  962,  964,  969. 

Sperry  v.  Flygare  (80  Minn.  325,  81 
Am.  St.  Rep.  261,  49  L.  R.  A.  757, 
S3  X.  W.   177    [1900]),  322. 

Spier  v.  Kalamazoo  (138  Mich.  G52, 
101  X.  W.  846),  1015. 

Spokane,  City  of  v.  Browne  (S  Wasli. 
317,  36  Pac.  26  [1894]),  166,  168, 
227,  313,  436,  511,  725,  856,  869. 

Spokane,     City     of     v.     Preston     ( — 

Wash.  \  89   Pac.   406    [1907]). 

324,   783,  830,  835. 

Spokane,  f  ity  of  v.  Security  Savings 

Society    ( —    Wash.    .    89    Pac. 

466  [1907]),  301,  580,  586,  628, 
956,  958,  9(!0. 

Spokane,  City  of  v.  Stephens  (12 
Wash.  667,  22  Pac.  123  [1895]), 
1164. 


^ 


ccx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Spokane  Falls,  City  of  v.  Browne   (.3 

Wash.    84,   27    Pac.    1077    [1891]  i, 

43,    147,    148,    223,    229,    234,    545, 

548,  553,  642,  777,  883. 
Spoon  River  Drainage  District,  Com- 
missioners of,  in  Champaign  Coun- 
ty   V.    Conner     (121    111.    App.    450 

fl905]),  340,  549,  564,  659. 
Spring  Garden  v.  Wistar   { 18  Pa.  St. 

(6   Harr.)    195    [1852]),    314,   666, 

698,  709,  779,  781. 
Spring    Steel    Fence    &    Wire  *Co.    v. 

City    of    Anderson.   (32    Ind.    App. 

138,   69    X.    E.    404    [1903]),    735, 

738,  751,  1432. 
Spring  Valley  Park  in  Kansas  City, 

In  re  (—  Mo.  ,  106  S.  W.  531 

[1907]),  70,  305,  1067. 
Spring  Valley  Waterworks  v.  Schott- 

ler   (110  U.  6.  347,  28  L.  173.  4  S. 

48),  142. 
Springbrook  Pvoad,    (64  Pa.  St.  451), 

909. 
Springdale    Township    Road    (91    Pa. 

St.  260),  909. 
Springer  v.  Avondale    (35   0.   S.   620 

[1880]),  683,  977,   1378. 
Springer    v.    Walters     ( 139    111.    419, 

28  X.  E.   761    [1891]),  8,  89,   103, 

247,  248,  253,  564,  1432. 
Springfield,    City    of,    to    the    use    of 

Tuttle  V.  Baker    (56  Mo.  App.  637 

[1894]),    50,    100,    110,    394,    1284, 

1346. 
Springfield,    City    of    v.    Green     (120 

111.   269,    11   X.   E.   261),    153,   295, 

620. 
Springfield,    City    of    v.    Harris    (107 

Mass.   532    [1871]),    17,    1033. 
'Springfield,    City    of,    to    the    use    of 

MoEvilly    V.    Knott    (49    Mo.    App. 

612  [1892]),  818,  838. 
Springfield    v.    Mathus    (124    111.    88. 

10  \.  E.  92),  324,  864,  867. 
Springfield,    City    of,    ex    rel.    Upde- 

graft"   V.    Mills"    (99   Mo.   App.    141, 

72  S.  W.  462    [1903]),  53,  55.  491. 
Springfield,  City  of  v.  Sale    (127  111. 

359,   20   N.   E.    86),   51,    324,    663, 

665,  675,  677,  699,  882,  894. 
Springfield,  City  of,  ex  rel.  Gilsonite 

Construction  Co.  v.  Schmook    ( 120 


Mo.  App.  41.  96  S.  W.  257  [1906] ), 

538,   1052. 
Springfield  v.   Springfield   Street  Ry. 

Co.    (182   Mass.   41,   64   N.   E.   577 

[1901,    1902]),    60,    166,    168,   599. 
Springfield,  City  of,  to  use  of  Central 

National    Bank     v.     Weaver     ( 137 

Mo.   650,   37   S.  W.  509,  39   S.  W. 

276    [1896]),    118,   -244,    439,    496, 

504,   604,   620,   723,   775,   776,   830, 

838,   1338. 
Springfield  Fire  &  Marine  Insurance 

Co.  V.  Village  of  Keeseville  (  148  X. 

Y.  46,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  667,  30  L. 

R.  A.   660,  42   X.  E.  405    [1895]), 

353. 
Spuyten    Duyvil    Park    Way,    In    the 

Matter  of  the  Opening  of  ( 67  How- 
ard   (X.   Y.)    341    [1884]),    1026. 
Squier  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    (5  Ohin 

C.   C.   400    [1891]),   561.   685. 
Stack  V.  People  ex  Tel.  Talbott   (217 

111,  220,  75  X.  E.  347  [1905]  ),  202, 

203,   271.   340,   344,   736,   776,   921, 

993. 
Stadler  v.  Roth   (59  ]^Io.  400  [1S75]  ), 

1134,   1137,   1139. 
Stadler    v.    Strong    (3   Mo.    App.   5;i8 

(appendix)       [1877]),      50  ,    1113, 

1172. 
Stafl"ord    v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Albany 

(7    John.    Sup.    Ct.     (X.    Y.)     541 

[1811]),  206. 
Stallcup    V.    Bradley     (43    Tenn.     (3 

Coldw.)   406   [1866]),  363. 
Stanbrough   v.   Daniels    (77    la.   561, 

42  X.  W.  443),   1146. 
Stansbury   v.    White    (121    Cal.    433, 

53    Pac.    940    [1898]),    867,    1068, 

1195. 
Stanton   v.   City   of   City   of   Chicago 

(154  111.  23,  39  X.  E.'987),  636. 
Stanwood    v.    City    of    ^lalden    ( 157 

:\lass.   17,   16  L^   R.   A.   591,   31   X. 

E.    702    [1P92]),    64,    65. 
Stark  V.  City  of  Boston    (180   Mass. 

293,  62  X.E.  375  [1902]),  86,  370, 

665,   666,    695,   696,    724. 
Starr   v.   City  of  Burlin'jton    (45   la. 

87     [1876]*),    740,    747,    760,    777, 

830,  831,  836,  950,  983. 


I 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXl 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State  V. 


,  or  State  ex  rel.  v. 

{ See     also     People     v. 
-,     or     People     ex     rel.     v. 


State  of  Louisiana  v.  .    ( See 

also  Louisiana  v.  . ) 

State  of  Ohio  v.  .     ( See  als3 

Ohio  V.  .) 

State  ex  rel.  Ely  v.  Aetna  Life  In- 
surance Co.  (117  Ind.  251,  20  X. 
E.    144    [1888]),    1047,    1049,    10l]8. 

State  ex  rel.  Minnesota  Loan  &  Trust 
Company  v.  Ames  (87  Minn.  23, 
91  X.  W.  18  [1902]  I,  117,  185, 
237. 

The  State  ex  rel.  Mispagel  v.  Angert 
(127  Mo.  456,  30  S.  W.  118 
[1894]),   340,    1040,   1049. 

State  of  Minnesota  v.  Armstrong  (54 
Minn.  457,  56  X''.  W.  97  [1893]), 
323,  832,  843. 

State  ex  rel.  ^loore  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Ashland  (88  \Yis.*599,  60  x'  W. 
1001  [1894]),  665,  666,  674.  709, 
872. 

State  ex  rel.  Vaugh  v.  Mayor  ot 
Ashland  (71  Wis.  502,  37  "x.  W. 
809),  359. 

State,  Felix,  Pros.  v.  City  Council 
of  Atlantic  City  (34  X.  J.  L.  (5 
Vr.)    99   [1869]),  306.  392,  395. 

State  ex  rel.  Lavin  v.  Bacon  ( 14  S. 
D.  284,  85  X.  W.  225),  214. 

State  on  Application  of  Alter  v. 
Bader  (56  0.  S.  718,  47  X.  E.  564 
[i897]),  1418. 

State  ex  rel.  v.  Baker  (55  O.  S.  1,44 
X".  E.  516    [1896]),  189. 

Sta/te  of  Washington  on  the  Relation 
of  Ileman  ex  rel.  v.  City  of  Bal- 
lard (16  Wash.  418.  47*Pac.  970 
[1897]),  244,  246,  965,  1165,  1168. 
1172. 

State,  Frevert,  Pros.  v.  flavor  and 
Council  of  the  (  ity  of  Bnyonne 
(63  X.  J.  L.  (34  Vr. )  202.  42  At). 
773  [1899]),  665,  677,  699.  709. 
956,    1408. 

State,  Humphreys,  Pros.  •  v.  Mayor 
and  Council  of  the  City  of  Ba-  - 
onne  (60  X.  J.  L.  406,  38  Atl.  761 
[1897),   554.   559,    644,    723. 


State,  Central  X'ew  Jersey  Land  & 
Improvement  Co.  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne 
56  X.  J.  L.  (27  Vr.)  297,  28  Atl. 
713  [1893]),  187.  324,  553,  642, 
699. 

State,  Muller,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne 
(55  X".  J.  L.  (26  Vn)  102.  25  Atl. 
267    [1892]),   560,   631,   895. 

State,  Morris,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Bayonne  (53  X.  J.  L.  (24  Vr.) 
299,  1  Mun.  Corp.  Cas.  299,  21  Atl. 
453    [1891]),  633,  651. 

State,  Central  Railroad  Company  of 
X'^ew  Jersey,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Bayonne  (51  X'.  J.  L.  (22  Vr.) 
428,  17  Atl.  971  [1889]),  63,  661, 
755,    906,    1029. 

State,  White,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne 
(49  X.  J.  L.  (20  Vr.)  311.  f-  Atl. 
295  [1887]),  263,  308,  426.  744. 
763,  777,  824. 

State,  Bramhall,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  the  City  of  Bayonne  ( 35  X^.  J. 
L.  (6  Vr.)"  476  [1872]),  280,  527, 
840. 

State  ex  rel.  v.  Beacom  (66  0.  S. 
491,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  599,  64  X. 
E.  427   [1902]),   174,   189,  1001. 

State,  Conklin,  Pros.  v.  Bergen  Coun- 
ty Circuit  Court  (64  X".  J.  L.  (35 
Vr.)  536,  45  Atl.  981  [1900]), 
280. 

State,  Vreeland,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Town  of  Bergen  (34  X.  J.  L. 
(5  Vr.)    438    [1871]),  973. 

State,  Gleason,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Ber- 
gen (33  X.  J.  L.  (4  Vr.)  72 
[1868]),  279,  837,  838,  884,  894. 
906. 

State,  Ackerman.  Pros.  v.  Town  ot 
Bergen,  County  of  Hudson  (33  X. 
J.  L.  (4  Vr.)  39  [1868]),  279, 
837,  844.  878. 

State,  'S'an  Horno,  Pros.  v.  Town  of 
Bergen  (30  *X.  J.  L.  (1  Vroom) 
307  [1863]),  483,  494,  560,  639. 
672,  675,  690,  692,  723,  885,  967. 


CCXll 


TABI.E   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State,  Culver,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Ber- 
gen, in  the  County  of  Hudson  ( 29 
N.  J.  L.  (5  Dutcii.)  266  [1861]), 
544,  560,  639,  672,  690,  693,  723, 
885. 

State,  Wain,  Pros.  v.  Common  Coun- 
cil of  Beverly  (53  N.  J.  L.  (24 
Vr.)  560,  22  Atl.  340  [1891]), 
1050,   1081,   1113,   1408. 

State  of  Nebraska  ex  rel.  City  of 
Omaha  v.  Birkhauser  (37  Xtb. 
521,  56  K  w.  303  [1893]),  314, 
78L  789,  800. 

State,  Brittin,  Pros.  v.  Blake  (36  X. 
J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  442  [1872]),  93,  97, 
110,  142,  227,  339,  340,  420,  1347, 
1356. 

State,  Brittin,  Pros.  v.  Blake  (35  X. 
J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  208  [1871]).  143, 
340,  549,  665,  667,  674,  1347. 

State  V.  Board  of  Trustees  (121 
Wis.  44,  98  N.  W.  954  [1904]), 
191. 

State  V.  Brewster  (39  0.  S.  653 
[1883]),   189. 

State  ex  rel.  Scotter  v.  Brill  (5S 
Minn.  152,  59  N.  W.  CS9  [1894]), 
694. 

State  of  Washington  on  the  Relation 
of  Witherop  v.  Brown  ( 19  Wash. 
3:^3,  53  Pac.  548  [1898]),  355, 
1469,    1473. 

State,  Ilirkpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Streets  and  Sewers  in 
City  cf  Brunswick  (42  N.  J.  L. 
(13  Vr.)    510    [1880]),  5. 

State  V.  Bury  (101  Minn.  424,  112 
N.  W.   534   [1907]),  781,  785. 

State  V.  Butler  (79  Tenn.  (11  Lea) 
418    [1883]),  44,   1483. 

State,  Aprey,  Pros.  v.  Cannon  (33 
N.  J.  L.  (4  Vr.)  218  [1868]),  664, 
690,  8"6,  894. 

State  of  Washin-rton  ex  rel.  Bock  v. 
Cass  (42  Wash.  658,  85  Pac.  423 
[1906]),  308,  915. 

State,  M'Clcskey,  Pros.  v.  fhamber- 
lin  (37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  358 
[1875]),  89,  250,  330,  666,  667, 
711. 

State,  City  of  Elizabeth  v.  The  Chan- 
cellor ("si  N.  J.  L.  (22  Vr.)  414, 
17  Atl.  942   [1889]),  1068. 


State  ex  rel.  Horlbeck  v.  City  Coun- 
cil of  Charleston  (12  Rich.   (S.  C.) 
702    [I860]),  44,   118,  302,  309. 
State  ex  rel.  v.  C-incinnati    ( 52  0.  S. 

419,  40  N.  E.  508   [1895]),   189. 
State  V.  City  of  Cincinnati   ( 23  0.  S. 

445    [1873]),   189. 
State  ex  rel.  Attorney-General  v.  City 
of  Cincinnati   (20  O.  S.  18  [1870]), 

189. 
State,    Skinkle,    Pros.    v.    Inhabitants 

of   rownship  of  Clinton,  in  Countv 

of   Essex    (39    N.    J.    L.    (10    Vr.) 

656    [1877]),    280,    291,    335,    475, 

549,  504,  654,  775,  923,  1282,  1405, 
549,  564,  654,  755,  923,  1277,  1282, 

1405. 
State   ex   rel.   v.    Commissioners    (54 

0.   S.   333,   43   N.   E.   587    [1896]), 

189,  252,  779. 
State  V.  Commissioners  (37  0.  S.  526 

[1882]),   322,   1469,   1502. 
State,  Ward,  Pros.  v.  Commissioners 

of  Streets  and  Sewers   (49  X.  J.  L. 

(20  Vr.)   552,  10  Atl.  109  [1887]), 

690. 
State  ex  rel.  Childs  v.  Copeland    (66 

Minn.    315,    61    Am.    St.    Rep.   410, 

34    L.    R.    A.    77/,    69    X.    W.    27 

[1896]),    81,    185,    215. 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  Kansas  v.  Cor- 

rigan  Consolidated  Street  Railway 

Co.   (85  Mo.  263),  603. 
State     ex     rel.     Attorney-General     v. 

Covington    (29   0.   S.   102    [1876]), 

197. 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Cowles   (64  0.  S.  162, 

59  xs.  E.  895   [1901]),  189. 
State,    Winans,    Pros.    v.    Crane    (36 

X.  J.  L.   (7  Vr.)   394  [1873]),  280, 
State    ex    rel.    Witte    v.    Curtis    (86 

Wis.   140,  56  X.  W.  475),  335. 
State   on   the   Relation   of   Lingenfel- 

ter    v.    Danville    &    Xorth    Salem 

Gravel    Road    Company     (33    Ind. 

133    [1870]),    322,    466,    554,    629, 

645,  1477. 
State  V.  Dean  (23  X.  J.  L.  (3  Zab.) 

335  [1852]),  392,  395,  615,  721. 
State  v.  Digby  (5  Blackf.  (Ind.) 

543  [1841]),  72. 


TABLE    OF    CAKES 


CCXlll 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State  V.  District  Court  of  Blue  Earth 
■County  (102  Minn.  482.  113  X.  W. 
697,  114  X.  W.  654  [1907]),  301. 
483,   507,   878,   905,   990. 

State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Shannon 
V.  Judges  of  District  Court  of 
Eleventh  Judicial  District  (51 
Minn.  539,  53  X.  W.  800,  55  X. 
W.   122    [1892]),  367,  862,  863. 

State  ex  rel.  City  of  ^Minneapolis  v. 
District  Court  of  Fourth  Judicial 
District  (83  Minn.  170,  86  X.  W. 
15   [1901]),  615,  617. 

State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  ]\Ierrick 
V.  District  Cotirt  of  Hennepin 
County  (33  Minn.  235,  22  X.  W. 
625  [1885]),  79,  158,  225,  245, 
260,  263,  273,  615,  666,  668,  689, 
755,  761,  763,  920.  927,  1393,  1394. 

State  V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 
County,  98  Minn.  63,  107  X.  W. 
726   [i906]),  414,  666,  674,  956. 

State  ex  rel.  Eaton  v.  District  Court 
of  Ramsey  County  ( 95  Minn.  503, 
104  X.  W.  553  [1905]),  549,  550, 
648,  671,  693,  699,  735,  743,  744, 
967,  969,  970. 

State  ex  rel.  St.  Anthony  Park  Xorth 
Trust  Co.  V.  District  Court  of 
Ramsey  County  (95  Minn.  183, 
103  X.  W.  88l"  [1905]),  952,  956, 
962. 

State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County  ( 95 
Minn.  70,  103  X.  W.  744  [1905]), 
142,  206,  549,  555,  556,  561,  619, 
743,  745,  969,  970,  1333. 

State  ex  rel  McKune  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County  (90 
Minn.  540,  97  X.  W.  425  [1903]), 
393,   400,   563. 

State  ex  rel.  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ramsey  County  ( 90 
Minn.  294,  96  X.  W.  737  [1903]), 
735,  743,  747. 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ramsey  County  (89 
Minn.  292.  94  X.  W.  870  [1903]). 
323,  381,  781,  784. 

State  ex  rel.  Ryan  v.  District  Court 
of  Ramsey  County  (87  Minn.  146, 
91  X.  W.  300  [1902]),  86,  215, 
223,  359,  776,  1394. 


State     ex     rel.     Wheeler     v.     District 
Court     of      Ramsey      County      (80 
Minn.  293,  83  X.  W.   183    [1900]), 
314,   317,   373,   374,   380,   381,   464, 
519,  604,  640,  671,  693. 
State     ex     rel.     Gotzian     v.     District 
Court     of     Ramsey     County      ( 77 
Minn.  248,  79  X.  iv.  971    [1899]), 
311,  414,  956,  967,  973. 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ramsey  County   ( 75 
Minn.  292,  77  X.  W."  968    [1899]), 
11,  67,  356,  665,  666,  925. 
State    of   Minnesota   ex   rel.    City   of 
St.     Paul     V.     District     Court     ot 
Ramsey  County    (72  Minn.  226,  71 
Am.    St.    Rep.   480,   75   X.    W.   224 
[1898]),  81,  185,  215,  483. 
State  ex  rel.  Minnesota  Transfer  Co. 
V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  Coun- 
ty   (68   Minn.   242,   71   X.  W.   27), 
596,  614,  693,  886,  956,  972. 
State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel.    Thomp- 
son   V.    District    Court    of    Ramsey 
County    (51   Minn.   401,   53   X.   W. 
714   [1892]),  771,   1029,  1183. 
State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Powell  v. 
District  Court   of   Ramsey   County 
(47     Minn.    406,    50    X. '  W.     476 
[1891]),    488,    555.    568,    600,    709, 
1271. 
State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel.    Chapin 
V.      District      Court      of      Ramsey 
County    (40  Minn.  5,  41   X.  W.  235 
[1889]),  313,  428,  771,   1035. 
State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel.    Burger 
V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  Coun- 
ty   (33   Minn.   295,   23   X.  "w.   222 
[1885]),  158,  2-14,  359. 
State   of   Minnesota  ex    rel.   Lewis   v. 
District   Court   of   Ramsey   County 
(33     Minn.     164,     22     X^     W.     295 
[1885]),    266,    436,    490,    550.    670, 
822,  880.  907. 
State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel.    Benz    v. 
District  Court   of   Ramsey    County 
(32     Minn.     181.     19     X.     W.     732 
[1884]),   192,  574,   603,  604. 
State  of  ^Minnesota   ex   rel.   St.   Paul 
City  Railway  Company  v.  District 
Court     of     Ramsey     County      (31 
Minn.  354,   17  X^.  W.  954   [1884]), 
601.  630. 


TAB1.E   GP   C.VSi^S. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Cunning- 
ham V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 
County  (29  Minn.  62,  11  X.  \V. 
133  [1882]),  11,  549,  556,  670, 
671,  690,   693,  699,   1306. 

State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Merchant 
V.  District  Court  for  St.  Louis 
County  (66  Minn.  161,  68  X.  W. 
860  [i896]),  67,  70,  158,  356,  622, 
665,   719. 

State  of  ^Minnesota  ex  rel.  City  of 
Duluth  V.  District  Court  of  St. 
Louis  County  (61  Minn.  542,  64 
X.  W.  190  [1895]),  86,  158,  185, 
526,  624,  666,  927,  941,  954,  1015, 
1035. 

State  of  Xebraska  ex  rel.  Abbott  v. 
Board  ^f  County  Commissioners  of 
Dodge  County  '  ( 8  Xeb.  124,  30 
Am.  Eep.  819  [1879]),  103,  105, 
147,  245,  261. 

State,  Kean,  Pros.  v.  Driggs  Drain- 
age Company  ( 45  X.  J.  L.  ( 16 
Vr.)  91  [1883]),  113,  149,  255, 
340,  666,  667,  690,  709,  779. 

State,  Penwarden,  Pros.  v.  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  the  Borough  of 
Dunellen  (50  X.  J.  L.  (21  Vroom) 
565,  15  Atl.  Rep.  529  [1888]), 
838. 

State,  King,  Pros.  v.  Duryea  (45  N. 
J.  L.  (16  Vr.)  258  [1883]),  279, 
548,  617,  664. 

State,  Hoeltzel,  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants 
of  East  Orange  (50  X.  J.  L.  (21 
Vr.)  354,  12  Atl.  911  [1888]),  231, 
279,  776. 

State  ex  rel.  Putnam  v.  Egan  (64 
Minn.  331,  67  X.  W.  77  [1896]), 
9,  965,  967,   1033. 

State,  Xorris,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth (51  X.  J.  L.  (22'Vr.)  485, 
18  Atl.  302  [1889]),  80,  648,  775, 
967,  968,  1483. 

State  ex  rel.  Benedictine  Sisters  of 
Elizabeth  v.  City  of  Elizabeth  (50 
X.  J.  L.  (21  Vr.)  347,  13  Atl.  5 
[1888]),  589,   1409. 

State,  Watson,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliz- 
abeth (42  X.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  508 
[1880]),  475,  529,  973. 

State,  Forbes,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 


beth    (42    X.    J.    L.     (13    Vr.)     56 
[1880]),  758,  760,  771,  1029. 

State,  Wetmore,  Pros,  v,  City  of 
Elizabeth  (41  X.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.) 
152  [1879]),  666,  690,  691,  748, 
918,  1408,  1409. 

State,  Watson,  Pros.  v.  .City  of  Eliz- 
abeth (40  X.  J.  L.  (11  Vr.)  278 
[1878]),   81,   119,   666,   667,   709. 

State,  Kellogg,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliz- 
abeth (40  X.  J.  L.  (11  Vroom) 
274    [1878]),    633. 

State,  Parker,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth (39  X.  J.  L.  (10  Vroom) 
689   [1877]),  886. 

iState,  Kellogg,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliz- 
abeth (37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  353 
[1875]),  745,  755,  913. 

State,  Xew  Jersey  Railroad  &  Trans- 
portation Company,  Pros.  v.  City 
of  Elizabeth  (37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.') 
330  [1875]),  418,  549,  563,  594, 
598,   614. 

State,  Baker,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth (37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vroom)  142 
[1874]),  42,  474,  475,  563. 
i  State,  Clark,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth (32  X.  J.  L.  (3  Vr.)  357 
[1867]),  280,  739,  754. 

State,  Hand,  Pros.  v.  City  Council 
of  the  City  of  Elizabeth  (31  X.  J. 
L.  (2  Vr.)  547  [1864]),  416,  423, 
753,  771,  906,  1319. 

State  V.  Council  of  City  of  Eliz- 
abeth (30  X.  J.  L.  (i  Vr.)  365 
[1863]),  468. 

State  for  use  of  Cram  v.  Elliott  (32 
Ind.  App.  605,  70  X.  E.  397 
[1903]),   340,   637,   1147. 

State,  Xorthern  Railroad  Company 
of  Xew  Jersey,  Pros.  v.  Englewood 
(62  X.  J.  L.  (33  Vr.)  188,  40  Atl. 
Rep.   653    [1898]),    872. 

State,  Lydecker,  Pros.  v.  Drainage 
and  Water  Commissioners  of  the 
Township  of  Englewood  (41  X.  J. 
L.    (12   Vr.)    154    [1879]),   248. 

State  ex  rel.  Spencer  v.  Ensign  ( 55 
Minn.  278,  56  X.  W.  1006  [1893]), 
356,  359,  909. 

State  V.  Ensign  ( 54  Minn.  372,  56  N. 
W.  41 ) ,  359. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXV 


[References  iire  to  sections.] 


State,  Aldridge,   Pros.   v.   Essex   Pub- 
lic  Road   Board    ( 4S    X.   J.    L.    (19 
Vr.)    366,  5  At!.  7S4   [1686]),  412, 
666. 
State,    Speer,    Pros.    v.    Essex    Public 
Road  Board   (47  X.  J.  L.   (18  Vr.) 
101   [1885] ),  412,  666. 
State,  Aldridge,  Pros.  v.  Essex  Pub- 
lic  Road   Board    (46   X.  J.   L.    (17 
Vr.)     126    [1884]),    313,    425,    426, 
557,  631,  066.  !)50,  958,   1408. 
State,    Ropes,    Pros.    v.    Essex    Public 
Road  Board    (37  X.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.) 
335    [1875]).    428,    661,    91)9,    1015, 
1019,    1408. 
State,   Kilbuni.   Pros.   v.   Essex   Pub- 
lic  Road   Board    (37    X.   J.   L.    (8 
V"r.)   273   [1874]),  639.  723.  885. 
State,  Day,   Pros.   v.  Mayor   and   Al- 
dermen   of    the    Borough    of    Fair- 
view  in  tlie  County  of  Bergen    (62 
X.    J.    L.    621.    43    Atl.    Rep.    578 
[1898]),  787,  1282. 
State  of  Texas   v.   Farmer    ( 94   Tex. 

232,  59  S.  W.  541    [1900]),  3. 

State    ex    rel.    Kansas    City    v.    Field 

(107     Mo.     445.     17     S."     W.     896 

[1891]),   1471,   1472. 

State   ex    rel.    Kansas   City    v.    Field 

(99  Mo.  352,   12   S.  W.  ^802),  215. 

State  V.  Fisk   (15  X.  D.  219,   107  X. 

W.  191   [1906]),  340,  1430. 
State  ex  rel.  Stifel   v.   Flad    (26  Mo. 

App.  500   [1887]),   1435,   1518. 
State  ex  rel.   Flint   v.   City  of   Fond 
du  Lac   (42  Wis.  287   [1877]),  125. 
728,  737. 
State   V.    Foster    (94   Minn.   412,    103 
X.    W.    14    [1905]),   53,    223,    234, 
555,  737,  829. 
State   ex    rel.   v.    Board    of    Commi3> 
.    sioners  of  Franklin  County   (35  0. 
S.  458   [1880]).   174,   189,  252,  293. 
State,  Sigler,   Pros.   v.   Fuller    (34  X. 
J.  L.   (5  Vr.)   227   [1870]),  5,  8,  9, 
13.   35,   89,   95,   96,    111,   420,    540, 
553,   6.34,   667,    1404. 
State,   Becker,   Pros.    v.   Gardner    (34 
X.  J.  L.    (5  Vr.)    327   [1870]),  696. 
699,  956,  962. 
State  ex  rel.  Ilolden  v.  Gill    (84  Mo. 
248    [1884]),    308,    1366. 


State  ex  rel.  Hallauer  v.  Gosnell 
(116  Wis.  606,  61  L.  R.  A.  33,  93 
X'.  W.  542    [1903]),  353.   1436. 

State  of  Maryland  on  Relation  of 
McClellan  v.  Graves  (19  Md.  351, 
81   Am.   Dec.  639    [1862]  i,   1519. 

State  of  Ohio  ex  rel.  Durner  v.  Gray- 
don  (6  Ohio  C.  C.  034  [1892]), 
332. 

State,  Herrman,  Pros.  v.  Town  of 
Guttenberg  (02  X'^.  J.  L.  (33  Vr.) 
605,  43   Atl.   703    [1898]),   7. 

State,  Kohler,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Gut- 
tenberg (38  X.  .J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  419 
[1876]),  468,  470,  472,  475,  524, 
526,  677,  690,  691,  693,  699,  735, 
819,  894. 

State,  Van  Solinger,  Pros.  v.  Town 
of  Harrison  (39  X.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.) 
51  [1870]),  693,  699.  745,  894,  906, 
1407. 

State  of  Connecticut  v.  City  of 
Hartford  (50  Conn.  89,  47  Am. 
Rep.   622    [1882]),  580,  581. 

State  ex  rel.  Latimer  v.  Henry  (28 
Wash.  38,  68  Pac.  368),  202* 

State  ex  rel.  Donnelly  v.  Hobe  (106 
Wis.  411,  82  X,  W.  336),  1095, 
1114. 

State,  Stewart,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  .etc., 
of  Hoboken  (58  X.  ,T.  L.  "(29  Vr.) 
696,  36  Atl.   1129   [1896]),  2. 

State,  Stewart,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  Cit.v  of 
Hoboken  (57  X\  J.  L.  (28  Vr.) 
330,  31  Atl.  278  [1894]  i.  2.  63, 
313,    735,    744,    1394.    140.i.    1408. 

State,  Board,  Pros.  v.  City  of  IT  )bo- 
ken  (36  X.  J.  L.  (7  \  r. )  378 
[1873]),  542,  731.  900,  907,  909. 

State,  Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement 
Company,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
Hoboken  ( 36  X.  .T.  L.  (7  Vr. ) 
291).  34,  280,  005.  606.  677,  690, 
692,  894. 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Hoffman  (35  0.  S. 
435  [1880]).  108.  189,  029.  1469. 
State,  Green,  Pros.  v.  Hotnling  (44 
(X'.  J.  L.  (15  Vr.)  347  [1882]; 
anirmed  46  X.  ,L  L.  (17  Vr.)  207 
[1884]),    187.   381,  563.   580,   1015. 


CCXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State,  Freeholders  of  County  of  Hud- 
son, Pros.  V.  Inferior  Court  of 
Common  Pleas  of  County  of  Hud- 
son  (42  X.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  608 
[1880]),   248,   278,  663. 

State  V.  Hudson  County  Avenue  Com- 
missioners (37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.) 
12  [1874]),  263,  434,  666,  696. 

State,  Moran,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Hud- 
son (34  X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  25 
[18C9]),  392,  395,  615. 

State,  Wilson,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Hudson  (32  X.  J.  L.  (3  Vr.)  3G5 
[1867]),  323,  531,  1406. 

State,  Ogden,  Pros.  v.  Town  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  City  of  Hudson 
( 29  X.  J.  L.  (5  Dutcher )  475 
[1861]),  735,  739,  981,   1026. 

State,  Zabriskie,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
•Common  Council  of  Hudson  City 
(29  X.  J.  L.  (5  Dutch.)  115 
[I860]),  670,  690,  693,  099. 

State,  Ogden,  Pros.  v.  flavor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Hudson  (29  X.  J.  L.  (5  Dutcher) 
104  [I860]),  266,  501.  690,  693. 
699,  781,  800. 

State,  Water  Commission's  of  Jer- 
sey City,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  City  of  Hud- 
son (27  X.  J.  L.  (3  Dutcher)  214 
[1858]),   639,   690,  693,   699,  884. 

State  V.  Hudson  (44  O.  S.  137,  5  X. 
E.  225),  174.  189,  1001. 

State  of  Washington  on  the  Rela- 
tion of  Donofrio  v.  Humes  ( 34 
Wash.  347,  75  Pac.  348  [1904]). 
1519. 

State  ex  rel.  Ransom  v.  Irey  ( 42 
Xeb.  186,  60  X.  W.  001).  45.  1048, 
1115,    1173. 

State  V.  Jackman  (69  X.  H.  318,  42 
L.  R.  A.  438,  41  Atl.  347  [1898]), 
58,  457. 

State  ex  rel.  Wilcox  v.  Jackson  (IIS 
Ind.  553,  21  X.  E.  321  [1888]), 
271,  928,  1008. 

State  of  Florida  ex  rel.  City  of  Jack- 
sonville V.  Jacksonville  Street  Ry. 
Company  (29  Fla.  590,  10  So.  590 
[1892]),   437. 


State,  Moran,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  (58  X.  J. 
L.  (29  Vr.)  653,  35  Atl.  950 
[1896]),    1379. 

State,  !Moran,  Pros.  v.  Mavor  and 
Aldermen  of  .Jersey  C  ity  ( 58  X.  J. 
L.  (29  Vr.)  144,  35  Atl.  284 
[1895]),  570,  819,  923,  1281. 

State,  Walls,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  (55  X. 
J.  L.  (26  Vroom)  511,  26  Atl.  Rep. 
828   [1893]),  921,  1395 

State,  Provident  Institution  for  Sav- 
ings in  Jersey  City,  Pros.  v.  May- 
or, etc.,  of  Jersey  City  (52  X.  J. 
L.  (23  Vr.)  490,  19  Atl.  1096 
[1890]).  523,  570,  779.  £01,  1015. 
1023. 

State,  Culver,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  C  ity  ( 45  X.  J. 
L.  (16  Vr.)  256  [1883]),  6,  20, 
349,  608,  666,  708,  717,  718,  1394, 
1408. 

State,  McCarty,  Pros.  v.  ^Mayor,  etL-.. 
of  Jersey  City  (44  X.  J.  L.  (15 
Vroom)  "l36   [1882]),  880,   1196. 

State,  Vreeland,  Pros.  v.  Ma.yor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  (43  X.  J. 
L.  (14  Vr.)  135"  [1881]  ).  6.  20, 
349,   354,  608,   666. 

State,  Xew  Jersey  Midland  Railroad 
Co.,  Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  Jersey  City  "(42  X.  J.  L.  (13 
Vr.)  97  '[1880]),  42,  594,  596.  612, 
614,  1282. 

State,  Henderson,  Pros.  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Jersey  City  (41  X.  J.  L. 
(12  Vr.)  489  [1879]),  324.  560, 
563,   619.   771.   1029. 

State,  United  Xew  Jersey  Railroad 
&  Canal  Company  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  (41  X. 
J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  471),  6,  349.  608, 
666. 

State,  Cronin.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  ( 38  X. 
J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  410  [1876]).  420, 
443,  463,   699,  717,  860. 

State,  Harris,  Pros.  v.  Mayor.  Alder- 
men, etc.,  of  Jersey  City  1 38  X. 
J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  85  [1875]).  223, 
280.    9.50. 


I 


TABLE  OF    CASES. 


CGXVll 


[Refpreiiees  are  to  sections.] 


State,  Van  Tassel,  Pros.  v.  flavor 
and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  (37 
N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  128  [IS?/]),  5. 
34,  323,  420,  443,  605,  U!)9,  713, 
717. 

State,  Baxter,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  ( 3(>  X.  J. 
L.  (7  Vr.)  188  .[1873]'),  090,  ti!)4, 
714,   1004,   1196. 

State,  Morris  and  Essex  Railroad 
Company,  Pros.  v.  .Jersey  City  ( 3o 
N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  5(5  fl872]),  4, 
549,   578,  596,  665,   ijm,   mi. 

State,  Wakeman,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  (35  X.  .L 
L.  (6  Vr.)  455  [1872]),  1408, 
1410. 

Stat?,  Evans,  Pros.  v.  ^layor  and 
Common  Council  of  Jersey  City 
(35  X.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  381  [1872]), 
G90,  692,  894,  985,  986,  1174,  1196. 
1204,   1408. 

State,  Gregory,  Pros.  v.  flavor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City  ( 34  X. 
J.  L.  (o  Vr.)  390  [1871]),  308, 
313.  549,  616,  721. 

State,  Fiacre,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  .Jersey  City 
(34  X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  277  [1870]), 
381,  464,  563. 

State  V.  Jersey  City  (31  X.  J.  L.  {i 
Vr.)  575  [1865]"),  263,  266,  294, 
835. 

State,  Malone,  Pros.  v.  Water  Com- 
missioners of  .Jersey  City  ( 30  X. 
J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  247  [1863]  ).  1015, 
1408. 

State,  Vanderbec-k.  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  Jersey 
City  (29  X.  J.  L.  (5  Dutch.)  441 
[1861]),  381,  393,  400,  444.  532. 
542,  563.  639,  723.  909. 

State,  .\Ialone.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  .Jersey  City 
(28  X.  J.  L.  (4  Dutcher)  500 
[1S60]),  280.  432.  570,  670.  690. 
092,  699,  740.  7-50.  7.52,  768,  779. 
784,  800.  894. 

State  ex  rel.  v.  ^Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  .Jersey  City  (27  X.  J. 
T..  (3  Dutclier)  536  [1859]),  754. 
875,   913. 


!"  tate,  Townsend,  Pros.  v.  ilayor  and 
Common  Council  of  .Jersey  City 
(26  X.  -J.  L.  (2  Dutch.)  444 
[1857]),  229,  397.  431.  753,  771, 
775,  884,   1015,   1021.   1029. 

State,  Mann,  Pros.  v.  flavor  and 
Common  Council  of  Jersey  City 
(24  X.  J.  L.  (4  Zab.)  662  [1855]  ), 
53.  119.  130,  147,  273,  278,  313, 
549,  631,  646,  699,  720,  726,  729, 
732,   745,   862. 

State  ex  rel.  French  v.  Johnson  ( 105 
Ind.  463,  5  X.  E.  553  [1885]), 
108,  134,  207,  221,  267,  375,  461, 
773,  1347,  1356. 

State  ex  rel.  City  of  Putte  v.  John- 
son (16  Mont.  570.  41  Pac.  706 
[1895]),   3. 

State  ex  rel.  Knisely  v.  .Jones  (66  0. 
S.  453,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  592,  64 
X.  E.  424   [1902]),   174,   189,  1001. 

State  ex  rel.  Hill  v.  Judges  of  Court 
of  Appeals  (46  La.  Ann.  1292.  16 
So.  219),  8,  43,  46,  47.  1.55.  212, 
218,  343,  711,  1369. 

State  -of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Sliannon 
V.  Judges  of  District  Court  of 
11th  Judicial  District  (51  ^Minn. 
539,  53  X.  W.  800,  55  X.  W.  122 
[1892]),   694. 

State  ex  rel.  Chicago.  Burlington  & 
Quincy  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of 
Kansas  City  (89  Mo.  34,  14  S.  \V. 
515  [1886]),  70,  113,  308,  425.  613, 
614. 

State  of  Ivansas  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  City 
of  Kansas  City  (60  Kan.  518,  57 
Pac.  118   [1899]),  780.  781. 

State  ex  rel.  Allen  v.  Kansas  City. 
St.  Joseph  &  Council  Blufl's  Rail- 
road Company  (116  Mo.  15.  22  S. 
W.  611   [189.3]).  3. 

State,  Xew  York  &  Creenwood  Lake 
Railway  Co.,  Pros.  v.  Board  of 
Townshij)  Connrittee  of  Township 
of  Kearney  (55  X.  J.  L.  (26  Vr. ) 
463.  26  Atl.  800  [1893]).  80.  82. 
696. 

Stite.  Sanford.  Pros.  v.  The  Board 
nf  Townsliip  Committee  of  the 
I'ownship  of  I^earney  (51  X  .J.  L. 
'•22  Vr.)  473.  18  Atl.  349  [18S9]), 
".")  •.   0''7. 


CCXVlll 


TABLE   OF    C.VSES 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State,  Sanford,  Pros.  v.  Township  of 
Kearny  (48  N.  J.  L.  (19  Vr.)  125, 
4  Atl.  442   [1886]),  958,  964,  1406. 

Sitate  ex  rel.  Magnet  v.  Kemp  ( 141 
Ind.  125,  40  X.  E.  661  [1894]), 
363. 

State  V.  Kilburn   ( —  Conn.  ,  69 

Atl.    1028    [1908]),   581,   1068. 

State  ex  rel.  Boycott  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  La  Crosse  ( 107 
Wis.  654,  84  X.  W.  242  [1900]), 
191,  862. 

State  ex  rel.  Schintgen  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  La 
Crosse  (101  Wis.  208,  77  N.  W. 
167  [1898]),  324,  1015,  1348,  1403. 
1436,   1443,   1506. 

State  V.  Laverack  ( 34  N.  J.  L.  ( 5 
V-.)   207),  412. 

State  ex  rel.  Chouteau  v.  Leffingwell 
(54  Mo.  458  [1873]),  634. 

State,  Dobbins,  Pros.  v.  Board  ol 
Commissioners  of  the  Long  Brancli 
Police  Sanitary  and  Improvement 
Commission  (59  X.  J.  L.  (30  Vr.) 
146,  36  Atl.  482   [1896]),  187. 

State  ex  rel.  Wilson  v.  Longstreet 
(38  X.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  312  [1876]). 
639,  644,  645,  723,  909,  1471. 

State  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Love  (37  X. 
J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  261  [1874]),  475, 
968. 

State  of  Washington  on  the  Relation 
of  Craver  v.  McConnaughey  (31 
Wash.  207,  71  Pac.  770  [1903]), 
1069. 

State  V.  McCrillis   (—  R.  I.  .  66 

Atl.  301    [1907]),  58. 

State  V.  McMahon  (76  Conn.  97,  55 
Atl.  591    [1903]),  58,  371,  457. 

State  V.  Trustees  of  Macalester  Col- 
lege (87  Minn.  165,  91  X.  W.  484 
[1902]),  86,  118,  350,  565,  590, 
613. 

State  ex  rel.  Keith  v.  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Michigan  City 
(138  Ind.  455,  37  X.  E.  1041 
[1894]).  264,  J90,  554,  555,  602, 
603,  604.  640,  837.  874. 

State  V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R.  Co. 
(39  Minn.  219),  359. 

State    ex    rel.    City    of    Columbus    v. 


Mitchell     (31    0.    S.    592    [1877]), 

189,  440,  587,   775,   777,   1012. 
State    ex    rel.    Monroe    Gravel    Road 

Co.  V.  Stout  (61  Ind.  143  [1878]), 
86,  1113. 

State  V.  Morris  (47  La.  Ann  1660,  IS 
So.    710),   372. 

State  V.  Moss  (44  Wash.  91,  86 
Pac.  1129  [1906]),  223,  250,  313, 
550,  555,  622. 

State  ex  rel.  Mayfield  v.  Myers  ( 100 
Ind.    487    [1884]),    1244,    1251. 

State  ex  rel.  Young  v.  City  of  Xeo- 
desha  (3  Kan.  App.  319,  45  Pac. 
122  [1896]),  293,  415,  506,  507, 
525,  1430. 

Sta4;e,  Ward,  Pros.  v.  Commissioners 
of  Streets  and  Sevpers  of  Xevv 
Brunswick  (49  X.  J.  L.  (20  Vr.  I 
552,  10  Atl.  109  [1887]),  570,  894, 
1405. 

State,  Robins,  Pros.  v.  Commission- 
ers of  Streets  and  Sewers  in  the 
City  of  Xew  Brunswick  (44  X.  .1. 
L.    (15  Vr.)    116   [1882]),  420,  441. 

State,  Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Coram i>- 
sioners  of  Streets  and  Sewers  in 
City  of  Xew  Brunswick  (42  X. 
J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  510  [1880]),  9,  IS, 
92,  95,  96,  118,  323,  420,  441,  6(>3. 
1408,    1409. 

Sitate,  ex  rel.  Van  Cleef,  Pros.  v. 
Commissioners  of  Streets  and  Sew 
ers  of  Xew  Brunswick  (38  X.  J. 
L,  (9  Vr.)  320  [1876]),  1409. 
1410. 

State,  Xew  Brunswick  Rubber  Co., 
Pros.  V.  Commissioners  of  Streets 
and  Sewers  in  the  City  of  Xew 
Brunswick    (38   X.   J.   L.    (9   Vr.) 

190,  20  Am.  Rep.  380  [1876]),  665, 
696,    699,    1032. 

State  V.  Xew  Brunswick  ( 34  X.  J. 
L.    (5  Vr.)    395),  306. 

State,  Parker,  Pros,  v.  City  of  Xew 
Brunswick  (32  X.  J.  L.'  (3  Vr.) 
548    [1867]),  397,  431,  438. 

State.  Parker,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  the  City  of  Xew  Brunswick  (30 
X.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  395  [1863]),  390, 
397,  431,  862.   867.  1398. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCXIX 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State  ex  rel.  City  of  Xew  Orleans 
V.  New  Orleans  City  &  Lake  Rail- 
road Company  (42  La.  Ann.  550, 
7  So.  606  [1890]),  60,  166,  167, 
599,   605,    1162. 

State  of  Connecticut  v.  New  York, 
New  Haven  &  Hartford  Railroad 
Company  (60  Conn.  326,  22  Atl. 
765  [1891]),  3. 

State,  Protestant  Foster  Home  of 
City  of  Newark,  Pros.  v.  Mayor, 
Aldermen  and  Common  Council  of 
■City  of  Newark  (52  N.  J.  L.  (23 
Vr.')  138,  18  Atl.  572  [1889]), 
968. 

State,  Moimt  Pleasant  Cemetery  Co., 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  Newark  (.50  N.  J.  L.  (21 
Vr.)  66,  11  Atl.  147  [1887]),  166. 
172,  592,  617. 

State,  Jelliff,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Newark  (48  N.  J.  L.  (19  Vr.)  101, 
2  Atl.  627  [1886]),  187,  381,  416, 
423,  464,  719,  779,  856,  813.  923, 
1277,  1282. 

State,  Righter,  Pros.  v.  ilayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Newark  (45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vr.)"^  104 
[1883]),    559.    644,    663,    723,    961. 

State,  Peckham,  Pros.  v.  Ma.yor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  Cit.v  of 
Newark  (43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.) 
576  [1881]!,  143,  229,  414,  777, 
983,   1337. 

State,  Agens.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Newark  (37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.  )"415, 
18  Am.  Rep.  729  [1874]).  11,  13, 
92,  95,  172,  323,  420,  443,  549,  663. 
665,   667,   690,   709,   717. 

State,  Protestant  Foster  Home  So- 
ciety, Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Newark  (36 
N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  478,  13  Am.  Rep. 
464  [1873]  ).  42.  589,  614. 

State  ex  rel.  Little.  Pros.  v.  flavor 
and  Common  Council  of  Newark 
(36  N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  170  [1873]). 
280,  670. 

State,  Agens,  Pros.  v.  ^layor  and 
Common    Council    of    the    City    of 


Newark  (35  N.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.) 
168  [1871]),  8,  89,  172,  480.  614, 
663,  665. 

State,  Protestant  Foster  Home  So- 
ciety, Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Newark  (35 
N.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  157,  10  Am.  Rep. 
223    [1871]),    578,   589. 

State  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Newark  (34  N.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  236 
[1870]),  194,  195,  956,  958,  959, 
980,  983,   1072. 

State  ex  rel.  Peters  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Newark  (31  N.  J.  L.  (2  Vr.)'  360 
[1865]),    264,    278,    308,    551,    530. 

State,  Doyle  &  Co.,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  Newark 
(30  N.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  303  [1863]), 
739,   741,   1394,   1409. 

State,  Grant,  Pros.  v.  ilayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Newark  (28 
N.  J.  L.  (4  Dutch.)  491  [I860]), 
394,    395,    396. 

State,  The  New  Jersey  Railroad  and 
Transportation  Company,  Pro?,  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  Newark  (27  N.  J.  L.  (3 
Dutch.)  185  [1858]),  11,  34,  42, 
113,  166,  167.  279,  594,  653,  983, 
1113. 

State,  Tims,  Pros.  v.  'Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Newark  ( 25 
N.  J.  L.  (1  Dutch.)  399  [1856]), 
229,  280,  690.  691.  ()92,  7.35,  847, 
893,  894,   1394. 

State,  Ackerson,  Pros.  v.  Inliabitant-* 
of  North  Bergen  in  the  County  of 
Hudson  (39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vroom  ) 
694    [1877]).  885,  886.  887.  981. 

State,  Gohisch,  Pros.  v.  Inliabitanls 
of  the  Township  of  North  Bergen 
in  the  Couiit.v  of  Hudson  (37  N. 
J.  L.  (S  Vr.)  -102  [1875]  K  624, 
632,    635. 

State.  Coward,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc.. 
of  North  Plainfield  (63  N.  J.  L. 
(34  Vr. )  (il.  42  Atl.  805  [1899]), 
2S0,  631,  672,  675.  690.  895.  1283. 
1398,    1410. 


ccxx 


TABLE   or    C.\SE:^ 


[References  ure  to  sections.] 


State  ex  rel.  City  of  Dulutli  v.  North, 
ern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  (98  Minn.  420, 
108  X.  W.  269).  52,  93,  97,  359, 
420,  717,  1162. 

State  V.  Norton  (63  Minn.  497,  58 
Am  St.  Rep.  549,  63  N.  W.  935 
[1896]),  416,  927,  986,  1109,  1337, 

State  V.  Orr  (68  Conn.  101,  34  L.  R. 
A.  279,  35  Atl.  770),  372. 

State  V.  Osawkee  (14  Kan.  418,  19 
Am.  Rep.  99),  410. 

State  ex  rel.  Stees  v.  Otis  (53  Minn. 
318,  55  N.  W.  143  [1893]),  308, 
743. 

State  V.   Board   of   Commissioners   of 

Pacific  County    (—  Wasli.  ,  93 

Pac.  326    [1908]),  961,  969. 

State,  Simmons,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (58  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  60 
ri875]),   1402. 

State,  Post,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Passaic 
(56  N.  J.  L.  (27  Vr.)  421,  28  Atl. 
553    [1894]),    1015,    1020,    1408. 

State,  Simmons,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (55  N.  J.  L.  (26  Vr.)  485, 
27  Atl.  909    [1893]),  1401,  1403. 

State,  Paterson  and  Hudson  River 
Railroad  Company,  Pros.  v.  City  of 
Passaic  (54  N.  j'  L.  (25  Vr.)  340, 
23  Atl.  945  [1892]),  324,  594,  595, 
598,   613. 

State,  Hageman,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Passaic  (51  N.  J. 
L.   (22  Vr.)    109   [1888]),  1306. 

State,  Hegeman,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  the  City  of  Pas- 
saic (51  N.  J.  L.  (22  Vr.)  109, 
16  Atl.  62   [1888]  I.  909. 

State,  Schulting,  Pros.  v.  City  of 
Passaic  (47  N.  J.  L.  (18  Vr.)  273 
[1885]),   166,   172,   560,  576,   1409. 

State,  Rettinger,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vr.)  146 
[1883]),  67,  308,  997,  1015,  1405, 
1409. 
State  ex  rel.  Butler  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (44  N.  J.  L.  (15  "Vr.)  171 
[1882]),  951,  1283. 
State,  Society  for  Establishing  Use- 
ful Manufactures,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  City  of  Paterson 
(42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  615  [1880]), 
12,  32,  553,  624,  642. 


State.  Simmons.  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  524 
[1880]  i.  279,   699,   1406. 

State,  Terhune,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (41  N.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  90 
[1879]),   229.   279.   777. 

State,  Ryerson,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  171 
[1875]),    1015,    1408. 

State  ex  rel.  Speer,  Pros.  v.  City  of 
Passaic  (38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)"l68 
[1875]  I,  280.  670.  894.   1402.   1404. 

State.  Simmons.  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (38  N.  J.  L.  (9  'Vr.)  60 
[1875]).  63,  278,  308,  666,  677, 
690,  691,  894,  900. 

State,  Bogart,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic (38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  57 
[1875]),   665,   699,   894.   983.    14(19. 

State,  Delaware.  Lackawanna  and 
Western  Railroad  Company  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Passaic  (37  N.  J.  L.  (8 
Vr.)  137  [1874]),  665,  666,  667, 
677,   690,   709.   894,  983,   1277. 

State,  Pudney,  Pros.  v.  Village  of 
Passaic  (37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  65 
[1874]).  301,  690,  693,  699,  909, 
979,  981,  983,  1283. 

State,  Copeland,  Pros.  v.  Village  of 
Passaic  (36  N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr. )  382 
[1873]).  279,  950,  95P,  959,  969, 
983. 

State,  Van  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pat- 
erson (67  N.  J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  455, 
51   Atl.  922    [1902]),  420. 

State,  Reynolds,  Pros.  v.  Maj'or  and 
Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Paterson 
(48  N.  J.  L.  (19  Vr.)  435,  5  Atl. 
896    [1886]),   147,  665,  667,  709. 

State,  Beam,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermen of  the  City  of  Paterson  ( 47 
N.  J.  L.  (18  Vr.)  15  [1885]).  735. 
770,  1010,  1404. 
State,  Society  for  Establisliiii'^  Use- 
ful Manufactures,  Pros.  v.  City  of 
Paterson  (40  N.  J.  L.  (11  Vr.) 
250  [1878]).  405,  968,  1026,  1291. 
State.  Youngster.  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Paterson  ( 40  N. 
J.  L.  (11  Vr.)  244  [1878]).  239, 
003.  666.  690,   722.   1281. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


ccxxi 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


State  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
City  of  Paterson  (37  X.  J.  L.  (8 
Vr.)  412  [1875]).  (i!)G,  885,  894, 
1026. 

State  ex  rel.  Hnslcy.  '/n.s.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pat- 
erson (37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  409 
[1875]),  279,  280,  281. 

State,  Graham,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Paterson  (37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.) 
380  [1875]),  110,  281,  313,  553, 
624,  665.  667,  677.  690,  691,  699, 
709,  956,   1408. 

State,  Hampton,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Paterson 
36  X\  J.  L.  (7  Vr.  159  [1873]), 
280,  495,  665,  666,  696,  771,  1015, 
1021,  1029. 

State  V.  Payssan  (47  La.  Ann.  1029, 
49  Am.  St.  Rep.  390,  17  So.  481), 
372. 

State,  Spear,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Perth 
Amboy  (38  X.  J.  L.  (9  Vr. )  425 
[1876]).  281,   884. 

State,    Brinley,    Pros.    v.    Inhabitants 
of   the    City   of    Perth    Amboy    (29 
^  X.  J.  L.    (5  Duteher).  259  [1861]), 

739,   771,   981,    1029. 

State,  Pardee  Works,  Pros.  v.  City 
of  Perth  Amboy  (59  X.  J.  L.  (30 
Vr.)  335,  36  All.  666  [1896]),  313, 
956. 

State  V.  Pillslnuy  1 82  :\Iinn.  3.39, 
85  X.  W.  175  '[1901]),  111,  121, 
158,  549,  563,  572.  707,  708,  739, 
813. 

State  ex  -rel.  Southern  I'.aiik  v.  Pills- 
bury  (31  La.  Ann.  1  [1879]), 
1409. 

State,  Van  Riper.  Pro-;,  v.  Township 
of  Plainfield  (43  X.  .T.  (14  Vr.) 
349    [1881]),    911,    13(il. 

State,  Boice,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Plain- 
field  (41  X.  .T.  L.  (12  \'r.)  138 
[1879]).  309. 

State,  Boice,  Pro*,  v.  Inhabitants  of 
tlie  City  of  PlainfTeld  (38  X.  J.  L. 
(9  Vr.)  95  [1875]),  309,  739,  760, 
857,  865,  983. 

State,  Randolph.  Pros.  v.  Inhabit, 
ants  of  the  City  of  Plainfield  (38 
X.  J.  L.  (9  Vv.)  93  [1875]),  465, 
479,  956. 


State     ex     rel.     Utick     v.     Board     of 

County      Commissioners      of      Polk 

County   (87  Minn.  325,  60  L.  R.  A. 

161,   87   X.    W.    216    [1902]).    291, 

335,   336,    337,    340,   449,    781,    798, 

1317. 
State  ex    rel.   Christopher   v.   (_  ity   of 

Portage     (14     Wis.     550     [1861]), 

646,   720. 
State  ex   rel.   Christopher   v.   City  of 

Portage     (12     Wis.     562     [I860]), 

163,   323,   443,   714,    1471. 
State  ex  rel.  McClurg  v.  Powell    (77 

Miss.  543,  48  L.  R.  A.  652,  27   So. 

927),  216. 
State,     Hunt,     Pros.    v.     ^Nlayor     and 

Common    Council    of    Rahway     ( 39 

X.    J.    L.     (10    Vr.)     646    [1877]), 

549,   557,   560,   642,   653,   693,   697, 

699.     894,     899,     923,     1277,     1282, 

1398. 
State  ex  rel.  Embrce  v.  Rathbnn    ( 22 

Wash.  651,  62  Pac.  85).   1199. 
State   V.   Rau    (93   Mo.    126,   5   S.    W. 

697),    125.3. 
State,  Bonney,  Pros.  v.  Reed    (31   X. 

J.  L.    (2  Vr.)    133),  278,  322.  324, 

549,  563,  5(34,  585,  664,   1113. 
State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel.    Chapin 

V.   Reis    (38   Minn.   371,   38   X.   W. 

97   [1888]),  698. 
State   of   ^linnesota   ex   rel.    Stateler 

V.   Reis    (38   Minn.   371.   38   X.   W. 

97     [1888]  1,     103,     104.    287.    370. 

666,    698.    709. 
State,    Board    of    Cho~cn    Freeholders 

of     County     of     Hudson.     Pros.     v. 

Road   Commissioners    (41    X.   J.   L. 

(12    Vr.)     83     [1879]),     130.    248, 

537,    5.53,    066,    690,    691.    723.    726, 

735,   745,   983. 
State    V.    R(3bert    P.    Lewis    Company 

(82   :Minn.   390.   S.l    X.    W.   207.   86 

X.    W.    (ill),    lot.     118.    350.    702. 

708. 
State    V.    Robert    P.    Lewis    Company 

(72  Minn.  87,  42   L.   R.  A.  639,  75 

X.  W.    108    [1898]),    104.   118,  350, 

549,  609.   630,  702,   708. 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Rogers    (56   X.  -J.   L. 

(27  Vr.)    480.  23  L.  R.  A.   3.-)4.  28 

Atl.   726,  29   Atl.    173).  216. 


CCXXll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  ;ire  to  sectioii.s.] 


State,  Raymond,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 

Council  of   Borough  of  Rutherford 

(55  N.  J.  L.   (26  Vr.)   441,  27  Atl. 

172    [1893]),    118,    430,    476,    4S0, 

666,  699. 
State  ex   rel.   Skrainka   Construction 

Co.  V.   City  of   St.   Louis    ( —  Mo. 

,    Ill's.   W.   89    [1908]),   553, 

631. 
State   ex   rel.   Barber   v.   City   of   St. 

Louis     (183    Mo.    230,    81    S.    W. 

1104),  314,  624,  628,  631,  896,  962, 

956,  978,   1138. 
State  of  Missouri  ex  rel.  Cavender  v. 

City    of    St.    Louis     (56    Mo.    277 

[1874]).  324,   813,   859. 
State  of  Missouri  ex  rel.  Cavender  v. 

City    of    St.    Louis     (52    Mo.    574 

[1873]),  86,   118.  272. 
State  ex  rel.   Greeley  v.   City   of   St. 

Louis    (1    Mo.    App.    503    [1876]), 

15,    557,    558,    748,    764,    766,    867, 

1353. 
State   of   Minnesota   ex   rel.    Oakland 

Cemetery    Association    v.    City    of 

St.  Paul    (36  Minn.  529,  32  X.  W. 

781    [1887]),  592,  614. 
State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.   Cunning- 
ham V.  Board  of  Public  Works  of 

the    City    of    St.    Paul    (27    Minn. 

442,    8    X.    W.    161     [1881]),    313, 

556,  670,   1405. 
State  ex  rel.  Woulfe  v.  St.  Paul   ( 107 

La.    777,    32    So.    88    [1901-1902]), 

373,   374,   461,   508,   519.    540,    722, 

1469. 
State   V.    St.    Paul   'M.    &    M.    R.    Co. 

(38  Minn.   246),  359. 
State   V.    St.   Paul   M.    &   M.   R.    Co. 

(35  Minn.   131,  59  Am.  Rep.  313), 

359. 
State  ex   rel.  Guye   v.   City   of   Seat- 
tle   (—   Wash.' ,    95    Pac.    656 

[1908]),  73,  1346. 
State  of  Washington  on  Relation   of 

Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Company 

V.  City  of  Seattle    (42  Wash.   370, 

85  Pac.   11    [1906]),  301,  645.  75'), 

944,  956,  962.   1026. 
State  V.  Several  Parcels  of  Land    ( — 

Xeb.  ,  110  X.  W.  753   [1907]), 

426.  556.  1005,   1033. 


State  V.  Several  Parcels  of  Land   ( — 

Xeb.  ,  113  X.  W.  248  [1907]), 

549,   584,   619. 
State  V.  Several  Parcels  of  Land   ( — ■ 

Xeb.  ,  107  X.  W.  566   [1906]), 

55,  323,  737,  765,   1299. 
State  V.  Shuflford    (—  Kan.  .  94 

Pac.    137    [1908]),    1442. 
State,     Essex     Public     Road     Board, 

Pros.   V.  Skinkle    (49  X.  J.  L.    (20 

Vr.)   641,  10  Atl.  379   [1887]),   15. 
State    V.    Smith    (99    Minn.    59,    108 

X.  "W.  822    [1906]),  231,  359,  450. 
State  ex  rel.  Smith   (48  0.  S.  211,  26 

X.  E.   1069   [1891]),  189. 
State  ex  rel.  Ely  v.  Smith    ( 124  Ind. 

302,    24    X.    E.    Rep.    331    [1890]). 

886,  909.  978. 
State  ex   rel.   Curtice   v.    Smith    ( 177 

Mo.    69,    75    S.    W.    625     [1903]), 

916,  1369. 
State   ex    rel.    Lewis    v.    Smith    ( 158 

Ind.   543,   63   L.   R.  A.   116,   63   X. 

E.  25,  214,  64  X.  E.  18  [1901]),  3. 
State,    Brown,    Pros.    v.    Village    of 

South    Orange     (49    X.    J.    L.     (20 

Vr.)    104,  6  Atl.  312    [1886]),  SOS. 

973. 
State,    Souther,    Pros.    v.    Village    of 

'South    Orange     (46    X.    J.    L.     (17 

Vr.)    317    [1884]),    266,    692,    894, 

956. 
State  ex  rel.  Baltzell  v.  Stewart    (74 

Wis.   620.   6   L.   R.   A.   394,   43   N. 

W.  947   [1889]),  5,  19,  93,  97,  134, 

191,  252,  294,  335,  420,  556,  557. 
State,  App.   Pros.  v.  Town  of  Stock- 
ton, in  the  County  of  Camden    (61 

X.  J.  L.   (32  Vr.)"  520,  39  A+l.  921 

[1898]),    781,    789,    800,    956,   8S1, 

1015. 
State  ex  rel.  Monroe  Gravel  Road  Co. 

v.  Stout  (61  Ind.  143  [1878]),  166, 

169,  322,   1469. 
State    ex    rel.    City    of    Columbus    v. 

Strader     (25    O.'    S.    527     [1874]), 

238,  431,  662. 
State  ex  rel.  Burbank  v.  City  of  Su- 
perior    (81    Wis.    649,    51    X.    W. 

1014    [1892]),  245,  271,  663,   1469, 

1518. 


TABLE  ''F   CASES. 


CCXXlll 


[References  are  to  sections,  j 


State  of  Washington  on  the  Relation 
of  Matson  v.  Superior  Court  for 
Skagit  County  (42  Wash.  491.  85 
Pac.  264  [190b]),  63,  105,  196,  206. 
271,  340. 

State  of  Washington  on  the  Relation 
of  Nelson  v.  Superior  Court  of 
King  County  (31  Wash.  32,  71 
Pac.  601   [1903]),  1395. 

State  of  New  York  ex  rel.  Ready  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  Syracuse  (65  Hun.  321,  29 
N.  Y.  Sup.  236  [1892]),  1469, 
1473. 

State  of  Maryland  ex  rel.  Hender- 
son V.  Taylor  (59  Md.  338  [1882]), 
1088,  1163,  1211,  1471. 

State  ex  rel.  Horrall  v.  Thompson 
(109  Ind.  533,  10  N.  E.  305 
[1886]),  239,  583,  587,   1076. 

State  ex  rel.  Ashby  v.  Three  States 
Lumber  Co.  (19*8  Mo.  430,  95  S. 
W.  333  [1906]),  249,  265,  343,  556. 
566,   642,  910.  911.   1004. 

State  ex  rel.  Hudd  v.  Tinime  (4  Wis. 
318,  11  N.  W.  785   [1882]),  216. 

State  V.  Toledo  (48  0.  S.  112,  26  N. 
E.    1061    [1891]),    189. 

State  ex  rel.  Woods  v.  Tooker  ( 15 
Mont.  8,  25  L.  R.  A.  560,  37  Pac. 
840),  216. 

State,  Wilson,  Pros.  v.  Trenton  (53 
N.  J.  L.  (24  Vr.)  178,  20  Atl.  738 
[1890]),  757. 

State,  Semon,  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants 
of  the  City  of  Trenton  (47  N.  J. 
L.  (28  Vroom)  489,  4  Atl.  Rep. 
312   [1885]),  806,  810,  884,  906. 

State,  Johnson,  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants 
of  City  of  Trenton  (43  N.  J.  L. 
(14  Vr.)  166  [1881]),  278,  314, 
475,  557,  690,  693,  894,  956,  975, 
1283. 

State,  Wilkinson,  Pros.  v.  Inhabit- 
ants of  the  City  of  Trenton  (36 
N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  499  [1873]), 
1.30,  229,  726,  745,  894,  923,  1015, 
1277,   1282,  1396,   1401.   1407,   1408. 

State,  Wilkinson,  Pros.  City  of  Tren- 
ton (35  N.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  485 
[1872]),  77,  281,  885. 

State  ex  rel.   v.  Tufly    (19  Nev.  391, 


3  Am.  St.  Rep.  895,  12  Pac.  835), 
216. 

State  for  use  of  Bringham  v.  Turvey, 
99  Ind.  599    [1884]),   1244. 

State,  Estate  of  Brown,  Pros.  v. 
Town  of  Union  (62  N.  J.  L.  142, 
40  Atl.  632  [1898]  I.  79.  166,  167, 
172,    187,    617,    950. 

State,  Schlapfer,  Pros.  v.  Town  of 
Union,  in  the  County  of  Hudson 
(53  N.  J.  L.  (24  Vr.)  67,  20  Atl. 
894    [1890]),   563,   658. 

State,  Walter,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Un- 
ion, in  County  of  Hudi^on  (33 
N.  J.  L.  (4  Vr.)  350  [18(59]),  166, 
195,   414,   677,   781,   799,   980,   983. 

State  ex  rel.  Pope  v.  Town  of 
Union  (32  N.  J.  L.  (3  Vr.) 
343    [1867]),   280,   765,    1402. 

State,  Bergen  County  Savings  Bank, 
Pros.  V.  Inhabitants  of  tlie  Town- 
ship of  Union  (44  N.  J.  L.  (15 
Vr.)  599  [1882]).  199.  332,  414, 
690,   956. 

State  ex  rel.  Rader  v.  Townsliip  of 
Union  (44  N.  J.  L.  (15  Vr. )  259),' 
1113. 

State,  Kingsland,  Pros.  v.  Inhabi- 
tants of  the  Township  of  Union 
in  the  County  of  Bergen  (37  N. 
J.  L.  (8  Vr.')  268  [1874]),  280, 
690,  894. 

State,  Randolph,  v.  Union  County 
Freeholders  (63  N.  J.  (34  Vr.) 
155,   41   Atl.   960),   70. 

State,  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  City  of  Newark,  Pros.  v.  In- 
habitants of  Verona  Township  (58 
N.  J.  L.  (29  Vr.)  595,  33  Atl.  9.59 
[1896]),    80,    82,    696. 

State  ex  rel.  Stotts  v.  Wall  (  153 
Mo.  216,  54  S.  W.  465  [1899]). 
189,  343,  557,  673,  748,  885,  973. 
1008. 

State  V.  Wapello  County  (13  la. 
388),  365. 

State,  Leuly,  Pro.s,  v.  Town  of  West 
Hoboken  (.53  N.  J.  L.  (24  Vr.) 
64.  20  Atl.  737  [1890]),  747,  753, 
770,  983. 


CCXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sectious.  ] 


State,  Bue.-is,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  West 

Hoboken    (51    X.    J.    L.     (22    Vr.) 

267,  17  Atl.  110  [1889]),  308,  690, 

092,  699,  723,   894. 
State,   Winkler,   Pros.   v.   Inhabitants 

of  West  Hoboken    (37  N.  J.  L.    (8 

Vr.)    406    [1875]),  956. 
State,    Kerrigan^    Pros.    v.    Township 

of  West  Hoboken    (37  N.  J.  L.    (8 

Vr.)     77    [1874]),    391,    393,     394, 

396,  425,  569,  884,  893,  1409. 
State,   Hutton,    Pros.    v.    Inhabitants 

of   the   Township   of   West   Orange 

(39  X.  J.  L.   (10  Vr.)  453  [1877]), 

667,  691,  696,  709,  894. 
State  V.  Williams    (68  Conn.   131,  4S 

L.     R.    A.    465,     35    Atl.    24,     421 

[1896]),     61,   292,    553,    664,     730, 

1473. 
State,   Bowlcer,   Pros.   v.   Weight    ( 54 

N.  J.  L.   (25  Vr.)    130,  23  Atl.  116 

[1891]),  280. 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Wurts    (63  X.  J.  L. 

(34  Vr.)    289,  45  L.  R.  A.  251,  43 

Atl.   744),  216. 
State     of    Kansas    ex     rel.    Shaw      y 

Mayor   and   Aldermen  of   the   City 

of      Wyandotte       (4      Kan.       430 

[1868]),    1471. 
State  V.  Young    (29  Minn.  474,  9  X. 

W.  737),  216. 
Stebbins   v.   Kay    (123   X".   Y.   31,   £5 

X.  E.  Rep.   207    [1890]),  223,  234, 

777,  904,  1190. 
Steckert    v.    City    of    East    Saginaw 

(22   Mich.    104    [1870]),   264,^278, 

439,  570,  843.  864.  892,  1013. 
Steele  v.  Village  of  River  Forest  (141 

HI.    302,    30   N.    E.    1034    [1893]), 

244,  403,   448,   572,   775,   776,   857, 

862. 
Steenberg    v.    People,    Kochersperger 

(164   HI.   478,   45   X.   E.   Rep.   970 

[1897]),    856,    927,    929,    986,    996, 

1183,   1340. 
Steese     v.     Oviatt      (24     0.     S.     248 

[1873]),    133,    475,    496,    500,    503, 

821,   1085,   1421. 
SteflTen     v.     Fox      (56     Mo.     App.     9 

[1893]),   528. 
Steffen  v.  St.  Louis    (135  Mo.  44,  30 

S.    W.    31),    1505. 
Steffins   V.   Stewart    (53    Kan.    92,    30 


Pac.     55    [1894]),     541,    840,     862, 

1442. 
Stehmeyer       v.       City       Council       of 

Charleston   (53  S.  C.  259,  31  S.  E. 

322   [1898]),  44,  86,  118,  159,  350. 
Steidl    V.    People    ex    rel.    Alexander 

(173  111.  29,  50  X.  E.  129   [1898]), 

1126,  1183,  1189,  1274,  1375. 
Steinacker  v.  Gest  ( —  Ky.  ,  89 

S.   W.   481,  28  Ky.   Law  Rep.   573 

[1905]),  431,  628'. 
SteinmuUer    v.    City   of   Kansas   City 

(3     Kan.     App.    45,    44     Pac.     600 

[1896]),  781,  1440. 
Stephan    v.    Daniels     (27    0.    S.    527 

[1875]),   133,  977,   1484,   1496. 
Stephani   v.   Catholic   Bishop   of    Chi' 

cago        (2       Bradwell        (111.       249 

[1878]),  3,   49,   1054. 
Stephens    v.    Guthrie     (67     Ky.     (4 

Bush.)    462    [1868]),    352,    1249. 
Stephens    v.     City    of     Spokane     ( 14 

Wash.    298,    44   Pac.    541.    45    Pac. 

31    [1896]),   1511,   1513. 
Stephens    v.    City    of    Spokane     (11 

Wash.    41,    39    Pac.    266    [1895]), 

238,  489,   1242,   1510,   1525. 
Stephenson    v.    Town    of    Salem     (  14 
'      Ind.    App.    386,    42    X.    E.    44,    943 

[1895]),  735,   918,   1029. 
Sterling,  City  of  v.  Gait   (117  111.   11, 

7   X.  E.  471    [1887]),   11,  51,    153, 

295,  670,  715,  876,  1333. 
Sterrett   School    Sub-District   v.    City 

of  Pittsburg    (183  Pa.   St.   225,  38 

Atl.   1103   [1897]),  1271. 
Stetler  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of  the 

Borough    of    East    Rutherford     ( 65 

X.  J.  L.    (36  Vr.)    528,  47  Atl.  489 

[1900]),   1408. 
Stevens  v.   City  of  Port  Huron    ( 149 

Mich.  536,  113  X.  W.  291   [1907]), 

370,  699. 
Stevens  v.  Templeton    ( —  Ind.  , 

84    X.    E.    148    [1908]),    87,    1348, 

1353. 
Steward    v.    City    of    Philadelphia    to 

Use     (Pa.)     ('7    Atl.    192     [1880]), 

700. 
Stewart     v.     City     of     Detroit     (137 

Mich.  381,  100  X.  W.  613   [1904]), 

788,  812. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXXV 


[References  are  to  !<ections.] 


Stewart,    Pros.    v.    Mayor    and    Com- 
mon   Council    of    the    City   of    Ho- 

boken    (57   X.  J.  L.    (28  Vr.)    330, 

31   Atl.   276    [1894]),  263,    1408. 
Stewart    v.    Board    of    Commissioners 

of    Wyandotte   Co.    ( 45    Kan.    708, 

23   Am.   St.   Rep.  746,  26   Pac.   683 

[1891]),   1012,   1015,  1029,   1436. 
Stiewel  v.   Fencing  District  Xo.  6  of 

Johnson    County    (71    Ark.    17,    70 

S.  W.  308,  71   S.  W.  247    11903]), 

249,   363,   474,   475,   482,   495,   557, 

578,   582,   596,   598,   691,   697,   747, 

795,  800,   1285,   1337,   1372. 
S-tifel    V.    Brown    (24    Mo.   App.    102 

[1887]),  620,  629,  632,  683. 
Stifel  V.  Dougherty    (6  Mo.  App.  441 

[1879]),  837,   1284. 
Stifel    V.    MacManus     (74    Mo.    App. 

558    [1898]),   525,   604,    1153. 
Stifel  V.  Southern  Cooperage  Co.    ( 38 

Mo.   App.    340    [1889]).    1134. 
Stimson  v.  Hanley    (151   Cal.  379.  90 

Pac.  9-15   [1907]  ),  498. 
Stinson     v.     Smith      (8     Minn.     36G 

[1863]),    8,   44,    86,    100,    104,    158, 

313,  690,  697. 
Stipp   V.   Claman    (123    Ind.    532.    24 

X.  E.   131),  266,  270. 
Stockton,  City  of  v.  Creanor   (45  Cal. 

043     [1873]),    494,    498,    510,    84:), 

1290,    1331. 
Stockton,    City   of   v.    Dalil     ( 06    Cal. 

377,     5     Pac.     682     [1885]),     1260, 

1272. 
Stockton.    City    of    v.    Dunham     (59 

Cal.  608   [1881]),  887,  1382. 
Stockton     V.     Mayor     and     Common 

Council    of   Xewark    (58   X.    J.    L. 

(29     Vr.)     116,    32     Atl.    Rep.     67 

[1895]),   986,    1405,    1409. 
Stockton,  City  of  v.  Skinner   (53  Cal. 

85    [1878])',   490,    821. 
Stockton,    Cit.v   of   v.    Whitmore     (50 

Cal.    554     [1875]),    223,    234,    510, 

840. 
Stoddard     v.    Johnson     1 75    Tnd.     20 

[1881]),   568,    790,    798,    1442. 
Stone     V.     Street     C'ommissiiinors     of 

Boston    (192   Mass.    297,    78    X.    E. 

478    [1906]),    166,    168. 
Stone   V.    City    of    Chicatro    (218    111. 

348,   75   X.'  E.   980    [1905]),    1369. 


Stone  V.  Little  Yellow  Drainage  Dis- 
trict   (118  Wis.  388,  95  X.  W.  405 

[1903]),    119,    123,    126,    134,    340, 

732,   738,   952,  955. 
Stone  V.  Mississippi    (101  U.  S.  814, 

25  L.   1079   [1879]),  92. 
Stone     V.     Viele      (38     O.      S.      314 

[1882]),  527,   1196,   1433,   1446. 
Storer  v.  City  of  Cincinnati    (4  Ohio 

C.  C.  279  "[1889]),  685,  769,  783, 

1013,  1015. 
Storms  V.  Stevens  (104  Ind.  46,  3 

X,  E.  401  [1885]),  475,  1103,  1125. 
Storrie  v.  Cortes  (90  Tex.  283,  35 

L.  R.  A.  668,  38  S.  W.  154 

[1896]),  42,  174,  213,  007,  1041, 

1079. 
Storrie  v.   Houston   City  Street  Rail- 

Avay  Co.    (92  Tex.   129,  44  L.  R.  A. 

716,  46  S.  W.  796  [1898]  ),  GO,  145, 

164,    166,    172,   223,    234.    314,   475, 

599,  775,  886,  1068,  1103. 
Storrs   V.    City   of   Chicago    (208    III. 

364,    70    X.    E.    347    [1904]),    267, 

555,  571. 
Stout    V.    Xoblesville    and    Eagletown 

Gravel     Road     Co.      (83     Ind.     466 

[1882]),   1098. 
Stowell    V.    Milwaukee    (31    Wis.    523 

[1872]),   11,  65,   73,  313,  420,  428, 

657,  661. 
Strachan    v.    Brown     (39    :\Iich.    168 

[1878]),   278. 
Strafford    v.    Sharon    (61    Vt.    126,    4 

L.  R.   A.  499,   17  Atl.   793,    IS   All, 

308),   170. 
Strassheim    v.    Jerman    (56    Mo.    104 

[1874]),    522,    541,    570.    867,    871, 

1040,    1373,    1383. 
Strauss    v.    City     (23    W.    L.    B.    359 

[1890]),    1346. 
Street     Opening,    -Board     of.        (Sea 

Board   of    Street    Opening.) 
Streuter    v.    Willow    Creek    Drainage 

District   (72  111.  App.  561    [1897]), 

247,    340,    564,    566,    1008. 
Strickland  v.   City  of  Stillwater    (63 

Minn.   43,    65    X.    W.    131    [1895]), 

525,  526,   1490. 
Strieb  v.  Cox    (111    Ind.    299,    12   X. 

E.    481    [1887]).    986.    1030.    1031. 
Striker,    In    the    :\latter   of    (23    Ilun 

(X.  Y.)    647    [1880]),    1461. 


CCXXVl 


T^VBLE    OF    CASES. 


[Refereucess  are  to  sections.] 


Striker's  Petition  to  Have  State  As- 
sessment Vacated,  In  the  Matter 
of  (10  Hun  (N.  Y.)  308  [1877]), 
,1090. 

Striker  v.  Kelley  (7  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
9   [1844]),   100,  206,   1150,   1297. 

Striker  v.  Kelly  (2  Denio  (N.  Y.) 
323  [Court  of  Errors,  1845]),  206, 
271,  1150,  1202,  1297. 

Strosser  v.  City  of  Fort  Wayne  (100 
Ind.  443  [1884]),  726,  735,  770, 
1015. 

Stroud  V.  City  of  Philadelphia  (61 
Pa.   St.  255    [1869]),   100,   308. 

Strout  V.  City  of  Portland  (26  Ore. 
294,  38  Pac.  Rep.  126  [1894]), 
1013,   1017. 

Strowbridge  v.  City  of  Portland  (8 
Or.  67  [1879]),  135,  324,  415,  550, 
555,  732,  872. 

Strusburgh  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New- 
York   (87  N.  Y.  452   [1882]),  1488. 

Strusburgh  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
'Commonalty  of"  the  City  of  New 
York  (45  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Eep.  508 
[1879]),   1486. 

Stuart  V.  Palmer  (74  N.  Y.  183,  30 
Am.  Rep.  289  [1878]),  11,  115, 
119,  121,  122,  125,  135,  549,  726, 
728,  729,  732,  961,  964,  1425. 

Stuart  V.  Palmer  (10  Hun  23 
[1877]),  726. 

Studebaker  v.  Studebaker  (152  Ind. 
89,  51  N.  E.  933  [1898]),  531,  532, 
1433,  1444. 

Stutsman  v.  City  of  Burlington, 
Iowa  (127  la.  563,  103  N.  W.  800 
[1905]),  651,  653,  666,  680,  682, 
895. 

Succession  of  Irwin  ( 33  La.  Ann.  63 
[1881]).  (See  Irwin,  Succession 
of.) 

Sullivan  v.  Haug  (82  Mich.  548,  10 
L.  R.  A.  263,  46  N.  W.  795),  142, 
1347.    • 

Sullivan  v.  Mier   (67  Cal.  264,  7  Pac. 

691  [1885]),  207,  1208,  1209. 
Sullivan  v.  North  Hudson  County 
Railroad  Company  (51  N.  J.  L. 
518,  18  Atl.  689  [1889]).  65,  66. 
Sullivan  v.  O'-eeon  Ry.  aur)  Nav.  Co. 
(19   Or.  319,  24  Pac.  408),  363. 


Sumner   v.    Village   of    Milford    (214 

111.  388,  73  N.  E.  742  [1905J  ),  278, 

279,  801,  927,  931,    1085,    1391. 
Sunier  v.  Miller   (105  Ind.  393,  4  N. 

E.  867   [1885]),  726,  735,  770,  771, 

772,  1029,  1030,  1414,  1431,  1432. 
Surget  v.  Chase  (33  La.  Ann.  833 

[1881]),  86,  196,  212,  223,  244, 

245. 
Surgi    v.    Snetchman    (11    La.     Ann. 

387    [1856]),    155,   314,   624. 
Sutphin   v.    Inhabitants   of   the    City 

of  Trenton   (31  N.  J.  Eq.   (4  Stew- 
art)   468    [1879]),   884,   894,   1179. 
Sutton's  Heirs  v.  Louisville    (35  Ky. 

(5     Dana)     28     [1837]),    69,     100, 

154,  701,  710,  1039,   1056. 
Sutton  v.  School   City  of  Montpelier 

(28   Ind.   App.   315,   62   N.   E.   710 

[1902].),  586. 
Swain  v.  Fulmer    (135  Ind.  8,  34  N. 

E.  039  [1893]),  119,  121,  324,  727, 

72C. 
Swamp    Land    District    No.    207    v. 

Glide    (112    Cal.    85,    44    Pac.    451 

[1896]),   340,   724,  886,  918,   1085, 

1113,  1375. 
Swamp    Land    District    No.     307     v. 

Gwynn    (70   Cal.  566,   12   Pac.   462 

[1886]),    278,    340,   899,    901,    951, 

1086. 
Swamp    Land     District    No.     150    v. 

Silver     (98    Cal.    51,    32    Pac.    866 

[1893]),    180,    246,    247,    254,    340, 

341,  449,   1301. 
Swan   Creek,   Township   of   v.    Brown 

(130    Mich.    382,    90    N.    W.    38), 

1394. 
Swan   Point    Cemetery    v.    Tripp    (14 

R.   I.    199    [1883]),   614. 
Swanson    v.   City    of    Ottumwa    (118 

Iowa   161,  59  L.  R.  A.   620,  91  N. 

W.   1048   [1902]),  36,  50,  507. 
Sweet    V.    West    Chicago    Park    Com- 
missioners   (177  111.  492.  53- N.  E. 

74     [1899]),    416,    423,    873,    920, 

922,   1328,   1390. 
Sweeten  v.  City  of   Millville    (—  N. 

J.  ,  66  Atl.  923   [1907]),  509, 

1500. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXXVll 


{References  are  to  sections.] 


Swenson   v.   Board  of   Supervisors  of 

Town    of    Hallock     (95    Minn.    161, 

103   X.   W.   895    [1905]),   417,  418, 

652,  657. 
Swift  V.  City  of  St.  Louis    {180  Mo. 

80,  79  S.  \\.  172  [1904]),  515,  807. 
Swindler    v.    Monrovia    &    Belleville 

Gravel     Road     Co.     (33     Ind.     160 

[1870]),  1384. 
Syenite  Granite  Co.  v.  Bobb   (37  Mo. 

App.  483   [1889]),   1161,   1369. 


Taber  v.  Ferguson  (109  Ind  227,  9 
X.  E.  723  [1886]),  301,  500,  831, 
843,  858,  868,  877,  1015,  1019, 
1227,  1237,  1303,  1337. 

Taber  v.  Grafmiller  (109  Ind.  206, 
9  X\  E.  721  [1886]),  267,  323,  432, 
610,  814,  821,  831,  843. 

Tacoma  Land  Co.  v.  City  of  Tacoma 
(15  Wash.  133,  45  Pac.  733 
[1896]),  670,  771,  1010,  1011, 
1012,   1471. 

Talbot  V.  Blacklege  (22  la.  572 
[1867]),  363. 

Talbott  V.   Town  of  Xew 

Ind.   ,   81   X''. 

542. 

Talcott    Brothers    v 

470,    78    X\    W.    39    [1899]),    314, 
1043,   1065,   1085,    1164.    1503. 

Tallant  v.  City  of  Burlington  (39  la. 
543  [1874])',  40,  50,  783,  843,  1015, 
1035,  1436,  1483,  1484. 

Tallman  v.  City  of  .Tanesville  (17 
Wis.  71    [1863]),  971. 

Tappan  to  Vacate  Certain  Assess- 
ments, In  tlie  Matter  of  the  Ap- 
plication of  (54  Barb  (X'.  Y.)  225 
[18(19]),  194,  195,  233,  244,  342, 
469,  663,   888,   775,  911. 

Tappan,  to  Vacate  Certain  Assess- 
ments, In  the  Matter  of  ( 36  How. 
(X.  Y.)  390  [1869]),  233,  453, 
468,  469,  911. 

Tappan  v.  Board  of  Street  Commis- 
sioners of  Boston  (193  Mass.  498, 
79  X.  E.  796   [1907]),  950. 

Tappan  v.  Young  (9  Daly  (X".  Y.) 
357   [1880]),  741,  766,  860. 


Castle    (  — 
E.   724    [1907]), 

Xoel     (107    la. 


Tarentum  Borough  v.  Moorhead    (26 

Pa.    Super.   Ct.    273    [1904]),    495, 

1063. 
Tarman     v.     City     of     Atchison     (69 

Kan.     483,    77    Pac.    Ill     [1904]), 

781. 
Taylor  v.   City  of  Bloomington    ( 186 

111.     497,    58    X.    E.    216     [1900]), 

781,   791. 
Taylor      v.      Boyd       (63      Tex.      533 

[1885]),  39,  43,  118,  145,  147,  148, 

244,   245,   301,   620,   678,   713,   738, 

895,  951,  1135,  1141,  1215,  1218. 

1295,  1299. 
Taylor  v.  Brown  ( 127  Ind.  293,  26 

X.  E.  822  [1890]),  840,  1312. 
Taylor  v.  Burnap  (39  Mich.  739 

'[1878]),    271,    272,   278,    340,    735, 

747,  1013,  1402,  1408. 
Taylor,    McBean    &    Co.    v.    Chandler 

(9  Heisk.    (56  Tenn.)    349,  24  Am. 

Rep.   308    [1872]),   32,   35,   44,   56, 

96,  113,  145,  160,  420. 
Taylor     v.     Conner      (31     Cal.     481 

[1866]),  223,  234,  887,  888,  889. 
Ta.vlor    V.    Crawford    (72    0.  -S.    5i;0, 

09    L.    R.   A.    805,    74    X.    E.    I()(i5 

[1905]),  93,  97,  119,  142,  373,  375, 

860. 
Taylor     v.     Cit.v     of     Crawfordsville 

(155  Ind.  403.  58  X;.  E.  490),  620. 
Taylor     v.     City    of     Haverhill     (192 

Mass.   287,   78   X.   E.   475    [1906]), 

324,  563,   1347. 
Taylor    v.    Lake    Shore    &    ^Michiga:! 

Southern    Railroad    Co.    (45    Mich. 

74,  40  Am.  Rep.  457,  7  X^  W.  728 

[1881]),  58. 
Taylor     v.     Palmer      (31      Cal.      240 

il8()6]).  11,  35.  147,  148,  174, 

228,  242.  414.  490,  538,  763,  835, 

836.  807,  1042.  1049,  1151.  1215. 

1216,  1358,  1378. 
Taylor  v.  Patton  (100  Ind.  4,  (iC  X. 

E.  91  [1902]),  1015,  1019,  1038, 

1242. 
Taylor  v.  People  ex  rel.  Reed  ( 66 

ill.  322  [1872]).  223,  234,  584, 

1017,  1075,  1206. 
Taylor  v.  Schroeder  ( —  ^lo.  App. 

^ .  110  S.  W.  26  [1908]),  515, 

1332,  1337. 


CCXXVUl 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Tylor  V.  Strayer  (167  Ind.  2.3,  78 
N.  E.  236  [1906]),  206,  340,  449, 
950. 

Taylor  v.  Village  of  Wapakoneta 
(26  Ohio  C.  C.  285  [1904]),  324, 
432,  503,  525,  527,  571,  674,  700, 
821,  1431,  1432. 

Tebault  v.  City  of  New  Orleans  ( 108 
La.  686,  32  So.  983,  46  La.  Ann. 
1292,   16  So.  219),  3,  46,   1369. 

Teegarden  v.  Davis  (36  0.  S.  601 
[1881]),   1028,    1420,   1436. 

Teegarden  v.  City  of  Racine  (56 
Wis.  545,  14  x!  W.  614  [1883]), 
142,   163,  360,  555,  670,  674,   1352. 

Temple  v.  Hamilton  County  ( 134  la. 
706,  112  N.  W.  174  [1907]).  690. 
909. 

Ten  Eyck  v.  Rector  and  Inhabitants 
of  the  City  of  Albany  in  Commun- 
ion with  the  Protestant  Episcopal 
Church  in  the  State  of  New  York 
(65  Hun  194,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  757 
[1892]),  381,   1054. 

Terre  Haute,  City  of  v.  Blake  (9 
Ind.  App.  403,  36  N.  E.  932 
[1893]),   239,    1519. 

Terre  Haute  &  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ear- 
hart  (35  Ind.  App.  56,  73  N.  E. 
711    [1905]),  363. 

Terre  Haute  &  Logansport  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Erdell  (163  Ind.  348,  71  N.  E. 
960    [1904]),   363. 

Terre  Haute  &  Logansport  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Town  of  Flora  (29  Ind.  App. 
442,   64   N.    E.    648    [1902]),    1519. 

Terre  Haute,  City  of  v.  Mack  (139 
Ind.  99,  38  N.  E.  468),  626,  629. 
630,  1432. 

Terre  Haute  &  Logansport  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Salmon  (161  Ind.  131,  67  N.  E. 
918   [1903]),  363. 

Terre  Haute  and  Logansport  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Soice  ( 128  Ind. 
105,  27  N.  E.  429  [1890]  ^  375, 
1030,    1047,    1414,    1431,    1444. 

Terrell  v.  Hart    (—  Ky.  ,  90  S. 

W.  953,  28  Ky.  L.  R^  901  [1906]), 
392,   395,   615' 

Terrell  v.   City  of  Paducah    (—  Ky. 

,   5  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    289,  92 

S.  \V.  310,  28  Ky.  L.  R.  1237 
[1906]),   362,   431,    1498. 


Terry  v.  City  of  Hartford  (39  Conn. 
286    [1872]),  70,  308,   632. 

Texarkana,  Board  of  Improvement 
District  Number  Five  of  v.  Offen- 
hauser  (84  Ark.  257,  105  S.  W. 
205  [1907]),  1220.  See  Improve- 
ment   Board    v.   . ) 

Texas   v.   .      ( See    Statj 


of  Texas  v. 


Texas  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Childress 
(64  Tex.   346),   363. 

Texas  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mat- 
thews   (60   Tex.   215    [1883]),   70. 

Texas  Transportation  Co.  v.  Boyfl 
<67   Tex.    153,  2   S.  W.   364),   147. 

Thaler  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners (174  111.  211,  52  N.  E. 
116    [1898]),   424,   526,   837. 

Thayer  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids  (82 
Mich.  298,  46  N.  W.  228  [1890]), 
223,  469,  470.  526.  569,  952,  955. 
1490. 

Thayer  Lumber  Co.  v.  City  of  Mus- 
kegon   (—  Mich.   ,   115   N.   W. 

957  [1908]),  270,  750,  1414,  1432, 
1437. 

Theobald  v.  Sylvester  (27  Pa.  Super. 
Ct.  362),  353,    1047. 

Theresa  Drainage  District,  In  re  (90 
Wis.  301,  63  N.  W.  288),  291,  337. 

Third  Street,  Matter  of  (6  Cowen 
(N.  Y.)    571    [1827]),  206. 

Thomas  v.  City  of  Chicago  (204  111. 
611,  68  N.  E.  653  [1903]),  393, 
825,  920. 

Thomas  v.  City  of  Chicago  ( 152  111. 
292,  38  N.  E.  923  [1894]),  653, 
655,  908,  922,  1309,  1323,  1328, 
1375,  1382. 

Thomas  v.  Evans  (105  N.  Y.  601, 
59  Am.  Rep.  519,  12  N.  E.  571), 
1055. 

Thomas  v.  Gain  (35  Mich.  155,  24 
Am.  Rep.  535  [1876]),  11,  118, 
119.  C53,  666,  674,  711,  726,  735, 
1426,   1427,   1443. 

Thomas  v.  Hooker-Colville  Steam 
Pump  Company  (22  Mo.  App.  8 
[1886]),  49,  50,   1054. 

Thomas  v.  Leland  (24  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)    65    [1840]),  36,  252,  361,  548. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


ccxxix 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Thomas     v.     City     of     Olympia     ( 12 

W^-sh.   465,    41    Pac.    191    [1895]), 

1510,  1513. 
Thomas   v.    Portland    (40    Or.    50,    G6 

Pac.    439    [1901]),    414,    905,    971, 

983. 
Tliomas    v.    \^  alker    Township    Board 

(116    Mich.    597,    74    X.    W.    Rep. 

1048    [1898]),   1348,   1390. 
Thomas  v.  Woods   (—  Ky.  ,   108 

S.   W.  878    [1898]),  287,  462,  844. 
Thomason  v.  Ashworth    ( 73   C'al.   73, 

14    Pac.    615     [1887]),     180,    215, 

216,  221,  227,  245,  500. 
Thomason  v.   Carroll    (132   Cal.   148, 

64    Pac.    262     [1901]),    735,     740, 

805,  808,  809,  810. 
Thomason  v.  Ciineo    (119  Cal.  25,  50 

Pac.   846    [1897]  ),  551,  555. 
Thomason   v.    Ruggles    { 69   Cal.   465, 

11   Pac.  20   [1886]),  216,  223,  506, 

950. 
Thompi^on    v.    City    of    Chicago     ( 197 

III.    599,    64    X.    E.    392     [1902]), 

469,  909,    1389. 
Thompson    v.    City    of    Detroit     (114 

Mich.  502,  72  X.  W.  320   [1897]), 

902,   936,    1482,    1485. 
Thompson    v.    Goldthwait     ( 132    Ind. 

20,  31  X.  E.  451   [1892]),  269,  322. 
Thompson   v.   Harlow    ( 150   Ind.   450, 

50   X.   E.   474),    1444. 
Thompson  v.  City  of  Highland  Park 

(187     111.     265,     58     N.     E.     328 

[1900]),  305,  314,  431,  909. 
Thompson     v.     Hode     (30     Cal.     180 

[1866]),  835. 
Thompson   v.   Honey   Creek   Draining 

Company     (33    Ind.    2G8     [1870]), 

884,   902,  905,    1244. 
Thompson   v.   Lapworth    ( L.    R.    3   C. 

P.    149),    1054. 
Thompson    v.    Love     (42    0.     S.     61 

[1884]).    2C9.    322,    588,    739,    754, 

785,   786,  788. 
Thompson     v.     Mitcliell      (133     Iowa 

527.   110  X.  W.  901    [1907]),   9G1, 

1035,    1431,    1434,    1436. 
Thompson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ilanberg 

(207      111.      334,     69     N.     E.     842 

[1904]),    469,    820,    909,    927,   928, 

932,  986,  993,  996,   1390. 


Thompson  v.  Schermerhorn    ( 6  X.  Y. 

92,   55   Am.   Dec.   385    [1851]),   53, 

55,   864,   867. 
Thompson  v.  Schermerliorn    ( 9  Barb. 

(X.   Y.)    152    [1850]),  864. 
Thompson     v.     Treasurer     of     Wood 

County   (11  0.  S.  678   [I860]),  86, 

147,   335,   340. 
Thomson    v.    City    of    Detroit     (114 

Mich.  502,  72  X.  W.  320   [1897]), 

927. 
Thomson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Foote   ( 184 

111.  17,  56  X.  E.  383   [1900]),  301, 

527,   604,   640,   897,   927,   938,   987. 

1000. 
Thorn   v.    West   Chicago    Park    Com- 
missioners   (130  111.  ,594,  22  X.  E. 

520    [1890]),    234,    266,    305,    620. 

780,  787,  911,   916,  923,   1279. 
Thornton  v.   Cincinnati    (26   Ohio   C. 

C.  33    [1904]),  666.   1012,  1033. 
Thornton    v.    City    of    Clinton     (148 

Mo.  648,  50  S.  W.  295),  575,  582, 

665,    666,     709,     714,     1113,     1211, 

1498,   1505,   1506,    1508. 
Thome    v.    Rutland    R.    Co.    (27    Vt. 

140,   62  Am.   Dec.   625),   363. 
Thurston  v.  City  of  Elmira   ( 10  Aiih. 

Pr.    (X.  S.)    119   [1868]),  280,  .509. 

1411,  1423,  1432,  1442. 
Tidewater  Co.  v.  Coster  ( 18  X.  J. 

E.  (3  C.  E.  Green)  518,  90  Am. 

Dec.   634),  34,   113,  255,  665. 
Tifft   V.    City   of   BulValo    (82    X.    Y. 

204    [1880]),    100,   956,   980,   983. 
Tilestone  v.  Street   Commissioners  of 

City  of  Boston   (182  Mass.  325,  65 

X.  E.  380   [1902]),   1406,   1407. 
Tilden     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty    of    the    City   of   New 

York      (56*  Barb.      (N.     Y.)      340 

'  [1870]),  166,  172,  381,  1425.  1427. 

Tillie  V.   Mitchell    (—  Ky.  ,   102 

S.  W.  263   [1907]),   1371. 
Tillman    v.     Kircher     (64     Ind.     104 

[1878]),   335,  337,  549,   564,   1278. 
Tinnio    v.    Village    of    Port    Chester 

(101     X.    Y.     294,     4    X.     E.     625 

[1S8G]),    196,    755,    801,    823,    957, 

958,  986,   1450. 
Tipton,   ""own   of   v.   Jones    (77    Ind. 

307   [18-111,   1518. 


ccxxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Title    Guarantee    and    Trust    Co.    v. 

City  of   Chicago    (162   111.   505,   44 

N,   E.   832    [1896]),  417,   418,   444, 

563,    633,   652,    857,    864,    920,    921. 
Titus   V.    Chicago,    Milwaukee    &    St. 

Paul  Ry.  Co.    ( 128  la.  194,   103  N. 

W.  343),  363. 
Tober    v.    City    of    Chicago     (164    111. 

572,   45   N.' E.    1010    [1897]).   720, 

763,   764,   772,   913,   927,   933,   986, 

996,   1379. 
Todd    V.    City    of    Atchison     (9    Kan. 

App.  251),' 59  Pac.  676   [1900]),  8, 

89. 
Todd    V.    Kankakee    &    Illinois    River 

Railroad     Company     (78     111.     530 

[1875]),   72. 
Todd   V.   McFarland    (20    App.   D.    C. 

170    [1902]),  244,  983,    1112,   1382. 
Toledo   V.    Aiasworth    (7    Ohio   X.    P. 

391    [1900]),    704. 
Toledo,  City  of,  for  Use  v.  Beaumont 

(3    Ohio   X.    P.    287    [1895]),    549, 

565,  575,  674. 
Toledo,   City   of  v.   Board   of   Educa- 
tion   (48    0.    S.   83,  26    X.   E.   403 

[1891]),  580,  586,  1077. 
Toledo,  City  of,  for  the  Use  of  Gates  • 

V.     Brown      (2      Ohio     X.     P.     45 

[1895]),  563. 
Toledo,  City  of,  for  Use  of  Iloran  v, 

Barnes  (1  Ohio  X.  P.  187   [1894]), 

392,  395,  396,  1330. 
Toledo,  City  of  v.   Ford    (20  Ohio  C. 

C.  290   [1900]),  324,  327,  440,  555, 

563,  670,   1005. 
Toledo,  City  of  v.  Goulden    ( 10  Ohio 

C.   C.    161    [1895]),    1515. 
Toledo    for    Use   v.    Grasser    ( 7    Ohio 

X.   P.   396    [1883]),  535. 
Toledo,  Cit.y  of,  for  the  Use  of  Gates 

V.  Kohn  "(2  Ohio  X.  P.  47   [1895]"), 

563. 
Toledo,  City  of,  for  the  Use  of  Gates 

V.   Lake    Shore   &   Michigan    South- 
ern  Railwa.y   Company    (4   Ohio   C. 

C.    113    [1889]),   38,    86,   264,    268, 

563,   663,   679,   686,   700,   747,   813, 

821,   823,  844. 
Toledo  V.  McGlynn   (67  O.  S.  498,  67 

X.  E.  1103), 313. 
Toledo,  City  of  v.  McMahon   (9  Ohio 

C.  C.  194    [1894]),  740. 


Toledo,  City  of  v.  ^larlow    (75  0.  S. 

574,   80   X.    E.    1124    [1906]),   680, 

687,  950. 
Toledo,   City  of  v.   Piatt    (2   Ohio   X. 

P.  304),   1109. 
Toledo  V.  Potter    ( 19  Ohio  C.  C.  661 

[1893]),  563,   648,  723. 
Toledo,   City  of   v.   Sheill    (53    0.   S. 

447,  30  L.  R.  A.  598^  42  X.  E.  323 

[1895]),  561,  625. 
Toledo,    St.    Louis    &    Western    Rail- 
road Co.  V.  People  ex  rel.    (226  111. 

557,  SO  X.  E.   1059   [1907]),  22. 
Toledo,  St.  Louis  and  Western  Rail- 
road V.  People  ex  rel.  Brown    ( 225 

111.    425,    80    X.    E.    283     [1907]), 

322. 
Tomlinson  v.  Bainaka   (163  Ind.  112, 

70  X.  E.    155    [1904]),   111,  363. 
Tompkins  v.  Village  of  Xorwood    ( 18 

Ohio   C.   C.   883    [1897]),  561,  625, 

704. 
Ton  V.  City  of  Chicago   (216  111.  331, 

74    X.    E.    1044    [1905]),    86,    295, 

298,  523,  741. 
Tonawanda  v.   Lyon    (181   U.   S.   389, 

45  L.  908,  21  "S.  609  [1901]),  118, 

570,  702. 
Tone  V.  Columbus  (39  0.  S.  281,  48 

Am.  Rep.  438  [1883]),  33,  1012, 

1013. 
Tone    V.    The    Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

Commonalty  of  Xew  York    (6  Daly 

(X.  Y.)    343    [1876]),  910.   1518.  " 
Toolan    v.    Longyear    ( 144    Mich.    55, 

107   X.   W.   699    [1906]),    119. 
Topeka,    City   of    v.    Gage    ( 44    Kan. 

87,  24   Pac.   82    [1890]),   141,   570, 

1337. 
Topliff  V.   City   of   Chicago    (196    111. 

215,    63    X.    E.    692    [1902]),    293, 

295,   437,   672,   690,   865,    1381. 
Torrey     v.     Wallis      (57     Mass.      (3 

Cush.)    442   [1849]),   1054. 
Tournier    v.    ^Municipality    Xo.    1     (5 

La.    Ann.    298     [1850]"),    323,    663, 

1509. 
Towne  v.  Salentine    (92  Wis.  404,  66 

X.     W\     395     [1896]),     895,     1175, 

1196,    1201. 
Townsend    v.    Citv    of    Manistee     (8S 

Mich.   408,  50  X.   W.   321    [1891]),, 

663,  738,  851,  902,   1434. 


I 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXXXl 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Traction     Co.     v.     Board     of     Public 

Works    (50  X.  J.   L.    (27  Vr.)    431, 

29  Atl.  1G3),  280. 
Traders'  Bank  v.  Payne   (31  ^Mo.  App. 

512),  530. 
Trail  V.  Village  of  Grant  Park    (192 

III.    351,    61    X.    E.    442     [1901]), 

785,  789. 
Traphagen  v.  Township  of  West  Ilo- 

boken    (39   X.   J.   L.    (10   Vr.)    232, 

[1877]),    141. 
Treacy  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,   In 

the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of    (59 

Barb.    (X.    Y. )    525    [1871]),    IGti. 

1G7. 
Treanor  v.  Houton    ( 103   Cal.   53,  3G 

Pac.    1081    [1894]),   301.   522,   574, 

666,  698,  1030,  1236,  1238,  1337. 
Treasurer  of  City  of  Camden  v.  Mul- 

ford  (26  X.  J.  L.  (2  Dutcher)  49 

[1856]),  1003,  1394. 
Treat  v.  City  of  Chicago  (  130  Fed. 

443,  64  C.  C.  A.  645  [1904]).  818, 

998,  1015,  1022,  1035,  1183,  1435, 

1436. 
Treat  v.  City  of  Chicago  (125  Fed. 

644),  818,  998,  1035,  1183^  1435, 

1436. 
Treat    v.     People    ex     rel.     Raymond 

(195     111.      196,     62     X.     E.     891 

[1902]),  514. 
Trcgea    v.    Modesto    Irrigation     Dis- 
trict   (164   U.    S.    179,   41    L.    395, 

17  S.  52   [1896]).  129,  1370,  1477. 
Tregea    v.    Owens     (94    Cal.    317,    29 

Pac.     643    [1892]),    48,    221,     355, 

697,  780,   1496. 
Trenton,  The  Town  of  v.  Coyle    ( 107 

Mo.    193,    17    S.    W.    643    [1891]). 

234,  837,  838,  875. 
Trenton,  City   of,   ex  rel.   Gardner   v. 

Collii^r    (68  Mo.  App.  483   [189(1]), 

510,    747,    763,    813,    817,    859,   804. 
Trephagen   v.    City    of    South    Omaha 

(09     Xeb.     577,     90     X.     W.     248 

[1903]),  223,   372,   459.   717.   775. 
Trigger   v.   Drainage   District  Xo.    1. 

etc.    (193    111.   230,   61    X.   E.    1114 

[1901]),    202,    271,   272,    278,    281, 

340.    557,   558,    564,    918,   921.   947, 

1008,   1027,  1281,  1283.   1325.  1337. 
Trimble  v.   McGee    (112   Ind.   307.   14 

X.  E.  S3   [1887]).  375.   10S5,   1414. 

1431. 


Trimmer   v.    City   of   Rochester    ( 130 

X.  Y.   401,  29  X.   E.   746    [1892]), 

995,   1456,   1487,   1488,   1492. 
Trinity    Church    v.    Cook     (11     Abb. 

Prac.    371    [1800]),    1054. 
Trinity    Church.    Rector    of    v.    Hig- 

gins     (27    X.    Y.    Su]).    C  t.    Rep.    1 

[1800]  1,  279,  832,  1054. 
Trinity    College    v.    City   <jf    Hartford 

(32  Conn.  452    [1805]),   70,  308. 
Tripler     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty    of    the    City   of    Xew 

York    (139*X.  Y.   1,  .34  X.   E.   729 
Tripler     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty   of    the    City    of    Xew 

York    (125    X.    Y.    617,  *26    X.    E. 

721),   482,   826,    1478,    1484,    1497. 
Tripler     v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty   of    the    City    of    Xew 

York    (53   Hun    (X.   Y.)*  36,   6   N. 

Y.    Supp.    48    [1889]),    1478.    1497. 
Tripler  v.   Mayor,  etc.,  of  Xew  York 

(20    Abb.     (X.    C.)     325     [1891]), 

1484. 
Tripp  V.  City  of  Yankton    ( 10  S.  D. 

510,    74    X.    W.    447    [1898]),    96. 

118,    135,    147,   323,   355,   420,   562, 

032,  660,  698,  703,  709,  732. 
Trowbridge    v.    City    of    Detroit    (99 

Mich.   443,  58  X."  W.   308    [1894]), 

200,  308. 
Troy  &  Lansingburgh  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Kane   (9  Hun   (X.  Y.)   506 

[1877]).  603. 
Troyer   v.   Dyar    (102   Ind.   390,    1    X. 

E.  728   [1885]),  887.  1028,  1445. 
Trustees    v.    Atlanta     (70    Ga.    181), 

588. 
Trustees    of    Belleview    v.    Hohn     (82 

Ky.    1    [1884]),    1499. 
Trustees    v.    McConnel     (12    111.    138 

[1S50]),   42. 
Trustees  of v. 

— .        ( See    name 


of  organization.) 
Tucker   v.    People   ex    rel.    Wall     (  150 

111.     108.    40    X.    E.    4.)1     [1895]). 

244.     254,     340,     777.     1008,     1183, 

1337,   1477. 
Tucker   v.    Sellers    (130    Ind.   514.    30 

X.   E.   531    [1891]).   7:]5,    745.    747, 

795.  873,  910,  952.  955.  969.   1502. 


CCXXXll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[lieferenees  are  to  sections.] 


Tulare    Irrigation    District    v.    Shep- 

ard    (185   U.    S.    1,   46   L.    773,   22 

S.  531  [1902]),  234,  1502. 
Tull  V.  Royston  (30  Kan.  617,  2 

Pac.  866   [1883]),   1022,   1067, 

1272. 
Tuller  V.  City  of  Detroit    (126  Mich. 

605,  85  N.  W.  1080   [1901]),  1015. 
Tunuvater,     Town     of     v.     Pix      (IS 

Wash.    153,    51    Pac.    353    [1897]), 

416,    482,   551,    714,    724,   933,    965, 

969,  1026,  1237,  1337. 
Tunbridge   v.    Pvoyalton    (58   Vt.    212 

[1885]),  Gl,  359,   450,   636, 
Turfler's    Case     (19    Abb.    Prac.    IJO 

[1865]),   584,   663,   884,   941. 
Turfler,   In  the  Matter  of    (44  Baib. 

46     [1865]),    584,     663,    884,    941, 

984. 
Turley   v.    The   People    ex    rel.    IMay- 

fiekl     (116    111.    433,    6    X.    E.    52 

[1887]),   897,   918,    1358,    1360. 
Turner  v.  Lay    (163  Ind.   103,   71   X. 

E.   217    [1904]),   909. 
Turner    v.    Pievere    Water    Co.     (171 

Mass.  329,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  432,  40 

L.  Pv.  A.  657,  50  X.  E.  634),  1072. 
Turner    v.    Snyder     (101    Minn.    481, 

112  X.  W.  868    [1907]),  215,   776. 
Turner   v.    City    of    Springfield    (117 

Mo.     App.     418,     93     S.     W.     867 

[1906]),  510. 
Turner  v.  Thorntown  and  ^lechanics- 

burg    Gravel    Road    Co.     (33    Ind. 

317    [1870]),    255,    332,    551,    629, 

859,   1432. 
Turnquist     v.     Cai?s     County     Drain 

■Commissioners    (11   X.   D.   514,   92 

X.  W.  852   [1902]).    196,  266,  340, 

472,    556,    674,    1005,    1007,    1012, 

1015,  1430,  1436. 
Turpin  v.   Eagle   Creek   Gravel   Road 

Co.    (48  Ind.  45),  86,  322. 
Turpin   v.   Lemon    (187   U.  S.   51,   23 

0.    S.    20    [1902]),    115,    119.    726. 

768. 
Turrill     v.     Grattan      (52     Cal.     97 

[1877]),   781,   798. 
Tusting  V.  City  of  Asbury  Park    ( — 

N.    J.   ,    62    Atl.    183    [1905]), 

690,   1015,   1403,   1408,   1409. 
Tuthill  for  the  Appointment  of  Com- 
missioners   to    Drain    Certain    Wet 


and  Low  Lands  in  the  Towns  of 
Chester  and  Blooming  Grove  in 
Orange  County,  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Petition  of  ( 163  X.  Y.  133,  79 
Am.  St.  Rep.  574,  49  L.  R.  A.  781, 
57  X.  E.  303   [1900]),   117,  337. 

Tuttle  V.  Polk  and  Hubbel  (92  la. 
433,  60  X.  W.  733  [1894]),  182, 
209,  314,  507,  525,  927,  1026,  1105. 
1106,   1295,   1504. 

Tuttle  V.  Polk  and  Hubble  (84  la. 
12,  50  X.  W.  38),  868,  956,  962, 
975,   1026,   1105,    1108. 

Tweed  v.  Metealf  (4  Mich.  590 
[1854]),  958. 

Twenty-fourth  Street,  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Sewer  in  (31  Howard  (X. 
Y.)    42    [1863]),   1457. 

Tyler  v.  Beacher  (44  Vt.  648,  8  Am. 
^Rep.  398   [1871]),  117. 

Tyler  v.  City  of  Columbus  (6  Ohio 
C.   C.  224   [1892]),   1444. 

Tyler  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (50  Mo. 
'go   [1874]),   118,  676,  677,  709. 

Tyler  v.  Shea  (4  X.  D.  278,  50  Am. 
St.  Rep.  660,  61   X.  W.  468),  272. 

Tyson  v.  City  of  ^Milwaukee  ( 50  Wis. 
78,   5   X.  W.   914    [1880]),    1524. 


u 


LHirig  V.  City  of   St.  Louis    (44  Mo. 

458   [1869]),  86,  118. 
Ulm  V.  Cincinnati   (7  Ohio  X.  P.  278 

[1900]),   1015,   1346. 
Ulman  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 

Baltimore    (165    U.    S."  719.    41    L. 

1184,  17  S.  1001   [1897]).  950.  962, 

967. 
Llman  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 

Baltimore    (72   Md.   587,    11   L.   R. 

A.  224.  32  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 

228,     20     Atl.     141,     21     Atl.     709 

[1890]),    119,    122,    123,    137,    570, 

626,  641,  647,  726.  729,  959,  962. 
Umbria  Street  (32  Pa.  Super  Ct.  333 

[1907]  ),    909,    1055. 
Uncas  Xational  Bank  v.  City  of  Su- 
perior   (115    Wis.    340,    91    X.    W. 

1004   [1902]),  1505. 
Underbill,  To^vn  of  v.  Town  of  Essex 

(64   Vt.   28,   23   Atl.   617    [1891]). 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


CCXXXIU 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


61,    101,    16G,    170,    35!).    450,    G3(i, 
989. 
Underwood   v.   Green    (42   N.    V.    140 

[1870]),  372. 
Union    Building    Association    v.    City 
of    Chicago    (61    111.    439    [1871]), 
113,    134,    143,   278,   466,   485.   954, 
979,    1337,    1486. 
Union    Cemetery   Association    v.    Mc- 
Connel   ( 124  X.  Y.  88,  26  X.  E.  330 
[1891]),  437,   1378. 
Union   College,   for   an   Order  Direct- 
ing  the   Treasurer  of   Long   Island 
City  to  cancel  certain  water  rates 
and    rents,    In    the    ]\Iatter    of    the 
Application     of     the     Trustees     of 
(129    N.    Y.    308,    29    X.    E.    460 
[1891]),    119.    122.    124,    351,    354, 
414,  718,  726,  729,  734,  957. 
Union    County,    Commissioners   of   v. 
Greene   (40"o.  S.  318   [1883]),  322, 
725. 
Union,  Township  of  v.  Rader    (41  X'. 

J.  L.    (12  Vr.)    617),   1081. 
Union  Drainage  District  Xo.   1,  Com- 
[1893]),  1488. 

missioners    of    v.    Smith    (233    III. 
417,    84    X.    E.    376    [1908]).    119, 
280,  935. 
Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City 
(73      Kan.      571,      85      Pae.      603 
[1906]),    141,    301,    795.    1337. 
Union  Paving  and   Contracting  Com- 
pany   V.    .McGovern    (  127    Cal.   638, 
60    Pac.     169     [1900]).    810,    830. 
1010,   1034. 
Union    Railway    Company    v.    Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Cam- 
bridge    (93    Mass.     (11     AH.)     287 
[1865]),  58,  457. 
United    Brethren    in    Christ    Church, 
Trustees    of    the    v.    Rausch     (  122 
Ind.    167.    23    X.    E.    717    [1889]), 
1005,   1015,   1018.   1337,   1445. 
United   Xew   Jersey   R.   &    Canal    Co, 
V.  Gummere   (69  X.  J.  L.    (40  Vr.) 
Ill,   54    Atl.   520    [1903]),    1409. 
United    States    e.\    rel.    Kilpatrick    v. 
Capdeviellc    (118    Fed.    809.    55    C. 
C.    A.    421     [1002]),    340.    1518. 
United    States    on    Petition    of    Com- 
missioners  V.   Cooper    (21    App.    D. 
C.   491    [1893]).   tiOo.   660. 


United    States    ex    rel.    Thompson    v. 
Dent      (1     Mackey      (D.     C.)      463 
[1882]),  475,   1103. 
United    States  ex.   rel.    Henderson    v. 
Edmunds    (3   Mackey    (D.   C.)    142 
[1884]),   553,  621,   707. 
United  States  v.   Ft.  Scott    (99  U.  S. 
152,  25  L.  348  [1878]),  1502,  1505. 
United  States  v.  :Memphis    (97  U.  S. 
284,  24  L.  937   [1877]),  1469,  1473. 
1518. 
United  'States    Fidelity   &    Guaranty 
Co.   V.   City  of   Xewark    ( —  X.   J. 

Eq.    ,     66     At!.    904     [1907]), 

1261,    1517. 
United  States  Security  and  Bond  Co. 
V.    Wolfe     (27    Colo.    218,    60    Pac. 
637    [1900]),   1202,   1297. 
University    v.    People     (80    III.    333, 

22   Am.   Rep.    187).   42. 
Updike      V.      Wright      (81      111.      49 
[1876]),     18.    104,    105,    149.     153, 
242,    257,    258.   2.59.    344,    574,   651, 
654,    1163. 
Upham    V.    City    of    Worcester     I  113 

Mass.  97   [1873]  ),  76. 
Upington    v.    Oviatt    (24    0.    S.    232 
[1873]),    496,    503,    639,    645,    686, 
700,   723,   740,   834,    835,   853,   956. 
962,  977,  990,  1431,  1434,   1442. 
Upson,   In   the   Matter  of    (89   X.   Y. 
67     [1882]).     313.    405.     479.    540. 
821. 
Upson,    In    the    Matter    (if     (24    Ilun 

(X.  Y.)  650  [1881]  ).  821. 
Upton  V.  Peoi)le  ex  rel.  :Murri<'  (176 
111.  632,  52  X.  E.  35S  [1S9S]). 
886,  1035,  1183. 
Upton  V.  Soutli  Reading  Branch 
Railroad  Company  (62  Mass.  (8 
Cush.)    600   [1851]!,  60. 


V 

Valparaiso.  C  ity  of  v.  Parker  (  148 
Ind.  379.  47  X.  E.  330  [1897]), 
271,  280.  324.  444.  918,  1352,  1358. 

Van  Antwerp  to  \'acate  an  A?sess- 
ment,  In  the  Matter  <if  the  Appli- 
cation of  (56  X.  Y.  261  [1874] I, 
8.  89.  196,  199,  241,  414,  550,  G98, 
956.  958.   964. 


CCXXXIV 


T^VBLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Van  Antwerp,  Matter  of  (1  N.  Y, 
Super.   Ct.  423),  408. 

Van  Buren,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of,  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment (79  N.  Y.  384  [1880]),  342, 
449,  461,  564,  572,  628. 

Van  Buren,  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  (55  How  (N.  Y.)  513 
[1878]),   229,   342,   461,    1453. 

Van  Buren,  In  the  Matter  of  thfe 
Petition  to  Vacate  an  Assessment 
(17  Hun  527  [1879]),  223,  234, 
444,  777. 

Van  Cleef  v.  Commissioners  of 
Streets  and  Sewers  of  New  Bruns- 
wick (38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  320 
[1876]),  1410. 

Van  Cleve  v.  Passaic  Valley  Sew- 
erage Commissioners  (71  N.  J.  L. 
(42  Vr.)  183,  58  Atl.  571  [1904]), 
81,   178,  324. 

Van  Deventer  v.  Long  Island  City 
(139  N.  Y.  133,  34  X.  E.  774 
[1893]),  11.  554.  639. 

Van  Dusen's  Estate  ( 1  Penn.  Dis- 
trict  Rep.    156    [1892]),    1055. 

Van  Loenen  v.  Gillespie  ( —  Cal. 
,  96  Pac.  87   [1908]),  512. 

Van  Rensselear  v.  Kidd  (4  Barb.  ( X. 
Y.)    17    [1847]),   1425,   1427. 

Van  Sant  v.  City  of  i'ortland  ( 6  Or. 
395    [1877]),   760.   1292,    1304. 

Van  Sickle  v.  Belknap  ( 129  Ind.  558, 
28  N.  E.  305  [1891]),  267,  301, 
814,   1229,   1244. 

Van  Wagoner  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  City  of  Paterson  (67  X. 
J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  455  [1902]).  5,  9, 
11,  93,  97,  295,  297,  324,  328,  420, 
448,   609,  690,   717,   895,   1409. 

Vance  v.  Corrigan  ( 78  Mo.  94 
[1883])    1195,    1219. 

Vandalia  Levee  and  Drainage  Dis- 
trict V.  Hutchins  (234  111.  31,  84 
N.  E.  715  [1908]).  280,  468,  469, 
952,  953. 

Vane  v.  City  of  Evanston  (150  111. 
616,  37  X.  E.  901  [1894]).  293, 
298,  448,  857. 

Vanderbeck  v.  City  of  Rochester  (122 
X.  Y.  285,  10  L.  R.  A.  178,  25  X. 
E.  408  [1890]),  1053,  1055.  1346, 
1478,   1484,   1488. 


Vanderbeck  v.  City  of  Rochester    (46 

Hun  87    [1887]  [,  308,    1055. 
Vandersyde    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray- 
mond   (195  111.  200,   62  X.  E.   806 
[1902]),    297,    324,    328,    448,    609, 
620,  895,  927,  987,  1183,  1340. 
Vandine,    Petitioner     ( 23    Mass.     ( 6 
Pick.)    187,  17  Am.  Dec.  351),  372. 
Vanhorne's    Lessee    v.    Dorrance     ( 2 

Dall.   304,   315    [1795]  ),   71. 
Vantilburg    v.    Shann    (24    X.    J.    L. 

(4  Zab.)    740),  130,  745. 
Vasser     v.     George      (47     Miss.     713 
[1873]),   43,    147.    148,    666,    1174, 
1175,  1177. 
Vaughn    v.    Village    of    Port    Chester 
(135     X.    Y.    460,    32    X.    E.     137 
[1892]),    1484. 
Vaughn    v.    Village    of    Port    Chester 
(43    Hun     (X.    Y.)     427     [1887]), 
1484. 
Vennum   v.   People   ex   rel.   Galloway 
(188     111.      158,     58     X.     E.     979 
[1900]),   282,   886,   900,   992,   1183, 
1189,    1341. 
Verdin  v.  City  of  St.  Louis   (131  Mo. 
26,    33    S.  "W.    480,    36    S.    W.    52 
[1895]),    228,    479,    483,    494,    515, 
519. 
Vernon    Park     (163    Pa.    St.    70,    29 

Atl.  972),  356. 
Vickrey  v.   City  of   Sioux  City    (115 

Fed.   437    [1902]),    1502. 
Vicksburg,  S.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Good- 
enough    (108  La.  442,  66  L.  R.  A. 
314,   32   So.   404    [1902]),   365. 
V'icksburg,      Shrevej^ort      &      Pacific 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Scott   (47  La.  Ann. 
706,   17  So.  249   [1895]),  46,   1369. 
Vieths   V.  Planet  Property  &   Finan- 
cial      Co.       (64      Mo.      App.      207 
[1895]),    1138,    1243,    1255. 
Violet  V.  City  Council  of  Alexandria 
(92  Va.  561,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  825, 
31    L.    R.    A.    382,    23    S.    E.    909 
[1896]),    115,    122,    135,    139,    161, 
223,   234,   301,   549,    624,   665,   666, 
690,  693,  699,  726,   732,   777. 
Voght  V.  City  of  Buflalo    ( 133  N.  Y. 
463,    31    X.    E.    340    [1892]),    314. 
381,    511,    527,   549,    604,    672,    675, 
690,  693,  761,  823,  913. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXXXV 


[References  ure  to  sections.] 


yoigt    V.    Detroit    City     (184    U.    S. 

115,  46  L.  459,  22  S.  337   [1902]), 

118,    125,    126,   308,    669,    670,    690, 

691,  728,  738. 
Voigt  V.  City  of  Detroit    ( 123  Mich. 

547,   82   X.    W.   253    [1900]),    118, 

125,   248,   308,   663,   669,   670,   690, 

691,  709,  728,  738. 
Von  Steen  v.  Beatrice    (36  Neb.  421, 

54   N.   W.    677    [1893]),   581,   582, 

586,   781,   791,   793. 
Voorliees  v.   Borougli  of  North  Wild- 
wood    (—   N.   J.   L.   ,   68   Atl. 

175    [1907]),   1168. 
Voorhis,    In    the    :\ratter    of     (90    N. 

Y.   668    [1882]),   1466. 
Voris'     Ex'rs    v.    Gallaher     (27     Ky. 

Law    Rep.     1001,    87     S.    W.     775 

[1905]),  1067,  1072,  1130,  1164. 
Voris  V.  Pittsburg  Plate  Glass  Co. 

(163  Ind.  599,  70  N.  E.  249),  119, 

121,   139,  626,  G29,  699,  731,   1043. 
Vrana  v.  City  of  St.  Louis   (164  ^lo. 

146,    64    S.'   W.    180    [1901]),    310, 

616. 
Vreeland  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Bayonne 

(58  N.  J.  L.  "(29  Vr.)    126,  32  Atl. 

68     [1895]),    444,    549,    563,     652, 

665. 
Vreeland    v.    Mayor    and    Council    of 

the  City  of  Bayonne    (54  N.  J.  L. 

(25  Vr.")   488,  24  Atl.  486   [1892]), 

280. 
Vreeland  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 

Jersey    City     (37    N.    .J.    Eq.     (10 

Stew.)    574   [1883]).  353,   1049. 
Vreeland  v.  O'Neil    (36  N.  J.  Eq.    (9 

Stew.)    399,   (aOirnied  37  N.  J.  Eq. 

(10    Stew.)    574).    124.   353,    1049. 
Vreeland    v.     City    of    Taconia     ( — 

Wash.   ,   94   Pac.    192    [1908]), 

347,   1004,   1431. 

w 

W.  F.  Stewart  Co.  v.  City  of  Flint 
(147  Mich.  697,  111  N.  W.  352 
[1907]),  284,  329,   1015. 

Wabash  Avenue  (26  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
305    [1904]),  503,   574,   620. 

Wabash  Eastern  Railway  Co.  of  Illi- 
nois V.  Commissioners  of  East 
Lake   Fork  Drainage  District    (134 


111.  384,   10  L.  R.  A.  285,  25  N.  E. 

781    [1890]),  8,   89,  254,  340.  739, 

745,     758,    760,    1008,    1026,     1053, 

1068,   1078,   1258,   1337,   1477. 
Wabash    River,    Board    of    Directors 

for    Leveeing   v.    Houston    (71    111. 

318    [1874]),   105. 
Waco,   City  of,   v.   Prather    (90   Tex. 

80,  37  S".  W.  Rep.  312  [1896]),  830. 

837,  838. 
Wadlow  V.  City  of  Chicago   (.159  111. 

176,    42    N.  "e.    866    [1896]),    912. 

1287,   1379. 
Wagg  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  (218 

III.    337,    75    N.    E.    977     [1905]), 

986,  996,   1183. 
Waggcman      v.      \'illage      of      North 

Peoria     (155    111.    545,    40    N.    E. 

485   [1895]),  64,  70,  111,  308,  425. 

426,   547,    587.    631.    070,    674,   896. 

1279. 
Wagner    v.    Gast     ( —    Ky.    ,    71 

S.     W.    533,    24     Ky.    L.    R.     1401 

[1903]).  628,  666,  709.  710, 
Wagner    v.    Milwaukee    County     (112 

Wis.   601,   88   N.   W.   577    [1901]), 

191. 
Wagner  v.  City  of  Rock  Island   ( 146 

111.   139,  21  L.  R.  A.  519,  34  N.  E. 

545    [1893]),  6,   124,  353,   1049. 
Wahlgren     v.    Cit.y   of    Kansas     City 

(42      Kan.      243,      21      Pac.      1068 

[1889]),   141,   800,   1337. 
Waite  V.  People   (228  111.  173,  81  N. 

E.     837    [1907]),    771.    774.     1029, 

1150. 
Waite     v.     Worcester     Brewing     Co. 

(176    Mass.    283.    57    N.    E.    460), 

353. 
Wakefield   Local    Board   of   Health   v, 

Lee    (1  Ex.   Div.  336).  620. 
Wakeley  v.  City  of  Omaha    (58  Neb. 

245.    78    N.    W.    511     [1S99]).    745. 

763,    1013.    1035.    11. )0. 
Wakeman,    Pros.    v.    flavor    and    Al- 
derman  of   Jersey    (  ity    (35    N.    J. 
)     455     [1872]).     1408. 


Vr, 


L.     ( 6 

1410. 
Waldschmidt 

Cir.   Ct.   R 
Wales   v.   Warren    (66 

N.   W.   590    [1902]), 


V.    Bowland     ( 27    Ohio 
782    [1905]  I.   985. 

Neb.    455,    92 
60,   265,   604, 


640.  911,   1181.    120T. 


CCXXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[Ilcferences  are  to  sections.] 


Walker   v.   City  of   Ann  Arbor    (118 

Mich.  251,   76   N.  W.  394    [1898]), 

622,  097. 
Walker  v.   City  of  Aurora    (140   111. 

402,    29    X.    E.    741     [1893]),    51, 

271,   324,   340,   402,   447,   563,   058, 

764,  771,  772,  912,  918,  1029,  1379. 
Walker  v.  City  of  Chicago    (202   111. 

531,    07    N.    E.    369    [1903]),    297, 

298,  324,  563,   619,   922,    1324. 
Walker   v.   City   of   Chicago    (62    111. 

286    [1871]),  867. 
Walker   v.   Cincinnati    (21    0.   S.    14, 

8  Am.  Rep.  24),  189. 
Walker  v.  City  of  Detroit  ( 136  Mich. 

6,  98  N.  W.  744  [1904]),  324,  732, 

1299,  1324. 
Walker   v.   District   of   Columbia    (ft 

Mackey    (D.    C.)    352    [1888]).    3, 

263,  274,  342,  883. 
Walker    v.    Jameson    (140    Ind.    591, 

49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  28  L.  R.  A. 

679,   37   N.   E.   402,   39   N.   E.   869 

[1894]),  6,   7,   11,   15,  20,  372. 
Walker    v.   Village   of   Morgan    Park 

(175  111.  570,  51   N.  E.  630),  323. 
Walker    v.    People   ex    rel.    Raymond 

(202  111.  34,  66  N.  E.  827   [19031), 

927,   937,   986,   996,    1172. 
Walker    v.    People    (170   III.    410,    48 

N.  E.  1010),  998. 
Walker  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 

ger    (169    111.    473,    48    N.    E.    694 

[1897]),   281,    857,    866,   927,   929, 

935,  986,  996,  998,  1009,  1183,  1340. 
Walker  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 

ger     (166    111.    96,    46    N.    E.    761 

[1897]),  324,  864,   1126,   1324. 
Walker    v.    Wliittemore     (112    Mass. 

187   [1873]),  49,   1054.. 
Walker    Township    v.    Thomas     ( 123 

Mich.  290,  82  N.  W.  48),  1015. 
Wallace    v.     Mayor,     Aldermen     and 

Commonalty    of    the    City   of   New 

York    (52  Hun    (N.  Y.)    587,   5   X. 

Y.   Sup.   705    [1889]),   1495. 
Wallace  v.  Shelton   ( 14  La.  Ann.  498 

[1859]),  39,  43,  155,  343,  689. 
Wallace  v.  Sortor    (52  Mich.   159,  17 

X.  W.  798    [1883]),   1446,   1495. 
Waller    v.    City   of   Chicago    (53    111. 

88  [1869]),  735,  754,  769,  1184. 


Wain  V.  Common  Council  of  Beverly 

(53  N.  J.  L.   (24  Vr.)   560,  22  Atl. 

340    [1891]),    1408. 
Wain's  Heirs  v.  City  of  Philadelphia 

to  Use  of   Armstrong    (99   Pa.   St. 

330    [1882]),    324,    740,    832,    834, 

835,   836,   1303,   1304. 
Walsh   V.    Barron    (61    0.    S.    15,    70 

Am.    St.    Rep.    354,   55   X.    E.    164 

[1899]),  11,  79,  111,  113,  651,  677, 

700,  956,  902. 
Walsh     V.     Mathews     (29     Cal.     123 

[1865]),   1039,  1049. 
Walsh  V.  Sims   (65  0.  S.  211,  62  X. 

E.  120  [1901]),  674,  675,  077,  700, 

985,   1361. 
Walston  V.  Xevin   ( 128  U.  S.  578.  32 

L.  544,  9  S.  192   [1888]),  108,  119, 

121,    131,    134,   301,    553,    666,    709, 

710,    728,    1356,    1370. 
Walter,   In   the   Matter   of   the   Peti- 
tion  of    (75    X.    Y.    354    [1878]), 

479,    574,    684,    1057,    1066,    1068, 

1460. 
Walter,    In   the   Matter    of    (14    Htm 

148    [1878]),   684. 
Walter  v.  Town  of  Union    (33   X.  .7. 

L.    (4  Vr.)    350),  167,   1113. 
Walters,    In    the    Matter   of    (83    X. 

Y.   538    [1881]),  784. 
Walters   v.   Town   of   Lake    (129    111. 

23,    21    X.    E.    556     [1890]!,    440. 

663,   665,   666,   672,   677,   771,   885, 

918,    924,    1005,    1007,    1283,    1328, 

1382. 
Ward,  to  Vacate  Certain  Assessments, 

In    the   ^Matter   of    tlie    Petition    of 

(52   X.   Y.    395    [1873]),   309,    621, 

622. 
Ward    V.    Ward    (9    Ohio    C.    C.    454 

[1895]),    1056. 
Warder   v.   Commissioners    ( 38    0:   S. 

639    [1883]),   36,   412,   1483. 
Wardsboro,  Town  of  v.  Town  of  Ja- 
maica    (59     Vt.  .514,     9     Atl.     11 

[1887]),  61,  359,  450,  636. 
Ware  v.  City  of  Jerseyville    (158   111. 

234,    41    N.    E,    736    [1895]),    469, 

472,  670,  698,  715,  813, 
Ware      v.      Willis       (45      Ala.       120 

[1871  I.  (ion. 
Warner  v.   Knox    (50  Wis.  429,   7  X. 

W.     372     [1880J),     163,     191,     194, 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CCXXXVll 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


198,   242,   380,   381,   464,   821.   823. 

1432,  1442. 
Warner   v.   New   Orleans    (  167   U.    S. 

467,  42  L.  239,  17  S.  892   [1897]), 

587,  1010,  1508. 
Warner  v.  City  of  New  Orleans    (87 

Fed.  Rep.  829,  31   C.  C.  A.  238,  59 

U.     S.    App.     131     [1898]),     1037, 

1508. 
Warner  v.  City  of  New  Orleans    (SI 

Fed.   645,   26   C.   C.   A.   508,   52    U. 

S.  App.   348    [1897]),   1508. 
Warren,  In  the  Matter  of   (85  N.  Y. 

268   [1881]),  736,  762. 
Warren    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving 

Co.    (115  Mo.  572,  22  S.  W.  490), 

515. 
Warren    v.    Street    Commissioners    of 

the    City    of    Boston     (187     Mass. 

290,   72'n.   E.   1022    [1905]),    156, 

407,    414,   641,    643,    648,   961,    967. 
Warren    v.    Street    Commissioners    of 

the   City  of   Boston    (181   Mass.   6, 

62    N.    E.    951     [1902]),    480,    490. 

504. 
Warren  v.  City  of  Chicago    (118   111. 

329,    11    N.    E.    218    [1888]),    347, 

451,  631,  713. 
Warren  v.    Ferguson    (108    Cal.    535, 

41  Pac.    417     [1895]),    273.     1052. 
1293,  1384,  1387. 

Warren  v.  City  of  Crand  Hav(>n  (30 
Mich.  24  [1874]),  247,  248,  250, 
278,  324,  392,  400,  444,  472,  549, 
555,  560,  563.  619,  653,  672,  690, 
692,   699,   893,   1014. 

Warren  v.  Henly  (31  la.  31  [1870]), 
12,  110,  147,"  323,  437,  438,  439, 
443,  474,  570.  620,  666,  677. 

Warren    v.    Hopkins     (110    Cal.    506, 

42  Pac.  986  [1895]).  313.  630.  6.31. 
1057,   1067,   1008. 

Warren   v.    Postol     (99    Cal.    294,    33 

Pac.   930    [1893]),   301,   084. 
Warren  v.  Riddel]    (  106  Cal.  352.  39 

Pac.    781     [1895]).    313,    537.    840, 

1358. 
Warren   and   Mallev    v.    llusscll    (129 

■Cal.  381,  62  Pac.  75   [1900]),  301, 

314,     750,     784,     809,     1216.     1281, 

1375.    1377. 
Warren  v.   Warren    (148   111.  641.   30 

N.  E.  611    [1894]),  49.   1053.   1055. 


Warren  Brothers  Co.  v.  City  of  New 

York   (190  X.  Y.  297,  83  N.  E.  59 

[1907]),  495,  515. 
Warren    Bros.    Co.    v.   Taylor    ( —   R. 

I.  — ,   69   Atl.   303    [1908]),   604, 

1498. 
Waples  V.   Citj'  of  Dubuque    (110  la. 

107,   89   N.   W.    194    [1902]),    1440. 
Washburn   v.    City   of   Chicago    (  198 

111.    506,    64    N.    E.    1064    [1902]), 

549,  608,  609,  610,  819. 
Washburn  v.  Lyons    (97  Cal.  314,  32 

Pac.    310    [1893]),    522,    736,    759, 

760,  1230,   1237. 
Washburn  Memorial  Orphan  Asylum 

V.  State    (73  Minn.  343,  76  N.  W. 

204  [1898]),  42,  589.  613,  614. 
Washle    v.    Nehan    (97    Ky.    351,    41 

S.  W.   1040   [1895]),  628. 
Washington  v.  Mayor   and   Aldermen 

of  Nashville    (31   Tenn.    (1    Swan) 

177    [1851]).  5,   19,  44,  53,  55,  80. 

93,    96,    160.    323,    370,    420,    717, 

737,  747,  829,   1044,   1048. 
Washington    v.    State    (13    Ark.    732 

[1853]),  151. 
Washington    &    Georgetown    Railroad 

Company    v.    District   of    Columbia 

(108   V.    S.    522,    27    L.    807,   2    S. 

865    [1883]),   437,  602,   603. 
Wa.shington  Avenue   (69  Pa.  St.  352, 

8   Am.    Rep.    255    [1871]),    28,   34, 

35,    100,    110,    291,    322,    384,    378, 

665,  698,  706,  1333. 
Washington  Ice  Company  v.   (_  ity  of 

Chicago    (147    Hi.   327,   37   Am.   St. 

Rep.   222,    35    N.    E.    378    [1894]), 

69,  71,  293,  295,  651,  850,  857,  862, 

864. 
Washington,  State  of  v.  . 


State  of   Wasjiington   v. 


Washington     Park    Club    v.    1  itv     of 

Chicago     (219    111.    323,    76    X.    E. 

.383    [1906]).    295.    297.    324,    609. 

717.  912. 
Water  Front.   In  tlie  .Matter  of.    (Sec 

New    York.) 
Waterbury,    City    nf    v.    Schmitz    (58 

Conn.    .522.    20    Atl.    606     [1890]), 

1041.    1-144.    1145.    1231. 
Waterloo  Woolen    Manufacturing  Co. 

v.   Shannahan    I  128   N.    Y.   3-15,    14 


ccxxxvin 


TiVBLE    OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


L.  R.  A.  481,  28  X.  E.  358  [1891]  ), 

361. 
Watertown,  City  of  v.  Fairbanks   (65 

N.  Y.  588    [1875]),   196,  231,  232, 

324,  444,  980,  1032. 
Walthen    v.    Allison    Ditch    District 

No.  2    (213  111.   138,  72  N.   E.  781 

[1904]),   651,   672,   675,   677,   1281. 
Watkins  v.  Griffith    (59  Ark.  344,  27 

S.  W.  234   [1894]),   223,  234,  245, 

780,  781,  791,  800,  1024. 
Watkins   v.    City   of   Milwaukee    (55 

Wis.  335,  13  N.  W.  222),  342,  420. 
Watkins   v.    City   of    Milwaukee    (52 

Wis.  98,  8  X.  W.  823  [1881]).  677, 

899,  1414,  1432,  1443. 
Watkins  v.  State  ex  rel.  Van  Auken 

(151    Ind.    123,   49   X.   E.    169,    51 

X.   E.   79    [1898]),   270,   471,    637, 

1216,  1473. 
Watkins  v.  Zwietusch    (47  Wis.  513, 

3  X.  W.  35   [1879]),  80,  665,  666, 

693,  694,  714. 
Watson  V.  City  of  Cliicago    (115  111. 

78,  3  X^.  E.  430  [1886]),  323,  571, 

663,   670,   676,   677,   709,   723,   870, 

920,  1271,  1273,  1313. 
Watson    V.    Crowsore     (93    Ind.    220 

[1883]),  70,   661,  922. 
Watson  V.   City  of  Elizabeth    (35   X. 

J.     Eq.     (8  'stew.)     345     [1882]), 

1411,    1418,    1444. 
Watson  V.  Xevin   (86  Ky.  492,  9  Ky. 

Law     Rep.     819,     5     S.     W.     546 

[1887]),   108,  628. 
Watson   V.   City   of   Philadelphia,    to 

Use    of    Adams     (93    Pa.    St.     (12 

Xorris)      111     [1880]),     527,     766, 

1281. 
Watson  V.  Borough  of  'Sewickley    (91 

Pa.   St.    (10   Xorris)    330    [1879]), 

745,  748,  930. 
Watt  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  €ity  of 

Xew  York   (3  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 

23   [1847]),  73,  1346. 
Watts    V.    Village    of    River    Forrest 

(227  111.  31,  81  X.  E.   12   [1907]), 

631,  896. 
Waud    V.    Green     (7    Mo.     Apj).    82 

[1879]),     263,     267,     1134,     1135. 

1284. 
Waukegan,   City  of  v.   Burnett    (234 


111.    460,    84    X.    E.    1061     [1908]), 

417,  418. 
Wayne  County  Savings  Bank  v.  Gas 

City     Land     Company      ( 15(i     Ind. 

662,  59  X.  E.    1048    [1900]).    1043, 

1085. 
Weatherhead  v.  Cody    ( —  Ky.  , 

85   S.   W.    1099,   27   Ky.   Law  Rep. 

631    [1905]),  844. 
Weaver    v.     Canon    Sewer     Co.     ( 18 

Colo.     App.     242,     70     Pac.      953 

[1902]),  283,  333,  445,  1252. 
Weaver  v.  Templin  (113  Ind.  298, 
•   14  X.  E.  600  [1887]),  125.  142, 

207,  267,  375,  461,  728,  756.  840, 
1351. 

Webb  v.  Southern  Missouri  &  A.  Ry. 

Co.   (92  Mo.  App.  53   [1902]),  363. 
Webber   v.   Gottschalk    ( 15   La.   Ann. 

376    [I860]),   323,   795,   1282. 
Webber    v.    Common    Council   of    the 

City  of  Lockport    (43  Howard   (X. 

Y.)     368    [1872]),    415,    482,    511, 

525,   581,   586,   588,   639,   723,   884, 

885,  886. 
Weber  v.  San  Francisco    (1   Cal.  455 

[1851]),     475,     1015,     1109,     1427, 

1431,   1436. 
Weber    v.    Schergens     (59     ^ilo.    389 

[1875]),  323,  525,  707.   1061.  1136. 
Webster  v.  City  of  Chicago    (62   111. 

302),  173. 
Webster  v.  City  of  Fargo   (181  U.  S, 

394,  45  L.  912,  21  S.  623   [1901]), 

118,    147,   314,   5.53,   570,   666,   677, 

698,  702,  1333. 
Webster  v.   City  of  Fargo    (9   X.   D. 

208,  56  L.  R.  A.  156,  82  X.  W.  732 
[1900]),  118,  147.  314,  .553,  570, 
653,  606,  677,  098,   702,  709.   1333. 

Weckler  v.   City  of   Chicago    (61    111. 

142   [1871]),' 573,   1519. 
Weed    V.    Ma.yor     and     Aldermen    of 

Boston   (172  Mass.  28,  42  L.  R.  A. 

642,    51    X.    E.    204    [1898]).    103, 

110,    134.   156.  324.  666.  700.   1396, 

1400. 
Weeks  v.  City  of  Middletown    (95  N. 

Y.     S.     352.     107     App.     Div.    587 

[1905]!,   739. 
Weeks    v.     City    of    Milwaukee     (10 

Wis.    242    [1860]),    12.    33.   44,   89, 

104,   145,   163.  323,  342,  698. 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


CCXXXIX 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Weeks  v.   Milwaukee    (10  Wis.   258), 

150. 
Wehage    v.    City    of    Cincinnati     ( 1 

Ohio   N.   P.   82    [1894]),   tJ-25,   701. 
Weidman  v.  Wilson    ( —  Mich.  , 

116  N.  W.  593   [1908]),  6,  353. 
Weinrich    v.    Hensley    (121    Cal.    047, 

54.  Pac.     254     [1898]).     340,     887, 

986,  995,   1057,   1068,   1225. 
Weise   v.  City  of   Chicago    (200    111. 

339,   65  N.  E.  648    [1902]),   1384. 
Welch  V.  Town  of  Roanoke    (  157   Ind. 

398,    61    X.    E.   Rep.    791    [1901]), 

907,  951,  1230,  1282. 
Weld    V.    People    ex    rel.    Kern    (149 

111.    257,    36    X.    E.    1006    [1894]), 

413,  424,   735,   741,   837,   848,   873, 

958     1506. 
Welker     v.     Potter     ( 18     O.     S.     85 

[1868]),    189,    740,    830,    836,    977. 
Welker  v.   City  of  Toledo    (18   0.   S. 

452    [1869]),   1506. 
Weller  v.  City  of  St.  Paul    (5  :\linn. 

95,    5    Gilf.    70    [1861]).    220,    (;24, 

813,  815,  979,  1337,  1425,  1427, 

1428. 
Wells    V.     Street    Commissioners     of 

City  of  Boston   (187  Mass.  451,  73 

N.  E.  554    [1905]),   364,   465,  480, 

573,  656. 
Wells  V.   City  of   Buffalo    (80   X.   Y. 

253    [1880]),    1425. 
Wells    V.     Burnham     (20     Wis.     112 

[1865]),   495,   822,   862,   867,    1432. 
Wells   V.  'City   of    Chicago    (202    111.. 

448,    66    X.   E.    1050    [1903]),    604, 

920,     922,     923,    947,     1271,     1272, 

1336. 
Wells  V.  City  of  Cliica.L'o   (06  111.  280 

[1872]),  967,  1196,  1200. 
Wells     V.     People    ex     rel.     Raymond 

(201      111.     4,"5,     60     X.     E.     210 

[1903]),   514,   533,    1332. 
Wells   V.    Savannah    (181    U.    S.    531, 

45   L.   980,  2;    8.   697    [1901]),   31, 

40,  614. 
Wells    V.    Wostern    Paviii',^   &    Snp])ly 

Company    (96    Wis.    116,    7    X.    W. 

1071    [1897]),  301,  4i;5,  479,    KH.-). 

1022,  1435,  1436,  1445. 
Wells  V.  Weston    (22   Mo.   385),   150. 
Wells    V.    Wood     (114    Cal.    255,    46 


Pac.    96     [1896]),     380,     381,    724, 
831,  1358. 

Wells  County,  Board  of  Commission- 
ers of  V.  Fahlor  ( 132  Ind.  426, 
31  X.  E.  1112),  125,  728. 

Wells  County,  Board  of  Commission- 
ers of  V.  Fahlor  (114  Ind.  176,  15 
X.  E.  830    [1887]),  738,  955. 

Wells  County,  Board  of  Commission- 
ers of  V.  Gruver  (115  Ind.  224,  17 
X.  E.  290  [1888]),  738,  955,  1431, 
1444. 

Welsh,  In  the  Matter  of  (30  Hun 
(X.  Y.)  372  [1883]),  381,  462, 
1456. 

West  V.  Bullskin  Prairie  Ditcliing 
Company  (32  Ind.  138  [1869]), 
247,  798,   859. 

West  V.  Bullskin  Prairie  Ditching 
Co.    (19   Ind.  458    [1862]),    1244. 

West  V.  Porter  (89  Mo.  Ap]).  150 
[1901]),   223,   234,    777,    11 J9. 

West  Chicago  ^Masonic  Association 
V.  City  of  Chicago  (215  TU.  278,  74 
X.   E.    159    [1905]),  71. 

West  Chicago  Park  Ci)mmissioners 
V.  Baldwin  (102  111.  87,  44  X.  E. 
404),  234. 

West  Chicago  Park  Comnii-sioners 
V.  City  of  Chicago  (152  111.  392, 
38  XL  E.  697  [1894]),  259,  368, 
580,  584,  637,  638,  604. 

West  Chicago  Park  Comrs.  v.  Chi- 
cago Terminal  Transfer  Railroad 
Company  (183  III.  08,  50  X.  E. 
1134    [1899]),  549,   1381. 

West  Chicago  Park  Commissioners  v. 
Farber  (171  111.  140,  49  X.  E.  427 
[1S98J),  51,  SO,  259,  206,  305,  307, 
356,  431.  553,  023,  927,  929,  956, 
962,  965,  900,  970,  990,  992. 

West  Cliieago  Park  Commissioners  v. 
^letropolitan  West  Side  Elevated 
Railroad  Co.  (182  111.  240,  55  X. 
E.  344   [1899]),  305,  954,   13S0. 

West  Cliieago  Park  Commissioners  v. 
Xovnk  (121  III.  App.  287  [1905]), 
993,    1200,   1207. 

West  Cliieago  Park  Commissioners  v. 
Sweet  (107  111.  326,  47  X.  E.  728 
[1897]),  259,  266,  356,  359,  037, 
1279. 


ccxl 


TABLE    OP    CASES. 


[Rpferences  are  to  sections.] 


West  Chicago  Park  Commissioners  v. 
Western  Union  Telegraph  Co.  ( 103 
111.  33    [1882]),  259,  356. 

West  Chicago  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago  (178  111, 
339,  53  N.  E.  112  [1899]),  602, 
603,  617. 

West  Chicago  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  People  ex  rel.  Kern  ( 156 
111.  18,  40  N.  E.  605  [1895]),  036, 
748,  751,  764,  772,  856,  887,  891, 
927,  930,   993,    1291,   1341,   1373. 

West  Chicago  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  People  ex  rel.  Kern  ( 155 
m.  299,  40  N.  E.  599  [1895]), 
636,   764,   772,   856,   891,   913,   993. 

West  Farms  Road  in  City  of  New 
York,  In  re  (95  N.  Y.  S.  894,  47 
Misc.   Rep.   216    [1905]),    593. 

West  Third  Street  Sewer,  Appeal  of 
the  City  of  Williamsport  (187  P.t. 
St.  565,  41  Atl.  476  [1898]),  382, 
384,  4G2. 

Westall  V.  Altschul  (126  Cal.  164, 
53  Pac.  458    [1899]),  972,   1253. 

Westenhaver  v.  Village  of  Hoytsville 
(28  Ohio  C.  C.  357  [1905]),  9, 
717,   1450. 

Western  Paving  and  Supply  Com- 
pany V.  Citizens'  Street  Railroad 
■Company  (128  Ind.  5£5,  25  Am.  St. 
Rep.  462,  10  L.  R.  A.  770,  26  N. 
E.  188,  28  N.  E.  88  [1891]),  00, 
601,  603,  617,  1028. 

Western  Pennsylvania  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Allegheny  ( 92  Pa. 
St.  100   [1879]),  15,  223,  234,  776. 

Western  Pennsylvania  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Allegheny  (92  Pa. 
St.  (11  Norris)  100  [1879]),  15, 
223,  3f)6,  775. 

Western  Spring-s.  Vi'.lpge  of  v.  Hill 
(177  111.  034,  52  N.  E.  959  [1S99]), 
475,   737,  777,   829,   1085,   1106. 

Western  Union  Tele-rraph  Company 
V.  Modesto  Irrigation  Co.  (\A^  Cal. 
662,  87  Pac.   190   [1906]),  548. 

Westlake  Avenue,  Seattle,  In  the 
Matter  of  (40  Wash.  144,  82  Pac. 
279  [1905]),  105,  169,  206,  2"8, 
279,  301,  308,  554,  557,  578,  61!), 
623,   650,   672,   675,   690,   896,   964, 


969,  970,  973,  1345,  1361,  1366, 
1391. 

Westminster  Heights  Company,  In 
the  Matter  of  the  Application  of 
the,  for  a  Peremptory  Writ  of 
Mandamus  Against  Delany  as  Cor- 
poration Counsel  of  the  City  of 
New  York  (185  N.  Y.  539,  77  N. 
E.  1198  [1906]),  618. 

Westminster  Heights  Co.  v.  Delany 
(95  N.  Y.  S.  247,  107  App.  Div. 
577    [1905]),  618. 

Weston  V.  Commissioners  of  Hamil- 
ton County  (6  Ohio  C.  C.  641 
[1892]),  HI,  552,  553,  042,  077, 
090,   091. 

Weston  V.  City  of  Syracuse  ( 158  N. 
Y.  274,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  472,  43 
L.  R.  A.  078,  53  N.  E.  12  [1899]), 
324,  484,  485,  531,  537,  541,  1469, 
1501,   1508,   1518. 

Weston  V.  City  of  Syracuse  ( 82  Hun, 
(N.  Y.)   67,  31  N.  Y.  S.  186),  485. 

Westport,  City  of,  to  use  of  Hoelzel 
V.  Smith  (08  Mo.  App.  03  [1890]), 
53,  234,  737. 

Westport,  City  of  v.  Whiting  (62 
Mo.  App.  047  [1895]),  273,  838, 
877,   1134. 

Wetherell  v.  Devine  (110  111.  031,  6 
N.   E.   24),   259. 

Wetmore  v.  Campbell  (4  N.  Y.  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  341  [1849]),  407,  415, 
525,  873,  887,  1047,  1053,  1143, 
1484. 

Wetmore  v.  City  of  Chicago  (206  111. 
3:7,  09  N.  E.  234  [1903]),  328, 
859. 

Wewell  V.  City  of  Cincinnati  (45  0. 
S.    407,     15    N.    E.     1C6     [1887]), 

II,  111,  324,  527,  5G3,  677,  816, 
•840,  977. 

Weyerhaueser  v.  State  of  Minnesota 
('l76  U.  S.  550,  44  L.  583,  20  S. 
485),    126. 

Whalen  v.  City  of  La  Cro'-se  ( 16 
Wis.  271    [1862]),   1469,  1518. 

Whaples   v.   C  it.y  of  Waukegan    (179 

III.  310,  53  *N.  E.  618  [1899]), 
781,   800. 

Wheeler,  Appeal  of  ( 80  N.  Y.  S.  204, 
39  Misc.  Rep.  484  [1902]),  563, 
008,   093,  099,   703. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


ccxli 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Wheeler  v.  City  of   Chicago    (57   III. 

415   [1870]),  281,  731,   1331,   1335. 
Wheeler   v.   City  of   Chicago    (24   111. 

105,     7G    Am.    Dec.    736     [I860]), 

1519. 
Wheeler  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern    ( 153 

111.    480,    39    X.    E.     123     [1894]), 

636,   754,    1291. 
Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia    (77  Pa.   St. 

(27    P.    F.    Smith)     338     [1875]), 

180,  190. 
Wheeler   v.    City   of    Plattsmouth    (7 

Neb.  270   [1878]),  86. 
Wheeler  v.  City  of  Poplar  Bluff   (149 

Mo.    36,    49    S.   W.    1088    [1898]), 

313,   436,   662.   813,   815,   837,   838, 

873,    1506. 
Wheeler  v.  Treasurer  of  Muskingum 

County   (3  Ohio  C.  C.  596  [1889]), 

351,  354,  554. 
Whipple  V.  City  of  Toledo    (29   Ohio 

C.  C.  42   [1905]),  801,  1067. 
Whisler    v.    Drain    Commissioners    of 

Lenawee     County     (40    Mich.     591 

[1879]),  825,  1404. 
Wliitaker    v.    Phoenixville    Bor.     (141 

Pa.   St.   327,   21   Atl.   604    [1891]), 

72. 
Whitcomb    v.    City    of    Boston     (192 

Mass.  211,   78   N.   E.   407    [1906]), 

616,  618. 
White,     Estate     of      (19     Phil.      106 

[1888]),  748,  1063,  1221. 
White  V.  City  of  Alton   ( 149  111.  626, 

37  N.  E.  96   [1894]),  73,  280,  486, 

559,   5(59,   604,   723,   771,   840,   857, 

889,  912,  922,   1324,   1330. 
White   V.   City   of   Chicago    (188    111. 

392,    58    N.    E.    917    [1900]),    759, 

764,  772,  859,  8G4,  914,  947,   1373, 

1379. 
White  V.   Fleming    (114  Ind.  560,   16 

N.   E.  487    [1887]),  266,  270,   .322, 

927,    986,    1004,    1030,    1031,    1292, 

1444,    1450. 
White   V.    Gove    (183   Mass.    333,    67 

X.  E.  359  [1903]),  7,  8,  79,  82,  89, 

92,  97,  103,  118,  156,  667,  668,  695, 

702,   709,   1425,   1427. 
White    V.    Harris    (116    Cal.    470,    48 

Pac.  382   [1897]  ),  754,  759. 
White   V.   Harris    (103    Cal.    528,    37 


Pac.  502  [1894]),  522.  551,  553, 
624,  698,   1239. 

White  V.  Knowlton  (84  :\Iinn.  141, 
86  N.  W.  755   [1901]),   1069. 

White  V.  McCJrew  ( 129  Ind.  83,  28 
X.  E.  322  [1891]  ).  340,  1011,"  1101, 
1102. 

White  V.  Municipality  X'umber  Two 
(9  La.  Ann.  446),  934. 

White  V.  People  ex  rel.  City  of  Bloom- 
ington  (94  III.  604  [1880]),  8,  44, 
51,  100,  103,  104,  110,  153,  202, 
323,  420,  670,  698,  715,  717. 

White  V.  City  of  Tacoma  (  109  Fed. 
32  [1901]),  111,  118,  301,  677, 
700,   1005. 

White  V.  Thomas  (91  Minn.  395,  98 
X.  W.    101    [1904]  ),   1069. 

White  V.  Town  of  West  Chicago 
(164  111.  196,  45  X.  E.  495  [1896]), 
1085. 

White  Plains  Road  in  City  of  Xew 
York,  In  re  (94  X.  Y.  sl  110,  106 
App.  Div.  133   [1905]),  63,  909. 

White  Water  Valley  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  McClure  (29  Ind.  536 
[1868]),  72. 

Whitefield  v.  Hippie  (12  S.  W.  Rep. 
(Ky.)  150,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  386 
[1889]  ),   53,   54,   531,   532,   534. 

Wliitcford,  Township  of  v.  Phinney 
(53  Mich.  130,  18  X.  W.  Rep.  593 
[1884]),  279,  744,  798,   1396. 

Whiteley  v.  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  Lansing  (27  Mich.  131 
[1873]),  963. 

Whiteley  v.  Mississippi  Water  Power 
&  Boom  Company  (38  iNIinn.  523, 
36  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cases  624,  38 
X.  W.  753   [1888]),  70. 

Whitemann's  Ex'x.  v.  Wilmington 
and  Susquehanna  Railroad  Com- 
pany (2  Harr.  (Del.)  514,  33  Am. 
Dec.  411    [1839]),  70. 

Whiting  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
the  City  of  Boston  ( 106  Mass.  89 
[1870])',  73,  244,  309.  415,  435, 
525,  532,  546,  587,  643,  663,  723, 
776,  879,  1337,  1346.  1411.  1413, 
1423. 

Whiting  V.  Quackenbush  (54  Cal. 
306  [1880]),  8,  43,  632,  698,  824, 
883,  886,   1317. 


ccxlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Whiting    V.    Slieboygan    R.    Co.     ('25 

Wis.  167,  3  Am.  Rep.  30),  365. 
Whiting    V.    Townsend    (57    Cal.    515 
[1881]),  549,  831,  861,   1153,   1220. 

1238,   1239,   1293. 
Whitley   v.    Fawsett    (Styles    12    (23 

Car.   1),  581,  639. 
Whitlock  Avenue,   In   re   Opening   of 
(85    N.    Y.    S.    650     [1904]),    680, 

892. 
Whitney  v.  City  of  Boston   (98  ^Mass. 

312   [1867]),  70,  284. 
Whitney  v.   Common   Council   of   tlie 

Village  of  Hudson    (69   Mich.    189, 

37    N.    W.    184    [1888]),    229,    264, 

273,  495,  498,  555,   776,   777,  785, 

843,  845,  851,  874,  1304. 
Whitney   v.    City   of   Pittsburg    (147 

Pa.  St.  351,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.   740, 

23  Atl.  395  [1892]),  194,  195,  323, 

414,  961,  983. 
Whittaker   v.   City  of  Dead  wood    (12 

>S.  Dak.  608,  82  X.  W.  202  [1900]), 

1392. 
Whittaker  v.  City  of  Janesville    (33 

Wis.   76    [1872]),   958. 
Whittemore    v.    Sills     (76    Mo.    App. 

248   [1898]),  490,  538. 
Whitworth   v.   Webb   City    (204   Mo. 

579,    103    S.    W.    86    [i907]),    536, 

837,  856,  867,  868. 
Whyte    V.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

Nashville      ("2     Swan     (32     Tenn.) 

364    [1852]),   44,   93,  96,   160,'  223. 

234,   243,   273,    323,    420,    717,    749, 

777,  867,  1055. 
Wick   Street,  In  re  Grading,  Paving 

and   Curbing,   Appeal   of   the    City 

of   Pittsburg    (184   Pa.   St.    93,   39 

Atl.  3   [1898]),  316,  432. 
Wickett  V.  Town  of  Cicero    (152   111. 

575,    38    N.    E.    909    [1894]),    922, 

943,  955,  991,  1307. 
Widman    Investment    Co.    v.    City   of 

St.  Joseph    (191  Mo.  459,  90  s'l  W. 

763    [1905] 1,   71. 
Wiedman   v.  Wilson    ( —  Mich.  , 

116   N.    W.    593    [1908]),    1054. 
Wiemers  v.  People  ex  rel.  Price   (225 

111.  82,  80  N.  E.  68    [1907]),  886, 

994,  1126,  1183,  1281,  1390. 
Wight  V.  Davidson  (181  U.  S.  371, 

45  L.  900,  21   S.   616    [1901]),  86, 


121,    127,   130,   243,   310,   663,   666, 

690,  702,  709,  760,  1010,  1011. 
Wilbur    V.    City    of    Springfield    (123 

111.    395,    14    N.    E.    871     [1889]), 

103,    104,    153,   562,   5i;8,   570,   625, 

627,   686,   670,   698,   715,   776,   837, 

870. 
Wilcox  V.  City  of  Meriden   (57  Conn. 

120,  17  Atl.  366   [1889]),  78,  322. 
Wilcox  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  New  York 

City    (53  N.  Y.  iSup.  Ct.  Rep.  436 

[1886]),  837,   1478,  1484,   1485. 
Wilcox     V.      People      (90      111.      186 

[1878]),  259. 
W^ilcoxon  V.  City  of  San  Luis  Obispo 

(101  Cal.  508,"  35  Pac.  988  [1894]), 

231,    232,    434,    1196. 
Wilcox    Lurj.-ber    Co.    v.    School    Dis- 
trict   Number    268    of    Otter    Tail 

County   ( —  Minn.  ,  114  N.  W. 

262    [1907]),   1517. 
Wilder  v.   City  of  Cincinnati    (26  0. 

S.  284   [1875]),  500,  569,  742,  761, 

977. 
Wilder   v.   Maine   Central   R.   R.   Co. 

(65    Me.    332,    20    Am.    Rep.    698 

[1876]),   363. 
Wilhelm   v.   City  of   Defiance    (58    0. 

S.  56,  65  Am".  St.  Rep.  745,  40  L. 

R.   A.   294,   50   N.   E.    18    [1898]), 

55,  56,  96,  323,  420. 
Wilkes  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  'City  of  New  York 

(8  Daly   (N.  Y.)   407   [1878]),  995, 

1454,    i487. 
Wilkes  Barre,  City  of  v.   Felts    (134 

Pa.    St.   529,    19"  Atl.   676    [1890]), 

1157,   1159. 
Wilkin  v.  Houston    (48  Kan.  584,  30 

Pac.    23     [1892]),    293,    381,    388, 

781. 
Wilkins  v.  City  of  Detroit   (46  Mich. 

120,    8    N.    W.    701,    9   N.    W.    427 

[1881]),    293,    381,    388,    501,    823, 

1308,    1443. 
Wilkinsburg  Bor.   v.   Home   for   Aged 

Women    (131   Pa.  St.   109,  6  L.  R. 

A.   531,    18   Atl.    937    [1890]),   42, 

93,    96,    155,    323,    385,    443,    589, 

592,  613,  648. 
Wilkinson  v.  Collyer   (13  Q.  B.  D.   1 

[1884]),    1054. 


fl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


ccxliii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Wilkinson    v.    District    of    Columbia 

(22    App.    D.    C.    289    [1903]),    G3, 

310,   896,    1439. 
Wilkinson    v.    Lemasters     ( 122     Ind, 

82,    23    X.    E.    Rep.    088     [1889]), 

1384. 
Wilkinson,   Pros.   v.   City   of  Trenton 

(36  X.  J.  L.    (7  Vr.)    499   [1873]), 

777,    1408. 
Willard   v.   Albertson    (23   Ind.   App. 

164,   53  N.  E.   1077,  54  N.  E.   403 

[1899]),   246,   569,  620,   832,    1008, 

1253. 
Willard   v.   Albertson    (23   Ind.   App. 

162,  53  X.   E.   1076,  54  X.  E.   446 

[1899]),   1015,    1018,   1262. 
Willard    V.    Hodapp     (98    Minn.    269, 

107  X.  W.  954   [1906]),  986,   1181, 

1200. 
Willard   v.   Presbury    (14   Wail.    (81 

U.  S.)   676,  20  L.  719   [1869]),  40, 

89,  243,  245,  374,  381,  1054. 
Willard  V.  Willard  (154  U.  S.  568, 

38  L.  1088,  14  S.  1215  [1870]), 

373,  380,  381. 
Willet,   In  the  Matter  of    (70  X.  Y. 

490    [1877]),   381,   462,   1466. 
Williams    v.    iSupervisors    of    Albany 

(122   U.    S.    154,   30   L.    1088,    7    S. 

1244),  408. 
Williams  v.  Bergin   (129  Cal.  461,  62 

Pac.    59    [1900]),    490,    498.    1281, 

1359. 
Williams  v.  Bergin   (127  Cal.  578,  60 

Pac.    164    [1900]),    301,    522,    871, 

1059,  1093,  1150,  1151,  1153,  1240, 

1248. 
Williams  v.  Bergin  (116  Cal.  56,  47 

Pac.  877  [1897]),  267,  537,  570, 

861,  878,  1163,  1168,  1242,  1264, 

1351,  1358,  1359. 
Williams  v.  Bergin  (108  Cal.  166. 

41  Pac.  287  [1895]),  744,  751,  774. 

958,  969,  1101,  1355. 
Williams    v.     Brace     (5     Conn.     190 

[1824]),  323,  420,  443,  1055,  1522. 
Williams  v.  Cammack    (27  Miss.  209, 

61   Am.  Dee.   508    [1854]),   37,  39, 

145,  147,  308,  343.  407,  408. 
Williams    v.    Corcoran     (46    Cal.    553 

[1873]),   38,  279,   1425. 
Williams   v.    Craig    (2    Edward's   Ch. 

(X.  Y.)    297   [1834]),  1054. 


Williams  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit 
(2  Mich.  560  [1853]),  85,  86,  100, 
110,  135,  157,  162,  380,  388,  432, 
439,  472,  648,  713,  725,  732,  747, 
760,  829,  838,  868,  872,  889,  950, 
984,   1049,    1411,   1444,   1445. 

Williams,  Treasurer  v.  Eggleston 
(170  U.  S.  304,  42  L.  1047,  18  S. 
617  [1808]),  61,  123,  125,  292,  359, 
553,   730,   1473. 

Williams  v.  Little  White  Lick  Grav- 
el Road  Company  (Wilson's  Sup. 
Ct.  (Ind.)  7  [1871]),  279,  322, 
581,  1015,  1025,  1074. 

Williams  v.  McDonald  (58  Cal.  527 
[1881]),  824,   1375. 

Williams  v.   Merritt    ( —  Mich.  , 

116  X.  W.  386  [1908]),  1482. 

Williams  v.  Monk  (179  Mass.  22,  60 
X.   E.   394    [1901]),   1072. 

Williams  v.  Monroe  ( 125  Mo.  574, 
28  S.  W.  853    [1894]),  278,  735. 

Williams  v.  Payne  (80  Mo.  409 
[1883]),  1148. 

Williams  v.  Savings  and  I^an  So- 
ciety (97  Cal.  122,  31  Pac.  908 
[1893]),  514,   1281,   1317,   1379. 

Williams  v.  Townsend  (31  X.  Y. 
411),  1057. 

Williams  v.  Viselich  (121  Cal.  314, 
53  Pac.  807  [1898]),  748,  751, 
1355. 

Williamson  v.  Joyce  ( 140  Cal.  069, 
74  Pac.  290  [1903]),  301,  864, 
1141,   1145,   1242,   1248,   1263,   1265. 

Williamson  v.  -Joyce  (137  Cal.  107, 
69  Pac.  854  [1902] ),.  831,  831, 
1165,    1182,    1194. 

Williamson,  In  tlie  Matter  of  tlie  Pe- 
tition of  V.  flavor,  etc.,  of  Xevv 
York  City  (3  ilun  (X.  Y.)  65 
[1874]),  324,  821,  855,   1464. 

Williamsport,  City  of  v.  Beck  (128 
Pa.  St.  147.  18  Atl.  329  [1889]), 
293.   382,   632,   981. 

Williamsport  v.  Huglies  (21  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  443    [1902),  479,  519. 

Willis,  In  the  Matter  of  (.30  Hun 
(X.  Y.)  13  [18831),  475,  4^^). 
1455. 

Willis  V.  City  of  Chicago  (189  111. 
103,  59  X."  E.  543  [1901]),  864, 
992,  1341. 


ccxHv 


TABLE    OF    CxVSES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Willius  V.  City  of  St.  Paul  ( 82  Minn. 

273,  84  N.  W.  1009   [1901]),  1497. 

Wills  V.  Austin   (53  Cal.  152  [1878]  ), 

1478. 
Wills  V.  Waters    (5  Bush.    ( ti8  Ky.) 

351),   363. 
Wilmette,  Village  of  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Farm  Land  Mortgage  Co.   (214  111. 
107,   73    N.    E.    327    [1905]),    953, 
1085. 
Wilmington     Avenue     (213     Pa.    St. 
238,  62  Atl.  848   [1906]),  308,  309, 
523,  570. 
Wilmington,  City  of  v.  Yopp   (71   N. 
C.   76   [1874])',  55,  86.   89,  93,   96. 
118,  651,   698,  717. 
Wilmington   &   Weldon   Railroad    Co. 
V.   Smith    (99   N.   C.    131,   5   S.   E. 
237    [1888]),  70. 
Wilson    V.    Allegheny    City     (79    Pa. 
St.   (29  P.  F.  Smith)   272   [1875]), 
397. 
Wilson  V.   City  of  Auburn    (27  Neb. 
435,  43   N.   W.  257    [1889]),   7,   8, 
89,   236. 
Wilson   V.   Board   of  Trustees   of   the 
Sanitary  District  of  Chicago    ( 133 
111.   443,   27    N.   E.   203    [1890],   7, 
11,    79,    103,    247,    248,    253,    258. 
259. 
Wilson  V.  California  Bank   (121  Cal. 
630,    54    Pac.     119     [1898])  ,   301, 
1068,    1195,    1219. 
Wilson  V.  Chilcott   (12  Colo.  600,  21 
Pac.    901    [1889]),    44,   92,    95,    96, 
152,  315,  420,  441,  666,  717. 
Wilson   V.    Cincinnati    ( 7    Ohio    Dec. 

242),  381. 
Wilson  V.  City  of  Cincinnati  (5 
Ohio  N.  P.  68,  9  Low.  Dec.  ( Ohio ) 
242  [1897]),  324,  392,  400,  401, 
550,  563,  587,  629,  683,  723,  874, 
1019,  1346,  1442. 
Wilson   V.   Hall    (6    Ohio    C.   C.    570 

[1892]),  609,  1047,  1053,  1067. 
Wilson  V.  Lambert  (168  U.  S.  611, 
42  L.  599,  18  S.  217  [1898]),  86, 
243,  356,  1420,  1425. 
Wilson  V.  Town  of  Philippi  (39  W. 
Va.  75,  19  S.  E.  553  [1894]),  52, 
53,  55,  86,  162,  323,  420,  1423, 
1426,   1427. 


Wilson      V.      Poole      (33      Ind.      443 

[1870]  ),  223,  479,  480,  1359. 
Wilson    V.    City   of   St.    Joseph    ( 125 

Mo.    App.     460,     102     S.     W.     600 

[1907]),   542,    1500. 
Wilson    V.    City    of    Salem     (24    Or. 

504.    34    Pac.    9,    691    [1893]),    86, 

135,  301,  666,  700,  732,  918,  1015, 

1027,   1414. 
Wilson   V.   City   of  Seattle    (2   Wasli. 

543,  27  Pac.  474  [1891]),  141,  168. 

215,     227,     725,     747,     766,     1394. 

1395,    1446. 
Wilson  V.  State,  Karle,  Pros.    (42  N. 

J.   L.    (13   Vr.)    612    [1880]),   727, 

735,  738,  756. 
Wilson  V.  Talley   ( 144  Ind.  74,  42  N. 

E.    362,     1009     [1895]),     70,    674, 

1277,  1382. 
Wilson  V.  Inhabitants  of  tlie  City  of 

Trenton   (61  N.  J.  L.  (32  Vr.)  599, 

68  Am.   St.  Rep.   714,  44  L.  R.  A. 

540,  40   Atl.  575    [1898]),   11,  517, 
518. 

Wilson  V.  Inhabitants  of  the  Citj' 
of  Trenton  (53  N.  J.  L.  (24  Vr.) 
645,  16  L.  R.  A.  200,  23  Atl.  278 
[1891]),  748,  756,  757,  758. 

Wilson  V.  Woolman  (133  Mich.  350, 
94  N.  W.  1076  [1903]),  1015,1436. 

Wilvert  v.  Sunbury  Borough  (811/4 
Pa.  St.  (32  P.  F.  Smith)  57 
[1871]),  420,  441,  1063,  1103,1377. 

Wilzinski  v.  City  of  Greenville  (85 
Miss.  393,  37  So.  807  [1905]),  111, 
244,  323,  666,  698,  709. 

Winchester,  Town  of  v.  Hinsdale  ( 12 
Conn.  85   [1837]),  70. 

Windsor  v.  City  of  Des  Moines  (110 
la.  175,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  280,  81 
N.  W.  476  [1900]),  368. 

Windsor  v.  District  of  Columbia  (7 
Mackey    (D.   C.)    96    [1889]),  527, 

541,  983. 

Windsor,  Inhabitants  of  the  Town  of 

V.  Field   (1  Conn.  279   [1814]),  70. 
Winfrey  v.  Linger    (89  Mo.  App.  159 

[190i]),  538,  916,    1026,   1337. 
Wingate     v.     City     of     Tacoma      (13 

Wash.    603,   43    Pac.    874    [1896]), 

1012,    1015. 
Wingert  v.  Snouffer  &  Ford   ( 134  la. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


ccxlv 


[References  are  tn  sections.] 


97,   108   X.   \V.    10.35    L190ti]|.   527. 

528,    1015,    1022,    l()2(i. 
Wingert   v.   Tipton    (134    la.   97,    lOS 

N.  W.   1035),   IS. 
Winkelman     v.     Moredock     and     Ivy 

Landing     Drainage     District     ( 170 

111.  37,  48  N.  E.  715   [1897]),  424, 

1278. 
Winkler    v.    Halstead'    ( 36    Mo.    App. 

25    [1889]),    1444. 
Winnebago  Furniture  Manufacturing 

Company  v.   Fond   du   Lac   County 

(113     Wis.    72,     88    N.     W.     1018 

[1902]),   464,    1033. 
Winona  &  St.  Paul  Land  Co.  v.  Min- 
nesota   (159   U.  S.   526,  40  L.  247, 

16  S.  83),  126. 
Winona    &    St.    Peter    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Waldron     (11    Minn.    515,    11    Gil. 

392,     88     Am.     Dec.     100     [1866]), 

65,   70,  363. 
Winona   &    St.    P.    R.    Co.    v.    t  ity   of 

Watertown    (1    S.  D.  46,  44  N.  W. 

1072    [1890]),  35,  42,  43,  147.  210, 

301,   594,    613,    614,   698. 
Winslow    V.    City    of    Cincinnati     (53 

O.   S.  665.  44'X.   E.    1150    [1S95J), 

412. 
Winslow    V.    City   of    Cincinnati    ( 10 

Ohio  C.   C.   191,  6   Ohio   C.   D.   150 

[1894]),   412. 
Winslow    V.    City    of    Cincinnati     (2 

Ohio   Dec.    291),   412. 
Winter  v.   City  Council  of  ^lontgom- 

ery      (83     Ala.     5S9,     3     So.  '  235 

[1887]),  55,  295,  296,  323,  420. 
VVisner   v.    People   ex   rel.   Kern    (  156 

III.  180,  40  N.  E.  Hep.  574  [1895]), 

636,  852,  856. 
Wistar  v.   City  of   Phila(hdphia    (111 

Pa.    St.    604.    4    Atl.    511    [1S86]). 

382,  383. 
Wistar    v.    Philadel])hia    (80    Pa.    St. 

(30  P.  F.  Smith)   505,  21  Am.  Rep. 

112  [1876]),  55,  382,  383,  384,  387, 

462. 
Witman  v.  City  of  Reading    (169  Pa. 

St.  ;-;75    32  Atl.  576).  327.  5(i().  572. 

706,   709,   714. 
Witter    V.    Bachman     (117    Cal.    31S. 

49    Pac.    202    [1S97]).    1131.    1281. 
Witter     V.     Mission     Sclioul     District 

(121  Cal.  350.  Cd  Am.  St.   Pvci).  33. 


53     Pac.     905     [1898]),    370,    580, 

586,   657. 
U'olf  V.   City  of  Keokuk    (48  la.    129 

[1878]),    317,    440,    561,    666,    709, 

716. 
\\n\i    V.    City    of    Philadelphia     (  105 

Pa.  St.  25  [1884]),  8,  89,  324,  419, 

1047,    1049,    1063. 
Wolfe    V.    Village    of    Avondale     (  14 

Ohio  C.  C.   375   [1897]),  625,   704. 
Wolfe  V.  McHargue    (88   Ky.  251,   10 

S.   W.   809),    147. 
Wolfe     V.     City     of     Moorehead     (98 

Minn.  113,  107  X.  W.  728   [1906]  i, 

781. 
Wolff    V.    City    oi    Denver     (20    Colo. 

App.  135,  77  Pac.  364   [1904]).  89, 

90,  92,  244,  245.  324,   555,   670. 
Wolfort    V.    City    of    St.    Louis     (115 

Mo.    139,    21'  S.    W.    912    [1892]  ), 

621,   629,   631,   679,  683,  896,    1284. 
Wollacott  V.  Meekin    (151   Cal.     701, 

91   Pac.  612   [1907]),  509. 
Wood,  In  the  Matter  of  (33  Hun   ( X. 

Y.)    4    [1884]  ).    1460. 
Wood,   In  tiie  Matter  of  the  Petition 

of   (51  Barb.   (X.  Y.)   275   [1S68]). 

469,   525,   537,   541,   542. 
Wood     V.     Mayor     and    Aldermen    of 

Boston    (172  Mass.  28,  42  L.  R.  A. 

642,  51  X.  E.  204   [1898]),  1406. 
Wood    V.    Brady     (  150    U.    S.    18,    37 

L.  981,  14  S.'  6  [1893]),  174.  538, 

1046,  1370. 
Wood  V.  Brady  (68  Cal.  78.  5  Pac. 

623,  8  Pac.  599  [1885]  1,  35,  1194, 

1225. 
Wood  V.  Cuiian  (99  (  al.  137.  33 

Pac.   774   |1S9:?J).   1IH2.   11-44. 

1225. 
Wood  V.   City  of  Galveston    (76   Tex. 

126,    13    S.    W.    227    [1890]),    223, 

234.  777,  1049,  1141,  1145,  1229. 
Wood  V.  Hall  (—  la.  .  110  X. 

W.  27i»  [1907]).  918.  1015,  1022. 

1029.    1436,    1502. 
Wood   V.    Inhabitants  of   Hudson  I  114 

Mass.    513    [1874]  >.    70. 
Wood    V.    .Jordan     (  125    Cal.    261,    57 

Pac.    997    [1899]  ).   986,    1429. 
Wood    V.    Village    of    Pleasant   Ridge 

(  12   Ohio  C.  C.    177    [1896]).    1437. 


ccxh 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Wood  V.  Squires  (1  Hun  (X.  Y.) 
481  [1874]),  1072. 

Wood  V.  Strotlier  (70  Cal.  545,  9 
Am.  St.  Rep.  249,  18  Pac.  766 
[1888]),  965,  967,  972,  1129,  1432, 
1468,    1469. 

Woodall  V.  City  (5  Ohio  N.  P.  428 
[1898]),    1013. 

Woodbridge  v.  City  of  Detroit  ( 8 
Mich.  274  [I860]'),  3,  8,  100,  157, 
323,    713. 

Woodhouse  v.  City  of  Burlington  (47 
Vt.  300  [1875]),  11,  78,  86,  735, 
747,  928,  956,  962. 

Woodman  v.  Xorthwood  ( 67  N.  H.' 
307,   36   Atl.  255    [1892]),   66. 

Woodruff  V.  Catlin  (54  Conn.  277), 
359. 

Woodruflf  V.  State  of  Mississippi  (77 
Miss.  68,  25  So.  483  [1899]),  1468, 
1475. 

Woodruff  V.  Perry  (103  Cal.  611.  37 
Pac.  526   [1894]),  780. 

Woodruff  Place,  Town  of  v.  Raschig 
(147  Ind.  517,  46  X.  E.  990 
[1896]),    546,   622,    632,    1075. 

Woods  V,  City  of  Chicago  (135  111. 
582,  26  X.' E.  608  [1892]),  570, 
859,  865. 

Woodwine  v.  Leak  ( 127  Ind.  509,  27 
N.  E.   161    [1890]),  1373,   1384. 

Woollacott  V.  Meekin  (151  Cal.  701, 
91  Pac.  612  [1907]),  18,  512,  1435, 
1442. 

Woolsey,  In  the  Matter  of  the  Ap- 
plication of  (95  X.  Y.  135  [1884]), 
188,  278,  309. 

Woolsey,  Matter  of  (29  Hun.  626 
[1883]),   188. 

Worcester,  City  of  v.  Worcester  Con- 
solidated Street  Railwa.y  Company 
(196  U.  S.  539,  25  S.  327  [1905]), 
15,  60,  95,  166,  168,  599,  600. 

Worcester,  City  of  v.  Worcester  Con- 
solidated Street  Railway  Company 
(182  Mass.  49,  64  X.  E.  581 
[1902]),   15,  60,  106,  168,  599. 

Worcester  AsricuUural  Society  v. 
Mayor  of  City  of  Worcester  (116 
Mass.  193,  17  Am.  Rep.   159),  580. 

Worcester  County  v.  Worcester  (116 
Mass.  193.  17  Am.  Rep.  159 
[1874]),   582. 


Wordin's    Appeal    (71    Conn.    531,    71 

Am.    St.    Rep.    219.    42    Atl.    659). 

1055. 
Workman  v.  City  of  Chicago   (61  111. 

463    [1871]), '223,    234,    709,    777, 

813,   817,  867,  954,  978. 
Workman  v.   City  of   Worcester    (118 

Mass,    168    [1875]).   244,    480.   058, 

780. 
Works  V.  City  of  Lockport    ( 28  Huu 

(X.  Y.  9   [1882]),  728,  743,  800. 
Worman  v.   Hagan    (78   Md.    152,   21 

L.  R.  A.  716,  27  Atl.  616),  216. 
Wormley    v.     District    of    Columbia 

(181  "U.   S.   402,  45   L.   921,   21   S. 

609    [1901]),    118,    702. 
Wormley  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 

Wright     County,     Iowa      (108     la. 

232,    78   X.    W'.   824    [1899]),   340, 

622,  785. 
Worthington    v.    Cit.v    of    Covington 
(82    Ky.    265     [1884]),    223,    234, 

494,   777. 
Wray  v.  Fry    (158  Ind.  92,  62  X.  E. 

1004    [1901]),    86,    118,    324,    555, 

606,   674,   677,   691,   699,   724,   735, 

927,  1005,  1007,  1026. 
Wray    v.    Mayor    etc.,    of    Pittsburg 

for    use,     etc.     (46     Pa.     St.     (10 

Wright)   365  [1863]),  86,  118,  313, 

555,  666,  670,  698,  709. 
Wreford     v.     City     of     Detroit     (132 

Mich.  348,  93  X.  W.  870   [1903]), 

284,  387,   435,   463,   777. 
Wright  V.   City    (9   Cush.  233),   336. 
Wright  V.   City   of   Chicago    (60   111. 

312   [1871]),  860,  861. 
Wright   v.   City   of   Chicago    (48   111. 

285    [1808])",    278,    557,    576.    642, 
■     652,  723,  884,  898,  899,  1283,  1298, 

1300. 
Wright   v.   City   of   Chicago    (46    111. 

44   [1867]),  86,  101,   113,  118.  153, 

549,   013,   666,   677.   709. 
Wright   v.   City  of   Chicago    (20   111, 

252    [1858]),    223,    229,    300,    456, 

775,  1341. 
Wright  V.  Jessup    (44  Wash.  618,  87 

Pac.  930    [1906]),   1195.   1203. 
Wright   v.    Rowley    (44   Mich.    557,   7 

X.  W.  235   [1880]),  1028. 
Wright  V.  City  of  Taconia    (3  Wash. 


I 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


ccxlvii 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Ter.  410,  19  Pac.  42  [1888]!,  785, 
789,  809,  818,  1026,  1430. 

\Yright  V.  Thomas  (26  0.  S.  346 
[1875]),   81,   113,  343,   1017,   1425. 

Wright  V.  Township  Drain  Commis- 
sioners (44  Mich.  557,  7  X.  W. 
235  [1880]),  735.  739,  824,  1402. 

Wright  V.  Wilson  (95  Ind.  408 
[1883]),   726. 

Wulzen  V.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
the  City  and  County  of  San  Fran- 
cisco ( 101  Cal.  15,  40  Am.  St.  Rep. 
17,  35  Pac.  353   [1894]),   121,  760. 

Wurts  V.  Hoagland  (114  U.  S.  606, 
29  L.  229,  5  S.  1086  [1885]),  12, 
101,  108,  119,  130,  336,  338,  339, 
341,  449,  677,  717,  732,  956,  962, 
1370 

Wyandotte  City  of  v.  Zeitz  (21  Kan. 
649  [1879]),"  1502. 

Wyandotte  County.  The  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  v.  Arnold  (49 
Kan.  279,  30  Pac.  486  [1892]  ),  781, 
1012,   1375,   1380,   1389,   1436. 

Wyandotte  County,  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  V.  Barker  ( 45  Kan. 
699,  26  Pac.  591  [1891]),  781, 
1007,   1028,   1432. 

Wyandotte  County,  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  V.  Browne  (49  Kan. 
291,  30   Pac.  483    [1892]).   1028. 

Wyandotte  County,  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  V.  Hoag  (48  Kan. 
413,  29  Pac.  758  [1892]),  781, 
1012,   1436. 

Wyandotte,  Kansas  City  &  North- 
western Railway  Company  v.  Wal- 
do   (70  Mo.  629   [1879]  ) ,'  65. 

\Vyoming  Street,  Paving,  etc.,  of 
"(137  Pa.  St.  494,  21  Atl.  74 
[1891]),  81,  190,  9G1. 


Vaggj'   V.   City   of   Chicago    (194   111. 

88,"  62    X. 'e.    316     [1901]).    .551. 

762,   767,   874,   913,   9.50. 
Vaggv'   V.   City  of   Chicago    ( 192   111. 

104,    61    X.    E.    494    [1901]),    818, 

828.    1287.    1289. 


Yale   College,   President   and   Fellows 

of  V.  City  of  Xew  Haven  ( 57  Conn. 

1,    17   Atl.    139    [1889]),   323,   443, 

1414,    1430,    1432. 
Yarnold    v.    City    of    Lawrence     ( 15 

Kan.    126    [1875]),   474,    496,   515, 

813,  1502. 
Y'ates    v.    Borough   of    ]\Ieadville    ( 50 

Pa.     'St.      (6     P.     F.     Smith)      21 

[1867]),  473,   1159. 
Y'ates  V.  City  of  Milwaukee   ( 92  Wis. 

352,  66  X'  W.  248  [1896]).  41,  42, 

591,   613,   614,   1116,    1173,    1435. 
Y'eakel  v.  City  of  Lafayette   ( 48  Ind. 

116    [1874]'),    293,    380,    381,    388, 

501,   742,   763. 
Y'eatman   v.    Crandall    ( 1 1    La.   Ann. 

220    [1856]),    8,    38,    40,    43,    155, 

343,  549,  566,  688,  689,  697,  934. 
Y'eomans   v.    Riddle    (84    la.    147,   50 

N.   W.   886    [1891]),   39,    119,    126, 

145,   373,   375,   495,   726,   738,   773, 

781. 
Y'oder  v.  Turner    (8   Ohio  X.   P.   387 

[1901]),    49,    1067,    1072. 
Y'oung   V.    Borzone    (26   Wash.    4,   66 

Pac.   135,  421    [1901]),  1088,   1494. 
Young    V.    Boston     (104    Mass.    95), 

353. 
Y'oung   V.   Gentis    (7    Ind.   App.    199, 

32  X'.  E.  796   [1893]),  564. 
Y'oung   V.   People   ex   rel.    Kern    ( 155 

111.  247,  40  X.  E.  Rep.  604  [1895]), 

772,  856,  1130.  1375. 
Young     V.     People     ex     rel.     Kocher- 

sperger    (171  111.  299.  49  X.  E.  .503 

[1898]),    745,    772,    927.    930,    986, 

993,  996,   998.    1000,   1183,    1343. 
Y'oung    V.    People    ex    rel.    Raymond 

(196     111.     603,     63     X.     E."    1075 

[1902]),    266,    314,   510,    533,    541, 

840,   927,   945,   989,    1183,    1342. 
Young  V.  City  of  St.  Louis    (47  Mo. 

492   [1871]'),  347,  843,  851,  872. 
Young  V.  City  of  Tacoma    (31   Wash. 

153,  71  Pac.  742   [1903]).  314.  440. 

479,  516,  519.  918.  965.  1035.  1324. 
Young   V.   ^'illage   of   Waterville    (39 

Minn.    196.   39   X.   W.    97    [1888]). 

55.    323.    461. 
Y'ounglove  v.  Ilackman   (43  0.  S.  69, 

1   X.  E.  230    [1885]),  631,  896. 


ccxlviii 


TABLE   OP    CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Zabel    V.    Harshman    Drain    Commis 

sioners    (68   Mich.   273,   42   N.   W 

44    [1888]),    1099. 
Zabel  V.  Louisville  Baptist  Orphans 

Home    (92    Ky.    89,    13    L.    R.    A 

668,   17   S.   W.   212,    13   Ky.   L.   R 

385  [1891]),  42,  138,  589,  611,  613 

862,   867,    1234,    1253,   1371. 
Zahn  V.  Borougli  of  Rutherford    (72 

N.    J.    L.     (43    Vr.)    446,    60    Atl. 

1123    [1905]),   271,   408,   677,   977, 

1398,   1410. 
Zaiesky  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rapids  ( 118 

la.    714,    92    X.    W.    657    [1902]), 

413,   739,   747,   830,   836,    981,  984. 
Zeigler  v.   Flack    (54  X.  Y.  Sup.   Ct. 

Rep.  69),  762,  983,  1113,  1196. 
Zeigler   v.   Hopkins    (117   U.   S.   683, 

29  L.  1019,  6  S.  919   [1886]),  781, 

795,  946,  1190,  1196,  1204,  1415. 
Zeigler  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern  ( 156 

HI.  133,  40  X.  E.  607  [1895]),  636, 

856,  925,  1132. 
Zeigler  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 

ger     (164    111.    531,    45    X.    E.    965 

[1897]),   771,   1183,   1184. 
Zehnder    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving 

Co.    (108    Fed.    570    [1901]),    118, 

301,   709,  710,   723. 
Zehnder    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving 

Co.   (24  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2279,  74  S. 

W.  201   [1903]),  628.  709,  1348. 
Zelie  v.  City  of  Webster  City   (94  la. 

393,   62   X.   W.    796    [1895]),   838, 

839. 


Zeliff  v.  Bog  &  Fly  Meadow  Com- 
pany  (68  X.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.)  200, 
56  Atl.  302  [1902]).  83,  340,  1015, 
1018,  1398,   1408. 

Ziegler  v.  City  of  Chicago  (213  111. 
61,  72  X.  E."  719  [1904]  ),  814,  828. 
831,  917,  979,  981,   1375. 

Zigler  V.  Menges  (121  Ind.  99,  16 
Am.  St.  Rep.  357,  22  X.  E.  782 
[1889]),  291,  334,  335,  337,  338, 
340,  477,  549,  564,  717,  886,  1108. 

Zink  V.  City  of  Buffalo  (6  Hun,  611 
[1876]), "995. 

Zinser    v.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Buena  Vista  County   ( —  la.  , 

114  X.  W.  51  [1907]),  340,  564, 
659,  899. 

Zion  Church  of  the  City  of  Balti- 
more V.  Mayor  and  City  'Council  of 
Baltimore  "(71  Md.  524,  18  Atl. 
895    [1889]),   308,  649,   1055. 

Zoeller  v.  Kellogg  (4  Mo.  App.  163 
[1877]),  11,  89,  111,  651,  653,  678. 

Zorn  v.  Warren-Schaaf  Asphalt  Pav- 
ing Co.    (—  Ind.  App.  ,  84  X. 

E.  509   [1908]),  499,   1332. 

Zorn  V.  Warren-.Schaaf  Asphalt  Pav- 
ing Co.    (—  Ind.  App.  ,  81  X. 

E.  672   [1907]),  495,  1024,  1332. 

Zumbro  v.  Parnin  (141  Ind.  430,  40 
X.  E.  1085  [1895]),  239,  557,  583, 
804,    1075. 

Zwietusch  v.  City  of  Milwaukee  (55 
Wis.  369,  13  X.  W.  227  [1882]), 
1505. 


Taxation    by    Assessment 

CHAPTER   I. 

NATURE  OF  ASSESSMEIH'  AND  PLACE  IN  LAW. 

§1.    Derivation  of  "assessment." 

Assessment  is  a  word  wliich  like  so  many  other  law  terms  has 
come  into  our  language  from  old  French.  The  Latin  \7ord  assidere 
meant  "to  sit  by"  and  was  used  especially  of  judges  in  court.  It 
thus  acquired  the  idea  of  deciding  or  passing  upon.  From  it  was 
derived  the  low  Latin  assessare  meaning  "to  value  for  taxation." 
From  this  latter  term  we  find  the  old  French  assessc7%  meaning 
to  regulate  or  to  settle.  From  this  term  we  get  the  English  word 
"assess"  and  the  noun  "assessment."  It  is  thus  in  derivation  akin 
to  the  word  "assize."  A  relic  of  its  original  Latin  meaning  is 
found  in  the  word  "assessor"  which  is  used  of  assistants  as  "as- 
sessor judges"  in  consular  courts — a  meaning  well  recognized 
though  not  common.  Assessment  then  by  derivation  is  the  act  or 
sometimes  the  result  of  deliberating  and  deciding. 

§  2.    Technical  meanings  of  "assessment ' '  outside  of  taxation. 

Again,  like  too  many  of  our  law  terms,  "assessment"  has 
acquired  several  technical  meanings  in  law,  all  having  the  general 
idea  of  the  act  or  result  of  deliberation  and  deciding  in  a  judicial 
or  quasi-judicial  capacity. ^  While  we  have  to  deal  here  with  but 
one  of  these  meanings,  the  others  must  be  noted  for  the  purpose 
of  indicating  forms  of  as.sessment  which  have  nothing  but  the  name 
in  connnon  with  the  subject  here  discussed.  Assessment  in  the  law 
of  damages  means  the  ascertaining  of  the  amount  of  damages,  by 
proceedings   cf   a   judicial    character.-     While   in   our  law   this   is 

*  "To   flix'ido   tlie   dofrroe   of;    to   do-  -  "I'ixini    the    amount    of    damages 

termiTio   the   extent  of;    as,   to   assess  to    wliieli    tlie    prevailing    party    in    a 

a  punishment."     Anderson's  Law  Die-  suit  is  entitled."    Bouvier's  Law  Diet., 

tionary,  Title  "Assessment."   "The  act  Title    "Assessments;"    CifTord   v.    Re- 

or    proceeding   by    wliieh    a    sum    due  publican    Valley    &    Kansas    Railroad 

or    payable    is    determined;    al«o    the  Company.  20  Neb.   5.38,  .*?!    N.  W.   11 

sum    itself   as    a    payment    or    obliga-  [1886]. 
tion."      Anderson's    Law    DietiDiiary. 

Title    "Assessment."  1 


§  2  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  2 

usually  effected  by  means  of  the  deliberations  of  a  jury,  the  word 
in  this  sense  has  nearly  the  same  meaning  as  the  original  Latin 
term.  In  the  law  of  eminent  domain  it  has  a  meaning  which  is 
the  converse  of  that  discussed  in  this  work — that  is,  it  denotes  the 
act  of  fixing  the  damages  to  be  paid  to  the  owners  of  property 
taken  in  eminent  domain  or  injured  by  such  taking,  and  often  the 
distribution  of  such  damages  among  the  several  land  owners  ia  du^ 
proportion.^  A  similar  general  significance  is  found  when  the 
word  is  used  in  connection  with  the  doctrine  of  contribution.  In 
this  sense  it  means  the  judicial  determination  of  the  shares  to  be 
paid  by  those  liable  to  make  contribution.^  The  term  is  also  used 
of  adjustment  or  apportionment  of  loss  under  the  doctrine  of  gen- 
eral average.^  Other  forms  of  this  general  meaning  are  found 
when  the  word  is  used  of  the  determination  (in  the  first  instance 
extra-judicial)  of  the  amount  to  be  paid  at  a  given  installment  by 
those  who  have  subscribed  to  a  common  purpose,  in  amounts  pay- 
able in  installments.  A  common  example  of  this  use  of  the  term 
is  the  determination  of  the  amount  to  be  paid  in  by  subscribers  to 
stock  in  a  corporation."  A  similar  meaning  is  that  of  liability  on 
premium  notes  given  by  members  of  mutual  fire  insurance  com- 
panies."^ Apportionment  of  liabilities  among  stock-holders  of  an 
insolvent  corporation,  in  jurisdictions  where  stock-holders  are  liable 

^  Hutchins   v.    Vandalia    Levee   and  cles    and    interests    at    risk    according 

Drainage    District,    217    111.    5151,    75  to  their  value  at  the  time  and  place 

N.     E.     354     [1905J;     Kotheimer     v.  of   being    in    safety,    for    contribution 

Louisville  Interurban  R.  E.  Co.  (Ky.)  for   damage    and    sacrifices    purposely 

89     S.      W.      104,     28      Ky.      L.      R.  made    and    expenses    incurred   for   es- 

298     [1905];     Mayor     and     Common  cape    from    impending    peril."      Bou- 

Council     of     Newark     v.     Weeks,     70  vier's  Law  Diet.,  Title  "Assessments." 

N.     J.    L.     {41     Vr.)     166,     56     Atl.  Bedford   Commercial   Insurance  Com- 

118     [1903];     State,     Stewart,    Pros.  pany  v.  Parker,  2  Pick.  1,  11,  13  Am. 

V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Hoboken,  58  N.  J.  Dec.  388   [1823];   McLoon's  Adminis- 

L.  (29  Vr.)  696,  36  Atl.  1129  [1896]:  trator   v.    Cummings,    73    Pa.    St.    98 

affirming     State,     Stewart     Pros.     v.  [1873]. 

Mayor    and   Common    Council    of    the  "  "Used  of  a  business  corporation,  a 

City    of   Hoboken,    57    N.    J.    L.     (28  rating  or   fixing  by  the  board  of  di- 

Vr.)    330,  31  Atl.  278    [1894].  rectors  of  the  proportion  of  his  sub- 

*  "Adjusting    the    shares   of    a    con-  scription    which    every    subscriber    is 

tribution  by  several   towards  a  com-  to  pay  when  notified  of  it  and  when 

iron  beneficial  object  according  to  the  called    on."      Anderson's    Law    Diet., 

benefit      received."       Bouvier's      Law  Title    "Assessment." 

Diet.,   Title   "Assessments."  'Bouvier's    Law    Diet.,    Title    "As- 

"  "An   apportionment  made   in  gen-  eessments." 
eral   average   upon   the   various   arti- 


3 


ASSESSMENT    AND   PLACE   IN    LAW. 


§3 


for  the  debts  of  the  corporation  in  an  amount  over  and  above  tb  ■ 
amount  of  their  subscriptions,  is  another  example  of  the  use  of  the 
term  with  a  similar  meaningr. 

§3.    Technical  meaning's  of  "assessment"  in  general  taxation. 

"Assessment"  is  used  in  the  law  of  taxation  with  a  meaning, 
like  that  of  the  low  Latin  verb  from  which  it  is  derived,  of  valuing 
property  for  the  purpose  of  taxation.^  Involved  with  this  mean- 
ing is  often  that  of  listing  and  valuing  property  for  the  purpose 
of  taxation,-  and,  indeed,  the  term  is  often  used  to  include  the 
valuation  of  property  for  taxation  and  the  determination  of  the 
amount  that  each  is  to  pay,^  or  to  include  all  the  steps  necessary 
to  impose  the  tax,'*  or  the  means  employed  to  enforce  i)ayment  of 


'  People  ex  rel.  Hallett  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners  of  Arapahoe 
County,  27  Colo.  86,  59  Pac.  733 
1 18!)9]  ;  State  ex  rel.  Lewis  v.  Smith, 
158  Ind.  543,  63  L.  R.  A.  116,  63  N. 
E.  214,  25,  64  N.  E.  18  [1901]  ;  Wood- 
bridge  V.  City  of  Detroit,  8  Mich. 
274  [I860];  People  of  the  State  of 
New  York  ex  rel.  The  New  York  Cen- 
tral &  Hudson  River  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Priest,  169  N.  Y.  432.  62  N. 
E.  567  [1902]  ;  Gray  v.  Stiles,  6  Okl. 
455,  49  Pac.  1083  [1897];  "Deter- 
mining the  value  oi  a  man's  prop- 
erty or  occupation  for  the  purpose 
of  levj'ing  a  tax."  Bouvier's  Law 
Diet.,    Title    "Assessment." 

^Huntington  v.  ^\'nrthon.  120  U. 
S.  97.  7  S.  469  [1887];  Lyman  v. 
Howe.  (i4  Ark  436,  42  S.  *  ^^■.  830 
[18971:  Allen  v.  McKay  &  Co..  120 
Cal.  332,  52  Pac.  828  [1898];  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Fishburn.  189  111.  367, 
59  N.  E.  791  [1901];  Adams  v.  City 
of  Shelbyville,  154  Ind.  467.  77  Am. 
St.  Rep.  484,  49  L.  R.  A.  797,  57  N. 
E.  114  [19001:  Pomeroy  Coal  Co.  v. 
Emlon.  44  Kan.  117.  24  Pnc.  340 
[18901;  Hincs  v.  Citv  of  Leaven- 
worth. 3  Kan.  ISO  [1865];  State  e\ 
rel.  Allen  v.  Kansas  Citv.  St.  Joseph 
&  Council  Bluffs  Railroad  Company, 
116   Mo.    15,   22   S.   W.    611    [1893]; 


State  ex  rel.  City  of  Butte  v.  John- 
son. 16  Mont.  570,  41  Pac.  706 
[1895];  Hacker  v.  Howe,  72  Neb. 
385,  101  N.  W.  255  [1904];  Sheets 
V.  Paine,  10  N.  D.  103,  86  N.  W. 
117  [1.901];  Southern  Railway  Co. 
V.  Kay,  62  S.  C.  28,  39  S.  E.  785 
[1901]. 

'People  V.  Weaver,  100  U.  S.  539 
[1879];  Dollar  Savings  Bank  v. 
United  States.  19  Wall.  227  [1873]; 
State  of  Connecticut  v.  New  York, 
New  Haven  &  Hartford  Raih-oad 
Company,  60  Conn.  326,  22  Atl.  765 
[1891];  Rood  V.  Board  of  Supervis- 
ors of  Mitchell  Co..  ,39  la.  444  [1874] ; 
"Determining  the  share  of  tax  to  be 
paid  by  each  individual."  Bouvier's 
Law  Diet.,  Title  "Assessment."  "The 
assessment  is  the  otricial  ascertain- 
ment of  the  amount  of  the  tax  to 
be  charged  upon  the  property." 
Walker  v.  District  of  Columbia.  6 
Mackey    (D.  C.)    352,  355   [1888]. 

*  Stcphani  v.  Catholic  Bishop  of 
Chicago,  2  111.  App.  249  [1878]  :  Pen- 
ninston  v.  Wool  folk.  79  Ky.  13 
[1880]:  Rothschild  v.  •  Begole,  105 
Vuh.  388.  63  N.  W.  309  [18951; 
(  hicaeo.  Burlington  &  Quincy  Rail- 
wav  Company  v.  Villaare  of  Wilber. 
63  Neb.  624:  88  N.  W.  660  [19021; 
Hurford  v.  City  of  Omaha,  4  Neb.  336 


§  4  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  * 

the  tax."'  The  exact  shade  of  meaning  depends  in  most  cases  upon 
the  context  of  the  constitutional  or  statutory  provision  in  which 
the  term  is  used.  "The  word  'assessment'  means  the  specific 
amount  charged  on  the  property  and  not  the  meri-  act  of  valua- 
tion.'"^ 

§4.  Meaning  of  "assessments"  as  here  discussed — Assessment 
based  on  benefits. 
With  none  of  the  foregoing  meanings  of  the  term  "assessment" 
are  we  here  concerned.  The  form  of  assessment  discussed  in  this 
work  is  what  is  variously  termed  the  local  assessment,  the  special 
assessment,  the  "assessment  for  benefits,"^  or  often  merely  the 
assessment.  Without  attempting  an  accurate  definition  here  it 
may  be  said  that  it  is  generall}^  a  charge  upon  property,  imposed 
by  proper  authority,  usually  in  return  for  special  beiiefits  conferred 
upon  such  property  by  an  improvement  of  a  jiublic  character  for 
the  expense  of  making  which  the  assessment  is  levied.-  It  is  worth 
noting  that  the  latest  edition  of  one  of  the  standard  law  diction- 
aries gives  the  meaning  of  the  term  as  a  meaning  which  attaches 
to  it  in  New  York  only.''  It  is,  nevertheless,  the  meaning  in  which 
the  term  is  most  often  used  outside  of  a  context  showing  that  it  is 
employed  with  reference  to  general  taxation.  It  is  in  this  sense 
that  the  term  is  used  in  this  work,  unless  its  meaning  is  in  some 
way  qualified.  Ihider  this  general  name  are  grouped  a  number  of 
different  forms  of  charges  or  exactions  upon  the  property  or  upon 
the  owner  thereof,  which  in  their  extreme  and  typical  forms  are 

[1876];  State  of  Texas  v.  Farniei  are  specially  beneficial  to  individuals 
94  Tex.  232,  59  S.  W.  541  [1900];  or  property  and  which  are  imposed  in 
Levy  V.  Wilcox,  96  Wis.  127,  70  N.  proportion  to  the  particular  benefits 
W.  1109  [1897];  Chicago  &  North-  supposed  to  be  conferred.  They  are 
western  Railway  Company  v.  Forest  justified  when  the  improvements  con- 
County,  95  Wis,  80,  70  X.  W.  77  fer  special  benefits  and  are  equitable 
[1897].  "Laying  a  ta.x."  Bouvier's  only  when  divided  in  proportion  ti 
Law  Diet.,  Title  "Assessment."  .-uch  benefits."     Anderson's  Law  Diet. 

°  Tebault  v.    City   of   New    Orleans,  Title  "Assessments." 
108  La.  686;  32  So.  983   [1902].  ''"The   term    is   used   in   this   latter 

°  Lynch    v.    City    of    Kansas    City,  sense     in     New    York     distinguishing 

44  Kan.  452,  458,  24  Pac.  973  [1890].  some  kinds  of  local  taxation  whereby 

^  City   of   Bridgeport   v.   New   York  a   peculiar   benefit   arises  to   the  par- 

&  New  Haven  Railroad  Company,  36  ties    from    general    taxation."      Bou- 

Conn.   255,  4  Am.  Rep.   03    [1869].  vier's   Law   Diet.    (Rawle's   Revision) 

-"Assessments    have     reference     t)  [1897],   Title,  "Assessment." 
impositions   for    imjirovcments    which 


I 


5  ASSESSMENT   AND   PLACE   IN    LAW.  8  O 

sharply  distinct  from  one  p.nother,  but  which  in  their  intermediate 
types  are  often  so  merged  together  as  to  he  practically  indistin- 
guishable. The  most  common  form  which  is  usually  the  one  dis- 
cussed to  the  exclusioii  of  the  others,  is  the  charge  or  exaction  in 
some  form,  either  in  money  or  in  work,  which  is  levied  upon  prop- 
erty, generally  upon  realty,  in  return  for  and  as  an  equivalent  for 
the  special  and  peculiar  benefit  conferred  upon  sucli  property  by 
the  improvement  to  defray  the  cost  of  which  the  assessment  in 
question  is  levied.^  Such  a  charge  is  rather  optimistically  referred 
to  as  a  "contribution."'^ 

§  5.    Assessment  for  performance  of  legal  duty. 

Another  form  of  assessment,  which  is  usually  regarded  as  a  true 
assessment  also,  is  one  which  does  not  necessarily  depend  upon  th" 
theory  of  benefits.^  It  is  found  where  the  owner  of  realty  is  bound 
by  law  to  do  some  act  with  reference  to  such  realty,-  which  act 
is  often  the  abatement  of  a  nuisance  existing  thereon  or  caused  by 
the  use  thereof,  and  such  owner  refuses  or  omits  to  do  such  act ;  and 
thereupon  the  public  corporation  in  which  such  realty  is  situated, 
or  some  other  branch  of  the  government  performs  such  act  and 
charges  such  owner,  or  his  property,  or  both,  with  the  cost  there- 


*City  of  Chicago  v.  Blair,  149  111. 
310,  24  L.  R.  A.  412,  36  N.  E.  829 
[1894];  Excelsior  Planting  &  Man- 
ufacturing Company  v.  Green,  39  La. 
Ann.  455,^1  So.  873' 1  1887] ;  Charnock 
V.  Fordoche  &  (irosse  Tete  Special 
Levee  District  Company,  38  La.  Ann. 
323  11880];  State,  Morris  &  Essex 
Railroad  Company,  Pros.  v.  Jersey 
City,  36  X.  J.  L.   (7  Vr.),  50   [1872]. 

"For  the  validity  of  such  assess- 
ments   three    elements    must    concur: 

1.  The  work  must  be  public  and 
of  a  character  to  confer  special  local 
benefits  on  the  district  within  wliich 
the   assessment  is   levied. 

2.  The  assessment  must  bo  sup- 
ported by  benefits  actually  or  pre^ 
sumptively  received  by  '  tlic  persons 
or  property  subjected  to  it. 

3.  The  contribution  miist  not  man- 
ifestly exceed   the  benefit  conferred."' 


Mino.-  V.  Daspit,  43  La.  Ann.  337, 
338,  339,  9  So.  49   [1891]. 

°  Opening  of  Park  Avenue,  Appeal 
of  Luce  Brothers,  (83  Pa.  St.  175 
[1S70]. 

'  Such  a  charge,  wliicli  was  lield 
invalid  because  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  laid  was  held  not  to  be  a  pub- 
lic duty,  was  said  to  be  "an  imposition 
upon  lands  .  .  .  for  which  no  better 
luime  was  found  in  tlie  court  below, 
or  has  been  discovered  by  me.  than 
'assessement.'  "  T^oughten  v.  City  of 
Camden,  72  X.  .1.  L.  (43  Vr.)  451, 
4r,-2.  3  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  817,  03  Atl. 
170  [1905].  reversing  Doughten  v. 
City  of  Camden.  71  X.  J.  L.  (42  Vr.) 
420.  59   Atl.    10    [1904]. 

■  The  purposes  for  which  assessment 
of  this  sort  may  be  levied  are  dis- 
cussed elsewhere.     See  §  420. 


§  5  TAX^VTION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  b 

of.^  Such  charge  or  exaction  is  often  called  "^n  assessment,*  and 
is  generally  discussed  under  that  heading.  Such  identity  of  name 
does  not,  however,  impart  an  identity  of  ideas;  and  an  assessment 
of  this  type,  which  we  may  call  an  assessment  for  want  of  a  better 
name,  is  sharply  distinguished  from  the  true  assessment  whenever 
the  distinction  in  the  theories  underlying  the  two  would  lead  to 
different  results."'  Assessments  of  this  sort  differ  from  assess- 
ments for  benefits  in  several  important  wa3^s.  Assessment  for 
benefits  is  a  form  of  a  tax''  and  is  referred  to  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion.'^ Assessment  of  the  type  under  discussion  is  an  exercise  of 
the  police  power**  and  does  not  have  anything  to  do  with  taxation 
necessarily.  Assessments  for  benefits  must  be  apportioned  in  sub- 
stantial proportion  to  benefits.''  Assessments  of  this  type  do  not 
dejiend  on  benefits  and  therefore  need  not  be  apportioned  with  any 
reference  to  benefits  unless  the  legislature  so  provides;^"  in  which 


^  INIayor  and  Board  of  Trustees  of 
tlie  Town  of  New  Iberia  v.  Fontelien, 
108  La.  460,  32  So.  3()0  [19021:  Xu- 
pent  V.  City  of  Jackson.  72  ]Miss. 
1040.  18  So."  493  [1895];  Horbach  v. 
City  of  Omaha.  54  Xeb.  83.  74  X^.  W. 
434  [1898];  Van  Wajjoner  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  City  of  Pater  son. 
67  X.  J.  L.  (38  Vr.')  455  [1902]; 
State,  Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Streets  and  Sewers  in  City 
of  Brunswick,  42  X.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.) 
510  [1880];  State,  Van  Tas-sel.  Pros. 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  .Jersey 
City,  3*7  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  128  [1874]': 
State,  Sigler,  Pros.  v.  Fuller,  34  X. 
J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  227  [1870];  Brown  v. 
Keener.  74  N.  C.  714  [1876];  Ses- 
sions V.  Crunkilton,  20  0.  S.  349 
[1870];  Bliss  V.  Kraus.  16  O.  S.  54 
[1864];  Charleston  V.  Werner,  38  S. 
C.  488;  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  776;  17  S. 
E.  33  [1892];  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
V.  Maberry  25  Tenn.  (6  Humph.) 
368,  44  Am.  Dec.  315  [1845];  Wash- 
ington V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Xashville,  31  Tenn.  (1  Swan.)  177 
[1851];  Adams  v.  Fisher.  63  Tex. 
651  [1885];  Rude  v.  Town  of  St, 
IMarie.  121  Wis.  634;  99  X.  W.  460 
[1904];  State,  ex  rel.  Baltzell.  v. 
Stewart,    74    Wis.    620.    6    L.    R.    A. 


394.  43  X.  W.  947  [1889];  Donnelly 
V.  Decker.  58  Wis.  461.  46  Am.  Rep. 
637,  17  X.  W.  389   [1883]. 

*  Xugent  V.  City  f)f  Jackson.  72 
Miss.  1040.  18  So."  493  [1895];  Hor- 
bach V.  City  of  Omaha.  54  X"eb.  83; 
74  N.  W.  434  [1898] ;  Bliss  v.  Kraus. 

16  0.  S.  54  [1864];  Adams  v.  Fisher. 
63  Tex.  651  [1885]  :  Rude  v.  Town  of 
St.  Marie,  121  Wis.  634.  99  X.  W. 
460  [1904];  Donnelly  v.  Decker,  58 
Wis.  461.  46  Am.  Rep.  637.  17  X.  W. 
.'^89    [1SF31. 

^^TpAor  ;'n<l  Board  of' Trustees  of 
th.e  'Jcwn  cf  Xew  Iberia  v.  Fontelieu. 
108  La.  460.  32  So.  369  [1902]; 
Charle.ston   v.  Werner,  38   S.   C.   488, 

37  Am.  St.  Rep.  776,  17  S.  E.  33 
[1892]. 

'  See  §  8. 

■'See    §   89. 

«See  §93. 

Tims  the  court  said  that  a  ques- 
tion as  to  such  exactions  "is  not  gov- 
erned by  the  principles  of  law  ap- 
plicable to  a  local  tax  for  improve- 
ments," but  that  is  referable  to  the 
police  power.     Charleston  v.  Werner. 

38  S.   C.  488.   37   Am.   St.  Rep.   776: 

17  S.  E.  33  [18921. 
"See  Chapter  XIIL 
'"See   §   717. 


7  ASSESSMENT  AND  PLACE  IN   LAW.  §  6 

latter  case  the  legislature  usually  exacts  less  from  the  property 
owner  than  it  might.  This  power  to  levy  assessments  for  benefits 
exists  only  when  granted  by  the  legislature.^^  and  cannot  be  im- 
plied from  a  grant  of  power  to  make  the  improvement  for  which 
it  is  sought  to  levy  the  assessment.^-  Assessment  of  this  type  is  a 
power  existing  as  a  p«rt  of  and  incidental  to  the  police  power,  and 
may  be  granted  in  very  general  terms. ^'^  A  source  of  much  confu- 
sion, however,  is  found  in  the  fact  that  courts  have  disagreed  as  to 
which  type  of  assessment,  assessments  for  certain  kinds  of  improve- 
ment were;  and  that  the  same  court  has  at  different  times  placed 
the  same  kind  of  improvement  now  under  one  and  now  under  the 
other  of  these  types.^* 

§  6.     Assessment  for  property  or  service  furnished  at  request. 

A  number  of  cases  exist  which  present  facts  very  much  like 
those  of  the  regular  local  assessment,  but  which  differ  from  the 
local  assessment  in  one  essential  fact.  This  essential  difference 
is  that  in  these  cases  it  is  optional  with  the  party  so  charged 
to  incur  the  ]i;i])ility  by  acceptance  of  the  benefit  for  which 
the  charge  is  made,  or  to  abstain  from  such  benefit  and  thus 
to  be  free  from  liability.  Common  examples  of  this  are  ordi- 
nances providing  for  furnishing  water  in  part  or  all  of  the  city 
to  those  who  wish  to  take  it.  at  a  price  fixed  by  the  ordinance, 
where  the  persons  who  make  use  of  the  water  are  charged  an 
amount,  sometimes  estimated  at  a  lump  sum,  and  sometimes  based 
upon  the  amount  consumed.  Whichever  form  the  charge  may 
assume,  the  ]>erson  who  makes  use  of  such  commodity  is  under 
no  legal  obligation  to  do  so,  and  does  so  voluntarily.^  Such  a 
statute  does  not  impose  an  assessment  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  term,  thongh  the  charge  is  often  spoken  of  as  a  "tax."- 
The   transaction   really    amounts   to   an    offer  by   the   municipal 

"See  Chapter  VT.  Stow.]  027  [188.31.  which  amnns  with- 

'-See  §  231.  out  opinion  37  X.  J.  Eq.    [10  Stew.] 

'^-See  §  230.  36  [1883];  City  of  Ea^t  Grand   Forks 

"  For  illustrations  of  the  classes  of  v.  Luck,  97  ^linn.  373:   107  X.  W.  393 

assessments  referred  to  these  two  dif-  [190(5];   Burke  v.  City  of  Water  Val- 

ferent  types,  see   §§   419-421.  ley,  87   Miss.   732.   112   Am.   St.  Rep. 

'Provident  Institution   for  Savings  408,  40  So.  820    [190.5]. 

V.    Mayor,    etc.,    of    Jersey    City,    113  -Village   of   Lemont    v.    .Tenks.    107 

U.  S.  50r>,  28  L.  1102.  5  S.'fil2  [188.5].  III.  363:  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  172.  64  N. 

(aflirmin.!?   Provident    Institution    for  E.  362    [1902]:   Cook  County  v.  City 

Savings   v.    Allen    37    X^.    J.    Eq.    [10  of   Clncago.    103    111.   (146    [1882]. 


§6 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


corporation  and  an  acceptance  by  the  party  who  takes  the  water, 
thus  forming  a  contract.^  The  transaction  then  is  substantially 
a  contract  of  sale.*  Accordingly  so-called  assessments  of  this 
sort  cannot  be  levied  on  vacant  property  where  water  might  be 
used  but  is  not  in  fact  used.''  Such  an  assessment  cannot  be 
levied  by  a  city  under  a  contract  with  a  water  company  which 
the  city  has  cancelled  as  being  invalid.*^  It  is  confused  with 
assessments  proper,  in  part  because  such  charge  is  made  by  a 
public  corporation,  although  the  transaction  is  the  same  when 
the  commodity  furnished  is  supplied  by  a  private  corporation 
or  an  individual.  Another  source  of  confusion  is  the  fact  that 
the  city  is  often  given  a  lien  upon  the  property  upon  which 
such  commodity  is  used  for  the  price  thereof.  The  city  may 
by  ordinance  make  the  owner  of  realty  liable  for  light  and  water 
furnished  to  his  lessee  and  used  upon  the  realty  so  leased."  An 
ordinance  provided  for  a  lien  upon  realty  for  the  price  of  water 
furnished  for  use  thereon,  the  lien  to  be  lost  if  the  water  was 
not  turned  off  thirty  days  prior  to  the  expiration  of  a  collection 


^Village  of  Lemont  v.  Jenks,  197 
III.  363,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  172;  64  N. 
E.  362  [1902].  The  liability  of  a 
guarantor  of  such  a  bill  is  considered 
in  Board  of  Public  Works  of  City  of 

Xiles  V.  Pinch,  —  Mich. ,  116  N. 

W.  408  [1908].  The  question  of  the 
liability  of  A.  to  B.  for  making 
wrongful  use  of  water  which  comes 
through  B.'s  meter  and  for  which  B. 
is  liable  to  the  cjty  is  considered  in 

Weidman  v.   Wilson,   —   Mich.  . 

116  N.  W.  593  [1908].  Recovery  of 
the  difference  be^veen  the  advance 
payment  and  the  rate  for  the  water 
which  was  actually  iised  is  consid- 
ered in  American  Brewing  Co.  v.  City 

of  St.  Louis,  —  Mo.  ,  108  S.  W. 

1    [1907,   1908]. 

*  "The  water  rates  are  imposed  and 
collected  not  as  a  tax  but  as  a  com- 
pensation to  be  paid  by  those  who 
choose  to  receive  and  use  the  water." 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Northwestern  Mu- 
tual Life  Insurance  Co.,  21-8  111.  40, 
1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  770,  75  X.  E.  803 
[1905]. 

^  Hoboken  Manufacturers  R.  Co.  v. 


j\Iayor,  etc..  of  City  of  Hoboken,  —  N. 
J.  L.  — ,  68  Atl.  1098  [1908];  State, 
Culver,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  Jersey  City,  45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vr.) 
256  [1883];  State,  Vreeland,  Pros, 
v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey 
City,  43  X.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  135 
[1881],  (affirmed  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Jer- 
sey City  V.  State,  Vreeland,  Pros., 
43  X.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  638  [1881]); 
State,  United  New  Jersey  Railroad 
&  Canal  Company,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  41  N. 
J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  471  [1879];  Provident 
Institution  for  Savings  v.  Allen,  37 
X.   J.   Eq.    (10   Stew.)    36    [1883]. 

"  Regan  Land  Co.  v.  City  of  Car- 
thage, —  Mo.  App.  ,  i08  S.  W. 

589    [1908]. 

'  Citv  of  East  Grand  Forks  v.  Luck, 
97  Minn.  373,  107  X.  W.  393  [1906]. 
Contra;  that  a  charge  for  water  fur- 
nished to  a  tenant  for  years  under 
a  contract  with  him  cannot  be  a  lien 
upon  the  estate  of  the  landlord ;  Car- 
penter V.  IMayor  and  Council  of  the 
City  of  Hoboken,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  (6 
Stew.)    27    [1880]. 


9  .  ASSESSMENT   AND   PLACE   IN   LAW.  §  O 

period.  Under  such  ordinance  the  vendee  of  realty  upon  which 
the  lien  has  been  lost  cannot  be  held  for  arrearages  which  ac- 
crued prior  to  his  purchase  of  such  realty. **  A  rule  requiring 
water  to  be  turned  off  upon  default  in  payment  and  not  to  be 
turned  on  again  until  the  arrears  are  paid  has  been  held  to  be 
unreasonable  where  it  operates  to  prevent  a  lessee  of  realty  who 
tenders  the  charges  for  his  use  of  water,  from  being  permitted 
to  use  water  until  the  arrears  due  from  a  former  tenant  are  also 
paid.^  This,  however,  is  merely  special  remedy  given  for  a  charge 
which  is  essentially  contractual  in  its  nature.^"  Another  source 
of  confusion  between  a  transaction  of  this  sort  and  a  true  as- 
sessment is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  city  has  ordinarily  no 
option  to  sell  or  to  decline  to  sell,  but  as  long  as  all  reasonable 
regulations  have  been  complied  with,  the  city  is  bound  to  sup- 
ply water  impartially  to  all  wJio  apply  for  the  use  thereof  upon 
land  which  can  be  supplied  from  the  city's  pipes."  A  similar 
case  is  presented  under  a  statute  providing  that  in  the  organi- 
zation of  a  sanitary  district,  a  city  owning  a  system  of  water- 
works which  is  supplied  from  a  source  Avhich  is  preserved  from 
pollution  by  the  construction  of  the  drain  provided  for,  must 
furnish  water  to  other  cities  incorporated  towns  or  villages  in 
such  district  not  having  any  system  of  waterworks  of  its  own, 
at  the  table  of  rates  fixed  the  city  owning  such  system  of  water- 
works.^- To  be  distinguished  from  such  cases  are  those  in  which 
the  charge  is  imposed  on  the  owner  of  the  land  which  may  be 
supplied  with  water  from  the  water-works  system,  irrespective 
of  whether  or  not  he  accepts  and  makes  use  of  such  water.  These 
are  not  eases  of  contract.^-*  Whether  such  charges  can  be  classed 
as  assessments  or  not,  and  whether  they  are  valid  or  invalid  are 
questions  discussed  in  another  connection."  Another  form  of  a 
charge  which  is  in  substance  a  contract  is  to  be  found  wliere  a 
municipality,    under   authority    conferred    l)y    statute,    imposes   a 

"City   of   Chirajio    v.   Xorthwostprn  40.  1   L.  R.  A.    (X.  S.)    770.  75  X.  E. 

Mutual    Life    Tn'^urance    Co..    218    111.  S0.3   [1905];   \Va<Tnpr  v.  City  of  Rock 

40;    1  L.  R.  A.    (X.  S.)    770.  75  X.  E.  Island,   146  111.   1.30.  21  L.  Jl.  A.  519. 

R03   [19051.  34  X.  E.  545   [1893]. 

°  Ruikc    V.    Cit\    of    Water    Valley.  '"City  of  Cliicaffo  v.  Town  of  Cice- 

87   :\Iiss.   732.    112  Am.  St.  Rep.   408.  ro.  210  111.  290.  71  X.  E.  356   [1904]. 

40  So.  820    [1905].  '^Viliaore  of  Lemont  v.  Jenks.   197 

"•See   8   20.  III.  363;  90  Am.  St.  Rep.   172.  64  X. 

"City  of  Chicago   v.   Xorthwestern  E.    362     [1902]. 

:\rutuaf  Life   Insurance   Co..   218   111.  "  See  §  353. 


§  6  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  10 

charge  upon  property  owners  who  connect  their  land  with  a  sewer 
system  constructed  bj^  the  city/"  the  owner  being  free  to  avoid 
liability  by  refraining  from  making  such  connection.  Such  charge 
may  be  a  fixed  sum  for  the  privilege  of  making  the  connection,"' 
or  it  may  be  a  charge  based  upon  the  amount  of  sewage  dis- 
charged from  the  premises  into  the  sewer.^'  Such  a  charge  is 
not  ordinarily  regarded  as  a  local  assessment.^ ^  Another  form 
charge  which  is  in  substance  a  contract  is  to  be  found  where  a 
municipality  under  authority  of  statute  imposes  a  charge  for  the 
removal  of  garbage,  but  leaves  the  owner  free  to  avoid  liability 
either  by  making  such  use  of  his  property  that  no  garbage  is 
produced  thereon,  or  by  destroying  it  upon  the  premises.  Such 
a  charge  even  if  valid  is  not  an  assessment.^"  Such  a  charge  is 
said  not  to  be  a  local  assessment  for  three  reasons:  (1)  It  is 
not  a  forced  charge  but  is  incurred  by  the  voluntary  act  of  the 
owner  of  the  premises;  (2)  the  amount  of  such  charge  is  not 
determined  in  advance  and  (3)  no  lien  therefor  is  created  upon 
the  .realty.^''  Not  all  these  reasons  would  hold  good  under  all 
statutes.  The  third,  especially,  would  not  be  a  satisfactory  reason 
in  some  jurisdictions.-^  The  first  reason  given  is,  in  this  con- 
nection, the  one  to  be  noted.  The  fact  that  a  transaction  of 
this  sort  is  a  contract  and  not  a  true  assessment  produces  several 
specific  differences  between  such  a  charge  and  a  true  assessment. 
(1)  The  power  of  the  city  to  charge  for  such  commodities  may  be 
given  in  very  broad  and  general  terms  and  is  not  restricted  to 
an  express  grant  of  powder  by  the  legislature,  as  is  the  case  in 
assessments  for  benefits.--  (2)  Since  the  relation  between  the 
parties  is  a   contractual  one,  the  notice  and  hearing  which   are 

'^  Carson  v.  Sewerage  Commission-  a  charge  seems  to  be  treated  as  an 
ers  of  Brockton.  175  Mass.  242 ;  48  assessment  based  on  benefits  as  de- 
L.  R.  A.  277;  5G  N.  K.  -1  [1900];  termined  by  the  amount  of  sewage 
City  of  Fergus  Falls  v.  Boen,  78  discharged,  and  levied  for  the  pur- 
Minn.  186;    80  X.  W.  961    [1899].  pose  of  keeping  the  sewer  in   repair. 

'"City  of  Fergus  Falls  v.  Boen,  78  "  Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591, 

Minn.  186,  80  X.  W.  961   [1899],  49    Am.    St.    Rep.    222,    28    L.    R.    A. 

"  Carson   v.   Sewerage   Commission-  670,    37    X.    E.    402,    39    X.    E.    869 

ers   of   Brockton,    175    Mass.    242,    48  [1894]. 

L.  R.  A.  277,  56  X.  E.  1    [1900].  ="  Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591, 

^Hity    of    Fergus    Falls    v.    Boen.  49    Am.    St.    Rep.    222,    28    L.    R.    A. 

78  Minn.   180.  80  X.  W.  961    [1899];  679,    37    X.    E.    402.    39    X.    E.    869 

In   Carson    v.    Sewerage   Commission-  [1894]. 

ers  of  Brockton,  175  :\Iass.  242,  48  L.  ^' See  §   1049. 

R.  A.   277,   56  X.   E.    1    [1900],  such  "See  §  229. 


11  ASSESSMENT    AND   PLACE    IN    LAW.  §7 

essential  in  assessments  for  benefits  are  not  required  in  the  so- 
called  assessments  of  this  type."''  (3)  The  question  of  benefits 
does  not  enter  into  the  determination  of  the  amount  to  be  paid 
for  the  property  or  services  thus  furnished  by  the  person  who 
has  received  them.-^ 

§  7.     Definition  of  assessment. 

A  local  assessment  levied  on  the  theory  of  benefits  may  then 
be  defined  as  an  enforced  involuntary  charge,  generally  in  money 
though  sometimes  in  the  alternative  in  work  and  materials,  im- 
posed by  competent  political  authority  in  order  to  raise  funds 
to  pay  for  part  or  all  of  an  improvement  of  a  public  character 
whereby  an  especial  local  benefit  has  in  the  contemplation  of 
the  law  been  conferred  upon  certain  property,  in  most  cases, 
realty,  l)ut  in  some  rare  cases,  personalty ;  imposed  generally 
upon  the  property,  but  in  some  eases  upon  the  owner  thereof; 
and  imposed  in  the  contemplation  of  the  law  in  return  for  such 
especial  benefits,  and  in  an  amount  not  exceeding  such  special 
benefits  and  apportioned  according  to  the  amount  of  such  special 
benefits.^  This  definition  is  more  elaborate  than  is  desirable, 
but  the  attempt  to  simplify  seems  to  result  in  eliminating  es- 
sential elements  of  the  assessment,  or  else  in  i^rodueinu-  a  defini- 
tion which  does  not  agree  with  the  result  of  carefully  considered 
cases  which  must  be  recognized  as  authoritative  in  the  law  of 
assessments     Naturally  the  courts  have  not  had  occasion  to  eon- 

^'Sce    §    734.  140  Ind.  591.  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  28 

"See  §  718.  L.  R.  A.  670.  37  X.  E.  402.  39  n'  E. 

'For   cases    in    which    tlie    cloinents  ,9fin    [18941;    :Min()r  v.  Daspit,  43  La. 

of   tlio    definition   here    suirgested    are  .\n!i.   337.   9   So.   49    [1891]  ;    Daly  v. 

recocrnized,  sec   Illinois  Central   Rail-  Morpan,  (i9  ^Fd.  4(iO,   1   L.  R.  A.  757. 

road  Co.  v.  Decatur,   147   U.   S.    190,  IC   Atl.   287    118881;    Wliite  v.   Gove. 

37   L.    132,    13   R.   293    [18931;    Fair  1S3  Mass.  333.  fi7  X.  E.  359   [19031; 

Haven    &    Westville    Railroad    Co.    v.  ITrman    Construction    Co.    v.    Wabash 

City    of    Xew    TTaven.    77    Conn.    494.  Ky.   Co..  —  :\ro.  .   104   S.   W.   07 

59  Atl.  737  [19051;  Rarjrentv.  Tuttle,  [19071;    Wilson    v.    Citv    of    Auburn. 

07    Conn.    Ifl2.    32    L.    R.    A.    822.    34  27   Xeb.   435.   43   X.    w!   257    [18891; 

Atl.    1028    [18951;    Huston    v.    Trib-  Slialer  v.  ^FcAIees-.  —  X.  J.  Eq.  — . 

betts.    171    111.   547.   03   Am.   St.   Rep.  (;S  Atl.  410    [19071;    State.  Herrman. 

275.    49    X.    E.    711    [18981;    City    of  Pros.   v.   Town   „f   Outtenberir.   02   X. 

Chicago  v.  Blair.   149  Til.  310.  24  L.  T.    T.     ( r!3     Vr.^     005.     43    Atl.    703 

R.    A.    412.    30    X'.    E.    829     [18941;  [18981:     Citv      f    Raleifrh    v.    Peace. 

New  York.  Chicajro  &  St.  Louis  Rv.  v.  110  X'.   C.  32.   17  L.  R.  A.  330,  14  S. 

City  of  Hammond.  —  Ind.  — .  83  X.  E.    .521     [18921:    Petfit    v.    Duke.    10 

E.   244    [19081:    Walker   v.    .Jameson.  T^tah  311.  37  Vac.  .508   [18941. 


§  7  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  12 

sider  all  these  elements  in  any  one  case,  and  the  definitions 
framed  by  them  are  applicable  to  the  facts  of  the  case  in  which 
the  definition  is  to  be  found.  A  local  assessment  has  been  said 
to  signify  "charges  upon  adjacent  property  for  improve- 
ments."- This  definition  in  its  context  is  a  perfectly  proper 
one,  as  the  court  was  pointing  out  that  "assessment"  in  the 
eleventh  article  of  the  constitution  of  Kansas  referred  to  general 
taxation  and  meaning  listing  and  valuing  property  for  taxa- 
tion,^ while  in  the  twelfth  section  it  referred  to  local  assess- 
ments. As  a  general  definition  it  is  inadequate,  since  it  restricts 
the  assessment  to  adjacent  property,  and  ignores  the  fact  that  in 
many  jurisdictions  it  is  a  personal  charge  as  well  as  a  charge 
on  property,  and  that  in  some  jurisdictions  it  is  merely  a  per- 
sonal charge  on  the  owner;*  it  omits  all  mention  of  the  class 
of  improvements  for  which  it  may  be  levied ;  and  omits  all  ref- 
erence to  the  theory  of  benefits.  An  assessment  of  this  sort  has 
also  been  said  to  be  an  assessment  to  pay  for  an  improvement 
for  public  purposes  upon  real  property  which  is  by  reason  of 
the  locality  of  the  improvement,  specially  benefited  beyond  the 
benefits  conferred  l\v  the  improvement  upon  the  real  property 
generally  throughout  the  municipality.^  This  definition  ignores 
the  fact  that  in  some  jurisdictions  the  assessment  may  be  a 
personal  charge,  lays  down  the  principle  that  a  benefit  to  all 
the  realty  in  the  municipality  cannot  be  a  local  benefit,  a  prin- 
ciple that  is  sharpl.y  controverted  in  some  jurisdictions  at  least/' 
and  omits  all  reference  to  apportionment.  An  assessment  is  said 
to  be  "a  tax  on  property  levied  according  to  benefits  conferred 
on  the  property."'  Other  definitions  of  assessments  found  in 
adjudicated  cases  are  even  more  limited.  Assessments  for  street 
purposes  are  said  to  be  "those  special  and  loealimpositions  upon 
property  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  an  improved  street  which 
were  necessary  to  pay  for  the  improvement  and  laid  with  ref- 
erence to  the  special  benefit  which  such  property  derived  from 
such   expenditure   of  money. ""^     If  used   without   any  qualifica- 

"  Hines   v.    City  of  Lpavenworth,    3  "  See   §   054. 

Kan.   180    [18G5].  '  Adler   v.  Whitbeck,   44   O.   S.   ,530, 

^See  §   103.  564,  9  N.  E.  672   [1886]. 

*  See   Chapter  XX.  "  Raymond    v.    Cleveland,    42    O.    S. 

=  Wilson    V.    Board    of    Trustees    of  522,527  [18851;  quoting  Hill  v.  Hi;?- 

the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago,  133  don.   5    O.    S.    243,   247,   G7    Am.    Dec. 

111.  443,  27"  N.  E.  203    [1890].  289   [1855]. 


13 


ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE  IN   LAW. 


§8 


tion   in   a  statute   and   with   this   g-eneral  meaning   the   word   as- 
sessment means  a  valid  assessment.'^ 

§  8.     Assessment  for  benefits  a  form  of  taxation. 

The  nature  of  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  provide  for 
levying  local  assessment  is  a  question  which  is  discussed  in  de- 
tail hereafter.^  It  is  sufficient,  in  this  connection  to  point  out 
that  by  the  great  weight  of  authority  a  local  assessment,  levied 
in  return  for  the  benefits  conferred  upon  the  property  assessed 
by  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied  is  a  kind 
of    tax.-      The    power    to    levy    local    assessments    is    said    to    be 


"  (  ity  of  San  Luis  Obispo  v.  Pettit, 
87  Cal.  499,  25  Pac.  G94   [1891]. 

'  See   C  liapter   V. 

-  \A  liiting  V.  Quackenbush,  54  Cal. 
30G  [1880];  Hancock  v.  Whittoniore, 
50  Cal.  522  [1875].  In  the  matter  of 
opening  and  grading  Market  street, 
49  Cal.  54G  [1875]  ;  Appeal  of  Hough- 
ton, 42  Cal.  35  [1871];  Chambers 
V.  Satterlee,  40  Cal.  497  [1871]; 
Emery  v.  The  San  Francisco  Gas 
Company,  28  Cal.  34G  [18G5];  Fair 
Haven  &  Westville  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Xew  Haven,  77  Conn. 
494,  59  Ati.  737  [1905];  Sargent  & 
Company  v.  Tuttle,  G7  Conn.  IG2,  32 
L.  K.  A.  822;  34  Ati.  1028  [1895]; 
City  cf  Xew  London  v.  Miller,  GO 
Conn.  112,  22  Ati.  499  [1891];  City 
of  Bridgeport  v.  Xew  York  &,  Xew 
Haven  Railroad  Company,  3G  Conn. 
255,  4  Am.  Rep.  G3  [1809];  Xieliols 
V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  23  Conn.  1S9, 
GO  Am.  Dec.  636  [1854;]  Elmore  v. 
Drainage  Commissioners,  135  111.  2()9, 
25  Am.  St.  Rep.  303,  25  X.  E.  1010. 
[1890];  White  v.  People,  ex  rel.  City 
of  Bloomington,  94  111.  G04  [1880]; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  AVard,  3(5  111.  9 
[18G4  1;  Xew  York.  Cliieago  &  St. 
Louis     Ivy.     v.     City     of     llammniKl. 

—   Ind. .   83   X.   E.   24)    |1!I0S|; 

Board  of  Commissioners  df  ('nunty 
of  :\I()nroe  v.  l!;n-rcll.  1  17  ind.  oOO. 
4G  X.  K.  124  IISOC,];  (Imrchnian  v. 
(ity  of  Indianapolis.  110  In, I.  2:)9. 
n     X.     E.    301     [1886];     Huston    v. 


Tribbetts,  171  111.  547,  63  Am.  St. 
Rep.  275.  49  X.  E.  711  [1898];  Pal- 
mer v.  City  of  Danville,  154  HI.  156, 
38  X.  E.  1067  [1894]  ;  City  of  Bloom- 
ington V.  Latham,  142  111.  462,  18  L. 
R.  A.  487.  32  X.  E.  506  [1892]; 
Springer  v.  Walters,  139  III.  419,  28 
X.  E.  761  [1891];  Wabash  Eastern 
Railway  Company  of  Illinois  v.  Com- 
missioners of  East  Lake  Fork  Special 
Drainage  District,  134  111.  384;  10 
L.  R.  A.  285,  25  X.  E.  781  [1890]; 
County  of  Adams  v.  City  of  Quincy, 
130  111.  566,  6  L.  R.  A.  155,  22  X.  E. 
624  [1889];  Prindiville  v.  Jackson, 
79  III.  337  [1875];  Robinson  v.  City 
of  Burlington,  50  la.  240  [1878]; 
Todd  V.  City  of  Atchison,  9  Kan.  App. 
251,  59  Pac.  676  [1900];  Bradley  v. 
McAtee,  7  Bush.  667;  3  Am.  Rep. 
309  [1870];  Pleasants  v.  City  of 
Shreveport,  110  La.  1046,  35  So.  283; 
State  ex  rel.  Hill  v.  Judges  of  the 
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Third  Cir- 
cuit of  the  State  of  Louisiana,  46 
La.  Ann.  1292,  16  So.  219  [1894]; 
Yeatnian  v.  Crandall,  11  La.  Ann. 
220  fl85G];  Xew  Orleans  Drainage 
Comjiany  praying  for  the  confirma- 
tion of  a  Tableau.  11  La.  Ann.  338 
MS.-)6]:  Could  v.  :Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore.  59  :Md.  378 
|IS^21;  A'ayor  and  City  Council  of 
P.altiinore  v.  Johns  Hopkins  Hospital. 
5G  :\I(i.  1  [1880]:  Wliite  v.  Gove.  183 
:\rass.  333.  67  X.  E.  359  [1903]:  Pro- 
prietors of  the  Cemetery  of  Mt.  Au- 


§8 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


14 


"essentially  a  power  to  tax."^  The  power  of  levying  a  local 
assessment  is  "distingnishable  from  our  general  idea  of  a  tax. 
but  owes  its  origin  to  the  same  source  or  power."*  This  propo- 
sition means,  primarily,  that  an  assessment  is  an  enforced  con- 
tribution for  a  public  object.  "It  is  a  public  tax  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  levied  for  a  public  object;  it  is  a  local  tax  in  the 
sense  in  which  most  public  taxes  are  local — that  it  is  limited  to 


burn  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermon  of  Cam- 
bridge, 150  Mass.  12;  4  L.  R.  A.  836. 
22   X.    E.   66    [1889];    President   and 
Fellows  of  Harvard  College  v.  Board 
of   Aldermen  of   the   City   of   Boston, 
104    Mass.    470     [1870];     Dorgan    v. 
City  of  Boston,   12  All.  223    [1866]; 
People  on   the   relation   of   Butler   v. 
Board     of     Supervisors     of     Saginaw 
County,   26   Mich.   22    [1872];    Wood- 
bridge  V.  City  of  Detroit,  8  Mich.  274 
[ISfiO],   (decided  by  a  divided  court). 
Williams   v.   Mayor,   etc.,   of   Detroit, 
2  :^.Iich.  560  [1853]  ;  Stinson  v.  Smith, 
8  Minn.  366  [1863];  McComb  v.  Bell, 
2    Minn.    295     [1858];    Heman    Con- 
struction Co.  V.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  206 
Mo.  172;   104  S.  W.  67  [1907];  Meier 
V.  City  of  St.  Louis.  180  Mo.  .391;   79 
S.  W.  955  [1903]  ;  Seaboard  National 
Bank  of  New  York  v.   Woesten,   176 
Mo.  49,  75  S.  W.  464  [1903]  ;  Hemdn 
V.  Schulte,  166  Mo.  409,  66  S.  W.  163 
[1902];    Moberly   v.   Hogan,    131    Mo. 
19,    32    S.    W.    1014    [1895];    Lamar 
Water  &   Electric   Light  Company  v. 
City   of  Lamar,    128  Mo.    188:    32   L. 
R.  A.  157,  31  S.  W.  .756  [1895];  City 
of  St.  Joseph  to  use  of  Gibson  v.  Far- 
rell,     106    Mo.    437,     17    S.    W.    497 
[1891];    Keith  v.   Bingham,    100   Mo. 
300,    13   S.   W.    683    [1889]:    City   of 
St.     Louis    V.     Speck,     07     :\Io.     403 
[1878];  Garrett  v.  City  of  St.  Louis. 
25  Mo.  505,  69  Am.  Dec.  475  [1857]: 
Wilson   V.    City    of    Auburn.    27    Neb. 
435.  45  N.  W.'257    [1889]:   Shaler  v. 
McAleese,  —  N.  J.  Eq.  — .  68  Atl.  416 
[19071;  State,  Agens.  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and   Common  Council   of  the  City  of 
Newark,    35    N.    J.    L.     (6    Vr.)     168 
[1871]:  State,  Sigler.  Pros.  v.  Fuller, 


34  X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  227  [1870];  In 
the  matter  of  Van  Antwerp,  56  N.  Y. 
261  [1874]:  People  ex  rel.  Griffin 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y. 
419;  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851];  Ireland 
V.  City  of  Rochester,  51  Barb.  414 
[1868i;  Litchfield  v.  Mc(  omber,  42 
Barb.  288  [1864]:  In  the  matter  of 
the  Report  of  the  Commissioners  of 
Assessment  for  Grading,  Paving,  etc.. 
Sackett  Street  in  the  City  of  Brook- 
lyn, 4  Hun.  92  [1875] ;  Astor  v.  May- 
or, Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of  the 
City  of  New  York,  37  N.  Y.  Superior 
Ct.^5  J.  &  S.)  539  [1874];  Hilliard 
V.  City  of  Asheville,  118  N.  C.  845. 
24  S.  E.  738  [1896];  Pittsburgh  v. 
Storrett  Sub-district  School,  204  Pa. 
St.  635,  61  L.  R.  A.  183,  54  Atl.  463 
[1903];  Morewood  Avenue,  Cham- 
ber's Appeal,  159  Pa.  St.  20;  28  Atl. 
123  [1893];  Scranton  v.  Jermyn,  156 
Pa.  St.  107.  27  Atl.  66  [1893];  In 
le  Vacation  of  Center  Street,  115  Pa. 
St.  247,  8  Atl.  56  [1886];  Wolf  v. 
City  of  Philadelphia,  105  Pa.  St.  25 
[1884];  In  re  opening  of  Park  Ave- 
nue, 83  Pa.  St.  167  [1876];  Gault's 
Appeal,  33  Pa.  St.  94  T1859]  ;  Bishop 
V.  Tripp,  15  R.  I.  466,  8  Atl.  692 
[1887] ;  Reelfoot  Lake  Levee  District, 
v.  Dawson,  97  Tenn.  151,  34  L.  R.  A. 
725,  36  S.  W.  1041  [1896];  Allen  v. 
Drew.  44  Vt.  174  [1872];  Blount  v. 
City  of  Janesville,  31  Wis.  648 
[1872]  ;  Holton  v.  City  of  Milwaukee. 
31  Wis.  27    [1872]. 

'  Sargent  &  Company  v.  Tuttle,  67 
Conn.  162,  32  L.  R.  A.  822,  34  Atl. 
1028    [1895]. 

*  State.  Sigler,  Pros.  v.  Fuller.  3-! 
N.  J.  L.    (5  Vr.^    227.  230    [1870]. 


15  ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE  IN   LAW.  ^  9 

a  certain  locality.  It  differs  from  ordinary  public  taxes  in  that 
it  is  not  levied  upon  the  polls  and  estates  within  a  municipality 
or  a  district  in  respect  of  public  or  common  benefits,  but  upon 
particular  lands  in  respect  of  a  particular  benefit  received  by 
them  from  the  execution  of  a  public  object."-'  Whether  the 
right  to  levy  assessments  of  this  type  in  some  cases  may  not 
be  referred  to  and  justified  by  some  power  of  government  other 
than  the  power  of  taxation,  such  as  the  police  power  or  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  is  a  question  which  is  discussed  in  detail 
elsewhere."  Here  it  must  be  noted,  first,  that  an  assessment  is 
very  generally  recognized  as  a  manifestation  of  the  taxing  power; 
second,  that  as  might  be  expected,  such  a  proposition  is  so  broad 
that  it  is  used  to  support  conclusions  which  are  utterly  incon- 
sistent with  each  other;  and  third,  that  the  question  whether 
the  term  "tax"  is  so  broad  as  to  include  "assessment"  depends 
on  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case.'^ 

§9.    Assessment  for  legal  duty  not  taxation. 

Assessments  of  the  second  type,  that  is,  assessments  levied  to 
reimburse  the  public  corporation  for  the  cost  of  performing  some 
act  which  the  owner  of  the  realty  assessed,  is  bound  by  law 
to  perform,  but  which  he  omits  or  refuses  to  do,  do  not,  as  we 
have  seen,  rest  upon  any  theory  of  benefits  conferred.  Accord- 
ingly, such  an  assessment  is  not  necessarily  a  form  of  taxation.^ 
If  the  improvement  confers  benefit  upon  the  property  which  it 
is  sought  to  assess,  and  if  the  legislature  provides  that  the 
amount  assessed  shall  be  limited  to  the  benefits,  and  apportioned 
thereto,  we  have  a  form  of  taxation.  This,  however,  is  a  case 
where  the  legislature,  though  having  the  right  to  levy  the  as- 
sessment of  the  second  type  irrespective  of  benefits,  foregoes  the 
extreme  exercise  of  its  power,  exacts  less  from  a  property  owner 
ordinarily  than  it  would  otherwise  have  a  right  to  exact  and 
levies  an   assessment   of  the  first   type.     If  the  legislature  sees 

■*  Proprietors  of  tlip  Comotory  of  ?>rt.  patriclc.    Pros.    v.    Commissionprs    of 

Auburn    v.    City    of    f'anibridcrc.    150  Streets   and   Sewers   in   City   of   New 

Mass.    12;    4  L.  R.   A.  830;   22  N.  E.  IJrunswiek,  42  N.  J.  L.   (13  Vr.)    510 

66   riS891.  11880]:  State.  Sitjler,  Pros.  v.  Fuller. 

"See  §S   02.  00-102.  34  N.  J.  L.   (5  Vr.)   227   [1870],     To 

'See   Chapter    ITT.  Hie  same  efTeet  see  obiter  in  Dyar  v. 

'  Van  Watroner  V.  Mayor  ami  Alder-  l-"arniin.<iton    Village    Corporation.    70 

men  of  City  of  Paterson.  67  X.  J.  L.  Me.  515  [18781. 
(38   Vr.)    455    [15)021;    State,    Kirk- 


§§  10,  11  TxVXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  16 

fit  to  exercise  the  full  extent  of  its  power,  and  to  assess  for  the 
cost  of  the  work  done  irrespective  of  the  benefits,  we  have  what 
is  ordinarily  regarded  as  an  exercise,  not  of  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion, but  of  the  police  power.^ 

§  10.     Assessment  for  goods  furnished  not  taxation. 

The  so-called  assessment  of  the  third  type,  that  is,  assessments 
for  the  price  of  commodities  furnished  for  use  on  certain  realty 
at  the  request  of  the  person  consuming  them,  is  evidently  not 
an  exercise  of  the  taxing  power,  nor  is  it  a  form  of  a  tax.  The 
relation  between  the  public  corporation,  which  furnishes  the  com- 
modity, and  the  person  consuming  it,  is  a  relation  purely  con- 
tractual in  its  nature.  As  said  before,  the  relation  between  the 
parties  is  substantially  what  it  would  have  been  had  the  com- 
modity been  furnished  by  a  private  corporation  or  a  natural 
person.  The  transaction  is  substantially  a  contract  of  sale,  in 
some  cases  with  additional  remedies  given  to  the  public  for  the 
enforcement  and  collection  of  the  purchase  price  over  and  above 
those  granted  in  ordinary  contracts  of  sale.^  Such  a  charge  is, 
however,  not  infrequently  referred  to  as  a  tax  or  an  assessment. - 
Thus  a  charge  for  water  furnished  is  referred  to  as  a  "water 
tax  or  rates,"  and  as  "water  rates  or  assessments."^ 

§  11.     Theory  underlying  the  doctrine  of  assessment  for  benefits. 

The  theory  underlying  the  doctrine  of  local  assessments  of  the 
first  type,  which  is  held  by  the  great  majority  of  the  courts  is 
that  is  that  the  value  of  certain  property  is  enhanced  by  an 
improvement  of  a  publi^  character,  the  property  thus  receiving 
an  especial  and  peculiar  benefit ;  and  that  upon  such  property 
a  part  or  the  whole  of  the  cost  of  such  public  improvement  is 
assessed  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  the  amount  of  such  bene- 
fits.   The  owner  of  the  property  is  therefore  under  this  theory  no 

-  Westenliaver  v.  Village  of  Hoyts-  dereliction  of  duty  is  no  more  a  tax 
ville,  28  Ohio  C.  C.  357  [1905].  "The  than  an  imprisonment  for  the  viola- 
taxing  power  of  a  municipal  corpora-  tion  of  a  police  regulation."  Barrow 
tion  is  as  distinct  from  its  power  v.  Hepler,  34  La.  Ann.  3C2,  365 
to  regulate  the  manner  of  making  and  [1882]. 
repairing  public  roads  and  to  enforce  ^  See  8  6. 
its    ordinances    hy    fine    or    imprison-  -  See  §  6. 

ment  as  it  is  distinct  from  the  power  ^  Cook   County  v.   City   of  Chicago, 

of   such   corporations   to   enforce    any  103   III.   040    [1882]. 
police    regulations.      A    fine    for    the 


17 


ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE  IN   LAW. 


§11 


poorer  by  reason  of  the  entire  transaction,  as  the  assessment 
only  takes  from  him  the  equivalent  of  part  or  all  of  the  special 
benefit  which  the  public  improvement  has  conferred  upon  him; 
or  to  state  it  in  another  way,  the  special  benefits  conferred  on 
him  by  the  public  improvement  compensate  him  or  more  than 
compensate  him  for  the  amount  of  the  assessment  which  he  is 
obliged  to   pay.^     This   general  theory  has  been   stated   by  the 


'  Village  of  Norwood  v.  Baker, 
172  U.  S.  269,  43  L.  443,  19 
S.  187  [1898],  (affirming  Baker  v. 
Village  of  Norwood,  74  Fed.  997; 
Bauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548,  42 
L.  270,  17  S.  966  [1897];  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Company  v.  Deca- 
tur, 147  U.  S.  190,  37  L.  132,  13  S. 
293  [1803];  (affirming  Illinois  Cen- 
tral Railroad  Company  v.  Decatur, 
126  111.  92,  1  L.  R.  A.  613,  18  N.  E. 
315  [1888];  Fay  v.  City  of  Spring- 
field. 94  Fed.  409  [1899];  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Birmingham  v.  Klein, 
89  Ala.  461,  8  L.  R.  A.  369,  7  So. 
386  [1889];  In  the  matter  of  the 
Bonds  of  Madera  Irrigation  District, 
92  Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106, 
14  L.  R.  A.  755,  28  Pac.  272,  675 
[1891];  Bixler  v.  Board  of  Supervis- 
ors of  the  County  of  Sacramento,  59 
Cal.  698  [1881];  In  the  matter  of 
Opening  and  Grading  of  Market 
Street,  49  Cal.  546  [1875];  Cham- 
bers V.  Satterlee,  40  Cal.  497  [1871]  ; 
Taylor  v.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  240  [1866]  ; 
City  of  Denver  v.  Knowles.  17  Colo. 
204.  17  L.  R.  A.  135,  30  Pac.  1041 
[1892];  Ferguson  v.  Borough  of 
Stamford,  60  Conn.  432,  22  Atl.  782 
[1891];  City  of  New  Haven  v.  Fair 
Haven  &  Westerville  Railroad  Com- 
pany. 38  Conn.  422.  9  Am.  Rep.  399 
[1871];  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  New 
York  &  New  Haven  Railroad  Com- 
pany. 36  Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63 
]18i;9];  Allman  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 3  App.  D.  C.  8  [1894]:  City 
of  Atlanta  v.  Hamlein.  96  Oa.  381.  23 
S.  E.  408  (1895];  De  Clercq  v.  Bar- 
ber Asphalt  Paving  Company.  167  111. 
215,  47  N.  E.  367  [1897];  Illinois 
Central   Railroad  Comjiany  v.  City  of 


Decatur,  154  111.  173,  38  N.  E.  026 
[1894];  Palmer  v.  City  of  Danville, 
154  111.  156,  38  N.  E.  1067  [1894]; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Blair,  149  111.  310, 
24  L.  R.  A.  412,  36  N.  E.  829  [1894] ; 
Prindiville  v.  Jackson,  79  111.  337, 
[1875];  Mix  V.  Ross,  57  111.  121 
[1870];  Trustees  of  the  Illinois  and 
Michigan  Canal  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
12  III.  403  [1851];  Gas'Light  &  Coke 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Albany,  158 
Ind.  268,  63  N.  E.  458  [1902]  ;  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  the  County  of 
Monroe  v.  Harrell,  147  Ind.  500,  46 
N.  E.  124  [1896];  Quill  v.  City  of 
Indianapolis,  124  Ind.  292,  7  L.  R. 
A.  681,  23  N.  E.  788  [1890];  Law 
V.  Madison,  Smyrna  &  Graham  Turn- 
pike Company,  30  Ind.  77  [1868]; 
City  of  New  Albany  v.  Cook,  29 
Ind.  220;  ]1867];  Marion  Bond 
Company  v.  Johnson,  29  Ind.  App. 
294.  64  N.  E.  626  [1902];  Beck- 
er V.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  South  West- 
ern Railway  Company,  17  Ind.  App. 
324,  46  N.  E.  685  [1897];  Burke  v. 
Lukens,  12  Ind.  App.  648,  54  Am. 
St.  Rep.  539,  40  N.  E.  641  [1895]; 
Simpson  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  46 
Kan.  438  [1891];  Henting  v.  Gil- 
more,  33  Kan.  234.  6  Pac.  304  [1885]  ; 
Gilmore  v.  Ilcntig,  33  Kan.  156,  5 
Pac.  781  [1885]:  Excelsior  Plantini 
&  Manufacturing  Company  v.  Green. 
39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So.  873  [1887]; 
City  of  Auburn  v.  Paul,  84  Me.  212, 
24  Atl.  817  [1892];  Daly  v.  Morgan. 
69  Md.  460,  1  T-.  Pv.  A."757  [1888]; 
Mayor,  etc..  of  Baltimore  v.  Moore. 
6  Harris  &  J.  375  [1825]  ;  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Hughes' 
Adni'r.  1  Gill.  &  J.  480;  19  Am.  Dec. 
243  [1829];  City  of  Boston  v.  Boston 


11 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


18 


courts  in  many  different  forms,  varying  according  to  the  point 
of  view  taken  by  the  specific  court  and  according  to  the  particu- 
lar application  of  the  general  theory  of  assessments  which  it  is 
sought  to  make  in  each  specific  case.    Thus  it  has  been  said  to  be 


&  Albany  Railroad  Company,  170 
Mass.  95,"^ 49  N.  E.  95  [1898];  Select- 
men of  Norwood  v.  New  York  &  New 
England  Railroad  Company,  161 
Mass.  259,  37  N.  E.  199  [1894]; 
Proprietors  of  tlie  Cemetery  of  Mt. 
Auburn  v.  IMayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Cambridge,  150  Mass.  12;  4  L.  R.  A. 
836,  22  N.  E.  66  [1889]  ;  City  of  De- 
troit V.  Judge  of  Recorder's  Court, 
112  Mich.  588,  71  N.  W.  149  [1897]; 
Siih  nomine  City  of  Detroit  v.  Chapin, 
42  L.  R.  A.  638  [1897];  City  of  De- 
troit V.  Daly,  68  Mich,  503,  37  N.  W. 
11  [1888];  Thomas  v.  Gain,  35  Mich. 
155,  24  Am.  Rep.  535  [1876];  Hoyt 
V.  City  of  East  Saginaw,  19  Mich.  39, 
2  Am*.  Rep.  76  [1869];  State  ex  rel. 
City  of  St.  Paul  v.  District  Court  of 
Ramsey  County,  75  Minn.  292,  77  N. 
W.  968  [1899];  State  of  Minnesota 
ex  rel.  Cunningham  v.  District  Court 
of  Ramsey  County,  29  Minn.  62,  11 
N.  W.  133  [1882];  Rogers  v.  City  of 
St.  Paul,  22  Minn.  494  [1876];  Town 
of  Macon  v.  Patty,  -57  Miss.  378,  34 
Am.  Rep.  451  [1879];  Heman  Con- 
struction  V.   Wabash  R.   Co.,   —  Mo. 

,   104   S.  W.   67    [1907];    McGor- 

mack  V.  Patchin,  53  Mo.  33,  14  Am. 
Rep.  440  [1873];  Lockwood  v.  City  of 
St.  Louis,  24  Mo.  20  [1856];  Lohrum 
V.  Eyermann,  5  Mo.  App.  481  [1878] ; 
Zoeller  v.  Kellog?,  4  Mo.  ApD.  IIS 
[1877];  City  of  Butte  v.  School  Dis- 
trict No.  1,  29  Mont.  336.  74  Pac. 
869  [1904];  Medland  v.  Linton,  60 
Neb.  149.  82  N.  W.  866  [1900]-, 
Smith  V.  City  of  Omaha,  49  Neb.  883, 
69  N.  W.  402  [18961;  Cain  v.  City 
of  Omaha.  42  Neb.  120.  60  N.  W.  368 
[1894]:  Hanscom  v.  City  of  Omnlia, 
11  Neb.  37,  7  N.  W.  739  [1881]: 
Van  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  Mpvor  and 
Aldermen  of  the  Citv  of  Pater.son. 
67  N.  J.  L.   (38  Vr.)   455,  51  Atl.  922 


[1902]  ;  Wilson  v.  Inhabitants  of  the 
City  of  Trenton,  61  N.  J.  L.  599,  68 
Am.  St.  Rep.  714,  44  L.  R.  A.  540, 
40  Atl.  575  [1898];  State,  Agens, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  Newark,  37  N.  J.  L.  415,  18  Am. 
Rep.  729  [1874];  Bogert  v.  City 
of  Elizabeth,  27  N.  J.  Eq.  568  [1876] ; 
Gotthelf  V.  Stranahan,  138  N.  Y.  345, 
20  L.  R.  A.  455,  34  N.  E.  286  [1893] ; 
Stuart  V.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  183,  30 
Am.  Rep.  289  [1878];  Buffalo  City 
Cemetery  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  46  N.  Y. 
506  [1871];  People,  ex  rel.  Griffin  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  419,, 
55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851];  City  of 
Asheville  v.  Wachovia  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.,  143  N.  C.  360,  55  S.  E.  800 
[1908];  City  of  Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110 
N.  C.  32,  17  L.  R.  A.  330,  14  S.  E. 
521  [1892];  Busbee  v.  Commis-ioners 
of  Wake  County,  93  N.  C.  143  [1885] ; 
Commissioners  of  Green  County  v. 
Commissioners  of  Lenoir  County,  92 
N.  C.  180  [1885];  Walsh  v.  Barron, 
61  0.  S.  15,  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  354; 
55  N.  E.  164  [1899];  Wewell  v.  City 
of  Cincinnati,  45  O.  S.  407,  15  N.  E. 
196  [1887];  Raymond  v.  Cleveland, 
42  0.  S.  522  [1885];  Lima  v.  Ceme- 
tery Association,  42  0.  S.  128,  51 
Am.  Rep.  809  [1884];  Fields  v.  Com- 
missioncT-s  of  Highland  County,  36  0. 
S.  -^76  [1881];  Chnmberlain  v.  Cleve- 
land, 34  0.  S.  551,  [1878];  King 
v.  Portland,  38  Ore.  402.  52  L. 
R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2  [19001:  Hud- 
dleston  v.  City  of  Eugene,  34  Ore. 
343,  43  L.  R.  A.  444,  55  Pac. 
868  [18901:  Boyd  v.  Borou-rh 
of  Wilkinsbursr,  183  Pa.  St.  198,  38 
Atl.  592  [1897];  Morewood  Avenue, 
Chan-bers's  Anneal,  159  Pa.  St.  20, 
28  Atl.  123  [1893];  City  of  Erie  v. 
Ru^soll,  148  Pa.  St.  384,  23  Atl.  1102 
[1892];  City  of  Chester  v.  Black,  132 


19  ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE  IN  LAW.  §  11 

"the  fundamental  principle  of  sneh  special  taxation,  that  it  shall 
be  measured  by  the  special  benefit."-  Other  forms  of  stating 
this  general  theory  are  as  follows:  "The  assessment  is  made 
solely  on  the  ground  of  benefits  conferred."^  "It  is  a  local 
assessment  imposed  occasionally,  as  required,  upon  a  limited  class 
of  persons  interested  in  a  local  improvement  who  are  assumed 
to  be  benefited  by  the  improvement  to  the  extent  of  the  assess- 
ment, and  it  is  imposed  and  collected  as  an  equivalent  for  that 
benefit  and  to  pay  for  the  improvement."*  "The  foundation 
of  special  benefits  for  public  improvements  is  the  special  benefit 
derived  by  the  owners  of  property  over  and  above  the  rest  of 
the  community.""'  "The  only  basis  on  which  special  taxation 
or  special  assessments  can  be  sustained  is  that  the  property 
subject  to  the  assessments  or  taxation  will  be  enhanced  in  value 
by  such  improvements  to  the  extent  of  the  benefit  imposed."^ 
"Assessments  for  local  improvements  can  be  justified  only  upon 
the  theory  that  the  lands  upon  which  they  are  laid  are  specially 
benefited  by  the  improvements  for  which  they  are  laid,  and 
hence  ought  to  bear  the  burden  rather  than  property  generally ; 
and  if  a  law  should  authorize  such  assessments  to  be  laid  with- 
out reference  to  benefits  it  would  either  take  property  for  pub- 
lic good  without  compensation  or  it  would  take  property  from 
one  person  for  the 'benefit  of  another."^  An  assessment  is  said 
to  be  "in  the  nature  of  compensation  for  a  benefit."**  "The 
principle   on   which   they   are   levied   is   'that    the   terjntory   sub- 


Pa.  St.  508.  G  L.   R.   A.  802    [18001;  Company    v.    Jaspor    County.    117    la. 

Opening  of  Park   Avenue,  83   Pa.  St.  3G5,  381.  !)4  .\m.  St.  JW\^.  301.  90  X. 

175   [188G]  ;  Kettle  V.  City  of  Dallas,  W.    inOG    [1902]. 

35  Tex.  Civ.  App.  632,  80  S.  W.  874  '  City   of   Kridsjeport    v.   New   York 

[19041:    Barnes  v.    Dyer,   5G   Vt.   4G9  &   Xcw  Haven  Railroad  Company.  3G 

[18841;    Woodhouse   v.    City  of   Bur-  Conn.   255,   262,   263.   4   Am.   Rep.    63 

linpton,  47  Vt.  300   [1875]";   Allen  v.  |isr9]. 

Drew,  44  Vt.   174   [1872];   Asberry  v.  "  Wewoll    v.   City   of   Cincinnati,   45 

City  of  Roanoke,  91  Va.  562,  42  L.  R.  O.  S.  407,  -124,   15  X.  E.   196   [1887]. 

A.  636,  22  S.  E.  380    [1895];   Seanor  "City   of    liutto    v.    School    District 

v.    Board    of    County    Commissioners.  Xo.  1,  29  ^font.  336.  339,  74  Pac.  86!) 

13    Wasii.    48,    42    Pac.    552    [18951;  11904]. 

Stowell    V.    Milwauls-eo,    31    Wis.    5::i  'Stuart    v.    Palmer.   74    X.    V.    183. 

[1872];  TTolton  V.  City  of  Mil\vnuke:\  30    .Am.    Rep.    289    [1878]. 

31   Wis.  27   [1872].  'Mayor  and   .Aldermen  of  Birrnin;!- 

"  Vacation    (  f    Howard    Street.    1  !2  liam  v.  Klein.  89  Ala.  461,  8  L.  R.  A. 

Pa.  St.,  601.  606.  21   Atl.  974   [1<'91].  369.  7  So.  386  [1889]. 

'  Edwards    &     Wal.sh     Construction 


§  11  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  20 

jected  thereto  will  be  benefited  by  the  work.'  " '^  "Assessments 
for  street  improvements  are  npheld  on  the  ground  that  the  ad- 
adjacent  property,  upon  which  the  cost  of  the  improvement  is 
assessed,  is  enhanced  in  value  to  an  amount  equal  to  the  sum 
assessed  against  it,  and  that  the  owner  has  received  peculiar 
benefit  which  the  citizens  do  not  share  in  common."^"  "The 
making  of  such  assessments  is  a  form  of  taxation  which  rests 
upon  the  ground  that  the  property  in  the  neighborhood  of  a 
public  improvement  may  receive  special  and  peculiar  benefits 
from  the  improvement  that  make  it  equitable  as  against  the 
owner  to  charge  it  with  the  payment  of  a  greater  proportional 
part  of  the  cost  of  the  work  than  is  paid  by  property  owners 
generally.""  "Assessments  for  street  improvements  are  up- 
held on  the  ground  that  the  adjacent  property  upon  which  the 
cost  of  the  improvement  is  assessed  is  enhanced  in  value  to  an 
amount  equal  to  the  sum  assessed  against  it,  and  that  the  owners 
have  received  peculiar  benefits  which  the  citizens  do  not  share 
in  common."^-  "A  tax  or  assessment  for  local  improvement  is 
based  upon  the  theory  that  it  is  a  return  for  the  benefit  received 
by  the  person  who  pays  the  tax  or  by  the  property  assessed."" 
"These  local  assessments  are  authorized  on  the  principle  of  the 
direct  benefits  resulting  to  those  upon  whom  they  are  made, 
from  the  improvements.""  "An  assessment  is  a  charge  laid 
upon  individual  property  because  the  property  upon  which  the 
burden  is  imposed  receives  a  special  benefit  which  is  different 
from  the  general  one  which  the  owner  enjoys  in  common  with 
others  as  a  citizen.  .  .  .  An  assessment  is  levied  only  upon 
the  property  benefited.  It  is  uniformly  restricted  to  the  means 
for  paying  those  local  burdens  arising  by  reason  of  the  Avants  of 

°  Bixler  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  "  City  of   Boston  v.   Boston  &   Al- 

the    County    of    Sacramento,    59    Cal.  bany    Railroad    Company,    170    Mass. 

698,    702    [1881];    quoting    Litchfield  9.5,  08,  49  N.  E.  95    [1898]. 

V.  Vernon,  41  N.  Y.  123  [1869].  ^- Quill  v.  City  of  Indianapolis,   124 

'"Marion   Bond    Company   v.   John-  Ind.   292,   299,    300,    7    L.   R.   A.    681. 

son,  29  Ind.  App.  £94,  297,  64  N.  E.  23  N.  E.  788    [1890]. 

626    [1902];    (citing  Quill  v.  City  of  ^^  Board    cf    Commissioners    of    the 

Indianapolis,  124  Ind.  292,  7  L.  R.  A.  County  of  Monroe  v.  Harrell,  147  Ind. 

681.    23    N.    E.    788    [1890];    Ross    v.  500,  505;    46  N.  E.   124   [1896]. 

Stackhouse,    114   Ind.   200.    16   N.    E.  "City  of  New  Albany  v.  Cook,  29 

501     [1887];    Heick    v.    Voight,     110  Ind.  220,  223   [1867]. 
Ind.  279,  11  N.  E.  306  [1886]). 


21 


ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE   IN   LAW. 


§11 


small  communities."'''  So  the  theory  of  assessments  is  said  to 
be  "that  the  value  of  the  lots  is  enhanced  by  the  public  ex- 
penditure."^' Such  an  assessment  is  said  to  be  "an  assessment 
to  pay  for  an  improvement  for  pul)lic  purposes  upon  real  prop- 
erty, which  is,  by  reason  of  the  locality  of  the  improvement, 
specially  benefited  beyond  the  benefits  by  the  improvement  to 
real  property  generally  throughout  the  municipality,  proportioned 
by  such  benefits. "'"  "The  theory  upon  which  such  assessments 
are  sustained  as  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the  taxing  power 
is  that  the  party  assessed  is  locally  and  peculiarly  bene- 
fited over  and  above  the  ordinary  benefit,  which  as  one 
of  the  community,  he  receives  in  all  public  improvements 
to  the  precise  extent  of  the  assessment."  ^'^  Hence,  one 
who  agrees  to  buy  a  property  free  from  incumbrances  is 
not  prejudiced  by  the  construction  of  improvements  and  the  levy 
of  assessments  therefor,  after  the  time  fixed  for  performance  of 
the  contract  to  convey,  since  under  the  theory  of  assessments, 
the  property  is  benefited  to  the  amount  of  assessment. ^'^  The  im- 
provement must  be  regarded  as  an  entirety  as  far  as  it  affects 
the  (juestion  of  special  benefits.  An  assessment  may  be  levied 
upon  the  theory  of  benefits  where  the  improvement  as  n  whole 
l)enefits  the  property  assessed,  even  though  a  particular  part  of 
tlie  improvement  might  have  been  omitted  without  aff'e-ting  the 
benefit  to  the  property.""  To  levy  such  an  assessment  is  said  to 
be  "to  assess  for  contributions."-'  Indeed  some  courts  occa- 
sionally put  so  much  emi)liasis  upon  the  special  benefit  to  the 
immediate  loealitv  that  the\-  minimize  or  ignore  the  ueneral  l)enefit 


'^WalkiT  V.  Janipson,  1-10  In.l.  591. 
59  1.  5i)r).  40  A.  S.  R.  222,  28  L.  R.  A. 
(179.  :?7  X.  E.  402.  39  X.  E.  Sflfi 
[1S941. 

'"  Sclienloy  v.  The  C'oninioiiwoaUIi 
for  till'  use  of  tlie  City  of  Al!ou;lieny, 
•M\  Vi\.  St.  29,  57.  78  Am.  Doc.  359 
I1S.591. 

"  Wilson  V.  Board  of  Trustees  of 
tlie  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago.  133 
111.  443,  4{19.  27  X.  E.  203  [1890]; 
(citing  (iuild  v.  City  of  C'liica'jro,  82 
111.  472  [18701;  City  of  Sterling  v. 
(ialt.  117   111.   n,  7  X.  E.  471   [1880]. 

'"  State,   The   Xew   -lersev   Railroad 


&  'i'ransportation  Company.  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  ('nuucil  of  the 
City  of  Xewark.  27  X.  .1.  L.  (3 
Dutch.)  185.  190  I1S58].  quoted 
City  of  Detroit  v.  Judge  of  Record- 
er's Court.  112  Mich.  588.  589,  71  N. 
W.  149;  fiiih  nomine  City  of  Detroit 
V.  (  liapin,  42  L.  R.  A.  038   [1897]. 

"(iutthelf  V.  Stranahan.  138  X.  Y. 
345.  20  L.  R.  A.  45.").  3t  X.  E.  280 
[18931. 

="  Boyd  V.  Borough  of  Wilkinsbrrjr, 
183  Pa.  St.   198.  38  Atl.  592   [1897]; 

-'  Opening  of  Park  Avenue,  83  Pa. 
St.    175    11880]. 


§  12  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  22 

to  the  public  at  large."'  However  it  is,  under  most  theories  of 
local  assessment,  necessary  that  there  should  be  also  a  general 
benefit  to  the  public  as  well  as  a  special  local  benefit,  since 
without  the  general  public  benefit,  the  state  would  have  no  au- 
thority to  enforce  contribution  for  an  improvement,  however 
beneficial  it  might  prove  to  the  individual  property  owners.^^ 
While  the  great  majority  of  the  courts  are  found  to  adopt  the 
general  theory  here  given,  and  to  state  it  and  restate  it  in  many 
forms,  differing  somewhat  in  expression,  but  essentially  the  same, 
it  must  here  be  observed  that  the  statement  of  the  theory  here 
given  is  so  broad  and  general  in  its  terms  that  it  leaves  open  for 
future  decision  many  questions  which  might  at  first  glance  seem 
to  be  precluded  by  the  form  in  which  the  theory  is  stated.  Who 
determines  the  question  of  the  existence  and  amount  of  special 
benefits  conferred  by  the  public  improvement  in  question — 
v/hether  the  legislature  can  directly  or  through  grant  of  power 
to  municipalities  or  public  quasi  corporations,  make  the  decision 
of  the  officers  of  such  corporations  or  of  the  legislature  a  finality, 
or  whether  the  courts  will  review  the  question  of  benefits  de 
novo,  are  all  problems,  the  answer  to  which  determines  the  very 
nature  of  the  local  assessment,  but  nevertheless  problems  left 
open  for  consideration.  Courts  which  agree  in-  their  general 
theory  of  assessments  differ  sharply  in  the  answers  which  they 
give  to  these  questions.  This  branch  of  the  subject  is  discussed 
elsewhere  in  detail.-'' 

§  12.     Divergent  theories  of  assessment  for  benefits. 

Another  theory  is  advanced  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa. 
It  is  that  the  local  assessment  is  without  any  justification  as  long 
as  each  improvement  is  considered  separately.  It  is. only  when 
the  fact  is  considered  that  ultimately  all  the  public  improvements 
will  be  constructed  and  property  assessed  to  pay  therefor,  that 
a  justification  of  local  assessments  can  be  found.  "When  we 
contemplate  the  case  of  a  single  street  or  a  single  block,  the 
manner   of  specific   taxation   upon   abutting  lots  may   appear  to 

"  "Local    improvements    for    which  to  be  paid  by  the  property  specially 

assessments    are   made    are   not   sup-  benefited."      Van    Deventer    v.    Long 

posed  to  be  beneficial  to  the  general  Island  City,  139  N.  Y.  133,  34  N.  E. 

public.      They    are   usually   beneficial  774   [1893]. 

wholy    or    mostly    to    the    locality    in  -"  See    §   '2S3. 

which  they  are  made,  and  tliey  are  to  =*  See   §   290  et   seq.;   §   6(56  et  seq. 


23  ASSESSMENT   AND   PL.VCE   IN   LAW.  ^i  12 

impose  more  unequally  the  burden  in  relation  to  the  benefits,  but 
when  we  take  in  view  the  fact  that  all  the  streets  of  the  city, 
so  far  as  the  public  jj^ood  demands,  are  to  be  paved  in  the  same 
way,  we  see  at  once  that  the  burdens  are  more  equally  distributed. 
The  lots  on  one  street  nuiy  not  be  taxed  this  year,  but  they 
will  be  next,  or  when  the  public  good  requires  it.  In  due  time 
they  must  bear  their  own  burden.  If  the  public  good  never 
requires  it,  all  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  taxpayer  is  relieved 
because  the  public  interest  does  not  demand  the  expenditure 
of  revenue  realized  from  such  tax.  In  this  view  the  system  is 
equitable  and  .just.  I  do  not  claim  that  this  is  so  perfectly;  I 
know  that  it  is  not.  But.  as  I  have  before  pointed  out.  no  system 
in  my  opinion  is  or  can  be.  But  it  approximates  a  just  distribution 
of  the  burden  and  is  as  near  thereto  as  the  system  of  general  taxa- 
tion for  such  improvements  can  attain."^  There  are  two  weak 
points  in  this  theory.  First,  there  is  no  assurance  that  subsequent 
improvements  will  l)e  needed  and  constructed;  nor,  if  they  are 
constructed,  is  there  any  assurance,  under  many  statutes,  that 
the  municipality  may  not  elect  to  pay  therefor  by  general  taxa- 
tion. If.  however,  the  remaining  improvements  are  paid  for  by 
general  taxation,  there  is  nothing  left  of  the  theory  of  equality 
in  the  long  run.  Second,  even  if  a  foriu  of  equality  in  the 
long  run  is  thus  obtained,  it  is  an  equality  as  to  realty  only. 
Personal  property  is,  uiuler  most  systems  of  assessment,  omitted 
entirely — an  omission  hard  to  justify  on  the  ground  of  equality 
or  uniformity  if  the  theory  of  benefits  is  repudiated.  A  some- 
what similar  theory  has  been  suggested  in  a  Mississippi  case  in 
which  it  has  been  said  that  if  all  the  streets  in  a  mtmieipality 
were  improved  at  once,  the  burdin  of  the  cost  of  such  improve- 
ment would  be  e(|uali/e(l  if  assessed  upon  tlu^  benefited  prop- 
erty.- The  same  theory  as  that  adopted  by  the  Iowa  court  had 
some  time  before  been  considered  by  tlu'  Sui)reme  Court  of 
Kentucky  and  held  to  be  unsound,  ou  the  grouiul  that  an  as- 
sessment upon  one  person  cnuld  not  be  upheld  or  justified  by 
the  remote,  contingent  and  uncertain  possibility  that  a  similar 
burden  for  a  similar  pur])ose  might  eventually  aiul  iu  process 
of  time  lie  imjiosed  uix-.n  every  other  j^-operty  owner.'     The  Su- 

'  Warri'ii    v.    Ilciily.    .''.1     in.    31.    41  '  C\ty   of   T.pxinsrtoii    v.   McQuillan's 

[1870].  ITciis.  n   Diuia   513,  .3.5   Am.  Doc.    150 

=  Town  of  :\Iacon  v.  Pattv.  57  Miss.  [18391. 
378.  34  Am.  V.vy..  451    [18701. 


§  12  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  24 

preme  Court  of  Iowa  has  continued  to  adhere  to  the  view  that 
the  justification  of  local  assessments  does  not  depend  upon  the 
theory  of  benefits.*  Thus  the  court  has  said:  "We  do  not 
understand  that  it  has  ever  been  held  by  any  court  that  a  prop- 
erty owner,  called  on  to  pay  assessments  for  the  general  public 
benefit  is  allowed  to  show  that  the  specific  personal  benefit  which 
he  derives  from  the  subject-matter  for  which  the  tax  is  levied 
is  not  equal  to  the  amount  of  the  tax  imposed  on  him  for  that 
object."^  Again  it  has  said  that  a  street  improvement  "is  a 
public  object  which  will  support  such  an  assessment  regardless 
of  the  fact  of  whether  or  not  it  is  a  benefit  to  the  abutting 
property."®  This  last  case  was  taken  on  error  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  and  in  that  court  it  was  urged  that 
the  assessment  was  invalid,  since  the  Iowa  theory  of  assessments 
was  in  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment;  but  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  refused  to  consider  or  to  pass  upon 
this  question  on  the  ground  that  the  Federal  question,  which 
it  was  thus  sought  to  raise,  had  not  been  presented  to  the  Iowa 
courts  or  passed  upon  by  them."  In  California  the  courts  seem 
disposed  to  ignore  the  theory  of  benefits  and  to  insist  that  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  select  such  basis  of  apportionment 
as  it  may  see  fit  does  not  depend  on  the  fact  of  benefit  to  the 
property  upon  which  the  assessment  is  levied.'^  In  Kentucky 
it  has  been  suggested  that  local  assessments  are  to  be  justified 
on  the  same  theory  as  that  on  which  the  citizens  of  a  county  have 
been  required  to  make  county  roads  and  keep  them  in  repair.** 
The  theory  has  been  advanced  that  the  property  owner  may  be 
liable  for  an  assessment,  even  though  his  property  receives  no 
particular  benefit  from  the  improvement  for  which  the   assess- 


*Ft.  Dodge  Electric  Light  &  Power  °  Dewey  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  101 

Company   v.   City   of   Ft.   Dodge,    115  la.   416,   423,   70   N.   W.   605    [1897]. 

la.  568,  89  X.  W.  7   [1902];  Chicago,  'Dewey  v.   Des  Moines,    173   U.   S. 

Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Raihvay  Com-  103,  43  L.  665,  19  S.  379   [1899]. 

pany  v.   Phillips,   111   la.   377,  82  X.  *  In  the  matter  of  the  Bonds  of  the 

W.  787   [1900];  Allen  v.  City  of  Dav-  Madera    Irrigation    District,    92    Cal. 

enport,    107    la.    90,    77    X.'  W.    532  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106,  14  L.  R.  A. 

[1898];  Gatch  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  755,  28  Pac.  272,  675    [1891]. 

03   la.   718,    18   X.   V\'.   310.  «  City  of  Lexington  v.  McQuillan's 

=  Oliver  v.  Monona  County,  117  la.  Heirs,  9  Dana.  513,  35  Am.  Dec.  159 

43,  58,  90  X.  W.  510  [1902]'.  [1840]. 


25  ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE  IN   LAW.  §  12 

ment  is  levied. ^'^  In  Virginia,  at  a  time  when  the  constitution 
did  not  expressly  restrict  assessments  as  it  now  does,^^  the  whole 
theory  of  assessments  was  considered,  discussed  at  length,  and 
sharply  criticised.'-  The  court  said:  "It  is  grossly  un.just  as 
well  as  destructive  of  the  principles  of  free  government  to  hold 
that  the  expense  of  opening,  widening,  extending,  or  otherwise 
improving  a  public  street  in  a  city  or  incorporated  town  should 
be  borne  by  the  few  who  live  nearest  to  it  when  such  improve- 
ment, if  made,  is  founded  in  public  necessity,  and  is  not  only 
open  to  the  public  at  large,  but  is  used  by  the  public,  perhaps, 
hundreds  of  times  where  it  is  used  bu.t  once  by  any  one  of  the 
abutting  owners  who  are  made  to  bear  the  burden  of  its  erec- 
tion. Any  such  imposition  is  necessarily  repulsive  to  the  sense 
of  justice  of  ever}^  fair-minded  man  and  it  would  seem  impossible 
for  any  free  government  to  long  survive  the  practice  of  such 
inequality,  extortion  and  oppression.  There  is  no  just  ground 
upon  Avhich  to  place  any  such  arbitrary  system  of  taxation,  and 
any  such  .system  is  opposed  to  the  very  letter  and  spirit  of  our 
Constitution."'^  At  the  same  time  the  court  refrained  from 
deciding  the  case  on  the  view  of  assessments  here  expressed,  but 
rested  its  holding  on  the  ground  tliat  the  municipality  in  levy- 
ing the  assessment  had  not  complied  with  the  statute  from  which 
it  derived  its  authority.  While  in  some  of  these  cases  assess- 
ments of  the  second  type  are  presented  for  consideration,  in 
which  the  assessment  is  levied  for  the  cost  of  doing  somethirg 
which  the  owner  of  the  land  assessed  was  legally  bound  to  do 
and  which  he  has  neglected  or  refused  to  do.  and  accordingly 
the  question  of  benefits  is  not  necessarily  involved,'*  yet  in 
many  of  the  cases  assessments'  of  the  first  type  are  presented 
which  in  theory  at  least  are  based  upon  and  limited  by  the  bene- 
fits conferred  liy  the  improvement  for  whidi  the  assessment  is 
levied.  In  other  cases  assessments  have  been  said  to  be  inde- 
fensible in  theory.'"  The  New  Jersey  courts  are  disposed  to 
justify    assessments   on    the    ground    of   ancient    usage    and    h^m' 


'"Otter   V.   Barber   Asphalt   Pavinj;  '-^  City  of   Norfolk   v.   Chamhorlain, 

Co.,    —    Ky.    ,    96    S.    W.    802  SO  Va.  19(5.  229.  16  S.  E.  730   [  1S021. 

I190(>1.         *  "See  §    13;    §   717. 

"See  §    161:    §  .lO.S.  '=  Weeks  v.   City  of   Milwaukee,    10 

'-(ity   of   Norfolk    v.   Chamberlain,  Wis.   242    [I860]. 
89  Va.  196,  229,  16  S.  E.  730  [1892]. 


§  13  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  26 

continued  custom  as  much  as  on  the  theory  of  benefits.^"  While 
it  is  true  that  this  reason  has  been  advanced  in  cases  involvinpf 
assessments  which  may  be  classed  as  assessments  for  the  cost 
of  performing  what  it  is  the  legal  duty  of  the  land-owner  to  do, 
such  as  drainage  assessments;^'  it  has  also  been  advanced  in  cases 
involving  a.ssessments  of  classes  which  are  usually  justified  only 
on  the  theory  of  benefits  such  as  streets/^  With  reference  to 
some  classes  of  improvement^**  the  theory  has  been  advanced 
that  the  power  to  compel  public  improvements  of  such  types 
and  to  levy  local  assessments  therefor  is  a  branch  of  the  power 
to  provide  for  the  regulation  and  management  of  interests  com- 
mon to  a  number  of  land-owners,  which  cannot  be  cared  for 
efficiently  except  by  a  common  control  exercised  alike  over  the 
willing  and  the  unwilling.-"  In  some  jurisdictions  we  find  that 
the  theory  upon  which  the  doctrine  of  local  assessments  is  based 
is  a  combination  of  the  theory  that  the  state  may  provide  for 
the  regulation  and  management  of  interests  common  to  a  num- 
ber of  land-owners  as  well  as  to  the  general  public,  and  of  the 
theory  that  the  owners  of  land  especially  benefited  by  a  public 
improvement,  must  bear  the  burden  of  its  cost.-^ 

§  13.     Theory  underlying  doctrine  of  assessment  for  legal  duty. 

The  theory  underlying  the  doctrine  of  assessment  for  the  cost 
of  performing  a  legal  duty  which  the  owner  of  the  property  is 
bound  to  perform,  but  which  he  has  neglected  or  refused  to 
perform,  and  which  the  public  corporation  has  performed  at 
his  cost,  has  nothing  to  do  with   the   doctrine   of  compensation 

"In    matter    of    Drainage    of    the  L.    (13    Vr.)    553    [1880];     (affirmed 

Great  Meadows  on  Pequest  River,  42  without  opinion  as  Hoagland  v.  State, 

N.   J.   L.    (13   Vr.)    553    [1880]     (af-  Simonton,  Pros.,  43  N.  J.  L.   (14  Vr.) 

firmed  without  opinion  as   Hoagland  456   [1881]  ;   and  affirmed  by  the  Su- 

V.    State,   Simonton,   Pros.,    43   N.   J.  preme  Court  of  the  United  States  as 

L.   (14  Vr.)   456  [1881],  and  affirmed  Wurts   v.   Hoagland,    114   U.   S.    606, 

on    error   by   the    Supreme    Court   of  29  L.  229,  5  S.  1086   [1885]). 

the  United  States  as  Wurts  v.  Hoag-  "  State,     Society    for     Establishing 

land,   114  U.  S.  606,  29  L.  229,  5  S.  Useful  Manufactures,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 

1086      [1885]:      State,      Society     for  and    Aldermen    of    City    of    Paterson, 

Establishing     Useful      Manufactures,  42  N.  J.  L.   (13  Vr.)   615   [1880]. 

Pros.    V.    ]\rayor    and    Aldermen    of  "See  §§  13,  334  et  seq ;  §  363. 

City   of   Paterson,    42   X.    J.   L.    (13  =»  See   §§    13,  334  et  seq.;  §   363. 

Vr.)    615    [1880].  =^  Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty,  57  Miss. 

I'ln   matter   of   Drainage   of   Great  378;    34  Am.  Rep.  451    [1879]. 
Meadows  on  PeouFst  River.  42  X.  J. 


27  ASSESSMENT   AND   PLACE   IN    LAW.  §  13 

for  benefits  conferred  by  such  improvement.  The  true  theory 
in  such  cases  is  that  the  law  compels  the  property  owner  to 
do  certain  things  with  reference  to  his  property  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  public,  irrespective  of  the  question  whether  the 
performance  of  such  legal  duty  will  benefit  the  property  with 
reference  to  which  such  ^ct  is  required  or  not.^  In  many  cases 
such  benefit  is  in  fact  conferred,  a  circumstance  which  often 
leads  to  confusion  between  assessments  of  this  type  and  assess- 
ments based  on  the  theory  of  benefits,  and  which  often  makes 
it  impossible  to  determine  whether  a  given  assessment  is  based 
upon  the  one  theory  or  the  other.  In  other  cases  it  may  happen 
that  no  benefit  is  conferred,  or  that  if  a  benefit  is  conferred,  it 
is  less  in  amount  than  the  cost  of  doing  such  work.  In  these 
later  cases  the  right  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  assessments 
for  the  cost  of  doing  such  work  is  established  by  the  great  weight 
of  authority,-  and  clearly  has  no  connection  Avith  the  doctrine 
of  benefits,  and  is  not  dependent  thereon.  Assessments  which 
might  be  explained  upon  this  theory  are  not  infrequently  re- 
ferred to  theories,  different  in  expression,  though  not  neces- 
sarily inconsistent  with  such  tlieory.  Thus  it  has  been  suggested 
that  in  some  forms  of  public  improvements,  at  least,  assess- 
ments are  to  be  justified  on  the  theory  of  the  power  and  duty 
of  the  state  to  make  regulations  for  the  management  of  prop- 
erty which  for  any  reason  can  be  managed  efficiently  only  by 
concerted  action.^  This  theory  does  not  attempt  to  demonstrate 
the  propriety  of  placing  the  burden  of  the  public  improvement 
upon  the  individual  owners  instead  of  on  the  public  treasury, 
and  it  seems  to  assume  the  duty  of  the  property  owner  to  make 
the  improvement  at  his  own  expense — the  very  point  which  most 


'  State,  Kirkpatrick.  Pros.  v.  Com-  management   of   property   of   persons, 

missioncrs   of   Streets   and   Sewers    in  whose     property    adjoins,     or    which. 

City  of  Xew  Brnnswick,  42  X.  J.  L.  from  some  oilier  reason,  can  be  better 

(13  Vr.)    510    [1880]:    State,   Agens,  managed  and  improved  by  some  joint 

Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council  operation,  sncli  as  the  power  of  regii- 

of  Newark,  37  X.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    415.  biting    the    bnibling   of    party    wall-. 

IS  Am.  Rep.  729    [18741:   State.  Sig-  making     and     maintaining     partition 

ler,    l^ros.   v.    Fuller.   34    X.    J.    L.    (5  fences  and  ditches,  constructing  ditch 

Vr.   227)    flSTO].  es    and    sewers    for    the    draining    ot 

-See    §    93.  uplands    or    marshes,    which    can    be 

'"It    is    the    power    of    the    govern-  more    advantageously    drained    by    a 

ment   to   prescribe   public   regulations  common    sewer    or    ditch.      This    is    a 

for    tlie   better    and    more    economical  well    known    legislative   power.    ri-c:)jf- 


n4 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


28 


needs  explanation  and  justification.  A  theory  for  justifying 
the  power  of  local  assessment,  as  distinguished  from  the  motive 
of  the  legislature  in  exercising  a  clearly  recognized  power,  it 
seems  superfluous  if  other  justification  can  be  found  and  defi- 
cient if  no  other  justification  can  be  found.  If  the  assessment 
is  one  which  can  be  upheld  on  the  theory  of  benefits,  as  an 
assessment  for  an  improvement  public  in  its  nature,  which  con- 
fers an  especial  private  benefit  upon  the  property  assessed  there- 
for, or  if  it  can  be  upheld  on  the  theory  of  an  assessment  for 
the  performance  of  a  legal  duty  which  rests  primarily  upon 
the  owner  of  certain  realty  and  which  the  public  may  perform 
at  his  expense  if  he  refuses  or  omits  to  perform  it,  we  have 
in  either  case  an  assessment  which  can  be  justified  without  re- 
sorting to  the  theory  of  the  propriety  of  community  of  manage- 
ment. If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  assessment  is  one  which  cannot 
l)e  upheld  on  either  of  these  grounds,  it  is  difficult  to  see,  under 
constitutional  restrictions,  what  power  the  legislature  has,  on 
the  theory  of  a  common  management,  to  levy  forced  contribu- 
tions   for    purposes    not    falling    within    either    of    these    classes. 

§  14.     Theory  underlying-  doctrine  of  assessment  for  goods  fur- 
nished at  request. 

The   theory   underlving    the    doctrine    of   the    so-called    assess- 


iiized  and  treated  hy  all  jurisconsults 
and  writers  upon  law  throuiih  the 
civilized  world ;  a  branch  of  legisla- 
tive power  exercised  by  this  state  be- 
fore and  since  the  Revolution,  and 
before  and  since  the  adoption  of  the 
present  constitution,  and  repeatedly 
recognized  by  our  courts.  The  legis- 
lature has  power  to  regulate  these 
subjects,  either  by  general  law,  or 
by  particular  laws  for  certain  locali- 
ties or  particular  and  defined  tracts 
of  land.  When  the  constitution  vest- 
ed the  legislative  power  in  the  Sen 
ate  and  General  Assembly,  it  con- 
ferred the  power  to  make  these  pid)- 
lic  regulations  as  a  well  understood 
part  of  that  legislative  power."  Cos- 
ter V.  Tide  Water  Company,  18  N.  J. 
Eq.  [3  C.  E.  Green]  54,  68,  69 
[1866].      "There     are     essential     im- 


))rovenients  which  cannot  be  made 
on  one  tract  without  affecting  an- 
other. These  relate  especially  ti 
drainage,  protection  from  inundation 
and  free  passage  and  intercourse. 
These  improvements  sometimes  be- 
come of  public  importance  as  well 
as  indispensable  to  the  proper  enjoy- 
ment of  each  separate  tract.  In  such 
cases  society  has  arranged  for  the 
management  of  these  common  public 
and  private  interests  as  would  be 
just  and  equitable;  and  to  prevent 
the  burden  of  such  improvement-* 
from  falling  only  on  the  liberal  and 
public  spirited,  has  provided  for  it-i 
equitable  division  among  those  inter- 
ested. Such  a  regulation  is  a  local 
assessment."  Town  of  Macon  v.  Pat- 
ty, 57  Miss.  378,  400,  401,  34  Am. 
Rep.    451    [1879]. 


29  ASSESSMENT   AND   PLACE   IN   LAW.  ^15 

ment  for  the  value  of  ,u'ood.s  furnished  for  use  on  certain  realty 
at  the  refjuest  of  the  owner  or  occupant  thereof,  has  nothing'  to 
do  with  the  doctrine  of  compensation  for  benefits  conferred. 
As  has  been  said  before.^  the  transaction  amounts  to  a  contract 
between  the  cit.\'  whicli  fui'uislics  the  commodity  and  the  per- 
son at  whose  request  the  commodity  is  furnished,  and  the  trans- 
action is  in  effect  a  contract  of  sale,  rather  than  an  assessment. 
An  assessment  of  this  type  beiiiff  essentially  a  contract  has 
notliin<i'  to  do  with  taxation.  It  is  entered  into  voluntarily, 
while  taxation  is  essentially  an  involuntary  imposition. - 

§  15.     Assessment  for  benefits  not  based  on  contract. 

An  assessment  for  benefits  is  a  forced  charue.  levied  upon 
the  property  benefited  by  the  improvement  for  wliich  the  as- 
sessment is  levied,  in  some  eases  upon  the  owner  of  such  prop- 
erty, imposed  by  the  sovereig'n  power  of  the  state,  or  by  some 
public  corporation  or  quasi  corporatioiL  <»r  in  some  cases  by  a 
private  corporation,  under  authorit.v  conferred  by  the  state.  This 
follows  from  the  fact  that  the  assessment  for  benefits  is  a 
branch  of  the  taxinc:  power,  and  a  special  manifestation  of  such 
power.  In  turn,  it  is  tliis  characteristic  of  assessment  for  Ix-ne- 
fits  that  causes  it  to  l)e  classed  as  a  branch  of  tlic  power  of 
taxation.  The  validity  of  a  special  as^-.essment  does  not.  there- 
fore, rest  upon  any  tlieory  of  the  assent  of  the  pi'operty  owner 
to  such  char<ie  levied,  eitlier  upon  his  propei-ts'  or  ui)on  him- 
self, nor  does  it  rest  upon  any  theory  of  contract  between  the 
property    owner    and    the    i)ul)lic.^      The    local    assessment    is    es- 

'See§G.  [If^STD:    People,   v.    IIull)ert,    71    Cal. 

-See   S§   15,20.  72.     14    l':u-.    4.S     |  ISSti]  ;    Haskell    v. 

'City    of    Worcester    v.    Worcester  liartiett,  .'U  Cal.  2S1    118G7I;    Emery 

Consolidated     Street     Unihvav     Com-  v.  P.radford.  29  Cal.  75   f  18(i.T]  ;   (Jray 

l)aiiy.       1!M;       V.      S.      ry.V.).      2.")       S.  V.    'i'owii    of   (  ieero.    177    111.    AM.    .">:! 

:?27    |1!I0.")1:     (allirniiiipj  (  ity  of   Wor-  X.  K.  Dl    11S!)!)|:    Walker  v.  .Iniiieson. 

cester      v.      Worcester      Coiisoiidatetl  UO    Ind.   oOl,    4!)    Am,    St.    Rep.   222. 

49.  64  X.  E.  581    [1902]  )  -,   Essex  Piih-  28  L.  R.  A.  G79,  :^7  X,  E.  402.  .'?9  X. 

lie    Road    Board    v.    Skiiikle,    140    V.  E.   8(19    |  1894]  :    Elourii  .y   v.   (ity   of 

S.   3.'^4,   .35   L,   44(),    11    S.   790    |  18«)1  |.  .TellVrsonville.     17     lixl.     i(;9.    79    Am. 

(anirmin<i   State,    Essex    Piililic    PxkkI  Dec.  4(i8    |18()11:    (  itv  of  S]irevei)orl 

Board,   Pros.  v.   Skinkh".   49   X.  .1.    L.  v.   Prescott.  51    La.    Ann.    1895,  4(')  L. 

(20  Vr.)   05,  (5  Atl,  4.35  ]  188(5],  whicli  R.  A.  193.  2(5  So.  ()(i4  |  18991  :  Hender- 

was    afliiTiied    in    State,    Essex    Piihlip  son    v.    Mayor    and    (  ity    Council    of 

Road    Hoard.   Pros.   v.   Skinkle.   49   X.  Baltimore,    use    of    Escliback,    8    Md. 

J.     L.     (20    Vr,)     041,     10    Atl.    379  3.V2  |  1855] ;  Rose  v.  Trestrail,  02  Mo. 


§15 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


30 


sentially  a  forced  contribution,  levied  in  iuvifuin,  by  virtue  of 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  state.-  "Such  assessments  are  en- 
forced proportional  contributions  of  a  somewhat  special  kind, 
made  in  i)rvitum,  by  virtue  of  legislative  authority  conferred 
upon  the  municipality  for  that  purpose,  upon  such  terms  and 
conditions  as  the  legislature  within  constitutional  limits  may 
see  fit  to  impose."'*  Accordingly  a  statute  modifying  the  rights 
and  liabilities  of  the  property  owner  is  not  a  statute  impairing 
the  obligation  of  a  contract,*  whatever  other  objection  may  be 
made  thereto.'^  So  a  local  assessment  is  not  a  contract  with 
reference  to  the  right  to  interest  thereon'''  or  with  reference  ta 
the  limitation  of  actions  thereon.'  The  contract  entered  into 
between  the  city  and  the  contractor,  providing  for  the  construc- 
tion of  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  is 
not  the  basis  of  the  action  to  collect  such  assessment.®  So  ii 
an  improvement  is  constructed  by  the  contractor  under  special 
contract  with  the  land  owner,  no  liability  to  the  public  cor- 
poration in  the  nature  of  an  assessment  lien  exists  therefor.'' 
In  Louisiana  it  has  been  said  that  if  the  statute  requires  the 
consent  of  a  ma.jority  of  the  property  owners  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  making  the  improvement,  the  local  assessment  lev- 


App.  352  [18051;  Brewster  v.  City  of 
Syracuse,  19  X.  Y.  116  [1859].  "As 
the  lien  does  not  rest  upon  any  agree- 
ment or  specific  assent  of  the  owner 
of  the  land  charged  with  this  burden, 
and  the  improvement  is  often  against 
his  w'ish,  a  clear  right  should  be 
shown  by  tlie  municipality  to  justify 
such  an  act  of  s')vereign  power." 
Western  Peimsylvania  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Allegheny,  92  Pa.  St. 
lOo!    103    [1879]. 

-  City  Street  Improvement  Com-^ 
pany  v.  Babcock,  139  Cal.  690,  73 
Pac.  G66  [1903];  San  Diego  Invest- 
ment Company  v.  Shaw,  129  Cal. 
273,  61  Pac.  io82  [1900];  Brock  v. 
Luning,  89  Cal.  316,  26  Pac.  972 
[1891];  Mound  City  Land  &  Stock 
Company  v.  Miller,  170  Mo.  240,  94 
Am.  St.  Rep.  727,  60  L.  R.  A.  190,  70 
S.  W.  721  [1902];  State  ex  rel.  Gree- 
ly  V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  67  Mo.  113 
[1877];   Guinotte  v.  Egelhoflf,  64  ^Mo. 


App.  356  [1895];  Rose  v.  Trestrail, 
62  Mo.  App.  352    [1895]. 

^Sargent  &  Company  v.  Tuttle,  67 
Conn.  162,  166,  32  L.  R.  A.  822,  823, 
34   Atl.    1028    [1895]. 

*  Essex  Public  Road  Board  v.  Skin- 
kle,  140  U.  S.  334,  35  L.  446,  11  S. 
790  [1891],  (affirming  State,  Essex 
Public  Road  Board,  Pros.  v.  Skinkle, 
49  N.  J.  L.  (20  Vr.)  65,  6  Atl.  435 
[1886],  affirmed  in  State,  Essex  Pub- 
lic Road  Board,  Pros.  v.  Skinkle,  49 
N.  J.  L.  (20  Vr.)  641.  10  Atl.  379 
[1887]).  Brewster  v.  City  of  Syra- 
cuse,  19  X.  Y.   116    [1859]. 

^See  Chapter  XVII. 

« Haskell  v.  Bartlett,  34  Cal.  281 
[1867]. 

'People  v.  Hulbert,  71  Cal.  72,  14 
Pac.    43    [1886]. 

^  Drew  V.  Town  of  Geneva,  159  Ind. 
364,  65  X.  E.  9    [1902]. 

»McCausIand  v.  Leuflfer,  4  Whart. 
(Pa.)    175    [1839]. 


31  ASSESSMENT   AND   PLACE   IN   LAW.  §  16 

ied  for  such  improvement  is  not  a  forced  contribution,  but  is 
based  on  the  consent  of  the  property  owners/"  This  pi'incijile 
has  been  suggested  in  determining  whether  an  assessment  is  a 
tax  within  the  meaning  of  a  provision  giving  the  Supreme  Court 
jurisdiction  in  eases  involving  the  validity  of  a  tax,  regardless 
of  the  amount  involved. ^^  The  distinction  is  one  which  is  not 
made  by  the  courts  of  most  other  jurisdictions.^-  However,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  statute  authorizing  the  organization  of  an  ir- 
rigation district  on  the  affirmative  vote  of  a  majority  of  the  electors 
thereof,  and  providing  that  the  bonds  of  the  district  and  the  inter- 
est thereon  shall  be  paid  from  annual  assessments  on  the  realty  in 
such  district  is  so  far  a  contract  that  a  subsequent  statute  au- 
thorizing the  board  of  directors  of  such  district,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  owners  of  realty  to  pledge  the  realty  itself  for  the 
bonds  is  held  to  l)e  invalid  as  impairing  the  obligation  of  con- 
tracts.^-' However,  an  assessment  or  the  right  to  levy  one  may 
be  the  subject  matter  of  a  contract.^*  Such  a  contract  will  be 
protected  against  state  legislation  impairing  its  obligation. ^^ 

§  16.     Theory  of  contract  invoked  in  assessment. 

In  some  cases,  however,  the  theory  of  contract  has  been  in- 
voked in  assessments  levied  upon  the  theory  of  benefits  as  a 
means  of  explaining  in  part  the  operation  of  such  assessments. 
It  is  stated  in  some  cases  that  in  making  an  improvement  to  l)e 
paid  for  l)y  local  assessment,  the  municipality  acts  as  the  agent 
of  the  property  owners  upon  whom  the  assessment  is  to  be 
levied.^     In   making  the   improvement   for  which   a  local   assess- 

"Fayssoux   v.   Denis.   4S   La.    Ann.  .38,5,  20  S.  280;   Lucas,  Turner  &  Co. 

850,   19  So.  760   [LS9(>1.  v.  City  of  San  Francisco.  7  Cal.  40.3 

"See   §    1309.  ri?57i;    Charnnck   v.   Levee   District, 

»=See  8   779  et  seq.  .38  La.  Ann.  323:   Liebstein  v.  Mayoi 

"Merchants'  National  Rank  of  San  atid   Common  Council   of  the  City  of 

Diogo    V.    Escnndido    Irrigation     Dis-  Xmvark.  24  N.  ,T.  £().    (9  C.  E.  Or.) 

trict.     144     Cal.     329.     77     Pac     937  200    1 18731  :   Schumni  v.  Sevmour.  24 

[19041.                                                   .  X.  .].  Eq.    (9  C.  E.  Cr.)    143   [18731: 

"  :\IcC,po    T.    ]\Iathis.    71    I'.    S.     (4  In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of  Liv- 

Wall.)     143.    18    L.    314     flStiOl.    re-  i'lrston  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  121 

versing    McGee    v.    Matins,    21     Ark.  X.    V.   9-!.   24    X.    E.   290    [18901:    In 

40    [18001.  llio  matter  of  the  Petition  of  Ander- 

"  See  §  171  et  seq.  s m   to  Vacate  an   Asessment.   109   N. 

'New  Orleans  v.  Warner.  17.5  I'.  S.  V.  .5.")4.  .559   [18881.     "The  city  in  di- 

120,  44  L.  90,  20  S.  44  [18991;  modi-  rccting  and  making  the  improvement 

fied  on  rehearing,  176  I^.  S.  92.  44  L.  was  in  some  sense  at  least  the  a'jent 


§  16  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  32 

ment  is  to  be  levied  the  city  is  said  to  be  "more  of  an  agent 
than  a  principal."-  "While  it  is  true  the  city  exercises  but  a 
delegated  power  in  making  these  assessments  and  in  so  doing 
is  acting  as  one  of  the  instrumentalities  of  government,  it  is 
nevertheless  true  that  in  levying  and  collecting  the  same  it  acts 
merely  as  an  agent  of  the  parties  and  derives  no  direct  benefit 
therefrom  distinct  from  that  of  the  property  owners."^  A  stat- 
ute allowing  the  contractor  to  sue  on  the  assessment  is  said  to 
2nake  him  the  agent  of  the  municipality  for  the  purpose  of  col- 
lecting such  assessment.*  An  improvement  district  embracing 
the  territory  of  a  city  is  said  to  act  as  agent  of  the  property 
owners  and  not  as  agent  of  the  city.^  These  statements  are, 
however,  mere  dicta,  representing  an  analogy  but  not  a  prin- 
ciple. The  municipality  is  the  superior  imposing  a  tax,  not  an 
agent  binding  a  principal  by  contract.  Wherever  the  question 
becomes  a  practical  one,  it  is  held  that  the  public  corporation 
or  quasi  corporation  is  not  the  agent.*"'  The  liability  of  the 
parties  to  the  agreement  is  sometimes  based  solely  on  the  theory 
of  an  implied  promise.  Thus  under  a  statute  providing  that 
on  petition  of  one-third  of  the  owners  of  land  affected,  the 
county  commissioners  should  make  a  contract  for  drainage  and 
assess  the  properties  benefited,  the  proper  number  of  land  own- 
ers petitioned,  the  contract  was  let  and  the  work  done ;  but  it 
proved  to  be  of  no  benefit.  It  was  held  that  the  county  commis- 
sioners and  the  land  owners  who  did  not  petition  were  not  liable, 
but  that  the  owners  who  signed  the  petition  hatl  requested  that 
the  work  be  done,  that  it  was  done  at  their  request,  and  that 
there  was,  accordingly,  an  implied  promise  on  their  part  to  pay 


of  the  property  owners,  and  if  it  per-  Company   v.    Jasper   County.    117    la. 

mitted    grossly    extravagant    or    ticti-  365,    381,    94    Am.    St.    Rep.    301,    90 

tious    items    to    be    included    in    the  X.   W.   1006    [1902]. 

sum  to  collect  which   the  assessment  ^  Banaz  v.  Smith,   133  Cal.   102,  65 

was  levied,  that  operated  as  a  fraud  Pac.   309    [1901]. 

upon  him  and  entitled  him  to  relief  ^  Morrilton  Waterworks  Improve- 
in  this  proceeding."  In  the  matter  ment  District  v.  'Earl,  71  Ark.  4, 
of  the  Petition  of  Livingston  to  Va-  69  S.  W.  577,  71  S.  W.  666  [1903]; 
cate  an  Assessment.  121  X.  Y.  94.  Fitgerald  v.  Walker,  55  Ark.  148, 
105,   24  X.   E.   290    [1890].  17  S.  W.  702   [1891]. 

^  Xorth  Pacific  Lumbering  &   ^lan-  "  Board  of  Commissioners  of  Mont- 

ufacturing    Company    v.    East    Port-  gomery    County    v.    Fullen,    111    Ind. 

land,  14  Or.  3,   12  Pac.  4   [1886].  410,  12  N.  E.  298  [1887]. 

^Edwards    &    Walsh    Construction 


33  ASSESSMENT   xVND   PLACE   IN   LAW.  §  17 

tlierefor.'  The  fallacy  of  this  theory  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
request  to  do  the  work  was  a  request  to  do  it  for  a  payment  to 
be  made  in  a  certain  way;  while  the  theory  imposes  a  general 
liability  upon  the  owners  who  petition  for  the  improvement. 
Cases  of  this  sort  are  usually  explained  upon  the  theory  of 
estoppel.^ 

^n.     Special  contract  to  pay  assessment. 

In  some  cases,  however,  improvements  are  made  under  con- 
tracts between  the  municipal  corporation  and  the  owners  of 
property  benefited  thereby,  who  agree  to  pay  for  such  improve- 
ments. As  long  as  such  contract  does  not  tend  to  place  an  undue 
share  of  the  burden  of  the  improvement  upon  the  property  own- 
ers who  are  not  parties  thereto,  it  is  upheld,  if  possessing  the 
elements  of  contracts  in  general.^  Such  charges,  however,  are 
not  properly  regarded  as  true  assessments,  but  as  liabilities  aris- 
ing out  of  contract.  Under  such  contracts  the  cost  of  an  im- 
provement may  be  charged  upon  property  which  by  statute 
would  be  exempt  except  for  such  contract,-  such  as  a  cemetery.^ 
So  by  virtue  of  such  contracts  assessments  may  be  enforced 
under  circumstances  which  would  make  such  assessment  invalid 
except  for  such  contract.  Thus  a  contract  was  enforced  whereby 
the  property  owners  agreed  that  if  the  city  would  leave  stand- 
ing a  row  of  trees  in  the  centre  of  a  street  which  the  city  was 
al)out  to  pave,  and  Avould  i)lace  curbstones  around  such  trees 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  tliem,  the  said  owners  would  pay 
Ihe  cost  of  the  eur])stones  so  placed  opposite  their  land  on 
their  side  of  the  street.*  So  under  such  a  contract  an  assess- 
ment may  be  enforced,  although  no  order  was  made  extending 
the  time  for  performance,  and  under  the  statute  in  force  such 
fact  would  invalidate  the  assessment.'"'  Such  a  contract,  like 
any  other,  requires  a  valuable  consideration  to  support  it.     Such 

'Moore  v.   Barry.   30   S.   C.    530.   4  Boston     v.     Brazor,     11      Mass.     447 

L.  R.  A.  294,  9  S."  E.  589   [1889].  [18141. 

'See  §  1011  et  ficq.  =  Edwards    v.    Cooper,    168    Ind.    54. 

'Bernstein  v.  Downs.   112  Cal.   197.  79    X.    E.    1047    [19071. 

44  Pac.  557  [18901;  Floyd  v.  Atlanta  Edwards   v.    Cooper,    1(58    Ind.    54. 

Banking   Company.    109*  C.a.    778,    35  79    X.    E.    1047    [19071. 

S.  E.  172  [18991;  Edwards  v.  Cooper,  ''City  of  Springtiidd  v.  Harris.   107 

168   Ind.   54.   79   X.   E.    1047    [1907];  :\Inss.  532   [18711. 

City    of    Sprin-rfiold    v.    Harris,     107  MVrnsteiii  v.  Downs.  112  Cal.   197, 

Mass.    532     [1871];     Inhabitants    of  44  Pac.  557   [1890]. 


§  17  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  34 

consideration  is  sometimes  found  in  the  doing  of  additional  work 
by  the  contractor  in  reliance  on  such  promise/'  Another  form 
of  valuable  consideration  is  the  construction  of  the  improve- 
ment in  question  after  the  promise  is  made  and  in  reliance 
thereon.'^  Another  form  of  valuable  consideration  is  an  exten- 
sion of  time  for  payment  of  the  assessment.^  If  the  improve- 
ment is  made  before  the  promise  to  pay  the  assessment  is  entered 
into,  the  question  is  then  presented  whether  the  benefits  con- 
ferred upon  the  property  by  such  improvement  form  a  consid- 
eration for  a  promise  to  pay  or  not.  It  seems  to  be  assumed 
in  some  jurisdictions  that  the  existence  of  such  benefits  consti- 
tuted a  consideration.''  This  view,  however,  is  out  of  harmony 
with  the  general  theories  of  cgnsideration.  The  making  of  the 
improvement  is  a  past  transaction,  imposing  no  liability  upon 
the  property  or  the  owner  thereof  except  in  case  of  compliance 
with  the  terms  of  the  statute.^"  Such  a  transaction,  leaving  no 
liability  of  any  kind  cannot,  properly  speaking,  form  a  consid- 
eration for  a  subsequent  promise.  If  there  is  a  genuine  dispute 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  assessment,  the  compromise  of  such 
dispute  and  forbearance  on  the  part  of  the  city  to  enforce  such 
assessment  might  furnish  a  consideration.  In  the  absence  of 
such  compromise  and  forbearance  the  effect  of  such  a  promise 
made  after  the  improvement:  is  constructed  can  be  explained 
only  on  the  theory  of  estoppel  or  waiver.  A  special  contract 
between  the  municipal  corporation  and  the  owners  of  property 
to  be  assessed  may  operate  to  prevent  the  owner  from  inter- 
posing defenses  which  he  w^ould  otherwise  be  entitled  to  make. 
Thus  an  agreement  that  the  cost  of  the  improvement  should  be 
assessed  against  certain  property  will  prevent  the  owners  of 
such  property  who  entered  into  such  agreement  from  raising  the 
question  that  the  citv,  Avhile  it  had  authority  to  construct  such 
improvement,  had  no  authority  to  lew  assessments  therefor.^^ 
An  agreement  bv  which  the  owners  of  the  land  assessed  agree 
that  in  consideration  of  permission  to  pay  the  assessment  in 
installments   the    owners   will   not   make    any    objection    to    the 

« Bernstein  v.  "Downs.  112  Cal.  197,  pany,    109    Ga.    778.    3.5    S.    E.    172 

44  Pac.  5ri7   [189^1.  [1899]. 

'Efhvards   v.   Cooper,   168   Ind.   54,  "See   §§    18,  777,  Chapter  VI. 

79  N.  E.  1047  [1907T.  "  Hendriekson   v.    Toledo,    23    Oliio 

*See  §  1033.  C  C.  256  [19011, 

•  Floyd    V.    Atlanta    Bankinjr    Com- 


35  ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE  IN  LAW.  §  18 

legality  or  regularity  of  the  assessments  prevents  them  from 
making  defenses  otherwise  avaihible,  such  as  the  defense  that 
the  report  of  the  engineer  on  which  the  assessment  was  based 
did  not  contain  a  full  description  of  each  lot  or  parcel  of  ground 
bordering  on  the  improved  street,  together  with  the  name  of 
the  owner  thereof.^-  Promises  like  this  are  often  regarded  not 
as  valid  contracts,  enforceable  in  themselves,  but  as  operating 
to  estop  the  promisor  from  denying  the  validity  of  the  assess- 
ment, or  as  operating  as  a  waiver  of  defenses  which  might  other- 
wise have  been  interposed. 

§  18.    Assessment  not  based  on  quasi  contract. 

While  the  general  theory  of  assessments  for  benefits  presents 
some  points  of  resemblance  to  quasi  contract  ^  assessment  is  not 
a  form  of  quasi-contract  other  than  as  taxes  generally  are.  The 
attempt  to  identify  assessment  with  quasi-contract  is  made  most 
often  where  by  reason  of  failure  to  comply  with  the  statutory 
requirements,  or  by  reason  of  the  statute's  failure  to  comply 
with  constitutional  requirements,  the  assessment  itself  is  invalid, 
and  the  attempt  is  then  made  to  compel  the  owner  to  pay  for 
the  benefits  conferred  upon  him  by  an  action  in  quantum  meruit, 
irrespective  of  the  validity  of  the  assessment.  It  is  a  funda- 
mental rule  of  assessments  that  constitutional  and  statutory  re- 
quirements must  be  complied  with,  in  a  substantial  manner  at 
least.-  It  is  evident  that  if  assessment  can  be  identified  with 
quasi-contract  in  the  manner  here  suggested,  all  the  restrictions 
upon  the  power  of  a  public  corporation  to  levy  assessments  are 
swept  away,''  except  the  limitation  that  assessments  must  not 
exceed  the  amount  of  the  benefits.  There  would  be  small  use 
in  framing  rules,  the  violation  of  which  would  produce  no  legal 
consequences,  and  llie  law  of  assessments  would,  in  a  manner, 
cease  here.  Accordingly,  where  this  attempt  to  identify  assess- 
ment with  quasi-contract  has  been  made,  it  has  failed  in  the 
absence  of  some  specific  statute  authorizing  recovery,  and  if  the 
irregularities  and  defects  are  so  marked  as  to  avoid  the  assess- 


'- Dunkirk   Land    Company  v.    Zoh-  ^  Allon    v.    City    of   Davonport.    132 

ner.  35  Iiul.  App.  694,  74  X.  E.  1099  Fed.  209.  G5  C.  C.  A.  (541  [1904].  ( ro 
[1905].  versinj^   City  of   Davenport   v.   Allen. 

'See   §   11.  120    Fed.    172    [19031^ 

''See  §  777,  Chapter  VI. 


§18 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


36 


ment,  no  recovery  can  be  had  on  the  theory  of  quasi-contract.* 
Of  an  action  upon  the  common  courts,  ignoring  the  assessment, 
it  is  said  that  "it  does  not  conform  to  any  known  rule  of  law."  ' 
At  a  sale  under  an  apportionment  warrant  issued  against  one 
who  was  not  the  true  owner  of  the  property,  the  owner  of  the 
warrant  bid  the  property  in.  This  was  held  to  extinguish  the 
assessment.  Accordingly,  if  the  assessment  itself  could  not  be 
enforced  it  was  said  that  the  owner  was  "under  no  common 
law  or  moral  obligation  to  pay  the  debt  in  question.'"'  So  the 
city  cannot,  after  paying  for  the  cost  of  the  improvement,  main- 
tain an  action  against  the  property  owner  for  money  laid  out 
and  expended."  If  any  cause  of  action  exists  it  must  be  one 
on  the  assessment.  The  original  proceeding  leading  up  to  the 
attempted  assessment  is  a  statutory  proceeding  in  invitum,^  and 
recovery,  if  permitted  at  all,  must  be  on  the  assessment  and 
not  for  reasonable  compensation."  In  some  of  these  cases  it 
does  not  appear  that  a  benefit  was,  in  fact,  received  by  the 
property  owner. ^'^  Thus  a  levee  was  constructed  at  a  time  when 
such  improvement  could  not  be  paid  for  by  assessment."     The 


*  O'Brien  v.  Wheelock,  184  U.  S. 
450,  22  S.  354  [1902],  (affirming 
O'Brien  v.  Wheelock,  95  Fed.  883,  37 
C.  C.   A.   309    [1899],  wliich   affirmed 

78  Fed.   673    [1897]);    Woollacott  v. 

Meekin,   —    Cal.    ,    91    Pac.    612 

[1907];  McManus  v.  Hornaday,  124 
la.  267,  100  N.  W.  33  [1904];  Craw, 
ford  V.  Mason,  123  la.  301,  98  N. 
\Y.    795    [1904];    City    of   Owensboro 

V.  Hope,  —  Ky.  \  110  S.  W.  272 

[1908];    City  of  Manistee  v.  Harley, 

79  Mich.  238,  44  N.  W.  603  [1890]; 
Heman  v.  Larkin,  108  Mo.  App.  392, 
83  S.  W.  1019  [1904]  ;  Neill  v.  Trans- 
Atlantic  Mortgage  Trust  Company, 
89  Mo.  App.  644  [1901];  McQuiddy 
V.  Brannock,  70  Mo.  App.  535  [1897]  ; 
Galgreath  v.  Newton,  30  Mo.  App. 
380  [1887];  Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  New  York,  7  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
234  [1858];  Burns  v.  Patterson,  2 
Handy  (Ohio)  270  [1855];  Reilly  v. 
City  of  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St.  467 
[1869].  "It  will  not  do  to  say,  be- 
cause the  property  owner  has  been 
benefited    by    the    improvement,    that 


he  should  pay  for  it  whether  the  law 
has  been  complied  with  or  not.  This 
would  be  to  invoke  the  spirit  of  ex- 
pediency to  which  a  court  of  justice 
should  never  resort."  Municipal  Se- 
curities    Corporation     v.     Gates.     — 

Mo.    App. ,    105    S.    W.    85,    8(> 

[1908]. 

^  City    of    IVIanistee    v.    Harley,    79 
Mich.  238,  240,  44  N.  W.  603   [1890]. 
*Kirwin    v.    Nevin,     111    Ky.    682, 
64  S.  W.  647,  687    [1901]. 

''Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Bal- 
timore V.  Hughes'  Adm'r,  1  Gill  & 
J.  480,   19  Am.  Dec.  243    [1829]. 

"  Galbreath  v.  Newton,  30  Mo.  App. 
380    [1887].      See    §§    15,   778. 

"Heman  v.  Larkin,  108  Mo.  App. 
392,    83    S.    W.    1019    [1904]. 

i"  O'Brien  v.  Wheelock,  184  U.  S. 
450,  22  S.  354  [1902],  (affirmi'i- 
O'Brien  v.  Wheelock,  95  Fed.  ShTJ. 
37  C.  C.  A.  309  [1899],  which  af- 
firmed   78    Fed.    673    [1897]). 

"Updike  v.  Wright,  81  111.  49 
[1876]. 


87  ASSESSMENT   AND   PLACE   IN   LAW.  §  18 

levee  was  not  kept  up  and  proved  to  be  of  no  actual  benefit 
to  the  land  owners,  it  amounting  to  a  partial  failure  of  an  in- 
divisible consideration.  No  recovery  was  allowed  against  the 
land  owners.^-  In  some  of  the  cases,  however,  th(^  existence  of 
a  benefit  was  elear.^''  Thus  if  an  assessment  is  invalid,  the  fact 
that  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  connected  with  the  property 
assessed  and  thus  used,^^  or  the  gjradino-  of  a  street,^''  or  the 
construction  of  a  sidewalk^''  conferred  a  benefit  upon  the  prop- 
erty of  the  land-owner  does  not  make  him  liable  therefor  in 
quasi-contract.  The  theory  that  assessment  may  be  regarded  as 
a  form  of  quasi-contract  has  possibly  been  invoked  through  a 
misapprehension  of  other  principles  applicable  to  the  law  of  as- 
sessments, but  not  involving  the  doctrine  of  quasi-contract.  Thus 
in  many  cases,  certain  forms  of  acquiescence  in  an  improvement 
which  result  in  special  l)enefit  are  held  to  estop  the  property 
owner  from  attacking  the  validity  of  assessment  therefor,  and 
from  setting  up  defects  which,  but  for  such  circumstances  so 
operating  as  an  estoppel,  would  have  defeated  the  assessment." 
While  occasionally  confused  with  quasi-contract  the  doctrine  of 
estoppel  is  of  a  radically  different  nature,  since  its  operation 
renders  the  assessment  itself  enforceable,  and  does  not  leave  the 
right  of  recovery  one  for  benefits  without  support  for  the  as- 
sessment. Certain  principles  for  ascertaining  the  amount  of  the 
benefits  received  are  also  occasionally  confused  with  (|uasi-con- 
tract.  Under  some  statutes  the  rule  applicable  to  contracts  is 
also  applicable  to  assessments,  and  no  recovery  is  allowed  in 
case  of  material  aiul  substantial  failure  to  construct  the  im- 
provement as  stipulated.  Tn  other  jurisdictions  and  uiuler  other 
statutes  this  rule  is  relaxed  so  far  that  the  contract  price  less 
the  proper  amount  of  abatement  for  defects  in  construction  is 
the  basis  for  th(^  amount  of  the  assessnuMit.'**  These  statutory 
provisions   take   the   contract    pi'icc   as   tlie   basis   for   dt't(M-iuininL; 

•=0'Ilrion    v.    \Yh('(>l..ck.    184    U.    S.  Midi.    238.    44    X.    \V.    (103     1 18901: 

450,    22    S.    354     [1902].     (nninniii;  Xi-ill      v.      Trans-At  Iniitic      M()rt<ia,<,'o 

0'Bri(-ii    V.    Wlieolofk.    95    ¥>-<].    SS3.  Trust     ('()Tii])an.v.    89    Mo.     Ap]).    044 

37    V.    C.    A.    309    [18991.    wliicli    af-  |  19011. 

finiiod   78   Fofl    673    [18971.  '■' ^MeQuiddy    v.    l^iaiiiiofk.    70    Mo. 

'■'City    of    ATanistpo    v.    Tlnrlcv.    79  Api).   535    [18971. 

Aficli.    238,    44    N.    W.    003     [1890];  "•TToniaii    v.    Larkin.    108   Mo.    App. 

llonian  v.  Larkin.   108  ^\n.   App.  392,  392.  83  S.  W.    1(I19    [19041. 

83    8.    W.    1019    [1904].  ''See    §    1011    rt   srq. 

^Hitv    of    :\ranistoe    v.    Ilarlev.    79  "'See   §§   529.  530. 


§  18  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  38 

the  amount  of  the  assessment  and  therefore  do  not,  properly 
speaking,  involve  the  theory  of  quasi-contract.  More  closely  re- 
lated to  quasi-contract  is  the  statutory  rule  which  is  in  force 
in  a  few  jurisdictions  allowing  recovery  in  case  of  certain  de- 
fects for  the  reasonable  value  of  the  work  done,  not  to  exceed 
the  contract  price."  This,  however,  is  a  statutory  method  for 
estimating  the  amount  of  the  assessment  and  resembles  quasi- 
contract  only  in  that  quasi-contractual  principles  have  been  to 
a  limited  extent  enacted  into  statutory  form.  Under  a  statute 
which  provided :  "In  any  such  proceeding  where  the  court  try- 
ing the  same  shall  be  satisfied  that  the  work  has  been  done  or 
material  furnished  which,  according  to  the  true  intent  of  the 
act,  would  be  properly  chargeable  upon  the  lot  or  land  through 
or  by  which  the  street,  alley  or  highway  improved,  repaired 
or  lighted,  may  pass,  a  recovery  shall  be  permitted  or  a  charge 
enforced,  to  the  extent  of  the  proper  proportion  of  the  value 
of  the  work  or  materials  which  would  be  chargeable  on  such 
lot  or  land,  notwithstanding  any  informality,  irregularity  or  de- 
fect in  any  such  municipal  corporation  or  its  officers.  *  *  *  "  ^o 
Under  this  statute  it  was  held  by  the  United  States  Circuit 
Court  that  recovery  in  quantum  meruit  could  be  had  even  if 
the  assessment  and  contract  were  both  invalid  and  the  city  had 
no  right  to  pay  the  contractor.-^  The  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals, 
however,  held  by  a  majority  vote  that  such  assessment  could 
not  be  enforced  in  quantum  meruit^--  where  the  contract  was 
one  which  the  State  Supreme  Court  had  held  to  be  void  and 
without  the  power  of  the  city  to  make.-''  The  Supreme  Court 
of  Iowa  has  taken  the  same  view  of  such  statute,  holding  that 
no  recovery  in  quantum  meruit  could  be  allowed  where  the  as- 
sessment was  void,-*  although  such  statute  prevents  the  owners 
of  property  from  invoking  defects  which  are  not  jurisdictional 


1"  Quest   V.    Johnson.    58    Mo.    App.  la.   90,   77   N.  W.   532    [1898]. 

54    [1894].      See    also    Bingaman    v.  -*  Snouffer   v.   Grove,   —    la.   , 

City   of   Pittsburg,    147    Pa.   St.   353,  116   N.   W.    1056    [1908],    (involving 

23   Ail.   395    [1892].  the    assessment    the    levy    of    which 

^^  §  479,  Code  of  Iowa   [1873].  was   enjoined   in   Wingert   v.   Tipton. 

=iCity   of  Davenport  v.   Allen,   120  134     la.     97,     108     N.     W.     1035); 

Fed.   172    [1903].  Carter    v.    Cemansky,     126    la.    506. 

'^  Allen  V.   City   of  Davenport.    132  102  N.  W.  438    [1905];   Crawford  v. 

Fed.  209,  65  C.  C.  A.  641    [1904].  Mason.    123    la.    301,    98   N.   W.    795 

^  Allen  v.   City  of  Davenport,   107  [1904]. 


39  ASSESSMENT   AND  PLACE   IN   LAW.  §§  19,20 

to  defeat  the  assessment,  though  the  amount  of  recovery  in  some 
cases  be  reduced  by  such  defects.-^' 

§  19.     Assessment  for  legal  duty  not  based  on  contract. 

From  the  nature  of  the  assessment  for  the  performance  of  a 
legal  duty,  and  from  the  theory  underlying  such  assessment,^ 
it  follows  that  the  assessment  for  the  performance  of  a  legal 
duty  is  a  forced  charge  upon  the  owner  of  the  property  from 
whom  such  legal  duty  may  lawfully  be  exacted.  While  such 
assessment  is  not  based  upon  any  theorj'  of  the  assent  of  the 
property  owner  to  such  charge,  nor  upon  any  theory  of  a  con- 
tract between  the  property  owner  and  the  public.  An  assess- 
ment of  this  type  is  essentially  a  forced  contribution  made  in 
invitum  by  the  authority  of  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state, 
and  is  not  in  any  way  dependent  on  the  assent  of  the  property 
owner.- 

§  20.     Assessment  for  goods  furnished  based  on  contract. 

From  the  nature  of  the  assessment  for  goods  furnished  or 
services  rendered,  and  from  the  theory  underlying  such  so-called 
assessment,^  it  follows  that  the  assessment  of  this  type  depends 
upon  the  assent  of  the  owner  of  the  property  upon  which,  or 
with  reference  to  which,  use  is  made  of  the  property  for  the 
use  of  which  the  assessment  is  levied.  While  such  property 
owner  is  not  consulted  in  most  cases  with  reference  to  the  origi- 
nal statute  or  ordinance  which  provides  for  such  charge,  he  has 
the  option  of  making  use  of  such  property  and  thus  rendering 

=^Ottiimwa  Brick  &  Construction  Kraus,  16  0.  S.' 54  [1864];  Charles- 
Company  V.  Ainley,  109  la.  386,  80  ton  v.  Werner,  38  S.  C.  488,  37  Am. 
N.  W.  510  [189!)];  Dittoe  v.  City  of  St.  Rop.  776,  17  S.  E.  33  [1892]: 
Davenport,  74  la.  66,  36  N.  W.  895  Mayor  and  Aldermen  v.  Maberry,  6 
[1887];  City  of  Chariton  v.  Holli-  Humph.  (Tenn.)  368,  44  Am.  Dec' 315 
day,  60  la.  391,  14  N.  W.  775  [1882].  [1845];  Washington  v.  Mayor  and 
^  See  §  13.  Aldermen  of  Nashville,  1  Swan 
2  Mayor  and  Board  of  Trustees  of  (Tenn.)  177  [1851];  Adams  v.  Fish- 
the  Town  of  Xow  Iberia  v.  Fonte-  er,  03  Tex.  051  [1885]  ;  Rude  v.  Town 
lieu,  108  La.  460.  .32  So.  369  [1901];  of  St.  Marie,  121  Wis.  034.  99  N.  W. 
Nugent  V.  City  of  .Tackson.  72  Miss.  460  [1904];  State  ex  rel.  Baltzell  v. 
1040.  18  So.  493  [1895];  TTorbaoh  Stewart,  74  Wis.  620.  6  L.  R.  A.  394, 
V.  City  of  Omaha.  54  Neb.  83,  74  N.  43  N.  W.  947  [1889];  Donnelly  v. 
W.  434  [1898]:  Brown  v.  Keener.  74  Decker,  58  Wis.  461.  46  Am.  Rep. 
N.  C.  714  [18761:  Sessions  v.  Crun-  637.  17  N.  W.  389  [1883]. 
kilton,  20  0.  S.  349   [1870];   Bliss  v.  ^  See   §    14. 


§20 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


40 


himself  liable  to  such  charge,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  of  refrain- 
ing from  the  use  of  such  property,  and  thereby  incnrring  no 
liability  for  such  charge.  While  a  charge  of  this  type  is  not 
properly  termed  an  assessment,  it  is  a  charge  which  rests  upon 
the  assent  of  the  property  owner.-  That  the  so-called  assess- 
ment of  this  type  does  in  fact  rest  upon  the  assent  of  the  prop- 
erty owner  is  manifest  in  cases  in  which  the  attempt  is  made 
to  levy  an  assessment  of  this  sort  without  the  consent  of  the 
property  owner.  Such  assessments  cannot  be  sustained  as  as- 
sessments of  this  type ;  and  if  not  apportioned  substantially  in 
accordance  with  benefit  and  thus  sustained  as  assessments  based 
upon  the  theory  of  benefits,  they  fail  altogether.^  The  fact  that 
such  charge  is  based  upon  the  assent  of  the  property  owner  is 
said  to  be  conclusive  of  the  fact  that  it  is  not  a  true  assessment.* 


^  Provident  Institution  for  Savings 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey 
City,  113  U.  S.  506,  28  L.  1102,  5  S. 
612  [1885],  affirming  Provident  In- 
stitution for  Savings  v.  Allen,  37  N. 
J.  Eq  (10  Stew.)  627  [1883],  which 
affirmed  without  opinion  37  N.  J. 
Eq.  (10  Stew.)  36  [1883]);  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Northwestern  Mutual  Life 
Insurance  Co.,  218  111.  40,  1  L.  R. 
A.  (N.  S.)  770,  75  N.  E.  803  [1905]; 
Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591, 
49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  28  L.  R.  A. 
679,  37  N.  E.  402,  39  N.  E.  869 
[1894];  Carson  v.  Sewerage  Com- 
missioners of  Brockton,  175  Mass. 
242,  48  L.  R.  A.  277,  56  N.  E.  1 
[1900];  City  of  East  Grand  Forks 
v.  Luck,  97  Minn.  373,  107  N.  W. 
393  [1906];  City  of  Fergus  Falls  v. 
Boen,    78   Minn.' 186,    80   N.   W.   961 


[1899];  Burke  v.  City  of  Water  Val- 
ley, 87  Miss.  732,  112  Am.  St.  Rep. 
468,  40   So.  820    [1905]. 

^  Hoboken  Manufactures  Co.  v. 
Mayor,   etc.,   of   City  of   Hoboken,   — 

N.  J.  L.  ,  68  Atl.   1098    [1908]; 

State,  Culver,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  45  N.  J.  L. 
(16  Vr.)  256  [1883];  State,  Vree- 
land.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  Jersey  City,  43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.) 
135  [1881],  (affirmed  Mayor,  etc.. 
of  Jersey  City  v.  State,  Vreeland, 
Pros.,  43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  638 
[[1881]);  Provident  Institution  for 
Savings  v.  Allen,  37  X.  J.  Eq.  (10 
Stpw.f    36    [1883]. 

*  Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591, 
49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  28  L.  R.  A. 
(579.  37  K  E.  402,  39  N.  E.  869 
[1894]. 


CHAPTER  II. 
HISTORY  OF  LOCAL  ASSESSMENTS. 

§  21.     Early  analogies  to  local  assessments — Feudal  exactions. 

In  mediaeval  times  the  construction  of  public  impri)vements 
which  could  confer  special  benefits  on  private  property  was  a 
rare  occurrence.  Castles,  palaces  and  cathedrals  absorbed  a 
much  larger  amount  of  the  wealth  of  the  people  than  paved 
streets,  sidewalks  and  sewers.  When  public  improvements  of 
this  sort  were  constructed,  they  were  paid  for  in  part  by  gen- 
eral taxation  or  its  equivalent.  The  charge  of  such  improve- 
ments in  part  rested  upon  the  owners  of  certain  land,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  general  theory  of  the  feudal  system.  Such 
a  charge,  however,  was  not  a  local  assessment  as  we  know  it. 
nor  did  it  possess  the  essential  elements  thereof.  It  was  not 
l)ased  upon  the  theory  of  benefits,  it  was  not  apportioned 
according  to  benefits,  and  it  was  not  imposed  necessarily 
upon  land  benefited  in  the  least  by  the  improvement.  A 
land-owner  might  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  constructing  or 
maintaining  a  given  public  improvement ;  but  if  he  w^as  so 
charged,  it  was  by  virtue  of  an  arrangement  between  himself 
and  the  lord  of  whom  he  held  his  land,  and  was  in  efifect  a  part 
of  the  return  made  by  him  for  such  land.  It  stood  on  the  same 
footing  with  the  duty  resting  upon  some  tenants  to  furnish  fully 
equipped  men-at-arms  in  time  of  war,  and  with  the  duty  resting 
upon  other  tenants  to  pay  money,  or  grain,  or  other  produce, 
for  their  land.  These  feudal  charges  and  exactions  undoubt- 
edly familiarized  people  with  the  idea  tliat  a  part  or  all  of  the 
cost  of  put)li('  iin])rovements  iniuiit  he  imposed  upon  certain 
private  individuals.  They  cannot  be  regarded,  however,  as  any- 
thing more  than  analogies  to  the  local  assessment  as  it  ulti- 
mately appeared.  The  feudal  charge  dici  not  develop  into  the 
local  assessment,  but  rather,  tended  to  be  crowded  out  and  ex- 
tinguished by  the  local  assessment  as  it  developed  under  sub- 
n 


§22 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


42 


sequent  legislation.^  The  later  cases,  however,  showed  a  tend- 
ency to  regard  the  feudal  charge  is  persisting  and  as  existing 
side  by  side  with  the  statutory  assessment.^ 

§  22.     Work  on  roads. 

Another  analogy  to  the  local  assessment  has  been  sought  in 
the  duty  imposed  by  law  upon  the  residents  of  certain  districts 
to  work  upon  the  roads  for  a  certain  time  each  year,  or  to  pay 
a  fixed  sum  of  money  in  lieu  thereof.^  A  charge  of  this  sort  is 
undoubtedly  a  tax.  However,  it  lacks  the  essential  elements  of 
a  local  assessment.  It  is  not  imposed  upon  land-owners  as  such, 
is  not  apportioned  according  to  benefits,  and  is  not  restricted 
to  the  lands  benefited  by  the  improvement.  It  is  merely  a  spe- 
cial form  of  general  taxation  charged  upon  individuals,  without 
reference  to  the  property  owned  by  them,  resembling  the  local 
assessment  chiefly  in  being  a  tax  for  the  purpose  of  a  public 
improvement  which  confers  a  special  benefit,  and  differing  from 
the  ordinary  form  of  general  taxation  solely  in  the  fact  that  it 
is  not  apportioned  in  accordance  to  the  value  of  the  property 
owned  by  the  taxpayer. 


^Rooke's    Case,    5    Rep.    996     (Hil. 
40   Eliz.). 

^Keighley's     Case,     10     Rep.     139a 
(Mich.  7  Jac.   1).     See   §  25. 

^  Kootenai  County  v.  Hope  Lumber 
Co.,  13  Ida.  262,  89  Pae.  1054  [1907] ; 
People  ex  rel.  v.  Chicago  &  Alton 
Railway  Co.,  228  111.  102;  81  N.  E. 
813  [1907];  Toledo,  St.  Louis  & 
Western  Railroad  Co.  v.  People,  ex 
rel.,  226  111.  557,  80  N.  E.  1059 
[1907];  St.  Louis,  Alton  &  Terre 
Haute  R.  Co.  v.  People,  224  111.  155, 
79  N.  E.  664  [1906]  ;  Burnes  v.  May- 
or and  City  Council  of  Atchison,  2 
Kan.  454  (original  edition)  [1864]; 
City  of  Lexington  v.  McQuillan's 
Heirs,  9  Dana  (Ky.)  513,  35  Am. 
Dec.  159  [1839];  Seaboard  National 
Bank  of  New  York  v.  Woesten,  176 
Mo.  49,  75  S.  W.  464  [1903].  "At 
first  every  man  was  subject  to  the 
duty  of  working  so  many  days  every 


year  upon  the  public  roads,  and  pen- 
alties were  prescribed  for  those  who 
failed  to  respond  to  an  order  to  do 
such  work.  Then,  as  the  natural  and 
inevitable  development  of  the  system 
of  improving  roads  the  public  was 
given  authority  to  have  the  work 
done  and  to  charge  the  cost  thereof 
to  the  owners  of  the  abutting  prop- 
erty that  was  specially  benefited  by 
tlie  improvement.  And  to  insure  the 
prompt  payment  of  that  cost  a  pen- 
alty for  delay  in  payment  was  im- 
posed. In  both  cases  the  penalty 
is  imposed  for  failure  to  discharge 
a  public  duty.  In  the  former  in- 
stance it  was  a  penalty  for  not  work- 
ing in  person ;  and  in  the  latter  in- 
stance it  is  a  penalty  for  not  paying 
for  the  work  done  by  another."  Sea- 
board National  Bank  of  New  York 
V.  Woesten,  176  Mo.  49,  61,  75  S.  W. 
464    [1903]. 


43  HISTORY   OP   LOCAL   ASSESSMENTS.  §§23,24 

§  23.     Origin  of  assessments  in  drainage. 

The  necessity  of  draining  marshes-  seems  to  have  forced  the 
adoption  of  a  system  of  rules  and  regulations  intended  to  equal- 
ize the  burden  of  such  drainage.  The  improvement  and  reclam- 
ation of  Rumney  Marsh  seems  to  have  been  the  occasion  for  the 
original  adoption  of  provisions  upon  this  subject.  Coke  tells 
us  that  "Rumney  Marsh,  in  the  County  of  Kent,  containing 
24,000  acres,  is,  at  this  day  and  long  time  hath  been  governed 
by  certain  ancient  and  equal  laws  of  sewers  made  t)y  a  venerable 
justice,  Henry  de  Bathe,  in  the  reign  of  H.  III.,  from  which 
laws,  not  only  other  parts  in  Kent,  but  all  England  receive 
light  and  direction — for  example:  The  said  general  act  of  23 
H.  8  Ca.  5,  in  the  clause  which  giveth  power  to  the  com- 
missioners to  make  statutes,  ordinances  and  provisions,  etc.,  nec- 
essary and  behooveful  after  the  laws  and  customs  of  Rumney 
Marsh,  in  the  County  of  Kent,  or  otherwise  by  any  ways  or 
means,  etc."^  "Both  the  town  and  marsh  of  Rumney  took  their 
name  of  one  Robert  Rumney.  This  Robert  (as  appeareth  by 
the  book  of  Domesday)  held  this  town  of  Odo,  Bishop  of  Bai- 
eux,  wherein  he  had  13  burgesses  who,  for  their  service  at  the 
sea,  were  discharged  of  all  actions  and  customs  of  charge,  ex- 
cept felony,  breach  of  the  peace  and  forestalling."- 

§  24.     Statute  23,  Hen.  VIII.,  C.  5. 

In  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII.,  in  1531,  a  statute  was  passed 
providing  for  the  construction  of  sewers,  drains  and  other  im- 
provements, designed  to  reclaim  tracts  of  land.  A  part  of  this 
statute  is  as  follows:  "The  bill  of  sewers  with  a  new  proviso, 
etc.  Our  sovereign  lord  the  King,  like  a  virtuous  and  most 
gracious  prince,  nothing  earthly  so  highly  weighing  as  the  ad- 
vancing of  the  common  profit,  Avealth  and  commodity  of  this, 
his  realm,  considering  the  daily  great  damages  and  losses  which 
have  happened  in  many  and  divers  parts  of  this,  his  said  realm,  as 
well  by  the  reason  of  the  outragious  flowing  surges  and  course 
of  the  sea  in  and  upon  marsh-grounds  and  other  low  places  here- 
tofore through  politick  wisdom  won  and  made  profitable  for  the 
great  common  wealth  of  this  realm  as  also  by  occasion  of  land, 
waters  and  other  outragious  springs  in  and  upon  meadows,  pa.s- 

■4  Inst.    (Coke)    276,  277.  '4   Inst.    (Coke)    277. 


§  24  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  i4 

tures  and  other  low  grounds  adjoining  to  rivers,  floods  and  other 
water  courses;  and  over  that,  b.y  and  through  mills,  mill-dams, 
wears,  fishgarths,  kedels,  gores,  gates,  flood-gates,  locks  and 
other  impediments  in  and  upon  the  same  rivers  and  other  water- 
courses, to  the  inestimable  damages  of  the  commonwealths  of 
this  realm,  which  daily  is  likely  more  and  more  to  increase  un- 
less speedy  redress  and  remedy  be  in  this  behalf  shortly  pro- 
vided ;  wherein  albeit  that  divers  and  many  provisions  have  been 
before  this  time  made  and  ordained,  yet  none  of  them  are  suffi- 
cient remedy  for  the  reformation  of  the  premises,  hath  there- 
fore by  deliberate  advice  and  assent  of  his  lords,  spiritual  and 
temporal,  and  also  his  loving  commons  in  this  present  parlia- 
ment assembled,  ordained,  established  and  enacted.  That  com- 
missions of  sewers  and  other  premises  shall  be  directed  in  all 
parts  within  this  realm  from  time  to  time,  where  and  when  need 
shall  require,  according  to  the  manner,  form,  tenor  and  effect 
hereafter  ensuing,  to  such  substantial  and  indifferent  persons 
as  shall  be  named  by  the  lord  chancellor  and  lord  treasurer  of 
England  and  the  two  chief  justices  for  the  time  being,  or  by 
three  of  them,  whereof  the  lord  chancellor  be  one."^  The  form 
of  commission  to  be  issued  under  such  statute  was  as  follows : 
"We,  therefore,  for  that  by  reason  of  our  dignity  and  preroga- 
tive royal,  we  be  bounden  to  provide  for  the  safety  and  preser- 
vation of  our  realm  of  England,  willing  that  speedy  remedy  be 
had  in  the  premises  have  assigned  you  and  six  of  you  of  the 
which  we  will  that  A.,  B.  and  C.  shall  be  three  to  be  our  jus- 
tices, to  survey  the  said  walls,  streams,  ditches,  banks,  gutters, 
sewers,  gates,  calcies,  bridges,  trenches,  mills,  mill-dams,  flood- 
gates, ponds,  locks,  hebbing-wears,  and  other  impediments,  lets 
and  annoyances  aforesaid,  and  the  same  cause  to  be  made, 
corrected,  repaired,  amended,  put  down,  or  reformed  as  the  case 
shall  require,  after  your  wisdoms  and  discretions ;  and  therein 
as  well  to  ordain  and  do  after  the  form,  tenor  and  effect  of  all 
and  singular  the  statutes  and  ordinances  made  before  the  first 
day  of  March,  in  the  three  and  twentieth  year  of  our  reign, 
touching  the  premises  or  any  of  them  as  also  to  enquire  by  the 
oaths  of  the  honest  and  lawful  men  of  said  shire  or  shires,  place 
or  places,  where  such  defaults  or  annoyances  be,  as  well  within 

^23  Hen.  VIII.,  C.  5,  par.  1   [1531]. 


45  HISTORY   OF   LOCAL  ASSESSMENTS.  §  24 

the  liberties  as  without  (by  whom  the  truth  may  tlie  rather  be 
known),  through  whose  default  the  said  hurts  and  damages  have 
happened  and  who  hath  or  holdeth  any  lands  or  tenements,  or 
common  of  pasture  or  profit  of  fishing  or  hath  or  may  have 
any  hurt,  loss  or  disadvantage  by  any  manner  of  means  in  the 
said  places  as  well  near  to  the  said  dangers,  lets  and  impedi- 
ments as  inhabiting  or  dwelling  thereabouts  by  the  said  walls, 
ditches,  banks,  gutters,  gates,  sewers,  trenches  and  the  other 
said  impediments  and  annoyances;  and  all  those  persons  and 
every  one  of  them  to  tax,  assess,  charge,  distrain  and  punish 
as  well  within  the  metes,  limits  and  bounds  of  old  time,  accus- 
tomed or  otherwise,  or  elsewhere  within  our  realm  of  England 
after  the  quantity  of  their  lands,  tenements  and  rents,  by  the 
number  of  acres  and  perches,  after  the  rate  of  every  person's 
portion,  tenure  or  profit  or  after  the  quantity  of  their  common 
of  pasture  or  profit  of  fishing  or  other  commodities  there,  by 
such  ways  and  means  and  in  such  manner  and  form  as  to  you 
or  six  of  you  whereof  the  said  A.,  B.  and  C.  to  be  three,  shall 
seem  most  convenient  to  be  ordained  and  done  for  redress  and 
reformation  to  be  had  in  the  premises.-  .  .  .  "  By  the  ex- 
press provisions  of  this  statute  the  laws  and  customs  of  Rum- 
ney  IMarsh  were  extended  at  the  discretion  of  the  commissioners, 
over  England.  The  commissioners  were  authorized  "to  make 
and  ordain  statutes,  ordinances  and  provisions  from  time  to 
time,  as  the  case  shall  require,  for  the  safeguard,  conservation, 
redress,  correction  and  reformation  of  the  premises  and  of  every 
of  them  and  the  parts  lying  to  the  same,  necessary  and  be- 
hooful  after  the  laws  aiul  customs  of  Rumney  IMarsh.  in  the 
County  of  Kent  or  otherwise  by  any  ways  or  means  after  youi' 
own  wisdoms  and  discretions."''  This  provision,  it  was  held  sub- 
sequently, did  not  compel  the  commissioners  to  follow  the  cus- 
toms of  Rumney  ]\Iarsh  if  they  did  not  deem  it  advisable  so  to 
do.*  Section  8  of  this  statute  provides  that  if  the  tax  or  as- 
sessment levied  as  therefore  provided  for.  was  not  paid,  the 
lands  of  the  delinquent  taxpayer,  held  by  him  in  fee  simple, 
fee  tail,  for  life  or  for  years,  might  be  sold.  This  provision 
was  subsequently  extended  to  provide  for  a  sale  of  lands  held 


'23   Hen.   VIII.,  C.   5.   par.   III.  '  Keighley's    Casp,     10     Rep.     139a 

•23  Hen.  VIII.,  C.  5.   par.   III.  (Mich.,  7  Jac.   1). 


§  ^5  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  46 

in  copyhold  in  case  of  default.^  Section  9  of  the  statute,  23 
Hen.  VIII.,  C.  5,  provides  that  the  decrees  of  the  commissioners 
therein  provided  for  shall  bind  the  lands  of  the  king.  Section 
13  of  the  same  statute  provides  for  the  payment  of  the  expenses 
of  the  improvements  including  the  compensation  of  the  commis- 
sioners, their  clerk,  and  the  like,  out  of  the  taxes,  levies  and  the 
like,  therein  provided  for.  Coke  explains  this  statute  as  fol- 
lows :  * '  Quando  aqua  profuit,  that  is,  when  water  doth  issue, 
ATilgarly  sue :  hereupon  cometh  the  word  suera  for  a  sewer, 
passage,  channel  or  gutter  of  water.  At  the  complaint  of 
Henry  de  Lacye,  Earle  of  Lincolne,  a  commission  of  sewers  was 
granted  to  Roger  de  Brabason,  Mayor,  and  the  sheriffs  of  Lon- 
don. Their  authority  is  by  'commission  under  the  great  seal  in 
haec  verba,  at  this  day  grounded  and  warranted  by  the  act  of 
parliament  of  23  Hen.  VIII. "« 


§  25.    Effect  of  statutory  assessment  on  prescriptive  duties. 

The  effect  of  a  statutory  right  of  local  assessment  for  such 
improvements  upon  the  special  duties  resting  upon  certain  land- 
owners to  keep  such  improvements  in  repair — duties  originat- 
ing in  many  cases  under  the  feudal  system  as  returns  for  the 
land  granted  to  the  tenant,  ultimately  justified  in  many  cases 
on  the  doctrine  of  prescription — was  presented  for  judicial  con- 
sideration. It  was  held  at  first  that  the  tax  ought  to  be  levied 
upon  all  the  owners  of  land  benefited,  and  not  upon  the  owners 
immediately  adjoining  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  even  if  the 
owners  immediately  adjoining  always  used  to  repair  such  im- 
provement, or  were  bound  to  repair  such  improvement,  by  pre- 
scription.^ This  holding  was  subsequently  explained  and  modi- 
fied ;  and  the  rule  was  laid  down  that  if  A.  was  bound  by  pre- 
scription to  repair  a  wall  as  against  the  sea  (contra  Fluxum 
Maris),  and  A.  was  at  fault  in  not  repairing  such  wall  against 
ordinary  damage  and  deterioration,  the  commissioners  might  tax 
A.  only,  while  if  the  wall  was  wrecked  by  a  sudden  and  unusual 
flood  the  commissioners  might  tax  all  who  would  be  damaged  by 


"7   Ann.  c.   10.  *  Rooke's    Case,    5    Rep.    996     (Hil. 

•IV  Coke's  Institutes,  275.  40    Eliz.) 


47  HISTORY  OF   LOCAL  ASSESSMENTS.  §  26 

such  injury  to  the  wall,  without  waiting  to  compel  A.  to  make 
such  repairs. - 

§  26.     Questions  arising  under  early  statute. 

The  questions  which  arose  under  the  statute  foreshadowed 
many  of  the  questions  which  have  constantly  been  presented 
to  the  courts  of  this  country  under  our  statutes  providing  for 
local  assessments.  The  provision  of  the  statute  entrusting  the 
matter  of  repairs  and  assessments  to  the  commissioners  "ac- 
cording to  your  wisdom  and  discretion"  was  held  not  to  give 
them  an  unlimited  and  arbitrary  discretion,  but  to  require  them 
to  act  in  substantial  accordance  with  law  and  justice.^  An 
assessment  for  these  purposes  could  be  laid  only  on  those  who 
would  be  damaged  by  failure  to  make  the  improvement  and 
keep  it  in  repair,  or  who  would  be  benefited  by  the  reforma- 
tion thereof.-  Accordingly,  where  A.  owned  land  on  higher 
ground  than  that  drained  by  the  ditch  in  question,  which  ground 
drained  into  another  stream,  and  was  in  no  way  benefited  by 
the  construction  of  a  ditch,  it  was  held  that  no  assessment  could 
be  levied  upon  A.^  In  the  absence  of  specific  statutory  au- 
thority it  was  held  that  the  commissioners  of  sewers  could  not 
make  a  new  river.*  If  an  old  wall  could  be  repaired  so  as  to 
perform  the  necessary  service,  it  was  held  that  the  commission- 
ers ought  not  to  destroy  it  and  construct  a  new  wall.^  A  tax 
assessment  and  charge  authorized  by  the  statute  should  be  in 
proportion  to  the  quantity  of  land  owned  by  each  tenant,  ac- 
cording to  the  acreage,  or  should  be  according  to  the  rate  of 
portion,  tenure  or  profits  held  by  him.  Accordingl.v,  an  assess- 
ment upon  a  vill  in  gross,  was  held  to  be  unauthorized."     The 


^Keighley's     Case,     10     Rep.     139a  .Sewers   for   Essex,    1    Barn.   &   Cress. 

(Mich.,  7   Jac.   1).     See  to  the  same  477,  2  How.  &  Ryl.  700   [182.3]. 

effect  the   King  v.   Commissioners   of  'Case  of  Isle  of  Ely,  10  Rep.  141a 

Sewers   for   Essex,    1    Barn.   &   Cress.  (7  Mich.,  Jac.   1). 

477,  2  How.  &  Ryl.  700  [1823],  where  '  Anselm    v.    Barnard,    2    Keb.    675 

contribution  for  rebuihling  a  wall  cast  (Trin.  22  Car.   II). 

down    by    an    unusual    storm    is    not  *  Case  of  Isle  of  Ely.  10  Rep.   141a 

allowed  unless  the  party  who  repairs  (7    Mich.,   Jac,    I), 

the   sea-wall  has  not  been   in  default  "Case  of  I.sle  of  Ely.   10  Rep.   141a 

in  his  duty  to  make  repairs.  (7  Mich.  Jac.  I). 

»Keighley's     Case,     10    Rep.     139a  "Case  of  Isle  of  Ely,  10  Rep.   141a 

(Mich.,  7  Jac.  1).    To  the  same  effect  (7  Mich.,  Jac.  I). 
see    the    King    v.    Commissioners    of 


§  27  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  48 

king  owned  eight  hundred  acres  in  a  tract  drained  by  a  ditch. 
This  land  was  omitted  from  the  assessment.  The  assessment 
was  held,  for  that  reason,  to  be  invalid  on  the  ground  that  "a 
tax  is  unjust  because  by  the  not  taxing  of  them  a  greater  por- 
tion was  laid  upon  the  rest  of  the  land  than  of  right  ought  to 
be.  "^  Under  the  statute  it  was  held  that  notice  was  neces- 
sary, and  should  be  given  to  the  owners  of  the  property  to  be 
assessed.*  If  an  old  ditch  existed,  draining  certain  land  so 
that  it  was  not  benefited  by  the  construction  of  a  new  ditch, 
the  commissioners  ought  to  refund  the  assessment  levied  and 
make  new  assessments,  on  the  theory  of  benefits.''  The  com- 
missioners ought  to  describe  the  lands  assessed.  It  was  not 
necessary  for  them  to  name  the  owners  thereof,  since  the  im- 
position of  such  a  requirement  would  make,  in  effect,  an  end 
of  all  assessments.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  not  sufficient  to 
describe  the  area  taxed  as  all  the  land  from  such  a  place  to 
such  a  place. ^"^ 

§  27.     Assessment  extended  to  street  improvements. 

I\Iore  than  eighty  years  before  the  American  Revolution,  the 
idea  of  local  assessments  was  extended  in  England  to  streets, 
lanes  and  alleys.  A  statute  of  William  &  Mary  provided:  "VI., 
and  be  it  further  enacted  by  the  authority  aforesaid,  That  all 
open  streets,  lanes  and  alleys,  which  are  now  paved  within  any 
of  the  parishes  or  places  aforesaid,  shall  be  from  time  to  time 
repaired,  amended  and  paved  at  the  costs  and  charges  of  the 
householders,  inhabitants  in  any  such  streets  and  lanes  respec- 
tively; and  where  any  houses  shall  be  empty  and  unoccupied  in 
any  such  streets  and  lanes,  then  to  be  paved  and  repaired  at  the 
charge  of  the  owners  or  proprietors  thereof  in  the  manner  fol- 
lowing (that  is  to  say)  :  every  of  the  said  householders,  owners 
or  proprietors  of  houses,  to  repair,  pave,  and  keep  repaired, 
amended  and  paved,  the  streets,  lanes  or  alleys  before  his  house, 
stables  or  out-houses,  so  far  as  his  housing,  walls  or  buildings 
extend   unto   the    center-stone,    channel    or   middle    of   the    same 


'Whitley  V.  Fawsett,  Styles  12.   1.3  »  Bow  v.  Smith,  9  Mod.  94   (Easter. 

(23  Car.   I).  10   Geo.   I). 

nVhitley  v.  Fawsett,  Styles  12,  13  "Bow  v.  Smith,  9  Mod.  94  (Easter, 

(23   Car.  I).  10   Geo.    I). 


49  HISTORY  OF   LOCAL   ASSESSMENTS.  §  28 

street,  lane  or  alley;  upon  pain  to  forfeit  twenty  shillings  for 
every  perch,  or  rod,  and  after  that  rate  for  a  greater  or  less 
quantity-  for  every  default  of  twenty  shillings  a  week,  for  every 
week  after,  until  the  same  sliall  be  sufficiently  paved  and 
amended."^  Sections  9  and  10  of  this  statute  provided  for 
cleaning  streets  by  a  general  tax.  Section  13  of  this  statute 
provided  for  repairing  streets  by  a  general  tax.  Section  15  of 
this  statute  required  householders  to  set  out  lights  in  front  of 
houses  at  their  own  expense.  It  will  be  noticed  that  this  statute 
requires  each  householder  or  land-owner,  as  the  case  might  be, 
to  repair  the  street  in  front  of  his  house.  The  exaction  im- 
posed was  in  the  form  of  work  and  labor,  the  penalty  in  money 
being  for  the  purpose  of  coercing  performance. 

§  28.     Early  colonial  legislation — Pennsylvania. 

The  idea  of  local  assessment  was  therefore  one  with  which  the 
English  immigrants  to  this  country  at  the  date  of  its  original 
settlement,  were,  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  familiar.  We  find 
accordingly  that  early  colonial  statutes  provided  for  local 
improvements  to  be  paid,  for  by  local  assessments,  appear- 
ing within  a  few  years  after  the  statute  of  2  William 
&  Mary.^  Such  provisions  existed  in  Pennsylvania  from 
the  year  1700.  "By  a  province  law  of  1700  commissioners  or 
assessors  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor,  with  four  of 
his  council,  for  regulating  the  streets  and  water  courses,  the 
pitching,  paving  and  graveling  thereof;  the  clearing  of  docks, 
and  repairing  landing-places  and  bridges  in  the  towns  (the 
water-courses  under  ground  to  be  arched  and  laid  with  brick  or 
stone),  and  to  defray  the  charge  of  pitching,  paving,  graveling 
and  regulation  of  the  said  streets,  and  scouring  and  cleaning 
said  docks  each  inhabitant  concerned  was  to  pay  towards  the 
same,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  feet  of  his  lots  or  land- 
ings adjoining,  on  ench  or  either  side  of  tlu-  said  streets  or 
docks.  And  for  defraying  Ihe  charge  of  repairing  landing- 
places,  bridges,  making  common  sewers,  and  paving,  pitching, 
graveling  or  regulating  any  part  of  the  streets;  scouring  and 
cleansing  any  part  of  the  docks  l)elonging  to  tlie  public,  each 
inhabitant  in  the  said   respective  town  or  place  was  to  pay  his 

'2    William    &    Mary.    Second    Ses-  'See   §  28. 

sion,  Ch.  8,   Section  VII    [1690]. 


§  28  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  50 

proportional  rate  according  to  his  estate  in  each  town.  The  com- 
missioners were  empowered  to  agree  with  and  employ  workmen 
for  performing  the  same  from  time  to  time,  and  having  made 
the  assessments  were  to  appoint  collectors  and  receivers  thereof, 
and  in  case  of  non-payment  each  collector,  by  a  warrant  from 
the  proper  justice,  was  to  levy  the  same  by  distress  and  sale  of 
the  delinquent's  goods.  A  similar  law  had  been  passed  in 
1698. "1  "The  districts  [i.  e.,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Phila- 
delphia] being  sparsely  settled,  with  large  vacant  spaces,  and 
inhabited  by  persons  unable  to  bear  heavy  taxation,  resorted 
to  the  old  method  of  1700,  which  applied  to  the  whole  province, 
of  localizing  the  taxes  and  imposing  the  cost  of  the  improve- 
ments upon  those  who  were  immediately  benefited  by  them. 
The  district  of  the  Northern  Liberties  comprised  all  of  that  part 
of  the  township  of  that  name  lying  between  the  west  side  of 
Sixth  street  and  the  River  Delaware,  and  between  Vine  street 
and  Cohocksink  Creek ;  and  by  the  act  of  1803  its  commissioners 
were  given  full  power  to  pave  the  footways  and  gutters  within 
said  district,  to  plant  curbstones,  and  assess  the  freeholders  in 
front  of  whose  ground  such  footways  shall  be  paved,  in  order 
to  defray  the  expense  of  paving  and  keeping  them  in  repair, 
in  proportion  to  their  respective  extents  of  front;  and  upon  the 
application  of  two-thirds  of  the  freeholders  on  any  street,  lane 
or  alley,  to  establish  lamps  and  a  nightly  watch  in  such  street, 
lane  or  alley,  the  expense  to  be  defrayed  by  an  assessment  agree- 
ably to  the  county  rates  and  levies  within  the  district  so  lighted 
and  watched,  and  upon  like  application  to  pitch  and  pave  any 
street,  lane  or  alley,  provided  said  street,  lane  or  alley,  so  re- 
quired to  be  paved,  be  not  less  in  length  than  one  nor  exceed- 
ing two  squares  at  any  one  time,  and  the  owners  of  land  in 
front  of  which  such  street  is  pitched  and  paved,  shall  be  taxed 
in  proportion  to  the  respective  fronts  of  their  property  within 
the  streets  so  pitched  and  paved.  "^  Similar  acts  were  passed 
in  1813,  1826,  1837  and  in  181-4.^  An  interesting  and  detailed 
account  of  assessment  legislation  in  Pennsylvania  is  to  be  found 

^Dissenting    opinion    of    Read,    J.,  Pa.   St.    (15   P.    F.   Smith)    146,    160, 

in  Hammett  v.  Philadelphia,  65   Pa.  3   Am.   Rep.   615    [1869,    1870]. 

St.    (15  P.   F.   Smith)    146,   157,   158,  'Hammett   v.   Philadelphia,   65  Pa. 

3    Am.   Rep.   615    [1869.    1870].  St.    (15  P.   F.  Smith)    146.   160,   161, 

^  l<'rom  dissenting  opinion  of  Read,  3  Am.  Rep.  615   [1869,  1870]. 
J.,    in   Hammett   v.   Philadelphia,   65 


51  HISTORY   OF   LOCAL   ASSESSMENTS.  §  29 

in  some  of  the  opinions  of  the  Supreme  Court.*  A  history  of 
the  legislation  in  Pennsylvania  for  the  recovery  of  municipal 
claims  is  found  in  an  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsyl- 
vania.^ 

§29.    New  York. 

The  existence  of  the  local  assessment  in  New   York  slightly 
antedates   its   existence   in   Pennsylvania.     "In   the   colony   and 
state  of  New  York,  the  system  of  taxation  for  local  purposes 
by  assessing  the  burden   according   to   the  benefit   has  been   in 
force  for  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  years.     It  was  ap- 
plied  to   highways      in   the   county   of   Ulster   in   1691:    Bradf. 
Laws,   45.     The   power   was   given   to   the   corporation    of   New 
York  in  the  same  year:  Id..  9.     This  statute  remained  in  force 
in  1773.  when  Van  Schaack's  edition  of  the  statutes  was  pub- 
lished, and  no  evidence  of  its  repeal  is  found  until  1787,  when  it 
seems  to  have  been  revised  and  its  provisions  re-enacted  under 
the  state  constitution:     Van   Schaack's  Laws,  8,  9;  2  Jones  & 
Var.  152;  1   Greenl.  443.     The  colonial  statute  was  doubtless  in 
force  when  the  state  constitution  was  adopted.    It  is  not  unworthy 
of  remark,  that  in  April,  1691.  a  bill  of  rights  was  passed  for  the. 
security  and  protection  of  the  people  of  the  province.     The  stat- 
ute authorizing  the  assessments  first  mentioned  was  passed  after- 
wards during  the  same  year.    In  elanuary.  1787.  an  act  was  passed 
declaring  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  this  state,  and  prohibiting 
among  other  things  that  any  person  should  be  deprived  of  his 
property  except  by  due  course  of  law.     The  statute  of  1787,  au- 
thorizing street  assessments  in  the  city  of  New  York,  was  passed 
by  the  same  legislature,  and  sanctioned  by  the  same  council  of 
revision,  which  had  assented  to  the  bill  of  rights.     Street  assess- 
ments upon  the  same  principle  were  authorized  in  the  city  of  New 
York  in  1703:  3  Oreenl.  58;  and  in  1795:  Id.  244.  245;  and  in 
1796:  Id.  333.  334;  and  in  1801  :  2  K.  &  R.  130;  and  in  1813:  2  R. 
L.  407.     The  corporation   of  New  York  has  had  and  exercised 

*  A   detailed   history   of   special    as-  Washington   Avenue,  69  Pa.  St.   352, 

sessment    legislation    in    Philadelphia  .3.58-360,    8     Am.    Rep.    255     [1871]; 

is  given  in  the  dissontinji  opinion   of  Vacation    of    Howard    Street,    Phila- 

Read.    J.,    in    Hammott    v.    Philadel-  delphia.  U2  Pa.  St.  601,  21  Atl.  974 

phia,   65    Pa.   St.    (15   P.    F.   Smith)  [1891]. 

146,   157-177,  3  Am.  Rep.  615   [1S60.  'Northern    Liberties   v.    St.    John's 

1870].      For    further    account    of    as-  Church,   13  Pa.  St.   104   [1850]. 
sessment  statutes  in  Pennsylvania  see 


§  30  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  52 

authority  to  make  street  assessments  from  the  infancy-  of  that 
city.  Similar  powers  have  been  conferred  on  nearly  every  city, 
and  on  many  of  the  villages  of  this  state.  It  has  also  been  ap- 
plied to  highways,  to  turnpike  roads,  and  to  the  draining  of 
marshes."  ^ 

§  30.    South  Carolina. 

Local  assessments  in  South  Carolina,  too,  slightly  antedate 
those  in  Pennsylvania.  "An  examination  of  our  statutes  prior  to 
1790  relating  to  the  improvement  of  streets  and  sidewalks  will 
show  that  the  provisions  therein  related  to  the  city  of  Charleston 
and  that  such  statutes  were  confined— that  of  1698  (7  Stat.  12) 
to  requiring  every  inhabitant  of  Charleston  to  amend  and  raise 
the  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  house  in  the  manner  and  to  the  di- 
mensions therein  prescribed  on  penalty  of  forfeiting  for  each 
house  a  penalty  to  be  collected  under  the  warrant  of  a  justice  of 
the  peace  and  that  of  176-t  to  requiring  the  construction  of  sew- 
ers or  drains  and  sidewalks.  These  statutes  were  considered  and 
upheld  with  reluctance  in  the  two  eases  of  Cruikshanks  v.  City 
Council,  1  M'Cord  860  decided  in  1821.  and  Yeadon  v.  City  Coun- 
'cil,  decided  in  1828  (cited  12  Rich.  733)  and  when  the  act  of 
1850  (12  Stat.  59.  60)  was  considered  by  the  court  in  the  case  of 
State  V.  City  Council  12  Rich.  702  the  court  of  errors  distinctly 
repudiated  as  foreign  to  our  laws  any  mode  of  taxation  for  the 
improvement  of  streets  in  the  city  of  Charleston  which  looked  to 
the  assessment  of  property  abutting. on  George  street  in  that  city 
according  to  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  such  improvement  to 
such  land-owners  under  the  said  act  of  1850.  saying:  "As  has 
been  said,  the  general  rule  knows  nothing  about  partial  assess- 
ments for  benefits  or  the  selection  of  a  portion  for  a  class.  Exist- 
ence of  persons,  or  the  possession  of  property,  not  the  supposed 
benefits,  are  the  guide.  When  each  is  taxed  according  to  the  value 
of  his  property,  both  equality  and  certainty  may  be  attained  to  a 
reasonable  extent;  but  what  may  be  beneficial,  or  otherwise,  is  a 
matter  of  opinion  or  fancy  or  vague  conjecture."^  This  is  the 
more  interesting  since   South   Carolina  to-day  is  the   only  state 

^People    ex    rel.    Griffin    v.    Mayor,  ^  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green- 

etc,    of   Brooklyn,    4    N.    Y.    419.    55       ville,  42  S.  C.  293,  302,  303;   46  Am. 
Am.  Dec.  266,  282,  283   [1851].  St.    Rep.    723.    27    L.    R.    A.    284,    20 

S.  E.   842    [1893]. 


53  HISTORY  OF   LOCAL   ASSESSMENTS.  §  31 

which    has   totally   repudiated    the   local    assessment    and    all   its 
works. 

§  31.    Other  colonial  and  state  legislation. 

The  colonies  already  mentioned  have  been  selected  only  as  ex- 
amples, showing  the  geographical  extent  of  the  local  assessment 
statutes  that  appeared  within  a  few  years  of  the  enactment  of 
the  English  statute  of  2  William  and  Mary.  The  local  assess- 
ment also  appeared  in  many  other  of  the  American  colonies.  "In 
Massachusetts,  meadows,  swamps  and  lanes  may  be  assessed 
among  the  proprietors  for  the  expense  of  draining  the  same,  with- 
out reference  to  any  political  district,'  and  in  proportion  to  the 
benefit  each  proprietor  derives  from  the  work:  R.  S.  of  Massa- 
chusetts, 673.  In  Connecticut,  the  same  power  is  given  by  statute 
to  commissioners  for  draining  marshy  lands:  Stat,  of  Connecticut, 
Ed.  of  1839.  p.  544."  ^  A  review  of  sidewalk  legislation  in  Massa- 
chusetts from  the  statutes  of  1799  C..31  down  to  the  present  time 
is  found  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  in  a  recent  case.-  It  will  there 
be  noted  that  the  early  assessment  statutes  are  all  special  acts. 
An  account  of  the  developement  of  assessments  is  also  to  be  found 
in  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri.-''  The  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  has  pointed  out,  in  a  case  arising  in 
Georgia,  that  local  assesment  was  so  uncommon  in  the  early  part 
of  the  nineteenth  century  that  the  word  assessment  must  be  re- 
garded as  then  used  in  the  sense  of  general  taxation.*  No  attempt 
is  made  here  to  do  more  than  refer  to  some  of  the  early  statutes 
and  comments  thereon,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  relation 
in  point  of  time  between  the  system  of  assessments  and  the  speci- 
fic constitutional  provisions  which  restrict  them.^  A  tabulated 
statement  of  assessment  statutes  would  possess  but  little  value 
and  is  not  here  attempted. 


'  People    ex    rel.    r.riffin    v.    Mayor.  *  "The  faet  is  notorious  that  a  cen- 

etc.    of    Brooklyn.    4    X.    Y.    419.    5.5  tnry  a<ro  special  assessments  were  not 

Am.  Dee.  200    [18511.  nsnal    in    this    country    and    at    that 

-Copeland   v.  ^Mayor  and   .Mdcnncn  time    tiie   word   was   used    as   synony- 

of  S])rin<ifield.   inn   ^lass.   408.   44   N.  nions  with  'rates  or  taxes'  generally. " 

K.  ()05    1189()1.  ^Vells   v.    Savannah,    181    U.    S.    531, 

'Newby   V.   Platte   County,    25   Mo.  54.3    [inoil. 

258.  269,  270   [1857].  °  See  Chapter  V. 


§§32,33  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  54 

§  32.     Assessment  not  recognized  by  common  law. 

The  local  assessment,  therefore,  has  no  existence  at  the  com- 
mon law,  but  exists  both  in  England  and  this  country  solely  by 
virtue  of  statute.^  Upon  the  enactment  of  the  legislature  de- 
pends the  existence  of  the  right  of  levying  such  assessments.  In 
New  Jersey  it  has  been  said  that  the  system  of  local  assessments 
was  general  in  1788,  and  that  while  not  justifiable  on  theories 
either  of  taxation  or  of  eminent  domain,  the  system  is  "part  of 
the  local  common  law"  and  it  is  "quite  too  late  to  revert  to  first 
principles  in  order  to  overthrow  a  system  of  procedure  which  is 
possessed  of  such  antiquity  and  has  to  its  credit  so  many  recogni- 
tions,"- and  that  assessments  depend  for  their  justification  upoii 
ancient  usage/'  If  really  a  part  of  the  common  law  of  New  Jer- 
sey, the  assessment  is  so  by  virtue  of  the  adoption  in  New  Jer- 
sey of  the  English  assessment  statutes  as  a  part  of  their  common 
law.  On  the  other  hand  it  has  been  said  that  there  is  no  custom- 
ary law  of  taxation  in  Tennessee.* 

§  33.    Statutory  assessment  held  valid. 

The  system  of  local  assessment,  therefore,  is  one  of  considerable 
antiquity  in  this  country.  It  antedates  specific  constitutional  pro- 
visions, which  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  restrict  or  limit  its  oper- 
ation. Its  recognition  as  an  established  and  existing  system  of 
taxation  which  must  have  been  known  to  the  framers  of  the  state 
constitution,  and  which  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  they  intended 
to  destroy  or  subvert,  has  been  insisted  upon  in  many  cases. 
"We  may  remark,  too,  that  taxation  of  this  character  has  pre- 
vailed too  long  and  too  extensively  to  be  treated  as  illegitimate 
or  denounced  as  legislative  spoliation  under  the  guise  of  the  tax- 
ing power.  It  prevailed  in  England  several  centuries  ago ;  and 
the  assessments  made  there  by  the  commissioners  of  sewers  on 
the  lands  affected  by  their  operations  was  taxation  of  this  char- 


^  City  of  Owensboro  v.  Hope,  —  ^  State,  Society  for  Establishing 
Ky.  ,  110  S.  W.  272  [1908].  See  Useful  Manufacturies,  Pros.  v.  May- 
Chapter  VI.,   §   775.  or  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pat- 

^  Drainage  Assessments.     Hoagland  erson,    42    N.    J.    L.     (13    Vr.)     615 

V.  Wurts,  41  N.  J.  L.    (12  Vr.)    175,  [1880]. 

180   [1879],    (affirming;   In  matter  of  *  Taylor,  McBean  &   Co.  v.   Chand- 

Commissioners    to    drain    the    Great  ler,    9    Heisk.    (Tenn.)    349,    24    Am. 

Meadows  on  Pequest  River,  39  N.  J.  Rep.  308    [1872]. 
L.   (10  Vr.)   433  [1877]. 


55  HISTORY  OP  LOCAL  ASSESSMENTS.  §  33 

acter.  (28  Hen.  VIII  Chap.  5,  Sec.  5.)  In  Massachusetts,  from  an 
early  period,  meadows,  swamps  and  lowlands  were  required  to  be 
assessed  among  the  proprietors  to  pay  the  expense  of  draining 
them  (Rev.  Stat,  of  Mass.  p.  673),  and  in  Connecticut  the  same 
power  was  given  to  commissioners  for  draining  marshy  lands. 
(Conn.  Stat.  Ed.  1839,  p.  544).  It  is  said  by-  the  judge,  who  de- 
livered the  opinion  of  the  court  of  appeals  in  the  Brooklyn  case  be- 
fore referred  to,  (People  ex  rel  Griffin  v.  ]\Iayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn, 
4,  N.Y.  428),  that  the  system  of  local  taxation  for  local  improve- 
ments by  assessing  the  burden  according  to  the  benefit,  had  pre- 
vailed for  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  years,  and  that  this 
power  was  given  to  the  corporation  of  New  York  in  1691,  and 
had  since  been  conferred  on  nearly  every  city  and  on  many  of 
the  villages  of  the  state. "^  "It  is  far  too  late  to  question  now 
the  validity  of  legislation  like  this  imposing  local  assessments,  in- 
vesting the  local  authorities  with  the  discretion  of  judging  as  to 
the  necessity  for  the  improvements,  and  with  power  to  levy  and 
apportion  the  charge."-  "We  believe  the  power  exi.sts;  it  has 
been  recognized  as  an  existing  power  in  the  state  by  the  public, 
the  legislature  and  by  at  least  three  decisions  of  this  court.  It 
may  be  difficult,  perhaps  impossible,  to  trace  it  to  its  proper 
source,  and  square  its  operation  by  logical  rnles,  derived  from  a 
consideration  of  it  as  one  of  the  precisely  defined  powers  of  the 
constitution.  It  had  its  origin  and  development  in  the  principle 
of  local  self-government,  characteristic  of  free  institutions, 
founded  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  race — the  leaving  to  each  local  com- 
munity the  due  administration  of  the  affairs  in  which  it  had  an 
exceptive,  peculiar  and  local  interest,  and  in  the  nature  of  real 
property  to  which  it  is  alone  applicable.  It  is  not  the  creation  of 
a  philosophical  brain  drafting  constitutions  and  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, but  the  outgrowth  of  the  neees.sities  and  varying  exigen- 
cies of  local  commnnities.  and  hence  like  all  institutions  of  sim- 
ilar origin  and  development,  has  inconsistencies  and  incongrui- 
ties. Its  practical  operation,  so  as  to  prevent  injustice,  depends 
largely  upon  the  good  sense  and  the  capacities  of  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race  for  the  .successful  working  of  free  government  and 


^Kewbv   V.    Platte   County.   25   Mo.  =  Xufient    v.    City    of    Jackson.    72 

258,  2G9.  270   [18571.  Miss.  1040,  1056.  18  So.  493  [1895]. 


§  34  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  56 

the  management  of  their  private  affairs."^  It  is  probably  this 
recognition  as  an  existing  system  of  taxation  which  has  saved 
it  under  the  provisions  of  modern  constitutions.  The  courts  have, 
with  the  exception  of  one  state,*  taken  the  attitude  that  the  sys- 
tem of  local  assessment  must  be  reconciled  with  the  constitutional 
provisions  rather  than  be  destroyed  by  them.  Hampered  and  lim- 
ited by  constitutional  provisions  as  it  has  been,  it  has,  neverthe- 
less, prevailed  where  a  new  and  unheard  of  system  of  taxation 
would  probably  have  been  overthrown  by  the  courts  as  being  in 
violation  of  the  rights  guaranteed  by  the  constitution  to  the 
property  owners.  Even  the  courts  which  have  criticised  the  sys- 
tem of  local  assessments  as  a  system  of  taxation  which  cannot  be 
sustained  on  principle  have  nevertheless  upheld  it."' 

§  34.    Development  of  constitutional  restraints. 

The  force  and  effect  of  constitutional  provisions  affecting  taxa- 
tion and  local  assessment  were  not  at  first  understood  very  accur- 
ately by  the  courts.  When  such  constitutional  provisions  as 
those  requiring  uniformity  of  taxation  and  forbidding  the  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law  were  seen  to  have  some* 
application  to  the  local  assessment,  the  very  existence  of  the 
power  of  local  assessment  was  sharply  challenged.  At  one  time 
it  seemed  as  though  the  constitutional  provision  requiring  uni- 
formity of  taxation  would  be  applied  by  the 'court  to  the  local  as- 
sessment with  the  result  that  the  existence  of  that  power  would 
be  denied.  The  system  of  local  assessments,  however,  had  be- 
come too  firmly  entrenched  in  the  svstem  of  American  taxation 
thus  to  be  overthrown.  The  final  resnlt  of  this  discussion  Avas  th( 
view  that  while  the  local  assessment  is  a  form  of  tax.  it  is  not  a 
tax  within  the  constitutional  provision  requiring  uniformity  of 
taxation  except  in  the  very  special  and  peculiar  sense  that  the 
amount  of  the  assessment  miist  not  exceed  the  amount  of  the  bene- 
fits conferred  for  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is 
levied,  and  that  the  assessment  must  be  apportioned  according  to 
such  benefits.     When  this  view  became  thoroughly  established,  it 

^Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty,  57  Miss.  Wis.  242   [18G01  ;   Municipality  Num- 

378,     379.     400,     34     Am.  "  Rep.     451  ber  Two  Praying  for  Opening  "of  Ben- 

[1879].  ton  Street  v'.  White,  9  La.  Ann.  44r> 

^  For  the  view  fif  tlie  courts  of  [18541;  City  of  Norfolk  v.  Cham- 
South    Carolina    see    §§    30,    118.  herlain,    89    Va.    196;    16    S.    E.    730 

"Weeks    v.    Citv    of   Milwaukee,    10  [1S92]. 


57 


HISTORY   OP   LOCAL   ASSESSMENTS. 


§34 


seemed  for  awhile  viiuler  the  decision  oi  the  courts  as  though  a 
power  of  taxation  had  been  discovered  which  was  subject  to  no 
practical  restraint.  It  was  assumed  that  the  legislative  determin- 
ation as  to  the  existence  and  amounts  of  special  benefits  was  final 
and  conclusive.  The  application  of  this  doctrine  together  with 
that  of  the  freedom  of  the  local  assessment  from  the  constitu- 
tional restrictions  of  uniformity  left  the  legislature  practically 
free  to  assess  as  it  chose,  as  long  as  the  purpose  was  one  which 
might  combine  the  elements  of  a  public  use  and  an  especial  local 
benefit.  From  that  time  on  there  has  been  a  constant  struggle 
to  restrain  the  power  of  local  assessment  by  the  application  of 
other  constitutional  provisions  such  as  that  forbidding  the  tak- 
ing of  property  without  due  process  of  law  and  by  the  application 
of  limitations  deduced  from  the  very  nature  of  the  local  assess- 
ment itself.^     This  attempt  to  restrict  and  regulate  the  power  of 


■  An  pxcellont  discussion  of  the 
early  history  of  tliis  attempt  to  re- 
strain the  power  of  local  assessment 
is  found  in  Town  of  ]\Iacon  v.  Patty, 
57  Miss.  378,  390,  34  Am.  Rep.  451 
[1879]. 

The    conrt    said: 

"As  the  dangerous  nature  of  the 
power  began  to  be  more  and  more 
recognized,  wlien  considered  as  a  tax- 
ing power  only  and  therefore  virtual- 
ly without  restriction,  unless  im- 
posed by  the  Constitution,  and  as  the 
courts  had  held  tliflt  it  was  not 
within  the  constitutional  restriction 
in  reference  to  the  taxing  power,  tlie 
judicial  mind,  giving  more  import- 
anci'  to  tliosc  ])oculiarities  which  dis- 
tinguished it  from  the  taxing  power 
pure  and  siii;|)](".  licgan  to  discover 
lestrictions  and  limitations  arising 
from  its  nature  and  characteristics, 
as  well  as  from  the  nature  and  char- 
acteristics of  the  taxing  power  in 
general.'' 

The  court  thou  discussed  certain 
cases  in  which  lestrictions  have  been 
imposed  ujjon  the  ])ower  of  local  as- 
sessment; among  them  City  of  Lex- 
ington V.  McQuillan's  Heirs.  39  Ky. 
(9  Dana)  513;  in  which  it  was  held 
improper    to    apportion    the    cost    by 


requiring  each  owner  to  pay  the  ex- 
pense in  that  i)art  of  the  improve- 
ment in  front  of  his  own  land;  the 
New  Jersey  cases,  such  as  Tidewater 
Co.  V.  Coster,  18  N.  J.  E.  (3  C.  E. 
Green)  518,  90  Am.  Dec.  634;  State, 
Xew  Jersey  Railroad  &  Transporta- 
tion Company,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  New- 
ark, 27  N.  J.  L.  (3  Dutch.)  185; 
State,  Van  Tassel,  Pros.  v.  flavor 
and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  37  N. 
J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  128;  State,  Hoboken 
Land  &  Improvement  Cnnipaiiy.  Pros. 
V.  Mayor,  etc..  Hoboken.  30  X.  J.  L. 
(7  Vr.)  291,  in  which  tlie  court  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  dctcrjiiina- 
tion  of  the  legislature  a<  In  tlic 
amoimt  of  benefits  conferred  by  tlie 
improvement  u])on  the  projierty  in 
question  was  not  conclusive,  but  that 
the  amount  of  benefits  could  be  in- 
quired into  in  each  case  as  a  fact; 
and  the  Pennsylvania  cases,  such  as 
Washington  Avenue,  (19  Pa.  St.  ( 19 
P.  F.  Smith)  352,  8  Am.  Rep.  255, 
and  Hanimett  v.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa. 
St.  (15  P.  F.  Smith)  146,  3  Am. 
Rep.  615,  in  which  it  was  held  that 
asses.sments  must  be  limited  to  spe- 
cial benefits,  and  that  the  front-foot 
lule  could  not  be  applied  in  all  cases 


34 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


58 


local     assessment     is     discussed     in     detail     in     the     following 
chapters. 


indiscriminately,  and  that  it  was  in- 
applicable to  rural  property. 

The  court  then  said,  "In  tracing 
thus  far  tlie  decisions  in  some  of  the 
most  important  states  of  the  Union 
on  the  subject  of  local  assessments, 
we  have  seen  the  gradual  rise  of  the 
revisory    power    of    the    courts    over 


this  public  imposition,  which  has  not 
been  extended  to  taxation  pure  and 
simple,  and  we  have  also  seen  the 
recognition  of  the  wide  diflferences  be- 
tween the  practical  operation  of  the 
two  powers."  Town  of  Macon  v.  Pat- 
ty, 57  Miss.  378,  395,  34  Am.  Rep. 
451    [1879]. 


CHAPTER  III. 

RELATION  BETWEEN  ASSESSMENT  AND  GENERAL  TAX- 
ATION. 

§  35.    General  distinction  between  tax  and  assessment. 

While  an  assessment  is  in  one  sense  a  tax,  it  is  a  tax  of  a  pecu- 
liar nature,^  differing  from  a  general  tax  in  important  character- 
istics.- It  is  said  that  an  assessment  is  "distinguishable  from  our 
general  idea  of  a  tax  but  owes  its  origin  to  the  same  source  or 
power.  "^  The  chief  and  most  important  distinction  between  a 
tax  and  a  local  assessment  is  that  a  tax  is  levied  for  the  purpose 
of  raising  revenue  for  paying  the  expenses  of  the  government. 
The  only  benefits  which  the  tax-payers  receive,  they  receive  as 
members  of  organized  society.  Many  of  the  most  valuable  of 
these  benefits  would  enure  to  them  if  they  were  not  possessed  of 
an.y  property  to  be  taxed.  If,  possessing  property,  some  of  them 
were  able  to  evade  the  payment  of  the  tax,  they  would  receive  the 
same  benefits  as  they  receive  in  case  of  payment.  The  individual 
tax-payer  is,  therefore,  poorer  in  a  sense  by  reason  of  the  payment 
of  the  tax.  The  local  assessment,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not,  in 
theory  at  least,  leave  the  property  owner  who  pays  his  assessment 
any  the  poorer  by  reason  of  the   entire  transaction  since  he   is 

'  City   of   Bridgeport   v.   New   York  poses     and     governed     by     principles 

&  New  Haven  Railroad  Company,  36  that  do  not  apply  generally."     Cooley 

Conn.    25.5;    4    Am.    Rep.    G3    [1869];  on  Taxation,  416,  417,  quoted  Rixler 

Munson    v.    Board    of    Commissioners  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  the  Countv 

of  the  Atchafalaya  Basin  Levee  Dis-  of     Sacramento,     59     Cal.     698,     702 

trict,    43    La.    Ann.     15,    8    So.    90C  [1881]. 

[1891].  'State,   Sigler,   Pros.   v.    Fuller.   34 

^"Special   assessments   are   a   pecu-  N.  .T.  L.    (5   Vr. )    227    [1870]. 

liar     species     of     taxation,     standing  *  "Between  taxes,  or  general  taxes, 

apart   from   the   general    burdens    ini-  as  they  are  sometimes  called  by  way 

posed   for   state    and    municipal    pur-  of    distinction,    which    are    the    exac- 
59 


§35 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


60 


fully  compensated  by  the  special  benefits  conferred  upon  him  by 
the  improvement  for  the  amount  of  the   assessment  thus  paid/ 


tions  placed  upon  the  citizen  for  the 
support  of  the  government  paid  to 
the  state  as  a  state,  the  considera- 
tion of  which  is  protection  by  the 
state,  and  special  taxes  or  special 
assessments  which  are  imposed  upon 
property  within  a  limited  area  for 
the  payment  for  a  local  improvement 
supposed  to  enhance  the  value  of  all 
property  within  that  area  there  is  a 
broad  and  clear  line  of  distinction, 
although  both  of  them  are  properly 
called  taxes,  and  the  proceedings  for 
their  collection  are  by  the  same  offi- 
cers and  by  substantially  similar 
methods.  Taxes  proper,  or  general 
taxes,  proceed  upon  the  theory  that 
the  existence  of  government  is  a  ne- 
cessity; that  it  cannot  continue  with- 
out means  to  pay  its  expenses;  that 
for  those  means  it  has  the  right  to 
compel  all  citizens  and  property  with- 
in its  limit  to  contribute;  and  that 
for  such  contribution  it  renders  no 
return  of  special  benefit  to  any  prop- 
erty, but  onl}'^  secures  to  the  citizen 
that  general  benefit  which  results 
from  protection  to  his  person  and 
property  and  the  promotion  of  those 
variovis  schemes  which  have  for  their 
object  the  welfare  of  all.*  *  *  On 
the  other  hand,  special  assessments 
or  special  taxes  proceed  on  the  theory 
that  when  a  local  improvement  en- 
hances the  value  of  neighboring  prop- 
erty, that  property  should  pay  for 
the  improvement."  Illinois  Central 
Railroad  Company  v.  Decatur.  147 
U.  S.  190,  197,  198,  37  L.  132.  13 
S.  293  [1893],  (affirming  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Company  v.  City  of 
Decatur,  126  111.  92,  1  L.'  R.  A.  613, 
18  N.  E.  315   [1890]. 

"We  have  spoken  of  the  assessment 
for  benefits  as  a  kind  of  taxation. 
The  statement  is  correct  to  this  ex- 
tent, that  the  authority  to  ?ay  spe- 
cial assessments  for  benefits  is  found 
in   the   taxing   power   of   the    legisla- 


ture. It  would,  however,  be  im- 
proper to  say  that  an  assessment 
for  benefits  is  ordinarily  included 
in  the  term  'taxes'  or  'taxation' 
It  is  not.  'It  is  never  so  spoken 
of  in  the  charters  of  cities  or 
boroughs  or  in  the  general  law  or 
in  popular  speech.'  Taxes  are  the 
regular  uniform  and  equal  contribu- 
tions which  all  citizens  are  refjuired 
to  make  for  the  support  of  the  gov- 
ernment. An  assessment  for  benefits 
may  lack  each  of  these  qualities  and 
yet  be  valid.  'It  is  a  local  assess- 
ment, imposed  occasionally  and  upon 
a  limited  class  of  persons  interested 
in  a  local  improvement  and  is  uni- 
form only  in  that  it  is  supposed  to 
give  an  added  value  to  the  property 
of  each  person  assessed  to  the  full 
amount  of  the  assessment."  City  of 
New  London  v.  ]\Iiller,  60  Conn.  112. 
116,  117,  22  Atl.  499   [1891]. 

Speaking  of  the  term  "assessment." 
the  court  said :  "It  was  employed 
therefore  to  represent  those  local  bur- 
dens imposed  by  municipal  corpora- 
tions upon  property  bordering  on 
an  improved  street  or  situated  so 
near  it  as  to  be  benefited  by  the  im- 
provement, for  the  purpose  of  pay- 
ing the  cost  of  the  improvement,  and 
laid  with  reference  to  the  benefit 
wliich  such  property  is  supposed  to 
derive  from  the  expenditure  of  the 
money.  This  definition  ex  vi  termini 
describes  the  power  and  defines  with 
precision  its  limits.  It  is  not  a 
power  to  tax  all  the  property  within 
the  corporation  for  general  purposes 
but  a  power  to  tax  specific  property 
for  a  specific  purpose.  It  is  not  a 
])ower  to  tax  property  generally 
founded  upon  the  benefits  supposed 
to  be  derived  from  the  organization 
of  a  government  for  the  protection  of 
life,  liberty  and  property,  but  a  pow- 
er to  tax  specific  property  founded 
upon    the   benefit    supposed   to   be   de- 


61 


ASSESSMENT   AND   GENERAL  TAXATION. 


§35 


This  distinction  between  a  tax  and  a  local  assessment  is  very  gen- 
erally   recognized    by    the    courts.'"'       Furthermore    a    tax    is    a 


rived  by  tlie  property  itself  from  the 
expenditure  of  the  tax  in  its  imme- 
diate vicinity.  Hence  property  not 
benefited  by  the  improvement  cannot 
be  subjected  to  the  burden  imposed 
for  that  purpose."  Taylor  v.  Palmer, 
31  Cal.  240.  254  [1800].  See  §  665. 
'^  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Decatur,  147  U.  S.  190,  37 
L.  132,  13  S.  293  [1893],  affirming 
Illinois  Lentral  Railroad  Company 
V.  City  of  Decatur,  126  111.  92,  1  L. 
R.  A.  613,  18  X.  E.  315  [1890]; 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birmingham 
V.  Klein,  89  Ala.  461,'  8  L.  R.  A.  369, 
7  So.  386  [1889];  City  of  San  Diego 
V.  Linda  Vista  Irrigation  District, 
108  Cal.  189,  35  L.  R.  A.  33,  41  Pac. 
291  [1895];  Wood  v.  Brady,' 68  Cal. 
78,  5  Pac.  623,  8  Pac.  599  [1885]; 
Taylor  v.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  240 
[1866];  Hayden  v.  City  of  Atlanta, 
70  Ga.  817  [1883];  De  Clercq  v. 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company,  167 
111.  215,  47  N.  E.  367  [1897],  (af- 
firming De  Clercq  v.  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Company,  66  111.  App.  590 
[1896];  City  of  Mt.  Vernon  v.  Peo- 
ple. 147  111!  359,  23  L.  R.  A.  807; 
Adams  County  v.  City  of  Quincy, 
130  111.  566,  6  L.  R.  A.  155  [1889]; 
Mix  V.  Ross,  57  111  121  [1870];  Trus- 
tees of  the  Illinois  and  ^Michigan  Ca- 
nal V.  City  of  Chicago.  12  111.  403 
[1851];  Lowe  v.  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  Howard  County,  94  Ind. 
553  1 1883]  ;  Low  v.  Madison,  Smyrna 
&  Craham  Turnpike  Company,  30 
Ind.  77  |18()8];  City  of  Shreveport 
v.  Prescott.  51  La.  Ann.  1895.  46  L. 
R.  A.  193.  26  So.  064  [18991;  Mnn- 
son  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
The  Atchafalaya  Basin  Levee  Dis- 
trict, 43  La.  Ann.  15.  8  So.  906 
[1891];  Town  of  Macon  v.  Pattv,  57 
Miss.  378.  34  Am.  Rep.  451  [1879]; 
McHuire  v.  Brf)ckman.  58  Mo.  App. 
307  [1894]  ;  Hanscom  v.  City  of  Oma- 
ha. 11   Neb.  37.  7  N.  W.  739   [1881]; 


Matter  of  New  York,  11  Johns.  (N. 
Y. )  77 ;  Busbee  v.  Commissioners  of 
Wake  County,  93  X.  C.  143  [1883]; 
Lima  v..  Cemetery  Association,  42  0. 
S.  128,  51  Am.  Rep.  809  [1884]; 
Reeves  v.  Treasurer  of  Wood  County, 
8  O.  S.  333  [1858];  Hill  v.  Higdon, 
5  O.  S.  243,  67  Am.  Dec.  289  [1855]  ; 
Ridenour  v.  Saffin,  1  Hand.  (Ohio) 
4()4  [1855];  Washington  Avenue,  69 
Pa.  St.  352,  8  Am.  Rep.  255  [1871]; 
^^■inona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Watertown,  1  S.  D.  46,  44  X."  W. 
1072  [1890];  Taylor,  McBean  &  Co. 
V.  Chandler,  56  Tenn.  (9  Heisk.)  349. 
sub  nomine  McBean  v.  Chandler,  24 
Am.  Rep.  308  [1872];  Hale  v.  City 
of  Kenosha,  29  Wis.  599  [1872]; 
Soens  v.  City  of  Racine.  10  Wis.  271 
[I860];  Knowlton  v.  Board  of  Su- 
pervisors of  Rock  County,  9  Wis.  410 
1859]. 

"The  general  distinction  that  is 
taken  between  taxes  and  local  assess- 
ments by  courts  and  authors  is  that 
the  former  are  forced  contributions 
levied  by  the  government  alike  on 
all  property  for  the  purpose  of  rais- 
ing revenue  for  the  support  of  the 
government  without  reference  to  the 
benefit  that  the  taxpayers  may  derive 
therefrom,  while  the  latter  are.  also, 
forced  contributions  which  are  levied 
by  tlie  government,  but  upon  certain 
particular  property  and  with  a  view 
of  raising  revenue  for  certain  desig- 
nated purposes,  having  direct  refer- 
ence to  the  special  benefits  which  will 
enure  to  the  property  thus  taxed." 
(  ity  of  Shreveport  v.  Prescott,  51 
La."  Ann.  1895.  1904.  40  L.  R.  A.  193. 
20  So.  064   [1899]. 

"Between  this  right  to  make  spe- 
cial a^se^isments  for  sidewalks  and 
tliat  of  taxation  for  general  corpo- 
ration purposes  there  is  in  the  judg- 
ment of  courts  a  clear  distinction 
involving  in  their  exercise  essentially 
dilTerent    powers    and    princii)les.    the 


§35 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


62 


recurring  charge  upon  which  an  assessment  is  levied  occasionally 
only." 


one  being  an  ordinary  tax  for  de- 
fraj'ing  the  expenses  of  the  munici- 
pal government  and  the  general  im- 
provement thereof;  whilst  the  other 
is  a  special  impositon  or  liability 
arising  out  of  the  benefit  conferred 
upon  the  property  assessed."  City 
of  Fairfield  v.  Ratcliff,  20  la.  396, 
398    [1866]. 

"An  assessment  as  distinguished 
from  a  tax  is  a  special  and  local 
charge  or  imposition  upon  property 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  munici- 
pal improvements,  predicated  upon 
the  theory  of  benefits  from  such  im- 
provements, and  levied  as  a  charge 
upon  land,  or  property  specially  ben- 
efited thereby,  while  a  charge  im- 
posed by  law  upon  the  assessed  value 
of  all  property,  real  and  personal, 
in  a  district,  is  a  tax,  and  not  an 
assessment,  although  the  purpose  be 
to  make  a  local  improvement."  Hol- 
ley  V.  County  of  Orange,  106  Cal. 
420,  39  Pac.  Rep.  790   [1895]. 

"The  distinction  between  a  tax  and 
a  special  assessment  is,  that  a  tax 
is  imposed  for  some  general  or  pub- 
lic object;  an  exaction  made  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  on  the  govern- 
ment directly;  a  charge  on  property 
that  lessens  its  value,  and  in  the  pro- 
portion in  which  the  owner  is  re- 
quired to  pay,  his  pecuniary  ability 
is  diminished;  whereas,  a  special  as- 
sessment has  none  of  those  distinct- 
ive features;  it  is  levied  for  a  special 
purpose,  and  not  for  a  general  or 
public  object;  the  property  is  spe- 
cially assessed  in  the  proportion  in 
which  it  is  benefited ;  the  assessment 
is  but  an  equivalent  for  the  increased 
value  given  to  the  property."  De 
Clercq  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.,  66  111.  App.  596.  597  [1896], 
(affirmed  De  Clercq  v.  Barber  As- 
phalt Paving  Company,  167  111.  215, 
47  N.  E.  367    [1897].^ 

°  "A  local  assessment  can  only  be 
levied  on  land.     It  cannot,  as  a  tax. 


can,  be  made  a  personal  liability  ol 
the  taxpayer;  it  is  an  assessment  on 
the  thing  supposed  to  be  benefited. 
A  tax  is  levied  on  the  whole  state, 
or  a  known  political  subdivision,  as 
a  county  or  town.  A  local  assess- 
ment is  levied  on  property  situated 
in  a  district  created  for  the  express 
purpose  of  the  levy,  and  possessing 
no  other  function,  or  even  existence, 
than  to  be  the  thing  on  which  the 
le\y  is  made.  A  tax  is  a  continuing 
burden,  and  mvist  be  collected  at 
state'd  short  intervals  for  all  time, 
and  without  it  government  cannot 
exist;  a  local  assessment  is  excep- 
tional both  as  to  time  and  locality — 
it  is  brought  into  being  for  a  partic- 
ular occasion,  and  to  accomplish  a 
particular  purpose,  and  dies  with  the 
passing  of  the  occasion  and  the  ac- 
complishment of  the  purpose.  A  tax 
is  levied,  collected  and  administered 
by  a  public  agency,  elected  by  and 
responsible  to  the  community  upon 
which  it  is  imposed;  a  local  assess- 
ment is  made  by  an  authority  ab  ex- 
tra. Yet  it  is  like  a  tax,  in  that  it 
is  imposed  under  an  authority  de- 
rived from  the  legislature,  and  is 
an  enforced  contribution  to  the  pub- 
lic welfare,  and  its  payment  may  be 
enforced  by  the  summary  method  al- 
lowed for  the  collection  of  taxes.  It 
is  like  a  tax,  in  that  it  must  be 
levied  for  a  public  purpose,  and  must 
be  apportioned  by  some  reasonable 
rule  among  those  upon  whose  prop- 
erty it  is  levied.  It  is  unlike  a  tax, 
in  that  the  proceeds  of  the  assess- 
ment must  be  expended  in  an  im- 
provement from  which  a  benefit  clear- 
ly exceptive  and  plainly  perceived 
must  enure  to  the  property  upon 
which  it  is  imposed,  or  else  the  courts 
will  interfere  to  prevent  its  enforce- 
ment." Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty,  57i 
Miss.  378,  386,  34  Am.  Rep.  451 
[1879]. 


63  ASSESSMENT   AND  GENERAL  TAXATION.  §§  36,  37 

§  36.    Exaction  on  political  unit  according  to  value  held  tax. 

If  the  charge  or  exaction  is  levied  upon  all  the  property  within 
the  limits  of  some  political  unit,  such  as  a  city,  county,  and  the 
like,  and  if  the  levy  is  made  in  proportion  to  the  valuation  of  the 
property  upon  which  it  is  levied,  such  a  charge  or  exaction  is  held 
to  be  a  tax,  and  not  an  assessment,  even  if  it  is  levied  for  a  pur- 
pose for  which  the  local  assessment  might  have  been  levied.^  If 
the  charge  or  exaction  is  levied  upon  all  of  the  property  in  some 
pre-existing  political  subdivision  of  the  given  political  unit,  and 
is  levied  in  proportion  to  the  valuation  of  such  property,  such 
charge  or  exaction  is  ordinarily  held  to  be  a  tax,  and  not  a  local 
assessment.  The  method  of  selecting  the  property  which  is  to 
bear  the  burden  in  connection  with  the  method  of  apportioning 
the  burden  among  the  property  thus  selected,  shows  that  the 
charge  was  not  based  upon  any  theory  of  special  benefits  to  the 
property  upon  which  the  tax  is  levied.-  Thus  a  tax  levied  upon 
all  the  property  in  a  given  ward,  for  the  construction  of  a  bridge, 
has  been  held  not  to  be  a  local  assessment,  but  to  be  properly 
classed  as  a  tax  in  the  more  limited  sense  of  the  term.^ 

§  37.    Exaction  on  assessment  district  according  to  benefits,  front- 
age or  area  held  assessment. 

If  a  district  is  created  which  contains,  or  is  supposed  to  contain, 
the  property  specially  benefited  by  the  improvement  for  which 
the  assessment  is  levied,  and  if  the  exaction  is  levied  upon  the 
property  in  such  district  in  proportion  to  the  benefits  conferred 
by  such  improvement,  such  form  of  exaction  is  regularly  recog- 
nized as  a  local  assessment  and  not  a  form  of  general  taxation. 


1  County  of  Mobile  v.  Kimball,  102  v.     Commissioners,     38     0.     S.     639 

U.  S.  69l',  26  L.  2.38   [1880],   (affirm-  118831. 

ing     Kimball     v.     Mobile,     14     Fed.  -  In    speaking    of    an    exaction    the 

Cas.     489,     3     Woods     555     [1877];  court    .said:      "As    this    tax,    though 

Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cherokee  County,  local,  is  levied  on  property,  generally 

144  Ala.  579,  42  So.  66  [1905];  Swan-  and   irrespective  of   local   benefit,   we 

son  V.  City  of  Ottumwa,  118  la.  161,  conclude    that    it    is   not    a    local    as- 

59    L.    R.    A.    620.    91    N.    W.    1048  spssnient."     •  Griggsry      Construction 

[1902];  Town  of  Parkland  v.  Caines,  Company    v.    Freeman,    108    La.    435, 

88    Ky.    562,    11    S.    W.    649    [1889];  438.  .58  L.  R.  A.  349.  351,  32  So.  399 

Thom'as  v.  Leland,  24  Wend.    (N.  Y.)  [1902]. 

65   [1840];   Beggs  v.  Paine,   15  N.  D.  ^  driggsry     Construction     Company 

436,   109  N.  W.  322   [1906]-.   Warder  v.  Freeman.  108  La.  435,  58  L.  R.  A. 

349,  32  So.  399   [1902]. 


§  38  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  64 

A  like  result  is  reached  if  the  property  which  is  supposed  to  be 
benefited  is  marked  off  into  an  assessment  district,  and  the  ex- 
action for  the  improvement  is  levied  upon  such  property,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  frontage.  Such  an  exaction  is  regularly  held 
to  be  a  local  assessment,  and  not  a  form  of  general  taxation.^  If 
the  land  which  is  supposed  to  be  benefited  by  the  improvement 
for  which  the  assessment  is  levied  is  made  into  an  assessment  dis- 
trict, and  the  exaction  is  apportioned  among  such  property  ac- 
cording to  the  area  thereof,  such  a  form  of  exaction  is  regularly 
held  to  be  a  local  assessment,  as  distinct  from  a  form  of  general 
taxation.-  A  common  example  of  such  form  of  assessment  is 
found  in  levee  districts,  in  which  the  property  which  is  supposed 
to  be  benefited  by  the  levee  is  often  assessed  at  a  certain  rate 
per  acre  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  the  levee.  Charges  of 
this  sort  are  regarded  as  local  assessments.^ 

§  38.    Exaction  on  assessment  district  according  to  valuation. 

If  the  propert.y,  which  is  supposed  to  be  benefited,  is  made  into 
a  special  district  for  taxation  purposes,  and  the  exaction  is  appor- 
tioned among  such  property  in  proportion  to  the  value  thereof, 
we  have  a  case  in  which  there  is  a  conflict  of  authority  on  the 
question  of  whether  such  exaction  is  a  local  assessment  or  a  form 
of  general  taxation.  In  a  number  of  cases  in  which  the  question 
has  been  considered,  it  has  been  held  that  such  an  exaction  is  a 

'Allentown    v.    Henry,    73    Pa.    St.  La.   Ann.    182;    Alcorn  v.   Hamer,   38 

404    [1873].  Miss.   652    [I860];    Williams  v.   Cam- 

''Hill    V.    Fontenot,    46    La.    Ann.  mack,  27  Miss.  209,  61  Am.  Dec.  508 

1563,    16   So.   475    [1894];    George   v.  [1854]. 

Young,  45  La.  Ann.  1232,  14  So.  137  ^Hill    v.     Fontenot,    46    La.    Ann. 

[1893];    Hollingsworth  v.  Thompson,  1563,    16   So.   475    [1894];    George  v. 

45   La.    Ann.    222,    40    Am.    St.    Rep.  Yoimg,  45  La.  Ann.  1232,  14  So.  137 

220,  12  So.   1   [1893];   Minor  v.  Das-  [1893];  Minor  v.  Daspit,  43  La.  Ann. 

pit,  43  La.  Ann.  337,  9  So.  49  [1891];  337,    9    So.    49     [1891];     Munson    v. 

Munson   v.   Board    of   Commissioners  Board     of     Commissioners     of     The 

of     The     Atchafalaya     Basin     Levee  Atchafalaya     Basin     Levee     District, 

District,   43   La.   Ann.   15,   8   So.   906  43   La.   Ann.    15,   8   So.   906    [1891]; 

[1891];    Excelsior  Planting  &  Mann-  Excelsior   Planting  &   Manufacturing 

facturing  Co.  v.   Green,  39  La.  Ann.  Co.  v.  Green,  39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So. 

455,     1     So.     873     [1887];     Charnock  873     [1887];     Charnock    v.    Fordoche 

V.    Fordoche    &    Grosse    Tete    Special  &    Grosse    Tete    Special    Levee    Dis- 

Levee  District  Co.,  38  La.   Ann.   323  trict   Co.,    38   La.   Ann.   323    [1886]; 

[1886];    Gillespie   v.    Police    Jiiry   of  Alcorn     v.     Hamer,     38     Miss.     652 

Concordia,    5    La.    Ann.    403    [1850];  [1860];     Williams    v.    Cammack,    27 

Second    Municipality    v.    Duncan,    2  I\riss.   209,   61    Am.   Dec.   508    [1854]. 


(i.l 


ASSESSMENT   AN  J   GENERAL   TAXATION. 


§38 


local  assessment  and  not  a  g-eneral  tax.'  The  theory  upon  which 
this  result  is  reached  is  that  the  exaction  is  levied  solely  upon 
the  property  benefited  by  the  improvement,  and  that  apportion- 
ment according  to  the  value  of  such  property  is  in  these  cases  a 
fair  method  of  approximating  the  apportionment  according  to 
benefits.  Thus  where  the  property  benefited  by  a  levee  is  made 
into  a  special  levee  district,  and  an  exaction  made  upon  the  prop- 
erty in  such  district  in  proportion  to  its  value,  we  have  a  charge 
which  is.  in  these  eases,  regarded  as  a  local  assessment.-  Like 
results  have  been  reached  where  similar  charges  have  been  made 
for  the  expense  of  constructing  sewers,'^  or  fences,  under  the  stock 
law  acts.*  In  other  eases  a  charge  upon  the  property  which  is 
supposed  to  be  specially  benefi.ted  by  the  improvement  appor- 
tioned among  such  property  in  proportion  to  the  value  thereof, 
is  held  to  be  a  general  tax.  and  not  a  local  assessment.^  '']\Iuch 
has  been  said  in  the  argument  against  the  validity  of.  the  statute 
0)1  the  assumption  that  it  was  intended  as  an  exercise  of  the  power 
of  local  assessment,  but  inasmuch  as  the  burden  does  not  purport 


Cliarnock  v.  Fordoche  &  Grosse 
'J  ete  Special  Levee  District  Co., 
,38  La.  Ann.  323  [1886];  Richardson 
V.  Morgan,  16  La.  Ann.  429  [18G2]; 
Yeatnian  v.  Crandell,  11  La.  Ann.  220 
IlHoGl:  Masoii  v.  Police  Jury  of 
Parisli  of  Tonsas,  9  La.  Ann.  368 
|1S.54|:  Crowley  v.  Copley,  2  La. 
Ann.  329  [  1847  1  ;  Morrison  v.  ^Morey, 
146  Mo.  543,  48  R.  W.  629  n898]  ; 
Kansas  City  v.  Ward,  134  Mo.  172,  35 
S.'  W.  600  [1896];  Pajio  v.  City  of 
St.  Louis,  20  Mo.  136  [1854];  Com- 
missioners of  Chatham  County  v. 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Kailway  Co..  133 
X.   C.  216,  45   S.   E.  56(i    11903]. 

-  Charnock  v.  Fordoche  &  Grosse 
lete  Special  Levee  District  Co.,  38 
La.  Ann.  323  [1886];  Richardson  v. 
-Morgan,  16  La.  Ann.  429  [1862]; 
^'eatnian  v.  Cnuidcll.  11  La.  Ann. 
220  [1S56]:  Mason  v.  Police  .hiry  of 
Parish  of  Tensas.  9  La.  Ann.  368 
11854]:  Crowley  v.  Copley.  2  La. 
Ann.  329  [1847];  :\Iorrison  v.  :\Iorey. 
146  Mo.  5-13,  48  S.  \V.  629  [1898]: 
]\ansas  City  v.  Ward,  134  Mo.  172, 
35  S.  W.  000    [1896]. 


'  Page  V.  City  of  St.  Louis.  20  Mo. 
136    [1854]. 

*  Commissioners  of  Chatham  Coun- 
ty V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Railwav  Co.. 
133  X.  C.  216,  45  S.  E.  566  [1903]; 
Harper  v.  Commissioners  of  Xew 
Hanover  County,  133  X".  C.  106.  45 
S.  E.  526  [1903];  Busbee  v.  Onnmis- 
sioners  of  Wake  Countv,  93  X.  C. 
143  [1883];  Cain  v.  Commissioners 
of  Davie  County,  86  X'.  C.  8   [1882], 

^Holley  V.  County  of  Orange,  106 
Cal.  420  [1895];  Williams  v.  Cor- 
coran. 46  Cal.  553  [1873];  People 
V.  ^^■hylf■r,  41  Cal.  351;  Burguieres 
v.  Sanders.  Ill  La.  109,  35  So.  478 
[1903]:  Jliller  v.  Tlixson,  64  0.  S. 
39.  59  X.  E.  749  [190]];  Carlisle  v. 
Hetherington.  47  0.  S.  235,  24  X'.  E. 
488  [1890];  Elliott  v.  Berry.  41  0. 
S.  110  [1884];  Bowles  v.  State  of 
Ohio.  37  O.  S.  35  [1881];  Fields  v. 
Commissioners  of  HiLrhland  County. 
3i;  O.  S.  476  [1881]:  City  of  Toledo 
for  use  of  Gates  v.  Lake  Shore  & 
Michigan  Southern  Railway  Co..  4 
Ohio  C.  C.  113  [18S9]. 


§  38  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  G6 

to  have  been  apportioned  to  property  benefited  according  to 
benefits,  it  was  not  a  rightful  exercise  of  such  power.  We  do  not 
think  the  legislature  intended  to  exercise  the  power  of  local  as- 
sessment according  to  benefits.  Except  as  to  property  within  a 
mile  of  the  crossing  of  free  turnpikes,  there  is  no  indication  that 
special  benefits  were  either  the  rule  or  the  limit  of  the  burden 
imposed.  The  intent  of  the  legislature,  we  think,  was  to  establish 
special  taxing  districts  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  the  expenses 
of  the  construction  of  free  turnpikes  therein  and  to  impose  the 
burden  thereof  by  taxation  upon  all  the  property  within  the 
district  by  a  uniform  rate  according  to  its  true  value  in  money."  " 
Thus  where  a  district  is  created  for  the  purpose  of  constructing 
a  road/  or  a  free  turnpike,^  or  a  levee,''  and  the  expense  of  such 
improvement  is  raised  by  a  charge  upon  such  property  according 
to  the  valuation  thereof,  such  charge  is  regarded  in  these  cases 
as  a  general  tax.  An  exaction  of  this  sort,  not  to  exceed  ten  mills 
on  the  dollar,  upon  all  taxable  real  estate  for  the  purpose  of  open- 
ing, widening,  and  grading  streets,  has  been  held  to  be  a  tax,  even 
though  called  "assessment"  in  the  statute  by  which  such  exaction 
was  imposed.^''  Under  a  statute  authorizing  the  levy  of  a  "special 
tax"  to  be  levied  "by  the  front  foot  or  the  assessed  value  there- 
of" a  "special  tax"  of  one  per  cent  was  levied  on  land  in  a  street 
improvement  district.  This  charge  was  upheld  by  the  court  as  a 
form  of  general  taxation,  though  referred  to  in  the  opinion  as  an 
"assessment."  "Whether  a  legi.slature  could  authorize  a  munici- 
pal corporation  to  assess  property  for  street  improvements,  not 
according  to  value,  but  according  to  the  supposed  benefit  to  ac- 
crue from  the  improvement  to  the  property  taxed,  has  sometimes 
been  questioned,  though  generally,  if  not  uniformly,  such  legisla- 
tion has  been  sustained.  But  the  tax  under  consideration  in- 
volves no  such  question.  It  was  assessed  according  to  value  upon 
the  property  abutting  the  street  to  be  improved,  and  differs  from 
ordinary  taxation  only  in   being  levied  upon  streets  instead  of 

''Bowles  V.  State  of  Ohio,  37  O.  S.  0.   S.   35    [1881];    Fields  v.   Commis- 

35,  44,  45    [1881].  sioners    of    Highland    County,    36    O. 

MVilliams  v.  Corcoran.  40  Cal.  553  S.   476    [1881]. 
[1873].  "People    v.    Whyler,    41    Cal.    351; 

« Miller  v.  Hixson,  64  0.  S.  39,  59  Burguieres   v.    Sanders,    111    La.    109, 

X.  E.   749    [1901];   Carlisle  v.  Heth-  35  So.  478   [1903]. 
erington,  47  O.  S.  235,  24  X.  E.  488  "Keys    v.    City    of    Xeodesha.    64 

[1890];   Bowles  v.  State  of  Ohio,  37  Kan.   681,  68   Pac.   625    [1902]. 


67 


ASSESSMENT   AND   GENERAL   TAXATION'. 


§39 


larger  districts.  It  is  quite  analogous  in  principle  to  the  raetho.i 
of  assessment  of  highway  labor  by  districts  in  use  in  this  and 
many  other  states.  It  is  not  taking  private  property  for  use  with- 
out just  compensation,  but  a  method  of  distributing  among  the 
citizens  the  public  burden  of  improving  the  streets.  We  think  the 
assessment  for  improving  the  streets  was  valid.  "^^  A  charge  ac- 
cording to  valuation  upon  all  the  property  in  a  sewer  district  for 
the  purpose  of  building  a  sewer  has  been  called  a  "general  tax."  ^- 

§39.     Term  "tax"  prima  facie  excludes  local  assessment. 

Since  there  is  this  important  and  fundamental  distinction  be- 
tween the  tax  in  the  more  limited  sense  and  the  local  assessment, 
the  question  often  arises  whether  provisions  in  constitutions  and 
statutes  which  refer  by  name  to  taxes,  include  also  local  assess- 
ments. This  is  primarily  a  question  of  legislative  intention.  In 
the  absence  of  anything  to  show  the  specific  intention  of  the  leg- 
islature, the  general  rule  is  that  the  local  assessment  possesses 
such  marked  peculiarities  differentiating  it  from  the  tax  in  the 
more  limited  sense  of  the  term,  that  the  use  of  the  term  "tax" 
does  not  prima  facie  show  an  intention  to  include  local  assess- 
ments.^ 


"  Burnes  v.  Mayor  and  City  Coun- 
cil of  Atchison,  2  Kan.  448.  479 
[18041. 

'■-  C  ity  of  Toledo  for  nso  of  Gates 
V.  Lake  Shore  &  Micliigan  Sovithern 
Railway     Co..     4     Ohio     C.     C.      li:^ 

Fi8sni.' 

M5();\rd  of  Improvement  I'aviiiu' 
District  Xo.  5  v.  Sisters  of  Mercy  of 
Female    Academy    of    Ft.    Smitl:.    — 

Ark.   ,    109    S.   \Y.    11G5    [19081: 

Crihljs  V.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555.  44 
S.  W.  707  [18971;  ^McCehee  v.  Ma- 
this.  21  Ark.  40  [18001:  Chambers 
V.  Satterlee,  40  Cal.  497  [18711;  Kil- 
gour  V.  Drainage  Commissioners,  111 
111.  342  [18851;  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Colby,  20  111.  614  [18581:  Iliggins 
V.  City  of  Chicago.  18  111.  270  [18571  ; 
Trustees  of  the  Illinois  and  ^licliigan 
Canal  v.  City  of  Chicago.  12  111.  40.3 
[18511;  Yeomans  v.  Riddle.  84  Ta! 
147,  50  X.  W.  880  [18911:  .T..hn<tMn 
V.  Louisville.  74  Kv.    (11    Busli.)    527 


[18751;  Excelsior  Planting  &  Manu- 
facturing Company  v.  Green,  39  La. 
Ann.  455.  1  So.  873  [18871;  Char- 
nock  V.  Fordoche  &  Grosse  Tete 
Sjiecial  Levee  District  Company,  38 
La.  .\nn.  323  [18801;  Barrow  v. 
Ilepler.  34  La.  Ann.  302  [18821; 
i'xiard  (if  Levee  Commissioners  v.  Lo- 
rio  Bros.,  33  La.  Ann.  276  [1881]; 
Richardson  v.  Morgan,  10  La.  Ann. 
429  11802]:  Wallace  v.  Shelton.  14 
La.  Ann.  -498  [1859]:  Williams  v. 
Cammack.  27  Miss.  209,  01  Am.  Dec. 
508  [18541:  Lamar  Water  &  Electric 
Light  Company  v.  City  of  Lamar, 
128  Mo.  188.  '.32  L.  R.  A.  157,  26 
S.  W.  1025,  31  S.  W.  756  [1895]; 
(ity  cf  Raleigh  v.  Reace,  110  N.  C. 
32:  U  L.  R.  A.  330,  14  S.  E.  521 
[189?]:  Busliee  v.  Commissioners  ot 
Wake  County.  93  X.  C.  143  [1883]; 
County  of  Harris  v.  Boyd,  70  Tex. 
237,  7  S.  W.  713  [1888]";  Taylor  v. 
Boyd.  63  Tex.  533    [1885]. 


§  40  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  68 

§  40.    Essential  nature  of  charge  controls. 

The  use  of  the  terms  "tax"  and  "assessment"  in  statutory  or 
constitutional  provisions  is  by  no  means  conclusive  of  the  nature  of 
the  charge.  This  depends  rather  upon  its  own  elements  than 
upon  the  name  by  which  it  is  called.^  On  the  one  hand  the  term 
"assessment"  is  sometimes  used  where  the  context  shows  that  a 
general  tax  is  intended.-  It  has  been  said  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  that  local  assessments  were  so  rare  a  century 
ago  that  the  w^ord  'assessment'  then  employed  in  a  statute  must 
be  taken  as  referring  to  rates  or  to  general  taxes.^  More  often  a 
charge  which  is  essentiallj^  a  local  assessment  is  referred  to  in  the 
statute  as  a  tax.*  Thus  a  charge  which  is  in  its  essential  nature 
a  local  assessment  is  referred  as  a  "tax""  a  "special  tax""  a 
"macadam  tax""  a  "sewer  tax""''  or  a  "levee  tax. "*•  So  a  stat- 
ute making  certain  property  of  railroad  corporations  "subject  to 
taxation  by  ordinance  for  city  purposes"  has  been  held  to  confer 
the  power  to  levy  local  assessments  as  well  as  to  impose  general 
taxes.^'-  In  speaking  of  an  exaction  called  in  the  statute  a  'tax' 
but  apportioned  according  to  benefits,  the  court  said:  "designat- 
ing as  a  tax  that  which  in  its  elements  is  an  assessment  can  have 


1  Doyle     V.     Austin,     47     C'al.     353  07(5.    20    L.    719    [1869];    Tallant    v. 

[1874].  City     of      Burlington,      39      la.      543 

"City  Council  of  Augusta  v.   Mur-  [1874];    County   of   Harris    v.   Boyd, 

phy,  79  Ga.  101,  3  S.  E.  326   [1887];  70  Tex.  237,  7  S.  W.  713   [1888]. 

In    the    Matter    of    the    Petition    of  For  free   gravel   roads:      Board   of 

Dassler  for  a  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus,  Commissioners  of  County  of  Monroe 

35  Kan.  678,  12  Pac.   130   [1886].  v.    Harrell,    147    Iml.    500,    46    N.    E. 

••Wells  V.  Savannah,  181  U.  S.  531,  124   [1896]. 

45    L.   986,    21    S.   697    [1901].  For  side  walks:      City  of  Dubuque 

*  Hancock    v.    Whittemore,    50    Cal.  v.  Harrison,  34  la.  163   [1872];   Mer- 

522    [1875];    People  ex   rel.  Doyle  v.  riam    v.    Moody's    Executors,    25    la. 

Austin,    47    Cal.    353    [1874];    Daily  163    [1872]. 

v.    Swope,    47    Miss.    367    [1872]  'Sanger  v.   Rice,   43    Kan.   580,   23 

"An   assessment  for   levee  purposes  Pac.    633    [1890]. 

is  not  a  tax  in  the  strict  legal  sense  "  Dittoe   v.   C  ity   of   Davenport,    74 

of  the  term,  although   it   is   true  the  la.  66.  3t)  X.  W.  895    [1887];   Mason 

Legislature    has    called    it    so    in    the  v.  Spencer.  35  Kan.  512,   11  Pac.  402 

act    whose     constitutionnlity     is     at-  [1880]. 

tacked."      Yeatman    v.    Crandell.     11  "  Yeatman  v.  Crandell,  11  La.  Ann. 

La.   Ann.   220,   221    [1856].  220    [1850]. 

•■Willard  v.  Presbury,  81  U.  S.    (14  '"City    of    Pliiladelphia    for    use    of 

Wall.)    676.    20    L.    719    [1869],    (an  ]\IcCann    v.    Philadelphia    &    Reading 

assessment    for    re-paving    a    street).  Railroad    Company,    177   Pa.   St.   292. 

«As  in  street  improvements:      Wil-  34  L.  R.  A.  564,  35  Atl.  010    [1S90]. 
lard  V.  Preshurv.  81  V.  S.   (14  Wall.) 


69 


ASSESSMENT   AND   GENERAL   TAXATION. 


41 


no  effect  in  deterniiniiiu'  whether  it  is  one  or  the  other."  ^^  In  the 
same  opinion  the  same  charge  is  often  referred  to  indiscrimin- 
ately as  a  'tax"  and  'assessment.'  ^- 

§41.    Term  'tax'  as  including  assessment. 

If  the  statute  specifically  provides  that  the  word  'tax'  means 
any  tax  or  special  assessment,  there  is,  of  course,  no  ciuestion  but 
that  under  such  statute  the  word  'tax'  includes  assessments.^ 
Under  such  statute  an  assessment  is  regarded  as  a  tax  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  providing  for  foreclosure  in  equity  of 
the  lien  given  by  statute  for  such  assessments.-  or  within  the 
meaning  of  a  statute  providing  for  appeals  to  a  certain  court.'' 
Under  some  statutes  the  provisions  concerning  taxes  are  so 
worded  as  to  show  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  include 
assessments  in  such  provisions.  Full  effect  is,  of  course,  given  to 
such  intention,  and  an  assessment  is  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of 
such  statutes.*  Thus,  under  such  statutes,  an  assessment  is  a  tax 
with  reference  to  the  sale  and  conveyance  of  land  for  non-pay- 
ment of  taxes,"'  and  with  reference  to  the  .settlement  of  unpaid 
taxes  between  the  town  treasurer  and  the  county  treasurer."  So 
a  certificate  issued  upon  a  sale  of  land  for  the  non-payment  of  an 
assessment  is  a  'tax  certificate' '  and  a  statute  limiting  the  bring- 
ing of  an  action  "to  set  aside  any  sale  of  lands  for  the  non-pay- 


"  People  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  Austin. 
47   C  al.  353.   358    [1874]. 

i-Willard  v.  Presbuiy.  81  U.  S.  (14 
Wall.)  670,  20  L.  719  [1809];  City 
of  Dubuque  v.  Harrison.  34  Ja.  103 
[1872]. 

'  Blake  v.  People  for  use  of  Cald- 
well,   109    111.    504    [1884]. 

-Gauen  v.  Moredock  and  Ivy  Land- 
ing Drainage  District  Xo.  1.  131  111. 
440.   23   X.   E.   033    [1890]. 

'■'  Peo]>le  ex  rel.  Johnson  v.  Spriiii^- 
er.  100  111.  542  [1883]:  Potwin  v. 
Johnson.    lOt)   111.  532    [1883]. 

*San<rer  v.  Rice,  43  Kan.  580.  23 
Pac.  633  [1890];  Pratt  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee.  93  Wis.  658.  OS  X.  W. 
392  [18901:  Yates  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee. 92  Wis.  352.  (iO  X.  W. 
248  [1890]:  ShehovL^an  County  v. 
Citv    of   Shebovixan.    54    Wis.    415.    11 


X.  W.  598  [1882]:  Dalryniple  v.  City 
of  Milwaukee.  53  Wis.  178,  10  X.  W. 
141     [1881]. 

"We  have  used  the  terms  •assess- 
ment' and  'tax'  interchangeably,  for 
tiiey  are  so  employed  in  the  statute 
wmch  rules  this  case.  Within  the 
meaning  of  those  statutes  a  special 
assessment  for  the  cost  of  {^radin^; 
is  a  tax."  Sheboy<ran  County  v.  City 
of  Shebovfran.  54  Wis.  415."  421,  11 
X.    W.   598    [1882]. 

^'^anjier  v.  Rice.  43  Kan.  580.  23 
Pac.  033  [18901;  Yates  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee.  <)2  Wis.  .352,  06  N.'  W. 
2^8    11890]. 

"Sheboygan  County  v.  City  of  She- 
hovfran,  54  Wis.  M5.  11  X.  W.  598 
[1882]. 

•  Pratt  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  93 
Wis.   058.  OS   X.   W.   392    [1896]. 


s  42 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


70 


i;ient  of  taxes,  or  to  cancel  any  tax  certificate,  or  to  restrain  or 
prevent  the  issuing  of  any  tax  deed  or  any  tax  certificate  or  to 
set  aside  and  cancel  any  tax  deed"  to  "nine  months  after  the 
making  of  such  sale,  date  of  such  certificate  or  recording  of  such 
tax  deed,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  not  thereafter"  applies  to  a 
sale  for  the  non-payment  of  a  local  assessment.^ 

§  42.    Assessment  not  tax  within  provisions  for  exemption. 

]\Iany  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions  are  found  ex- 
empting property  from  taxation  or  from  taxation  for  certain  pur- 
poses. The  validity  and  effect  of  these  provisions  are  discussed 
in  detail  elsewhere.^  In  this  connection  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that 
it  is  generally  held  that  a  local  assessment  is  not  a  tax  within  the 
meaning  of  provisions  of  this  sort.-     This  principle  has  been  ap- 


"  Dalrymple  v.  L  ity  of  Milwaukee, 
r>3  Wis.*  178,  in  X.  Vv.  141    11881]. 

^See  §  G18. 

-  Ford  V.  Delta  &  Pine  Land  Co., 
104  U.  S.  662,  41  L.  500,  17  S.  230 
[1897],  {affirming  Ford  v.  Delta  & 
Pine  Land  Co.,  43  Fed.  181  [1890])  ; 
Board  of  Improvement  Paving  Dis- 
trict No.  5  V.  Sisters  of  Mercy  of 
Female    Academy    of    Ft.    Smith,    — 

Ark.   ,    109    S.    W.    1165    [190SJ; 

City  of  San  Diego  v.  Linda  Vista 
Irrigation  District,  108  Cal.  189;  35 
L.  R.  A.  33;  41  Pac.  291  [1905]; 
City  of  Bridgeport  v.  New  York  & 
New  Haven  Railroad  Co.,  36  Conn. 
255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869];  City  of 
Chicago  in  Trust  for  Use  of  Schools 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  207  111.  37,  69  N. 
E.  580  [1904];  County  of  Adams  v. 
City  of  Quincy.  130  Il"l.  566.  6  L.  R. 
A.  155,  22  N.  E.  624  [1890];  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of  Deca- 
tur, 126  in.  92,  1  L.  R.  A.  613, 
18  N.  E.  315  [1890];  LTniversity 
V.  People,  80  111.  333,  22  Am. 
Rep.  187;  People  v.  Western  Society, 
87  111.  246  [1871];  City  of  Ottawa 
V.  Spencer,  40  111.  211  [1866];  Trus- 
tees V.  McConnel,  12  111.  138  [1850]; 
Edwards  &  Walsh  Construction  Co. 
V.  Jasper  County,  117  la.  305,  94 
Am.    St.    Rep.    301,    90    N.    W.    1006 


[1902];  Farwell  v.  Des  IMoines  Brick 
^Manufacturing  Co.,  97  la.  280,  35 
L.  R.  A.  03,  66  N.  W.  176  [1896]; 
Paine  v.  Spratley,  5  Kan.  317  [1870]  ; 
Atfhison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Peterson,  5  Kan.  App. 
103,  48  Pac.  877  [1897];  Zable  v. 
Louisville  Baptist  Orphans'  Home, 
92  Ky.  89,  13  L.  R.  A.  668,  17  S.  W. 
212,  13  Ky.  L.  R.  385  [1891];  City 
of  Lafayette  v.  ilale  Orphans'  Asy- 
lum, 4  La.  Ann.  1  [1849];  Crowley 
V.  Copley,  2  La.  Ann.  329  [1847]; 
Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern 
Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids, 102  Mich.  374,  29  L.  R.  A.  195. 
60  N.  W.  767  [1894];  Lefevre  v. 
]Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit,  2  :Mich.  586 
[1853];  Washburn  IMemorial  Orphan 
Asylum  v.  State,  73  Minn.  343,  76 
N.  \V.  204  [1898];  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  183 
Mo.  451,  82  S.  W.  64  [1904];  Kan- 
sas City  Exposition  Driving  Park  v. 
Kauj^as'  City,  174  Mo.  425,  74  S.  W. 
979  [1903];  City  of  Clinton  to  use 
of  Thornton  v.  Henry  County,  115 
Mo.  557,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  415,"  22  S. 
W.  494  [1893];  Sheehan  v.  Good  Sa- 
maritan Hospital,  50  Mo.  155;  City 
of  Beatrice  v.  Brethren  Church  of 
Beatrice,  41  Neb.  358;  59  N.  W.  932 
[1894];    State,    New   Jer.sey    :\ridlaiid 


71 


ASSESSMENT   AND   GENERAL   TAXATION. 


§42 


plied  to  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions  exempting  from 
taxation  churches,-^  cemeteries,*  charitable  institutions,"'  educa- 
tional institutions,"  and  public  school  property.'     So  it  has  been 


Railroad  Co.,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermen of  Jersey  City,  42  X.  J.  L. 
(13  Vr.)  97  [1880];  State,  New  Jer- 
sey Railroad  &  Transportation  Com- 
pany, Pros.  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  37 
N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  330  [1875];  State, 
Protestant  Foster  Home  Society, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  the  City  of  Newark,  3G  N.  J.  L. 
(7  Vr.)  478,  13  Am.  Rep.  464 
1 1873] ;  State,  New  Jersey  Railroad 
&  Transportation  Co.,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Newark,  27  N.  J.  L.  (3  Dutch.)  "^185 
[1858];  President  and  Council  of  the 
(  ity  of  Paterson  v.  Society  for  Es- 
tablishing Useful  Manufactures,  24 
N.  J.  L.  (4  Zab.)  385  [1854];  Roose- 
velt Hospital  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 
York,  84  N.  Y.  108  [1881]';  Hassan 
V.  City  of  Rochester,  67  N.  Y.  528 
[1876];  In  re  M.  E.  Church,  66  N. 
Y.  395  [1876];  Buffalo  City  Ceme- 
tery V.  Buffalo,  46  N.  Y.  503"^[1871]  ; 
Sharp  V.  Speir,  4  Hill  76  [1843]; 
In  the  matter  of  the  Application  of 
the  Mayor  and  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York 
for  the  Enlarging  and  lni])roving  a 
Part  of  Nassau  Street  in  the  said 
City,  11  Johns.  77  [1814];  City  of 
Philadelphia  v.  Union  Burial  Ground 
Society  of  the  City  and  County  of 
Philadelphia  178  Pa.  St.  533,  36  L. 
R.  A.  263,*36  Atl.  172  [1896];  Beltz- 
hoover  Borough  v.  Heirs  of  Beltz- 
hoover,  173  Pa.  St.  213,  33  Atl.  1047 
[1896];  New  Castle  City  v.  Jackson, 
172  Pa.  St.  86,  33  Atl. '236  [18951; 
Philadelpjiia  v.  Pennsylvania  Hospi- 
tal, 143  Pa.  St.  367,  22  Atl.  744 
[1891];  Second  Universal ist  Society 
V.  City  of  Providence.  6  R.  I.  235; 
Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Watertown.    1     S.    1).    46.    44    N.'  W. 


1072  [1890];  Yates  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 92  Wis.  352,  66  N.  W.  248 
II896J. 

"City  of  Atlanta  v.  First  Presby- 
terian Church,  86  Ga.  730,  12  L.  R. 
A.  852,  13  S.  E.  252  [1890];  Lefevre 
v.  Maj^or,  etc.,  of  Detroit,  2  Mic'i. 
586  [1853];  City  of  Beatrice  v. 
Brethren  Church  of  Beatrice,  41  Neb. 
358,  59  N.  W.  932  [1894];  In  the 
matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 
of  the  City  of  New  York  for  the 
Enlarging  and  Improving  a  Part  of 
Nassau  Street  in  the  said  City,  11 
Johns.   77    [1814]. 

*  Louisville,  v.  Nevin,  73  Ky.  ( 10 
Bush.)  549,  19  Am.  Rep.  78  [1874]; 
Buffalo  City  Cemetery  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo, 46  N.'  Y.  506  [1871];  Lima  v. 
Cemetery  Association,  42  O.  S.  128, 
51  Am.  Rep.  809    [1884]. 

^  Zahel  v.  Louisville  Baptist  Or- 
phans' Home,  92  Ky.  89,  13  L.  R.  A. 
668,  17  S.  W.  212,  13  Ky.  L.  R.  385 
[1891];  City  of  Lafayette  v.  Male 
Orphans'  Asylum,  4  La.  Ann.  1 
[1849];  Crowley  v.  Copley,  2  La. 
Ann.  329  [1847];  Washburn  Memo- 
rial Orphan  Asylum  v.  State,  73 
Minn.  343,  76  N.  W.  204  [1898]; 
Boston  Seamen's  Friend  Society  v. 
Mayor  of  City  of  Boston.  116  Mass. 
181,  17  Am".  Rep.  153;  Sheehan 
V.  Good  Samaritan  Hospital,  50  Mo. 
155,  11  Am.  Rep.  412  [1872];  Roose- 
velt Hospital  V.  flavor.  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  Ci<y  of  New 
York,  84  N.  Y."  108    [1881]*. 

°  In  the  matter  of  College  Street. 
8   R.   I.   474    [18671. 

^  City  of  Chicago  in  Trust  for  Use 
of  Schools  v.  City  of  Chicago,  207  111. 
37,  69  N.  E.  580  [1904];  St.  Loui-; 
Public  Schools  v.  City  of  St.  Loui^. 
26   Mo.   468    [1857]. 


§42 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


72 


applied  to  constitutional^  and  statutory"  provisions  exempting 
from  taxation  land  belonging  to  the  state,  to  municipalities  and 
the  like.  It  has  been  applied  to  statutes  exempting  land  from 
"taxation"  as  long  as  it  is  leased,  used  and  occupied  by  a  State 
Agricultural  Society^'  and  to  a  statute  exempting  from  'taxes 
charges  or  impositions'  property  of  a  society  for  the  establish- 
ment of  useful  manufactures."  Under  the  constitution  of  Texas 
a  homestead  is  exempt  from  forced  sales,  but  by  another  provi- 
sion this  exemption  does  not  apply  to  sales  for  taxes  due  thereon. 
The  original  view  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Texas  was  that  an  as- 
sessment w^as  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  this  latter  provision 
and  that  accordingly  a  homestead  was  not  exempt  from  a  forced 
sale  for  non-payment  of  an  assessment  due  thereon.^-  Subse- 
quently, however,  this  view  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  'tax'  was 
abandoned,  the  earlier  decision  was  overruled,  and  it  was  held 
that  an  assessment  is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  .such  provi- 
sion, and  that  accordingly  a  homestead  is  exempt  from  forced 
sale  for  non-payment  of  an  assessment.^''  So  an  assessment  is  not 
a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  providing  for  a  certain 
form  of  taxation  for  railroads  and  exempting  them  from  all  other 
taxation;^*  or  within  a  statute  exempting  from  taxation  for  fiv3 
years  from  the  sale  thereof,  any  lands  sold  by  the  United  States  ^^ 
or  within  a  statute  exempting  from  'all  taxation'  lands  granted 


*  Barber  Asjjhalt  Paving  Co.  v. 
City  of  St.  Joseph,  183  Mo.  451,  82  S. 
W.  64  [1904];  City  of  Clinton  to 
use  of  Thornton  v.  Henry  County, 
115  Mo.  557,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  415, 
22  S.  W.  494  [1893]. 

°  Hassan  v.  City  of  Rochester.  67 
N.  Y.  528    [1876]! 

1"  Yates  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  92 
Wis.  352,   66  N.  "w.   248    [1896]. 

"  President  and  Council  of  the  City 
of  Paterson  v.  Society  for  Establish- 
ing Useful  ^Manufactures,  24  N.  J. 
L.    (4  Zab.)    385    [1854]. 

■^  Lufkin  V.  City  of  Galveston,  58 
Tex.   545    [1883]. 

13  Higgins  V.  Bordages.  88  Tex.  458, 
53  Am.  St.  Rep.  770,  31  S.  W.  52, 
803  [1895].  To  the  same  effect  are 
Storrie  v.  Cortes,  90  Tex.  283,  35  L. 
R.    A.    666,    38    S.    W.    154     [1896]; 


Lovenberg  v.  City  of  Galveston,  17 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  162,  42  S.  W.  1024 
[1897]. 

"  C  ity  of  Bridgeport  v.  New  York 
&  New  Haven  Railroad  Co.,  36  Conn. 
255.  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869];  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of  Deca- 
tur. 126  111.  92,  1  L.  R.  A.  613,  18 
N.  E.  315  [1890];  Luke  Shore  & 
Michigan  Southern  Railway  Co.  v. 
City  of  Grand  Rapids,  102  Mich.  374. 
29  L.  R.  A.  195,  60  N.  W.  767  [1894]  ; 
State,  New  Jersey  Midland  Railroad 
Co.,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Jersey  City,  42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  97 
[1880];  State,  New  Jersey  Railroad 
&  Transportation  Co.,  Pros.  v.  City 
of  Elizabeth,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.") 
330    [1875]. 

^^  Crowley  v.  Copley,  2  La.  Ann. 
329   [1847]. 


73  assess:ment  and  general  taxation.  §  4-2 

to  a  certain  railroad^-'  or  exempting  from  taxation  for  any  city 
purposes  lands  within  the  city  limits  used  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses.i'  jj^  ^11  these  cases  it  is  generally  held  that  a  local  assess- 
ment is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  provisions  for  ex- 
emption, and  that  it  may,  therefore,  be  levied  notwithstanding 
such  provisions.  In  Pennsylvania  a  local  assessment  was  origin- 
ally held  to  be  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  provisions  in  the 
constitution  and  statutes  exempting  certain  property  from  taxa- 
tion,^* except  such  assessments  as  were  referred  by  the  courts  to 
the  police  power,  such  as  assessments  for  curbing,"  or  for  side- 
walks.-' Subsequently,  however,  the  earlier  decisions  were  not 
followed,  and  it  was  held  that  within  the  meaning  of  such  provi- 
sions for  exemption  an  assessment  is  not  a  tax.-^  on  the  ground 
that  "the  constitutional  exemption  relates  to  taxes  proper,  or 
general  public  contributions  levied  and  collected  by  the  state,  or 
by  its  authorized  municipal  agencies  for  general  governmental 
purposes,  as  distinguished  from  peculiar  forms  of  taxation  or 
special  assessments  imposed  on  property  within  the  limited  areas 
by  which  the  property  assessed  is  specially  and  peculiarly  bene- 
fited and  enhanced  in  value  to  an  amount  at  least  equal  to  the 
as.sessment. " --  This  later  view  has  been  taken  in  several  cases 
decided  subsequently,-''  and  the  Pennsylvania  courts  now  seem  to 
he  committed  to  the  rule  accepted  by  the  great  weight  of  au- 
thoritv. 


'"Winona  &   St.   P.   R.   Co.  v.   City  Pa.   St.   475,   30   Atl.    1007    [1895J. 

<f  Watertown,   1   S.   D.  4(>.  44  X.  W.  -'"Broad    Street:    Sewickley   Metho. 

1072    [1890].  (list   Episcopal   Church's  Appeal,    1G5 

■'  Farwoll     v.     Des     Moinos     P.rick  Pa.    St.    475;     30    Atl.    1007     [1895]. 

^Manufacturing  Co.,  97  la.  28().  35  L.  ([uoted    in    City    of    Philadelphia    v. 

R.   A.  03.  G6  X.  W.   170    [1890].  Cnion  Burial  Ground  Society  of  the 

'Hity  of  Erie  v.  First  Univcrsalisl  (  ity  and  County  of  Philadelphia.  178 

(  hurcl/.  105  Pa.  St.  278  [1SS4|:  Oliv.-  i'a.'   St.    533.    538.    36    L.    R.    A.    263, 

Cemetery  Co.  v.  Philadelphia.  93    Pa.  36  Atl.  172  [1896]. 

St.    129.   39    Am.    Rep.    732.  -H'ity    of    Philadelphia     v.     Union 

'"  Philadolphin        v.       Pennsylvania  Burial    Ground    Society    of    the    City 

Hospital.    143    Pa.    St.    3(i7.    22    Atl.  and  ('(Hinty  of  Philadelphia,   178   Pa. 

744     11891].  St.  5:13.  30  L.   R.  A.  263,  36  Atl.   172 

=  'Wilkins1mrg  Borough  V.  llouK- for  IISOOJ:       Bcit/.hoover      Borough      v. 

Aged   Women.   131   Pa.   St.    lOO:    (i   L.  Ih'irs  of  Beltzhoover,  173  Pa.  St.  213. 

R.   A.   531,    18  Atl.  937    11890].  :!3  Atl.  1047  [1896];  Xew  Castle  City 

-'Broad    Street;    Sewickley    :\I(>tli(.-  v.    Jackson,    172    Pa.    St.    86.    33    Atl. 

di-t    Episcopal    Church's   Appeal,    165  236     [1895]. 


§43 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT 


74 


§  43.     Assessment  not  tax  within  provision  for  equality  and  uni- 
formity. 

In  the  constitutions  of  the  several  states  of  the  union  are  often 
found  provisions  that  taxation  must  be  uniform,  or  uniform  and 
equal,  throughout  the  state.  Whether  an  assessment  is  a  tax 
within  the  meaning  of  these  provisions  is  a  question  which  has 
often  been  presented  to  the  courts  for  decision,  and  it  is  held  by 
the  great  weight  of  authority  that  a  local  assessment  is  not  a 
tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  constitutional  provisions.^  In 
some  opinions  this  view  is  somewhat  qualitied  by  the  expression 


'  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222  [1874]; 
Chambers  v.  Satterlee,  40  Cal.  497 
[1871];  Creighton  v.  Mauson,  27  Cal. 
614  [1865];  Burnett  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Sar- 
ramento,  12  Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec. 
518  [1859];  Speer  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49;  9  L. 
R.  A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890|; 
Hayden  v.  City  of  Atlanta.  70  Ca. 
817  [1883];  Bedard  v.  Hall.  44  111. 
91  [1867];  Reinkeu  v.  Fuehring  130 
Ind.  382  30  Am.  St.  llcp.  247,  15  L. 
R.  A.  624,  37  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas. 
354,  30  N.  E.  414  [1891];  Gosnell 
V.  City  of  Louisville,  104  Ky.  201,  46 
S.  W.  722,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  519  [1898]; 
State  ex  rel.  Hill  v.  Judges  of  Court 
of  Appeals,  46  La.  Ann.  1292,  16  So. 
219;  Excelsior  Planting  &  ilanufiic- 
turing  Co.  v.  Green.  39  La.  Ann.  -155. 
1  So.  873  [1887];  City  of  New  Or- 
leans praying  for  Opening  of  Casaca- 
loo  and  Moreau  Streets,  20  La.  Ann. 
497  [1868];  Richardson  v.  Morgan, 
16  La.  Ann.  429  [1862];  Yeatman 
V.  Crandall,  11  La.  Ann.  220  [1856]; 
Wnllace  v.  Shelton,  14  La.  Ann.  498 
[1859];  New  Orleans  Drainage  Com- 
pany praying  for  the  confirmation 
of  a  tableau,  11  La.  Ann.  338  [1856  |  ; 
(see  opinion  on  rehearing,  351); 
Oakey  v.  Mayor.  1  La.  1  [1830]; 
Motz  v.  City  of  Detroit,  18  ]Mich.  494 
[1869];  Nugent  v.  City  of  Jackson, 
72  Miss.  1040,  18  So."  493  [1895]; 
Town    of    Ylacon    v.    Patty,    57    Miss. 


378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451  [1879];  Yasser 
V.  George,  47  Miss.  713  [1873];  Daily 
V.  Swope,  47  Miss.  367  [1872];  He- 
man  Construction  Co.  v.  Wabash  R. 
Co.,  206  Mo.  172,  104  S.  VV.  67 
[1907'];  Meier  V.  City  of  St.  Louis. 
180  Mo.  391,  79  S.  Vv.  955  [1903]: 
City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Owen,  110  Mo. 
445,  19  S.  W.  713  [1892];  Adams 
V.  Lindell,  72  Mo.  198  [1880].  (So 
Adams  v.  Lindell,  5  Mo.  App.  197 
I  1878]  )  ;  Shuford  v.  Commissioners 
of  (Gaston  County,  86  N.  C.  552 
[18S2];  Cain  v.  Commissioners  ot 
Davie  County,  86  N.  C.  8  [1882]: 
Kadderly  v.  Portland,  44  Ore.  118, 
74  Pac'  710,  75  Pac.  222  [1903 1; 
King  V.  Portland,  38  Ore.  402,  52 
L.  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900]  ;  Mas- 
ters V. '  City  of  Portland,  24  Ore. 
161,  33  Pac.  540  [1893];  King  v. 
City  of  Portland,  2  Ore.  146 
[1865];  Taylor  v.  Boyd,  63  Tex.  533 
[1885];  Alien  v.  Galveston,  51  Tex. 
302  [1879];  Roundtree  v.  Galveston, 
42  Tex.  012  [1875];  Nalle  v.  City 
of  Austin,  —  Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ,  103 
S.  W.  825  [1907];  Davis  v.  City  of 
Lynchburg,  84  Va.  861,  6  S.  E.  230 
[i888];  Richmond  &  Allegheny  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  City  of  Lynchburg,  81  Va.  473 
[1866];  Gilkeson  v.  Frederick  Jus- 
tices 13  Gratt.  (Va.)  577;  City  of 
Spokane  Falls  v.  Browne,  3  Wash.  84, 
27  Pac.  1077  [1891];  Douglass  v. 
Town  of  Harrisville,  9  W.  Va.  162. 
27    Am.   Rep.   548    [1876]. 


75  ASSESSMENT    AND   GENERAL   TAXATION.  §  43 

of  the  opinion  that  if  such  provision  does  ai)ply,  the  assessment 
may  nevertheless  be  so  api)ortioned  that  it  will  conform  to  the 
requirement  of  uniformity  as  nearly  as  such  a  form  of  tax  can.- 
It  "is  as  uniform  as  any  taxation  in  relation  to  the  subject  could 
be."'^  This  view  has  been  expressed  both  in  cases  in  which  it  has 
been  said  that  the  constitutional  requirement  of  uniformity  ap- 
plies,* and  those  in  which  it  is  said  not  to  apply."'  Analogous  pro- 
visions are  found  in  some  constitutions  to  the  effect  that  taxes 
levied  upon  property  must  be  assessed  in  proportion  to  the  value 
of  such  property.  Under  provisions  of  this  sort  it  is  ordinarily 
held  that  a  local  assessment  is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of 
the  term  as  used  in  such  provision.'''  This  result  has  been  reached 
under  very  stringent  constitutional  provisions,  as  that  "all  taxes 
levied  on  property  shall  be  assessed  in  exact  proportion  to  the 
value  of  such  property"  '  or  that  "all  property  subject  to  taxation 
.shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value,"  **  or  that  taxes  on  prop- 
erty shall  be  "assessed  equally,  according  to  the  just  value  there- 
of."^ No  matter  how  clear  the  constitutional  requirement  of 
uniformity  may  be,  the  theory,  as  held  by  these  courts,  is  that 
.such  provisions  are  intended  to  apply  only  to  general  taxation  im- 
posed for  the  purpose  of  raising  revenue  to  carry  on  the  govern- 
ment, and  not  to  local  assessments  for  which,  in  the  theory  of  the 
law,  at  least,  full  compensation  is  made  to  the  owner  of  the  prop- 
erty assessed,  in  the  form  of  benefits  conferred  by  the  improve- 
ment for  which  the  assessment  is  levied. ^'^ 


"Wliitiii'j;   V.   Qiiackonbusli.   r)4   Cal.  Dec    .70    [ISnSh   -Tout's  v.  Holzapfel, 

300    fl880];    Law  v.  Madison.   Stiivi-  11     Okl.    40.1.    (iS    I'up.    511     [10021: 

Jia  &  Graham  Turnpike  Co..  :50   Tnd.  Winona    &    St.    P.    R.    Co.    v.    City   of 

77    [1808];    Oakey    v.    ]\Iayor,    1    La.  Watcrtown,    1     S.    D.    40,    44    X."   W. 

1   [1830L  1072    [1890L 

'Oakey  v.   Mayor,    1   La.    1    [1S:?01.  '  ^Mayor  and  Aldormon  of  Birminu;- 

MMiitintr   v.   Qnackenbusli,    .")  I    Cal.  liam  v.  Klein.  SO  Ala.  401,  8  L.  E.  A. 

306    [1880].  3ti0.    7    So.    380    [ISSOj. 

"Oakey   v.    flavor.    1    La.    1    |1S;1()1.  ''.Tones    v.    Tlol/apfel.    11    Okl.    40;"). 

•^  Mayor  and    Aldermen   of   P.irmin;!;-  (iS    I'ae.    .Ill     [1002]. 

ham  V.  Klein.  SO  Ala.  401.  8  L.  IL  A.  "City    of    Aulairn    v.    Panl.    84    Me. 

300,    7    So.    380    [18.^0];     Kiehardsoii  212.    2!    All.    817    [1802]. 

V.  Morcran.   10  La.    Ann.  420    [1802];  '" 'l'he-;e  questions  are  considered  in 

City  of  Aiiliurn  v.  l^anl,  84  ^fe.  212.  connection  with   specific  constitution- 

24  Atl.   817    [1802]:   Egyptian   Levee  al  provisions.     See  §140  et  seq. 
Co.   V.   Hardin,   27   Mo."  495.   72   Am. 


§  44  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  76 

;;  44,     Special  views  of  certain  states. 

In  some  jurisdictions  a  different  view  was  taken  originally,  the 
courts  in  these  states  holding  that  an  assessment  was  a  tax  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision  requiring  uniform- 
ity; but  either  by  change  in  judicial  decision  or  by  constitutional 
amendment  this  view  has  been  abandoned.  Thus  in  Colorado  it 
was  held  originally  that  an  assessment  was  a  tax  and  therefore 
invalid  as  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  requirement  of  uni- 
formity.^ This  theory  was  subsequently  abandoned  and  the  view 
entertained  by  the  weight  of  authority,  that  an  assessment  was 
not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  constitutional  requirement 
was  adopted.-  It  may  be  here  noted  that  when  the  original  Colo- 
rado rule  on  this  point  was  in  force  it  was  applied  to  improve- 
ments which  the  court  referred  to  the  taxing  power  such  as  curb- 
stones and  gutters,^  or  grading  and  paving  streets,*  but  not  to 
improvements  referred  by  the  court  to  the  doctrine  of  the  police 
power,  such  as  sewers,"'  in  which  case  assessments  were  held  to  be 
valid  though  not  uniform.  In  Illinois  a  local  assessment  was  held 
to  be  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  requirement 
of  uniformity."  This  principle,  however,  was  applied  so  as  to  in- 
validate assessments  apportioned  according  to  the  frontage  of  the 
land  assessed,^  and  was  not  so  applied  as  to  invalidate  assess- 
ments entirely.  If  apportioned  according,  to  actual  benefits,  an 
assessment  might  be  valid. '^     Subsequently  on  the  adoption  of  the 

^  In  re  House  Resolutions  Concern-,  [18G7];    Bedard   v.    Hall,   44    111.    91 

i:iir    Street    Improvements,    15    Colo.  [1867];   City  of  Chicago  v.  Baer,  41 

598,   26   Pac.   323    [1890];    Wilson   v.  111.    306    [1866];    City   of   Ottawa   v. 

Chilcott,    12    Colo.    600,   21    Pac.    901  Spencer,  40   111.  211    [1866];    City  of 

[1889];    Palmer  v.  \Yay,  6  Colo.   106  Chicago  v.  Larned,  34  111.  203   18!]4]. 

[1881].  '"In  that  ca-e    (i.  c..  City  of  Chi- 

-City    of    Denver    v.    Knowles.    17  cago   v.   Larned,   34   111.    203    [1864]) 

Colo.   204,   17   L.   R.   A.    135.   30    Pac.  it  was  lield    that   in   taxation,   equal- 

1041    11892],    (overruling    Palmer    v.  ity   and   uniformity   were   indispensa- 

Way,    6    Colo.    106    [1881],    and    the  ble  to  its  constitutionality,  and  that 

cases    which    followed    it).  the  same  principle  applied  to  assess- 

'  Wilson   V.   Chilcott,    12   Colo.   600,  ments   for   public    improvements,   and 

21   Pac.  901    [1889].  tliat  an  assessment  upon  the  size  or 

*/«  re  House  Resolutions  Concern-  wiilth   of  the  front  of  a  lot  without 

ing    Street    Improvements,     15    Colo.  reference  to  its  value  was  invalid,  as 

598.  26  Pac.  323   [1890].  being    in    violation    of    the    principle 

^  City    of    Pueblo    v.    Robinson,    12  of    equality    and    uniformity."      Hol- 

Colo.  593,  21  Pac.  899   [1889];   Keese  brook  v.   Dickinson,   46   111.   285,   287, 

v.  Citv   of  Denver,    10   Colo.    112,    15  288    [1867]. 

Pac.  825    [1887].  "Bedard  v.  Hall,  44  111.  91   [1867]. 

« Holbrook  v.  Dickinson,  46  111.  285 


7/  ASSESSMENT   AND   GENERAL   TAXATION.  §41- 

constitution  of  1870  a  provision  inserted  therein  '•'  anthorized  thr 
legislature  to  "vest  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and 
villages  with  power  to  make  local  improvements  by  special  as- 
sessment or  by  special  taxation  of  contiguous  property  or  other- 
wise." Under  this  provision  it  has  been  held  that  a  local  assess- 
ment is  not  within  the  provision  of  the  constitution  requiring  uni- 
formity of  taxation.^'  This  question  in  Illinois,  then,  resolves 
itself  into  a  question  of  the  rule  of  apportionment,  and  is  dis- 
cussed in  detail  under  that  topic. ^'  In  IMinnesota  it  was  held  ori- 
ginally that  a  local  assessment  is  a  tax  wnthin  the  provision  re- 
quiring a  tax  to  be  levied  according  to  the  valuation  of  the  prop- 
erty assessed.^-  Su])sequently  a  provision  was  inserted  in  the 
new  constitution  of  IMinnesota  allowing  local  assessments  to  be 
levied  according  to  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  improvement  up- 
on the  property  assessed,  and  in  some  cases,  according  to  the 
frontage  of  the  property  benefited,  upon  the  improvement."  Un- 
der such  a  provision  an  assessment  is  not  held  to  be  a  tax  within 
the  meaning  of  the  provision  requiring  uniformity.  In  South 
Carolina  the  view  is  now  maintained  that  an  assessment  is  a  tax 
Avithin  the  meaning  of  the  provision  requiring  uniformity  as  far 
as  such  assessment  is  of  a  kind  referrable  to  the  taxing  power.^* 
Whether  an  assessment,  as  for  a  sidewalk,  can  be  referred  to  the 
police  power,  and  hence  held  not  to  be  a  tax  within  the  meaning 
of  the  provision  reciuiring  uniformity  is  a  (piestion  upon  which 
there  is  a  conflict  of  opinion  in  these  jurisdictions,  Tennessee 
holding  that  such  an  improvement  as  a  sidewalk  is  to  be  referred 
to  the  police  power  and  is,  therefore,  not  a  tnx  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  provision  requiring  uniformity.^''  while  in  South  Caro- 
lina it  has  finally  been  held  that  such   improveinents  are  not  so 

»  Constitution  of  Illinois  1870,  Art.  322   [1898]  ;   :M!vnl(lin  v.  City  Council 

IX..  8  !).  of   Cieenviilo.   42    S.   C.   293,   4G    Am. 

'"White   V.   People   ex   rel.   City   of  St.  Rep.  723.  27  L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S. 

Blooninjiton,  94  III.  604   [1880].  E.    842    [18931:    State    ex    rel.    Hool- 

"  See  (  liapter  XIIT.  beck  v.  City  Council  of  Charlestown, 

'=IM(Iwell  V.  Coleman,  11  Minn.  45;  12    Rich.    702    flSfiOl. 

Stinson  V.  Smith,  8  ]\rinn.  306  [1863].  '^Mayor    and    Aldcrjucn    v.    Mahcr- 

'•■' Con.stitution    of    ^Minnesota,    Art.  ry.    25    Town.     (0    Humph.)     3(58,    44 

IX.,   §  9.  Am.  Dec.  315  [1845]  ;  Whyte  v.  May- 

"  Mauldin  V.  (ity  Council  of  Green-  or    and     Aldermen    of    Nashville,    32 

ville,  53   S.   C.  285,  09  Am.   St.   Rep.  Tenn.    (2  Swan.)    364   [1852];   Wa.sh- 

855,   43   L.   R.   A.    101.    31    S.   E.   252  infirton    v.    IMayor    and    Aldermen    of 

[1898];'   Stehm-yer    v.    City    C"uncil  Nashville,    31    Tenn     (1    Swan.)     177 

of  Chnrleslnn.  5:5   S.   C.   2.-)n.  ?A    S.   F..  llKoll. 


§45 


TAXxVTION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


78 


vrithin  the  police  x)Ower  that  assessments  therefor  are  not  taxes. 
Accordingly  such  assessments  are  held  to  be  taxes  within  the 
meaning  of  the  provision  requiring  uniformity.^''  In  Tennessee 
assessments  other  than  those,  there  referred  to  the  police  power, 
were  for  a  long  time  held  to  be  taxes  within  the  rule  requiring 
uniformity  of  taxation.^'  This  view  has,  however,  been  aban- 
doned, and  in  that  state  a  local  assessment  is  held  not  to  be  a 
tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  constitutional  provisions.''^  In 
Wisconsin  the  provision  requiring  uniformity  in  taxation  was 
held  of  itself  to  apply  to  a  local  assessment  on  the  ground  that 
an  assessment  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  tax,  but  under  another  clause 
of  the  constitution  of  Wisconsin  ^•'  providing  that  the  legislature 
might  "provide  for  the  organization  of  cities  and  incorporated 
villages  and  (to)  restrict  their  power  of  taxation,  assessment" 
and  the  like,  it  was  held  that  an  assessment  could  be  upheld 
though  not  complying  with  the  requirement  of  uniformity.-'' 

§  45.    Assessment  as  tax  within  provisions  for  collection. 

Statutes  and  ordinances  often  contain  provisions  of  various 
kinds  for  the  collection  of  taxes.  Whether  an  assessment  is  or  is 
not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  provisions  depends  largely 
on  the  context  and  on  the  way  in  which  the  words  -are  employed. 
No  absolute  rule  can  be  laid  down.  In  general,  however,  in  the 
alisence  of  anything  to  show  a  contrary  intention,  an  assessment 
is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  these  provisions.^     Thus  under 


'"  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green- 
ville. 53  S.  C.  285,  G9  Am.  St.  Rep. 
835.  4.-?  L.  R.  A.  101,  31  S.  E.  252 
[18981,  (overrviling  dictum  in  Maul- 
din V.  Citv  County  of  Greenville,  42 
8.  C.  293.'  46  Am'.  St.  Rep.  723,  27 
L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S.  E.  842  [1893]). 

'■  Reelfast  Lake  Levee  District  v. 
Dawson,  97  Tenn.  151.  34  L.  R.  A. 
725,  36  S.  W.  1041  [1896];  Taylor 
IMcBean  &  Co.  v.  Chandler,  50  Tenn. 
(9  Heisk.)  349,  suh  nomine  McBean 
V.  Chandler,  24  Am.  Rep.  308  [1872]  -. 
State  V.  Rntler.  79  Tenn.  (11  Lea) 
418    [1883]. 

1^  Arnold  v.  ?»Iayor  and  Aldermen 
of  Knoxville,  115  Tenn.  195,  3  L.  R. 
A.   (N.  S.)   837,  90  S.  W.  469  [1905]. 

>'  Art.  XL,  §  3. 


="  Weeks  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  10 
Wis.    242    [I860]. 

^  City  of  Galveston  v.  Guaranty 
Trust  Co.  of  New  York,  107  Fed.  325, 
46  C.  C.  A.  319  [1901] ;  City  of  High- 
lands v.  Johnson,  24  Colo.  371,  51 
Pac.  1004  [1897];  Sargent  &  Com- 
pany V.  Tuttle,  67  Conn.  162,  32  L.  R. 
A.  822,  34  Atl.  1028  [1895];  Sam- 
uels V.  Drainage  Commissioners,  125 
Til.  536,  17  N.E.  829  [1889];  Lein- 
decker  v.  People  ex  rel.  Johnson,  98 
111.  21  [1881];  Mix  v.  Ross,  57  111. 
121  [1870]  ;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Colby, 
20  111.  614  [1858];  Gould  v.  Mayor 
and  City  Council  of  P>altimore,  59 
Md.  378  [1882];  McCutcheon  v.  Pa- 
cific  Railroad   Co.,   72   Mo.   App.   271 


79 


ASSESSMENT    AND   GENERAL   TAXATION. 


45 


statutes  re({uiriiig  a  cJaiiii  for  taxes  to  l;e  re<iistered.-  or  requiring 
warrants  to  be  issued  for  the  collection  thereof,''  or  authorizing 
the  collection  of  interest  on  unpaid  taxes,*  or  providing  for  the 
remission  of  part  of  the  interest  and  penalties  due  on  unpaid 
taxes  if  paid  within  a  certain  time.''  or  providing  a  special  proced- 
ure for  foreclosing  the  liens  of  taxes,"  or  providing  at  w^hat  term 
of  court  application  for  judgment  for  delinquent  taxes  must  be 
made,'^  or  authorizing  a  sale  of  real  property''  as  the  right  of  way 
of  a  railway  company  °  in  payment  of  delinquent  taxes;  or  au- 
thorizing the  sale  of  personal  property  for  delinquent  taxes,^''  or 
fixing  a  period  of  limitations  within  which  the  collection  of  taxes 
must  be  enforced,^^  or  providing  specifically  that  a  period  of  lim- 
itations, otherwise  applicalde,  should  not  apply  to  the  collec- 
tion of  taxes,^-  it  is  held  that  assessments  are  not  taxes  within 
the  meaning  of  such  provisions.  In  most  of  these  cases  it  may  be 
observed,  there  are  other  provisions  governing  assessments  as 
such,  or  else  there  have  l)een  other  provisions,  since  repealed  gov- 
erning assessments.  Thus  where  separate  statutes  provided  for 
sales  for  taxes  and  sales  for  assessments,  it  was  held  that  the  re- 
peal of  the  statute  providing  for  sales  for  assessments  did  not 
authorize  a  sale  for  assessments  under  and  by  virtue  of  the  provi- 
sions authorizing  a  sale  for  taxes.^*''  Power  to  sell  "for  the  non-pay- 
ment of  any  taxes"  does  not  confer  power  to  sell  for  the  non-pay- 
ment of  local  assessments.^^  A  statute  providing  that  assessments 


[ISOT];  Stato  of  Xol)raska  o\  rel. 
Ransom  v.  Irev.  42  Neb.  1S().  60  X. 
W.  COl  [1894]:  I'ray  v.  Xoitliern 
Liberties.  .31  Pa.  St.  00  ILS.IOI:  Al- 
len V.  City  of  (ialvostmi.  ol  'Vex.  302 
[1870];  (ity  of  Seattle  v.  \Miittel- 
sey,  17  Wash.  '292.  40  Pnc.  480 
118971. 

-Pray  v.  Xorllinn  Liberties.  31 
Pa.  St.'G9    [18501. 

'City  of  Hifjhlands  v.  .Tobnson.  24 
Colo.    371,    51    Pae.    1004     |  1807]. 

*  Sarsrent  &  Coni|)any  v.  Tiittle.  07 
Conn.  102.  32  L.  P.  A.  822.  3(  Atl. 
1028    [1805]. 

«City  of  Seattle  v.  Wliittelsey.  17 
Wa«li.   202.   40   Pae.    489    [18071. 

"  Santuels  V.  Dvnina^'o  Commission 
ors.  125  Til.  530.  17  X.  E.  820  [18801. 

'Leindeeker  v.  Pe-nib'  ex  rel.  John- 
son,  OS    Til.    21    [1881]. 


'City  of  Chicao-o  v.  Coll)y.  20  Til. 
014  [1858]:  Alieii  v.  City  of  Calves- 
ton.  51  Tex.  302   [1870]. 

"  McCutcheon  v.  Paeilie  Pailroad 
Co..   72   Mo.   App.   271    [1897]. 

'"Mix  V.  Ross,  57  111.  121  [18701; 
State  of  X'^ebraska  ex  rel.  Ran.som 
V.  Trey.  42  Xeb.  186,  60  X.  W.  601 
I1S04I. 

"(Jonld  V.  Mayor  and  City  Coun- 
cil of  Paltimore.  50  :\rd.  378    [1882]. 

'-(ity  of  Calveston  v.  Cuaranty 
Trust  Co.  (pf  Xew  York.  107  Fed.  325. 
40   C.   C.    A.   310    [1001]. 

"Cilv  of  Chiea.L'o  V.  Colby.  20  III. 
(■,14     |1S5S|. 

"  Piiine  V.  Si)ratley.  5  T\an.  525 
11870]:  T^>urns  v.  Spratley,  5  Kan. 
.■)51    I  18701.    (memorandum   o]>inion). 


§  46  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  80 

shall  be  collected  as  other  taxes  are  collected  does  not  in  all  re- 
spect abrogate  the  distinction  between  taxes  and  assessments.  Such 
a  statute  entitles  the  collector  to  the  same  commission  on  assess- 
ments collected  by  him  as  on  taxes/'^  but  it  does  not  render  assess- 
ments subject  to  the  statutory  period  of  limitation  which  is  pro- 
vided for  in  case  of  taxes,/"  nor  does  it  empower  the  collector  to 
sell  personal  property  in  satisfaction  of  an  assessment  under  and 
by  virtue  of  provisions  applicable  to  the  case  of  taxes. ^"  Even  with- 
out any  words  showing  specific  legislative  intent  to  include  an  as- 
sessment under  the  term  'tax'  an  assessment  is  so  far  a  tax  that 
without  clear  authority  from  the  legislature  it  cannot  be  recovered 
in  assumpsit  in  jurisdictions  where  common  law  forms  of  action 
exist. ^* 

§  46.    Assessment  as  tax  within  jurisdictional  provisions. 

Provisions  are  found  limiting  the  jurisdiction  of  certain  courts 
to  actions  involving  a  certain  specified  sum,  but  providing  that 
they  shall  have  jurisdiction  of  actions  involving  the  validity  of  a 
tax,  irrespective  of  the  amount  in  question.  Such  a  provision  is 
found  in  the  constitution  of  Louisiana.^  Whether  an  assessment 
is  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  provision  is  a  question  upon 
which  there  has  been  some  confusion.  In  the  earlier  cases  it  was 
held  that  an  assessment  was  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such 
provision.-  Subsequently  in  a  case  involving  the  validity  of  an 
assessment  to  build  a  levee,  it  was  held  that  such  assessment  was 
a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  this  provision,^  the  court  saying  of 
the  earlier  cases  that  they  "must  in  these  particular  cases  yield 
to  the  conclusions  reached  by  us  if  as  contended  by  counsel  they 

"  Mayor    and    Council    of    Hatrers-  of  the  bills  less  about  twenty-five  dol- 

town   V.    Startzman,    93    Md.    006,    49  lars;    and    the    declaration    contained 

Atl.   838    [1901].  a  count  of  insimul  computassent. 

'"  Gould  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  ^  Art.    74,    Constitution    of    Louisi- 

of    Baltimore,   59   Md.   378    [1882].  ana;    Art.  85,  Constitution  of  Louis- 

I'Mix  V.  Ross.  57   111.    121    [1870].  iana,    1898:    Art.   81,   Constitution   of 

"  McKeesport    Borough    v.     Fidler,  Louisiana.    1879. 

147  Pa.  St.  532,  23  Atl.  799   [1892].  =  Board  of  Levee  Commissioners  v. 

In    Clemens    v.     Mayor    and     City  Lorio     Brothers,     33     La.     Ann.     276 

Council    of    Baltimore,    use    of    Volk-  [1881];     Rooney    v.    Brown,    21    La. 

mar,   16  Md.  208   [1860],  it  was  held  Ann.    51    [1869],    (an   assessment   for 

that  a  local  assessment  might  be  re-  curbing  and  guttering), 

covered     in     assumpsit.      There     was,  ^  State    ex    rel.    Plill    v.    Judges    of 

however,   an   express   promise  by   the  Court  of  Appeals.  46  La.  Ann.    1292, 

property    owner    to    pay    the    amount  16    So.    219. 


81  ASSESSMENT   AND   GENERAL   TAXATION.  §  47 

would  be  in  contiict  with  it."*  Subse(|uently  in  a  case  involving 
the  validity  of  an  assessment  for  a  sidewalk  it  was  held  that 
such  an  assessment  was  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  this  pro- 
vision, on  the  ground  that  since  the  statute  required  the  consent 
of  a  ma.jority  of  the  property  owners  to  be  affected,  the  charge 
was  not  an  involuntary  imposition  and  therefore  not  a  tax.-"'  In  a 
later  case,  involving  the  validity  of  an  assessment  for  the  im- 
provement of  a  street,  the  assessment  was  levied  under  a  statute 
which  did  not  require  the  assent  of  the  owners  of  the  property 
to  be  assessed.  The  court  held  that  such  an  assessment  was  a  tax 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision.*"'  In  this  case 
Fa3'Ssoux  v.  Denis,^  was  distinguished  from  the  case  at  bar  on  the 
ground  that  the  earlier  case  involved  an  assessment  "predicated 
upon  the  assent  of  the  property  holders"  and  therefore  not  a 
tax,  while  the  later  case  involved  an  assessment  not  so  predicated 
and  therefore  a  tax.  In  later  cases-  on  this  point,  State  ex  rel 
Hill  V.  Judges  of  Court  of  Appeals  '•*  has  been  followed  consistent- 
ly and  an  assessment  has  been  held  to  be  a  tax  within  the  mean- 
ing of  this  provision. 

§  47.    Assessment  as  tax  under  restrictions  upon  taxation. 

Constitutional  provisions  are  found  restricting  the  rate  of  taxa- 
tion which  may  be  levied  by  municipal  corporations.  An  assess- 
ment is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  restrictions,  and  ac- 
cordingly an  assessment  may  be  valid,  although  such  assessment, 
together  with  the  general  taxes  levied  exceeds  the  rate  of  taxa- 
tion thus  fixed. ^    So  an  assessment  is  not  a  tax  within  a  statutory 

*  State    ex    rel.    Kill    v.    .Tiulges    of  So.  295  [10031.   (amrmed.  though  not 

Court  of  Appeals,  4G  La.  Ann.    1292,  on   this   point    in    ChadwicU   v.   Kelly, 

16    So.    219.      A    similar    view    was  187  U.  S.  540,  23  S.  175   [1903];  ap- 

taken    in    Vicksbvirjr,    Shreveport    &.  jiarently   contra,   Tebault    v.    City   of 

Pacilic  Railroad  Co.  v.  Scott,  47  La.  New  Orleans,  108  La.  (iSO,  32  So.  983. 

Ann.    700,    17    So.   249    [18951.  » 40  La.  Ann.    1292.   10  So.  219. 

"  Fayssoux    v.    Denis,    48    La.    Ann.  '  Dyer  v.  City  of  Newport, —  (Ky.) 

8,50,   19  So.  700    [18901.  — ,  80  S.  W.    1127,  20  Ky.  L.  R.  204 

"City  of  Slireveport  v.  Preseott.  51  [19041;  Hill  v.  Fontenot,  46  La.  Ann. 

La.   Ann.    1895.   40   L.    R.    A.    193.   20  15()3.    10    So.    475    [18941;    State    ex 

So.    664    [18991.  rcl.    llill    v.    .Fudjcs   <,f   Court   of   Ap- 

'48     La.     Ann.     850.     19     So.     700  iienis    for    tin-    Tliinl    Circuit    of    tlie 

[18901.  Slate  of  Louisiana.  40  La.  Ann.  1292. 

'Pleasants    v.    City    of    Shreveport.  Ki  So.  219   [18941;   Charnock  v.  For-. 

110    La.    1040.    35    Sn.    283    [19031;  do.elie    &    Grosse   Tete    Special    Levee 

Kelly   V.   Chadwick,    104   La.   719,   29  District   Company.   38    La.   Ann.    323 


§  48  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  82 

provision  restricting  the  power  of  the  council  to  levy  taxes  to  pay 
liabilities  incurred  by  the  city."  The  effect  upon  the  validity  of 
local  assessments  of  restrictions  on  the  power  of  a  city  to  incur 
debts,  in  cases  when  the  city  incurs  a  primary  liability  for  the 
pulbic  improvement  for  which  it  expects  to  be  reimbursed  by  lo- 
cal assessments  is  a  question  discussed  elsewhere.^  Constitutional 
provisions  are  found  providing  that  a  law  imposing  an  assess- 
ment shall  state  the  tax  and  its  object.  Such  provisions  do  not 
apply  to  local  assessments,  as  the  intent  is  clearly  to  regulate  gen- 
eral taxation.*  An  assessment  is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of 
a  statutory  provision  that  no  tax  shall  be  levied  upon  any  district 
unless  the  proposition  to  levy  the  same  has  been  submitted  to  the 
qualified   electors  thereof.*'' 

§  48.    Assessment  as  tax  under  other  provisions. 

Under  a  provision  requiring  the  value  of  any  mortgages  exist- 
ing on  real  estate  to  be  deducted  from  the  value  thereof  in  asses- 
sing its  value  for  taxation,  it  is  held  that  a  local  assessment  is  not 
a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  provision,  since  the  benefits  con- 
ferred upon  the  property  assessed  by  the  improvement  for  which 
the  assessment  is  levied  are  in  no  way  affected  by  the  existence 
of  mortgages  upon  such  realty.^  An  assessment  is  a  'tax  for  lo- 
cal purposes'  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  saving  from  repeal 
provisions  'in  relation  to  taxation  for  local  purposes.'-  So  an  as- 
sessment is.  Avithout  any  special  words  showing  legislative  intent, 
regarded  as  a  tax  in  so  far  that  no  set-off  can  be  made  against  it 
unless  the  statute  expressly  authorizes  such  set-off  to  be  made." 


[1886];    Barrow    v.    Helpler,    34    La.  'See  §   507. 

Ann.  362  [1882];  Kansas  City  v.  Ba-  *  In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of 

con,    147    Mo.    259,    48    S.    W.    860  Ford    to    Vacate    an   Assessment    for 

[1898];   Morrison  v.  Morey,   146  Mo.  the  Regrading  of  Union   Street,  etc., 

543,    48    S.    W.    629    [1898];    Lamar  in  the  City  of  Broklyn,  6  Lans.    (N. 

Water  &   Electric  Light   Co.  v.   City  Y.)    92   [1872]. 

of  Lamar,   128  Mo.   188,  32  L.  R.  A.  ^Holley  v.   County  of  Orange,    106 

157,   26    S.   W.    1025,   31    S.    W.    750  Cal.  420,   39  Pac.  790    [1895]. 

[1895]:    City    of    St.    Joseph    to    use  ^  Tregea  v.   Owens,  94  Cal.   317,  29 

of  Gibson   V.   Owen,    110  Mo.   445,    19  Pac.   643    [1892]. 

S.  W.  713   [1892];   Farrar  v.  City  of  -Reclamation     District     Xo.     3     v. 

St.  Louis,  80  Mo.  379   [1883].      '  Goldman,    61    Cal.    205    [1882]. 

-  Baldwin    v.     City    of     Oswc'TO,     2  '  Himmelmann  v.  Spanagel.  39  Cal. 

Keyes    (N.  Y.  Ct.  App.)    132   [1805].  389    [1870].     See   §    1346. 


83  ASSESSMENT    AND   GENERAL   TAXATION.  §  49 

?!  49.    Assessment  as  tax  in  conveyances. 

Whether  a  local  assessment  is  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  a 
covenant  concerning  taxes  or  a  provision  for  the  payment  thereof 
in  a  deed  lease,  will,  or  other  similar  instrument  depends  upon  the 
intention  of  the  parties  as  evidenced  by  the  words  employed  and 
the  context  of  the  instrument.  The  general  rule  is  that  if  the 
covenant  or  other  provision  refers  only  to  a  'tax'  it  does  not  in- 
clude local  assessments.'  Thus  where  the  deed  contains  a  cove- 
nant of  warranty  except  as  to  'taxes,'  it  is  held  that  a  local  assess- 
ment is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  the  exception,  and  the 
grantor  is  accordingly  liable  therefor  on  his  covenant.-  Thus  a 
covenant  against  incumbrances  "except  taxes  assessed  for  the 
year  1893"  refers  only  to  "general  annual  taxes, "'^  and  does  not 
include  local  assessments.  So  in  a  covenant  whereby  the  lessee 
agrees  to  pay  part  or  all  of  the  'taxes'  levied  on  the  realty  leased 
to  him,  the  term  'taxes'  does  not  include  local  assessments  and 
the  lessee  is  not  liable  therefor.*  So  in  a  will  a  direction  to  an 
executor  to  j)ay  'aninud  taxes'  on  certain  realty.'^  or  a  direction 
that  the  wife  of  testator  shall  pay  'all  taxes'  assessed  against 
realty  in  which  she  is  devised  an  estate  for  life  ''  does  not.  in 
either  case,  include  local  assessments  in  the  term  'taxes.'  In  jur- 
isdictions in  which  the  term  'special  tax'  is  used  to  denote  a  local 
assessment,  a  covenant  with  reference  to  'special  taxes'  is  con- 
strued  as   including  local   assessments.'      Thus   a   covenant   hy   a 

'Sanders    v.    Brown,    Go    Ark.    49S,  n.>r.    S    Ohio    X.    P.    387    [1901  ].    ( af  • 

47   S.   W.   4G1    [1898];    De   Clercq    v.  lirmcd    by    Oliio    ( ircnit   Court). 

Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company,  107  =  Smith  v.  Abington  Savings  Bank, 

111.   215,    47    X.    E.    367    [1897]'    (af-  105    Mass.    285,    286,    42    X.    E.    1133 

firming  De  Clcreci  v.  Barber  Asphalt  [189(5]. 

Paving    Company,    (iti     ill.    App.    596  *  De  Clcrc'(|  v.  Barber  Asplialt    Pav- 

[1S96];    Warren   v.   Warren.    148    111.  ing  (oiiipany.    I(i7    111.   215.   47    X.   E. 

641,  36  X.  E.  Oil    [1894];    Chaiiibrr  ;!(',7    |lS!t71.    (alHrniing    De    (  Icrc.i    v, 

liii   V.  Cleason.   1()3  X.   'S'.  21  1.  57    X.  r.arlicr   As])lialt   Paving  Coni])any.  66 

E.    18/    1190(11:    ^■(Hl(.!■    V.    ■I'lirner.    S  III.   App.  596   [1896];   Beals  v.  Provi- 

Ohio  X.  P.   :!S7    11901],    (anrirmed  by  .'ciicc  Biibijor  Company.  11    1!.   I.  381. 

Ohio  (ircnit  Court);   Beals  v.  Provi  •:3     Vni.   P>ep.   472    [187ti]. 

dence  Ilubber  Company.   11    11.1.381.  'Warr.'n    v.    Warren.    148    111.    (Ul. 

23    Am.    Rep.    472     [1876]  :     Love    v.  :;(i   \.   K.  (Ill    [lS9tl. 

Howard,  6   R.    1.    IK!    I18.")91.  ■■•  (  Icunbcrlin  v.  (Ileason.   Ki:'.   X.   Y. 

=  Sanders    v.    P.rown.    (;5    Ark.     198.  214.   57   X.   E.   487    [1900]. 

47   S.   W.  461    [1898]:    Smith   v.    Ab-  '  I.nens    v.    :\rcCann.    50    :Mo.    App. 

ington   Savings   Baid<.   165   Mass.  285.  ()38    [1892]:    Thomas    v.    Hooker-Col- 

42  X.  E.   11:53   [189(5]  :    Voder  v.  Tur  ville   Steam   Pnmp   Company,  22   Mo. 

App.   8    [1886]. 


§  49  TAXxVTION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  84 

lessee  to  pa.y  'special  taxes'"*  or  to  pay  'all  taxes  general  and 
special'''  prima  facie  includes  local  assessments.  If  the  term  'as- 
sessment' is  used  in  the  instrument  in  addition  to  the  term  'tax,' 
the  prima  facie  inference  is  that  'assessment'  in  this  connection 
means  a  local  assessment.^"  Thus  a  covenant  in  a  lease  whereby 
the  lessee  Avas  to  pay  "all  taxes  and  assessments  of  every  kind 
whatever  which  should  be  laid  or  imposed  on  the  premises  dur- 
ing said  term"  imposes  on  the  lessee  the  duty  of  paying  local  as- 
sessments.^^ So  a  clause  in  a  mortgage  whereby  the  mortgagee 
covenants  to  pay  "taxes  and  assessments"  promptly,  includes 
local  assessments.^-  So  covenants  whereby  lessee  agrees  to  pay 
"all  taxes  and  assessments  whether  in  the  nature  of  taxes  now  is 
being  or  not  which  may  be  payable  or  assessed  in  respect  of  the 
premises  or  any  part  thereof  during  said  term."  ^■'  and  to  pay  "all 
and  singular  the  taxes,  rates,  charges  and  assessments  which  shall 
or  may  from  time  to  time  and  at  any  time  during  said  term  be 
levied,  assessed  or  made  on  the  demised  premises  or  in  respect  of 
the  same  for  or  on  account  of  any  matter  or  cause  whatever"^* 
include  local  assessments  for  benefits.  Conversely  a  covenant  in 
a  lease  whereby  the  lessee  agrees  to  "pay  all  assessments  what- 
soever levied"  docs  not  include  general  taxes. ^■''  HoAvever,  in  a 
long  lease,  for  ninety-five  years,  containing  a  covenant  whereby 
the  lessee  covenanted  to  "pay  or  cause  to  be  paid  all  taxes  and 
assessments  that  might  at  any  time  during  the  term  be  assessed 
upon  said  lot"  it  was  held  that  the  covenant  did  not  include  so 
much  of  an  assessment  for  laying  out  a  new  street  as  was  assessed 
against  the  interest  of  the  reversioner.^'^  The  theory  on  which 
such  holding  was  made  was  that  such  a  form  of  assessment  was 
unknown  when  the  lease  was  executed  and  not  within  the  contem- 

*  Lucas    V.    McCann,    50    Mo.    App.  '-  National     Lifo     Insurance     Com- 

638    [1802].  pany  v.  Butler,  61  Xeb.  449,  87  Am. 

^Thomas  v.   Ilooker-Colville   Steam  St.  Rep.  462,   85  N.  W.  437    [1901]; 

Pump     Company,     22     ]\Io.     App.     8  Northwestern  ]\Iutual  Life  Insurance 

[1886].  Company  v.   Butler,   57   Neb.    198,   77 

"National    Life    Insurance    Co.    v.  N.  W.  667   [1898]. 

Butler,  61  Neb.  449,  87  Am.  St.  Rep.  "  Codman    v.    Johnson,    104    Mas-. 

462,    85    N.    W.    437    [1901];    North-  491    [1870]. 

western  ISIutual  Life  Insurance  Com-  i' Walker  v.  Whittemore,  112  .Mass. 

pany   v.    Butler.   57    Neb.    198.    77    N.  187    [1873]. 

W.    667     [1898];    Oswald    v.    Gilfert,  '^  Stephani    v.    Catliolic    Bislu.p    of 
II   Johns.    (N.  Y.)    443    [1814].              ■    Chicago,    2    Brad.    (111.)    249    |1878]. 

"Oswald   V.   Oilfert,   11   Johns.    (N.  ^«  I  ove    v.    Howard,    6     R.     T.     IH) 

Y.)    443.   [1ST4].  [lS.i9]. 


85  ASSESSMENT   AND   GENERAL   TAXATION.  §  49 

plation  of  the  parties.  Words  in  connection  with  the  word  'tax' 
may  show  an  intention  to  include  local  assessments  in  such 
terms.^'  Under  a  covenant  in  a  coal  lease  whereby  the  lessee 
agreed  to  pay  a  certain  rent  "clear  of  and  over  and  above  all 
taxes  and  reprises"  it  was  held  that  as  between  the  lessor  and 
lessee  the  lessee  was  bound  to  pay  local  assessments  levied  for 
the  cost  of  constructing  a  sewer.^^  Covenants  whereby  a  lessee 
agrees  to  pay,  "all  taxes  and  duties  levied  or  to  be  levied  thereon 
during  the  term,"^®  or  to  pay  "such  sum  or  sums  of  money  as 
shall  be  equal  to  the  amount  of  the  rates,  taxes,  and  duties  of 
every  kind  that  shall  be  levied  or  assessed  on  the  demised  prem- 
ises or  on  the  lessors  of  the  same  as  well  as  those  assessed  or 
levied  by  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  or  those  assessed  or 
levied  l)y  the  authority  of  the  State  of  Massachusetts,  or  of  the 
city  of  Boston,  for  each"  year  and  part  of  a  year, "^^  have  been 
held  to  include  local  assessments.  A  direction  to  pay  "the  an- 
nual taxes  and  insurance  and  also  all  reasonable  repairs  and  im- 
provements" out  of  rents  has  been  held  to  include  local  assess- 
ments on  the  theory-  that  it  is  payment  for  an  'improvement.'-^ 
An  assessment  for  benefits  has  been  held  not  to  be  an  incumbrance 
within  the  meaning  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,  where  the 
improvement  was  made  and  the  assessment  levied  after  the  time 
fixed  for  performance  of  such  contract,  on  the  theory  that  the 
amount  of  the  assessment  did  not  exceed  the  benefits  conferred  by 
such  improvement  and  that  the  vendee  was  therefore  paying  only 
for  what  he  received."  In  a  letter  from  a  business  man,  not  a 
lawyer,  who  v/as  a  non-resident  and  was  writing  with  reference 
to  his  land  the  term    'taxes'  includes  local  assessments.^^ 


'"Blake    V.    BaktM'.    115    ^las.s.    188  quiring  the  tnistoe  to  pay  '"all  taxes. 

[1874]:    Delaware    &    Hudson    Canal  rates,    assessments    ami   expenses   for 

Company  v.  Von  Storeli.   106  Pa.  St.  insurance   and   repairs  and  other  ex- 

102.  40  Atl.  375   flOOni.  penses    and    outgoings    of    every    na 

'"Delaware   &   Hudson   Canal    Com-  lure"  is  held  not  to  require  the  trus- 

pany  v.  Von  Storcli,  19G  Pa.  St.  102,  tec    to    pay    assessments    for    street^ 

4(1   Atl.  .375    [19001.  and    sewers:    Rhode    Island    Hospital 

"  P.lake    V.    Baker.    11.')    Mass.    188  Trust    Co.    v.    Babbitt.    22    R.    T.    11.3. 

I1S741.  40   Atl.  403   [19001. 

-"^Curtis    V.    Pierce.    115    Mass.    180  '-Oottlielf    v.     Stranalian.     138     X. 

[18741.  V.    345.    20    L.    R.    A.    455.    34    \.    E. 

-'Warren   v.   Wairen.    148    Til.   041.  280   [18931. 

.30  N.  E.  611    [18941.  -Mlibbs  v.   People's  National    Bank, 

However,  a  provision  in  a  will   re-  198  HI.  307.  64  X.  E.  1000   [19021. 


§50 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


86 


§  50.    Special  tax. 

The  term  "special  tax"  is  one  which  is  used  with  several  differ- 
ent meanings.  In  many  cases  it  is  used  as  a  synonym  of  the  local 
assessment.^  Where  this  meaning  attaches  to  the  term,  the 
charge  is  often  referred  to  indiscriminately  as  a  "special  tax'" 
and  as  an  "assessment."  -  It  is  occasionally  called  by  both  names 
at  once.^  Another  meaning  which  attaches  to  the  term  "special 
tax"  is  that  of  a  tax  analogous  to  the  general  tax,  but  devoted  to 
a  specific  purpose  and  not  to  be  lised  for  the  general  expenses  of 
the  public  corporation  which  levies  it.*  Thus  a  local  assessment 
was  held  not  to  be  a  special  tax  within  the  meaning  of  a  constitu- 
tional provision  which  imposed  a  limitation  upon  the  rate  of  tax- 
ation "general  or  special."  ^  Such  a  special  tax  is  a  branch  of  the 
taxing  power  and  not  an  exercise  of  eminent  domain." 


iTallant  v.  City  of  Burlington,  39 
la.  543  [1874];  City  of  Dubuque  v. 
Harrison,  34  la.  1C3  [1872];  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  County  of  Mon- 
roe V.  Harrell.  147  Tnd.  500,  40  N.  E. 
124  [1890]:  TTentij;-  v.  Gilmore,  33 
Kan.  234,  6  Pac.  304  [1885];  Bar- 
ber Asphalt  Pavinj,'  Company  v.  City 
of  St.  Joseph,  183  Mo.  451,  82  S.  W. 
64  [1904];  Moberly  v.  Hogan,  131 
Mo.  19,  32  S.  W.  1014  [1895];  City 
of  Clinton  to  use  of  Thornton  v.  Hen- 
ry County,  115  Mo.  557.  37  Am.  St. 
Rep.  415,"  22  S.  W.  494  [1893];  City 
of  St.  Joseph  to  use  of  Gibson  v.  Far- 
rell,  106  Mo.  437,  17  S.  W.  497 
[1891]  ;  Keith  v.  Bingham.  100  Mo. 
300,  13  S.  W.  083  [1889];  City  of 
Springfield  to  the  use  of  Tuttle  v. 
Baker,  50  Mo.  App.  637  [1894];  Al- 
len V.  Krenning,  23  Mo.  App.  561 
[1886];  Thomas  v.  Hooker-Colville 
Steam  Pump  Company,  22  jVlo.  App. 
8  [1886];  Kefferstein  v.  Holliday, 
3  Mo.  App.  570  (appendix)  [1877]; 
Brockschmidt  v.  Cavender,  3  Mo. 
App.  568  (appendix)  [1877];  Stad- 
ler  V.  Strong,  3  Mo.  App.  568  (ap- 
pendix) [1877];  Creamer  v.  Allen, 
3  Mo.  App.  545  [1877];  City  of 
Butte  V.  School  District  No.  1.  29 
Mont.  336,  74  Pac.  869  [1904];  Low- 
den  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  2  Disney 
(Ohio)    203    [1858]:    County  of  Har- 


ris V.  Boyd,  70  Tex.  237,  7  S.  W.  713 
[1888]. 

-Tallant  v.  City  of  Burlington,  39 
la.  543  [1874];  City  of  Dubuque  v. 
Harrison,  34  la.  163  [1872];  City  of 
Butte  V.  School  District  No.  1,  29 
Mont.  336,  74  Pac.  869   [1904]. 

^  Such  charges  are  referred  to  as 
"assessments  or  special  taxes."  Mil- 
waukee Electric  Railway  &  Electric 
Light  Com])any  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 

95  Wis.  42,  69  N.  W.' 796   [1897]. 

*  County  of  San  Luis  Obispo  v. 
White,  91  Cal.  432,  24  Pac.  864,  27 
Pae.  756  [1891]  ;  Marion  Water  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Marion,  121  la.  306, 

96  N.  W.  883  [1903];  Grunewald  v. 
City  of  Cedar  Rapids,  118  la.  222, 
91  N.  W.  1059  [1902];  Swanson  v. 
City  of  Ottumwa.  118  la.  161,  59  L. 
R.  A.  620,  91  N.  W.  1048  [1902]; 
Lamar  Water  &  Electric  Light  Co. 
V.  City  of  Lamar.  128  Mo.  188,  32  L. 
R.  A.'  157,  20  S.  W.  1025,  31  S.  W. 
756   [1895]. 

'^  Lamar  Water  &  Electric  Light 
Co.  V.  City  of  Lamar,  128  Mo.  188, 
32  L.  R.  A.  157,  26  S.  W.  1025,  31  S. 
W.  750   ]1895]. 

®  Chicago  &  Northwestern  Railway 
Company  v.  Village  of  Elmhurst,  165 
HI.  148,'  40  N.  E.  437  [1897];  Chi- 
cago &  Alton  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Jolief.  I.i3  HI.  049.  39  N. 
E.    1077    [18941. 


87 


ASSESSMENT    AND    GENERAL    TAXATION. 


51 


§  51.     Special  taxation  in  Illinois. 

The  term  "special  tax"  has  a  distinct  and  peculiar  meaning  in 
Illinois.  In  this  state  it  was  once  held  that  local  assessments 
were  within  the  constitutional  re(iuirement  of  uniformity  and  that 
accordingly  such  assessments  could  not  be  apportioned  by  front- 
age or  by  any  similar  method  of  apportionment.^  Sul)se(iuently 
the  constitution  was  so  modified  as  to  permit  certain  public  cor- 
porations to  make  local  improvements  "by  special  assessment, 
speeail  taxation  or  otherwise."-  The  legislature  thereupon  con- 
ferred upon  cities  and  villages  the  "power  to  make  local  im- 
provements by  special  assessments,  or  by  special  taxation,  or 
both,  of  contiguous  property  or  general  taxation  or  other- 
wise as  they  shall  by  ordinance,  prescribe."  This  language 
is  substantially  that  of  the  constitution  and  is  not  regarded 
as  any  broader  in  its  effect  and  meaning,''  and  confers  the 
power  of  making  local  improvements  by  special  assessment, 
special  taxation  or  general  taxation.*  Under  this  provision 
the  special  tax  has  been  held  to  be  distinct  from  lioth  the 
general  tax  and  the  local  assessment.''  Under  this  constitutional 
provision  a  special  tax  must  be  limited  to  "contiguous  prop- 
erty,"" while  a  special  assessment  need  not  be  so  limited  but  may 
be  assessed  upon  any  property  benefited.  On  the  other  hand  a 
special  assessment  apportioned  according  to  benefits  may  be  re- 
stricted to  contiguous  or  abutting  property."  The  mere  fact  that 
the  charge  is  limited  to  abutting  property  is  not  conclusive  that  it 


'See  §§  44.   1.53. 

=  Constitution  of  Illinois.  Art.  IX., 
§   9. 

^  Falc'h  V.  Ppoplo  <'.\  rcl.  .Tohnson, 
09    111.    137    [18S1]. 

*City  of  Chica.^o  v.  r.rede.  218  111. 
.528,  75  X.  E.  1044  [1905];  Misprvey 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond.  208  111. 
646,  70  N.  E.  678  [19041:  Ronan  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Shafter,  193  111.  631, 
61  N.  E.  1042;  People  ex  rel.  Miller 
V.  Sherman,  83  111.  165   [18761. 

"Gage  V.  Waterman.  121  111.  115, 
13  X.  E.  5-13  [18891;  P,utler  v.  Xo- 
vin,  88  111.  575  [18781:  HniM.  .Tr.. 
V.  City  of  Chicairo.  82  111.  472  [187(11. 

The  notice  of  the  tax  snle  nni-t 
show  whether  it  is  for  a  speeial  tax 
or    a    special    assessment.      Gage    v. 


\Vaternian.  121  111.  115,  13  X.  E.  543 
I1S891. 

The  oflicer  making  the  sale  for  a 
special  tax  must  show  his  authority 
s)  to  sell,  and  merely  showing  au- 
tliority  to  sell  for  special  assessments 
is  not  sufTK'ietit.  F.utler  v.  X^evin,  88 
III.    575    [1878]. 

"(luild.  .Tr..  V.  (  ity  of  Chicago,  82 
111.   472    [lS7(il. 

'  Bass  V.  South  Park  Commission- 
ers, 171  111,  370,  49  X.  E.  5-19  [18981  : 
^Vest  Chicago  Park  Commissioners  v. 
Farher.  171  111.  146.  49  X.  E.  427 
[18981:  Walker  v.  City  of  Aurora. 
110  111.  402,  29  X.  E.  741  [18931: 
City  of  Springfield  v.  Sale,  127  111. 
3.-)9.  20  X.  F.  81)  [18901;  Lake  v. 
Citv   of   Decatur,   91    111.   596    [18791. 


51 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


88 


is  a  special  tax  as  distinguished  from. an  assessment.*  The  special 
tax  is  in  most  respects  like  the  special  assessment.  They  are  both 
based  on  the  theory  of  presumed  equivalents  for  the  charge  or 
exaction  in  the  form  of  benefits, **  differing  in  this  respect  from 
general  taxation.  The  chief  difference  between  the  special  tax 
and  the  special  assessment  is  in  the  manner  of  ascertaining  bene- 
fits.^°  In  special  taxation  the  imposition  of  the  tax  is  a  conclu- 
sive determination  of  the  fact  of  benefit  and  the  apportionment 
of  the  expense  of  the  improvement,  while  in  a  special  assess- 
ment the  cost  must  not  exceed  the  actual  benefit  and  must  be 
apportioned  in  proportion  thereto. ^^  The  determination  to  con- 
struct a  sidewalk  by  special  taxation  has  been  said  to  be,  "a  de- 
termination that  the  property  so  specially  taxed  is  benefited  to 


*"lt  does  not  follow  that  oecause 
the  ordinance  confined  the  assessment 
to  abutting  property  it  was  a  spe- 
cial tax  instead  of  a  special  assess- 
ment (Lake  v.  City  of  Decatur,  91 
111.  59G  [1879];  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners  v.  Farber,  171  111.  14G, 
49  K.  E.  427  [1898]).  In  the  case 
at  bar  the  assessment  was  made  ac- 
cording to  benefits,  and  though  con- 
fined to  contiguous  property,  was  a 
special  assessment  and  not  a  special 
tax."  Bass  v.  South  Park  Commis- 
sioners, 171  111.  370,  372,  373,  49  N. 
E.  549   [1898]. 

"Davis  V.  City  of  Litchfield,  145 
111.  313,  21  L.  k  A.  5G3,  33  X.  E. 
888    [1893]. 

'"  Lightner  v.  City  of  Peoria,  150 
111.   80,   37    N.   E.   C9    [1894]. 

'1  Davis  V.  City  of  Litchfield,  145 
111.  313,  21  L.  R.  A.  563.  33  N.  E. 
888    [1893]. 

'  ihe  difl'erence  between  special  as- 
sessments and  special  taxation  has 
been  repeatedly  pointed  out  by  thii. 
court.  It  lies  mainly  in  the  manner 
of  determining  the  benefits.  In  spe- 
cial taxation  the  body  enacting  the 
ordinance  determines  that  the  bene- 
fits are  equal  to  the  cost,  and  before 
the  passage  of  the  amendment  to  Sec- 
tion 17,  Article  9,  Chapter  24  of  tlia 
Revised  Statutes  in  1895  that  deter- 
mination   was    conclusive    and    could 


not  be  reviewed  by  court  or  jury, 
while  in  special  assessments  the  ben- 
efits are  assessed  by  the  commission- 
ers and  were  always  reviewable  by 
a  jury."  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners v.  Farber,  171  111.  146, 
159,  49  X.  E.  427    [1898]. 

"Special  taxation,  as  spoken  of  in 
our  Constitution,  is  based  upon  the 
supposed  benefit  to  the  contiguous 
property  and  difl'ers  from  special  as- 
sessments only  in  the  mode  of  ascer- 
taining tlie  benefits.  In  the  case  of 
special  taxation,  the  imposition  of 
the  tax  by  the  corporate  authorities 
is  of  itself  a  determination  that  the 
benefits  to  the  contiguovis  property 
will  be  as  great  a^  the  burden  of  the 
expense  of  the  improvement  and  that 
such  benefits  will  be  so  nearly  lim- 
ited or  confined  in  their  effect  to 
contiguous  property  tliat  no  serious 
injustice  will  be  done  by  imposing 
the  whole  expense  upon  such  prop- 
erty. In  the  case  of  special  assess- 
ments the  property  to  be  benefited 
must  be  ascertained  by  careful  inves- 
tigation and  the  burden  must  be  dis- 
tributed according  to  the  carefully 
ascertained  proportion  in  which  each 
part  thereof  will  be  beneficially  af- 
fected." Craw  V.  Village  of  Tolono, 
96  111.  255.  262,  36  Am.  Rep.  143 
[1880],  quoted  in  Enos  v.  City  of 
Springfield,   113   III.  65.  71    [1886]. 


89 


ASSESSMENT    AND    GENEKAL    TAXATION. 


§51 


the  extent  of  the  special  tax."^-  Accordingly  in  the  special  tax 
it  has  been  said  to  be  no  objection  thereto  that  the  amount  of  the 
tax  exceeds  the  amount  of  the  benefits/^  This  theory  of  the  spec- 
ial tax  has  been  stated  in  a  number  of  eases.^*  Thus  it  has  been 
said  that  the  power  of  levying  a  special  tax  is  an  unqualified  one. 
without  restriction  as  to  the  benefiting  of  the  contiguous  property 
thus  taxed.''''  While  the  validity  of  the  special  tax  is  regularly 
recognized.^"  the  courts  are  now  inclined  to  insist  that  the  spec- 
ial tax  must  be  reasonable.  "The  only  difference  in  special  assess- 
ments and  special  taxation  as  to  benefits  is  that  in  the  latter  case 


'-Harris  v.  People  ex  rcl.  Kniirht. 
218  111.  439,  443.  75  X.  E.  1012 
[19051;  Pierson  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Walter.  204  III.  456,  68  X.  E.  383 
[19031;  Payne  v.  Village  of  South 
Sprinstield.  'l(;i  111.  285,  44  X.  E.  105 
[189G1;  (  hieaofo  &  Alton  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Joliet.  153  III. 
649.  39  "X.  E.  1077  [1894]:  City  of 
Sterling  v.  Calt.  117  111.  11.  7  X 
E.  471  [1887];  Craw  v.  Village  of 
Toiono,  96  111.  255.  36  Am.  Rep.  143 
[1880];  White  v.  People  ex  rel.  City 
of   Bloomington.    94    111.    604    [1880]. 

'^  ''The  obiection  that  the  special 
tax  here  exceeds  the  benefits  to  the 
lot  im]ilies  that  the  only  mode  of 
making  the  improvement  is  by  spe- 
cial a.ssessment.  whereas  the  broad 
power  is  given  under  the  constitu- 
tion to  make  it  either  by  special  as- 
sessment or  by  special  taxation  of 
contiguous  j)roperty  or  otherwise. 
*  ''"'  *  This  proceeding  is  in  the 
special  taxation  of  contiguous  prop- 
erty, and  in  the  adoption  of  that 
mode  tliere  is  no  requirement  of  ben- 
efits received  and  no  respect  thereto 
further  than  may  be  had  by  the  city 
council  in  determining  upon  which 
particular  one  of  the  several  modes 
of  sj.ecial  taxation  of  contiguous 
property  open  to  tliem  sliall  be  re- 
sorted In."  l''!iins  v.  Citv  of  Sp'in  ■■- 
field,  ll:!  111.  (;.-).  71.  72  [1886].  fiU"t- 
ing  White  v.  Peaple  ex  rel.  Citv  ot 
Bloom in'/ton.  94  111.  604.  016   [1880]. 

"Whether  or  not  the  special  t:ix 
exceeds  the  actual   benefit  to  the  lot 


is  not  material.  It  may  be  supposed 
to  be  based  on  a  presumed  equiva- 
lent. The  city  council  have  deter- 
mined the  frontage  te  be  the  proper 
measure  of  probable  benefits.  That 
is  generally  cohsidered  as  a  very 
reasonable  measure  of  benefits  in  ease 
of  sucli  an  im])r()vement,  and  if  it 
does  not  in  fact  in  the  present  case 
represent  the  actual  benefits  it  is 
enough  that  the  city  council  have 
deemed  it  the  proper  rule  to  apply." 
Enos  V.  City  of  Springfield.  113  111. 
65.  73  [1886],  quoting  White  v.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  City  of  Bloomington.  94 
111.  604,  613   [1880]. 

"  C  ity  of  Bloomington  v.  Latham, 
142  111!  462.  18  L.  R.  A.  487,  32  X. 
E.  506  [1S9.",1:  County  of  Adams  v. 
City  of  Quincy.  130  III.  566.  6  L.  R. 
A.  155,  22  X.  E.  624  [1890];  City 
of  Sterling  v.  Halt.   117   III.   11,  7  X. 

E.  471  [1SS7I:  City  of  Galesburg  v. 
Searlos,  114  111.  217.  29  X.  E.  686 
[1886];  Enos  v.  City  of  Springfield, 
113  III.  65  [1886];*  People  ex  rel. 
:\:iller  V.  Sherman.  83  111.  165  [1876]. 

'^  City  of  Calesburg  v.  Searles,  114 
111.   217,  29  X.  E.   686    [1886]. 

'*  City  ex  rel.  Ilanberg  v.  Peyton. 
214  111.  376.  73  X.  E.  768  [1905]; 
Comnissionors  of  Highways  of  Town 
of  |)ix  V.  Big  Four  Drainage  District 
if    Ford    County.    207    111.    17.    69    X. 

F.  576  [1904];  T.i'/htnrv  v.  (  itv  of 
Pc- ria,  150  III.  80.  37  X.  E.  69 
II '■9J]:  Davis  v.  City  of  Litchfield, 
1-15  III.  313.  21  L.  R.  A.  563,  33  X. 
K.  888   [1893]. 


51 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


90 


the  determination  of  the  city  council  is  final — not  an  arbitrary 
unreasonable  determination,  but  one  which  can  be  seen  to  be  fair- 
ly and  reasonably  made,"^'  and  that  even  a  special  tax  is  to  be 
regarded  as  based  upon  the  theory  of  an  equivalent  for  benefits 
in  the  increased  value  of  the  property  taxed.^^  Under  the  doc- 
trine that  the  special  tax  must  be  reasonable,  special  taxes  clearly 
in  excess  of  the  benefits  conferred  have  been  held  invalid.'"' 
Whether  a  special  tax  is  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process 
of  law  has  been  presented  for  adjudication.  In  Illinois  it  has 
been  held  that  under  a  statute  imposing  a  special  tax,  but  pro- 
viding that  the  propertj^  owner  may  have  the  question  of  whether 
the  special  tax  is  in  excess  of  the  benefits  or  not,  determined  reg- 
ularly, such  a  tax  is  not  in  violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  4!onstitution  of  the  United  States.-"  The  same  ques- 
tion has  been  presented  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,-^  but  in  this  case  the  court  refused  to  pass  upon  the  ques- 
tion on  the  ground  that  the  Federal  question  had  not  been  pre- 
sented to  the  State  Court,  to  whose  decision  error  was  prosecuted. 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  tendency  of  statutes  and  recent  deci- 
sions in  Illinois  is  to  bring  the  special  tax  more  nearly  to  the  local 
assessment  than  the  original  holdings  of  the  Supreme  Court 
seemed  to  indicate.  Similar  constitutional  provisions  are  found 
in  a  few  other  states. -- 


''  City  of  Bloomington  v.  Chicago 
&  Alton  Railroad  Company.  134  111. 
451,  459,  26  N.  E.   36fi    [1891  J. 

'"Huston  V.  Tribbetts,  171  111.  547, 
03  Am.  St.  Rep.  275,  49  N.  e.  711 
[1898];  Chicago  &  Alton  Railroad 
Company-  v.  City  of  Joliet,  153  111. 
649,  39  N.  E.  1077  [1894];  Lightner 
V.  City  of  Reoria,  150  111.  80.  37  X. 
E.  69  [18941  ;  Davis  v.  City  of  Litch- 
field, 145  111.  .313.  21  L.  R.  A.  563. 
33  N.  E.  888   [18931. 

"  City  of  Bloomington  v.  Chicago 
&    Alton  Railroad   Company,    134   111. 


451,  26  X.  E.  366  [1891].  See  §  295 
et  seq. 

="  Job  V.  City  of  Alton.  189  111.  256, 
82  Am.  St.  Rep.  448,  59  X.  E.  622 
[1901]. 

^  Lombard  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  181  U.  S.  33,  45  L. 
731,  21  S.  507  [1901],  (affirming 
Cnmmings  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  181  111.  136.  54  X.  E. 
941    [1899]). 

^  Sec.  6,  Article  IX.,  Constitution 
of  Xebraska:  Darst  v.  Criffin,  31 
Xeb.  608,  48  X.  W.  819  [1891].  See 
§    103. 


CHAPTER   IV. 
FORM   OF   EXACTION   IN   ASSESSMENT. 

§  52.    Option  to  owner  to  construct  improvement. 

An  assessment  usually  takes  the  form  of  a  charge  or  exaction  in 
money.^  At  the  same  time  there  is  no  reason  why  the  charge 
might  not  be  in  the  form  of  requiring  the  actual  construction  of 
the  improvement  by  the  party  to  be  charged  therewith  instead  of 
imposing  upon  him  a  charge  in  money  to  pay  the  cost  thereof. 
However,  if  the  party  refuses  to  perform  the  work  thus  assigned 
to  liim,  there  is  usually  no  method  available  of  compelling  specific 
performance.  He  may  be  coerced  into  performance  by  the  impo- 
sition of  a  penalty,  or  in  case  of  his  refusal,  the  work  may  be  done 
by  others  and  he  may  be  charged  with  his  proportionate  share  of 
the  expense  thereof.  The  latter  of  these  methods  is  usually 
treated  as  a  form  of  assessment.-  It  will  be  noted  that,  although 
the  charge  is  by  this  means  originally  imposed  as  a  form  of  work 
and  labor,  it  is  ultimately  enforceable  as  a  charge  in  money.  Ac- 
cordingly, under  such  statutes  the  proceedings  must  provide 
some  means  for  compelling  payment  in  money.  If  a  road  is  or- 
dered to  be  built  by  the  adjoining  land  owners,  but  no  assessment 
is  levied  in  proportion  to  the  benefits  conferred,  so  that  the  i"')i 

'  See   Chapter   XX.      For   the   ques-  200     |  l.«n()l  ;     Mayor    and    Board    of 

tion  of  the  power  to  require  payment  'Iriistees   of   Town   of   New   Iberia   v. 

in    certain    limited    kinds    of    money  Fontelieu,    108    La.    460,    .32    So.    .3Git 

or    legal    tender    to    the    e.\clusion    of  [1901];      Cuming     v.     Cleason.      140 

others,  see  §    1080.  :\Iich.    19.5.    10:5    X.    \V.    ,-)37    [190.5]; 

=  People    ex    rel.    Hanberg    v.    Pey-  Sanford   v.    \illage   of   Warwick,    181 

ton,     214     111.     370,     73     X.     E.     708  X.   Y.  20.  73  X.  E.  490   [1905]  :    ( re- 

[19051;     City    of    Keokuk     v.     Inde-  versing    82    X.    Y.    S.    466.    S3    App. 

pendent    District    of    Keokuk.    53    la.  Div.    120    [1903];    City   of    NVilmins- 

352,   30   Am.   Rep.   22G,   5   X.  ^V.   503  ton    v.    Yopp,    71    X'.    C.    76    [1874] -. 

[1880];    Scherm    v.   Garrett's   Adm'r,  Mt.   Pleasant   P.or.  v.  Bait.  &   O.   Ry. 

(Ky.)    80    8.    AV.    1101.    26    Ky.    Law  Co..    138    Pa.    St..    365.    11    L.    R.    A. 

Rep.     180     [1904]:     Board    of    Coun-  520.    20    Atl.     1052     [1890]  :  .  Wils.n 

oilmen    of     Frankfort     v.     :\Iason    &  v.   Town  of  Philippi.   39    W.    \'n.    75. 

Foard    Co.,    100    Kv.    48.    37    S.    W.  19  S.  E.  553   [1894]. 

91 


§  53  TAXATIOX    BY    ASSESSMENT.  92 

may  be  built  by  assessment  if  the  work  is  not  done,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  proceedings  should  be  quashed  upon  certiorari.^  If 
the  obligation  to  construct  an  improve  nient  is  imposed  bv  law 
upon  a  public  corporation  or  a  quasi  public  corporation  such  as  a 
railroad  company,  such  corporation  may  be  compelled  to  con- 
struct such  improvement  by  proceedings  in  mandamus.* 

§  53.     Power  and  duty  to  grant  option. 

A  municipal  corporation  may  hy  ordinance  give  to  the  property 
owner  the  option  to  do  the  work  in  front  of  his  property  or  pay 
an  assessment  therefor  even  if  the  statute  does  not  provide  for 
such  option.  Thus  a  municipal  corporation  may  give  to  the  abut- 
ting owner  such  option  to  do  the  work  himself  under  a  statute 
authorizing  the  council  to  pass  ordinances  to  require  the  improve- 
ment of  the  street  at  the  cost  of  the  al)utting  owner, ^  or  even,  it 
has  been  held,  under  a  statute  authorizing  the  board  of  trustees 
to  make  and  pass  such  resolutions,  ordinances  and  by-Jaws  as  may 
be  deemed  necessary  and  proper  and  to  regulate  and  make  im- 
provements to  the  streets,  alleys,  sidewalks,  public  squares, 
wharves,  and  other  public  property  and  places.-  Such  option  is 
frequently  given  to  the  property  owner  by  statute.^  If  the  stat- 
ute provides  for  an  option  to  the  owner  to  do  the  work  himself  or 
pay  an  assessment  therefor,  the  municipal  corporation  must  give 
such  option  as  a  condition  precedent  to  levying  such  assessment.* 
Other  property  owners  cannot  complain  because  such  option  is 
given  and  advantage  is  taken  of  it  by  some  property  owners,  and 
because  upon  assessment,  allowance  is  made  to  the  owners  who 

=■  Pierce    V.    County    Commissioners  ton,  223  111.  379,  79  N.  E.  51   [1906]; 

of     Franklin     County,     (i3     :Me.     252  City    of    Chicago    v.    Burkhardt,    223 

[18721.  "  111.' 297,   79   K   E.   82    [1906]. 

*  Northern    Pacific    Ry.    v.    Duluth,  *  City    of    Chicago    v.     Burkhardt, 

208    U.     S.  -583     [1908],      (affirming  223    ni.    297,    79    N.    E.    82    [1906]: 

State  ex  rel.  City  of  Duluth  v.  North-  Pierce    v.    County    Commissioners    of 

ern    Pacific    Ry.    Co.,    98    Minn.    429.  Franklin  County,  63  Me.  252  [1872]: 

108  N.  W.  261).     See   §    1162.  Brewster     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

^  Board   of   Councilmen    of    City    oi  Council    of    the    City    of    Newark.    1 1 

Frankfort    v.    :\Iurray,    99    Ky.    422,  N.    J.    Eq.     (3    Stockt.)     114    [1856]: 

36    S.    W.    180    [1896].  Mt.   Pleasant   Bor.   v.    Bait.    &   O.   R. 

nUyor   and   Board   of   Trustees   of  Co.,    138    Pa.    St.    365,    11    L.    R.    A. 

the    Town    of    New    Theria    v.    Fonte-  520,    20    Atl.     1052     [1891];     Rosrers 

lieu,   108  La.  460,  32  So.  369   [1901],  v.    City    of    Milwaukee,    13    Wis.    610 

^People    ex    rel.    Hanberg    v.    Pat-  [1861], 


93 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT. 


§53 


did  the  work  tlu'iiiselves.'  Furthermore,  if  a  property  owner 
takes  advantage  of  such  oi)tion  and  i)erfornis  the  work  in  a  proper 
manner,  the  city  cannot  levy  an  assessment  without  crediting 
him  for  such  work  so  done."  If  the  owner  is  not  given  the  oppor- 
tunity to  construx't  such  ini[)rovement  under  a  statute  which  pro- 
vides therefor,'  as  where  a  defective  notice  not  giving  specifica- 
tions which  would  enable  him  to  ascertain  what  work  was  to  be 
done,  is  served  on  him,''  or  where  the  ordinance  providing  for  the 
improvement  does  not  give  the  specifications  or  prescribe  the 
manner  of  doing  the  work,  but  delegates  to  the  city  engineer  the 
power  to  direct  the  method  of  doing  the  work,^  or  where  the 
statute  gives  the  property  owner  the  option  to  construct  the 
whole  of  a  sidewalk  improvement  and  thus  relieve  himself  from 
liability  for  assessment,  and  the  notice  served  npon  the  owner 
gives  him  the  option  to  constrnct  the  sidewalk  except  the  inter- 
sections/' the  public  corporation  cannot  constrnct  the  improve- 
ment at  the- cost  of  the  property  owners.  Tlius  under  a  statnte 
providing  for  such  an  option,  the  municipal  corporation  cannot 
constrnct  the  sidewalk  and  assess  the  cost  ther(M)f  upon  the  abut- 
ting property  owners  nnless  they  have  been  notified  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  the  statute  and  have  been  given  an  ojiportun- 


^  (  ity  of  C'onnersville  v.  ]\Ierrill, 
U  hiil.  App.  303,  42  X.  E.  1112 
[18!).-y|. 

"  ]?iiiV)er  V.  lloaid  i>f  Supervisors 
of  the  City  and  County  of  San  Fran- 
cisco, 42"  Cal.  C.-M)  11872];  State. 
Mann,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  Jersey  City,  24  N.  J.  L. 
(4  Zab.)  662  [isoof;  In  tlie  mat- 
ter of  the  Assessment  for  Improv- 
ing East  Eighteenth  Strei't  in  tlie 
Town  of  Flatbusli.  75  Ilun.  (X  .Y.) 
603,   27   X.   Y.   Sup]).   fiOl    I1S!)4]. 

^  State  V.  Foster.  94  Miiui.  412, 
103  X.  W.  14  rmool;  City  of  \Yest- 
port  to  use  of  Iloelzel  v.  Smith,  G8 
Mo.  App.  63  flSDO]:  Erie  City  v. 
WUVk.  26  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  459  [19031  ; 
Johnson  v.  City  of  Oslikosli.  21  Wi-s. 
184  [1866];  Kneeland  v.  City  of 
:^niwaukee,    18    Wis.    411     flS64]. 

"^Myrick  v.  City  of  La  Cro-so.  17 
Wis.   ^42    [1803]. 

"  Thompson   v.   Schermerliorn,   6   X. 


V.  92,  55  Am.  Dec.  3S5  [1851];  a 
ease  where  the  ordinance  directed 
that  tlie  owners  or  occupants  of  lots 
fronting  on  a  certain  described  por- 
tion of  a  given  street  sliould  cause 
tlie  street  in  front  of  tlicir  respec- 
tive lots  to  he  pitclied,  leveled  and 
llagged  at  their  own  expense  in  such 
manner  as  tlie  city  superintendent, 
under  the  direction  of  tiie  commit- 
tee on  roads  a])])ointed  by  the  com- 
mon council,  siiould  direct  and  re- 
(luire:  while  the  statute  by  virtue 
of  llie  ordinance  was  passed,  em- 
])o\veied  tlie  common  council  to  make 
by-laws  and  ordinances  directing  any 
stri'ct  or  lane  in  the  city  to  be 
])itclie(l,  hn(>!ed.  paved  or  llagged 
within  such  time  and  in  sucli  man- 
ner as  they  might  ])'escribe  under 
the  superintendence  and  direction  of 
t^e    city    supevinte-ident. 

'"  (  ity    of    (  hicai'o    v.     l?urkliardt, 
223    111.   297,   79   X.   E.   82    [1906]. 


§  5^  TAXxVTION    BY    ASSESSxMENT.  94 

ity  to  construct  the  improvement  themselves."  An  insufficient 
notice  such  as  one  served  by  placing  it  upon  the  premises  under 
a  stone  which  covered  it  entirely/-  or  one  requiring  the  work  to 
be  done  in  seventeen  days  when  the  ordinance  under  which  it  is 
given  provides  that  the  owner  shall  be  given  thirty  days  in  which 
to  do  the  work,^''  gives  the  city  no  right  to  construct  the  improve- 
ment and  assess  the  cost  thereof  upon  the  abutting  property 
owners.  At  the  same  time  the  right  of  the  owner  to  do  the  work 
is  not  one  which  is  secured  to  him  by  constitutional  provisions.'* 
It  is  a  mere  favor  conferred  upon  him  by  statute,  and  according- 
ly any  notice  which  the  statute  provides  for,  is  sufficient,  such  as 
notice  by  publication/^  If  the  notice  is  mailed  properly  the  fact 
that  the  property  owner  has  not  received  it.  and  so  has  had,  in 
fact,  no  opportunity  to  do  the  work,  does  not  relieve  him  from 
liability.'"  In  this  respect  notice  to  the  owner  to  do  the  work 
is  to  be  distinguished  from  notice  of  the  assessment  itself.'^  Ac- 
cordingly he  cannot  insist  upon  an  opportunity  to  do  the  work 
himself  if  the  statute  makes  no  provision  therefor.^^  If  after  due 
notice  and  oportunity,  the  owner  neglects  or  refuses  to  do  the 
work,  subsequent  proceedings  are  in  the  nature  of  ordinary  local 
assessments.  By  failing  to  act  in  due  season  the  property  owner 
waives  his  right  to  do  the  work  himself.'"  Thus,  under  such  a 
statute,  if  the  owner  neglects  or  refuses  to  construct  a  sidewalk  in 
front  of  his  property,  the  municipal  corporation  may  proceed  to 
do  the  work  or  to  cause  it  to  be  done  at  the  expense  of  such 
owner.-"     If  the  abutting  owners  do  not  do  the  work,  the  city 

'1  Schmidt    v.    Village    of    Elmwood  19    N.    W.    533    [1884].      Queried    in 

Place,    15    Ohio    C.    C.    351     [1897];  Brewster     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

Mt.   Pleasant   Bor.   v.    Bait.   &    0.    R.  Council    of    the    City   of    Newark,    11 

Co.,    138    Pa.    St.    3C5,    11    L.    R.    A.  X.   J.  Eq.    (3   Stockt.)    114   [1856]. 

520,   20   Atl.    1052    [1890].  i"  City  of  Chicago  v.  Gait,  225  111. 

'-City    of    Philadelphia    to    use    of  368,    80    N.    E.    285    [1907]. 

Winmill  v.   Edwards,   78   Pa.  St.    (28  "See  Chapter  XIV. 

P.  F.   Smith)    62    [1875].  '» Clapton   v.    Taylor,    49   Mo.    App. 

"Washington    v.    Mayor    and    Al-  117     [1892];     Bingaman    v.    City    of 

dermen    of    Nashville,    31     Tenn.     (1  Pittsburgh,    147   Pa.   St.   353,  23*  Atl. 

Swan.)    177    [1851].      (In    such   case  395    [1892]. 

the   fact  that  the  city   delays   thirty  ^^  Broadway      Baptist      Church      v. 

days    before    commencing    to    do    the  McAtee,    71    Ky.     (8    Bush.)     508,    8 

work  does  not  cure  the  defect  in  the  Am.    Rep.    480    [1871]. 

notice.)  -'"  Buell  v.  Ball,  20  la.  282   [1866]; 

"Fass    V.    Seehawer,    60    Wis.    525,  Cuming    v.    Gleason,    140    Mich.    195, 

19    N.   W.    533    [1884].  103     N.     W.     537     [1905];     City    of 

"  Fass   V.    Seehawer,    60   Wis.    525,  Louisiana  v.  Shaffner,   104  Mo.  App. 


95  P^ORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  54 

may  let  the  contract  therefor  as  well  as  do  the  work  itself.-^ 
Mere  election  on  the  part  of  the  abutting  owner  to  do  the  work 
and  attempted  performance  on  his  part  will  not  be  sufficient  to 
discharge  his  liability  for  such  improvement.  He  must  further- 
more comply  substantially  with  the  re([uirements  of  the  ordi- 
nance.-- On  the  other  hand,  if  the  owner  does  the  work  and  it  is 
accepted  by  competent  public  authority,  the  other  owners  cannot 
resist  payment  of  their  assessmen-ts  on  the  ground  that  such  work 
so  done  by  the  owner  was  defective.-"  If  the  statute  does  not  give 
the  property  oAvner  the  option  to  do  the  work,  the  fact  that  he 
voluntarily  constructs  an  improvement  in  front  of  his  land  does 
not  prevent  the  city  from  making  an  improvement  of  the  same 
general  character,  but  of  a  different  material,  and  levying  an  as- 
sessment therefor.-*  Thus  where  a  property  owner  voluntarily 
constructed  a  street  surfaced  with  round  cobble  stones,  the  city 
had  power  to  provide  for  surfacing  such  street  with  asphalt  and 
levying  an  assessment  therefor  upon  the  land  owned  by  such 
property  owner.-"'  Hence,  if  the  city  permits  an  owner  to  con- 
struct a  sidewalk  "in  front  of  his  property"  and  is  silent  as  to 
permitting  him  to  construct  intersections,  but  provides  tliat  a 
pro  rata  charge  for  intersections  shall  be  made  upon  lots  in  front 
of  which  the  owner  has  constructed  the  sidewalk,  the  owner  can- 
not relieve  himself  from  liability  for  assessment  for  intersections 
by  constructing  an  intersection  at  the  corner  of  his  lot.-" 

§  54.    Option  to  do  work  in  assessment  for  benefits. 

In  the  case  of  im])rovements.  the  cost  of  which  is  made  a  charge 

101,    78    S.    W.    287    [ino;?l:    Ciiy   of  -' Pcoiilc    ox    rcl.    Ilanberg    v.    Poy- 

Sprinjrfield      ex      rcl.      rpdorgraff     v.  ton.    214     III.     'M(>,    73     N.     E.     708 

Mills,    99    Mo.    App.    141,    72    S.    W.  [1905|. 

462    [190.31;    Inhabitants   of   the   Vil-  -  Shnini  v.  Town  of  Salem,  13  Ind. 

lage  of  Ilonstania   v.  (hnibhs,  80  :\I().  App.    115.    30    X.    E.    1050    [18951. 
App.    433    [18991:    Paxson    v.    Sweet.  =' Whitefield    v.    Hippie,    —     (Ky.) 

13   1\.   J.    L.    1911    118321;    Ronsall    v.  — .  12  S.  W.  150.  11   Ky.  L.  K.  3Sfi". 
^layor.  Reeoi-der  and   Trustees  of  the  -■*  Parsons    \-.   (  iiy   of   Cdlnnibns.   50 

Town     of      Lebanon,      19      Oliio     418  O.   S.  41)0,  34  X.   E.   (577    [1893]. 
[1850];     Findley    v.    City    of    Pitts-  -'' Parsons  v.  City  of  Columbus.  50 

burjr     (Pa.),     11     Atl.     (178     [1887];  O.   S.  4(50,   34  X.   E.   077    [1893]. 
Mavor    and     Aldermen      v.    "Maberry,  -"  Ilenian      Construction      Com])any 

25   Tenn.    (0    Humph.)    3G8,   44    Am,  v.    McManus,    102    :Mo.    App.    049,    77 

Dee.  315    [1845];   Wilson  v.  Town  of  X\    W.    310    [1903]. 
rhiliT>pi.  39  \V.  Va.  75,  19  S.  E.  553 
[1894]. 


§  55  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  9G 

upon  the  property  owner  on  the  theory  of  benefits,  provisions 
giving  to  the  property  owner  the  option  to  do  the  work  himself, 
are  not  as  common  as  in  improvements  which  it  is  the  legal  duty 
of  the  land-owner  to  construct,  but  such  provisions  are  occasion- 
ally found.  Similar  views  are  entertained  where  the  statute  pro- 
vides that  the  owner  shall  be  allowed  to  do  the  grading,^  curbing,- 
or  guttering, •''  in  the  construction  of  a  street ;  or  shall  be  allowed 
to  construct  a  road.^  or  to  construct  a  levee,^  or  to  clean  out  the 
bed  of  a  creek.*'  Charges  of  this  sort  are  treated  as  ordinary  as- 
sessments, subject  to  the  option  of  the  owner  of  the  property'  to 
do  the  work  himself.  The  question  of  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  apportion  the  assessment  by  recjuiring  each  owner  to  pay 
for  the  Avork  done  in  front  of  his  property  is  not  here  considered, 
and  is  discussed  elsewhere.'^ 

§  55.    Option  to  do  work  in  performance  of  legal  duty. 

Assessments  of  this  kind  are  most  commonly  found  in  cases  in- 
volving assessments  of  the  second  type,  that  is  assessment  for  the 
cost  of  performing  a  legal  duty  which  the  ov>-ner  of  the  realty 
assessed  has  omitted  or  refused  to  perform.  A  common  example 
of  such  a  form  of  assessmeut  exists  where  the  owner  of  realty  is 
required  to  construct  a  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  property,  or  con- 
tinguous  thereto,  and  in  event  of  his  failure  so  to  do,  the  municipal 
corporation  is  authorized,  by  statute,  to  do  the  work  or  to  have 
it  done  and  to  charge  such  property  owner  with  the  expense 
thereof.     This  is  treated  as  a  form  of  assessment.^     Such  form  of 


^Myrick  v.   City   of  La   Crosse,   17  59    Ark.    494,    28    L.    R.    A.    49G,    28 

Wis.  "^442    [1863]."  S.    W.    32     [1894];     James    v.    Pine 

-Childers  v.  Holmes,  95   Mo.   App.  Bluff,    49    Ark.    199,    4    S.    W.    700 

154,  68   S.  W.   1046    [1902].  [1887];   City  of  Chicago  v.  Gait,  225 

MVhitefield  v.  Hippie,  —  (Ky.)  111.  368,  80  X.  E.  285  [1907];  People 
.  12  b.  ^Y.   150,   11   Ky.  L.  Pv.  386.  ex   rel.   Hanberg   \.   Peyton,   214   111. 

'Pierce    v.    County    Commissioners  376,   73    N.   E.    768    [1905];    Biggin's 

of     Franklin     County,     63     Me.     252  Estate    v.    People    ex    rel.    Tethering- 

[1872].  ton,    193    111.    601,    61    X.    E.    1124; 

5  Crowley  v.  Copley,  2  La.  Ann.  329  Town  of  Greendale  v.   Suit,   163  Ind. 

[1847].      '                   '  282,    71    X.    E.    658    [1904];    Shrum 

"Brown   v.    Keener,    74   X.    C.    714  v.  Town  of  Salem,  13  Ind.  App.  115. 

[1876],  39  X.  E.   1050   [18951:   City  of  Keo- 

'See   §   713.  kuk  v.   Independent  District  of  Keo- 

1  Winter  v.   City  Council   of  Mont-  kuk,    53    la.   352,    36   Am.    Rep.   226. 

gomery.     83     Ala!     589,     3     So.     235  5   X.  W.   503    [1880]:    Buell   v.   Ball. 

[1887];     Little    Rock    v.    Fitzgerald,  20    la.   282    [1866]:    Board   of   Coun- 


97 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IX    ASSESSMENT. 


§  ')o 


assessment  for  sidewalks  has  been  upheld  where  ordinary  assess- 
ments for  benefits  are  held  to  be  unconstitutional.-  Other  ex- 
amples of  assessments  of  this  type  where  the  owner  is  required 
to  do  the  work  are  found  in  cases  of  the  construction  of  sewers." 
or  of  house  connections  therefor,*  or  the  construction  of  drains/' 
under  the  alternative  provision,  in  the  event  that  he  refuses  or 
neglects  to  construct  such  improvement  of  having  the  same  con- 


cilmen  of  Frankfort  v.  Mason  & 
Foard  Co.,  100  Ky.  48,  37  S.  W.  290 
1 18!)6]  ;  Board  of  Councilmen  of  City 
of  Frankfort  v.  Murray,  99  Ky.  422, 
30  S.  W.  180;  Mayor  and  Board  of 
Trustees  of  Town  of  New  Iberia  v. 
Fontelieu,  108  La.  460,  32  So.  309 
[1901];  Cuming  v.  Gleason,  140 
:^licli.  195.  103  X.  W.  537  [1905]  : 
^■(iun<r  V.  \'illage  of  Waterville,  39 
Minn.  190,  39  N.  W.  97  [1888];  In- 
l;al)itants  of  Town  of  Palmyra  v. 
Morton,  25  Mo.  593  [1857];  City  of 
Louisiana  v.  Shaffner,  104  ^lo.  App, 
101,  78  S.  W.  287  [1904];  Heman 
Construction  Company  v.  McManus, 
102  Mo.  App.  049,  77  S.  W.  310 
11903];  City  of  Springfield  ex  rel. 
UpdegrafT  v.  Mills,  99  Mo.  App.  141, 
72  S.  W.  462  [1903];  Inhabitants 
of  tlie  Village  of  Iloustania  v. 
Grubbs.  80  Mo.  App.  433  [1899]; 
State  V.  Several  Pareels  of  Land, 
—  Neb.  — ,  107  X.  W.  500  [1900]; 
^lorris  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Bayonne.  25  N.  J. 
Eq.  (10  C.  E.  Gr.)  .345  [1874]; 
Brewster  v.  !Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Xewark,  11  X. 
.7.  Eq.  (3  Stookt.)  114  [1856];  San- 
ford  V.  Village  of  Warwick,  181  X. 
v.  20,  73  X.  E.  490  [1905]  (revers- 
ing 82  X.  Y.  S.  406,  83  App.  Div. 
120.)  Thompson  v.  Sohermerhorn,  6 
X.  V.  92.  55  Am.  Dec.  385  [1851]; 
City  iif  Wihiiington  v.  ^'opp.  71  X. 
C.  70  I1S7I1:  Wilhelm  v.  City  of 
Defuuice,  58  0.  S.  5ti.  05  Am.  St. 
Bep.  745.  40  L.  B.  A.  294.  50  X.  E. 
18  [1898];  Schmidt  v.  Village  of 
Elmwood  Place,  15  Ohio  C.  C.  351 
[1897];   Hunt  v.  Hunter,   11   Ohio  C. 


C.  (59  [1895]:  Mt.  Pleasant  Bor.  v. 
Bait.  &  0.  R.  Co.,  138  Pa.  St.  305, 
11  L.  R.  A.  520,  20  Atl.  1052  [1891]  ; 
Philadelphia  v.  Stevenson,  132  Pa. 
St.  103.  19  Atl.  70  [1890];  Wilkins- 
burg  Bor.  v.  Home  for  Aged  Women, 
131  Pa.  St.  109,  6  L.  R.  A.  531,  18 
Atl.  937  [1890];  City  of  Philadel- 
pliia  to  use  of  Winmill  v.  Edwards, 
78  Pa.  St.  (28  P.  F.  Smith  I  62 
[  1S75I  ;  Findlay  v.  (  ity  of  Pittsburg 
(Pa.)  11  Atl.'  678  [1887];  Mayor 
anil  Aldermen  v.  jSIaberry,  25  Tenn. 
(6  Humph.)  368,  44  Am.  Dec.  315 
[1845];  Washington  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Nashville,  31  Tenn.  ( 1 
Swan)  177  [1851];  i\layor  and  City 
Council  of  Xashville  v.  Berry,  2 
Shan.  Cas.  (Tenn.)  501  [1877); 
Sands  v.  City  of  Richmond,  31 
Graft.  571,  31  Am.  Rep.  742  [1879]; 
W'ilscm  V.  Town  of  Philippi,  39  W. 
Va.  75.  19  S.  E.  553  [1894]:  Fass 
V.  Scchawer,  60  Wis.  525,  19  X.  W. 
533    [18841. 

-Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty.  57  Miss. 
378.  34  Am.  Rep.  45  [1879];  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  v.  Maberry,  25  Tenn. 
(0  Humph.)  368,  44  Am.  Dec.  315 
[1845];  Washington  v.  flavor  and 
Aldermen  of  Xashville.  31  Tenn.  (1 
Swan.)  177  11851];  Xashville  v. 
Berry.  2  Shan.  Cas.  (Tenn.)  561 
[1877]. 

^  State  V.  Foster.  94  Minn.  412.  103 
X.    W.    14    [1905]. 

*  Erie  City  v.  Willis.  20  Pa.  Super. 
(  t.  4,59    [1904]. 

'  Scherm  v.  (larrett's  Adm..  118 
Ky.  290.  80  S.  W.  1103.  20  Ky.  L. 
R.   180   [1904]. 


§  56  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  98 

structed  by  the  proper  public  authorities  at  the  cost  of  such 
owner.  If  the  improvement  is  one  the  cost  of  which  the  land- 
owner cannot  be  compelled  to  pay,  either  on  the  theory  of  bene- 
fits or  on  the  theory  of  the  performance  of  a  legal  duty,  no  ad- 
ditional validity  can  be  given  to  such  exaction  by  requiring  the 
owner  to  construct  the  improvement  himself."  Thus  if  a  ditch  in 
not  necessary  to  protect  the  public  health  or  to  protect  the  con- 
tiguous land  from  nuisance  it  cannot  be  made  the  duty  of  the 
land-owner  to  construct  it  by  giving  him  notice  so  to  do.''  So,  in 
Pennsylvania,  where  no  assessment  can  be  levied  for  a  new  im- 
provement if  the  old  is  in  good  condition,^  the  owner  cannot  be 
required  to  take  up  a  curb  which  is  in  good  condition  and  re- 
place it  with  a  new  and  expensive  curb  as  a  part  of  the  general 
plan  of  turning  a  street  into  a  boulevard.® 

§  56.    Primary  duty  upon  city. 

Under  statutes  which  permit  a  city  to  require  property  owners 
to  construct  improvements  in  front  of  their  respective  lands,  the 
city  remains  liable  to  third  persons  for  any  damages  which  may 
be  caused  by  failure  to  make  such  improvement  or  for  defects  in 
its  construction.  The  effect  of  statutes  of  this  sort  is  not  to  trans- 
fer liability  by  reason  of  such  improvement  froni  the  city  to  abut- 
ting property  owners.,^  Hence  the  owner"  is  not  primarily  liable 
to  a  traveler  for  an  injury  occasioned  by  the  fact  that  the  side- 
walk was  out  of  repair.-  So,  if  the  owner  is  required  to  con- 
struct a  sidewalk  and  he  constructs  it  in  a  negligent  manner,  the 
city  cannot  recover  indemnity  from  such  owner  by  reason  of  a 
judgment  which  a  third  person,  injured  by  such  negligence,  has 

'Chicago    &   Erie    Railroad    Co.    v.  Philadelphia,  US  Pa.  St.  535,  12  Atl. 

Keith,  67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R.  A.  525,  174]    [1888]. 
65  K  E.   1020   [1902].  ^  City    of    Keokuk    v.    Independent 

'Chicago    &    Erie    Railroad    Co.    v.  District   of   Keokuk,   53    la.    352,   36 

Keith,  67  O.  S.  279.  60  L.  R.  A.  525,  Am.  Rep.  226,  5  N.  W.  503    [1880]; 

65  N.'E.   1020    [1902].  Haskell   v.   Village   of   Penn.   Yan.,   5 

«See   §§   378,  382,  383.     In  assess-  Lans.    (X.   Y.)    43    [1871];    Wilhelra 

ments  on   the   theory   of  benefits,   all  v.   City  of  Defiance,  58  O.   S.  56,  65 

reconstruction    must    be    at    the    ex-  Am.   St.  Rep.   745.  40  L.  R.   A.  294, 

pense  of  the  city  and  not  at  the  ex-  50  N.  E.   IS    [1898];    Hay  v.  City  of 

pense  of  the  property  owners.  Baraboo,   127  Wis.  1.  3  L.  R.  A.   (N. 

nVistar  v.  Philadelphia.  80  Pa.  St.  S.)   84,  105  TsT.  W.  654  [1906]. 
505,   21    Am.   Rep.    112    [1876]:    [dis-  -Hay  v.  City  of  Baraboo.  127  Wis. 

tinguished    in    Michener    v.    City    of  1.  3  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    84,  105  N.  W. 

654  [1906]. 


I 


99  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  5 1 

recovered  against  the  city,  although  the  city  could  have  con- 
structed such  sidewalk  in  a  proper  manner  at  the  expense  of  such 
owner.'  So  under  a  statute  which  provides  that  the  city  may  re- 
({uire  a  land-owner  to  repair  a  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  land,  if 
the  city  allows  the  sidewalk  to  get  into  defective  condition  so  that 
the  city  is  held  liable  for  damage  caused  thereby,  it  cannot  re- 
cover indemnity  therefor  from  such  land-owner,  although  it  could 
have  recovered  from  him  the  cost  of  putting  such  sidewalk  in 
good  condition.* 

§  57.     Repairs. 

Statutes  are  found  which  in  case  of  repairs,  give  the  owner 
the  option  to  do  the  work  himself,  or  to  permit  it  to  be  done 
at  his  expense  by  competent  public  authority.  Thus  provisions 
of  this  sort  are  found  in  the  case  of  the  repair  of  sidewalks.' 
Power  to  assess  if  the  owner  does  not  perform  the  work  has 
been  found  under  a  statute  providing  that  where  any  portion 
of  the  roadway  of  any  street  or  alley  or  any  portion  of  any 
sidewalk  shall  be  out  of  repair  the  board  of  public  works  shall 
require  the  owners  or  occupants  of  the  property  adjoining  to 
repair  such  portion.  This  provision  was  held  to  authorize  the 
board,  in  case  of  neglect  or  omission  of  the  owner  to  make  such 
repairs,  to  award  a  contract  for  the  repair  of  such  sidewalk  or 
to  take  charge  of  such  repairs  itself.'-  The  same  general  prin- 
ciples applicable  in  eases  of  original  construction  are  in  force  in 
case  of  repairs.  Thus  if  the  owner  complies  with  the  notice, 
commences  work  within  the  prescribed  time  and  proceeds  in 
its  performance  with  reasoiial)le  diligence,  the  municipal  cor- 
poration cannot  charge  him   with   the  cost  of  work  done  by  the 

'Willu'hn    V.    City   of   Dofiancc.    ")«  H  ity    of    Kookuk    v.    Independent 

0.  S.  50.  C).)  Am.  St.  Rep.  745.  40  L.  District   of    Keokuk,    53    la.    352,    36 

R.  A.  294,  50  X.  E.   18    [ISflS];    See  Am.  Hep.  22(),  5  X.  \V.  503  [18S01. 
to  the  same  effect   City   of   Hartford  '  Heath    v.    Maiison,    147    Cal.    094, 

V.  Talcott.  48  Conn.  525,  40  Am.  Rep.  S2     Pac.     331      [1905];     :Mayor     and 

189    [18811;    Flynn   v.    Canton    Com-  I'.oard  of  Trustes  of  the  Town  of  Xew 

pany   of    Baltimore.    40    :\Id.    312.    17  Theria   v.    Fontelien,    108   La.   460,   32 

Am.    Rep.    003    [18741:     Citv    of    Rt.  So.  .309    [19011:    Heman  v.  St.  Louis 

Louis  V.  Connecticut  Alutunl  life  In-  ^Tereliant*'   I^aml    Iniprovement   Com- 

surance    Company.     107     ^\n.    02.    28  panv.   75   Mo.    App.   372    [18981. 
Am.  St.  Rep.  402!  17  S.  W.  037:   Citv  =  llc;'tli    v.    Manson.    147    Cal.    094, 

of  Rochester  v.   Cnmiihell.    123   X.  Y.  82    Pac.    .'531     [10051. 
405.   20    Am.   St.   Rep.    700.    10   L.    R. 
A.  393.  25  X.  W.  937   [1S901. 


§  58  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  100 

corporation  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit.^  In  Illinois 
a  city  ordinance  reqnirecl  the  owners  or  occupants  to  repair  the 
sidewalk  in  front  of  their  respective  lots,  and  provided  for  a 
fine  or  penalty  in  case  of  failure  so  to  do.  It  was  held  that 
the  ordinance  was  invalid,  on  the  theory  that  neither  original 
construction  nor  repairs  can  be  demanded  of  the  abutting  owner 
or  occupant  at  his  own  expense.^  This  view  of  such  an  ordi- 
nance turns  chiefly  on  the  Illinois  theory  of  local  improvements.^ 
and  not  solely  on  the  ground  that  the  duty  to  repair  was  en- 
forceable only  by  fine  or  penalty.  Under  the  general  principles 
in  force  in  most  states  it  is  held  that,  a  statute  providing  for  the 
allotment  of  the  work  of  maintaining,  cleaning  and  repairing  a 
public  ditch  after  notice  and  a  hearing,  and  for  an  assessment 
if  the  work  is  not  done  as  allotted,  neither  allotment  nor  assess- 
ment to  exceed  the  benefits,  is  constitutional ;"  though  under 
such  statute  an  allotment  without  notice  is  invalid.^  If  due  no- 
tice is  given  and  the  trustee  of  the  township  personally  promises 
the  land-owner  that  the  latter  will  be  permitted  to  make  such 
repairs  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  fixed  by  the  notice,  such 
promise  is  invalid,  and  if  repairs  are  made  by  the  township 
trustee  after  the  expiration  of  such  time  so  limited,  the  owner 
cannot  resist  such  assessment.*^ 

§  58.     Removal  of  ice  and  snow. 

Statutes  or  ordinances  provide  in  some  cases  that  the  owner 
or  occupant  of  land  shall  remove  ice.  snow  and  the  like  from 
the  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  land  within  a  certain  period  of 
time  after  it  is  formed  or  deposited  there.  The  question  of  the 
power   of   the   legislature   to    impose   such   charges   is    one   upon 


'  Heman    v.    St.    LonLs    Merchants'  liis  work  having  been  done  according 

Land  Improvement  Company,  75  Mo.  to     tlie     requirements     of    the     ordi- 

App.  372   [1898].     Tlie  owner  was  to  nance. 

do   the   work   within   five   days.     No-  *  City    of    Chicago    v.    Crosby,    111 

tice  was  sent  on  the  thirteenth  of  the  111.  538   [1885]. 

month;    received    on    the    fourteenth;  ^  See   §   377. 

work  was  begun  on  the  sixteenth;  and  "  Roundenbusli  v.  Mitchell,  154  Ind. 

completed  on  the  eighteenth.     Subse-  (116,  57  N.  E.  510   [1900]. 

quently   the    work    was   torn    up    and  '^  Hille  v.   Neale.  :3'2   Ind.  App.   341, 

done     again     by     the     contractor     to  fiO  N.  E.   713    [1004]. 

whom   the  city  had  let  the   contract.  "Davison     v.     Campbell.     28     Ind. 

It  was  held  tbat  the  owner  was  not  App.  088.  (53  X.  E.  779   [1901]. 
liable   for   .such   second   improvement, 


I 


101  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  58 

which  there  is  a  sharp  conflict  of  authority.  Exactions  of  this 
sort  are  rarely  liasetl  upon  any  theory  of  benefits,  the  owner 
beinjUT  required  to  remove  the  ice  or  snow  upon  the  assumption 
that  a  legal  duty  rests  upon  him  so  to  do.  Some  of  the  eases 
holding  such  statutes  and  ordinances  invalid  proceed  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  charges  thu.s  imposed  are  assessments  of 
the  first  class,  based  upon  the  theory  of  benefits.  If  it  is  as- 
sumed or  granted  that  these  charges  are  to  be  upheld,  if  at 
all.  on  the  theory  of  benefits  it  is  usually  easy  to  show  that 
the  statute  or  ordinance  is  invalid  as  it  rarely  purports  either 
to  limit  the  exaction  to  the  benefit  or  to  apportion  it  with  ref- 
erence thereto.  Thus  an  act  of  Congress  applicable  to  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  imposing  a  fine  of  five  dollars  for  the  first 
day's  default  and  a  further  fine  of  five  dollars  thereafter  for 
each  day  not  exceeding  five  days.^  or  a  citv  ordinance  imposing  a 
similar  fine  in  case  of  default  in  removing  snow  Avithin  six  hours 
after  it  ceases  falling,  or  within  six  hours  after  sunrise  if  it  falls 
durng  the  nii>ht.-  hnve  each  been  h(dd  invalid.  Tt  is  an  attempt 
to  enforce  the  collection  of  local  assessments  by  criminal  pro- 
ceedings. Furthermore,  if  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  enforce 
a  legal  duty,  irrespective  of  the  theory  of  assessment  for  bene- 
fits, the  very  existence  of  the  legal  duty  has  been  denied,  the 
courts  in  some  cases  holding  that  such  duty  rests  upon  the  public 
corporation  and  that  it  cannot  be  transferred  from  the  public 
corporation  to  tbc  |)r(U')erty  owner.^  In  accordance  with  these 
views  we  find  that  in  some  jurisdictions  the  power  to  compel 
the  property  owner  to  renu)ve  ice  and  snow  is  denied  entirely.* 
A  different  view  is.  however,  entertained  in  many  jurisdictions, 
and  it  is  held  that  a  legal  duty  rests  upon  the  owner  of  realty 
to   remove   such   ice   and   snow,    and   that   such    legal    duty    may 


»McGuire   v.    District    of   Cohinil)!.-!.  Mlcnuirc   v.   District  of  Columbia. 

24  App.   D.  V.  22    fl004].  24    Ai)]).  D.   ('.  22    [10041;    Holtznian 

=  Ori(llev    v.    City   of    Blooniiii-j'ton.  v.  riiited  States.   14  App.  D.  C.  454 

88   111.  5.54,  .30  Am.  Rej).  r-,M   f  18781.  flf-OOl;    City   of  Chicasro   v.   O'Brien. 

'McCuire  v.   District   .f   ('plunil)i;i.  Ml   111.  532.  53  Am.  Ben.  640  [18841; 

24  App.  D.   C.   22    [10041:    Il.ilt/mnn  C'.vidley    v.    Citv    of    Bloominfrton.    88 

V.  Cnited   Ptnte*.    14    Anp.  D.   C\   454  HI.    554.    30    Am.    Bcp.    500    [18781: 

[IPnni:    Oridlev    v.    Citv    of    Bloom-  State  v.   Jackman.   00   X.   IT.   318.    42 

iiiffton.  88  Til.  554.  30   Am.  Rep.  566  L.  R.  A.  438.  41  All.  347   [18081. 
[187S1. 


^  58  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  102 

l)e  enforced  by  fines  or  penalties.''  Language  is  occasionally 
found  in  the  cases  upholding  such  statutes  which  seems  to  in- 
dicate that  the  charge  is  regarded  as  a  benefit.  Thus  the  work 
of  removing  the  snow  is  said  to  be  "a  slight  burden,  insignificant 
in  comparison  with  the  benefit  secured."''  At  the  same  time, 
such  statutes  are  really  treated,  where  held  valid,  as  operations 
of  the  police  power,  imposing  criminal  liability  and  not  as  pro- 
viding for  an  assessment.  The  penalty  imposed  has  usually  no 
relation  either  to  the  cost  of  the  work,'^  or  to  the  benefits  de- 
rived therefrom  by  the  owner  of  the  realty,**  but  is  imposed  solely 
to  coerce  performance.  "It  is  not  speaking  strictly  to  char- 
acterize this  city  ordinance  as  a  law  levying  a  tax,  the  direct 
or  principal  object  of  which  is  the  raising  of  revenue.  It  im- 
poses a  duty  upon  a  large  class  of  persons  the  performance  of 
which  requires  some  labor  and  expense,  and  therefore  indirectly 
operates  as  a  laAV  creating  a  burden.  But  we  think  it  is  rather 
to  be  regarded  as  a  police  regulation  requiring  a  duty  to  be 
performed,  highly  salutary  and  advantageous  to  the  citizens  of 
a  populous  and  closely  built  city  and  which  is  imposed  upon 
them  because  they  are  so  situated  as  that  they  can  most  promptly 
and  conveniently  perform  it,  and  it  is  laid,  not  upon  a  few,  but 
upon  a  numerous  class,  all  those  who  are  so  situated  and  equally 
upon  all  who  are  within  the  description  composing  the  class."** 
Thus  provisions  have  been  upheld  imposing  fines  of  from  one 
to  four  dollars  per  day^**  or  one  to  fifty  dollars  per  day^^  for 
each  day  that  the  snow  or  ice  is  allowed  to  remain  upon  the 
sidewalk;  or  imposing  a  fine  of  ten  dollars.^-  or  a  fine  of  from 
one  to  ten  dollars^'  for  each  offense.  Even  a  provision  that  the 
owner  in  case   of  his   neglect   or   omission   to   remove   the   snow 

=  State   V.   McMalion.    76    Conn.    07,  "  noddard.  Petitifmor.  .3.3  Mass.    (16 

55  Atl.  591   [1903];  Goddard  V.  Peti-  Pick.)     504.    509.    28    Am.    Dec.    259 

tioner,   33   Mass.    ( IG   Pick.)    504.   28  [1835]. 

Am.  Dec.  259   [1835]  ;  City  of  Helena  "Goddard,     Petitioner,     33     Mass. 

V.   Kent,   32   IMont.   279,   80  Pac.   258  (16    Pick.)     504,    28    Am.    Dec.    259 

[1905];      Village     of      Carthage      v.  [1835]. 

Frederick,  122  N.  Y.  268,  19  Am.  St.  "  City  of  Helena  v.  K(>nt,  32  Mont. 

Rep.  490,   10  L.  R.  A.  178,  25  N.  E.  279,  80  Pac.  258   [1905]. 

480    [1890];    State   v.    McCrillis,    —  « State  v.  McIMahon.   76   Conn.   97. 

R.    I.  _,   66    Atl.    301    [1907].  55  Atl.  591    [1903]. 

"State  V.   McMalion,   76   Conn.   97,  "Village  of  Carthage  v.  Frederick. 

106,  55   Atl.  591    [1903].  122  N.  Y.  268,   19  Am.  St.  Rep.  490. 

•'See   §§   713,   717.  10  L.  R.  A.  178,  25  N.  E.  480  [1890]. 

'See  §  651   et  seq..  §   717. 


103  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  59 

or  ice  shall  be  liable  for  the  expense  of  clearing  the  same  off 
and  also  for  a  penalty  of  two  dollars,  is  not  regarded  as  impos- 
ing an  assessment.^*  Under  such  provisions  th^  primary  duty 
of  keeping  the  sidewalk  free  from  ice  and  snow  still  rests  on  the 
city.  The  owner  who  neglects  to  remove  the  ice  and  snow  from 
the  sidewalk  is  not  liable  to  a  person  injured  thereby/^  even  if 
by  the  provisions  of  the  statute  the  owner  is  liable  over  to  the 
city  for  any  injury  caused  by  such  neglect.^"  Such  a  statute 
does  not  apply  until  the  city  has  been  held  liable  to  the  person  in- 
jured, and  then  seeks  to  be  reimbursed  by  the  owner.  The  manner 
of  removing  snow  may  be  regulated  by  the  city.  Thus  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  a  street  railway  to  remove  snow  from  the  tracks 
only  as  directed  by  the  superintendent  of  streets  has  been  upheld 
as  valid. ^^  If  the  ordinance  requires  snow  to  be  removed  by 
the  tenant  occupying  the  adjoining  premises  and  in  case  there 
is  no  tenant,  the  owner,  an  owner  who  has  let  the  two  parts  of 
the  premises  to  two  different  tenants  and  who  occupies  rooms 
there  as  a  boarder  with  one  of  his  tenants  is  not  liable.^* 

vj  59.     Lig-hting. 

Some  statutes  provide  that  railway  companies  must  maintain 
lights  at  the  crossings  of  the  tracks  of  such  railways  with  the 
l)ublic  streets  of  municipal  corporations.  Such  statutes  are  up- 
held as  a  valid  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state. ^  If 
the  statute  provides  that  the  municipal  corporation  shall  light 
llie  crossing  and  collect  the  cost  thereof  from  the  railway  com- 
pany, in  case  such  company  refuses  to  light  it.  we  have  what  is 

'*  Flynn     v.     Canton     Company     of  '^  Commonwoalth     v.     Watson.     07 

Baltimore.  40  Md.  312,   17  Am.  Rep.  Mass.    562    [18G71. 

<i03   [1874].  '  (  hicaffo,     Indianapolis     &     Louis- 

'■Flynn     v.     Canton     Company     of  villc    Railway    Company    v.    City    of 

Faltinu.ro.   40  Md.  312,   17  Am.  Rep.  Crawfordsvilie,  164  Ind.  70,  72  N.  E. 

(i03   [1874  1:    Kirby  v.  Boylston  Mar-  1025  [1904];  Villajre  of  St.  Marys  v. 

ket  Association.  80  ilass.    (14  Cray^  Lake     Erie     and     Western     Raiiroad 

240.   74    Am.    Dec.    682    [1850 1.  Company,  60  O.  S.  136.  53  X.  E.  705 

'"Taylor    v.    Lake    Shore    &    Miclii-  flSOO];       Cincinnati.      Hamilton      & 

-inn   Routliern   Railroad   Company.   45  Dayton  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Villajje  of  Bowl- 

^licli.  74.  40  Am.  Rep.  457.  7  X.  W.  intr  Creen.  Ohio.  57   O.  8.^^336.  41   L. 

728   [1881].  R.  A.  422.  40  X.  E.  121   [1807]:   Cin- 

'■  l^nion  Railway  Company  V.  May-  cinnati.   Hamilton   and   Dayton   Rail- 

or  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Cam-  road   Company  v.   Sullivan.  32   0.   S. 

hrhhjo.     03     ?irn<s.      (11      A11.1      287  1.52    [1877]. 

ri8r5]. 


§  60  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  104 

substantially  an  assessment.-  It  is,  however,  held  that  this  is 
not  a  local  assessment  within  the  provision  of  the  statute  for 
collection  of  local  assessments.^  This  means  that  such  assess- 
ment cannot  be  placed  upon  the  tax  duplicate,  but  must  be  col- 
lected by  suit.  If,  however,  the  ordinance  imposes  a  penalty 
upon  the  railway  company  for  refusing  to  maintain  the  light, 
thereby  intending  to  coerce  obedience,  and  does  not  provide  for 
assessing  the  cost  of  maintaining  such  light  upon  the  railway 
company,  we  have  a  provision  w^hich,  though  valid,  is  not  re- 
garded as  an  assessment  in  this  sense.* 

§  60.     Liability  of  street  railway  company  for  paving  between 
tracks. 

A  form  of  assessment  in  which  the  liability  is  voluntarily  in- 
curred by  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed  is  found  where  a 
street  railway  company  accepts  a  charter  or  franchise  by  the 
terms  of  which  it  is  bound  to  pave  and  keep  in  repair  a  certain 
part  of  the  street  upon  which  the  rails  of  such  surface  road  are 
laid.  It  is  evident  that  if  the  railway  company  declines  to  ac- 
cept such  charter  or  franchise,  it  does  not  incur  any  liability 
under  the  terms  thereof.  On  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  lay  or 
operate  its  track  without  accepting  such  charter  or  franchise, 
including  the  burdens  as  well  as  the  benefits  thereof.  A  charge 
of  this  sort  differs  from  charges  for  water,  gas,  or  other  com- 
modities furnished  for  use  upon  certain  realty.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  charges  of  this  sort  are  really  contracts  and  noth- 
ing more,  since  it  is  possible  at  any  time  to  discontinue  the  use 
of  such  commodity,  and  thus  terminate  all  liwbility  in  the  future. 
In  the  case  of  the  street  railway,  on  the  other  hand,  once  the 
franchise  or  charter  is  accepted,  the  railwa.v  company  becomes 
liable  for  the  paving  and  repairing  therein  specified.  It  may 
be  accordingly  a  ease  of  assessment  and  not  a  case  of  contractual 
relation  merely,  although  the  liability  is  assumed  by  a  contract. 


-Village    of     St.    ^Vlarrs     v.    Lake  *  Cincinnati,  Hamilton  and  Dayton 

Erie    and    Western    Railroad     Com-  Eailroad  Company  v.  Sullivan,  .32  0. 

pany.    60    0.    S.    136.    53    X.    K.    795  S.   152    [1877]. 

[1899];  Cincinnati,  Hamilton  &  Day-  *  Chicago,     Indianapolis     &     Loiiis- 

ton  R.   R.   Co.  V.  Village  of  Bowling  ville    Railway    Company    v.    Citv    of 

Green,  Oliio,  57   O.   S.   336.  41   L.   R.  Crawfordsville,  164  Ind.  70,  72  X.  E. 

A.  422.  49  X.  E.   121    [1897].  1025    [1904]. 


105 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IX    ASSESSMENT. 


§G0 


or  something  analogous  thereto.'  In  some  of  these  cases,  the 
street  railway  company  is  liable  to  do  the  work  itself,  and  the 
assessment  assumes  the  form  of  a  money  charge  only  if  the  rail- 
way company  neglects  or  omits  so  to  do.-  Assessments  of  this 
sort  resemble  closely  the  other  forms  of  assesment  in  which  the 
property  is  bound  primarily  to  do  the  work,  and  is  liable  to 
a  charge  in  money  only  in  the  event  of  his  refusing  or  omitting 
to  do  such  work.  Under  other  forms  of  charter  or  franchises 
the  street  railway  company  is  required  to  pay  the  cost  of  such 
paving  or  repairing,  which  is  to  be  done  by  the  city  or  other 
public  corporation.''  Asses.sments  of  this  sort  resemble  the  ordi- 
nary type  of  assessment  in  which  the  property  owner  has  no 
option,  but  is  required  to  pay  the  amount  of  a  valid  assessment 
against  his  property  for  the  work  done.  An  obligation  to  pave 
and  keep  in  good  repair  has  been  held  not  to  show  any  liability 
to  repave.*  The  street  railway  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay  the 
increase  in  cost  due  to  a  guaranty  of  repairs,  the  bond  for  which 
does  not  enure  to  the  benefit  of  such  railway  company.'  A  sub- 
sequent change   of  charter  or  statute   diminishing  or  modifying 


'City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
Consolidated  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany. lOG  U.  S.  539,  25  S.  327 
[1905];  (affirming  City  of  Worces- 
ter V.  Worcester  Consolidated  Street 
Railway  Company,  182  Mass.  49,  64 
X.  E.  581  [19021)  ;  New  Orleans  City 
&  Lake  Railroad  Co.  v.  Louisiana  e\ 
rel.  New  Orleans.  157  V.  S.  219,  39 
L.  079,  15  S.  581  [1895];  (Affirm- 
ing. State  ex  rel.  City  of  New  Or- 
leans V.  New  Orleans  City  &  Lake 
Uailroad  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  550 
11890]  I  ;  Fair  Haven  and  Westville 
Railroad  Company  v.  (  ity  of  Now 
Haven,  75  Conn.  442.  53  Atl.  900 
[1003]:  An:erican  Hide  and  Leather 
Company  v.  (ity  of  (  liicago.  203  111. 
451.  07  N.  E.  979  [1903]:  City  ot 
TN-nton  TLulior  v.  St.  Joseph  and 
Henton  Harbor  Street  Raihv;'y  Co.. 
102  Mich.  386.  26  L.  R.  A.  245.  60 
N.  W.  758  [1894]:  Wales  v.  War- 
ren. 66  Neb.  455.  92  X.  W.  590 
[1902]:  City  of  Rochester  v.  Roch- 
ester Railway  Company,  182  X'.  Y. 
99.    70   L.   R."  A.    773.    74    X.    E.    953 


11905]:  Storrie  v.  Houston  City 
Street  Railway  Co..  92  Tex.  129,  44 
L.  R.  A.  716,  46  S.  W.  796  [1898]. 

-  Xew  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Louisiana  ex  rel. 
City  of  Xew  Orleans.  157  L'.  S.  219, 
39  L.  679,  15  S.  581  [1895];  [Affirm- 
ing State  ex  rel.  f  ity  d  Sow  Or- 
leans V.  Xew  Orh'uiis  (  ily  and  Lake 
Railroad  Co..  42  La.  Ann.  550 
7  So.  600  [1S90|;  Fair  Haven  and 
Westville  Railroad  Company  v.  City 
of  Xew  Haven.  77  C<mn.  219.  58  Ati. 
703  [1904];  City  of  Sprinirfield  v. 
Springfield  Street  Ry.  Co..  182  Mass. 
41.  64   X.  E.  577    [1902]. 

Mity  of  Rochester  v.  Roi-lu'stei' 
Railway  Company.  182  X.  Y.  99,  70 
L.    R.    A.   773.   74   X.   E.   953    [1905]. 

'  Western  Raving  and  Supply  Com- 
pany V.  (  iti/fiis'  Street  Railroad 
C()ni])any.  1_'S  Ind.  .-)25.  25  Am.  St. 
Hop.  462.  1(1  L.  R.  A.  770.  26  X.  E. 
188.  28   X.   E.   88    [18911. 

"Fair  Haven  &  Westville  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  X'ow  Haven.  77  Conn.  219.  58 
Atl.   703    [1904L 


§61 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


KK) 


the  burden  which  is  acquiesced  in  by  the  railway  company  is 
valid  as  against  the  objection  of  the  city,"  and  a  change  in- 
creasing the  burden  upon  the  railway  is  valid  as  against  it  and 
its  pre-existing  mortgages  if  by  the  constitution  such  franchises 
remain  subject  to  legislative  control.'  The  city  may  assess  the 
abutting  property  owners  even  if  by  contract  the  railway  com- 
pany which  occupies  part  of  the  street  is  bound  to  regrade  and 
gravel  it  and  keeji  it  in  repair.**  In  some  cases,  however,  the 
fact  that  the  liability  is  assumed  voluntarily  is  regarded  as  pre- 
venting it  from  being  a  true  assessment.''  If  the  charter  of  the 
railway  company  imposes  such  liability  on  the  street  railway, 
but  the  charter  of  the  borough  does  not  confer  any  power  upon 
the  borough  to  levy  an  assessment  except  on  "lands  and  build- 
ings," the  borough  cannot  enforce  the  liability  of  the  railway 
company  by  an  assessment.^" 

§  61.     Appropriation  of  expense  between  public  corporations. 

A  form  of  exaction  or  forced  contribution  which  presents  some 
resemblance  to  assessment,  and  some  to  general  taxation,  is  found 
where  the  expense  of  certain  public  improvements  is  apportioned 
among  public  corporations.^     An  exaction  of  this  sort  resembles 


"Worcester  v.  \Yorcester  Consoli- 
dated Steel  Railway  Co..  182  Mass. 
49,  64  N.  E.  581   [19021. 

''  Storrie  v.  Houston  City  Street 
Railway  Co..  92  Tex.  129,  44  L.  R. 
A.  716^  46   S.  W.   796    [1898]. 

*  Cason  V.  City  of  Lebanon,  15.3 
Ind.  567,  55  X.  E.  768. 

^  "Street  railway  companies  are 
sometimes  required  as  a  condition 
for  enjoying  the  franchise  to  con- 
tribute to  the  expense  of  street  im- 
provements. In  that  manner  they 
sustain  a  contractual  relation  to  the 
city,  but  that  is  altogether  different 
from  the  attempt  to  levy  and  en- 
force an  assessment  against  anything 
so  intangible  as  the  mere  right  to 
operate  cars  upon  a  street  owned  by 
the   public."      In    re   City   of   Seattle. 

—   Wash.    ,    94    Pac.    1075.    1079 

[1908]. 

"  Farmers  Loan  and  Trust  Co.  v. 
Ansonia,    61    Conn.    76,    23   Atl.   705. 


See  also  People  ex  rel.  Troy  and 
Lansingburg  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coffey.  (iC) 
Hun.  160,  21  K  Y.  Supp.  34  [1892]. 

MVilliams  v.  Eggleston,  170  U.  S. 
304.  42  L.  1047,  18  S.  617  [1898]; 
(Affirming  State  ex  rel.  Bulkeley  v. 
Williams,  68  Conn.  131,  48  L.  R.  A. 
465,  35  Atl.  24,  421  [1896]);  Com- 
missioners of  Highways  of  Town  of 
Dix  V.  Big  Four, Drainage  District  ot 
Ford  County,  207  111.  17,  69  N.  E. 
576  [1904];  Kingman,  Petitioner, 
153  Mass.  566.  12  L.  R.  A.  417,  27 
N.  E.  778  [1891];  Maltby  v.  Taut- 
ges,  50  Minn.  248,  52  N.  W.  858 
[1892]  ;  Guilder  v.  Town  of  Otsego. 
20  Minn.  74,  20  Gil.  59  [1873]; 
Town  of  Underbill  v.  Town  of  Essex, 
64  Vt.  28,  23  Atl.  617  [1891]; 
Town  of  Wardsboro  v.  Town  of  Ja- 
maica, .59  Vt.  514,  9  Atl.  11  [1887]; 
Town  of  Tunbridge  v.  Town  of  Roy- 
alton,  58  Vt.  212,  1  Atl.  487   [1885]: 


107  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IX    ASSESSMENT.  §  62 

an  assessment  because  such  apportionment  is,  in  theory  at  least, 
made  upon  the  basis  of  the  benefits  received  by  each  public 
corporation.  It  differs  from  a  local  assessment  in  that  the  bene- 
fits conferred  are  not  those  "conferred  upon  real  property  owned 
by  the  public  corporation,  but  are  those  which  are  conferred 
upon  the  inhabitants  thereof,  as  members  of  the  general  public 
living-  in  that  locality,  and  without  reference  to  their  owner- 
ship of  real  estate  benefited  by  such  improvement.  The  prin- 
ciples involved  in  the  discussion  of  eases  of  this  sort  are  often 
those  applied  in  local  assessments.-  Such  a  charge,  however,  is 
often  referred  to  as  a  "tax."^  and  the  right  of  making  such 
apportionment  is  said  to  rest  in  eminent  domain.*  Among  the 
purposes  for  which  such  contributions  have  been  levied  upon 
municipal  corporations  are  the  construction  of  bridges,^  expenses 
of  drainage."  and  sewerage  systems." 

§  62.  Deduction  of  benefits  from  damages  an  indirect  form  of 
assessment. 
Principles  analogous  to  those  involved  in  the  subject  of  local 
assessments  are  often  found  in  the  subject  of  eminent  domain. 
When  the  question  is  presented  of  the  right  to  deduct  benefits 
accruing  to  the  owner  of  certain  realty  by  reason  of  a  given 
improvement  from  the  damages  which  he,  as  owner  of  such  realty 
has  sustained  by  reason  of  such  improvement,  and  for  which  he 
is  entitled  to  receive  compensation;  and  to  pay  him  as  damages 
merely  the  difference  thus  ascertained,  we  have  a  question  in- 
volving many  of  the  principles  of  the  laAv  of  local  assessments 
in  the  determination  of  the  fact,  amount  and  apportionment  of 

-Williams  v.  Ejjsrieston.   170  U.   S.  4r;5.  .35  .All.  24,  421    [ISOG]:   Mciltby 

304.   42   L.    1047,    18    S.    617    [18081:  v.   Tant^os.  .50  Minn.   248,  52  N.   W. 

[Afrirming  State  ex   rel.   Bulkeley   v.  858     [1802];     Guilder    v.     Town    of 

Williams!  68  Conn.   131.  48  L.  K.  A.  Otsesro,    20    :Minn.     74,    20    Gil.     59 

465,    35    Atl.   24,    421    [18061:    Kin<jr-  [18731;    Town   of  Un.lerhill   v.   Town 

man.    Petitioner,  .  153    Mass.    566.    12  of    Essex.    61    Vt.    28,    23    Atl.    617 

L.  T\.  A.  417.  27  N.  E.  778   [isnil.  flSOll. 

'Maltby  v.  Taut'i'es,  50  Minn.  248.  "Commissioners     df     lliirliways     of 

52  N.  W.  S.'^S   [18021.  Town   of   Di\    v.    P.ifx   Four   Drainaire 

«Town  of  rndorliill  v.  Town  of  Es-  Distriet.  of  V„r<]  County.  207  lit  17. 

sex.  64  Vt.  28.  23  Atl.  617   [18011.  60   X.  E.   576    [1004]. 

*  Williams  v.   E<rile«ton.    170  V.   S.  '  K inirman.     Petitioner.     153    Mass. 

304.   42   L.    1047.    18    S.    617    [ISOS];  566.    12   L.   E.    A.   417.   27   N.   E.   778 

[Afr-rniin?   State   ex    rel.   Bnlkelov   v.  [1891]. 
Williams.  68  Conn.   131.  48  L.  R.  A. 


§  63  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  108 

benefits.  If  the  improvement  is  made  by  a  municipal  corpora- 
(ion  or  other  public  corporation  and  the  question  presented  is 
of  the  right  to  charge  the  property  holder  for  the  amount  that 
the  aggregate  of  the  benefits  exceeds  the  aggregate  of  the  dam- 
ages, in  case  the  benefits  are  greater  in  value  we  have  a  ques- 
tion of  local  assessments  differing  merely  in  form  from  the  ordi- 
nary assessment.  If  the  proceeding  is  one  in  eminent  domain  in 
which  damages  and  benefits  are  to  be  estimated  together  and  the 
damages  apportioned  among  the  owners  of  property  benefited 
in  proportion  to  such  benefits,  we  have  another  example  of  local 
assessments  differing  from  ordinary  assessments  merely  in  the 
peculiar  and  complicated  form  in  which  they  are  presented.  That 
such  estimate  of  l-enefits  is  a  form  of  local  assessment  is  well 
recognized  ^  and  the  general  theory  of  benefits  invoked  in  the 
one  case  is  repeated  in  the  other.-  Failure  to  consider  the  dam- 
ages resulting  from  the  improvement  or  to  make  any  deduc- 
tion from  the  gross  benefits  for  the  damage  thus  caused  invali- 
dates the  assessment.^ 

§  63.     Combination  of  eminent  domain  and  special  assessment. 

Eminent  domain  and  local  assessments  are  not  infrequently 
combined  in  one  proceeding  in  which  net  damages  and  net  bene- 
fits are  both  to  be  estimated  and  the  total  of  the  damages  is 
to  be  assessed  upon  the  property  benefited  in  proportion  to  the 
benefits  thereto.^  A  proceeding  of  this  sort  has  a  twofold  nature. 
It  is  in  part  a  proceeding  in  eminent  domain  and  in  part  a  pro- 

'  City  of  Seattle  v.  Board  of  Home  Brewing  Company  v.  City  of  Mil- 
Missions  of  Methodist  Protestant  waiikee,  126  Wis.  110,  105  X.  W.  563 
(  hurch,  138  Fed.  307.  70  C.  C.  A.  [1905];  Holton  v.  City  of  Mihvau- 
597  [1905];  Bassett  v.  City  of  New  kee.  31  Wis.  27  [1872].'  Deduction  ol 
Haven,  76  Conn.  70.  55  Atl.  579  benefits  is  said  to  be  in  effect  an  as- 
[1903];  Bartram  v.  City  of  Bridge-  sessment;  Xewby  v.  Platte  County, 
port,  55  Conn.  122,  10  At!.  470  25  Mo.  258  [18571. 
[1887];  Hall  v.  Meriden,  48  Conn.  =  Village  of  North  Alton  v.  Dor- 
416:  (  ity  of  Joliet  v.  Spring  Creek  sett,  59  111.  App.  612  [1895];  City  of 
Drainage  District,  222  111.  441,  78  N.  Savanna  v.  Loop.  47  111.  App.  214 
E.  836  [1906];  City  of  Kansas  v.  [1892];  Sage  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  89 
Hill,   80   Mo.   523    [1*883];    McDowell  N.  Y.  189   [1882]. 

V.   City  of   Asheville,    112  N.   C.   747.  '  Pittelkow   v.    (ity    of    :\Iilwaukee. 

17  S.  E.  537   [1893]:   Gaston  v.  Port-  94   Wis.   651.   69   N.   W.   803    [1897]: 

land,    41    Or.    373.    69    Pac.    34.    445  Liebermann  v.  City  of  Milwaukee.  Sfl 

[1902];     Penrose    Ferry    Avenue,    27  Wis.  336.  61  N.  W.  1112   [1895]. 

Pa.    Super.   Ct.   341    [1905];    City   of  'People  of  the  State  of  California 

San  Antonio  v.  Sullivan.  23  Tex.  Cir.  ex   rel.   Macpherson   v.   Board  of    Su- 

App.  658,  57  S.  W.  45   [1900]  ;   Pabst  pervisors  of  City  and  County  of  San 


109 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT. 


§63 


eeeding  in  the  nature  of  a  local  assessment  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  proceeding  in  eminent  domain.-  Whether  such  a  pur- 
pose is  one  for  which  the  power  of  local  assessment  may  be  ex- 
ercised is  a  question  discussed  elsewhere."  The  combination  of 
the  two  proceedings  in  one  renders  the  subject  more  difficult 
than   either   proceeding   would   be    separately.*      So    antagonistic 


Francisco.  43  Cal.  91  [1872];  In  the 
matter  of  the  proceedings  to  cliange 
tlie  grade  of  Beale  Street,  in  tlie  City, 
and  County  of  San  Franei.sco,  39 
Cal.  495  [1870] ;  Roper  v.  City  of 
New  Britain,  70  Conn.  459,  39  Atl. 
850  [189S]:  Wilkinson  v.  District  of 
Columbia,  22  App.  D.  C.  289  [1903]; 
Elnore  v.  Drainage  Commissioners, 
135  ill.  269,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  363,  25 
X.  i:.  1010  [1892];  City  of  Chicago 
V.  Wright,  32  111.  192  [1863]:  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Wheeler,  25  HI.  396, 
79  Am.  Dec.  342  [1861];  Gas  Light 
and  Coke  Company  v.  City  of  New 
Albany,  158  Ind.  268.  63  N.  E.  458 
[1901];  Municipality  Xo.  Two,  for 
opening  Euphrosine  Street,  7  La. 
Ann.  72  [1852];  Paul  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 32  Mich.  108  [1875];"^  In  the 
matter  of  the  Appeal  of  Powers,  29 
Mich.  504  [1874];  McKu.sick  v.  City 
of  Stillwater,  44  Minn.  372,  46  X.  W. 
769  '[1890];  City  of  St.  Paul  v. 
Xickl,  42  Minn.  262,  44  X.  W.  59 
[1890];  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Law- 
ton,  189  Mo.  474,  88  S.  W.  80 
[1905];  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Xelson, 
169  Mo.  46i,  69  S.  W.  466  [1902]; 
State,  Stewart  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Ho- 
boken.  57  X.  J.  L.  (28  Yr.)  330.  31 
Atl.  278  [1894]:  State,  Central  Rail- 
road Company  of  Xew  Jersey,  Pros. 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Bayonne,  51  X.  J. 
L.  (22  Vr.)  428,  17  Atl.  971  [1889]; 
State..  Simmons,  Pros.  v.  City  of 
Passaic.  38  X.  J.  L.  (9  Vr. )  60 
(18751:  l»  re  White  Plains  Road 
<  f  (  ity  of  Xew  York.  94  X.  Y.  S. 
110.  106  App.  Div.  133  [1905]:  City 
of  Asheville  v.  \\'achi)vi  i  Loan  and 
Trust  Co..  143  X.  C.  360.  55  S.  E.  800 
[1906]:  Cast.m  v.  Portland.  41  Or. 
373.   69    Pac.   34.   445    [19021:    In    re 


opening  of  Park  Avenue,  Huidekop- 
er's  Appeal,  83  Pa.  St.  167  [1876] ; 
Fenelon's  Petition,  7  Pa.  St.  173 
[  1848]  ;  State  of  Washington,  on  the 
Relation  of  Matson  v.  Superior  Court 
for  Skagit  County,  42  \Vash.  491,  85 
Pac.  264  [1906];  In  the  matter  of 
Pike  Street.  Seattle.  42  Wash.  551, 
85  Pac.  45    [1906]. 

-  The  proceeding  is  one  of  a  "du- 
plex character."  "The  purpose  ol 
the  act  is  to  compensate  the  owners 
of  property  damaged  by  a  public  im- 
provement out  of  a  funil  to  be  raised 
by  the  assessment  of  the  amount  of 
such  damage  against  the  city  and 
the  property  that  will  be  benefited 
thereby.  To  accomplish  this  purpose 
in  one  proceeding,  two  assessments 
are  provided  for,  by  one  set  of  com- 
missioners, by  one  of  which  the  ag- 
gregate amount  of  damages  to  be 
paid  as  ascertained,  as  well  as  the 
amount  to  he  paid  to  each  individ- 
ual owner  and  by  the  other  the  ag- 
gregate amount  to  be  assessed  for 
benefits  as  well  as  the  amount  to  be 
j)aid  by  the  city  and  each  property 
owner  is  ascertained,  and  the-e  ag- 
gregate anunuits  must  be  precisely 
the  same,  however  apportioned.  This 
e(|uilibrium  can  only  he  established 
by  a  final  decree,  and  such  a  decree 
can  only  be  rendered  after  the 
amount  of  each  individual  owner's 
damage  has  been  finally  determined." 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Xelson.  169  :\Io. 
461.  469.  470.  69  S.  W.  466   [1902]. 

'See  §  308  ct  scq..  §  426  et  acq. 

'  "The  questions  are  more  complex 

and     the     difficulties     are     multiplied 

by     this    condition     of    thinrs."       In 

■  the  matter  of  t''e  .Appeal  of  Powers, 

C9  Mich.  504,  50G  ]1874]. 


64 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


110 


are  the  interests  of  the  corporation  which  is  seeking  to  condemn 
land  and  those  of  the  property  owners,  that  a  statute  which 
provides  that  the  city  attorney  shall  aid  the  jury,  give  them 
legal  advice  and  prepare  the  form  of  the  report  is  "fatally  ob- 
jectionable" as  requiring  and  providing  for  "relations  which  are 
illegal  and  grossly  improper."^ 


§  64.     Deduction  of  benefits  from  compensation  for  land  taken  in 
eminent  domain. 

Of  these  forms  assumed  by  the  special  assessment  we  will  con- 
sider first  that  in  which  it  is  sought  to  deduct  benefits  accruing 
from  an  impi^ovement  for  which  it  is  sought  to  take  land  in 
eminent  domain,  from  the  damages  to  which  the  property  owner 
is  entitled.  This  rule  in  its  origin  presents  little  resemblance  to 
the  subject  of  local  assessments,  since  it  is  primarily  a  rule  of 
law  concerning  the  measure  of  damages.^  Substantially  the 
same  principles,  however,  control  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 


■^Paul  V.  City  of  Detroit,  32  Mich. 
108,   117    [1875*]. 

'  "All  these  last  cited  cases  [re- 
ferring to  Stanwood  v.  City  of  Mai- 
den, 157  Mass.  17,  16  L.  R.  A.  591, 
31  N.  E.  702  [1892];  Benton  v.  In- 
habitants of  Brookline,  151  Mass. 
250,  23  N.  E.  84G  [1890];  Ahbott  v. 
Inhabitants  of  Cottage  City,  143 
Mass.  521,  58  Am.  Rep.  143,  10  N. 
E.  325  [1887];  Cross  v.  County  of 
Plymouth,  125  Mass.  557  [1878]; 
Parks  V.  County  of  Hampden,  120 
Mass.  395  [1876];  Hilbourne  v. 
County  of  Suffolk,  120  Mass.  393,  21 
Am.  Rep.  522  [1876];  Jones  v.  Board 
of  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Boston, 
104  Mass.  461  [1870];  Smith  v.  City 
of  Boston,  61  Mass.  (7  Cush.)  254 
[1851];  Dorgan  v.  City  of  Boston, 
94  Mass.  (12  All.)  223  [1866]; 
start  from  Meacham  v.  Fitchburg 
Railroad,  4  Cush.  291,  297,  298,  and 
it  is  said  that  tliis  distinction  be- 
tween special  and  general  benefits 
liad  its  beginning  in  a  mere  rule  of 
damages  for  determining  the  sum  to 
be  deducted  from  the  amount  to  be 
paid  when  land  was  taken  for  a  pub- 
lic  improvement.      It    is   argued   that 


constitutional  difficulties  have  no 
place  in  a  case  of  that  sort,  but  arise 
only  when  the  special  benefits  ar<^ 
made  the  subject  of  an  assessment. 
A  suggestion  that  the  deduction  of 
benetits  may  be  referred  to  the  right 
of  eminent  domain  will  be  found  in 
Harvard  College  v.  Boston,  104  Mass. 
470,  490,  491.  See  Sears  v.  Board 
of  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Boston, 
173  Mass.  71,  76,  43  L.  R.  A.  834, 
53  N.  E.  138  [1899].  The  distinc- 
tions of  constitutional  law  must  be 
pretty  technical  if  taking  a  man's 
money  is  unlawful  in  the  latter  case 
and  is  not  equally  so  in  the  former. 
It  may  be  that  the  line  between 
special  and  general  benefits  is  fixed 
by  a  somewhat  rough  estimate  of 
differences.  But  all  legal  lines  are 
more  or  less  arbitrary  as  to  the  pre- 
cise place  of  their  incidence,  although 
the  distinctions  of  which  they  are 
the  inevitable  outcome  are  plain  and 
undeniable.  This  one  we  regard  as 
sanctioned  by  legislation  and  judi 
cial  determination";  Lincoln  v. 
Board  of  Street  Commissioners  of 
City  of  Boston.  176  Mass.  210.  213 
57  N.  E.  356   [1900]. 


Ill 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT. 


65 


If  the  owner  of  realty  is  charged  with  the  benefits  which  enure 
thereto  by  reason  of  a  public  improvement,  it  makes  no  dift'er- 
ence  to  him  outside  of "  cpiestions  of  proper  procedure  whether 
he  is  to  receive  his  damages  in  full  and  then  pay  for  his  bene- 
fits in  full  or  whether  heWs  to  receive  merely  the  excess  of  dam- 
ages over  benefits.-  In  determining  whether  such  benefits  can 
be  deducted  from  the  damages  sustained  the  following  distinc- 
tions must  be  noted. 

§  65.     Distinction  between  general  and  special  benefits. 

General  benefits  must  be  distinguished  from  special  benefits, 
though  the  exact  line  of  demarcation  is  difficult  to  draw.^  Gen- 
eral benefits  are  those  which  enure  to  the  benefit  of  the  entire 
neighborhood  or  locality.-    They  are  the  general  intangible  bene- 


-  "The  damages  under  the  two  acts 
are  substantially  the  same.  Under 
the  one  benefits  are  set  off  againrt 
damages;  vmder  tlie  other  they  are 
separately  assessed";  Benton  v.  In- 
habitants of  Brookline,  151  ^lass. 
250,  261,  23  X.  E.  846  [1890J;"Com- 
plete  compensation  is  secured  al- 
though the  condemnation  judgment 
is  paid  either  in  whole  or  in  part  by 
setting  off  against  it  the  special 
benefits  received  by  the  property 
from  the  improvement";  Waggeman 
V.  Village  of  North  Peoria,  155  111. 
545.  548,  40  N.  E.  485  [1895];  Man- 
damus has  been  awarded  to  compel 
tlie  payment  of  damages  into  court, 
when  held  as  a  set-off  against  an  as- 
sessment; Fisher  v.  Mayor  of  Xow 
York,  4  Lansing  451    [1871]. 

'■  See  quotation  from  Lincoln  v. 
Board  of  Street  Commissioners  of 
City  of  Boston.  176  Mass.  210,  57  N. 
E.   356    [1900],   ante.    S    64. 

-Chicago  &  Evanstnn  Biiilrond 
Company  v.  Blake,  110  III.  163 
[1886];  Roberts  v.  Board  of  County 
Commissioners  of  Brown  County,  21 
Kan.  247  [1878]:  Childs  v.  Xew  Ha- 
ven &  Northampton  Company,  133 
Mass.  253  [1882]-.  :\Ieachem  v.  Fitch- 
burg  Bailroiul  Comnanv.  58  IMnss. 
<4  Cush.)    201    [1849];    Dickenson  v. 


Inhabitants  of  Fitchburg,  79  Mass. 
(13  Gray)  546  [1859];  Wyandotte, 
Kansas  City  &  Northwestern  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Waldo,  70  Mo.  629 
[1879];  City  of  South  Omaha  v. 
Ruthjen,  71  Neb.  545,  99  N.  W.  240 
[1904];  City  of  Omaha  v.  Schaller, 
26  Neb.  522,  42  N.  W.  721  [1889]: 
Sullivan  v.  North  Hudson  County 
Railroad  Company,  51  N.  J.  L.  518, 
18  Atl.  689  [1889];  City  of  Alle- 
gheny V.  Black's  Heirs,  99  Pa.  St. 
152  [1881];  City  of  Houston  v.  Bar- 
tels,  36  Tex.  Civ.  App.  498.  82  S. 
W.  323  [1904].  rehearing  denied,  82 
S.  W.  469  [1004];  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Foreman,  24  W.  Va.  662, 
20  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cases  215  [1884]. 
''The  benefits  which  the  petition- 
ers offered  to  prove  were  those  com- 
mon to  all  lands  in  the  vicinity, 
and  these,  it  is  settled,  are  not  to  be 
regarded  as  s])ocial."  Lincoln  v. 
I'oard  of  Street  Commissioners  of 
Citv  of  Boston.  176  IMass.  210.  213. 
57  N.  E.  356  [1900];  (citin?  Stan- 
wnod  V.  City  (if  'Maiden.  157  ^lass. 
17.  in  L.  R.  A.  501.  .".1  N.  E.  702 
[1802];  Benton  v.  Inliabitnnts  of 
Brookline.  151  :\rass.  250.  23  N.  E. 
846  [1800]:  Abbott  v.  Inhnbitants 
of  Cottatre  Citv.  143  Mass.  .521.  58 
Am.  Rep.   1-13.   10  N.  E.  325   [1887]; 


66 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


112 


fits  which  are  supposed  to  flow  to  the  general  public  from  a 
public  improvement.''  Special  benefits  are  those  which  enure 
to  certain  specific  realty  in  a  manner  different  from  that  in 
which  the  general  neighborhood  is  benefited,  and  which  operate 
to  increase  the  value  of  such  realty.*  Some  difficulty  has  been 
experienced  by  the  court  in  cases  where  peculiar  benefit  has 
been  received  by  many  different  tracts  of  realty,  as  for  example, 
by  all  the  realty  abutting  upon  the  improvement  in  question, 
which  benefit  does  not  enure  to  the  rest  of  the  realty  in  the 
same  neighborhood.  AVhether  such  a  benefit  is  general  becausi^ 
there  is  so  much  other  property  which  shares  in  it.  or  special 
because  there  is  so  much  other  property  Avhich  does  not  share 
in  it,  is  a  question  of  some  difficulty.  The  courts  generally  hold 
that  benefits  of  this  sort  are  special  benefits  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  rule."'  The  contrary  opinion  has,  however,  been  occa- 
sionally expressed.'' 

§  66.     Effect  of  distinction  between  general  and  special  benefits. 

The   importance   of   the.  distinction   between   general   and   spe- 


Cross  V.  County  of  Plymouth,  125 
Mass.  557  [1878];  Parks  v.  County 
of  Hampden.  120  Ma?s.  395  [1876]; 
Hilbourne  v.  County  of  Suffolk,  120 
Mass.  393,  21  Am.  Rep.  522  [1876]; 
Jones  V.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  the 
City  of  Boston.  104  Mass.  461 
[1870];  Smith  v.  City  of  Boston,  61 
Mass.  {7  Cush.)  254  [1851];  Dorgan 
V.  City  of  Boston.  94  Mass.  (12  All.) 
223   [1866]. 

^  Metropolitan  ^Vest  Side  Elevated 
Railway  Company  v.  Stickney.  150 
111.  362,  26  L.  R.  A.  773,  37  X.  E. 
1098    [1894], 

^  City  of  Denver  v.  Bayer.  7  Colo. 
113.  2  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cases  465 
[1883];  Shurtleff  V.  City  of  ChicaT-^, 
190  111.  473.  477.  60  X.  E.  870 
[1901]:  Fahne^tock  v.  City  of  Peo- 
ria. 171  111.  454,  49  X.  E.  496  [1898] ; 
^letropolitan  West  Side  Elevated 
Railway  Company  v.  Stickney.  150 
111.  362,  26  L.  R.  A.  773,  37  X.  E. 
1098  [1894];  Lincoln  v.  Board  of 
Street  Commissioners  of  City  of  Bos- 
ton,   176    Mass.    210,    57    X.    E.    356 


[1900];  Winona  &  St.  Peter  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Waldron,  11  Minn.  515,  88 
Am.  Dec.  100  [1865];  Kirkendall  v. 
tity  of  Omaha,  39  Xeb.  1,  57  X.  W. 
752  [1894];  City  of  Omaha  v.  Schal- 
ler.  26  Xeb.  522,  42  X,  W,  721 
[1889];  Railroad  Company  v.  Foie- 
man,   24   W,   Va.    662    [1884]. 

^  Metropolitan  West  Side  Elevated 
Railway  Company  v.  Stickney.  150 
111.  362.  26  L.  R.  A.  773.  37  X.  E. 
1098  [18941;  Chase  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 86  Me.  362,  29  Atl.  1104 
[  1894]  ;  Hilbourne  v.  County  of  Suf- 
folk, 120  Mass.  393.  21  Am.' Rep.  522 
[1876]:  Allen  v.  City  of  Charles- 
town,  109  Mass.  243  [1872]:  Kirk- 
endall V.  City  of  Omaha.  39  Xeb.  1, 
7  X.  W.  752  [1894]:  City  of  Dallas 
V.  Kahn,  9  Tex.  Civ,  App.  19,  29 
S.  W.  98  [18941:  Stowell  v.  Milwau- 
kee.  31    Wis.    523    [18721. 

"  (  itv  nf  Houston  v.  Bartels.  36 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  498.  82  S.  W.  323, 
rehearing  denied,  82  S.  W.  469 
[1904], 


113 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT 


^6G 


cial  benefits  lies  in  the  fact  that  general  benefits  cannot  be  de- 
ducted from  damages  under  any  circumstances.^  Thus  it  is  said 
that  the  "vague  general  indefinite  benefit  which  all  inhabitants 
of  a  particular  locality  are  said  to  derive  from  a  great  public 
improvement"  cannot  be  deducted  from  damages  sustained. - 
Still  less  can  general  benefits  be  deducted  under  a  constitutional 
provision  requiring  compensation  to  be  made  in  money  irrespec- 
tive  of  any  benefit  from  the   proposed   improvement,   when    the 


^  City  of  Chicago  v.  Le  INIoyne, 
119  Fed.  662,  56  C.  C.  A.  278  [1902] ; 
Little  Rock  &  Ft.  Smith  Railway 
Company  v.  Allister.  68  Ark.  600, 
60  S.  \\'.  953  [19011:  St.  Louis,  Ar- 
kansas &  Texas  Railroad  v.  Ander- 
.son,  39  Ark.  167  [1882]:  Ferguson 
V.  Borough  of  Stamford.  60  Conn. 
432,  22  Atl.  782  [1891]  :  City  of  Chi- 
cago V.  Lonergan,  190  111.  518.  63 
N.  E.  1018  [1902];  Ginn  v.  Moultrie, 
Coles  &  Douglas  Drainage  District, 
188  III.  305.  58  N.  E.  988  [1900]; 
Metropolitan  West  Side  Elevated 
Railway  Company  v.  Stickney.  150 
111.  362.  26  L.  R.  A.  773.  37  N.  E. 
1098  [1894]:  .Village  of  Hyde  Park 
V.  Washington  Ice  Company,  117  111. 
233,  7  X.  E.  523  [188G]:  Roberts  v. 
Board  of  County  Commissioners  of 
Brown  County.  21  Kan.  186  [1878]: 
Lincoln  v.  Board  of  Street  Commis- 
sioners of  City  of  Boston.  176  Mass. 
210,  57  N.  E.'356  [1900]:  Childs  v. 
New  Haven  &  XorthamiVton  Com- 
pany. 133  :\[ass.  253  [1582]:  Cross 
V.  County  of  Plyniiiulli.  125  Mass. 
557  [1878];  (  lark  v.  (  itv  nf  Wor- 
ce.ster,  125  Mass.  226  [1878]:  Old 
Colony  &  Fall  River  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Inhabitants  of  tlie  County 
of  Plymouth.  80  Mass.  (14  Cray) 
155  [1859]:  Dickenson  v.  Inhabi- 
tants of  Fitchbursr.  7n  :\Iass.  (l.T 
Gray)  546  11859]:  Proprietors  of 
Locks  and  Canals  v.  Nashua  &  Low- 
ell Railroad  Corporation.  64  Mass. 
(10  Cush.)  385  [1852]:  I'pton  v. 
South  Readin-'  Branch  Railroad 
Company.  62  Mass.  (8  Cush.)  600 
[1851]:  Moacham  v.  Fitchburg  Rail- 
road   Comiiany.    5S    Mass.     (4    Cush.) 


291  [1849]  ;  Cole  v.  City  of  St.  Louis. 
132  Mo.  633,  34  S.  W.  469  [1895]; 
City    of    South    Omaha    v.    Ruthjen, 

71  Xeb.  545,  99  X.  W.  240  [1904]; 
Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Buel.  56  X"eb.  205, 
76  X.  W.  571  [1898];  Dayton  v. 
City  of  Lincoln,  39  Xeb.  74^  57  X. 
W.  754  [1894];  Woodman  v.  Xorth- 
wood,  67  X.  H.  307,  S3  Atl.  255 
[1892];  Adden  v.  White  Mts.  X.  H. 
Railroad,  55  X.  H.  413,  20  Am.  Rep. 
220  [1875];  Sullivan  v.  North  Hud- 
son Railroad  Company.  51  N.  J.  L. 
518,  18  Atl.  689  [1889];  Commis- 
sioners of  Asheville  v.  Johnston,  71 
X.  C.  398  [1874]:  Southport.  Wil- 
mington &  Durham  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Owners  of  Piatt  Land.  133 
'S.  ('.  266.  45  S.  E.  5?9  [1903]  : 
r4uthrie  &  Western  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Faulkner.  12  Okl.  532.  73 
Pae.  290  [1903];  Shimor  v.  Easton 
Railway  Company.  205  Pa.  St.  648. 
55  Atl.  769  [l'903];  :\IahalTey  v. 
Beech  Creek  R.  R..  163  Pa.  St.  158. 
29  Atl.  881  [1894]:  :\Iayor  and  Al- 
dermen of  Chattanooga  v.  Geiler.  SI 
Tenn.  (13  Lea.)  611,  7  Am.  &  Ewr. 
Corp.  Cases  534  [1884]:  City  of 
Houston  V.  Bartels.  36  Tex.  Civ.  Aii]>. 
498.  82  S.  W.  323.  rehearinir  denied. 
82  S.  W.  469  [1904]:  Pochiia  v. 
Calvert.  Waco  &  Brazos  Vallev  Bail 
wav  Comjianv.  31  Tex.  Civ.  App.  398. 

72  S.  W.  255  [1903]:  Eastern  Texas 
Bailioad     Companv    v.     Eddinss,    30 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  170.  70  S.  W.  98 
[1902]. 

-Dickenson  v.  Inhabitants  of  Fitch- 
burir.  79  Mass.  (13  Gray)  546.  558 
[lS.-,9]. 


§67 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


114 


improvement  is  made  by  any  corporation  other  than  a  municipal 
corporation.''  It  is  only  the  special  benefits  peculiar  to  the  prop- 
erty in  question  which  can  be  so  deducted.  Accordingly  if 
benefits  are  to  be  deducted  it  will  be  assumed  in  the  absence  of 
a  showing  to  the  contrary  that  special,  and  not  general  benefits 
are  to  be  deducted."'  If,  however,  the  theory  on  which  the  case 
is  tried  in  the  trial  court  and  in  which  the  property  owner  ac- 
quiesces, is  that  the  measure  of  the  damage  done  to  the  property 
is  the  decrease  caused  in  the  market  value  thereof,  the  property 
owner  cannot  complain  in  the  Supreme  Court  because  by  such 
theory  general  benefits  have  been  deducted  and  that  the  true 
rule  is  that  only  "benefits  which  are  peculiar  and  special  to  the 
property  in  question  and  not  common  or  general  to  properties 
generally  can  be  considered  or  taken  into  account."^'  Special 
benefits  can  be  deducted  from  the  damages  sustained,"  subject 
to  the  restrictions  hereinafter  discussed.'^ 

§  67.     Benefits  chargeable  but  once. 

Whatever  method  of  exacting  compensation  from  the  property 
owner  for  benefits  enuring  to  him  is  adopted,  the  property  owner 
cannot  be  charged  twice  for  the  same  benefit.^  Thus  benefits 
used  as  a  set-off  in  condemnation   proceedings  cannot  be   used 


^  Beveridge  v.  Lewis,  137  Cal.  610, 
92  Am.  St.  Rep.  188,  59  L.  R.  A. 
581,   70   Pac.    1083    [1902]. 

*  Fersriison  v.  Boroueh  of  Stam- 
forrl.  00  Conn.  432,  22  Atl.  782 
[1S911. 

'  Fiiess  V.  Kansas  City  and  the 
Brooklyn  Avenue  Railway  Company, 
191  Mo.   692,  90  S.  W.   1029   [1905]. 

8  City  of  Seattle  v.  Board  of  Home 
Missions  of  ]\Iethodist  Protestant 
rimrcli.  138  Fed.  307,  70  C.  C.  A. 
597  [1905];  Citv  of  Omaha  v.  Schal- 
ler.  26  Neb.  522,  42  N.  W.  721 
[18S9]-,  Citv  of  Dallas  v.  Kahn,  9 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  19.  29  S.  W.  98 
[1894]. 

See  §  67,  et  seq. 

'  Panman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548, 
42  L.  270.  17  S.  966  [1897],  (re- 
versing District  of  Columbia  v. 
Armes,  8  App.  D.  C.  393  [1896]; 
Bauman   v.   Ross.   9   App.   D.    C.   260 


[1896]):  Garvey  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Revere,  187  Mass.  545,  73  X.  E.  664 
[1905];  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel. 
^Merchant  v.  District  Court  of  St. 
Louis  County,  66  Minn.  161,  68  N. 
W.  860  [1896];  State  ex  "rel.  City 
of  St.  Paul  V.  District  Cmxrt  of  Ram- 
sey County,  75  Wmn.  292,  77  X.  W. 
908  [1899];  Carroll  v.  City  of  Mar- 
shall, 99  Mc  App.  464,  73  S.  W. 
1102  [1903];  Davis  v.  ]Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  tho  City  of  New- 
ark, 54  N.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  595,  25 
Atl.  336  [1892]:  State,  Rettinger, 
Pros.  v.  City  of  Passaic,  45  X.  J. 
L.  (16  Vr.)'  146  [1883];  Betts  v. 
City  of  Williamsburg,  15  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)'  255  [1853];  Lamb  v.  Elizabeth 
Citv.  131  X.  C.  241,  42  S.  E.  603 
[1902];  City  of  Xorfolk  v.  Cham- 
berlain. 89  Va.  196,  16  S.  E.  730 
[1892]. 

"It    is   obvious    that    benefits    which 


llf)  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §67 

again  as  a  set-off  in  an  action  for  damages  to  the  buildings  re- 
moved from  the  land  thus  condemned.-  So  if,  under  the  local 
statute,  certain  benefits  may  be  made  the  basis  of  a  local  assess- 
ment against  the  property,  such  benefits  cannot  be  set  off  against 
damages  as  the  property  owner  cmu  sul)se(iuently  be  compelled 
to  pay  therefor  in  such  assessment  proceedings."  So  if  benefits 
have  once  l)een  deducted  from  damages,  they  cannot  thereafter 
l)e  made  the  basis  of  an  assessment  for  benefits.*  Where  the  com- 
missioners did  not  strike  a  balance  between  the  damages  and 
l)enefits  as  required  by  the  city  charter,  but  assesr?ed  the  land  for 
the  full  amount  of  benefits  without  any  deduction  for  damages 
and  the  land  was  sold  to  pay  such  assessment  it  was  held  in  an 
action  by  the  land-owner  against  the  city  to  recover  the  value 
of  the  land  taken  for  the  improvement  as  determined  hy  the 
commissioners,  that  the  city  could  not  set  off  the  amount  of 
benefits  assessed."'  However,  it  is  not  a  doulile  charge  for  the 
sime  improvement  where  an  assessment  has  been  levied  for  a 
j)art  of  the  improvement  upon  th('  sup|)nsition  tliat  tlie  cost 
of  the  residue  of  sucli  improvement  wonld  be  donati^l.  anrl  sub- 
sequently, upon  finding  that  such  donation  would  not  be  made 
an  assessment  is  levied  for  tlu^  cost  of  the  residue  of  such  im- 
provement." If  the  benefits  exceed  the  damages,  such  l)enefits 
may  be  used  in  part  as  a  set-off  against  the  damages  and  the 
excess  of  benefits  over  damages  may  be  the  l)asis  of  a  local  as- 
se.s.sment.'  So  if  an  improvement  is  made  the  basis  of  a  special 
assessment,  the  excess,  if  any.   of  the  benefits  over  the  amount 


have  been  set  olT  against  damafjes  County,  fifi  Minn.  lill.  (IS  X.  W.  860 
cannot  be  also  assessed  as  Ijetter-  [  189()]  ;  Davis  v.  flavor  and  Com- 
ments; and  that  either  no  benefits  mon  Council  of  the  City  of  Newark, 
which  can  be  set  ofT  against  damages  54  N.  J.  L.  (25  Vr. )  595,  25  Atl. 
can    be    assessed    as    betterments    or  3.36    [18921. 

that    in    any    assessment    for    better-  ''  Koller   v.   City   of   T.a    Crosse.    106 

ments  it  must  be  competent  to  prove  Wis.    .3(10.    S2    X.    \\'.    :m     |  liJOO]. 
wliat  benefits  had  been  set  oil"  a'_'ainst  "  Ilnlsey     v.    'I'own    of    Lake    \'iew, 

damages."      l?enton    v.    Inhabitants   (.f  ISS    111.   5  K>.   59   X.    K.   234    [19011. 
Hrookline.     151     :Mass.    250.    201.    23  '  l^auman    v.    IJ.ss.    107    V.   S.    548, 

N.   E.   S40    [1890].  42  L.  270.   17  S.  <MU>   [1S971.    (revers- 

-  Lamb    v.    Elizabeth    City.    131    X.  ing    District    cf    (  ohimbia    v.    Armes, 

C.   241.    42    S.    E.    003    [I962L  S    App.    D.    C.    393    [ISOO]:    Bauman 

'  (Jarvey    v.    Inhabitants   of   Kevei-e.  v.    Ross,    9    .\pp.    D.    C.    200    [18961; 

187  Mass.  545.  73  X.  E.  004    [1905].  State.    Rettin«^er.    Pros.    v.    City    of 

•State    of    ^linnesota    ex    rel.    Aler  Passaic,    45    X^.    -T.    L.     (10    Vr. )     146 

chant  V.  District  Court  for  St.  Louis  [1883]; 


§§68.69  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  116 

of  the  assessment  may  be  deducted  from  the  damages  sustained. - 
So  it  has  been  held  proper  to  deduct  the  amount  of  the  special 
tax  levied  for  a  given  improvement,  from  the  amount  of  the 
benefits  received  from  such  improvement,  and  to  treat  the  amount 
thus  obtained  as  the  net  amount  of  benefits  to  be  deducted  from 
the  amount  of  damages." 

§  68.     Right  to  deduct  benefits  not  dependent  on  statute. 

In  many  .jurisdictions  specific  statutory  provision  is  made  for 
deducting  benefits  from  damages.  In  the  absence  of  such  spe- 
cific provision  it  is  assumed  that  such  deduction  of  benefits  from 
damages  may  be  made,  as  the  proper  method  of  estimating  the 
amount  to  be  paid  to  the  party  whose  land  is  taken  or  in.jured.^ 
It  is  said  to  be  a  "doctrine  ...  so  well  founded  in  reason 
and  ,;'ustiee  and  ...  so  strongly  fortified  by  the  decisions 
in  other  states  and  the  uniform  practice  in  this  state  that  it  no 
longer  presents  a  question  for  discussion;"  and  it  is  said  to  be 
implied  in  the  term  ".just  compensation."-  However,  the  com- 
missioners, acting  under  a  statute  requiring  them  to  estimate 
benefits  and  damages,  cannot  impose  additional  conditions  to 
the  right  of  the  property  owner  to  receive  his  award  for  dam- 
ages." Thus  they  cannot  require  that  buildings  upon  the  land 
taken  shall  be  removed  before  the  award  is  paid.* 

§  69.     Doctrine  that  special  benefits  cannot  be  deducted  from 
value  of  land  taken. 

The  right  to  deduct  special  benefits  from  damages  is  a  question 
calling  for  further  distinctions.  If  the  entire  tract  of  land  be- 
longing to   a   sp^c'fic   owner  is  taken   it  is   evident   that  he  has 

^Carroll    v.    City    of    Marshnll.    90  =  Chase  v.  City  of  Portland.  Sfi  :\re. 

Mo.  App.  464,  73  S.  W.  1102   [100.31.  .307.    20    Atl.    1104    [1804],      Tn    this 

"Village    of    Grant    Park    v.    Trah.  oase    benefits    from    fillinr    np     nnid 

218    111.    516,   75   N.   E.    1040    [1005],  holes   and   obtaining   a    more   eonven- 

afRrming    Village    of    Crnnt    Park    v.  ient    access    by    reason    of    a    change 

Trah,     115     111.     App.     201      [1004].  of  srrade  were  set  off  against  the  ex- 

(This    rule    applies    Avhere    the    prop-  pense    of    raisin?    the    honse    to    the 

erty    owner   concedes    the   validity    of  grade    thns   established, 
the  tax  in  ouestion.)  ^  Eiker    v.    IVTavor.    Aldermen,    nnd 

1  Chase    v.    City    of    Portland.    86  Commonaltv     of     the     Citv     of    Xew 

Me.   367.  20   Atl.   1104    [1S041  :    Com-  York.  3  Daly    (N.  Y.)    174   [1860]. 
monwerlth    v.    .Ti'stices   of   the    Court  ^  Eiker    v.    A^ayor.    Aldermen     and 

of   Sessions    for    the    r'nuntv    of   Nor-  Comm.onalty    of    the    Citv    of      Xew 

folk,   5   Mass.   435    [1809].  York,  3  Daly   (N.  Y.)    174   [1869]. 


117 


FORM  OF  p:xaction  in  assessment. 


69 


out  of  such  tract  nothing  left  to  be  benefited  by  the  improve- 
ment and  nothing  left  to  be  damaged.  Accordingly  in  such  a 
case  there  can  be  no  question  of  setting  off  benefits  against 
damages.  The  measure  of  damages  is  merely  the  value  of  the 
land  taken.  If,  however,  a  part  of  a  given  tract  is  taken,  and 
a  part  thereof  is  retained  by  the  original  owner  the  question  of 
the  deduction  of  benefits  from  damages  is  necessarily  presented. 
This  question  may  arise  in  several  different  ways.  It  may  be 
sought  to  deduct  the  special  benefits  to  the  part  retained  by 
the  owner  from  the  value  of  the  part  taken.  In  states  where 
there  is  no  specific  constitutional  provision  on  this  point,  but 
merely  a  general  direction  that  just  compensation  shall  be  made, 
vre  find  a  hopeless  conflict  of  authority  upon  this  question.  In 
some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  the  owner  cannot  be  required 
to  accept  compensation  for  land  taken  from  him  in  the  form  of 
benefits  conferred  against  his  will  to  the  residue  of  the  original 
tract  left  with  him,  and  that  accordingly  such  deduction  cannot 
be  made.^  This  rule  has  been  adopted  by  statute  in  some  juris- 
dictions,- and  in  some  this  rule  has  by  statute  been  made  ap- 
plicable  to  cases   where   a   railroad   takes  land  for   its   purposes 


Uity  of  Atlanta  v.  Groen,  07  Oa. 
:^8()  fisSll;  INIayor  and  Couneil  of 
tlie  City  of  Atlanta  v.  Central  Rail- 
road &  Bankinji  Company,  53  Ga. 
120  [18741:  Paysnn  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Parsons,  17.5  111.  207,  51  N.  E.  588 
flSflS]:  Cordon  v.  Commissioners  of 
Hi '.diways  cf  Road  District  ^o.  .3, 
Kin  111.'  510,  48  X.  E.  45  [18071: 
\A'ashinfifton  Tee  Company  v.  City  of 
Cliicaaro,  147  Til.  .327,  37  Am.  St.  Rep. 
222.  35  X.  E.  378  [ISO  11;  Village 
of  Hyde  Paik  v.  Washington  Tee 
C.mipany.  117  111.  233  [18801:  TTasr- 
trard  v.  Indeiiendent  School  District 
of  Altrona,  113  Ta.  480,  85  N.  W.  777 
[inOl1:  (hica.iro.  St.  T,.  c<l-  New  Or- 
leans n.  Co.  V.  Rott<rerin",f,  —  Ky.  — . 
83  S.  W.  584.  20  Vy.  T..  R.  il07: 
T,oiiisville  &  Nashville  Railroad  Co. 
V.  Tliompson.  57  T\y.  (18  P>.  ^lon.) 
735  [18571:  Sntton's  Heirs  v.  City 
of  Louisville.  35  T\v.  (5  Dana)  28 
[18371:  Shii)ley  v.  Baltimore  &  Po- 
tomn"  Railroad  Company,  34  Md. 
3.30   118711:   (  ity  of  Detroit  v.  Daly, 


08  Mich.  503,  37  N.  W.  11  [18881; 
City  of  Omaha  v.  Cochran,  30  Neb. 
037,  40  N.  W.  920  [18901:  City  of 
Omaha  v.  Howell  Lumber  Co.,  30 
Neb.  633,  40  N.  W.  919  [18901; 
Guthrie  &  Western  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Faulkner,  12  Okl.  532,  73 
Pac'.  290  [19031:  Mitchell  v.  Thorn- 
ton,   21    Gratt.    164    [18711. 

-  Boolcman  v.  New  York  Elevated 
Railroad  Company,  137  N.  Y.  302, 
33  N.  E.  333  [18931;  Bohm  v.' Metro- 
politan liilevated  Railway  Company, 
129  N.  Y.  570,  14  L.  R."  A.  344,  29 
N.  E.  802  [18921:  Quirk  v.  City  of 
Seattle,  38  Wash.  25,  SO  Pac.  207 
I  19051. 

•Tirand  Rai)ids  &  Indiana  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Horn,  41  Tnd.  479 
[18731:  New  Castle  &  Richmond 
Railroad  Company  v.  Brund)aek.  5 
Tnd.  543  [18541:  Orecron  Central  R. 
R.  C...  V.  Wait,  3  Ore.  91  [18091: 
T'.owen  V.  Atlantic  &  Fj-ench  Brond 
Valley  R.  R.  Company.  17  S.  C.  574. 
14  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cases  3.32   [1882]. 


70 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


118 


by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain.''  This  rule  is  intended  for 
the  protection  of  the  land-owner.  If  he  is  willing  to  allow  the 
amount  due  to  him  for  the  value  of  his  land  taken  to  be  applied 
in  reduction  of  the  amount  assessed  against  him  for  benefits, 
and  pays  the  amount  of  the  excess  of  such  benefits  over  the 
value  of  such  land,  he  cannot  thereafter  complain  that  he  was 
not  paid  in  cash  for  such  land.*  In  some  states  it  is  said  that 
the  incidental  damage  which  results  from  the  use  to  which  the 
land  is  to  be  applied  cannot  be  taken  into  consideration  or 
deducted  from  the  benefits.-^ 

§  70.  Doctrine  that  special  benefits  can  be  deducted  from  value 
of  land  taken. 
In  other  jua'isdietions  it  is  held  that  if  the  owner  of  the  part 
of  the  tract  not  taken  has  received  special  and  peculiar  benefits 
to  such  part  arising  out  of  the  improvement,  he  has  no  right  to 
demand  full  compensation  for  the  part  taken  in  addition  to  the 
benefits  to  the  part  retained  as  this  is  giving  him  more  than  the 
value  of  the  land  taken.  "Where  this  view  prevails,  it  is  held 
that  benefits  to  that  part  of  the  tract  which  is  not  taken  may 
be  deducted  from  the  value  of  the  part  which  is  taken.^     Bene- 


*  Elgin,  Joliet  &  Eastern  Railway 
Company  v.  Hohenshell,  193  111.  159, 
61   X.   E.    1102    [1901]. 

°  ]\Iemphis  v.  Bolton,  9  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)    508. 

^  Baunian  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548, 
42  L.  270,  17  S.  966  [1897],  (revers- 
ing District  of  Columbia  v.  Armes. 
8  App.  D.  C.  393  [1896],  and  Bau- 
man  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C.  260 
[1896] )  ;  Kennedy  v.  Indianapolis, 
103  U.  S.  599,  26  L.  550  [1880], 
(affirming  Kennedy  v.  Indianapolis, 
14  F.  C.  314,  U  Bis.  13  [1878]; 
(decided  under  Indiana  law)  ;  San 
Francisco,  Almeda  &  Stockton  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Caldwell,  31  Cal. 
367  [1866]  ;  City  of  Denver  v.  Bayer, 
7  Colo.  113,  2  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cases  465  [1883];  Wilcox  v."  City  of 
Meri(?en,  57  Conn.  120,  17  Atl.366 
[1889];  Trinity  College  v.  City  of 
Hartford,  32  Conn.  452  [1865],  (fol- 
lowing Nichols  v.  City  of  Bridge- 
port, 23  Conn.  189,  60  Am.  Dec.  636 
[1854];    Nicholson    v.    New   York    & 


New  Haven  Railroad  Company,  22 
Conn.  74  [1852]);  Terry  v.  City  of 
Hartford,  39  Conn.  286  [1872];  Ful- 
ton v.  Town  of  Dover,  8  Houst. 
(Del.)  78,  6  Atl.  633,  12  Atl.  394. 
31  Atl.  974  [1888];  Whiteman's 
Ex'x  V.  Wilmington  &  Susquehanna 
Railroad  Company,  2  Harr.  (Del.) 
514,  33  Am.  Dec.  411  [1839];  Clapp 
V.  :\Iacfarland.  20  App.  D.  C.  224 
[1002]:  Dorman  v.  City  of  Jackson- 
ville, 13  Fla.  538,  7  Am.  Rep.  253 
[1870];  Waggemaii  v.  Village  of 
North  Peoria,  155  111.  545,  40  N.  E. 
485  [1895],  (distinguishing  City  of 
Bloomington  v.  Latham,  142  111.  462. 
18  L.  R.  A.  487,  32  N.  E.  506  [1893], 
as  a  case  where  a  deduction  was  not 
permitted  because  the  proceeding  was 
one  of  special  taxation  under  the 
Constitution  of  Illinois,  and  not  as- 
sessment; special  taxation,  under  the 
statute  then  in  force  being  regarded 
as  not  based  upon  benefits).  An- 
drews V.  People  ex  rel.  Rumsey,  84 
111.    28    [1876]:     Pittsburgh.    Cincin- 


119 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT. 


70 


fits  may  be  set  off  ajiaiiist  the  value  of  land  taken  to  widen  a 
street,   although   an   etjual    benefit   enures   to   land    on   the   oth.n* 


nati,  Cliicago  &  St.  Louis  Railway 
Company  v.  Town  of  Wolcott,  102 
Ind.  399,  69  N.  E.  451  [1903];  Gas 
Liglit  &  Coke  Company  v.  City  of 
New  Albany.  158  Ind.  208,  03  N.  E. 
458  [1902];  Wilson  v.  Talloy,  144 
Ind.  74,  42  N.  E.  362,  1009  |  1895]  ; 
Forsyth  v.  Wilcox,  143  Ind.  144,  41 
N.  E.  371  [1895];  Watson  v.  Crow- 
sore,  93  Ind.  220  [1883];  Hagaman 
V.  Moore,  84  Ind.  496  [1882];  ]\Ic- 
Intire  v.  State,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  384 
[1840];  Bennett  v.  City  of  :\Iarion, 
106  la.  628.  70  N.  W.  844  [1898]; 
Duke  V.  O'Bryan,  100  Ky.  710.  39 
S.  W.  444,  824,  19  Ky.  L.  R.  81 
[1897];  Butchers'  Slaughtering  & 
Melting  Association  v.  Common- 
wealth, 109  Mass.  103,  47  X.  E.  599 
[1897];  Abbott  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Cottage  City,  143  Mass.  521.  58  Am. 
Rep.  143,  10  X.  E.  325  [1887]  ;  Parks 
V.  County  of  Ilamjxlen,  120  ]\Iass. 
395  [1870];  Wood  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Hudson,  114  Mass.  513  [1874]; 
Green  v.  City  of  Fall  River,  113 
Mass.  202  [1873]:  Howe  v.  Ray,  113 
Mass.  88  [1873];  Whitney  v."  City 
of  Boston,  98  Mass.  312  [1867]  •« 
Dorgan  v.  City  of  Boston.  94  ^lass. 
(12  All.)  223  [1866];  State  of  :\Iin- 
nesota  ex  rcl.  Merchant  v.  District 
Court  for  St.  Louis  County.  CO  ^linn. 
161,  G8  X.  W.  800  [18901:  Whitely 
V.  Mississippi  Water  Power  &  Boom 
Company,  38  Minn.  523.  30  Am.  & 
Eng.  R^  Cases  024,  38  X.  W.  753 
[1888];  Winona  &  St.  Peter  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Waldron.  11  ^'.Tinn.  515,  11 
Gil.  [392],  88  Am.  D.-<-.  100  |1S00I; 
Bennett  v.  Hall.  184  :\lo.  407.  S3 
S.  W.  439  [1904  1:  :\lcKln)y  v.  Kan- 
sas ("ity  &  Independence  Air  Line, 
172  Mo!  546,  72  S.  W.  913  [1903]: 
Dautiherty  v.  Brown.  91  Mo.  26.  3 
S.  W.  210  [1886]:  State  ex  rel.  Chi- 
cago, Burlington  &  Quincy  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  89 
Mo.  34.  14  S.  W.  515  [1886]:  Jack- 
son   Countv    V.    Waldo,    85    Mo.    637 


11885];  Combs  v.  Smith.  78  Mo.  32, 
20  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cases  209  [1883];- 
Garrett  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  25  Mo. 
505,  69  Am.  Dec.  475  [1857];  Xewby 
V.  Platte. County,  25  Mo.  258  [1857]; 
Adden  v.  White  Mts.  X'^.  H.  Railroad, 
55  X.  H.  413,  20  Am.  Rep.  220 
[1875];  State,  Randolph,  v.  Union 
County  Freeholders,  63  X".  J.  (34 
Vr.)  155,  41  Atl.  960;  Loweree  v. 
City  of  X^ewark,  38  X.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.) 
isf  [1875];  Baldwin  v.  City  of  Xew- 
ark,  38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  158  [1875]; 
Genet  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  99 
X.  V.  290,  l'  X.  E.  777  [1885]; 
Lowerre  v.  ^Mayor.  Aldemen  and 
Commonalty  oi  t'le  City  of  Xew 
York,  46  Hun  (X.  V.  i  253  [1887]; 
Betts  V.  City  of  Williamsburg,  15 
Barb.  (X^.  Y.)  255  [1853];  S\nith- 
port,  Wilmington  &  Durliam  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Owners  oi  tiie  Piatt 
Land,  133  X.  C.  200,  45  S.  E  589 
[1903];  Wilmington  &  Weldon  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Smith,  99  N.  C. 
131,  5  S.  E.  237  [1888];  Commis- 
sioners of  Asheville  v.  Johnston,  71 
X.  C.  398  [1874];  Gaston  v.  Port- 
land, 41  Or.  373,  09  Pac.  34,  445 
[1902];  Setzler  v.  Pennsylvania 
Schuylkill  Valley  Railroad  Company, 
112  Pa.  St.  56,  24  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cases  280,  4  Atl.  370  [1886];  Pitts- 
burg, Bradford  &  Buflalo  Railway 
Company  v.  ilcCloskey,  110  Pa.  St. 
436,  1  Atl.  555  [1885]:  City  of  Al- 
legheny V.  Black's  Heirs,  99  Pa.  St. 
152  [is81]:  Pusey's  Appeal,  In  the 
matter  of  Charles  Street,  83  Pa.  St. 
67  [1876];  Greenville  &  Columbia 
R.  R.  Company  v.  Partlow,  5  Rich. 
L.  (S.  Car.)  428  [1852];  Te.xas  & 
St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  :Matthews,  60 
Tex.  215  I1S831:  Adams  v.  St. 
Joiinslniry  &  Lake  Champlain  R.  R. 
Co..  57  Vt.  240.  25  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Cases  172  [1884];  Jones  v.  City  of 
Seattle,  23  Wash.  753,  63  Pac'  553 
[1901];  Board  of  Education  v.  Ka 
nawha  .&  M.   R.   Co.,   44   W.   Va.   71. 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


120 


s!de  of  the  street  no  part  of  which  is  taken.-  In  Illinois  special 
benefits  received  by  that  part  of  the  realty  which  is  not  taken 
can  be  set  off  against  the  value  of  the  land  taken  if  the  pro- 
ceeding is  one  in  v/hich  the  assessment  upon  the  realty  is  pro- 
portioned to  the  benefits  received  and  limited  by  them,  such  as 
an  assessment  proceeding  in  the  narrower  sense  in  which  the 
term  is  used  in  Illinois  law;''  but  such  set-off  cannot  be  made 
in  a  proceeding  in  which  the  amount  of  the  assessment  is  not 
so  proportioned  to  the  benefits  received  and  limited  by  them, 
such  as  a  proceeding  in  what  is  known  in  Illinois  law  as  special 
taxation.*  An  assessment  levied  against  the  property  before  the 
condemnation  proceedings  may  be  deducted  from  the  amount 
awarded  in  such  proceedings.^ 


§  71.     Special  benefits  deducted  from  damages  to  land  not  taken. 

It  may  be  sought  to  deduct  the  special  benefits  to  the  part 
retained  bj^  the  original  OAvner  from  the  damages  sustained  by 
such  part  by  reason  of  the  improvement  in  question.  In  the 
absence  of  any  specific  constitutional  provision  on  the  sub,iect, 
and    under    constitutional    provisions    for    compensation    to    the 


29  S.  E.  50.3  ri897];  Roller  v.  City 
of  La  Crosse,  106  Wis.  369,  82  X. 
W.  341  [1900];  Holton  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,   31    Wis.    27    [1872]." 

"Complete  compensation  is  se- 
cured, althougli  the  condemnation 
judgment  is  paid  either  in  whole  or 
in  part  by  setting  off  against  it  the 
special  benefit  received  by  the  prop- 
erty from  the  improvement."  Wag- 
geman  v.  ^'illage  of  North  Peoria, 
155   111.  545,   40  X.   E.   485    [1895]. 

"Committees,  in  the  assessment  of 
damages,  are  not  restricted  to  the 
value  of  the  land,  taken  for  the  high- 
w^ay;  but  they  may  award  more  or 
less,  or  no  damages  at  all,  to  an  in- 
dividual, because  the  highway,  as 
they  have  laid  it  out,  will  be  pro- 
motive to  him  of  greater  benefits 
than  the  value  of  liis  land."  Town 
of  Winchester  v.  Hinsdale,  12  Conn. 
85,  95,  [1837],  (citin'T  on  right  to 
set  off  benefits.  Inhabitants  of  the 
Town  of  Windsor  v.  Fi<»lfl.  1  Conn. 
279    [1814[:    Commonwealth    u.    .Jus- 


tices of  the  Sessions  for  the  County 
of  Middlesex,  9  Mass.  388  [1812]; 
Commonwealth  v.  Justices  of  the 
Cou.rt  of  Sessions  for  the  County  of 
Xorfolk,   5   Mass.   435    [1809]). 

"In  most  cases  damages  are  a  re- 
sult obtained  by  a  comparison  of  the 
injury  and  the  benefit  accruing  to 
the  party."  Pusey's  Appeal,  In  tlie 
matter  of  Charles"  Street,  83  Pa.  St. 
07,  70   [1870]. 

-Abbott  V.  Inhabitants  of  Cottage 
City,  143  INIass.  521,  58  Am.  Rep.  143, 
10  X.  E.  325    [1887]. 

'*  Waggeman  v.  Village  of  North 
Peoria.  155  111.  545,  40  X".  E.  485 
[1S951. 

*  City  of  Bloomington  v.  Latham, 
142  Ili.  462,  18  L.  R.  A.  487,  32  N. 
E.  500   [1893]. 

=  Ross  V.  Gates,  183  Mo.  338,  81 
S.  W.  1107  [1904].  To  the  same 
effect  see  In  re  Spring  Valley  Park 
in  Kansas  City,  —  Mo.  — ,  106  S. 
W.  531   [1907]. 


121 


FORM    OF    KXACTK)N    IN    ASSESSMENT. 


§71 


owner,  it  is  held  hy  the  great  weight  of  authority  that  the  spe- 
cial benefits  may  in  such  cases  be  deducted  from  such  damages. 
This  is  not,  however,  so  much  a  setting  off  of  benefits  against 
damages  as  it  is  a  determination,  whether  or  not  the  improve- 
ment, taken  as  a  whole,  has  caused  damage  or  not.^  In  ]\Iissis- 
sippi,  however,  it  is  held  that  under  a  constitutional  provision 
"just  compensation  first  to  be  made,"  special  benefits  to  that 
part  of  the  land  which  is  left  cannot  be  deducted  either  from 
the  value  of  the  land  which  is  taken  or  from  the  amount  of  the 
damage  to  that  part  which  is  left.-  Earlier  cases  holding  that 
benefits  cannot  be  set  off  and  that  no  compensation  for  damages 
can  be  made  except  in  money  have  been  overruled  in  some  juris- 


^Pliirt  V.  City  of  Atlanta,  100  fia. 
274,  28  S.  E. '().)  [189t>];  (iuess  v. 
Stone  Mountain  (iranite,  etc..  Com- 
pany, 72  Ga.  320,  28  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 
Ca.ses  236  [1884];  Mayor  and  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Atlanta  v.  Ceirtral 
Railroad  &  Banking  Company,  53 
Ga.  120  [1874];  West  Chicago  Ma- 
sonic Association  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
215  111.  278.  74  X.  E.'loO  [1905]; 
Davis  V.  NortInvcst(>rn  Elevated 
Railroad  Company,  170  111.  595,  48 
N.  E.  1058  [1897];  Gordon  v.  Com- 
missioners of  Iligliways  of  Road  Dis- 
trict No.  3,  1(59  111."  510,  48  N.  E. 
451  [18971;  :Metrop<)litan  West  Side 
Elevated  Railway  Comjiany  v.  Stick- 
ney,  150  111.  362,  20  L.  R.  A.  773, 
37  N.  E.  1098  [1894],  (not  follow- 
ing Keithsburg  &  Eastern  Railroad 
Company  v.  Henry,  79  111.  290 
[1875]  )  ;  Washington  Ice  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  147  111.  327,  37  Am. 
St.  Rep.  222;  35  X.  E.  378  [1894]; 
Andrews  v.  Peo])le  ex  rel.  Runisey, 
84  111.  28  [1876];  Loinsville  &  Nash- 
ville Railroad  Company  v.  Thomp- 
son. 57  Ky.  (18  P..  Mf>u.)  735 
[1857];  Abney  v.  Texarkana,  Shreve- 
port  &  Natchez  Railroad  Company, 
105  La.  446.  29  Si.  890  [19011; 
Cnshman  v.  Sn  itli.  34  ^h-.  247 
[1852];  Shipley  v.  Raltimore  &  Ro- 
tomac  Railro^'d  Comnany.  34  Md. 
336  [1871];  ^Meacham  v.'  Fitclibin-r 
Railroad     Company,     58     Mass.      (4 


Cusli.)  291  [1849];  St.  Louis,  Keo- 
kuk &  Northwestern  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Knapp-Stoiit  &  Company,- 
16o'Mo.  396,  61  S.  W.  300  [1900]-, 
Kansas  City  v.  Bacon,  157  Mo.  450, 
57  S.  W.  1045  [1900];  St.  Louis, 
Oak  Hill  and  Carondelet  Railway 
Company  v.  Fowler,  142  Mo.  670,  10 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cases  N.  S.  405,  44 
S.  W.  77r[1890];  Smith  v.  City  of 
Omalia,  49  Neb.  883,  69  N.  W.  402 
[1896];  City  of  Omaha  v.  Howell 
Lumber  Co.,  30  Neb.  663,  46  N.  W. 
919  [1890];  Clark  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth, 61  N.  J.  L.  (32  Vr.)  565,  40 
Atl.  616,  737  [1898];  Davis  v.  :Sla\- 
or  and  Common  Council  of  tlie  City 
of  Newark,  54  N.  J.  L.  (-5  Vr.) 
595,  25  Atl.  336  [1892];  Odell  v. 
New  York  Elevated  Railroad  Com- 
pany, 130  N.  Y.  690,  29  N.  E.  998 
11892];  Carlisle  v.  City  of  (  inein- 
nati,  29  Ohio  C.  ( '.  91  [1906]  ;  Pa- 
ducali  &  ^.lemphi-i  llailniad  Comjiany 
V.  Stovall,  59  Te:iii.  (12  Heisk.)  1 
I  1879]  ;  Neilson  v.  Chicago,  ililwau- 
kee  &  Northwestei-n  Railway  Com- 
pany, 58  Wis.  .-.Ki:  14  Am.  &  Eng. 
R.  Cases  239.  17  N.  W.  310  [1883]. 
■  New  Orleans.  Jackson  &  Great 
Northern  Railroad  Company  v.  Move. 
39  Mi<s.  374  [I860]:  Tsojn  v.  ]\Iis9- 
issippi  Central  Railroad  Co.,  36 
Mis;.  306  [1858]:  Brown  v.  Beatty, 
34  Miss.  227.  69  Am.  Dec.  389 
[1857], 


71 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


122 


dictions.  Thus  in  Pennsylvania  this  view  was  expressed  in  an 
early  case,^  but  in  a  later  case  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  ease 
was  not  one  involving-  such  rule,  the  court  saying  of  the  earlier 
opinion,  that  it  is  "not  easy  to  determine  whether  the  misap- 
prehension of  the  facts  in  the  cause  or  the  misapplication  of 
the  law  to  the  facts  is  the  most  conspicuous."*  Similar  con- 
siderations apply  where  no  part  of  the  land  has  been  taken,  but 
it  has  been  injured  by  a  neighboring  improvement  in  such  a  way 
as  to  entitle  the  owner  to  compensation.  In  such  cases  the  bene- 
fits received  from  such  improvement  must  be  deducted  from 
the  damages  caused  thereby.^  Thus  where  realty  has  been  in- 
jured by  a  change  in  the  grade  of  the  adjoining  street  or  road/' 
or  by  the  construction  of  a  viaduct  '  or  by  the  construction  of 
a  tunnel  for  the  use  of  a  street  railroad,**  and  the  owner  of  the 
realty  thus  injured  is  entitled  to  recover  damages  therefor,  the 
special  benefits  enuring  to  such  realty  by  reason  of  such  im- 
provement are  to  be  deducted  from  the  damages  caused  thereby. 
This,  too,  is  not  regarded  so  much  as  a  set-ojff,  as  an  ap- 
plication of  the  principle  that  "if  the  market  value  of  the  prop- 
erty is  not  decreased  there  is  no  damage  and  there  can  be  no 
recovery." " 


^  Vanhorne's  Lessee  v.  Dorranee.  2 
Dall.  304,  315   [1795]. 

•■  Satterlee  v.  Matthewson,  16  Serg. 
&   Raw.   169    [1827]. 

'"  Juvinall  v.  Jamesburg  Drainage 
District,  204  111.  106,  68  N.  E.  440 
[1903];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Webb. 
102  111.  App!  232  [1902];  Gas  Light 
&  Coke  Company  v.  City  of  Xew  Al- 
bany, 158  Ind.  268,  63  X.  E.  458 
[1901]. 

°  City  of  Seattle  v.  Board  of  Home 
Missions  of  Methodist  Protestant 
Church,  138  Fed.  307,  70  C.  C.  A. 
597  [1905];  Cook  v.  City  of  Anso- 
nia,  66  Conn.  413,  34  Atl.  183 
[1895];  Schroeder  v.  City  of  Joliet, 
189  111.  48,  52  L.  R.  A.  634,  59  N.  E. 
550  [1901];  City  of  Bloomington  v. 
Pollock,  141  111.  346;  31  N.  E.- 146 
[1F93];  City  of  Louisville  v.  Louis- 
ville Rolling  Mill  Company.  66  Ky. 
(3  Bush.)  416.  96  Am.  Dec.  243 
[1867];  Chase  v.  City  of  Portland. 
86    Me.    367,    29    Atl.'  1104     [1894]; 


Widmp.n  Investment  Co.  v.  City  of 
St.  Joseph,  191  Mo.  459,  90  S.  W. 
763  [1906];  Grover  v.  Cornet,  135 
Mo.  21,  35  S.  W.  1143  [18EP6];  Kent 
V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  72  Mo.  App. 
42  [1897];  Clark  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth, 61  X.  J.  L.  (32  Vr.)  565,  40 
Atl.  616,  737  [1898];  Inhabitants 
of  the  Town  of  Lambertville  v.  Clev- 
inger,  30  X.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  53  [1862]  ; 
Chambers  v.  South  Chester  Bor.,  140 
Pa.  St.  510,  21  Atl.  409  [1891]; 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Chattanooga 
V.  Geiler,  81  Tenn.  (13  Lea.)  611 
[1884];  Friedrich  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 114  Wis.  304,  90  X.  W.  174 
[1902]. 

•Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  City 
of  Chicago.   26   Fed.  415    [1886]. 

*  Kaufman  v.  Tacoma,  Olympia  & 
Gray's  Harbor  Railroad  Company.  1 1 
Wash.   632.   40  Pac.    137    [1895]. 

"Schroeder  v.  City  of  Joliet,  189 
111.  48,  52  L.  R.  A.  634,  59  N.  E. 
550    [1901]. 


123  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §§  72,  73 

§  72.     Deduction  not  allowed  if  tracts  distinct. 

Assessments  are  for  many  purposes  regarded  as  being  levied 
against  specific  tracts  of  property  irrespective  of  the  ownership 
thereof.  If  two  distinct  tracts  of  property  owned  by  the  same 
person  are  affected  by  the  same  improvement,  each  is  ordinarily 
considered  by  itself,  irrespective  of  the  effect  of  snch  improvement 
upon  the  other  tract  so  owned.  Accordingly  if  the  ov.-ner  of  land 
which  is  taken,  either  in  whole  or  in  part,  by  proceedings  in  emi- 
nent domain,  owns  another  distinct  and  separate  tract  of  land, 
benefits  conferred  upon  one  of  such  distinct  tracts  cannot  be  set 
off  against  damages  to  the  tract  which  is  taken.^ 

§  73.  Deduction  of  damages  from  special  assessment  for  benefits. 
In  the  classes  of  cases  thus  far  considered  in  connection  with 
this  subject  benefits  have  been  deducted  from  damages,  and 
the  corporation  which  has  appropriated  property  by  proceed- 
ings in  eminent  domain  has  urged  such  deduction.  A  different 
principle  applies  where  a  local  assessment  has  been  levied  for 
the  benefits  received  by  the  realty  in  question,  and  the  owner 
thereof  seeks  to  set  off  the  damage  received  by  such  property 
by  reason  of  such  improvement  against  such  assessment  for  bene- 
fits. In  the  absence  of  specific  statutory  provision,  no  set-off 
can  be  allowed  against  a  claim  of  the  state  or  of  a  municipal 
corporation   for  taxes.'      A  local   assessment   is  a  tax   within  the 

'Sharp    V.    United    States.    101    U.  [1883];   Finnegan  v.  City  of  Fernan- 

S.  341,  48  L.  211,  24  S.   114    [1903];  dina,    1.5    Fla.    379.   21    Am.   Rep.   292 

(afTirming    Sharpe    v.    United    States,  [1875];     Cartersville    Wrfter     \Vork9 

112  Fed.  893.  57  L.  T5.  A.  932,  50  C.  Company     v.    Mayor     and     Aldermen 

C.  A.  .597   [1902]:   Todd  v.  Kankakee  of     Cartersville,"  89     Ga.     (189.      IG 

&    Illinois    Pviver    Railroad    Company,  S.      E.      70      [1892];       Hawkins      v. 

78    Til.    530     [1875];     Wiiite    \Vater  County     of     Sumter.     57     Ga.      1G6 

Valley     Railroad     Company     v.     ^Mc-  [1870]:     Scobey     v.     Decatur     Coun- 

Clure.   29    Ind.   .536    [ISfiS]  ;    State  v.  ty.     72     Ind.     551     [1880];     Newport 

Dipjhy.  5   Rlaekf.    (Ind.)    543    [1841];  &   Cincinnati  Rridge  Co.  v.  nouglass. 

Koestenbader    v.    Peirce.    41    Ta.    204  75  Ky.   (12  Busli.)    073   [1877];   City 

[1875]:      Wliitaker     v.     Plioenixville  of     New     Orleans     v.     Xew     Orleans 

Rnr..    141     Pa.    St.    327.    21    Atl.    004  Water  Works  Company,  36  La.  Ann. 

[1891].     See  als^)  Xicliolson  Borough,  432    [1884]:    ^Morris    v.    Lalaurie.    39 

Alain    Street.    27    Pa.    Super.    Ct.    570  La.    Ann.    47    [1887];    Seibert   v.   Tif- 

n90-)].  fany.  8  :Mo.  App.  33   [1879]:   Gatlins 

'  iNTcVev   V.   Lanier.   50    Ark.   384.   8  v.  Commissioners  of  Carteret  County, 

S.    W.    141     [18871:    TTimmelmann    v.  92    X.     C.     530.     53     Am.     ReTi.     432 

Spanaeel.   30   Cnl.    389    [1970]:    Mor-  [1885]:  :\riller  v.  Wisener.  4.t  W.  Va. 

fran    v.    Pueblo    &     Arkansas    Vallev  59.  30  S.   K.   237    [1898]. 
Railroad      Company.      6      Colo.      478 


73 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


124 


application  of  this  principle  -  and  while  the  city  may  be  liable  for 
damages  due  to  the  construction  of  such  improvement,''  no  set- 
off can  be  allowed  against  such  assessment  in  the  absence  of 
som;  statutory  authority  therefor.*  Accordingly  if  the  legisla- 
ture sees  fit  to  provide  for  the  estimate  and  payment  of  dam- 
ages to  the  property  owner  in  one  proceeding  and  the  estimate 
and  payment  of  a  local  assessm^ent  for  benefits  by  the  property 
owner  in  another  proceeding,  the  property  owner  has  no  right 
to  set  off  the  damages  due  to  him  against  the  assessment  due 
from  him."'  nor  can  he  resist  payment  of  the  assessment  on  the 
ground  that  damages  are  unpaid."     Thus  damages  sustained  by 


^See   §    1340. 

'  Town    of    Entaw    v.    Botnick.    — 

Ala. .  43  So.  739   [1907];  Averill 

V.  City  of  Boston,  193  Mass.  488.  80 
N.  £.583  [1907];  Coyne  v.  (  ity  of 
Memphis,  118  Tenn.  651,  102  S.  W. 
355   [1907];   Crowe  v.  Corporation  of 

Charlestown.   —   W.   Va.  .  57    S. 

E.  330  [19071;  findbey  v.  City  of 
Bluefield,  —  W.  Va.  ^ — .  57  S.  E. 
45  [1907].  Dania'jes  cannot  be  re- 
covered for  the  sanie  facts  by  suc- 
cessive vendees.  Jn  re  Sedgley  Ave- 
nue, 217  Pa.  313,  63  Atl.  546  [1907]. 

*  Fitzbugh  v.  Levee  District,  54 
Ark.  224.  15  S.  W.  455  [1891];  Dra- 
per v.  City  of  .Atlanta,  12G  Ga.  649, 
55   S.   E.   929    [1906]. 

=  Duncan  V.  Ramisb,  142  Cal.  686, 
76  Pac.  661  [1904];  Orman  Savings 
&  Loan  Society  v.  Ramish,  138  Cal. 
120.  69  Pac.  89,  70  Pac.  1067  [1902]; 
Hornung  v.  McCarthy,  126  Cal.  17, 
58  Pac.  303  [1899] ;  Jones  v.  Town  of 
Lake  View,  151  111.  063,  38  X.  E.  688 
[1894];  Whiting  v.  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermen of  the  City  of  Boston,  100 
Mass.  89  [1870];  St.  Paul,  :Minneap- 
olis  &  Manitoba  Railway  Company 
V.  City  of  Minneapolis,  35  Minn.  141, 
27  X.'W.  500  [1886];  Keith  v.  Bing- 
ham. 100  Mo.  300,  13  S.  W.  683 
[1889];  McQuiddy  v.  Smith,  67  Mo. 
App.  205  [1896]';  Fisher  v.  Mayor, 
Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of  the 
City  of  New  York,  67  X.  Y.  73 
[1876],  (reversing  Fisher  v.  The 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Citv  of  Xew  York.   3 


riun.  648  [1875]  ;  People  of  the  State 
of  >vew  York  ex  rel.  Dean  v.  Board 
of  Assessors  of  the  City  of  Xew  York, 
59  Hun.  407,  13  X. "  Y.  Supp.  404 
[1891];  Watt  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the 
City  of  Xew  York,  3*  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
23  [1847];  Smith  v.  City  of  Alle- 
gheny, 92  Pa.  St.  110  [1879];  Quirk 
V.  city  of  Seattle,  38  Wash.  25,  80 
Pac.  207    [1905]. 

•=  White  V.  City  of  Alton.  149  111. 
225,   36  X.   E.    1008. 

"We  do  not  propose  to  consider 
whether  such  a  claim  of  damages 
could  be  maintained  against  the  city 
or  against  the  mayor  and  aldermen 
in  any  form.  Even  if  a  liability  to 
such  damages  could  be  substantiated 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  laid 
down  in  Child  v.  Boston,  4  All.  41, 
we  do  not  think  that  it  can  be  set 
up  against  an  assessment  required 
for  paying  the  expenses  of  a  public 
improvement  with  which  the  mayor 
and  aldermen  are  charged  as  public 
officers.  It  is  a  statute  proceeding. 
The  assessm.ent  is  authorized,  not 
merely  as  a  means  of  enforcing  a 
municipal  claim  in  the  nature  of  a 
private  right;  it  is  prescribed  as  a 
public  duty.  The  whole  proceeding, 
including  the  assessment  and  collec- 
tion of  the  amount  of  the  expenses, 
depends  upon  the  provisions  of  the 
statute  and  must  be  regulated  en- 
tirely by  them.  Those  provisions 
neither  contemplate  nor  admit  of 
such   investigations  as  would   b'>  nee- 


125 


FORM    OF    EXACTION    IX    ASRESSMEXT. 


§73 


a  delay  in  eonimencing'  to  construct  an  improvement  cannot  he 
set  off  against  an  assessment  for  benefits  levied  to  meet  the 
cost  of  such  improvement,'  nor  can  damages  claimed  for  defective 
performance  be  set  off."*  Damages  for  the  wrongful  appropria- 
tion of  road  material  b,y  the  contractor  cannot  be  set  off  against 
an  assessment."  Still  less  can  payment  of  assessment  be  re- 
sisted entirely  on  the  ground  that  compensation  for  the  damages 
sustained  has  not  been  first  made,  if  the  statute  does  not  pro- 
vide for  such  payment  as  a  condition  precedent  to  any  liability 
for  such  assessment.'"  If.  however,  damages  are  allowed  for  a 
change  of  grade  tlie  amount  of  the  assessment  for  making  such 
change  has  l)een  held  to  be  an  element  of  damage. ^^  Where 
damages  have  been  estimated  in  one  proceeding  and  a  local  as- 
sessment for  benefits  has  been  levied  in  another  proceeding,  the 
legislature  may  authorize  the  one  to  be  set  off  against  the  other. ^- 
Even  after  an  assessment  of  damages  and  a  local  assessment  for 
benefits  have  been  made,  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  provide  that  they  may  both  be  enforced  in  one  action 
bv  setting  off  the  one   against   the  other. ^•'^     In   Kentuck^^   how- 


essary  to  enable  parties  assessed  to 
avail  themselves  of  any  counterclaims 
tlicv  may  have,  growing  out  of  the 
mode  in  which  the  power  has  been 
e.\ercised.  To  require  the  collection 
of  the  assessment  to  be  delayed  for 
that  purpose  would  be  a  serious  ob- 
struction and  embarrassment  to  the 
discharge  of  a  public  duty  and  incon- 
sistent with  the  limited  period  al- 
lowed for  the  continuance  of  the  lien 
upon  the  land."  \Yhiting  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Boston, 
106   Mass.   89,   93,   94    [1870]. 

'  Whiting  V.  ^Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  the  City  of  Boston,  lOG  Mass.  89 
11870].  To  the  same  effect  see  Lav- 
erty  v.  State  ex  rel.  Hill.  109  Ind. 
217.  9  X.  E.  774. 

'Lux  &  Talbott  Stone  Co.  v.  Don- 
aldson, 162  Ind.  481,  f.8  X.  E.  1014 
[1904]:  Darnell  v.  Keller.  18  Ind. 
App.  10.3.  4.5  X.  E.  076.  Such  jud-z- 
mont  cannot  be  rendered  acrainst  the 
city  where  it  is  only  a  nominal  partv. 
the  contractor  beincr  the  real  party 
in  interest.     St.  Louis  to  use  of  Dep- 


pelheuer  v.  Xowman,  4.5  Mo.  138 
[18()9]. 

''Sims  V.  Hines.  121  Ind.  534,  23 
X.    E.   515    [1S89]. 

^"Duncan  v.  Rami  '.  142  Cal.  686, 
76  Pac.  061  [1904];  Hornung  v.  Mc- 
Carthy, 126  Cal.  17.  58  Pac.  303 
[1899];  Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co. 
V.  Mehler,  112  Ky.  438,  04  S.  W.  396, 
652.  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1335  [1901]; 
McQiiiddy  v.  Smith,  67  Mo.  App.  205 
[1896]. 

1' Stowell  V.  Milwaukee.  31  Wis. 
523    [1872]. 

'-Genet  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  94 
X.  Y.  645  [1884]:  People  ex  rel. 
Ctrillin  V.  ^Layor.  etc..  of  Brooklyn, 
4  X.  V.  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [ISoi] ; 
Livingston  v.  Mayor,  etc..  of  Xew 
York.  8  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  85.  22  Am. 
Dec.  622  [1831]:  City  of  Cleveland 
V.  Wick.  18  O.  S.  303  [1868].  (For 
the  present  Ohio  rule  as  to  the  power 
of  the  legislature  to  allow  a  local  as- 
sp-<rnent  in  such  a  case  see  §  308). 

"  Baldwin  v.  Citv  of  Xewark.  33 
X.  J.  L.    (9  Vr.)    158   [1875]. 


§74 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


12G 


ever,  it  is  held  that  the  legislature  cannot  authorize  a  local  as- 
sessment to  be  set  off  against  damages  in  such  cases,  on  the 
theory  that  the  owner  must  be  compensated  before  his  property 
is  taken  and  that  the  benefits  received  do  not  constitute  com- 
pensation.^* If  suit  is  brought  on  the  assessment  by  the  con- 
tractor it  has  been  held  that  a  set-off  of  his  individual  debt 
on  another  transaction  may  be  had.^^  Under  an  ordinance  which 
provided  that  a  property  owner  who  wished  to  set  off  damages 
against  benefits  might  do  so  by  receipting  on  the  docket  for  the 
amount  of  damages  and  obtaining  a  certificate  of  such  receipt, 
the  amount  of  which  should  be  credited  upon  the  assessment, 
it  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  the  property  owner  took 
warrants  for  payment  to  him  of  the  damages  did  not  operate  as 
a  waiver  of  his  right  of  set-off.^'' 


§  74.     Special  contract  for  set-off. 

A  contract  between  a  municipal  corporation  and  owners  of 
property  whereby  the  property  owners  release  their  right  for 
damages  resulting  from  the  improvement  in  consideration  of 
which  the  municipal  corporation  assumes  local  assessments  to 
be  levied  on  such  realty  has  been  upheld.^  especially  under  a 
statute  providing  for  such  a  contract.-  Thus  a  contract  whereby 
a  property  owner  assented  to  the  change  of  location  of  a  boule- 
vard through  his  land  and  released  damages  therefor  in  con- 
sideration of  which  the  municipal  corporation  assumed  assess- 
ments for  such  improvements  and  agreed  to  take  care  of  any 
sewer  assessments  and  surface  water,  was  held  valid,  even  though 
the  municipal  corporation  would  be  thereby  obliged  to  obtain  the 
richt  to  go  upon  the  land  of  others  and  to  go  upon  such  land  in  or- 
der to  perform  its  agreement  to  care  for  the  surface  water,  the  stat- 
ute authorizing  a  sf^ttlement  on  such  terms  as  may  be  agreed  upon.^ 

Seattle,  —  Wash.  — ,  94  Pac.  656 
[1908]. 

1  Shelby  v.  City  of  Burlinqrton.  125 
la.  343,  101  N.  W.  101  [1904].  (A 
case  in  which  the  property  owners 
had  paid  for  one  prior  improvement 
of  the  street  in  question,  and  proba- 
bly for   two   such   improvements.) 

'^  Bell  V.  City  of  Newton,  183  Mass. 
481.  67  N.  E.  599   [1903]. 

5  Bell  V.  ritv  of  Newton.  183  Mass. 
481.   67   X.   E.    599    [1903]. 


"  City  of  Covington  v.  Worthingr- 
ton,  88  Ky.  206,  27  Am.  &  Ens.  Corp. 
Cases,  187,  11  S.  W.  1038,  10  S.  W. 
790    [1889]. 

i^Bodley  v.  Finley,  111  Ky.  618; 
64  S.  W.  439,  23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  851 
[1901].  (This  ouestion  was  raised 
but  not  decided  in  Pnrdv  v.  Drake, 
(T\v.).  32  S.  W.  939.  17  Ky.  L.  R. 
819. 

'"State    ex    rel.    Guye    v.    Citv    of 


127  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §   10 

In  this  last  case  the  contract  was  made  by  the  maj'or  under  au- 
thority from  the  city  council,  had  been  recognized  by  the  city 
b}^  a  recital  in  the  instrument  in  which  it  assumed  the  local 
assessment  and  the  city  council  had  ratified  and  confirmed  all 
settlements  heretofore  effected  on  account  of  such  improvement. 
It  was  held,  accordingly,  that  such  contract  was  binding  on 
the  city,  and  that  the  owner  could  maintain  an  action  for  breach 
of  the  covenants  to  take  care  of  the  sewer  assessments  and  the 
surface  water.*  If  property  owners  agree  that  the  assessment 
for  benefits  shall  be  deducted  from  the  damages  due  to  them  and 
that  the  assessment  shall  be  delayed  until  the  amount  of  dam- 
ages can  be  determined,  they  cannot  recover  until  the  assess- 
ment is  levied,  even  in  case  of  delay,  as  long  as  they  have  not 
reftuested  the  levy  of  the  assessment.'^  A  diffeernt  question  may 
be  presented  if  the  contract  for  exemption  from  assessment 
operates  to  transfer  to  other  property  owners  the  burden  of  the 
assessment  of  which  the  realty  in  question  has  been  relieved." 
An  assessment  is  void  as  to  the  other  property  owners  if  a 
given  tract  of  land  is  relieved  from  assessment  in  consideration 
of  a  waiver  of  damages  by  such  property  owner,  since  the  bene- 
fits may  greatly  exceed  the  damages  and  such  contract  may 
thus  be  unfair  to  the  other  property  owners.' 

§  75.     Statutory  provision  for  deduction  of  value  of  land  donated. 

In  the  absence  of  specific  statutory  provision  therefor,  a  land- 
owner who  has  donated  land  for  a  street  cannot  have  the  value 
of  such  land  deducted  from  a  subse(iuent  assessment  for  bene- 
fits arising  from  the  improvement  of  such  street.  Statutes  are 
occasionally  found,  however,  which  provide  that  the  value  of 
the  land  so  donated  shall  be  deducted  from  such  assessment. 
The  right  of  the  owner  1o  deduct  the  value  of  the  land  donated 
by  him  is  lJmit(Hl  by  and  restricted  to  the  terms  of  such  stat- 
utes. Thus  under  a  statute  authorizing  a  city  to  accept  dona- 
tions of  land  for  use  as  a  street,  and  i)i'()vi(liug  tliat  if  tlie  laud 
is  so  used,  the  land  of  the  doiioi'  shall   not  be  assessed  for  such 

*Bell  V.  City  of  Xewtnn.  TSH  Miiss.  '  fn    re   City    of   Seattlp.    —    Wash. 

481,   67   N.   E.   599    ri9n.'?|.  — .    94    Pac."  1075     [19081;      (citing 

"Boston   Water   Power   Co.   v.   City  Aver  v.  City  of  Cliicaoro.  149  111.  202, 

of   Boston.    194   Mass.   571.   80   X.   E.  37  X.  E.  57   [18941;   City  of  Chicago 

598    [1907].  V.   Shepard,  8   111.   App.  (102    [1881]). 

*See  §  61G  ct  scq.,  §  G39  rt  scfj. 


§  76  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  128 

street,  it  wa.s  held  that  if  land  is  donated  which  is  not  used  for 
the  particular  street  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  the  land 
of  the  donor  is  liable  for  siich  assessment/  If,  however,  the 
ow^ner  of  land  has  donated  a  part  thereof  for  a  street  under 
such  statute,  and  subsequently  proceeding's  are  instituted  to 
widen  such  street,  it  is  held  that  the  value  of  the  land  so  do- 
nated should  be  appraised  and  applied  as  a  set-off  to  benefits 
assessed  against  land  of  such  owner,  who  was  the  grantee  of 
such  donor,  abutting  on  such  strip  of  land  so  donated. - 

§  76.    Deduction  of  certain  benefits  and  assessment  for  others. 

It  is  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  provide  that  cer- 
tain kinds  of  benefit  to  property  may  be  deducted  from  the  dam- 
ages thereto  while  other  kinds  of  benefit  are  not  to  be  deducted, 
but  are  to  be  made  the  basis  of  a  special  assessment.^  Thus 
under  a  IMassachusetts  statute  for  laying  out  highways,  it  was 
said  that  benefits  must  be  classified  as  (1)  those  directly  occa- 
sioned to  an  estate  bounding  on  the  highway,  peculiar  to  the 
estate  itself  as  distinguished  from  other  estates  not  bounding 
thereon;  (2)  those  shared  by  such  estate  in  common  with  other 
estates  in  the  neighborhood ;  and  (3)  those  extending  to  all  es- 
tates in  the  same  city ;  and  it  was  held  that  under  such  statute 
benefits  of  the  first  class  could  be  allowed  only  by  way  of  set- 
off for  damages;  benefits  of  the  second  class  could  not  be  set-off, 
but  could  be  assessed  for  under  the  betterment  acts;  and  for 
benefits  of  the  third  class  no  compensation  could  be  exacted 
from  the  owner.-  So  the  legislature  may  provide  for  a  pro- 
ceeding under  one  statute  in  w^hich  benefits  cannot  be  set  off,  but 
must  be  assessed  and  also  for  a  proceeding  under  another  stat- 
ute in  which  benefits  are  to  be  set-off.^  Thus  under  the  better- 
ment acts*  benefits  are  not  to  be  set  off  against  damages,  but 


^  Shurtleff  V.   City  of  Chicago,    190  ton.    115    Mass.    377    [1874];    Upliam 

111.  473,  60  N.  E.  870   [1901].  v.    City   of   Worcester,    113   Mass.   97 

=  Espert  V.  City  of  Chicago,  201  111.  [1873];   Allen  v.  City  of  Charleston, 

264.    66    N.    E.    212    [1903],     (distin-  109  Mass.  243   [1872]. 

guishing   Shnrtleff   v.   City   of   Chica-  =  Upham  v.  City  of  Worcester,   113 

go.  190  111.  473.  60  X.  E.  870  [1901].  Mass.    97    [1873]. 

'  Garvey  v.   Inhabitants   of   Eevere,  ^  God  bold    v.    City    of    Chelsea,    111 

187  Mass.  54.'5,  73  N.  E.  664   [190.5];  Mass.   294    [1873]." 

French  v.   City  cf  Lowell.    117   Mass.  *  Statutes     18G0.    c.     174;     1868,    c. 

363  ]1875];  Bancroft  v.  City  of  Bos-  75.  216;    1869,  c.   169. 


129  FORM    OF    EXACTION    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §7/ 

are  to  be  the  basis  of  an  assessment  in  a  separate  proceeding.'' 
while  under  another  statute "  such  benefits  are  to  be  set  off.' 
Accordino-ly  if  the  record  leaves  it  in  doubt  which  method  was 
followed  a  ruling  of  the  court  will  be  presumed  to  be  correct 
and  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  method  was  followed  under 
which  such  riding  would  be  correct.'* 

§  77.     Method  of  computation  of  benefits  and  damages. 

Where  benefits  are  to  be  deducted  from  damages  the  question 
whether  the  amount  of  each  is  to  be  found  or  whether  the  net 
amount  merely  is  to  be  found  is  one  of  Some  difficulty,  one  which 
depends  upon  the  wording  and  interpretation  of  the  statutes 
which  control,  and  one  upon  which  several  different  view's  have 
been  entertained.  "Where  the  statute  provides  that  the  jury  in 
a  proceeding  to  open  a  street  shall  determine  the  benefits  or 
enhanced  value  that  will  accrue  from  the  improvements  to  the 
portion  or  portions  not  taken,  and  deduct  the  same  from  the  dam- 
ages or  compensation  they  would  otiierwise  awarci  to  the  owner 
or  owners  it  has  been  held  that  the  jury  must  concur  on  both 
the  items  of  damage  and  the  items  of  benefit  and  accordingly 
that  the  jury  must  report  each  separately.^  A  general  verdict 
has  been  said  to  be  insufficient,  on  the  ground  that  it  should  show 
either  the  amount  of  the  benefits  separately  or  at  least  the  dif- 

=  "Those    acts    provide    for    the    as-  Society    v.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of 

sessment  of  the  full  damages  at  one  Boston,   116  Mass.   181,   17   Am.  Rep. 

stage  of  the  proceedings  and  the  as-  153   [1874];  Bancroft  v.  City  of  Bos- 

sessment    of    the    l)enefit    and    advan-  ton,    115   Mass.   377    [1874];    Godbold 

tage   to   the   land   owner   at   a    suhse-  v.    City    of    Chelsea,    HI    Mass.    294 

qiient    stage    and    by    an    independent  [1873];  Prince  v.  City  of  Boston,  HI 

act."      (iodbold    v.  "  City    of    Chelsea,  Mass.    22f)    [1872],    while    under    the 

111    Mass.   294,   295    [1873].     To   the  highway    acts    (Statutes    1871.    Chaj.. 

same  elFect   see   Edmands   v.    City    of  :{82 )    benefits  can   be   set  off   against 

Boston,    108   Mass.   535    [1871].  damages     and     only     those     benefits 

"General    Statutes,    Chaps.    43,    44.  which    cannot    be    so    set    off    can    be 

'  In      Benton      v.      Inhabitants      of  assessed   as  betterments.     Under  this 

Brookline.    151    Mass.    2.50.    23    X.    E.  statute   the    right   of   set-off   was   up- 

840    [1890],   it  was   pointed   out   that  lield   in  CJreen   v.  City  of  Fall   River, 

()pposite  results  in  similar  cases  ha<l  IK!     Mass.    2(i2     [1873];     Upham    v. 

been   reached   in  ^Massachusetts   under  (  ity     of     Woicester,      113     Mass.     97 

ditrerent     statutes.        In     proceedings  [1873]. 

under   the  betterment    acts    (Statute-;  "Godbold    v.    (ity    of    Chelsea.    HI 

18fif,,    Chap,    174)    benefits   cannot    be  Mass.   294    [1873]. 

set    off    against    damages,    and    under  '  Dull'ield     v.    City    of    Detroit,     15 

this  statute   the   rigiit  of  set-off  was  Midi.  474   [  18fi7"l 
<lenied    in,    Boston    Seamen's    Friend 


§  77  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  130 

ferenee  between  such  amoiints,  showing  that  the  jury  has  con- 
sidered both.-  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  statute  requires  com- 
missioners to  consider  the  damages  and  benefits  and  to  report 
the  amount  that  the  realty  concerned  will  be  damaged  or  bene- 
fited, it  has  ])een  held  not  to  be  necessary,  as  far  as  concerns 
the  owners  of  land  taken,  that  the  commissioners  .should  assess 
damages  and  benefits  separately.  It  is  sufficient  if  the  report 
shows  that  in  making  the  assessment  both  were  duly  considered.^ 
Even  if  the  statute  requires  the  damages  and  benefits  to  be 
assessed  separately,  it  is  not  necessary  to  enter  them  separately 
in  the  absence  of  a  specific  constitutional  reciuirement,  and  it 
will  be  presumed  that  the  amounts  inserted  in  the  column  of 
benefits  represent  the  amount  of  net  benefits  where  no  entry  is 
made  in  the  column  of  damages  and  damages  are  shown  to  ex- 
ist in  fact.*  If  the  jury  finds  the  amount  of  damages  and  the 
amount  of  benefits,  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the  jury  or 
the  court  performs  the  mathematical  operation  of  subtracting  the 
one  from  the  other.^  In  a  Wisconsin  case  ^  it  seems  to  have 
been  held  that  the  commissioners  in  making  the  appraisement 
should  strike  a  balance  between  benefits  and  damages.  The  real 
objection,  however,  was  that  the  land  was  sold  for  non-payment 
of  the   assessment   for   benefits   without   deduction    for   damages. 

2  City  of  Portland  v.  Kanim.  5  Or.  Huston    v.     Clark.     112     111.     344 

362    ri8741.  ri.°H51. 

'State,  Wilkinson.  Pros.  v.  City  of  "■  :VIillpr    v.    City    of    Aslieville.    112 

Trenton,    35    N.    J.    L.    (6    Vr.)    485       X.  ('.  7C>9.  16  S.  E.  765   [1893]. 
[18721,  « Roller  v.  City  of  La  Crosse,   106 

Wis.  369,  82  N.  V.  341    [1900]. 


CHAPTER  V. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  RESTRICTIONS  APPLICABLE   TO 
ASSESSMENT. 

§  78.    Justice  and  fairness  of  local  assessments. 

The  attitude  of  the  courts  toward  local  assessment  is  inevi- 
tably affected  by  considerations  of  fairness  and  justice.  There 
are,  hoAvever,  in  practice  two  sides  to  this  question.  If,  in  fact, 
and  not  merely  in  theory,  assessments  are  apportioned  according 
to  actual  benefits  and  are  limited  to  the  amount  of  actual  bene- 
fits, and  if  by  actual  benefits  is  meant  the  increase  in  the  value 
of  the  realty  assessed  which  is  caused  by  the  improvement  for 
which  the  assessment  is  levied,  the  local  assessment  is  the  most 
fair  and  just  system  of  taxation  imafrinable.'     On  the  other  hand 


iCity  of  New  Albany  v.  Cook,  29 
Ind.  220  [1867];  Woodhouse  v.  City 
of  Burlington,  47  Vt.  300  [1875^; 
Allen  V.  Drew,  44  Vt.  174  [1872]; 
"Experience  has  shown  that  by  a 
judicious  exercise  of  this  power  where 
it  has  been  conferred,  a  nearer  ap- 
proach to  equality  of  taxation  has 
been  arrived  at  than  where  the  en- 
tire burden  has  been  permitted  to 
rest  upon  the  property  of  the  muni- 
cipality without  regard  to  special 
benefits  onfcrred."  Woodhouse  v. 
(  ity  of  Turlington,  47  Vt.  300,  303 
|1S7.-)1;  "Would  it  be  just  that  all 
should  be  taxed  alike  and  that  the 
owner  of  property  in  a  remote  part 
of  the  city  be  compelled  to  contrib- 
ute as  much  towards  tlie  particular 
improvement  as  those  whose  lands 
are  thus  peculiarly  benefited?  This 
would  savor  very  much  of  the  "forced 
cnnt-ihutions"  of  the  olden  time 
whicli   are  so  generally  denounced   as 


obnoxious  to  tlie  principles  of  free 
government,  and  the  bare  statement 
of  the  proposition  shocks  all  sense 
of  justice  and  furnisiies  its  own  refu- 
tation. It  is  therefore  but  pre-emi- 
nently just,  as  well  as  the  duty  ot 
the  law-making  power,  to  provide  for 
an  equitable  adjustment  of  such  bur- 
dens in  proportion  to  the  benefits 
conferred,  and  it  is  for  tlie  voi-y  pur- 
pose, as  we  have  seen,  of  accomjdish 
ing  this  end,  and  of  preventing  so 
great  a  perversion  of  the  taxing; 
power,  that  these  local  or  special  as- 
sessments are  almost  universally  re 
sorted  to."  Arnold  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Knoxville.  ll.i  Tonn. 
10.5.  220,  3  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.t  S37.  90 
S.  W.  469  [1905];  "Their  intrinsic 
justice  strikes  every  one.  Tf  an  im- 
jirovement  is  to  be  made,  t7ie  benefit 
of  which  is  local,  it  is  but  just  that 
the  property  benefited  should  bear 
the  burden.  While  tlie  few  ought 
131 


§  79  TAXATION    Bi     ASSESSMENT.  132 

the  local  assessment  is  subject  to  great  and  undeniable  abuses.- 
Improvements  may  be  made  either  as  a  speculation  in  the  hope 
that  the  market  value  of  the  realty  assessed  will  be  increased 
greatly  by  the  improvement  in  question ;  or  as  a  part  of  a  scheme 
of  beautifying  th^  city  without  any  real  reference  to  the  benefit 
to  be  conferred  upon  the  property  assessed.  Cities,  like  people, 
often  believe  that  they  can  afford  anything  that  they  can  get. 
without  much  regard  to  the  means  of  paying  for  it.  If  the  de- 
termination of  the  legislature  or  of  the  public  corporation  levy- 
ing the  assessment  is  regarded  as  final  as  to  the  amount  of  bene- 
fits, the  constructive  and  theoretical  benefits  are  not  infrequently 
found  to  exceed  any  increase  in  market  price  due  to  the  im- 
provement in  question  and  occasionally  found  to  exceed  the  mar- 
ket value  of  the  property  assessed,  benefits  and  all.'^ 

§  79.     Rule  for  determining  constitutionality  of  statute. 

The  states  of  the  Union  are  governments  which  possess  power, 
general  and  unlimited  in  character,  except  where  limited  by  soine 
provision  of  the  constitution  of  that  state  or  of  the  United 
States,  either  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication.'  The  leg- 
islature is  presumed  to  know  the  limits  of  its  authority  and  to 
respect  them.  It  is  presumed  that  it  obeys  the  state  constitu- 
tion, a  law  higher  than  statute,  since  it  is  the  direct  expression 
of  the  supreme  power  of  each  state,  the  people  thereof.  Accord- 
ingly an  assessment  statute  passed  by  a  state  legislature  cannot 
be  held  unconstitutional  unless  it  is  clearly  shown  to  be  incon- 
sistent -  with  some  specific  provision  in  either  the  state  or  fed- 
eral constitution.''   and   a   doubt   as  to   the  validity   of  a   statute 

not  to  be  taxed  for  the  benefit  of  the  wood    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    24    Mo. 

whole,   the   whole   ought    [not]    to   be  20,  22    [1856]. 

taxed    for    the    few.      A    single    town-  -  Reed   v.   Erie,    79    Pa.    St.    ( 29   P. 

ship  in  the  county  ought  not  to  bear  F.    Smith)    346    [1875]. 

the    whole    county    expenses,    neither  ^  See    discussion    in    Reed    v.    Erie. 

ought  the  whole  county   to  be   taxed  79    Pa.    St.     (29    P.    F.    Smith)     346 

for  the  benefit  of  a  single  township:  [1875]. 

and  the  same  principle  requires  that  '  Carson   v.   St.   Francis  Levee   Dis- 

taxation    for    a    local    obje(-t,    benefi-  trict,    59    Ark.    513.    27    S.    ^Y.    590 

cial  only  to  a  portion  of  a   town  or  [1894]. 

city  should  be  upon  that  part  only.  "  Carson  v.   St.   Francis  Levee  Dis- 

General    taxation    for    a    mere    local  trict,    59    Ark.    513,    27    S.    W.    590 

purpose    is    unjust,    it  burdens    those  [1894]. 

not  benefited,  and  benefits  those  who  ^Carson   v.   St.   Francis   Levee  Dis- 

are  exempt  from  the  burden."     Lock-  trict,    59    Ark.    513.    27    S.    W.    590 


133 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


^79 


must  be  resolved  in  its  favor.*  Conversely  of  two  or  more  dif- 
ferent possible  constructions  of  a  statute,  that  one  will  be  pre- 
ferred which  will  render  such  statute  constitutional.''  Further- 
more the  question  of  the  constitutionality  of  the  statute  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  its  wisdom  or  lack  of  wisdom.  It  is  possible  and 
proper  for  the  court  to  uphold  as  constitutional  a  statute,  which, 
it  ma.y  think,  is  unwise  and  impolitic."  At  the  same  time,  ra- 
tional action  is  prima  facie  to  be  expected  of  the  legislature, 
and  accoding  to  a  statute  will  not  be  so  construed  as  to  be 
unreasonable  unless  such  intention  is  indicated  in  express  terms." 

§  80.    Effect  of  unconstitutional  statute. 

If  a  statute  is  enacted  in  violation  of  one  or  more  consti- 
tutional provisions  no  rights  can  exist  thereunder  as  a  general 
rule.^     Even  the  act  of  a  majority  of  property  holders  in  vot- 


[1894]:  In  the  matter  of  the  Bonds 
of  the  Madera  Irrigation  District, 
02  Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  lOfl.  14 
L.  R.  A.  755,  28  Pac.  272,  675  118911  ; 
Ilagnr  v.  lioaid  of  Supervisors  of 
Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222  [18741: 
Creighton  v.  Manson.  27  Cal.  ON 
[18651. 

*  Carson  v.  St.  Francis  Levee  Dis- 
trict. 59  Ark.  513,  27  S.  W.  590 
[1894];  In  the  matter  of  tlie  Bonds 
of  tlie  Madera  Irrigati;in  District, 
92  Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106.  14 
L.  R.  A.  755,  28  Pac.  272,  675  [1891]  ; 
Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222  ]1874]; 
Wilson  V.  Board  of  Trustees  of  the 
Sanitary  District  of  Chicago.  133  III. 
443.  27  X.  E.  203  [18911:  Camphell 
V.  Dwiggins,  83  Ind.  473  [1882]; 
White  V.  Gove.  183  :\rass.  333.  67  X. 
E.  359  [1903];  State  ex  rel.  Merrick 
V.  District  Court  of  Hennepin 
County,  33  :Minn.  235.  22  X.  \V.  625 
[1885]:  State,  Estate  of  Brown. 
Pros.  V.  Town  of  I'nion.  62  X'.  J.  L. 
(33  Vr.)  142,  40  Atl.  632  [1898]; 
Village  of  Passaic  v.  State,  Deln 
ware,  Lackawanna  and  Western  Rail- 
road Company.  Pros..  37  X.  J.  L. 
(8  Vr.)  538  [18751:  Ireland  v.  City 
of  Rochester.  51  Bnl).  (X.  Y.I  414 
[1868]:     City    of    Rnlci-h     v.     Peace. 


110  X.  C.  32,  17  L.  H.  A.  330,  14  S. 
E.  521  [1892];  Walsh  v.  Barron, 
61  O.  S.  15,  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  354, 
55  X.  E.  164  [1899]:  Hill  v.  Hig- 
don,  5  O.  S.  243.  67  Am.  Dec.  289 
[1855];  "The  action  of  the  legisla- 
ture shall  be  upheld  unless  palpably 
in  contravention  of  the  organic  law." 
City  of 'Atchison  v.  Bartholow,  4 
Kan.    124,    141    [1806]. 

^Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  88 
Wis.  383,  60  X.  W.  270  [1894];  To 
the  same  effect  see  Sage  v.  City  of 
Brooklyn,   89   X.   Y.    189    [1882].' 

«  Praigg  V.  We.-tern  Paving  &  Sup. 
ply  Company.  143  hid.  358,  42  X^.  E. 
750  [18951:  "If  the  matter  were  left 
to  me  I  should  say  that  the  law  is 
unwise  and  absolutely  incapable  of 
any  beneficial  operation;  but  those 
aie  questions  exclusively  for  the  leg- 
islature." Hellman  v.  Shoiilters.  114 
Cal.  136,  44  Pac.  915.  45  Pac.  1057 
[18961:  See  also  State  e.K  rel.  :\rer- 
rick  v.  District  Court  of  Hennepin 
County.  33  Minn.  235.  22  X.  W.  625 
[18851. 

'  Xeenan  v.  Siuitli.  50  Mo.  525 
[18721. 

'  State.  Mayor  .ind  Council  of  the 
(  ity  of  Xcwark.  Pro-;,  v.  Inhabitants 
of  the  Town-^hip  of  \'crona  in  the 
Countv  of  Essex.  58  X.  .1.  L.   (29  Vr.) 


§§80,81  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT  134 

iag  in  favor  of  such  tax  does  not  make  such  statute  valid  as 
against  the  dissenting  minority.-  This  rule  is  said  to  be  even 
more  stringent  in  the  case  of  local  assessments  than  in  the  case 
of  general  taxation.  General  taxation  is  said  to  rest  upon  the 
antecedent  duty  of  the  citizen  to  support  the  government,  and 
accordingly  it  has  been  said  that  to  restrain  the  collection  of  a 
general  tax  in  equity,  the  plaintiff  must  show  that  the  tax  is 
not  merely  invalid  but  inequitable.''  In  the  case  of  the  local 
assessment  it  is  said  that  there  is  "no  antecedent  duty  or  bur- 
den even  in  the  most  general  sense,"  and  that  accordingly  it  is 
necessary  only  to  show  that  the  statute  which  atuhorizes  the  as- 
sessment is  itself  unconstitutional,  Avithout  also  showing  that  the 
assessment  is  inequitable.*  An  assessment  made  by  a  public  cor- 
poration acting  under  an  unconstitutional  law,  is  until  set  aside, 
a  subsisting  assessment.-  Accordingly  the  part.y  who  has  paid 
in  such  assessment  cannot  recover  in  some  jurisdictions  until  it 
is  set  aside ;  and  the  public  corporation  which  has  collected  it 
cannot  legally  repay  it  in  the  absence  of  statutory  authority. 
So  an  improvement  which  is  constructed  under  an  unconstitu- 
tional  statute   is   one   constructed   under  the  laws   of  the   state." 

§  81.     Effect  of  partial  unconstitutionality. 

If  part  of  a  statute  is  unconstitutional  while  the  rest,  con- 
sidered by  itself,  does  not  violate  any  statutory  provision,  the 
effect  of  such  unconstitutional  provision  upon  the  validity  of  the 
entire  act  depends  upon  v\diether  it  appears  to  be  the  intention 
of  the  legislature  to  unite  the  different  provisions  in  one  entire 
and  inseveral)le  act  which  must  stand  or  fall  as  a  whole;  or 
whether  it  is  the  intention  of  tlie  legislature  to  enact  such  jiro- 
visions  as  distinct  and  severable  rules,  some  of  which  may  be 
valid,  and  some  invalid.  If  it  appears  to  be  the  intention  of  the 
legislature   to   enact   a   niimber  of   distinct  and   severable   provi- 

ndo,  ?,Z  Atl.  959   I  18901  ;   State.  New  '  Hixon  v.  Oneida  County,  82  Wis. 

York    and    Greenwood   Lake    Railway  51.5.  52  N.  W.   445    [18921. 

Company,  Pros.  v.  Board  of  Township  *  Dietz  v.  City  of  Neenah,  91   Wis. 

Committee   of   Town.ship   of   Kearney,  422,    64    X.    W.    299.    65    X.    W.    500 

55    X.    J.    L.    (26    Yr.)    463,    26    Atl.  [18951. 

800    [18931;    Beckert   v.    City    of    Al-  ^State,    Xorris,    Pros.    v.    City    ot 

legheny.   85   Pa.    Rt.    (4    Xorri;^)     191  Kli/abeth,  51  X.  J.  L.    (22  Vr.)    485. 

[18771.  18  Atl.  302    [18S9i: 

'Anderson    v.    Tlill.    54    Ylieii.    477,  "Blake   v.   People   for   use   of   Cald- 

■-il   N.   \V.   549    [18841.  well.    109    111.   504    [18R41. 


135 


CONSTITUTIONAL   RESTRICTION    APPLIC^VBLE,    ETC. 


§81 


sions  with  reference  to  the  same  subject  matter,  the  invalidity 
of  some  provisions  will  not  destroy  the  validity  of  the  remain- 
ing provisions.^  This  is  especially  true  if  the  proceedings  in 
question  are  based  exclusively  upon  the  valid  provisions  of  the 
statute.^  Thus  the  invalidity  of  a  grant  of  power  to  levy  a  local 
assessment  does  not  render  invalid  other  provisions  Avhich  con- 
cern the  laying  out  of  streets,^  the  appropriation  of  property 
by  eminent  domain,*  the  power  to  pave  streets,'"'  or  the  issuing 
of  bonds."  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  unconstitutional  provi- 
sion is  so  closely  connected  in  effect  and  meaning  with  the  re- 
mainder of  the  statute  that  it  cannot  be  presumed  that  the  leg- 
islature would  have  passed  the  valid  part  of  such  statute  without 
the  invalid  provision,  the  invalidity  of  such  integral  part  of  the 
statute  invalidates  the  entire  statute."  This  is  especially  true 
where  the  only  authority  for  doing  the  work  for  which  the  as- 
sessment is  to  be  levied  is  found  in  that  part  of  the  statute 
which  is  unconstitutional.  Thus  where  a  commissioner  of  public 
works  is  appointed  for  a  city  under  a  statute  which  is  invalid 
because  of  a  local  option  clause  therein  whereby  it  is  to  take 
effect  in  cities  only  on  adoption  by  each.**  and  an  attempt  is 
made  to  levy  assessments  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  improvements 
ordered  bv  such  commissioner''  the  invaliditv  of  the  statute  au- 


'  Edwards  v.  Bruorton,  184  Mass. 
o2{),  G9  N.  E.  328  [1904];  McKusick 
V.  City  of  Stillwater,  44  Minn.  372. 
40  N."  W.  709  [1890];  State.  Wat- 
r.ous,  Pros.  v.  (  ity  of  Elizabeth.  40 
\.  J.  L.  (11  Vr.)"278  [1878];  Horn 
V.  Town  of  New  Lot^.  83  X.  Y.  100, 
38  Am.  Rep.  402  [1880];  Adkiiis  v. 
Toledo,  27   Ohio   ('.   ('.   417    [1905]. 

-  ^IcKusick  V.  City  of  Stillwater, 
44  Minn.  372.  40  X.  W.  709  [1890]; 
Adkins  v.  Toledo.  27  Ojiio  C.  C.  417 
[1905]. 

'Edwards  v.  Bruorton.  184  ^Mass. 
529,  09  X.  E.  328   [1904]. 

*  McKusick  V.  (  itv  of  Si  illwatiM". 
44  Minn.  372.  40  X.  W.  709   [1890]. 

*  State,  Watrous,  Pros.  v.  City  of 
Elizaheth,  40  X.  J.  L.  (11  Vr.)'278 
[1878]. 

*  Horn  V.  Town  of  Xew  T.nts.  83 
N.  Y.    100.  38   Am.  Rep.   402    [1880]. 

'  Loeb  V.  Trustees  of  Columbia  Tp., 
Hamilton    County.    Ohio.   91    Fed.    37 


[1899J;  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel. 
City  of  St.  Paul  v.  District  Court  of 
Ramsey  County,  72  ]\linn.  220,  71 
Am.  St.  Rep.  480,  75  X.  W.  224 
[1898];  (Statute  held  unconstitu- 
tional in  State  of  ^Minnesota  ex  rel. 
Childs  V.  Copeland.  00  Minn.  315,  69 
X.  W.  27  [1896]):  Wright  v. 
Thomas,  26  O.  S.  346  [1875];  (Act 
held  unconstitutional  in  Smith  v.  At- 
lantic and  Great  \Vestern  Railroad 
Company,  25  0.  S.  91  [1874])  ;  Pitts- 
burg's Petition,  for  Board  of  View- 
ers, 138  Pa.  St.  401.  21  .\tl.  757. 
759.  761  [1891]:  Pavinjr.  etc.,  of 
Uyominn;  Street.  137  Pa.  St.  494,  21 
Atl.  74    [1891]. 

"State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Cliilds 
V.  Copeland.  00  Minn.  315.  09  X.  W. 
27    [1890]. 

*  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  rjty  of 
St.  Paul  V.  District  Court  of  Ram- 
sey County.  72  ^finn.  220.  71  .Am. 
St.   Rep.    480.   ".^   X.   W.   224    [1898]. 


§  82  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  136 

thorizing  the  improvement  invalidates  the  assessment.  So  if 
the  authority  to  make  the  improvement  and  levy  the  assessment 
is  derived  from  a  statute  which  is  invalid  as  being  special  legis- 
lation ^"  the  assessment  cannot  be  levied.^^  If,  however,  the  leg- 
islature is  forbidden  to  pass  special  legislation  only  in  certain 
enumerated  cases  and  in  such  other  cases  "which  in  its  judg- 
ment may  be  provided  for  by  general  laws,"  a  wide  discretion  is 
to  be  given  to  the  legislature  to  determine  in  what  cases  gen- 
eral laws  are  suitable;  and  its  decision  that  a  specific  drainage 
system  is  necessary  in  a  region  where  the  streams  are  polluted 
by  sewerage  to  an  unusual  extent,  which  condition  will  prob- 
ably not  occur  elsewhere,  and  that  such  condition  should  be 
remedied  by  special  legislation,  is  to  be  followed  if  not  clearly 
erroneous. ^- 

§  82.     Constitutionality  as  affected  by  facts  of  specific  case. 

The  legislature  may  enact  a  statute  which  under  some  circum- 
stances may  not  operate  as  a  violation  of  an\'  constitutional  right; 
of  the  parties  affected  thereby,  while  under  other  circumstances, 
it  may  operate  as  authority  for  such  violation.  The  question 
whether  such  a  statute  is  to  be  regarded  as  unconstitutional  be- 
cause it  is  not  always  bound  to  operate  in  a  constitutional  man- 
ner or  whether  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  constitutional  except 
under  circumstances  in  which  it  operates  in  fact  in  an  uncon- 
stitutional manner,  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  some  con- 
flict of  authority,  although  the  conflict  is  chiefly  in  obiter. 
According  to  the  weight  of  authority  a  statute  which  may 
operate  in  an  unconstitutional  manner,  but  which  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case  does  not  operate  t^ 
violate  any  constitutional  rights  is  to  be  regarded  as  val- 
id.^ Thus  if  a  statute  is  framed  as  not  to  afford  sufficient 
safeguards  a.f^'ainst  a  possible  abuse  of  power  on  the  part  of  the 

>"See  §   170  ct  prn.  Ala.   458,   41    So.   934    [1906]  ;    Banaz 

"Gilmore   v.   Norton.    10   Kan.   491  v.   Smith,    133   Cal.    102,   65   Pac.   309 

[1872];      Pittsburslrs     Petition     for  [1901];    Hadley    v.    Daoue,    130    Cal. 

Board   of   Viewers!    138    Pa.    St.    401.  207,    62    Pac.    500     [1900];     City    of 

21  All.  757,  759,  761   [1891];  Paving,  Raleigli   v.    Peace,    110   N.   C.   32.    17 

etc.,  of  Wyoming  Street.   137  Pa.  St.  L.   R.   A.   330,    14   S.   E.   521    [1892]; 

494,  21  Ail.  74   [1891].  Pittsburgh.    Cincinnati,    Chicago    and 

i-Van  Cleve  v.  Passaic  Valley  Sew-  St.  Louis  Pailway  Company  v.  Hays, 

erage  Commissioners.  71  X.  J.  L.    (42  17    Ind.   App.   261.   44  N.    E.   37r>.   45 

Vr.)    183,  58  Atl.  571    [1904].  N.  E.  675,  46  N.  E.  597   [189(3]. 

'  Harton  v.  Town  of  Avondale.   147 


137  COxXSTITUTIOXAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  82 

public  authorities,  but  under  the  eircunistances  of  tlie  particular 
case  there  is  in  fact  no  abuse  of  power,  such  statute  is  to  be  held 
valid.-  If  a  statute  is  so  drawn  as  to  permit  an  apportionment 
which  is  not  according  to  benefits  and  not  limited  by  benefits, 
but  in  the  particular  case  of  apportionment  has  been  made  ac- 
cording to  benefits  and  limited  to  the  total  amount  thereof,  such 
statute  is  held  to  be  valid.^  Where  notice  is  held  to  be  a  con- 
stitutional right  and  the  statute  does  not  require  the  giving  of 
notice  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  validity  of  the  assessment, 
but  notice  has  in  fact  been  given,  it  is  held  by  many  authorities 
that  .such  assessment  is  to  be  regarded  as  valid.'*  The  question 
of  the  eff'ect  of  such  a  statute  in  a  particular  case  is  therefore 
said  not  to  be  one  of  its  constitutionality,  but  rather  of  its  con- 
struction and  application,  as  far  as  such  ({uestion  is  involved  in 
determining  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  error.''  A  bond  issued  un- 
der such  a  statute  is  valid,  and  hence  may  be  the  subject  of 
forgery,  even  though  under  special  circumstances  the  law  may 
operate  so  as  to  be  unconstitutional."  There  is  some  authority 
for  the  proposition  that  a  statute  in  order  to  be  constitutional 
inust  be  so  framed  that  it  does  not  permit  the  public  officers 
while  acting  in  compliance  with  its  terms  to  violate  constitu- 
tional rights."  Thus  a  statute  which  leaves  it  to  the  discretion 
of  commissioners  to  decide  what  proportion  of  the  expense  is 
to  be  assessed  on  each  parcel  of  land  is  unconstitutional  without 

-  Banaz  v.  Smith,   133  Cal.   102.  05  Townsliip    of    Verona    in- the    County 

I'ac.   309    [1901].  <.f  Eshpx.  58  N.  J.  L.    (29  Vr.)    595, 

'Harton  v.  Town  of  Avondale.   147  :i3  Atl.  959  [189G]:  State,  New  York 

Ala.  458,  41   So.  934   [1906]-.   Hadley  and    Crecnwood    Lake    Railway    Com- 

V.   Dague,   130   Cal.   207.   02   Pac.   500  puiiy.    Pros.    v.    Board    of    Township 

[1900].      See    §    068.  (  Dinmittee    of   Trustees    of    Township 

'See   §    732.  (  t   Kearney.  55  X.  .J.  L.   (20  Vr.)   403. 

H'ittsburg,       (  ineinnati,       Chicago  JO    Atl.    800    [1893];    "In    determin- 

and    St.    Louis    Railway    Company    v.  ing  wlicther  a   statute   is  uncoustitu- 

Ilays,    17    Ind.    App.    201,    44    X.    E.  lional    the    (piestion    is    not    whether 

375.    45    X.    K.    075..    40    X.    E.    597  tlie  result   is  harmful   in  tlie  particu- 

|189(n.                                                 '  lar  ease,  liut  wlietlier  the  statute,  ac- 

'■  15;iwles  V.  State  of  Oliio.  :?7  O.  S.  cordinfr  to  its  terms,  will  violate  the 

35   [1881].  provisions   of   the   constitution    in   its 

'  \Nhite  V.  Cove,  183  IMass.  333,  07  application  to  cases  which  may  be  e\- 

X.  E.  359   [1903];   De.xter  v.  City  of  pected   to  arise."     Dexter   v.   City  of 

Boston,    170    Mass.    247,    79    Am.    St.  Boston.    176    Mass.    247.    79    Am.    St. 

Rep.  306,  57  X.  E.  379  [1900]  :  State.  Rep.     3O0.     57     X.     E.     379     (1900]; 

Mayor    and    Council    of    the    City    of  Quoted   in  White  v.  Cove.   1S3   Mass. 

Xewark,   Pros.   v.    Inhabitants   of   the  333.  338.  07  X.  E.  359   [1903]. 


83 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


188 


reference  to  the  propriety  of  the  specific  assessment  made  by 
virtue  of  such  statute.-  So  a  statute  by  the  terms  of  which  it 
may  be  possible  for  the  total  amount  assessed  to  exceed  the 
total  benefits  has  been  held  to  be  unconstitutional,  irrespective 
of  its  effect  in  the  particular  case.^  So  according  to  some  au- 
thorities a  statute  which  does  not  provide  for  notice  where  no- 
tice is  a  constitutional  right  has  been  held  to  be  unconstitutional 
even  though  notice  was  given  in  the  particular  case.^" 

§  83.     By  whom  question  of  constitutionality  can  be  raised. 

As  a  general  rule  only  one  who  will  be  affected  prejudicially 
by  the  operation  of  the  statute,  if  such  statute  is  constitutional 
and  valid,  can  be  permitted  to  raise  the  question  of  the  con- 
stitutionality thereof.^  Thus  the  owner  of  certain  land  which  is 
clearly  in  the  drainage  district  cannot  raise  the  question  of  con- 
stitutionality of  the  drainage  act  as  to  other  classes  of  land  in 
which  he  has  no  interest.-  A  party  who  is  offered  compensa- 
tion for  land  taken  in  eminent  domain  cannot  raise  any  question 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  proceding  by  which  said  assessment  was 
levied.'^  If  the  provisions  which  affect  the  party  who  interposes 
the  objection  are  constitutional,  such  party  cannot  escape  lia- 
bility because  other  provisions  are  unconstitutional.*     One  whose 


'  State,  Mayor  and  Council  of  the 
City  of  Newark.  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants 
of  the  Township  of  Verona,  in  the 
County  of  Essex,  58  N.  J.  L.  (29  Vr.) 
595,  33  Atl.  959  [189G];  State,  New 
York  and  Greenwood  Lake  Railway 
Company,  Pros.  v.  Board  of  Town- 
ship Committee  of  Township  of 
Kearney,  55  N.  J.  L.  (26  Vr.)  403, 
26  Atl."  800    [1893]. 

MVhite  V.  Gove,  183  Mass.  333,  67 
N.  E.  359  [19031;  (However  an  as- 
sessment was  levied  subsequently  un- 
der the  same  statute,  apparently. 
The  benefits  in  this  case  exceded  the 
amount  of  the  assessment,  there  was 
proT)ably  some  contract  between  the 
city  and  the  owner  at  that  time  of 
such  land,  and  the  grantee  of  such 
owner  omitted  to  attack  such  assess- 
ment for  almost  six  vears.  when  he 
applied  for  a  writ  of  cp^'tiorari  to 
quash   said   assessment.     His  applica- 


tion for  such  writ  was  denied.  Har- 
wood  v.  Donovan,  188  Mass.  487,  74 
N.  E.  914  [1905])  ;  Lorden  v.  Coffey. 
178  Mass.  489,  60  N.  E.  124   [1901]. 

i"See  §  732. 

'■  Laguna  Drainage  District  v. 
Charles  Martin  Co.,  144  Cal.  209,  77 
Pac.  933  [1904];  Edgerton  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Town  of  Green  Cove 
Springs.  19  Fla.  140  [1882];  Blake  v. 
People  for  use  of  Caldwell,  109  111. 
504  [1884];  Zeliff  v.  Bog  and  Flv 
:\readow  Company,  68  N.  J.  L.  (39 
Vr.)    200.  ,56  Atl.   302    [1902]. 

=  Zeliff  V.  Bog  and  Fly  Meadow 
Company.  68  N.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.)  200. 
56   Atl.   302    [1902]. 

^  Edgerton  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  the  Town  of  Green  Cove  Springs. 
19   F!a.    140    [1882]. 

*In<Tuna  Drainage  District  v. 
Charles  Martin  Co..  144  Cal.  209.  77 
Pac.  933   [19041. 


139  CONSTITl-TIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.       §§84.85 

land  it  is  soujiht  to  condemn  for  drainage  purposes,  cannot  in- 
terpose the  objection  that  the  statute  providing  for  an  assess- 
ment to  meet  the  cost  of  such  expense  is  unconstitutional  if  such 
land  is  outside  of  the  drainage  district  and  is  not  liable  for  such 
assessment.^ 

§  84.     Estoppel  to  attack  constitutionality  of  statute. 

Whether  a  property  owner  or  a  public  corporation  can  so  act 
as  to  estop,  himself  from  attacking  a  statute  upon  the  ground 
of  unconstitutionality  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  some 
conflict  of  authority.  It  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  such 
an  estoppel  may  exist  so  as  to  prevent  an  attack  upon  a  statute 
as  unconstitutional,  although  such  statute  would  be  itself  of  no 
validity  if  it  were  not  for  the  existence  of  such  grounds  of  es- 
toppel.^ Thus,  where  this  theory  obtains,  a  party  who  petitions 
for  certiorari  and  bases  his  application  upon  the  theory  of  the 
validity  of  a  certain  statute  cannot  be  allowed  in  the  same  pro- 
ceeding to  raise  the  (|uestion  of  the  validity  of  such  statute. - 
In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  if  a  statute  is  invalid  as 
being  in  violation  of  constitutional  provisions,  it  cannot  be  made 
valid  by  reason  of  the  conduct  of  the  parties.'' 

« 

§  85.     Effect  of  change  in  constitutional  provisions. 

A  change  in  a  constitutional  provision  is  regarded  as  prospec- 
tive merely,  in  the  absence  of  som6  evidence  of  intention  that 
such  provision  is  to  have  a  retrospective  effect.^  Thus  the  adop- 
tion of  a  provision  requiring  taxation  to  be  equal  and  uniform 
throughout  the  state  has  no  retrospective  effect  and  does  not 
operate  to  repeal  any  law  in  force  wlien  sucli  constitutional  pro- 
vision was  adopted.-  Whether  the  change  in  coiistitut'onal  pi*o- 
visions  can  be  retrospective  in  scope  and  effect  is  considered  else- 


'Laguna       Drainage      District       v.  Dillon.  2  0.  S.  (KIT   [1853];   Douglass 

Charles  Martin  Co.,   144  Cal.  209,  77  v.  Town  of  Ilarrisville,  9  \V.  Va.  162, 

Pae.  93.3   [1904].  27    Am.    Rep.    .'j^S    [lS7f)];     (Citing 

'See   §    1019.  (Jnivcs    v.    Slaugliter.    40    U.    S.     (15 

^Barnes    v.    Drainage    Conirnission-  Tct  i    449    [1S41];   Slack  v.  Maysville 

ers  of  Drainage  Dist,  No.  1.  etc.,  221  and   Lexington  Txailroad  ('oin]iany,  13 

III.  627,  77  X.  E.   1124   [1906].  P..  .Mon.   1    [1?S2]). 

'See   §    1019.  *  Douglass   v.   Town   of   Harrisville. 

•Williams    v.    Mayor,    etc..    of    De-  9    W.    Va.     162,    27     Am.     Rep.    54S 

troit.    2    Mich.    560    [1853]:    Cass    v.  [1876], 


^86 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


110 


where.'*  If  the  new  provision  takes  effect  after  the  passage  of 
an  improvement  ordinance,  but  before  any  action  is  taken  there- 
under, such  new  constitutional  provisions  control.* 

§  86.     Assessment  not  prohibited  by  American  constitutions. 

The  special  assessment,  as  has  been  already  stated,^  ante- 
dates many  of  the  constitutional  provisions  which  might  be  re- 
garded as  restricting  or  preventing  the  exercise  of  such  power, 
and  indeed,  its  very  existence;  and  antedates  the  general  dis- 
cussion by  the  courts  of  the  meaning  and  scope  of  such  provi- 
sions— a  discussion  which  has  extended  the  operation  of  many 
of  the  constitutional  provisions  far  beyond  the  scope  originall;. 
attributed  to  them.  Accordingly^  we  find  that  in  almost  all  the 
American  states  the  special  assessment  has  become  intrenched  in 
a  position  from  which  it  has  proved  impossible  to  dislodge  it 
as   an   essential    and    integral   part    of   our   system    of   taxation. - 


"  See  §   165  et  seq. 

'City    of    St.    Louis    v.    Lang,    131 
Mo.   4i2,  3.3   S.  W.   54    [1895]. 

^Sce  Chapter  II. 

=  Wight  V.  Davidson.  181  U.  S.  371. 
45  L.  ^900,  21  S.  61G  [1901];  (Re- 
versing Davidson  v.  Wight,  16  App. 
D.  C.  371  [1900]  )  ;  French  v.  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Company,  181  U.  S. 
324.  45  L.  879.  21  S.  625  [1901]; 
(Affirming  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Company  v.  French.  158  Mo.  534,  58 
S.  W.  934  [1900]);  Wilson  v.  Lam- 
bert. 168  U.  S.  611.  42  L.  599,  18  S. 
•217  [1898];  (Reversing  Craighill  v. 
Van  Pviswick,  8  App.  D.  C.  185 
[IFgii]);  Bauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S. 
548,  42  L.  270,  17  S.  966  [1897]; 
(Reversing  District  of  Columbia  v. 
Armes.  8  App.  D.  C.  393  [1896]; 
Bauman  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C.  260 
[1896];  Abbott  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C. 
289  1896]  )  ;  Fennedy  v.  Indianapo- 
lis, 103  U.  S.  599,  26  L.  550  [1880]; 
Hellman  v.  Shoulters,  114  Cal.  136. 
44  Pac.  915.  45  Pac.  1057  [1896]; 
In  the  matter  of  the  Bonds  of  tho 
Madera  Ii-rigation  District.  92  Cal. 
296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106.  14  L.  R.  A. 
755.  28  Pac.  272.  28  Pac.  675  [1891]  : 
Bixler  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  the 


County  of  Sacramento,  59  Cal.  698 
[1881];  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222 
[1874];  Burnett  v.  Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  City  of  Sacra- 
mento, 12  Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec.  518 
[1859];  City  of  Denver  v.  Kennedy. 
33  Colo.  80,  80  Pac.  122,  467  [1905]; 
Nichols  V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  23 
Conn.  189,  60  Am.  Dec.  636  [1854]; 
Murphy  v.  flavor  and  Council  of  tiie 
City  of  Wilmington,  6  Houst.  (Del.) 
108,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  345  [1880]; 
English  V.  Mayor  and  Council  of  Wil- 
mington, 2  Marv.  (Del.)  63,  37  Atl. 
158  [1896];  Edgerton  v.  IMayor  and 
Aldermen  of  the  Town  of  Green  Cove 
Springs,  19  Fla.  140  [1882];  West 
Chicago  Park  Commissioners  v.  Far- 
ber,  171  111.  146.  49  N.  E.  427  [1898]  ; 
Green  v.  City  of  Springfield,  130  111. 
515.  22  X.  E.  602  [1890];  Falch  v. 
Peojdo  ox  rel.  .Tnhnson,  99  111.  137 
[1881]:  Wri<jbt  v.  Citv  of  Chicago. 
46  111.  44  [18671:  Pittsburgh,  Cin- 
cinnati. Chicago  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Fish.  158  Ind.  525,  63  X.  E.  454 
[1901]:  Hibben  v.  Smith,  158  Ind. 
206,  62  X.  E.  447  [1901];  Wrav 
V.  Fry,  158  Ind.  92,  62  N.  E.  1004 
[19021;    Leeds    v.    Defrees.    157    Ind. 


141 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§86 


Even  at  the  outset,  there  was  an  occasional  expression  of  doubt 
as  to  the   validity   of  local   assessments   based   on  the   theorv   of 


392,    61    N.    E.   930    [1902];    Forsyth 
V.    Wilcox,    143    Ind.    144,    41    x/ E. 
371    [1895];    Brown    v.    Eagle    Creek 
and   Little   White   Lick   Gravel   Road 
Company,  78  Ind.  421    [1881];   State 
ex    rel.   Monroe   Gravel    Road    Co.    v. 
Stout,  61  Ind.  143   [1878];   Turpin  v. 
Eagle    Creek    and    Little    White    Lick 
Gravel    Road    Company,    48    Ind.    45 
[1874];    Palmer   v.    Stumph,    29    Ind. 
329   [18G8];   Flournoy  v.  (  ity  of  Jef- 
fersonville,   17   Ind.   1C9,  79  Am.  Dec. 
468     [1861];     Mclntire    v.     State,    5 
Blackford     (Ind.)     384    [1S40];    City 
of    Burlington    v.    Quick,    47    la.    222 
[1877];    City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Gib- 
son, 66  Kan.  501.  72  Pac.  222  [1903]  ; 
Moore  v.  City  of  Paola,  63  Kan.  867, 
66    Pac.     1040     [1901];     Barficld     v. 
Gleason,    111    Ky.    491,    23    Ky.    Law 
R.   128,  63   S.  W.  964    [1901]  i    Abra- 
ham v.  City  of  Louisville    {Ky. ),  23 
Ky.    Law    R.    375,    62    S.    W.    1041 
1901;     Dunlap    v.     Gosnell,     18     Ky. 
Law    R.    8,    35    S.    W.     108     [1896]; 
City  of  Covington,  v.  Worthington,  88 
Ky.    206,    10    S.    W.    790,    11    S.    W. 
1038    [1889];    Bradley  v.  McAtee,  70 
Ky.    (7  Bush.)    667,  3  Am.  Rep.  309 
[1870];    City  of  Louisville  v.   Hyatt, 
41  Ky.  (2  B.  Mon.)    177,  36  Am.  Dec. 
594     [1841];     City    of    Lexington    v. 
McQuillan's  Heirs,  9  Dana    (39  Ky. ) 
513,      35      Am.      Dec.      159      [1839]: 
Brooks  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 
Baltimore,  48  Md.  265   [1877];   How- 
ard   V.    First    Independent    Church    of 
Baltimore,   18  Md.  451    [1862];    Hen- 
derson V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 
IJaltimorc.    use    of    Eschbach,    8    ^Id. 
352     [1S55];     Moale    v.    Mayor    and 
City  Council  of  Baltimore,  5  Md.  314, 
61    Am.   Dec.   276    [1S541;    Alexander 
V.  Mayor  and  City  Cmmcil   of  Balli- 
more.  5  Gill.    (^U].)   383.  46  Am.  Doc. 
(:.30   [18471:    Stark  v.  T  itv  of  Boston. 
ISO  Afass.  293.  62  X.  E.  375   [19021; 
Hall  V.  Street  Commissioners  of  Bos- 
ton,   177   ]\Iass.   434    [1901]:    :\rnsonic 
Building  Association  v.  Brownell.  164 


Mass.     306.    41    X.    E.    306     [1895]; 
Holt   V.    City    Council    of    Somerville, 
127   Mass.   408    [1879];    Boston   Sea- 
men's   Friend    Society    v.    Mayor    and 
Aldermen  of  Boston,    116   Mass.    181, 
17    Am.    Rep.    153    [1874];    Howe   v. 
(ity    of    Cambridge,    114    Mass.    388 
11874];     Boylston     Market     Associa- 
tion   v.    City    of    Boston,    113    Mass. 
528    [1873];    Butler  v.   City  of  Wor- 
cester, 112  Mass.  541    [1873];   Prince 
V.    City    of    Boston,    111    ]>.rass.    226 
[1872];   Jones  v.  Board  of  Aldermen 
of  the  City  of  Boston,   104  Mass.  461 
[1870];   Grand  Rapids  School   Furni- 
ture Company  v.  City  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids,   92    :\rieh.    564,    52    X.    W.    1028 
[1892];   Hoyt  v.   City  of  East   Sagi- 
naw,   19    Mich.    39,    2    Am.    Rep.    76 
[1869];    Williams   v.   :\rayor.   etc.,   of 
Detroit,  2  :\nch.  560  [1853];  State  v. 
Trustees    of    Macalester    College,    87 
Minn.    165,    91    X.    W.    484     [1902]; 
State  ex  rel.  Ryan  v.  District  Court 
of  Ramsey  County,  87  'Mum.   146;   91 
X.  W.  300    [1902];   Lien  v.  Board  of 
County     Commissioners     of     Xorman 
County,  80  Minn.  58,  82  X.   W.   1094 
[1900];    State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel. 
City  of   Duluth   v.    District   Court  of 
St.   Louis    County.   61    :Minn.   542,   64 
X.  W.   190    [1895];    Smith  v.  Corpor- 
ation    of     Aberdeen,     25     Miss.     458 
[1853];    Keith   v.   Bingham,    100   Mo. 
300.    13   S.    W.    683    [1889] ;    Buchan 
V.  Broadwell,  88  Mo.  31   [1885];  City 
of    Kansas    v.    Johnson,    78    Mo.    661 
flSS3];     State    of    :\'issouri    ex    rel. 
Cavender    v.    City    of    St.    Louis.    52 
Mo.  574   [1873];   l-hrLj:  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis.  44  Mo.  458  [1869]  ;  City  of  St. 
Louis  to  use  of  ^McGrath  v.  Clemens, 
36   Mo.   467    [1865];    Garrett   v.   City 
of    St.    Louis,    25    Mo.    505.    69    Ani. 
Dec.  475    [1857];    Wheeler  v.  City  of 
Platt'-mouth.     7     Xeb.     270     [1878]; 
Paxson    v.    Sweet.     13    X.    J.    L.     ( 1 
Groe-i)    196    [1832]:    Loweree  v.   City 
'f   Xewark.   38   X.   J.   L.    (9  Vroom) 
151     [18751;    In    the    matter    of    the 


^86 


TAXATION    15  V    ASSESSMENT. 


142 


special  benefits,''  although  such  doubts  were  not  regarded  as  of 
sufficient  weight  to  justify  the  court  in  holding  the  law  to  be 
unconstitutional.^  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  ob.jections  which 
might  be  made  upon  constitutional  grounds  have  become  more 
noticeable,  the  very  existence  of  the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  authorize  and  provide  for  the  levy  and  collection  of  local  as- 
sessments based  on  the  theory  of  special  benefits  has  been  very 
sharply  attacked    and  the  question  of  the  existence  of  that  power 


City  of  New  York,  190  X.  Y.  350. 
sub  nomine  In  re  Water  Front  in 
City  of  Xew  York,  83  N.  E.  299 
[1907];  modifying  105  N.  Y^  S. 
750,  120  App.  biv.  849;  McLaughlin 
V.  Miller,  124  N.  Y.  510.  20  N.  E. 
1104  [1891];  Spencer  v.  :\Ierchant, 
100  N.  Y.  585,  3  N.  E.  6S2  [1885]: 
( Affirmed  Spencer  v.  ^Merchant.  125 
U.S.  345,31  L.  763,  8  S.  921  [188S]); 
Hassan  v.  City  of  Rocliester,  67  X.  Y. 
528  [1876];  People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  X.  Y.  419, 
55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851];  City  of 
Wilmington  v.  Yopp,  71  X.  C.  76 
[1874];  Roberts  v.  First  Xational 
Bank  of  Fargo,  8  X.  D.  504,  79 
X.  W.  1049  [1899];  Raymond  v. 
Cleveland,  42  0.  S.  522*  [1885]; 
Gest  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  26  0. 
S.  275  [1875];  Corry  v.  Camp- 
bell, 25  O.  S.  134  [1874];  Thompson 
V.  Treasurer  of  Wood  County.  11 
O.  S.  678  [I860];  Xorthern  Indiana 
Railroad  Company  v.  Connelly,  10  O. 
S.  100  [1859];  Hill  v.  Hi^don.  5  O. 
S.  243,  67  Am.  Dec.  289  [1855]; 
City  of  Toledo  for  the  use  of  Gates 
V.  Lake  Shore  &  INIichigan  Southern 
Railway  Company,  4  Ohio  C.  C.  113 
[1889];  Wilson  v.  City  of  Salem,  24 
Or.  504,  34  Pac.  9.  091  [1893]  ;  Mas- 
ters V.  City  of  Portland.  24  Or.  101, 
33  Pac.  540  [1893];  Kinsr  v.  City  of 
Portland.  2  Or.  146  [1805];  Oil  City 
V.  Oil  City  Boiler  \Vorks.  152  Pa.  St. 
348,  25  Atl.  5h9  [1893]  ;  City  of  Har- 
risburg  v.  Segelbaum,  151  Pa.  St. 
172,  20  L.  R.  A.  834,  24  Atl.  1070 
[1892];  Michener  v.  <  ity  of  Phila- 
delphia, lis  Pa.  St.  535,   12  Atl.    174 


[1888];  In  re  Vacation  of  Centre 
Street,  115  Pa.  St.  247,  8  Atl.  50 
[1886];-  Wray  v.  ■Mayor,  etc.,  ol 
Pittsburg  for  iise,  etc.,  46  Pa.  St.  ( 10 
Wright)  305  [1803];  In  the  Matter 
of  Dorrance  Street,  4  R.  I.  230 
[1850];  Arnold  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Knoxville,  115  Tenn.  195,  3 
L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  837;  90  S.  W.  409 
[1905];  Washington  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Xashville,  1  Swan  (31 
Tenn.)  177  [1851];  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermen V.  Maberry,  6  Humph.  (25 
Tenn.)  308  [1845];  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Xashville  v.  Berry,  2  Shan, 
(as.  (Tenn.)  501  [1877];  Connor  v. 
(  ity  of  Paris,  87  Tex.  32,  27  S.  W. 
88  [1894];  Woodhouse  v.  City  of 
Burlington,  47  Vt.  300  [1875];'  Al- 
len V.  Drew,  44  Vt.  174  [1872] ;  Davis 
V.  City  of  Lynchburg,  84  Va.  861,  6 
S.  E.  "230  [i888];  Sands  v.  City  of 
Richmond,  31  Grattan  (72  Va.)  571. 
31  Am.  Rep.  742  [1879];  Norfolk 
tity  V.  Ellis,  26  Grattan  (67  Va.) 
224  [1875];  McXamee  v.  City  of 
Tacoma,  24  Wash.  591.  64  Pac.  791 
[1901];  City  of  Parkersburg  v.  Tav- 
enner,  42  W.  Va.  486,  20  S.  E.  179 
I  1890] ;  Wilson  v.  Town  of  Pliilippi, 
39  W.  Va.  75,  19  S.  E.  553  [1894]; 
Sanderson  v.  Herman.  108  Wis.  662, 
84  X.  W.  890,  85  X\  W.  141  [1901]; 
Watkins  v.  Zwietusch,  47  Wis.  513, 
3  X.  W.  35  [1879];  Johnson  v.  City 
of  Milwaukee,  40  Wis.  315    [1876]. 

=  Hill  V.  Higdon.  5  O.  S.  243,  67 
Am.    Dec.    289    [1855]. 

^Hill  V.  Higdon,  5  O.  S.  243,  67 
Am.   Dec.   289    [1855]. 


143 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§80 


has  received  eareiul  consideration  by  the  courts.  The  result  of 
such  deliberations  has  been  that  by  the  great  weight  of  authority 
it  is  held  that  the  legislature  has  power  to  provide  for  the  levy 
and  collection  of  such  assessments. °  The  earlier  cases  which 
held  that  a  local  assessment  based  upon  the  theory  of  benefits 
was  necessarily  unconstitutional  have  been  reversed  or  overruled." 
A  discussion  of  these  contrary  doctrines  is  to  be  found  else- 
where." The  one  state  which  now  seems  to  hold  that  local  as- 
sessments, based  upon  the  theory  of  benefits,  are  necessarily  un- 
constitutional is  South  Carolina.*  In  other  states,  like  Virginia," 
constitutional  provisions  exist  specifically  forbidding  local  as- 
sessments for  many  of  the  purposes  for  which  such  assessments 
are  generally  made.  AVhile  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments 
is  recognized  by  the  great  weight  of  authority  and  the  great 
majority  of  jurisdictions,  state  legislatures  are  very  far  from 
possessing  absolute  and  unrestricted  authority  in  the  exercise  of 
the  power  of  providing  for  the  levy  of  local  assessments.     The 


^  French  v.  Barber  Asplialt  Paving 
Company,  LSI  U.  S.  324,  45  L.  879. 
21  S.  G25  [1901];  (Amrming  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Company  v.  French, 
158  Mo.  534,  54  L.  R.  A.  492,  58 
S.  W.  934  [1900]);  Crane  v.  Siloam 
Springs,  07  Ark.  30,  55  S.  W.  955 
[1899];  James  v.  Pine  Bluff,  49  Ark. 
199.  4  S.  W.  760  [1887];  Lent  v. 
'iillson,  72  Cal.  404.  14  Pac.  71 
[1887];  Reclamation  District  No. 
108  V.  Hagar,  GG  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945 
[1884];  Chambers  v.  Satterlee,  40 
(  al.  497  [1871]  ;•  Emery  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco Gas  Company,  28  Cal.  346 
[1865];  Burnett  v.  Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  City  of  Sacra- 
mento, 12  Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec.  518 
[1859];  Fair  Kaven  and  Westerville 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  New 
Haven,  75  Conn.'  442,  53  Atl.  960 
[1903];  Ton  v.  City  of  Chicago,  216 
111.  331,  74  N.  E.  1044  [1905];  Chi- 
cago Title  "and  Trust  Company  v. 
Town  of  Lake  View.  187  111.  622.  58 
N.  E.  597  [1900];  Surget  v.  Chase, 
33  La.  Ann.  833  [1S81];  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Baltiniore  v.  Johns 
Hopkins  Hospital,  56  yU\.  1  [1880]; 
Daily  v.  Swope,  47  Miss  367   [1872]; 


Hcman  v.  Allen,  156  :M().  534.  57  S. 
W.  559  [1900];  McLaughlin  v.  Mil- 
ler,  124  N.  Y.  510,  20  N.  E.  1104 
[1891];  Ireland  v.  (  ity  of  Rochester, 
51  Barb.  (N.  Y. )  '  414  [1868]; 
Northern  Indiana  Railroad  Company 
V.  Connelly,  10  O.  S.  160  [1859]; 
(f(dlowed  without  opinion  Daniels  v. 
Keeler,  10  0.  S.  169  [1859]:  Fitch 
V.  Keeler,  10  0.  S.  169  [18.J91  )  :  Eriist 
V.  Kunkle,  5  O.  S.  521  [1856]  ;  Hill  v. 
Iligdon,  5  0.  S.  243,  67  Am.  Doc.  289 
[1855];  Vacation  of  Howard  St., 
Philadelphia,  142  Pa.  St.  601,  21  Atl. 
974  1 1891];  City  of  Seattle  v.  Ves- 
h-r.  1  \Vash.  Terr.  571    [1878]. 

"  People  ex  rel.  Griffing  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Brooklyn,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  535 
[18.50 1  ;  People  ex  rel.  Post  v.  ^Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  6  Barb.  ( N.  Y.) 
209    [1849]. 

■See   §   33. 

*  Mauldin  v.  C  itj-  Council  of  Green- 
ville, 53  S.  C.  285,  69  Am.  St.  Rep. 
855.  43  L.  R.  A.  101,  31  S.  E.  252 
[1898];  Stehmeyer  v.  City  Council  of 
Charleston,  53  S.  C.  259.  31  S.  E. 
322    [1898]. 

"See  §   If.l. 


§§  87.  88  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  144 

provisions  of  the  Federal  and  state  constitutions  limit  the  ex- 
ercise of  this  power  in  a  great  variety  of  ways,  and  these  pro- 
visions must  be  considered  in  detail. 

§  87.     Nature  of  power  of  assessment — In  general. 

As  a  step  preliminary  to  determining  what  constitutional  pro- 
visions restrict  the  exercise  of  this  power,  the  nature  of  the 
power  and  the  basis  upon  which  it  is  to  be  placed  and  on  which 
it  can  be  justified  must  first  be  considered.  As  is  often  pointed 
out  by  the  courts,  however,  if  an  assessment  is  not  in  violation 
of  any  constitutional  provisions,  it  makes  but  little  difference  to 
which  branch  of  governmental  power  it  may  be  referred.^  The 
question  of  the  branch  of  governmental  power  to  which  a  local 
assessment  is  to  be  referred  and  upon  which  it  is  to  be  based 
is  in  such  cases  a  theoretical  rather  than  a  practical  question. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  certain  constitutional  provisions,  which 
if  applicable  would  avoid  the  assessment,  are  in  fact  applicable 
or  not  according  to  the  nature  of  the  governmental  power  upon 
which  the  right  of  local  assessment  is  based,  the  question  of  the 
power  to  Mdiich  local  assessments  may  be  referred  becomes  of  the 
greatest  practical  importance. 

§  88.     Classes  of  assessments. 

With  reference  to  the  nature  and  basis  of  the  power  of  assess- 
ment, the  fact  must  be  recognized  that,  in  many  jurisdictions  at 
least,  assessments  are  to  be  divided  into  three  broad  classes.  One 
class  consists  of  assessments  in  the  modern  accurate  sense  of 
the  term;  that  is,  those  assessments  which  are  levied  upon  prop- 
erty especially  benefited  by  a  local  improvement  of  a  public 
character,  upon  the  basis  of  the  benefits  conferred  by  such  im- 
provement.^ The  second  class  consists  of  those  charges  upon 
property  which  are  imposed  to  reimburse  the  public  for  the  cost 
of  doing  certain  things  with  reference  to  such  property,  which 

'  "The    act    is    clearly    within    the  when    referred    to    the    police    power, 

sphere   of   legitimate   legislation    and  For    the    power    of    police    is    more 

it  is  immaterial  as  to  what  particu-  comprehensive  in  its  application  and 

lar  emanation  of  the  sovereign  power  the  limitations  upon  its  exercise  are 

it  will  be  referred.     Having  run  the  not     so     imperious     and     exacting." 

gauntlet  of  constitutional  tests  under  Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555,  562,, 

the    rules    applicable    to    eminent    do-  44  S.  W.  707    [18971. 

main    it    will    be    readily    sustained  '  See  §  4. 


145  CONSTITl'TIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  8'J 

it  is  the  duty  of  the  owner  thereof  to  do,  l)iit  whieh  he  omits 
or  refuses  to  do.-  Such  assessments  therefore  are  based,  not 
primarily  upon  the  theory  of  benefit  to  the  realty,  but  upon  the 
theory  of  the  leg'al  duty  of  the  owner,  irrespective  of  benefit; 
and  in  effect  afford  a  method  of  compelling  compensation  for 
doing  the  act  in  question  where  performance  is  not  rendered 
voluntarily  by  the  owner.  The  accuracy  of  this  classification 
of  assessments  is  impaired  by  several  considerations.  There  are 
cases  found  in  which  the  act  done  is  not  merely  the  legal  duty 
of  the  owner,  but  also  one  which  confers  a  benefit  upon  the 
property,  and  it  may  well  be  that  if  the  amount  of  the  assess- 
ment does  not  exceed  the  amount  of  the  benefits  thus  conferred, 
the  assessment  can  be  referred  as  well  to  the  first  class  as  to 
the  second.''  Furthermore  in  some  jurisdictions  the  courts  have 
changed  their  views  upon  this  classification  of  assessments  and 
have  finally  placed  in  one  class  assessments  of  types  whieh 
in  the  earlier  cases  they  had  placed  in  the  other  class.  The  third 
class  of  assessments  consists  of  charges  for  goods  of  some 
kind  furnished  for  use  upon  certain  realty.  As  has  been 
pointed  out  before,  such  charges  are  not,  properly  speak- 
ing, assesments,  but  are  contracts  of  sale,  often  with  spe- 
cial remedies  added  by  the  legislature.*  Where  an  asses.s- 
ment  is  held  to  be  a  branch  of  the  taxing  power,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  constitutional  questions,  outside  of  special  pro- 
yision  concerning  assessments  specifically,  which  can  be  raised 
in  objecting  to  the  validity  of  statutes  authorizing  assessments 
may,  as  a  rule,  be  reduced  to  one  of  two  classes ;  first,  is  the 
assessment  levied  for  a  public  purpose,  so  as  to  be  really  a  tax 
and  not  a  method  of  confiscation  -J'  and  second,  if  a  tax,  is  it  ap- 
portioned in  a  manner  permitted  by  the  provisions  of  the  con- 
stitution.*^ 

§  89.     Assessments  on  basis  of  benefits  referred  to  power  of  tax- 
ation. 

I^y  tlie  great  weight  of  authority  ass(\ssments  of  the  first  class, 

that    is.   assessments,   wliieh   are   to  ])e  justified  upon    the   tlieorv 

'See  §  5.  Company.  28  Cal.  34(1   flSd.")!.  it  was 

*  See  §   13.  said  tnat   if  levied   for  a  proper  pur- 

*  See  §  6.  ])ose   tlie  only  possible  pround  of  at- 

*  For    the    discussion    of    this    qnes-  tack    as    far    as    constitutional    ques- 
tion   see   Chapter    VIII.  tions    are    concerned    was    upon    the 

*  In    Emery    v.    San    Francisco    Has  method   of  apportionment. 


§89 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


146 


of  benefits,  are  held  to  be  referable  to  the  power  of  taxation; 
and  to  be  a  special  form  of  the  exercise  of  that  power.^     How- 


1  Sioux  City  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Sioux  City,  138  U.  S.  98, 
34  L.  898  [1891];  Willard  v.  Pres- 
bury,  14  Wall.  (81  U.  S.)  676,  20  L. 
719  L1869];  City  of  Little  Rock  v. 
Board  of  Improvements,  etc.,  42  Ark. 
152  [1883];  Hornung  v.  McCarthy, 
126  Cal.  17,  58  Pac.  303  [1899]; 
Appeal  of  Houghton,  42  Cal.  35 
[1871  J;  Emery  v.  San  Francisco  Gas 
Company,  28  Cal.  346  [1865];  Pal- 
mer V.  Way,  6  Colo.  106  [1881]; 
Wolff  V.  city  of  Denver,  20  Colo. 
App.  135,  77  Pac.  364  [1904];  City 
of  New  London  v.  Miller,  60  Conn. 
112,  22  Atl.  499  [1891];  City  of 
Bridgeport  v.  The  New  York  &  New 
Haven  Railroad  Company,  36  Conn. 
255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869];  Nichol* 
V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  23  Conn.  189, 
60  Am.  Dec.  636  [1854];  Huston  v. 
Tribbetts,  171  111.  547,  63  Am.  St. 
Rep.  275,  49  N.  E.  711  [1898];  Chi- 
cago and  Northwestern  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Village  of  Elmhurst,  165  111. 
148,"  46  N.  E.  437  [1897];  The  Chi- 
cago &  Alton  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  cf  Joliet,  153  111.  649,  39  N. 
E.  1077  [1894];  City  of  Blooming- 
ton  V.  Latham,  142  111.  462,  18  L.  R. 
A.  487,  32  N.  E.  506  [1893]; 
Springer  v.  Walters,  139  111.  419, 
28  N.  E.  761  [1891];  Elmore  v. 
Drainage  Commissioners,  135  111.  269, 
25  Am.  St.  Rep.  363,  25  N.  E.  1010 
[1892];  Wabash  Eastern  Railway 
Company  of  Illinois  v.  Commissioners 
of  East  Lake  Fork  Special  Drainage 
District,  134  111.  384,  10  L.  R.  A. 
285,  25  N.  E.  781  [1890];  Church- 
man V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  110 
Ind.  259,  11  N.  E.  301  [1886];  Law 
V.  INIadison,  Smyrna  and  Graham 
Turnpike  Company,  30  Ind.  77 
[1868];  Edwards  &  Walsh  Construc- 
tion Company  v.  Jasper  County,  117 
la.  365,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  301,  90  N. 
W.    1006     [1902];    Todd    v.    City    of 


Atchison,  9  Kans.  App.  251,  59  Pac. 
676  [1900];  Bradley  v.  McAtee,  7 
Bush  (70  Ky.)  667,  3  Am.  Rep.  309 
[1870];  Cypress  Pond  Draining  Com- 
pany v.  Hooper,  2  Mete.  (59  Ky.) 
350  [1859];  Oakey  v.  Mayor,  1  La. 
1  [1830];  Munson  v.  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  The  Atchafalaya  Ba- 
sin Levee  District,  43  La.  Ann.  15, 
8  So.  906  [1891];  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Johns  Hop- 
kins Hospital,  56  Md.  I  [1880]; 
?\Iayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more V.  Hughes'  Adm'r,  1  Gill  & 
Jolinson,  CMd.)  480.  19  Am.  Dec. 
243  [1829];  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Balti- 
more V.  ;Moore,  6  Harris  &  Johnson, 
(Md.)  375  [1825];  White  v.  Gove, 
183  Mass.  333,  67  N.  E.  359  [1903]; 
Trustees  of  Phillip's  Academy  v.  In- 
habitants of  Andover,  175  Mass. 
118,  48  L.  R.  A.  550,  55  N.  E. 
841  [1900];  Sears  v.  Board  of  Al- 
dermen of  City  of  Boston,  173  Mass. 
71,  43  L.  R.  A.  834,  1  Mun.  Corp. 
Cas.  497,  53  N.  E.  138  [1899];  Pro- 
prietors of  the  Cemetery  of  Mount 
Auburn  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Cambridge,  150  Mass.  12,  4  L.  R.  A. 
836,  22  N.  E.  66  [1889];  President 
and  Fellows  of  Harvard  College  v. 
Board  of  Aldermen  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  104  Mass.  470,  482  [1870]; 
Dorgan  v.  City  of  Boston,  12  All.  (94 
:\Iass.)  223  [1866];  People  on  the 
Relation  of  Butler  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  Saginaw  C'oiuity,  26  Mich. 
22  [1872];  Motz  v.  (  ity  of  Detroit, 
18  Mich.  494  [1869];"  Stinson  v. 
Smith,  8  Minn.  366  [1863];  McComb 
V.  Bell,  2  Minn.  295  [1858]  ;  Daily  v. 
Swope,  47  Miss.  367  [1872];  Hem.an 
Construction  Co.  v.  Wabash  R.  Co., 
206  Mo.  172,  104  S.  W.  67  [1907]; 
ISTeier  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  180  Mo. 
391,  79  S.  W.  955  [1903];  Moberly 
V.  Hogan,  131  Mo.  19,  32  S.  W.  1014 
[1895];   City  of  St.  Joseph  to  use  ot 


14< 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


89 


ever,  the  view  has  been  expressed  that  if  the  precedent  appli- 
cation of  the  property  OAvners  to  be  assessed  is  necessary,  as  it 
so  often  is,-  to  the  validity  of  the  assessment,  such  assessment 
is  not  a  tax.^  This  remark  was  obiter,  however,  as  the  result  was 
held  to  be  the  same  whether  it  was  regarded  as  a  tax  or  not. 


Gibson  v.  Farrell,  lOG  Mo.  437,  17 
S.  W.  497  [1891];  City  of  St.  Louis 
V.  Speck,  U7  Mo.  403  [1878];  Garrett 
V.  tity  of  St.  Louis,  25  Mo.  505,  69 
Am.  Dec.  475  [1857];  Zoeller  v.  Kel- 
logg, 4  Mo.  App.  103  [1877];  Wilson 
V.  City  of  Auburn.  27  Xeb.  435,  440, 
43  N.  W.  257  [1889];  Slialer  v. 
McAleese,  —  X.  J.  Eq.  — ,  68  Atl.  410 
[1907];  State,  McClosky,  Pros.  v. 
Chamberlin,  37  X".  J.  L.  (8  Vr.) 
388  [1875]:  State,  Agens,  Pros.  v. 
Jlayor  and  Common  Council  of  tlio 
(  ity  of  Xewark.  35  X.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.) 
168  [1871];  State,  Siller,  Pros.  v. 
Fuller,  34  X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  227 
[  1870]  ;  (  ity  of  Rocbester  v.  Rocbes- 
ter  Railway  Company,  182  X".  Y.  99, 
70  L.  R.  A."  773,  74  X\  E.  953  [1905]  ; 
Genet  v.  (  ity  of  Brooklyn,  99  X'^.  Y. 
296,  1  X.  E.  "777  [1885]  ;*  In  tbe  Mat- 
ter of  tbe  Application  of  Van  Ant- 
werp to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  56  X. 
Y.  261  [1874];  Rrewster  v.  City  of 
Syracuse,  19  X.  V.  116  [1850];  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Griflin  v.  ]\Iayor,  etc.,  of 
P.rooklyn,  4  X.  V.  419,  .55  Am.  Dec. 
266  [1851];  Astov  V.  :\Iavor.  Alder- 
men and  Commonalty  of  tbe  City  of 
New  York,  37  X\  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
539  [1874];  Moran  v.  City  of  Troy. 
9  Hun.  540  [1877];  In  tbe  ?ilatter  of 
tbe  Report  of  the  Commissi(mers  of 
Assessment  for  Grading.  PavinT,  etc.. 
Sackett  Street  in  tbe  City  of  Brook- 
l.yn,  4  Hun.  92  [1875]:"  Trcbuid  v. 
City  of  Rocbester.  51  Barb.  414 
[186cS|;  Litcbfield  v.  ?ilcCombor.  42 
Barb.  288  [1864]:  (ity  of  Wilming- 
t<m  V.  Yopp,  71  X.  C.  76  [1874]; 
Jones  V.  Holzapfel.  11  Okla.  405.  68 
Pac.  511  [1902]  Cincinnati.  Lebanon 
&  Xortbern  Py.  Co.  v.  Citv  of  r'incin- 
nati.  02  O.  S.'  JC5.  40  L.  RR.  A.  566. 


57  X.  E.  229  [1900];  Xortbern  Indi- 
ana Railway  Company  v.  Connelly, 
10  0.  S.  160  [1859];  Foster  v.  Com- 
missioners of  Wood  County,  9  0.  S. 
540  [1859];  Ernst  v.  Kunkle,  5  0.  S. 
521  [1856];  Hill  v.  Higdon,  5  0.  S. 
243;  67  Am.  Dec.  289  ^[1855];  Sco- 
vill  V.  City  of  Cleveland,  1  0.  S.  126 
[1853];  King  v.  Portland,  38  Ore. 
402,  55  L.  R.  A.  812,  03  Pac.  2 
[19;)0];  Pittsburgh  V.  Sterrett,  Sub- 
district  School,  204  Pa.  St.  635, 
61  L.  R.  A.  183,  54  Atl.  463  [1903]; 
Scranton  v.  Jermyn,  156  Pa.  107,  27 
Atl.  60  [1893];  Vacation  of  Howard 
St.,  Philadelphia,  142  Pa.  St.  601, 
21  Atl.  974  [1891];  In  re  Vacation 
(f  Centre  Street,  115  Pa.  St.  247,  8 
Atl.  56  [1886];  Wolf  v.  City  of 
Philadelpliia,  105  Pa.  St.  25  [1884]; 
Gault's  Appeal,  33  Pa.  St.  (9  Casey). 
94  [1859]:  Olypbant  Borough  to  use, 
V.  Egreski,  29  Pa.  Super."  Ct.  116 
[1905];  Mc^lasters  v.  Commonwealth 
3  Watts  292  [1834];  Cleveland  v. 
Tripp,  13  R.  I.  50  [1880];  Reelfoot 
Lake  Levee  District  v.  Dawson,  97 
Tenn.  151,  34  L.  R.  A.  725,  36  S.  W. 
1041  [1896];  Taylor,  McBean  &  Co. 
V.  Chandler,  9  Heisk.  (56  Tenn.)  349 
[1872];  sub  nomine  ^IcBean  v. 
(  liandler,  24  Am.  Rep.  308  [1872]; 
Allen  V.  Drew,  44  Vt.  174  [1872]; 
City  of  Norfolk  v.  Youn'jr.  97  Va.  728, 
47  L.  R.  A.  57.'.  34  S.  E.  886 
[1900]:  Blount  v.  City  of  .Tanesville. 
31  Wis.  648  [18721:  Wee'.- s  v,  ^ity 
of  Milwaukee.  10  Wis.  242  [1860]; 
Socns  V.  City  of  Racine.  10  Wis.  271 
[1860-]. 

=  See   §   780  ef  fteq. 

'Bacas  v.  Adlcr,  112  La.  806,  36 
So.    739    [1904]. 


§  90  TAXATION    BV    ASSESSMENT.  14:8 

g  90.     Assessment  referred  to  legislative  power. 

In  one  jnrisdiction  it  was  once  held  that  the  power  of  taxation 
was  too  narrow  and  restricted  to  include  the  power  of  local  as- 
sessment, and  accordingly  the  suggestion  was  made  that  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  power  of  special  assessment  was  to  be  referred  to 
the  legislative  power,  a  power  broader  than  that  of  taxation  and 
including  the  latter  within  it.^  However,  this  suggestion  was 
made  in  part  in  order  to  enable  the  court  to  explain,  in  a  man- 
ner satisfactory  to  itself,  the  reason  for  holding  that  the  pro- 
vision of  the  constitution,-  which  provides  that  private  prop- 
erty shall  be  inviolate  though  subservient  to  the  public  welfare, 
and  that  if  taken  for  public  use  compensation  shall  be  made  in 
mone.v,  which  compensation  shall  be  assessed  by  a  jury  without 
deduction  for  benefits  to  any  property  of  the  owner,  was  not 
a  restriction  on  the  power  of  levying  assessments.  From  this 
theory  of  assessment  was  deduced  the  principle  that  if  land 
was  appropriated  by  eminent  domain,  as  for  opening  a  street, 
the  cost  of  such  appropriation  might  be  assessed  upon  the  prop- 
erty benefited  thereby,^  even  if  such  property  is  the  residuum 
out  of  w^hich  a  part  has  been  thus  appropriated.*  With  reference 
to  this  reason  for  referring  the  power  of  special  assessment  to 
the  legislative  rather  than  to  the  taxing  power  two  suggestions 
may  be  made.  First,  as  pointed  out  by  this  court^  and  as  held 
by  the  great  weight  of  authority,"  these  constitutional  provi- 
sions regulate  the  right  of  eminent  domain  and  have  nothing  to 
do  with  taxation,  properly  speaking.  The  true  objection  to  as- 
sessing where  no  benefits  exist  is  that  it  is  taking  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law.^  To  assign  as  the  reason  for  this  objec- 
tion that  it  is  taking  private  property  without  compensation  is 
to  confound  eminent  domain  with  taxation.  Second,  this  court 
has  overruled  these  earlier  cases  and  now  holds  that  this  section 

'  Sef5sions   v.    Crunkilton,   20    O.    S.  Caldwell    v.   Village   of   Carthafre.    49 

349    [18701;    Reeves   v.    Treasurer   of  0.    S.    334,    31    N.    E.    602     [1892]; 

Wood    County,    8    0.    S.    333    [1858];  Kriimberg   v.    City   of    Cincinnati,    2ft 

Hill  V.  Higdon,  5  0.  S.  243,  67  Am.  0.  R.  69  [1875]. 

Dec.   289    [1855].  *  City  of  Cleveland   v.   Wick,    18   O. 

^'Art  I    §    19   Constitution   of   Ohio  8.   303    [1868]. 

1851.  'Hill   V.  Higdon,  5   O.  S.  243,  245, 

'Henkel   v.   City   of   Cincinnati,   53  246,  67  Am.  Dec.  289   [1855]. 

0.     S.     726     [1898];      (No    opinion.)  "See    §§    110,    118. 

Cincinnati  v.   Batsche,   52   0.  S.   324,  'See   §§    110,   118. 
27  L.  R.  A.  536,  40  X.  E.  21   [1895]; 


II 


149  CONSTITrTIONAI,    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  91 

of  the  constitution''  restricts  the  power  of  levying  assessments;^ 
and  that  as  a  corollary  assessments  cannot  be  levied  to  pay  for 
the  expense  of  appropriating  land  by  eminent  domain  whether 
such  assessment  is  levied  upon  the  residuum  of  the  realty  left 
after  appropriating  a  part  thereof  ^"  or  upon  other  realty. ^^  The 
remaining  reason  for  attributing  the  power  of  assessment  to  the 
legislative  power  rather  than  to  the  narrower  power  of  taxation 
was  that  it  also  enabled  the  court  to  explain  in  a  manner  satis- 
factory to  itself,  the  reason  for  holding  that  the  provision  re- 
quiring real  and  personal  property  to  be  taxed  according  to  its- 
true  value  in  money  '-  did  not  apply  to  special  assessments.^^' 
But  the  same  result  is  reached  in  states  which  hold  that  the 
power  of  assessment  is  to  be  referred  to  the  taxing  power,  by 
holding  that  an  assessment,  though  a  tax  in  its  essential  nature, 
is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  such  constitutional  provi- 
sions.'* It  follows  that  of  the  reasons  for  holding  assessment 
to  be  a  branch  of  the  taxing  power,  one  has  since  been  discarded 
in  the  jurisdiction  in  which  that  doctrine  was  suggested,  wliile 
the  other  is  very  generally  assumed  to  be  insufficient.  The  act 
of  a  city  council  in  esta])lishing  a  sewer  district  and  determining 
its  boundaries  has  been  said  in  another  jurisdiction  to  be  tlu' 
exercise  of  a  legislative  power  having  its  origin  in  the  taxing 
power.'^ 

§  91.     Assessment  referred  to  judicial  power. 

Occasionally  we  fiiul  that  the  assessment  involving,  as  it  often 
does,  the  determination  of  (|uesti()ns  of  fact  as  to  the  existence 
and  amount  of  special  benefits  is  referred  to  the  judicial  power. 
The  act  of  a  .city  in  ordering  an  original  improvement  in  th 
exercise  of  a  leglislative  power  having  its  origin  in  the  taxing 
tluM-efor.    has   been    said,    to    l)e    a    judicial    act.'      Tliis    view    \va  . 

"Alt.  1    S   19.  Art.     XIT     §     2     Constitution     ,,f 

»(  ity  of  Dayton  v.  P.nnnian.  Of)  O.  Ohio    LSnL 

S.  37!).  t;4  N.  E.  43.3   [HlO'il;   Cinein-  ''Hill    v.    Iliirflon.   5    O.    S.    243.   (i7 

nati.  Lebanon  &   Xorthcrn  Ry.  Co.   v.  Am.  Doc.  280    [18551. 

City  (if  Cincinnati,   fi2   O.   S.   4^5.   40  "  Sc(>  S    147  rt  stn/. 

L.  R.    A.   500,  57   X.   E.   220    flOnOT;  'MVollV  v.  City  of  Denver.  20  Colo. 

'"Cincinnati,    Lelianon    &    Xortliorn  Ajip.   135,  77  Pac.  364    [1^041. 

Ry.   (  o.  V.   City  of  Cincinnati,   02   O.  'Treasurer  of  the   City  of   raniden 

S.    405.    40    L.    P>.    A.    500.    57    X.    E.  v.    Mnlfonl.   26   X.   J.   l".    (2    Dutch.) 

220    1 1000].  40    [1S5(!1. 

"City  of  Dayton  v.  Raunian,  00  O. 
S.  370."  04  X.   E.  433    [10021. 


§  92  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  150 

taken  in  this  case,  however,  in  order  to  justify  the  review  ol 
assessment  proceedings  by  the  writ  of  certiorari,  a  remedy  which 
is  given  in  many  jurisdictions.-  even  though  assessments  are  re- 
garded as  an  exercise  of  the  legislative  power  rather  than  of 
the  judicial  power. 

§  92.  Assessments  based  on  benefits  not  referable  to  police  power. 
The  courts  have  often  been  urged  to  regard  special  assessments 
as  based  upon,  and  as  a  special  form  of  exercise  of,  the  police 
power.  This  suggestion  is  generally  made  where  assessments  are 
involved  which  exceed  the  amount  of  benefit  conferred  upon  the 
realty  upon  which  the  assessments  are  levied  or  where  the  ap- 
portionment of  the  assessment  is  such  as  to  ignore  the  question 
of  special  benefits.  In  order  to  determine  whether  assessments 
may  properly  be  referred  to  the  police  power  it  is  necessary  to 
consider,  first  the  nature  of  the  police  power  itself,  and  second 
-the  nature  of  the  improvement  for  which  the  specific  assessment 
in  question  in  each  case  is  levied.  The  police  power  is  that 
indefinite  and  possibly  indeterminate  power  which  the  state  ex- 
ercises in  securing  the  protection  of  property  and  the  protectio" 
of  life,  limb,  body,  comfort  and  well-being  of  persons.^  "The 
police  power  is  incapable  of  exact  definition  and  of  a  precise 
limitation.  It  seems  to  be  a  power  to  which  are  referred  all 
governmental  acts  which  are  incapable  of  arrangement  under  any 
other  distinct  head,  and  which  are  at  the  same  time  justifiable, 
as  internal  regulatiors  bavins:  in  vieiv  facility  of  int'^reonrs" 
between  citizen  and  citizen,  the  preservation  of  good  order,  good 
manners  and  morals,  and  the  health  of  the  puMie.  When  a  dut\' 
is  imposed,  under  this  power,  on  a  propertv-holder,  no  attention 
is  paid  to  the  fact  that  its  performance  will  confer  any  exceptive 
benefit  on  his  jiropertv.  as  in  cases  of  local  assessments.  On  the 
contrary,  this  power  justifies  the  exaction  from  him  of  that  whicli 
will  lessen  the  value  of  his  estate  by  depriving  him  of  what 
would,  under  other  circumstances,  be  a  lawful  use  and  enjoy- 
ment of  his  property:  as  Avhere  it  prevents  his  carrying  on  a 
lawful    business    in    his    house,    situated    in    a    crowded    district 

2  See   §   1393  et  seq.  Pac.   437    [1895];   Town  of  Macon  v. 

'  Ptnne    v.    Mississippi.    101    U.    S.  Patty,  57  Miss.  378.  34  Am.  Rep.  451 

814,    25    L.    1079    [1879];    In?ram    v.  [1879];    City   of  Helena  v.   Kent,   32 

Colgan,  lOo  Cal.  113,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  Mont.  279,  80  Pac.  258   [1905]. 
221,  28  L.  R.  A.  187,  38  Pac.  315,  39 


151 


CO>;STITUTI0NAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


93 


because  such  business  is,  under  the  j)eculiar  eireumstauees,  a  nuis 
ance;   and   also   where   it   prevents  the   erection   on   his  property 
of  a  house  of  wood  or  other  inflammable  material,  as  a  precau- 
tion  against  fire.     Under   this   power   is   imposed   on   the   owner 
of  urban  property  the  duty  of  keeping  his  grounds  and  vaults 
clean,  and  the  removal  of  all  causes  for  the  generation  or  spreac 
of  disease.     This  power,   as   to   active  duties   re((uired   under   it. 
has  usuall.v  been  confined  to  acts  to  be  performed  on  propert.\' 
in  the   use   and   occupancy   of   the   party   upon   whom    the.v    an. 
imposed,  and  such  imposition  has  been  on  account  of  the  relatioi 
which  the   person  from  whom  the  requisition   is  made  bears  to 
the  property,   with   reference  to   which   the   duty   is   to   be   per 
formed."-     It  is  a  power  of  which  it  is  said  that  "it  is  know; 
when   and   wher(»   it   begins,   but  not   when   and    v/hcrc    it    term' 
nates."''     Further,   as   has   already  been   stated.^   special   assess- 
ments are  for  some   j)urposes  at  least  to   be   divided  into  three 
broad    classes.      Considering   now   the   first   class   of  assessments 
that  is.  those  which  are  levied  upon  property  especially  benefitc 
by  a  local  improvement  of  a  public  character,  upon  the  basis  of 
the  benefits  conferred  by  such   improvements,  it  is  to  be  notec' 
that  by  the  great  weight  of  authority  the  courts  have  held  tha; 
such  assessments  cannot  be  referred  to  the  police  power. '^ 

§  93.     Assessments  for  legal  duty  referred  to  police  power. 

On  the  other  hand  the  attempt  is  made  oceasionall.v  to  construct 
improvements  for  the  benefit  of  the  public  at  large,  to  assess  the 


-Town  of  Macon  v.  Patt,v.  57  ^Mi.ss. 
378,  407.  34  Am.  Ro]).  451.  473,  474 
ri8701. 

'(hamper  v.  Citj'  of  firepncastlp. 
L38  Ind.  339,  35L  ^40  Am.  St.  Rop. 
390.  24  L.  R.  A.  708.  35  :^^.  E.  14 
118941. 

*  See   §   4  rf   ."frr/. 

"Wilson  V.  f'hilcott.  12  Colo.  COO, 
21  Pac.  901  [18891;  (Not  afTocted 
on  tliis  point  1>y  City  of  Dcnvor  v. 
Knowles,  17  Colo.  204.  17  L.  R.  A. 
135.  30  Pao.  1041  [1892]  which 
ovornilos  the  sireater  part  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Wilson  V.  Chilcott.)  City  ol 
Ottawa  V.  Spencer.  40  Til.  211  [1800]  -. 
White  V.  Gove,  183  Mass.  333.  67  X. 


E.  359  11903];  yinf/.  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 18  Mich.  494  [18i;9j";  State, 
Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Commisiioners 
of  Streets  and  Sewers  in  the  City  of 
New  Brunswick,  42  \.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.) 
510  [1S8()|;  fallowing  State,  Agens. 
PiDs.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  Newark,  37  X.  .1.  L.  (8  Vr.)  415 
[18741;  Latiiroj)  v.  City  of  Racine. 
119  Wis.  4r.l.  97  X.  W.'l92  [19031: 
The  ])ower  of  asscssn^ent  for  sewers 
is  said  to  he  a  le<iislativ(>  power  exer 
cised  for  jiolice  purjioses  and  havin;r 
its  origin  in  the  taxing  power  in. 
WolIT  V.  City  of  Denver.  20  Colo. 
App.   1-35,  77   Pac.  364   [1904]. 


93 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


152 


cost  of  such  improvements  upon  adjoining  property  without  re- 
gard to  the  question  of  special  local  benefits,  and  then,  since 
such  an  assessment  cannot  be  upheld  as  a  tax,  to  justify  it  under 
the  theory  of  the  police  power.  Whether  such  attempt  is  suc- 
cessful or  not  depends  upon  the  question  whether  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  adjoining  land-owners  to  construct  such  improvement  in 
order  to  keep  their  property  in  such  condition  as  will  not  en- 
danger the  public  welfare.  Assessments  of  the  second  class ; 
that  is,  charges  levied  upon  property  to  reimburse  the  public 
for  the  cost  of  doing  certain  things  with  reference  to  such  prop- 
erty which  it  is  the  legal  duty  of  the  owner  to  do,  but  which 
he  has  omitted  or  refused  to  do,  are  on  the  other  hand,  accord- 
ing to   many   authorities,   to   be    referred    to    the   police   power.^ 


'  Xorthern  Pacific  Ry.  v.  Duhith, 
208  U.  S.  583  [1908];  (Afilrming 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  Dvilutli  v.  North- 
ern Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  98  Minn.  429,  108 
X.  \V.  269)";  James  v.  Pine  BlulT, 
49  Ark.  199,  4  S.  W.  760  [1887]; 
Keese  v.  City  of  Denver,  10  Colo.  112, 
15  Pac.  825  [1887];  Chicago,  In- 
dianapolis &  Louisville  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Crawfordsville,  164 
Ind.  70,  72  X.  E.  1025  [1904];  May- 
or and  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Town 
of  Xew  Iberia  v.  Fontelieu,  108  La. 
460,  32  So.  369  [1901];  Nugent  v. 
City  of  Jackson,  72  Miss.  1040,  18 
So.  493  [1895];  Town  of  Macon  v. 
Patty,  57  Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451 
[1879];  Harbach  v.  City  of  Omaha, 
54  Neb.  83,  74  N.  W.  434  [1898]; 
Van  \Yagoner,  Pros.  v.  ]\Iayor  and 
Aldermen  of  tlie  City  of  Paterson, 
67  X.  J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  455,  51  Atl. 
922  [1902];  State,  Brittin,  Pros.  v. 
Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  442 
[1872];  Taylor  v.  Crawford,  72  0.  S. 
560,  69  L.  R.  A.  805,  74  N.  E.  1065 
[1905];  (reversing  Crawford  v.  Tay- 
lor, 27  Ohio  C.  C.  245  [1905]);  Wil- 
mington V.  Yopp.  71  N.  C.  76;  Vil- 
lage of  St.  Marys  v.  Lake  Erie  and 
Western  Railroad  Company,  60  0.  S. 
136,  53  X.  E.  795  [18991:  Cincin- 
nati, Hamilton  &  Dayton  R.  R;  Co.  v. 
Village   of    Bowlin':r   Green,    Ohio,   57 


O.  S.  336,  41  L.  R.  A.  422,  49  N.  E. 
121  [1897];  Cincinnati,  Hamilton  & 
Dayton  Railroad  Company  v.  Sulli- 
van,  32  O.  S.  152  [1877];  Sessions 
V.  Crunkilton,  20  0.  S.  349  [1870]; 
Bliss  V.  Kraus,  16  O.  S.  54  [1864]; 
Meanor  v.  Goldsmith,  216  Pa.  489, 
10  L.  R.  A.  (X\  S.)  342,  65  Atl. 
1084  [1907];  Philadelphia  v.  Penn-^ 
sylvania  Hospital,  143  Pa.  St.  367, 
22  Atl.  744  [1891]  ;  Wilkinsburg  Bor. 
V.  Home  for  Aged  Women,  131  Pa. 
St.  109,  6  L.  R.  A.  531.  18  Atl. 
937  [1890];  Charleston  v.  Werner, 
38  S.  C.  488,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  776, 
17  S.  E.  33  [1892];  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermen VS.  JNIaberry,  25  Tenn.  ( 6 
Hump.)  368,  44  Am.  Dec.  315  [1845]  ; 
Wliyte  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
X'ashville.  2  Swan  (32  Tenn.)  364 
[1852];  Washington  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  X'ashville,  1  Swan  (31 
Tenn.)  177  [1851];  Lentz  v.  City  of 
Dallas,  96  Tex.  258,  72  S.  W."  59 
[1903];  Adams  v.  Fisher,  63  Tex. 
051  [1885];  Lislwn  Avenue  Land  Co. 
V.  Town  of  Lake,  —  Wis.  — — -,  113 
X.  W.  1099  [1907];  Town  of  Mus- 
kego  V.  Drainage  Commissioners,  78 
wTs.  40,  47  N.V.  11  [1890];  State 
ex  rel.  Baltzell  v.  Stewart.  74  Wis. 
620,  6  L.  R.  A.  394,  43  N.  W.  947 
[1889];  Bryant  v.  Bobbins,  70  Wis. 
258,   35   X.W.   545    [1887]. 


15:i 


COXSTIT;  TKJNAI.    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


!J4,  95 


The  result  of  so  referring  the  power  of  levying-  these  assess- 
ments to  the  police  power  is  to  free  the  legislature  in  levying 
them  from  many  of  the  constitutional  restrictions  as  to  the  na- 
ture and  purpose  of  the  improvement,  the  ap[)ortionment  of 
the  assessment  and  the  like.-  If  a  legal  duty  rests  upon  the 
owner,  such  a  charge  is  not  a  violation  of  the  clause  which  for- 
bids the  taking  of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  nor  is 
it  the  impairment  of  the  obligation  of  a  contract.'' 

§  94.     Classification  of  specific  types  of  improvement. 

The  practical  difficulty  in  determining  what  assessments  are 
to  be  referred  to  the  police  power  and  what  are  to  be  referred 
to  the  taxing  power,  still  remains.  The  same  type  of  improve- 
ment may  be  phieed  l;y  tlie  courts  of  one  jurisdiction  under  the 
police  power  and  by  tlie  courts  of  another  jurisdiction  under 
the  taxing  power.  Indeed  in  the  same  jurisdictions  an  improve- 
ment of  a  given  type  may  lie  placed  under  tlie  police  power  at 
one  time  and  under  the  taxing  power  at  another.'  Accordingly 
it  is  necessary  to  consider  some  of  the  different  types  of  im- 
provement in  detail. 


§  95.     Streets. 

Acording  to  the  weight  of  authority  assessments  for  street  im- 
provements'    including     the     construction     of     gutters,-     cannot 


-  "'Vre  must  not,  tliprofrn-o,  eon- 
found  an  e.\erci?e  of  tlit>  polioe  power 
with  the  nice  distinctions  whicli  be- 
long to  the  doctrine  of  taxation  for 
local  improvements."  Charleston  v. 
Werner.  .38  S.  C.  488.  403.  37  Am.  St. 
Rep.  776.  17  S.  E.  33   [18021. 

'Northern  Pacific  Ry.  v.  Duluth. 
208  U.  S.  583  [inosi;  (Anirmin.sj 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  Diihith  v.  North- 
ern Pacific  IJy.  Co..  OS  :\rinn.  420.  108 
N.  W.  2G9.) 

'Thus  compare  the  ditl'erent  Colo- 
railo  cases  upon  the  subject  of  side- 
walks, and  the  difTerent  South  Caro- 
lina cases.  Sec  §§  44.  03.  0.^.  Ofi. 
323. 

'Wilson  V.  Chilcott.  12  Colo.  r.OO. 
21  Pac.  001  [18801:  :\r..t/  v.  City  of 
Detroit.  IS  Mich.  404  [18(101  :  Nupent 
V.  Citv  of  Jackson,  72  Miss.  1040.  18 


So.  493  [1895]:  Town  of  Macon  v. 
Patty,  57  Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Rep. 
4.")1  [18791  ;  State.  Kirkpatrick,  Pros. 
V.  Commissioners  of  Streets  and  Sew- 
ers in  the  City  of  New  Brunswick, 
42  N.  J.  L.   (13  Vr.)   510  [18801. 

-Wilson  V.  (  hilcott.  12  Coin.  000, 
21  Pac.  001  [ISSOl:  State,  Kirkpaf- 
rick.  Pros.  v.  Commissioners  of 
Streets  and  Sewers  in  the  City  of 
New  Brunswick.  42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.) 
510  [1S801.  Whether  curb-st;mos  arft 
considered  as  part  of  the  street  and 
therefore  not  jefeiahle  to  the  police 
])ower.  as  in  Wilson  v.  Chilcott.  12 
Colo.  nOO.  21  P:ic.  001  [18891.  or  a^ 
ynrt  of  tin-  sidewalk  and  therefore 
referable  (o  t' e  prdice  power  if  the 
con-^truction  of  the  sidewalk  is  si 
referable  as  in  State.  Kirkpatrick. 
Pros.  V.  Commissioners  of  Streets  and 


§96 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


154 


be  referred  to  the  police  power ;  and  therefore  they  can- 
not be  sustained  at  all  unless  as  under  the  taxing  power. 
In  some  of  these  cases  the  distinction  is  made  between  as- 
sessments for  street  improvements  proper  which  are  said  not 
to  be  referable  to  the  police  power,  and  those  for  the  construc- 
tion of  sidewalks  which  are  said  to  be  referable  to  the  police 
power.^  On  the  other  hand  there  is  some  authority,  in  obiter 
at  least,  for  saying  that  the  same  police  power  which  Avould 
authorize  a  local  assessment  for  a  sidewalk,  would  also  authorize 
one  for  a  street.*  So  it  seems  to  have  been  held  that  an  assessment 
for  the  repair  of  roads  is  based  upon  the  police  power."  The 
right  to  charge  a  street  railway  company  for  the  expense  of 
paving  between  the  rails  is  said  to  rest  upon  the  taxing  power,** 
though  it  has  been  observed  that  the  same  result  would  be  reached 
in  these  cases  if  such  right  were  referred  to  the  police  power." 

§  96.     Sidewalks. 

As  has  already  been  intimated,  assessments  for  the   construc- 
tion of  sidewalks  are  very  generally  referred  to  the  'police  power.^ 


Sewers  in  the  City  of  Xew  Bruns- 
wick, 42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  510 
[1880],  is  a  question  upon  which  the 
authorities  are  in  conflict. 

MVilson  V.  Chilcott,  12  Colo.  600, 
21  Pac.  901  [1889];  Nugent  v.  City 
of  Jackson,  72  Miss.  1040,  18  So. 
493  [1895]  ;  Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty, 
57  Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451 
[1879];  State,  Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v. 
Commissioners  of  Streets  and  Sewers 
in  the  City  of  Xew  Brunswick.  42 
N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  510  [1880];  State, 
Agens,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  Newark.  37  N.  J.  L.  (8 
Vr.)  415,  18  Am.  Rep.  729  [1874]; 
State,  Sigler,  Pros.  v.  Fuller,  34  N. 
J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  227  [1870]  Mauldin  v. 
City  Council  of  Greenville.  42  S.  C. 
293,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  723.  27  L.  R. 
A.  284,  20  S.  E.  842   [1893]. 

*  Adams  v.  Fisher,  63  Tex.  651 
[1885]. 

"  Barrow  v.  Hepler.  34  La.  Ann  362 
[1882]. 

*  City  of  Worcester  v.  ^Yorcpster 
Consolidated     Street     Railwnv     Com- 


pany, 196  U.  S.  539  [1904];  Sioux 
City  Street  Railway  Company  v. 
Sioux  City,  138  U.  S.  98.  34  L.  898 
11891];  City  of  Rocliester  v.  Roches- 
ter Railway  Company.  182  N.  Y.  99, 
70  L.  R. '  A.  773,  "  74  N.  E.  953 
[1905]. 

'  C  ity  of  Rochester  v.  Rocliester 
Railway  Company,  182  N.  Y.  99,  70 
L.  R.  A.  773,  74  N.  E.  953   [1905]. 

'  James  v.  Pine  Bluff,  49  Ark.  199, 
4  S.  W.  760  [1887]:  \Yilson  v.  Chil- 
cott. 12  Colo.  600.  21  Pac.  901 
[1S89];  Speer  v.  Mayor  and  Coun- 
cil of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9  L.  R.  A. 
402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890];  Mayor 
and  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Town 
f;f  New  Iberia  v.  Fontelieu,  108  La. 
460,  32  So.  364  [1901];  Nugent  v. 
City  of  Jackson,  72  Miss  1040,  18 
So.  493  [1895];  Town  of  Macon  v. 
Patty,  57  Miss  378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451 
[1879];  City  of  Lincoln  v.  ,Jane=ch. 
63  Neb.  707.  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  478.  56 
L.  R.  A.  762,  89  N.  W.  280  [1002]; 
State,  Kii'kpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Streets  and  Sewers  in  the 


155 


CONSTITTTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


^nr> 


A  charter  provision  authorizing  a  town  to  re(iuire  the  owner  of 
land  to  eonstrnct  a  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  house,  and  if  he 
should  fail  to  do  so  on  demand,  to  construct  the  same  and  charge 
him  with  the  expense  thereof  is  said  to  be  a  "mere  police  regu- 
lation,"- even  in  jurisdictions  where  assessments  for  street  im- 
l)rovements  other  than  the  sidewalks  cannot  be  so  referred.^ 
There  is,  on  the  other  hand,  some  authority  for  holding  that 
a'^sessments  for  the  construction  of  sidewalks  are  not  referable 
to  the  police  power.*  Without  determining  whether  assessments 
for  the  construction  of  sidewalks  might  not  be  referred  to  the 
police  power,  it  has  been  held  that  assessments  for  such  pur- 
poses, if  based  on  the  theory  of  benefits,  may  be  referred  to  the 
])ower  of  taxation.'^  In  West  Virginia  it  has  been  said  to  be 
immaterial  whether  the  power  of  the  state  in  relation  to  side- 
walks should  be  classified  as  an  exercise  of  the  police  power 
or  of  the  taxing  power,  but  the  court  said  that  it  was  inclined 
to  treat  it  as  an   exercise  of  the  police  power  and  hold  that  it 


City  of  New  Brunswick,  42  N.  J.  L. 
(13  Vr.)  510  [1880];  State,  Sigler. 
Pros.  V.  Fuller,  34  X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.) 
227  [1870];  Wilmington  v.  Yopp,  71 
N.  C.  76;  Meanor  v.  Goldsmith,  216 
Pa.  St.  489,  10  L  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  342, 
()5  Atl.  1084  [1907]:  Philadelphia  v. 
Pennsylvania  Hospital.  143  Pa.  St. 
367,  22  Atl.  744  [1891];  Wilkins- 
burg  Bor.  Home  for  Aged  Women, 
131  Pa.  St.  109,  18  Atl.  937  [1890]; 
sub  nomine  Himc  for  Aged  Protest- 
ant Women  vs.  P.>rou'rli  of  Wiikins- 
burg,  6  L.  R.  A.  531 ;  Mauldin  v.  City 
Council  of  Greenville,  42  S.  C.  293, 
46  Am.  St.  Rep.  723.  27  L.  R.  A. 
284,  20  S.  E.  842  [1893];  Taylor, 
McBean  &  Co.  v.  (  handler.  9  Heisk. 
(56  Tenn.)  3-19  11872];  sub  nomine 
^IcBean  vs.  Chandler.  24  Am.  Rep. 
308;  Mayor  and  Aldermen  v.  ila- 
berry.  6  Huni]).  I  2.t  Tenn.)  368.  4-1 
Am.  Dec.  315  [18  1.")]  ;  Washington  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldcrnii'ii  of  Xa^hville,  1 
Swan  (31  Tenn.)  177  [1851]-.  Whyte 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Xashville, 
32  Tenn.  (2  Swnn.)  .364  [1852]; 
Mayor  and  City  Cnnncil  of  Xasli- 
ville  v.  Berrv.  2  Shannon's  Tenn. 
Cases   561    [1877]:    Lentz  v.   City  of 


Dallas.  96  Tex.  258.  72  S.  W.  59 
[1903];    Lisbon  Avenue   Land   Co.   v. 

Town  of  Lake.  —  Wis.  ,   113  N. 

W.   1099    [1907]. 

-  Inhabitants  of  Palmyra  v.  Mor- 
ton, 25  Mo.   593    [1857]. 

••'See    §    95. 

'Tripp  V.  City  of  Yankton,  10  S. 
D.  516,  74  X.  W.  447  [1898];  "A 
sidewalk  is  a  ])ortion  of  a  public 
highway,  appropriated  it  is  true  to 
pedestrians  alone,  but  still  ojicn  and 
free  to  all  persons  desiring  to  use 
and  enjoy  it  as  a  public  highway.  It 
is  as  much  a  public  highway  in  the 
mode  of  its  u-^e  as  the  street  itself. 
The  difference  in  the  manner  of  their 
use  does  not  render  one  more  ])ublie 
than  the  other.  They  are  both  free 
to  be  properly  used  and  enjoyed  by 
the  entire  public  and  are  con- 
structed alike  for  their  use."  City 
of  Ottawa  V.  Spencer.  40  HI.  211, 
217    [1866]. 

•"'Citv  of  Keokuk  v.  Indejiendent 
Di^tri-t  of  Keokuk.  53  hi.  352.  36 
Am.  Pej).  226.  5  X.  W.  503  [1880]: 
Wilhelm  v.  City  of  Defiance.  58  O. 
S.  .56.  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  745.  40  L.  R. 
A.   294.   .50   X.   E.    18    [1808]. 


§97 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


156 


"cannot  properly  be  reckoned  as  a  taxing  power."''  The  power 
of  assessing  for  sidewalks  has  been  referred  to  the  power  o- 
taxation  even  where  an  apportionment  not  in  proportion  to  bene- 
fits was  upheld  and  the  apportionment  would  have  been  held 
to  be  improper  in  a  regular  assessment  for  benefits.^  Such  a 
view  is  illogical.  If  such  a  charge  can  be  imposed  without  an 
apportionment  on  the  basis  of  benefits  it  cannot  be  an  exercise 
of  the  taxing  power."'  and  it  can  be  upheld,  if  at  all,  onh'  undei 
the  police  power. 

§  97.     Sewers  and  drainage. 

Assessments  for  the  construction  of  sewers  have  been  held  to 
be  referable  to  the  police  power,  and  accordingly  have  been 
upheld  under  circumstances  which  an  assessment  based  upon 
benefits  could  not  be  sustained.^  In  other  jurisdictions  it  has 
been  held  that  assessments  for  sewers  are  referable  to  the  power 
of  taxation  and  not  to  the  police  power.-  Assessments  for  the 
drainage  of  large  tracts  of  realty  have  also  been  referred  to  the 
police  power. ^   as   well   as   assessments   for   widening,    deepenijig 


'  Douglass  V.  Town  of  Harrisville, 
n  W.  Va.  102,  27  Am.  Rep.  548 
fl876];  (Citing  Goddard,  Petitioner, 
16  Pick.  (Mass.)  504  [1835];  Nor- 
folk City  V.  Ellis,  26  Gratt  (67  Va.) 
224   [18751. 

^  State,  Sioler,  Pros.  v.  Fuller.  34 
N.  -J.  L.    (5  Vr.)    227    [1870]. 

"See    §    118,   Chapter   XII T. 

1  Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149  U.  S, 
30,  37  L.  637,  13  S.  750  [1893],  (af- 
firniini  Paulson  v.  City  of  Portland, 
16  Or.  -150.  1  L.  R.  A.  673.  19  Pae. 
450  [ISHS]);  Keese  v.  City  of  Den- 
ver, 10  Colo.  112,  15  Pac.  825  [1887]  : 
Van  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  City  of  Paterson,  67  N. 
J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  455,  51  Atl.  922 
[1902]. 

"A  sewer  is  constructetl  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  police  power  for  the 
health  and  cleanliness  of  the  city, 
and  the  police  power  is  exercised  sole- 
ly at  the  legislative  will."  Paulsen 
V.  Portland,  149  U.  S.  30,  40,  37  L. 
637.  13  S.  750  [1893].  (affirming 
Paulson  -v.    Citv    of   Portland.    16    Or. 


450.  1  L.  R.  A.  673,  19  Pac.  450 
11888]). 

-In  re  127th  Street,  56  How.  (N. 
\.)  (iO.  lieing  an  exercise  of  the 
])ower  of  taxation  such  assessments 
are  subject  to  the  constitutional  re- 
quirement that  they  must  be  "pro- 
]iortional  and  reasonable."  White  v. 
Gove,  183  Mass.  333,  67  N.  E.  359 
[1903]. 

^Carson  v.  St.  Francis  Levee  Dis- 
trict, 59  Ark.  513,  27  S.  W.  59(7 
[1894];  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222 
[1874];  O'Reilly  v.  Kankakee  Valley 
Diaining  Company,  32  Ind.  169 
|18()9];  Lien  v.  Board  of  County 
Commissioners  of  Norman  County,  8'* 
Minn.  58,  82  N.  W.  1094  [1900]: 
llorbach  v.  City  of  Omaha,  54  Neb, 
S3.  74  N.  W.  434  [1898];  State,  Brit- 
tin.  Pros.  V.  Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  (7 
Vr.)  442  [1872];  Taylor  v.  Crnw- 
ford.  72  O.  S.  560,  69' L.  R.  A.  805. 
74  N.  E.  1065  [1905];  Sessions  v. 
Crumkilton.  20  0.  S.  349  [1870]; 
Bliss   v.  Krauss,   16   0.  S.  54    [1864]. 


157 


CONSTITL'TIONAL    KESTRICTIOX    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


^9S 


and  straightening  the  channel  of  a  river  as  incident  to  drainage,* 
and  assessments  for  filling  up  low  ground  so  as  to  prevent  the 
accumulation  of  stagnant  water/'  The  view  that  drainage  as- 
sessments are  to  be  referred  to  the  police  power  has  been  sub- 
ject to  some  criticism,  nowever.  even  from  courts  which  once 
have  expressed  the  same  view.  In  Wisconsin  it  has  been  said 
drainage  assessments  were  referable  to  the  police  power,'^  and 
indeed  that  such  assessments  could  be  justified  only  on  the  theory 
of  the  police  power.''  A  part,  at  least,  of  the  reasoning  of  these 
cases  has  recently  been  condemned,'*  though  without  necessarily 
affecting  the  doctrine  of  the  police  power.  If  the  assessment  for 
drainage  is  not  in  violation  of  any  constitutional  provision  it  is 
comparatively  immaterial  whether  it  is  referred  to  the  taxing 
power^  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  or  the  police  power."  In 
some  jurisdictions  assessments  for  the  construction  of  levees  have 
been  held  to  be  referable  to  the  police  i)ower.^"  On  the  other 
hand  assessments  for  the  construction  of  levees  liave  in  other 
jurisdictions  been  held  to  be  referable  to  the  taxing  power,  and 
incapable  of  justification  as  an  exercise  of  the  police  power.'^ 

§  98.     Other  types  of  improvement. 

Assessments  against  railway  companies  for  the  expense  of  light- 
ing grade  crossing  are  referable  to  the  police  power  ^  and  have 
been   held   to   ])e   valid   charges   upon   that   theory.-      Under   this 


♦State  V.  Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  (7 
Vr.)    442   [1872]. 

"  Cliarleston  v.  Werner,  38  S.  C. 
488,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  776,  17  S.  E. 
33    [1892]. 

"Town  of  ]\Iiiskeg()n  v.  Drainage 
Commissioners,  78  Wis.  40,  47  N. 
W.  11  [18001;  State  ex  rel.  BaltzeH 
V.  Stewart.  74  Wis.  620,  6  L.  R.  A. 
394,  43  N.  W.  947  [1889];  Bryant  v. 
Rohhins,  70  Wis.  258,  35  N.  W.  545 
[18871. 

•Donnelly  v.  Decker.  58  Wis.  401, 
46  Am.  liep.  637.  17  X.  W.  389 
[18831. 

"Rude  V.  Town  of  St.  Marie.  121 
Wis.  634,  99  N.  W.  460   [19041. 

'  Cribbs  v.  Beiiediet,  64  Ark.  555. 
44  S.  W.  707  [1S971:  Cnr^.-n  v.  St. 
Francis  Levee   Di-itricl.   59    .\rk.   513. 


27  S.  W.  590  [18941;  Lien  v.  Board 
of  County  Commissioners  of  Norman 
County,  80  Minn.  58,  82  X.  W.  1094 
[1900]. 

'"  In  speaking  of  a  law  authorizing 
an  assessment  for  tlie  construction 
of  a  levee,  the  court  said:  "the  police 
power  of  the  .state  is  broad  enough 
to  aiithorize  the  law  in  question." 
Morrison  v.  ^Morey,  14()  Mo.  543,  502. 
48  S.   W.  629    [1898]. 

"  Reelfoot  Lake  Levee  District  v. 
Dawson,  97  Tenn.  151.  34  L.  R.  A. 
725.    36    S.    W.    1041    [1896]. 

'  Cincinnati.  Hamilton  &  Dayton 
Railroad  Com])any  v.  Sullivan.  32 
O.  S.   152   [18771.     See  ij  59. 

-ChicaLTo,  Indinnapolis  &  Loui-^villc 
Railway  Conipaiiv  v.  Citv  of  Craw 
fordsviile.  164  Ind.  70.  7'2  X,  L.  1025 


§  99  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  153 

theory  the  cost  of  constructing  a  viaduct  may  be  imposed  upon 
a  railway  company.^  The  expense  of  cleaning  and  sprinkling- 
streets*  and  of  removing  ice  and  snow  from  sidewalks  ■'  is  to  be 
charged  upon  the  owner  of  the  abutting  property  upon  the  theory 
of  the  police  power  in  jurisdictions  where  such  charges  can  be 
imposed  upon  the  owners  of  abutting  property  at  all.  In  some 
jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  such  assessments  cannot  be  upheld 
upon  any  theory.''  The  construction  of  public  docks  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  owner  of  abutting  property  cannot  be  upheld  as 
justified  by  the  police  power.  An  assessment  was  made  for 
building  a  public  dock  upon  the  land  of  a  private  owner,  who 
had  refused  to  build  such  dock  when  ordered.  The  city  then 
built  such  dock  and  levied  an  assessment  upon  such  land-owner 
for  the  cost  thereof.  It  was  held  that  such  assessment  could  not 
be  justified  as  an  exercise  of  the  police  power,'  A  charge  for 
laying  waterpipes  so  that  land  can  receive  water  thereby,  cannot 
be  upheld  under  the  police  power.  So  a  tax  was  levied  upon 
each  lot  or  parcel  of  ground  having  a  building  upon  it,  which 
abutted  on  any  street  through  which  water  supply  pipes  were 
laid  and  which  could  be  conveniently  supplied  with  water  there- 
from. The  tax,  amounting  to  two  dollars  and  fifty  cents  per 
annum,  and  the  cost  of  the  water  actually  consumed  upon  said 
premises  was  made  a  personal  liability  of  the  owner  of  such 
premises.  It  was  conceded  by  the  village  that  such  charge  was 
not  a  local  assessment,  based  upon  benefits,  but  it  was  sought 
to  justify  it  under  the  police  power.  The  Supreme  Court  of 
Illinois  held  that  such  a  charge  could  not  be  justified  under  the 
theory  of  the  police  power  and  hence  that  such  charge  was 
invalid.^ 

§  99.     Attempt  to  base  assessments  on  power  of  eminent  domain. 

Occasionally   courts   have   heen   urged   to   place   the   power   of 
assessment  upon  the  basis  of  eminent  domain  rather  than  of  taxa- 

[1904];  Village  of  St.  Marys  V.  Lake  ern    Pacific    Ry.    Co..    98    Minn.    429, 

Erie   &   Western   Railroad    Company,  108  N.  W.  269) .     See  §  359. 

60  0.  S.   136,   53  X.  E.   795    [1899];  'See   §  370. 

Cincinnati,  Hamilton  &  Dayton  R.  R.  ^  See   §§    58,   371. 

Co.    V.     Village    of    Bowling    Green,  "See   §§  370,  371. 

Ohio,  57  0.  S.  336,  41  L.  R.  A.  422,  '  Lathrop    v.    City    of    Racine,    119 

49  N.  E.   121    [1897].  Wis.   461,   97   N.   W.    192    [1903]. 

^Northern    Pacific    Ry.    v.    Dnhith,  *  Village   of   Lemont   v.   Jenks,    197 

208     LT.     S.     583     [1908],     (affirming  111.  363,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.   172,  64  N. 

State  ex  rel.  Citv  of  Duluth  v.  North-  E.   362    [1902]. 


159  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  99 

tioii.  Such  attempt  is  usually  made,  it  may  be  added,  not  in 
order  to  find  a  <iround  for  justifying  assessment,  but  rather  in 
order  to  restrict  the  exercise  of  the  power  by  applying  the  con- 
stitutional provision  that  property  cannot  be  taken  for  public  use 
without  making  compensation.  This  power  undoubtedly  limits 
eminent  domain  and  by  the  great  weight  of  authority  has  no 
application  to  taxation ;  and  accordingly  unless  assessment  is  a 
branch  of  eminent  domain  it  is  not  restricted  by  such  provision.' 
Special  assessment,  as  based  on  benefits,  is  essentially  an  exac- 
tion from  an  individual  or.  a  charge  upon  property,  upon  the 
theor}^  that  it  is,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  a  fair 
contribution  to  the  expense  of  a  public  improvement  in  return 
for  the  peculiar  benefits  received  therefrom.  Payment  of  such 
assessment  does  not  leave  the  public  indebted  to  the  property 
owner  for  the  amount  thereof.  The  sole  duty  it  owes  by  reason 
of  such  assessment  is  to  make  proper  application  of  the  fund 
thus  created.  Under  eminent  domain,  on  the  other  hand,  prop- 
erty is  taken,  not  as  the  fair  proportion  of  public  burdens  due 
from  the  owner,  but  as  something  in  addition  to  and  beyond  his 
share.  What  is  taken  from  him  is  measured  not  by  fair  pro- 
portion, but  by  the  needs  of  the  public.  The  taking  leaves  the 
pu])lic  indebted  to  the  owner  unless  compensation  is  made  in 
advance.-     Another  purpose  in  the  attempt  to  base  the  right  ol 

'  For     discussion     of     this     specific  tlie  owner's  share  of  contribution  to 

question    see    §§    109-113.  a  public  burden,  but  as  so  much  be- 

^  One    of    the    leading    cases    which  yond    his    share.      Special    conipensa- 

holds  that  assessment  is  not  a  brancli  tion    is   therefore    to   be   made   in   the 

of    the    power   of    eminent    domain    is  latter    case,    becau.se    the    government 

People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v.  Mayor,  etc..  is  a  debtor  for  the  property  so  taken; 

of    Brooklyn.    4    X.    Y.    419,    55    Am.  but   not    in    the   former,   because   the 

Dec.    2()<i    118511.    overruling    People  payment  of  taxes  is  a  duty,  and  cre- 

ex  rel.  Post  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brook-  ates  no  oblitration  to  repay  otherwise 

lyn,    6    Barb.     (X.    Y.)     209    [1849].  than  in  tlic  proper  application  of  the 

In  this  case  the  essential   distinction  tax.     Taxation  operates  upon  a  com- 

between  the   power  of   sjK'cial    assess-  munity    or    U])on    a   class    of    ])ersons 

ment    as    based    on    benefits    and    the  in    a    coinnnuiily.    and    by    some    rule 

power    of    eminent    domain    is    stated  of    ajiportionnicnt.      The    exercise    of 

in    lanfiuage    often    (juoted    in    svibse-  the    right    of    eminent    domain    oper- 

quent  decisions.  ates  upon  an  individual,  and  without 

"Taxation  exacts  money  or  services  reference  to  the  amount  or  value  ex- 

from    individuals    as    and     for    their  acted    from    any   other    individual    or 

respective    shares    of   contribution    to  class   of    individuals.      People   ex    rel. 

any  public  burden.     Private  property  Oriffin    v.    Mayor,   etc.,    of   Brooklyn, 

taken    for    any    public    u«e,   by    right  4   X.   Y.   419,   424,   55   Am.   Dec.  266 

of  eminent  domain,  is  taken,  not  as  [18511. 


§100 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


160 


special  assessment  upon  the  power  of  eminent  domain  is  to  in- 
sist upon  having  the  question  of  the  amount  of  benefits  and  the 
apportionment  thereof  passed  upon  by  a  jury.  In  most  juris- 
dictions there  is  a  constitutional  provision  securing  the  right  to 
a  jury  in  determining  compensation  in  eminent  domain.  Under 
the  taxing  power  on  the  other  hand  there  is  ordinarily  no  con- 
stitutional right  to  have  the  amount  or  the  apportionment  oi 
the  tax  passed  upon  by  a  jury. 

§  100.     Assessment  not  based  on  power  of  eminent  domain. 

In  determining  this  question,  in  w^hatever  way  it  has  arisen, 
the  courts  have  held  that  the  power  of  special  assessment,  as 
far  at  least  as  it  is  based  on  the  theory  of  s]iecial  benefits,  is 
not  a  branch  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  nor  is  it  to  be 
referred  thereto.^ 


'  Hornung  v.  McCarthy,  126  Cal. 
17,  58  Pac.  303  [1899];  Chambers  v. 
Satterlee,  40  Cal.  497  [1871];  Emery 
V.  San  Francisco  Gas  Company,  28 
Cal.  346  [1865];  Nichols  v.  City  of 
Bridgeport,  23  Conn.  189,  60  Am. 
Dec.  636  [1854];  Speer  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  Atliens,  85  Ga.  49,  9  L.  R. 
A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890];  Hayden 
V.  City  of  Atlanta,  70  Ga.  817 
[1883];  Chicago  &  Northwestern 
Railway  Company  v.  Village  of  Elm- 
hurst,  165  111.  148,  46  N.  E.  437 
[1897];  Chicago  &  Alton  Railroad 
Company  v.  Citj'  of  Joliet,  153  111. 
649,  39' N.  E.  1077  [1894];  White 
V.  People  ex  rel.  City  of  Bloomington, 
94  111.  604  [1880];'  New  York  C.  & 
St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of  Ham- 
mond,   —    Ind.    ,    83    N.    E.    244 

[1908];  Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pa- 
cific Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Ottumwa,  112  la.  300,  51  L.  R.  A. 
763,  83  N.  W.  1074  [1900];  Hack- 
worth  V.  City  of  Ottumwa,  114  la. 
467,  87  N.  W.  424  [1901];  Howell  v. 
Bristol,  71  Ky.  (8  Bush.)  493 
[1871];  Bradley  v.  McAtee,  70  Ky. 
(7  Bush.)  667  [1870];  City  of  Lex- 
ington V.  McQuillan's  Heirs,  39  Ky. 
(9  Dana)  513,  35  Am.  Dec.  159 
[1839];  Sutton's  Heirs  v.  City  of 
Louisville,     5     Dana      (35     Ky.)'     28 


[1837];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Com- 
pany V.  Gogreve,  41  La.  Ann.  251, 
5  So.  848  [1889];  Excelsior  Plant- 
ing &  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Green, 
39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So.  873  [1887]; 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more v.  Johns  Hopkins  Hospital,  56 
Md.  1  [1880];  Brooks  v.  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Baltimore,  48  Md. 
265  [1877];  Groff  v.  Mayor,  Alder- 
men and  Common  Council  of  Fred- 
erick City,  44  Md.  67  [1875];  Moale 
v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more, 5  Md.  314,  61  Am.  Dec.  276 
[1854];  Jones  v.  Board  of  Aldermen 
of  City  of  Boston,  104  Mass.  461 
[1870]';  Roberts  v.  Smith,  115  Mich. 
5.  72  N.  W.  1091  [1897];  Wood- 
bridge  V  City  of  Detroit,  8  Mich.  274 
[I860];  Williams  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Detroit,  2  Mich.  560  [1853];  Stin- 
son  V.  Smith,  8  Minn,  366,  8  Gil.  326 
[1863];  McComb  v.  Bell,  2  Minn. 
295,  2  Gil.  256  [1858];  Heman  v. 
Schulte,  166  Mo.  409,  66  S.  W.  163 
[1902];  Kansas  City  v.  Ward,  134 
Mo.  172,  35  S.  W.  600  [1896];  Keith 
V.  Bingham,  100  Mo.  300,  13  S.  W. 
683  [1889];  Inhabitants  of  Palmyra 
V.  Morton,  25  Mo.  593  [1857];  Cit.> 
of  Springfield  to  use  of  Tuttle  v.  Ba- 
ker, 56  Mo.  App.  637  [1894];  J.  & 
A.    McKechnie    Brewing    Company    v. 


161 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


^  101 


§  101.     Theory  that  assessment  is  referable  to  power  of  eminent 
domain. 

The  proposition  that  the  power  of  special  assessment  is  not 
referable  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain  has  not,  however,  been 
free  from  question.  Cases  are  not  wanting  in  whielu  in  obiter 
at  least,  it  is  suggested  that  this  power  is,  or  may  be,  referable 
to  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  In  California  it  has  been 
suggested  that  it  may  be  referable  to  the  power  of  eminent  do- 
main,^ but  this  suggestion  is  made  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  that  even  if  special  assessment  is  a  branch  of  eminent 
domain,  the  assessment  cannot  be  a  personal  liability,  but  must 
be  restricted  to  a  lien  upon  the  property  against  which  it  is 
assessed.-  In  Illinois  the  Supreme  Court  in  its  earlier  decisions 
seemed  to  hold  that  the  poAver  of  local  assessment  might  possibly 
be  referred  to  the  right  of  eminent  domain.''  In  these  cases, 
hov/ever,  the  actual  holding  was  not  necessarily  based  upon  this 
proposition.  The  real  point  in  question  was  the  validity  of  spe- 
cial assessments  upon  the  basis  of  frontage;  and  the  actual  hold- 
ing was  that  under  the  Constitution  of  1818  such  assessments 
were  invalid,  since  if  referable  to  the  taxing  power  they  lacked 
the  uniformity  required  by  the  constitution  and  if  referable  to 
the  power  of  eminent  domain,  no  provision  for  adequate  compen- 
sation was  made.*     In  New  Jersey  it  was  once  suggested   that 


Trustees  of  Village  of  Canandaisiia. 
102  N.  Y.  631,  57  N.  E.  1113  [19001, 
(affirming  J.  &  A.  McKechnie  Brew- 
ing Company  v.  Trustees  of  the  Vil- 
lage of  Canandaigua,  1.5  App.  Div. 
139,  44  N.  Y.  Sui)p.  317  [1897]); 
People  ex  rel.  Crowell  v.  Lawrence, 
41  N.  Y.  137  [18(i{)l:  Litchfield  v. 
Vernon,  41  N.  Y.  123  [1809];  Howell 
V.  City  of  Buffalo.  37  N.  Y.  2G7 
[18671;  Brewster  v.  Citv  of  Syra- 
cuse, 19  N.  Y.  110  [1859 1:  Striker  v. 
Kelly,  7  Hill  (X.  Y. )  9  [1844]; 
Hilliard  v.  City  of  Ashcvilh>.  118  N. 
C.  84.5,  24  S.  E.  738  11890];  City 
of  Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110  X.  C.  32.  17 
L.  R.  A.  3.30,  14  S.  E.  .521  [1892]; 
Maloy  V.  Citv  of  Marietta.  11  O.  S. 
636  [18601;  Scovill  v.  ^itv  of  Cleve- 
land, 1  0.  S.  126  [1853]:  Kinnr  v. 
Citv  of  Portland.  2  Or.  UO  [18051; 
In  re  Vaciti'^n  ri  ('n^ior  Street.  115 
Pa.  St.  247.  8  Atl.  50  [1880]  ;  Wash- 


ington Avenue,  69  Pa.  St.  ( 19  P.  F. 
Smith)  352,  8  Am.  Rep.  255  [1871]; 
Stroud  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  01 
Pa.  St.  255  [1809];  In  the  matter  of 
Dorrance  Street.  4  R.  I.  230  [1850]; 
Roundtree  v.  (  ity  of  Galveston,  42 
Te.\-.  612  [1875];' Allen  v.  Drew,  44 
Vt.  174  [18721;  Rude  v.  Town  of  St. 
Marie.  121  ^Vis.  034.  99  X.  W.  400 
119041. 

'  Creighton  v.  ^Maiison.  27  Cal.  014 
I  1805  I . 

-  See   Chapter  XX. 

'Wright  v.  City  of  Chicago,  40  111. 
44  [18671;  Bedard  v.  Hall,  44  111. 
91,  92  Am.  Dec.  190  [1807];  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Baer,  41  III.  .306  [1806]; 
City  of  Ottawa  v.  Spencer.  40  111. 
211  [1860];  Citv  of  Cliicago  v. 
Larned.  34  111.  203  [l«04i:  <'\iv  of 
Peovin   V.  Kidder.  20  VI  351    [18611. 

*ritv  of  rinnnTo  V.  la'-ned.  34  111. 
203    [1804].      For    the    effect    of    the 


101 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


162 


assessments  for  drainage  might  be  justified  under  the  theory  of 
eminent  domain.^  This  suggestion  was  made  to  justify  the  theory 
that  such  assessments  would  not  necessarily  be  limited  to  the 
amount  of  the  benefits  conferred  upon  the  property  by  reason 
of  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  was  levied.  In 
an  earlier  case  it  had  been  said  that  assessments  for  purposes 
of  drainage  were  not  to  be  explained  as  resting  either  on  the 
power  of  taxation  or  on  that  of  eminent  domain,  but  as  a  "part 
of  the  local  common  law.""  In  other  jurisdictions,  also,  it 
has  been  suggested  that  the  right  to  levy  local  assessments  foi 
the  purpose  of  drainage  is  to  be  referred  to  the  power  of  emi- 
nent domain.'^  An  assessment  levied  without  notice  to  the  prop- 
erty owners  affected  thereby  has  been  held  to  be  invalid  as  a 
taking  of  private  property  for  public  use.^  Assessments  without 
notice  are  usually  regarded  as  unconstitutional  because  lacking 
in  due  process  of  law."  In  a  case  involving  an  assessment  upon 
certain  towns  for  contributions  for  maintaining  highways  and 
bridges  not  within  the  limits  of  such  towns,  it  has  been  sai( 
that  the  power  of  assessment  rested  on  the  power  of  eminent 
domain.^*^     An  assessment  for  a  purpose  not  public  in  its  char- 


special  constitutional  provision  of  the 
constitution  of  1870  upon  such  as- 
sessment, see  §§  51,   104. 

^  in  matter  of  drainage  of  the 
Great  Meadows  on  Pequest  River,  42 
X.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  553  [1880],  (af- 
firmed without  opinion  as  H.^agland 
V.  State,  Simonton,  Pros.,  43  N.  J. 
L.  (14  Vr.)  456  [1881],  and  af- 
firmed by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  as  Wurts  v.  Hoagland, 
]i  •  '\  S.  606,  29  L.  229,  5  S.  1086 
[18e-5]). 

'■  n  agland  v.  Wurts,  41  N.  J.  L. 
(1-2  Vr.)  175  [1879],  (affirminnr  in 
matter  of  Commissioners  to  drain 
Great  Meadows  on  Pequest  Eiver,  39 
N.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.)  433  [1877].  It 
was  said  to  be  "quite  too  late  to  re- 
vert to  first  principles  in  order  to 
overthrow  a  system  of  procedure 
which  is  possessed  of  such  antiouity 
and  has  to  its  credit  so  many  reco<T- 
nitions."  Hoa"laTid  v.  Wurts.  41  N. 
J.  _L.    [12  Vr.]    175,   180   [18791. 


'  Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555, 
44  S.  W.  707  [1897];  Hagar  v.  Su- 
pervisors of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal. 
233:  Duke  v.  O'Bryan,  100  Ky. 
710,  39  S.  W.  444,  824  [1897];  In 
matter  of  Commissioners  to  drain 
the  Great  Meadows  on  Pequest  River, 
39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.)  433  [1877]; 
In  the  matter  of  the  Application  for 
Drainage  of  Lands  between  Lower 
Chatham  and  Little  Falls,  in  the 
Counties  of  Passaic,  Essex  and  Mor- 
ris, 35  N.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  497  [1872]; 
In  the  matter  of  the  Application  of 
Ryers  for  Audit  of  Accounts,  72  N. 
Y.  1.  28  Am.  Rep.  88  [1878];  Hart- 
well  V.  Armstrong,  19  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
166  [1854];  Burk  v.  Ayers,  19  Hun. 
(N.   Y.)    17    [1879]. 

'Citv  of  Logansport  v.  Shirk,  129 
Ind.   352.   28   N.   E.   538    [1891]. 

^See  §  119  et  srq. 

"Town  of  ITnderhill  v.  Town  of 
Essex,  64  Vt.  28,  23  Atl.  617   [1891]. 


163  COXSTITrTIONAL    KESTRICTIOX    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  102 

acter  has  been  said  to  be  a  taking  of  private  property  for  a 
private  iise.^^  Assessments  in  excess  of  benefits  have  been  said 
to  be  invalid  as  being  an  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent 
domain  without  making  due  compensation  for  the  property 
taken.  ^- 

§  102.     Confusion  of  assessment  with  power  of  eminent  domain. 

One  excuse  for  confusing  special  assessment  with  eininent  do- 
main is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  often  the  actual  taking  of 
property  by  eminent  domain  for  a  public  improvement  is  com- 
bined Avith  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  special  assessment  to 
pay  for  such  improvement  ;^  and  accordingly  a  discussion  of  the 
two  together  is  necessarily  made.  Furthermore,  in  some  eases 
the  validity  of  the  special  assessment  depends  upon  the  validity 
of  the  proceedings  in  eminent  domain.-  Furthermore,  in  man\- 
cases  the  power  of  s^^eeial  assessment  is  discussed  on  the  assump- 
tion, rather  than  on  the  specific  holding,  that  it  is  a  branch  of 
eminent  domain.  These  eases  involve  the  question  of  the  right 
to  levy  special  assessments  in  disregard  of  the  question  of  bene- 
fits accruing  to  the  realty  assessed  by  reason  of  the  public  im- 
provement to  pay  for  wh'ch  the  assessment  is  levied.  If  nr 
benefits  exist  or  if  the  assessment  levied  is  in  excess  of  the 
benefits  conferred  the  assessment  is  according  to  many  authori- 
ties not  a  valid  tax.  Such  taking  of  property  is  then  objection 
able  as  a  taking  without  due  process  of  law.''  Unfortunately 
on  the  assumption  that  special  assessment  is  a  branch  of  enii 
nent  domain,  the  invalidity  of  such  assessments  is  placed,  in  the 

"  '  liicacro    &    Erie    Railroad    Co.    v.  may  .so  exercise  the  taxinj;  power  of 

Feitli.  67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R.  A.  525,  the    Commonwealth    as    to    work    the 

65   N.  E.   1020    [1902].  financial  niin  of  the  owners  of  lands 

'■"There    is    a    line    at    whicli    the  witliin  their  Ixnmdaries."     In  rr  Op- 

rifrlit  of  taxation,  which  subjects  the  eninji  of  l^ark  Avenue.  R.3  Pa.  St.    (2 

individual    to   his    share    of   the    pub-  ^lorris)    167,    173    [1876]. 

lie  burdens   ceases,   and   the   right   of  *  Carson   v.   St.    Francis  Levee  Dis- 

eminent   domain   which   subjects  him  trict.    59    Ark.    513.    27    S.    W.    ;;90 

to    more    than    his    share,    begins    to  [18941:    Cas  Light  &   Coke  Company 

operate.      It  is   not  requisite   now   to  v.  City  of  Xew  Albany.  158  Iml.  268, 

attempt  to  define  that  line,  or  to  an-  63    X.    E.    45S    [lOni].      See    §    63    et 

tici])ate  cases   in   whicli    the   question  f^cq. 

will     liave     to     1  e     met     and     settled  -  See  §  390  et  srq. 

whether    officers    of    municipal    corpo-  *  See  §    118. 
rations,    luider    legislative    authority, 


^  103 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


164 


line  of  cases  referred  to,  upon  the  ground  that  it  is  a  taking  of 
private  property  without  compensation.* 

§  103.     Specific  grant  of  power  of  assessment. 

In  most  of  the  state  constitutions  no  specific  grant  is  made  to 
the  legislature  of  povrer  to  levy  special  as.sessments,  since  it  is? 
embraced  in  the  general  grant  of  legislative  power,  which  in 
turn  includes  the  power  of  taxation.  Special  constitutional  pro- 
visions are,  however,  occasionally  to  be  found  which  specifically 
authorize  assessments.  Full  effect  is  of  course  given  to  these 
provisions  in  all  cases  coming  within  the  scope  thereof.^  The 
constitution  of  Arkansas  provides,  "Nothing  in  this  constitution 
shall  be  so  construed  as  to  prohibit  the  General  Assembly  from 
authorizing  assessments  on  real  property  for  local  improvement , 


*  For  tiie  further  discussion  of  this 
particular  topic   see  Chapter  XIII. 

^  Ahern  v.  Board  of  Improvement 
District  No.  3  of  Texarkana,  69  Ark. 
(i8.  61  S.  W.  575  [1901];  Crane  v. 
Siloam  Springs,  67  Ark.  30,  55  S. 
W.  955  [1899];  Carson  v.  St.  Fran- 
cis Levee  District,  59  Ark.  513,  27 
S.  W.  590  [1894];  Little  Rock  v. 
Fatzenstein.  52  Ark.  107,  12  S.  W. 
198  [1889];  Davis  v.  Gaines,  48  Ark. 
370,  3  S.  W.  184  1 1886]  ;  City  of 
Little  Rock  v.  Board  of  Improve- 
ments, etc.,  42  Ark.  152  [1883]; 
ftivins  V.  City  of  Chicago,  188  111. 
348,  58  N.  e".  912  [1900]:  Chicago 
&  Northwestern  Railway  Company  v. 
Village  of  Elmhurst,  165  111.  148,  46 
N.  E.  437  [1897];  Chicago  &  Alton 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  Joliet. 
153  111.  649,  39  N.  E.  1077  [1894]: 
Jones  V.  Town  of  Lake  View,  151  111. 
663,  38  N.  E.  688  [1894];  McChesney 
V.  Village  of  Hyde  Park.  151  111.  634. 
37  N.  E.  858'  [1894];  Kuehner  v. 
City  of  Freeport,  143  111.  92,  17  L. 
R.  A.  774,  32  N.  E.  372  [1893], 
Smith  V.  People  ex  rel.  Detrick.  140 
111.  355,  29  N.  E.  676  [1893];  Snri-i 
ger  V.  Walters.  139  111.  419,  28  N.  E. 
761  [1893]  ;  Wilson  v.  Board  of  Trus- 
tees of  the  Sanitary  District  of  Chi- 
cnw,  133  111.  443.  27  N.  '^.  203 
[1891];    Wilbur    v.    City    of    Spring- 


field, 123  111.  395,  14  X.  E.  871 
[1889];  Blake  v.  People  for  use  of 
Caldwell,  109  111.  504  [1884];  Dun- 
ham V.  People  ex  rel.  McCrea,  96  111. 
331  [1880];  White  v.  People  ex  rel. 
City  of  Bloomington,  94  111.  604 
[1880];  Lake  v.  City  of  Decatur,  91 
111.  596  [1879]:  Ricketts  v.  Village 
of  Hyde  Park,  85  III.  110  [1877]; 
People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Sherman,  83 
111.  165  [1876];  People  ex  rel.  Mil- 
ler v.  Brislin.  80  111.  423  [1875]; 
Hines  v.  City  of  Leavenworth,  3  Kan. 
180  [1865]":  Excelsior  Planting  & 
Manufacturing  Company  v.  Green, 
39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So.  873  [1887]; 
McGee  v.  Board  of  County  Commis- 
sioners of  Hennepin  County,  84 
Minn.  472,  88  N.  W.  6  [1901];"  Scott 
County  v.  Hinds,  50  Minn.  204.  52 
X.  W.  523  [1892];  State  of  Minne- 
sota ex  rel.  Stateler  v.  Reis,  38  Minn. 
371,  38  N.  W.  97  [1888];  Dowlan  v. 
Coimty  of  Sibley,  36  Minn.  430,  31 
N.  W.'  517  [1887]:  City  of  St.  Paul 
v.  Mullen,  27  Minn.  78,"  6  N.  W.  424 
[1880];  Rogers  v.  City  of  St.  Paul, 
22  Minn.  494  [1876];  Darst  v.  Grif- 
fin, 31  Neb.  668,  48  N.  W.  819  [1891]  ; 
State  of  Nebraska  ex  rel.  Abbott  v. 
Board  of  T'oiintv  Commissioners  of 
Dodge  Countv.  8  Neb.  124.  30  Am. 
Rep.  819  [18791:  TTurford  v.  City  of 
Omaha,    4   Xeb.    336    [1876]:    Hansen 


165 


CONSTITITIOXAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§103 


in  towns  and  citieo,  '.mdt'r  siieh  reguhitions  as  may  he  prescribed 
by  law  to  be  based  upon  the  consent  of  a  majority  in  value  of 
the  property  adjoining  the  locality  to  be  affected,  but  such  as- 
sessments shall  be  ad  valorem  and  uniform.  .  .  .  "^  Whatever 
questions  may  be  raised  under  such  a  provision  there  can  be  no 
doubt  as  to  the  possi'oilit.v  of  providing  for  assessments,  within 
the  limits  of  such  constitutional  provision  which  shall  be  free 
from  constitutional  objections.''  A  statute  which  provides  foi 
an  assessment  but  does  not  provide  for  securing  the  assent  of 
the  property-  owners  is.  under  such  a  provision,  unconstitutional.^ 
The  constitution  of  IMassachusetts  provides  that  the  legislature 
shall  have  power  "to  impose  and  levy  proportional  and  rea- 
sonable assessments,  rates  and  taxes.  "^  This  provision  is  re- 
garded as  a  restriction  as  well  as  a  grant  of  powder,  and  under 
it  a  statute  which  authorizes  an  assessment  without  a  correspond- 
ing equivalent  in  benefits  is  unconstitutional.''  It  is  this  pro- 
vision which  controls  in  case  of  such  assessments  and  not  the 
provision.'  which  forbids  taking  private  property,  except  by  eon- 
sent  of  the  owner  thereof,  unless  reasonable  compensation  is 
made."*     On  the  other  hand  an  assessment  which  is  in  proportion 


V.  Hammer.  15  Wash.  3]o.  4G  Pac. 
332  [1S901.  And  see  upon  tlsis  ques- 
tion Milwaukee  Kleetvi  •  Eailway  & 
Liglit  Company  v.  (it'.'  of  Milwau- 
kee. 05  Wis.  42.  09  X.  W.  T'.KI  1 1807]  : 
Dean  v.  I'.oreliseniu^,  30  Wis.  230 
[18721. 

-Article  XIX..  S  27.  Constitution 
of  Arkansas. 

^  Crane  v.  Siloam  Sprin{];s.  67  Ark. 
30,  55  S.  W.  055  [18001;  Little  Rock 
V.  Katzenstein.  52  Ark.  107.  12  S. 
W.    198    [18801. 

*  (  raig  V.  Bnard  of  Improvements 
of  Kusselville  Water  Works  Improve- 
ment District.  84  Ark.  300.  105  S.  W. 
867     [19071. 

''Part.  II..  (  IkM'-  1.8  1.  Alt.  IV.. 
Constitution  of  Massacliusetts. 

'  Harwood  v.  Donovan.  188  Mass. 
487.  74  X.  E.  914  [19051,  (a  case 
in  which  the  plaintifT  was  not.  how- 
ever, avowed  to  take  advantage  of 
the  \nicojistitutionality  of  tlie  stat- 
uteK       Edwards     v.     nruorton.     184 


Mass.  529,  G9  X.  E.  328  [1904]  ;  Har- 
wood  V.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 
City  of  Boston,  183  Mass.  348.  07  N. 
E.  302  [19031:  White  v.  Gove.  183 
ilass.  333,  67  X".  E.  350  [1903]: 
Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 
City  of  Boston,  180  Jda.ss.  274,  62 
X.  E.  307  [10021:  Lorden  v.  CofTej-, 
178  Mass.  489.  60  X.  E.  124  [19011; 
Dexter  v.  City  of  Boston,  176  Mass. 
247,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  300,  57  X\  E. 
379  [19001;  Lincoln  v.  Board  of 
Street  Commissioners  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  170  ]\Iass.  210.  57  X.  E.  356 
[1900];  Sears  v.  Street  Commi-sion- 
crs  of  Boston.  173  Mass.  350.  53  X\ 
E.  870  [1899]:  Weed  v.  Mayor  and 
.-\ldermen  of  Bo«ton.  172  ^Ias=.  28. 
42  L.  R.  A.  (112.  51  X.  E.  204  [18981. 

"Part  I.  (Bill  of  Ri-lits).  Art.  X.. 
Constitution    of    Massachu-etts. 

"  Wee<l  V.  Mayiu"  and  Aldermen  of 
Boston.  172  Mass.  28.  42  L.  R.  A. 
042.   51    X".   E.   204    [1808]. 


§  104  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1()G 

to  the  special  benefits  conferred  and  not  in  excess  of  the  amonnt 
of  such  benefits  is  not  invalidated  by  this  clause  of  the  consti- 
tution.^ 

S  104.     Grant  held  to  imply  restriction. 

The  diiScult  questions  raised  under  such  provisions  are  (1) 
vrhat  assessments  are  included  within  the  scope  of  such  provi- 
sions, and  (2)  whether  such  provisions  impliedly  forbid  assess- 
ment other  than  those  included  in  their  provisions.  The  greater 
number  of  these  specific  constitutional  provisions  authorizinjj-  as- 
sessments have  been  adopted  because  of  judicial  decisions  ren- 
dered prior  to  the  adoption  of  such  provisions  which  either  en- 
tirely prevented  or  greatly  restricted  the  power  of  levying  local 
assessments.  Such  specific  provisions,  it  may  be  added,  are  com- 
paratively*few  in  number  because  in  most  states  the  provisions 
ordinarily  found  in  constitutions  are  so  construed  as  to  make  it 
possible  to  levy  and  apportion  assessments  in  a  practicable  man- 
ner,^ and  it  is,  as  a  ride,  only  in  jurisdictions  where  the  con- 
struction placed  upon  the  ordinary  constitutional  provisions  is 
contrary  to  the  v.^eight  of  authority  that  such  special  provisions 
have  been  found  to  be  necessary.  In  Illinois  the  courts  held 
originally  that  assessments  must  be  apportioned  solely  according 
to  benefits,  and  that  apport'onment  by  the  front  foot  was  neces- 
sarily unconstitutional."  The  constitution  which  was  adopted  in 
1870  contained  the  following  provision:  "The  general  assembly 
may  vest  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and  villages 
with  power  to  make  local  improvements  by  special  ass-^ssment  or 
Vy  special  taxation  of  contiguous  property  or  otherwise.  .  .  .  "  '^ 
Under  this  provision,  whatever  questions  have  arisen,  there 
has  been  no  doubt  of  the  validity  of  statutes,  conferring 
upon  the  authorities  of  cities,  towns  or  villages  the  power  to  levy 

Mlieney    v.    City    of    Bcvorley.    188  ^  See   §   86. 

Mass.     si,    74    N.    E.     300     [1905];  =  City   of   Chicago   v.   Eaer,   41    111. 

Smith    V.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of  "OG   [1866];   City  of  Ottawa  v.  Spen- 

Worcester,    1?2    Mass.   232,    59   L.    R.  cer,  40  111.  211    [1860];   City  of  Chi- 

A.  728,  65  N.  E.  40    [1902];   Hall  v.  c?,oo    v.    Earned,    34    111.    203    [1864]. 

Street  Comirissioners  of  Br^ston,   177  "  hess   decisions  were   rendered   und^r 

Mass.  434,  59  N.  E.  68  [1901];  Jones  the  Constitution  of  1848.     See  §§  51. 

V.    Board    of    Aldermen    of    the    City  101. 

.•f    Boston,    104    Mass.    461     [1870];  ^  Art.  IX.,  §  9,  Constitution  of  Illi- 

i:)organ    v.    City    of    Boston,    12    All.  nois,    1870.                                  * 
(9-1    Mass.)    223    [1866]. 


167 


CONSTITUTIONAL   RESTRICTION    APPLICVBLE,    ETC. 


104 


.special  assessments.*  This  provision  of  the  constitution  of  Illi- 
nois of  1870  has  been  regarded  not  only  as  granting  the  power 
of  special  as.ses?ment  as  therein  set  forth.  YvA  also  as  prohibiting 
the  legislature  from  conferring  the  power  of  special  assessment 
in  any  war  othor  thnn  as  therpin  sot  fortli."  Accordingly  it 
was  held  that  tbe  rni-cpr  of  snpc'al  assessment  conld  not  be  con- 
ferred nr>on  anv  other  corporation  than  a  city,  a  town,  or  a 
villatre:  that  is.  it  conUI  not  be  conferred  upon  a  drainage  dis- 
trict"." To  meet  this  rl'fficnltv  an  amendment  was  made  to  the 
con.stitntion  of  1870.  which  provided:  "The  general  assembly 
may  pass  laws  permitting  the  owners  of  lands  to  construct  drains, 
ditches  and  levees  for  agricultural,  sanitary  or  mining  purposes 
across  the  lands  of  others:  and  provide  for  the  organization  of 
drainage  districts  and  vest  the  corporate  authorities  thereof  with 
power  to  construct  and  maintain  levees,  drains  and  ditches,  and 
to  keep  in  repair  all  drains,  ditches  and  levees  heretofore  con- 
structed under  the  laws  of  this  state  by  special  assessment  upon 
the  property  benefited  thereby."  Under  this  provision  the  power 
of  the  legislature  to  create  special  drainage  districts  and  to  em- 
power them  to  levy  special  assessments  cannot  be  questioned;^ 
and  it  has  been  held  tliat  the  legislature  may,  under  this  pro- 
vision, confer  power  upon  cities  and  villa.ges  to  levy  assessments 


'City  of  Chicafro  v.  Brede.  218  Til. 
528,  75  N.  E.  1044  [19051;  Givins  v. 
(  ity  of  Chicago.  188  111.  348,  58  N. 
E.  "912  [1900];  Chicago  &  Nortli- 
\vo«tern  Railway  Company  v.  Village 
of  Elmhurst,  ir,5  111.  148.  40  N.  E. 
437  [1897];  Chicago  &  Alton  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Citv  of  Joliet,  153 
111.  G49,  39  X.  E.  1077  [1894];  Mc- 
Chesney  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park.  151 
111.  034.  37  X.  E.  858  [1894];  Kueh- 
uor  V.  City  of  Freeport.  143  111.  92. 
17  L.  R.  a".  774.  32  X.  E.  372  [1893]  ; 
Wilbur  V.  City  of  Sprin^fu-ld.  123  111. 
395,  14  X.  E.  871  [18891:  Huston 
V.  Clark.  112  111.  344  [1885].  Dun- 
ham V.  People  ex  rel.  ^TcCrea.  90  111. 
331  [1880];  White  v.  People  ex  nd. 
City  of  P.lonmington.  94  111.  004 
[1880];  Lake  v.  City  of  Deeatur,  91 
111.    596    [1879]:    Fagan    v.    Citv    of 


Chicago,  84  III.  227  [1870];  People 
ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Sherman.  83  111. 
105  [1870]:  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v. 
Pfisliu.    80   111.    423    [1875]. 

=  Civins  V.  City  of  Chicago.  188  111. 
348.   58   X.   E.   912    [1900]. 

•=  Updike  V.  Wright.  81  111.  49 
[1876]. 

'  Commis>^ioners  of  Iliirhways  of 
the  Town  of  Colfax  v.  Commission- 
ers of  East  Lake  Fork  Special  Drain- 
age District.  127  111.  581.  21  X.  E. 
206  [1890]:  Samuels  v.  Drainage 
Commissioners.  125  111.  53(i.  17  X.  E. 
^^29  [1889];  Fileour  v.  Drainage 
f'ommis-ioners.  Ill  Til.  342  [1885]: 
r>lake  V.  People  for  u«e  of  Caldwell. 
I(t9  111.  504  [18841:  ^Nfoore  v.  Peoi.le 
t'\  rel.  Lewis.  106  III.  370  [1S831, 
decided  under  the  amendment  Article 
TV.,   §   31. 


§  104  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  168 

for  the  purpose  of  drainage.-  Under  the  ct)nstitution  of  ]\Iiune- 
sota,  which  contained  the  provision.  "Ail  taxes  to  be  raised  in 
this  state  shall  be  as  nearly  equal  as  may  be.  and  all  property 
on  which  taxes  are  to  be  levied  shall  have  a  cash  valuation  and 
be  equalized  and  uniform  throughout  the  state,""  it  was  held 
that  such  provision  included  -local  assessments  under  the  term 
'taxes.'  and  prevented  the  legislature  from  levying  assessments 
on  the  theory  of  benefits  or  apportioning  assessments  according 
to  the  benefits  accruing  to  the  property  assessed  by  reason  oi 
the  improvement  for  which  such  assessment  was  levied,  or  ap- 
portioning the  assessments  on  any  basis,  but  that  of  a  cash  valu- 
ation.'" Following  this  decision  the  constitution  of  ^Minnesota 
was  amended  so  as  to  include  the  further  provision,  "the 
legislature  may  by  general  law  or  special  act  authorize  mu- 
nicipal corporations  t)  lew  assessments  for  local  improvements 
upon  the  property  fronting  upon  such  improvements  or  upon 
the  property  to  be  benefited  by  such  improvements  without  re- 
gard to  a  cash  valuation  and  in  such  manner  as  the  legislature 
maj'  prescribe.""  Under  this  amendment  the  power  of  the  legis- 
lature to  levy  assessments  for  local  improvements  without  refer- 
ence to  the  cash  valuation  of  the  property  upon  which  such  as- 
sessment is  levied  is  clearly  established.'-  Subseqnentlv  some  diffi- 
culty was  experienced  in  levying  assessments  for  waterpipes/^ 
and  accordingly  the  constitution  of  Minnesota  was  further  so 
amended  as  to  include  the  provision,  "And  provided,  further, 
that  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  the  expenses  of  laying  water- 
pipes  and  supplying  any  city  or  municipality  with  water,  the 
legislature  may  by  general  or  special  law  authorize  any  such 
city  or  municipality  having  a  population  of  five  thousand  or 
more  to  levy  an  annual  tax  or  assessment  upon  the  lineal  foot 


*  McChesney  v.  Village  of  Hyde  '-  McGee  v.  Board  of  County  Corn- 
Park.  151  111.  634,  37  X.  E.  858  niissioners  of  Hennepin  County.  84 
[1894];  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Minn.  472,  88  N.  W.  6  [1901]  ;  State 
Spencer,  118  111.  44G.  8  X.  E.  846  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Stateler  v.  Eels. 
[1888].  38   Minn.   371,   38  N.  W.  97    [1888]; 

"Art.     IX..     §     1,    Constitution     of  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Mullen,  27  Minn. 

Minnesota    [1857].  78.   6   X.   W.   424    [1880];    Rogers   v. 

"Stinson    v.    Smith.    8    :\Iinn.    366,  City     of     St.     Paul.     22     Minn.     494 

8  Gil.  326  [1863].  [1876]. 

"Art.  IX.,  §  1,  Constitution  of  "  :Minnesota  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Pal- 
Minnesota  as  amended  in  1869:  Laws  mer.  20  Minn.  468.  20  Cil.  -124 
1869,   Ch.   51.  [1874]. 


169  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION     APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  105 

of  all  lands  fronting'  on  any  water  main  or  water  pipe  laid  by 
such  city  or  niunicipality  Avithin  corporate  limits  of  said  city 
for  supplying  water  to  the  citizens  thereof  without  regard  to 
the  cash  value  of  such  property ;  and  to  empower  such  city  to 
collect  any  such  tax  assessments  or  fines  or  penalties  for  failure 
to  pay  the  same  or  any  fine  or  penalty  for  any  violation  of  the 
niles  of  such  city  or  mnnieirality  in  regard  to  the  use  of  Avater. 

or  for  any  water  rate  due  for  the  same "  ^*     Under  this 

provision  the  power  of  levying  assessments  for  the  purpose  of 
constructing  water  pipes  is  thoroughly  established  as  far  as  the 
state  constitution  is  concerned,^^  though  with  some  doubt  as  to 
the  validity  of  such  apportionment  under  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States^®  as  construed  at  one  time  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States.^'  a  doubt  which  at  one  time  led  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  ^linnesota  to  hold  such  assessments  invalid/* 
but  which  was  subsequently  resolved  in  favor  of  their  validity.^" 
In  Wisconsin  it  has  been  said  that  the  power  of  assessment 
existed  only  by  virtue  of  the  express  grant  of  the  power  of  as- 
sessment, and  could  not  be  sustained  under  the  general  grant 
of  the  taxing  power.-" 

§  105.     Grant  held  not  to  imply  restriction. 

Where  the  other  provisions  of  the  constitution  as  eon.strued 
by  the  court  do  not  impose  any  serious  restrictions  upon  local 
assessments,  such  provisions  as  those  referred  to  in  this  section, 
are  not  usually  regarded  as  the  source  of  legislative  power  con- 
cerning assessments;  nor  are  they  regarded  as  restrictions  upon 
legislative  power.  The  constitution  of  Arkansas  provides  :  "Noth- 
ing in  this  constitution  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  [)rohibit  the 
general  assembly  from  authorizing  assessments  on  real  property 
for  loeal  improvements  in  towns  and  eities  uiuler  such  reg'.ilations 

"Alt.     TX..    §     1.    rnn'-tituti.in     nf  paiiy.    S2    Minn.    .300,    8.5    X.    W.    207 

"Mimiosotn,  ainr-inlfvl    ISSl.  110011;    siiib   nomine   Rani.sev   County 

'   State   of   ^Minnosnta    v.   Rohort    P.  v.    RoliPit    P.   Lewis   Company.   53   L. 

T,c\vi^  Coiiipany.  72  Minn.  87:    75  N.  H.   A.   421    [18081. 

W.   108    [1808]:    .s»&   iwniinr  Ramso\'  '"State    v.    Rolieit    P.    I>e\vis    Com- 

Covinty  V.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Company.  jiany.    82    Alinii.    402.    Sfi    X.    W.    611 

42  L.  R.  A.  630.  f  10011;  ftiih  iKuniiir  Ramsey  Conntv 
'"Amendment  XTV.  v.  Robert  P.  T-ewis  Company.  .)3  L. 
"Xorwood  V.  Baker.  172  V.  S.  260.  R.  A.  427. 

43  T>.  443,  10  S.  187  [1808].  ="  Weeks  v.  City  of  Milwiukec.  10 
'"-State    V.    Robert    P.    Lewis    Com-  Wis.    242    [1860]. 


§  105  TAXATION    BV    ASSESSMENT.  170 

as  may  be  prescribed  by  law,  to  be  based  upon  the  consent  oi 
a  majority  in  value  of  the  property  holders  owning  property 
adjoininjj'  the  locality  to  be  affected;  but  su.ch  assessments  shall 
be  ad  valorem  and  uniform."^  Under  this  provision  it  has 
been  held  that  the  legislature  may  confer  the  power  of  local 
assessment  upon  some  public  corporation  or  quasi  corporatioi 
other  than  a  city  or  a  town,  such  as  a  levee  district.-  The  leg- 
islature may.  also,  under  this  provision,  create  an  improvement 
district  ^  which  may  embrace  the  entire  area  of  a  city  or  town.* 
The  constitution  of  Nebraska  contains  the  provision:  "The  leg- 
islature may  vest  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and 
villages  with  power  to  make  local  improvements  by  special  as- 
sessment or  by  special  taxation  of  the  property  benefited."^ 
There  have  not  been,  under  the  construction  placed  upon  the 
general  provisions  of  the  Nebraska  constitution  by  the  courts 
of  that  state,  any  especial  restrictions  upon  the  power  of  levying 
special  assessments.  The  foregoing  provision  is  not.  therefore,  re- 
garded in  that  state  as  the  sole  source  of  the  power  to  levy  local  as- 
sessments, nor  is  it  regarded  as  preventing  the  legislature  fron 
conferring  upon  other  municipal  corporations  or  public  quasi 
corporations  the  power  of  levying  special  assessments;  but  on 
the  contrary,  such  power  is  held  to  be  embraced  in  the  power 
of  taxation,  included  in  the  grant  of  legislative  power,  and  is 
not  to  be  restricted  by  this  specific  provision.*^  Accordingly 
such   power  may  be   conferred  upon   cou.nties.'     In   this  respect 

•Art.    XIX..    §    27.   Constitution   of  Xeb.    124,    30    Am.    Rep.    819    [1879]. 

Arkansas    [1874].  As   originally   expressed   the   view   of 

-Ritter  v.  Drainage  District  Xo.  1.  the  court  was  that  the  right  of  local 

Poinsett    County,    78    Ark.    580.    94  assessment   rested   on   this   clause  ex- 

S.    W.    711     [1906];     Carson    v.    St.  clusively.     Hurford   v.   City  of  Oma- 

Francis  Levee  Distri-t.   59  Ark.  513,  lia.   4   Xeb.   336    [1876]. 

27     S.     W.     590     [1S94];     Davis     v.  '  Darst   v.   Griffin,   31   Xeb.   668,   48 

Gaines    48    Ark.    370.    3    S.    W.    184  X.  W.  819   [1891];   State  of  Xebras- 

[1886].  ka  ex  rel.  Abbott  v.  Board  of  County 

■''  (  ity   of   Littk^    Rock    v.    Board   of  Commissioners    of    Dodge    County,    8 

Improvements,     etc.,     42     Ark.      152  Xeb.  124.  30  Am.  Rep.  819   [1S79]. 

[1883].  ^Updilve     v.     Wright.     81     Ilk     -!9 

^  Crane  v.  Siloam  Springs.  67  Ark.  [1876];      Board      of      Directors      for 

30,  55  S.  W.  955   [1899].  Leveein<i   ^y abash    River   v.    Houston. 

=  Art.  IX.,  §  6.  Constitiition  of  Xe-  71   III.  318    [1874];   Gage  v.  Graham, 

bra'^ka.  57  Ilk  1J4   [1870]-.   He^sler  v.  Drain- 

"  Darst   V.   Griffin,  31   Xeb.   668,   48  acre      Commissioners.      53      111.      105 

X.  W.   819    [1891];    State  of  Xebras-  [1870];  Harward  v.  St.  Clair  &  :\r'>n- 

ka  ex  rel.  Abbott  v.  Board  of  County  roe  Levee  Drainage  Company.  51    111. 

Commissioners    of    Dodge    County,    8  130   [1869]. 


171  CONSTITTTIOXAT-    KESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  K^'"^ 

the  courts  of  Nebraska  differ  from  those  of  Illinois.'"  I'lider  the 
provision  in  the  constitution  of  California,  the  legislature  is 
not  limited  to  the  creation  of  cities  and  towns  as  the  sole  public 
corporations  upon  which  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments 
may  be  conferred  but  may  create  other  public  corporations, 
such  as  irrigation  districts,''  and  confer  upon  such  district 
the  power  of  special  assessment.  The  constitution  of  Ohio  pro- 
vides: "The  general  assembly  shall  provide  for  the  organization 
of  cities  and  incorporated  villages  by  general  laws,  and  restrict 
their  power  of  taxation,  assessment,  borrowing  money,  contract- 
ing debts  and  loaning  their  credit  so  as  to  prevent  the  abuse 
of  such  power.  "^"  T'uder  this  provision  local  assessments  are 
held  to  be  valid."  This  provision  is  held  on  the-  one  hand  to 
show  conclusively  that  local  assessment  is  distinct  from  the 
power  of  general  taxation ;  and  on  the  other  hand  it  is  held  not 
to  limit  the  power  of  the  legi.slature  or  to  restrict  its  action  in 
■conferring  the  power  of  special  assessment  to  "cities  and  incor- 
porated villages."^-  Accordingly,  the  power  of  local  assessment 
may  be  conferred  upon  township  trustees.^'  The  constitution 
of  Fouth  Dakota  contains  the  provision.  "The  legislnture  may 
vest  the  corporate  authority  of  cities,  towns  and  villages  with 
power  to  make  local  improvements  by  special  taxation  of  con- 
tiguo:'s  property  or  othei^vise." '^  The  constitution  of  Wash- 
ington provides:  "The  legislature  may  vest  the  corporate  au- 
thorities of  cities,  towns  and  villages  with  the  power  to  make 
local  improvements  by  special  assessment  or  by  special  taxation 
of  property  benefited.  For  jill  corporate  purposes  all  municipal 
corporations  may  be  vested  with  authority  to  assess  and  collect 
taxes,  and  such  taxes  sh;ill  be  uniform  in  respect  to  persons  and 
property  within  the  jurisdict'on  of  the  body  levying  the  same."^"' 
AV'lhout  anv  discussion  of  the  ouestion  it  was  at  first  assumed 
that   under   this   provision    the   legi.slature   had    power   to   create 

®  In  tlio  matter  of  tho  Bonds  of  tho  '-' Rpcvps     v.     Tipasurpi-     if     Wood 

Madera    Irrijration    District.    02    Cai.  County,   8   O.   S.   333    [18581. 

290.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  100.  14  L.  R.  A.  "Reeves     v.     Treasurer     of     Wood 

75.).  28  Pac.  272.   f)75    [1891].  County,   8   O.   S.   333    [18581. 

'V^rtifle    XTTT..    §    fi.    Constitution  "Art.    XT..    §    10.    Constitution    of 

of  CM  .    [lS.-il  1.  Sout'i    Dal-«ta. 

"Hill    V.    Ui-r.ion.    .')    0.    S.   243.   67  ''Art.    Vll..    §    9.    Constitution    of 

Am.  Dec.  289   [1855].  Washington. 


U05 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


172 


i^peeial  taxing  districts/''  such  as  an  irrigation  district/'  a  road 
district/*  or  a  district  for  constructing  dikes/**  and  to  confer 
upon  such  district  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments  to  pay 
for  such  improvements.  When  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
confer  such  power  upon  taxing  districts  was  attacked  specifically, 
it  was  held  that  the  legislature  possessed  such  power.-"  Under 
this  provision  it  has  been  held  that  a  drainage  statute  requiring 
the  commissioners  to  submit  the  scheme  of  drainage  to  the  court, 
in  order  that  the  court  may  determine  whether  such  scheme  is 
practical,  conducive  to  public  welfare  and  beneficial  to  the  land 
to  be  drained ;  and  further  requiring  damages  and  benefits  to  be 
estimated  by  a  jury,  and  transcript  of  such  proceedings  to  be 
certified  to  the  county  auditor  who  then  proceeds  to  make  such 
assessment,  is  valid,  as  it  does  not  confer  upon  either  the  court 
or  the  jury  the  power  of  making  such  assessments.-^  So  a  stat- 
ute on  the  subject  of  assessments  for  street  improvements  which 
allows  the  city  to  take  the  initiative  in  the  question  of  levying 
assessments,  but  provides  that  the  court  shall  appoint  commis 
sioners  to  make  apportionment  of  such  assessment,  and  that  the 
court  shall  on  objection  review  such  assessment,  and  shall  cor- 
rect inequalities  therein,  is  held  to  be  valid,  as  conferring  the 
power  to  make  the  assessment  upon  the  city  and  not  upon  the 
court.-- 


'"  Cass  V.  Dicks,  14  Wash.  75,  53 
Am.  St.  Rep.  859,  44  Pac.  113  [1896] ; 
Seanor  v.  Board  of  County  Commis- 
sioners, 13  ^Yasl).  48.  42  Pac.  552 
[1895];  Board  of  Directors  of  Mid- 
dle Kittitas  Irrigation  District  v. 
Peterson,  4  Wash.  147.  29  Pac.  995 
[1892]. 

"  Board  of  Directors  of  Middle  Kit- 
titas Irrigation  District  v.  Peterson. 
4  W^ash.    147,   29   Pac.   995    [1892]. 

"  Seanor  v.  Board  of  County  Com- 
missioners, 13  Wash.  48.  42  Pac.  552 
[1895]. 

I'Cass  V.  Dicks,  14  Wash.  75,  53 
Am.  St.  Rep.  859.  44  Pac.  113  [189ti]. 

-"Hansen  v.  Hammer,  15  Wash. 
315,  46  Pac.  332  [1896],  The  court 
follows  the  holding  in  Nebraska : 
State  of  Nebraska  ex  rel.  Abbott  v. 
Board  of  Countv  Commissioners  of 
Dodge  rv.untv.  8  Neb.  124,  30  Am. 
Rep^    819     [1879].      See     ante,     this 


section,  notes  6,  7  and  8,  and  de- 
clined to  follow  the  holding  in  Illi- 
nois: Updike  V.  Wright,  81  111.  49 
[1876].  See  §  104,  pointing  out,  how- 
ever, a  slight  difference  in  phrase- 
ology between  the  Constitution  of 
Wasliington  on  tlie  one  hand,  and 
the  Constitutions  of  Illinois  and  Ne- 
braska on  the  other :  the  former  pro- 
viding "For  all  ciirporate  purpose* 
municipal  corpora,tions  may  be  vest- 
ed with  the  taxing  power/'  while  the 
two  latter  provide  in  such  connec- 
tion, "For  all  other  corporate  pui- 
poses." 

^  State  of  Washington  on  the  rela- 
tion of  Matsnn  v.  Superi.ir  Court  f  >•• 
Skagit  County,  42  Wash.  491,  85 
Pac.   204    [1906]. 

-^  In  the  matter  of 'Westlake  Ave- 
nue, Seattle.  40  Wash.  144,  82  Pac. 
279     [1905], 


173  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  lOG 

§  106.  Provisions  requiring  legislature  to  restrict  povver  of  as- 
sessment. 
In  maiiy  of  the  state  constitutions  are  to  be  found  provisions, 
variously  worded,  to  the  general  effect  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
legislature  to  restrict  the  power  of  assessment  as  conferred  upon 
public  corporations  so  as  to  i)reveiit  the  al)use  thereof.  Thesa 
provisions  are  as  follows:  "The  General  Assembly  shall  pro- 
vide .  .  .  for  the  organization  of  cities  .  .  .  a. id  .iicoriiorated 
towns,  and  restrict  their  power  of  taxation,  assessment,  borrow- 
ing money  and  contracting  debts  so  as  to  prevent  the  abuse  of 
such  power.  "^  Such  a  provision  evidently  pre-supposes  the 
existence  of  the  power  of  local  assessm.ent.'-  Whether  such 
provisions  impose  any  effective  restraint  upon  the  exercise  of 
the  power  of  local  assessment  is  a  more  difficult  question.  AVhere 
the  effect  of  such  provisions  upon  the  power  of  the  legislature 
has  been  considered,  it  has  been  held  that  such  provisions  are 
addressed  to  the  conscience  of  the  legislature,  that  by  the  oatli 
of  office  of  the  members  of  the  legislature  they  are  bound  to 
respect  and  enforce  such  provisions,  and  that  they  should  not 
pass  any  law  in  violation  thereof;  but  that  the  courts  cannot 
enforce  so  general  and  so  indefinite  a  rule  and  cannot  declare  <•: 
statute  to  be  unconstitutional  because  in  the  judgment  of  the 
court  it  does  not  restrict  the  power  of  public  corporations  suffi- 
ciently.^   The  question,  it  may  be  added    is  the  same  as  the  one 

^Article  XII.,  §  3,  Constitution  of  'City  of  Emporia  v.  Norton,  L3 
Arkansas.  Similar  provisions  are  Kan.  56!)  [1S74];  (on  roiioaring, 
found  in  Article  XTI.,  §  5,  Constitu-  IG  Kan.  23(5  [18761);  Hines  v.  City 
tioji  of  Kansas;  Article  XIV.,  §  13,  v.i  Leavenworth,  3  Kan.  186  (origi- 
Constitution  of  Michigan;  Article  iial  edition).  180  (second  edition), 
XL.  §  5,  Constitution  of  Mississippi;  |  18(i51  ;  Hurford  v.  City  of  Oma- 
Article  VI 11..  §  8,  Constitution  of  ha.  4  Xeb.  336;  Titft  v.  City 
Nevada:  Article  XII.,  §  1,  Constitu-  <.{  Buffalo,  82  N.  Y.  204  [1880]"; 
tion  of  New  York;  Article  VI.,  §  130,  In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Constitution  of  North  Dakota;  Arti-  Meade  to  Reduce  an  Assessment,  74 
cle  VIII..  §  4.  Constitution  of  North  N.  V.  216  |1878|;  (  ity  of  Raleigh 
Carolina;  Article  XIII.,  §  6,  Consti-  v.  Peace,  110  N.  C.  32."  17  L.  R.  A. 
tution  of  Ohio;  Article  XI.,  §  5,  Con.  330,  14  S.  E.  521  |1892];  Parsons 
stitution  of  Oregon;  Article  VIII.,  v.  City  of  Columhus.  50  O.  S.  460. 
§  3.  Constitution  of  South  Carolina;  :]4  N.  K.  677  |  1S!)31  ;  Raymond  v. 
Article  X..  §  I.  Constitution  of  South  Cleveland,  -12  O.  S.  522  [18851;  Ma- 
Dakota;  Article  XIII.,  §  3.  Consti-  loy  v.  City  of  :Marietta,  1 1  O.  S.  63rt 
tution  of  Wyoming.  [lS(i(»l;  Hill  v.  Higdon,  5  0.  S.  243. 
^Ridenour  v.  Saffin,  1  Handy  67  Am.  Dec.  280  [18551;  Faddevly 
(Ohio)    464    [18551.                                '  v.    Portland.    44    Ore.     118,    74    Pac. 


§  107  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  174 

presented  in  cases  involving  general  taxation,  since  the  consti- 
tutional provisions  already  quoted  apply  to  taxation  as  well  as 
to  special  assessment.  The  conclusion  reached  in  cases  of  spe- 
cial assessment  is  the  same  as  that  reached  in  cases  of  general 
taxation.  Indeed  it  has  been  held  that  these  provisions  apply 
to  general  taxation  alone  and  not  to  special  assessments.*  How- 
ever, in  all  these  cases  the  statute  which  authorized  the  assess- 
ment contained  some  restrictions,  showing  that  the  legislature 
had  made  some  attempt,  though  possibly  an  inadequate  one,  to 
comply  with  the  constitutional  mandate.  It  may  fairly  be  looked 
upon  as  still  an  open  question,  whether  a  statute  which  imposed 
no  restriction  of  any  sort  could  be  held  to  be  uneonstitutiona' 
as  being  in  violation  of  these  provisions.  Such  a  question,  how- 
ever, is  not  likelv  to  arise  for  two  reasons :  First,  because  no 
legislature  is  at  all  likely  to  pass  such  a  statute;  and  second, 
because  if  it  did,  such  statute  would  in  all  probability  be  in 
violation  of  other  specific  and  more  definite  constitutional  prr 
visions.  A  statute  providing  for  the  levy  of  local  assessments 
must,  therefore,  be  construed  as  restricting  the  power  of  the  pub- 
lic corporation  to  which  is  given  authority  to  levy  such  assess- 
ment.^ 

§  107.     Provisions  forbidding  assessment. 

The  constitution  of  Virginia,  which  went  into  effect  June  10, 
1902,  contains  a  provision,  "No  city  or  town  shall  impose  any 
tax  or  assessment  on  abuttino-  land-owners  or  other  public  local 
improvements,  except  for  making  and  improving  the  walkways 
upon  existing  streets  and  improving  and  paving  the  existing  alleys 
and  for  their  construction  or  for  the  rise  of  sewers."^  The 
same  constitution  contained  a  provision  that  every  city  having 
a  municipal  charter  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  consti- 
tution might  retain  the  same,  except  so  far  as  it  might  be  re 
pealed  or  amended  by  the  general  assembly,  but  "that  every 
such  charter  is  hereby  amended  so  as  to  conform  to  all  the  pro- 
visions, restrictions,  limitations  and  powers  set  forth  in  this  ar- 

710,  75  Pac.  222    [190.3]:    Milwaukee  C.  .32,   17  L.  R.  A.  330.   14  S.  E.  521 

Electric    Railway    &    Light    Company  [1892]. 

V.    City    of    Milwaukee.    95    Wis.    42.  'Bailey    v.    City    of    Zanesville,    20 

69  N.  W.  796  [1897];  Dean  v.  Borcb-  Ohio   C.   C.   236    [1900]. 

.■3enius,   30   Wis.    236    [1872].  ^  Art.  VTTT.,  §   170.  Constitution  of 

*City  of  Raleigh   v.   Peace,    110   X.  Virginia    [19021. 


175  CONSTITFTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  |5  lOS 

tide  or  otherwise  provided  in  the  constitutiou." -'  The  schedule 
of  the  constitution  contained  a  provision.  "Except  as  modified 
by  this  constitution,  all  suits,  actions  and  causes  of  action,  prose- 
cutions, ritihts  of  individuals,  of  bodies  corporate  and  politic, 
and  of  the  state  shall  continue;"^  and  also  a  provision.  "All 
taxes  accrued  or  aceruin<i-  to  the  commonwealth  or  to  any  po- 
litical subdivision  thereof  under  laws  now  in  force  shall,  under 
this  constitution,  enure  to  the  use  of  the  commonwealth  or  ol 
s^^ch  suV)division  thereof.''^  Under  these  provisions  it  was  held 
that  an  assessment  for  pavin.g:  a  street  authorized  by  the  chartei 
l)rior  to  the  taking  effect  of  the  new  constitution,  but  not  ac- 
tually made  until  after  such  constitution  took  effect,  was  even 
if  a  "tax,"  still  not  one  "accrued  or  accriiing;"  and  hence 
that  such  assessment  was  prohibited  by  the  constitution.^  II 
some  assessments  were  perfected  and  some  not  perfected  whe:; 
this  constitutional  provision  took  effect,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  assessments  not  perfected  then  could  not  be  perfected  there- 
after, and  that  on  account  of  the  constitutional  requirement  oi 
v.nif.irmity  "  the  assessments  already  perfected  could  not  ];e  en 
forced  since  it  was  impossible  to  enforce  the  other  assessments  for 
the  same  improvement." 

§  108.     Equal  protection  of  law. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  those  of  many  of 
the  states  contain  provisions  securing  the  e'pnd  iiroteetion  of 
the  laws  to  persons  affected  thereby.  These  provisions,  re(iuir- 
ing  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  are  often  found  in  constitutions 
united  so  closely  with  the  provisions  for])idding  the  taking  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law  that  the  two  classes  of  pro- 
visions are  often  discussed  together.'  The  clause  of  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  which  contains  this  provision  is  as  fol- 

"Art.  XIII..  §    117.  (oiistitutiim  of  '  Fiold    v.    Barlicr    Asplialt    P:ivin<,' 

Virtrinia     [1002].  (■oiiii)any.   liU   I'.  S.  (ilS.  48  L.   1142. 

'Sec.  3,  Schedulo  of  Coiislitiitu.ii  of  24    S.    784    |1!)041.    (niodifviim    ^^'^t-Ul 

Virginia   [lfl02].  v.   Harber   Asphalt   Paving   Company, 

*Sec.  4.  S.-lio(Inlc  of  ("oiistitutioM  (»f  117     Fed.     Oi'.i     [1902]):     Hagar    "v. 

Vircrinia    [!i)l)21.  Rcidaination     District     No.     lOS.     Ill 

Clicks   V.  (  ity  of   Piisti.].    102   Va.  V.  S.  701.  28  L.  .5(J0.  4  S.  fifi3  [1884]; 

Sfil.  47   S.  E.   inoi    [1904].  PittslnirLOi.  Cincinnati.  Chicago  &  St. 

°  Spp   §    101.  Louis    Railway    Company    v.    Taher, 

'FnlK-crson   v.   C  itv   of  Pvi^tol.    in.")  108  Ind.  419.  77  X.  E.  741    [1906]. 
Va.  555.  54   S.   E.   408    [1900]. 


§  108 


TAXATION    BY    ASSF-SSMENT. 


176 


lows:  "  .  .  .No  state  shall  .  .  .  deny  to  any.. person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws."  -  Many  of  the  state 
constitutions  contain  in  varying  phraseology  and  with  some  repeti- 
tion the  statement  of  the  equality  of  men  before  the  law.  Under 
these  provisions  an  assessment  levied  upon  due  notice  and  fairly 
apportioned  according  to  benefits  is  not  necessarily  unconstitu- 
tional.'' Under  these  provisions  an  assessment  apportioned  ac 
cording  to  frontage  as  a  fair  method  of  estimating  benefits  and 
not  according  to  frontage  co  nomine  is  not  a  violation  of  the 
requirement  of  equal  protection  of  the  law.*  A  statute  giving 
to  resident  property  owners  the  right  to  stop  an  improvement 
by  filing  a  protest  against  it.  thereby  preventing  both  the  im 
provement  and  the  levying  of  an  assessment  therefor,  but  giving 
no  such  right  to  non-resident  property  owners  does  not  violatt 


2  Article  XIV..  §  1.  Amendments  to 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

^  Field  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Company,  194  U.  S.  618.  48  L.  1142, 
24  S.  784  [1904],  (modifying  Field 
V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company, 
117  Fed.  925  [1902]):  Walston  v. 
Xevin,  128  U!  S.  578,  9  S.  Ct.  192, 
32  L.  544  [1888],  (affirming  Wat- 
son v.  Kevin,  80  Ky.  492.  9  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  819,  5  S.  W.  546  [1887] )  :'  Wurts 
v.  Hoagland.  114  U.  S.  606,  29  L. 
229,  5  S.  1086  [1885],  (affirming  In 
the  matter  of  Drainage  of  the  Great 
Meadows  on  Peqne'^t  River.  42  X. 
J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  5.53  [1880].  which 
had  been  affirmed  wit'ir.ut  opinion  as 
Hoasland  v.  State.  Simonton.  Pros. 
43  X.  J.  L.  (14  V-.l  450  [1881])  ; 
Hagar  v.  Reeh'r  ■?\.\  -n  District.  Xo. 
^■^".  \\\  U.  p.  7"1.  :S  L.  569  [1884]; 
r,a  i  ^  -  ■-.  y  w  '^:  leans.  90  U.  S, 
f)7    f-    T..   ri!)    [1S77]:    State   ex    rel. 

:• ■     -      .T"iinsT,.    105    Ind.    463.    5 

X.  i:.  553  [18851:  Sisson  v.  Board 
of  SAi]:ervisors  of  Bnena  Vista  Coun- 
ty. 128  la.  4-42.  70  L.  R.  A.  440. 
104  X.  W.  454  [1905]:  Owen  v.  City 
of  Sioux  Citv.  91  Ta.  190.  59  X.  W. 
3  [1894]:  Ross  v.  Cnte*.  183  Mo. 
338.  81  S.  W.  1107  [1904]:  Loven- 
berw  V.  City  of  Galveston.  17  Tex. 
Civ?App.  162,  42  S.  W.  1024  [1897]: 


"As  the  statute  (providing  foi 
drainage  at  the  expense  of  the  own- 
ers of  property  benefited)  is  appli- 
cable to  all  lands  of  the  same  kind. 
and  as  no  person  can  be  assessed 
under  it  for  the  expense  of  drain- 
age without  notice  and  opportunity 
to  be  heard,  the  plaintiffs  in  error 
liave  neither  been  denied  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  nor  been  de 
prived  of  their  property  without  due 
proce-s  of  law,  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the 
United  States."  Wurts  v.  Hoagland, 
114  U.  S.  600.  615.  29  L.  229,  5  S. 
1086  [1888].  (affirming  Matter  of 
Drainage  of  Great  3Ieadows  on  Pe- 
que.st  River,  42  X.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.) 
553  [1880],  which  had  been  affirmed 
without  opinion  as  Hoagland  v.  State. 
Simonton.  Pros..  43  X\  J.  L.  (14 
Vr.)    456    [1881]  i. 

"Whenever  tlio  law  operates  alike 
on  all  persons  and  property  similarly 
situated,  equal  protection  cannot  be 
said  to  be  denie-\"'  Wal-^ton  v.  Xe- 
vin. 128  U.  S.  578.  582.  9  S.  192.  32 
L.  5J4  [1888].  affirmiiT  Watsnn  v. 
Xevi  1.  80  Fv.  J 02.  9  Fy.  Law  Rep. 
819.  5   S.   W.   546    [1887]. 

*Ross  V.  Gates.  183  Mo.  338,  81 
S.   W.    1107    [19041. 


177 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§108 


this  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  F'tates.^  A  stat- 
ute which  provides  that  assessments  are  to  be  enforced  agrainst 
residents  by  a  suit  in  the  circuit  court,  but  against  non-residents 
as  other  taxes  does  not  deny  the  erpial  protection  of  the  laws  to 
non-residents.''  A  statute  which  authorizes  the  county  surveyor 
to  keep  in  repair  the  ditches  constructed  under  the  drainage 
laws  of  the  state,  and  to  certify  the  cost  of  such  repair,  includ- 
ing his  own  per  diem  to  the  county  auditor,  who  is  required 
to  draw  his  warrant  in  favor  of  the  holders  of  such  certificate: 
upon  the  county  treasurer,  payment  to  be  made  out  of  the  county 
treasury,  which  is  to  be  reimbursed  thereafter  by  assessment  lev- 
ied against  the  owners  of  property  benefited  by  such  repair, 
does  not  violate  the  provision  insuring  equal  protection  of  law, 
an  opportunity  being  given  for  appeal  which  gives  the  property 
owmer  his  day  in  court  and  a  full  hearing.'  A  statute  which 
requires  the  entire  amount  of  the  assessment  to  be  paid  at  once, 
but  which  provides  that  those  property  owners  who  waive  all 
objections  to  the  legality  of  the  proceedings  shall  have  the  privi- 
lege of  paying  the  assessment  in  installments  does  not  violate 
this-  constitutional  provision,**  or  the  corresponding  provision 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.     A  similar  statute  was 


''  "It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the 
Fourteentli  Amendment,  as  has  been 
frequently  liekl,  to  prevent  the  States 
from  classifying  the  subjects  of  lenj- 
islation  and  makinji  diJVerent  rej^u- 
lations  as  to  the  property  of  different 
individuals  differently  situated.  The 
provision  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
is  satisfied  if  all  persons  similarly 
situated  are  treated  alike  in  privi- 
leges conferred  or  liabilities  im- 
posed. (Citing  Kentucky  Railroad 
Tax  Cases.  115  U.  S.  321,"  29  L.  414, 
6  S.  57  [18851;  Hayes  v.  Missouri. 
120  U.  S.  08,  .30  L.  .578  [18771;  Ma- 
goun  V.  Illinois  Trust  k  Saving.'* 
Bank.  170  V.  S.  283,  42  L.  1037 
[181181:  (inlf.  Colorado  &  Santa  Fe 
Kaihvay  Company  v.  Ellis.  1(15  V. 
S.  150,  41  L.  6()f)  [18071.) 

The  alleged  discrimination  is  cer- 
tainly not  nn  arbitrary  one;  the 
presence  within  tlio  city  of  the  resi- 
dent  property   owners,    their    interest 


in  the  subject  matter  and  their  abil- 
ity to  protest  promptly  if  the  means 
employed  are  objectionable,  place 
them  on  a  distinct  footing  from  <i"ie 
non-residents  whom  it  may  be  diffi- 
cult to  reach.  Furthermore,  there  is 
no  discrimination  among  the  property 
owners  in  taxing  for  the  improve- 
ment. When  the  assessment  is  made 
it  operates  on  all  alike."  Field  v. 
Barber     Asphalt     Paving     Company. 

104  I'.  S.  CIS.  621,  f)22.  48  L.  1142, 
24  S.  784  [19041.  (modifying  Field 
V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Companv, 
117    Fed.    925    [19021). 

*Cribbs  v.  Benedict.  (U  Ark.  555. 
44  S.  W.  707   [18971. 

'State   ex    rel.    French    v.    .Johnson. 

105  Ind.  463.  5  X.  E.  553    [18851. 

*  Sisson  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Buena  Vista  County.  128  la.  442, 
70  L.  R.  A.  440.  104  X.  \V.  454 
[1905]. 


§108 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


ITS 


attacked  as  unconstitutional  on  the  ground  that  it  violated  the 
corresponding  provision  of  the  constitution  of  Indiana:  "All 
courts  shall  be  open,  and  every  man  for  injury  done  to  him,  in  his 
person,  property  or  reputation,  shall  have  remedy  by  due  course  of 
law.  Justice  shall  be  administered  freely  and  without  purchase; 
completely  and  without  denial;  speedily  and  without  delay. "° 
The  validity  of  such  statute  was  upheld.^"  Under  the  same 
constitutional  provisions  the  validity  of  a  statute  imposing 
attorney's  fees  as  part  of  the  costs  in  a  suit  to  collect  a 
local  assessment  has  been  upheld. ^^  The  Indiana  statute  for 
assessments  for  street  improvements  ^-  has  been  held  to  be 
a  violation  of  this  constitutional  provision,  on  the  ground 
that  the  asses-nipnt  v\as  not  I'mited  to  s'lec'al  benefits  a'-id  that 
no  notice  and  hearing  was  given  except  to  revise  and  cor- 
rect the  report  and  estimate  of  the  engineer  and  make  it  con- 
form to  the  prescribed  basis  of  assessment.^^  This  ease  cannot 
be  regarded  as  an  authority,  for  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana 
has  construed  the  statute  as  limiting  the  assessment  to  the  amount 
of  the  special  benefits,  and  has  held  that  at  the  hearing  given, 
the  assessments  are  to  be  revised  to  limit  them  to  the  special 
benefits.^*  With  this  construction,  this  statute  has  been  held  by 
the  Surreme  Court  of  the  United  Ptates  +">  be  co'nstiti^'l-i'^'nnl.^^ 
The  constitution  of  Colorado  provides:  "That  courts  of  justice 
shall  be  open  to  everv  persni  and  a  speedv  renisdv  a-fo"bl  for 
evprv  injnrv  to  ■ner^^^'i.  property  o^  r-haract'^r :  find  that  i-' -''h-,  ^nd 
justice  should  be  administered  without  sale,  denial  or  delay."  ^® 


"Art.  I.,  §  12,  Constitution  of  In- 
diana. 

"  PittsLurah,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  & 
St.  Louis  Railway  Co.  v.  Taber,  1G8 
Incl.  419.  77  N.  E.  741    [1906]. 

"  Shirk  V.  Hupp.  107  Ind.  509,  78 
N.  E.  242,  79  X.  E.  490  [1906]; 
Pittsburgh,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  & 
St.  Louis  Py.  Co.  v.  ^aber,  108  Ind. 
419.  77  N.  E.  741  [190(1]  ;  Brown  v. 
Central  r>ernnuV7  '"'"■•"' '^an'''.  1^2  Ind. 
452,  69  N.  E.  150  [19'1.'?1  •.  Pittsimrnh, 
Cincinnati.  Chicap''^  .1-  St.  T  nnis  R'^il- 
way  Company  v.  Fish,  158  Ind.  525, 
63  N.  L.  154   [19011. 

'-2  Burns'  Pp'"ised  Statutes  of  In- 
diana,  §§  4288-4298  [1^94],  common- 
ly known  as  the  Barett  law. 


"Charles  v.  City  of  Marion,  100 
Fed.    538    [1900]. 

"Schaefer  v.  WerliuT,  15G  Ind. 
704,  60  X.  E.  194  [1901];  Adams 
V.  City  of  Shelbyville,  154  Ind.  467, 
77  Am.  St.  Rep.  484,  49  L.  R.  A. 
797,  57  X.  E.   114   [1899]. 

"Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310, 
24  S.  88,  48  L.  195  [1903],  (affirm- 
ing liibben  v.  Smith,  158  Ind.  206, 
62  X.  E.  4M  [1901]);  Sc^a-fer  v. 
Werlino-.  L^8  T^.  S.  516,  23  S.  449, 
47  L.  570  ri903].  (affivminq;  Schae- 
fer  V.  Werlino-,  156  Ind.  704,  60  N. 
E.    149    [1901]). 

'« Art.  II.,  §  6,  Constitution  of  Col- 
orado   [1876]. 


179  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  ^  109 

Under  this  provision  a  statute  {irovidinij:  that  a  failure  to  pay 
an  assessment  within  thirty  days  from  the  publication  of  the 
assessing  ordinance  shall  be  considered  conclusively  as  an  elec- 
tion to  pay  in  installments,  and  that  persons  electing  to  pay 
in  installments  shall  be  precluded  from  (luestioning  the  power  of 
the  city  to  construct  the  improvement,  the  regularity  or  suffi- 
ciency of  the  proceedings,  or  the  validity  or  correctness  of  the 
assessment,  has  been  held  to  be  constitutional.^' 

i^  109.  Provisions  forbidding  the  taking  of  property  without  just 
compensation — Specific  provisions. 
Iji  many  constitutions  provisions  are  found  which  for])id  the 
taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  without  just  compen- 
sation. Some  of  these  provisions,  which  have  been  considered 
by  the  courts  as  affecting  the  validity  of  assessments,  are  as 
follows:  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or  applied  for 
public  use  unless  just  compensation  be  first  made  therefor;  nor 
shall  private  property  be  taken  for  private  use  or  the  use  of 
corporations  other  than  municipal  without  the  consent  of  the 
owner. "^  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken,  appropr-iated  or 
damaged  for  private  use,  without  just  compensation  therefor." - 
"The  property  of  no  persou  shall  );e  taken  for  public  use  with- 
out just  compensation  therefor.""  "Private  property  shall  not 
be  taken  or  damaged  for  public  or  ])rivate  use  without  just  com- 
pensation." "*  "No  private  ])roperty  or  right  of  way  shall  be 
appropriated  to  the  use  of  any  corporation  or  individual  until 
full  compensation  therefor  shall  be  first  made  to  the  owner  or 
first  secured  to  him  l)y  deposit  of  money.  .  .  .  "^  "Private 
property  shall  not  1  e  taken  or  damaged  for  public  purposes  with- 
out just  and  aderpuite  compensation  l>eing  first  paid.""  "Pri- 
vate property  may  be  taken  for  pu])lic  use,  l)ut  not  until  a  just 
compensation   to  be  ascertained   in   a   manner  preseri])ed   by   law 


"City    of    Denvpi-    v.    Caniplioll.    .3.3  XVTTT..   §    14.   ('(.iKtitiition  nf  ^riclii- 

Colo.    H)2.   80   Pac.    142    [100.51.  -.mii. 

'Article    I.,    §    24,    Constitution    oi  'Article    IT.,   5?    14.   Constitution   of 

Alabama.  Colorado;   Article   I..   §   33.  (Onstitu- 

'^  Article    I..    §    22,    Constitution    of  tion   of  Wyominix. 
Arkansas.  =  Article    XVI..    §    20.    Constitution 

'Article    T..    §    13.    Constitution    of  of  Florida. 
California,     Article     I.     §      11.     Con-  "Article    I..    §    3.    Constitution    of 

stitution      of      Connecticut;      Article  Ceorjiia. 


v;  109  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  180 

shall  be  paid  therefor."'  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken 
or  damaged  for  public  use  without  just  compensation."*  "No 
man's  property  shall  be  taken  by  law  without  just  compensa- 
tion."" "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use 
without  iust  compensation  being  made  or  secured  to  be  made 
to  the  owner  thereof.  .  .  .  "  ^"  "Municipal  and  other  corpo- 
rations aufl  individuals  invested  v/ith  the  privilege  of  faking 
private  property  for  public  use  shall  make  just  compensation  for 
property  taken,  injured  or  destroyed  by  them."^^  "Private 
property  shall  not  be  taken  or  damaged  for  public  use  without 
just  and  adequate  compensation  being  first  paid."^-  "Private 
property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public  uses  without  just  com- 
pensation. .  .  .  "  ^'^  "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for 
pubJic  use  without  just  compensation  therefor  first  paid  or  se- 
cured."^* "Private  property  shall  not  be  taken  or  damaged  for 
public  use  except  on  due  compensation  being  first  made  to  the 
owner  or  owners  thereof,  in  a  manner  to  be  prescribed  by  law.  "^^ 
"The  property  of  no  person  shall  be  taken  or  damaged  for  pub- 
lic uses  without  just  compensation  therefor."^*'  "Private  prop- 
erty shall  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensa- 
tion. .  .  .  "  ^'  ".  .  .  Nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for 
public  use  without  just  compensation.""*  "Private  property 
shall  ever  be  held  inviolate,  but  subservient  to  the  public  wel- 
fare. "When  taken  in  time  of  war  or  other  public  exigency 
imperatively  requiring  its  immediate  seizure,  or  for  the  purpose 
of  making  or  requiring  roads  which  shall  be  open  to  the  public 


'Article   I.,    §    14,    Constitution    of  "§     21,     Constitution     of     Maine: 

Idaho.  Article     1.,     §     1(3,     Constitution     of 

*  Article   II.,    §    13,   Constitution   of  Rhode  Island. 

Illinois;    Article   II.,    §    21,   Constitu-  '^Article    I.,    §    13,    Constitution   of 

tion  of  Missouri;    Article   III..    §    14,  Minnesota. 

Constitution  of  Montana;    Article  I.,  ^=*  Article    III.,    §     17,    Constitution 

§    14,   Constitution  of  North   Dakota.  of   Mississippi. 

"Article    I..    §    21,    Constitution    of  '^Article    I.,    §    21,   Constitution    of 

Indiana.  Nebraska. 

1"  Article    I.,    §    18.    Constitution   of  '' Article    I.,    §    16,   Constitution    of 

Iowa.  New  Jersey.     Substantially  the  same, 

"  §      242,      Constitution      of      Ken-  provision  is  found  in  Article  I.,   §   4. 

tucky.      A   substantially   similar   pro-  Constitution  of  Oregon, 

vision  is  found  in  Article  NVII.,  §  18,  '«  Article    I.,    §    6,    Constitution    of 

Constitution  of  South  Dakota.  New  York. 

12  Article  156,  Constitution  of  Loui- 
Biana   [1879]. 


181  CONSTITl'TIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  HO 

without  charge,  a  compensation  shall  be  made  to  the  owner  in 
money,  and  in  all  other  cases  where  private  property  shall  be 
taken  for  public  use  a  compensation  therefor  shall  first  be  made 
in  money  or  first  secured  by  a  deposit  of  money.  .  .  .  "  ^"^ 
"No  person's  property  shall  be  taken,  damaged  or  destroyed  for 
or  applied  to  public  use  without  adequate  compensation  being 
made  unless  by  the  consent  of  such  person.  .  .  .  " -"  "Private 
property  shall  not  be  taken  or  damaged  for  public  use  without 
just  compensation."-^  "...  Whenever  any  person's  prop- 
erty is  taken  for  the  use  of  the  public  the  owner  ought  to  receive 
an  equivalent  in  money."--  "The  general  assembly  .  .  .  shall 
not  enact  any  law  whereby  private  property  shall  be  taken  or 
damaged  for  pu])lic  uses  without  just  compensation."-^  "No 
private  property  shall  be  taken  or  damaged  for  public  or  private 
use  without  just  compensation  having  been  first  made  or  paid 
into  court  for  the  owner."-* 

§  110.     Constitutional  rule  as  to  just  compensation  held  not  to 
apply  to  assessments. 

AVhether  these  provisions  apply  to  local  assessments  or  not  is 
a  question  upon  which  there  has  been  a  diversity  of  judicial 
ojiinion.  chiefly,  however,  in  obiter  dicta.  By  the  great  weight 
of  authority  and  by  the  sounder  and  more  logical  view,  these 
provisions  are  restrictions  upon  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
and  rcrpiire  compensation  to  ])e  made  for  property  taken  in  the 
exercise  of  that  power;  but  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
power  of  taxation,  and  therefore  have  no  application  to  local 
assessments  wliieh  are  a  liranch  of  the  taxing  power.^  The  cor- 
rectness of  the  rule  tliat  the  provision  forbidding  the  taking 
of  private  property  for  public  use  without  compensation  does 
not    apply   to   local   asse.ssments   is  best   seen   when   the   eonstitn- 

'"  .-\rticlc    T..    S    10.  (DiistitutiDn    of            '  (hanibers     v.     Rattorlce.     40     Cal. 

Oliio.  -I!)7     [1S711:     Piper's    Appeal    in    the 

'-"  .Vrticlc    1..    8    17.  t'onslitiitioii    of       matter   of  Widening   Kearney   Street. 

Texas.  :?2    Cal.    530    [18071;    Emery    v.    San 

-'  Article    I..    §    22.  Constitution    of        I'raneiseo  Gas   Company.   2S   Cal.   .34.1 

rtali.  I  I.'"'!!.")  I  :    P.urnctt    v.   Mayor  ami   Com- 

-- Article    IT.,    8    1.  Constitution    of       mon    Council    of    the    City    of    Sacra- 

Verntont.  mento,    12   Cal.   76.   73   Am.    Deo.   .51S 

-' §   .'iS.  Constitution   of  Viririnia.  [IR-'Ol:    Xiohols    v.    Citv    of    Bridure- 

■-'Article    1..    5?    l(i,  Constitution    of        port.  23  Conn.   1S9.   CO  Am.  Dee.  636 

Washinirton.  [  18.i41  ;    Speer    v.    ^layor    and    Coim- 


§110 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


182 


tional  provision  in  ([uestion  is  one  which  specifically  requires 
compensation  to  be  made  in  money.  In  such  cases  it  has  been 
pointed  out  that  the  provision  cannot  apply  to  local  assessments,- 
and  from  a  negative  standpoint  it  may  be  said  that  it  has  never 
been  held  or  even  seriously  contended  that  such  a  provision 
applies  to  local  assessments  so  as  to  require  the  public  to  pay 
back  to  the  projjerty  owner  the  money  which  it  has  exacted 
from  him  as  an  assessment,  except  the  earlier  cases  since  over- 
ruled, which  made  use  of  this  principle  to  demonstrate  that  as- 
sessments, according   to   I'enefits  were   necessarilv   invalid.^     Ac- 


cil  of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9  L.  R.  A. 
402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890];  Hayden  v. 
City  of  Atlanta,  70  Ga.  817  [1883]; 
Chicago  &  Northwestern  Railway  Co. 
V.  Village  of  Elmhurst,  165  111.  148, 
46  N.  E.  437  [1897]  ;  White  v.  People 
ex  rel.  City  of  Bloomington,  94  111. 
604  [1880];  Martin  v.  Wills.  157 
Ind.  153,  60  N.  E.  1021  [1901]:  War- 
ren V.  Henly,  31  la.  31  [1870];  City 
of  Covington  v.  Worthington,  88  Ky. 
206,  10  S.  W.  790,  11  S.  W.  1038 
[1889];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co. 
V.  Gogreve,  41  La.  Ann.  251,  5  So. 
848  [^1889]  ;  Excelsior  Planting  & 
Manufacturing  Company  v.  Green, 
39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So.  873  [1887]; 
Brooks  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore,  "  48  Md.  265  [1877]; 
Groff  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  Frederick  City,  44 
Md.  67  [1875];  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Proprietors 
Green  Mount  Cemetery,  7  ^U\.  517 
[1855];  Mcalo  v.  ]\Iayor  and  City 
Council  cf  Baltimore,  5  Md.  314,  61 
Am.  Dec.  276  [1854];  Weed  v.  May- 
or and  Aldermen  of  Boston,  172 
Ma?s.  28,  42  L.  R.  A.  642,  51  N.  E. 
204  [1898];  Grand  Rapids  School 
Furniture  Co.  v.  C  ity  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids, 92  Mich.  5fi4,  52  N.  W.  1028 
[1P9-2];  Williams  v.  Mayor,  etc, 
of  Detroit,  2  Mich.  560  [1853];  Grif- 
fin v.  Dogan,  48  Mi*s.  11  [1873]; 
Heman  v.  Schulte.  166  Mo.  409,  6S 
S.  W.  163  [1902];  Keith  v.  Binirham. 
100  Mo.  300,  13  S.  W.  683  [1889]; 
City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  O'Donoghue,  31 


Mo.  345  [1861];  Inhabitants  of  Pal- 
myra V.  Morton,  25  Mo.  593  [1857]; 
Garrett  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  25  Mo. 
505,  69  Am.  Dec.  475  [1857];  City 
of  Springfield  to  the  use  of  Tuttlc 
V.  Baker,  56  Mo.  App.  637  [1894]; 
State,  Graham,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Paterson,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  380 
[1875];  State,  Brittin,  Pros.  v. 
Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  442 
[1872];  Litchfield  v.  Vernon,  41  N. 
Y.  123  [1869];  People  ex  rel.  Crow- 
ell  V.  Lawrence,  41  N.  Y.  137  [1869]; 
People  ex  rel.  Gri.Tm  v.  Mayor,  etc.. 
of  Brooklyn.  4  N.  Y.  419,  55  Am. 
Dec.  266  [1851];  Livingston  v.  May- 
or, etc.,  of  New  York,  8  Wend.  85, 
22  Am.  Dec.  622  [1831];  Moran  v. 
City  of  Troy,  9  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  540 
[1877];  Hill  v.  Higdon,  5  0.  S.  243, 
G7  Am.  Dec.  289  [1855];  Scoville  v. 
City  of  Cleveland,  1  0.  S.  126 
[1853];  Bonsall  v.  Mayor,  Recorder 
and  Trustees  of  Town  of  Lebanon, 
19  Ohio  418  [1850];  Washington 
Avenue,  09  Pa.  St.  (19  P.  F.  Smith) 
352.  8  Am.  Rep.  255  [1871];  Round- 
tree  V.  City  of  Galveston,  42  Tex. 
612  [1875];  Allen  v.  Drew,  44  Vt. 
174  [1872];  Haubner  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 124  Wis.  153,  101  N.  W. 
930  [1905],  (rehearing  denied,  102 
N.  W^   578    [1905]). 

-Emery  v.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co., 
28  Cal.  345  [1865];  Ridenour  v.  Saf- 
fin.   1   Handy    (Ohio)    464    [1855]. 

^  People  ex  rel.  Post  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Brooklyn,  6  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  209 
[1849]. 


183 


CONSTITUTIONAL   RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§111 


cordingly    such    provision    does    not    invalidate    a    re-assessment 
made  where  the  original  assessment  was  for  some  reason  invalid.* 

§  111.  Constitutional  rule  as  to  just  compensation  held  to  apply 
to  assessments. 
It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  there  are  many  cases  in 
which  it  is  said  or  assumed  that  the  constitutional  provision 
which  forbids  the  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  with- 
out compensation  is  applicable  to  local  assessments.  The  most 
common  class  of  these  cases  is  that  in  which  it  is  claimed  that 
the  assessment  as  levied  is  in  excess  of  or  not  in  proportion 
to  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  improvement  for  which  the 
assessment  is  levied.  In  many  of  these  cases  the  courts  have 
discussed  the  question  on  the  theory  that  such  constitutional 
provision  was  applicable.  If  it  is  shown  that  the  assessment 
does  not  exceed  the  benefits  substantially  and  that  it  is  fairly 
apportioned  according  to  benefits,  it  is  said  that  such  constitu- 
tional provision  is  not  violated,  and  that  just  compensation  is 
made  for  the  assessment  exacted.^  If  the  assessment  exceeds 
the  benefits  in  a  substantial  manner,  or  is  not  fairly  apportioned 
according  to  the  benefits,  it  is  said  on  the  other  hand  that  the 


*  Haubner  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 
124  Wis.  123,  101  N.  W.  930  [1905], 
(roliearing  denied,  102  N.  W.  578 
[19051). 

'  Charles  v.  City  of  ^Marion,  100 
Fed.  538;  City  Council  of  :\Iontt,n)ni- 
ery  v.  Birdson<r,  126  Ala.  032.  28  So. 
522  [1899];  Mayor,  Aldermen,  etc., 
of  Mobile  V.  Royal  Street  Railroad 
Co.,  -15  Ala.  322  [1871];  (overruled 
in  ]Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birming- 
ham V.  Klein,  89  Ala.  461,  8  L.  R.  A. 
369,  7  So.  380);  Rittcr  v.  Drainage 
District  No.  1,  Poinsett  County,  78 
Ark.  580,  94  S.  W.  711  [1906]; 
Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555,  44 
S.  W.  707  [1897];  Tomlinson  v. 
Bainaka,  163  Ind.  112,  70  N.  E.  155 
[1904];  Roundenbusli  v.  Mitidiell.  154 
Ind.  616,  57  N.  E.  510  fl9(»()];  Rein- 
ken  V.  Fuehring,  130  Ind.  382,  30 
Am.  St.  Rep.  247,  15  L.  R.  A.  624. 
37  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  354,  30 
N.  E.  414  [1891]  ;  Ray  v.  City  of  .Tef- 


fersonville,  90  Ind.  567  [1883];  Pal 
mer  v.  Stumph,  29  Ind.  329  [1868;] 
Cypress  Pond  Draining  Company  v. 
Hooper,  59  Ky.  (2  Met.)  .350  [1859]; 
Hill  V.  Fontenot,  46  La.  Ann.  1563. 
16  So.  475  [1894];  Wilzinski  v.  City 
of  Greenville,  85  Miss.  393,  37  So. 
807  [1905];  Morrison  v.  Morey,  146 
^lo.  5-13,  48  S.  W.  629  [1898];"  Kan- 
sas City  V.  Ward,  134  Uo.  172,  35 
S.  W.  600  [1896];  State,  Sigler, 
Pros.  V.  Fuller,  34  X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.) 
227  [1870];  Genet  v.  City  of  Brook- 
lyn. 99  X.  Y.  296,  1  N.  E.  777  i  1885]  ; 
Peo])le  ex  rel.  Crowell  v.  Lawrence, 
36  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  178  [1862];  King 
V.  Portland,  38  Ore.  402,  55  L.  R.  A. 
812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900];  Vacation  of 
Howard  Street,  Philadelphia,  142  Pa. 
St.  601,  21  Atl.  974  [1891];  McMas- 
ters  V.  Comnionwealth,  3  Watts 
(Pa.)  292  [1834];  In  the  Matter  of 
Dorrancc  Street,  4  R.  I.  230   [1856], 


§ni 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


184 


assessment  is  unconstitutional  as  amounting  to  a  taking  of 
private  property  for  public  use  without  compensation.^  Where 
an  assessment  was  held  to  be  valid  as  not  in  excess  of 
the  benefits,  since  there  was  no  case  where  the  property  as- 
sessed "has  not  been  so  far  benefited  by  the  work  done 
as  to  be  increased  in  value  more  than  the  cost  of  the  work 
assessed,"  it  was  added,  "were  this  not  the  case  the  prop- 
erty of  each  proprietor  to  the  extent  of  the  difference  be- 
tween the  increased  value  and  the  cost  of  the  work  assessed  to 
him  would  be  taken  for  a  purpose  of  public  utility  without  ade- 
quate compensation  previously  made ;  and  consequently  there 
would  be  a  violation  of  the  provisions  of  Article  105  of  the 
Constitution."^  So  the  Supreme  Court  of  Kentucky  said  in 
speaking  of  an  assessment  not  apportioned  according  to  benefits 
and  not  limited  to  the  amount  thereof:  "Such  an  exaction  by 
whatever  the  legislature  might  choose  to  call  it,  would  not  be  a 
tax,  but  would  be  undoubtedly  the  taking  of  private  property 
for  public  use  and  which  could  not  be  done  constitutionally  with- 
out the  consent  of  the  owner  or  owners  or  without  retribution 
of  the  value  in  money."* 


-Norwood  V.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  269. 
19  S.  Ct.  187,  43  L.  443  [1898]; 
White  V.  City  of  Tacoma,  109  Fed. 
32  [1901];  Cowley  v.  City  of  Spo 
kaiie,  99  Fed.  840  '[1900];  Allman  v. 
District  of  Columbia.  3  App.  D.  C. 
8  [1894];  City  of  Blooniington  v. 
Latliam,  142  fll.  462,  18  L.  R.  A. 
487,  32  N.  E.  500  [1893].  (A  case 
of  .special  taxation,  and  as  such  dis- 
tinguished in  ^Yaggeman  v.  Village 
of  North  Peoria,  155  111.  545,  40  N. 
E.  485  [18.95],  which  is  a  case  of 
special  assessment).  CTraham  v.  Con- 
ger, 85  Ky.  582,  4  S.  W.  327  [1887]  ; 
City  of  Louisville  v.  Louisville  Roll- 
ing Mill  Company,  3  Rush.  (66  Ky.) 
416,  96  Am.  Dec.  243  [1867];  Cy- 
press Pond  Draining  Company  v. 
Hooper,  59  Ky.  (2  Met.)  350  [1859]; 
City  of  Lexington  v.  McQuillan's 
Heirs,  39  Ky.  (9  Dana)  513,  35  Am. 
Dec.  159  [1840];  State  v.  Pillslniry, 
82  Minn.  059.  85  N.  W.  175  [1901]; 
Zoeller    v.    rello"n-.    4    Mo.    App.    163 


[1877];  Walsh  v.  Barron,  61  O.  S. 
15,  76  Am.  St.  Rep.  354,  55  N.  E. 
164  [1899];  Schroder  v.  Overman,  61 
0.  S.  1,  47  L.  R.  A.  156,  55  N.  E. 
158,  42  W.  L.  B.  270  [1899],  (af- 
firming Schroeder  v.  Overman,  18 
Ohio  C.  C.  385  [1899]);  Wewell  v. 
(  ity  of  Cincinnati,  45  O.  S.  407,  424. 
15  "n.  E.  190  [1887];  Chamberlain 
V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  0.  S.  551 
[1878];  West;in  v.  Commissioners  of 
Hamilton  County,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  G41 
[1892];  Rhoades  v.  City  of  Toledo,  6 
Ohio  C.  C.  9  [1890];  McNamee  v. 
City  of  Tacoma,  24  Wash.  591,  64 
Pac.   791    [1901]. 

'  New  Orleans  Drainage  Company 
Praying  for  the  Confirmation  of  a 
Tableau,  11  La.  Ann.  338  [1856]; 
(setting  aside  on  rehearing  the  opin- 
ion   first   rendered ) . 

*  City  of  Lexington  v.  ^McQuillan's 
Heirs,  39  Ky.  (9  Dana)  513.  517,  35 
Am.  Dec.   159    [1840]. 


185  CONSTITTTIONAL    RESTRICTION  Ari'iJCAHL;-:,    KTC  §  ^^  112,  11:3 

§  112.     CoEfusion  as  to  true  constitutional  principle  involved. 

The  confusion  between  provisions  forbidding'  the  tcdtiny  of 
private  property  for  pnblic  use  without  compensation  and  the 
provisions  forbiddinij-  the  taking-  of  property  without  due  procesr^ 
of  law,  into  which  the  courts  have  fallen,  may  be  well  illustrated 
by  a  case  in  which  the  confusion  can  be  traced.^  In  the  lower 
court  the  assessment  was  held  to  be  invalid  as  being-  a  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.'-  In  the  first  part  of 
the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  affirm- 
ing the  opinion  of  the  circuit  court,  the  objection  to  the  assess- 
ment is  stated  as  a  taking  without  due  process  of  law;''  but 
very  soon  the  objection  is  stated  as  "a  taking,  under  guise  of 
taxation,  of  private  property  for  public  use  without  compen- 
sation,"* and  it  is  this  proposition  which  is  discussed  in  the 
remainder  of  the  opinion.  This  was  done  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  had  pointed  out,  in  an 
earlier  assessment  case,  that  the  United  States  Constitution  con- 
tained no  prohibition  against  a  state's  taking  private  property 
for  public  use  without  due  comj)ensation.''  The  same  confusion 
is  found  in  other  Fetleral  cases,  the  court  holding  that  an  as- 
sessment not  levied  in  proportion  to  benefits  was  in  violation  of 
that  clause  in  the  Federal  Constitution  which  forbids  a  state  to 
take  private  property  for  public  use  without  due  compensation.'' 

§  113.     Special  grounds  for  confusion. 

In  some  of  the  cases  involving  the  validity  of  assessments  the 
effect  of  the  provision  against  taking  private  property  for  jiul)- 
lic  use  without  compensation  and  the  eft'cr-t  of  llie  i)rovision 
against  taking  property  without  due  process  of  law  are  discussfMl 
together,  no  attempt  being  made  to  distingu.ish  the  effect  of  tlie 

'Norwood  V.  Baker.  17-2  V.  S.  2r>0;  wiion    llic    f.u;rtooiitli    .iTiiondnipnt    is 

m   S.   Ct.    187.   43   L.    44:?    [ISHSl.  lulnptcd.    tli,'    innvisi,)n    on    tliat    sulv 

-  Baker   v.   \'illajre   of   Norwood.    74  jcct     in     iiiiiiiodiato    jiixtapositioii     in 

Fed.    007    riS^i^t'l-  t'lc  (iflli   an'ondment   witli   tlio  ono  we 

^  Xorwiiod  V.  Baker.   172  V.  S.  2t>0,  are  oonj^triiinir,  was  left  out  and  ti>i^ 

277.   10  S.  (  t.   1«7.  4:?  T..  44.3   flSOSl.  one    was    taken."      Davidson    v.    New 

'Norwood  V.   P.nkcr.  172  V.  S.  2li0.  Orleans.  0(1   l'.   S.   07.    in.").  24   L.  (ilC> 

279.  43  L.  443.  10  S.  1S7  |  ISOSl.  |  1S771. 

"  "Tf  private  ])ro])er1y  be  taken   f  )r  "  ('owl(\v     y.    (  ity    of-    Spokane.    00 

]>n!)lie    uses    witliont    just    cotnpensa-  Fed.   840    f  10(10]. 
tion.    it    jnust    be    reineiiihei-cd     that. 


§  113  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  186 

one  from  the  effect  of  the  other.^  Some  of  the  cases  go  no 
farther  than  Jo  hold  that  if  special  assessments  are  to  be  justi- 
fied upon  the  theory  of  eminent  domain,  they  are  then  within 
the  restrictive  provision  against  taking  private  property  for 
public  use  without  compensation,  and  that  they  are  therefore 
invalid'  unless  compensation  is  made  in  the  form  of  benefits.- 
These  are  cases  in  which  the  assessments  were  held  not  to  be 
sustained  upon  the  basis  of  the  power  of  taxation  and  it  was 
then  sought  to  justify  them  on  the  theory  of  eminent  domain. 
On  the  other  hand  if  the  assessment  does  not  exceed  the  bene- 
fits it  is  held  that  there  is  no  taking  without  just  compensation.^ 
Some  of  the  cases  holding  that  the  provision  of  the  constitution 
which  forbids  taking  private  property  for  public  use  without 
due  compensation  applies  to  local  assessments,  are  cases  involv- 
ing improvements  which  are  referred  by  some  courts  to  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  *  or  to  the  police  power,'  such  as  as- 
sessments for  the  purpose  of  drainage."  In  some  of  the  cases 
eminent  domain  and  assessment  are  combined  in  one  proceeding, 
and  accordingly  we  find  that  the  provision  forbidding  the  taking  of 
private  property  without  compensation  is  quoted  properly  enough, 
although  it  is  sometimes  extended  in  its  application  beyond  the 
taking  of  property  for  the  purpose  of  the  improvement  to  the  as- 
ses.sment  levied  to  pay  the  cost  of  such  improvement.'     The  ques- 

'  Roimflenbi!>li  v.  Mitchpll,  154  Ind.  Copipaiiy  v.  Green.  30  La.  Ann.   455. 

(Ufi.   57    N.   E.   510    [1900];    Reinken  1   So.  R73    [1887]:   A'aeation  of  How- 

V.    Fuehrinff,    130    Ind.    382,    30    Am.  aid  Street,  Philadelphia.   142  Pa.  St. 

St.    Rep.    247,    15    L.   R.    A.    G24.    37  (;01.  21  Atl.  974   [1891]. 

Am.   &   Eng.    Corp.    Cas.    354,    30   N.  *  See  §  99  et  seq. 

E.  414  [18911:   Hiitcheson  v.  Storrie,  ^  See  §  93. 

92    Tex.    6S5     71    Am.    St.   Rep.    884.  "State,     Kean,     Pros.     v.     DriTU's 

45  L.  R.  A.  Cen,  51  S.  W.  848  [1899]  ;  Drainasfe  Company,  45  X.  J.  L.    (10 

(overruling  Adams  v.  Fisher,  75  Tex.  Vr. )    91    [1883];    State.   Xew   Jersey 

057.  6  S.  W.  772   [1890]).  Railroad  &  Transportation  Company. 

-  Creighton  v.  ^lanson.  27  Cal.  614  Prr^s.  v.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 

[1805]  r  Wright   v.    City   of   Chicago.  of   the   City  of  Newark,  27   N.   J.  L. 

40  111.  44  [1867]:  Bedard  v.  Hall,  44  (3   Dutch.)    185    [1858];    Tide  Water 

111.    91     [18671;    City    of    Ottawa    v.  Co.  v.  Coster,  18  K  J.  Eq.    (3  C.  E. 

Spencer,  40  111.  211    [1866];   City  of  Cr.)    518.   90   Am.   Dec.   634    [1866]: 

Chicago  V.  Larned.  34  111.  203  [1864]:  (affirming  Coster  v.  Tidewater   Com- 

Tavlor,   INIcBean    &    Co.    v.    Chandler.  j)any.   18  X.  J.  Eq.    (3  C.  E.  Green) 

9  Heisk.   (50  Tenn.)   3-J9,  24  Am.  Rep.  54    [1866])  ;    Hartwell  v.   Armstrong. 

308    [1872].  19  Barb.   (X.  Y.)    166   [1854]. 

^  Adams  v.  City  of  Shelbyville.  154  "  Hilmes  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park. 

Ind.    467.    77    Am.    St.    Ren.    484.    4«  121    Til.    128.    13    X^  E.    540    [18891: 

L.   R.   A.   797.   57  X.  E.    114    [1899]:  Barfield   v.  Gleason,   111   Ky.  491.  23 

Excelsior   Planting  &   Manufacturing  Kv.  L.  R.  128,  63  S.  W.  964  [1901]; 


187  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  113 

tion  whether  benelits  may  be  set  off  against  damages  caused  by 
the  improvement  is  in  one  sense  a  branch  of  the  law  of  assess- 
ments,** and  as  it  is  also  a  branch  of  eminent  domain  it  properly 
involves  tlie  question  whether  such  setting  off  of  benefits  against 
damages  is  not  a  taking  of  private  property  v/ithout  just  com- 
pensation. Where  such  right  of  set-off  is  upheld,  it  is  upon  the 
theory  that  benefits  constitute  just  compensation  within  the 
meaning  of  this  constitutional  provision.^  In  some  of  the  eases 
which  hold  that  the  constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  tak- 
ing of  private  property  for  public  use  applies  to  local  assess- 
ments, vre  find  that  this  provision  was  invoked  as  a  ground  for 
declaring  to  be  invalid,  assessments  of  types  which  in  those  same 
jurisdictions  have  subsequently  been  held  to  be  valid.  Thus  such 
provision  was  regarded  as  applicable  in  Alabama,^''  w^here  assess- 
ments were  not  levied  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the  property  as- 
sessed. Subsequently  it  has  been  held  w  .\labama  that  assessments 
may  be  levied  in  proportion  to  benefits  and  that  they  need  not  be 
levied  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  the  prope?'ty  assessed. ^^  So 
in  Louisiana  this  provision  was  regarded  as  applying  to  assess- 
ments which  were  regarded  as  invalid  because  apportioned  ac- 
cording to  benefits  and  not  according  to  the  valuation  of  the 
property.^-  Assessments  so  apportioned  have  subsequently  been 
held  in  Louisiana  to  be  perfectly  valid  and  unobjectionable.^" 
Under  this  provision  it  is  held  that  an  assessment  fairly  appor- 
tioned  to'  special   lienefits   and   not    in   excess   of  them    is   valid; 

Municipality    Xo.    T\V(i,    for    Openini^  12.5   [IS"!]:   Fenelon's  Petition.  7  P:i. 

Eiipl\rosine    Street.    7    La.    Ann.    72  St.    (7   Barr.)    173    [1847]. 

[18521;    Dfirpan    v.    City    of    Boston.  'See  §   G2  et  acq. 

12     AW.     (^fns^.)     223    '[ISGO];     Mc-  "Forsyth   v.   Wilcox,    143    Inrl.    144. 

Kusick  V.  City  of  Stillwater,  44  Minn.  41    X.    E.    371     [1895];    :\lclntire    v. 

372,   4G   N.   W.   7i:9    [ISDO];    Boss  v.  State.   5   Blackf.    (hul.)    384    11840]. 

Oxates    183   JIo.   338,   81    S.   W.    1107  '"Mayor,    AUlernien,    etc.,    of    :\Io- 

[1904];    State   ex   rel.   C'liicapjo,    Bur-  bile    v.    Boyal    Street    Railroad    Coni- 

linsrton  &   Quiney   Railroad   Company  pany,    45    Ala.    322    [1871];    Mayor. 

V.    City    of    I'ansas,    89    Mo.    34,    14  AMermen,  etc..  of  Mobile  v.  DarL^an, 

S.   W.   515    [1P8()];    Loweree   v.   City  45   Ala.  310    [1871]. 

of  Newark,  38   X.  J.  T..    (9  Vr. )    151  "Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birminji- 

[1875];    In   the   matter   of  One   Ilnn-  ham  v.  Klein,  89  Ala.  4G1,  8  L.  R.  A. 

dred    and    Twentv-seventh    St'pot.    5!i  3(i9,    7    Si.    38fi    [1889]. 

How.    (N.   Y.)    GO    [1878]:    Betts   v.  '=  Municipality  Xumber  Two,  Pray- 

City  of  Willinmpbur?,    15   Barb.    (X.  \u<x  fnr  the  Openintr  of  Benton  Street 

Y.)     255    [1853];    Sessions    v.    Crun-  v.    \Yhite.   9   La.   Ann.   44fi    [1854]. 

kilton,  20  0.  S.  349  [1870];  Fnrhea  "See  Chapter  XTTL.  and  al^o  §  40. 
Street,  70  Pa.  St.    (20  P.  F.  Smith) 


§  113  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  188 

out  that  an  assessment  in  excess  of  such  benefits  is  invalid/* 
The  constitution  of  Ohio  further  provides:  "The  general  as- 
sembly shall  provide  for  the  organization  of  cities  and  incor- 
porated villages  by  general  laws,  and  restrict  their  power  of 
taxation,  assessment,  borrowing  money,  contracting  debts  and 
loaning  their  credit  so  as  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  such  power."''" 
■^he  view  originally  taken  ]\v  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio  was 
that  these  two  sections  wore  independent  of  each  other  and  that 
article  one.  section  nineteen,  was  not  a  limitation  npon  the  power 
of  assessment.'"  The  practical  working  out  of  this  view  to  its 
extreme  limit  was  the  holding  that  where  part  of  a  tract  was 
taken  by  eminent  domain  for  a  local  improvement,  the  owner 
must  be  compensated  in  full  for  such  part  taken,  without  de- 
duction for  benefits:  but  that  the  residue  of  such  tract  might 
then  be  assessed,  up  to  the  amount  of  benefits  conferred,  at 
least,  for  the  cost  of  such  im])rovement,  including  the  amount 
paid  for  the  land  thns  taken."  The  correctness  of  this  view 
was  assumed  in  subsequent  cases. '^  In  this  series  of  cases  is 
found  one.  however,  in  which  the  opposite  vicAv  is  taken,  it 
being  held  that  article  one.  section  nineteen,  limits  and  restricts 
the  power  referred  to  in  section  six.  article  thirteen.'"  This 
view  was  subsequently  adopted  in  a  case  in  which  the  earlier 
cases  were  overruled  and  the  earlier  principle  held  to  be  un- 
sound ;■-"  and  the  later  view  thus  expressed  has  subsequently  been 
reiterated.-'  The  practical  working  out  of  this  view  is  the  hold- 
ino-  that  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied,  even  for  the  amount  of 
benefits  conferred,  to  pay  for  the   cost   of  taking  land  by   eini- 


»  Walsh  V.  Barron.  Gl  O.  R.  15.  76  Caldwell  v.  Villaire  of  Carthage,  49  0. 

Am.     St.    Rep.    354.    55    X.    E.     164  S.  334,  31  N.  E.  602    [1892]^  Krnm- 

[18991.  berg  v.   City  of  Cincinnati.   29   0.   S. 

'^.•Skvtielp    Xin..    §    6.    Constitution  69    [1875]. 

of  Ohio    [18511.  "Chamberlain    v.     City    of    Cleve- 

>«City  <f  Cleveland  v.  Wick.   IS  O.  land,  34   0,  S.  551    [1878]. 

S.  303    [1868];   Hill   v.  Hi"(lon.  5  O.  ""Cincinnati.    Lebanon    &    Northern 

S.   243.   67    Am.   Dec.   289    [1855].  Ry.   Co.  v.   City  of  Cincinnati.  62   O. 

^'  City  of  Cleveland  v.  Wick.   18  O.  S.    465.    49    L.    R.    A.    566.    57    N.    E. 

S.   303    [1868].  229      [1900]:      (overruling     City     of 

'"Schroder  v.  Overman.  61   O.  S.   1.  Cleveland     v.     Wick.     IS     O.     S.     303 

47  L.  R.  A.  156.  55  X.  E.  158  [1899]  :  f  1868] ) . 

Cincinnati   v.   Ratsche.   52   0.   S.   324,  ='  City  of  Dayton  v.  Bannian.  66  0. 

27  L.  R.  A.  536,  40  N.  E.  21    [1895];  S.  379.  64  X.  E.  433   [1902]. 


189  CONSTITITIOXAL    RESTRICTION'    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  113 

nent  domain.--  whether  upon  the  residue  of  the  original  tract.-" 
or  upon  other  realty,-*  a  result  which  is  clearly  contrary  to  the 
weight  of  authority.-"'  T^nderlying  the  entire  discussion  is  the 
assumption  that  section  six,  article  thirteen,  confers  the  power 
of  local  assessment ;  whereas,  as  is  held  by  the  great  weight  of 
authority,  provisions  of  this  sort  do  not  confer  the  power  of 
assessment,  but  either  merely  recognize  its  existence  or  else  re- 
strict it.-"  It  is  only  in  jurisdictions  in  which  the  remaining 
constitutional  provisions  prevent  the  levy  of  local  assessments 
that  provisions  like  this  are  held  to  confer  the  power.^^  Even 
in  Ohio  it  is  held  that  the  legislature  can  confer  the  power  of 
local  assessment  upon  corporations  other  than  those  named  in 
this  clause,  a  result  which  could  not  be  reached  if  this  clause 
were  the  source  of  the  power.  Furthermore,  the  view  now^  held 
in  Ohio  assumes  that  the  provision  which  concerns  the  taking 
of  private  property  for  public  use  applies  to  assessment  and 
taxation,  v/hereas  by  the  weight  of  authority,  such  provision 
applies  solely  to  eminent  domain.-"  The  first  sentence  of  article 
one,  section  nineteen,  has  been  held  to  forbid  the  taking  of 
private  property  for  private  use,  and  this  in  turn  has  been  held 
t)  invalidate  assessments  for  purposes  w^hich  are  not  public  in 
their  nature.^"  Such  assessments  are  undoubtedly  invalid.  It 
is  contrary  to  the  very  nature  of  taxation,  of  which  assessment  is  a 
branch,  that  public  exactions  should  be  made  except  for  public  pur- 
poses.'"' To  assume  that  this  section  applies,  however,  it  must  first 
be  determined  that  the  exaction  in  question  is  not  a  tax  or  a 
local  assessment,  but  confiscation,  masquerading  in  the  guise 
of  taxation. ^^  Tender  such  provision  a  statute  providing  for  an 
assessment.''-  as  well  as  for  appropriation  of  realty ,^^  for  the 
construction   of  a   levee  for  the  private  benefit   of  certain  land- 

"  City  of  Dayton  v.  Bauman,  60  0.  =^  See  §  104. 

S.    379,    04    X.' E.    433    [19021:    Cin-  ="  Pee  §   110. 

cinnati,  Lebanon  &  Xortliern  l\v.  Co.  ^Chicago    &    Erie    Railroad    Com- 

V.   City  of  Cincinnati,  62  O.   S.   465,  pany  v.  Keith.  67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R. 

49  L.  R.  A.  566.  57  X.  E.  229  [1900].  A.  525,  65  X.  E.  1020   [19021. 

=^  Cincinnati.    Lebanon    &    Xorthern  '"See  §  283. 

Ry.  Co.  V.   City  of  Cineinnnti.   62   O.  '"See    §    US;    Chapter   XITI. 

S.  465.  49  L.  li.  A.  566.  57  X.  E.  229  "  ^V^i■zllt    v.   Thomas,  26   O.   S.    346 

[19001.  (1S751. 

='  City    of    Dayton    v.    Bauman.    66  "  Smith  v.  Atlantic  &  Oreat  West- 

0.  S.  379.  64  X.  E.  433    [1902].  ern   Railroad   Company,   25   O.   S.   91 

"'See  §  308  et  seq.  [1874]. 

=*See  §   103:    §    105. 


§  114  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  190 

owners,  the  public  interest  not  being  involved,  is  unconstitu- 
tional. A  statute  which  limits  the  property  owner  to  a  circum- 
scribed and  in  many  cases  impracticable  method  of  attack  on 
a  local  assessment  has  been  spoken  of  as  an  attempt  to  divest 
him  of  h's  property  without  his  consent.^* 

§  114.     Due  process  of  law — Specific  provisions. 

In  many  constitutions  are  found  provisions  forbidding  the  tak- 
ing of  property  except  by  due  course  of  law,  the  law  of  the 
land  or  some  expression  of  similar  import.  While  substantially 
similar  in  legal  effect^  these  provisions  may  be  grouped  into 
several  classes  according  to  their  phraseology.  This  provision 
of  ]Magna  Charta  is  incorporated  into  several  of  the  state  con- 
stitutions in  the  language  of  its  original  form.  "...  Nor  can 
he  be  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty  or  property  unless  by  the 
judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law  of  the  land;  .  .  .  "-  "lie 
shall  not  ...  be  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty,  property  or  privi- 
leges, but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  by  the  law  of  the 
land.  "^  "...  No  man  ought  to  be  taken  or  imprisoned  or 
disseized  of  his  freehold,  liberties  or  privileges,  or  outlawed  or 
exiled  or,  in  any  manner,  destroyed  or  deprived  of  his  life,  lib- 
erty or  property,  but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  by  the 
law  of  the  land."*  "...  No  subject  shall  be  arrested,  im- 
prisoned, despoiled  or  deprived  of  his  property,  immunities  or 
privileges,  put  out  of  the  protection  of  the  law,  exiled  or  de- 
prived of  his  life,  liberty  or  estate,  but  l)y  the  judgment  of  his 
peers  or  the  law  of  the  land."'"'  "No  person  ought  to  be  taken, 
imprisoned  or  disseized  of  his  freehold,  liberties  or  privileges, 
or  outlawed  or  exiled,  or  in  any  manner  deprived  of  his  life, 
liberty  or  property  but  by  the  law  of  the  land.""  "...  Xor 
can  he  be  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty  or  property  unless  by  the 
judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law   of  the  land."'      "Xo  person 

''*T^nion     Biiildincr     A^■sociation     v.  of  the  Constitution  of  ]Mas^ac1uisetts. 

City  of  Chicago, -61  111.  439  [1871].  « Article    I.,    §    17,    Constitution    of 

^  See   §    115.  North  Carolina. 

-§  11,  Constitution  of  Kentucky.  'Article    T..    §    9.    Constitution    of 

'Article    I.,    §    6,    Constitution    of  Pennsylvania.      Article    I.,    §     10,    of 

Maine.  the   Constitution   of   Rliode   Island    is 

*  §   23.   Constitution   of  Maryland.  suh~t;intially  the  same  as  Article  I,  § 

^  §    12,   Constitution   of   Mass^chu-  0   -  f   the   Constitution   of  Pennsylva- 

setts.      §    13    of    the    Constitution    of  nia. 

New  Hampshire  is  the  same  as  §   12 


1L»1  CONSTITLTIOX.VL    RESTRICTION    APPLIC.VBLE,    ETC.  §  11-i 

shall  be  arrested,  imprisoned,  despoiled  or  dispossessed  of  his 
property,  immunities  or  privileges,  put  out  of  the  protection  ot 
the  law,  exiled  or  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty  or  estate  but  by 
the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law  of  the  land.  .  .  .  "^ 
"...  No  man  shall  be  taken  or  imprisoned  or  disseized  of  his 
freehold,  liberties  or  privileges  or  outlawed  or  exiled  or  in  any 
manner  destroyed  or  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty  and  property 
but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  the  law  of  the  land."" 
The  phrase  more  commonly  used  is  "due  process  of  law."  "No 
person  shall  ...  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law;  .  .  .  "  "'  "...  nor  shall  any  state 
deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty  or  property  without  due 
process  of  law.  .  .  .  ""  Provisions  substantially  similar  to 
the  language  used  in  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  are  found  in  many  of  the  state  constitu- 
tions.^- The  constitution  of  Virginia  separates  property  from 
life  and  liberty  in  the  corresponding  provision  in  its  consti- 
tution. "  .  .  .No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  his  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  .  .  .  "  ^'^  Some  of  the  provi- 
sions found  are  of  composite  type,  suggesting  both  the  clause 
from  ]\Iagna  Charta  and  the  more  familiar  requirement  of  due 
process  of  law.  "No  citizen  of  this  state  shall  be  deprived  of 
life,  liberty.  i)roperty,  privileges  or  immunities  or  in  any  manner 


'Article    I.,    §    14,    Constitution    of  I.,  §   13,  Constitution  of  Idaho;   Arti- 

Soutli   Carolina.  cle   I.,    §    2,   Constitution   of   Illinois; 

^  Article    I.,    S    8,    Constitution    of  Article   I.,   §   9,   Constitution  of  Iowa 

Tennessee.  [1857];    §    6,    Constitution   of   Louis- 

'"  Article    V.,    Amendments    to    tlia  iana ;  Article  VII..  §  32,  Constitution 

Constitution    of    the    United    States.  of  Michigan;  Article  I.,  §  7,  Constitu- 

[Adopted    1791].  tion  of  Minnesota;   Article  III.,  §   14, 

"Article  XIV.,  Amendments  to  the  Constitution    of    ]\lississi])pi ;    Arti-le 

Constitution    of    the    United    States.  II.,    §    30,    Constitution   of   Missouri; 

[Adopted     18081.  Article    III.,    §    37,    Constitution    of 

'-Article  I.,  §  8,  Constitution  of  Ala-  ^Montana;  Article  I.,  §  3.  Constitution 

bama;  Article  II.,  §  8.  Constitution  of  of  Nebraska;  Article  I.,  §  8,  Constitu- 

Arkansas;   Article  I.,   S    115,  Constitu-  tion  of  Nevada;  Article  I.,  S  13,  Con 

tion  of  California;   Article  II..   §  25,  stitution    of   North    Dakota;    Article 

Constitution   of  Colorado;    Article   I..  VI.,    §   2,   Constitution   of   South    Da- 

8     9.     Constitution     of     Connecticut;  kota;   Article  I.,  §  3,  Constitution  of 

Article  I.,   §   7,  ^Constitution  ^f  Dela-  Wasliincrton;   Article  I.,  §   10,  Consti- 

ware;     .Article    XII.,    Constitution    of  tution  of  Wvomiii:. 

Florida;    .Article    I.,    §    1,    Para-zraph  "Article    I.,    §    II,    Constitution   of 

III.,  Constitution  of  Georgia;  Article  Virginia   [1902]! 


§  115  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  102 

disfranchised  except  by  the  due  course  of  the  law  of  the  land."  '^ 
"No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law  and  the  judgment  of  his  peers. ' '  ^^ 

§  115.     Scope  and  meaning  of  "due  process  of  law." 

The  scope  and  meaning  of  the  phrase  "due  process  of  law"  is 
a  question  which  has  received  some  attention  from  the  courts. 
It  is  looked  upon  as  the  equivalent  of  the  phrase  "the  law  of 
the  land."  found  in  the  various  charters  in  England,  guarantee- 
ing the  personal  rights  of  the  English,  of  which  the  most  cele- 
brated is  Magna  Charta.'  This  provision  was  inserted  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  in  one  of  the  earlier  amend- 
ments thereto,-  as  a  limitation  upon  the  power  of  the  Federal 
government.  It  has  been  incorporated  in  the  constitutions  of 
many  of  the  states  of  the  Union  as  a  limitation  upon  the  exer- 
cise of  power  by  the  officers  of  the  governments  of  such  states 
respectivel.y."  By  a  more  recent  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,*  it  has  become  a  limitation  imposed  by 
the  Federal  Constitution  upon  the  powers  of  the  states.  The 
f;iurteenth  amendment  resulted  in  a  prompt  and  marked  increase 
in  the  number  of  cases  brought  before  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  to  obtain  a  construction  of  this  clause  and 
a   determination   of  its  force   and   effect.-'     The   Supreme   Court 

"Article   I..    §    10.   Constitution   of  'See  §  114. 

Texas    [187G1.  *  Amendment  XTV.,  Constitution  of 

1^  Article  II..   §    10.  Constitution  of  United  States. 

West  Virginia.     Though   diflfering   in  =  "It  is  not  a  little  remarkable  that 

form  this   provision  of  the  Constitu-  while  this  provision  has  been  in  the 

tion  of  West  Virginia  has  the   same  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  as 

meaning   as   the   other   constitutional  a  restraint  upon  the  authority  of  the 

provisions  "or"  here  meaning  "and."  Federal  Government  for  nearly  a  cen- 

Jelly  v.  Dils,  27  W.  Va.  267    [1SS5];  tury,  and  while  during  all  that  time 

(See  discussion  on  page  275).  the   manner   in   which   the   powers   of 

^  The  equivalent  of  the  phrase  "due  that  government  have  been  exercised 

process    of    law"    according    to    Lord  has  been  watched  with  jealousy   and 

Coke  is   found   in   the  words   'law   of  subjectea  to  the  most  rigid  criticism 

the    land'    in    the    Great    Charter    in  in  all  its  branches,  this  special  limi- 

connection   with    the    writ   of    habeas  tation    upon    its    powers    has    rarely 

corpus,  the  trial   by  jury,   and  other  been  invoked  in  the  judicial  forum  or 

guarantees  of  the  rights  of  the  sub-  the  more   enlarged   theatre   of  public 

ject    against    the    oppression    of    the  discussion.     But  while  it  has  been  a 

crown."      Davidson    v.    New    Orleans.  part    of    the    Constitution    as    a    re- 

96  U.  S.  97,  101,  24  L.  616  [1877'!.  straint  upon  the  power  of  the  States 

-  Amendment    V.,     Constitution    of  only  a  very  few  years,  the  docket  of 

the   United   States.  this   court    is    already    crowded   with 


193  CONSTITUTIONAL   RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  115 

of  the  United  States  at  first  deelinell  to  attempt  to  define  "due 
process  of  law"  within  the  meaning  of  the  fourteenth  amend- 
ment, as  impracticable,  though  highly  useful."  Subsequently  an 
attempt  was  made  to  define  or  describe  due  process  of  law  as 
follows:  "It  is  suifieient  to  observe  here,  that  by  'due  process' 
is  meant  one  which,  folio-wing  the  forms  of  law,  is  appropriate 
to  the  ease  and  just  to  the  parties  to  be  affected.  It  must 
be  pursued  in  the  ordinary  mode  prescribed  by  the  law ;  it  must 
be  adapted  to  the  end  to  be  attained ;  and  wherever  it  is  neces- 
sary for  the  protection  of  the  parties  it  must  give  them  an  op- 
portunity to  be  heard  respecting  the  justice  of  the  judgment 
s(Might.  The  clause  in  question  means,  therefore,  that  there  can 
be  no  proceeding  against  life.  lil)erty  or  property  which  may 
result  in  deprivation  of  either  without  the  observance  of  those 
general  rules  estal)lished  in  our  system  of  jurisprudence  for  the 
security  of  private  rights."^  Other  attempts  have  been  made 
to  define  "due  process  of  law."  "Due  process  of  law  requires 
an  orderly  proceeding  adapted  to  the  nature  of  the  case  in  which 
the  citizen  has  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  and  to  defend,  enforce 
and  protect  his  rights.  A  hearing  or  an  opportunity  to  be  heard 
is  absolutely  essential.  We  cannot  conceive  of  due  process  of 
law^  without  this.     In  his  argument   in  the  Dartmouth   College 

casos  in  wliich  we  are  asked   to  liold  of  such  an   important  phrase,  in  the 

that   State   Courts   and   State   Legis-  Federal   Constitution  by  the  gradual 

latures  have  deprived  their  own  citi-  process  of  judicial   inclusion  and  ex- 

zens  of  life,  liberty  or  property  with-  elusion    as    the    cases    presented    for 

out  due  process  of  law."     Davidson  v.  decision    shall    require   with    the    rea- 

New  Orleans,   flfi   U.   S.   07,    103,   104,  soning  on  which   such   decisions   may 

24  L.  filfl   [1877].  be   founded."     Davidson   v.   Xew   Or- 

'••If   ...   it  were  possibh^  to  dofinp  leans.    00    U.    S.    97,    104,    24    L.    616 

what    it    is  for   a   state   to   deprive   a  [18771. 

])ers()n    of    life,    liberty    or    property  '  Ila<rar     v.     Reclamation     District 

without  due  process  of  law.  in  terms  No.   108,  111  U.  S.  701.  708,  4  S.  Ct. 

whicli   would    cover  every   exercise   of  663,    28    L.    560     [1884]     quoted     in 

l)ower    thus    forbidden    to    the    state,  Turpin   v.   Lemon.    187   I'.   S.   51,   58, 

and  exclude  those  which  are  not,  no  47  L.  70,  23  S.  20   [1002];   wTiere  it 

more    useiul     construction     could     be  is  said  that  "due  process  of  law  was 

furnished  by  this  or  any  other  court  well  defined"  in  the  definition  quoted, 

to  any  part  of  the  fundamental   law.  The    definition    above    quoted    follows 

But    apart    from    the    imminent    risk  close  upon  the  statement  by  the  court 

of    a    failure    to    give    any    definition  that  the  definition   is  a   diflficult  one, 

which  would  be  at  once  perspicuous.  and  its  approval  of  the  statement  al- 

eomprehensive  and  satisfaetoi-y.  there  ready  quoted   from   Davidson   v.   Xew 

is    wisdom,    we    think,    in    the    ascer-  Orleans,  00  U.  S.  97,   104,  24  L.   610 

taining  of  the  intent  and  application  [1877]. 


§  115  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  194 

case,  4  Wheat.  519,  Webster  defines  'due  process  of  law'  as  a 
proceeding  Svhich  proceeds  upon  inquiry  and  renders  judgment 
only  after  trial.'  "^  "Due  process  of  law  is  not  violated  and 
the  equal  protection  of  the  laws  is  given  when  the  ordinary 
course  is  pursued  in  such  proceedings  for  the  assessment  an 
collection  of  taxes  that  has  been  customarily  followed  in  the 
state,  and  where  the  party  who  may  subsequently  be  charged 
in  his  property  has  had  a  hearing  or  the  opportunity  for  one 
provided  by  the  statute.'"*  "It  is  settled  that  if  provision  i' 
made  'for  notice  to  and  hearing  of  each  proprietor  at  some  stage 
of  the  proceedings  upon  the  question  what  proportion  of  the 
tax  shall  be  assessed  upon  his  land,  there  is  no  taking  of  his 
property  without  due  process  of  law.'  "  ^'^  Due  process  of  law 
is  said  to  consist  in  "an  opportunity"  to  appear  and  contest  the 
legality,  justice  and  correctness  of  a  proposed  assessment  against 
(his)  property,  to  defray  any  part  of  the  expense  of  a  local 
improvement,  at  some  stage  in  the  proceedings  before  the  as- 
sessment becomes  final,  which  was  declared  by  this  court  to 
be  his  constitutional  right.  "^^  At  the  same  time  the  difficulty 
of  defining  due  process  of  law  with  perfect  accuracy  is  still 
frequently  noted. ^-  Furthermore,  while  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  such  constitutional  provisions  being  written  law  can  over- 
ride   provisions    of    the    common    lav/    inconsistent    therewith,^' 

« Stuart  V.   Palmer,   74   X.   Y.    183.  "Adams   v.   City   of   Roanoke.    102 

191.  30  Am.  Rep.  289  [1878];  quoted  Va.  53,  45  S.  E.  881    [1903];    (Citing 

in    Campbell    v.    Dwiggins.    83     Ind.  City  of  Norfolk  v.  Young,  97  Va.  728. 

473.  482    [1882].            ^  47  L.  R.  A.  574,  34  S.  E.  886  [1900]  ; 

»  Fallbrook    Irrigation    District    v.  Hetli  v.  City  of  Radford,  96  Va.  272, 

Bradley,    164    U.    S.    112,    168.    41    L.  31    S.    E.    8    [1898]-.    Violett   v.    City 

309,  17  S.  56   [1896];  quoted  in  Hib-  Council    of    Alexandria,    92    Va.    56i. 

ben  V.  Smith.  191  U.  S.  310,  322,  48  53    Am.    St.    Rep.    825,    31    L.   R.   A. 

L.    195,  24   S.   88    [1903];.    (affirming  382,  23  S.  E.  909   [1896]). 

Hibben  v.  Smith,  1.58  Ind.  206,  62  X.  '-"It  would   not   be  a  simple   mat- 

E.  447    [1902]).  ter  to  state  in  a  succinct  proposition 

"  Paulsen    v.    Portland,    149    U.    S.  any  rule  as  to  when  a  notice  of  assess- 

30,  41,  37  L.  637,   13  S.  750   [1893];  ment  is  and  when  it  is  not  due  pro- 

( Affirming  Paulson  v.   City  of   Port-  cess     of     law."       Oliver     v.     Monona 

land,   16  Or.  450,  1  L.  R.  A.  673.   19  County.    117    la.    43,    53,    90    X.    W. 

Pac.  450    [1888]);    (Citing  McMillen  510    [i902]. 

V.  Anderson,  95  U.   S.   37,  24  L.   335  "  "If  at  common  law  private  prop- 

[1877]);    Davidson   v.    Xew    Orleans,  erty  might  be  taken  for  private  use. 

96  U.  S.   97,   24  L.   616    [1877];    Ha-  or    taken    or    destroyed    without    due 

gar  V.  Reclamation  District  Xo.   108,  course  of  law,   then  our  constitution 

111    U.    S.   701.   4   S.    663.   28   L.   569  has  rendered  inoperative  the  common 
[18^4];   S'-c-icer  v.  ^lo-fhant.   123  U. 
S.  3-!5.  8  S.  921.  31   L.  763   [1888]. 


195  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.        §§  116.  117 

the  condition  of  the  laAv  existing  and  Avell  recognized  when 
these  provisions  were  adopted  must  be  considered  carefully,  and 
is  of  great  weight  in  aiding  in  the  determination  of  what  is 
due  process  of  law.  "It  is  important  for  this  court  to  avoid  ex- 
tracting from  the  very  general  language  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  a  system  of  delusive  exactness  in  order  to  destroy 
methods  of  taxation  which  were  well  known  when  that  amend- 
ment was  adopted  and  which  it  is  safe  to  say  that  no  one  then 
supposed  would  be  disturbed."" 

§  116.     Sale  of  property  as  taking  without  due  process. 

The  enforcement  of  a  void  assessment.^  including  assessments 
levied  under  unconstitutional  statutes.^  is  spoken  of  as  amount- 
ing to  a  taking  without  due  process  of  lav>'.  This  is  not  the  ordi- 
nary meaning  of  due  process  of  law.  however.  If  due  notice 
and  hearing  are  given,  the  owner  has  a  right  to  take  advantage 
of  the  invalidity  of  the  assessment  and  of  the  statute  under 
M'hich  it  is  levied.  If  no  notice  or  hearing  is  provided  for.  such 
omission  constitutes  the  want  of  due  process  of  law. 

§  117.     Due  process  of  law  requires  taking  for  public  use. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  definitions  of  due  process  of  law  which 
have  been  given  lay  especial  stress  upon  opportunity  for  a  hear- 
ing. Constitutional  provisions  of  this  character  may,  however, 
affect  the  validity  of  assessments  in  several  different  ways.  (1) 
Under  such  provisions,  according  to  many  authorities,  the  legis- 
ature  is  prohibited  from  levying  an  assessment  for  a  purpose 
A'hich  is  not  essent'allv  public  in  its  character.  The  determina- 
tion of  the  legislature  that  a  given  improvement  is  public  in 
character  is  therefore  not  final  and  conclusive.  It  is,  on  the  con- 
trary, a  mattf^r  for  the  conrt  to  jiass  upon  in  order  to  determine 
whether  the  pv.rpose  for  vliicli   an    assessment   is  levied   can   be 

law  in  that  regard.  .  .  .  The  common  v.  Keith,  07  O.  S.  270,  20.1,  HO  L.  R. 
law  in  so  far  as  it  conflicts  with  these  A.  .52.'),  65  X.  E.  1020  [1002]. 
provisions  of  the  constitution  is  in-  "  Louisville  and  Nashville  Rail- 
operative.  There  is  nothinnr  so  sacred  road  C"om])any  v.  Rarher  Asphalt 
in  the  common  law  that  it  should  Pavinsr  Company.  107  I'.  S.  4.30.  4,34. 
override  a  constitution   or   a    statute.  2.)  S.  406   flOd.')]. 

Mucli       of      our      constitution       was  '  Rrady  v.  King;.  .iS  fal.  44   [1^781. 

adopted    and    manv    of    our    statutes  =  Rrady  v.  Kins.  53  Cal.  44  [1^781: 

enacted,   to   pet    rid    of   the    imperfec-  Andorson    v.    Hill.    54    Mich.    477.    20 

tions    and    injustice    of    the    common  X.  W.  549    [1884]. 
law."     Chica-TO   &    Erie   Railrond   Co. 


§  117  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  196 

a  purpose  so  public  in  its  nature  that  an  assessment  can  be 
levied  therefor.^  What  these  purposes  are  is  a  topic  which,  for 
the  sake  of  convenience,  is  treated  in  greater  detail  elsewhere. - 
There  is  no  serious  conflict  of  authority  upon  the  proposition 
that  the  purpose  for  which  an  assessment  may  be  levied  must 
be  one  which  is  public  in  its  nature ;  though  there  is  considerable 
conflict  upon  the  question  whether  or  not  certain  specific  pur- 
poses are  public.^  Upon  the  question  of  the  specific  constitu- 
tional provision  which  forbids  an  assessment  for  a  private  pur- 
pose, there  is  on  the  other  hand,  a  conflict  of  judicial  opinion. 
Thus  it  has  been  urged  that  such  an  assessment  is  unconstitu- 
tional,* because  in  conflict  with  the  provision,  "Private  prop- 
erty shall  ever  be  held  inviolate  but  subservient  to  the  public 
welfare,"''  and  hence  a  taking  of  private  property  for  a  private 
vise  without  the  consent  of  the  owner  thereof.  It  may  be  added, 
however,  that  it  has  been  said  that  private  property  can  not  be 
taken  for  private  use  even  without  such  constitutional  provision." 
This  clause  does  not  prevent  an  assessment  for  work  which  was 
not  authorized  by  the  improvement  ordinance,  but  which  has 
been  adopted  and  accepted  by  the  municipality,  the  work  being 
of  a  kind  which  the  municipality  might  have  ordered  in  the 
first  instance  and  thus  have  levied  an  assessment  therefor.'^  A 
statute  which  provides  that  the   city  shall  issue  bonds  to  pa.v 

^  Fallbrook     Irrigation    District    v.  Tyler  v.  Beachcr,  44  Vt.   648,  8  Am. 

Bradley,    164    U.    S.    112,    41    L.    369,  Rep.  398   [1871]. 

17  S.  56   [1896];   Consolidated  Chan-  =  See  Chapter  VIII. 

nel  Company  v.  Central  Pacific  Rail-  ^  See  Chapter  VIII. 

road  Company,   51   Cal.   269    [1876];  *  Chicago    &    Erie    Railroad    Co.    v. 

Parham   v.    Justices   of    the    Inferior  Keith,  67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R.  A.  525, 

Court  of  Decatur  County,  9  Ca.  341  65    N.    E.     1020     [1902];     Reeves    v. 

[1851];    Coster   v.   Tide   Water   Com-  Treasurer   of   Wood   County,   8    0.   S. 

pany,  18  N.  J.  Eq.    (3  C.  E.  Greene)  333    [1858];   As  expressing  the  same 

54  [1866];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti-  opinion   see  McQuillen  v.  Hatton,  42 

tion  of  Tuthill   for  the   Appointment  0.   S.   202    [1884]. 

of    Commissioners    to    Drain    Certain  '^  Art.  I,  §   19,  Constitution  of  Ohio 

Wet  and  Low  Lands  in  the  Towns  of  [1851]. 

Chester      and      Blooming     Grove      in  "  Shaver    v.    Starrett,    4    0.    S.    494 

Orange    County,    163    N.    Y.    133,    79  [1855]. 

Am.   St.   Rep.  574,  49  L.   R.   A.   781,  'City   of    Seattle   v.    Kelleher,    195 

57  N.  E.  303   [1900]  ;  Chicago  &  Erie  U.  S.  351,  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904] ; 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Keith,  67   0.  S.  279,  Hall  v.  Street  Commissioners  of  Bos- 

60    L.    R.    A.    525,    65    X.    E.    1020  ton,    177    Mass.    434,    59    N.    E.    68 

[1902];    McQuillen   v.   Hatton,   42   O.  [1901];     Bellows    v.    Weeks,    41    Vt. 

S.    202    [1884];    Anderson    v.    Turbe-  590    [1868];    Mills    v.    Charleton.    29 

ville,  6  Cold.   (46  Tenn.)    150  [1868];  Wis.  400,   9   Am.  Rep.   578    [1872]. 


197  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  118 

the  expense  of  the  improvement  which  is  to  be  made  thereafter, 
and  that  the  city  is  to  reimburse  itself  by  levying  an  assessment 
upon  the  property  benefited  by  such  improvement  is  not  invalid 
as  in  violation  of  the  clause  forbidding  the  taking  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law.'*  It  seems  not  to  prevent  the  legis- 
lature from  fixing  the  rate  of  interest  to  be  paid  on  deferred 
installments  of  assessments."'^  "Taking  without  due  process  of 
law"  is  usually  regarded  as  meaning  a  taking  by  the  public 
for  its  own  use  as  well  as  a  taking  for  the  advantage  of  a  private 
person,  a  taking  under  the  guise  of  assessment  or  other  form 
of  taxation  as  well  as  undisguised  confiscation.  This  provision 
has  been  said,  however,  to  have  no  application  to  the  taking  of 
private  property  for  public  use,  but  to  refer  solely  to  the  trans- 
fer of  property  from  one  person  to  another  without  the  consent 
of  the  former.^"  The  constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  tak- 
ing of  property  without  due  process  of  law  has  been  said  to  be 
restricted  to  eminent  domain,  and  to  have  no  application  to 
local  assessments.^^  This  observation  was.  however,  an  obiter, 
since  the  proceeding  contained  the  elements  usually  recognized 
as  due  process  of  law. 

§  118.  Due  process  of  law  requires  apportionment  according  to 
benefits. 
(2)  These  constitutional  provisions  forbidding  the  taking  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law,  also  affect  the  method  of 
apportioning  the  assessment  with  reference  to  the  property  upon 
which  it  is  levied.  In  theory,  at  least,  it  is  held  in  the  great 
majority  of  jurisdictions  that  an  assessment  must  be  apportioned 
according  to  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  improvement  for  which 
such  assessment  is  levied,  and  must  not  in  any  case  be  in  sub- 
stantial excess  of  such  lienefits.^  As  lias  already  been  said,-"  the 
courts  are  not  in  liarmony  as  to  the  constitutional  princijile  which 

"State    px    rol.    Miiiiiosoln    T>o;mi    &  '".ronlan  v.  ITyatt.  .1  Rarb.   (X.  Y.) 

Trust    Company    v.    Amps.    ST    Minn.  27.')    [18481. 

2.3.  91   N.  W.   18   [19021.  "Excelsior  Plantin<r  and   :\lanufap 

°  Ilulltprt    V.    City    nf    T'lii'-aco.    202  tnrintr    Company    v.    fJrppn,     .39    La. 

V.  S.  27.5   [190(11:   This  (nn-slion   was  Ann.  -I.l.i.   1   So.  873   [1887]. 

not     hrouslit     to     tli(>     attoiition      r.f  '  Spp   §    11. 

pitlior    the    trial    court    or    tlip    Statp  "See  §  111  et  scq. 
Suprpmp  Court  and   accordintrly   was 
not    passed     upon    by    the    Supreme 
Court  of  tlic  T'nitcd  States. 


§118 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


198 


is  applicable  in  limiting  assessments  to  benefits  conferred.  The 
great  weight  of  authority,  however,  is  that  the  constitutional 
provision  applicable  is  that  which  forbids  taking  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  If  the  assessment  does  not  exceed 
the  amount  of  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  improvement  for 
which  such  assessment  is  levied,  and  is  apportioned  according 
to  such  benefits,  it  is  not  objectionable  as  a  violation  of  the 
constitutional  provisions  here   under  discussion.''     If  the   assess- 


'  Lousville   and   Nashville   Railroad 
Company   v.    Barber   Asphalt   Paving 
Co.,  197  U.  S.  430,  25  S.  460  [1905]; 
(affirming    Louisville    and    Nashville 
R.    R.    Co.    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Pav- 
ing   Co.,    116    Ky.    856;     76    S.    W. 
1097,    25    Ky.    L.    R.    1024    [1903]); 
Shepard   v.    Barron,    194    U.    S.    553, 
24     S.     737,     48     L.     1115      [1904]; 
Schaefer   v.   Werling,   188   U.   S.   516, 
23    S.    449,    47    L.    570    [1903];     (af- 
firming Schaefer  v.  Werling,  156  Ind. 
704,    60    N.    E.    149     [1901],    which 
upheld  the  assessment  without  opin- 
ion   on    the    authority    of    Adams    v. 
City  of  Shelbyville,   154  Ind.  467,  77 
Am.  St.   Rep.  484,   49  L.   R.   A.   797, 
57   N.  E.   114    [1900]);    Chadwick  v. 
Kelley,  187  U.  S.  540,  47  L.  293,  23 
S.    175    [1903];     (affirming   Kelly    v. 
Chadwick,    104   La.   719,    29    So.    295 
[1901]);     Goodrich    v.    Detroit,    184 
U.    S.    432,    46    L.    627,    22    S.    397 
[1902];     (affirming   Goodrich   v.   City 
of  Detroit,   123  Mich.  559,  82  N.  W. 
255    [  1900]  )  ;    Voigt  v.   Detroit  City, 
184  U.  S.   115,  46  L.  459,  22  S.   337 
[1902];     (affirming  Voigt  v.    City   of 
Detroit.    123    Mich.    547,    82    N.    W. 
253   [1900]  )  ;   King  v.  Portland  City, 
184   U.    S.   61,   46   L.   431,   22   S.   290 
[1902];      (affirming     King    v.     Port- 
land,    38     Or.     402,     55     L.     R.     A. 
812,    63    Pac.    2     [1900]);     Shumate 
V.  Heman,   181   U.  S.  402,  45  L.  922, 
21     S.    645     [1901];      (affirming    He- 
man  V.  Allen,  156  Mo.  534,  57  S.  W. 
559     [1900]);     Wormley    v.    District 
of    Columbia,    181    U.    S.   402,    45    L. 
921,  21  S.  609  [1901];    (   per  curiam. 
no  opinion)  ;    Detroit  v.   Parker.    181 
U.  S.  399,  45  L.  917,  21   S.  624,  645 


[1901];    (reversing  Parker  v.  City  of 
Detroit,   103  Fed.  357    [1900]);   Cass 
Farm  Company  v.  Detroit,  181  U.  S. 
396,  45  L.  914,' 21  S.  644,  645  [1901]  ; 
( affirming  Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  124  Mich.  433,  83  N.  W."^  108 
[1900]);     Tonawanda    v.    Lyon,     181 
U.    S.    389,    45    L.    908,    21    S.    609 
[1901];    (reversing  Lyon  v.  Town  of 
Tonawanda,    98    Fed.    361     [1899]); 
French    v.    Barber     Asphalt    Paving 
Company,   181   U.   S.   324,  21   S.  625. 
45  L.  879    [1901];    (affirming  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Company  v.   French. 
158    Mo.    534,    54    L.    R.    A.    492,    58 
S.  W.  934    [1900]);    Spencer  v.  Mer- 
chant,   125   U.   S.    345,   31    L.   763,   8 
S.  921   [1888]:    (affirming  Spencer  v. 
Merchant,    100    N.   Y.    585,    3    N.    E. 
682    [1885]);    Hagar   v.   Reclamation 
District   No.   108,   111   U.   S.   701,   28 
L.   569,   4   S.   663    [1884];     (affirming 
Reclamation  District  No.   108  v.  Ha- 
gar,  4    Fed.    366    [1880]);    Brown   v. 
Drain,  112  Fed.  582   [1901];  Burling- 
ton   Sav.    Bank   v.    City    of    Clinton. 
Iowa,    106    Fed.   269    [1901];    Harton 
V.   Town   of   Avondale,    147   Ala.   458. 
41    So.   934    [1906];    City   Council   of 
Montgomery  v.  Moore,   140  Ala.  638. 
37  So.  291    [1903];   Inge  v.  Board  of 
Public    Works    of    Mobile,    135    Ala. 
187,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  20,  33  So.  678 
[1902];   City  Council  of  Montgomery 
V.    Birdsong,    126    Ala.    632,    28    So. 
522    [1899];    Chapman  v.  Ames,    135 
Cal.  246,   67   Pac.   1125    [1901];    San 
Francisco  Paving  Company  v.  Bates, 
134  Cal.  39,  66  Pac.  2   [1901];   Had- 
ley  V.   Dague,    130   Cal.   207,   62    Pac. 
5()0    [1900];    Cohen    v.    City    of    Ala- 
meda,    124    Cal.    504,    57    Pac.    377 


199 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


§11S 


ment  is  nut  apportioned  in  substantially  the   same   ratio   as   the 
benefits  or  if  it  is  substantially  in  excess  thereof,  such  as.sessnient 


[1899];  Hellman  v.  Shoulters,  114 
Cal.  136,  44  Pac.  915,  45  Pac.  1057 
tlS9GJ;  Davies  v.  City  of  Los  An- 
geles, 86  Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  7.71  [1890]  ; 
Appeal  of  North  Beach  and  Mission 
Railroad  Company  in  the  Matter  of 
Widening  Kearney  Street,  32  Cal. 
500  [1867];  City  of  Denver  v.  Camp- 
bell, 33  Colo.  162,  80  Pac.  142 
[1905];  City  of  Denver  v.  Knowles, 
17  Colo.  204^  17  L.  R.  A.  135.  30  Pac. 
1041  [1892];  Ferguson  v.  Borough 
of  Stamford,  60  Conn.  432,  22  Atl. 
782  [1891];  English  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  Wilmington,  2  Marv. 
(Del.)  63,  37  Atl.  158  [1890];  Edger- 
ton  \.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the 
Town  of  Green  Cove  Springs,  19  Fla. 
140  [1882];  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Savannah,  86  Ga.  301, 
12  S.  E.  580  [1890];  Speer  v.  Mayor 
and  Council  of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9 
L.  R.  A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890]; 
Pioneer  Irrigation  District  v.  Brad- 
ley. 8  Ida.  310,  101  Am.  St.  Rep. 
201,  67  Pac.  295  [1902];  Job  v.  City 
of  Alton,  189  111.  256,  82  Am.  St. 
Rep.  448,  59  N.  E.  622  [1901];  Chi- 
cago and  Northwestern  Railway 
Company  v.  Village  of  Elmhurst.  165 
111.  148,  46  N.  E.  437  [1897];  Chi- 
cago and  Alton  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Joliet,  153  111.  649,  39  N.  E. 
1D77  [1894];  Wright  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 46  111.  44  [1867];  Deane  v. 
Indiana  Macadam  &  Construction 
Company.  161  Ind.  371.  (iS  N.  K, 
686  [1903];  Martin  v.  Wills.  157 
Ind.  153,  60  N.  K.  1021  [1901]; 
Wray  v.  Fry,  158  Ind.  92.  62  N.  E. 
1004  [1901];  Roundenlmsh  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 154  Ind.  616.  57  N.  K.  510 
[1900];  Adams  v.  (  ity  df  Slirlbyvilh-. 
•151  Ind.  467.  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  4S4. 
49  L.  R.  A.  797.  57  N.  E.  114  [1900]  : 
Reinken  v.  Fuehring.  130  Ind.  382. 
30  Am.  St.  Rop.  247.  15  L.  R.  A. 
624,  30  N.  E.  414.  37  Am.  and  Eng. 
Corp.  Cases.  354  [1891];  Minne- 
apolis &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lind- 
quist.    119    la.    144.    93    N.    W.    103 


[1903];  Ft.  Dodge  Electric  Light  & 
Power  Company  v.  City  of  Ft. 
Dodge,  115  la.  568,  89  N.  W.  7 
[1902];  Hackworth  v.  City  of  Ot- 
tumwa,  114  la.  467,  87  N.  W.  424 
[1901];  Allen  v.  City  of  Davenport, 
107  la.  90,  77  N.  W.  532  [1898]; 
City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Gibson,  66 
Kan.  501,  72  Pac.  222  [1903];  Bar- 
field  V.  Gleason,  111  Ky.  491,  23  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  128,  63  S.  W.  964  [1901]; 
Broadway  Baptist  Church  v.  McAfee, 
8  Bush.  "(71  Ky.)  508,  8  Am.  Rep. 
480  [1871];  Burguieres  v.  Samlers. 
Ill  La.  109,  35  So.  478  [1903]; 
Bruning  v.  Chadwick,  109  La.  1067, 
34  So.  90  [1903];  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Ulman,  79 
Md.  469,  30  Atl.  43  [1894];  White 
v.  Gove,  183  Mass.  333,  67  N.  E.  359 
[1903];  Lincoln  v.  Board  of  Street 
Commissioners  of  the  City  of  Boston. 
176  Mass.  210,  57  N.  E.  356  [1900]; 
Howe  V.  City  of  Cambridge,  114 
Mass.  388  [1874];  Cass  Farm  Co.  v. 
City  of  Detroit,  124  ]Mich.  433,  83 
N.  W.  108  [1900];  (affirmed  Cass 
Farm  Company  v.  Detroit,  181  U.  S. 
396,  45  L.  914,  21  S.  044,  645 
[1901]);  Voigt  v.  City  of  Detroit. 
123  Mich.  547,  82  N.  W.  253  [1900]; 
(affirmed  Voigt  v.  Detroit  City,  184 
r.  S.  115,  46  L.  459  22  S.  337 
[1902])  ;  Goodrich  v.  City  of  Detroit. 
123  Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255  [1900|: 
City  of  Kalamazoo  v.  Francoise.  115 
Mich.  554.  73  N.  W.  801  [1898]; 
Roberts  v.  Smith,  115  Mich.  5,  72  N. 
W.  1091  [1897];  Sheley  v.  City  of 
Detroit.  45  Mich.  431,  8  N.  W.  52 
[18811;  Thomas  v.  Gain.  .35  Micii. 
155.  24  Am.  Rep.  535  |  1876]  ;  Mot/ 
V.  City  of  Detroit.  IS  :\Iich.  491 
[1869];  McMillan  v.  Board  of  County 
(\>mniissioners  of  Freeborn  County, 
03  Minn.  16.  100  N.  W.  384  [1904]; 
State  v.  Trustees  of  Macalester  Col- 
lege. 87  Minn.  165,  91  N.  W.  484 
[1002];  State  v.  Robert  P.  Lewis 
Company.  82  Minn.  402.  86  N.  W. 
611      [1901];     sub     nomine     Ramsey 


§118 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


200 


is  invalid  as  amounting  to  a  taking  without  due  process  of  law.* 
It  may  be  observed  that  in  many  of  the  cases  there  was  a  failure 


County  V.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  53 
L.  R.  A.  421  [1901];  (reversing  on 
rehearing  State  v.  Robert  P.  Lewis 
Company,  82  Minn.  390,  85  N.  W. 
207  [1901];  sub  nomine  Ramsey 
County  V.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  53 
L.  R.  A.  421);  State  of  Minne- 
sota.  V.    Robert    P.    Lewis    Company. 

72  Minn.  87,  75  N.  W.  108  [1S98]; 
sub  nomine  Ramsey  County  v.  Rob- 
ert P.  Lewis  Co.,  42  L.  R.  A.  639; 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Munn, 
185  Mo.  552,  83  S.  W.  1062  [1904]; 
Ross  V.  Gates,  183  Mo.  338,  81  S. 
W.  1107  [1904];  City  of  St.  Cliarles 
ex  rel.  Budd  v.  Deemar,  174  Mo.  122. 

73  S.  W.  469  [1903];  Heman  v.  Gil- 
liam, 171  Mo.  258,  71  S.  W.  163 
[1902];  Prior  v.  Buehler  &  Coney 
Construction  Company,  170  Mo.  439, 
71  S.  W.  205  [1902];"^Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Company  v.  French,  158  Mo. 
534,  54  L.  R.  A.  492,  58  S.  W.  934 
[1900];  Heman  v.  Allen,  156  Mo. 
534,  57  S.  W.  559  [1900];  City  of 
Springfield  to  use  of  Central  Nation- 
al Bank  v.  Weaver,  137  Mo.  650,  37 
S.  W.  509,  39  S.  W.  276  [1897]; 
Eyerman  v.  Blaksley,  78  Mo.  145 
[1883];  Tyler  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
56  Mo.  60  [1874];  State  of  Missouri 
ex  rel.  Cavender  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
52  Mo.  574  [1873];  Uhrig  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  44  Mo.  458  [1869]; 
Mc:\Iillan  v.  City  of  Butte,  30  Mont. 
220,  76  Pac.  203  [1904];  State.  Ray- 
mond, Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Council 
of  the  Borough  of  Rutherford,  55 
N.  J.  L.  (26  Vr.)  441,  27  Atl.  172 
[1893];  People  ex  rel.  Scott  v.  Pitt. 
169  N.  Y.  521,  58  L.  R.  A.  372,  62 
N.  E.  662  [1902];  People  ex  rel. 
Griffin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4 
N.  Y  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851]; 
People  ex  rel.  Crowell  v.  Lawrence, 
36  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  178  [1862]; 
Hilliard  v.  City  of  Asheville,  118  X. 
C.  845,  24  S.  E.  738   [1896];   City  of 


Wilmington  v.  Yopp,  71  N.  C.  76 
[1874];  Erickson  v.  Cass  County,  11 
X.  D.  494,  92  X.  W.  841  [1902]; 
Webster  v.  City  of  Fargo,  9  X.  D. 
208,  56  L.  R.  A.  156,  82  X.  W.  732 
[1900];  (affirmed  as  Webster  v. 
Fargo,  181  U.  S.  394,  45  L.  912,  21 
S.  623,  645  [1901]);  Roberts  v. 
First  Xational  Bank  of  Fargo,  8  X. 
D.  504.  79  X.  W.  1049  [1899]; 
Rolph  v.  City  of  Fargo,  7  X.  D.  640. 

42  L.  R.  A.  646,  76  X.  W.  242  [1898] ; 
Schroder  v.  Overman,  61  0.  S.  1,  47 
L.  R.  A.  156,  55  X.  E.  158  [18991; 
(affirming  Schroeder  v.  Overman,  18 
Ohio  C.  C.  385  [1899]);  Village  of 
Xorwood  V.  Ogden,  15  Ohio  C.  C.  539. 
8  Ohio  C.  D.  383  [1898];  Harris- 
burg  V.  McPherran,  200  Pa.  St.  343, 
49  Atl.  988  [1901];  Scranton  v. 
Koehler,  200  Pa.  St.  126,  49  Atl.  792 
[1901];  Wray  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Pittsburgh  for  use,  etc.,  46  Pa.  St. 
(10  Wright)  365  [1863];  Cleveland 
v.  Tripp,  13  R.  I.  50  [1880];  Tripp 
v.  City  of  Yankton,  10  S.  D.  516,  74 
X.  W.  447  [1898];  Arnold  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Knoxville,  115  Tenn. 
195;  90  S.  W.  469  [1905];  Loven- 
berg  V.  City  of  Galveston,  17  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  162,  42  S.  W.  1024  [1897]; 
Xorfolk  City  v.  Ellis,  26  Graft.  (67 
Va.)  224  [1875];  Dancer  v.  Town  of 
Mannington,  50  W.  Va.  322,  40  S.  E. 
475  [1901];  City  of  Parkersburg  v. 
Tavenner.  42  W.  Va.  486,  26  S,  E. 
179;  Meggett  v.  City  of  Eau  Claire. 
SI    Wis.   326,    51    X.   W.   566    [1892]. 

•  Xorwood  V.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  269, 

43  L.  443,  19  S.  187  [1898];  (af- 
firming Baker  v.  Village  of  Xorwood, 
74  Fed.  997  [1896]);  White  v.  City 
of  Tacoma,  109  Fed.  32  [1901]; 
Zehnder  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co..  108  Fed.  570  [1901];  Bidwell 
V.  Huff,  103  Fed.  362  [1900];  Fay  v. 
Citv  of  Springfield,  94  Fed.  409 
[1899];    Loeb  v.   Trustees   of  Colum- 


201 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


118 


to  give  the  property  owner  a  proper  notice  and  hearing  as  to 
the  amount  and  apportionment  of  his  assessment  as  well  as  an 
excess  of  the  amount  of  the  assessment  over  the  amount  of  the 
special  benefits  f  w^hich  constitutes  an  additional  reason  for  hold- 
ing that  such  assessment  does  not  constitute  due  process  of  law.'' 
Questions  of  the  details  of  a  valid  apportionment  and  a  discussion 
of  the  specific  classes  of  statutes  upon  the  subject  are  considered 
subsequently.'  In  some  few  cases  the  theory  that  an  assessment 
must  be  apportioned  according  to  benefits  or  must  be  limited  to 
the  amount  thereof  has  been  repudiated.^  The  constitution  of 
South  Carolina  provides:  "No  person  shall  be  arrested,  impris- 
oned, despoiled  or  dispossessed  of  his  property,  immunities  or 
privileges,  put  out  of  the  protection  of  the  law,  exiled  or  de|)rived 


bia  Tp.,  Hamilton  County.  Oliio,  91 
Fed.  37  [1899];  Scott  v.  City  of 
Toledo,  36  Fed.  385,  1  L.  R.  A.  688 
[1888];  Lower  Kings  River  Reclama- 
tion District  Xo.  531  v.  Phillips,  108 
Cal.  306,  39  Pac.  030,  41  Pac.  335 
[1895];  City  of  Atlanta  v.  Hanilein, 
96  Ga.  381;  23  S.  E.  408  [1895]; 
Guckien  v.  Rotlirock.  137  Ind.  355, 
37  N.  E.  17  [1893]  ;  Klein  v.  Nugent 

Gravel  Co.. Ind.  App.  ,  66 

X.  E.  486  [1903];  City  of  Detroit 
V.  Judge  of  Recorder's  Court,  112 
Mich.  588,  71  X.  \Y.  149  [1897]; 
sub  nomine  City  of  Detroit  v. 
Chapin.  42  L.  R."  A.  628;  City  of 
Detroit  v.  Daly.  68  Mich.  503.  37 
N.  W.  11  [1888];  Town  of  :Macon 
v.  Patty.  57  Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Rep. 
451  [1879];  City  of  St.  Joseph  v. 
Crowther.  142  Mo.  155,  43  S.  W.  78(i 
[1897];  State.  Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v. 
Commissioners  of  Streets  and  Sewers 
in  the  City  of  New  Brunswick,  42 
N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  510  [1880];  City 
of  Dayton  v.  Bauman.  66  O.  S.  379, 
64  X.  E.  433  [1902]:  Cincinnati, 
Lebanon  &  Xorthorn  Ry.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Cincinnati.  62  O.  S.  4n.i.  49  L.  R. 
A.  566.  57  X.  E.  229  [191)01:  (over- 
ruling City  of  Cleveland  v.  Wick.  18 
O.  S.  303  [1868].  on  tlic  (question 
whether  such  assessment  (for  payin'i 
the  expense  of  taking  land  in  emi- 
nent domain)    can  lx>  levied  on  abut- 


ting property.  See  §§  113,  308); 
Chamberlain  v.  Cleveland,  34  0.  S. 
551 ;  Dodsworth  v.  City  of  Cincinnati. 
18  Ohio  C.  C.  288,  10  Ohio  C.  D.  177 
[1899];  Klein  v.  City  of  Cincinnati. 
7  Ohio  C.  C.  266  [1893];  Rhoades 
V.  City  of  Toledo,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  9 
I  1890]  ;  Or.  &  Cal.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Portland,  25  Or.  229,  22  L.  R.  A. 
713,  35  Pac.  452  [1894];  Craig  v. 
City  of  Philadelphia.  89  Pa.  St.  (8 
X^orris)  265  [1879];  Kaiser  v.  Weise, 
85  Pa.  St.  (4  Xorris)  366  [1877]; 
Seely  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  82  Pa. 
St.  (1  Xorris)  360,  22  Am.  Rep.  760 
[1876];  Hutcheson  v.  Storrie,  92 
Tex.  685.  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  884.  45 
L.  R.  A.  289.  51  S.  W.  848  [1899]; 
(overruling  Adams  v.  Fisher,  75  Tex. 
657,  6  S.  W.  772  [1890];  Ashberry 
v.  Roanoke,  91  Va.  562.  42  L.  R.  A. 
636,   22   S.   E.   360    [1895]. 

=  Fay  v.  City  of  Springlield,  94 
Fed.  409;  Scott  v.  City  of  Toledo,  36 
Fed.  385,  1  L.  R.  A.  688:  Lower 
Kings  River  Reclamation  District 
Xo.  531  v.  Phillips.  108  Cal.  305,  .30 
Pac.  630;  Guckien  v.  Rothrock.  137 
Ind.  355.  37   X.  E.   17    [1893]. 

"See   §    119   rl   scq. 

'See  Chapter  XI 11. 

"P.olph  v.  City  of  Fargo.  7  X.  D. 
640.  42  L.  R.  A.  646.  76  X.  W.  242 
[1898];  Taylor  v.  Boyd,  63  Tex.  533. 


§  118  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENl .  202 

of  his  life,  liberty  or  estate  but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or 
the  law  of  the  land  .  .  .  ".'*  The  earlier  decisions  recognized 
the  validity  of  assessments  for  sidewalks  and  drains  under  this 
clause  of  the  constitution.^"  In  a  later  case,  under  the  constitution 
of  1790.  a  case  was  presented  in  which  land  had  been  taken  for 
widening  a  street,  and  the  expense  of  such  taking  had  in  part 
been  assessed  upon  the  lot  holders  on  the  other  side  of  the  street, 
whose  lands  had  not  been  taken.  Such  assessment  was  held  to  be 
a  violation  of  this  clause  of  the  constitution.^^  In  a  subsequent 
case  decided  under  the  constitution  of  1868,  the  question  of  the 
validity  of  assessments  for  street  improvements  was  considered. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  South  Carolina  construed  the  phrase  "the 
law  of  the  land"  as  meaning  "the  common  law  and  the  statute 
law  existing  at  the  adoption  of  our  constitution,"  that  is,  in  1790.^- 
There  being  no  express  authority  found  in  the  law  of  South 
Carolina  as  it  stood  in  1790  for  assessments  for  street  improve- 
ments, it  was  held  that  they  were  rendered  invalid  hy  this  clause 
of  the  constitution.^^  It  was  said,  however,  in  an  obiter  in  this 
case  that  by  the  decisions  rendered  prior  to  the  present  consti- 
tution, assessments  for  sidewalks,  drains  and  sew3rs  had  been 
recognized  as  valid,  and  such  assessments  were  therefore  a  part 
of  the  "law  of  the  land"  within  the  meaning  of  the  present  con- 
stitution. In  subsequent  cases,  hov/ever,  this  earlier  obiter  is 
overruled  and  it  is  held  that  by  virtue  of  the  clause  of  the  consti- 


°  §  14,  Constitution  of  South  Caro-  validity    of    assessments    for    taking 

Una     [1868].      A     similar     provision  land,   see    §§    113,   308   et   seq. 

was  found  in  Art.  IX..  §  2.  Constitu-  It    will    be    noted    that    the    result 

tion  of  South  Carolina  [1790].  would  be  concurred  in  by  some  courts 

"  Sidewalks      and      drains. — Cruik-  which  would  not  agree  with  the  rea- 

shanks    v.    City    Council,    1    ]McCord  soning     whereby     such     result     wa-- 

(S.  C.)    360    [1821].  reached. 

Drains. — Horiston   v.    City    Council  ^- This    construction    is    not    in    ac- 

of  Charleston,  1  MoCord    ( S.  C.)    345  cordance  with  that  generally  given  tj 

[1821].  this    and    to    similar    phrases.       See 

Shoolbred    v.    Corporation    of    the  S    115. 

City  of  Charleston,  2  Bay   (S.  C.)    63  It   would    seem    to    have    the    efl'ecl 

[1796],  seems  to  be  a  case  of  assess-  of  petrifying  the  law  of  South  Caro- 

ment,  but  possibly  of  assessment  pre-  lina    at    1790,    making    further    ex- 

liminary    to    levying    a    general    tax  tension  impossible, 

and  not  a  special   assessment.  **  Mauldin      v.      City     Council     of 

'1  State    ex    rel.    Horlbeck    v.    City  Greenville,  42  S.  C.  293,  46  Am.  St. 

Council   of   Charleston,    12   Rich.    (S.  Rep.   723.  27  L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S.  E. 

C.)    702    [I860].  842   [1893]. 

For    the    general    view    as    to    tlie 


203  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  119 

tution  under  discussion  assessments  even  for  sidewalks,  drains 
and  sewers  are  invalid.'^  If  these  last  decisions  are  adhered  to  and 
no  constitutional  amendment  is  made  the  law  of  local  assessments 
in  South  Carolina  is  ended. 

§  119.     Due  process  of  law  requires  notice  and  hearing. 

(3)  The  constitutional  provisions  Which  forbid  the  taking  of 
property  without  due  process  of  law  find  their  most  prominent 
sphere  of  influence  as  far  as  the  law  of  local  assessments  is  con- 
cerned, in  the  doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  notice.  That  under 
these  constitutional  provisions  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed 
is  entitled  to  some  form  of  notice  of  the  assessment  at  some 
stage  of  the  proceedings  is  clear  by  the  great  weight  of  au- 
thority. At  what  stage  of  the  proceedings  such  notice  must  be 
given  and  of  w^hat  the  property  owner  is  entitled  to  notice,  are 
questions  upon  which  there  is  not  so  clear  a  consensus  of  opin- 
ion. The  general  rule  is  that  at  some  time  before  the  assessment 
becomes  an  absolute  finality  there  must  be  a  notice  to  the  prop- 
erty owner  and  an  opportunity  for  a  hearing. as  to  those  ques- 
tions of  fact  which  concern  the  amount  of  the  assessment  to  be 
imposed  upon  such  property,  except  such  as  the  legislative  power 
has  authority  to  determine  without  especial  inquiry,  and  has  in 
fact  so  determined.  *' Whenever  the  amount  of  tax  to  be  ex- 
acted depends  upon  the  exercise  of  the  judgment  and  discretion 
of  those  fixing  the  value  of  the  property  or  benefits  by  which 
such  amount  is  to  be  measured,  an  opportunity  for  correction 
must  be  afforded."^  Such  notice  and' hearing  must  furthermore 
be  given  as  a  matter  of  riglit.  "It  is  not  enough  that  the  own- 
ers chance  to  have  notice  or  that  they  may  as  a  matter  of  favor 
have  a  hearing.  Tlie  law  must  ref(nire  notice  to  them  and  give 
them  the  right  to  a  hearing  and  the  opportunity  of  being 
heard."-  An  assessment  made  u]ion  notice  which  possesses  these 
elements  is  not  invalid  upon  the  ground  of  want  of  notice,  and 
as  far  as  notice  is  concerned,  is  not  a  taking  without  due  i)rocess 

"Mauldin     v.      City      Cmincil      of  101   Am.  Rt.  Rop.  250.  97  X.  \V.  086 

Greenville,  53  S.  C.  285,  60  Am.  St.  [10041. 

Rep.  855.  4.3  L.  R.  A.   101,  31   S.  E.  -Stuart   v.   Palmer.   74   X.   Y.    183. 

252      [18081;      Stehmeyer      v.      City  30   Am.   Rep.  280    [18781;    quoted   in 

Council   of  Charleston,  53   S.   C.  259,  Reeln'    v.    Mairoun.     122    la.    94.    9G, 

31  S.  E.  322   [1808].  07.   101   Am.  St.  Rep.  250,  97  X.  W. 

'  Reebe  v.  Magoim,   122  la.   94,  96,  086    [1004]. 


119 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


204 


of  law.''  If,  on  the  other  hand,  such  notice  is  not  given  and 
under  the  law  the  assessment  becomes  a  finality,  subject  to  be 
enforced  summarily,  without  giving  an}^  opportunity  for  a  hear- 


^  Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago 
and  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter,  210 
U.  S.  177,  28  S.  647  [1908]-,  (Affirm- 
ing Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago 
and  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter,  38 
Ind.  App.  226,  74  N.  E.  260,  76  N. 
E.  179);  Ballard  v.  Hunter,  204  U. 
S.  241,  51  L.  461,  27  S.  261  [1907]; 
(Affirming  74  Ark.  174,  85  S.  W. 
252  [1905]);  Turpin  v.  Lemon,  187 
U.  S.  51,  47  L.  70,  23  S.  20  [1902]; 
Bellingham  Bay  &  British  Columbia 
Railroad  v.  New  Whatcom,  172  U. 
S.  314,  43  L.  460,  19  S.  205  [1899]; 
(Affirming  City  of  New  Whatcom  v. 
Bellingham  Bay  Improvement  Com- 
pany, 16  Wasii.  131,  47  Pac.  236 
[1896]);  Parsons  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943,  18 
S.  521  [1898];  (Affirming  Parsons 
v.  District  of  Columbia,  8  App.  D. 
C.  391  [1896]).;  Bauman  v.  Ross, 
167  U.  S.  548,  42  L.  270,  17  S.  966 
[1897];  (Reversing  District  of  Co- 
lumbia V.  Armes,  8  App.  D.  C.  393 
[1896];  Bauman  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D. 
C.  260  [1896];  Abbott  v.  Ross,  9 
App.  D.  C.  289  [1896]);  Fallbrook 
Irrigation  District  v.  Bradley,  164  U. 
S.  112,  41  L.  360,  17  S.  56  [1896]; 
(Reversing  Bradley  v.  Fallbrook  Ir- 
rigation District  68  Fed.  948 
[1895];  Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149  U. 
S.  30,  37  L.  637,  13  S.  750  [1893]; 
(Affirming  Paulson  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 16  Or.  450,  1  L.  R.  A.  673,  19 
Pac.  450  [1888]);  Lent  v.  Tillson, 
140  U.  S.  316,  35  L.  419,  11  S.  825 
[1891];  Palmer  v.  McMahon,  133  U. 
S.  660,  33  L.  772,  10  S.  324;  Wals- 
ton  v.  Nevin,  128  U.  S.  578,  32  L. 
544,  9  S.  192  [1888]:  (Affirming 
Nevin  v.  Roach,  86  Ky.  492,  5  S.  W. 
546  [1887]);  Spencer  v.  Merchant, 
125  U.  S.  345,  31  L.  763,  8  S.  921 
[1888];  (Affirming  Spencer  v.  Mer- 
chant, 100  N.  Y.  585,  3  N.  E.  682 
[1885]);  Wurts  v.  Hoagland,  114  U. 
S.  606,  29  L.  229,  5  S.   1086   [1885]; 


(Affirming  Matter  of  drainage  of 
Great  Meadows  on  Request  River,  42 
N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  552  [1880]  which 
was  affirmed  without  opinion  as 
Hoagland  v.  State,  Simonton,  Pros., 
43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  456  [1881]); 
Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District,  No. 
108,  111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569,  4  S. 
663  [1884];  Davidson  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 96  U.  S.  97,  24  L.  616  [1877]  ; 
( Affirming  In  the  Matter  of  the  Com- 
missioners of  the  First  Draining 
District,  praying  for  the  Homologa- 
tion of  the  Assessment  Roll,  27  La. 
Ann.  20  [1875]);  McMillen  v.  An- 
derson, 95  U.  S.  37,  24  L.  335 ;  Brown 
V.  Drain,  112  Fed.  582  [1901];  Min- 
nesota &  M.  Land  &  Improvement  Co. 
V.  City  of  Billings,  111  Fed.  972,  50 
C.  C.  A.  70  [1901];  Cohen  v.  City  of 
Alameda,  124  Cal.  504,  57  Pac.  377 
[1899];  In  the  matter  of  the  Bonds 
of  the  Madera  Irrigation  District,  92 
Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106,  14  L. 
R.  A.  755,  28  Pac.  272,  675  [1891]; 
Davies  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  86 
Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771  [1890];  Lent  v. 
Tillson,  72  Cal.  404,  14  Pac.  71 
[1887];  City  of  Denver  v.  Londoner. 
33  Colo.  104,  80  Pac.  117  [1904]; 
Clapp  V.  City  of  Hartford,  35  Conn. 
06  [1868];  Nichols  v.  City  of  Bridge- 
port, 23  Conn.  189,  60  Am.  Dec.  636 
[1854];  District  of  Columbia  v. 
Wormley,  15  App.  D.  C.  58  [1899]; 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Burgdorf,  7 
App.  D.  C.  405 ;  District  of  Columbia 
V.  Burgdorf,  6  App.  D.  C.  465  [1895]  ; 
People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  v.  Cohen,  219 
111.  200,  76  N.  E.  388  [1906];  Citi- 
zens' Savings  Bank  and  Trust  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  215  111.  174, 
74  N.  E.  'll5  [1905];  Owners  of 
Land  v.  People  ex  rel.  Stookey,  113 
111.  206  [1886];  New  York  C.  and 
St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of  Ham- 
mond, —  Ind.  — ,  83  N.  E.  244 
[1908]:  Dyer  v.  Woods.  166  Ind.  44, 
76  N.  E.  624   [1906];   Voris  v.  Pitts- 


205 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


§11!) 


ing  as  to  the  questions  of  fact  which  concern  the  amount  of  the 
assessment  other  than  those  which  the  legislative  power  has  au- 
thority to  determine  without  especial  inquiry,  and  which  the 
legislative  power  has  in  fact  so  determined,  such  assessment  then 
constitutes  a  taking  without  due  process  of  law  and  is  invalid 
as  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  provisions  under  considera- 
tion.*    The   hearing   for   which   provision   is   mada   munt   be   one 


burg  Plate  Glass  Co.,  163  Ind.  599, 
70  X.  E.  249  [1904];  Leeds  v.  De- 
frees,  157  Ind.  392.  01  X.  E.  930 
[19011;  Roundenbush  v.  Mitchell, 
154  Ind.  OIG,  57  X.  E.  510  [1900]; 
Kizer  v.  Town  of  Winchester,  141 
Ind.  694,  40  X.  E.  265  [1895]; 
Swain  v.  Fulmer,  135  Ind.  8,  34  N. 
E.  639  [1893];  Rcinken  v.  Fuehring, 
130  Ind.  382,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  247, 
37  A.  &  E.  Corp.  Cas.  354,  15  L. 
R.  A.  624,  30  N.  E.  414;  Law  v. 
Johnston,  118  Ind.  261,  20  N.  E. 
745  [1888];  Garvin  v.  Daussman, 
114  Ind.  429,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  637, 
16  X.  E.  826  [1887];  Ross  v.  Board 
of  Supervisors  of  Wright  County,  128 
la.  427,  I  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  431,  104 
X.  W.  506  [19051;  Beebe  v.  Ma- 
goun.  122  la.  94,  101  Am.  St.  Rep. 
259,  97  X.  W.  986  [1904];  Yeomans 
V.  Riddle,  84  la.  147,  50  X.  W.  886 
[1881];  Anierv  v.  City  of  Keokuk, 
72  la.  701,  30  X.  W.'  780  [1887]: 
Xevin  v.  Roach,  86  Ky.  492.  5  S.  W. 
546  [18871;  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore  v.  I'lnian,  79  :Md.  469. 
30  Atl.  43  [1894]:  City  of  St.  Paul 
V.  Xickl.  42  Minn.  262,  44  X.  W. 
59  [18901;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Ran- 
ken.  96  Mo.  497,  9  S.  W.  910  [1888]  ; 
Hurford  v.  City  of  Omaha,  4  Xeb. 
336  [1876];  Spencer  v.  ^Merchant, 
100  X.  Y.  585,  3  X.  E.  682  [1885]; 
In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of  Low- 
den  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  89  X'. 
Y.  548  [1882];  IMatter  of  Ryers.  72 
N.  Y.  1,  28  Am.  Rep.  88;  ITilliard 
V.  City  of  Asheville,  118  X\  C.  845, 
24  S."  E.  738  [18961;  Erickson  v. 
Cass  County,  11  X.  D.  494.  92  X.  W. 
841  [1902];  Taylor  v.  Crnwfor.l.  72 
0.  S.  560,  69  L."  R.  A.  805.  74  X.  E. 


1065  [1905];  (Reversing  Crawford  v. 
Taylor,  27  Ohio  C.  C.  245 )  ;  Cald- 
well v.  Village  of  Carthage,  49  0.  S. 
334,  31  X.  E.  602  [1892];  King  v. 
Portland,  38  Or.  402,  55  L.  R.  A. 
812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900];  Cleveland  v. 
Tripp,  13  R.  I.  50  [1880];  Kettle 
V.  City  of  Dallas,  35  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
632.  80  S.  W.  874  [1904];  Davis  v. 
City  of  Lynchburg,  84  Va.  861,  6 
S.  E.  230"  [18881;  Stone  v.  Little 
Yellow  Drainage  District,  118  Wis. 
388,  95  X.  W.  405  [1903];  Hen- 
nessy  v.  Douglas  County,  99  Wis. 
129,"  74  X.  W.  983  [1898];  Meggett 
v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  81  Wis.  326, 
51  X.  W.  506  [1892];  See  also  as 
to  sufficiency  of  notice  in  taxation 
Longyear  v.  Toolan,  209  U.  S.  414, 
28  S."  506  [1908];  (Affirming  Toolan 
V.  Longyear,  144  Mich.  55,  107  X'.  W. 
G99  [19061). 

*Xorwood  V.  Baker,  172  V.  S.  269, 
43  L.  443,  19  S.  187  [1898];  (Af- 
firming Baker  v.  Village  of  X'orwood, 
74  Fed.  997  [1896]);  Anderson  v. 
Messenger,  158  Fed.  250  [1907];  Fay 
V.  City  of  Springfield.  94  Fed.  4o"» 
11899];  Murdock  v.  City  of  Cincin- 
nati, 39  Fed.  891  [1889]:  44  Fed. 
726  [1891];  Scott  V.  City  of  Toledo, 
36  Fed.  385,  1  L.  R.  A.  688  [1888]; 
Lower  Kings  River  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict, Xo.  531  V.  Phillips.  108  Cal. 
306.  39  Pac.  630.  41  Pac.  335  [1895]  ; 
l!uls;in  V.  Woodbridge  Protection 
District.  Xo.  1.  79  Cal.  90,  16  Pac. 
549.  21  Pac.  435  [1889];  Boorman 
V.  City  of  Santa  Barbara,  65  Cal. 
313,  4  Pac.  31  [1884]  ;  Brown  v.  City 
of  Denver.  7  Colo.  305.  3  Pac.  455 
118841;  Allman  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 3  App.  D.  C.  8   [18941;   Ben- 


§119 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


206 


which  gives  to  the  property  owner  an  opportunity  for  a  fair  and 
impartial  determination  as  to  the  amount  of  his  assessment.^ 
Hence  a  provision  which  permits  an  interested  party  to  act  as  a 
commissioner  in  apportioning  the  assessment  denies  due  process 
of  law  and  is  invalid."    An  opportunity  to  submit  objections  with- 


singer    v.    District    of    Columbia,    6 
Mack.    (D.   C.)    285    [1888];    Savan- 
nah  F.   and   W.   Ry.   Co.   v.    City   of 
Savannah,  96  Ga.  680,  23  S.  E.  847; 
Clarke    v.   City   of    Chicago,    185    111. 
354,  57  N.  E.  15   [1900];   Guckien  v. 
Rothrock,   137   Ind.  355,  37  X.  E.   17 
[1893];    SciuUler    v.    Jones,    134    Ind. 
547,    32    N.    E.    221    [1893];    City    of 
Logansport  v.  Shirk,  129  Ind.  352,  28 
X.  E.  538   [1891];   Hille  v.  Neale,  32 
Ind.  App.  341,  69  N.  E.  713   [1904]; 
Beebe  v.  Magoun,  122  la.  94,  101  Am. 
St.  Rep.   259,  97   N.  W.   986    [1904]; 
Oliver  v.  Monona  County,  117  la.  43, 
90      K.      W.      510       [1902];       Ford 
v.     Town     of     North     Des     Moines. 
80   la.   626,    45   N.   W.    1031    [1890]; 
Lyman   v.   Plummer,    75    la.   353,   39 
X.  W.  527    [1888];   Gatch  v.  City  of 
Des  Moines.  63  la.  718,  18  X.  W.  310; 
Gilmore    v.    Hentig,   33    Kan.    156,    5 
Pac.    781     [1885];     Chesapeake    and 
Ohio    Railway    Company   v.    Mullins, 
94   Ky.   355,  "22    S.   W.    558    [1893]; 
Ulman  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 
Baltimore,   72  Md.  587.   11   L.   R.  A. 
224,  20  Atl.  141,  21  Atl.  709,  32  Am. 
and    Eng.     Corp.    Cas.    228     [1890]; 
Sears     v.     Street     Commissioners     of 
Boston,  173  Mass.  350,  53  X.  E.  870 
[1899];     Sligh     v.     City     of     Grand 
Rapids,  84  Mich.  497,  47  X.  W.  1093; 
Thomas    v.    Gain,    35    Mich.    155,    24 
Am.  Rep.  535   [1876];   People  on  the 
Relation  of  Butler  v.   Supervisors  of 
Saginaw  County,  26  Mich.  22  [1872] ; 
Overmann    v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    39 
Minn.    120,    39    N.    W.    66     [1888]; 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Ranken,  96  Mo. 
497,  9  S.  W.  910   [1888];   Poillon  v. 
Mayor  and  Council  of  the  Borough  of 
Rutherford,    65    X.    J.    L.     (36    Vr.) 
538,  47  Atl.  439   [1900];   State,  Wat- 
rous.   Pros.   v.   City   of  Elizabeth.   40 
N.  J.  L.   (11  Vr.)   278  [1878];  State, 


]Mann   Pros.   v.   Mayor   and   Common 
Council   of  Jersey   City,  24   N.   J.   L. 
(4  Zab.)    062    [1855];    In  the  Matter 
of  the  Application  of  the  Trustees  of 
Union  College  for  an  Order  directing 
the  Treasurer  of  Long  Island  City  to 
cancel  certain  water  rates  and  rents, 
129  X.  Y.  308,  29  X.  E.  400   [1891]; 
McLaughlin  v.  Miller,  124  X.  Y.  510, 
26    N.    E.    1104    [1891];    Remsen    v. 
Wheeler,    105    X.    Y.    573,    12    X.    E. 
564   [1887];   Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74  X. 
Y.    183,    30    Am.    Rep.    289    [1878]; 
Ireland    v.     City     of     Rochester,     51 
Barb.    (X.    Y.)  ^414    [1868];    In    the 
Matter    of    the    Application    of    the 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Am- 
sterdam to  take  lands  for  the  exten- 
sion   of    Grove    and   Jay    Streets,    55 
Hun.    (X.    Y.)    270,    8'x.    Y.    Supp. 
234    [1889];    In    re    Mayor,    etc.,    of 
Xew   York,   89   X.  Y.   S."  6,   95   App. 
Div.  552    [1904];    Pickton  v.  City  of 
Fargo,    10   X.   D.   469,   88   X.   W.   90 
[1901];,  Chicago  &  Erie  Railroad  Co. 
V.  Keitii,  67   O.   S.  279,  60  L.  R.  A. 
525,    65   N.    E.    1020    [1902];    Hersh- 
berger  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  115  Pa. 
St.    78,   8   Atl.   381    [1886];    Hutche- 
son  V.   Storrie,  92  Tex.  685,  71   Am. 
St.  Rep.  884,  45  L.  R.  A.  289,  51   S. 
W.  848   [1899];   City  of  Galveston  v. 
Heard.   54  Tex.  42o'  [1881];    City  of 
Xorfolk    V.    Young,    97    Va.    728,    47 
L.  R.  A.   574,  34   S.  E.   886    [1900]; 
Baltimore  R.  Co.  v.  Pittsburg  R.  Co., 
17  W.  Va.  835;  Dietz  v.  City  of  Xee- 
nah,  91   Wis.  422,  64  X.  W.  299,  65 
X.  W^  500   [1895]. 

^  Commissioners  of  Union  Drainage 
District  Xo.  1  v.  Smith,  233  111.  417, 
84   X.   E.   370    [1908]. 

'  Commissioners  of  L'nion  Drainage 
District  Xo.  1  v.  Smith,  233  111.  417, 
84  X.  E.  376   [1008]. 


207 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.         §§  120,  121 


out  a  provision  for  a  hearing  at  which  the  objectors  may  offer 
evidence  in  support  of  their  objections  does  not  constitute  due 
process  of  law.^ 


§  120.     Theory  that  notice  is  not  a  constitutional  right. 

In  some  cases  language  is  used  which  seems  to  intimate  that 
notice  is  not  a  constitutional  right.'  "Claims  for  paving  and 
other  municipal  improvements  are  a  species  of  taxation  and  the 
property  owner  has  only  such  right  of  contest  and  defence  as 
the  legislature  chooses  to  allow  him."-  These  cases,  however, 
are  for  the  most  part  cases  holding  that  notice  of  the  intention 
of  making  the  public  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is 
to  be  levied  is  not  necessary.^  or  cases  in  which  no  notice  was 
given  in  advance  of  a  legislative  determination  of  benefits,*  or 
eases  in  which  some  reasonable  notice  was  in  fact  provided  for 
by  the  legislature.  In  other  eases  it  seems  to  be  held  that  the 
mere  performance  of  the  work  itself,  under  a  law  which  pro- 
vides for  levying  assessments  therefor,  is  sufficient  notice  to  the 
property  holder.^ 

§  121.     Legislative  discretion  as  to  nature  and  kind  of  notice. 

The  legislature  has  a  wide  discretion  in  determining  the  nature 
and  kind  of  notice  to  be  given.'  though  it  has  no  power  to  dis- 


"  Londoner  v.  City  and  County  of 
Denver,  210  U.  S.'  37.3,  28  S. '  708 
11908];  (reversing  City  of  Denver  v. 
Londoner.  .33  Colo.  104.  80  Pac.  117)  : 

Heinz  v.  Biu-khani.  —  Mith.  ,  110 

X.  \V.  730   [19081. 

'  Ilenian  v.  Allen,  1.50  Mo.  ,534.  57 
S.  \V.  559  [19001;  Finnell  v.  Kates. 
19  0.  S.  405  [1869];  Seranton  v. 
Jermyn.  15G  Pa.  St.  107,  27  Atl.  66 
[189.3];  Seranton  v.  Whyte.  148  Pa. 
St.  419;  Adams  v.  Fisher,  63  Tex. 
051  [1885];  City  of  Galveston  v. 
Heard,  54  Tex.   420    [1881]. 

'Seranton  v.  Jermyn,  156  Pa.  St. 
107,  27  Atl.  66   [1893]. 

'  See  §  125,  §  740. 

•TTenian  v.  Allen.  156  Mo.  534.  57 
S.  \V.  559   [1900]. 

'•  Davis  V.  City  of  Lynelilnirfj.  84 
Va.  861,  6  S.  E.  230  [1888]  ;  (It  may 
be    noted    that    the     foregoing    case 


treats  this  question  as  no  longer 
open,  and  cites  upon  the  point  Nor- 
folk City  V.  Ellis,  67  Va.  (26  Gratt.) 
224  [1875]  a  case  which  does  not 
seem  to  determine  the  question.) 
"AH  possible  notice  is  given  by  the 
[)rogress  of  the  work  itself,  and  un- 
der our  system  of  laws  every  citizen 
is  charged  with  notice  of  the  public 
law."  Davis  v.  City  of  Lynchburg, 
84  Va.  861,  870,  6  S.  E.  2.30  [1888]. 
'  Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chicago 
and  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter,  210 
r.  S.  177.  28  S.  647  [1908];  (Af- 
firming Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Chica- 
go and  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter, 
38  Ind.  App.  226,  74  X.  E.  260,  76 
X.  E.  179)  ;  Ballard  v.  Hunter,  204 
r.  S.  241.  51  E.  461.  27  S.  261 
[19071:  (Affirming  74  Ark.  174,  85 
S.  \V.  252  11905])  ;  Davidson  v.  Xe« 
Orleans.    96    U.    S.    97.    24     L.     616 


121 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


208 


pense  with  all  notice.-  If  such  notice  is  given  as  will  fairly  ■ 
and  reasonably  apprise  the  property  owner  of  the  pendency  of  i 
the  assessment  proceedings  so  as  to  give  him  an  opportunity  for  ' 
a  hearing  upon  the  merits  he  is  not  entitled  as  a  matter  of  con- 
stitutional right  to  personal  service.  Notice  by  publication  may  i 
therefore  be  provided  for  by  the  legislature  without  violating  / 
the  constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  taking  of  property* 
without  due   process   of  lavr."*     Notice  by  publication   consisting  ' 


[1877];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Lowden  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, 89  N.  Y.  548  [1882]:  Swain  v. 
Fiilmer,  135  Ind.  8,  34  X.  E.  639 
[1893]. 

2  Stuart  V.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y.  183, 
30  Am.  Pvep.  289   [1878]. 

^Ballard  v.  Hunter,  204  U.  S.  241, 
51  L.  401.  27  S.  261  [1907];  (Af- 
firming BaUard  v.  Hunter,  74  Ark. 
174.  85  S.  W.  252  [1905] )  ;  Detroit  v. 
Parker,  181  U.  S.  399,  45  L.  917,  21 
S.  624,  645  [1901];  (Reversing  Par- 
ker V.  City  of  Detroit,  103  Fed.  357 
[1900]);  Wight  v.  Davidson,  181  U. 
S.  371.  45  L.^900,  21  S.  616  [1901]:, 
Bellingham  Bay  &  British  Columbia 
Railroad  v.  New  Whatcom,  172  U.  S. 
314,  43  L.  460,  19  S.  205  [1899]; 
( Affirming  City  of  New  Whatcom  v. 
Bellingham  Bay  Improvement  Com- 
pany," 16  Wash.  131.  47  Pac.  230 
[1896]);  Fallbrook  Irrigation  Dist. 
V.  Bradley.  164  U.  S.  112.  41  L.  369, 
17  S.  56  [1896];  (Reversing  Bradley 
V.  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District.  68 
Fed.  948  [1895];  Paulsen  v.  Port- 
land, 149  U.  S.  30,  37  L.  637,  13  S. 
750  [1893];  (Affirming  Paulson  v. 
City  of  Portland,  16  Or.  450.  1  L. 
R.  A.  673,  19  P.  450  [1888])  ;  Lent  v. 
Tillson,  140  U.  S.  316.  35  L.  419,  11 
S.  825  [1891];  Walston  v.  Xevin, 
128  U.  S.  578,  32  L.  544, 
9  S.  192  [1888];  Ha^ar  v.  Re- 
clamation District  No.  108,  111  U.  S. 
701,  28  L.  569,  4  S.  063  [1884]; 
Ritter  v.  Drainage  District  No. 
1,  Poinsett  County,  78  Ark.  580, 
94  S.  W.  711  [1906];  Wulzen  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  the  City  and 


County  of  San  Francisco,  101  Cal.  15. 
40  Am.  St.  Rep.  17,  35  Pac.  353 
[1894];  Davies  v.  City  of  Los  Ange- 
les, 86  Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771  [1890]: 
Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago,  225  111.  218. 

80  "X.  E.  "l27  [1907];  Ricketts  v. 
Village  of  Hyde  Park,  85  111.  110 
[1877];  Lyman  v.  Plummer.  75  la. 
353.  39  X.'W.  527  [1888];  Hoertz  v. 
Jefferson  Southern  Pond  DrainiuT 
Company,  119  Ky.  824,  84  S.  W. 
1141,  27  Ky.  L."  R.  278  [1905]; 
Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Alullins,  94  Ky.  355.  22  S. 
W.  558  [1893];  State"  V.  Pillsbury. 
82  Minn.  359,  85  X.  W.  175  [1901]: 
Hennepin  County  v.  Bartleson,  37 
Minn.  343,  34  X^."w.  222;  City  of  St. 
Joseph   V.   Truckenmiller,    183   :Mo.   9. 

81  S.  W.  1116  [1904];  Kansas  City 
V.  Ward.  134  Mo.  172,  35  S.  W.  600 
[1896];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appli- 
cation of  the  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  Amsterdam  to  take  lands  for 
the  extension  of  Grove  and  Jay 
Streets,  126  X.  Y.  158.  27  X.  E.  272 
[1891];  Remsen  v.  Wheeler,  105  X. 
Y.  573,  12  X.  E.  564  [1887]:  Spen- 
cer V.  ]\Ierchant,  100  X.  Y.  585,  3  X. 
E.  682  [1885];  (Affirmed  Spencer 
V.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345,  31  L.  763, 
8  S.  Ct.  921  [1888] )  ;  In  the  matter  of 
the  Petition  of  De  Peyster  to  Vacate 
an  Assessment,  80  X.  Y.  565  [1880]; 
King  V.  Portland,  38  Or.  402,  55  L. 
R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2;  Philadelphia  v. 
Jenkins,  162  Pa.  St.  451,  29  Atl. 
794;  Hansen  v.  Hammer,  15  Wash. 
315,  46  Pac.  332  [1896];  Fass  v. 
Seehawer,  60  Wis.  525,  19  X.  W. 
533    [1884]. 


209  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  ^  §  122 

of  one  insertiou  in  a  paper  of  general  circulation  has  been  held 
sufficient  as  constituting  due  process  of  law.*  The  option  which 
is  often  given  to  property  owners  to  construct  the  improvement 
themselves  instead  of  requiring  them  to  pay  an  a.ssessment  there- 
for •'  is  a  mere  favor  extended  by  the  legislature.  They  have 
no  constitutional  right  thereto."  Notice  may  therefore  be  given 
in  such  cases  by  publication."  Notice  may  be  given  as  well  by 
the  statute  by  which  the  assessment  is  authorized  or  by  the  ordi- 
nance by  which  the  assessment  is  levied  as  by  any  other  means. 
Accordingly  if  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  hearing  is  given 
in  the  ordinance  by  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  such  notice 
is  sufficient.^  The  hearing  provided  by  the  Indiana  statute  is 
sufficient  even  though  by  statute  the  property  abutting  on  the 
improvement  is  liable  in  the  first  instance  and  the  strip  of  back- 
lying  property  extending  one  hundred  feet  in  depth  from  the 
fifty-foot  strip  is  liable  only  if  the  assessment  upon  the  fifty-foot 
strip  proves  insufficient." 

§  122.    Legislative  discretion  as  to  time  of  notice. 

Similar  considerations  apply  to  the  question  of  the  time  for 
which  tlie  notice  is  to  be  given.  The  legislature  has  a  wide 
range  of  discretion  and  as  long  as  the  time  is  sufficient  to  give 
the  property  owner  a  fair  opportunity  to  l)e  heard,  the  length  of 
time  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  legislature.^  A  fair  oppor- 
tunity for  a  hearing  is,   however,   a   constitutional  right   of  the 

*Rittpr  V.  Drainage  District  Xo.  1,  V.  S.  177.  2S  S.  047  [1908];    (Affirni- 

Poinsett  Coxuity,  78  Ark.  580,  94  S.  ing    Cloveland,     Cincinnati,     Cliicajro 

W.  711    [19()(il.  an<l    St.   Louis   Ry.   Co.   v.   Porter.   38 

''See   8   r)2  et   .soq.  Ind.  App.  226;  74  X.  E.  2(30,  76  X,  E. 

"Fass  V.  Seehawer,  GO  Wi?:.  .525.  19  179);    following    Voris    v.    Pittsburg 

N.   W.   53.3    [1884].  Plate  Glass  Co..   163   Ind.  599,  70  X. 

'  Fass  V.  Seeliawer,  60  Wis.  525.  19  E.  249. 
X.  W.  .533   [1884].  'Cleveland,    Cincinnati,    Chicago    & 

MVulzen    v.    Board    of    Supervisors  St.   Louis   Ry.   Co.   v.   Porter,   210   V. 

of  tlie  City  and  County  of  San  Fran-  S.        177.       28        S.       647        [1908]; 

Cisco,   101    Cal.    15,   40  Am.   St.   Rep,  P.ellinjrliam     Ray    &     British    Colum- 

17.    35    Pac.    353    [1894]:    Arnold    v.  Ida    Railroad    v.    Xew    Whatcom.    172 

City    of    Fort    DodL'e.    Iowa.    Ill     Ta.  ('.    S.    314.    43    L.    460,     19    S.    205 

1.52.  82  X.  W.  495  [1900]:   Broadway  [1S99];       ( afTirmin.^r     City     of     Xew 

Baptist    Church    v.    McAtee.    8    Bush.  Whatcom     v.     Bellincdiani     Bay     Tm- 

(71     Ky.)      508,     8     Am.     Rep.     480  provement    Companv,    16    Wash.    131, 

[l*^"!]-  47   Pac.   2.36    [1896]):    Kinir  v.   Port- 

•  Cleveland,    Cincinnati.    Chicago   &  land.   38    Or.   402.   55    L.   R.   A.   812, 

St.    Louis    Ry.    Co.    v.    Porter,    210  63   Pac,   2    [1900]. 


§i2a 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


210 


property  owner.  A  notice  which  is  not  given  until  the  assess- 
ment has  become  a  finality  is  given  too  late  to  satisfy  the  con- 
stitutional requirement  of  "due  process  of  law."^ 

§  123.     Notice  not  necessary  as  to  matters  which  legislature  may 
determine. 

If  the  legislature  has  power  to  levy  the  assessment  itself  and 
has  in  fact  so  levied  it,  notice  thereof  has  been  held  to  be  un- 
necessary as  to  such  matters  as  the  legislature  itself  may  pass 
upon.^  Two  reasons,  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  each  other, 
have  been  suggested  for  this  rule.  One  is  that  where  the  ques- 
tion is  within  the  discretion  of  the  legislature  which  may  in 
such  cases  pass  upon  the  facts  and  determine  the  question  of 
benefits,  notice  is  useless,  and  therefore  unnecessary.  The  other 
is  that  where  the  legislature  itself  levies  the  assessment,  the 
property  owner  has  in  fact  notice  and  hearing,  not  in  person, 
but  through  his  representative  in  the  legislature.  In  accord- 
ance with  the  foregoing  principles  notice  need  not  be  given  of 
the  determination  of  such  questions,  as  the  legislature  may  pass 


-  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District  v. 
Bradley,  164  U.  S.''ll2,  41  L.  369,  17 
S.  56  [1896];  Palmer  v.  McMahon, 
133  U.  S.  660,  33  L.  772,  10  S.  324 
[1890];  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U. 
S.  345,  31  L.  763,  8  S.  921  [1888]; 
(Affirming  100  N.  Y.  585,  3  N.  E. 
682  [1885] );  .Davidson  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 96  U.  S.  97,  24  L.  616  [1877]; 
Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District  No. 
108,  111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569,  4  S. 
663  [1884];  Scott  v.  City  of  Toledo, 
36  Fed.  385,  1  L.  R.  A.  688  [1888]; 
Beebe  v.  Magoun,  128  la.  94,  101 
Am.  St.  Rep.  259,  97  N.  W.  986 
[1904]  ;  Ulman  v.  Mayor  and  CitA^ 
Council  of  Baltimore,  72  Md.  587,  11 
L.  R.  A.  224,  20  Atl.  141,  21  Atl.  709, 
32  Am.  and  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  228 
[1F90];  Sears  v.  Street  Commission- 
ers of  Boston,  173  Mass.  350,  53  N. 
E.  876  [1899];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Application  of  the  Trustees  of  I^nion 
College  for  an  order  directinsr  the 
Treasurer  of  Lonsj  Island  City  to 
cancel     certain     Water     Rates     and 


Rents,  129  N.  Y.  308,  29  N.  E.  460 
[1891];  Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74  N.  Y. 
183,  30  Am.  Rep.  289  [1878];  Chi- 
cago &  Erie  Railroad  Co.  v.  Keith, 
67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R.  A.  525,  65 
N.  E.  1020  [1902];  Hutcheson  v. 
Storrie,'92  Tex.  685,  71  Am.  St.  Rep. 
884,  45  L.  R.  A.  289,  51  S.  W.  848 
[1899];  City  of  Norfolk  v.  Young. 
97  Va.  728,  47  L.  R.  A.  574,  34  S.  E. 
886  [1900];  Violett  v.  City  Council 
of  Alexandria,  92  Va.  561,  53  Am. 
St.  Rep.  825,  31  L.  R.  A.  382,  23  S. 
E.  909  [1896];  Dietz  v.  City  of  Nee- 
nah,  91  \Vis.  422,  64  N.  w".  299,  65 
N.  \V.  500  [1895]. 

^  Williams,  Treasurer,  v.  Eggles- 
ton,  170  U.  S.  304,  42  L.  1047,  18  S. 
617  [1898];  Parsons  v.  District  of 
Columbia,  170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943, 
18  S.  521  [1898];  Spencer  v.  Mer- 
chant, 125  U.  S.  345,  31  L.  763,  8 
S.  921  [1888];  (Affirming  Spencer  v. 
:\rerchant.  100  N.  Y.  585.  3  N.  E. 
682  [1885]);  Spencer  v.  IMerchant, 
100  N.  Y.  585,   3  N.  E.   682    [1885]. 


211  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §12^^ 

upon  linally  and  as  to  which  its  determination  is  a  finality." 
Where  the  legislature  has  power  to  pass  upon  the  question  of 
benefits  and  determine  w^hat  property  is  benefited  and  in  what 
proportion,^  the  property  owners  have  no  right  to  notice  as  a 
condition  precedent  to  such  determination.*  If  the  legislature 
in  the  exercise  of  its  constitutional  power  has  made  such  pro- 
vision concerning  the  area  and  limits  of  the  assessment  district. 
the  determination  of  the  amount  of  the  assessment  and  the 
apportionment  thereof,  that  the  ascertaining  of  the  amount  that 
each  property  owner  is  to  pay  is  a  matter  of  mere  arithmetical  cal- 
culation, notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  making  such  calculation 
is  said  to  be  useless,  in  that  it  could  not  avail  the  property  owner. 
Accordingly,  it  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  if  the  proceed- 
ings up  to  this  point  are  not  objectionable  as  being  a  taking  of 
property  Avithout  due  process  of  law,  omission  to  require  or  to 
give  notice  is  not  in  such  cases  a  violation  of  such  constitutional 
provisions.^  This  principle  is  not,  hoAvever,  regarded  in  all  juris- 
dictions as  the  correct  one.  Questions  of  various  sorts,  such  as 
the  extent  of  the  land  belonging  to  a  given  property  owner  as 
affecting  the  basis  of  arithmetical  calculation,  or  special  circum- 
stances peculiar  to  the  tract  in  question,  and  modifying  the  ap- 
portionment, may  arise.     An  opportunity  for  hearing  should  be 

^\\illiams,  Treasurer,  v.  Eggleston.  '  vSee  §   5.5.3  et  seq. 

170  U.  S.  304,  42  L.   1047,  18  S.  617  *Barfield   v.  Gleason.   Ill    Ky.  491. 

[18981;   Spencer  V.  Merehant,   125  1'.  0.3    S.    W.    964,    23    Ky.    L.    R.     128 

S.  .345,  31    L.   763.   8   S.   921    [18881;  11001]. 

Lower  Kings  Eiver  Reclamation  Dia-  TJillette    v.    Denver.    21    Fed    822; 

trict.    No.    531    v.    IMiillips,    108    C'al.  Kiizlish    v.     Mayor    and     Council    of 

306,  39  Pac.  6.30.  41   Pae.  335  11895];  Wilniiiiirton,    2    Marv.    (Del.)    63,    37 

Barfield  v.  CJleason,   111   Ky.  491,  63  Atl.   1,)8    [1896];    People  ex  rel.  Bar- 

S.  W.  964,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  128   [1901];  ber  v.   Chapman.    127   111.  387,   19   N. 

Meier  v.  City  of  Pt.   Louis,   180  Mo.  E.    872    [1890];    Amery    v.    City    of 

391,    79    S.    \V.    955    [1003];    Barber  Keokuk.    72    la.    701,    30    X.    W.' 780 

Asphalt    Paving    Co.    v.    French,    158  [1887];   People  of  the  State  of  New 

Mo.  534,  54  L.  R.  A.  492.  58   S.   W.  York  ex  rel.  Scott  v  Pitt,   169  X.  Y. 

934    [1900];     (anirmed    in    Frencli    v.  .")21.   5S   L.   R.   A.   372,   62   X.   E.   662 

Barber    Asi)halt    Paving    Co.,    181    U.  [1902];   Cleveland  v.  Tripp,   13  R.  I. 

S.  324.  45  L.  879,  21   S.  025   [1901];  50     [1880];     City     of     Galveston     v. 

Heman    v.    Allen,    1.56    ilo.    534,    57  Heard,  54  Tex.  420  [1881] ;  Adams  v. 

S.W.  5.59  [1900]  )  ;   City  of  St.  Louis  City   of   Roanoke.    102   Va.   53,   45   S. 

v.  Ranken,  96  :Mo.  497.  9  S.  W.  910  E.   881    [1903];    Stone   v.   Little   Yel- 

[1888] ;    People  of  the   State  of  Xew  low  Drainage  District.   118  Wis.  .388, 

York    ex    rel.    Scott    v.    Pitt.    169    X.  95    X.    \V.     105    [1903];    Megcett    v. 

Y.  521,  .58  L.  R.  A.  372,  62  X.  E.  662  City  of  Eau   Claire.   81   Wis.   326.  51 

[1902].  X.  "W.  566   [1S92]. 


124 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


212 


given  to  permit  the  property  owner  to  raise  questions  of  this 
sort  if  he  wishes,  according  to  the  view  entertained  in  many 
jurisdictions,  and  therefore  in  such  jurisdictions  notice  is  held 
necessary.^ 

§124.     Notice  not  necessary  if  liability  optional  with  owner. 

If  the  charge  is  for  a  purpose  of  whicl'  tho  property  owner 
may  avail  himself  or  not,  at  his  option,  and  the  charge  is  one  to 
which  he  is  not  liable  if  he  does  not  see  fit  to  avail  himself  of 
such  privilege,  notice  is  unnecessary,  since  no  assessment  is  im- 
posed for  the  improvement  itself,  but  only  for  such  use  of  the 
privilege.^  Thus  where  an  assessment  was  to  be  levied  upon  the 
property  from  which  private  sewers  might  be  connected  with  a 
public  sewer,  it  was  held  that  notice  was  unnecessary.-  So  a 
statute  providing  that  the  state  may  make  contracts  for  excavat- 
ing a  waterway  and  filling  in  tide  lands,  and  then  selling  the 
lands  .to  private  owners  subject  to  the  lien  of  the  cost  of  such 
improvement,  is  not  unconstitutional  as  a  taking  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law.^  So  where  the  charge  for  water 
used  upon  the  premises  was  based  upon  the  amount  so  used, 
the   owner  being  free  to  make  use   of  the  water  or  not.   as  he 


*  Ulman  v.  ]\Iayor  and  C  ity  Council 
of  Baltimore,  72'Md.  587,  11  L.  R.  A. 
224,  20  Atl.  141,  21  Atl.  709,  32 
Am.  and  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  228  [1890]  ; 
McLaughlin  v.  Miller,  124  jST.  Y.  510, 
26  N.  E.  1104   [1891]. 

^  Seattle  Dock  Co.  v.  Seattle  and 
Lake  Washington  Waterway  Co.,  195 
U.  S.  624,  49  L.  350,  25  S.  789 
[1904];  (Affirming  in  a  per  curiam 
opinion  without  discussion  Seattle 
and  Lake  Washington  Waterway  Co. 
V.  Seattle  Dock  Co.,  35  Wash."^  503, 
77  Pac.  845  [1904] )  ;  Carson  v.  Brock- 
ton Sewerage  Commission,  182  V.  S. 
398,  45  L.  1151,  21  S.  860  [1901]; 
(Affirming  Carson  v.  Sewerage  Com- 
missioners of  Brockton,  175  Mass. 
242,  48  L.  R.  A.  277,  56  K  e.  1 
[1900]);  Provident  Institution  for 
Savings  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Jersey  City,  113  U.  S.  506,  28  L. 
1102,  5  S.  612  [1884];  Wagner  v. 
City  of  Rock  Island,  146  111.  139.  21 


L.  R.  A.  519,  34  N.  E.  545;  Vreeland 
V.  O'Neil,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  (9  Stev..)  399; 
(affirmed  37  N.  J.  Eq.  (10  Stew.) 
574)  ;  E/ass  v.  Rathbone,  153  N.  Y. 
435,  47  N.  E.  905;  Silknian  v.  Board 
of  Water  Commissioners  of  City  of 
Yonkers,  152  X.  Y.  327,  37  L.  R.  A. 
827,  46  N.  E.  612  [1897];  Alter  v. 
City  of  Cincinnati,  56  O.  S.  47,  35 
L.  R.  A.  737,  46  X.  E.  69   [1897]. 

-  Carson  v.  Brockton  Sewerage 
Commission,  182  U.  S.  398,  45  L. 
1151,  21  S.  860  [1901]  (Affirming 
Carson  v.  Sewerage  Commissioners  ot 
Brockton,  175  Mass.  242,  48  L.  R.  A. 
277,   56   N.   E.    1    [1900]). 

^  Seattle  Dock  Co.  v.  Seattle  and 
Lake  Washington  Waterway  Co.,  195 
U.  S.  624.  25  S.  789  [1904]; 
(affirming  in  a  per  curiam 
report  without  discussion  Seattle  and 
Lake  Washington  Waterway  Co.  v. 
Seattle  Dock  Co.,  35  Wash."^  503,  77 
Pac.  845    [1904]). 


213 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§125 


might  choose,  notice  is  not  necessary.'  The  essential  fact  which 
renders  notice  unnecessary  in  levying  such  assessments  is  that 
it  is  optional  with  the  party  charged  with  such  liability  to  accept 
or  reject  the  article  offered  at  his  pleasure.  It  is  not  the  nature 
of  the  article  furnished  that  dispenses  with  the  necessity  of  no- 
tice. Accordingly,  if  the  statute  attempts  to  impose  a  liability 
upon  land  which  fronts  upon  the  water  pipes  for  the  laying  of 
which  the  assessment  is  levied,  irrespective  of  the  use  of  watei 
made  upon  such  land,  and  irrespective  of  whether  the  owner 
voluntarily  makes  connection  with  such  pipes,  notice  is  necessary 
as  in  case  of  other  assessments.' 

§  125.     Notice  of  preliminary  steps  not  necessary. 

Notice  of  every  step  in  assessment  proceedings  is  by  no  means 
necessary.^  On  the  one  hand  it  is  not  necessary  that  notice  ])e 
given  of  preliminary  matters,  which  lead  up  to  the  determination 
of  the  amount  for  which  each  tract  of  property  is  to  be  assessed, 
but  do  not  directly  involve  such  determination.*  "If  the  law 
provides  for  the  required  notice   to   the  land-owner  whose   land 


*  Provident  Institution  for  Savings 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey 
City,  113  U.  S.  50G,  28  L.  1102,  5  S. 
012  [1884];  Wa<.'ner  v.  City  of  Rock- 
Island.  14G  111.  1.39,  21  L.  R.  A.  519. 
34  N.  E.  54.5;  Vreeland  v.  O'Xeil,  3(1 
N.  J.  Eq.  (9  Stew.)  .399;  (aflirmed 
37  X.  ,1.  Eq.  (10  Stew)  574);  Brass 
v.  Rathbone,  153  N.  Y.  435,  47  X.  E. 
905;  Alter  v.  City  of  Cincinnati.  5(5 
0.  S.  47,  35  L.  R.  A.  737.  4(J  X.  E. 
G9  [18971:  Silkman  v.  Board  of 
Water  Coniniissioners  of  City  of 
Yonker.s,  152  X.  Y.  327.  .17  L.  U.  A. 
827,  4()  X.  E.  G12   [18971. 

Mn  tlie  :Matter  of  llic  Aj. plication 
of  the  Trustees  of  riiion  Collcjie  for 
an  order  directing  the  Treasurer  of 
Lonj^  Island  to  cancel  certain  Water 
Rates  and  Rents,  129  X'.  Y.  308.  29 
N.  E.  460   [1891]. 

*Voigt  V.  Detroit  City.  184  V.  S. 
115,  40  L.  459.  22  S.  337  [1902]; 
(adirniing  Voi<i;t  v.  City  of  Detroit, 
123  Mich.  547,  ^2  X.  W.  253  [1900] )  ; 
Kinn;  v.  Portland  City,  184  U.  S.  61, 
40  L.  431.  22  S.  290  [1902];    (adirni- 


ing King  V.  Portland,  38  Or.  402.  55 
L.  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2    [1900]). 

'Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  184  V.  S. 
432,  46  L.  627,  22  S.  397  [1902]; 
(airirniing  Goodrich  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 123  ilich.  559.  82  N.  W.  255 
11900]);  Voigt  V.  Detroit  City,  184 
V.  S.  115,  46  L.  459,  22  S.  337  [i902] ; 
(alTirniing  Voigt  v.  City  of  Detroit. 
123  Mich.  547,  82  X.  W.  253  [1900]  )  ; 
King  V.  Portland  City,  184  U.  S.  61, 
46  L.  431,  22  S.  290  [1902];  (allirni- 
ing  King  v.  Portland.  38  Or.  402.  55 
L.  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900];  Lent 
V.  Tillson.  72  Cal.  404.  14  Pac.  71 
[  1887]  )  ;  Weaver  v.  Teniplin.  113  Ind. 
298.  14  X.  E.  600  [1887];  Barfield  v. 
Gleason.  Ill  Ky.  491.  63  S.  W.  964. 
23  Ky.  L.  R.  128  [1901];  Roberts  v. 
Smith.  115  :\Iich.  5.  72  X.  W.  1091 
[1897];  Kelley  v.  Minneapolis  City, 
57  Minn.  294,'  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  6o'5. 
26  L.  R.  A.  92,  59  X.  W.  304  [1S04]  ; 
City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Xickl.  42  Minn. 
262,  44  X.  W.  59  [1890];  Adams  v. 
City  of  Roanoke.  102  Va.  53.  45  S.  E. 
881    [1903]. 


§  125  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  214 

it  is  proposed  to  charge  with  any  part  of  the  costs  of  the  public 
improvement,  an  assessment  against  his  property  made  under  it 
will  not  be  defeated  if  he  has  been  given  at  some  stage  of  the 
proceedings  a  fair  opportunity  to  be  heard  to  test  the  legality, 
justice  and  correctness  of  the  assessment.  It  is  only  with  the 
charge  upon  him  that  he  is  concerned,  and  of  that  alone  he  can 
complain.  In  the  legality  of  that  charge  is  necessarily  involvec, 
all  that  precedes  it,  and  of  which  it  is  the  consequence.  Whei; 
the  land-owner  has  been  given  a  hearing  at  which  he  might 
insist  that  his  property  was  not  benefited  to  the  amount  assessed, 
or  that  it  was  not  benefited  at  all,  and  thus  obtains  every  ad- 
vantage which  he  might  obtain  were  he  informed  of  every  ste^ 
in  the  proceedings  there  is  no  want  of  due  process  of  law  withii; 
the  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment ;  and  where  the  ordi- 
nance or  resolution  of  the  council  is  that  each  lot  in  the  district 
or  section  within  which  the  improvement  is  made  shall  be  as 
sessed  in  accordance  with  or  not  in  excess  of  the  benefits  derived 
from  the  improvement,  the  whole  question  of  the  amount  ol 
benefit  derived  from  a  particular  parcel  of  real  estate  is  opened 
up  even  to  showing  that  no  benefit  whatever  was  occasioned  by 
the  improvement."^  This  is  true  especially  where  such  pre 
liminary  steps  are  within  the  discretion  of  the  legislative  depart 
ment.*  Thus,  by  the  weight  of  authority  no  notice  of  the  de- 
termination of  making  a  public  improvement  need  be  given  t( 
those  to  be  assessed  therefor.^     In  some  cases,  however,  it  seems 

'Adams    v.    City    of    Roanoke,    102  ^  Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  184  U.  S.  432 

Va.  53,  G3,  64,  45  S.  E.  881    [1903];  40    L.    027,   22    S.    397    [1902];     (ai- 

( citing    as    under    a    similar    statute  firming  Goodrich  v.   City  of   Detroit 

Voight  V.  Detroit,   123  Mich.  547,  82  123  Midi.  559,  82  N.  W.  255  [1900])  •' 

N.   W.   253    [1900];    afiirmed    184   U.  Voigt  v.  Detroit  City,  184  U.  S    115 

S.  115,  46  L.  459,  22  S.  337  [1902])  ;  40    L.    027,    22   S.    397    [1902];     ( af- 

and    also    Goodrich    v.    Detroit,     184  firming  Voigt  v.  City  of  Detroit    123 

U.    S.    4.32,    46    L.    627,    22    S.    397  Mich.   547,   82   X.    W.   253    [1900]); 

[1902].  King  V.  Portland  City,  184  U.  S.  61, 

*  Williams,  Treasurer  v.  Eggleston,  46  L.  431,  22  S.  290  [1902];    (Affirm- 

170    U.    S.    304,    42    L.    1047,    18    S.  ing    King    v.    Portland,    .38' Or.    402, 

617     [1898];     Spencer    v.    Merchant,  55  L.  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2   [1900])-' 

125   U.   S.   345,   31   L.   763,   8   S.   921  In   the   Matter   of   the   Bonds   of  the 

[1888];   Barfield  V.  Gleason,   111   Ky.  Madera    Irrination    District     92    Cal 

491,  63  S.  W.  904,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  128  296.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  100,  14  L.  R.  A. 

[1901];    Meier  v.   City  of  St.  Louis,  755,  28  Pae.  272,  28  Pac.  675  [1891]- 

180   Mo.   391,   79   S.  W.   955    [1903];  Lent  v.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404,   14  Pac. 

City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Ranken,  96  Mo.  71    [1887];    District   of   Columbia    v. 

497,  9  S.  W.  910   [1888].  Burgdorf,  6   App.   D.   C.  465    [1895J; 


215 


{.o:<WTiTi;TIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§125 


to  be  assumed  that  such  notice  should  be  given."  So  notice  need 
not  be  given  of  the  condemnation  of  realty  to  those  whose  lands 
are  not  to  be  taken,  but  are  to  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  the 
improvement."  Where  local  authorities  are  given  discretion  to 
determine  whether  a  given  improvement  should  or  should  not  be 
made  the  better  view  is  that  the  persons  whose  property  is  to 
be  assessed  have  no  constitutional  right  to  notice  of  the  intention  • 
of  such  local  authorities  to  make  such  improvement.**  If  the 
council,  the  board  of  commissioners  and  the  like  are  given  powei 
to  fix  the  limits  of  the  assessment  district,  they  may  do  so  with- 
out giving  notice  of  such  determination  of  the  limits  of  such 
assessment  district  if  not  required  by  statute ;  and  the  omission 
of  the  statute  to  require  such  notice,  and  the  omission  of  the 
council,  the  board  of  commissioners  and  the  like  to  give  such 
notice,  does  not  violate  the  constitutional  right  of  the  owner.^ 
of  the  land  to  be  assessed,  have  to  notice  and  hearing  as  long 
as  an  opportunity  is  given  to  them  to  file  objections  and  to 
have  a  hearing  upon  the  (juestion  of  apportionment  and  of  th' 
amount  of  the  assessment  to  be  charged  upon  each  tract  of  , 
realtv."      Thus    if    the    statute    authorizes    the    commissioners    t'    ' 


Dyer  v.  Woods.  IGfi  Ind.  44.  7G  N. 
E.  624  [1000];  Collins  v.  Holyoko, 
146  Mass  298.  1.5  N.  E.  908;  Roberts 
V.  Smith.  11,5' Mich.  5,  72  N.  W.  1091 
[1897];  People  of  the  State  of  New 
York  ex  rel.  Scott  v.  Pitt,  169  X.  Y. 
521.  58  L.  R.  A.  372.  62  X.  E.  662 
[1902]. 

"Scott  V.  City  of  Toledo,  36  Fed. 
385,  1  L.  R.  A.  688  [1888]  ;  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  Wells  Coxinty  v. 
Fahlor,  1.32  Ind.  426.  31  X.  E.  1112; 
Paul  V.  City  of  Detroit,  32  :\rieh.  108 
[1875];  Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74  X.  Y. 
183.  .30  Am.  Rep.  289  [1878];  State 
V.  Fond   du   Lae.  42   Wis.   287. 

^Goodrich  v.  Detroit.  184  U.  S. 
432,  46  L.  627.  22  S.  397  [1902]; 
(AfTirniinfr  Coodricli  v.  City  of  De- 
troit. 123  :\ripli.  5.-)9.  82  X.  W.  255 
(19001  I :  Lent  v.  TiUson.  72  Cal.  404. 
14  P;tc.  71  [18871:  Roberts  v.  Sn^itb. 
115  ■Midi.  5.  72  X.   W.    1001    [1897]. 

*  Repair  of  Ditch.  Weaver  v. 
Templin.  113  Ind.  298.  14  X.  1".  600 
[1887];   Construction  of  Drain.    Rob- 


erts V.  Smitli,  115  :\rich.  5.  72  X^  W. 
1091    [1897]. 

"Voigt  V.  Detroit  City,  184  U.  S. 
115,  46  L.  459,  22  S.  "337  [1902]; 
(Affirmino:  Voigt  v.  City  of  Detroit, 
123  Mich.  547,  82  X.  W.  253  [1900]  )  ; 
King  V.  Portland  City,  184  U.  S.  61, 
46  L.  431.  22  S.  290  [1902];  (Affirm- 
ing King  V.  Portland.  38  Or.  402.  55 
L.  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900]); 
Paulson  V.  Portland,  149  U.  S.  30,  37 
[>.  637.  l.T  S.  750  [18931;  Ross  v. 
Jioai'd  of  Siijiervisors  of  Wright 
Coiiiitv.  lowM.  128  la.  427.  1   L.  R.  A. 

IX.  S.]  431.  104  X.  W.  .506  [1905]: 
VoiL't  V.  f  ity  of  Detroit,  123  :Mich. 
547.  82  X.  W.  253  [1900];  -Kelly  v. 
ilinneapolis  City.  57  ^linn.  294.  47 
Am.  St.  Rep.  605.  26  L.  R.  A.  92.  59 

X.  W.  304  [1894]:  Roo-crs  v.  City  of 
St.  Paul.  22  Minn.  494  [1876];  Peo- 
ple of  the  State  of  Xew  York  e\  rel. 
Scott  V.  Pitt.  169  X.  Y.  .521.  58  L.  R. 
A.  372,  62  X.  E.  662  [1902]:  People 
e\  rel.  OrifTin  v.  'Ma^or.  etc..  of 
ProokljTi,  4  X\  Y.  419.  55  Am.  Dec. 


§  126  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  216 

classify  lands,  with  reference  to  a  subsequent  assessment  thereon 
for  drainage  purposes  as  "low,"  "wet,"  "swamp"  and  "dry," 
■  such  classification  is  in  legal  effect  fixing  the  boundaries  of  the 
drainage  district,  and  omission  to  give  notice  thereof  does  not 
amount  to  a  want  of  due  process  of  law/*^  Owners  of  property 
to  be  assessed  have  no  constitutional  right  to  a  hearing  upon 
I  the  question  as  to  who  shall  be  appointed  assessors,  nor  any 
right  to  appeal  therefrom,  and  accordingly  a  statute  which  does 
not  provide  for  notice  and  hearing  upon  such  question  is  not 
on  that  account  unconstitutional."  If  the  legislature  has  power 
to  levy  the  assessment  itself,  notice  is  unnecessary.^-  Notice  is 
necessary  and  sufficient  if  the  property  owner  is  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  before  the  tribunal  which  is  to  ascertain  the 
facts,  and  upon  such  facts  is  to  apportion  the  street  assess- 
ment.^^ 

§  126.     Notice  of  preliminary  steps  not  sufficient. 

On  the  other  hand  notice  of  matters  preliminary  to  the  de- 
termination of  the  amount  to  be  assessed  against  the  land  of 
each  property  owner  is  not  sufficient  if  no  notice  is  given  of  the 
determination  of  such  amount,  and  the  existence  of  such  pre- 
liminary proceedings  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  apprise  the  land- 
owner that  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events  an  assessment  will 
follow.^  Thus  if  notice  is  given  of  a  preliminary  resolution  which 
declares  it  necessary  to  'open  a  street  and  to  appropriate  land 
therefor,  but  does  not  refer  to  the  levy  of  an  assessment  to  pay 
the  cost  thereof,  such  notice  is  not  sufficient.-  So  if  notice  has 
been  given  and  opportunity  for  hearing  had,  subsequent  increase 
of  the  assessment  without  notice  and  hearing,  not  based  upon 

266  [1851];  Erickson  v.  Cass  County.  (affirming   Spencer   v.   Merchant,    100 

11  N.  D.  494,  92  N.  W-  841   [1902] -.  X.  Y.  585,  3  X.  E.  682   [1885]). 

State  ex  rel.  Baltzell  v.  Stewart,  74  "Meier   v.   City   of   St.   Louis,   180 

Wis.  620,  0  L.  R.   A.  394,  43  N.  W.  Mo.  391,  79  S.  W.  955  [1903]. 

947    [1889].  1  Scott   v.    City   of   Toledo.   36    Fed. 

^"Ross  V.   Board  of   Supervisors   of  385,  1  L.  R.  A.  688   [1888];   Ouckien 

Wriglit  County,  Iowa,  128  Ta.  427,   1  v.  Rothrock,    137   Ind.   355,   37  N.  E. 

L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    431,  104  N.  W.  506  17     [1893];     City    of    Logansport,    v. 

[1905].  Shirk,    129    Ind."  3.52.    28    X.    E.    538 

"Kelly     V.     Minneapolis     Citv.     57  [1891];    City    of    Xorfolk    v.    Young. 

Minn.   294.   47   Am.   St.   Rep.   605,   26  97  Va.  728.  47  L.  R.  A.  574.  34  S.  E. 

L.  R.  A.  92,  59  X.  W.  304   [ISO!].  P86    [1900]. 

1=  Spencer    v.    Merchant.    125    V.    S.  =  Scott   v.    City   of   Toledo.   36    Fed. 

345.    31    L.    763.    8    S.    921     [I8g"8];  385.  1  L.  R.  A.  688   [1888]. 


217  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  l'^''' 

the  former  hearing  is  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process 
of  law.-^     Upon   the   hist   point,   however,   there   is   not   complete 
accord  among-  the  authorities.     Where  the  statute  concerning  the 
establishment  of  a  drainage  district  provides  that  if,  on  making 
the  first  assessment,   the   commissioners  report  a  sura   too   small 
to  pay  the  entire  cost  of  the  work,  the  court  may  order  a  furthe. 
assessment  in  proportion  to  the  original  assessment,  it  has  beer 
held  that  if  notice  of  the  original  assessment  is  given,  the  prop 
erty  owner  is  apprised  of  the  assessment  proceedings  and  of  thi 
possibility  of  a  supplemental  assessment,  so  that  no  further  notice 
of  the  supplemental  assessment  is  necessary.*     If.  however,  the 
preliminary  steps  of  which  notice  are  given  are  such  that  in  th 
ordinary  course   of  events  an   assessment  will  follow,   such   pre 
liminary   notice   is   sufficient    and   further   notice   is   unnecessary 
Notice  of  the  inclusion  of  the  property  in  question  in  an  assess- 
ment district  has  been  held  sufficient  where  under  the  law  notice 
of   such   inclusion    would    he    sufficient    to    apprise    the    property 
owner  that  an  assessment  would  be  levied  upon  the  land  so  in- 
cluded   for    the    purpose    of    paying    for    such     improvement.'"' 
"    .    .    .It  seems  to  be  well  settled  that  a   statute   which   pro- 
vides for  notice  to  tlie  property  owner  at  some  stage  of  the  pro- 
ceedings before  the  assessment  is  made  is  not  open  to  the  consti- 
tutional ob.iection  simply  because  it  does  not  provide  for  a  new 
or  additional  notice  of  each  successive  step  leading  up  to  the 
assessment."  ^ 

§  127.    Necessity  of  personal  notice. 

If  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed  is  a  resident  of  the  state 
in  which  the  assessment  is  levied  so  that  personal  notice  could 
be  given  to  him  within  the  state,  the  question  whether  the  as- 
ses.sment  is  a  personal  liability  of  such  owner  or  not,  is  not 
affected  in  any  way  by  the  clause  which  Jorbids  taking  property 

'nufkion     V.     rvotlirock.     1.37     Tn.l.  |l!tn.>1:    ( Citing  Voijrt  v.  Dptroit.  181 

3.55.  .37  X.  E.   17    [18931.  V.    S.     11.5.    40    L.    4.50,    22    S.    337 

^  Stone    V.    Little    Yellow    DiJiinafre  [19021:     ^VeyerllalIesor    v.     State    of 

District,  118  Wis.  .3S8.  95  X.  W.  405  :Minnosota.   170  U.  S.  5.50.  44  L.  583. 

[19031.  20  S.  485;  Winona  and  St.  Paul  Land 

"Oliver  v.  ilonona  County,   117    la.  Co.   v.  'Minnesota.    159   I'.   S.   526.   40 

43,  90  X.  W.  510   [19021.  L.   247.    Ifi   S.    83:    Oliver    v.   ]\ronona 

•Ross   V.    Board    of    Supervisors   of  Countv.    117    La.    43.    90    X'.    W.    510 

Wricht  County.  Towa.   128  Ta.  427.  1  [19021:    Yeomans    v.    "Riddle.    84    la. 

L.  "R.  A.    (X.  S.)   431.   104  X.  W.  506  147.  50  X^  W.  886  [18911). 


§§  128.  129  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  218 

without  due  process  of  law.^  If,  however,  the  owner  of  the  prop- 
erty assessed  is  not  a  resident  of  the  state  in  which  the  assess- 
ment is  levied,  and  personal  notice  could  not  be  given  to  him 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  the  clause  of  the  Federal 
Constitution  forbidc'ng  the  taking  of  property  without  due 
process  of  law,  applies  to  the  question  of  personal  liability  and 
renders  unconstitutional  any  statute  which  attempts  to  impose 
personal  liability  upon  such  non-resident.-  Outside  of  the  ques 
tion  of  personal  liability,  personal  notice  is  unnecessary  and  a 
reasonable  notice  given  by  publication  is  sufficient.^ 

§  128,     Notice  aft  r  determination  of  amount,  insuflEicient. 

Furthermore  a  notice  given  after  the  determination  of  the  ap- 
portionment of  the  assessment,  and  of  the  amount  to  be  charged 
upon  each  tract  of  realty  assessed  is  in.sufficient  if  the  entire  ques- 
tion of  apportioninent  and  amount  of  assessment  is  not  opened 
up  for  a  hearing  as  to  those  thus  subsequently  notified;^  since 
the  notice  must  be  given  in  time  to  secure  to  the  property  own- 
ers a  full  and  ample  hearing  on  the  merits. 

§  129.     Notice  of  proceeding  to  determine  validity  of  assessment. 

A  statute  which  provides  for  an  action  to  be  brought  by  a 
taxing  district  for  determining  the  validity  of  the  assessment  in 
which  notice  and  an  opportunity  for  a  full  hearing  on  the  inerits 
is  to  be  given  to  the  property  owner,  the  judgment  rendered 
in  which  is  to  be  conclusive  between  the  parties  thereto  in  any 
subsequent  action  upon  the  assessment,  is  not  in  violation  of  the 
constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  taking  of  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law.^  A  similar  question  under  this  statute 
was  presented  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and 
it  was  there  held  that  such  proceeding  was  merely  one  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  evidence,  that  it  did  not  involve  the  taking 

1  Davidson   v.   New   Orleans.   96   U.  Moines,    101    la.    416.    70   X.   W.    605 

S.   97,  24  L.   616    [1877];    (affirming  [1897]). 

In  the  Matter  of  the  Commissioners  'Wight  v.  Davidson,  181  U.  S.  371. 

of  tlie  First  Drainage  District  pray-  45  L.  900,  21   S.  616    [1901].     See  § 

ing    for    the     Homologation    of    the  121. 

Assessment    Roll.     27    La.    Ann.    20  ^  Hille  v.  Xeale.  32  Ind.  App.  341, 

[1375]).  69  X.  E.  713   [1904]. 

^  Dewey  v.   Des   Moines.    173   U.    S.  ^  Lower    Kings    River    Reclamation 

193,    43    L.    665.    19    S.    379    [1899];  District    Xo.    531    v.    IMcCnllah.    124 

(reversing    Dewey    v.    City    of    Des-  Cal.   175,  56  Pac.  887    [1899]. 


219  CONSTITl^TIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  130 

of  property,  and  that  accordiugly  the  question  whether  there 
was  a  taking  without  due  process  of  law  could  not  be  consid- 
ered.- 

§  130.     Notice  of  confirmation. 

Whether  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  upon  appli- 
cation to  confirm  the  assessment  is  a  compliance  with  the  con- 
stitutional provision  forbidding  the  taking  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law.  or  whether  such  notice  is  gi\en  at  too  late  a 
stage  of  the  proceedings,  is  a  question  which  depends  for  its 
answer  upon  the  nature  of  the  proceedings  at  confirmation  and 
the  effect  therein  of  the  prior  proceedings.  If  at  confirmation 
the  property  owner  is  given  a  full  opportunity  to  be  heard  upoi 
the  merits  of  the  case,  it  is  generally  held  that  such  notice  and 
opportunity  for  hearing  constitute  due  process  of  law,^  whether 
such  confirmation  is  upon  hearing  in  court.-  or  upon  hearing 
before  the  council  or  other  similar  taxing  body.''  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  confirmation  is  a  mere  review  and  no  opportunity  is 
given  for  a  full  and  original  hearing,  notice  of  confirmation  alone 
is  not  sufficient.  Thus,  where  on  confirmation  the  assessment  is 
assumed  to  be  valid  if  not  shown  affirmatively  to  be  invalid  and 
where  possibly  the  only  incjuiry  permitted  was  as  to  the  correct- 
ness of  the  principle  upon  which  the  assessment  was  levied 
without  any  inrpiiry  into  the  facts,  it  was  held  that  notice  of 
such  confirmation  was  insufficient.*     A  statute  providing  for  the 

'Ti-ppea  V.  Modesto  Irrigation  Dis-  0.3  X.  W.  259   [1003];  City  of  Duhitii 

trict,  1C4  r.  S.  179,  41  L.  395,  17  S.  v.    Dihhlee.    62    Minn.    IS."   r.3    X.    W. 

52      [18961;      (dismissing     error     to  1117    [1895]. 

Modesto    Irrigation    District    v.    Tre-  -  People  ex   rel.  Hanherg  v.  Colien, 

gea.  88  Cal.  334,  26  Pac.  237).  219    III.   200,   76   X.   E.   388    [1906]; 

MViglit  V.  Davidson.  181  V.  S.  371.  Job  v.  City  of  Alton,  189  111.  256.  82 

45  L.  900.  21   S.  616    [1901];    Wurts  Am.    St.    Rep.    448.    ,59    X.     E.    622 

V.  Hoagland.  114  U.  S.  606,  29  L.  229.  [1901]  ;  City  of  Duluth  v.  Dihhlee.  62 

5   S.    1086    [1885];    Davidson    v.   Xew  Minn.  IS,  63  X.  W.   1117   [1895]. 
Orleans,    96    U.    S.    97.    24    L.    616  'Cohen    v.    City    of    Alameda.    124 

[1877];    Cohen   v.   City   of   Alameda.  Cal.  504.  57  Pac.  377  [1899];  City  of 

124    Cal.    504,    57    Pac.    377     [1899];  Denver    v.    Londoner,    33    Colo.    104, 

City  of  Denver  v.  Londoner,  33  Colo.  80  Pac.  117   [1904];   Auditor  Ceneral 

104,   80   Pac.    117    [1904];    People   ex  v.  HofTman.  132  Mich.   198.  93  X.  W. 

rel.  Hanherg  v.   Cohen.   219   111.   200.  259  [1903]. 

76  N.  E.  388  [1906];  Joh  v.  City  of  'State.  The  Board  of  Chosen  Free- 
Alton.  189  111.  256.  82  .\ni.  St.  Rep.  holders  of  the  County  of  Hudson. 
448,  59  X.  E.  622  [1901];  Auditor  Pros.  v.  Paterson  Avenue  and  Secau- 
General   v.   Hoffman,    132   Mich.    198,  cus  Road  Commissioners.  41   X.  J.  L. 


^^  131.132 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


220 


re-opening  of  a  prior  order  of  confirmation,  and  an  inquiry  into 
the  valuation  and  apportionment  in  such  proceeding  does  not 
amount  to  a  taking  without  due  process  of  law.^ 

§  131.     Notice  for  hearing  objections. 

Under  some  statutes  provision  is  made  for  notice  which  gives 
to  the  owners  of  property  assessed  an  opportunity  to  make  ob- 
jections to  the  assessment  as  actually  made  and  to  be  heard 
before  a  board  of  commissioners,  assessors,  equalizers,  and  the 
like,  before  the  assessment  becomes  a  finality.  Such  a  provi- 
sion is  held  to  give  such  notice  and  hearing  as  complies  with 
the  requirement  for  due  process  of  law.^  Like  results  have  been 
reached  where  the  statute  provided  for  an  opportunity  to  make 
objections  to  the  assessment  as  actually  made,  and  to  have  a 
hearing  before  an  officer,  as  distinguished  from  a  board,  as  long 
as  such  officer  has  authority  to  act  upon  such  objections  and 
readjust  the  assessments  in  conformity  to  the  requirements  of 
law.^ 

§  132.     Notice  of  proceedings  to  enforce  assessment. 

AVhether  a  notice  is  necessary  prior  to  proceedings  to  enforce 
the  assessment  in  question  is  a  matter  which  depends  upon  the 
nature  of  the  proceeding  by  which  such  assessment  is  enforced. 
If  the  assessment  is  to  be  enforced  summarily  without  notice 
or  judicial  proceedings,  it  is  evident  that  no  opportunity  is  there- 


(12  Vr.)  83  [1879];  (Citing  State, 
Wilkinson,  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants  of 
the  City  of  Trenton,  36  X.  J.  L.  (7 
Vr.)  499  [1873];  Vantilburg  v. 
Shann,  24  X.  J.  L.  (4  Zab.)  740; 
State,  Mann,  Pros.  v.  flavor  and 
Common  Council  of  Jersey  City,  24 
X.  J.  L.    (4  Zab.)    662    [1855]  )'. 

^  In  the  matter  of  widening  Broad- 
way in  the  City  of  Xew  York,  61 
Barb.  (X.  Y.)  583  [1872];  In  the 
matter  of  widening  Broadway  in  the 
City  of  Xew  York,  42  How.  (X.  Y.) 
220   [1872]. 

*  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District  v. 
Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  41  L.  369,  17 
S.  56  [1896];  Paulson  v.  Portland, 
149  U.  >>.  30,  37  L.  637,  13  S.  750 
[1893];   Spencer  v.  Merchant,   125  U. 


S.  345,  31  L.  763,  8  S.  921  [1888]; 
(Affirming  Spencer  v.  ilerclmnt,  100 
X.  Y.  585,  3  X.  E.  682  [1885]  )  ;  Ha- 
gar  V.  Reclamation  District  Xo.  108, 
111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569,  4  S.  663 
[1884];  Carson  v.  St.  Francis  Levee 
District,  59  Ark.  513,  27  S.  W.  590 
[1894]  ;  Chase  v.  Trout,  146  Cal.  350, 
80  Pac.  81  [1905]  ;  City  of  Denver  v. 
Kennedy,  33  Colo.  80,  80  Pac.  122, 
80  Pac.  467  [1905];  Xew  York,  C. 
and  St.  L.  By.  Co.  v.  City  of  Ham- 
mond,   —    Ind.    .    83    X.    E.    244 

[1908];  City  of  Richmond  v.  Wil- 
liams, 102  Va.  733.  47  S.  E.  844 
[1904]. 

MYalston  v.  Xevin.   128  U.  S.  578, 
32  L.  544,  9  S.  192   [1888]. 


221 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


132 


by  given  to  the  property  owner  to  contest  the  assessment  upon 
its  merits.  The  assessment  has,  in  such  case,  already  become 
a  finality.  Accordingly,  if  notice  has  not  been  given  at  a  prior 
stage  of  the  proceedings  so  that  the  property  owner  has  an 
opportunity  to  contest  the  assessment  upon  its  merits,  the  pro- 
ceeding is  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  provision  which  for- 
bids the  taking  of  property  without  due  process  of  law.^  On 
the  other  hand  if  the  proceeding  to  enforce  the  assessment  is 
in  the  nature  of  a  judicial  proceeding  in  which  notice  is  given 
to  the  property  owner  and  a  full  opportunity  is  given  to  him 
to  be  heard  upon  the  merits,  such  proceeding  constitutes  due 
process  of  law  and  no  prior  notice  seems  to  be  necessary.-  A 
statute  which  secures  to  the  property  owner  the  right  to  appeal 
to  the  city  council  to  correct  the  assessment,  and  further  pro- 
vides that  the  assessment  cannot  be  enforced  until  a  court  ol 
equity  shall  have  decreed  its  enforcement  in  a  proceeding  in 
which  the  property  owner  is  given  a  full  and  ample  opportunity 
to  be  heard  upon  the  merits  and  to  show  cause  why  such  de- 
cree should  not  be  rendered  is  clearly  a  compliance  with  the 
constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  taking  of  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law."  Under  some  statutes,  the  public  cor- 
poration which  seeks  to  enforce  the  assessment  may  elect  be- 
tween a  judicial  proceeding  in  which  notice  is  given  to  the 
property  owner,  and  a  full  opportunity  is  given  to  him  to  be 
heard   upon  the  merits  and  a   proceeding  of  a   sun^'nary  nature 


'  Fay  V.  City  of  Sprinjifipld,  94 
Fed.  409  [1899];  Scott  v.  City  of  To- 
ledo. 30  Fed.  38.5,  1  L.  R.  A.  088 
[18881;  Ilutsnn  v.  Woodbridge  Pro- 
tection District  Xo.  1,  79  Cal.  90,  10 
Pac.  549,  21  Pac.  435   [1889]. 

^'Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310, 
48  L.  195,  24  S.  88  [19031;  (aflirni- 
iiifi  Hibben  v.  Sniitli.  158  Ind.  200. 
•12  X.  E.  447  I  19(11  1  I  :  lla-ar  v.  Re- 
clamation District  Xo.  los.  Ill  I".  S. 
701.  28  L.  509,  4  S.  003  |1S84|; 
(allirminix  Reclamation  District  Xo. 
108  V.  Hajiar,  4  Fed.  300  [1880]); 
Murdock  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  39 
Fed.  891  [18891;  Carson  v.  St.  Fran- 
cis Levee  District.  59  Ark.  51.3.  27 
S.  W.  590  [18941:  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict   Xo.    108   V.   Hacrar,   00    Cal.    54. 


4  Pac.  945  [1884]:  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict Xo.  3  V.  CJoldman,  05  Cal.  035. 
4  Pac.  070  [1884];  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict Xo.  108  V.  Evans,  01  Cal.  104 
[1882];  Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago,  59 
111.  280  [1871];  City  of  Indianapolis 
V.  Holt,  155  Ind.  222,  57  X.  E.  900. 
988,  1100  [1900]:  Garvin  v.  Daiiss- 
man,  114  Ind.  429,  5  Am.  St.  Rep. 
037.  10  X.  E.  820  [1887];  Xevin  v. 
Hoach.  80  Ky.  492,  5  S.  W.  540 
I1SS7];  City  of  Galveston  v.  Heard. 
54  Tex.  42  [1881];  Mefrrrett  v.  Citv 
of  Eau  Claire,  81  Wis.  320,  51  X. 
\V.  500   [1892]. 

■'  City  Council  of  Montgomery  v. 
Rirdsonj;.  126  Ala.  032,  28  So.'  522 
I  1899]. 


§  133  TAXx\TION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  222 

in  which  neither  notice  nor  hearing  is  necessary.  Such  an  elec- 
tion does  not  of  itself  constitute  due  process  of  law,  at  least 
where  the  public  corporation  has  not  elected  to  resort  to  the 
judicial  proceeding,  since  by  a  resort  to  the  other  method  it 
may  deprive  the  property  owner  of  an  opportunity  to  be  heard ; 
and,  accordingly,  such  method  of  enforcing  an  assessment  will 
not  supply  the  want  of  due  notice/ 

§  133.     Right  to  court  review. 

Under  some  statutes  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed  is 
given  a  full  and  ample  opportunity  to  have  the  validity  of  the 
assessment  and  the  justice  of  apportionment  thereof  reviewed 
by  proceedings  in  court ;  and  summary  enforcement  of  the  as- 
sessment is  suspended  until  such  review  may  be  had.  Such  an 
opportunity  for  judicial  hearing  is  held  to  constitute  due  process 
of  law,  even  if  sufficient  notice  of  the  fixing  of  the  amount  of 
the  assessment  was  not  provided  for.^  In  some  states  the  prop- 
erty owner  ma,v  avail  himself  of  the  remedy  of  injunction  to 
resist  an  invalid  assessment  or  one  in  which  the  amount  of  the 
assessment  exceeds  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  improvement. 
Where  such  procedure  is  recognized  as  proper,  the  question  may 
then  arise  whether  the  opportunity  to  sue  in  equity  for  an  in- 
junction constitutes  due  process  of  law.  If,  in  the  suit  in  equity, 
the  property  owner  is  given  a  full  and  ample  hearing  upon  the 
merits  of  the  assessments  and  upon  the  question  of  benefits, 
the  general  rule  is  that  such  opportunity  is  due  process  of  law.- 
This  is  the  rule  in  general  taxation,^  and  no  reason  appears 
Avh,v  the  analogy  should  not  extend  to  cases  of  local  assessments, 
even  though  a  right  to  a  hearing  may  exist  in  the  latter  case 
but  not  in  the  former.  It  appears,  however,  to  be  assumed  in 
some  jurisdictions  that  the  opportunity  of  suing  for  an  injunc- 
tion and  having  a  full  hearing  in  that  suit  does  not  constitute 


*  Scott   V.   City  of  Toledo,   36    Fed.  62   N.   E.   447    [1001]);    Caldwell   v. 

385,   1   L.  R.  A.  688    [1888].  Village    of    Carthage,    49    0.    S.    334, 

1  Security  Trust,  and  Safety  Vault  31  N.  E.  602  [1892];  Tone  v.  Colum- 

Co.  V.   City  of  Lexington,  203   U.   S.  biis,  39  0.   S.   281,  48  Am.  Rep.  438 

323    [1906];    Lent  v.   Tillson,   140  U.  [1883];   Stephan  v.  Daniels,  27  O.  S. 

S.  316.  35  L.  419,  11  S.  825   [1891].  527    [1875];    Steese   v.   Oviatt,  24   0. 

='Hibben  v.    Sniith,    191    U.    S.   310,  S.  248    [1873]. 

48  L.  195.  24  S.  88   [1903];    (Affirm-  '  McMillen    v.    Anderson,    95    U.    S. 

ing   Hibben   v.    Smit'i.    158    Ind.    206.  37,  24  L.  335   [1877]. 


223  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  134 

due  process  of  law.*  If  reasonable  notice  is  given  of  a  hearing 
before  the  body  which  levies  the  assessment  it  is  not  necessary 
that  an  opportunity  for  a  review  by  the  courts  be  given  to  con- 
stitute due  process  of  law.  "The  claim  set  up  on  the  part  of 
the  lot  owner  that  there  can  be  no  due  process  of  law  under 
which  an  assessment  can  be  made  which  does  not  provide  for 
a  review  of  such  assessment  and  a  hearing  by  a  court  is  not 
tenable.  Assuming  the  necessity  of  a  hearing  before  an  as.sess- 
ment  can  be  made  conclusive  the  law  may  provide  for  that  hear- 
ing by  the  body  which  levies  the  assessment,  and  after  such 
hearing  may  make  the  decision  of  that  body  conclusive.  Al- 
though in  imposing  such  assessments  the  common  council  or 
board  of  trustees  may  be  acting  somewhat  in  a  judicial  char- 
acter, yet  the  foundation  of  the  right  to  assess  exists  in  the 
taxing  power  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  in  imposing  an  as- 
sessment there  shall  be  a  hearing  before  a  court  provided  by 
the  law  in  order  to  give  validity  to  such  assessment.  Due  process 
of  law  is  afiForded  where  there  is  an  opportunity  to  be  heard 
before  the  body  which  is  to.  make  the  assessment  and  the  leg- 
islature of  a  state  may  provide  that  such  hearing  shall  be  con- 
clusive so  far  as  the  Federal  Constitution  is  concerned."'' 

§  134.     Right  of  appeal  as  supplying  want  of  notice. 

Whether  an  opportunity  for  an  appeal  is  a  sufficient  com- 
pliance with  the  constitutional  requirement  forbidding  the  tak- 
ing of  property  without  due  process  of  law  is  a  question  de- 
pending upon  the  nature  of  the  hearing  allowed  on  appeal.  If 
an  opportunity  is  given  on  appeal  for  a  fidl  and  com])lete  hear 
ing  upon  the  merits,  the  rights  of  the  property  owner  are  pro- 
tected and  the  proceeding  constitutes  due  ju-ocess  of  law.^     Like 

•Chicago    &    Erie    Railroad    Co.    v.  .')S2     |  litoi)  ;     In    tlie    Matter    of    the 

Keith,  07  O.  S.  270,  (K»  L.  R.  A.  525,  lion.is  of  the  :\ra(lora   Irripation  Dis 

65  N.  E.   1020   110(121.  trict.   02   Cal.   29G,   27   Am.   St.   Rep. 

Mlihben   v.    Smith,    101    V.   S.    310.  10(!,    14    L.    R.    A.    755,    28    Pac.    272. 

321,  322,  4S  L.   105,  24  S.  88   |  1003]  ;  (i75    [18911:    Davies    v.    City    of    Los 

(Amrmin-,'  Hihben  v.  Smith.  l.')8   hid.  Anjj:eles,    8(5    Cal.     37,     24     Pac.     771 

206.  62   X.   E.   447    [10011).  •  [1800];      Roundcnhush     v.     Mitchell, 

'Kinp  V.  Portland  City,   1H4  U.  S.  154    Tnd.   610.   57   X.   K.   510    [lOOO]  : 

61,    40    L.    431,    22    S.    200    [10021;  Stati^  e\  rel.  French  v.  .Tnhnsm.   105 

(amrminT   King  v.    Portland.   38   Or.  Tnd.     403.     5     X.     E.     553      [18851; 

402.    55    L.    R.    A.    812.    03    Pac.    2  Flournoy  v.  City  of  .TefTorsonville.   17 

[19001 );    Brown   v.    Drain.    112    Fed.  Ind.    169,   79   Am.   Dec.   468    [1861]; 


§  135  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  224 

results  have  been  reached  where  provision  was  made  for  a  suit 
to  correct  the  assessment.-  So  a  statute  providing  that  the  "gen- 
eral council  or  courts  in  which  suits  may  be  pending  shall  make 
all  corrections,  rules  and  orders  to  do  justice  to  all  parties  con- 
cerned" has  been  held  to  be  sufficient  to  constitute  due  process 
of  law.^  On  the  other  hand  the  hearing  on  appeal  may  be  so 
restricted  as  to  preclude  the  property  holder  from  obtaining  a 
full  and  fair  adjudication  of  his  rights.  Thus  a  statute  grant- 
ing an  appeal  and  providing  that  if  the  appellant  were  success- 
ful his  only  relief  should  be  that  the  difference  between  the 
amount  originally  assessed  and  the  amount  found  on  appeal  to 
be  the  amount  of  benefits  received  by  him  should  be  j^aid  by 
the  city,  leaving  him  to  pay  the  amount  so  adjudged  to  be  the 
amount  of  benefits,  and  providing  that  such  appeal  should  be 
the  only  remedy  for  any  grievance  which  he  might  have  by 
reason  of  the  making  of  such  improvement  was  held  to  beun 
constitutional,  as  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process  ol 
law.*  Other  statutes  intended  to  restrict  the  power  to  the  prop- 
erty owner  to  seek  relief  from  the  courts  have  been  held  uncon- 
stitutional when  by  reason  of  such  restrictions  it  is  impracticable 
or  unreasonably  difficult  for  the  property  owner  to  avail  him- 
self of  such  relief.^ 

§  135.     Effect  of  notice  in  fact  where  none  provided  for. 

If  the  statute  providing  for  an  assessment  does  not  provide 
for  notice  specifically,  but  such  notice  is  in  fact  given  and  a  full 
and  ample  opportunity  for  a  hearing  is  given,  is  such  notice  a 

Gilmore   v.   Hentig,    33    Kan.    156,    5  ^Valston  v.  Nevin,   128  U.  S.  578, 

Pac.    781     [1885];     Mayor    and    City  32  L.  544,  9  S.   192   [1888];    (Affirm- 

Council    of   Baltimore   v.   Ulman,    79  ing   Nevin   v.    Roacli,    86    Ky.   492,   5 

Md.  469,  30  Atl.  43   [1894]";   Sears  v.  S.  W.  546   [1887]). 

Street  Commissioners  of  Boston,   173  *Hayes     v.     Douglas     County,     92 

Mass.    350,    53    N.    E.    876     [1899];  Wis.    429,   53   Am.   St.   Rep.   926,   31 

Weed    V.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of  L.   R.   A.  213,  65  N.  W.   482    [1896] 

Boston,    172   Mass.    28,   42   L.   R.   A.  °  "There   was    apparently   a    design 

642,  51   N.   E.   204    [1898];    Stone   v.  on    the   part   of   the   draughtsman   of 

Little  Yellow  Drainage  District,   11?  the  section  to  place  these  original  as- 

Wis.    388,    95    N.    W.    405     [1903];  sessments  beyond   the  reach  of  judi- 

State  ex  rel.  Baltzell  v.   Stewart,  74  cial    power   except   when    that   power 

Wis.  620,  6  L.  R.  A.  394,  43  N.  W.  should    be    exercised    in    the    circum- 

947   [1889].  scribed  and   in  many  cases  impracti- 

^  English  V.  Mayor  and   Council   of  cable      manner      specified."        Union 

Wilmington.    2    Marv.    (Del.)    63,    37  Building  Association  v.   City  of   Chi 

Atl.  158  [1896].  cago,  61  111.  439   [1871]. 


225 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


?5  135 


compliaucc  with  the  constitutional  provision  forbiddinjy;  a  tak- 
ing of  property  without  due  process  of  law?  The  position  upon 
this  question  taken  by  many  courts  is  that  such  power  is  neces- 
sarily subject  to  constitutional  limitations,  that  it  will  not  be 
assumed  that  the  le«iislature  intended  to  violate  constitutional 
provisions/  and  that  accordingly  in  such  cases  the  public  cor- 
poration will  be  regarded  as  given  a  broad  discretion  with  ref- 
erence to  the  kind  and  character  of  notice  which  it  gives,  and 
that  if  such  public  corporation  actually  gives  sufficient  notice, 
the  constitutional  provision  in  question  is  not  violated."  In  other 
jurisdictions  it  seems  to  be  held  that  notice  must  be  provided 
for  specifically  by  statute,  as  a  right  of  the  property  owner,  not 
as  a  favor  to  him."*  Under  such  view  an  assessment  statute  not 
making  provision  for  notice  would  be  held  invalid  even  if  notice 
were  in  fact  given.-*  If  possible  by  fair  construction,  provision 
as  to  notice  found  in  one  statute  will  be  regarded  as  adopted  by 
another  statute  which  does  not  provide  for  notice  in  express 
terms,  so  as  to  avoid  the  constitutional  question.^  Thus  a  pro- 
vision for  a  hearing  to  be  given  to  the  owners  of  the  property 


»See  §  70. 

=  Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149  V.  S.  30, 
37  L.  G37,  13  S.  750  [1893];  (af- 
firming Paulson  V.  City  of  Portland. 
IC)  Or.  450.  1  L.  R.  A.  673,  19  Pac. 
450  [18881  );  Hagar  v.  Reclamation 
District,  No.  108,  111  U.  R.  701,  4 
S.  a()3,  28  L.  509  [1884];  City  of 
Denver  v.  Dumars,  33  Colo.  94,  80 
Pac.  114  [1904];  Ford  v.  Town  of 
Des  Moines,  80  la.  626.  45  N.  W. 
1031  11890];  Catch  v.  City  of  Des 
:Moines.  63  la.  718,  18  N.  W.  310; 
f;ilmf)re  v.  Henti'j:,  33  Kan.  156.  5 
Pac.  781  [1885];  \Yillianis  v.  Mayor. 
etc..  of  Detroit.  2  :\nch.  560  [1853]; 
King  V.  Portland,  38  Or.  402,  55  L. 
R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900];  Wilson 
V.  City  of  Salem,  24  Or.  504.  34  Pac. 
9.  (19i  I1F93];  Strowbrid-.'c  v.  City 
of  Portland,  8  Or.  67  [1879];  ( foi 
lowed  with  regret  in  Paulson  v.  City 
of  Portland.  16  Or.  450,  1  L.  R.  A. 
673.  19  Pac.  450  [1888]);  Cleveland 
V.  Tripp.  13  R.  T.  .50  [1880];  Tripp 
V.  City  of  Yankton,   10  S.  D.  516,  74 


X.  W.  447  [1898];  Davis  v.  City  of 
Lynchburg.  84  Va.  861,  6  S.  E.  230 
[1888];  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad 
V.  Pittsburgh,  Wheeling  &  Kentucky 
Railroad.  17  W.  Va.  812  [1881]. 

^  "It  is  not  enough  that  the  own- 
ers chance  to  have  notice  or  that 
they  may,  as  a  matter  of  favor,  have 
a  hearing.  The  law  must  require  no- 
tice to  them  and  give  them  the  ritdit 
to  a  hearing  and  the  opportunity  of 
being  heard."  Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74 
N.  Y.  183,  30  Am.  Rep.  289  [1878]; 
( Quoted  in  Beebe  v.  Magoun,  122  la. 
04,  96.  97.  101  Am.  St.  Rep.  259. 
97   N.  W.  986   [1904]). 

*  Violett  v.  City  Council  of  Alex- 
andria. 92  Va.  561.  53  Am.  St.  Rep. 
825.  31  L.  R.  A.  382.  23  S.  E.  909 
[1896]. 

''  Auditor  General  v.  Ilollnian,  132 
Mich.  108,  03  N.  W.  2.50  [1003]; 
CJrand  Rapids  School  Furniture  Com- 
pany v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  92 
Micii.  564,  52  N.  W.  1028  [1892]. 


§§  136,  137  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT,  226 

to  be  assessed  implies  a  provision  for  a  notice  of  such  hearing." 
If  the  provision  which  requires  notice  and  hearing  is  incom- 
plete, as  where  the  time  and  place  of  the  hearing  are  not  in 
fact  given,  an  assessment  is  not  invalid  if  a  sufficient  hearing 
is,  in  fact,  given. '^ 

§  136.     Right  of  each  land-owner  to  notice. 

The  right  to  notice  is  a  right  which  is  possessed  by  each  sep- 
arate owner  of  property  which  it  is  sought  to  assess  for  the 
improvement  in  question.  Accordingly  notice  to  certain  prop- 
erty owners  less  in  number  than  all,^  as  to  the  owners  of  lands 
through  or  abutting  on  which  the  improvement  is  to  be  con- 
structed, but  not  to  the  owners  of  other  lands  which  are  bene- 
fited and  which  it  is  proposed  to  assess,-  violates  the  consti- 
tutional rights  of  those  land-owners  who  are  not  notified  and 
whose  land  it  is  sought  to  assess,  and  amounts  to  a  taking  ot 
their  property  without  due  process  of  law. 

§  137.     Effect  of  omission  of  notice. 

If  the  constitutional  reijuirement  of  notice  sufficient  to  con- 
stitute due  process  of  law  has  not  been  complied  with,  it  is  held 
that  the  entire  assessment  is  void  and  not  merely  such  part 
thereof  as  exceeds  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  improvement 
for  which  the  assessment  is  levied.^ 


"Paulsen    v.    Portland,    149    U.    S.  234      [1889];      Ireland     v.     City     ot 

30,    37    L.    637,    13    S.    750    [1893];  Rochester,    51     Barb.     (N.    Y.)"    414 

(affirming   Paulson   v.    City   of   Port-  [1868]. 

land,   16  Or.  450,  1  L.  R.  A.  673,  19  -  Beebe  v.  Magoun,   122  la.  94,  liil 

Pac.    450    [1888]);    Auditor    General  Am.    St.    Rep.    259,    97    N.    W.    9SG 

V.  Hoffman,   132  Mich.  198,  93  N.  W.  [1904];   In  the  Matter  of  the  Appli- 

259    [1903].  cation  of  the  Common  Council  of  the 

"  Hallett  V.  United  States  Security  City  of  Amsterdam  to  take  lands  for 

and    Bond     Co.,    —    Colo.    ,    90  the     extension     of     Grove     and     Jay 

Pac.  683   [1907].  Streets,   55   Hun.    (N.  Y.)    270,  8  X. 

^Langlois  v.  Cameron,  201  111.  301,  Y.   Supp.   234   [1839]. 
66   N.   E.   332    [1903];    Beebe  v.   Ma-  '  Ufman  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council 

goun.    122   la.   94,    101    Am.   St.    Rep.  of   Baltimore,    72    Md.   587,    11    L.   R. 

259,    97    N.    W.    986    [1904];    In    the  A.  224,   20  Atl.   141,  21   Atl.  709,  32 

Matter    of    the    Application    of    the  Am.     and     Eng.      Corp.     Cases     228 

Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Am-  [1890];     Hutchison     v.     Storrie,     92 

sterdam  to  take  lands  for  the  exten-  Tex.  685,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  884,  45  L. 

sion    of    Grove    and    Jay    Streets,    55  R.  A.  289,  51  S.  W.  848  [1899]. 
Hun.    (N.    Y.)    270,    8    N.    Y.    Supp. 


227  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.         §§  138,  139 


§  138.  Statute  making  certain  steps  prima  facie  evidence  of 
validity. 
Statutes  not  infrequently  make  certain  steps  prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  regularity  and  validity  of  the  assessment  pro- 
ceedings Under  such  statutes  the  property  owner  is  given  ai 
opportunity  to  show  any  facts  which  may  establish  the  invalidity 
of  such  assessment,  and  accordingly,  although  by  force  of  thi 
statute  there  is  a  presumption  against  him  which  he  must  over 
come,  it  has  generally  been  held  that  such  statute  does  not  vio- 
late the  constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  taking  of  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law.^  Thus,  statutes  which  pro- 
vide that  the  account  of  the  cost  of  the  work  done,  duly  cer- 
tified,- or  tax  bills  issued  for  the  cost  of  the  work,^  or  the  re- 
port of  the  commissioners,  assessing  benefits  and  damages,*  or 
certified  copies  of  the  improvement  ordinance,  the  contract  for 
such  improvement  and  the  apportionment.'^  shall  respectively  con- 
stitute prima  facie  evidence  of  the  validity  of  the  assessment. 
have  been  upheld. 

§  139.  Statute  making  certain  steps  conclusive  evidence  of  va- 
lidity. 
If  the  statute  goes  farther  than  making  such  steps  prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  validity  and  regularity  of  the  assessment  and 
attempts  to  make  them  conclusive  evidence  thereof,  it  is  gen- 
erally held  that  such  statute  is  valid  as  to  all  matters  not  jurisdic- 
tional  in  their  character.^  which  the  legislature  might  have  dis- 


'  (  haso  V.  Trout.  140  Cal.  3.50,  80 
Pac.  81  1190,51;  McDonald  v.  Von- 
niff.  99  Cal.  .'iSfi,  34  Pac  71  [18931; 
Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  Railroad 
Conii)any  v.  City  of  Cliicaijo.  217  111. 
343.  75  N.  E.  499  1 190.51;  McHenry 
V.  Selvage,  99  Ky.  232.  35  S.  W.  0^5 
[18901;  Zable  v.  Louisville  Baptist 
Orplians'  Home,  92  Ky.  89.  13  L.  R. 
A.  (508,  17  S.  W.  212  [18911;  St. 
Louis  to  use  of  Cornelli  v.  Armstrong. 
38  Mo.  107  [1866];  St.  Louis  to  us' 
of  Lakrum  v.  Coons.  37  ^lo.  44 
[180(51;  City  of  Excelsior  Springs  t) 
use  of  McCormick  v.  ^lississippi  Val- 
ley Trust  Co..  —  :Mo.  App.  — ,  90 
S.  W.  707  [19001;  City  of  Excelsior 
Springs  to  use  of  MoCormick   v.   Et- 


tenson,  120  Mo.  App.  215,  90  S.  W. 
701  [1900];  City  of  Schenectady  v. 
Trustees  of  Union  College  00  Hun. 
(X.  Y.)  179,  21  X.  V.  Supp.  147 
[1892]. 

-  City  of  Schenectady  v.  Trustees 
of  Union  College,  06  Hun.  (X.  Y.) 
179.  21   X.   V.  Supp.   147    [1892]. 

'St.  Louis  to  use  of  Cornelli  v. 
Armstrong.  38  Mo.  107  [1800];  City 
of  St.  Louis  to  the  use  of  Lakrum 
v.  Coons.  37  Mo.  44    [1865]. 

*(hicago  Terminal  Transfer  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  Chicago 
217  Til.  343.  75  X.  E.  499   [1905]. 

''McTTenry  v.  Selvage.  99  Ky.  232, 
35  S.  W.  045   [18901. 

'  Ramish  v.  nnrtv,-cll.  126  Cal.  443. 
58  Pac.  920    [18991. 


§  140  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  228 

pensQd  with  in  advance.  As  to  matters,  however,  which  are 
jurisdictional  in  their  character,-  and  with  which  the  legislature 
could  not  have  dispensed  in  advance,  a  statute  making  such  step^ 
conclusive  evidence  of  the  validity  of  the  assessment  is  uncon- 
stitutional if  made  obligatory  upon  the  property  owner. '*  Thus 
if  the  assessment  is  to  be  enforced  by  a  proceeding  of  a  judicial 
character,  but  in  such  suit  the  action  of  the  officials  who  have 
levied  such  assessment  is  to  be  final  as  to  the  apportionment  ol 
the  assessment,  such  proceeding  cannot  supply  the  want  of  no- 
tice before  the  assessment  became  a  finality.*  If  the  property 
owner  is  given  the  option  of  making  certain  steps  conclusive 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  assessment,  he  cannot  after  takinj. 
advantage  of  such  option  complain  that  it  amounts  to  a  takinf 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.  Statutes  are  occasion- 
ally found  in  which  it  is  provided  that  the  amount  of  the  as- 
sessment shall  be  paid  in  full  at  once  unless  the  property  ownei 
agrees  to  waive  all  irregularities  or  other  defenses  to  the  as 
sessment,  in  which  case  he  may  exercise  the  option  of  paying 
the  assessment  in  installments.  Such  statutes,  it  will  be  ob- 
served, merely  give  to  the  property  owner  the  option  betweei 
resisting  the  assessment  at  once,  or  waiving  defenses  and  pay 
ing  in  installments ;  and  accordingly  such  statutes  are  held  not 
to  violate  the  constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law.^ 

§  140.     Issuance  of  bonds. 

Statutes  are  frequently  found  which  authorize  the  issuan-ce  of 
bonds  in  order  to  obtain  the  means  of  paying  the  contractors 
forthwith,  and  which  provide  for  the  redemption  of  the  bonds 
by  means  of  a  fund  raised  by  assessments.  Such  statutes  are 
held  to  be  valid. ^     They  do  not  violate   the   constitutional  pro- 

=  Eanush  v.  Hartwell.  120  Cal.  44.3.  Company,  16.3  Ind.  599,  70  N.  E.  249 

58   Pac.   920    [1899].  [1904];  Quill  v.  City  of  Indianapolis, 

^Violett   V.   City   Council   of   Alex-  124  Ind.  292,  7  L.  R.  A.  681,  23  N. 

andria,  92  Va.  561,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  E.   788    [1890]. 

825,   31    L.   R.    A.   382,   23   S.   E.   909  ^  Fallbrook    Irrigation    District    v. 

[1890].  Bradley,    164   U.    S.    112,   41    L.   369. 

^Violett   V.    City    Council    of   Alex-  17    S.    56    [1896];    Bauman   v.    Ro.ss, 

andria,  92  Va.  561,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  167   U.   S.  548,  42  L,.  270,   17   S.  966 

825,    31    L.   R.   A.    382,   23   S.   E.   909  [1897];     Davidson    v.    New    Orleans, 

[1890].  96  U.  S.  97.  24  L.  616   [1877];   Hell- 

"Voris    V.    Pittsburgh    Plate    Class  man    v.    Shoulters,    114    Cal.    136,    44 


229 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§141 


vision  forbidding  the  takinc  cf  property  without  due  process  of 
law,  even  where  the  bonds  are  interest  bearing  and  are  pay- 
able in  installments,-  at  least  as  long  as  the  property  owner  has 
the  opportunity  to  pay  the  full  amount  of  his  assessment  and  thus 
stop  interest.^  Such  statutes  have  been  held  valid  even  where 
they  fix  the  rate  of  inte'rest  which  such  bonds  shall  bear  ;*  though 
it  has  been  contended  unsuccessfully  that  by  thus  fixing  the  rate 
of  interest  they  may  preclude  the  city  from  borrowing  money 
at  a  lower  rate,  and  thus  operate  as  a  taking  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law." 

§  141.     Restriction  of  time  of  making  objection. 

Statutes  are  frequently  found  which  require  that  objections 
to  assessments  must  be  made  within  some  short  space  of  time 
and  that  if  not  so  made  they  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been 
waived.  Such  statutes  are  usually  held  to  be  valid  if  the  tim 
given  is  sufficient  to  enable  the  property  owner  to  present  his 
objections  fairly.'  Thirty-day  limitations  have  been  upheld." 
as  in  cases  of  assessments  for  street  improvements.^  or  for  sew- 


Pac.  915.  45  P.  1057;  People  ex  rel. 
Pollard  V.  Swigert,  130  111.  608,  22 
N.  E.  787  [18901;  Martin  v.  Tyler, 
4  X.  D.  27S.  25  L.  R.  A.  838,  60  N. 
W.  392,  Ileniiessy  v.  Douglass  Conn- 
ty.  99  Wis.  129.  74  X.  W.  983  [1898]. 

^  Ericksnn  v.  Cass  ("(nnity,  11  N. 
D.  494.  92  X.  W.  841    [1902]. 

'  Ericksnn  v.  Cass  County,  11  X. 
D.   494,   92   X.   W.    841    [1902]. 

'Hnlbert  v.  City  of  Cliicago,  217 
111.  286,  75  X.  E."48a  [1905];  Hul- 
bort  V.  City  of  Chicago.  213  111.  452, 
72  X.  E.  1097  [190.51;  Germond  v. 
City  of  Tacoma,  G  Wash.  365,  33  Pac. 
961    [1893]. 

"Iluibert  V.  City  of  Cliicago.  213 
111.  452,  72  X.  E.  1097   [1905]. 

'  Chase  v.  Trout,  146  Cal.  350,  80 
Pac.  81  [1905];  City  of  Denver  v. 
Campbell,  33  Colo.  162,  80  Pac.  142 
[1905]:  ITays  v.  Tippy.  91  Ind.  102 
[18831:  L(ioniis  v.  City  of  Little 
Falls,  176  X.  Y.  31.  68  X.  K.  105 
1190:51:  (alTirming  I^oniis  v.  City  of 
Little  Falls.  72  X.  Y.  S.  774.  66  App. 
Div.  299  [1901]):  Union  Pacific  R. 
Co.  V.  Kansas  Citv,  73  Kan.  571,  85 


Pac.  603  [1906];  Germond  v.  City 
of  Tacoma,  6  Wash.  365,  33  Pac.  961 
[1893]. 

-'Chase  v.  Trout,  146  Cal.  350,  80 
Pac.  81  [1905];  City  of  Denver  v. 
Campbell,  33  Colo.  162,  80  Pac.  142 
[1905]:  Loomis  v.  City  of  Little 
Falls.  176  X.  Y.  31,  68  N.  E.  105 
[1903];  (affirming  Loomis  v.  City  oi 
Little  Falls.  72  X^  Y.  S.  774,  06  App. 
Div.  299  [1901]);  Germond  v.  City 
of  Tacoma,  6  Wash.  365.  33  Pac.  961 
[1893]. 

Such  a  statutoiy  provision  has  been 
lield  to  be  applicable  to  re-assess- 
ments; Kansas  City  v.  McGrew,  — 
Kail.  .  96  Pac.  484   [1908]. 

^  Cnion  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Kansas 
City.  73  Kan.  571,  85  Pac.  603 
[1906];  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Kim- 
hall,  60  Kan.  224.  56  Pac.  78  [1899]  : 
Arends  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  57 
Kan.  350,  46  Pac.  702;  City  of  Ar- 
gentine v.  Simmons,  54  Kan.  699,  38 
Pac.  181  ;  Dnran  v.  Barnes.  54  Kan. 
238.  38  Pac.  300  [1894];  Simpson 
V.  City  of  Kansas  City,  52  Kan.  88, 
^4  Pac.   406    [1893]. 


§  141  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  230 

ers.*  A  three  day  limitation  has  been  upheld,"'  even  where 
on  aeeoiint  of  sickness  the  property  owner  was  not  able 
to  file  his  remonstrance  within  the  time  limited.''  Such  re- 
strictions are  held  in  some  jurisdictions  to  apply  to  consti- 
tutional questions  as  well  as  to  failure  to  comply  with  stat- 
utory requirements,'  while  in  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held 
that  they  cannot  apply  to  constitutional  questions.^  In  some  states, 
however,  restrictions  even  less  stringent  than  those  previously  given 
have  been  held  to  be  invalid  as  a  taking  of  property  without 
due  process  of  law."  Limitations  of  sixty  ^"  and  forty  ^^  days 
have  thus  been  held  to  be  unreasonable  and  therefore  invalid. 
"Any  attempt  to  cut  off  his  (the  property  owner's)  right  with- 
out having  afforded  him  such  just  and  reasonable  opportunity 
to  be  heard  is  not  properly  a  statute  of  limitations  at  all.  It 
savors  rather  of  spoilation  and  plunder."^-  The  proposition  has. 
in  these  jurisdictions,  been  assumed  as  almost  axiomatic.  It 
is  said  to  be  "too  plain  for  discussion."^''  A  provision  in  a 
charter  adopted  by  a  city  under  a  constitutional  provision  per- 
mitting such  adoption,  which  requires  the  property  owner  to 
pay  in  the  amount  of  the  assessment  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  contesting  its  validity,  has  been  held  to  be  unconstitutional, 
but  rather  on  the  ground  that  such  power  was  not  granted  to 
cities  by  the  constitutional  provision  permitting  them  to  frame 

^City    of    Kansas    City    v.    Gibson,  534,   83   S.   W.    1069    [1904];    Barber 

66    Kan.    501,    72    Pac.    222    [1903];  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Ridge,  169  Mo. 

Kansas   City   v.   Gray,   62   Kan.    198,  376,  68  S.  W.   1043    [1902];    Tvichter 

61  Pac.  746  [1900];  Doran  v.  Barnes,  v.  Merrill,  84  Mo.  App.   150    [1900]; 

54    Kan.    238,    38    Pac.    300    [1894];  Hayes    v.    Douglas    County,    92  Wis. 

City  of  Topeka  v.  Gage,  44  Kan.  87,  429,  53   Am.   St.   Eep.  926,  31   L.   Pv. 

24  Pac.  82  [1890];  Wahlgren  v.  City  A.  213,  65  N.  W.  482   [1896]. 
of  Kansas  City,  42  Kan.  243,  21  Pac.  "  Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.    v. 

1068    [1889].  '  Munn,    185   Mo.   552,   83   S.   W.    1062 

^Assessment    for    ditch;    Hays    v.  [1904];    Barber    Asphalt   Paving   Co. 

Tippy,  91  Ind.  102  [1883].  v.  Ridge,  169  Mo.  376,  68  S.  W.  1043 

« Hays  V.  Tippy,  91  Ind.  102  [1883].  [1902];    Richter    v.    Merrill,    84    Mo. 

'City    of    Denver    v.    Campbell,    33  App.   1.50    [1900]. 
Colo.    162,   80   Pac.    142    [1905].  '^  Hayes  v.  Douglas  County.  92  Wis. 

»Hutcheson  v.  Storrie,  92  Tex.  685,  429,   5.3   Am.   St.   Rep.   926.   31    L.   R. 

71    Am.    St.    Rep.    884,    45    L.    R.    A.  A.   213,    65   X.    W.    482    [1896]. 
289,    51    S.    W.    848    [1899];    Howell  i=  Hayes     v.     Dr.u^las     Count",     92 

V.  City  of  Tacoma.  3  Wash.   711.  2?>  Wis.   429,   440.  53   Am.   St.  Ren.  926. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  83.  29  Pac.  447   [1892].  31  L.  R.  A.  213,  65  N.  W.  482  |:1896]. 

"  Barber     Asphalt     Paving     Co.     v.  ^'  Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.    v. 

Munn,    185   Mo.   552,   83   S.   W.    1062  Ridse.    169   Mo.   376.   68   S.   W.    1043 

[1904];    Schibel   v.   Merrill,    185   Mo.  [1902]. 


231 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPIJCABLE.    ETC. 


S  142 


their  own  charters,  than  on  the  ground  that  such  provision  did 
not  amount  to  due  process  of  law."  It  has  been  doubted  whether 
the  legislature  can  limit  the  time  within  which  certiorari  can 
be  brought,  if  the  statute  under  which  the  assessment  has  been 
levied  is  unconstitutional.^' 

§  142.     Appeal  not  essential  to  due  process  of  law. 

If  sufficient  notice  of  the  original  making  and  apportionment 
of  the  assessment  is  given  and  a  full  hearing  upon  the  merits 
is  provided  for,  appeal  is  not  essential  to  a  compliance  with 
the  provision  forbidding  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process 
of  law  and  may  accordingly  be  dispensed  with.^  The  fact  that 
an  appeal  is  not  allowed  in  the  case  of  improvements  in  towns, 
though   it  is   in   improvements   in   cities   does  not,   by   reason   of 


"Wilson  V.  City  of  Seattle.  2 
Wash.    543.    27    Pac.    474    [1891]. 

'^  Traphagen  v.  Township  of  West 
Hoboken,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.)  232 
11877]. 

'  Hibben  v.  Smith,  191  U.  S.  310, 
48  L.  19.5.  24  S.  88  [1903];  Spen- 
cer V.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345,  31  L. 
703.  8  S.  921  [1888];  Hagar  v. 
Reclamation  District  No.  108,  111  U. 
S.  701,  28  L.  569,  4  S.  603  [1884]; 
Spring  Valley  Waterworks  v.  Schott- 
ler,  110  U.  S.  347,  28  L.  173,  4  S. 
48;  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96  U. 
S.  97,  24  L.  616  [1877];  People  v. 
Hagar,  66  Cal.  59,  4  Pac.  951;  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Hanberg  v.  Cohen,  219 
111.  200.  76  N.  E.  388  [1906];  Deano 
V.  Indiana  Macadam  &  Construction 
Company.  161  Ind.  371,  68  N.  E.  686 
11903];  Lake  Erie  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Watkins.  157  Ind.  600.  62  n!  E.  443; 
Bonfoy  V.  Goar.  140  Ind.  292.  39  N. 
E.  56;  Reeves  v.  Groettendick.  131 
Ind.  107.  .30  N.  E.  889  [1891];  Bar- 
ber Asphalt  Paving  Company  v.  Edj^- 
'•rton.  125  Ind.  -I.i5.  25  N.  E.  436 
[1890];  :McEneney  v.  Town  of  Sulli- 
van. 125  Ind.  407.  25  X.  E.  540- 
(18901;  Weaver  v.  Templin.  113  Ind. 
298,  14  N.  E.  600  [1887];  Ross  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  Wright 
County.    Iowa.    128    Iowa    427.    1.    L. 


R.  A.  (N.  S.)  431,  104  N.  W.  506 
[1905];  Oliver  v.  ]\Ionona  County, 
117  la.  43,  90  N.  W.  510  [1902]; 
Allerton  v.  Monona  County,  111  la. 
560,  82  N.  W.  922;  Chambliss  v. 
-Johnson,  77  la.  611,  42  N.  W.  427 
[1889];  Lambert  v.  Mills  County,  58 
la.  666,  12  N.  W.  715;  Griffith  v. 
Pence,  9  Kan.  App.  253,  59  Pac. 
677;  Sullivan  v.  Haug,  82  Mich.  548. 
10  L.  R.  A.  263.  46  N.  W.  795;  Gil- 
lett  v.  McLaughlin,  69  Mich.  547,  37 
N.  W.  551;  State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v. 
District  Court  of  Ramsey  County. 
95  Minn.  70,  103  N.  W.  744  [19051: 
Rogers  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  22  Minn. 
494  [1876];  Joplin  Consolidated  Min- 
ing Co.  V.  .Joplin.  124  Mo.  129,  27 
S.  W.  406 ;  Comity  of  Dodge  v.  Aconi. 
61  Neb.  376,  85  N.  W.  292  [1901]: 
State.  Britton,  Pros.  v.  liiake.  35 
N.  ,T.  L.  (6  Vr.)  208  [18711,  36  N. 
J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  442  [1872];  Matter  of 
Eowler.  53  N.  Y.  60;  Taylor  v.  Craw- 
ford. 72  O.  S.  5(i0.  69  L.  R.  A.  805, 
74  N.  E.  1065  [1905]:  Bowcrsox  v. 
Watson.  20  0.  S.  496  [1870];  State 
ex  rel.  Baltzell  v.  Stewart.  74  Wi*. 
620.  6  L.  R.  A.  .394.  43  N.  W.  947 
[1889]:  Dickson  v.  Titv  of  Racine. 
61  Wis.  545.  21  N.  W.  620  [1884]; 
Teegarden  v.  City  of  Racine.  56  Wis. 
545.   14  N.  W.  614   [1883]. 


§  143  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  232 

•such  discrimination,  amount  to  a  denial  of  due  process  of  law  - 
So  if  notice  and  hearing  are  given  upon  the  question  of  benefits 
as  well  as  upon  other  questions,  but  on  appeal  the  owaier  is  not 
allowed  to  show  that  his  land  receives  no  benefit  from  the  con- 
templated improvement,  such  restriction  upon  the  issues  to  be 
tried  on  appeal  does  not  violate  the  constitutional  provision  re- 
quiring due  process  of  law.^ 

§  143,     Right  of  appeal. 

If  suificient  notice  of  the  assessment  proceeding  has  been  given 
to  constitute  due  process  of  law.^  it  is  not  necessary,  as  has  al- 
ready been  stated,-  that  provision  be  made  for  an  appeal  from 
the  decision  of  the  assessing  body.^  This  principle  is  especially 
applicable  where  the  assessment  is.  under  the  provisions  govern- 
ing such  proceedings,  regularly  brought  before  a  court  for  con- 
firmation.* Under  a  constitution  providing  that  appeals  and 
writs  of  error  may  be  taken  to  certain  specified  divisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  and  that  such  writs  of  error  and  appeals  should 
bne  allowed  from  the  final  determination  of  the  county  court  as 
might  be  allowed  by  law,''  it  has  been  held  that  a  statute  providing 
that  a  writ  of  error  shall  issue  from  the  Supreme  Court  in  an  as- 
sessment case  only  if  the  application  for  such  writ  is  accompanied 
by  an  affidavit  showing  that  the  applicant  did  not  receive  notice  of 
the  filing  of  such  assessment  for  confirmation  or  otherwise  learn  of 
its  pendency  until  ten  days  previous  to  the  entry  of  applicant's 
default  therein,  is  constitutional,  since  proceedings  for  the  con- 
firmation of  assessments  are  purely  statutory  and  appeals  from 
siTch  proceedings  are  not  controlled  by  the  law  relating  to  ap- 
peals in  general.®     A  statute   denying  the  right  of  appeal  from 

-Deaiie  V.  Indiana  ^lacadam  &  Con-  [1900];    Deane  v.   Indiana   ilacadani 

struction  Company.   161   Ind.   371,  68  &    Construction    Company,    161    Ind. 

N.  E.  686   [1903].  371.    68    X.    E.    686    [1903];    State. 

'  Ross   V.    Board   of   Supervisors   of  Britton,  Pros.  v.   Blake,   35   X.   J.   L. 

Wright    County,    Iowa,    128    la.    427,  (6  Vr. )    208   [1871]. 

I   L.   R.  A.    (X.   S.)    431.   104  X.   W.  *  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  v.  Cohen, 

506    [1905].  219    111.    200,    76   X\    E.    388    [1906]; 

^  See  §   119  et  seq.  Bickerdike    v.    City    of    Chicago,    185 

=  See   §    142.  111.    280.   56   X.   e".    1096    [1900]. 

^People  ex   rel.   Hanberg  v.   Cohen,  "'Article  VI.,   §§   8  and   19,  Consti- 

219    111.    200,    76   X.    E.    388    [1906];  tution  of  Illinois. 

Hart    Bros.    v.    ^Yest    Chicago    Park  *  Hart  Bros.  v.  West  Chicago  Park 

Commissioners.  186  111.  464,  57  X.  E.  Commissioners,    186    HI.    464,    57    N. 

1036    [1900]:    Bickerdike    v.    City    of  E.    1036    [1900]. 
Chicago.   185  111.  280.  56  X.  E.   1096 


233  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.         §5$l-i4,  l-io 

assessments  for  street  improvements  in  towns  is  not  unconsti 
tutional,  though  an  appeal  is  given  in  like  forms  of  assessment: 
in  cities.'  It  has.  on  the  other  hand,  been  said  that  the  legis 
lature  cannot  deny  the  right  of  the  property  owner  to  seek 
relief  from  the  courts  if  the  assessment  is  void.-  Where  the 
right  of  the  property  owner  to  attack  the  assessment  is  so  re 
stricted  that  it  appears  that  the  legislature  intends  to  place  such 
assessment  practically  beyond  the  reach  of  judicial  power,  it 
has  been  held  that  such  restrictions  are  invalid.'' 

ij  144.     Right  of  protest  not  essential  to  due  process  of  law. 

Statutes  occasionally  provide  that  property  owners  may  by 
protest  put  an  end  to  proceedings  which,  if  not  so  ended,  would 
have  resulted  in  a  public  improvement  and  an  assessment  there- 
for. Such  right  of  protest  is  by  no  means  an  essential  feature 
of  due  process  of  law.  A  statute  giving  the  right  to  residents 
to  prevent  the  improvement  and  assessment  if  a  majority  of 
them  protest  against  it.  but  not  giving  such  right  to  non-resi- 
dent owners   does  not   deny   due   process   of  law  to   the   latter. 

§  145.  Constitutional  provisions  restricting  taxation  not  ap- 
plicable to  local  assessment. 
In  the  various  state  constitutions  are  found  many  provisions 
restricting  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation  which  is  else- 
where conferred  upon  the  state  legislature.  While  local  assess- 
ment is  generally  regarded  as  an  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion.^ it  is  nevertheless  held  for  many  purposes  not  to  be  a  tax 
within  the  more  limited  use  of  that  term.'-  These  constitutional 
provisions  restricting  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation,  are 

'  Deane  v.  Indiana  Macadam  6c  Con-  or  and  Common   Council   of  the  City 

struction  Company.   101    Ind.  :57l.  08  of  Ne\vari<.  43  X.  J.  L.   (14  Vr.)   57ii 

N.  E.  686   [190,3]'.  [18811. 

"Hutchinson  v.  City  of  Omaha.  52  "Union      Rnil(lin<r     Association     v. 

Neb.  345.  72  X.  W.  218    [1807 1.    (an  City   of  Cliica.<,'o.   (il    111.   439    [18711. 

obiter,    since    the    statute    luovidini:  '  Field    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Paviirr 

that     no    court    should     entertain     a  Co..    191    V.    R.    618.    48    L.    1142.    24 

complaint  Avhich   t!ie   pmiwrty   owner  S.    7S4    [19041.     i  modifying;    Field    v. 

had   a  lejral    right    to   make,   and    did  Barber  Asjihalt   Pavinir  <'o..   117   Fed. 

make,    to   the    board    of   equalization.  925    [19021). 

was    construed    as    not    applying    to  '  See    §    89. 

cases     where     the      assessment      was  -See  §  42  et  seq. 
void)  :  State.  Peckham.  Pros.  v.  Mav- 


§146 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


234 


generally  so  worded  as  to  show  an  inteution  of  dealing  with  and 
restricting  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation  in  its  more  lim- 
ited rather  than  its  broader  sense.  It  is  very  generally  held, 
therefore,  that  such  constitutional  provisions  do  not  apply  to  the 
exercise  of  the  power  of  local  assessment.^  The  courts  have  not 
been  unanimous  in  their  holdings  upon  this  point,  however.  In 
some  cases  it  has  been  queried,  but  not  decided  whether  such  con- 
stitutional provisions  were  applicable  to  local  assessments.*  In 
other  cases  it  has  been  held  that  since  an  assessment  is  a  tax,  con- 
stitutional provisions  applying  to  taxation  must  include  local  as- 
sessments.^ These  latter  cases  have,  however,  been  overruled  by 
subsequent  decisions.*^  In  view  of  the  conflict  of  authority  here  in- 
dicated, and  because  the  specific  phraseology  of  the  different  con- 
stitutional provisions  is  sometimes  insisted  on  as  the  ground  for 
difference  of  judicial  opinion,  it  is  necessary  therefore  to  con- 
sider in  detail  the  different  constitutional  provisions  on  the  sul)- 
ject. 

§  146.     Specific  provisions  for  equality  and  uniformity  of  taxa- 
tion. 

Provisions  requiring  taxation  to  be  uniform,  equal  and  pro- 
portionate are  found  in  most  American  constitutions.  These  pro- 
visions are  as  follows :  All  taxes  levied  on  property  in  this  state 
shall  be  assessed  in  exact  proportion  to  the  value  of  such  prop- 


*  Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555, 
44  S.  W.  707  [1897];  McGehee  v. 
Mathis,  21  Ark.  40  [I860]);  not  af- 
fected on  this  point  by  reversal  in 
71  U.  S.  (4  \Yall.)  143,  18  L.  314 
1866] )  ;  Chambers  v.  Satterlee.  40 
Cal.  497  [1871];  Atlanta  First  Meth- 
odist Episcopal  Church  v.  Atlanta, 
76  Ga.  181;  Kilgour  v.  Drainage 
Commissioners,  111  111.  342  [1885]; 
Law  V.  Madison,  Smyrna  &  Graham 
Turnpike  Company,  30  Tnd.  77 
[1868];  Yeomans  v.  Riddle,  84  la. 
147,  50  X.  W.  886  [1891];  Munson 
V.  Hoard  of  Commissioners  of  The 
Atchafalaya  Basin  Levee  District. 
43  La.  Ann.  15,  8  So.  906  [1891]; 
Williams  v.  Cammack.  27  Miss.  209. 
61     A.m.    Dec.     508     [1854];     Lamar 


Water  &  Electric  Light  Company  v. 
':ity  of  Lamar,  128  Mo.  188,  32  L. 
R.  A.  157,  26  S.  W.  1025,  31  S.  W. 
756  [1895] ;  City  of  Raleigh  v.  Peace. 
110  X.  C.  32,  "l7  L.  R.  A.  330,  14 
S.  E.  521  [1892];  Jones  v.  Holzapfel, 
11  Okla.  405,  68  Pac.  511  [1902]: 
Storrie  v.  Houston  City  Street  Rail- 
way Company,  92  Tex.  129,  44  L. 
R.  A.  716,  46  S.  W.  796  [1898]: 
County  of  Harri.s  v.  Boyd,  70  Tex. 
237,  7  S.  W.  713  [1888]";  Taylor  v. 
Boyd,   63   Tex.   533    [1885]. 

*  Weeks  v.  Milwaukee,  10  Wis.  242. 

^Palmer  v.  Way,  0  Colo.  106 
[18S1]:  Taylor.  McBean  &  Co.  v. 
Chandler,  9  Heisk.  (56  Tenn.)  349, 
24  Am.  Rep.  308   [1872]. 

"See   §   86,  §    152.   ;j    160. 


235  COXSTiTLTIOXAL    KESTKICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  146 

erty,  but  no  tax  shall  be  assessed  upon  any  debt  for  rent  or  hire 
of  real  or  personal  property,  while  owned  b}-  the  landlord  oi 
hirer  during  the  current  year  of  such  rental  or  hire,  if  such  real 
or  personal  property  be  assessed  at  its  full  value. ^  All  prop- 
erty in  the  state,  not  exempt  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value,  to  be  ascertained  as 
provided  by  law.  The  v\'ord  "property,"  as  used  in  this  ar- 
ticle and  section,  is  hereby  declared  to  include  moneys,  credits, 
bonds,  stocks,  dues,  franchises,  and  other  matters  and  things, 
real,  personal  and  mixed,  capable  of  private  ownership ;  pro- 
vided, that  propert.y  used  for  free  public  libraries  and  free 
museums,  growing  crops,  property  used  exclusively  for  public 
schools,  and  such  as  may  belong  to  the  United  States,  this  state, 
or  to  any  county  or  municipal  corporation  within  this  state,  shall 
be  exempt  from  taxation.  The  legislature  may  provide,  except 
in  case  of  credits  secured  by  mortgage  or  trust  deed,  for  a  de- 
duction from  credits  of  debts  due  to  bona  fide  residents  of  thij- 
state.-  Land,  and  the  improvements  thereon,  shall  be  separately 
assessed.  Cultivated  and  uncultivated  land,  of  the  same  quality, 
and  similarly  situated,  shall  be  assessed  at  the  same  value.^  All 
taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of  subjects  within  the 
territorial  limits  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax  and  shall  be 
levied  and  collected  under  general  laws  which  shall  prescribe 
such  regulations  as  shall  secure  a  just  valuation  for  taxation  of 
all  property,  real  and  personal.  Provided,  That  the  household 
goods  of  every  person  being  the  head  of  a  family,  to  the  vahu 
of  two  hundred  dollars,  .shall  bo  exempt  from  taxation.  Ditches, 
canals  and  flumes  owned  and  used  by  individuals  or  corpora- 
tions for  irrigating  lands  owned  by  such  iiulividnals  or  corpora- 
tions, or  the  individual  members  thereof,  sliall  not  be  separately 
taxed  so  long  as  they  shall  be  owned  and  used  exclusively  foi 
such  purpose.  And  provided  further.  That  the  provisions  oi 
this  section  shall  not  affect  snch  special  assessments  for  benefit.'^ 
and  municipal  iiuprovements  as  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities, 
towns,  or  improvement  districts  mny  assess  and  collect  undei 
provision.s  In  be  prescribed  by  Inw.^     All  taxes  shall  be  unifori- 

'  Artirlo    XI..    §    211.    Constitution  ^  Article  XTTT..  §  2.  Constitution  of 

of   .Vhiliania.  California. 

=  Article    XIII.,    §     1,    Constitution  'Article    X..    §    3,    Constitution    of 

of   California    [Amended    1894].  Colorado. 


§  146  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  236 

upon  the  same  class  of  subjects  within  the  territorial  limits  of 
the  authority  levying  the  tax,  and  shall  be  levied  and  collected 
under  general  laws,  but  the  General  Assembly  may  by  genera 
laws  exempt  from  taxation  such  property  as  in  the  opinion  of 
the  General  Assembly  will  best  promote  the  public  welfare,'' 
The  legislature  shall  provide  for  a  uniform  and  equal  rate  oi 
taxation,  and  shall  prescribe  such  regulations  as  shall  secure  i 
just  valuation  of  all  property,  both  real  and  personal,  excepting 
such  property  as  may  be  exempted  by  law  for  municipal,  edu- 
cational, literary,  scientific,  religious  or  charitable  purposes."  Af 
taxation  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of  subjects,  and 
ad  valorem  on  all  property  subject  to  be  taxed  within  the  terri- 
torial limits  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax,  and  shall  be  levied 
and  collected  under  general  laws.  The  General  Assembly  may, 
however,  impose  a  tax  on  such  domestic  animals  as.  from  theii 
nature  and  hal)its,  are  destructive  of  other  property.'^  All  taxes 
shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of  subjects  within  the  ter- 
ritorial limits  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax,  and  shall  be  levied 
and  collected  under  general  laws,  which  shall  prescribe  such  regu- 
lations as  shall  secure  a  just  valuation  for  taxation  of  all  prop- 
erty, real  and  personal.  Provided,  That  the  legislature  may 
allow  such  exemptions  from  taxation  from  time  to  time  as  shaL 
seem  necessary  and  just,  and  all  existing  exemptions  provided 
by  the  laws  of  the  territory,  shall  continue  until  changed  by  the 
legislature  of  th^^  state.  Provided  further.  That  duplicate  taxa- 
tion of  prop(>rty  for  the  same  purpose  during  the  same  year,  is 
hereby  prohibited.''  The  General  Assembly  shall  provide  such 
revenue  as  may  be  needful  by  levying  a  tax,  by  valuation,  so 
thnt  every  person  and  corporation  shall  pay  a  tax  in  propor- 
tion to  the  value  of  his,  her,  or  its  property,  such  value  to  be 
ascertained  by  some  person  or  persons,  to  be  elected  or  appointed 
in  .snch  manner  as  the  General  Assembly  shall  direct,  and  no' 
otherwise."  .  .  .  The  General  Assembly  shall  provide,  by  law, 
for  a  uniform  and  equal  rate  of  assessment  and  taxation;  and 
shall   provide   such   regnlations   as  shall  secure   a   just   valuation 

"Article  VIIT.,  §  1,  Constitutinn  of  '^  Article  VIT..   §   5.  Constituti')?!  of 

Delaware.  Idnlio. 

"Article   IX.,    §    1,    Constitution    of  "Article   IX..    S    1,   Constitution    of 

Florida.  Illinois. 

^Article  VII..  §  11,  Constitution  of 
Georgia. 


I 


237  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  146 

for  taxation  of  all  property,  both  real  and  personal,  excepting 
such  only,  for  municipal,  educational,  literary,  scientific,  relig- 
ious, or  charitable  purposes,  as  maj'  be  specially  exempted  b;. 
law.^"  The  legislature  shall  provide  tor  a  uniform  and  equal 
rate  of  assessment  and  taxation ;  but  all  property  used  exclu- 
sively for  state,  county,  municipal,  literary,  educational,  scien- 
tific, religious,  benevolent  and  charitable  purposes,  and  personal 
property  to  the  amount  of  at  least  two  hundred  dollars  for  each 
family,  shall  be  exempted  from  taxation."  All  taxes  upon 
real  and  personal  estate,  assessed  by  authority  of  this  state, 
shall  be  apportioned  and  asse.ssed  equally,  according  to  the  jusl 
valuation  thereof.^-  That  the  levying  of  taxes  by  the  poll  is- 
grievous  and  oppressive.' and  ought  to  be  prohibited;  that  pauper.' 
ought  not  to  be  assessed  for  the  support  of  the  Government; 
but  every  person  in  the  state,  or  person  holding  property  there- 
in, ought  to  contribute  his  proportion  of  public  taxes  for  th. 
support  of  the  Government,  according  to  his  actual  worth  ii: 
real  or  personal  property;  yet  fines,  duties  or  taxes  may  properly 
and  justly  be  imposed  or  laid  with  a  political  view  for  the  good 
government  and  benefit  of  the  community.'"  The  It^gislature  shall 
provide  an  uniform  rule  of  taxation,  except  on  property  payini 
specific  taxes,  and  taxes  shall  be  levied  on  such  property  as  shall 
be  prescribed  by  law:  Provided,  That  the  legislature  shall  pro- 
vide an  uniform  rule  of  taxation  for  such  property  as  shall  be 
asse.ssed  by  a  state  board  of  assessors,  and  the  rate  of  taxation 
on  such  property  shall  be  the  rate  which  the  state  board  of 
assessors  shall  ascertain  and  determine  is  the  average  rate  levied 
upon  other  property  upon  Avhich  ad  valorem  taxes  are  assessed 
and  assessed  for  state,  fdnnty.  township,  school  and  municipal 
purposes.'*  All  assessments  hereafter  authorized  shall  be  or 
prnj>ortv  at  its  cash  value. '•'•  All  taxes  to  be  raised  in  this  state 
shall  be  as  nearlv  e^nal  as  ma.v  be.  and  all  property  on  which 
tax(\s  are  to  be  levied  shall  hnve  a  cash  valuation,  aiul  be  eijualized 
and  uniform  throughout  the  state:  Provided.  That  the  legi.sla- 
ture   ma.v,   by    general    biw    or   snecial    act.    authorize    municipal 

*"  Article   X.,    §    1.    rmistituiion    of  '  ■  DcclaiiUion     of     RiLrhts.     Article 

Indiana.  X\'..   ron.«titutioii    of    .\rarvlan(l. 

"Article   XT.,   §    1.   Constitution   of  "Article   XU'..    §    11.   Constitntion 

Kansas.  of    Miclti^nn. 

i^' Article  IX.,   §  8,  Constitution  of  ■"Article   XIV..   §    12.   Constitution 

Maine.  of   Michigran. 


§  146  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  238 

corporations  to  levy  assessments  for  local  improvements  upon  the 
property  fronting  upon  such  improvements,  or  upon  the  prop- 
erty to  be  benefited  by  such  improvements,  or  both,  without 
regard  to  a  cash  valuation,  and  in  such  manner  as  the  legisla- 
ture may  prescribe;  and  provided,  further,  that  for  the  purpose 
of  defraying  the  expenses  of  laying  water  pipes  and  supplying 
any  city  or  municipality  with  water,  the  legislature  may,  by 
general  or  special  law,  authorize  any  such  city  or  municipality 
having  a  population  of  five  thousand  or  more  to  levy  an  annual 
tax  or  assessment  upon  the  lineal  foot  of  all  lands  fronting  on 
any  water  main  or  water  pipes  laid  by  such  city  or  municipality 
within  corporate  limits  of  said  city,  for  supplying  water  to  the 
citizens  thereof,  without  regard  to  the  cash  value  of  such  prop- 
ert.y.  and  to  empower  such  city  to  collect  any  such  tax  assess- 
ments, or  fines  or  penalties  for  failure  to  pay  the  same,  or  any 
fine  or  penalty  for  any  violation  of  the  rules  of  such  city  or 
municipality  in  regard  to  the  use  of  water,  or  for  any  water  rate 
due  for  the  same.^**  Taxation  shall  be  uniform  and  equal  through- 
out the  state.  Property  shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value 
The  legislature  may.  however,  impose  a  tax  per  capita  upon  such 
domestic  animals  as  from  their  nature  and  habits  are  destructive 
of  other  property.  Property  shall  be  assessed  for  taxes  under 
general  laws,  and  by  uniform  rules,  according  to  its  true  value 
But  the  legislature  may  provide  for  a  special  mode  of  valuatio: 
and  assessment  for  railroads,  and  railroad  and  other  corporatt 
property,  or  for  particular  species  of  property  belonging  to  per 
sons,  corporations  or  associations  not  situated  wholly  in  one  coun- 
ty. But  all  such  property  shall  be  assessed  at  its  true  value,  and 
no  county  shall  be  denied  the  right  to  levy  county  and  special 
taxes  upon  such  assessment  as  in  other  cases  of  property  situ- 
ated and  assessed  in  the  county.^'  Taxes  may  be  levied  and 
collected  for  public  purposes  only.  They  shall  be  uniform  upon 
the  same  class  of  subjects  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the 
authority  levying  the  tax  and  all  taxes  shall  be  levied  and  col- 
lected by  general  laws.^®  All  property  sub.iect  to  taxation  shall 
be   taxed   in   proportion   to   its   value.'"     The   necessary   revenue 

^'Article  IX..   §   3.  Constitution  of  ''Article   X.,    §    3,    Constitution   of 

Minnesota.  Missouri. 

"§     112.    Constitution    of    Missis-  "Article    X..    §    4.    Constitution   of 

sippi.    .  Missouri. 


239  CONSTITUTIONAL,    RESTRICTION    APPLIC^VBLE,    ETC.  §  146 

ior  the  support  and  maintenance  of  the  state  shall  be  provided 
by  the  legislative  assembly,  which  shall  levy  a  uniform  rate 
of  assessment  and  taxation,  and  shall  prescribe  such  regulations 
as  shall  secure  a  just  valuation  for  taxation  of  all  property, 
except  that  specially  provided  for  in  this  article.  The  legis- 
lative assembly  may  also  impose  a  license  tax,  both  upon  per- 
sons and  upon  oorporations  doing  business  in  the  state. -'^  Taxes 
shall  be  levied  and  collected  by  general  laws  and  for  public 
purposes  only.  They  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of 
subjects  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  authority  levying  the 
tax.-^  The  legislature  shall  provide  such  revenue  as  may  be 
needful,  by  levying  a  tax  by  valuation,  so  that  every  person 
and  corporation  shall  pay  a  tax  in  proportion  to  the  value  of 
his,  her  or  its  property  and  franchises,  the  tax  to  be  ascertained 
in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  shall  direct,  and  it  shall  have 
power  to  tax  peddlers,  auctioneers,  brokers,  hawkers,  commis- 
sion merchants,  showmen,  jugglers,  inn-keepers,  liquor  dealers, 
toll  bridges,  ferries,  insurance,  telegraph  and  express  interests 
or  business,  venders  of  patents,  in  such  manner  as  it  shall  direct, 
uniform  as  to  the  class  on  which  it  operates.--  All  real  property 
and  possessory  rights  to  the  same,  as  well  as  personal  property 
now  existing  or  hereafter  created,  or  corporations,  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  taxation  the  same  as  property  of  individuals;  provided, 
that  the  propert.v  of  corporations  formed  for  municipal,  chari- 
table, religious  or  educational  purposes  may  be  exempted  by 
law.-"*  The  legislature  shall  provide  by  law  for  a  uniform  and 
equal  rate  of  assessment  and  taxation,  and  shall  prescribe  such 
regulations  as  shall  secure  a  just  valuation  for  taxation  of  all 
property,  real,  personal  and  possessory,  excepting  mines  and  min- 
ing claims,  the  proceeds  of  which  alone  shall  be  taxed,  and  also 
excepting  such  property  as  may  be  exempted  by  law  for  mu- 
nicipal, educational,  literary,  scientific,  religious  or  charitable  pur- 
poses.-* The  General  Court  lias  power  to  impose  and  lev.v  pro- 
portional and  reasonable  assessments,  rates  and  taxes  upon  all 
the  inhal)itants  of.  and  residents  within    the  said  state,  and  upon 

^Article  XTI..  §   1.  Constitutinn  of           ==>  Artirlo    VITT..    §    2.    Constitution 

Montana.  of    Nevada. 

=' Article  XIl..  §  7.  Constitution  of            =*  Article    X..    §    1,    Constitution   of 

Montana.  Nevada. 

=- Article  IX.    §    1.   Constitution   of 
Nebraska. 


§  146  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  240 

all  estates  within  the  same.-'  Property  shall  be  assessed  for  tax- 
ation under  general  laws  and  by  uniform  rules,  according  to 
its  true  valuation.-"  Laws  shall  be  passed  taxing,  by  uniform 
rule,  all  moneys,  credits,  investments  in  bonds,  stocks,  joint-stock 
companies,  or  otherwise ;  and,  also,  all  real  and  personal  prop- 
erty, according  to  its  true  value  in  money.  The  General  Assem- 
bly may  also  tax  trades,  professions,  franchises  and  incomes, 
provided  that  no  income  shall  be  taxed  when  the  property  from 
which  the  income  is  derived  is  taxed.-'^  All  taxes  levied  by  any 
county,  city,  town  or  township  shall  be  uniform  and  ad  valorem 
upon  all  property  in  the  same,  except  property  exempted  by  this 
constitution.-*  Laws  shall  be  passed  taxing  by  uniform  rule  all 
property  according  to  its  true  value  in  money.-**  .  .  .  Lavv's  shall 
be  passed,  taxing  by  uniform  rule,  all  moneys,  credits,  invest- 
ments in  bonds,  stocks,  joint-stock  companies,  or  otherwise;  and 
also  all  real  and  personal  property,  according  to  its  true  value 
in  money.''''  The  property  of  corporations,  now  existing  or 
hereafter  created,  shall  be  subject  to  taxation  the  same  as 
the  property  of  individuals."^  Xo  tax  duty  shall  be  imposed 
Avithout  the  consent  of  the  people  or  their  representatives  in  the 
Legislative  Assembly;  and  all  taxation  shall  be  ecpial  and  uni- 
form."*- The  Legislative  Assembly  shall  provide  by  law  for  r 
uniform  and  equal  rate  of  assessment  and  taxation :  and  shall 
prescribe  such  regulations  as  shall  secure  a  just  valuation  for 
taxation  of  all  prorertv.  I^oth  real  and  person»al.  exceptino-  such 
only  for  municipal,  edueat'onal,  literary,  scientific,  religious  or 
charitable  purposes,  as  may  be  specially  exempted  bv  law.^^  All 
taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of  subjects,  within 
the  territorial  limi«ts  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax.  an*d  shall 
be  levied  and  collected  under  general  laws ;  but  the  General 
Assembly  mav.  by  general  laws,  exempt  from  taxation  public 
property    used    for    public    purposes,    actual    places    of   religious 

"■Part  II.,  Article  V..  Constitution  '"Article  XII.,  §  2.  Constitution  of 

of   Xew   Hampshire.  Ohio. 

=«  Article  IV.,  §  7.  par.   12.  Con^ti  ^^  Article  XII.,  §  4.  Constitution  of 

tution  of  Xew  Jersey.  Ohio. 

^Article   V.,    §    3,    Constitution    of  '-Article   I.,    §    32,   Constitution    of 

North    Carolina.  Orejron. 

=«  Article  VII..  §  9.  Constitution  of  ==  Article  IX.,   §    1,  Constitution  of 

Xorth    Carolina.  Oregon. 

™  Article   XI..    §    176.    Constitution 
of  X'orth    Dakota. 


241  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  146 

worship,  places  of  burial  not  used  or  held  for  private  or  cor- 
porate profit,  and  institutions  of  purely  public  charity.^*  All 
free  governments  are  instituted  for  the  protection,  safety  and 
happiness  of  the  people.  All  laws,  therefore,  should  be  made 
for  the  good  of  the  whole,  and  the  burdens  of  the  state  ought 
to  be  fairly  distributed  among  its  citizens. ^^  All  property  sub- 
ject to  taxation  shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value. ^"^  All 
taxes  upon  property,  real  and  personal,  shall  be  laid  upon  the 
actual  value  of  the  property  taxed,  as  the  same  shall  be  ascer- 
tained by  an  assessment  made  for  the  purpose  of  levying  such 
tax."'  The  General  Assembly  shall  provide  by  law  for  a  uni- 
form and  equal  rate  of  assessment  and  taxation,  and  shall  pre- 
scribe regulations  to  secure  a  just  valuation  for  taxation  of  all 
property,  real,  personal  and  possessory,  except  mines  and  mining 
claims,  the  products  of  which  alone  shall  be  taxed;  and  also 
excepting  such  property  as  may  be  exempted  by  law  for  munici- 
pal, educational,  literary,  scientific,  religious  or  charitable  pur 
poses :  Provided,  however.  That  the  General  Assembly  maj^  im- 
pose a  capitation  tax  upon  such  domestic  animals  as  from  theii 
nature  and  habits  are  destructive  of  other  property:  And  pro- 
vided further.  That  the  General  Assembly  may  provide  for  a 
graduated  tax  on  incomes,  and  for  a  graduated  license  on  occu 
pations  and  business. ^^  .  .  .  All  taxation  shall  be  equal  ant 
uniform.''"  All  taxes  to  be  raised  in  this  state  shall  be  uniform 
on  all  real  and  personal  property,  according  to  its  value  in 
money,  to  be  ascertained  by  such  rules  of  appraisement  and  as 
sessment  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  legislature  by  general  lav*- 
so  that  every  person  and  corporation  shall  pay  a  tax  in  propor- 
tion to  the  value  of  his,  her  or  its  property.  And  the  legisla- 
ture shall  provide  by  general  law  for  the  assessing  and  levying 
of  taxes  on  all  corporation  property,  as  near  as  may  be  by  the 
same  methods  as  are  provided  for  assessing  and  levying  of  taxes 
on  individual  ]u-()i)erty."'     Tlu-  lei^islatiii'i'  iiiny  vest  the  corporate 

"Article    1\..    §    1.   Constitiitiuii  of  ^"Article    X..    §    1.    Constitution    of 

Pennsylvania.  SoiUh    Carolina. 

'•"■Article    I..    S    2,    Constitution  of  »"  Article  VI.,  §   17,  Con.stitution  of 

Rhode    Island.  South    Dakota. 

'"Article    I.,    §    6,    Constitution  of  <"  Article  XI.,   §   2,   Constitution   of 

South   Carolina.  South  Dakota. 

"Article  TIL.  §  29,  Constitution  of 
South   Carolina. 


§  146  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  242 

authority  of  cities,  towns  and  villages  with  power  to  make  local 
improvements  by  special  taxation  of  contiguous  property  or 
otherwise.  For  all  corporate  purposes,  all  municipal  corpora- 
tions may  be  vested  with  authority  to  assess  and  collect  taxes; 
but  such  tax  shall  be  uniform  in  respect  to  persons  and  property 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  body  levying  the  same.*^  All 
property,  real,  personal  or  mixed,  shall  be  taxed,  but  the  legis- 
lature may  except  such  as  may  be  held  by  the  state,  by  counties, 
cities  or  towns,  and  used  exclusively  for  public  or  corporation 
purposes,  and  such  as  may  be  held  and  used  for  purposes  purely 
religiov.T^,  charitable,  scientific,  literary  or  educational,  and  shall 
except  one  thousand  dollars'  worth  of  personal  property  in  the 
hands  of  each  taxpayer,  as  the  direct  product  of  the  soil  in  the 
hands  of  the  producer,  and  his  immediate  vendee.  All  property 
shall  be  taxed  according  to  its  value,  that  value  to  be  ascertained 
in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  shall  direct,  so  that  taxes  shall 
be  equal  and  uniform  throughout  the  state.  No  one  species  of 
property  from  which  a  tax  may  be  collected,  shall  be  taxed 
higher  than  any  other  species  of  property  of  the  same  -value.*" 
Taxation  shall  be  equal  and  uniform.  All  property  in  this  state, 
whether  owned  by  natural  persons  or  corporations,  other  than 
municipal,  shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value,  which  shall 
be  ascertained  as  may  be  provided  by  law.  The  legislature  may 
impose  a  poll-tax.  It  may  also  impose  occupation  taxes,  both 
upon  natural  persons  and  upon  corporations,  other  than  munici- 
pal, doing  any  business  in  this  state.  It  may  also  tax  incomes 
of  both  natural  persons  and  corporations,  other  than  municipal, 
except  that  persons  engaged  in  mining  and  agricultural  pursuits 
shall  never  be  required  to  pay  an  occupation  tax ;  provided,  that 
two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars'  worth  of  household  and  kitchen 
furniture,  belonging  to  each  family  in  this  state,  shall  be  exempt 
from  taxation,  and  provided  further,  that  the  occupation  tax 
levied  by  any  county,  city  or  town,  for  any  year,  on  persons  or 
corporations  pursuing  any  profession  or  business  shall  not  exceed 
one-half  of  the  tax  levied  by  the  state  for  the  same  period  on 
such   profession   or   business.*^     All   property   in   the    state,    not 


"Article  XI.,  §  10,  Constitution  of  « Article   VIII.,    §    1,    Constitution 

South   Dakota.  of  Texas. 

*=  Article   I.,    §    28,    Constitution   of 
Tennessee. 


243  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  146 

exempt  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  or  under  tliis  con- 
stitution, shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value,  to  be  ascer- 
tained as  provided  by  law.  The  word  property,  as  used  in  this 
article,  is  hereby  declared  to  include  moneys,  credits,  bonds, 
stocks,  franchises,  and  all  matters  and  things  (real,  personal  and 
mixed)  capable  of  private  ownership;  but  this  shall  not  be  so 
construed  as  to  authorize  the  taxation  of  the  stocks  of  any  com- 
pany or  corporation,  when  the  property  of  such  company  or 
corporation  represented  by  such  stocks  has  been  taxed.**  The 
legislature  shall  provide  by  law  a  uniform  and  equal  rate  of 
assessemnt  and  taxation  on  all  property  in  the  state,  according 
to  its  value  in  money,  and  shall  prescribe  by  general  law  such 
regulations  as  shall  secure  a  just  valuation  for  taxation  of  all 
property,  so  that  every  person  and  corporation  shall  pay  a  tax 
in  proportion  to  the  value  of  his,  her  or  its  property :  Provided, 
That  a  deduction  of  debits  from  credits  may  be  authorized :  Pro- 
vided, further.  That  the  property  of  the  United  States,  of  the 
state,  counties,  cities,  towns,  school  districts,  municipal  corpora- 
tions, and  public  libraries,  lots  with  the  buildings  thereon  used 
exclusively  for  either  religious  worship  or  charitable  purposes, 
and  places  of  burial  not  held  or  used  for  private  or  corporate 
benefit,  shall  be  exempt  from  taxation.  Ditches,  canals,  reser- 
voirs, pipes  and  flumes  owned  and  used  by  individuals  or  cor- 
porations for  irrigating  lands  owned  by  such  individuals  or  cor- 
porations or  the  individual  members  thereof,  shall  not  be  sep- 
arately taxed  so  long  as  they  shall  be  owned  and  used  exclu- 
sively for  such  purpose.  Provided  further,  relating-  to  the  re- 
mittance or  abating  of  taxes  of  the  indigent  poor,  that  the  taxes 
of  the  indigent  poor  may  be  remitted  or  abated  at  such  time 
and  in  such  manner  as  may  be  provided  by  law.*"'  That  govern- 
ment i'S,  or  ought  to  be,  instituted  for  the  common  benefit,  pro- 
tection and  security  of  the  people,  nation,  or  community,  and  not 
for  the  particular  emolument  or  advantage  of  any  single  man, 
family,  or  set  of  men,  who  are  a  part  only  of  that  community.*" 
That  no  man,  or  set  of  men,  is  entitled  to  exclusive  or  separate 
emoluments  or  privileges  from  the  community,  but  in  considera- 
tion   of   public    services.*^      All    property,    except    as   hereinafter 

"Article  XITT.,    §    2,    Constitution  'H'liap.    T..    Aiticlo    VIT..    Constitu- 

of  Utah.  tion  of  Vorniont. 

•"Article  XIII..    §    3,    Constitution  *"  Article    T.,    8    4,   Constitution    of 

of  Utah.  Virginia. 


§  146  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  244 

provided,  shall  be  taxed.  All  taxes,  whether  state,  local,  or  mu- 
nicipal, shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of  subjects  within 
the  territorial  limits  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax,  and  shall 
be  levied  and  collected  under  general  laws.*^  Except  as  here- 
inafter provided,  all  assessments  of  real  estate  and  tangible  per- 
sonal property  shall  l)e  at  their  fair  market  value,  to  be  ascer- 
tained as  prescribed  by  law.  The  General  Assembly  may  allow 
a  lower  rate  of  taxation  to  be  imposed  for  a  period  of  years 
by  a  city  or  town  upon  land  added  to  its  corporate  limits,  than 
is  imposed  on  similar  property  within  its  limits  at  the  time  such 
land  is  added.  Nothing  in  this  constitution  shall  prevent  the 
General  Assembly,  after  the  first  day  of  January,  1913,  from  seg- 
regating, for  the  purpose  of  taxation,  the  several  kinds  or  classes 
of  property,  so  as  to  specify  and  determine  upon  what  subjects, 
state  taxes,  and  upon  what  subjects,  local  taxes,  may  be  levied.*^ 
No  city  or  town  shall  impose  any  tax  or  assessment  upon  abut- 
ting land-owners  for  street  or  other  public  local  improvements, 
except  for  making  and  improving  the  walk-ways  upon  then  ex- 
isting streets  and  improving  and  paving  alleys,  and  for  either 
the  construction,  or  for  the  use  of  sewers;  and  the  same 
when  imposed,  shall  not  be  in  excess  of  the  peculiar  bene- 
fits resulting  therefrom  to  such  abutting  land-owners.  Ex- 
cept in  cities  and  towns,  no  such  taxes  or  assessments,  for 
local  public  improvements,  shall  be  imposed  on  abutting 
land-owners. •'"'''  All  property  in  this  state,  not  exempted  un- 
der the  laws  of  the  United  States,  or  under  this  constitution, 
shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value,  to  be  ascertained  as 
provided  by  law.'"'^  Tbe  legi'slature  shall  provide  by  law  a  uni- 
form and  equal  rate  of  assessment  and  taxation  on  all  property 
in  the  state,  according  to  its  value  in  money,  and  shall  prescribe 
such  regulations  by  general  laws  as  shall  secure  a  just  valua- 
tion for  taxation  of  all  property,  so  that  every  person  and  cor- 
poration shall  pay  a  tax  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  his,  her 
or  its  property:  Provided,  That  a  deduction  of  debts  from 
credits  may  be  authorized :  Provided  further.  That  the  prop- 
erty of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state,  counties,  school  dis- 
tricts, and  other  municipal  corporations,  and  such  other  property 

^^  Article  XII.,   S    1C8.   Constitution  =»  Article  XIII.,  §  170,  Constitution 

of  Virginia.  of  Virsrinia. 

^"Article  XIII.,  §  160,  Constitution  ^^^  Article  VII.,  §   1,  Constitution  of 

of  Virginia.  Washington. 


245  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  146 

as  the  legislature  may  by  general  laws  provide,  shall  be  exempt 
from  taxation.'^-  The  legislature  shall  provide  by  general  law 
for  the  assessing  and  levying  of  taxes  upon  all  corporation  prop- 
erty as  near  as  may  be  by  the  same  methods  as  are  provided 
for  the  assessing  and  levying  of  taxes  on  individual  property."'' 
The  legislature  may  vest  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns 
and  villages  with  power  to  make  local  improvements  by  special 
assessment,  or  by  special  taxation  of  property  benefited.  For 
all  corporate  purposes,  all  municipal  corporations  may  be  vested 
with  authority  to  assess  and  collect  taxes,  and  such  taxes  shall 
be  uniform  in  respect  to  persons  and  property  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  body  levying  the  same."'*  Taxation  shall  be  equal 
and  uniform  throughout  the  state,  and  all  property,  both  real 
and  personal,  shall  be  taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value,  to  be 
ascertained  as  directed  by  law.  No  one  species  of  property 
from  which  a  tax  ma^^  be  collected,  shall  be  taxed  higher  than 
any  other  species  of  property  of  equal  value ;  but  property  used 
for  educational,  literary,  scientific,  religious  or  charitable  pur- 
poses; all  cemeteries  and  public  property  may,  by  law,  be  ex- 
empted from  taxation.  The  legislature  shall  have  power  to  tax, 
by  uniform  and  e(|ual  laws,  all  privileges  and  franchises  of  per- 
sons and  corporations.^'"  The  legislature  may,  by  law,  authorize 
the  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and  villages,  for  cor- 
porate purposes,  to  assess  and  collect  taxes;  but  such  taxes  shall 
be  uniform,  with  respect  to  ])ersoiis  and  pr()i)erty  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  authority  imposing  the  same.""  The  rule  of 
taxation  shall  be  uniform,  and  taxes  shall  be  levied  upon  such 
property  as  the  legislature  shall  prescribe.""  No  tax  shall  be 
imposed  without  the  consent  of  the  people  or  their  authorized 
representatives.  All  taxation  shall  be  equal  and  uniform."'*  All 
property,  except  ;is  in  this  constitution  otherwise  provided,  shall 
be  uniformly  assessed  for  taxation,  and  the  legislature  shall  pre- 
scribe such  regulations  as  shall  secure  a  just  valuation  for  t;ixa- 
tion  of  all  property,  real   ;ind  personal."" 

"  Article  VTT..  §  2.  Constitution  of           •"  Artiolo    X.,    §    9.    Constitntinn    of 

\Vasliin<:ton.  W(>st    Vii-<iinia. 

"Article  Vn..  §  3.  Constitntinn  of           =^' Article    VTII..    §    1.    Cmist  itnti..n 

Washington.  of   Wisconsin. 

"Article  VIT..  §  9.  Constitution  of           ■'"Article    I..    §    28.    Constitntion    of 

Wasliinjiton.  Wyoniiiiix. 

""Article    X.,    §  1,    Constitution   of            ^''Article    XV..    §     11,    Constitution 

West  Vir^nia.  of  WvominL'. 


§147 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


246 


§  147.     Provisions  requiring  uniformity  and  equality  of  taxation 
not  applicable  to  local  assessments. 

The  question  whether  such  provisions  as  those  given  in  the 
foregoing  section,  requiring  uniformity  and  equality  of  taxation, 
apply  only  to  general  taxation,  or  whether  they  also  operate 
as  a  restriction  upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  provide  for 
the  levy  of  local  assessments  is  a  question  which  has  often  been 
presented  for  judicial  decision.  The  great  weight  of  modern 
authority  is  that  such  provisions  do  not  operate  as  a  restriction 
upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  levy  local  assessments,  being 
limited   in   their   operation   to    general   taxation.^      The    adoption 


^  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District 
Xo.  108,  ill  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569, 
4  S.  663  [1884];  (affirming  Recla- 
mation District  Xo.  108  v.  Hagar,  4 
Fed.  366  [1880]  )  ;  City  of  San  Diego 
V.  Linda  Vista  Irrigation  District,  108 
Cal.  189,  35  L.  R.  A.  33,  41  Pac.  291 
[1895] ;  In  the  matter  of  the  Bonds  of 
the  Madera  Irrigation  District,  92 
Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106,  14  L. 
R.  A.  755,  28  Pac.  272,  28  Pac.  675 
[1891];  Mahoney  v.  Brauerman,  54 
Cal.  565 ;  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222 
[1874];  Chambers  v.  Satterlee,  40 
Cal.  497  [1871];  Taylor  v.  Palmer, 
31  Cal.  240  [1866];"  Emery  v.  San 
Francisco  Gas  Co.,  28  Cal.  346 
[1865];  Burnett  v.  Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  City  of  Sacra- 
mento, 12  Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec.  518 
[1859];  Edgerton  v.  Green  Cove 
Springs,  19  Fla.  140  [1882];  Speer 
V.  flavor  and  Council  of  Athens.  85 
Ga.  49,  9  L.  R.  A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802 
[1890];  Harden  v.  City  of  Atlanta, 
70  Ga.  817"[1883];  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  County  of  Monroe  v. 
Harrell,  147  Ind.  500,  46  X.  E.  124 
[1896];  Reinken  v.  Fuehring,  130 
Ind.  382,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  247,  15 
L.  R.  A.  624,  30  X.  E.  414,  37  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  354  [1891];  Pal- 
mer V.  Stumph,  29  Ind.  329  [1868]; 
Goodrich  v.  Winchester  Turnpike 
Co.,  26  Ind.  119;  Warren  v.  Henly, 
31  la.  31  [1870];  Xewman  v.  City  of 
Emporia,   41    Kan.   583,   21   Pac.   593 


[1889];  Ottawa  County  v.  Xelson,  19 
Kan.  234,  27  Am.  Rep.  101 ;  City  of  Ot- 
tawa V.  Barney,  10  Kan.  270  [1872]  ; 
Hines  v.  City  of  Leavenworth,  3  Kan. 
180  [1865]  ;  Gosnell  v.  City  of  Louis- 
ville, 104  Ky.  201,  4R  S.  W.  722,  20 
Ky.  L.  ,R.  519  [1898];  O'Mahoney  v. 
Bullock,  97  Ky.  774^,  31  S.  W.  878. 
Holzhauer  v.  City  of  Xewport,  94 
Ky.  396,  22  S.  W.  752  [1893];  Wolf;- 
v.  McHargue,  88  Ky.  251,  10  S.  ^^■. 
809;  City  of  Louisville  v.  Hyatt.  •_' 
B.  Mon.  (41  Ky.)  177.  36  Am.  Dec. 
,594  [1841]:  City  of  Lexington  v. 
McQuillan's  Heirs,  9  Dana  (39  Ky.  I 
513.  35  Am.  Dec.  159  [1840];  Hill 
v.  Fontenot,  46  La.  Ann.  1563,  16  So. 
475  [1894];  George  v.  Young,  45  La. 
Ann.  1232,  14  So.  137  [1893];  Minor 
V.  Daspit,  43  La.  Ann.  337,  9  So.  49 
[1891];  Munson  v.  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  The  Atchafalaya  Ba- 
sin Levee  District,  43  La.  Ann.  15, 
8  So.  906  [1891];  Excelsior  Plant- 
ing &  ^Manufacturing  Company  v. 
Green,  39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So.  873 
[1887];  Charnock  v.  Fordoche  &. 
Grosse  Tete  Special  Levee  District 
Company,  38  La.  Ann.  323  [1886]; 
Richardson  v.  Morgan.  16  La.  Ann. 
429  [1862];  City  of  Auburn  v.  Paul. 
84  Me.  212,  24  Atl.  817  [1892]: 
Alexander  v.  Mayor  of  Baltimore,  5 
Gill.  (Md.)  383,*  46  Am.  Dec.  630; 
City  of  St.  Paul  v.  St.  Paul  &  Sioux 
City  Railroad  Company.  23  Minn. 
469  [1877]:  Edwards  House  Co.  v. 
City  of  Jackson,  —  Miss.  — ,  45  So. 


247 


CONSTITLTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


§147 


of  such  provision  does  not  invalidate  a  pre-existing  special  law 


14  [1907];  Nugent  v.  City  of  Jack- 
son, 72  Miss.  1040,  18  So.  493  [1895]  ; 
Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty,  57  Miss. 
378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451  [1879];  Yas- 
ser V.  George,  47  Miss.  713  [1873]; 
Daily  v.  Swope,  47  Miss.  367  [1872]: 
Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss.  652 
[I860];  Williams  v.  Cammack.  27 
Miss.  209,  61  Am.  Dec.  508  [1854]; 
Heman  Construction  Co.  v.  Wabash 
R.  Co.,  206  Mo.  172,  104  S.  W.  67 
[1907];  City  of  Sedalia  ex  rel.  Tay- 
lor V.  Smith.  206  Mo.  346,  104  S.  W. 

15  [1907]  ;  Meier  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
180  Mo.  391,  79  S.  W.  955  [1903]; 
Morrison  v.  Morey,  146  Mo.  543,  48 
S.  W.  629  [1898f;  City  of  St.  Jos- 
eph V.  Owen,  110  Mo.  445,  19  S.  W. 
713  [1892];  Farrar  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  80  Mo.  379  [1883];  Adams 
V.  Lindell,  72  Mo.  198  [1880];  City 
of  St.  Joseph  V.  Antliony,  30  Mo.  537 
[18t50];  Egyptian  Levee  Co.  v.  Har- 
din, 27  Mo.  495,  72  Am.  Dec.  27G 
11858];  Lockwood  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  24  Mo.  22,  Adams  v.  Lindell, 
5  Mo.  App.  197  [1878];  Creamer  v. 
Allen,  3  Mo.  App.  545  [1877];  Di- 
rectors of  Alfalfa  Irrigation  District 
V.  Collins,  46  Xeb.  411.  64  X.  W. 
1086;  State  of  Xebraska  ex  rel.  Ab- 
bott V.  Board  of  County  Commis- 
sioners of  Di)(lg(>  County,  8  Xeb.  124, 
30  Am.  Rep.  819  [1879]:  llurford 
V.  City  of  Omaha.  4  Xeb.  336  [1876]  ; 
Chancellor  of  State  v.  Citj'  of  Eliza- 
beth, 06  X.  J.  L.  (37  Vr.)  688.  52 
Atl.  1130  [inoi];  (affirming  Chan- 
cellor of  State  V.  City  of  Elizabeth, 
65  X.  J.  L.  (36  Vr.)  483,  47  Atl, 
455  [1900],  which  followed  Chancel- 
lor of  State  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  65 
X.  J.  L.  (36  Vr.)  479,  47  Atl.  454 
[  1900] )  ;  State,  Reynolds,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of 
Paterson.  48  X.  J.  L.  (19  Vr.)  435, 
5  AtL  896  [1886];  State,  Mann. 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  Jersey  City,  24  X.  J.  L.  (4  Zab.) 
C62  [1855]:  People  ex  rel.  Grimn  v. 
Mayor,    etc..    of    Brooklyn.    4    X'.    V. 


419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851];  In  the 
matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
the  City  of  Xew  York  for  the  En- 
larging and  Improving  a  Part  of 
Xassau  Stret  in  the  said  City,  11 
John  Sup.  Ct.  (X.  Y.)  77  [1814]; 
Livingston  v.  Xew  Y'ork,  8  NV'end. 
(X.  Y.)  85,  22  Am.  Dec.  622;  Harper 
V.  Commissioners  of  Xew  Hanover 
County,  133  X.  C.  106,  45  S.  E.  526 
[1903];  Hilliard  v.  City  of  Ashe- 
ville,  118  N.  C.  845,  24  S.  E.  738 
[  1896] ;  eity  of  Raleigh  v.  Peace. 
110  X.  C.  32,  17  L.  R.  A.  330,  14  S. 
E.  521  [1892];  Busbee  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Wake  County,  93  N.  C. 
143  [1885];  Shuford  v.  Commission- 
ers of  Gaston  County,  86  N.  C.  552 
[1882];  Cain  v.  Commissioners  of 
Davie  County,  86  X.  C.  8  [1882]; 
Webster  v.  City  of  Fargo,  9  X.  D. 
208,  56  L.  R.  A.  156,  82  N. 
W.  732  [1900];  (affirmed  Webster  v. 
Fargo,  181  U.  S.  394,  45  L.  912,  21 
S.  623,  645  [1901] )  ;  Rolph  v.  City  of 
Fargo,  7  X.  D.  640,  42  L.  R.  A.  646, 
16  X.  W.  242  [1898];  Carlisle  v. 
Hetherington.  47  0.  S.  235,  24  X.  E. 
488  [1890],  (distinguishing  Fields  v. 
Commissioners  of  Highland  County, 
36  0.  S.  476  [1881]);  Thompson  v. 
Treasurer  of  Wood  County,  11  0.  S. 
()7S  [1860];  Reeves  v.  Treasurer  of 
Wood  County.  8  0.  S.  333  [1858]; 
Hill  v.  Higdnn.  5  O.  S.  243,  67  Am. 
Dec.  289  [1855]:  Seovill  v.  City  of 
(  h'veland,  1  Oi  S.  126  [1853];  Bon- 
sal  V.  Lebanon.  19  Ohio  418  [1850]; 
Ridenour  v.  Saffin,  1  Handy  (Ohio) 
464  [1855];  Jones  v.  Holzapfel.  11 
Okl.  405,  68  Pac.  511  [1902];  Kad- 
derly  v.  Portland,  44  Or.  118,  74 
Pac'  710,  75  Pac.  222  [1903];  King 
V.  Portland.  38  Or.  402,  55  L.  R.  A. 
812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900];  (affirmed  184 
U.  S.  61,  46  L.  431.  22  S.  290  [1902] )  : 
Ladd  V.  Gambell.  35  Ore.  393.  59 
Pac.  113:  :\raster3  v.  City  of  P;)rt- 
land.  24  Ore.  161.  33  Pac.  540  [1893] : 
King  v.  City  of  Portland.  2  Ore.   146 


^us 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


248 


providing  for  local  assessments  according  to  frontage.-  A  cura- 
tive statute  validating  assessments  in  certain  classes  of  cities 
which  were  invalid  because  authorized  only  by  a  statute  which 
was  unconstitutional  as  based  on  an  unconstitutional  classifica- 
tion of  municipal  corporations,'^  is  not  invalid  as  in  violation  of 
the  clause  requiring  uniformity  of  taxation.*  In  states  in  which 
there  are  no  constitutional  provisions  requiring  uniformity  and 
equality  of  taxation,  the -legislature  is  of  course  regarded  as 
having  power  to  levy  assessments  upon  the  basis  of  benefits  and 
apportioned  in  substantial  accordance  therewith."' 

§  148.     Theory  that  such  provisions  are  entirely  inapplicable. 

Two  theories,  however,  different  in  form  but  not  inconsistent 
in  ultimate  result,  are  advanced  by  the  courts  which  uphold  this 
rule.  Both  theories  agree  that  local  assessments  must,  in  theory 
at  least,  be  limited  to  the  amount  of  benefits  conferred  by  the 
improvement  for  which  such  assessment  is  levied,  and  fairly  ap- 
portioned according  to  the  amount  of  such  assessment.^  The 
difference  between  these  theories  consists  in  the  reason  assigned 
for  such  restriction  and  rule  of  apportionment,  as  the  same  is 
affected  by  the  constitutional  provisions  requiring  equality  and 


[1865];  Anderson  v.  Lower  Merion 
Township,  217  Pa.  St.  369,  66  Atl. 
1115  [1907];  Franklin  v.  Hancock, 
204  Pa.  St.  110,  53  Atl.  644  [1902]; 
City  of  Erie  v.  Griswold,  154  Pa.  St. 
435,  39  Atl.  231  [1898];  Beanmont 
V  Wilkes-Barre  City,  142  Pa.  St.  198. 
21  Atl.  888  [1891]';  City  of  Chester 
V.  Black,  132  Pa.  St.  5118,  6  L.  R.  A. 
802,  19  Atl.  270  [1890];  Shoemaker 
V.  Harrisbnrg,  122  Pa.  St.  285,  16 
Atl.  366  [1888]:  Cleveland  v.  Trip]). 
13  B  I.  50  [1880];  In  the  matter  of 
Dorrance  Street.  4  R.  T.  230  [1856]; 
Tripp  V.  City  of  Yankton,  10  S.  D. 
516,  74  X.  W.  447  [1898];  Winona 
&  St.  P.  P.  Co  V.  City  of  Watertown, 
I  S.  D.  46,  44  X.  W.  1072  [1890]; 
County  of  Harris  v.  Boyd.  70  Tex. 
237,  7  S.  W.  713  [1888];  Texas 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Boyd,  67  Tex. 
153,  2  S.  W.  364:  Adams  v.  Fisher, 
63  Tex.  651  [18851:  Tnvlor  v.  Bovd. 
63  Tex.  533  [1885]:  AUor,  v.  n^\. 
veston,   51   Tex.   302    [1879];    Round- 


tree  V.  Galveston,  42  Tex.  626 ;  Loven- 
berg  V.  City  of  Galveston,  17  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  162,  42  S.  W.  1024  [1897]; 
Norfolk  City  v.  Ellis,  67  Va.  (26 
Gratt.)  224  [1875];  Hansen  v.  Ham- 
mer, 15  Wash.  315,  46  Pac.  332 
[1896];  Spokane  Falls  v.  Browne. 
3  Wash.  84,  27  Pac.  1077  [1891]; 
Austin  V.  City  of  Seattle,  2  Wash. 
667,  27  Pac.  557   [1891]. 

-  Beanmont  v.  Wilkes-Barre  City. 
142  P'     St.   198,  21   Atl.  888    [1891]. 

^See  §    176  et  seq. 

*City  of  Chester  v.  Black,  132  Pa. 
St.  568,  6  L.  R.  A.  802,  19  Atl.  276 
[1890]. 

s  Ferguson  v.  Borough  of  Stamford. 
60  Conn.  432,  22  Atl.  782  [1891]; 
City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Xew  York  & 
New  Haven  Railroad  Company,  36 
Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869]; 
Nichols  V.  City  of  Bridgeport.  23 
Conn.    189.   60   Am.   Dec.   636    [1854]. 

'See  §   11,   §   118,  Chapter  XIII. 


1^49 


CONSTITUTIONAL    KESIRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


5  148 


uniformity  of  taxation.  One  theory  is  that  such  provisions  by 
their  very  terms  apply  to  general  taxation  for  the  purpose  of 
raising  public  revenue  and  are  not  intended  to  apply  to  local 
assessments  levied  upon  the  theory  of  benefits  to  pay  for  the 
cost  of  constructing  public  improvements  v/hich  confer  an  es- 
pecial benefit  upon  the  property  assessed.  Therefore,  by  this 
theory,  such  provisions  do  not  in  any  way  concern  or  afifect 
local  assessments.-  Under  this  theory,  while  assessment  must  un- 
doubtedly be  apportioned,  in  theory  at  least,  with  reference  to 
benefits,  it  is  either  because  to  do  otherwise  would  be  a  taking 
of  property  without  due  process  of  law,"  or  (which  is  possibly 
the  same  rule  stated  in  a  different  form)  because  the  very  idea 
of  an  assessment  presupposes  such  a  method  of  apportionment, 
and  without  such  method  and  basis  of  apportionment  we  have 
a  form  of  extortion  and  confiscation  and  not  an  assessment,  no 
matter  bv  what  name  it  mav  be  called.* 


-  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222  [1874]; 
Taylor  v.  Pahiier,  31  Cal.  240  [ISOli]  ; 
Emery  v.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co..  28 
Cal.  346  [1865];  Burnett  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Sacramento,  12  Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec. 
518  [1859];  Speer  v.  ]Mayor  and 
Council  of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9  L.  R. 
A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890]:  Ilayden 
V.  City  of  Atlanta,  70  Ga.  817  [1S83|  ; 
Reinken  v.  Fuehring,  130  Ind.  382, 
30  Am.  St.  Rep.  247,  15  L.  R.  A. 
624,  30  N.  E.  414,  37  Am.  &  Eng. 
Corp.  Cas.  354  [1891];  Xugcnt  v. 
City  of  Jackson,  72  Miss.  1040,  18 
So.  493  [1895];  Town  of  Macon  v. 
Patty,  57  Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Pvep. 
451  [18791;  Va.sser  v.  George,  47 
Miss.  713  [1873];  Daily  v.  Swope,  47 
Miss.  367  [1872];  Meier  v.  City  of 
St.  Louis.  180  :Mo.  391,  79  S.  \V.  955 
11903];  City  of  St.  .lospph  v.  Owen, 
110  Mo.  445,  19  S.  \V.  7l;'>  I  1892]; 
Farrar  v.  City  of  St.  Loui'^.  SO  ;\lo. 
379  [1883]:  Adams  v.  Limlcll.  72  Mo. 
19S  [1880]:  (i.nivmin','  Adams  v.. 
Lindell,  5  Mo.  App.  197  |1878]); 
Egyjitian  Levee  Company  v.  irardiii, 
27  Mo.  495,  72  Am.  Dec.  276  [18.-.S1  ; 
Creamer  v.  Allen.  3  Mo.  App.  545 
[18771;     llilliard    v.    Citv    of    Ashe- 


ville,  118  N.  C.  845,  24  S.  E.  738 
[1896];  City  of  Raleigh  v.  Peace, 
110  N.  C.  32,  17  L.  R.  A,  330;  14 
S.  E.  521  [1892];  Shuford  v.  Com- 
missioners of  Lincoln  County,  86  N. 
C.  552 ;  Cain  v.  Commissioners  of 
Davie  County,  86  N.  C.  8  [1882]; 
Ridenour  v.  Saffin,  1  Handy  (Oliio) 
464  [1855];  Kadderly  v.  Portland,  44 
Or.  118.  74  Pac.  710.  75  Pac.  222 
[1903];  King  v.  Portland,  38  Or. 
402,  55  L.  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac.  2 
[1900];  Masters  v.  City  of  Portland. 
24  C>.  161,  33  Pac'  540  [1893]; 
King  V.  City  of  Portland.  2  Or.  146 
[1865];  Franklin  v.  Hancock,  204 
Pa.  St.  110.  53  All.  644  [1902]; 
City  of  Erie  v.  Griswold,  184  Pa.  St. 
435,  39  Atl.  231  [1898];  City  of  dies 
tcr  V.  Black.  132  Pa.  St.  568.  6  L. 
R.  A.  802.  19  Atl.  276  [1890];  In 
the  Matter  of  Dorrance  Street.  4  R. 
I.  230  [U^-)6]:  Taylor  v.  Boyd.  63 
Te.\.  533  [18851:  Allen  v.  Galveston. 
51  Tc\.  302;  Roundtree  v.  Galveston. 
42  Tex.  626;  City  of  Spokane  Fall-* 
V.  Browne.  3  Wash.  84.  27  Pac.  1077 
[1891];  Austin  v.  Citv  of  Seattle.  2 
Wash.  667.  27  Pac.  557    [1891]. 

'See   §   118. 

•See   §   11.  §   665. 


§§  149,  150  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT  250 

§  149.     Theory  that  such  provisions  are  partially  applicable. 

The  other  theory  is  that  such  constitutional  provisions  are 
applicable  in  part  and  in  part  not  applicable.  As  far  as  they 
restrict  the  method  of  apportionment  to  the  valuation  of  the 
property  assessed  they  do  not  apply  because  the  theory  of  as- 
sessment is  apportionment  on  the  basis  of  benefits,  and  not  of 
valuation.  As  far  as  they  require  assessments  to  be  uniform 
and  equal  they  are  applicable  Under  this  theory,  however,  equal- 
ity and  uniformity  mean  one  thing  in  the  law  of  local  assess- 
ments and  another  thing  in  the  law  of  general  taxation.  Assess- 
ments have  a  uniformity  and  equality  of  their  own,  and  that 
consists  in  an  apportionment  upon  the  theory  of  benefits.  It 
is  this  uniformity  and  equality  that  under  this  theory  is  required 
by  such  constitutional  provisions  in  the  law  of  local  assessments. 
Statutes  have  been  held  to  be  unconstitutional  if  they  provide 
for  the  construction  of  improvements  in  such  a  way  as  not  to 
insure  a  benefit  to  the  property  owner.^  Thus  where  the  benefit 
to  be  derived  from  the  construction  of  a  system  of  drains,-  or 
levees,^  depended  upon  keeping  them  up  and  if  they  were  not  kept 
up  the  benefit  conferred  by  their  original  construction  would  be 
far  less  than  the  assessment  levied  for  such  construction,  a  statute 
authorizing  their  original  construction  and  an  assessment  there- 
for, but  not  an  assessment  for  maintenance,  has  been  held  to  be 
invalid. 

§  150.     Special  views  of  different  jurisdictions — Alabama. 

The  views  expressed  by  tlie  courts  of  several  of  the  states 
need  further  comment,  however,  since  they  have  been  in  the 
past  at  variance  with  the  views  already  set  forth.  In  most  cases, 
it  may  be  added,  these  variant  views  have  been  modified  either 
by  change  of  judicial  opinion  or  by  express  constitutional  pro- 
vision, so  as  to  conform  to  those  held  by  the  majority  of  the 
courts.  While  it  was  always  held  in  Alabama  that  in  the  ab- 
sence of  constitutional  provisions  the  legislature  had  power  to 
authorize  public  corporations  to  levy  local  assessments  based  on 

1  State,     Kean,     Pros.      v.      Driggs  ^O'Brien    v.    Wheelock.    184    U.    S. 

Drainage   Company,   45  N.  J.   L.    (16  450,    46    L.    0.36,    22    S.    .354    [1902]; 

Vr.)    91   [1883].  (affirming    O'Brien    v.    Wheelock.    95 

estate,     Kean.     Pros.      v.     Driggs  Fed.   883,   37   C.   C.   A.   309    [1899]); 

Draina-e  romnany.  45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Updike  v.  Wright,  81  111.  49  [1876]. 
Vy.)    91    riSS31. 


251 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


150 


special  benefits  accruing  to  private  property  by  reason  of  pub- 
lic improvements/  it  was  nevertheless  the  original  doctrine  in 
that  state  that  the  provisions  of  their  constitution  requiring  taxes 
to  be  "assessed  in  exact  proportion  to  the  value"  of  the  property 
to  be  taxed,  and  forbidding  the  taking  of  private  property  for 
public  use  without  compensation  were  both  applicable  to  local 
assessments  and  accordingly  prevented  local  assessments  from 
being  based  on  the  theory  of  benefits  and  apportioned  thereto. - 
This  holding  was,  of  course,  directly  contrary  to  the  weight 
of  authority  which  holds  that  a  local  assessment  is  not  a  tax 
within  the  meaning  of  such  constitutional  provision.''  It  rested 
upon  the  theory  that  an  assessment  is  a  kind  of  tax  and  that 
accordingly  it  is  subject  to  constitutional  restrictions  applicable 
to  taxation.*     In  a  later  case  ^  it  was  sought  to  distinguish  the 


*  Mayor.  Aldermen,  etc.,  of  ]\Iobile 
V.  Royal  Street  Railroad  Company, 
45  Ala.  322  [1871]. 

^  Mayor,  Aldermen,  etc.,  of  Mobile 
V.  Royal  Street  Railroad  Company, 
45  Ala.  322  [1871]:  Mayor,  Alder- 
men, etc.,  of  Mobile  v.  Dargan,  45 
Ala.  310   [1871]. 

'See  §   147. 

*  "A  tax  is  an  orderly  rate  levied 
on  the  property  of  the  citizen  accord- 
ing to  its  value,  or  a  fixed  sum  lev- 
ied on  his  person,  for  the  public  use, 
and  as  it  is  for  the  use  of  all,  it 
ought  in  .strict  justice  to  be  levied  on 
the  property  of  all.  Here  the  levy 
is  not  upon  the  property  of  all  the 
citizens  for  a  public  purpose  but  it  is 
on  the  property  of  a  few,  for  flie 
|)ul)lic  use — for  the  improvement  of 
a  public  street.  Most  clearly  all 
taxes  are  intended  to  be  as  nearly 
equal  as  ])ossible.  If  they  are  local 
and  for  community  (n-  locnl  pur- 
poses, the  whole  community  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  interested  in  tlicir  up 
propriation;  and  for  this  reason  all 
are  required  to  contribtjte  to  supply 
them.  A  tax  levied  for  national  pur 
poses  is  levied  upr.n  the  whole  peo- 
ple of  the  nation:  a  tax  levied  for  a 
State  falls  on  all  its  people:  and  in 
like  manner  a  tax  levied  for  a  coun- 
ty   is    paid    by    the   whole    people    of 


the  county.  So  must  it  be  with  a 
tax;  levied  on  the  people  of  a  city  or 
town  in  order  to  make  it  just  and 
equal.  Such  levies  may  include  every 
thing  that  can  be  called  property — 
everything  that  can  be  owned.  Such 
taxes,  to  make  them  just,  must  be 
in  proportion  to  the  value  of  t!ie 
property  upon  which  the  burden  is 
imposed  and  they  must  be  levied  up- 
on all  and  not  upon  a  few  only.  This 
is  said  to  be  an  inherent  principle 
of  taxation.  It  is  the  limit  that  use 
affixes  to  the  word.  (Citing  ]\Ior- 
ford  V.  Unger,  8  Ta.  82;  Covington 
V.  Southgate,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  491: 
Merrick  v.  Amher-st,  12  All.  (04 
Mass.)  504;  Ryerson  v.  Utley,  16 
:Mich.  269;  Welis  v.  Weston,  22  Mo. 
385;  Weeks  v.  ^Milwaukee.  10  Wis. 
258;  Const.  Ala.  1868.  Art.  IX..  §  1). 
If  this,  then,  is  not  a  tax  in  the  just 
and  proper  sense  of  that  word  it  is 
a  sci/.uic  of  the  |irivate  property  of 
tlie  citizen  for  public  use  without  his 
consent,  and  without  first  making  to 
the  owner  ju^t  compensation  f.'r  the 
>a!)i('.  Tliis  t!ie  constitution  of  the 
State  forlnds.  Const.  Ala.  1868.  Art. 
]\'..  §  36."  flavor.  Aldermen,  etc., 
(if  Mnbili.  V.  Dargan.  4n  Ala.  310, 
310.    320    [18711. 

•''  Irwin    V.    ^layor.    etc..    of    Mobile. 
57   Ala.  6   [18701. 


§  150  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  252 

earlier  cases  without  overruling  them,  upon  the  theory  that  the 
constitutional  provisions  already  referred  to  were  adopted  when 
the  constitution  of  1868,  in  which  they  were  found,  went  into 
effect;  that  this  constitution  took  effect  June  25,  1863,  when 
Congress  declared  that  such  constitution  was  adopted,  and  re- 
admitted Alabama  over  the  veto  of  the  President;  that  in  the 
case  at  bar  the  ordinance  was  passed  ^May  22,  1868,  prior  to 
the  time  that  the  constitution  of  1868  took  effect ;  that  the  rec- 
ord did  not  show  when  the  contract  was  let,  and  that  the  court 
would  not  assume,  in  order  to  invalidate  the  transaction  that  it 
was  let  subsequently  to  the  time  that  the  constitution  of  1868 
went  into  effect ;  and  that  accordingly  such  assessment  would  not 
be  governed  by  the  constitution  of  1868  and  the  provisions 
therein  already  referred  to.  This  attempt  to  distinguish  the- case 
at  bar  from  the  earlier  cases  was.  however,  based  entirely  on 
an  oversight.  Conceding  the  correctness  of  the  theory  advanced 
as  to  the  inapplicability  of  the  constitution  of  1868  to  the  as- 
sessment in  question,  it  must  nevertheless  be  noted  that  the  prior 
constitutions  of  Alabama  contained  similar  provisions  as  to  the- 
taxation  of  lands."  This  oversight  was  observed  in  a  later  case 
in  which  the  same  question  was  presented."  and  the  question  of 
overruling  the  earlier  cases  or  the  later  case  was  presented 
squarely,  since  the  constitution  of  1875,  which  controlled  this 
ease,  contained  provisions  like  those  of  the  constitution  of  1S68. 
The  earlier  cases  already  cited  were  there  overruled,^  and  the 
doctrine  laid  down  that  these  constitutional  provisions  had  no 
application  to  local  assessments,  and  that  accordingly  the  legis- 
lature had  power  to  provide  for  the  levy  of  such  local  assess- 
ments/'     While    overruling   the    earlier   cases   the   court   pointed 

"Constitution   of   Alabama,   Artick  pany.   45   Ala.   322    [1871]    and  May- 

VI..    §    8     [1819];    Article    VI.,    §    8  or.  Aldermen,  etc.,  of  :\Iobile  v.  Dar- 

[1861];    Article    IV.,    §    38    [1865];  gan,  45  Ala.  310   [1871] ) . 

Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birmingham  ''"Are    the    provisions    of    Art.    XI. 

V.    Klein,    89    Ala.    40 1,    8    L.    E.    A.  referring  as  we  have  seen  to  general 

369,  7   So.  386    [1889].  taxes  and  taxation  and  to  such  only. 

'Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birming-  expressed    limitations    on    the    power 

ham  V.  Klein,  89  Ala.  461,  8  L.  R.  A.  of  the  legislature  with  respect  to  lo- 

369,  7  So.  386   [1889].  cal    a^^sessments   on   property   to   pay 

*  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birming-  for  local  improvements,  which  benefit 

ham  V.   Klein,   89   Ala.   461,   8  L.  R.  that  particular  property.     We  think 

A.   369,   7   So.   386    [1889];    (overrul-  not.     The  overwhelming  weight  of  au- 

ing    Mayor,    Aldermen,    etc.,    of    Mo-  thority    is    against    such    a    construc- 

bile    V.    Roval    Street    Railroad    Com-  tion   and    in  favor  of  tlie  validity  of 


253 


CONSTITLTIONAl.    KESTRICTIOX    APPLICABLE,    ETC 


§151 


out  that  they  were  cases  in  which  the  assessment  was  apportioned 
according  to  frontage,  and  that  in  saeh  earlier  cases  were  inti- 
mations that  it  the  assessments  had  been  made  according  to 
benefits  eo  nomine,  they  might  have  been  sustained.  The  doc- 
trine laid  down  in  ]\[ayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birmingham  v.  Klein/" 
has  since  been  followed  in  later  cases,^^  and  Alabama  may  now 
be  considered  as  in  line  on  this  point  with  the  weight  of  au- 
thoritv.^- 


§  151.    Arkansas, 

The  provision  of  the  former  constitution  of  Arkansas:  ''All 
property  subject  to  taxation  shall  be  taxed  according  to  its 
value — that  value  to  be  ascertained  in  such  manner  as  the 
General  Assembly  shall  direct :  making  the  same  equal  and  uni- 
form throughout  the  state.  No  species  of  property  from  which 
a  tax  may  be  cDllected  shall  be  taxed  higher  than  another  species 


such  assessments.  In  considering  the 
question,  jurists  and  judges  have  pro- 
ceeded on  the  theory  that  such 
charges  were  not  taxes  in  the  ordi- 
nary .sense  or  within  the  meaning  and 
intent  of  constitutional  provisions 
similar  to  those  of  Alabama,  but 
that  they  are  in  the  nature  of  com- 
pensation for  a  benefit  peculiar  to 
the  owner  of  the  abutting  property 
and  traceable  t.)  liim;  that  such  as- 
sessments are  not  exacted  for  the 
general  pul)]ic  welfare,  and  do  not  go 
to  the  support  of  governmental  agen 
cies  from  the  existence  and  mainte- 
nance cif  wliich  each  citizen  derives 
a  like  benefit,  but  tliat  tiiey  are  de- 
niandable  because  the  gDvernment 
has  expended  an  equivalent  sum  in 
improving  the  property  against  which 
they  are  laid,  and  tliereby  not  the 
fvublic.  but  t'.ie  individual  owner  of 
the  property  improved  lias  been  t  ) 
-.hat  extent,  the  gainer.  A  tax.  it  i< 
said,  is  a  contribution  to  the  genera! 
fund,  tlie  amount  of  which  is  taken 
from  tlie  individual  and  notiiing 
wliich  benefits  him  individually  as 
distiniruished  from  the  mass  of  citi- 
zens is  given  in  the  place  of  it.  He 
pays,  and  by  the  amount  he  pays  \- 
poorer   than   he   was  before.      Not    s 


with  an  as.sessment  of  the  class  we 
are  considering.  The  property  owTier 
pays  it,  but  in  legal  contemplation 
he  lo.ses  nothing.  He  receives  the 
value  of  his  money  in  the  betterment 
cf  his  property  and  in  addition  to 
this  he  is  benefited  to  the  same  ex- 
tent that  all  other  citizens  are  in 
that  a  thoroughfare  of  the  city  in 
which  his  property  is  situated  and 
he  probably  lives  is  improved.  The 
authorities  almost  universally  take 
fuch  an  imposition  though  confessed- 
ly laid  under  the  taxing  power  out  of 
the  category  of  taxes  and  taxation 
as  those  terms  are  employed  in  or- 
ganic limitations  on  legislative  power 
to  levy  or  authorize  the  levying  of 
taxes,  and  in  general  statutes." 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birmingham 
V.  Klein.  89  Ala.  401.  4G5.  4GG,  8  L. 
\\.  A.  3G9,  7  So.  386   [1889]. 

"89  Ala.  4G1.  8  L.  R.  A.  .^GO,  7 
So.  38G   [1S89]. 

"  (  ity  Council  of  Alontiomery  v. 
Pir(]s;)ng.  126  Ala.  G32.  28  So.  522 
[1899]. 

'-  Klyton  Land  C"o.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  (ity  of  Bi-rmingham,  89  Ala.  477, 
7  So.  901;  Hare  v.  Kennerly.  83  Ala. 
608.  3  So.  G83;  Shultos  v.  Eberly,  82 
.Ma.  242.  2  So.   34."). 


§  151  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  254 

of  i^roperty  of  equal  value,  "^  was  held  not  to  apply  to  local  as- 
sessments.'-' Accordingly  a  statute  providing  for  a  special  levee 
tax,  and  requiring  the  land  to  be  valued  at  not  less  than  ten 
dollars  an  acre  is  not  invalid  under  this  clause.^  Under  a  simi- 
lar constitutional  provision,  "Laws  shall  be  passed,  taxing  by 
a  uniform  rule,  ...  all  real  and  personal  property  according 
to  its  true  value  in  money, "  ■*  it  was  held  that  such  provision 
was  applicable  to  local  assessments,  that  they  must  be  appor- 
tioned according  to  the  value  of  the  property,  and  that  if  ap- 
portioned according  to  frontage,  such  assessments  were  invalid."' 
The  present  constitution  of  Arkansas  provides:  "All  property 
subject  to  taxation  shall  be  taxed  according  to  its  value,  that 
value  to  be  ascertained  in  such  manner  as  the  General  Assembly 
shall  direct,  making  the  same  equal  and  uniform  throughout  the 
state.  No  one  species  of  property  from  which  a  tax  may  be 
collected  shall  be  taxed  higher  than  another  species  of  property 
of  equal  value,  provided  the  General  Assembly  shall  have  power 
from  time  to  time  to  tax  hawkers,  peddlers,  ferries,  exhibitions 
and  privileges  in  such  manner  as  may  be  deemed  proper.  Pro- 
vided, further,  That  the  following  property  shall  be  exempt  from 
taxation :  Public  property  used  exclusively  for  public  purposes ; 
churches  used  as  such ;  cemeteries  used  exclusively  as  such ; 
school  buildings  and  apparatus;  libraries  and  grounds  used  ex- 
clusively for  school  purposes,  and  buildings  and  grounds  and 
materials  used  exclusively  for  public  charity.""  "All  laws  ex- 
empting property  from  taxation  other  than  as  provided  in  this  con- 
stitution shall  be  void."'     "Nothing  in  this  constitution  shall  be 

'  Article  VII.,  Title   Eevenue,   §   2,  burden    of   taxes    assessed.      But    the 

Constitution   of  Arkansas    [1S36].  principle  upon  which  this  approxima- 

-McGehee    v.    Mathis,    21    Ark.    40  tion  to  equality  is  to  be  maintained 

[I860];     (reversed   on    another    point  must   be   preserved    inviolate    in    this 

in    McGee    v.    Mathis,    71    U.    S.     (4  that  all  property  subject  to  taxation 

Wall.)    143,  18  L.  314   [1866]);    (fol-  sliall  be  uniformly  assessed  according 

lowing  Washington  v.  State,  13  Ark.  to  value,  a  rule  applicable  to  all  tax- 

752    [1853]    on    the    point    that    this  ation,    whether    for    general    or    local 

provision  does  not  apply  to  local  tax-  and    special    purposes.     .     .     .     This 

ation. )  valuation    and    assessment    cannot   be 

^  McGehee    v.    Mathis,    21    Ark.    40  arbitrarily  determined  either  by  law 

[I860].  or   by   an   ordinance."      Peay   v.    City 

*  Article    X.,    §    2,    Constitution    of  of    Little    Rock,    32    Ark.    31,    38,    30 

Arkansas  [1808].  [1877]. 

^Peay    v.    City   of   Little    Rock,    32  "Art.    XVI.,    §    5,    Constitution    of 

Ark.    31     [1877];     "We    can    scarcely  Arkansas    [1874]. 

■  expect  absolute  equality  in  all  cases.  '^  Art.    XVI.,    §    6,    Constitution    of 

or     benefit     commensurate     with     the  Arkansas   [1874]. 


255  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  152 

SO  construed  as  to  prohibit  the  General  Assembly  from  author- 
izing assessments  on  real  property  for  local  improvements  in 
towns  and  cities  under  such  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  law,  to  be  based  upon  the  consent  of  a  majority  in  value  of 
the  property  owners  owning  property  adjoining  the  locality  af- 
fected; but  such  assessments  shall  l)e  ad  valorem  and  uniform."^ 
Under  these  provisions  it  has  been  held  that  special  assessments 
must  be  according  to  value  and  not  according  to  frontage.* 
Furthermore,  if  part  of  the  property  affected  by  the  improve- 
ment is  exempted,  while  other  property  similarly  situated  is 
assessed,  the  requirement  of  uniformity  is  violated.^"  Assess- 
ments for  benefits  levied  according  to  the  value  of  the  property 
are  held  under  this  provision  to  be  constitutional.^^  It  has  been 
said,  however,  to  be  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  assess 
either  according  to  the  value  of  the  land  affected  or  according 
to  the  value  of  the  benefits  added  by  the  improvement,  without 
violating  this  constitutional  provision.^-  This  observation  was 
in  part  obiter  as  in  this  case  the  benefits  were  assessed  upon 
the  basis  of  the  valuation  of  the  land  affected.  Three  judges 
concurred  in  this  opinion  and  decided  the  ease  on  the  theory  that 
assessments  levied  in  proportion  to  the  .increased  value  of  the 
land  caused  by  the  improvement  for  which  such  assessment  was 
levied  was  an  ad  valorem  assessment.  The  fourth  judge  ren- 
dered an  opinion  in  which  he  did  not  discuss  this  theor.y.  Even 
under  the  theory  that  assessments  must  be  apportioned  according 
to  the  benefits  received  it  has  been  held  to  be  within  the  power  of 
the  legislature  to  require  a  property  owner  to  construct  a  sidewalk 
in  front  of  his  land,  on  the  theory  that  such  requirement  could 
be  made  under  the  jiolice  power  and  not  under  the  power  of  tax- 
ation.'^ 

§  152.     Colorado. 

In  Cob)ra(l()  it  was  hcbl  originall\'  tlial   tlu'  clause  of  the  con- 
stitution   providing    for    luiiloriiiity    of    taxation    included    local 

*.\rt.   XIX.,    S    27,   Constitution   of  Rock    v.    Katzonstcin,    52    Ark.     107. 

Arkansas    1  1S74J.  12  S.   W.    1!)8    [ISSOl;    (  ity  of  Little 

"Town  of   MonticcUo   v.   Banks,   48  Rock  v.  lioard  of  Iini)n)vcinents,  etc.. 

Ark.  251,   2   S.   W.   852    [188(1].  42  Ark.   152   [1883]. 

'"  Town  of  :Monticello  v.   Ranks,  48  ^-  Ahern  v.   Board  of  Iniprovoniont. 

.Ark.  251,  2  S.  \V.  852  [188(5]  :   Davis  District  Xo.  3  of  Toxarkana,  69  Ark. 

V.  Gaines,  48   Ark.   370.  3   S.-  \V.    184  08,  61  S.  W.  575   [1901]. 

tl880].  "James  v.  Pine  Bluff,  49  Ark.  199, 

"  Kitzgerald     v.    \Valkor.    .15    Ark.  4  S.  W.  700  [  1887]. 
148,    17    S.    W.    702     [1891]:     Little 


§  152  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  256 

assessments  for  special  benefits  as  well  as  taxes  in  the  narrower 
sense  of  the  term,  and  that  accordingly  assessments  referable 
to  the  power  of  taxation  as  distinguished  from  the  police  power 
could  not  be  apportioned- according  to  benefits/  This  viev/  was 
adhered  to  in  subsequent  cases ;-  and  in  a  still  later  case  the 
Supreme  Court  in  response  to  a  question  submitted  to  it  by  the 
legislature  declined  to  overrule  its  former  decisions  upon  ex 
parte  argument.'^  Soon  afterwards,  however,  the  same  question 
was  presented  in  litigation  in  which  adverse  interests  were  rep- 
resented, and  it  was  then  held  that  the  constitutional  require- 
ment of  uniformity  did  not  apply  to  local  assessments  and  that 
it  was  therefore  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  pro- 
vide for  local  assessments,  apportioned  according  to  benefits  and 
not  according  to  valuation.*  This  last  view  is  in  accordance  with 
the  weight  of  authority,^  and  has  since  been  followed  consistently 
by  the  courts  of  Colorado.*^  Even  while  the  earlier  rule  was 
in  force  in  Colorado,  the  courts  upheld  assessments,  based  on 
the  theory  of  the  performance  of  a  legal  duty  and  not  upon  the 
theory  of  benefits,  even  though  such  assessments  were  not  ap- 
portioned upon  a  basis  of  valuation,"  the  court  holding  that  as- 
sessments based  upon  the  theory  of  legal  duty  were  referable 
to  the  exercise  of  the  police  power  and  not  to  the  exercise  of 
the  taxing  power.  Among  assessments  of  this  class  were  assess- 
ments for  the  construction  of  sidewalks  **  and  sewers."  The  im- 
portance of  this  distinction  for  this  purpose  has  of  course  been 
diminished  by  the  change  of  view  of  the  Colorado  courts,  since 
now  assessments  for  all  improvements  of  a  public  character, 
which  confer  a  special  and  peculiar  benefit  to  certain  property 
may  be  levied  on  such  property  in  proportion  to  the  benefits  con- 
ferred without  violating  the  constitutional  requirement  of  uni- 
formity. 

^  Palmer     v.     Way,     6     Colo.     106  « See  §  147. 

[1S81].  'City    of    Denver    v.    Kennedy.    33 

=  Wilson  V.   Chilcott,    12   Colo.   600,  Colo.  80,  80  Pac.  122,  467   [1905]. 

21    Pac.   901    [1889];    City  of  Pueblo  'City    of    Pueblo    v.    Robinson,    12 

V.    Robinson,    12    Colo.    593,    21    Pac.  Colo.   593,  21   Pac.   899    [1889];    Pal- 

899    [1889];    Brown  v.   City   of  Den-  mer  v.  Way,  6  Colo.  106   [1881]. 

ver,  7  Colo.  305,  3  Pac.  455  [1884].  *  Palmer'   v.     Way,     6     Colo.     106 

^  In  re  House  Resolutions  concern-  [1881]. 

ing    Street    Improvements,     15    Colo.  *  City    of    Pueblo    v.    Robinson,    12 

598,   26   Pac.   323    [1890].  Colo.    ^593,     21     Pac.     899      [1889]', 

*  City    of    Denver    v.    Knowles,    17  Keese    v.    City    of    Denver,    10    Colo. 

Colo.   204.   17   L.   R.   A.    135,   30   Pac.  112,  15  Pac.  825  [1887]. 
1041    [1892]. 


25  (  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  $  1.53 

§  153.    Illinois. 

The  constitution  of  Illinois  of  1848  contained  the  following- 
provisions:  "The  corporate  authorities  of  counties,  townships, 
school  districts,  cities,  towns  and  villages  may  be  vested  with 
power  to  assess  and  collect  taxes  for  corporate  purposes;  such 
taxes  to  be  uniform  with  respect  to  persons  and  property  within 
the  .jurisdiction  of  the  body  imposing  the  same.  And  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  shall  require  that  all  the  property  within  the 
limits  of  municipal  corporations  belongring  to  individuals  shall 
be  taxed  for  the  payment  of  debts  contracted  under  authority 
of  law. "^  "The  General  Assembly  shall  provide  for  levying 
a  tax  by  valuation  so  that  every  person  shall  pay  a  tax  in  pro- 
portion to  the  value  of  his  or  her  pr/)perty.  .  .  .  "  -  Under 
these  provisions  it  was  held  that  the  doctrine  of  equality  and 
uniformity  of  taxation  was  applicable  to  local  assessuicnts  in  a 
very  limited  and  qualified  manner.  Local  assessments  were  held 
to  be  referable  to  the  power  of  eminent  domain  as  has  already 
been  stated.^  From  this  view  it  was  held  to  follow  that  com- 
pensation must  be  made  for  the  assessment,  either  in  money  or 
in  benefits,*  and  that  if  the  assessment  exceeded  the  amount  of 
the  benefits  it  was  a  violation  of  the  constitution,  since  it  could 
not  be  upheld  to  the  extent  of  such  excess,  under  the  doctrine 
of  eminent  domain;  nor  could  it  be  upheld  as  to  such  excess 
under  the  doctrine  of  taxation,  since  it  lacked  the  equality  and 
uniformity  prescribed  by  the  constitution.^  General  principles 
often  are  laid  down  Avith  constant  reference  to  the  particular 
application  of  them  which  the  court  intended  to  make.  In  this 
instance  the  deduction  made  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois 
was  that  while  assessments  were  valid  if  apportioned  according 
to  benefits  eo  nomine,^  they  were  invalid  if  apportioned  accord- 
ing to  frontage.'^     The  explanation   constantly  given  for  this  re- 

'  Art.  IX.,  §  5,  Constitution  of  Illi-  and   Michigan  Canal   v.   City  of  Chi- 

nois   [1848].  cago,  12  111.  403  [1851]. 

"  Art.  IX.,  §  2,  Constitution  of  Illi-  '  St.  Jolin  v.  City  of  East  St.  Louis, 

nois  [1848].  .-,0  111.  02   [1809]:'  Holbrook  v.  Dick- 

'Sce  §    101.  inson.   40   111.  28.5    [1867];    Wright  v. 

"City  of  Chi(..go  v.  Ward.  30  111.  9  (  ity   of   Chicago,   40    III.    44    [1867]; 

ri864].  Ik'dard    v.    Hall,    44    111.    91    [1867]; 

'City  of   Chicago   v.   Ward.   30   111.  City  of  Chicago  v.   Baer.  41    111.  306 

"   [1804].  [1800];    City   of   Ottawa    v.    Spencer. 

•City   of    Chicago    v.    Baer.    41    111.  40    111.   211    [1866];    City  of  Chicago 

306    [1860];    Trustees  of   the   Illinois  v.    Ward.    36    111.    9    [1864];    City   of 

Chicago  V.  Larned,  34  111.  203  [1864]. 


§  153  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  258 

suit  was  that  such  an  assessment  was  a  violation  of  the  rule 
requiring  equality  and  uniformity  in  taxation.^  To  escape  the 
res^^lt  arrived  at  in  the  foregoing  cases,  that  assessments  by  front- 
age must  be  invalid,  the  following  provision  was  inserted  in  the 
constitution  which  went  into  effect  in  Illinois  in  1870 :  ' '  The 
General  Assembly  may  vest  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities, 
towns  and  villages  with  power  to  make  local  improvements  by 
special  assessment  or  by  special  taxation  of  contiguous  property 
or  otherwise.  For  all  other  corporate  purposes  all  municipal 
corporations  may  be  vested  with  authority  to  assess  and  collect 
taxes,  but  such  taxes  shall  be  uniform  in  respect  to  persons  and 
property  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  body  imposing  the  same."  " 
In  a  ease  decided  soon  a:£ter  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  of 
1870  it  was  said  that  the  rules  of  equality  and  uniformity  of  taxa- 
tion were  not  strictly  applicable  to  special  assessments  for  local 
improvements;  but  that  they  must  be  levied,  it  seemed,  on  the 
principle  of  the  value  of  the  property  assessed  in  proportion  to 
the  benefits  thereto.^'^  Under  this  provision  it  was  finally  held 
that  the  power  of  local  assessment  thus  specifically  given  was 
free  froiu  the  constitutional  limitations  of  equality  and  uniform- 
ity.^^ The  latter  provision  in  the  constitution  of  1870  was  as 
follows:  "The  General  Assembly  shall  provide  such  revenue  ;is 
may  be  needful  by  levying  a  tax  by  valuation  so  that  every  per- 
son and  corporation  shall  pay  a  tax  in  proportion  to  the  value 
of  his,  her  or  its  property."^-    Under  these  provisions  the  power 

*"In  that  case    (i.  c-  City  of  Chi-  "^  Halsey    v.    Town    of    Lake    View, 

cago   V.   Larned,   34   111.   203)    it  was  188    111.    540,    59    X.    E.    234    [1901]; 

held    that    in   taxation,    ecfuaiiiy    and  Wilbur    v.    City    of    Springfield,     123 

uniformity   were   indispensable   to  its  111.   395,   14  N.  E.  871    [1889];    Mnr- 

constitutionality    and    that    the    same  phy  v.  People,   120  111.  234,   11  X.   E. 

principle    applied    to   assessments   for  202;  Cit,y  of  Springfield  v.  Green,  120 

public  improvements  and  that  an  as-  111.  269,   11  N.  E.  261;   City  of  Ster- 

sessment   upon    the    size   or   width   of  ling  v.  Gait,  117  111.  11,  7  N.  E.  471 

the    front    of   the    lot   without   refer-  [1887];  City  of  Galesburg  v.  Searles. 

ence    to     its    value    was    invalid    as  114    111.   217,    29    N.    E.    686    [1886]; 

being    in    violation    of    the    principle  Enos  v.   City  of  Springfield,   113   111. 

of    equalitv    and    uniformity."      Hoi-  05  [1886] ;  Craw  v.  Village  of  Tolono. 

brook  V.   Dickinson,  40   111.  "285.  287.  90  111.  255,  36  Am.  Rep.  143  [1880]; 

288   [1867].  White     v.     People     ex     rel.     City     of 

» Constitution  of  Illinois,  1870.  Art.  Bloomington,     94     111.     604     [1880]; 

JX.    §   9.  Bisrelow  v.  City  of  Chicago,  90  111.  49 

^^  Himdley    and    Rees    v.    Commis-  [1878];  Fagan  v.  City  of  Chicago,  84 

sioners  of  Lincoln  Park,   67   111.   559  111.  227. 

[1873].  i=Art.  IX.,  §   1,  Constitution  of  Ill- 
inois   [1870]. 


250  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  154 

of  local  assessment  if  attempted  to  be  granted  to  any  public 
corporation  other  than  those  mentioned  in  Article  IX.,  Section  9, 
already  quoted,  must  be  exercised  in  compliance  with  the  con- 
stitutional requirement  of  equality  and  uniformity  of  taxation. ^^ 
Accordingly  when  the  legislature  attempted  to  give  to  a  drain- 
age district  the  power  of  local  assessment  it  was  held  that  such 
power  could  be  granted  only  to  such  public  corporations  as  were 
mentioned  in  Article  IX.,  Section  9 ;  and  that  if  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion for  the  construction  of  a  levee  was  given  to  a  drainage  dis- 
trict it  was  limited  by  the  requirements  of  uniformity  and  equality 
of  taxation.^*  Accordingly,  as  a  result  of  this  holding,  an  amend- 
ment to  the  constitution  of  Illinois  was  adopted  as  follows: 
"The  General  Assembly  may  pass  laws  permitting  the  owners 
of  lands  to  construct  drains,  ditches  and  levees  for  agricultural, 
sanitary  or  mining  purposes,  across  the  lands  of  others  and  pro- 
vide for  the  organization  of  drainage  districts  and  vest  the  cor- 
porate authorities  thereof  with  power  to  construct  and  maintain 
levees,  drains  and  ditches  and  to  keep  in  repair  all  drains,  ditches 
and  levees  heretofore  constructed  under  the  laws  of  this  state 
by  special  assessments  upon  the  property  benefited  thereby.  "^^ 
Under  this  amendment  it  is  held  that  assessments  for  drainage 
purposes  are  not  subject  to  the  constitutional  requirement  of 
equality  and  uniformity  of  taxation  as  the  latter  have,  under 
the  constitution  in  its  present  form,  nothing  to  do  with  local 
assessments.^" 

§  154.     Kentucky. 

In  Kentucky  at  a  time  when  there  was  no  specific  constitu- 
tional provision  requiring  uniformity  of  taxation,  an  assessment 
for  benefits  was  held  to  bo  invalid  upon  grounds  which  were 
sufficient  to  overthrow  all  assessments.^  The  reason  assigned  for 
holding  such  assessment  invalid  was  that  if  a  tax  it  must  be  ap- 
portioned according  to  the  value  of  the  property  taxed,  while 
if  a  taking  of  private  property  for  public  use  the  exaction  could 
not  be  in  the  form   of  money,   since   the   constitutional   require- 

"  Updike     V.     Wrifjlit.     81     111.     40  '"Moore    v.    People    ex    rel.    Lewis, 

[1876].  km;  111.  .370   [18S3]. 

"Updii<e     V.     Wright.     81     111.     40  'Sutton's    Heirs    v.    Louisville.    35 

[1876].  Ky.    (5  Dana)    28   [1837]. 

"Constitution    of    1S70.    Art.    IV., 
§  31,  adopted  as  amendment   [1878]. 


§  154  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  260 

raent  for  compensation  would  require  a  return  of  the  same  amount 
of  money,  and  the  transaction  would  therefore  be  a  mere  farce. 
The  assessment  was  one  in  which  the  cost  of  land  taken  for 
widening  a  street  was  assessed  upon  the  OAvners  of  abutting 
property — a  kind  of  assessment  which  has  caused  more  trouble 
than  any  other.'-  The  court  receded  from  this  extreme  position 
in  subsequent  cases  and  it  was  held  that  the  very  nature  of  the 
power  of  taxation,  of  which  local  assessment  was  a  branch,  and 
the  constitutional  provisions  forbidding  the  taking  of  property 
without  due  compensation,''  made  it  necessary  to  apportion  an 
assessment  substantially  upon  the  basis  of  the  benefits  conferred 
by  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  was  levied,  and 
forbade  arbitrary  exactions,  irrespective  of  such  basis  of  ap- 
portionment, l)ut  that  if  apportioned  substantially  upon  a  basis 
of  benefits,  such  assessment  might  be  valid.*  "The  distinction 
between  constitutional  taxation  and  the  taking  of  private  prop- 
erty for  public  use  by  legislative  will,  may  not  be  definable 
with  perfect  precision.  But  we  are  clearly  of  the  opinion  that 
whenever  the  property  of  a  citizen  shall  be  taken  from  him  by 
the  sovereign  will  and  appropriated  without  his  consent  to  the 
benefit  of  the  public  the  exaction  should  not  be  considered  a 
tax  unless  similar  contributions  be  made  by  that  public  itself  or 
shall  be  exacted  rather  by  the  same  public  will  from  such  con- 
stituent members  of  the  same  community  generally  as  own  the 
same  kind  of  property.  Taxation  and  representation  go  to- 
gether. And  representative  responsibility  is  one  of  the  chief 
conservative  principles  of  our  form  of  government.  When  taxes 
are  levied,  therefore,  they  must  be  imposed  on  the  public  in  whose 
name  and  for  whose  benefit  they  are  required  and  to  whom  those 
who  impose  them  are  responsible.  And  although  there  may  Ix 
a  discrimination  in  the  subjects  of  taxation,  still  persons  in  the 
same  class  and  property  of  the  same  kind  must  generally  be 
subjected  alike  to  the  same  common  burden.  This  alone  is  taxa- 
tion, according  to  our  notion  of  constitutional  taxation  in  Ken- 

=  See  §  112,  §113,  §  308  et  seq.  Article     X..     §     12.     Constitution     of 

*  "Nor    shall    any    man's    property  Kentucky, 

be    taken    or    applied    to    public    use  *  Howell     v.     Bristil.     71     Ky.     (8 

without  the   consent  of  his  represen  Bush.)    493.  [1871];    City  of  Lexing- 

tatives    and    without    just    compensa-  ton  v.  McQuillan's  Heirs,  39  Ky.    (9 

tion  being  previously  made  to  him."  Dana)    513,  35  Am.  Dec.   159   [1840]. 


261  COXSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  155 

tucky.''-'  In  a  later  constitution  of  Kentucky  provisions  were 
inserted  requiring  e(inality  of  taxation,  as  follows:  Taxes  shall 
be  uniform  upon  all  property  subject  to  taxation  within  the  ter- 
ritorial limits  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax ;  and  all  taxes 
shall  be  levied  and  collected  by  general  laws."  All  ])roperty 
shall  be  assessed  at  its  fair  cash  value.'  All  property.  Avhether 
owned  by  natural  persons  or  corporations,  shall  be  taxed  in 
proportion  to  its  value,  unless  exempted  by  this  constitution; 
and  all  corporate  property  shall  pay  the  same  rate  of  taxation 
paid  by  individual  property.  Nothing  in  this  constitution  shall 
be  construed  to  prevent  the  General  Assembly  from  providing 
for  taxation  based  on  income,  licenses  or  franchises.^  These 
provisions  were  held  to  add  nothing  to  the  constitutional  re- 
quirements already  in  force,  but  to  be  merely  declaratory  of 
the  principles  in  force  in  Kentucky."  Local  assessments  are  not 
taxes  within  the  meaning  of  these  provisions  requiring  taxation 
in  proportion  to  value. ^^  The  sole  uniformity  and  equality  requi- 
site under  these  provisions  is,  as  before  their  adoption,  an  ap- 
portionment upon  a  sul)stantial  basis  of  benefits. 

§  155.    Louisiana. 

The  original  constitution  of  Louisiana  contained  no  provision 
requiring  equality  or  uniformity  of  taxation.  It  was,  therefore, 
held  in  a  case  not  involving  local  assessments,  that  the  legis- 
lature was  practically  unrestricted  in  its  exercise  of  the  power 
of  taxation.*  While  the  law  was  in  this  condition,  a  local  as- 
sessment for  public  improvements  was  held  to  be  valid,  in  part, 

"City  of  Lcxinjiton   v.   ^McQuillan's  '"  Gosnell  v.  (  ity  of  Lnuisvillo.   104 

Heirs,  39  Ky.  (<)  Dana)  5L3.  517,  35  Ky.  201,  40  S.  W.  722,  20  Ky.  L.  R. 
Am.  Di'c.   15v)    [1840].  519     [18981:     Ilolzhauer    v.    City    of 

Xpwpnrt.   94    Ky.    39(1.   22    S.   W."  752 
118031. 

'  "Tlic    constitution    of    this     state 
liavinp  aflixcd  no  limits  to   tlio  exer- 
cise of  the  power  of  taxation  by  the 
tucky.  lefjislature,    it   is   diflicult   to   suppose 

'Sections  171  and  174  of  the  pres-  even  a  case  in  which  the  exercise  of 
ent  constitutinn  of  Kentucky  an-  tliat  power  could  be  considered  un- 
nounce  '"nothing  new  but  are  merely  constitutional  or  properly  become 
declaratory  of  what  was  always  the  tlie  subject  of  judicial  interference." 
law  of  taxation  in  this  state."  Holz-  T,e  Brettui  v.  Mor<ii'i.  4  Mart.  (La.) 
hauer  v.  (ity  (f  Newpnrt.  94  Ky.  396,  X.  S.  138,  142  [18201. 
22   S.   W.    752    I  1S931. 


«Sec. 

171, 

Constitution 

of     Ken- 

tucky. 

'  Sec. 

172, 

Constitution 

of     Ken- 

tucky. 

*  Sec. 

174. 

Constitution 

(if     Ken- 

§  155  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  262 

on  the  theory  that  there  was  no  provision  requiring  uniformity 
and  equality  of  taxation,  and  in  part  upon  the  theory  that  the 
basis  of  apportionment  was  such  that  the  assessment  was  uniform 
and  equal  according  to  its  nature.-  The  validity  of  such  as- 
sessments was  thereafter  assumed  without  discussion.^  Subse- 
quently in  the  later  constitutions  of  Louisiana  provisions  were 
introduced  requiring  equality  and.  uniformity  of  taxation,  as 
follows:  "Taxation  shall  be  equal  and  uniform  throughout  the 
state.  "^  Taxation  shall  be  equal  and  uniform  throughout  the 
limits  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax,  and  all  property  shall  be 
taxed  in  proportion  to  its  value,  to  be  ascertained  as  directed 
by  law ;  provided,  the  assessment  of  property  shall  never  exceed 
the  actual  cash  value  thereof;  and  provided  further,  that  the  tax- 
payers shall  have  the  right  of  testing  the  correctness  of  their 
assessments  before  the  courts  of  justice.  In  order  to  arrive  at 
this  equality  and  uniformity  the  General  Assembly  shall,  at  its 
first  session  after  the  adoption  of  this  constitution,  provide  ; 
system  of  equality  and  uniformity  in  assessments  based  upon 
the  relative  value  of  property  in  different  portions  of  the  state. 
The  valuations  put  upon  property  for  the  purposes  of  stdte 
taxation  shall  be  taken  as  the  proper  valuation  for  purposes  o 
local  taxation,  in  every  subdivision  of  the  state.'  It  Avas  at  firs 
held  in  a  case  not  involving  local  taxation  that  such  provisions 
applied  only  to  state  taxes  and  had  no  application  either  to  local 
taxes  or  to  assessments."  In  following  out  this  theory  the  court 
held  or  in  many  cases,  assumed  without  discussion,  that  such  pro- 
visions had  no  application  to  local  assessments.'  Subsequently 
after  a  change  in  the  personnel  of  the  court,  the  majority  of  the 
court   began   to   hold   that   such   provisions   Avere    applicable    to 


=  Oakey  v.  Mayor,   1  La.   1    [1830].  Ann.    76    [1852];     Municipality    No. 

^  Blancliet    v.    Municipality    No.    2,  Two   for   the   Opening  of   Euphrosine 

13  La.  322   [1839].  Street,  7  La.  Ann.  72  [1852];  O'Leary 

*  Article  127,  Constitution  of  Louis-  v.  Sloo,  7  La.  Ann.  25  [1852]; 
iana  [1845]  ;  Article  123,  Constitu-  Boulat  v.  Municipality  Number  One, 
tion  of  Louisiana    [1852].  5  La.  Ann.  363   [1S50];  Municipality 

'  Art.    225,    Constitution    of    Louis-  Number    One    v.    Young,    5    La.    Ann. 

iana.  362     [1850];     Matter     of     Claiborne 

*  Second  Municipality  v.  Duncan.  2  Street,  4  La.  Ann.  7  [1849];  Matter 
La.  Ann.  182  [1847];  (a  case  in-  of  Exchange  Alley.  4  La.  Ann.  4 
volving  a  school  tax.)  [1849];    City    of    Lafayette    v.    Male 

"  Jlunicipality  Number  Two  fir  t-io  Orphan      Asylum,      4     La.      Ann.      1 

opening    of    Roffignac    Street.    7    La.  [18-!9]. 


263  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  155 

local  assessments/^  As  a  deduction  from  this  rule,  they  held 
in  some  cases  that  such  assessments  must  be  apportioned  on  a 
basis  of  valuation,  and  not  on  the  basis  of  benefits  or  of  any 
approximation  thereto.''  In  this  case  the  majority'  attempted 
to  distinguish  the  earlier  eases  on  the  ground  that  the  con- 
stitutional provisions  in  question  were  found  in  the  constitution 
then  in  force  ^^  and  that  the  earlier  cases  were  under  constitu- 
tions not  containing  such  provisions.^^  The  minority  dissented 
on  the  ground  that  the  provision  of  this  character  in  the  con- 
stitution then  in  force  ^-  was  taken  literally  from  the  constitu- 
tion of  1845,^^  and  that  since  such  provision  had  been  held  under 
the  prior  constitution  not  to  be  applicable  to  local  assessments, 
this  construction  must  be  presumed  to  have  been  adopted  as 
part  of  the  new  constitution.  In  other  cases  the  majority  held 
that  such  provisions  applied  to  local  assessments,  but  that  these 
provisions  were  not  violated  by  the  assessments  in  question, 
they  being  as  equal  and  uniform  as  in  their  nature  was  possible.'^ 
The  next  case  that  came  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  Louisiana 
was  one  involving  drainage  assessments.  On  the  original  hear- 
ing, the  view  that  constitutional  provisions  requiring  equality 
and  unformity  of  taxation  are  applicable  to  local   assessments 


*City    of    New    Orleans    v.    Elliott,  taxation  as  was  done  previous  to  the 

10  La.  Ann.  59   [1855];   Municipality  Act  of  1832."     [Municipality  Number 

Number   Two    v.    Dunn,    10    La.    Ann.  Two  Praying  for  the  Opening  of  Ben- 

57      [18551;      Municipality     Number  ton  Street  v.  White,  9  La.  Ann.  446. 

Two  Praying  for  the  Opening  of  Ben-  451    [1854]. 

ton  Street  v.   White,  9   La.  Ann.  446  ^"Article  123  Constitution  of  Louis- 

[1854];    (decided  by   a  vote  of  three  iana    [1852]. 

to  two).  "See     the      majority      opinion      in 

"Municipality  Number  Two  Pray-  Municipality  Number  Two  Praying 
ing  for  the  Opening  of  Benton  Street  for  the  Opening  of  Benton  Street  v. 
V.  White,  9  La.  Ann.  440  [1854];  White,  9  La.  Ann.  446  [1854];  (dis- 
"It  being  impossible  to  ascertain  the  tinguishing  Blanchet  v.  Municipality 
precise  degree  of  benefit  which  is  de-  No.  2,  13  La.  322  [1830]). 
rived  by  any  or  by  all  of  the  prop-  '=  Article  123,  Constitution  of 
erty  holders  within  the  district  from  Louisiana  [1852]. 
any  public  improvement  that  may  be  "  Article  127,  Constitution  of 
determined  on  by  the  local  authori-  Louisiana  [1845]. 
ties,  there  is  no  other  mode  of  ap-  "  City  of  New  Orleans  v.  Elliott, 
portioning  a  tax  for  such  improve-  10  La.  Ann.  59  [1855].  The  assess- 
ments which  will  be  equal  and  uni-  monts  in  question  were  said  to  be  "as 
form  but  that  of  an  ad  valorem  tax  equal  and  uniform  as  the  nature  of 
on  all  property  holders  within  the  tlie  thing  admits  of."  Municipality 
district,  or  by  p.iyinsr  the  expense?  No.  2  v.  Dunn,  10  La.  Ann.  57.  58 
out  of  tlie  funds  derived  from  general  [1855]. 


§  15(3 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


264 


was  adhered  to/^  The  next  ease  involving  this  question  came 
up  after  a  partial  change  in  the  composition  of  the  Supreme 
Court.  The  view  entertained  in  the  cases  immediately  preced- 
ing was  abandoned  and  that  entertained  by  the  earlier  eases 
and  by  the  weight  of  authority,  namely,  that  provisions  requir- 
ing equality  and  uniformity  of  taxation  are  not  applicable  to 
local  assessments,  was  adopted.^"  This  was  followed  by  a  re- 
hearing of  the  New  Orleans  Drainage  Company's  case,"  and  at 
such  rehearing "  the  view  entertained  at  the  original  hearing 
was  abandoned  and  it  was  held  that  such  constitutional  provi- 
sions were  not  applicable  to  local  assessments.  This  view  has 
been  adhered  to  consistently  in  the  later  cases  and  Louisiana 
may  be  classed  with  those  holding  the  majority  view.^'' 

§  156.     Massachusetts. 

The  constitution  of  Massachusetts  gives  the  legislature  power 
"to  impose  and  levy  proportional  and  reasonable  assessments. 
rates  and  taxes  upon  all  the  inhabitants  of,  and  persons  resi- 
dent, and  estates  lying  within  the  said  commonwealth;  and  also 
to  impose  and  levy  reasonable  duties  and  exercises  upon  any 
produce,  goods,  wares,  merchandise  and  commodities,  whatso- 
ever, brought  into,  produced,  manufactured,  or  being  within  the 
same.  "^     In   its  application  to  local   assessments  this   provision 


"  New  Orleans  Draining  Company, 
Praying  for  the  Confirmation  of  a 
Tablean,  11  La.  Ann.  338  [1S50]; 
( decided  by  a  vote  of  two  to  one ) . 

"=Yeatman  v.  Crandall,  11  La.  Ann. 
220   [1856]. 

"  New  Orleans  Draining  Company 
Praying  for  the  Confirmation  of  a 
Tableau,    11    La.   Ann.    338    [1856]. 

^' New  Orleans  Draining  Co.  Pray- 
ing for  the  Confirmation  of  a  Tab- 
leau,  11  La.  Ann.  351    [1856]. 

^'  As  holding  this  view  see  City  of 
Shreveport  v.  Prescott,  51  La.  Ann. 
1895,  46  L.  R.  A.  193,  26  So.  664 
[1899];  Rosetta  Gravel  Paving  &* 
Improvement  Co.  v.  JoUisaint,  51  La. 
Ann.  804,  25  So.  477;  Fayssoux  v. 
Denis,  48  La.  Ann.  850,  19  So.  760 
[1896]  ;  Hill  v.  Fontenot,  46  La.  Ann. 
1563,  16  So.  475  [1894];  State  ex 
rel.  Hill  v.  Judges,  46  La.  Ann.  1292, 


16  So.  219  (obiter)  [1894];  Ellis  v. 
Pontchartrain  Levee  District,  43  La. 
Ann.  33,  8  So.  914;  Munson  v.  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  the  Atchafal- 
aya  Basin  Levee  District,  43  La. 
Ann.  15,  8  So.  906  [1891];  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Company  v.  Gogreve, 
41  La.  Ann.  251,  5  So.  848  [1889]; 
Excelsior  Planting  &  Manuf'g.  Co.  v. 
Green,  39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So.  873; 
Charnock  v.  Fordoche  and  Grosse 
Tete  Special  Levee  District  Company, 
38  La.  Ann.  328  [1886]  ;  City  of  New 
Orleans  v.  Estate  of  Burthe,  26  La. 
Ann.  497 ;  City  of  New  Orleans  Pray- 
ing for  the  Opening  of  Casacaloo  and 
Moreau  Streets,  20  La.  Ann.  497 
[1868]:  Wallace  v.  Shelton,  14  La. 
Ann.  498  [1859];  Surgi  v.  Snetch- 
man,  11  La.  Ann.  387   [1856]. 

iPart   II.,    Chap.    1,    §    1.   Art.    IV., 
Constitution  of  Massaclmsetts. 


265  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.         §§  157,  158 

is  held  to  require  that  the  assessment  must  be  apportioned  to 
the  benefits  conferred  b.y  the  improvement  for  which  such  as- 
sessment is  levied,  and  must  be  limited  to  the  amount  thereof.- 
On  the  one  hand  an  assessment  so  apportioned  and  limited  is 
not  invalidated  by  this  clause  in  the  constitution.^  On  the  other 
hand  an  assessment  not  so  apportioned  and  limited  is  rendered 
invalid  by  the  effect  of  this  clause.* 

§  157.    Michigan. 

The  courts  of  Michigan  at  first  hesitated  to  commit  themselves 
upon  the  question  of  the  applicability  of  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision concerning  uniformity  of  taxation  to  local  assessments.  In 
a  case  arising  under  the  laws  passed  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the 
constitution  it  was  held  such  provision  was  not  self-executing, 
that  it  could  not  become  operative  until  the  legislature  had 
provided  some  new  rule  in  conformity  with  such  requirement, 
and  that  such  constitutional  provisions  could  not  affect  assess- 
ments made  before  the  legislature  had  provided  such  rule.^  Sub- 
sequently the  court  divided  upon  the  question  of  whether  such 
provisions  were  applicable  to  local  assessments.-  Finally  the 
view  entertained  by  the  majority  of  the  courts  was  adopted  and 
it  was  held  that  these  provisions  were  applicable  to  the  valua- 
tion and  taxation  of  property  for  general  purposes  but  not  to 
local  assessments  for  benefits.^ 

§  158.     Minnesota. 

Tlu'  constitution  of  ]Minnesota  contained  the  provision  original- 
ly :  "All  taxes  to  be  raised  in  this  state  shall  be  as  lu^arly  ecjual 
as  may  be,  and  all  property  on  which  taxes  are  to  be  levied 
shall  have  a  cash  valuation  and  be  equalized  and  uniform 
throughout   the  state.  "^     This  provision  was  held  to   apply  to 

*  White    V.    Oove.    18.3    :\rass.    .3.33.  28.    42   L.    R.    A.    642,    .51    X.    E.    204 

67  N.  E.  359   [1003].  [1898]. 

'  \A'anon    v.    Street    Cnmmissioners  M^'illiam.s    v.    flavor,    etc..    of    De- 

of  the  City  of  Boston.  187  :\ras.s.  290,  troit.  2  Mich.  560   [1853]. 

72    X.    E.    1022     [1905]:    Lincoln    v.  =  Woodhridpe   v.   City  of  Detroit.   8 

Board  of  Street  Commissioners  of  the  :Micli.  274    [1860]. 

City    of    Boston.    176    ^Fass.    210.    57  ':\rotz  v.  City  of  Detroit.   18  Mich. 

X.   E.   356    [1900].  494    [1869]. 

MVhite  V.  Gove,   183  Mass.  333.  67  'Art.  IX.,  §  1,  Constitution  of  Min- 

X.    E.    359    [1903]:    \Yeed    v.    .Mayor  nesota    [1857]. 
and   Aldermen   of    Boston.    172    Mass. 


§  159  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  266 

local  assessments.-  and  to  require  them  to  be  apportioned  on 
the  basis  of  valuation  of  the  property  assessed  and  not  on  the 
basis  of  the  amount  of  benefits  conferred.^  To  avoid  the  effect 
of  such  holding,  the  constitution  of  Minnesota  was  amended  in 
1869  by  adding  to  Article  IX.,  Section  1,  the  following  provision: 
"The  legislature  may  by  general  law  or  special  act  authorize 
municipal  corporations  to  levy  assessments  for  local  improve- 
ments upon  the  property  fronting  upon  such  improvements  or 
upon  th?  property  to  be  benefited  by  such  improvements  with- 
out regard  to  a  cash  valuation  and  in  such  manner  as  the  legis- 
lature may  prescribe."^  Under  this  amendment  the  clause  re- 
quiring equality  of  taxation  and  a  cash  valuation  does  not  prevent 
the  legislature  from  apportioning  assessments  substantially  ac- 
cording to  benefits;^  but  it  does  apply  to  assessments  in  excess 
of  the  amount  of  the  benefits  conferred  or  so  apportioned  as  to 
ignore  the  question  of  benefits.'^ 

§  159.     South  Carolina. 

The  cojistitution  of  South  Carolina  contains  provisions  for 
equality  and  uniformity  of  taxation.^  The  provision  re- 
quiring uniformity  and  equality  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  local  corporation  imposing  the  tax  was  found  in  the 
earlier  constitution  of  1868,  but  not  in  those  of  1779  and 
1787.  Prior  to  the  adoption  of  such  constitutional  pro- 
vision local  assessments  were  held  to  be  valid.-  After  its  adop- 
tion, the  constitutional  provision  forbidding  the  taking  of  prop- 
erty except  by  the  law   of  the  land  was  held  to  invalidate  all 

=  Stinson    v.    Smith.    8    Minn.    366,  Minn.  78,  6  N.  W.  424   [1880];   Rog- 

8   Gil.   326    [18G3].  ers  v.  City  of  St.  Paul.  22  Minn.  494 

'Bidwell  V.  Coleman,   11  Minn.  78,  [1876]. 

11  Gil.  45   [1865];   Stinson  v.  Smith.  ■=  State  v.  Pillsbury,  82  Minn.  359. 

8  Minn.  366,  8  Gil.  326    [1863].  85  X.  ^Y.   175   [1901];   State  of  Min- 

*  Laws   1869   Ch.  51.  nesota   ex    rel.    Merchant   v.    District 

^  State    of   Minnesota   ex    rel.    City  Court  for  St.  Louis  County,  66  Minn, 

of    Duluth    V.    District    Court    of    St.  161,  68  N.  W.  860    [1896];    State  of 

Louis   County,   CI    Minn.    542.   64   N".  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Merrick  v.  District 

W.    190    [1895]  :    Malthy   v.   Taut-res,  Court  of  Hennepin  County,  33  Minn. 

50  Minn.  248.  52  X.  W.  858   [1892];  235,  22  X".  W.  625    [1885]. 

State  of  ]Minnesota  ex  rel.  Burger  v.  ^Article  I.,   §  6;   Article  ITT.,   §   29 

District    Court    of    Ramsay    County,  and   Article  X.,   §   5,  Constitution  of 

33  Minn.  295,  23  X.  W.  222   [1885];  South  Carolina. 

Xoonan    v.    City    of    Stillwater.     33  ^  City      Council      v.      Pinckney.      1 

Minn.  198,  53  Am.  Rep.  23.  22  X.  W.  Treadwav   (S.  C.)    42   [1812]. 
444;   City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Mullen.  27 


I 


267  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  160 

assessments  for  local  improvements  except  those  improvements 
which,  like  sidewalks,  were  upheld  by  the  court  under  the  police 
power.^  Under  this  provision  it  has  finally  been  held  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  South  Carolina,  that  local  assessments  even 
for  sidewalks  and  other  improvements  under  the  police  power 
are  invalid.*  The  theory  upon  which  this  result  was  reached  was 
that  the  constitutional  provision  in  question  applied  to  local  as- 
sessments and  prevented  the. municipal  corporation  from  subdi- 
viding: the  city  into  taxing  districts,  and  thereby  prevented  the 
assessment  of  the  property  specially  benefited  by  the  local  im- 
provement. South  Carolina  thus  seems  to  be  committed  to  the 
view  contrary  to  that  entertained  by  the  overwhelming  weight 
of  authority.  It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  the  sidewalks  and 
drains  for  which  the  assessments  in  the  case  in  question  were 
levied  were  made  necessary  only  by  the  chanue  of  grade  of  the 
street.  The  result  reached  in  the  South  Carolina  case  has  been 
reached  in  other  jurisdictions  ^  without  invoking  the  theory 
adopted  in  South  Carolina. 

§  160.     Tennessee. 

The  constitution  of  Tennessee  contains  the  following  provi- 
sions: "  .  .  .  All  property  shall  be  taxed  according  to  its  val- 
ue, that  value  to  be  ascertained  in  such  manner  as  the  legislature 
shall  direct  so  that  taxes  shall  be  equal  and  uniform  throughout 
the  state.  No  species  of  property  upon  which  a  tax  may  be  col- 
lected shall  be  taxed  higher  than  any  othor  species  of  property 
of  the  .same  value  .  .  .  "^  "The  General  Assembly  shall  have 
power  to  authorize  the  several  counties  and  incorporated  towns 
in  this  state  to  impose  taxes  for  county  and  corporation  purposes 
respectively  in  such  manner  as  shall  be  prescribed  hy  law;  and 
all  property  shall  be  taxed  according  to  its  value,  upon  the  prin- 
•ciples  established  in  regard  to  state  taxation."  -  The  original  hold- 
ing of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee  was  that  local  assessments 

'Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Creen-  20  S.  E.  842   f  180.31)  ;   Stehmeyer  v. 

ville,  42  S.  C.  293.  46  Am.  St.   Rpp.  City  Council   of  Cliarloston.  538.  C. 

723,  27  L.  R.  A.  284.  20  S.  E.  842.  2.50.  31  S.  E.  322  [1808]. 

*Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Croon  »  Soo  §  382. 

villo,  53   S.   C.  285.  09   Am.   St.   Rop,  '  Art.    TL.     §     28.    Constitution    of 

85.5,   43   L.   R.    A.    101,   31    S.   E.   252  Tonnossee. 

11898];    (overruling  Mauldin  v.  City  =  Art.    II..    §    29.    Constitution    of 

Council   of  Greenville.   42   S.   C.   293.  Tennessee. 
46  Am.  St.  Rep.  723,  27  L.  R.  A.  284, 


§  161  TAXATION    BY    ASSEiSSMENT.  268 

referable  to  the  power  of  taxation  as  distinguished  from  those 
referable  to  the  police  power,  w^ere  controlled  by  these  provi- 
sions, and  that  they  must  be  equal,  uniform  and  according  to 
value. ^  Under  this  theory  assessments  for  street  improvements* 
and  for  drainage  purposes  ^  were  invalid  if  not  apportioned 
according  to  valuation.  This  theory  of  course  forliade  ap- 
portionment except  on  a  basis  of  valuation  or  some  approximation 
thereto.  It  was  adopted  as  the  doctrine  of  Tennessee  when  the 
question  first  came  before  the  courts  ®  and  was  adhered  to  till 
a  very  recent  time.'  One  of  the  reasons  given  for  this  hold- 
ing was  that  in  other  states  there  was  a  customary  law  of  as- 
sessments ante-dating  constitutional  restrictions,  but  in  Tennes- 
see there  was  no  such  customary  law.^  Finally,  however,  the 
court  abandoned  its  former  holding,  overruled  its  earlier  cases 
and  adopted  the  doctrine  held  by  the  weight  of  authority,  that 
such  constitutional  provisions  have  no  application  to  local  assess- 
ments." Assessments  based  on  the  theory  of  the  performance  of 
a  legal  duty,  whieli  the  court  regarded  as  referable  to  the  police 
power  rather  than  to  the  power  of  taxation  were  never,  in  Ten- 
nessee, held  to  be  limited  by  the  constitutional  provisions  in 
question.  Such  assessments  could  therefore  be  made  according 
to  frontage  without  violating  this  constitutional   provision.^" 

§  161.     Virginia. 

The  constitution  of  Virginia  contained  the  following  provision: 
"Taxation,  except  as  hereinafter  provided,  whether  imposed  by 

^  Reelfoot    Lake    Levee    District    v.  "  Taylor,  JNIcBean  and  Co.  v.  C'liand- 

Dawson,   97   Tenn.    151,   34   L.   R.   A.  ler,    56    Tenn.     (9    Heisk.)     349.    24 

725,   36    S.   W.    1041    [189H1;    Taylor,  Am.  Rep.  308  [1872]. 

McBean     and     Co.     v.     Chandler,     56  'Arnold  v.  Maj'or  and  Aldermen  of 

Tenn.    (9   Heisk)    349,   24   Am.   Rep.  Knoxville,  115  Tenn.   195,  3  L.  R.  A. 

308  [1872].  (X.    S.)    837,   90   S.   W.   469    [1905]. 

*  Taylor,  McBean  and  Co.,  v.  Chand-  ^°  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Nash- 

ler,  56  Tenn.    (9  Heisk.)    349,  24  Am.  ville  v.  Berry,  2  Shannon's  Cases  561 

Rep.  308   [1872].  [1877];   Whyte  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 

^  Reelfoot    Lake    Levee    District    v.  men  of  Nashville.  32  Tenn.   (2  Swan.) 

Dawson,   97    Tenn.    151,    34   L.    R.    A.  364     [1852];     Washington    v.    Mnyor 

725,  36  S.  W.  1041    [1896].  and  Aldermen  of  Xashville,  31   Tenn. 

« Taylor,  McBean  and  Co.  V.  Chand-  (1    Swan.)     177    [1851];    Mayor    and 

ler,    56    Tenn.     (9    Heisk.)     349,    24  Aldermen   v.   Mayberry,   25   Tenn.    (6 

Am.  Rep.  308   [1872].  TTnni,)h.)      368,     44     Am.     Dec.     315 

'Reelfoot    Lake    Levee    District    v.  [1845]. 
Dawson,   97   Tenn.    151,   34   L.   R.   A, 
725.  36  S.  W.  1041    [1896]. 


I 


269 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§161 


the  state,  county  or  corporate  bodies,  shall  be  eciual  and  uniform 
and  all  property,  both  real  and  personal,  shall  be  taxed  in  propor- 
tion to  its  value,  to  be  ascertained  as  prescribed  by  law.  No 
one  species  of  property  from  which  a  tax  may  be  collected  shall 
be  taxed  higher  than  any  other  species  of  property  of  equal 
value.  "^  Under  this  provision  it  was  held  that  local  assessments 
were  not  controlled  by  the  constitutional  requirement  of  equality 
and  uniformity,  which  concerned  general  taxation  alone.-  Sub- 
se(|uently  in  cases  presenting  circumstances  of  peculiar  hard- 
ship and  oppression  the  correctness  of  the  former  holding  was 
doubted.^  A  statute  providing  that  the  assessment  in  .addition 
to  being  a  lien  on  the  property  "shall  also  be  a  personal  debt 
of  the  owner  of  the  property,"  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional 
as  in  violation  of  the  foregoing  provision  requiring  equality  and 
uniformity.*  In  a  later  case  the  original  doctrine  was  re-affirmed 
and  it  was  held  that  an  assessment  apportioned  according  to 
benefits  and  not  involving  any  question  of  personal  liability 
was  not  affected  by  the  constitutional  requirement  of  equality 
and  uniformity."'  The  question  has  been,  to  a  great  extent, 
settled  in  Virginia  by  a  constitutional  provision  already  quoted," 
which  forbids  local  assessments  for  all  but  a  few  specified  pur- 
poses. An  assessment  was  levied  before  the  adoption  of  such 
constitutional  provision,  and  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  thereof 
it  had  been  perfected  as  to  some  of  the  tracts  to  be  assessed 
but  not  as  to  all.  It  was  held  that  the  adoption  of  such  con- 
stitutional  provision   rendered    it   impossible  to   perfect   such   as- 


^Art.  X.,  §  1,  Constitution  of  Vir- 
ginia. 

^  Davis  V.  City  of  Lvnclibnrir.  84 
Va.  861,  6  S.  E.  230  [1888]-.  Green 
V.  Ward,  82  Va.  324  [1880];  R.  and 
A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  LvncliburjT, 
81  Va.  473  [18GG1;  Sands  v.  City 
of  Richmond,  72  Va.  (31  (iratt.) 
571.  31  Am.  Rep.  742  [  18791;  Nor- 
folk City  V.  Ellis,  G7  Va.  (2G  Cratt.) 
224   r 18751 . 

'McCrowell  v.  City  of  P.ristid.  SO 
Va.  652.  20  L.  R.  A.  G53.  16  S.  E. 
867  [18031;  rity  of  Xorf(dk  v. 
Chamliprlain.  80  Va.  106.  IG  S.  E. 
730  [18921;  In  .speakinji  of  the  lead- 
ing case  of  People  ex  rel.  C.'-'Hri  v. 
IMayor,    etc..    of    P.rooklvn.    4    X.    Y. 


419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851]  the 
court  said:  "The  doctrine  lield  in 
that  case  if  viewed  in  the  liglit  of 
the  present  constitution  of  Virginia 
cannot,  it  would  seem,  be  considered 
otherwise  than  as  unwarranted  and 
daufzerous  in  tlie  extreme."  City  ot 
Norfolk  V.  Cliamberlain,  89  Va.  196, 
201.   IG  S.   E.   730    [1892]. 

*  Asberry  v.  City  of  Roanoke,  91 
Va.  5G2,  42  L.  R."  A.  636,  22  S.  E. 
:?G0   11805]. 

°^'ioh'tt  V.  Citj'  Council  of  Alex- 
andria, 92  Va.  561,  53  Am.  St.  Rep. 
825.  31  L.  R.  A.  382,  23  S.  E.  909 
[189G]. 

"See  §    107. 


§§  162,  163  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT,  270 

sessments  thereafter,  and  that  under  the  requirement  of  eiiuality 
i\n(\  uniformity  the  assessmnts  already  levied  could  not  be  en- 
forced.'^ 

§  162.     West  Virginia. 

The  constitution  of  West  Virginia  contains  provisions  requir- 
ing equality  and  uniformity  of  taxation.^  "The  legislature  may 
by  law  authorize  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and 
villages,  for  corporate  purposes,  to  assess  and  collect  taxes ;  but 
such  taxes  shall  be  uniform  with  respect  to  persons  and  prop- 
erty, within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  authority  imposing  the 
same.  "^"  It  has  been  held  that  the  former  provision  applies 
only  to  laws  applying  to  the  entire  state  and  not  to  lav*s  ap- 
plicable to  cities.^  The  latter  provision  was  held  to  be  addressed 
to  the  legislature,  not  self-executing,  prospective  in  operation 
and  not  operative  to  repeal  a  law  in  force  when  adopted.*  Ac- 
cordingly, until  the  legislature  should  pass  a  law  under  such  lat- 
ter constitutional  provision,  assessments  under  laws  in  force  when 
the  constitution  was  adopted  were  not  affected  by  such  consti- 
tutional provision.  Decision  of  the  question  of  the  general  ap- 
plicability of  such  constitutional  provisions  to  local  assessments 
was  thus  avoided.  In  later  cases  it  has  been  held  that  provisions 
requiring  uniformity  and  equality  of  taxation  do  not  apply  to 
assessments.^ 

§  163.     Wisconsin. 

The  constitution  of  Wisconsin  contains  the  provision,  "The 
rule  of  taxation  shall  be  uniform."^  As  far  as  this  section 
alone  was  concerned  it  was  held  that  it  applied  to  and  restricted 

■  Fulkerson  v.  City  of  Bristol.   105  case:  Williams  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  De- 

Va.  555,  54  S.  E.  468   [1006].  troit,   2  Mich.   560    [1853];    and   also 

^  Art.    VIII.,    §    1,    Constitution    of  cases      not      involving      assessments: 

West  Virginia   [1863];   Art.  X..  §   1.  Groves  v.  Slaughter,   15  Pet.    (40  U. 

Constitution        of        West      Virginia  S.)     449,    10    L.    800    [1841];    Slack 

[1872].  V.    Maysville    and    Lexington    R.    R. 

^'Art.  X.,  §  9,  Constitution  of  West  Co.,  13  B.  Mon.    (52  Ky.)    1;   Cass  v. 

Virginia   [1872].  Dillon,  2  0.  S.  607  [1853]). 

'  Douglass   V.   Town   of  Harrisville,  ^  t'ity  of  Parkersburg  v.  Tavenner, 

9    W.    Va.     162,    27    Am.    Rep.    548  42  W.  Va.  486,  26  S.  E.  179;  Wilson 

[1876]:     (citing    Gilkerson    v.    Fred-  v.   Town   of  Philippi,   39   W.   Va.   75, 

erick  Justices.  13  Gratt.    (Va.)   577).  19  S.  E.  553   [1894]. 

*  Douglass  V.   Town  of  Harrisville,  ^  Article  VIII.,  §  1,  Constitution  of 

9    W.    Va.    162,    27    Am.    Rep.    548  Wisconsin. 
[1876];    (citing  a  similar  assessment 


271  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  164 

local  assessments.-  However,  the  constitution  contained  another 
provision:  *'It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  legislature  and  they 
are  hereby  empowered  to  provide  for  the  organization  of  cities 
and  incorporated  villages  and  to  restrict  their  power  of  taxa- 
tion, assessment,  borrowing  money,  contracting  debts,  and  loan- 
ing their  credit  so  as  to  prevent  abuses  in  assessments  and  taxa- 
tion and  in  contracting  debts  by  such  municipal  corporations."^ 
This  latter  provision  was  held  to  except  local  assessments  from 
the  general  constitutional  requirement  of  uniformity  and  equality 
in  taxation,*  on  the  theory  that  the  term  "assessment"  there 
used  meant  local  assessment  in  usual  significance  of  the  term, 
including  the  idea  of  apportionment  on  the  theory  of  benefits."' 
In  this  way  the  Wisconsin  courts  have  reached  the  same  result 
as  that  held  in  most  jurisdictions,  namely,  that  constitutional 
requirements  of  uniformity  and  equalitj^  of  taxation  do  not  ap- 
ply to  local  assessments." 

§  164.    Restriction  of  purposes  of  taxation. 

Constitutional  provisions  are  found  restricting  the  purposes 
for  which  taxation  may  be  imposed.  The  constitution  of  Arkan- 
sas provides:  "...  The  General  Assembly  may  delegate  the 
taxing  power,  with  the  necessary  restrictions  to  the  state's  subor- 
dinate political  and  municipal  corporations  to  the  extent  of  pro- 
viding for  their  existence,  maintenance  and  well-being,  but  no 
further."^      "The   legislature   Shall   not   have   the   right   to   levy 

=  nale    V.    Kenosha,    29    Wis.    599-,  315    (1876];    Bond   v.  .City   of   Keno- 

Lumsden     v.     Cross,     10     Wis.     282;  sha,    17    Wis.    284    [1803];    Slate    ex 

Weeks  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  10  Wis.  rel.    Christopher   v.    City   of   Portage, 

242  [1800].  '  12   Wis.   502    [1800];    Weeks   v.   City 

'Art.    XL,     §     3,    Constitution    of  of   Milwaukee,    10   Wis.   242    [I860]; 

Wisconsin.  Lunisden  v.  Cross,  10  Wis.  282;  "We 

MVeols   V.    City    cf    ^lilwaukee,    10  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  provision 

Wis.  242  [1800].  of    tlie    eonstitution    relating    to    uni- 

°  It  is  generally  held  that  such  use  formity  in  taxation  does  not  apply  to 

of  the   term   assessment  does   not   in-  a  tax  of  this   character.      It   is  more 

elude  local  assessments.     See  §   3.  properly    speaking    of    the    nature    of 

'  Meggett  V.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  81  an    "assessment"   or   special    tax    im- 

Wis.    ,320,    51    X.    W.    506     [1892];  posed   for    the   purpose   of   municipal 

Teegarden  v.  City  of  Racine,  50  Wis.  and    local    improvements."      Bond    v. 

545,  14  N.  W.  014  [1883];  Dalrymple  City   of   Kenosha,    17    Wis.    284,   288, 

V.   City   of   [Milwaukee,   53    Wis.    178,  289    [1803]. 

10  N.  W.    141;    Warner   v.   Knox.   50  'Constitution  of   Arkansas,   Article 

Wis.  429,  7  N.  W.  372  [1880];  John-  11..   §   23    [1874]. 
son   V.    Citv    of    Milwaukee.    40    Wis. 


§  165  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  272 

taxes  or  impose  burdens  upon  the  people  except  to  raise  revenue 
sufficient  for  the  economical  administration  of  the  government 
in  which  may  be  included  the  following  purposes  .  .  .  "- 
These  provisions  are  regarded  as  applying  to  general  taxation 
only,  and  to  have  no  reference  to  local  assessments  levied  for 
special  benefits.  Accordingly  such  provisions  do  not  restrict  the 
legislature  from  granting  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments 
for   purposes    other    than    those    expressed    in    such    provisions.^ 

§  165.     Specific  provisions  protecting  the  obligation  of  contracts. 

In  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  in  those  of  many 
of  the  states  are  found  provisions  intended  to  prevent  state  leg- 
islation which  should  impair  the  obligation  of  contracts,  and  ex- 
pressed in  very  similar  terms.  Among  them  are  provisions  which 
have  been  considered  by  the  courts  in  cases  involving  assess- 
ments, as  follows:  ''No  state  shall  .  .  .  pass  any  .  .  .  law 
impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts  .  .  .  "^  "No  .  .  .  law 
impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts  shall  ever  be  passed.  "- 
"No  .  .  .  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts  .  .  .  shall 
be  passed."^  ''No  .  .  .  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  con- 
tracts shall  ever  be  passed."*  "The  legislature  shall  not  pass 
any  .  .  .  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts,  or  depriv- 
ing a  party  of  any  remedy  for  enforcing  a  contract  which  ex- 
isted when  the  contract  was  made. ' '  ^  "  The  General  Assembly 
shall  have  no  power  to  pass  retroactive  laws  or  laws  impairing 
the  obligation  of  contracts;  but  may  by  general  laws  authorize 
courts  to  carry  into  effect  upon  such  terms  as  shall  be  just  and 
equitable,  the  manifest  intention  of  the  parties  and  officers  by 
curing  omissions,  defects  and  errors  in  instruments  and  proceed- 
ings arising  out  of  their  v/ant  of  conformity  with  the  laws  of 
this  state."®  No  .  .  .  law  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts 
shall  ever  be  passed."'     "No    .    .    .    law  impairing  the  obligation 

=  Article  III.,  §  48,  Constitution  of  ^  Art.  II.,  §  14,  Constitution  of  Illi- 

Texas.  nois. 

^Cribbs   v.    Benedict,    64   Ark.    555,  *  Art.     I.,     §     24,     Constitution     of 

44    S.    W.    707     [1897];     Storrie    v.  Indiana    [1851]. 

Houston    City    Street    Railway    Com  ^Art.  IV.,  §  VII.,  Par.  3,  Constitu- 

pany,  92  Tex.   129.  44  L.  E.  A.   716,  tion  of  New  Jersey. 

46  S.  W.  796    [1898].  « Art.    II.,     §     28,    Constitution    of 

^Art.     I.,     §     10,     Constitution     of  Ohio    [1851]. 

United  States   [1787].  'Art.  I.,  §  21,  Constitution  of  Ore- 

''Art.  I.,  §   16,  Constitution  of  Cal-  gon    [1857]. 
ifornia    [1879]. 


273 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


§166 


of  contracts  .  .  .  shall  be  passed."-  "No  .  .  .  law  impair- 
ing the  obligation  of  contracts  shall  be  made.'"*  "No  .  .  .  law 
impairing  the  obligations  of  contracts  shall   ever  be   passed."^" 

§  166.     Assessment  not  a  contract  within  such  provisions. 

In  determining  the  question  of  the  extent  to  which  these  pro- 
visions restrict  the  power  of  the  legislature  in  enacting  new  leg- 
islation concerning  local  assessments  or  in  amending  or  repealing 
existing  legislation,  it  is  generally  held  that  the  laws  which  de- 
termine the  method  of  levy  and  apportionment  of  an  assessment, 
the  assesjment  itself,  and  the  remedies  given  therefor  are  none 
of  them  contracts  within  the  meaning  of  these  constitutional 
provisions.  Accordingly  such  laAVs  may  be  modified  at  the  will 
of  the  legislature,^  as  long  at  least  as  the  liability  of  the  prop- 


'Art.  I.,  §  17,  Constitution  of 
Pennsylvania. 

'Art.  I.,  §  10,  Constitution  of 
Texas. 

'"Art.  I.,  §  2.3.  Constitution  of 
Washington   [1880]. 

^  City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
Consolidated  Street  Railway  Co.,  196 
U.  S.  5.30,  25  S.  327  [lOOof;  (affirm- 
ing City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
Consolidated  Street  Railway  Co.,  182 
Mass.  40,  04  X.  E.  581  [1902] )  ;  New 
Orleans  City  and  Lake  Railroad  Com- 
panj-  V.  Louisiana  ex  rel.  City  of 
New  Orleans,  157  U.  S.  210,  .30  L. 
679,  15  S.  581  [1895];  (affirming 
State  ex  rel  City  of  New  Orleans  v. 
New  Orleans  Citj'  and  Lake  Railroad 
Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  550.  7  So.  GOO 
[1890]);  Essex  Public  Road  Board 
V.  Skinkle,  140  U.  S.  334,  35  L.  446, 
11  S.  790  [1F911:  (affirming  Essex 
Public  Road  Board  v.  Skinkle.  49  X. 
J.  L.  (20  Vr.)  05.  6  Atl.  4.35  [1886] 
wliich  had  been  affirmed  in  Essex 
Public  Road  Board  v.  Skinkle,  49  X. 
J.  L.  (20  Vr.)  041,  10  Atl.  379 
[18871);  (iarrison  v.  City  of  Xew 
York,  88  U.  S.  (21  Wall)  196,  22  L. 
612  [1874];  Dougherty  v.  Henarie, 
47  Cal.  9  [1873];  Field  v.  City  of 
Chicago.  198  111.  224,  64  X.  E.  840; 
Smith  V.  People  ex  rel.  Detrick.  140 
111.  2oo.  20  X.   E.   670    [1803];    Mar- 


ion and  ^Monroe  Gravel  Road  Co.  v. 
McClure,  GO  Ind.  468  [1879];  Bate 
V.  Sheets,  64  Ind.  209  [1878];  State 
ex  rel.  Monroe  Cravel  Road  Co.  v. 
Stout,  61  Ind.  143  [1878];  Stone  v. 
Street  Commissioners  of  Boston,  192 
Mass.  297,  78  X.  E.  478  [1900]; 
City  of  Springfield  v.  Springfield 
Street  Railway,  182  Mass.  41.  (54  X. 
E.  577  [1901,  1902];  O'Xeill  v.  City 
of  Hoboken,  72  X.  J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  67, 
()0  Atl.  59  [1905]^  City  of  East 
Orange  v.  Hussey,  72  X.  J.  L.  ( 43 
Vr. )  71;  (sub  nomine  Mayor  of  City 
of  East  Orange  v.  Hussey,  59  Atl. 
1000  [1905]);  State,  Estate  of 
Brown,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Union.  62 
X.  .L  L.  142,  40  Atl.  632  [1898]; 
.Tones  v.  Land  is  Township.  50  X.  .J. 
L.  (21  Vr.)  374,  13  Atl.  251;  State, 
]\Iount  Pleasant  Cemetery  Co.,  Pros. 
V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council  of 
Xewark,  50  X.  J.  L.  (21  Vr.)  66.  11 
Atl.  147  [1887]:  State,  Schulting, 
Pros.  V.  City  of  Passaic,  47  X.  J.  L. 
(18  Vr.)  273  [1885];  Rader  v. 
Township  of  I'nion.  44  X.  .J.  L.  (15 
Vr.)  259;  Baldwin  v.  City  of  New- 
ark, 38  X.  J.  L.  I  9  Vr.)  158  [1875]; 
State,  Walter,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Union 
in  the  County  of  Hudson.  33  X.  J.  L. 
(4  Vr.)  350  flS(;01:  Bonney  v. 
Bridgewater,  31  X.  1.  L.  (2  Vr.)"l33; 
State,     Xew     .Tcrscv     Railroad      and 


§167 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


21- 


erty  owner  is  not  materially  affected  thereby.-  The  assessment  is 
said  to  be  not  a  contract  but  a  remedy  in  which  there  is  no  vested 
right.^  Rig'hts  existing  under  a  statute  in  force  when  a  new 
constitution  is  adopted  are  not  affected  by  such  constitution  if 
it  contains  no  provision  which  specifically  abrogates  such  pre- 
existing rights.* 

§  167.     Changes  in  procedure  and  remedies  not  prevented  by  such 
provisions. 

Provisions  as  to  procedure  ^  or  as  to  the  method  of  collecting 
the  assessment  -  are  not  contracts,  and  may  be  modified  by  the 
legislature  at  least  in  so  far  as  they  do  not  increase  the  liability 
of  the  property  owner  above  that  which  rested  upon  him  when 
the  assessment  was  levied.  Thus  mandamus  may  be  granted  by 
statute  as  a  remedy  to  enforce  a  pre-existing  liability  of  a  street 
railway   company   to   maintain   in   good   condition   from   curb   to 


Transportation  Company,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  Kewark,  27  X.  J.  L.  (3 
Dutch)  185  [1858];  Lennon  v.  May- 
or, Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
City  of  New  York,  55  X.  Y.  361 
11874];  Brewster  v.  City  of  Syra- 
cuse, 19  X.  Y.  116  [1859];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Treacy  to 
Vacate  an  Assessment,  59  Barb.  (X. 
Y.)  525  [1871];  Tilden  v.  Mayor, 
Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of  the 
City  of  Xew  York,  56  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 
340  [1870];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  ileade  to  Reduce  an  As- 
sessment, 13  Hun.  (X.  Y.)  349 
[1878];  Ladd  v.  City  of  Portland, 
32  Or.  271,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  51 
Pac.  654  [1898];  City  of  Chester  v. 
Black,  132  Pa.  St.  568,  6  L.  R.  A. 
802,  19  Atl.  276  [1890];  Pray  v. 
Xorthern  Liberties,  31  Pa.  St.  69 
[1850];  Storrie  v.  Houston  City 
Street  Railway  Company,  92  Tex. 
129,  44  L.  R.  A.  716,  46  S.  W.  796 
[1698];  Town  of  Underbill  v.  Town 
of  Essex,  64  Vt.  28,  23  Atl.  617 
[1891];  Lewis  v.  City  of  Seattle,  28 
Wash.  639,  69  Pac.  393  [1902];  City 
of  Spokane  v.  Browne,  8  Wash.  317, 
36  Pac.  26  [1894]. 


=  Lewis  V.  City  of  Seattle,  28  Wash. 
639,  69  Pac.  393  [1902];  City  of 
Spokane  v.  Browne,  8  Wash.  317,  30 
Pac.  26   [1894]. 

^Bate  V.  Sheets,  64  Ind.  209 
[1878]. 

*  Hoertz  v.  Jefferson  Southern 
Pond  Draining  Co.,  119  Ky.  824,  84 
S.  W.  1141,  27  Ky.  L.  R.  278  [1905]. 
v^  State,  Estate  of  Brown,  Pros.  v. 
Town  of  Union,  62  X.  J.  L.  (33  Vr.) 
1-tl,  40  Atl.  632   [1898]. 

^  Xew  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Louisiana  ex  rel. 
C  ity  of  Xew  Orleans,  157  U.  S.  219, 
39  L.  679,  15  S.  581  [1895];  (affirm- 
ing State  ex  rel.  City  of  Xew  Orleans 
V.  Xew  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail- 
road Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  550,  7  So.  606 
[1890]);  Jones  v.  Landis  Township, 
50  X.  J.  L.  (21  Vr.)  374,  13  Atl. 
251;  Rader  v.  Township  of  LTnion,  44 
X.  J.  L.  (15  Vr.)  259;  Baldwin  v. 
Xewark,  38  X.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  259; 
Walter  v.  Town  of  Union,  32  X.  J. 
L.  (4  Vr.)  350;  Bonney  v.  Bridge- 
water,  31  X.  J.  L.  (2  Vr.)  133; 
State  V.  Xewark,  27  X.  J.  L.  (3 
Dutch.)    185. 


275  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  168 

curb  the  street  on  which  its  tracks  are  situated."'  So  a  statute 
passed  after  assessments  are  levied  and  providing  for  compul- 
sory arbitration  as  a  method  of  compromising  disputes,  and 
for  refunding  any  excess  of  the  amount  of  the  assessment  over 
benefits  conferred,  does  not  impair  the  obligation  of  a  contract.* 
So  where  an  assessment  is  levied  under  a  statute  providing  that 
the  court  shall  vacate  an  assessment  if  not  in  conformity  to  law, 
a  subsequent  statute  providing  that  where  proper  the  court  may 
modify  such  assessment  without  vacating  it,  is  not  unconsti- 
tutional because  it  applies  to  prior  assessments.^  Where  an  as- 
sessment is  levied  under  a  statute  giving  the  property  owner  a 
right  to  test  the  validity  of  an  assessment  by  a  suit  in  equity,  a 
statute  passed  after  the  assessment  Avas  levied  and  before  suit 
was  brought  thereon,  depriving  the  property  owner  of  such  right, 
was  held  not  to  be  unconstitutional."  No  specific  constitutional 
provision  is  referred  to  in  the  opinion,  but  the  court  seems  to  con- 
sider the  provision  against  taking  property  without  due  process  of 
law  as  the  one  in  point.  The  theory  suggested  for  the  holding 
is  that  as  long  as  the  property  owner  is  protected  against  the 
taking  of  his  property,  he  has  no  constitutional  right  to  pro- 
tection against  a  cloud  on  his  title. 

§  168.     Change  relieving  property  owner  at  expense   of  public 
corporation. 

Since  a  city   is  a   pul)lic  corporation  and  possesses  only  such 
powers  of  government  and  taxation  as  are  conferred  upon  it  bv 

'Xew  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail-  Matter   of   Eap;er,   58   Barb.    (X.   Y.) 

road   Company    v.    Louisiana   ex    rel.  557  [1871]  as  a  ease  where  the  proof* 

City  of  New  Orleans,   157  U.  S.  219,  were    taken    prior    to    the   change    of 

39  L.  679,  15  S.  581    [18951;    (amrm-  statute;    and,   Matter  of   Renisen,   59 

ing  State  ex  rel.  (  ity  of  New  Orleans  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    317    [1871]   as  a  case 

V.  New  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail-  where     the     petition     was     presented 

road  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  550,  7  So.  606  prior  to  such  change  of  statute.)  ;  In 

1 1890] ) .  tlic  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Beams 

*  Essex      Public      Road      Board      v.  to    Vacate    Assessment    for    Flagging, 

Skinkle,  140  U.  S.  3.34.  35  L.  446.   11  etc..    Mott    Street.    17    How.    Pr.    (N. 

S.     790      [1891];      (atrirniing     Essex  Y.)    450    [1859]. 

Public  Road  Board  v.  Skinkle,  49  N.  °  Lennon    v.    ]\Iayor,    Aldermen    and 

J.  L.    (20  Vr.)    65.  6  Atl.  435  [1886]  Commonalty     of     the     City     of     New 

which    had    been    afTirmed     in     Essex  York,    55    X.     Y.    361     [1874];     Eno 

PuVdic  Road  Board  v.  Skinkle.  49  X".  v.  Mayor.  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 

J.    L.     (20    Vr.)     641.     10    Atl.    379  of  the' City  of  Xew  York,  7  Hun.   (X. 

[1887]).  Y.)    320    [1876];     (adirming   Eno    v. 

•Matter   of   Treacy,    59    Barb.    (X.  Mayor,    etc.,    53    How.    (N.    Y.)    382 

Y.)      525      [1871];      (distinguishing,  [1877]);    (not  affected  on  this  point 


§163 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


276 


the  legislature,^  a  statute  which  increases  the  burden  cast  upon 
the  city  and  relieves  the  property  owner  from  corresponding 
liability  is  not  invalid  as  impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract. - 
Thus  a  statute  relieving  a  street  railway  company  from  liability 
to  pave  that  part  of  the  street  between  its  rails,  and  substituting 
an  increase  in  the  general  tax  in  lieu  thereof,  is  not  objectionable 
as  against  the  complaint  of  the  city.^  So  by  change  of  statute 
after  an  improvement  has  been  constructed  a  public  corporation 
may  be  deprived  of  the  right  to  reimburse  itself,  by  means  of 
local  assessments,  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement;*  or  the  cost 
of  an  improvement  may  be  made  a  personal  charge  upon  a  city, 
although  it  was  begun  under  a  statute  making  such  cost  payable 
only  out  of  the  assessments  therefor."'  If  an  improvement ,  is 
constructed  under  a  statute  which  imposes  one-half  of  the  cost 
upon  the  county  and  the  other  half  upon  the  owners  of  abutting 
property,  and  a  subsequent  statute  imposes  the  entire  cost  upon 
the  county,  a  general  taxpayer  has  no  ground  of  complaint.® 
In  these  cases,  it  may  be  added,  the  question  was  as  to  the 
power  and  duty  of  the  public  corporation  to  pay  the  amount 
thus  imposed  upon  it  by  statute.  A  different  question  might  be 
presented  if  the  contractor  were  complaining  of  the  change  of 
statute  and  were  attempting  to  assert  his  rights  as  they  existed 
when  the  contract  was  entered  into.     On  the  other  hand   it  has 


by  the  reversal  in  Eno  v.  ]Mayor,  Al- 
dermen and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of  New  York,  G8  N.  Y.  214   [1877]). 

^See  Chapter  VI. 

-  City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
Consolidated  Street  Railway  Co.,  I9G 
U.  S.  539,  25  S.  327  [1905];  (affirm- 
ing City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
Consolidated  Street  Railway  Co.,  182 
Mass.  49,  64  X.  E.  581  [1902]); 
City  of  Springfield  v.  Springfield 
Street  Railway"  Co.,  182  ^Slass.  41, 
64  N.  E.  577  [1901,  1902];  O'Xeill 
V.  City  of  Hoboken,  72  X.  J.  L.  (43 
Vr.)  67,  60  Atl.  50  [1905];  City  of 
East  Orange  v.  Hussey,  72  X.  J.  L. 
(43  Vr. )  71;  sub  nomine  Mayor  of 
East  Orange  v.  Hussey.  59  Atl.  1060 
[1905]. 

^  City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
Consolidated  Street  Railway  Co..  196 
U.     S.      539,      25      S.      327      [1905]: 


( affirming  City  of  Worcester 
V.  Worcester  Consolidated  Street 
Railway  Co.,  182  Mass.  49,  64  X.  E. 
581  [1902]);  City  of  Springfield  v. 
Springfield  Street  Railway  Co.,  182 
Mass.  41,  64  X.  E.  577   [1901,  1902]. 

*  Stone  V.  Street  Commissioners  of 
Boston,  192  Mass.  297,  78  X.  E.  478 
[1906];  City  of  East  Orange  v.  Hus- 
sey, 72  X.  J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  71;  sub 
)wmine  Mayor  of  East  Orange  v.  Hus- 
sey, 59  Ati.   1060   [1905]. 

=  O'Xeill  V.  City  of  Hoboken.  72 
X.  J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  67,  60  Atl.  50 
[1905];  Rader  v.  Township  Commit- 
tee of  Union,  39  X.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.) 
509;  (affirmed  41  X.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.) 
617). 

"  Durrett  v.  Davidson,  —  Ky.  . 

8  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  546,  93  S.  W.  25 
[1906]. 


277  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  169 

been  said  that  where  work  has  been  done  or  a  contract  entered 
into  under  a  statute  which  allowed  the  city  to  reimburse  itself 
by  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement,  the  repeal  of 
such  assessment  statute  cannot  affect  the  right  of  a  city  to  en- 
force its  equitable  right  to  compel  the  property  owners  to  re- 
imburse it  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement.'  The  right  to  levy 
an  assessment  may  be  taken  away  by  a  constitutional  amend- 
ment which  takes  effect  after  the  improvement  is  made  but  be- 
fore the  assessment  is  perfected,**  even  if  the  effect  of  such  change 
of  law  will  be  to  prevent  the  enforcement  of  assessments  already 
perfected  under  the  constitutional  requirement  of  equality  and 
uniformity  of  taxation.  A  statute  requiring  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  make  restitution  of  an  amount  unlawfully  exacted  by  it 
from  a  property  owner  as  a  local  assessment,  is  not  invalid,  al- 
though it  is  in  its  effect  retroactive.''  The  legislature  may  change 
the  powers  of  a  drainage  district,  since  it  is  a  public  or  quasi 
public  corporation  and  its  charter  is  therefore  not  an  executed 
contract.^" 

§  169.     Change  increasing  burden  of  property  owner. 

If  the  change  in  statute  will  result  in  an  increase  of  the  burden 
of  some  or  all  of  the  property  owners,  it  has  been  held  that  such 
statute  cannot  apply  to  prior  assessments.^  The  point  of  time  to 
be  taken  as  fixing  the  rights  of  the  parties  is  a  question  upon 
which  different  opinions  have  been  expressed.  It  has  been  said 
that  it  is  the  date  of  the  passage  of  the  improvement  ordinance,- 
the  date  when  the  contract  is  entered  into.''  and  the  date  that 


'  City    of    Spokane    v.    Browno.    8  vate    corporations   but   on    the    other 

Wash.  317,  .30  Pac.  20    11S941;    (dis-  liand    they   are   at   least  quasi   public 

tinguishing  Wilson  v.  City  of  Seattle,  corporations    and    as    such    the    laws 

2  Wash.  543.  27   Pac.  474    [1891]    as  providing    for   tlieir   organization   are 

a  case  where  no  work  had  been  done  subject  to  be  changed,  modified  or  re- 

and    no   contract   entered    into   before  pealed  as  the  wisdom  of  tlie  legisla- 

tlie  change   of   statute;    wliile    in   tlio  ture    may    direct."      Smith    v.    Peojile 

ease  at  bar  the  contract  had  been  let  ex    rel.    Detrick,    140    111.    3.55.   20    X. 

and  the  work  partly  done  before  sucli  K.  070   [18031. 

cliange.)  '  City  of  Dallas  v.  Ellison,   10  Tex. 

"Fnlkerson   v.   City  of  Bristol.    105  Civ.  App.  28.  30  S.  W.   1128    [18051. 

Va.  .555.  54  S.   K.  40S    [10001.  =  Cincinnati    v.    Seasongood.    40    0. 

"State  ex  rel.  v.  Ilon'man.  35  0.  S.  S.  29G.  21   X.  E.  030    [1887]. 

435  [1880].  'Houston  v.  McKenna.  22  Cal.  550 

"Such    districts    are    '-created    for  |  1S(;3]. 
public  purposes,  are  in  no  sense  pri- 


§  169  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  278 

the  assessment  is  levied.^  Where,  after  the  improvement  ordi- 
nance is  passed  and  before  the  assessment  ordinance  is  passed, 
the  legislature  changes  the  rule  of  law  controlling  as  to  the 
land  to  be  included  in  the  assessment  district,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  property  owners  have  a  constitutional  right  to  have 
the  assessment  levied  according  to  the  provisions  in  force  when 
the  ordinance  was  passed.^  The  rights  of  the  property  owners 
did  not  rest  solely  on  the  constitutional  provision,  since  the 
courts  construed  the  statute  as  being  entirely  prospective  in  its 
operation.  Other  viev/s  have  been  held  on  this  point,  however. 
An  improvement  ordinance  was  passed  at  a  time  when  the  stat- 
ute in  force  provided  that  assessments  could  be  levied  upon 
"contiguous"  property  benefited  by  such  improvement.  Sub- 
sequently the  statute  was  amended  by  omitting  the  word  "con- 
tiguous." After  such  amendment,  a  supplemental  petition  was 
filed  in  the  proceeding  in  which  the  city  was  seeking  to  appro- 
priate land  by  eminent  domain  at  the  cost  of  the  property  bene- 
fited, and  it  was  held  that  the  statute  as  amended  controlled  the 
proceeding,  and  that  under  such  supplemental  petition  it  was 
possible  to  assess  property  benefited,  even  though  not  contiguous 
to  the  proposed  street.^  Where  no  constitutional  provision  for- 
bade special  legislation  of  this  type,  it  has  been  held  that  the 
legislature  could  provide  for  levying  a  supplemental  assessment, 
the  original  assessment  being  valid,  for  the  purpose  of  paying  to 
the  contractor  who  had  constructed  the  improvement  a  sum  over 
and  above  the  contract  price,  which  additional  payment  the  city 
could  not  have  made  under  its  charter,  without  such  special 
authority."  Legislation  has  been  sustained  which  alternately  re- 
lieves the  property  owner  and  then  restores  his  original  burden. 
The  legislature  of  Indiana  repealed  all  laws  authorizing  assess- 
ments or  the  collection  of  existing  assessments  for  gravel  roads." 
This  statute  was  held  to  be  constitutional  even  as  to  assessments 
made  before  its  enactment.^     By  a  subsequent  statute  "  the  leg- 


*  Dougherty   v.   Henarie,   47   Cal.   9  '^  Brewster  v.   City   of  Svraeiisp,   19 
[1873].          "  N.  Y.  116   [1859]. 

^Cincinnati    v.    Seasongood,    46    O.  *  Act  of  March  13,  1875:  Acts  1875, 

S.  296,  21  N.  E.  630  [1887].  Rec;.  Sess.,  p.  80. 

*  In   the  Matter   of  Westlake   Ave..  ^Marion     Township     Gravel     Road 
Seattle.    40   Wash.    144,    82   Pac.    279  Co.  v.  Sleeth.  53  Tnd.  35. 

[1905],  ^"Act  of  March  2.  1877:  Acts  1877, 

Rp<?.  Rpss.,  p.  72. 


279  CONSTITI'TIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  169 

islature  provided  that  such  assessments  might  be  collected  wher- 
ever such  corporation  had  incurred  an  indebtedness  in  reliance 
upon  such  assessments.  This  statute  was  held  to  be  constitu- 
tional." This  statute  was  not.  however,  a  curative  statute,  and 
did  not  authorize  the  collection  of  assessments  which  were  void 
when  levied.^-  At  one  time  under  the  California  law  a  contract 
for  a  street  improvement  became  a  nullity  if  not  performed 
within  the  time  agreed  upon,  and  the  property  owner  was  not 
liable  for  assessments  to  pay  the  cost  of  such  improvement. 
When  a  contract  had  once  been  discharged  by  such  breach,  a 
subsequent  statute  attempting  to  revive  such  contract  and  to 
make  valid  an  assessment  for  street  work  done  thereunder,  was 
unconstitutional.^-"'  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  statute  provides 
that  an  extension  of  time  might  be  granted  before  the  time 
fixed  in  the  original  contract  has  expired,  and  that  if  such  ex- 
tension is  granted  the  contract  remains  valid  and  in  force,  a 
provision  in  the  state  constitution  subsequently  adopted,  forbid- 
ding an  extension  of  time,  cannot  apply  to  contracts  entered 
into  before  the  adoption  of  such  constitutional  provision,^*  and 
a  contract  entered  into  before  such  constitutional  provision  is 
adopted,  and  extended  thereafter,  does  not  become  a  new  con- 
tract of  the  date  of  such  extension ;  and  is  not  subject  to  such 
constitutional  provision.^''  A  statute  which  provides  for  the  or- 
ganization of  an  irrigation  district  on  the  vote  of  a  majority 
of  its  electors  and  imposes  a  certain  liability  on  the  property 
therein  as  a  means  of  paying  the  bonds  issued  for  the  cost  of 
such  improvement  and  the  interest  thereon,  is  in  legal  effect  a 
contract  when  acted  upon  and  the  district  is  once  organized, 
in  so  far  that  the  legislature  cannot  by  a  subsecpient  statute  in- 
crease the  l)urdeii   ujxju   llic   property  within   the  district.'" 

"Marion  and  ^lonrop  Gravol   Road  nf   tlio   State   of   C'alifdniia    v.   Lyiicli. 

Co.  V.  McCluro.  6G   Ind.   408    [18701;  ol   Cal.   l.",.  21    Am.  Rop.  077    [18751. 

State    ox    rel.    Monroo    Cravcl    Ivoad  "  Kdo    v.    Kiiiglit,    0.3    Cal.    ir>n,    28 

Co.  V.  Stout,  01    Ind.   14.3    [18781.  Pac.  800  [18921;  Ede  v.  Cogswell.  7!) 

'-Marion  and  :\ronroo  (iravol   Road  Cal.   278,  21    Pac   707    [ISSOl. 

Co.  V.  Mc-'luro.  00  Tnd.  468   [18791.  "Ede   v.    Knii^lit.    'X\    Cal.    l.>n.    28 

"Fanning    v.     So'-ammel.    08    Cal.  Pac.  767   [18891. 

428,    9    Par.    427     [18801:    Pooplo    v.  '"  Merchants'  National  P.ank  of  San 

McCnne,  .57   Cal.    1,53    [18801;    Brady  r)ie<xo    v.    Escondido    Trrirration    Dis- 

V.   King,   53   Cal.   44    [1878];    People  trict.     144     Cal.     329,     77     Pac.     937 

[19041. 


§  170  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  280 

§  170.     Other  forms  of  statutory  change. 

Where  an  assessment  is  levied  and  confirmed  at  a  time  when 
such  confirmation  is  conchisive  as  to  damages  and  benefits,  a 
snbseqnent  statute  allowing  an  appeal,  and  providing  for  a  va- 
cation of  the  order  of  confirmation  in  case  of  illegality,  does 
not  impair  the  obligation  of  a  contract,  since  neither  the  as- 
sessment nor  the  confirmation  thereof  is  a  contract.^  The  leg- 
islature may  increase  the  requirements  as  to  the  facts  to  be  es- 
tablished in  an  action  to  recover  an  assessment,  and  make  such 
increased  requirements  apply  even  in  case  of  actions  on  prior 
assessments.-  A  property  owner  has  no  contractual  right  in 
the  consequences  which,  by  law,  follow  in  case  of  his  delin- 
quency. Such  consequences  may  therefore  be  changed  by  law, 
without  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts.  Where  the  con- 
tract was  let  at  a  time  when  interest  could  not  be  charged  on 
assessments,  but  before  the  assessment  was  levied,  the  statute 
was  so  modified  as  to  permit  of  interest  on  assessments,  it  was 
held  that  interest  might  be  allowed  thereon.^  The  original  as- 
sessment statute  contained  no  provision  for  an  attorney's  fee 
in  case  of  the  collection  of  assessments  by  suit.  Subsequently 
after  an  assessment  had  been  levied  a  statute  was  passed  al- 
loAving  an  attorney's  fee  as  part  of  the  costs  in  such  ease.  This 
statute  was  held  to  be  valid  as  not  impairing  the  obligation  of 
any  contract.*  After  .judgment  has  been  entered  assessing  cer- 
tain towns  for  contributions  for  portions  of  the  expense  of  main- 
taining a  bridge  or  highway  not  within  their  limits,  a  subse- 
quent  statute   may   be   passed    relieving   such   towns   from   such 

^  Garrison  v.  City  of  New  York,  88  this  case  exceeded  those  which  should 

U.    S.     (21    Wall.)     196,    22    L.    012  be   established   to   justify    an    assess- 

[1874];    In   the  Matter   of   Widening  ment.       The    later     statute    provided 

Broadway,  in  the  City  of  Xew  York,  that   in   order    to    recover   on   an    as- 

61  Barb.   {X.  Y.)   48.3   [1872];  In  the  sessment  the  plaintiff  must  establish 

Matter  of  Widening  Broadway  in  the  the   fact   that    the    evidence    adduced 

City  of  New  York,  42  How.    (N.  Y.)  before    the    board    of    commissioners 

220    [1872];    In    the    Matter    of   the  showed,  and  that  the  board  found  as 

Petition   of   Beekman   to   Vacate   As-*  a  fact,  that  the  proposed  drain  was 

sessments,    19    Howard    (X.   Y. )    518  necessary  and  conducive  to  the  public 

[I860];  In  the  Matter  of»the  Petition  health,  convenience  or  welfare,  or  of 

of  Beams,  ta  Vacate  Assessments,  17  public  benefit  or  utility.) 

Howard   (X.  Y.)   459  [1859].  » Dougherty   v.   Henarie,   47   Cal.   9 

=  Bate     V.     Sheets,     64     Ind.     209  [1873]. 

[1878]:     (It    may   be    doubted,    how-  *  Dowell  v.  Talbot  Paving  Co..   13S 

ever  if  the  increased  requirements  in  Ind.  675,  38  X.  E.  389. 


281  CONSTiTTTIOXAL    RESTRICTIOX    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  171 

liability  iu  the  future.     There  is  no  vested  right   in  such  assess- 
ment.^ 

§  171.     Contracts  concerning  assessments  protected  by  such  pro- 
visions. 

If  a  contract  relates  to,  or  is  connected  with,  a  local  assess- 
ment, the  fact  that  a  local  as.sessment  forms  the  subject  matter 
of  the  contract  does  not  prevent  the  contract  from  being  pro- 
tected by  the  constitutional  provisions,  already  quoted,  which 
prohibit  legislation  impairing  the  obligation  of  conracts.  Ac- 
cordingly the  legislature  cannot  enact  valid  .statutes  after  such 
contracts  have  been  entered  into  modifying  the  rights  and  lia- 
bilities of  the  parties  thereto.^  Thus,  where  contracts  have  been 
entered  into  in  reliance  upon  the  right  to  levy  assessments  to 
pay  the  cost  of  .such  improvements,  a  subsequent  statute  cannot 
take  away  the  right  to  levy  such  assessment  to  the  prejudice 
of  the  parties  to  tlie  contract.-  as  by  requiring  the  contractor  to 
rely  upon  the  personal  liali^lity  of  the  property  owner  and  tak- 
ing away  his  right  to  proceed  against  the  property.^  A  contract 
was  entered  into  in  reliance  upon  the  power  of  the  city  to  levy 
assessments  not  exceeding  fifty  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the  land 
to  be  estimated  after  the  improvement  w^as  made  and  the  eon- 
tract  contained  a  provision  relieving  the  city  from  liability  there- 
on, the  contractor  agreeing  to  look  for  his  sole  compensation 
to  the  assessments.  Subsequenth'.  and  before  the  assessment 
ordinance  was  passed,  the  statute  was  so  amended  as  to  limit 
the  maximum  amount  of  the  assessment  to  twenty-five  per  cent 
of  the  value  of  the  land  as  assessed  for  taxation.  It  was  held 
that  the  legislature  could  not  take  away  or  restrict  the  power 
of  levying  assessments  to  tlie  prejudice  of  the  prior  contractor.* 

Town  of  Uiidcrliill  v.  Town  of  Es-  Dikcniaii.  11    Paige's  Ch.    (X.  Y.)    484 

sex,  04  Vt.   28,   23   All.   (517    [1891];  |  184ol ;    CJoodale  v.   Fennell.  27   0.  S. 

(critieisinjr    Rtratrord    v.    Sharon.    01  420.   22    Am.   Rep.   .321[  18751;    FIpw- 

Vt.  120.  4  L.  R.  A.  4W.   17   All.  703.  fllin    v.   Proot/ol.   80   Tex.    101.    15   S. 

IS  Atl.  308.)  W.    1043    |  18011. 

'  Mercliants'  National   Rank  of  San  ''Crawford  v.  Hedrick.  0  Ind.  Ai)p. 

Dlogo    V.    Escondido    lrri<iation    Dis-  350,   30   X.   E.    771    [1803];    Firth    v. 

trict,     144    C'al.     320.     77     Pac.     037  Rroadhead.  7  Mo.  App.  503. 

[19041;     Fanning    v.     Schamniol.    OS  'Firth    v.    Rroadhead.    7    >lo.    App. 

Cal.   428,  0   Pac.   427    [18S0];    Craw-  503. 

ford  V.  Hedrick.  0  Tnd.  App.  356,  30  «  Ooodale  v.    Fcnncll.   27   0.   S.  420, 

N.    E.    771    [18031;    Firth    v.    Rroad-  22  Am.  Rep.  321    |1875]. 
head.    7    Mo.    A])p.    503:    Dikeman    v. 


§  172  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  282 

Where  the  contract  is  made  when  the  assessment  may  equal  a 
certain  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the  property  assessed,  but  before 
the  assessing  ordinance  is  passed,  such  percentage  is  reduced, 
it  has  been  questioned  whether  the  legislature  could  divest  the 
corporation  of  such  power.'*  A  valid  contract  cannot  be  abro- 
gated by  a  subsequent  change  in  constitutional  provisions  of 
the  state  constitution,  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
protects  the  parties  to  the  contract  against  such  impairni^ent  of 
their  rights.**  Whether  a  purchaser  at  a  tax  sale  acquires  rights 
when  the  sale  is  made  or  only  when  the  sale  is  consummated 
and  his  title  perfected  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  a  con- 
flict of  authority.  It  has  been  held  that  a  purchaser  at  a  sale 
of  realty  to  pay  an  assessment  has  a  right  based  on  contract; 
so  that  he  cannot  be  deprived  of  part  or  all  of  his  rights  by  a  sub- 
sequent statute  extending  the  time  within  which  the  owner  may 
redeem."  On  the  other  hand  it  has  been  held  that  no  right  accrues 
until  the  sale  is  fully  consummated,  and  that  up  to  that  time  the 
proceedings  are  entirely  under  legislative  control.**  • 

§  172.     Contract  for  exemption  from  assessment. 

A  contract  for  exemption  of  certain  property  from  taxation 
and  local  assessment,  is,  if  valid,  a  contract  the  obligation  of 
which  cannot  be  impaired  by  subsequent  legislation  of  the  state.^ 
Thus,  a  state  received  lands  from  the  United  States  under  an 
arrangement  whereby  it  was  agreed  that  the  proceeds  of  the 
lands  or  the  lands  themselves  should  be  applied  as  far  as  neces- 
sarj'-  in  reclaiming  such  lands  from  cultivation  by  drains  and 
levees.  The  state  then  sold  such  lands  under  a  statute  which 
provided  "all  said  swamp  and  overflowed  land  shall  be  exempt 
from  taxation  for  the  term  of  ten  years  or  until  they  shall  be 
reclaimed."  Such  statute  was  held  to  be  a  contract  which 
could  not  be  abrogated  as  to  lands  already  sold  by  the  subse- 
quent repeal  thereof.  The  term  "taxation"  in  such  statute  was 
held  to  include  "special  taxes"  for  levees  and  drains.     Accord- 

^  Fennell    v.    Howells,    2    Cin.    Sup.  "  Dikeman   v.    Dikeman,    11    Paige's 

Ct.  Rep.    (Ohio)    150;    (The  case  was  Ch.    (N.  Y.)    484   [1845]. 

determined,    however,    by    construing  ^  Gault's    Appeal,     33    Pa.     St.     94 

the    statute   as   not   applying   to   im  [1859]. 

provements  already  commenced.)  ^  McGee    v.    IMathis,    71    U.    S.     (4 

"Ede   V.    Knight.    93    Cal.    159.    28  Wall.)    143,    18  L.  .314    [186n];    (re- 

'  Pac.  8(50   [1892].  versing  McGehee   v.   Mathis,   21    Ark. 

40    [I860]). 


288 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC. 


§172 


ingly,  it  was  held  that  such  lands  already  sold  could  not  be  as- 
sessed during  such  period  of  ten  years.^  It  is  necessary,  how- 
ever, to  have  the  clause  forbidding  the  impairment  of  the  ob- 
ligation of  contracts  apply,  that  a  valid  contract  exist.  In  an- 
other case  land  was  transferred  by  the  United  States  to  a  state 
under  a  similar  arrangement,  but  no  contract  was  entered  into 
by  the  state  with  the  purchasers  of  such  land.  Subsequently 
the  state  passed  a  statute  assessing  such  land.  It  was  held  that 
the  arrangement  between  the  United  States  and  the  state  was 
one  which  was  left  to  the  good  faith  of  the  state ;  that  if  it 
was  a  contract  it  was  between  those  two  governments  and  only 
the  United  States  could  complain  of  the  breach ;  and  that  the 
grantee  from  the  state  w^as  not  a  party  to  such  contract  and 
had  no  rights  thereunder."  A  statute  or  ordinance  exempting 
certain  land  from  local  assessment  is  not  a  contract,  and  may 
therefore  be  repealed  or  altered  by  the  legislature.*  Thus  a  stat- 
ute providing  that  no  assessment  for  the  extension  of  a  street 
should  be  levied  on  lands  which  had  been  assessed  for  the  open- 
ing of  the  street  so  extended,''  or  a  statute  providing  that  prop- 
erty once  assessed  for  the  constructing  of  a  street  shall  not 
be  assessed  for  a  subsequent  improvement  thereof,''  or  for  either 
the  subsequent  repair  or  repairing  thereof.'  are  none  of  them 
contracts  within  the  meaning  of  these  constitutional  provisions, 
but  are  subject  to  alteration  at  the  will  of  the  legislature.     So 


=  McGee  v.  Matliis,  71  U.  S.  (4 
Wall.)  143,  18  L.  314  [1866]  ( re- 
MTsing  McGehee  v.  ]Mathis,  21  Ark. 
40   [18601). 

'  Ilagar  v.  Reclamation  District 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569,  4 
S.  663  [1884];  (affirming  Reclama- 
tion District  Xo.  108  v.  Hagar,  4 
Fed.  366  [1880]);  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict Xo.  108  V.  Hagar,  66  Cal.  54. 
4  Pae.  945    [1884]. 

'Bradley  v.  McAtee,  70  Ky.  (7 
I'.usli.)  667,  3  Am.  Rep.  309  [1870]; 
State.  Estate  of  Brown.  l*ros.  v. 
Town  of  Union,  62  X.  J.  L.  ( 33  Vr. ) 
142,  40  Atl.  632  [1S98];  State, 
Mount  Pleasant  Cemetery,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  aiid  Common  Council  of  Xew- 
ark,  50  N.  J.  L.  (21  Vr.)  66,  11  Atl. 
147    [1887];    State,    Schulting,    Pros. 


V.  City  of  Passaic,  47  X".  J.  L.  (18 
Vr.)  273  [1885];  State,  Agens,  Pros. 
V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council  of 
Xewark,  37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  415, 
18  Am.  Rep.  729  [1874]:  35  X.  J. 
L.  (6  Vr.)  168  [1871];  Tilden  v. 
flavor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
the  City  of  Xow  York,  oti  Barb.  (X. 
Y.)  340  [1870];  Ladd  v.  City  of 
Portland,  32  Or.  271,  67  Am!  St. 
Rep.  526,  51  Pac.  654  [189S]. 

°  State,  Schulting.  Pros.  v.  City  of 
Passaic,  47  X\  J.  L.  (IS  Vr.)  273 
[1885]. 

'Ladd  V.  City  of  Portland.  32  Or. 
271,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  526.  51  Pac. 
654    [1S98]. 

"  Tilden  v.  ^Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  tlie  City  of  X"ew 
York.  56   Barb.    (X.   Y.)    340    flS70]. 


§  173  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  284 

a  provision  in  a  charter  of  a  cemetery  company  exempting  its 
land  from  assessment  unless  otherwise  ordered  by  the  board 
chosen  freeholders  of  the  county  where  snch  land  is  situated  is 
not  a  contract,  but  may  be  modified  by  the  legislature.^  So  a 
franchise  granted  to  a  street  railway  company,  and  by  consti- 
tutional provision,"  made  subject  to  legislative  control,  may 
be  modified  by  a  statute  passed  after  a  mortgage  has  been  given 
by  such  street  railway  company,  so  as  to  increase  the  lial)ility 
which  may  be  imposed  on  such  street  railway  company  for  street 
improvements;  and  such  statute  is  not  unconstitutional  even  as 
against  the  interest  of  such  mortgagee.^"  A  statute  requiring  a 
street  railway  company  to  pave  nine  feet  of  the  Avidth  of  a  street 
for  every  line  of  its  track  may  be  enacted  so  as  to  affect  a  street 
railway  already  incorporated  where  the  state  has  reserved  the 
right  of  amending  its  charter."  A  statute  fixing  a  certain  rate  of 
taxation  against  a  railroad  and  providing  that  such  rate  of  taxa- 
tion is  to  be  "in  lieu  of  all  taxes  whatsoever"  ^-  or  in  lieu  of  "all 
assessments  and  taxes,""  is  not  a  contract  and  may  be  modified 
subsequently  by  the  legislature. 

§  173.     Change  of  law  assumed  to  be  prospective  only. 

Unless  clearly  retrospective  a  change  of  law  is  assumed  to  be 
prospective  onlj'-.  The  constitution  of  Illinois  provides:  "The 
General  Assembly  shall  provide  in  all  cases  where  it  may  be 
necessary  to  sell  real  estate  for  the  non-payment  of  taxes  or 
special  assessments  for  state,  county,  municipal  or  other  pur- 
poses, that  a  return  of  such  unpaid  taxes  or  assessments  shall 
be  made  to  some  general  officer  of  the  county  having  authority 
to  receive  state  and  county  taxes;  and  there  shall  be  no  sale 
of  said   property  for  any   of  said  taxes  or   assessments,  but   by 

'State,    Mount    Pleasant    Cemetery  Westville  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of  Xew 

Co.,    Pros.    V.    Mayor    and    Common  Haven,    77    Conn.    G67,    GO    Atl.    651 

Council  of  Newark,  50  N.  J.  L.    (21  [1905]);    Fair  Haven   and   Westville 

Vr.)    66,   11   Atl.   147    [1887].  Railroad    Company    v.    City    of    Fair 

"Art.     I.,     §     17,     Constitution     of  Haven,    75    Conn."  442,    53    Atl.    960 

Texas.  [1903]. 

^"Storrie    v.    Houston    City    Street  ''City  of  St.  Paul  v.  St.  Paul  and 

Railway    Company,    92    Tex.    129,    44  SioiLX     City    Railroad     Company,    23 

L.  R.  A.  716,  46  S.  W.  796  [1898].  Minn.   469    [1877]., 

"  Fair  HaA^en  &   \Vestville  Railroad  "  First    Division    of    the    St.    Paul 

Co.    V.    New    Haven,    203    U.    S.    379  and     Pacific     Railroad     Company    v. 

[1906];     (affirming    Fair    Haven    and  City     of     St.     Paul.     21     Minn.     526 

[1875]. 


285  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICxVBLE,    ETC.  §  17i 

said  officer  upon  the  order  or  judgment  of  some  court  of  rec- 
ord." ^  This  provision  was  held  to  be  self-executing  as  to  ap- 
plications for  judgment  made  after  the  new  constitution  took 
effect.-  As  to  applications  made  before  such  new  constitution 
took  effect  it  is  not  applicable  even  if  the  sale  i.s  made  after  such 
constitution  took  effect.''  Thus,  prior  to  th(^  adoption  of  the  new 
constitution  an  application  for  judgment  against  certain  lands  for 
taxes  and  assessments  Avas  made;  and  the  judgment  rendered  on 
such  application  was  eventually  affirmed.^  A  sale  upon  such 
judgment  was  not  controlled  by  such  provision  of  the  new  con- 
stitution."' A  constitutional  provision  re(iuiring  uniformity  of 
taxation,  does  not  abrogate  existing  local  laws  for  special  as- 
sessments in  force  when  such  constitutional  provision  is  adopted. •"' 
A  statute  which  provides  for  state  aid  in  constructing  highways 
and  which  contains  no  provision  for  assessing  the  cost  of  the 
improvement  u|>on  the  owners  of  abutting  property  prevents 
b^cal  assessments  as  to  sul)se(pient  improvements,  but  does  not 
prevent  the  collecti(Mi  of  assessments  under  imjirovements  which 
have  l)(>en  liegun  when  the  change  in  statute  was  made."  If  a 
new  constitution  is  adopted  after  an  improvement  ordinance  is 
passed,  but  before  any  action  is  taken  thereunder,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  provisions  of  such  constitution  control." 

§  174.     Change  of  judicial  decision  as  impairing  obligation  of  con- 
tract. 

Whether  a  change  of  judicial  decision  can  amount  to  a  law 
impairing  the  ol)ligation  of  contracts  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitutional  pi'ohibition  is  a  question  that  is  occasionally  pre- 
sented for  consideration.  As  a  general  proposition  and  without 
regard  to  assessment  cases  particularly  it  has  been  held  l)y  the 
Supreme   Court   of  the   Tnited   States   that    a    change   of  judicial 

'  Artific    TX..    §    A.    ('i.ii-titiitioii    of  "  Beauniont     v.     Wilkesbarro     City. 

Illinois.  142  Pa.  St.   198,  21   Atl.  888   [1891]. 

"  \Vol)stor    V.    City    of    Cliicafjo,    02  "  Andor.son    v.    Cortelyou.   —   X.    J. 

111.  :i(t2:   Hills  V.  (  ity  of  Clii.'iii.n..  CO        I,. ,    G8    Atl.    118*  [19071:     ( re- 

111-   !^0.  vcisiim  Cortelyou  v.  Andorsnii.  73  X. 

M;aniik     v.    Cliaiiilicilaiii.    07     HI.  J.    L.     (44    Vr.  1     427.    03    Atl.     1095 

020   [18H11.  f  19001);    ITaiiios  v.  Board  of  Cho.sen 

*  Dunliani    v.    City    of    Chicauo.    .i.>  iMvclioldcrs  of  I'.nrlinjrton  Countv.  73 

111.  3.57    [18701.  X.    .7.    l.     ,14    Vr.)    82.    02    Atl."   186 

"Garrrifk    v.    Chamberlain.    97    111.  1100.-)]. 

<520    [1881].  Mitv    of    St.    Lonis    v.    Lan.L'.    131 

Mo.  412.  33  S.  W.  54    [1895]. 


§  174  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  286 

opinion,  whether  concerning  a  rule  of  common  law  or  concerning 
the  construction  and  effect  of  a  rule  of  written  law  is  not  a  law 
impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts  within  the  prohibition  of 
the  Federal  Constitution.  The  state  courts  have,  as  a  general 
rule,  taken  the  same  view.^  In  assessment  cases  the  weight  of 
authority  is  in  accordance  with  the  general  principles  already 
stated.-  Thus,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Texas  once  held  that  a 
homestead  was  not  protected  by  constitutional  exemption  against 
sales  for  liens  of  local  assessments  for  street  improvements.''' 
Subsequently  the  Supreme  Court  overruled  its  earlier  decision 
and  held  that  a  homestead  was  exempted  by  such  constitutional 
provision  as  against  sales  to  satisfy  liens  for  street  improve- 
ments.* In  a  case  that  involved  an  assessment  against  a  home- 
stead levied  after  the  earlier  of  these  decisions  and  prior  to  the 
later,  it  was  held  that  such  change  of  judicial  decision  was  not 
an  impairment  of  the  obligation  of  contract  even  as  against  a 
lien  acquired,  as  was  the  one  in  the  case  at  bar,  in  reliance  upon 
such  earlier  decision.^  In  some  cases  the  change  of  judicial 
decision  has  been  held  to  apply  to  assessments  levied  before 
such  change,  on  grounds  somewhat  narrower  than  those  indicated 
by  the  broad  principles  already  stated.  If  the  validity  of  the 
specific  statute  has  not  been  passed  upon,  it  has  been  held  that 
a  judicial  decision  concerning  a  similar  statute  does  not  prevent 
the  court  from  rendering  a  different  and  inconsistent  decision 
concerning  a  similar  statute,  and  such  subsequent  inconsistent 
opinion  does  not  impair  the  obligation  of  a  contract.*^  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  California  had  once  held  that  under  the  Cali- 
fornia statute,  an  extension  of  time  granted  after  the  contract 
had  once,  under  the  statute  in  force,  become  void  and  unen- 
forceable,  revived   such   contract   and   rendered   it  valid.'      In   a 


'See  Page  on  Contracts,  §   1744.  53   Am.   St.   Rep.    770,   31    S.   ^Y.   52, 

=  Woocl  V.  Brady,   150  U.  S.   18,  37  803   [1895]. 

L.  981,   14   S.   6    [1893];    (dismissing  =  Storrie  v.  Cortes,  90  Tex.  283,  35 

appeal     from     Brady     v.     Burke,     9l)  L.  R.  A.  666,  38  S.  W.  154  [1896]. 

Cal.    1,    27    Pac.    52    [1891]);    Lewis  •=  Wood  v.  Brady,   150  U.  S.   18.  37 

V.  Symmes,  61  0.  S.  471,  76  Am.  St.  L.  981,   14  S.  6    [1893];    (dismissing 

Rep.  428,  56  N.  E.  194   [1899];   Stor-  appeal  from  Brady  v.  Burke,  90  Cal. 

rie  V.   Cortes,  90   Tex.   283,   35  L.   R.  1,    27    Pac.    52  -[1891]);     Lewis    v. 

A.  66(1.  38  S.  W.   154    [1896].  Symmes,    61    0.    S.    471,    76    Am.    St. 

^Lufkin    V.    City    of    Galveston.    58  Rep.  428,  56  N.  E.   194    [1899]. 

Tex.   545    [1883].  ^Taylor    v.    Palmer,    31    Cal.    240 

^Hiffffins  V.  Bnvf]p,-e=.  88  ^ex.  458,  [1866]. 


287  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  174 

later  case  arising  under  a  similar  statute  it  was  held  that  such 
extension,  granted  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  fixed  by  the 
contract,  was  void.'*  While  similar,  however,  the  language  of 
the  two  statutes  was  not  identical  and  the  later  case  was  decided 
on  the  theory  that  the  doctrine  of  the  earlier  case  was  to  be  lim- 
ited to  the  very  language  used  in  the  statute  there  construed. 
The  law  being  in  this  condition,  it  was  held  that  the  change  of 
judicial  decision  was  applicable  to  assessments  levied  before  such 
later  decision  was  rendered,  and  did  not  impair  the  obligation 
of  contract  Avithin  the  meaning  of  the  constitutional  prohibition. 
"But  assuming  for  the  purposes  of  this  case  that  there  may  be 
a  vested  right  under  an  erroneous  decision,  it  is  carrying  the 
doctrine  to  an  unwarrantable  extent  to  say  that  the  construc- 
tion placed  by  the  court  upon  one  statute  implies  an  obligation 
on  its  part  to  put  the  same  construction  upon  a  different  stat- 
ute, though  the  language  of  the  two  may  be  similar.  The  argu- 
ment that  the  language  being  similar,  a  like  construction  should 
be  put  upon  both  acts,  is  one  properly  addressed  to  the  .state 
court ;  but  when  the  court  has  assumed  to  distinguish  between 
the  two  acts,  it  is  not  within  our  province  to  say  that  the  dis- 
tinction is  not  well  taken.  The  acts  in  this  case,  though  similar, 
are  not  identical,  and  there  is  certainly  some  ground  for  saying 
that  the  construction  of  the  two  should  not  be  the  same.  The 
point  made  by  the  plaintiff  in  error  that  the  decision  in  Beveridge 
V.  Livingston  was  made  retroactive,  is  answered  by  the  fact 
tliat  courts  are  bound  in  their  very  nature  to  declare  wliat  the 
law  is  and  has  been  and  not  what  it  shall  be  in  the  future,  and 
that  if  they  were  absolutely  bound  by  their  prior  decisions, 
they  would  be  without  the  power  to  correct  their  own  errors. "° 
In  Ohio  an  act  referring  to  a  specifically  named  county  and  re- 
(|uiring  a  specific  improvement  to  he  made  Avas  held  to  be  con- 
stitutional."^ Subsequently  a  statute  less  objectionable,  as  de- 
scribing the-  county  by  i)(i])ubttio)i.  instead  of  naming  it,  and  as 
empowering  the  oi^cers  to  inal<t'  tlie  improvement  instead  of  re- 
quiring them  to  nuike  it.  was  licld  to  ho  unconstitutional  as  in 
violation  of  the  provision  r(M|uiriiig  laws  of  a   general   nature  to 

*  Reverifloe  v.  Livingstoiio,  54  Cal.  inissing  appeal  from  Brady  v.  Burke, 
54    riSTOl.  '^  00  Cal.   1.  27  Pac.  ,')2   [1801]). 

•Wood  V.  Brady,   150  U.  S.   IS.  22,  '"State   ox    rol.    Uil.l.s   v.    Bnard    of 

23,  37  L.  981,   US.  6    [1893];    (dis-       Commissioners    of    Franklin    County, 

35  0.  S.  458  [1880]  ;  See  §  176  et  seq. 


§  174  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  288 

be  uniform."  Subsequently  an  assessment  was  levied  under  a 
statute  similar  to  that  considered  in  State,  ex  rel.  Hibbs  v. 
Board  of  Commissioners  of  Franklin  County/-  which  was  en- 
acted, and  under  which  the  improvement  was  made  prior  to  the 
change  of  judicial  opinion.  It  was  held  that  such  assessment 
could  not  be  enforced,  that  the  doctrine  of  the  later  case  could  be 
applied,  and  that  no  contractual  rights  were  involved,  since  the 
question  arose  between  the  county  which  was  seeking  to  reim- 
burse itself  by  local  assessments  and  the  property  owners.^'' 
The  Ohio  scheme  of  classifying  cities  was  for  a  long  time  held- to 
be  constitutional  ^''  and  improvements  made  and  assessments  levied 
under  the  authority  of  statutes  based  on  such  scheme  of  classifi- 
cation were  held  to  be  valid. ^"^  Subsequently  such  scheme  of  classi- 
fication was  held  to  be  unconstitutional.^''  The  question  was  then 
presented  as  to  the  effect  of  such  decisions  upon  the  validity  of 
assessments  for  improvements  already  undertaken.  The  court 
held  that  such  assessments  were  enforceable  and  the  property 
owners  could  not  have  an  injunction  in  equity  against  the  col- 
lection of  such  assessment.^'  If  the  decision  in  reliance  upon 
which  the  assessment  has  lieen  levied,  is  that  of  an  inferior 
court,  the  case  is  still  simpler,  as  a  court  of  last  resort  is  not 
bound  by  the  decisions  of  inferior  court.  At  one  time  the  court 
of  appeals,  an  intermediate  court  in  Missouri,  had  held  that  an  as- 
sessment ordinance  was  not  necessary.^-  Some  four  months  after 
this  decision  the  council  ordered  the  clerk  to  issue  tax  bills,  and 
omitted  to  pass  an  assessment  ordinance.  Within  three  weeks 
thereafter,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  an  assessment  ordinance 
was  necessary.^''  It  was  held  that  the  tax  bills  issued  between 
the   dates   of  these   two   decisions   were   invalid.-^      It   was   once 


1^  Hixson  V.   Burson,  54   0.   S.  470,  Rep.  599,  G4  X.  E.  427 ;   State  ex  rel. 

43  X.  E.   1000   [1890];    See   §    176  et  Knisely    v.    Jones,    66    0.    S.    453,    90 

seq.  Am.  St.  Rep.  592,  64  N.  E.  424. 

'-35  O.  S.  458    [1880].  "Shoemaker  v.  City  of  Cinciimati, 

'^  Lewis  V.   Symmes.   61    0.   S.   471,  68  0.  S.  603,  68  N.  E.  1,  48  0.  L.  B. 

76   Am.    St.   Rep.   428.   56   N.    E.    194  582    [1903]. 

[1899].  I'-Gilfillan  v.   Morris,   43  Mo.   App. 

"See  §   189.  590. 

'5  State   V.    Hudson.    44    0.    S.    137.  "Gilfillan    v.    Eddy.    123    Mo.    546, 

5    X.    E.    225;    Scheer    v.    Cincinnati,  27  S.  W.  471. 

15  W.  L.  B.  137.  ^City  of  Sedalia  to  use  of  Sedalia 

'^  State  ex  rel.  Attorney-General  v.  National   Bank  v.   Donoliue,    190  Mo. 

Beacom,    66    0.    S.   491,    90    Am.    St.  407,  89  S.  W.  386  [1905]. 


289  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §§1<  5-177 

held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  that  "just  compensation" 
for  private  property  taken  for  public  use  need  not  be  estimated 
by  the  judicial  department,  but  might  lawfully  be  made  by 
commissioners  of  the  board  of  public  works  and  similar  executive 
and  ministerial  officers.  Subsequenth^  the  Supreme  Court  held 
that  such  earlier  decisions  were  erroneous  but  that  as  the  legis- 
lature had  acted  in  reliance  thereon,  the  proceedings  should  be 
upheld  and  the  rights  acquired  thereunder  protected.-^  This 
objection,  it  may  be  added,  could  not  be  raised  against  the 
assessment  for  benefits ;  and  further,  under  the  statutory  pro- 
ceeding, then  in  force,  an  opportunity  for  a  hearing  in  court  on 
application  for  judgment  for  sale  was  given. 

§  175.     Provisions  forbidding-  retroactive  legislation. 

Provisions  which  forbid  retroactive  legislation  are  often  found 
in  state  constitutions,  usually  in  connection  with  provisions  which 
forl)id  the  impairment  of  the  obligation  of  contracts.  Such  pro- 
visions have  been  treated,  notwithstanding  their  wider  scope,  in 
substantially  the  same  way  as  provisions  which  forbid  impairing 
the  obligation  of  contracts.^  Statutes  which  modify  or  otherwise 
affect  prior  assessments  are  generally  held  to  be  valid  as  long, 
at  least,  as  they  do  not  increase  the  burden  upon  the  prop- 
erty owner.  Under  a  constitutional  provision  forbidding  retro- 
active legislation  a  city  ordinance  which  amends  a  prior  ordinance 
defective  in  its  method  of  apportionment  of  the  assessment  among 
the  property  owners  has  l)oen  h(dd  to  l)e  valid. - 

§  176.     Provisions  forbidding  special  legislation. 

A  group  of  constitutional  provisions  restrict  the  power  of  the 
legislature  to  enact  assessment  laws  by  forbidding  the  leg- 
islature to  enact  special  or  local  laws,  and  by  requiring  it  to 
make  provision  for  public  corporations  by  general  laws.  On  ac- 
count of  tlicir  effect  on  assessment  laws  these  provisions  must  be 
considered  in  so  far  as  such  effect  extends. 

§  177.     Providons  for  incorporating  by  general  lav^rs. 

The  constitution  of  Arkansas  ])rovides:  "The  general  assem- 
bly shall  pass  no  special  act  conrcrriny-  corporate  powers  except 
for  charitable,  educational,  penal  or  reformatory  purposes  where 
the  corporations  created  are  to  he  aiul  remain  under  the  patron- 

-'Rich   V.   City   of   Chicago.   50    Til.  =  Bacon   v.  :\[ayor  and  Aldermen  of 

286  [1871].  Savannah,    in.5   Ga.   62.   .31    S.   E.    127 

'  See  §    160  et  seq.  [1898]. 


§  177  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  290 

age  and  control  of  the  state."'  The  constitution  of  Illinois  pro- 
vides: "No  corporation  shall  be  created  by  special  laws  or  its 
charter  extended,  changed  or  amended  except  those  for  charitable, 
educational,  penal  or  reformatory  purposes  which  are  to  be  and 
remain  under  the  patronage  and  control  of  the  state,  but  the 
general  assembly  shall  provide  by  general  laws  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  all  corporations  hereafter  to  be  created."-  These  pro- 
visions refer  to  private  corporations  and  not  to  public  corpo- 
rations or  quasi  corporations.^  There  is,  therefore,  nothing  in 
such  provisions  to  prevent  the  delegation  to  a  levee  board  of 
power  to  levy  assessments  for  the  construction  of  a  levee ;  *  nor 
to  prevent  local  or  special  legislation  with  respect  to  drainage."' 
The  constitution  of  Kansas  provides:  "The  legislature  shall  pass 
no  special  act  conferring  corporate  powers.  Corporations  may  be 
created  under  general  laws ;  but  all  such  laws  may  be  amended 
or  repealed."  *^  The  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas  has  held  that  such 
provision  applies  to  cities  and  prevents  special  legislation. '^  Ac- 
cordingly a  statute  conferring  corporate  power  upon  a  single 
city  entitled  "an  act  to  legalize  proceedings  and  assessments  of 
the  mayor  and  councilmen  of  the  city  of  Emporia  in  1871"  with 
a  subject  matter  as  special  as  its  title  was  held  to  be  invalid  as  in 
violation  of  the  foregoing  clause  of  the  constitution.^  This  hold- 
ing is  contrary  to  the  opinoin  already  set  forth, *•  that  provisions 
of  this  sort  are  not  applicable  to  public  corporations.  The  result 
reached  in  this  case  might  have  been  reached  under  another  pro- 
vision of  the  constitution,  namely:  "Provisions  shall  be  made 
by  general  law  for  the  organization  of  cities,  towns  and  villages; 
.  .  .  "  ^'*  The  view  that  provisions  of  this  sort  apply  to 
public  corporations  as  well  as  to  private  corporations  seems  to 
be  the  one  that  is  generally  entertained.^^ 

^Art.    XII.,    §    2.    Constitution    of  "Art.    XII..    §     1,    Constitution    of 

Arlvansas   [1874].  Kansas    [1859]. 

'  Art.  XI.,  §   1,  Constitution  of  lUi-  "  Gilmore    v.    Norton,    10    Kan.    369 

nois   [1870].  [1S72]. 

^  Carson   v.   St.   Francis  Levee  Dis-  *  Gilmore    v.    Norton,    10    Kan.    3(50 

trict,    59    Ark.    513,    27    S.    W.    590  [1872]. 

[1894];    Owners   of   Lands   v.   People  "See   ante   this   section,   notes   3,   4 

ex  rel.   Stookey,   113   III.  296    [1886].  and  5. 

*  Carson  v.   St.   Francis  Levee  Dis-  '"  Art.    XIL,    §    B,    Constitution    of 

trict,    59    Ark.    513.    27    S.    W.    590  Kansas    [1859]. 

[1894].  "See   §    180  et  seq. 

®  Owners  of  I^ands  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Stookey.   113   111.  296    [1886]. 


291  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION   APPLICABLE.    ETC.        §§  178,  179 

§178.     Provisions   forbidding   special   legislation   where  general 
laws  are  applicable. 

The  constitution  of  Arkansas  contains  the  provision:  "In  all 
cases  where  a  general  law  can  be  made  applicable  no  special  law 
shall  be  enacted."^  The  constitution  of  Illinois  contains  the  pro- 
vision: "  .  .  .In  all  other  cases  where  a  general  law  shall  be  ap- 
plicable no  special  law  shall  be  enacted."-  These  general  provi- 
sions are  addressed  to  the  legislature,  not  to  the  courts,  and  out- 
side of  the  enumerated  classes  of  laws  concerning  Avhich  no  special 
statute  is  permitted  by  the  express  terms  of  the  constitution,  the 
legislature  is  the  sole  .iudge  to  determine  whether  a  general  law 
is  applicable  or  whether  a  special  law  is  necessary.-''  The  consti- 
tution of  New  Jersey  provides:  "...  The  legislature  shall 
pass  general  laws  providing  for  the  cases  enumerated  in  this 
paragraph  and  for  all  other  cases  which,  in  its  judgment,  may 
be  provided  for  by  general  laws."*  Ihider  this  provision  the 
legislature  has  a  wide  range  of  discretion  as  to  the  topics  which 
can  be  covered  by  general  laws,  and  if  the  courts  can  enforce 
this  provision  at  all  they  can  do  so  only  in  a  plain  case  of  legis- 
lative evasion.'  Accordingly,  a  statute  creating  a  special  seAv- 
erage  district  to  be  called  the  "Passaic  Valley  Sewerage  District" 
has  been  held  to  he  valid  where  the  pollution  of  the  streams 
within  such  district  is  without  parallel  in  the  state,  and  there  is 
no  reason  to  anticipate  that  such  condition  would  be  reached  in 
the  near  future  in  any  other  territory  in  the  state  outside  of 
such  district." 

§  179.    Provisions  requiring  notice  of  application  for  special  legis- 
lation. 

In  some  of  the  constitutions  which  j)ei'mit  special  legislation  to 
a  greater  or  less  extent,  are  found  provisions  which  recjuire  notice 


V\rt.    v.,     §     24.     rnn-^titntiim     of  '  Artiolo  Tv ..  §  7,  par.  XI..  Consti- 

ArKansas   [1874].  tntioii    of    Xow    Jersey    [as    amended 

=  Art.  IV..  §  22.  Constitution  ,.f  111-  lS7.il. 

inois   [1870].  ■>  Van  Cleve  v.   Passaie  Valley  Re\r- 

'  Carson    v.    St.    Francis    Levee    Dis-  ca'.'-e     Commissioners.     71     X.     -T.     L. 

trict,    50    Ark.    .")13.    27    S.    W.    .590  ]S3.  nS  Atl.  .571    [10041. 

[1804]:  Davis  v.  Oaines.  48  Ark.  ."^70.  "Van  Cleve  v.  Pa^saie  Valley  Sew- 

3     S.    W.     184     [1880];     Owners    of  erase    Commissioners.    71     X.    J.    L. 

Lands  v.  People  ex  rel.  Stookey.   11.3  183.  58  Atl.  571    [1004]. 
111.  296   [1886]. 


§  180  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  292 

of  the  intention  to  apply  for  such  special  leg-islation  to  be  given 
by  publication.  "Xo  local  or  special  law  shall  be  passed  unless 
notice  of  the  intention  to  apply  therefor  shall  have  been  published 
in  the  locality  where  the  matter  or  thing  to  be  affected  may  be 
situated,  which  notice  shall  be  at  least  thirty  days  prior  to  the 
introduction  into  the  general  assembly  of  such  bill,  and  in  the 
manner  to  be  provided  by  law.  The  evidence  of  such  notice 
having  been  published  shall  be  exhibited  in  the  general  assembly 
before  such  act  shall  be  passed."  ^  "Xo  local  or  special  law  shall 
be  passed  unless  notice  of  the  intention  to  apply  therefor  shall 
have  been  published  in  the  locality  where  the  matter  or  thing  to 
be  affected  may  be  situated,  which  notice  shall  state  the  substance 
of  the  contemplated  law  and  shall  be  published  at  least  thirty 
days  prior  to  the  introduction  into  the  legislature  of  such  bill  and 
in  the  manner  to  be  provided  by  law.  The  evidence  of  such  notice 
having  been  published  shall  be  exhibited  in  the  legislature  before 
such  act  shall  be  passed. ' '  -  Under  provisions  of  this  sort  it  is 
held  that  the  question  whether  the  notice  required  by  the  consti- 
tution has  been  given  or  not.  is  a  question  to  be  decided  solely 
by  the  legislature.''  Evidence  upon  such  question  outside  of  the 
journals  of  the  legislature  will  not  be  received  by  the  courts.* 
A  city  ordinance  for  improving  a  street  is  not  a  special  lavr  vrithin 
the  meaning  of  this  constitutional  provision  and  the  constitu- 
tional requirement  as  to  notice  does  not  apply,  the  statutory  rule 
])eing  paramount.^ 

§  180.     Effect  of  specific  constitutional  provisions — California. 

The  old  constitution  of  California  provided:  "Corporations 
may  be  formed  under  general  laws  but  shall  not  be  created  by 
special  act  except  for  municipal  purposes.  All  general  laws  and 
special  acts  passed  pursuant  to  this  section  may  be  altered  from 
time  to  time  or  repealed."'     AYhile  this  section  was  in  force  the 

^  Art.    v.,     §     2.5.    Constitution    of  *  Speer    v.    Mayor    and    Council    of 

Arkansas  [1874].  Athens,   85   Ga.    49.   9   L.   R.   A.   402, 

^'Art.    III.,    §    .57.    Constitution    of  11   S.  E.  802   [1890]. 

Texas.  =  Connor  v.   City  of  Paris.   87   Tex. 

^  Davis   V.    Gaines,    48    Ark.    370.    3  32.  27   S.  W.  88    [1894]. 

S.    W.    184    [18S6];    Speer    v.   Mayor  'Art.    IV.,    §    31,    Constitution    of 

and    Council    of    Athens.    85    Ga.    49.  California  [1849]. 
9  L.  R.  A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802   [1890]. 


2^3  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  180 

leprislature  liad  power  to  create  a  reclamation  district  l)y  special 
act.-  The  constitution  of  California  of  1879  provided:  "Cor- 
porations for  municipal  purposes  shall  not  l)e  created  by  special 
laws  but  the  legislature  by  general  laws  shall  provide  for  the 
incorporation,  organization  and  classification  in  proportion  to 
population  of  cities  and  towns,  which  laws  may  be  altered, 
amended  or  repealed.  .  .  .  "^  Tender  this  provision  the 
legislature  has  power  l)y  a  general  law  to  afifect  the  charter  of 
the  city  and  county  of  San  Francisco.*  While  under  .such  pro- 
visions the  legislature  can  provide  for  the  organization  of  special 
assessment  districts,  such  as  drainage  districts,''  by  general  laws 
as  distinguished  from  special  legi.slation  for  each  particular  dis- 
trict, the  legislature  may  group  such  districts  in  a  class  distinct 
from  municipal  corporations  such  as  cities  and  villages;  and  may 
provide  for  the  formation  of  such  districts  in  a  manner  distinct 
from  that  in  which  cities  and  villages  are  formed  and  may  confer 
upon  such  di.stricts  powers  different  "from  those  conferred  upon 
cities  and  villages.*'  The  constitution  of  California  also  provides: 
"The  legislature  shall  not  pass  local  or  special  laws  in  any  of  the 
following  enumerated  cases,  that  is  to  say:  First.  Regulating 
the  jurisdiction  and  duties  of  justices  of  the  peace,  police  judges 
and  of  constables.  .  .  .  "'  A  statute  making  the  warrant, 
assessment  and  diagram  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  regularity 
and  correctness  of  the  assessment  and  of  the  right  of  the  plaintiff 
to  recover  thereon,  is  not  a  local  or  special   law  regulating  the 

-Swamp  Land  District  Xo.   150  v.  Knickerbocker  v.  People.  102  Til.  218; 

Silver.     98     Cal.     .11,     .32     Pac.    800  llymes  v.  Aydelott,  20   ln<I.  4:11  :   Mc- 

ri893];    (created  by  the  act  of  March  Aunich  v.  Mississippi,  etc..  l\.  R.  Co., 

.'JO,  1874,  Statutes  1873-1874.  p.  807 ) .  20  la.  338;   Kiljrore  v.  Magee,  85  Pa. 

'Art.  XL.  §  6,  Constitution  ofCal-  St.    (4  Xorris)    401;   Wheeler  v.  Phil- 

ifornia   [1879].  adclphia,     77     Pa.     St.      (27     P.     F. 

*Thomason    v.    Ashworth,    73    Cal.  Smith)    338). 

73,  14  Pac.  015  [1887];  "As  the  fore-  'In    the    Matter    of    Bonds    of    tlie 

going    statutes    apply    to    all    ninnici-  Madera    Trrijration    District.    92    Cal. 

pal  corporations  in  the  state,  if  tliey  290.   27    Am.    St.   Rep.    100.    14    L.    R. 

are  not  general   law  it  would  lie   im-  A.  75."),  28  Pac.  272.  075    [1891]. 

possible   to   frame   one   wliicli    is  gen.  "  In  the  Matter  of  the  Bonds  of  the 

eral."      Thomason     v.     Ashworth.    73  Madera    Irrigation    District.    92    Cal. 

Cal.    73,    78,     14    Pac.    015     [1887]:  -'90.   27    Am.   St.   Pvcp.    100.    14   L.   R. 

(citing  on  the  question  of  what  con-  A.  755.  28  Pac.  272.  075    [1891]. 

Btitutes    a    general    law:    Chicago    R.  "  .Vrt.    TV..    !?    25.    Constitution    ot 

R.   Co.  V.   Towa,  94  U.   S.    155,  24  L.  California    [1879]. 
94;    Brooks    v.    Hyde,    37    Cal.    376; 


§  181  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  294 

practice  of  the  courts  within  the  meaning  of  this  provision  and 
is  constitutional.^ 

§  181.     Illinois. 

In  the  absence  of  specific  constitutional  provisions,  the  legis- 
lature may  create  towns  with  special  charters  ^  and  may  create 
a  town  six  miles  square  as  well  as  a  municipal  corporation  with 
less  territory.-  The  present  constitution  of  Illinois  provides: 
"The  general  assembly  shall  not  pass  local  or  special  laws  in  any 
of  the  following  enumerated  cases,  that  is  to  say,  for  .  .  .  in- 
corporating cities,  towns  or  villages,  or  changing  or  amending 
the  charter  of  any  town,  city  or  village,"  "  .  .  .  .  regu- 
lating the  rate  of  interest  on  money.  "^  The  subject  of  drain- 
age is  not  enumerated  in  this  section.  Accordingly  it  does 
not  prevent  the  legislature  from  passing  a  special  law  with 
respect  to  drainage.*  Classification  of  cities  upon  a  reasonable 
basis  of  population  is  not  prohibited  by  such  provision. •'*  A  law. 
which  provides  a  method  of  making  payment  and  then  further 
provides  that  certain  provisions  as  to  method  of  payment  shall 
not  apply  to  cities  containing  a  population  of  fifty  thousand  or 
more,  except  in  cases  where  such  special  assessment  exceeds  in 
the  aggregate  the  sum  of  fifteen  thousand  dollars,  is  not  special 
legislation  within  the  meaning  of  this  clause  of  the  constitution." 
This  provision  of  the  constitution  did  not  repeal  or  alter  the 
charters  of  cities,  towns  and  villages  which  were  in  force  when 
the  constitution  was  adopted,  but  merely  provided  that  such 
existing  charters  could  thereafter  be  amended  or  altered  only  by 
a  general  law.  Accordingly  the  legislature  may  pass  a  general 
law  leaving  it  to  existing  cities,  towns  and  villages  to  adopt  such 
amendment  or  not,  as  they  may  see  fit.  The  general  law  must 
apply  alike  to  nil  cities,  towns  and  villages.  It  cannot  be  per- 
mitted to  one  city  to  adopt  one  provision  and  to  another  city  to 
adopt  another  and  different  law  on  the  same  subject.  It  is,  how- 
ever, within  the  discretion  of  the  legislature  whether  the  amend- 

'  Bowling  V.   Conniff,    103   Cal.   75,  'Art.    IV.,    §    22.    Constitution    of 

36    Pac.    1034    [,1894]-,    McDonald    v.  Illinois    [18701. 

Conniff,     99     Cal.     SSfi,     34     Pac.     71  '  Owners  of  Lands  v.  People  ex  rel. 

[1893].  Stnokey.    113   111.   296    1^18861. 

^  Greeley  v.  People  of  the  State  of  ^  Ciimmings     v.     City    of     Cliicajjo, 

Illinois,   60   111.    19    [18711.  144  111.  563.  33  X.  E.  854    [.18931. 

^Creeley  v.  People  of  the  State  of  "  Cummin ws  v.  Citv  of  Chicago.  144 

Illinois,  60  111.  19   [1871].  111.  563,  33  N.  E.  854   [18931. 


295  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  182 

ment  which  cities,  towns  and  villages  are  permitted  to  adopt  is 
limited  to  one  subject  or  extends  to  many  subjects/  In  a  sub- 
sequent ease  it  has  been  held  that  even  if  the  correctness  of  such 
view  was  doubtful  as  an  original  question,  the  long  use  of  such 
option  of  adopting, provisions  of  the  general  law,  and  the  repeated 
recognition  by  the  courts  of  such  right,  do  not  now  leave  the 
question  open.*  A  classification  not  based  on  any  fair  distinction 
of  population,  but  framed  so  as  to  permit  of  special  legislation, 
is  in  violation  of  this  provision  and  is  invalid.^  Thus  a  statute 
which  provides  that  in  city  of  a  population  of  less  than  fifty 
thousand  and  more  than  twenty  thousand  an  ordinance  for  a 
public  improvement  to  be  paid  for  by  special  assessment  cannot 
be  adopted  unless  the  owners  of  one-half  of  the  property  abutting 
on  the  improvement  shall  petition  therefor,  followed  by  an 
amendment  which  prescribes  a  different  rule  for  local  improve- 
ments in  municipalities  containing  a  population  of  from  twenty- 
eight  thousand  to  fifty  thousand,  leaving  this  the  rule  for  munici- 
palities having  a  population  of  from  twenty  thousand  to  twenty- 
eight  thousand  is  invalid  as  in  violation  of  this  constitutional 
provision.^"  It  is  not  a  violation  of  the  clause  prohil)iting  special 
legislation  regulating  the  interest  on  money  to  fix  the  rate  of 
interest  which  installments  of  special  assessments  payable  in  the 
future  shall  bear.^^ 

§  182.    Iowa. 

The  constitution  of  Iowa  provides:  "The  general  assembly 
shall  not  pass  local  or  special  laws  in  the  following  eases:  For 
the  incorporation  of  cities  and  towns.  .  .  .  "^  Under  this 
provision  a  statute  classifying  cities  upon  a  reasonable  basis  of 
population  is  held  to  be  valid.-  Thus  a  statute  applying  to  cities 
having  a  popn.lation  of  over  thirty  tlious<ind  has  ])e(Mi  held  to  hr 

^  Guild   Jr.   V.   f'itv   of   Cliicafro.    S'2  "  IMcChesney     v.      People     ex      rel. 

111.  472   [1876].  .Tohnson,  99  111.  216   [18811. 

'Linck    V.    City    of    Litchfield,    141  'Art.    III.,    §    30.    Constitution    of 

111.  469,  31  X.  e".  123   [1893].  Iowa   [1857]. 

I'L'lIote  V.  Village  of  :Milford,  212  •  =  Tuttle  v.  Polk  and  Hubbel,  92  la. 

111.    418,    103    Am.    St.    Rep.    2.34.    72  433.  60  X.  W.   733    [1894];    Owen   v. 

X"".  E.  399    [1904].  City    of    Rioux    City.    91    Ta.    190.    .59 

"L'Hote  V.  Villape  of  Milfoni.  212  X.    W.    3:    Lnvn    Railroad    Land    Co. 

Til.   418,    103    Am.    St.    Rep.    234.    72  v.  Soper.  39  la.   112:   Haskel     .  City 

X.   E.   399    [1904].  of  Rurlin.irton.  30  Ta.  232. 


§§  183-185  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  296 

valid  thouph  at  the  time  of  its  enactment  Des  Moines  was  the 
only  city  within  such  class.'' 

§  183.     Kentucky. 

The  constitution  of  Kentucky  provides:  "The  cities  and 
towns  of  this  commonwealth  for  the  purpose  of  their  or- 
ganization and  government  shall  be  divided  into  six  classes. 
The  organization  and  powers  of  each  class  shall  be  defined 
and  provided  for  by  general  laws  so  that  all  municipal 
corporations  of  the  same  class  shall  possess  the  same  powers  and 
be  subject  to  the  same  restrictions.  .  .  .  "^  Under  this 
section  the  legislature  may  provide  that  where  a  city  of  the  first 
class  sues  to  enforce  a  lien  for  the  cost  of  street  improvements, 
copies  of  the  ordinance,  contract  and  apportionment  shall  be  evi- 
dence of  every  fact  necessary  to  enable  plaintiff  to  recover,  on  the 
theory  that  such  matters  affect  the  municipal  government. - 

§  184.    Louisiana. 

The  constitution  of  Louisiana  provides:  "No  local  or  special 
law  shall  be  passed  on  any  sub.ject  not  enumerated  in  article  46 
of  this  constitution  unless  notice  of  the  intention  to  apply  therefor 
shall  have  been  published  ...  at  least  thirty  days  prior  to 
the  introduction  into  the  general  assembly  of  such  bill."^  This 
statute  has  been  held  not  to  apply  to  a  statute  providing  for  the 
organization  of  a  levee  district  corporation  and  conferring  upon 
it  the  power  to  levy  special  assessments,  on  the  ground  that  such 
power  as  to  levees  is  expressly  conferred  upon  the  legislature  by 
other  constitutional  provisions.-  and  that  such  power  is  therefore 
not  limited  by  the  article  in  question. ^ 

§  185.     Minnesota. 

The  constitution  of  ^Minnesota  provides:  "The  legislature  shall 
provide  general  laAvs  for  the  transaction  of  any  business  that  may 
be  prohibited  by   section   one   of  this   amendment,   and   all  such 

^Tuttle  V.  Polk  and  Hiibbel.  02  ^  Article  48,  Constitution  of  Louis- 
la.  433,  60  N.  W.  733   [1894].  iana. 

^§    156.    Constitiition    of    Kentucky  'Articles    213    and    214,    Constitu- 

[1891].  tion   of   Louisiana. 

-Eicliardson    v.    ]Mehler.     Ill     Ky.  'Excelsior   Planting   and   Manufac- 

408.  63  R.  W.  957.  23  Ky.  L.  R.  917  turing    Company    v.    Green,    39    La. 

[1901];    (holding  valid   §  2838  Stat-  Ann.  455.   1  So.' 873   [1887]. 
utes  of  Kentucky.) 


297  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  185 

law.s  shall  be  uniform  in  their  operation  throughout  the  state.  "^ 
"  .  .  .  The  legislature  shall  pass  no  local  or  special  law 
regulating  the  affairs  of  or  incorporating,  erecting  or  changing 
the  lines  of  any  county,  city,  .  .  .  provided,  however,  that 
the  inhibitions  of  local  or  special  laws  in  this  section  shall  not 
be  construed  to  prevent  the  passage  of  general  laws  on  any  of 
the  subjects  enumerated.  The  legislature  may  repeal  any  existing 
special  or  local  law,  but  shall  not  amend,  extend  or  modify  any 
of  the  same."-  Under  these  provisions  it  is  held  that  an  act 
classifying  cities  on  a  reasonable  basis  of  population  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional.-'' A  statute  providing  for  a  form  of  city  government 
which  it  was  optional  with  each  city  to  adopt  or  not  to  adopt,  was 
held  to  be  unconstitu.tional  as  in  violation  of  these  provisions.^ 
Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  where  an  improvement  has  been 
authorized  and  made  by  an  officer  deriving  his  authority  from 
such  unconstitutional  statute,  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for 
the  cost  of  such  improvement."  Subsequently  the  following  con- 
stitutional amendment  was  adopted:  "The  legislature  may  pro- 
vide general  laws  relating  to  affairs  of  cities,  the  application  of 
which  may  be  limited  to  cities  of  over  fifty  thousand  inhal)itants 
or  to  cities  of  fifty  and  not  less  than  twenty  thousand  inhabitants, 
or  to  cities  of  twenty  and  not  less  than  ten  thousand  inhabitants. 
or  to  cities  of  ten  thousand  inhabitants  or  less  which  shall  appl.v 
equally  to  all  such  cities  of  either  class.""  Under  this  provision 
a  classification  of  cities  by  a  statute  applying  only  to  those  having 
a  population  of  fifty  thousand  or  over  is  valid,  even  if  the  subject 
matter  of  the  statute  is  not  one  which  would  reasonably  be  af- 
fected by  such  difference  in  population.' 

•Art.    IV.,    §    .34,    Constitution!    of  'State  ox   rel.   Chiids   v.   C'opeland. 

Minnesota    [amomled    1881].  OG   Minn.  315,  Gl   Am.   St.   Ecp.   410. 

=  Art.    IV..    §    3,3.    Constitution    of  34  L.  R.  A.  777,  60  X.  W.  27   [189G1. 

Minnesota    faniondod    1881;    amended  °  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  City  of 

again    1802);    Tlie   provision   prior   to  St.  Paul  v.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 

amendment   was:    "The  legislature   is  County,    72    ^linn.    22G,    71    Am.    St. 

prohibited  from  enacting  any  special  Rep.  480.  75  X.  \V.  224   [1898]. 

or  private  law  in  the  following  or.rtCs:  "Art.    IV..    §    3G,    Constitution    of 

.     .     .     7tli.     For  granting  corporate  Minnesota,    Amendm(>nt     1S!)S.     L;)\\'^ 

powers  or  privileges  e.xcept  to  cities.  18!>0.  page  V. 

.     .     .     !)th.      For    incorporating   any  ^  State  ex  rel.  ^linnesota  Loan  and 

town    or    villa-i-e."      Art.    IV..    §    33.  Trust    Company    v.    Ames.    87    ^linn. 

Constitution  ..f  Minnesota.  23.   01    X.   W.    18    [1002];    Alexander 

'State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  City  of  v.   City  of  Duluth.  77   Minn.  445.  80 

Ouluth  V.  District  Court  of  St.  Louis  X.   W."  623. 
Counlv.  til    Minn.  542.  G4  X.  \V.    190 
11895]. 


§  186  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  298 

§  186.    Missouri. 

The  constitution  of  ]\Iissonri  provides:  "The  general  assembly 
.  .  .  shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special  law  authorizing  the  cre- 
ation, extension  or  impairment  of  liens;  regulating  the  affairs  of 
counties,  cities,  townships,  wards  or  school  districts;  .  .  .  regu- 
lating the  practice  or  jurisdiction  of  or  changing  the  rules  of  evi- 
dence in  any  judicial  proceeding  or  inquiry  before  courts,  justices 
of  the  peace,  sheriffs,  commissioners,  arbitrators  or  other  tribunals, 
or  providing  or  changing  the  methods  for  the  collection  of  debts, 
or  the  enforcing  of  judgments,  or  prescribing  the  effect  of  judicial 
sales  of  real  estate."^  "Any  city  having  a  population  of  more 
than  one  hundred  thousand  may  frame  a  charter  for  its  own 
government  consistent  with  and  subject  to  the  constitution  and 
law^s  of  this  state.  .  .  .  "-  Under  these  provisions  an  act 
which  makes  a  special  tax  bill  for  an  assessment  prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  liability  of  the  property  is  not  unconstitutional 
as  far  as  it  affects  bills  issued  after  the  enactment  of  the  charter.^ 
So  a  provision  in  a  charter  framed  by  a  city  *  which  provides  that 
every  special  tax  bill  shall  be  a  lien  on  the  land  assessed  on  the 
date  of  the  receipt  to  the  board  of  public  works  therefor,  which 
lien  shall  continue  for  two  years  unless  suit  be  brought  to  collect 
such  bill  within  that  time,  provided  that  every  plaintiff  shall, 
within  ten  days  after  the  suit  is  commenced,  file  in  the  office  of 
the  city  treasurer  a  statement  showing  the  tax  bill  sued  on.  when 
suit  is  brought,  against  whom  it  is  brought  and  in  what  court  it  is 
brought,  has  been  held,  under  these  constitutional  provisions  not 
to  be  unconstitutional  in  so  far  as  the  statute  requires  such  notice 
to  be  filed,  prescribes  what  it  shall  contain  and  requires  the  city 
treasurer  to  note  the  filing  thereof.''  The  provision  that  a  failure 
to  file  su.ch  notice  frees  the  land  from  the  lien  and  the  judgment, 
and  prevents  the  sale  of  the  land  on  such  judgment,  which  pro- 
vision is  not  restricted  to  hona  fide  grantees  but  is  made  appli- 
cable to  the  owmer.  is  inconsistent  with  the  laws  of  the  state  and 
is  therefore  contrary  to  the  constitutional  provision  authorizing 

1  Article  TV..   S  53,  Constitution  of       Creamer     v.      Oeters,     36     Mo.     456 
Missouri    [1875].  [1865]. 

2  Article  IX..   §  16.  Constitution  of  *  Charter    of    Kansas    City.    Article 
Missouri    [1875].                                             TX..   §    18. 

^Eyerman  v.  Blaksley.  78  :\Io.   145  =  Haasr  v.    ^Yar(1.    186   Mo.    325,   85 

[1883]:    City  of  St.   Louis  to  use  of       S.   W.   :^01    [1904]. 


299  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  187 

certain  citie.s  to  frame  their  charters.'"'  A  statute  which  provides 
that  the  whole  cost  of  improving  a  street  shall  be  charged  against 
the  adjoining  property  and  is  to  be  "levied,  collected  and  paid 
in  the  manner  and  at  the  time  now  provided  by  law  or  charter  of 
said  cities"  is  held  to  show  plainly  that  the  legislature  intends 
such  act  to  apply  only  to  charters  existing  at  the  time  of  such 
enactment;  which  intention  renders  such  statute  unconstitutional.'' 

§  187,    New  Jersey. 

The  constitution  of  New  Jersey  provides:  "No  private,  special 
or  local  bill  shall  be  passed  unless  public  notice  of  the  intention 
to  apply  therefor  and  of  the  general  object  thereof  shall  have 
been  previously  given.  The  legislature  at  the  next  session  after 
the  adoption  thereof  and  from  time  to  time  thereafter  shall  pre- 
scribe the  time  and  mode  of  giving  such  notice,  the  evidence 
thereof,  and  how  such  evidence  shall  be  preserved."^  "The 
legislature  shall  not  pass  private,  local  or  special  laws  in  any  of 
the  following  enumerated  cases,  that  is  to  say :  Laying  out, 
opening,  altering  and  working  roads  or  highways.  Vacating  any 
road,  town  plat,  street,  alley  or  public  grounds.  Regulating  the 
internal  affairs  of  towns  and  counties,  appointing  local  officers  or 
commissioners  to  regulate  municipal  affairs.  .  .  .  "-  Under 
such  provisions  an  act  authorizing  "towns"  to  construct  certain 
improvements  by  assessment  has  been  held  to  be  constitutional 
on  the  theory  that  "towns"  included  all  bodies  corporate  less 
than  counties.''"  An  act  which  concerns  cities  only  and  places 
them  in  a  separate  class  is  not  unconstitutional  as  affected  by 
these  provisions;*  even  if  it  provides  that  assessments  sliall  be 
collected  in  conformity  with  existing  laws  in  force  in  the  citv 
where  the   improveinent    is   mride."'     A   statute    entitled   "an   act 

'Haas;   v.    \Yanl,    ISd    Mn.    32.").    85  <•■{   Elizahotli.    49    X.    J.    L.    (20    Vr.) 

S.  W.  391    119041.  48S,    10   All.   3(i3    [1887];    State,   Jt-l 

"Murnane    v.    City    nf    St.    Louis,  lilV.    Pros.     v.    Mayor    and    Common 

123  Mo.  470.  27  S.  \V.  711    |  18041.  Council    of    the    City    of    Newark,    4S 

'  Article  IV..  «   7.  par.  0.  C(.n<titii-  X.    J.    L.    (10    Vr.)'   101.    2    Atl.    627 

tion  of  Xew  Jersey    famended   187ol.  |  1S8(>1  ;    State,    fireen,    Pros.    v.    Ho- 

=  Article  IV.,   §   7,  par.   11.  Consti-  talinjr,    44    X'.    J.    L.     (15    Vr.)     347 

tution  of  New  Jersey  [18441    (amend-  [1882]:     (affirmed    40    X.    J.    L.     (17 

ed    1875).  Vr.)    207    [18841). 

'State.   Estate   of   Brown.    Pros.   v.  'State.  JellifT.  Pros.  v.  flavor  and 

Town  of  Union,  62  N.  J.  L.   (33  Vr.)  Con?mon  Council  of  the  City  of  Xew- 

142,  40  Atl.  632    [1898].  ark,    48    X.    J.    L.     (10    Vr*.)     101.    2 

*  In    re    Report    of    Commissioners  Atl.   627    [1886]. 


§  188  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  300 

authorizing  municipalities  governed  by  commissioners  to  pave 
and  improve  streets"  containing  a  subject-matter  appropriate  to 
such  title  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  a  classification  of  cities  based  on  the  nature  of  the  governing 
body,  and  that  no  substantial  reason  existed  why  the  powers 
enumerated  in  the  act  should  be  conferred  upon  municipalities 
governed  by  commissioners  and  not  upon  others."  After  the  con- 
stitution of  New  Jersey  was  so  amended  as  to  forbid  special  legis- 
lation for  cities,  a  general  law  was  passed  affecting  city  govern- 
ment, containing  no  express  provisions  for  repeal  of  existing 
special  laws  but  providing  that  "it  shall  or  may  be  lawful"  to 
assess  in  a  certain  specified  manner.  It  was  held  that  such  general 
law  repealed  the  pre-existing  city  charter.'^ 

§188.     New  York. 

The  constitution  of  New  York  provided :  "The  legislature  shall 
not  pass  a  private  or  local  bill  in  any  of  the  following  cases :  .  .  . 
Laying  out,  opening,  altering,  working  or  discontinuing  roads, 
highways  or  alleys,  or  for  draining  swamps  or  other  low 
lands.  .  .  .  "^  This  provision  does  not  include  the  improve- 
ment of  city  streets  nor  the  levying  of  assessments  to  pay  there- 
for.- The  constitution  of  New  York  further  provided:  "The 
legislature  shall  by  general  laws  confer  upon  the  boards  of  super- 
visors of  the  several  counties  of  the  state  such  further  powers  of 
local  legislation  and  administration  as  the  legislature  may  from 
time  to  time  deem  expedient. "  •''  Under  these  two  sections'*  it 
was  held  that  a  statute  giving  to  the  board  of  supervisors  in  any 
county  containing  a  city  of  over  one  hundred  thousand  inhab- 
itants, where  territory  in  the  county  contiguous  to  the  city  has 

'State,  Dobbins,  Pros.  v.  Board  of  of    Woolsey,    95    X.    Y.    135    [1884]; 

( 'ommissioners    of    the    Long    Branch  ( reversing    Matter     of     Woolsey,     20 

Police     Sanitary     and     Improvement  Hun.  626  [1883]);  Matter  of  Lexing- 

Commission,    59    N.    J.    L.    (30   Vr.)  ton    Avenue,    92    N.   Y.    629    [1883]: 

146,  36  Atl.  482   [1896].  (affirming     witliout    opinion     Matter 

"  State,    Central   New   Jersey   Land  of    Lexington    Avenue,    29    Hun.    303 

&    Improvement    Company   v.    Mayor  [1883];   People  of  the  State  of  New 

and  Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne,  York  ex  rel.  Gage  v.  Lohnas.  54  Hun. 

56   N.   J.   L.    (27   Vr.)'  297,   28    Atl.  604,   8  N.   Y.   Supp.    104    [18R9]. 

713    [1893].  ^Article  ITT.,  §  27.  Cbnstitution  of 

^Article  III.,  §   18,  Constitution  of  New    York    [1900]. 

New  York    [1900].  *  Article    III.,    §     18,    and    Article 

2  In   the   matter   of   the   application  III.,  §  27.  Constitution  of  New  Yoiic 

[1900]. 


301  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  189 

been  mapped  out  into  streets  and  avenues,  power  to  lay  out,  open, 
grade  and  construct  such  streets  and  avenues,  and  to  provide  for 
assessments  upon  the  property  benefited  b}'  such  improvement  was 
constitutional.^ 

§  189.     Ohio. 

The  constitution  of  Ohio  provides:  "The  general  assembly 
shall  pass  no  special  act  conferring  corporate  power.  "^  This 
provision  is  held  to  apply  to  public  corporations  as  well  as  to 
private  corporations.-  A  statute  authorizing  county  commis- 
sioners to  grant  further  time  for  the  completion  of  free  turnpike 
roads  and  for  paying  for  the  same,  applicable  to  a  public  turnpike 
company  incorporated  by  a  special  act  under  the  old  constitution 
of  Ohio  whose  road  was  uncompleted  and  the  assessments  for 
which  were  not  completed  when  the  present  constitution  was 
adopted,  was  held  not  to  violate  this  provision. ■'^  The  constitution 
of  Ohio"  also  provides:  "All  laws  of  a  general  nature  shall  have 
a  uniform  operation  throughout  the  state.  .  .  .  "*  This 
section  Avas  inserted  to  prevent  the  evils  experienced  under  the 
old  constitution,  of  laws  operating  over  only  a  portion  of  the 
state.^  It  applies  only  to  laws  of  a  general  nature.  Accordingly 
where  an  assessment  had,  through  a  mistaken  view  of  the  law, 
been  levied  upon  land  to  a  depth  greater  than  that  allowed  by 
law  and  the  i)r()perty  bad  thereliy  been  charged  with  the  entire 
cost  of  the  improvement  which  should  have  been  borne  in  part 
by  the  public  corporation,  it  was  held  that  a  special  statute  re- 
citing these  facts  and  requiring  the  public  corporation  to  refund 
to  the  property  owner  the  excess  over  his  rigbtful  proportion 
of  the  expense  was  constitutional.^'  TTnder'this  section  it  was  h(4d 
that  a  classification  of  cities  on  a  basis  of  population  was  valid7 

''In  the  matter  of  tlio   Ai)])li('!ition  State  ex  rel.  Attorney-d'eneral  v.  City 

of    Clnirch    for    tlie    Apimiiitnient    of  of  Cincinnati.  20  O.   S.   18    [18701.  ' 

Commissioners,     etc.,     02     X.     Y.     1  ''  Foster  v.  Commissioners  of  Wood 

11883].  Connty.   0   O.   R.   540    [IS.^O]. 

'Article    XIII.,    §     1.    Constilufion  VArliclo    II..    §   20.   Constitution   of 

of    Ohio    [18.511.  Oliio    [18.-)11. 

'City  of  Cincinnati   v.  Tnft.   r.;i   O.  '■  I.climan   v.  Mcl^ride.   l,i  O.  S.  ,573 

S.    141,    58    X.    E.    03    [lOOOl:    State  |  18(^1. 

ex  rel.  City  of  Columbia   v.  .Mitcliell,  "State    ex    rel.    v.    Hofl'man,    35    O. 

31  0.  S.  592  [1877];  State  v.  City  of  S.   435    [1880]. 

Cincinnati.     23     0.    S.    445     [1873];  '  \Vc1ker    v.    Potter.     18    O.    S.    85 

[1SG8]. 


§  189  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  302 

The  classification  here  made  was  a  reasonal)le  one,  the  act  apply- 
ing to  cities  of  the  first  class  having  at  the  last  Federal  census 
less  than  one  hundred  thousand  inhabitants.^  Subsequently  the 
legislature  extended  the  detail  of  its  classification  until  every 
large  city  in  the  state  was  in  a  separate  grade  and  class  and  might 
be  given  a  separate  form  of  government  and  separate  powers 
from  those  of  every  other  city.  This  scheme  of  classification  was 
long  held  valid."  After  the  earlier  cases,  the  court  upholds  the 
constitutionality  thereof  on  the  ground  that  it  "has  been  re- 
peatedly recognized  in  this  court  and  the  reasons  for  adhering 
to  that  construction  of  the  constitution  are  cogent  and  satisfac- 
tory."^" In  the  eases  following,  the  constitutionality  of  such 
classification  is  upheld  chiefly  on  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis, 
without  the  expression  of  great  satisfaction  wnth  the  correctness 
of  the  doctrine."  In  the  cases  that  followed  the  constitutionality 
of  the  system  of  classification,  when  upheld  on  the  doctrine  of 
stare  decisis,  was  upheld  with  expressions  of  grave  doubt  as  to 
the  propriety  of  the  classification.^-  The  con.stitutionality  of  this 
scheme  of  classification  was  upheld  on  the  sole  ground  that  the 
original  act  has  been  held  as  valid.^^  and  that  under  the  act  in 
question,  supplementary  to  the  original  act,  bonds  had  been 
issued  and  sold  in  reliance  upon  such  former  judgment."  Cases 
in  which  the  provisions  of  the  statute  were  held  to  be  so  re- 
stricted as  to  amount  to  a  mere  evasion  of  the  constitutional  re- 
quirement became  more  frequent.^'^  The  entire  scheme  of  classi- 
fication was  denominated  "isolation  under  the  form  of  classi- 
fication."^"    Finally  the   prior  decisions  were  overruled  and   it 

'Welker    v.    Potter.    IS    0.    S.    85  508    [1805];   State  v.  Hudson,  44   O. 

fl868].  S.   137,  5  N.  E.  225   [1886]. 

'City  of  Cincinnati   v.  Taft.  03  0.  '-State   ex   rel.   v.    Wall,   47    0.   S. 

S.  141,  58  N.  E.  63   [1900];   State  ex  499.   24  X.  E.   897    [1890]. 

lel.  V.   Baker,   55   0.   S.    1.   44   N.   E.  "Walker    v.    Cincinnati,    21    O.    S. 

516     [1896];    Parsons    v.    Columbus.  14.    8    Am.    Rep.    24. 

50  O.  S.  460,   34  X.  E.   677    [1893]:  "City    of    Cincinnati    v.    Taft,    63 

State  V.  Toledo,  48  O.   S.   112.  26  X.  O.   S.   141,  58  X.   E.  63    [1900]. 

E.    1061    [1891];    State    v.    Brewster.  '^  State    ex    rel.    v.    Cowles,    64    0. 

39  0.  S.  653   [1883]:   Welker  v.  Pot-  S.   162,  59  X.  E.  895   [1901];   Hixson 

ter,  18  0.  S.  85  [1808].  v.    Burson,    54   O.    S.    470,    43    X.    E. 

'"State   V.    Brewster.   39    O.    S.    653  1000    [1896];    City    of    Cincinnati    v. 

[1883].  Steinkamp,    54    0.    S.    284,    43    X.    E. 

"State   ex  rel.   v.   Baker.   55   0.   S.  490    [1896];    State   ex  rel.   v.   Smith, 

1,  44  X.  E,  516  [18915]:   State  ex  rel.  48   0.  S.  211,  26  N.  E.   1069    [1891]. 

V.  Cincinnati,  52  0.  S.  419,  40  X.  E.  '"State  ex  rel.  v.  Cowle-^.  64  0.  S. 

162.   59   X.   E.    895    [1901]. 


303  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  1^9 

Avas  held  that  such  a  classification  as  has  been  descriijed  was  a 
mere  evasion  of  the  plain  provisions  of  the  constitution,  and 
therefore  invalid.^^  Under  this  section  and  before  the  system  of 
classification  previously  described  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional, 
a  statute  providing  for  a  street  improvement  to  be  paid  for  by 
local  assessment,  applicable  to  all  cities  of  the  first  class  having 
at  the  last  federal  census  a  population  of  less  than  one  hundred 
thousand  was  held  to  be  valid. ^'^  When  this  statute  was  passed 
it  applied  to  Cleveland  only,  but  Toledo  subsequently  became  a 
city  of  the  first  class  within  the  classification  of  the  statue,  and 
this  case  involved  an  assessment  levied  by  Toledo.  So  a  law 
providing  for  the  improvement  of  streets  in  cities  of  the  first 
grade  of  the  second  class,  the  improvement  to  be  paid  by  local 
assessments,  was  held  to  be  constitutional  though  applicable  only 
to  Columbus.^"  Even  while  the  general  system  of  classification 
was  held  to  be  valid,  a  subdivision  which  not  only  placed  but  one 
city  in  each  class,  but  made  it  impossible  that  any  other  city  could 
come  into  such  class  was  held  invalid.-"  Thus  a  statute  appli- 
cable to  cities  of  the  second  class  having  at  the  last  Federal  census 
a  population  of  over  thirty-one  thousand  was  held  invalid.-^  Af- 
ter the  system  of  classification  herein  described  was  held  to  be 
unconstitutional,  the  question  arose  as  to  the  effect  of  assessments 
levied  under  acts  passed  with  reference  to  such  system  of  classi- 
fication. In  one  case  legislation  identical  with  that  involved  in 
the  case  under  consideration  as  far  as  its  substantial  features 
were  concerned  had  previously  been  upheld  by  the  Supreme 
Court.--  The  statute  in  (piestion  with  reference  to  the  same  city 
was  held,  though  unconstitutional,  to  be  enforceable  on  the  theory 
of  res  adjudicata.-'''  An  additional  reason  for  upholding  the 
statute  was  found  in  the  fact  that  if  the  act  in  question  was  un- 
constitutional,  the    repealing   clause   thereof   was    inoperative    as 

''  State    ox    rol.    v.    Beacom.    GO    O.  -'  Stato    ox    rol.    City    of    C'ohinihus 

S.   491,  90   Am.   St.   Rep.   590,   64   X.  v.    IMitcholl,    31    O.    S."  .592    [1877]. 

E.  427   [19021;   State  ex  rel.  Knisely  "  Solieer    v.    Cineinnati,    15    W.    L. 

V.   Jones,   06    0.    S.   4.-).?.   00   Am.    St.  B.    (Ohio)    66    [18861;     (followed    in 

Rep.   502,   G4   X.    E.   424    [1902].  State     ex     rel.     Attoniey-fieneral     v. 

"Welkor    v.    Potter,    18    O.    S.    85  Hudson.   44    O.    S.    1.37.    5    X.    E.    225 

[1868].  [1SS6]). 

"  Parsons  v.  City  of  Columbus,   .50  ^  Shoemaker  v.  City  of  Cincinnati. 

O.  S.  460,  34  X.  E.  677   [1893].  68  0.  S.  603,  68  X.  E.   1    [1903]. 

'^  State   ex    rel.    City   of   Colunilms 
V.  Mitchell,  31   O.  S.  592   [1877]. 


§  189  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  304 

well  as  the  rest  of  the  act ;  that  the  act  was  one  of  a  series  upon 
the  same  subject,  which  in  substance  give  the  same  protection  to 
the  rights  of  the  property  owner;  and  that  the  first,  at  least,  of 
such  acts  was  uniform  in  its  operation.  Accordingly  it  seems  to 
be  suggested  that  the  assessment  could  be  upheld  under  such 
prior  act.  A  like  result  wac  reached  by  the  Circuit  Court  in  a 
case,  in  which,  however,  a  recurrence  to  the  prior  constitutional 
statute  would  have  limited  the  amount  of  the  assessment  to 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  taxable  value  of  the  property.  The 
assessment  was  levied  before  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
overthrowing  the  scheme  of  classification.  The  Circuit  Court 
held  that  such  assessments  were  valid  and  collectable."*  Local 
laws  for  the  construction  of  roads  in  specified  counties  were  at 
first  upheld.-"  Thus  an  act  applicable  to  a  specific  county  re- 
quiring the  county  commissioners  to  levy  a  special  tax  and  with 
the  proceeds  to  construct  a  specifically  described  road,  was  held 
to  be  valid.-"  Subsequently,  but  before  the  decisions  over- 
throwing the  classification  statute,  a  similar  act,  applicable  to  a 
particular  county  therein  named,  and  requiring  a  specific  im- 
provement, set  forth  in  great  detail,  to  be  made  if  approved  by 
the  county  commissioners,  and  to  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments 
apportioned  according  to  benefits,  was  held  to  be  invalid.-^  More- 
over such  law  was  a  local  law,  while  the  subject  of  roads  was  one 
in  its  nature  general  and  therefore  controlled  by  the  constitu- 
tional provision  quoted.  A  further  objection  to  this  act  was  the 
fact  that  it  conferred  corporate  power  on  "any  village  owning 
any  part  of  the  lands  necessary  to  be  acquired  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  out  the  provisions"  of  such  act,  authorizing  it  to 
dedicate  such  land  for  such  purpose.-*  Soon  after  a  law  appli- 
cable to  "any  county  which  by  the  last  Federal  census  had,  or 
which  at  any  .subsequent  Federal  census  may  have  a  population 
of  not  less  than  thirty-five  thousand  one  hundred  and  ninety  and 

-*  Price    V.    Toledo,    25    Ohio    C.    C.  54   0.   S.   333,   43   N.   E.   587    [1S9G!; 

G17    [1903].  (In    effect    overruling    on    this    point 

^  State    ex    rel.    v.    Board   of    Com-  State  ex  rel.  Hibbs  v.  Board  of  Coun- 

missioners    of    Franklin    County,    33  ty  Commissioners  of  Franl-clin   Coun- 

0.  S.  458   [1S80].                             "  ty,  35  O.   S.  458    [1880]). 

^®  State  ex  rel.  v.  Board  of  County  ^  State    ex    rel.    v.    Commissioners, 

Commissioners    of    Franklin    County,  54   0.   S.   333,  43   N.   E.   587    [1896]; 

35  0.   S.  458   [1880];    (not  a  case  of  (citinjj  on   this  point   Commissioners 

special    assessment).  v.   Stall,  50  O.   S.   653,  35  N.  E.  887 

^  State  "  ex    rel.    v.    Commissioners,  [1893]). 


305  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  189 

not  to  exceed  thirty-five  thousand  and  two  hundred,"  might  con- 
struct free  turnpikes  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional.-**  The 
question  of  the  effect  of  such  change  of  judicial  opinion  upon  the 
validity  of  local  assessments  was  soon  presented  to  the  court.  An 
act  similar  to  that  considered  in  State  ex  rel.  Hibbs  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners  of  Franklin  County^"  was  passed  on 
April  12,  1893,  before  the  rendition  of  the  decisions  overruling 
the  former  case ;  and  the  improvement  was  begun  before  the  ren- 
dition of  such  decisions.  Payment  of  the  assessments  was  refused 
by  certain  of  the  property  owners.  It  was  held  that  the  law  was 
unconstitutional  and  that,  as  the  specific  statute  had  never  been 
passed  upon  or  held  to  be  valid,  the  court  was  not  bound  to 
uphold  the  assessments  levied  under  such  unconstitutional  stat- 
ute.-'*^ The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  held  in  a  case 
arising  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  and  thence  com- 
ing on  error  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  that  the 
Federal  courts  should  follow  the  earlier  decision  of  the  state 
courts  where  the  rule  of  law  was  clearly  settled,  and  the  rights 
of  the  parties  in  the  case  at  bar  were  fixed  before  the  date  of  the 
later  decision  overruling  such  earlier  decision.  Accordingly  a 
statute  requiring  a  specifically  named  township  to  construct  a 
designated  improvement,  to  issue  bonds  therefor,  and  to  levy  local 
assessments  to  meet  the  cost  of  such  bonds  was  upheld.-''-  A 
similar  question  with  an  important  point  of  difference  was  sub- 
sef(uently  presented  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.''^ 
Under  a  statute  similar  to  those  already  discussed,  an  improve- 
ment had  been  constructed,  ])ut  to  secure  the  sale  of  the  bonds 
issued  to  pay  for  the  improvement  the  property  owners  liable  to 
assessment  signed  an  agreement  that  the  improvement  was  legally 
made  and  constructed.  The  case  came  before  the  United  States 
Court.  The  Circuit  Court  upheld  the  validity  of  the  bonds  on  the 
theory  that  it  was  not  bound  to  follow  the  later  holdings  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Ohio'*  on  the  theory  that  where  a  case  orig- 


^  Hixson   V.   r>iir-inn.   54   O.   S.   470,  -  Loob  v.  Columbia  Township  Tnis- 

48   N.   E.    1000    nS9t;|:     (not    an    as-  toes,    170  U.  S.  472,  45  L.  280,  21   S. 

sessment  caso).  174  [1000];    ( reversinjj;  Loeb  v.  Trus- 

""SS  0.  S.  458,   [18801.  toes    of    Columbia    Town-hip.    TTamil- 

"  Lewis   V.    Symmes.   61    O.    S.   471,  ton  County,  Ohio,  91  Fed.  37  [1899]). 

76   Am.   St.   Rep.   428,   5G   X.   E.    194  ="  The    case   arose   under   a    statute 

[1899].  passed  in   1890. 

**  See    Pajre    on    Contracts.    S    1744. 


§  190  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  306 

inated  in  the  United  States  courts,  they  are  not  bound  to  follow 
the  latest  holding  of  the  state  courts  where  the  latter  courts  have 
at  different  times  held  different  views  upon  the  question  involved. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  upheld  the  validity  of 
the  bonds  on  the  theory  that  by  signing  the  agreement  referred 
to  the  property  owners  had  virtually,  although  not  technically, 
estopped  themselves  from  taking  advantage  of  the  unconstitu- 
tionality of  the  act.''^'  Statutes  classifying  counties  with  reference 
to  the  class  and  grade  of  cities  located  therein  have,  from  their 
nature,  a  clearer  tendency  to  local  legislation  than  those  con- 
cerning cities  themselves.  The  classification  thus  adopted  has 
ordinarily'  nothing  to  do  with  the  subject  matter  of  the  statute ; 
forms  no  just  basis  for  the  distinction  in  legal  authority  sought 
to  be  made,  and  is  ordinarily  an  attempt  to  legislate  specially, 
using  the  classification  by  cities  while  held  valid  to  conceal  the 
fact  that  special  legislation  is  enacted.  Thus  an  act  authorizing 
the  construction  of  sidewalks  and  the  levy  of  an  assessment 
therefor  in  any  village  of  any  city  of  the  first  grade  of  the  first 
class  in  which  no  sidewalks  had  already  been  constructed  under 
certain  enumerated  sections  of  the  Revised  Statutes  was  held 
invalid  as  resting  upon  an  improper  basis  of  classification.^"  So 
an  act  applicable  to  "any  county  containing  a  city  of  the  second 
grade  of  the  first  class,"  there  being  only  one  city  of  that  grade 
and  class,  was  held  unconstitutional."' 

§  190.     Pennsylvania. 

The  constitution  of  Pennsylvania  provides:  "The  legislature 
shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special  laws  .  .  .  regulating  the 
affairs  of  counties,  cities  or  townships  .  .  .  authorizing  the 
laying  out,  opening  or  maintaining  roads,  highways,  streets  or 
alleys  .  .  .  creating  ot^ces  or  prescribing  the  powers  and 
duties  of  officers  in  counties,  cities  .  .  .  regulating  the  prac- 
tice or  jurisdiction  of.  or  changing  the  rules  of  evidence  in  any 
judicial  proceeding  or  inquiry  before  courts  ...  or  other 
tribunals."^  A  classification  of  cities  based  on  essential  dis- 
tinctions which  make  necessary  legislation  for  one  class  different 

=^Shepard  v.  Barron,  104  U.  S.  553.  "  Mott   v.   Hubbard,   59   0.   S.    199, 

48   L.    1115,   24   S.    737    [1904].  53  N.   E.  47    [1898]. 

""  Costello    V.    WyomiTi<r.    49    0.    S.  '  Article   III.,    §    7,   Constitution   of 

202,   30  N.   E.   613    [1892].  Pennsylvania    [1874]. 


307  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  190 

from  that  required  for  another  class,  is  constitutional.-  Under 
this  section  an  act  classifying  the  cities  of  the  state  into  three 
classes  has  been  held  to  be  valid. ^  So  an  assessment  act  made 
applicable  to  cities  of  the  third  class  or  any  city  of  less  than  ten 
thousand  inhabitants  theretofore  inc.n-porated,  as  might  accept  it, 
has  been  upheld  as  constitutional.*  The  fact  that  it  was  left 
optional  with  each  city  to  accept  the  provisions  of  the^statute  or 
not  was  at  first  held  to  make  such  statute  unconstitutional^  but 
on  re-hearing  this  view  was  abandoned  and  the  statute  held  to  be 
constitutional,*'  a  view  which  has  since  been  adhered  to.'  How- 
ever, an  act  relating  to  one  class  of  cities  only,  is  valid  if  it  af- 
fects the  powers  and  duties  of  the  cities,  the  number,  character 
and  duty  of  officers  and  the  like,  and  it  affects  all  -the  cities  of 
that  class  alike;  but  invalid  if  it  relates  to  matters  not  under 
municipal  control  or  affecting  municipal  government.^  Under 
this  theory  an  act  Avhich  provided  that  in  the  construction  of 
streets  and  sewers  in  cities  of  the  second  class  a  board  of  viewers 
should  be  created  wliich  should  assess  damages  and  benefits  aris- 
ing from  such  improvements  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional, 
since  it  made  such  classification  upon  a  matter  not  affecting 
municipal  power  or  control.  Furthermore  it  affected  the  powers 
and  practice  of  the  courts  of  law  in  Allegheny  county  and  cre- 
ated in  this  one  county  an  oppressive  system  for  assessing 
damages  and  benefits."  Other  objections  to  the  system  were  that 
the  decision  of  the  council  as  to  the  number  of  petitioners  was 
final,  and  that  the  decision  of  the  viewers  was  final  unless  on 
appeal  to  the  city  councils  and  thence  to  the  courts — an  appeal 

"  Pliiladolphia    Company's    Petition.  "City    of    Reailintr    v.    Savncc    124 

210   Pa.   St.   ^nn,    on   Atl.   9.3    rin041.  Pa.    St.    .328.    If)   Atl.    788    [18801. 

'City    of    Readinii    v.    Savao'.'.    124  "City  of  :Mea(lville  v.  Dickson.   12!) 

Pa.    St.    328.     10    Atl.     788     [18801;  Pa.  St.   1,   18  Atl.  513    [18801. 

Wlioclci-   V.   Pliihulclpliia.   77    Pa.    St.  'Pittsburg's  Petition  for  Board  of 

338    [187;)!.  Viewers.  138  Pa.  St.  401.  21  Atl.  757, 

*  City  of  Meadville  V.  Dickson,    120  750.    701     [1800|:     \Yyomin<r    Street, 

Pa.  St.   1.   18  Atl.   513    [1880];    City  137  Pa.  St.  404.  21  Atl.  74  [18001. 

•  f    Reading    v.    Savage,    124    Pa.    St.  "  Pittsburg's  Petition   for  Board  of 

328,     10     Atl.    788     [1880];      (distin-  Viewers.    138    Pa.    St.    401.    21     Atl. 

guisliing     City     of     Scranton     Sc'iool  757.      7.50.      761      [18001;      Wyoming 

District's    Appeal.    113    Pa.    St.    170,  Street.    137    Pa.    St.    404,    21    Atl.    74 

fi    Atl.    158     [18801.    an,l    overrulin-;  [18001.      See    also    Scranton    City    v. 

City  of   Beading   v.    Savaiie.    120    Pa.  Ansley.      34      Pa.      Super.      Ct.    "  133 

St.    108.    13    Atl.   010    [18881).  [10071. 

"City    of    Reading    v.    Savage.    120 
Pa.    St.    108,    13    Atl.    919    [1888]. 


S  19]  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  308 

which  was  made  hard  and  technical  and  for  which  too  short  a 
time  was  given  These  last  objections,  however,  were  not  the 
basis  of  decision  in  the  cases  cited.  Classification,  with  separate 
legislation  for  each  class,  can  be  npheld,  however,  only  if  there 
exists  an  evident  necessity  therefor  springing  from  manifest 
peculiarities  which  distinguish  the  cities  of  one  class  from  those 
of  the  otjiers,  and  which  make  necessary  certain  legislation  for 
one  class  which  would  be  useless  and  detrimental  to  the  others.^'' 
Accordingly  the  act  which  classified  the  cities  of  Pennsylvania 
into  seven  classes  and  provided  differences  in  the  organization  of 
the  government  of  each  class  was  said  to  be  "classification  run 
mad,""  and  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional.^-  An  assessment 
authorized  under  such  classification  statute  is  invalid.^^ 

§  191.    Wisconsin. 

The  constitution  of  Wisconsin  provides:  "The  legislature  is 
prohibited  from  enacting  any  special  or  private  laws  in  the  fol- 
lowing cases:  .  .  .  6th.  For  assessment  or  collection  of  taxes  or 
for  extending  the  time  for  collection  thereof.  7th.  For  granting  cor- 
porate powers  or  privileges  except  to  cities.  8th.  For  incor- 
porating any  city,  town  or  village  or  to  amend  the  charter  there- 
of."^ "The  legislature  shall  provide  general  laws  for  the  trans- 
action of  any  business  that  may  be  prohibited  by  section  thirty- 
one  of  this  article,  and  all  such  laws  shall  be  uniform  in  their 
operation  throughout  the  state."'-  Under  this  section,  before 
amendment,  it  has  been  held  that  an  "act  to  authorize  the  im- 
provement of  certain  streets  in  the  third  ward  of  the  city  of 
]\Iilwaukee  and  to  authorize  the  levy  of  a  special  tax  in  said 
ward"  is  in  effect  an  amendment  to  the  city  charter,  and  a  grant 
of  corporate  poAvers  to  the  city  and  not  a  special  act  for  the 
assessment  or  collection  of  taxes;  and  that  is.  therefore,  not   in 


'"Appeal  of  Avars,  122  Pa.  St.  266,  Pa.  St.  285.   16  Atl.  366   [18881.     To 

2  L.  R.  A.  577,  16  Atl.  356  [1888].  the  same  effect  see  City  of  Meadville 

» Appeal  of  Ayars,  122  Pa.  St.  266,  v.    Dickson,    129    Pa.    St.    1,    18    Atl. 

279,    2    L.    R.    A.    577,    16    Atl.    356  513    [1889]. 

[1888];     (quoting    Commonwealth    v.  ^  Article  IV.,   §   31    (adopted  as  an 

Patton,  85  Pa.  St.  258).  amendment,    1871:    amended    further 

^-Shoemaker     v.     Harrisburg,     122  in    1892    by    adding    ''city"    in    para- 
Pa.    St.    285,    16    Atl.    366     [1888];  graph   9). 

Appeal    of    Ayars,    122    Pa.    St.    266,  =  Article  IV..   §   32,  Constitution  of 

2  L.  R.  A.  577,   16   Atl.   356   [1888].  Wisconsin     (adopted    as    amendment 


'^  Shoemaker     v.     Harrisburs,     122       1871' 


J 


309  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  191 

violation  of  this  section  of  the  constitution.'-  An  act  providing 
for  the  drainage  of  certain  lands  in  a  specified  county  and  for 
the  appointment  of  a  board  of  drainage  commissioners  possessed 
of  corporate  powers  to  carry  out  the  proposed  system  of  drain- 
age was  upheld  on  the  theory  that  the  main  purpose  of  such 
act  was  the  promotion  of  the  public  health  and  welfare  under 
the  police  power,  and  not  assessment  for  benefits  under  the  power 
of  taxation.*  Under  this  section  a  classification  of  cities  may  be 
made,  but  there  must  be  a  substantial  difiPerenee  on  which  such 
classification  is  based;  the  classification  must  be  germane  to  the 
purpose  of  the  act ;  it  must  not  be  based  solel^y  on  the  circum- 
stances existing  at  the  date  of  the  enactment  of  the  statute, 
but  must  also  be  prospective  in  its  operation ;  and  the  character- 
istics of  each  class  must  be  so  far  different  from  those  of  other 
members  of  that  class  as  reasonably  to  suggest  the  propriety  of 
different  legislation."'  Accordingly  a  statute  which  is  applicable 
to  Milwaukee  county  only,'^  or  a  statute  giving  power  for  a  cer- 
tain year  to  a  city  of  the  first  class  '  are  each  in  violation  of 
these  constituional  provisions.  The  legislature  may  provide  a 
general  charter  and  leave  it  to  the  option  of  cities  to  adopt 
it  or  the  whole  of  any  sub-chapter  therein,'*  but  a  city  cannot 
be  authorized  to  adopt  a  part  of  a  sub-chapter.^  Thus  it  cannot 
adopt  a  section  authorizing  it  to  assess  for  sprinkling,  but  not 
the  sections  prescribing  the  procedure  in  such  cases.^"  Apply- 
ing these  principles  to  legislation  concerning  assessments,  a  stat- 
ute concerning  street  assessments^'  applying  to  "any  city  hav- 
ing a  population  of  two  hundred  thousand  inhabitants  or  more," 
is  valid,  as  it  is  construed  as  applying  to  all  cities  as  soon  as 
they  attain  that  population.'-  The  legislature  may  classify  cities 
both  on   a  basis  of   popu.lation   and   also  as  to   whethor  they  an^ 

'Warner   v.   Knox.   .50   Wis.    420.    7  '^  Adams  v.  City  of  Beioit.  10.)  Wis. 

N.   W.   372    [1880].  .30.3.   47   L.   R.   A.   441,   81    X.   W.  SCO 

'State  ex   rel.  Balt/.cll    v.   Stewart.  [lOOO]. 

74   Wis.   020,   6  L.   R.    A.   394,   43   X.  "State     v.      Mayor     and     Common 

W.   947    [1889].  Conncil   of  La   Crosse.    107   Wis.   054. 

estate    V.    Board    of    Trustees.    121  84    X.   W.   242    [1900]. 

Wis.  44.  98  X.  W.  954  [1904]:  .Tohn-  "' Dawley    v.    City    of    Aiiti-o.    120 

son    V.    City    of    Milwaukee.    S8    Wis.  Wis.    302,    97    X.    W.     1119     [1904]; 

383,   GO   X.   W.    270    [1894].  Rorgman  v.  City  of  Anti^^o.   120  Wis. 

•WafTiier  v.  :\Iilwankee  County.  112  290.  97   X.  W.  936    [1904]. 

Wi.s.  001,  88  X.   W.   577    [1901].  "  Ch.  310.  Laws  of   1893. 

'Burnliam    v.    City    of    :\Iilwaukee,  '=  Boyd    v.    City    of    Milwank<-e.    92 

98  Wis.   128,  73  X.  "w.    1018    [1897].  Wis.  45(5.  00  X.  W.  0(»3   [1890], 


^102  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  310 

acting  under  general  laws  or  charters.  Accordingly  a  statute 
which  applies  to  all  cities  with  special  charters  having  a  popula- 
tion of  three  thousand  or  more,  and  "authorized  by  such  char- 
ters to  construct  sewers,"  has  been  held  to  be  constitutional  on 
the  theory  that  by  a  fair  construction,  such  statute  applied  to 
all  cities  whose  charters  expressly  or  impliedly  authorize  them 
to  construct  sewers. ^■'^  Prior  to  the  amendment  of  the  constitu- 
tion it  was  held  that  a  statute.^*  amending  the  charter  of  the 
city  of  Madison  by  authorizing  the  council  to  order  the  construc- 
tion of  a  sewer  from  a  point  in  the  marsh  in  the  second  and 
third  wards  to  Lake  IMonona  and  to  charge  the  expense  upon 
the  lots  situated  upon  said  marsh  was  valid."  The  constitu- 
tion of  Wisconsin  provides:  "The  legislature  shall  establish 
but  one  system  of  town  and  county  government,  which  shall  be 
as  nearly  uniform  as  practicable."^"  Under  this  provision,  a 
statute  providing  a  special  system  for  the  drainage  and  reclama- 
tion of  certain  lands  in  a  specific  county  is  not  invalid,  on  the 
theory  that  the  drainage  of  swamps  and  marshes  is  not  one  of 
the  ordinary  functions  of  town  or  county  officers.^^ 

§  192.     Specific  provisions  restricting  statute  to  one  subject  ex- 
pressed in  title. 

A  group  of  constitutional  provisions  require  the  legislature  to 
confine  each  statute  to  but  one  subject,  or  to  state  that  subject 
in  the  title,  or  both.  These  provisions  as  considered  in  assess- 
ment law  are  as  follows :  "...  Each  law  shall  contain  but 
one  subject  which  shall  be  clearly  expressed  in  its  title,  except 
general  appropriation  bills,  general  revenue  bills  and  bills  adopt- 
ing a  code,  digest  or  revision  of  statutes.  .  .  .  "^  "Every 
act  shall  einbrace  but  one  subject,  which  subject  shall  be  ex- 
pressed in  its  title.  But  if  any  such  subject  shall  be  embraced 
in  an  act  which  shall  not  be  expressed  in  its  title,  such  act  shall 
be  void  only  as  to  so  much  thereof  as  shall  not  be  expressed  in 
its  title."-     "No  bill  except  general  appropriation  bills  shall  be 

"  Johnson    v.    City    of    Milwaukee,  "  Bryant  v.   Eobbins,   70  Wis.   258, 

88  Wis.  383,  60  N.  W.  270  [1894].  35  X.  W.  545   [1887]. 

"Ch.    213.    P.    and    L.    Laws    1871,  'Article   IV..    §    2.   Constitution   of 

Wisconsin.  Alabama    [1875]. 

"Massing    v.    Ames,    37    Wis.    645  =  Article  IV.,   §   24,  Constitution  of 

[1875].  California. 

1"  Article  IV„  §  23.  Constitution  of 
W^isconsin   [1848], 


311  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  192 

passed  containing  more  than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  clearly 
expressed  in  its  title ;  but  if  any  subject  shall  be  embraced  in 
any  act  which  shall  not  be  expressed  in  the  title,  such  act  shall 
be  void  only  as  to  so  much  thereof  as  shall  not  be  so  expressed."^ 
"  .  .  .  No  act  hereafter  passed  shall  embrace  more  than  one 
subject  and  that  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title.  But  if  any 
subject  shall  be  embraced  in  an  act  which  shall  not  be  expressed 
in  the  title,  such  act  shall  be  void  only  as  to  so  much  thereof  as 
shall  not  be  so  expressed.  .  .  .  "*  "No  law  enacted  by  the 
General  Assembly  shall  relate  to  more  than  one  subject  and 
that  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title.  .  .  .  "^  "Every  law  en- 
acted by  the  General  Assembly  shall  embrace  but  one  object, 
which  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title.""  "No  law  shall  embrace 
more  than  one  object,  which  shall  be  expressed  in  its  title. 
.  .  .  "^  "No  law  shall  embrace  more  than  one  subject,  which 
shall  be  expressed  in  its  title."*  "To  avoid  improper  influ- 
ences which  may  result  from  intermixing  in  one  and  the  same 
act  such  things  as  have  no  proper  relation  to  each  other,  every 
]av\^  shall  embrace  but  one  object  and  that  shall  be  expressed 
in  the  title.  .  .  .  "^  "No  private  or  local  bill  which  may  be 
passed  by  the  legislature  shall  embrace  more  than  one  subjeet 
and  that  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title. "^^  "No  bill  shall  em- 
brace more  than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  expressed  in  its 
title,  but  a  bill  which  violates  this  provision  shall  be  invalidated 
only  as  to  so  much  thereof  as  shall  not  be  so  expressed. "  ^^ 
"No  bill,  except  general  appropriation  bills,  shall  be  passed  con- 
cerning more  than  one  subject,  which  shall  be  clearly  expressed 
in  its  title. "^-  "No  bill  shall  embrace  more  than  one  subject 
and  that  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title.""  "No  private  or 
local  bill,  which  may  be  passed  by  the  legislature  shall  embrace 
more  than  one  subject  and  thnt  shall  ])e  expressed  in  the  title."" 

'Article   V.,    §    21.    Constitution    of  V\i-ticlo  TV..  §   7,  par.  4.  Constitu- 

Colorado    [18761.  tion   of    Xcw   Jersey. 

*  Article  IV.,  §    13.  Constitutiim  of  '"Article    III..    §     16,    Constitution 

Illinois    [1870].  of  New  York. 

"Section    51.    Constitution    of    Ken-  '^Article  IT.,   §   61.   Con-^titution   of 

tucky.  North  Dakota. 

•Article  29.  Constitution  of  I>ouis  "=  Article  ITT..   §   3.   Constitution   of 

iana.  Pennsylvania. 

■'Article   TV..   §   20.   Constitution   of  ''Article   II..    §    19.   Constitution   of 

iticbigan    [18.501.  Washin!:'ton. 

•Article  IV..   §  27,  Constitution  of  "Article  IV..  §   IS,  Constitution  of 

Minnesota.  Wisconsin. 


§§193,194 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


312 


§  193.     Purpose  of  such  provisions. 

The  provisions  that  no  act  shall  relate  to  more  than  one  sub- 
ject were  intended  to  prevent  log-rolling  as  far  as  possible ; 
that  is,  to  make  it  impossible  to  include  a  number  of  different 
subjects  in  one  bill,  thus  securing  a  majority  that  could  not  have 
been  secured  for  any  one  of  them  separately.  The  provision 
requiring  the  subject  to  be  expressed  in  the  title  was  in  part  to 
prevent  the  practice  of  striking  out,  at  a  period  late  in  the  ses- 
sion, all  of  some  bill  which  had  progressed  so  far  as  to  be  nearly 
ready  for  a  final  vote,  and  substituting  therefor  a  bill  upon  some 
totally  different  subject.  In  part,  it  was  to  secure  the  attention 
of  the  legislators  to  the  subject  of  the  bill  by  having  the  bill 
express  that  subject  in  its  title. 

§  194.     Form  of  title. 

The  provision  that  the  subject  of  a  bill  must  be  expressed 
in  its  title  does  not  require  the  title  of  a  bill  to  be  a  complete 
and  perfect  index  of  the  contents  thereof.^  It  is  sufficient  if 
the  title  suggests  the  subject  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  reasonable 
information,  to  one  who  reads  the  title,  of  what  the  subject  of 
the  bill  is.- 


^  Whitney  v.  City  of  Pittsburg,  147 
Pa.  St.  351,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  740.  23 
Atl.   395    [1802]. 

^  City  Council  of  ^.lontgomery  v. 
Moore,  140  Ala.  638,  37  So.  291 
[1903];  Anderson  v.  Grand  Valley 
Irrigation  District,  35  Colo.  525,  85 
Pac.  313  [1906];  McChesney  v.  City 
of  Chicago.  159  111.  223,  42  X.  E. 
894  [1896];  Jones  v.  Town  of  Lake 
View,  151  111.  663,  38  X.  E.  683 
[1894];  Blake  v.  People,  for  use  of 
Caldwell.  109  111.  504  [1884];  Pot- 
win  V.  Johnson.  108  111.  70  [1883]; 
Guild.  Jr.,  V.  City  of  Chicago.  82  111. 
472  [1876];  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v. 
Brislin,  SO  111.  423  [1875];  Prescott 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  60  111.  121  [1871]  ; 
Richman  v.  Supervisors  of  Musca- 
tine County.  77  la.  513,  14  Am.  St. 
Rep.  308,  4  L.  R.  A.  445,  42  X.  \V. 
422  [1889];  Town  of  Parkland  v. 
Gaines,  88  Ky.  562,  11  S.  W.  649 
[1889];  Excelsior  Planting  &  Manu- 
facturing Co.  V.   Green.   39  La.    Vrn. 


455,  1  So.  873  [1887];  Butler  v.  De- 
troit, 43  Mich.  552,  5  X.  W.  1078; 
Ek  V.  St.  Paul  Permanent  Loan  Co.. 
84  Minn.  245,  87  X.  W.  844  [1901]; 
Lien  v.  Board  of  County  Commis- 
sioners of  X'orman  County,  80  Miim. 
58,  82  X.  W.  1094  [1900];  Sta+'3  e\ 
rel.  Doyle  v.  IMayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Xewark,  34 
X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  236  [1870];  In 
the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the 
Trustees  of  the  Leake  and  ^Vai  ts 
Orphan  Home  in  the  City  of  Xc^v 
York  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  92 
X.  Y.  116  [1883];  In  the  matter  of 
the  Confirmation  of  the  Report  of 
the  Commissioners  of  Assessment  for 
Grading,  Paving  and  Otherwise  Im- 
proving Sackett,  Douglas  and  De 
Graw  Streets  in  the  City  of  Brook- 
lyn, 74  X.  Y.  ^5  [1878]  ;  'in  the  mat- 
ter of  the  Petition  of  Mayor  to  Va- 
cate an  Assessment,  50  X.  Y.  504 
[1872];  In  the  matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion   of   Astor   to   Vacate   an   Assess- 


I 


313  (UXSTITLTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  195 

§  195.     Illustrations  of  titles  expressing  subject  matter. 

The  actual  ojjeration  of  these  constitutional  provisions  may 
best  be  shown  by  some  concrete  illustrations.  The  courts  allow 
a  wide  range  of  discretion  to  the  legislature  in  selecting  an 
appropriate  title  to  the  bill  as  long  as  the  subject  can  reasonably 
be  gathered  from  the  title.  Thus  a  statute  entitled.  *'an  act  to 
authorize  the  city  council  of  IMontgomery  to  issue  bonds  for  the 
purpose  of  paving,  or  otherwise  improving  the  streets,  or  side- 
walks, or  either,  of  the  city  of  ]\lontgomery. "  is  held  to  show 
the  subject  with  sufficient  certainty.^  A  statute  entitled  "An 
act  authorizing  the  ascertainment,  assessment,  levy  and  collection 
of  costs,  damages  and  expenses  of  municipal  improvements,  in- 
cluding the  grading,  paving,  maca^.amiziug  or  otherwise  im- 
proving of  any  street,  lane  or  alley  or  parts  thereof  completed 
or  now  in  process  of  completion  and  authorizing  the  completion 
of  any  such  improvement,"  shows  with  sufficient  certainty  that 
it  is  intended  to  cure  such  defects  as  omission  to  secure  the  con- 
sent of  property  owners,  or  the  inclusion  of  the  cost  of  improve- 
ments not  warranted  by  law.-  A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  to 
provide  for  the  incorporation  of  cities  and  villages"  sufficiently 
shows  its  subject  in  its  title,  even  though  it  provides  that  such 
act  shall  apply  to  cities  and  towns  already  incorporated,  as  well 
as  to  towns  to  become  incorporated;  and  though  as  to  such  cities 
and  towns  already  incorporated,  it  may  operate  only  as  an  amend- 
ment to  such  charters.^  A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  to  amend 
the  charter  of  the  town  of  Parkland,  in  Jefferson  county,"  ex- 
presses its  subject  sufficiently  in  its  title  if  the  effect  of  the  act 
is  to  extend  the  limits  of  such  town  ;  but  if  the  act  creates  a 
road  district  it  is  invalid,  as  the  title  does  not  express  such  sub- 
ject.*    A  statute  entitled,  "a  further  supplement  to  the  act  en- 

mont.   50  X.   Y.   376    [18721;    In   Hie  Knox.    50    Wis.    420,    7    X.    \V.    S72 

matter  of  tlip  Api)licati()n  of    r:i|)i)a)i  I  18801  ;    ^lassinji    v.    Ames.    37    \^  is. 

to    Vacate    Certain    Assessments,    54  045    [18751. 

Barb.    (X.    Y.)    225    [ISOOl:    lV)ple  'City    Council    of    Montoromery    v. 

ex  rel.  Crowell  V.  Lawrence.  36  Barb.  ^roore.     140     Ala.     638,     37     So.     '201 

(X.  Y.)    178    [1862]-,    In   tbe   matter  [10031. 

of    the    Petition    of   Mead    to    Reduce  -Whitney  v.  City  of  Pittsburfr.   147 

an  Assessment."  13  Hun    (X.  Y.)    340  Pa.  St.  351.  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  740.  23 

[18781;    Whitney    v.    City    of    Pilt^-  Ail.   305    [1S921. 

burg.    147    Pa.    St.    351.    30    Am.    St.  "Guild,  Jr..  v.  City  of  Cliicago.  82 

Rep.  740.  23  Atl.  305   [18021;   Brad-  111.  472   [18761. 

ley  V.  City  of  Pittsbursr.   130  Pa.  St.  ^  Town    of   ParVland    v.    Oaines.    88 

475.   18   Atl.   730    [18801;    Warn^-r   v.  Kv.    562.    11    S.    W.    6<0    [18801. 


§  195  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  314 

titled,  'an  act  to  revise  and  amend  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
Newark,  approved  March  11,  1857,'  "  and  containing  provisions 
with  reference  to  prior  defective  assessments  and  provisions  for 
a  new  assessment  for  such  improvement,  sufficiently  expresses  its 
subject  matter  in  its  title."'  A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  relative 
to  contracts,"  and  providing  for  the  creation  of  a  board  of  re- 
vision, is  not  invalid  as  failing  to  express  its  subject  in  its  title." 
The  title  need  not  indicate  the  means  by  which  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  the  bill  is  to  be  carried  into  effect."  Accordingly,  pro- 
visions which  are  incidental  to  the  subject  of  the  bill  or  a  means 
for  carrying  into  effect  such  subject  need  not  be  expressed  in 
the  title.  An  act,  whose  title  shows  it  concerns  cities,  towns  and 
villages,  and  which  contains  provisions  concerning  the  opening 
and  repair  of  streets,  expresses  its  purpose  sufficiently  in  the 
title,  as  the  opening  and  repair  of  streets  is  an  incident  of  mu- 
nicipal government  and  operation.**  A  statute  entitled,  "an  act 
to  provide  for  the  organization  and  government  of  irrigation 
districts"  which  provides  for  the  organization  of  irrigation  dis- 
tricts, the  construction  of  irrigation  ditches,  the  appropriation 
of  canals,  by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain,  the  issuing  of  the 
bonds  of  the  irrigation  district,  and  the  approval  of  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  district  by  the  court,  sufficiently  expresses  its  sub- 
ject in  its  title."  A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  to  establish 
a  board  of  public  works,"  and  containing  a  provision  that 
proposed  public  improvements  shall  be  referred  to  such 
board  expresses  its  subject  in  its  title  with  sufficient  cer- 
tainty.^" A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  to  amend  the  char- 
ter of  the  eit^  of  St.  Paul  in  relation  to  the  duties  and  powers 
of  the  Board  of  Public  Works  of  said  city,"  containing  provi- 
sions concerning  the  improvements  over  which  such  board  has 
jurisdiction,  which  are  connected  with  the  incidental  duty  of  the 
city   treasurer   to    issue   certificates   on    special   assessment   sales. 

^  State  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  Mayor  and  '  Prescott    v.    City    of    Chicago.    GO 

Common  Council  of  the  City  of  New-  111.    121    [1871]. 

ark,  34  N.  J.  L.   (5  Vr.)   23*6  [1870];  *  Potwin    v.    Johnson.     108    111.    70 

See   for    a   similar   case    State,   Wal-  [1883]. 

ter,   Pros.   v.   Town   of   Union   in    the  ^  Anderson  v.  Grand  Valley  Irriga- 

County    of    Hudson,    33    X.    J.    L.    (4  tion   District,    35    Colo.   525,    85    Pac. 

Vr.)    350    [18C9].  313    [lOOfi]. 

*  In  the  matter  of  the  Application  '"Butler   v.   Detroit.   43   Mich.   552, 

of  Tappan  to  Vacate  Certain  Assess-  5   X.   W.    1078. 
ments,  54  Barb.    (X.  Y.)   225   [1869]. 


I 


315  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  195 

sufficiently  expresses  its  subject  in  its  title. ^^  A  statute  entitled, 
"an  act  to  make  provision  for  the  government  of  the  city  of 
New  York,"  which  contains  a  provision  for  the  appointment 
of  certain  official  papers  in  which  must  be  published  such  notices 
as  are  required  to  be  published  to  the  exclusion  of  other  papers, 
has  been  held  valid  on  the  ground  that  such  provision  falls 
within  the  general  subject  of  the  government  of  the  city.^-  A 
statute  entitled,  "an  act  to  provide  for  laying  out,  opening,  ex- 
tending, widening,  straightening,  or  closing  up,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  any  street,  square,  lane,  alley,  place  or  court,  within  mu- 
nicipalities, and  to  condemn  and  acquire  any  and  all  land  and 
property  necessary  or  convenient  for  that  purpose,"  and  which 
contains  provision  authorizing  the  asesssment  of  such  land  as  is 
benefited  b}"  such  proceeding,  is  not  invalid.  The  subject  of 
the  act  is  sufficiently  expressed  in  the  title,  as  the  assessment  is 
regarded  as  merely  a  means  to  the  end  thus  indicated. ^^  A 
statute  entitled,  "an  act  for  the  relief  of  James  Ley  and  Son," 
which  provides  that  the  city  shall  levy  a  further  assessment  upon 
property  originally  assessed,  and  shall  pay  the  proceeds  of  such 
a.ssessment  to  James  Ley  and  Son,  the  contractors  by  whom  the 
original  improvement  was  constructed  as  a  payment  over  and 
above  the  contract  price,  has  been  held  to  show  the  subject  in  the 
title  with  sufficient  certainty.^*  A  statute,  the  subject  of  which 
.shows  that  it  is  upon  the  subject  of  collection  of  assessments, 
and  which  contains  a  provision  concerning  the  costs  of  collection, 
has  been  held  not  to  be  invalid  on  the  ground  that  the  subject 
of  the  act  is  not  expressed  in  the  title. ^^  An  act  concerning 
special  assessments  need  not  show  in  its  title  that  it  contains 
a  provision  to  the  effect  that  deferred  installments  of  assess- 
ments may  bear  interest.^"  It  will  ordinarily  be  presumed  that 
the  legislature  complied  with  the  provisions  of  the  constitution.^' 
A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  to  provide  for  the  Eastern  Boulevard 
in  the  citv  of  New  York,  and   in   relation  to  certain  alterations 


"  Ek  V.   St.  Paul   Permanent   Loan  "  l'.rew>tor  v.  City  of  Syracuse.   19 

Co.,    84    Minn.  .245.    87    X.    W.    844  N.    V.    116    [1859].  " 

[1901].  "Bradley    v.    City    of    Pittshurcrh, 

'=In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of  130  Pa.  St.  475,   18  Atl.  7.30    [1SS9]. 

Aster    to    Vacate    an    Assessment,    50  "■•  ^IcChesney    v.    City    of    Chicane, 

N.  Y.  3G3   [18721.  1.50   111.  223,  42  X.  E.894   [1890]. 

"  Davies    v.    City    of    Los    Angeles,  '"  See  §  79. 
ftO  Ca).  37.  24  Pae!  771   [1890]. 


§  196  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  816 

of  the  map  or  plan  of  said  city,  and  certain  local  improvements," 
and  containing  a  provision  authorizing  the  department  of  public 
work  to  improve  Tenth  avenue,  and  'construct  a  sewer  therein, 
was  held  to  express  the  subject  sufficiently  in  the  title,  inasmuch 
as  it  would  be  assumed  that  there  was  a  connection  between  the 
part  of  Tenth  avenue  specified  in  the  act,  and  the  Eastern  Boule- 
vard, in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  that  there  was  no  such 
connection. ^- 


§  196.     Illustrations  of  titles  not  expressing  subject-matter. 

On  the  other  hand  if  the  title  does  not  suggest  the  subject  of 
the  bill  in  a  fair  and  reasonable  manner  so  much  of  the  statute 
as  is  not  expressed  in  the  title  most  jurisdictions  held  to  be  in- 
valid for  failure  to  comply  with  these  constitutional  provisions.^ 
If  a  statute  contains  a  provision  not  expressed  in  the  title,  such 
provision  is  invalid;  but  the  invalidity  of  this  provision,  if  it 
can  be  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  act,  does  not  invalidate  the 
rest  of  the  statute  as  a  whole.-  Specific  examples  best  illustrate 
the  scope  of  these  general  priiiciples.  A  statute  entitled  "an 
act  to  amend  sections  three,  nine  and  twenty-four,  of  an  act  en- 
titled, 'an  act  to  provide  for  the  establishment  of  drainage  dis- 
tricts,' "  which  provided  for  amending  section  five  in  addition 
to  sections  three,  nine  and  twenty-four,  is  invalid,  since  the  en- 
tire subject  of  the  bill  is  not  expressed  in  the  title. ^  A  statute 
entitled,  "an  act  to  amend  chapter  245  of  the  laws  of  1875,  en- 
titled, 'an  act  to  amend  chapter  818  of  the  laws  of  1868,'  en- 
titled 'an  act  to  incorporate  the  village  of  Port  Chester  and  to 
amend   chapter   227   of   the   laws   of   1887,'  "   which   statute    at- 

^^In  the   niattor  of  the  Petition  of  494,   02   N.   W.   841    [19021;    Beckert 

the  Trustees  of  the  Leake  and  Watts  v.  City  of  Allegheny,  85  Pa.  St.   191 

Orphan    Home    in    the    City    of    New  [1877];    State  of  Wasliington  on  the 

York    to    Vacate    an    Assessmeiit,    92  Relation  of  Matson  v.  Superior  Court 

N.  Y.   116    [1883].  for  Skagit  County,  42  Wash.  491,  85 

^Surget  V.  Chase,  33  La.  Ann.  Pac.  264  [1906].* 
833  [1881];  Tingue  v.  Vil-  =  In  the  matter  of  the  Application 
lage  of  Port  Chester,  101  N.  Y.  294,  of  Van  Antwerp  to  Vacate  an  As- 
4  N.  E.  625  [1886];  City  of  Water-  sessment,  56  N.  Y.  261  [1874];  Beck- 
town  V.  Fairbanks,  65  N.  Y.  588  ert  v.  City  of  Allegheny,  85  Pa.  St. 
[1875];   Hopkins  v.  Mason,  61   Barb.  191    [1877]. 

(N.    Y.)     469    [1871];    Turnquist    v.  'State   of   Washington   on   the   Re- 

Cass    County    Drain    Commissioners,  lation   of   ^latson   v.    Superior    Court 

11  N.  D.  514,  92  N.  W.  852   [1902];  for  Skadt  County,  42  Wash.  491,  85 

Erickson   v.    Cass   County,    11    X.    D.  Pac.    264    [1906]. 


317  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION   APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  197 

tempted  to  authorize  re-assessments  in  cases  of  assessments  set 
aside  or  vacated  before  the  passage  of  such  act,  as  well  as  after 
such  passage,  was  held  to  be  insufficient,  since  the  title  of  such 
act  did  not  show  that  it  related  to  the  municipality  in  question ; 
namely,  the  village  of  Port  Chester.*  A  statute  which  purports 
to  be  an  amendment  to  a  charter,  and  contains  a  provision  which 
attempts  to  confirm  previously  unauthorized  assessments  has  been 
held  to  be  invalid,  on  the  ground  that  the  title  did  not  sufficiently 
express  the  subject  of  the  statute.^  If  the  title  of  a  statute  shows 
that  it  conq.erns  the  improvement  of  certain  streets,  and  the 
statute  contains  a  certain  provision  for  keeping  certain  streets  in 
repair  at  the  expense  of  the  city,  such  provision  is  invalid,  as 
being  a  subject  not  expressed  in  the  title. "^  A  statute  entitled, 
"an  act  to  provide  for  the  allowance  and  taxation  of  costs  for 
additional  attorneys'  fees  against  the  defendants  in  actions  to 
enjoin  drainage  proceedings,  or  the  levy  and  collection  of  taxes 
and  assessments  therefor,"  which  contains  a  provision  for  the 
allowance  of  additional  attorneys'  fees  against  the  plaintiffs  in 
such  an  action,  is  held  to  be  invalid  as  not  expressing  the  sub- 
ject of  the  act  in  the  title,  although  the  wording  of  the  title  was 
probably  a  misprint.'^  A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  relative  to 
grading,  paving,  curbing,  and  otherwise  improving  Troy  Road  in 
the  city  of  Allegheny,"  which  provides  for  improving  a  portion 
of  such  road  within  the  city  limits,  but  for  assessing  the  expense 
upon  property  paved  within  and  without  the  city  limits,  was  held 
invalid  on  the  ground  that  the  subject  of  the  bill  was  not  ex- 
pressed in  the  title  thereto.^ 

§  197.     View  that  such  provision  directory. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  it  may  be  added,  such  provisions  are 
regarded  as  merely  directory  and  addressed  to  the  conscience  of 
the  legislature.  A  violation  of  such  provision  does  not,  there- 
fore, render  the  statute  invalid  for  that  reason,  in  the  jurisdic- 

*Tingne  v.  Villapo  of  Port  Cliostor.  of    Van    Antwerp    to   Vacate    an    As- 

101   N.  Y.  204,  4  N.   E.   (12.5    [1SS(5].  sossment,  .56  N.  Y.  261    [1874]. 

Tity  of  Watertnwn   v.   Fairbanks,  "  Turnquist   v.    Cass    County   Drain 

65  N.   Y.   ,58S    [ISTol.    (not   reported  Comniissinnprs,   11   N.   D.  514.  92  X. 

in    fuin.      This    (|nostion    was    raised  W.    852     [1902];     Eriokson    v.    Cass 

but  not  decided  in  Hopkins  v.  Mason.  County,   11   N.  D.  494,  92  X.  \V.  841 

61   Barb.    (N.   Y.)    469    [1871].  [1892]. 

*In  the  matter  of  the  Application  *  Beckert  v.   City  of  Allegheny,   85 

Pa.  St.    191    [18771. 


§  198  TAXATIOM    BY    ASSESSMENT.  318 

tions  where  this  view  is  entertained.^  In  most  jurisdictions  such 
provisions  regarded  as  mandatory  and  failure  to  comply  with 
them  renders  the  statute  invalid.^ 

§  198.     Statute  may  provide  for  means  of  accomplishing  general 
purpose. 

The  clause  requiring  a  bill  to  contain  but  one  subject  does 
not  prevent  the  legislature  from  including  in  a  bill  both  the 
general  subject  to  be  accomplished  and  the  means  provided  for 
carrying  such  subject  into  effect.^  A  law,  under  §uch  constitu- 
tional provision,  may  contain  "several  particular  objects  properly 
referable  to  and  subdivisions  of  a  single  general  object."-  A 
statute  entitled,  "An  act  to  provide  for  the  construction,  repara- 
tion and  protection  of  drains,  ditches  and  levees  across  the  lands 
of  others  for  agricultural,  sanitary,  and  mining  purposes,  and 
to  provide  for  the  organization  of  drainage  districts"  is  not  in- 
valid as  embracing  more  than  one  subject.  The  subject  of  snch 
statute  is  the  protection  of  land  against  siirplus  water.  The  title 
of  the  statute  goes  into  unnecessar^y  detail  in  showing  the  means 
by  which  such  end  is  to  be  reached,  and  the  purposes  and  motives 
of  the  enactment ;  but  this  does  not  invalidate  the  statute.^  So 
the  fact  that  such  statute  contains  a  provision  for  the  construc- 
tion of  levees  as  incidental  to  the  general  scheme  of  protection 
against  surplus  water  does  not  make  the  statute  invalid  as  con- 
taining more  than  one  subject."*  A  statute  entitled,  "An  act  to 
amend  sections  6,  7  and  9  of  an  act  entitled  'An  act  in  relation 
to  the  completion  of  public  parks  and  the  management  thereof, 
approved  June  16,  1871,  and  to  add  two  (2)  sections  thereto,'  " 
and  containing  provisions  with  relation  to  the  acquisition  of 
property  for  park  purposes,  and  containing  in  one  of  the  added 

^  Seeley   v.   Thomas,    31    0.    S.    301  Jn  re  Report  of  Commissioners,  etc., 

[1877]  ;    State   ex   rel.   Attorney-Gen-  of   Elizabeth,   49   N-.   J.    L.    (20   Vr.) 

eral     v.     Covington,     29     0.     S.     102  488,   10  Atl.   363    [1887];   Warner  v. 

[187G];    Pirn    v.    Kieliolson,    6    0.    S.  Knox,    50    Wis.    429,    7    N.    W.    372 

176    [1856].  [1880]. 

-See   §    196.  -Excelsior     Phmtincr     &     Manufac- 

1  Jones  V.  Town  of  Lake  View,  151  turing  Co.  v.  Green,  39  La.  Ann.  455, 

111.  663,  38  N.  E.  688   [1894];   Blake  1  80.^^873   [1887]. 

V.    People    for    use    of    Caldwell.    109  'Blake  v.  People   for  u=e   of   Cald- 

111.    504    [1884];    Excelsior    Planting  well.    109    111.    504    [1884]. 

&  :\ranufacturin2  Company  v.  Green.  '  Blake   v.   People   for   use   of   Cald- 

39  La.   Ann.   455,    1    So.   873    [1887];  well,  109  111.  504   [1884]. 


II 


319  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §199 

sections  provisions  with  reference  'to  driveways  as  incidents  to 
parks,  sufficiently  expresses  its  subject  in  its  title;  as  such  sec- 
tion is  not  to  be  rec^arded  as  a  new  and  independent  subject, 
since  it  is  fairly  within  the  scope  of  the  general  purpose  of  the 
completion  and  management  of  public  parks.'  This  clause  re- 
quiring a  bill  to  contain  but  one  subject  does  not,  therefore, 
forbid  the  legislature  to  provide  for  an  improvement  and  an  as- 
sessment therefor  in  one  statute.  A  statute  which  deals  with 
taxes  and  assessments  levied  before  it  is  passed  and  also  vrith 
those  which  may  be  leviad  thereafter  does  not  include  more  than 
one  subject,  since  it  deals  primarily  with  taxes  and  assessments 
and  includes  these  classes  of  such  general  subject,  as  well  as 
the  means  specified  in  such  act  for  enforcing  and  collecting  such 
assessments.*'  A  statute  which  authorizes  a  council  to  order 
the  construction  of  a  certain  sewer,  and  to  charge  the  expense 
upon  certain  land,  is  not  invalid  as  containing  more  than  one 
subject.''  A  statute  which  provides  for  the  improvement  of  cer- 
tain streets,  and  the  levy  of  assessments  to  pay  for  the  cost  of 
such    improvement,    does   not    embrace    more    than    one    subject.^ 

§  199.     Combination  of  improvements  in  one  general  plan. 

Furthermore  two  or  more  improvements  v\'hieh  may  reasonably 
be  regarded  as  parts  of  a  general  plan  may  be  embraced  in  one 
statute.  A  statute  providing  for  the  improvement  and  assess- 
ment of  two  or  more  streets,  is  not  invalid  as  embracing  more 
than  one  subject.^  A  statute  entitled,  "an  act  to  widen  portions 
of  Sackett,  Douglass  and  President  streets,  and  otherwise  alter 
the  commissioners'  map  of  the  city  of  Brooklyn,"  is  held  not 
to  l)e  invalid,  as  embracing  more  than  one  subject.-  A  statute 
providing  for  levying  re-assessments  for  the  construction  of  two 
different  roads,  tbe  assessment  for  which  improvements  had  been 
levied  under  two  different  statutes,  one  a  supplement  of  the  other. 


°  Jonps  V.  Town  of  Lake  View.  1.51  '  In   the   matter  of  the  Application 

111.  (163,  3S  X.  E.  688   [1894].  of    Van    Antwerp    to    Vacate   an    As- 

° /?!    rr    Koj)ort    of    Commissioners,  sessment,  56   N.  Y.  261    [1874]. 

etc..   of    Eli/aheth,    49   X.   J.    L.    (20  *  In  the  matter  of  the  Confirmation 

Vr.)    488,   10  Atl.  363    [18871.  of  the  Report  of  the   Commissioners 

'Massing    v.    Ames.    37    Wis.    64.5  of    Assessment    for    Gradinfj,    Paving 

[1875].  and     Otherwise     Improving    Sackett, 

'  Warner  v.  Knox,   50  Wis.   429,   7  DouL'las  and  De  Craw  Streets  in  the 

X.  W.  372   [1880].  City  of  Brooklyn.  74  X.  v.  9.1  fiS78], 


§  200  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  320 

but  levied  by  the  same  commissioners  and  according  to  the  same 
general  method  of  assessment  does  not  contain  more  than  one 
subject.''  A  statute  which  provides  for  the  reassessment  of  cer- 
tain defective  assessments,  to  pay  for  certain  pieces  of  Nichol- 
son pavement  previously  laid  down  in  such  city  without  authority 
of  law,  and  further  authorizing  the  municipal  authorities  of  such 
city  to  order  the  streets  of  such  city  or  any  portion  of  them 
to  be  paved  with  snch  material  as  they  might  select,  and  if  such 
pavement  selected  was  patented,  either  to  buy  the  patent  for  the 
city,  or  to  let  the  work  to  the  lowest  bidder,  was  held  not  to  em- 
brace more  than  one  subject  within  the  meaning  of  the  consti- 
tutional provision  in  question.* 

§  200.     Provision  concerning  form  of  tax  laws. 

The  provision  of  the  constitution  of  New  York :  ' '  Every  law 
which  imposes,  continues  or  revives  a  tax  shall  distinctly  state 
the  tax  and  the  object  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied,  and  it  shall  not 
be  sufficient  to  refer  to  any  other  law  to  fix  such  tax  or  object;"  ^ 
refers  to  state  tax  laws  and  has  no  application  to  local  assess- 
ments for  street  improvements.-  The  constitution  of  Michigan 
provides,  "every  law  which  imposes,  continues  or  revives  a  tax, 
shall  distinctly  state  the  tax,  and  the  object  to  which  it  shall  be 
applied,  and  it  shall  not  be  sufficient  to  refer  to  any  other  law  to 
fix  such  tax  or  object.^  Under  this  provision,  a  statute  which 
authorizes  cities  and  villages  to  appropriate  private  property  by 
eminent  domain,  and  provides  for  ascertaining  the  amount  of  the 
damages,  and  the  amount  of  special  benefits  conferred  upon  the 
property  in  the  locality,  and  further  provides  for  fixing  the  dis- 
trict which  is  deemed  to  be  benefited  by  such  improvement,  and 
for  determining  the  manner  of  such  assessments,  and  then  refers 

'  State,     Bergen     County     Savings  '  Article  III.,  §  24,  Constitution  of 

Bank,    Pros.    v.    Inhabitants    of    the  New  York  [1894];  Article  III.,  §  20, 

Township  of  Union,  in  the  County  of  Amended   Constitution  of   New  York 

Bergen,    44    N.    J.    L.    (15    Vr.)  "599  [1846];  Article  VII.,  §   13,  Constitu- 

[1882].  tion  of  New  York. 

'Mills   V.   Charleton,   29   Wis.   400,  ^  Guest  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  8  Hun. 

9  Am.  Rep.  578   [1872];    (followed  in  (N.  Y.)    97   [1876];   In  the  matter  of 

Evans  v.  Sharp,  29  Wis.  564  [1872]).  the   Petition   of   Ford    to   Vacate    an 

This  point  was  queried,  but   not  de-  Assessment,     6     Lans.     (N.     Y.)     92 

cided   in   Dean   v.   Charlton,   27   Wis.  [187?]. 

522    [1S71].  »  Article   XIV.,    §    14,   Constitution 

of   Michicran. 


321 


CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION   APPLICABLE,    ETC. 


201 


to  an  existing  charter  for  the  machinery  of  levying  and  collecting 
the  assessment,  and  the  form  to  be  observed  in  such  proceedings, 
is  valid.  The  law  states  both  the  tax  and  the  object,  and  the 
reference  to  the  charter  of  the  city  merely  concerns  matters  of 
detail." 

§  201.     Specific  provisions  securing  right  of  trial  by  jury. 

In  many  state  constitutions  are  found  provisions  securing  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury.  Some  of  these  provisions,  which  have 
been  considered  in  cases  involving  the  method  of  levying  assess- 
ments, are  as  follows:  "The  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  remain 
inviolate."^  "The  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  secured  to  all 
and  remain  inviolate,  but  in  civil  actions  three-fourths  of  the 
jury  may  render  a  verdict."-  "Trial  by  jury  shall  be  as  here- 
tofore."^ "The  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  secured  to  all 
and  remain  inviolate  forever."*  "The  right  of  trial  by  jury, 
except  where  it  is  otherwise  provided  in  this  constitution,  shall 
remain  inviolate.  .  .  .  "°  "The  right  of  trial  by  jury  as  here- 
tofore enjoyed  shall  remain  inviolate."^     "The  right  of  trial  by 


*  Trowbridge  v.  City  of  Detroit,  99 
'Mich.   443,   58   N.   W.   368    [1894]. 

'  Article  I.,  §  12,  Constitution  of 
Alabama;  Article  II.,  §  7,  Constitu- 
tion of  Arkansas;  Article  I.,  §  12, 
Constitution  of  Connecticut;  Article 
I.,  §  20,  Constitution  of  Indiana  (as 
applied  to  civil  cases)  ;  Article  I.,  § 
9,  Constitution  of  Iowa;  Article  III., 
§  31,  Constitution  of  Mississippi; 
Article  I.,  §  6,  Constitution  of  Ne- 
braska; Article  I.,  §  7,  Constitution 
of  New  Jersey;  Article  I.,  §  15,  Con- 
stitution of  Rhode  Island;  Article  I., 
§  11,  Constitution  of  South  Carolina; 
Article  VI.,  §  6,  Constitution  of 
South  Dakota;  Article  I.,  §  6,  Con- 
stitution of  Tennessee;  Article  I., 
§  15,  Constitution  of  Texas;  Article 
I.,    §    5,    Constitution    of    Wisconsin. 

A  similar  provision  is  found  in 
Article  II.,  §  23,  Constitution  of  Col- 
orado, with  a  provision  that  in  civil 
cases  a  jury  may  consist  of  less  than 
twelve  men;  in  Article  I.,  §  7,  Con- 
stitution of  Idaho,  with  a  provision 


that  in  civil  actions  three-fourths  of 
the  jury  may  render  a  verdict;  in 
Article  I.,  §  4,  of  the  Constitution 
of  Minnesota;  Article  I.,  §  21,  Con- 
stitution of  Washincrton;  Article  I., 
§  9,  Constitution  of  Wyoming. 

'  Article  I.,  §  7,  Constitution  of 
California. 

'Article  I.,  §  4,  Constitution  of 
Delaware. 

*  Article  I.,  §  3,  Constitution  of 
Florida;  Article  I.,  §  3,  Constitution 
of  Nevada  (with  a  provision  for  a 
three-fourths  verdict  unless  the  leg- 
islature requires  unanimity  by  a  stat- 
ute passed  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of 
all  the  members  elected  to  each  house 
of  the  legislature). 

"Article  VI.,  §  18,  Constitution  of 
Georgia. 

'Article  IT.,  §  5,  Constitution  of 
Illinois;  Article  II.,  §  28,  Constitu- 
tion of  Missouri  (containing  a  fur- 
ther provision  to  the  effect  tliat  a 
jnrv  may  consist  of  less  tlian  twelve 
men). 


^201 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


322 


jury  shall  be  inviolate."^  "The  ancient  mode  of  trial  by  jury 
shall  be  held  sacred  and  the  right  thereof  remain  inviolate,  sub- 
ject to  such  modifications  as  may  be  authorized  by  this  consti- 
tution."^ "In  all  civil  suits  and  in  all  controversies  concerning 
property,  the  parties  shall  have  a  right  to  trial  by  jury  except  in 
cases  where  it  has  heretofore  been  otherwise  practiced."®  "The 
inhabitants  of  Maryland  are  entitled  to  the  common  law  of  Eng- 
land and  the  trial  by  jury  according  to  that  law.  .  .  .  "  ^° 
"In  all  controversies  concerning  property  and  in  all  suits  between 
two  or  more  persons,  except  in  cases  in  which  it  has  heretofore 
been  other  ways  used  and  practiced,  the  parties  have  a  right  to 
a  trial  by  jury,  and  this  method  of  procedure  shall  be  held  sacred 
unless  in  causes  arising  on  the  high  seas  and  such  as  relate  to 
mariners'  wages,  the  legislature  shall  hereafter  find  it  necessary 
to  alter  it.""  "The  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  remain,  but 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  waived  in  all  civil  cases  unless  demanded 
by  one  of  the  parties  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed  by 
law."^^  "The  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  secured  to  all  and 
remain  inviolate.  .  .  .  "  ^^  "The  right  of  trial  by  jury  in  all 
cases  in  which  it  has  been  heretofore  used  shall  remain  inviolate 
forever,  .  .  .  "  ^*  "In  all  controversies  at  law  respecting 
property,  the  ancient  mode  of  trial  by  jury  is  one  of  the  best 
securities  of  the  rights  of  the  people  and  ought  to  remain  sacred 
and  inviolate."  ^^  "In  all  cases  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall 
remain  inviolate.""  "Trial  by  jury  shall  be  as  heretofore  and 
the  right  thereof  remain  inviolate.""  "...  When  any  issue 
in  fact,  properly  for  the  cognizance  of  a  jury  is  joined  in  a  court 
of  law,  the  parties  have  a  right  to  trial  by  jury  which  ought  to 


'Article  I.,  §  5,  Constitution  of 
Kansas;  Article  I.,  §  5,  Constitution 
of  Ohio. 

*  §  7,  Constitution  of  Kentucky 
[1891]. 

"Article  I.,  §  20,  Constitution  of 
T\Iaine. 

^^  Article  V.,  Declaration  of  Rights 
of  Maryland. 

"  Article  I.,  §  15,  Constitiition  of 
Massachusetts.  A  similar  provision 
is  found  in  Part  I..  Article  XX..  of 
the  Constitution  of  New  Hampshire. 

"  Article  VI.,  §  27,  Constitution  of 
Michigan. 


1' Article  III.,  §  23,  Constitution 
of  Montana,  with  a  provision  for  a 
verdict  of  two-thirds  of  the  jury; 
Article  I.,  §  7,  Constitution  of  North 
Dakota. 

"Article  I.,  §  2,  Constitution  of 
New  York. 

'"Article   I 
North   Carolina 

''Article   I. 
Oregon. 

"Article    I 
Pennsylvania. 


§    13,   Constitution   of 
§    17,   Constitution  of 


§    6,    Constitution   of 


323  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.         §§202,203 

be  held  sacred. "^^  ''In  controversies  respecting  property  and 
in  suits  between  man  and  man,  trial  by  jury  is  preferable  to 
any  other  and  ought  to  be  held  sacred.  .  .  .  "  ^"  "In  suits  at 
common  law  where  the  value  in  controversy  exceeds  twenty  dol- 
lars, exclusive  of  interests  and  costs,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury 
if  required  by  either  party  shall  be  preserved.    .    .    .    " -'' 

§  202.     Provisions  not  applicable  to  local  assessments. 

These  provisions  are  held  to  be  intended  to  secure  and  protect 
the  right  of  trial  by  jury  in  cases  where  such  right  existed  at 
common  law.  They  are  not  intended,  unless  such  affirmative  in- 
tention is  expressly  stated,  to  extend  the  right  of  trial  by  jury 
to  cases  in  which  no  such  right  existed  at  common  law,  as  in 
cases  of  taxation.  Accordingly  an  assessment  statute  is  not  made 
unconstitutional  by  these  provisions  because  it  makes  no  provi- 
sion for  having  the  question  of  benefits  passed  upon  by  a  jury.^ 

§  203,     Provisions  applicable  to  eminent  domain  combined  with 
assessment. 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  not  infrequently  provided  that  the  same 
commissioners  or  other  assessing  body,  which  is  to  act  in  deter- 
mining the  amount  of  the  assessment  shall  also  exact  in  determin- 
ing the  amount  to  be  paid  as  compensation  to  the  owners  of 
property  taken  or  injured  by  the  improvement  for  which  the 
assessment  is  levied.     While  no  objection  can  be  made  to  a  stat- 

'"C'haptpr   I.,    Article    XII,    Consti-  cago,   59    111.  28G  '[1871];    Baltimore 

tution  of  Vermont.  and    O.    and    C.    Ry.   Co.    v.    Ketring, 

"Article    I.,    §    11,   Constitution    of  122    Ind.   5,    23   N.   E.   527;    Lipes   v. 

Virginia.  Hand,    104   Ind.   503,    1    N.   E.  871,   4 

™  Article  III.,  §   14,  Constitution  of  X.    E.    160    [1885];     (citing    Ross    v. 

West  Virginia.  Davis,  97   Ind.   79;    Indianapolis  and 

'Harris  v.   People   ex   rel.    Kniglit.  Cumberland     Gravel      Road     Co.     v. 

218  111.  439,   75  N.   E.    1012    [10051:  Christian.     !):{     Ind.     ;5(10;     Anderson 

Stack   V.    People   ex    rel.    Talbot.    217  v.    Caldwell.    91     Ind.    4.)1,    4()    Am. 

III.  220,  75  N.  E.  347    [1905]:    Trig-  Hep.    (ILS)  :     /h    rr    nradley.    108    la. 

gor  V.  Drainage  District  X"o.    1.  etc..  47ii.      79      X'.      W.      2S()-.      Howe      v. 

19;{   111.  230.   61    X.   E.    1114    [19011;  City    of    Canibridgc,     114    Mass.    388 

Chicago   &    Alton    Railroad    Company  [18741;    :Mound    City    Land    &    Stock 

V.  City  of  .Toliet,   153  HI.  649.  39  X\  ("o.   v.   ^Miller.    170   Mo.    140.   94    Am. 

I^-    1077     [18941;     Brisgs    v.    T^nion  St.  Rep.  727.  60  L.  R.  A.   190.  70  R. 

Drainage  District  X^o.   1.   140  111.  53.  W.   721    [19021;    Bishop  v.  Tripp.    15 

29  X.  E.  721    [18931;   White  v.  Peo-  R.  T.   406.  8   Atl.   692    [18871:    State 

pie  ex   rel.   City   of   Rloomin<iton.   94  ex   rel.   Latimer   v.   Henrv.   28   Wash. 

HI.  604   [18801;   Rich  v.  Citv  of  Chi-  38,    68   Pac.    368, 


204 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


324 


lite  which  provides  for  conducting  the  assessment  proeeediag 
and  the  proceeding  in  eminent  domain  together/  yet  there  is  gen- 
erally a  constitutional  provision  securing  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury  in  eminent  domain ;  and  where  this  is  the  ease,  a  statutory 
provision  for  submitting  the  determination  of  the  question  of 
damages  and  benefits  to  a  body  which  is  not  a  constitutional 
jury  is  unconstitutional  as  far  as  the  assessment  of  damages  is 
concerned.-  Furthermore,  where  the  amount  of  benefits  and  dam- 
ages is  to  be  stated  as  net  result,  all  that  is  given  for  each  tract 
being  the  difference  between  the  gross  amount  of  the  damages 
and  the  gross  amount  of  the  benefits,  it  is  evident  that  the  as- 
sessing body  cannot  pass  upon  the  amount  of  benefits,  leaving  a 
constitutional  jury  to  pass  upon  the  question  of  damages,  and 
the  entire  statute  is  therefore  invalid.^  The  damages  must  be 
assessed  by  a  jury  in  a  condemnation  suit  before  an  assessment 
is  made  for  special  benefits.* 

§  204.     Specific  provisions  for  separation  of  governmental  powers. 

The  state  constitutions  generally  contain  provisions  for  the 
separation  of  the  three  great  governmental  powers — the  legisla- 
tive, the  executive  and  the  judicial.  In  some  constitutions  this 
is  effected  by  specific  provisions,^  which   are  substantially  like 


'  See   §   63  et  seq. 

-  Hutchins  v.  Vandalia  Levee  and 
Drainage  District,  217  111.  561,  75 
N.  E.  354  [1905];  Stack  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Talbot,  217  111.  220,  75  N.  E. 
347  [1905];  Michigan  Central  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Spring  Creek  Drainage 
District,   215   111.   501,   74  N.   E.   696. 

^  Hull  V.  Sangamon  River  Drainage 
District,  219  111.  454,  76  N.  E.  701 
[1906];  Hutchins  v.  Vandalia  Levee 
and  Drainage  District,  217  111.  561, 
75  N.  E.  354   [1905]. 

"On  the  question  of  damages  to 
lands  not  taken  the  jury  would  he 
bound  to  consider  the  effect  of  the 
improvement  upon  the  land,  both 
advantages  and  disadvantages,  and 
for  the  purpose  of  reducing  or  balanc- 
ing damages  would  necessarily  take 
into  account  any  special  benefits. 
That  is  not  assessing  benefits  for 
the  land  but  is  merely   ascertaining 


whether  there  is  any  damage  or  not." 
Hull  V.  Sangamon  River  Drainage 
District,  219  111.  454,  461,  76  N.  E. 
701  [1906];  (citing  Page  v.  Chicago, 
Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Railway  Co., 
70   111.   324). 

*  City  of  Joliet  v.  Spring  Creek 
Drainage  District,  222  111.  441,  78 
N.  E.  836   [1906]. 

^Article  III.,  §§  1,  2,  Constitution 
of  Alabama;  Article  IV.,  §  1,  Con- 
stitution of  Arkansas;  Article  III, 
§  1,  Constitution  of  California;  Ar- 
ticle III.,  Constitution  of  Colorado; 
Article  II.,  Constitution  of  Connecti- 
cut; Article  II.,  Constitution  of  Flor- 
ida; Article  I.,  §  11,  Constitution  of 
Georgia;  Article  III.,  §  96,  Constitu- 
tion of  Indiana;  Article  III.,  §  1. 
Constitution  of  Iowa;  §  27  Constitu- 
tion of  Kentucky;  §  14,  Constitution 
of  Louisiana;  Article  3,  §§  1,  2,  Con- 
stitution  of   Maine;    Article   I..    §   8, 


i 


325  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.         §§205,206 

the  following  provision  from  the  constitution  of  Illinois:  "The 
powers  of  the  government  of  this  state  are  divided  into  three 
distinct  departments — the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial ;  and 
no  person,  or  collection  of  persons,  being  one  of  these  depart- 
ments, shall  exercise  any  power  properly  belonging  to  either  of 
the  others,  except  as  hereinafter,  expressly,  directed  or  permit- 
ted."- In  other  constitutions  the  same  result  is  accomplished 
by  provisions  conferring  the  separate  kinds  of  governmental  pow- 
er upon  the  respective  separate  branches  of  government. 

§  205.     General  effect  of  such  provisions. 

Whether  such  provisions  prevent  the  co-operation  of  these 
powers  in  matters  of  local  assessment  is  a  question  which  is 
occasionally  presented  to  the  courts  for  consideration.  It  is 
a  special  application  of  the  broader  question  whether  such  pro- 
visions prevent  the  partial  intermingling  of  these  three  branches 
of  governmental  power  to  make  up  the  power  of  those  officers 
often  termed  administrative  officers.  It  is  generally  held  that 
no  such  separation  is  demanded  by  these  provisions.  Indeed  to 
insist  on  such  separation  of  powers  would  be  to  render  local 
government  difficult  if  not  impossible.^  As  far  as  the  question 
of  local  assessments  is  concerned,  these  provisions  do  not  pre- 
vent the  legislature  from  providing  for  the  co-operation  of  the 
legislative,  executive  and  judicial  powers  in  the  levying  and  col- 
lection of  assessments.  Indeed,  without  such  co-operation  it  is 
difficult  to   see  how  assessments   could  be  levied   and  collected. 

§  206.     Co-operation  of  courts  in  levy  of  assessment. 

Statutory  provisions  which  provide  for  the  co-operation  of  the 
courts  in  the  levy  of  local  assessments  are  generally  held  not  to 

Constitution  of  Maryland;  Article  I.,  trocluction) ,    Constitution    of    Rhode 

§  30,  Constitution  of  ilassacliusetts;  Island;     Article    I.,    §    20,    Constitu- 

Articlc     III.,     §     1,     Constitution     of  tion   of   South    Carolina;    Article   II., 

Michigan;   Article  III.,   §§   1,  2,  Con-  Constitution    of    Soutli    Dakota;    Ar- 

stitution   of   ^Vlississippi ;    Article    II..  tide  II..  §    1.  Constitution  of  Texas; 

8   1   and  Article  III.,  Constitution  of  Article  II.,  §  fi.  Constitution  of  Ver- 

Missouri;    Article  IV.,   §   I,  Constitu-  niont;  Article  I.,  §  7,  and  Article  II., 

tion   of  ^lontana:    Article   III..    §    1,  Constitution  of  Virginia;   Article  II., 

Constitution  of  Xevada:   Article  III.,  §    1.   Constitution   of  Wyoming. 

5    1,    Constitution    of    New    .Tersey;  -Article   III..   Constitution   of   Illi- 

Article  I.,  §  8,  Constitution  of  North  nois. 

Carolina;    Article    ITT.,    §    T,    Consti-  'See  §§  206,207. 
tution    of    Oregon:    Article    IV.     (in- 


§  206  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  326 

be  invalidated  by  the  constitutional  provisions  under  discussion.^ 
Thus  a  statute  which  provides  that  a  drainage  district  can  be 
formed  only  if  the  court  on  proper  application  shall  find  that 
the  necessary  precedent  steps  have  been  taken  to  form  such  dis- 
trict ;  that  when  the  district  is  formed  the  commissioners  there- 
of shall  determine  the  amount  necessary  to  be  raised  by  special 
assessment  to  complete  the  proposed  work;  and  that  a  jury  un- 
der supervision  of  the  court  shall  apportion  the  amount  of  such 
assessment  among  the  different  tracts  of  land  benefited  by  such 
improvement,  is  not  objectionable  as  an  attempt  to  confer  the 
power  of  taxation  upon  the  judiciary.-  A  similar  statute  has 
been  upheld  on  the  ground  that  there  is  no  delegation  of  leg- 
islative power,  but  that  the  duties  thus  imposed  on  the  court  are 
judicial  in  their  nature.^  The  validity  of  similar  acts  is  recog- 
nized in  other  cases. ^  So  a  provision  for  taking  appeals  in  road 
assessment  cases  to  the  superior  judge  of  the  county,  who  is  to 
file  the  transcript  and  docket  the  ease,  is  not  unconstitutional,  as 
imposing  a  public  and  non-judicial  employment  upon  a  judge.^ 
The  constitution  of  New  York  provided:  "The  judges  of  the 
Court  of  Appeals  and  the  justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  shall 
not  hold  any  other  office  or  public  trust.  .  .  .  "  °  Under  this 
provision  a  statute  providing  that  the  court  shall  appoint  com- 
missioners and  confirm  their  reports,  does  not  confer  upon  them 
another  office  or  public  trust,  and  is  therefore  valid.'  The  power 
of  the  legislature  to  confer  such  powers  and  duties  upon  a  court 
was  questioned  in  an  earlier  case,  on  the  theory  that  while  acting 
under  the  statute,  the  judges  were  commissioners  or  quasi  com- 
missioners rather  than  a  court. ^     A  statute  granting  power  to  the 

'In   the   matter   of   Westlake   Ave-  '^  Striker  v.  Kelly,  2  Denio   (N.  Y.) 

nue,   Seattle,   40   Wash.    144.   S2   Pae.  323  [Court  of  Errors,  1845];    (revers- 

279    [1905].  intf  on  another  point  Striker  v.  Kel- 

^Huston     V.     Clark.     112     111.     344  ley.    7    Hill    (X.   Y.)    9    [1844]). 

[1885].  *In   the   matter   of  the   Petition  of 

'  State  of  Washington  on  the  rela-  the    Mayor,    Aldermen    and    Common- 

tion  of  Matson  v.  Superior  Court  for  alty  of  the'  City  of  New  York  in  the 

Skagit    County,     42    Wash.    491,    85  matter    of    Enlarging   and    Extending 

Pac.  264    [1906].  Beekman   Street  in  the  City  of  New 

*  Taylor    v.    Strayer,    1(17    Ind.    23.  York,  20  John.    (N.  Y.)    269   [1819]. 

78  N.  E.  236   [1906].  See    also    the    dissenting    opinion    of 

"  Seanor  v.  Board  of  County  Com-  Porter,    J.,    in    Striker    v.    Kelley.    2 

missioners,  13  Wash.  48,  42  Pac.  552  Denio    (X.  Y.)    323    [1845],  supra,  in 

[1895].  which    he    cites:      In    the    matter    of 

'Article  VI..  §   10.  Constitution  of  the  Petition  of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen 
New  York. 


4 


327  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  207 

court  to  set  aside  assessments  for  fraud  and  irregularity "  does 
not  violate  this  provision.  It  does  not  confer  any  new  jurisdic- 
tion, but  merely  extends  to  assessments  the  well  established  juris- 
diction of  the  courts  over  frauds  and  legal  irregularities.^''  Un- 
der constitutional  provisions  to  the  effect  that  the  legislature 
may  vest  in  municipal  authorities  the  power  to  make  local  im- 
provements," a  statute  providing  that  the  city  shall  commence 
proceedings  to  levy  local  assessments ;  that  the  apportionment  of 
assessments  Shall  be  made  by  commissioners  appointed  by  the 
court;  and  that  if  objection  to  the  assessment  is  made  the  court 
shall  have  power  to  correct  irregularities  therein,  is  valid,  and 
is  not  objectionable  as  conferring  upon  the  court  the  power  to 
make  assessments.^-  So  a  statute  authorizing  the  court  to  de- 
termine in  the  first  instance  whether  the  proposed  drainage 
scheme  is  practical  and  conducive  to  public  welfare  and  whether 
it  will  increase  the  value  of  the  lands  which  it  is  proposed  to 
drain,  is  valid." 

>^  207.     Action  of  administrative  board  as  reviewing  body. 

On  the  other  hand  it  has  been  claimed  that  statutes  providing 
for  a  board,  which  is  to  hear  complaints  and  decide  questions  of 
fact,  in  which  the  lev}^  and  apportionment  of  the  assessment  de- 
pends, are  invalid  as  conferring  judicial  power,  which  by  its 
nature  should  be  conferred  only  upon  a  court.  This  claim,  how- 
ever, has  failed  in  the  cases  in  which  it  has  been  made  and  the 
courts  have  held  such  statutes  valid, ^   on  the  ground  that  such 


and  Comnionalty  of  tlio  City  of  Xew  man's  Case.   11  Abb.  Pr.    (X.  Y.)    164 

York  in  tbe  matter  of  Enlarging  and  [18001. 

Extending    Beekman     Street     in     the  "  Article    VII..    §     0,    Constitution 

City  of  New  York.  20  John.    (X.  Y.)  of  \Vashington.     See   §   103  ct  seq. 

269    [1819];    StalTord   v.   Mayor,   Al-  '-In   tlie   matter  of  Westlake  Ave- 

dermen  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  nue,   Seattle,   40   Wash.   144,   82   Pac. 

of  Albany,  7  John.  Sup.  Ct.    (X.  Y.")  279  [1905]. 

541    [1811];   Matter  of  Third  Street,  "State  of  Washington  on  the  rela- 

6   Cowen    (X.  Y.)    571    [1827];    Mat-  tion  of  Matson  v.  Superior  Court  for 

ter   of   Canal    Street,    11    Wend.    (X.  Skagit    County,    42    Wash,    491.    85 

Y.)     154    [1834];    Matter    of    Mount  Pac.    264    [1906]. 

Morris    Square,    2    Hill     (X.    Y.)     14  ^  McC.ehee    v.    Mathis,    21    Ark.    40 

[1842].  [I860];     (reversed    on    another   point 

"Act  (if   April,    1858.  as    McGee    v.    Mathis.    71    U.    S.     (4 

"In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of  Wall.)    143,   18  L.   314   [1866]);   Da- 

Beeknian   to   Vacate    Assessments.    19  vies  v.   City  of  Los  Ansreles.  86   Cal. 

TTow.     (X.    Y.)     518     [1860]:     Beek-  .37.    24    Pac.    771     [1890]:    Owners   of 


^  207  •  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  328 

board  acts  as  a  ministerial  body  and  not  as  a  judicial  body.- 
So  a  statute  which  provides  that  the  county  surveyor  is  to  keep 
the  ditches  constructed  under  the  laws  of  the  state  in  repair  and 
certify  the  cost  of  such  repair,  including  his  own  compensation 
to  the  county  auditor,  who  is  to  draw  his  warrant  in  favor  of  such 
certificate  upon  the  county  treasurer,  is  not  invalid  as  delegatinji' 
judicial  power  to  the  surveyor.^  While  judicial  power  cannot 
be  conferred  upon  a  non-judicial  officer,*  the  discretionary  power 
here  conferred  is  of  a  class  that  may  be  given  to  administrative, 
ministerial  and  executive  officers.^  The  constitution  of  California 
provides:  "The  legislature  shall  not  delegate  to  any  special 
commission,  private  corporation,  company,  association  or  in- 
dividual any  power  to  make,  control,  appropriate,  supervise,  or 
in  any  way  interfere  with  any  county,  city,  town  or  municipal 
improvement,  money,  property  or  effects,  whether  held  in  trust 
or  otherwise,  or  to  levy  taxes  or  assessments  or  perform  any 
municipal  functions  whatever."^  Under  this  section  a  statute 
providing  for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  who  are  to  make 
a  finding  as  to  the  amount  necessary  to  meet  the  expense  of  the 
improvement,  but  who  act  under  the  direction  of  the  municipality 
and  whose  acts  are  not  binding  or  effective  until  they  are  ap- 
proved and  confirmed  by  the  city  council  is  not  invalid  as  a 
delegation  of  municipal  functions  to  such  commissioners.'  The 
appointment  of  such  commissioners  is  not  a  delegation  of  power 
to  make  or  control  a  municipal  improvement,  since  the  commis- 
sioners are  not,  in  legal  effect,  independent  officials,  but  merely 
agents  of  the  city  for  such  purpose.*  So  a  statutory  provision 
to  the  effect  that  the  contractor  shall  collect  the  assessment  is 
valid."  In  making  such  collection  he  acts  as  the  agent  of  the 
municipality  and  not  as  an  independent  officer  to  whom  muuici- 


Lands  v.  People  ex  rel.  Stookey,  113  54  Am.  Rep.  343,  4  N.  E.  197. 

111.    296    [1886];    Heath    v.    McCrea,  °  State   ex   rel.   French   v.   Johnson, 

20    Wash.    342     [1898];     P.ellinoham  105  Ind.  463,  5  N.  E.   553    [1885]. 

Bay  Improvement  Co.  v.  City  of  New  "  Article  XL,   §   13,  Constitution  of 

Whatcom,   20  Wash.  53,  54  Pac.   774  California. 

[1898].  ■^  Davies    v.    City    of    Los    Angeles. 

=  McCxehee    v.    Mathis,    21    Ark.    40  86   Cal.  37,  24  Pac.   771    [1890]. 
[I860];    Owners   of   Lands   v.   People  *  Davies  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  86 

ex  rel.  Stookey,   113  111.  290    [1886].  Cal.   37,   24   Pac.    771    [1890]. 

'  State   ex   rel.   French  v.   Johnson,  '  Banaz  v.  Smith,  133  Cal.   102,  65 

105   Tnd.  463,  5  N.  E.  553    [1885].  Pac.    309    [1901];    Sullivan    v.    Mier, 

'Elmore  v.   Overton,   104   Ind.   548.  67    Cal.   264,   7   Pac.   691    [1885]. 


329  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  207 

pal  power  has  been  delegated.  x\.  provision  in  an  act  of  Con- 
gress to  the  effect  that  certain  specified  officers  shall  serve  on 
the  board  of  park  commissioners  for  the  District  of  Columbia, 
is  valid,  as  it  is  merely  an  increase  in  the  duties  of  existing  officers, 
and  not  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Congress  to  exercise  the  ap- 
pointing power. ^"^  The  constitution  of  Illinois  provides:  "The  pow- 
ers of  the  government  of  this  state  are  divided  into  three  distinct 
departments — the  legislative,  executive  and  judicial;  and  no  per- 
son or  collection  of  persons  being  one  of  these  departments  shall 
exercise  any  power  properh^  belonging  to  either  of  the  others, 
except  as  hereinafter  expressly  directed  or  permitted."  ^^  "The 
Governor  shall  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate  (a  majority  of  all  the  members  elected  concurring 
by  yeas  and  nays)  appoint  all  officers  whose  offices  are  established 
l)y  this  constitution  or  which  may  be  created  by  law  and  whose 
appointment  or  election  is  not  otherwise  provided  for;  and 
no  such  officer  shall  be  appointed  or  elected  by  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly."^-  Under  this  section,  a  statute  conferring 
additional  powers  and  imposing  additional  duties  upon  existing 
officers  already  elected  by  the  people  is  not  unconstitutional  as 
an  appointment  or  election  to  office  by  the  Legislature."  Hence 
the  county  surve.yor,  county  treasurer  and  sheriff  may  be  consti- 
tuted an  appeal  board  to  hear  and  decide  all  appeals  from  the 
drainage  commissioners'  orders  confirming  special  assessments. 
Furthermore,  such  statute  is  not  unconstitutional  as  conferring 
judicial  i)owers  upon  a  non-judicial  body,  since  the  power  of  pass- 
ing on  assessments  in  this  manner  is  not  regarded  as  judicial 
power.^"'  The  statute  may  provide  that  the  commissioners  of  high- 
ways of  a  town  shall  also  l)e  the  drainage  commissioners  of  a 
township. ^^  The  Legislature  may  confer  upon  the  township  trus- 
tees a  discretionary  authority  to  determine  when  it  is  necessary 
to  repair  public  drains.^" 

"Shoemaker  v.  Unitod   States.   147  <^our  v.  Drainage  Comniissionors.  Ill 

U.    S.    282,    .37    L.    170,    1.3    S.    301  111.  342   [1885]. 

ri8G.jl.  "Owners  of  Lands  v.  People  ex  rel. 

"Article   ITT.,  Constitiitinn   of   Tlli-  Stookey,    113    Til.    296    [18861. 

nois.  ''KiJorour  v.  Drainage  Commission- 

« Article  V..   S    10.   Constilution   of  ers,   111    111.   342    [18851. 

Illinois.  i«  Weaver  v.  Templin.  113  Ind.  208, 

"Owners  of  Land  v.  T'eople  ex  rel.  14  N.  E.  600   [1887]. 
Stookey,    113    111.    206    [1886];    Kil- 


§  §  208,  209  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  330 

§  208.    Grant  of  taxing  power  to  executive  officer. 

Under  such  provisions  the  power  of  levying  taxes  cannot  be  con- 
ferred upon  an  executive  officer  either  directly  or  indirectly.  A 
statute  authorizing  the  tax  assessor  to  determine  whether  certain 
work  in  the  nature  of  removing  from  streams  on  the  lands  of  the 
owner  thereof,  impediments  to  the  flow  thereof,  has  been  done  by 
such  owner,  and  if  he  finds  that  it  has  not  been  done,  to  report 
such  fact  to  the  clerk,  who  is  to  extend  a  specific  tax  against  such 
land,  has,  under  these  constitutional  provisions,  been  held  to  be 
unconstitutional.^ 

§  209.    Restriction  on  power  to  incur  debts. 

General  provisions  which  forbid  the  pledging  of  public  credit 
or  the  incurring  of  debts  are  usually  so  worded  as  not  to  apply 
to  local  assessments.  If,  under  the  law  in  force,  the  contractor 
by  whom  the  improvement  is  constructed,  is  to  look  solely  to  the 
assessments  for  his  compensation,  and  is  to  have  no  personal  claim 
therefor  against  the  public  corporation  which  requires  the  im- 
provement to  be  constructed,  and  which  levies  the  assessment, 
such  transaction  creates  no  debt  against  such  public  corporation.^ 
In  such  case  the  constitutional  limitation  as  to  the  amount  of  in- 
debtedness which  such  public  corporation  may  contract  does  not 
apply.-  The  constitution  of  Louisiana  provides:  "The  General 
Assembly  shall  have  no  power  to  contract  or  to  authorize  the 
contracting  of  any  debt  or  liability  on  behalf  of  the  state,  or  to 
issue  bonds  or  other  evidence  of  indebtedness  thereof  except  for 
the  purpose  of  repelling  invasion,  or  as  the  suppression  of  insur- 
rection." ^  This  provision  restricts  the  power  of  the  state  and  does 
not  prevent  the  state  from  authorizing  a  levee  district  to  incur 
debts.*  The  further  provision :  ' '  The  funds,  credit,  property,  or 
things  of  value  of  the  state  or  of  any  political  corporation  thereof 
shall  not  be  loaned,  pledged  or  granted  to  or  for  any  person  or 
persons,  association  or  corporation,  public  or  private,  .  .  .  "^ 
does  not  prevent  a  levee  district  from  issuing  bonds  for  the  con- 

1  Cleveland.  C,  C.  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  'Article     XLIV.,     Constitution     of 

Co.  V.  People  ex  rel.,  212  111.  638,  72  Louisiana    [1879]. 

N.  E.  725.  *  Excelsior  Planting  &  Manufactur- 

^iSee  Chapter  XXVI.  ing   Company   v.   Green,   39   La.   Ann. 

=  Quill  V.  City  of  Indianapolis,  124  455,   1   So.  873   [1887]. 

Ind.   292,   7   L.   R.   A.   681,   23   X.   E.  =  Article      LVL,      Constitution      of 

788    [1890];    Tuttle   v.   Polk   &    Hub-  Louisiana    [1879]. 
bel,  92  la.  433,  60  X.  W.  733  [1894]. 


331  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTKICTKJN    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  209 

striiction  of  a  levee,  since  such  bonds  are  for  the  benefit  of  the 
district  itself  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  any  other  person  or  cor- 
poration." The  provision  of  the  constitution  of  California  restrict- 
ing indebtedness  applies  only  to  the  public  corporations  which  are 
specified  therein,  and  does  not  prevent  the  leg'islature  from  author- 
izing other  types  of  public  corporations,  such  as  irrigation  dis- 
tricts," to  incur  indebtedness  for  public  improvements  for  which  as- 
sessments are  to  be  levied,  without  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the 
qualified  voters  of  such  district.  Under  the  provision  of  the  consti- 
tution of  Arkansas,  restricting  the  amount  of  indebtedness  which 
may  be  incurred  by  a  county,  town  or  other  municipality/^  it  has 
been  held  that  the  words  "county,  town  or  other  municipality,"  do 
not  include  an  improvement  district,  which  derives  its  powers  from 
the  Legislature,  and  in  exercising  them  acts  as  agent  of  the  prop- 
erty owners.^  The  provision  in  the  constitution  of  Kentucky,^" 
which  provides  that  when  a  county  or  city  "is  authorized  to  con- 
tract an  indebtedness  it  shall  be  required  at  the  time  time  to  pro- 
vide for  the  collection  of  an  annual  tax  sufficient  to  pay  the  inter- 
est," is  not  self-executing  and  requires  legislation  to  make  it  oper- 
ative.^^ The  section  limiting  the  amount  of  indebtedness  which 
towns  and  cities  may  incur  ^-  is  indeed  self-executing  and  requires 
no  legislation  to  make  it  operative,"  but  by  its  terms  it  does  not 
apply  when  the  proposed  indebtedness  was  authorized  under  laws 
in  force  prior  to  the  adoption  of  such  constitution."  Accordingly, 
improvements  authorized  by  such  prior  laws  may  be  made  and 
contracts  entered  into  therefor  after  the  adoption  of  such  consti- 
tution, without  reference  to  the  amount  of  the  existing  indebted- 
ness of  the  city  or  the  amount  of  the  debt  to  be  created  by  such 
improvement;  ^^  at  least  until  the  Legislature  provides  by  general 


"  E.Kcelsior  Planting  &  ^faniifactur-  "  Holzhaiier    v.    City    of    Newport, 

ing  Company  v.  Groen,   .30   La.   Ann.  94   Ky.  306,  22  S.   \\.  752    [1893]. 

455,    1    So.    873    [1887].  '=  §   158.  Constitution  of  Kentueky. 

'  In  the  matter  of  tlie  Bonds  of  the  "  Holzhauer    v.    City    of    Newport, 

Madera    Irrigation    District.    02    Cal.  94  Ky.  30G.  22  S.  W."  752    [1893]. 

296,  27   Am.   St.   Eep.    IOC.    14   L.   R.  "City  of  Lexington  on  Appeal,  96 

A.  755,  28  Pae.  272.  075   [1891].  Ky.  258,  28  S.  W.  665   [1894];  IIolz- 

"  Article    XVI.,    §     1.    Constitution  liaiier    v.    City   of    Newport,    94    Ky. 

of  Arkansas.  .396,   22   S.   W.   752    [1893]. 

•  Fitztrerald  v.  Walker.  55  Aik.  148,  "City  of  Lexington   on   Appeal.  96 

17  S.  W.  702    [1891],  Ky.  258.  28  S.  W.  665   [1894];   Holz- 

"§   159,  Constitution  of  Kentucky.  liaiier    v.    City    of   Newport,    94    Ky. 

390,  22  S.  w!  752   [1893]. 


§  210  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  332 

laws  for  the  government  of  such  cities.^"  The  constitution  of  Mis- 
souri provides:  ''No  county,  city,  town,  township,  school  district 
or  other  political  corporation  or  subdivision  of  the  state  shall  be 
allowed  to  become  indebted  in  any  manner,  or  for  any  purpose, 
to  an  amount  exceeding  in  any  year  the  income  and  revenue  pro- 
vided for  such  year  without  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  voters 
thereof  voting  at  an  election  to  be  held  for  that  purpose."  ^^  This 
provision  does  not  prevent  the  Legislature  from  authorizing  a 
general  judgment  against  a  city  for  its  proportionate  share  of 
an  assessment,  based  on  the  city's  ownership  of  property  abutting 
on  the  street  for  the  improvement  of  which  the  assessment  is 
levied.^® 

§  210.    Constitutional  provisions  for  exemption  from  taxation. 

In  some  of  the  state  constitutions  provisions  are  found  exempt- 
ing certain  kinds  of  property  from  taxation.  As  considered  in  the 
law  of  local  assessments  these  provisions  are  like  the  following: 
"  .  .  .  The  property  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state,  coun- 
ties, school  districts  and  other*municipal  corporations,  and  such 
other  property  as  the  Legislature  may  by  general  laws  provide, 
shall  be  exempt  from  taxation."^  These  provisions,  as  worded, 
generally  refer  to  taxation  in  the  more  limited  sense  of  the  term, 
and  do  not  include  local  assessments.  The  Legislature  may,  there- 
fore, provide  for  levying  local  assessments  against  such  land  if  it 
sees  fit.-  The  greater  number  of  constitutional  provisions,  how- 
ever, merely  permit  the  Legislature  to  exempt  certain  property,  if 
it  sees  fit,  and  do  not  purport  to  make  such  exemption  mandatory. 
The  questions  thus  presented  are  chiefly  statutory,  and  will  be 
considered  elsewhere.^  Furthermore,  these  provisions  for  ex- 
emption are  exclusive  and  the  Legislature  cannot  provide  further 

I'' City  of  Lexington  on  Appeal.  96  S.  W.  556,  27  Ky.  L.  R.  129   [1905]: 

Ky.    258,   28    S.    W.    665    [1894].  Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.    v.    City 

"Article  X.,   §    12.   Constitution  of  of  St.  Joseph,  183  Mo.  451,  82  S.  W. 

Missouri    [1875].  64    [1904];    Kansas    City    Exposition 

"Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company  Driving    Park    v.    Kansas    City,    174 

V.   City  of   St.   Joseph,    183  Mo.   451,  Mo.  425,   74  S.  W.  979    [1903];   Wi- 

82   S.   W.   64    [1904].  nona    &    St.    P.    R.    Co.    v.    City    of 

1  Article  VII.,  §   2,  Constitution  of  Watertown,    1    S.    D.    46,    44    N.    W. 

Washington     [1889].       See    also    the  1072    [1890];    In  re  Howard  Avenue, 

constitutional    provisions    quoted    in  North,    in    the    City    of    Seattle,    44 

§    146   et  seq.  Wash.  62,  86  Pac.   1117   [1906]. 

=  Hagar  v.   Gast,    119   Ky.    502,   84  'See  §  579  et  seq..  §  618. 


333  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  211 

exemptionG.  The  constitution  of  Illinois  once  provided:  "The 
property  of  the  state  and  counties,  both  real  and  personal,  and 
such  other  property  as  the  General  Assembly  may  deem  neces- 
sary for  school,  religious  and  charitable  purposes,  may  be  ex- 
empt from  taxation."**  This  provision  was  held  to  apply  to 
general  taxation  only,  and  furthermore,  to  restrict  the  Legisla- 
ture from  granting  any  further  exemptions.  Accordingly  it  was 
held  that  the  Legislature  could  not  exempt  a  religious  or  char- 
itable corporation  from  special  assessments  for  local  improve- 
ments.^  The  constitution  of  IMissouri  provides:  "The  property, 
real  and  personal,  of  the  state,  counties  and  other  municipal 
corporations,  and  cemeteries,  shall  be  exempt  from  taxa- 
tion. .  .  .  " '■'  Under  this  provision,  a  statute  which  authorizes 
a  general  judgment  against  a  city  for  assessments  levied  against 
property  owned  hy  such  city,  for  the  improvement  of  abutting 
streets  is  valid." 

§  211.     Constitutional  restrictions  on  amount  of  taxation — Spe- 
cific provisions, 

Tn  some  states  are  found  constitutional  provisions  restricting 
and  limiting  the  amount  of  the  tax  that  may  be  levied.  These 
provisions,  as  considered  in  the  law  of  local  assessments,  are  as 
follows:  "No  county,  city,  town,  township,  board  of  education 
or  school  district  shall  incur  a,ny  indebtedness  or  liability  in 
any  manner  or  for  any  purpose  exceeding,  in  any  year,  the  in- 
come and  revenue  jirovided  for  such  year.  .  .  .  "^  "The  tax 
rate  of  cities,  towns,  counties,  taxing  districts  and  other  munici- 
palities for  other  than  school  purposes,  shall  not,  at  any  time, 
exceed  the  following  rates  ui>on  the  value  of  the  taxal)le  pro])- 
erty  therein.  .  .  .  "  -  "The  state  tax  on  projierty  for  all  ])ui-- 
poses  whatever,  including  expenses  of  government,  schools, 
levees  and  interest,  shall   in)t   t^xceed   in   any   one  year  six  mills 

'Artiolo    IX.,    §    .3.    Constitutinii    of  '  Articlo  XT..   §    IS,  Constitution  of 

Illinois    riS4Sl.  California,  oontaininsj  further  cortain 

''City   of    Chicairo    v.    Bajitist    Tho-  excoptions     to     such     provision     such 

olopiral  I^nion.   11;1  111.  245,  2  X.  E.  as    authority    to    incur    debt    if    con- 

254    [18801.  sonted    to   by   two-thirds   of   the   elec- 

'  Article    X.,    §    0,    Constitution    of  tors,    oi-    in    case    a    sinkinfj    fiind    is 

Missouri   [18751.  provided    suHTicient   to    pay   such    debt 

''Barber      Asphalt     Paving     Co.    v.  in   at   least  forty  years. 

City  of  St.  -Joseph,   183  Mo.  451,  82  -§    157,   C-onstitution  of  Kentucky. 
S.  W.   (U    [10041. 


§  212  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  334 

on  the  dollar  of  assessed  valuation ;  .  .  .  and  no  parish  or  mu- 
nicipal tax  for  all  purposes  whatsoever  shall  exceed  ten  mills  on 
the  dollar  of  valuation,  provided  that  for  the  purpose  of  erecting 
and  constructing  public  buildings,  bridges  and  works  of  public 
improvement  in  parishes  and  municipalities,  the  rate  of  taxation 
herein  limited  may  be  increased  when  the  rate  of  such  increase 
and  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  intended  shall  have  been  sub- 
mitted to  a  vote  of  the  property  taxpayers  of  such  parish  or 
municipality  entitled  to  vote  under  the  election  laws  of  the  state, 
and  a  majority  of  same  voting  at  such  election  shall  have  voted 
therefor."^  "No  county,  city,  town,  township,  school  district 
or  other  political  corporation  or  subdivision  of  the  state  shall  be 
allowed  to  become  indebted  in  any  manner  or  for  any  purpose 
to  an  amount  exceeding  in  any  year  the  income  and  revenue 
provided  for  such  year  without  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the 
voters  thereof,  voting  at  an  election  to  be  held  for  that  pur- 
pose.  .    .    .    "* 

§  212.    Application  of  such  provisions  to  local  assessments. 

These  provisions  show  by  their  phraseology  that  the  sovereign 
authority  that  enacted  them  had  in  mind  a  taxation  which  could 
only  be  expressed  and  was  necessarily  stated  in  the  form  of  a 
certain  per  centage  of  the  valuation  of  the  property  taxed.  Ac- 
cordingly it  is  held  that  these  provisions  are  limited  in  their 
application  to  general  taxation,  have  no  application  to  local 
assessments,  and  do  not  restrict  the  power  of  the  Legislature  to 
authorize  the  levy  and  collection  of  local  assessments.^ 

*  Article  209,  Constitution  of  Louis-  Paving  Company  v.  Gogreve,  42  La. 
iana    [1879],    Article    2.32    [1898].  Ann.  251,  5  So.  848    [1889];   Barrow 

*  Article  X.,  §  12,  Constitution  of  v.  Helpler,  34  La.  Ann.  362  [1882]; 
Missouri.  Surget    v.    Chase,    33    La.    Ann.    833 

^  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Birming-  [1881];    Meier   v.   City   of  St.   Louis, 

ham  V.  Klein,  89  Ala.  461,  8  L.  R.  A.  180  Mo.  391,  79  S.  W.   955;   Kansas 

369,  7   So.   386    [1889];    In  the  Mat-  City  v.  Bacon,  147  Mo.  259,  48  S.  W. 

ter  of  the  Bonds  of  the  Madera  Irri-  860  [1898];  Lamar  Water  &  Electric 

gation  District,  92   Cal.  296,  27  Am.  Light  Co.  v.  City  of  Lamar,  128  Mo. 

St.   Rep.    106,    14   L.    R.   A.    755,    28  188,  32  L.  R.  A."  157,  26  S.  W.  1025, 

Pac.  272,  28  Pac.   675    [1891];   Dyer  31  S.  W.  756  [1895];  City  of  Clinton 

V.  City  of  Newport,  —  Ky.  ,  80  to  use  of  Thornton  v.  Henry  County, 

S.  VV.  1127,  26  Ky.  L.  R.  204  [1904];  115   Mo.   557,   37   Am.    St.   Rep.   415. 

State  ex  rel.   Hiil  v.   Judges,  46  La.  22    S.    W.    494    [1893];    City    of    St. 

Ann.      1292,      16     So.     219      [1894];  -Joseph  v.   Owen,    110  Mo.   445,   19   S. 

George  v.  Young,  45  La.  Ann.   1232,  W.  713  [1892];  Farrar  v.  City  of  St. 

14   So.    137    [1893];    Barber   Asphalt  Louis,  80  Mo.   379    [1883]. 


1 


385  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.         §§  213,  214 

§  213.  Constitutional  provisions  for  exemption  from  sale. 

Specific  provisions  exempting  certain  kinds  of  propert}^  from 
forced  sales,  except  for  taxes  due  thereon,  have  been  considered 
by  the  courts.  Under  the  provision  found  in  the  constitution 
of  Texas  it  was  held,  originally,  that  a  local  assessment  was 
a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  the  provision  allowing  forced  sale 
of  a  homestead  for  taxes  due  thereon,  and  that  according  a  home- 
stead could  be  sold  at  forced  sale  to  satisfy  the  lien  of  a  local 
assessment.^  Subsequently,  however,  this  question  was  consid- 
ered by  the  court,  the  original  view  abandoned,  and  the  word 
"taxes"  in  such  provision  held  not  to  include  local  assessments, 
with  the  result  that  a  homestead  was  held  to  be  exempt  from 
forced  sale  for  local  assessments.-  This  change  of  judicial  opin- 
ion was  held  not  to  amount  to  an  impairment  of  the  obligation 
of  contracts  entered  into  after  the  decision  in  Lufkin  v.  City  of 
Galveston,^  and  in  reliance  thereon,  and  prior  to  the  decision 
in  Higgins  v.  Bordages,*  and  accordingly  such  contracts  were 
controlled  by  the  later  decision  as  to  the  power  to  sell  home- 
steads at  forced  sale  to  satisfy  the  lien  of  such  assessments.^ 

§  214.     Referendum  and  emergency  provisions. 

The  referendum  and  emergency  provisions,  which  are  found 
in  some  constitutions,  have  been  considered  as  affecting  local 
assessment.  The  constitution  of  Oregon  provides:  "  .  .  .  The 
second  power  is  the  referendum  and  it  may  be  ordered  (except 
as  to  laws  necessary  for  the  immediate  preservation  of  the  public 
peace,  health,  or  safety)  either  by  the  petition  signed  by  five  per 
cent  of  the  legal  voters,  or  by  the  Legislative  Assembly,  as  other 
l)ills  are  enacted.  .  .  .  "^  "No  act  .shall  take  effect  until 
ninety  days  from  the  end  of  the  session,  at  which  the  same  shall 
have  been  passed,  except  in  case  of  emergency,  which  emergency 
shall  be  declared  in  the  pi'(>ainble  or  the  body  of  the  law."-     The 

'Lufkin    V.    City    of    Galveston,    58  '58  Tex.  545   [1883]. 

Tex.  545    [1883];    construing  Article  *  88  Tex.  458,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  770, 

XVI.,  §   50,  Constitution  of  Texas.  31  S.  W.  52,  803   [1895]. 

=  Higgins  V.  Bordages,  88  Tex.  458.  =  Storrie  v.  Cortes.  90  Tex.  283,  35 

53   Am.   St.   Rep.   770,   31    S.   W.   52.  L.  R.  A.  GGfi.  38  S.  W.  154   [189fi]. 

803    [1895];     (overruling    Lufkin    v.  'Article    IV..    §    1,    Constitution   of 

City     of     Galveston.     58     Tex.     545  Oregon    [as   amended    1902]. 

[1883])  ;  Kettle  v.  City  of  Dallas.  35  =  Article  IV..   §  28.  Constitution  of 

Tex.    Civ.    App.    0.32,    80    S.    W.    874  0;e  on    [1857]. 
[1904]. 


§  215  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  336 

decision  of  the  Legislature  that  a  given  law  is  an  emergency 
matter,  is  held  to  be  conclusive  and  not  susceptible  of  judicial 
review."  Accordingly  the  declaration  of  the  Legislature,  that  the 
charter  of  Portland  is  an  emergency  matter,  causes  it  to  go  into 
effect  at  once,  and  as  it  may  fairly  be  regarded  as  concerning 
the  public  peace,  health  and  safety,  prevents  the  application 
of  the  referendum  clause.* 

§  215.    Home  rule  provisions. 

Certain  constitutional  provisions  conferring  upon  cities  the 
right  to  frame  charters  for  themselves  have  been  considered  in 
connection  with  the  law  of  local  assessments.^  The  constitution 
of  Missouri  provides:  "Any  city  having  a  population  of  more 
than  one  hundred  thousand  may  frame  a  charter  for  its  own 
government  consistent  with  and  subject  to  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  the  state.  .  .  .  "-  A  charter  adopted  by  the  vote  of 
the  people  of  a  city  having  such  population  and  consistent  with 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  state  has  the  force  and  effect  of 
an  act  of  the  Legislature.-''  Under  this  constitutional  provision, 
a  city  within  such  specified  class  may  frame  a  charter  which 
provides  that  every  special  tax  bill  shall  become  a  lien  upon  the 
lands  assessed  on  the  date  of  the  receipt  given  to  the  Board  of 
Public  Works  for  such  tax  bill;  that  such  lien  shall  continue 
for  two  years,  unless  suit  shall  be  brought  to  collect  and  enforce 
the  lien  within  that  time ;  in  which  case,  the  lien  shall  continue 
until  the  determination  of  such  suit;  provided,  that  in  case  of 
commencing  such  suit  the  plaintiff  shall  file  in  the  office  of 
the  city  treasurer  a  statement  showing  the  tax  bill  sued 
upon,  and  showing  in  what  court  the  suit  is  brought,  when 
it    is    brought,    and    against    whom    it    is    brought.*       The    pro- 

Msadderly  v.  Portland,  44  Or.   118,  'Meier    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    180 

74    Pac.    7io,    75    Pac.    222     [1903];  Mo.  391,  79  S.  W.  955   [1903];   Kan- 

(citing   and    following   State    ex    rel.  sas  City  v.   Bacon,    147   Mo.   259,   48 

Lavin  v.  Bacon,   14  S.  D.  284,  85  N.  S.   W.    860    [1898];    Kansas    City   v. 

W.  225).  Marsh   Oil   Co.,    140   Mo.   458,   41    S. 

*Kadderly  v.  Portland,  44  Or.  118,  W.   943;    Kansas   City   v.   Ward,    134 

74  Pac.  710,  75  Pac.  222   [1903].  Mo.  172,  35  S.  W.  600;   State  ex  rel. 

1  Turner  v.  Snyder,  101  Minn.  481,  Kansas    City   v.    Field,    99   Mo.    352. 

112    N.    W.     868     [19071:     Haag    v.  12  S.  W.  802. 

Ward,    186    Mo.    325.    85    S.    W.    391  *  Haag  v.   Ward,    186   Mo.   325.   85 

[1904].  S.  W.  391    [1904]. 

^Article  IX.,   §   16.  Constitution  of 
Missouri. 


337  CONSTITUTIONAL   RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  215 

visions  up  to  this  point  are  valid,  since  they  may  be  sus- 
tained on  the  ground  that  such  notice  must  be  given  to  bo)ta 
fide  purchasers  to  make  such  suit  notice  as  against  them.  How- 
ever, the  charter  proceeded  to  provide  that  in  case  of  failure  to 
file  such  notice,  the  land  should  be  free  from  the  lien  of  such 
assessment  and  the  lien  of  any  judgment  rendered  thereon,  and 
should  not  be  sold  for  such  judgment.  This  provision  was  not 
restricted  to  cases  where  bona  fide  grantees  had  acquired  in- 
terests in  such  realty,  but  applied  to  cases  where  the  original 
owner  retained  his  rights  in  such  property.  The  general  laws 
of  the  state  contain  no  provision  destroying  the  lien  of  an  assess- 
ment in  such  cases,  and  such  charter  provision  was  accordingly 
held  to  be  invalid.^  The  constitution  of  Washington  provides: 
"...  Any  city  containing  a  population  of  twenty  thousand 
inhabitants  or  more  shall  be  permitted  to  frame  a  charter  for 
its  own  government  consistent  with  and  subject  to  the  consti- 
tution and  laws  of  this  state.  .  .  .  "  "  Under  this  constitution- 
al provision  a  city  cannot  adopt  an  article  in  its  charter  to  the 
effect  that  "no  action  shall  be  brought  or  maintained  to  test  or 
question  the  validity  of  any  assessment  unless  the  plaintiff  shall 
first  pay  into  court  the  amount  of  the  assessed  tax."^  In  the  ab- 
sence of  a  constitutional  provision  permitting  cities  to  frame 
their  own  charters  a  statute  giving  such  authority  is  invalid  as 
being  in  violation  of  the  clause  in  the  constitution  forbidding 
special  legislation  and  requiring  legislation  to  be  uniform.^  In 
Minnesota  a  provision  securing  to  cities  the  right  to  frame  their 
governments  was  subsequiMitly  adopted  into  the  constitution.^ 
Under  such  provisions  the  power  of  local  assessment  •  is  lield  to 
be  implied.'"  The  Tjcgislature  may  provide  that  cities,  incorpo- 
rated under  special  charters  when  such  charters  were  valid, 
may  by  vote  of  the  electors,  adopt  the  provisions  of  the  general 

"TTaafr   v.   Ward.    ISfi   :\ro.    32.5.   S.'j  TJop.  410.  .'34  L.  K.  A.  777,  Of)  X.  \V. 

S.  W.  391    [10041.  27    [189f)l. 

"Article   XT..    §    7,    f'onstitiition    of  ®  Stato    ex     rel.     Ryan    v.     Di:*1riet 

Wasliington   flSSOl.  Court    of    Ramsey    County.    87    ^linn. 

'Wilson  V.  City  of  Soattio.  2  Wash.  14fi.  01   X.  W.   .300    [1002]. 

543,  27  Pac.  474   [18011.  '"State    e\     rel.    Ryan    v.    nislriet 

'State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  City  of  Court    of    Ramsey    Countv.    87    ^fiiin. 

St.  Paul   V.  District  Court.  72  :Minn.  14fi.  01   X.   W.  300    [10021:    See   also 

226,  71    Am.   St.  Rep.  480,   7.5  X.  W.  Turner  v.  Snyder.  101  ^linn.  481.  112 

224    [18081;    State   ex    rel.   Cliilds  v.  X.  W.  8G8  [10071. 
Copeland,  06  :Minn.   315.   61    Am.   St, 


§  216  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  338 

law  incorporating  cities,   passed  after  the  clause  requiring  uni- 
formity of  legislation  was  adopted  into  the  constitution.^^ 

§  216.     Provisions  concerning  method  of  amending  constitution. 

Questions  concerning  the  validity  of  constitutional  amend- 
ments are  occasionally  prescribed  in  the  law  of  assessments. 
Apart  from  the  law  of  assessments,  and  as  a  general  question, 
the  courts  have  power  to  decide  whether  a  given  amendment  has 
been  adopted  in  the  method  prescribed  by  the  constitution,^  ex- 
cept in  cases  where  the  constitution  itself  has  provided  for  some 
special  tribunal  whose  decision  on  this  question  is  to  be  final." 
A  limited  exception  to  this  general  principle  is  found  in  cases  in 
which  the  question  is  as  to  the  validity  of  the  very  constitution 
under  which  the  court  derives  its  authority ;  a  question  which,  it 
is  held,  such  court  cannot  pass  upon.^ 

The  constitution  of  California  provides:"  ...  If  two-thirds 
of  all  members  elected  to  each  of  the  two  houses  shall  vote  in 
favor  thereof,  such  proposed  amendment,  or  amendments,  shall 
be  entered  in  the  journals  with  the  yeas  and  nays  taken 
thereon.  .  .  .  "*  Under  this  provision  a  proposed  amendment 
concerning  local  assessment  was  passed  by  the  requisite  majority 
in  the  Legislature,  was  not  spread  in  full  upon  the  journal  of 
the  Legislature  but  was  referred  to  by  title  and  number;  and 
was  voted  for  by  the  requisite  majority.  Upon  the  question 
whether  such  failure  to  enter  the  amendment  at  length  upon 
the  journal  invalidated  the  amendment  the  court  at  first  divided, 
a  majority  of  the  court  in  one  case  holding  that  such  omission 

"Thomason   v.    Aslnvorth,    73    Cal.  v.  \Yiirts,  63  N.  J.  L.    (34  Vr.)    289. 

73,   14  Pac.  615   [1887];   See   §§   176,  45  L.  K.  A.  251,  43   Atl.  744;   State 

177  and   178.  ex    rel.   v.   Rogers,    56   N.   J.   L.    (27 

1  Collier  v.   Frierson,  24  Ala.   100',  Vr.)    480,   23   L.   R.   A.   354,   28   Atl. 

Nesbit    V.    People,    19    Colo.    441,    36  726,  29  Atl.  173;   State  ex  rel.  Hudd 

Pac.  221;  Koehler  v.  Hill,  60  la.  543,  v.  Timme,  54  Wis.  318,  11  N.  W.  785 

14   N.    W.    738,    15    N.   W.    609:    Se-  [1882]. 

combe  v.  Kittleson,  29  Minn.  555,  12  =  Worman  v.  Hagan,  78  Md.  152,  21 

X.  W.  519;   State  v.  Young,  29  Minn.  L.   R.   A.   716,   27  Atl.   616;    Miles  v. 

474,  9  N.  W.  737;   State  ex  rel.  Mc-  Bradford,   22   Md.   170,   85   Am.   Dec. 

Clurg  V.  Powell,  77  Miss.  543,  48  L.  643;  Dennett,  Petitioner,  32  Me.  508, 

R.    A.    652,    27    So.    927;    Edwards   v.  54  Am.  Dec.  602. 

Lesueur,    132    Mo.    410,    31    L.    R.    A.  'Luther    v.    Borden,    48    U.    S.     (7 

815,    33    S.    W.    1130;    State    ex    rel.  How.)   1,  12  L.  581. 
Woods  V.  Tooker,   15  Mont.  8,  25  L.  *  Article  XVIII.,   §    1,  Constitution 

R.  A.  560,  37  Pac.  840;  State  ex  rel.  of  C-lifornia   [1879]. 


i 


339  CONSTITTTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  217 

invalidated  the  amendment,'"'  and  in  another  that  it  did  not." 
It  was  finally  held  that  such  omission  did  not  invalidate  such 
amendment."  The  constitution  of  Oregon  provides:  "While  an 
amendment,  or  amendments,  which  shall  have  been  agreed  upon 
by  one  legislative  assembly  shall  be  awaiting  the  action  of  a 
legislative  assembl.y,  or  of  the  electors,  no  additional  amendment 
or  amendrrients  shall  be  proposed.  .  .  .  "*  In  construing 
this  provision  it  was  held  that  a  second  amendment  could  not  be 
introduced  while  a  former  one  was  "awaiting  the  action  of  a 
legislative  assembly,"  even  if  they  referred  to  diflferent  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution.  It  was  further  held  in  construing 
this  provision  that  the  Legislatiire.  which  was  to  pass  a  second 
time  upon  the  proposed  constitutional  amendment  before  it  was 
submitted  to  popular  vote,  was  the  Legislature  chosen  next  after 
the  Legislat^ire  M^hich  had  passed  such  amendment;  that  if  such 
Legislature  next  chosen  did  not  act  on  such  amendment  it  was 
no  longer  "awaiting  the  action  of  a  legislative  assembly,"  and 
that  new  amendments  might  be  introduced." 

§217.     Provisions  concerning  form  of  amending  statute. 

Provisions  with  reference  to  the  form  of  an  amending  statute 
have  been  considered  in  some  cases  involving  assessments.  The 
constitution  of  Pennsylvania  provides:  "No  law  shall  be  re- 
vived, amended,  or  the  provisions  thereof  extended  or  conferred 
by  reference  to  its  title  only,  but  so  much  thereof  as  is  revived, 
amended,  extended  or  conferred  shall  be  re-enacted  and  pub- 
lished at  length."^  Under  this  section  it  has  been  held  that  a 
statute,-  which  provides,  "in  exercising  the  power  aforesaid,  all 
proceedings  for  the  ascertaining  of  damages  and  the  assessment  of 

"Oakland  Paving  Company  v.  Hil-  in    difTcrcnt    phraseology    from    that 

ton,  f)9  C'al.  479,  11  Pac.  3   [1886].  which    was   submitted    to    the   people 

"  Thomason  v.  Ruggles,  69  Cal.  465,  and  voted  on  by  them  has  been  held 

11  Pac.  20   [1886].  to    be    invalid.      Koehlcr   v.    Hill.    60 

'Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Tompkins,  la.  543,  14  N.  W.  738,  15  X.  W.  609. 

72    Cal.    5,    1    Am.    St.    Rep.    17,    12  » Article  XVII.,  §  2,  Constitution  of 

Pac.  801;    (followed   in  Thomason  v.  Oregon. 

Ashworth,    73    Cal.    73,    14    Pac.    615  °  Kadderly  v.  Portland,  44  Or.  118, 

[1887]).      In   other   jurisdictions   the  74  Pac.  710,  75  Pac.  222  [1903]. 

opposite    result    has    been     reached:  'Article   III.,   §   6,   Constitution   of 

State   ex   rcl.   v.   Tufly.    19   Xev.   391,  Pennsylvania    [1874]. 

3    Am.    St.    Rep.    89.5.    12    Pac.    835;  =  Act  of  May,  1895,  §  2,  P.  L.  105. 
An  amendment  c(ii)ied  on  the  journal 


§  218  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  340 

benefits  incident  thereto  shall  be  as  now  provided  by  law  in  refer- 
ence to  payment  of  cases,  damagfes  and  expenses  of  public  improve- 
ments within  municipal  corporations"  is  valid.''  The  constitution 
of  Illinois  provides :  "  .  .  .No  law  shall  be  revised  or  amended 
by  reference  to  its  title  onl}',  but  the  law  revived,  or  the  section 
amended,  shall  be  inserted  at  length  in  the  new  act."*  Under 
this  provision  it  was  held  that  a  statute  entitled  "an  act  in  re- 
gard to  the  completion  of  public  parks  and  the  management  there- 
of,"  which  contains  a  subject-matter  fairly  corresponding  to  such 
title,  would  not  be  regarded  as  intended  primarily  to  amend  the 
acts  concerning  Lincoln  Park  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  since  the 
court  could  not  assume  that  there  were  no  other  uncompleted 
parks  within  the  state ;  and  accordingly  such  statute  was  held 
to  be  valid,  even  as  applying  as  a  general  law  to  Lincoln  Park, 
although  it  did  not  set  forth  at  length  the  prior  statutes  con- 
cerning Lincoln  Park,  which  were  in  effect  amended  bj^  such 
act.^  Under  a  similar  provision,  an  amendatory  statute  which 
repeats  the  title  of  the  amended  statute  correctly  with  the  ex- 
ception of  one  word,  the  word  "execute"  being  inserted  in  place 
of  the  correct  word  "exercise,"  but  the  meaning  being  sub- 
stantially the  same,  has  been  upheld." 

§  218.     Constitutional  provisions  regulating  jurisdiction. 

A  group  of  constitutional  provisions  which  regulate  the  juris- 
diction of  certain  courts  have  been  operative  in  the  law  of  local 
assessments.  The  constitution  of  Louisiana  provides:  "The  Su- 
preme Court,  except  in  cases  hereinafter  provided,  shall  have 
appellate  jurisdiction  only,  Avhich  jurisdiction  shall  extend  to 
all  cases  when  the  matter  in  dispute  or  the  fund  to  be  distributed, 
whatever  may  be  the  amount  therein  claimed,  shall  exceed  one 
thousand  dollars,  exclusive  of  interest,  to  suits  for  divorce  and 
separation  from  bed  and  board,  and  to  all  cases  in  which  the 
constitutionality  of  any  tax,  toll  or  import  whatever,  .  .  .  shall 
be  in  contestation,  w^hatever  may  the  amount  thereof,  and  in 
such  cases  the  appeal  on  the  law  and  the  fact  shall  be  directl.y 

^  In   re   Greenfield    Avenue,    Appeal  ^  Hundley  &  Rees  v.  Commissioners 

of  the  City  of  Pittsburp,   191  Pa.  St.  of  Lincoln  Park,  G7  111.  559   [1873]'. 
290,  43  Atl.  225   [1899].  ^  Pvay  v.   City  of  Jeffersonville,   90 

*  Article  IV.,   §    13,  Constitution  of  Ind.  567    [1883]. 
Illinois   [18701. 


341  CONSTITUTIONAL   RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  218 

from  the  court  in  which  the  case  originated  to  the  Supreme 
Court.  .  .  .  "^  Whether,  within  the  meaning  of  this  clause 
an  assessment  is  a  tax  so  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  jurisdiction 
of  a  ease  involving  an  assessment,  irrespective  of  the  amount 
thereof,  is  a  question  upon  which  the  court  has  rendered  decis- 
ions apparently  conflicting.  Levee  assessments  were  once  held 
not  to  be  taxes  within  the  meaning  of  this  provision.-  Subse- 
(juently  the  court  held  that  though  such  charges  for  the  con- 
struction of  levees  were  based  upon  the  theory  of  benefits  and 
were  properly  speaking  a.ssessments,  yet,  as  they  were  generally 
termed  taxes,  they  would  be  regarded  as  taxes  with  reference 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court. ^  At  the  same  time 
other  kinds  of  assessments.*  such  as  those  for  curbing  and  gut- 
tering ^  and  paving."  have  been  held  not  to  be  taxes  within  the 
meaning  of  this  constitutional  provision;  and  hence,  not  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  unless  of  the  amount 
specified.  The  constitution  of  Illinois  provides:  "...  County 
Courts  .  .  .  shall  have  original  juri.«tdiction  ...  in  proceed- 
ings for  the  collection  of  taxes  and  assessments.  .  .  .  "'  This 
provision  does  not  confer  exclusive  jurisdiction  upon  the  County 
Court,  but  such  jurisdiction  may  also  be  conferred  upon  the  Cir- 
cuit Court. ^  The  constitution  of  Illinois  also  provides:  "The 
Supreme  Court  .  .  .  shall  have  original  jurisdiction  in  eases 
relating  to  the  revenue.  .  .  .  "^  This  provision  does  not  con- 
fer exclusive  jurisdiction  upon  the  Supreme  Court.^"  These  (jues- 
tions  are  considered  elsewhere  with  reference  to  procedure  in 
assessment  cases,  and  in  connection  with  statutory  provisions." 


^Article  81,  Constitution  of  Louia-  '  Fayssoux    v.    Denis,    48    La.    Ann. 

iana.  850,    19   So.    7G0    [1890];    Roonoy   v. 

=  Police    Jury    v.    Mitchell,    ,37    La.  Brown,  21  La.  Ann.  51    [18691. 

Ann.  44;  Board  of  Levee  Commission-  °  Rooney  v.  Brown,  21  La.  Ann.  51 

ers  V.  Lorio  Bros..  33  La.   Ann.   270  [18091. 

[1881].  "Fayssoux    v.    Denis.    48    La.    Ann. 

'State   ex   rel.   Hill    v.   .Tudjxes.   40  850,  19  So.  700  [1896]. 

La.   Ann.    1292,    16    So.    219    [1894];  "Article  VL,  §   18,  Constitution  of 

In  the  opinion  in  this  case  the  court  Illinois   [1870]. 

points    out    that    for    other    purpo.ses,  "  Hundley  &  Rees  v.  Commissioners 

such  as  with  reference  to  the  consti-  of  Lincoln  Park,  67  HI.  559    [1873]. 

tutional     provisions     requiring     uni-  '  Article   VL,    §   2,   Constitution  ot 

formity    of    taxation    and    those    re-  Illinois   [1870]. 

striding  the  amount  of  taxation,  an  ^"  Hundley  &  Rees  v.  Commissioners 

assessment  is  not  a  tax.  of  Lincoln  Park.  07   111.  559    [1873]. 

"See  §§  911.   13(i9  rt  srq. 


§§219,220  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  342 

§  219.     Law  dependent  for  effect  on  future  action. 

As  in  the  case  of  other  laws,  there  is  no  constitutional  objection 
to  the  passage  of  an  assessment  act  which  is  not  to  take  effect 
until  the  happening  of  some  future  events.^  Such  statute  is 
not  a  delegation  of  the  legislative  power,  if  the  happening  of 
such  future  facts  depends  upon  the  will  of  third  persons.-  Thus 
an  assessment  statute  may  require  the  presenting  of  a  petition,'' 
and  the  official  finding  of  certain  facts  *  in  order  that  it  may  take 
effect.  A  statute  for  the  organization  of  a  drainage  district  may 
require  that  a  petition  therefor  is  to  be  presented  to  the  County 
Court  and  the  necessary  facts  found  to  be  true  before  the  cor- 
poration comes  into  existence.^  A  city  ordinance  may  provide 
that  it  shall  not  take  effect  until  certain  suits,  then  pending, 
shall  have  been  dismissed."  So  a  law  to  take  effect  upon  ac- 
ceptance thereof  by  the  municipality  is  valid.''  So  by  statute 
park  commissioners  may  become  corporate  authorities  upon  the 
vote  of  the  people  within  such  park  district.  Subsequently  the 
legislature  may  modify  the  powers  and  duties  of  such  park  com- 
missioners without  submitting  such  supplementary  and  amenda- 
tory act  to  popular  vote.^ 

1 220.     Provisions  securing  redress  for  injury  to  property. 

The  constitution  of  Wisconsin  provides:  "Ever}'  person  is 
entitled  to  a  certain  remedy  in  the  laws  for  all  injuries  or  wrongs 
M^hich  he  may  receive  in  his  person,  property  or  character;  he 
ought  to  obtain  justice  freely  and  without  being  .  obliged  to 
purchase  it,  completely  and  v/ithout  denial,  promptly  and  with- 
out delay,  conformably  to  the  laws. ' '  ^  Similar  provisions  are  found 
in  many  jurisdictions.  Among  them  are  the  following:  "All 
courts  shall  be  open;  and  every  man  for  injury  done  to  him  in 

^  Guild,  Jr.  V.  City  of  Chicago,  82  'Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 

111.  472   [1876].  more  v.   Cliinet,  23  Md.  449    [1865]. 

^ Blake  v.  People  for  use  of   Cald-  'Guild,  Jr.,  v.  City  of  Chicago,  82 

well,  109  111.  504  [1884];  Mayor  and  111.   472    [1876];    Borgman  v.  City  of 

City  Council  of  Baltimore  v.'ciunet,  Antigo.   120  Wis.  296,  97  N.  W.  936 

23  Md.   449    [1865].  [1904];  Adams  v.  City  of  Beloit,  105 

^  Blake  v.  People,  for  use  of  Cald-  Wis.  303,  47  L.  R.  A.  441,  81  N.  W. 

well,   109  111.  504   [1884].  869    [1900]. 

*  Blake  v.  People,  for  use  of  Cald-  '  Andrews  v.  People  ex  re!.  Rumsey, 

well,  109  111.  504   [1884].  83   111.  529   [1876]. 

®  Blake  v.  People,  for  use  of  Cald-  ^Article    T.,    §    9,    Constitution    of 

well,  109  111.  504   [1884].  Wisconsin  [1848]. 


II 


343  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE,    ETC.  §  221 

his  person  property  or  reputation  shall  have  due  course  of  law. 
Justice  shall  be  administered  freely  and  without  purchase;  com- 
pletely and  without  denial;  speedily  and  without  delay."-  "No 
court  shall  be  secret,  but  justice  shall  be  administered  openly 
and  without  purchase,  completely  and  without  delay,  and  every 
man  shall  have  remedy  by  due  course  of  law  for  injury  done 
him  in  person,  property  or  reputation."^  "All  courts  shall  be 
open  and  every  person  for  an  injury  done  him  in  his  land,  goods, 
person  or  reputation  shall  have  remedy  by  due  course  of  law; 
and  justice  administered  without  denial  or  delay."*  "Every 
person  within  this  state  ought  to  find  a  certain  remedy,  by  hav- 
ing recourse  to  the  laws,  for  all  injuries  and  wrongs  which  he 
may  receive  in  his  person,  property  or  character;  he  ought  to 
obtain  right  and  justice  freely  and  without  being  obliged  to 
purchase  it;  completely  and  without  any  denial;  promptly  and 
without  delay;  conformably  to  the  laws.""  These  provisions  do 
not  invalidate  a  statute  providing  for  a  re-assessment  of  bene- 
fits and  damages  arising  out  of  a  street  improvement,  the  origi- 
nal assessment  being  invalid."  Under  such  constitutional  pro- 
vision a  statute  which  provides  that  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  right  to  bring  an  action  to  set  aside  an  illegal  assessment 
or  special  tax,  the  owner  of  the  property  so  assessed  must  first 
pay  such  tax  is  unconstitutional,  as  amounting  to  a  denial  of 
justice.'^ 

§  221.     Other  constitutional  provisions. 

The  constitution  of  California  at  one  time  contained  a  provi- 
sion, "No  public  work  or  improvement  of  any  description  what- 
soever shall  be  done  or  made  in  any  city  in,  upon  or  about  the 
streets  thereof  or  otherwise,  the  cost  and  expense  of  which  is 
made  chargeable  or  may  be  assessed  upon  private  property  by 
special  assessment,  unless  an  estimate  of  such  cost  and  expense 
shall  be  made,  and  an  assessment  in  proportion  to  benefits  on 
the  property  to  be  affected  or  benefited  shall  be  levied,  collected 

=  Article    I.,    §    12.    Constitution  of       tion    of    Vermont    [179.3]. 

Indiana.       .  "  Haubner    v.    City    of    ^lilwaukee, 

'Article    I..    8    10.    Constilntinn  of        124  Wi.s.  153,  101  N.  W.  9.30  [1905]; 

Oregon   [in  effect  1859].  (rehearing    denied     102    X.    W.    578 

♦Article   T.,    §    10.    Constitution  of        [1905]). 

Ohio   [1851].  MVeller    v.     City    of    St.    Paul.     .5 

'Chapter    I..    Article    4,    Constitu-       Minn.  70,  5  Gilf.  95  [ISfil]. 


§  221  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  344 

and  paid  into  the  city  treasury  before  such  work  or  improvement 
shall  be  commenced  or  any  contract  for  letting  or  doing  the  same 
authorized  or  performed.  .  .  .  "  ^  Such  provision  was  held  to 
be  self-executing,  to  require  no  legislation  to  enforce  it,  and  to 
render  invalid  a  statute  enacted  prior  to  the  adoption  of  such 
constitutional  provision,-  and  inconsistent  therewith.^  This  sec- 
tion of  the  constitution  was  subsequently  amended  by  re-enacting 
it  with  the  omission  of  the  sentence  quoted.*  The  constitution  of 
California  provides:  "A  mortgage,  deed  of  trust,  contract  or 
other  obligation  by  which  a  debt  is  secured,  shall  for  the  pur- 
poses of  assessment  and  taxation  be  deemed  and  treated  as  an 
interest  in  the  property  affected  thereby.  Except  as  to  railroad 
and  other  quasi  public  corporations,  in  case  of  debt  so  secured, 
the  value  of  the  property  affected  by  such  mortgage,  deed  of 
trust,  contract  or  obligation  less  the  value  of  such  security  shall 
be  assessed  and  taxed  to  the  owner  of  the  property  and  the 
value  of  such  security  shall  be  assessed  and  taxed  to  the  owner 
affected  thereby  is  situate.  ..."■''  A  special  assessment  for 
benefits  is  not  a  tax  within  the  meaning  of  this  provision."  Ac- 
cordingly a  statute  which  provides  for  levying  an  assessment 
upon  the  property  in  an  assessment  district  without  deducting 
from  the  value  of  such  property  the  amount  of  any  mortgages 
which  might  affect  such  property  is  valid.'^  Under  a  constitutional 
provision  requiring  an  appropriation  by  law  for  paying  money  out 
of  the  county  treasury,^  it  has  been  held  that  a  statute  which 
provides  that  the  county  surveyor  shall  keep  the  ditches  in  re- 
pair and  shall  certify  the  cost  thereof,  including  his  own  per 
diem  compensation  to  the  county  auditor,  who  shall  then  draw 
his  warrant  in  favor  of  the  holder  of  each  certificate  upon  the 
county  treasurer,  who  shall  pay  it,  the  county  treasury  to  be 
reimbursed  subsequently  by  assessments  against  the  realty  bene- 
fited by  such  repairs,  is  constitutional,  since  such  statute  setting 

1  Article  XI.,   §   19  Constitution  oi  [1887]);    Amendment   approved   Feb. 

California    [1879].  14.    1883,   and   ratified    Nov.    4,    1884. 

'Act  of  April  1st,  1872.  =  Article  XIIL,  §  4,  Constitution  of 

^McDonald    v.    Patterson,    54    Cal.  California. 

245   [1880].  "Tregea  v.   Owens,  94  Cal.  317,  29 

*  Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Tompkins,  Pac.  643    [1892]. 

72  Cal.  5,  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  17,  12  Pac.  '  Tregea  v.  Owens,  94  Cal.  317,  29 

801;    (followed  in  Thomason  v.  Ash-  Pac.  643    [1892]. 

worth,     73     Cal.     73,     14     Pac.     615  « Article    X.,    §    3,    Constitution    of 

Indiana. 


I 


345  CONSTITUTIONAL    RESTRICTION    APPLICABLE.    ETC.  §  221 

aside  as  much  of  the  county's  revenues  as  is  necessary  to  pay 
the  cost  of  such  repairs  "is  in  legal  effect  an  appropriation  by 
law  of  so  much  of  the  county  revenues  of  the  several  counties 
as  is  necessary'  to  keep  the  ditches  of  the  state  in  repair."'-* 

'  State  ex  rel.  French  v.  Johnson, 
105  Ind.  463,  468,  5  N.  E.  553 
[1885]. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

NECESSITY    OF    STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR 

ASSESSMENT. 

§  222.     Assessment  not  inherent  power. 

A  municipal  corporation  has  no  inherent  power  to  levy  local 
assessments  for  special  benefits  accruing  to  property  by  reason 
of  a  public  improvement.^  No  such  power  is  conferred  upon  a 
municipal  corporation  by  any  rule  of  the  common  law.- 

§223.     Power  to  assess  for  benefits  must  be  conferred  by  writ- 
ten law. 

The  power  of  levying  special  assessments  to  pay  for  the  cost 
of  constructing  public  improvements  which  confer  some  special 
local  benefit  not  being  an  inherent  power,  and  not  existing  at 
common  law,  it  follows  therefore  that  a  municipal  corporation 
does  not  possess  such  power  unless  it  is  conferred  upon  it  by 
some  express  provision  of  the  written  law.  The  constitutions 
of  the  ditferent  states  do  not  usually  contain  provisions  con- 
ferring such  power,  though  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments 
has  been  construed  to  exist  under  a  home-rule  provision  by  impli- 
.cation.^     Accordingly  in  most  states  such  power  can  exist  only 

^  "The   power   to   levy   them    (i.    e.  sit.     There  is  no  common-law  liabil- 

local  assessments)   is  not  inherent  in  ity    resting   upon    lot-owners   to    pay 

any  public  corporation,  but  must  be  for   the   improvement  of  an  adjacent 

directly  conferred  by  statute."     City  street.      Whatever   liability   they   are 

of  Greensboro  v.  McAdoo,   112  X.   C.  subject  to  is  created  by  statute  and 

359,  362,  17  S.  E.  178   [1893].  all   such   statutes  must  be   construed 

2  City  of  Henderson  v.  Lambert.  77  most  strictly  against  those  asserting 

Ky.     (14    Bush.)     24     [1878];     "But  claims    under    them."      City    of   Hen- 

the   obligation    of    lot-owners    to    pay  derson     v.     Lambert,     77     Ky.      (14 

for   improving   streets   does   not   rest  Bush.)   24,  30,  31   [1878].     See  §§  15, 

alone   on   the   ground   that   they   are  17.  230  et  seq. 

benefited  by   such   improvements   and  ^  State    ex    rel.    Ryan    v.    District 

therefore  ought  in  natural  justice  to  Court   of   Ramsey    County,    67    Minn, 

pay  for   them.      That   they  are   bene-  146,  91  N.  W.  300.     For  special  con- 

fited  furnishes  the  foundation  for  leg-  stitutional   provisions  concerning  the 

islative  power  to  require  them  to  pay  power  of  assessment,  see  §  103  et  sea. 
but  does  not  raise  an  implied  assump- 
346 


347 


STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT. 


S223 


if   conferred   upon   municipal    corporations    by    statute.-      "It    is 
from  the  state  only  that  a  municipality  has  power  to  levy   an 


MVatkins  v.  Griffith,  59  Ark.  344, 
27  S.  W.  234  [1894]  ;  City  Street  Im- 
provement Co.  V.  Babcock,  139  Cal. 
690,  73  Pac.  666  [1903];  San  Diego 
Investment  Co.  v.  Shaw,  129  Cal.  273, 
61  Pac.  1082  [1900];  Ede  v.  Cimeo, 
126  Cal.  167,  58  Pac.  538  [1899]; 
Kelso  V.  Cole,  121  Cal.  121,  53  Pac. 
353  [1898];  Durrell  v.  Dooner,  119 
Cal.  411,  51  Pac.  628  [1897]; 
Schwiesau  v.  Mahon,  110  Cal.  543, 
42  Pac.  1065  [1895];  Shipman  v. 
Forbes,  97  Cal.  572,  32  Pac.  599 
[1893];  Reclamation  District  No.  3 
V.  Kennedj^  58  Cal.  124  [1881]; 
Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Yolo  County,  51  Cal.  474,  [1876]; 
City  of  Stockton  v.  Whitmore,  50 
Cal.  554  [1875];  Hewes  v.  Reis,  40 
Cal.  255  [1870];  Chambers  v.  Sat- 
terlee,  40  Cal.  497  [1871];  Nichol- 
son Pavement  Co.  v.  Painter,  35  Cal. 
699   [1868];   Dougherty  v.  Hitchcock, 

35  Cal.  51  [1868];  Himmclniann  v. 
Danos,  35  Cal.  441  [1868];  Smith  v. 
Cofran,  34  Cal.  310  [1867];  Haskell 
v,  Bartlett,  34  Cal.  281  [1867]; 
Mayo  V.  Ah  Loy,  32  Cal.  477,  91 
Am.  Dec.  595  "[1867];  Taylor  v. 
Conner,  31  Cal.  481  [1866];  Creigh- 
ton  V.  Manson,  27  Cal.  614  [1865]; 
Keese  v.  City  of  Denver,  10  Colo. 
112,  15  Pac.  825  [1887];  Fair  Haven 
&  Westville  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of 
New  Haven,  77  Conn.  494,  59  Atl. 
737  [1905];  Angus  v.  City  of  Hart 
ford,  74  Conn.  27,  49  Atl.  192  [1901]; 
Harris  v.  City  of  Ansonia,  73  Conn 
359,  47  Atl. '672  [1900];  Keifer  v. 
City    of    Bridgeport,    68    Conn.    401, 

36  Atl.  801  [1896];  Gilpin  v.  City 
of  Ansonia,  68  Conn.  72,  35  Atl.  777 
[1896];  Sargent  &  Co.  v.  Tuttle,  67 
Conn.  162,  32  L.  R.  A.  822,  34  Atl. 
1028  [1895];  Crofut  v.  City  of  Dan- 
bury,  65  Conn.  294,  .32  Atl.  365:  Mc- 
Lauren  v.  City  of  Grand  Forks,  6 
Dak.  397,  43  N.  W.  710  [1889];  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  v.  Weaver.  6  App. 
D.  C.  482   [1895];   Allman  v.  District 


of  Columbia,  3  App.  D.  C.  8  [18^4]; 
Johnson  v.  District  of  Columbia,  6 
:Mackey  (D.  C.)  21  [1887];  Alexan- 
der V.  Dennison,  2  McArthur  (D.  C.) 
562  [1876];  Halliday  v.  City  of  At- 
lanta, 96  Ga.  377,  23  S.  E.  406 
[1895]  ;  City  of  Chicago  v.  Blair,  149 
111.  310,  24  L.  R.  A.  412,  36  N.  E. 
cS29  [1894];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Law, 
144  111.  569,  33  N.  E.  855  [1893]; 
Wright  V.  City  of  Chicago,  20  111. 
252  [1858];  Dunkle  v.  Herron,  115 
Ind.  470,  18  N.  E.  12  [1888]; 
Churchman  v.  City  of  Indianapolis. 
110  Ind.  259,  11  N.  E.  301  [1886]; 
Phillips  v.  Lewis,  109  Ind.  62,  9  N. 
E.  395  [1886];  Case  v.  Johnson,  91 
Ind.  477  [1883];  Merrill  v.  Abbott, 
62  Ind.  549  [1878];  Maberry  v.  City 
of  Jeffersonville,  38  Ind.  198  [1871]'; 
Wilson  v.  Poole,  33  Ind.  443  [1870]; 
Palmer  v.  Stumph,  29  Ind.  329 
[1868];  City  of  Bluffton  v."  Miller, 
33  Ind.  App.  521,  70  N.  E.  989 
[1904]  ;  Town  of  Clay  City  v.  Bryson, 
30  Ind.  App.  490,  66  N.  E."  498 
[1903];  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg  v. 
Peyton,  214  111.  376,  73  N.  E.  768 
[1905]  ;  Gray  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  177 
111.  459,  53  N.  E.  91  '[1899];  Lingle 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  172  111.  170,  50 
N.  E.  192  [1898];  Robeson  v.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Curry,  161  111.  176,  43 
N.  E.  619  [1896];  McChesney  v.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Kern,  148  111.  221,  35.  N. 
E.  739  [1894];  Davis  v.  City  of 
Litchfield.  145  111.  313,  21  L'.  R.  A. 
563,  33  N.  E.  888  [1893];  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Law,  144  111.  569,  33  N. 
E.  855  [1893];  Morrison  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  142  111.  660.  32  N.  E.  172 
[1893];  Badger  v.  Inlet  Drainage 
District,  141  111.  540,  31  N.  E.  170 
[1893]:  City  of  Carlyle  v.  County  of 
Clinton,  140  111.  512,  30  X.  E.  782 
[1893]:  Goodwillie  v.  City  of  Lake 
View.  137  111.  51,  27  N.  E.  15  [1892]; 
Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad  Co. 
v.  City  of  "East  St.  Louis.  134  111. 
656.   25  X.  E.  062    [1891];    Gnuen   v. 


223 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


348 


assessment   on  property  for  street  work.     In   the  absence   of  a 
delegation  of  such  power,  its  efforts  in  that  direction  would  be 


^loredock  and  Ivy  Landing  Drainage 
District  Xo.  1,  131  111.  446,  23  N.  E. 
633  [1890];  People  ex  rel.  Huck  v. 
Pierce,  90  111.  85  [1878];  Guild,  Jr. 
V,  City  of  Chicago,  82  111.  472  [1876]  ; 
Taylor  v.  People,  Reed,  66  111.  322 
[1872]  ;  Workmen  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
61  111.  463  [1871];  Skinner  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  42  111.  52  [1866];  Scam- 
mon  V.  City  of  Chicago,  40  111.  146 
[1866];  Lill  v.  The  City  of  Chicago, 
29  111.  31  [1862];  Fort  Chartres  & 
Ivy  Landing  Drainage  &  Levee  Dis- 
trict No.  5  v.  Smalkand,  70  111.  App. 
449  [1897];  Independent  School  Dis 
trict  of  Burlington  v.  City  of  Burling- 
ton, 60  la.  500,  15  N.  W.  295  [1883]; 
Ankeny  v.  Hennigsen,  54  la.  29,  6 
N.  W.  65  [1880];  Wardens  &  Vestry 
of  Christ's  Church  v.  City  of  Bur- 
lington, 39  la.  224  [1874];  Merriam 
V.  Moody's  Executors,  25  la.  163 
[1868];  Worthington  v.  City  of  Cov- 
ington, 82  Ky.  265  [1884];  City  of 
Henderson  v.  Lambert,  77  Ky.  (14 
Bush.  24  [1878];  Murray  v.  Tucker, 
73  Ky.  (10  Bush.)  241  [1874];  Cald- 
well V.  Rupert,  73  Ky.  (10  Bush.) 
179  [1873];  Broadway  Baptist 
Church  V.  McAtee,  71  Ky.  (8  Bush.) 
508,  8  Am.  Rep.  480  [1871];  Hentig 
V.  Gilmore,  33  Kan.  234,  6  Pac.  304 
[1885]  ;  Sleeper  v.  Bullen,  6  Kan.  300 
[1870]  ;  Martin  v.  City  of  Oskaloosa, 
126  la.  680,  102  N.  W.  529  [1905]; 
(opinion  in  this  case  reported  in  99 
N.  W.  557,  [1904]  withdrawn); 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Watt, 
51  La.  Ann.  1345,  26  So.  70  [1899]; 
Surget  v.  Chase,  33  La.  Ann.  833 
[18811;  Sirffi  v.  Matthews,  24  La. 
Ann.  613  [1872];  Second  Municipal- 
ity of  New  Orleans  v.  McDonogh,  9 
Rob.  (La.)  408  [1845];  Henderson  v. 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Baltimore 
use  of  Eschbach.  8  Md.  352  [1855]; 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Baltimore  v.  Moore, 
6  H.  &  J.  (Md.)  375  [1825];  Thayer 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids.  82  Mich. 
298,  46  X.  W.  228    [1890];    State  v. 


Foster,  94  Minn.  412,  103  X".  W.  14 
[1905]  ;  McComb  v.  Bell,  2  Minn  295 
[1858];  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Koch, 
169  Mo.  587,  70  S.  W.  143  [1902]; 
West  V.  Porter,  89  Mo.  App.  150 
[1901];  City  of  St.  Joseph  to  the 
use  of  the  Saxton  National  Bank  v. 
Landis,  54  Mo.  App.  315  [1893]; 
Fruin-Bambrick  Construction  Co.  v. 
Geist,  37  Mo.  App.  509  [1889]; 
Trephagen  v.  City  of  South  Omaha, 
69  Xeb.  577;  96  X.  W.  248  [1903]; 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Hast- 
ings, 2  Xeb.  Unoff.  337;  96  X.  W.  104 
[1902];  City  of  South  Omaha  v. 
Tighe,  67  Neb.  572,  93  X.  W.  946 
[1903];  Morse  v.  City  of  Omaha,  67 
Neb.  426,  93  N.  W.  734  [1903];  Har- 
mon V.  City  of  Omaha,  53  Neb.  164, 
73  N.  W.  671  [1897];  Bellevue  Im- 
provement Co.  v.  Village  of  Bellevue, 
39  Neb.  876,  58  X.  W.  446  [1894]; 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Hast- 
ings, 2  X^eb.  Unoff.  337,  96  X.  W. 
104  [1902];  Mayor  of  East  Orange 
V.  Hussey,  72  X.  J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  71, 
59  Atl.  1060  [1905];  State,  Harris, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen,  etc.,  of 
Jersey  City,  38  X\  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  85 
[1875]  ;  Xehasane  Park  Association 
V.  Lloyd,  167  X.  Y.  431,  60  N.  E.  741 
[1901];  Stebbins  v.  Kay,  123  N.  Y. 
31,  25  X.  E.  207  [1890];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Pennie  to 
Vacate  an  Assessment,  108  X.  Y.  364, 
15  N.  E.  611  [1888];  Merritt  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Port  Chester.  71  X.  Y.  309, 
27  Am.  Rep.  47  [1877];  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  Petition  of  the  Second 
Avenue  Methodist  Episcopal  Church, 
to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  66  N.  Y. 
395  [1876];  Xewell  v.  Wheeler,  48 
X^.  Y.  486  [1872];  Felthousen  v.  City 
of  Amsterdam,  69  Hun.  505,  23  X.  Y. 
Supp.  424  [1893];  In  the  Matter  of 
flhe  Petition  of  Van  Buren,  to  Va- 
cate an  Assessment,  17  Hun.  527 
[1879]  :  Matter  of  Eager.  10  Abb.  Pr. 
X^.  S.  229  [1871]:  Matter  of  Doug- 
lass,   9    Abb.    Pr.    X^.    S.    84    [1870]; 


349 


STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT. 


223 


futile.""  Hence,  if  the  state  confers  a  certain  power  of  levying 
local  assessments  upon  cities  having  a  population  over  a  certain 
amount,    that    power    cannot    be    exercised    by    a    city   having    a 


People  ex  rel.  Kerber  v.  City  of  Utica, 
7  Abb.  N.  C.  414  [1879];  Lathrop  v. 
City  of  Buffalo,  3  Abb.  Ct.  App.  30 
[1861];  Hopkins  v.  Mason,  61  Barb. 
469  [1871];  Brenn  v.  City  of  Troy, 
60  Barb.  417  [1871];  People  ex  rel. 
Johnson  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  23  Barb. 
180  [1856];  Hopkins  v.  Mason,  42 
How.  (N.  Y.)  115  [1871];  Pettigrew 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of  New 
York, 'l 7  How.  (N.  Y.)  492  [1859]; 
Hersie  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  1  Sheldon 
(N.  Y.)  445  [1874];  City  of  Greens- 
boro V.  McAdoo,  112  N.  C.  359,  17 
S.  E.  178  [1893]  ;  Bradshaw  v.  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  Guilford  County, 
92  N.  C.  278  [1885];  Village  of 
Pleasant  Hill  v.  Commissioners,  71 
0.  S.  133,  72  N.  E.  896  [1904]; 
Smith  V.  City  of  Toledo,  24  O.  S. 
126  [1873];  Culbertson  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati,  16  Ohio  574  [1847]; 
Brewer  v.  Incorporated  Village  of 
Bowling  Green,  Ohio,  7  Ohio  C.  C. 
489  [1893];  Allen  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 35  Or.  420,  58  Pac.  509 
[1899];  Smith  v.  :\nnto,  30  Or.  351, 
48  Pac.  106  [1S97];  Ladd  v.  Spencer, 
23  Or.  193,  31  Pac.  474  [1892]; 
Nortiiern  Pacific  Lumbering  &  ]Man- 
ufacturing  Co.  v.  East  Portland,  14 
Or.  3,  12  Pac.  4  [1S86];  Hawthorne 
V.  City  of  East  Portland,  13  Or.  271, 
10  Pac.  342  [1886];  Philadelphia  to 
use  of  Nestor  v.  Spring  Garden  Far- 
mers' Market  Company,  161  Pa.  St. 
522,  29  Atl.  286  [18941;  Morewood 
Avenue,  Ferguson's  Appeal,  159  Pa. 
St.  39,  28  Atl.  130  [1893];  Widening 
of  Burnish  Street.  Pottsvillo  Bor- 
ough, 140  Pa.  St.  5.31.  21  .\tl.  500 
[1891];  Borough  of  (ireensburg  v. 
Laird,  138  Pa.  St.  533.  21  Atl.  96 
[1890]  ;  City  of  Meadville  v.  Dickson, 
129  Pa.  St!  1,  18  Atl.  513  [1889]; 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Biohards,  124 
Pa.  St.  303.  16  Atl.  S02  [1889]; 
Western    Pennsylvania    Baihvav    Co. 


V.  City  of  Allegheny,  92  Pa.  St.  100 
I  1S79]  ;  Borough  of  Mauch  Chunk  v. 
Shortz,  61  Pa.  St.  399  [1869]; 
Cruikshanks  v.  City  Council,  1  Mc- 
Cord  (S.  C.)  360  [1821];  Horiston 
V.  City  Council  of  Charleston,  1  Mc- 
Cord  (S.  C.)  345  [1821];  Mason  v. 
City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2  S.  D.  640,  39 
Am.  St.  Rep.  802,  51  N.  W.  770 
[1892];  Whyte  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Nashville,  32  Tenn.  (2  Swan.) 
364  [1852];  Breath  v.  City  of  Gal- 
veston, 92  Tex.  454,  49  S.  W.  575 
[1899];  Storrie  v.  Houston  City 
Street  Railway  Co.,  92  Tex.  129,  44 
L.  R.  A.  716,  46  S.  W.  796  [1898]; 
Connor  v.  City  of  Paris,  87  Tex.  32, 
27  S.  W.  88  [1894];  Flewellin  v. 
Proetzel,  80  Tex.  191,  15  S.  W.  1043 
[1891];  Wood  v.  City  of  Galveston, 
76  Tex.  126,  13  S.  W.  227  [1890]; 
Frosh  V.  City  of  Galveston,  73  Tex. 
401,  11  S.  W.  402  [1889];  Allen  v. 
City  of  Galveston,  51  Tex.  302 
[1879];  Ardrey  v.  City  of  Dallas,  13 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  442,  35  S.  W.  726 
I  1896];  City  of  Dallas  v.  Ellison.  10 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  28,  30  S.  W.  1128 
[1895];  Violett  v.  City  Council  of 
Alexandria,  92  Va.  561,  53  Am.  St. 
Bop.  825.  31  L.  R.  A.  382,  23  S.  E. 
009  [1896];  McCrowell  v.  City  of 
Bristol,  89  Va.  652,  20  L.  R.  A."  653, 
16  S.  E.  867  [1893];  Green  v.  Ward, 
82  Va.  324  [1886];  Blanchard  v. 
City  of  Barre,  77  Vt.  420.  60  Atl. 
970  [1005];  City  of  New  Whatcom 
v.  Bellingham  Bay  Improvement  Co., 
9  Wash.  6.39,  38  Pac.  163  [1894]; 
City  of  Spokane  Falls  v.  Browne,  3 
Wash.  84,  27  Pac.  1077  [1891];  Osh- 
kosji  City  Railway  Co.  v.  Winnebago 
County.  89  Wis.  435,  61  N.  W.  1107 
[1895];  Dean  v.  Borchsenius,  30 
Wis.  236  [1872];  Kneeland  v.  City 
of  Milwaukee.  IS  Wis.  411  [1864]; 
'Thomason  v.  Ru<i<Tles,  69  Cal  465, 
472.   11   Pac.  20   [1886]. 


§§224,225  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  350 

smaller  population.*  Where  certain  power  to  levy  assessments 
is-  given  by  statute  to  reclamation  districts  formed  under  the 
municipal  code  or  re-organized  thereunder,  such  power  cannot 
be  exercised  by  a  reclamation  district  which  is  not  so  formed  or 
re-organized.^ 

§  224,     Consent  of  voters  not  sufficient. 

In  the  absence  of  specific  constitutional  provision,  the  consent 
of  the  voters  or  property  owners  of  a  district  cannot  confer  upon 
the  public  authorities  the  power  to  levy  a  local  assessment.^ 
The  power  of  such  public  officers  to  levy  local  assessments  can  be 
conferred  only  by  act  of  the  legislature.  If  all  the  property  own- 
ers assent  to  the  making  of  the  improvement,  and  the  levy  of 
a  local  assessment  therefor,  they  may  be  bound  on  principles  of 
estoppel.-  The  assent  of  any  nvimber  less  than  all,  however,  can- 
not bind  those  who  do  not  assent.^  In  some  states  constitutional 
provisions  are  found  which  expressly  authorize  the  voters  of 
certain  cities  to  frame  their  owni  charters.  Where  such  provi- 
sions exist,  a  grant  of  power  by  the  voters,  acting  in  compli- 
ance with  such  constitutional  provision,  has  of  course  the  same 
effect  and  validity  as  an  act  of  the  legislature.* 

§  225.     Consent  of  voters  necessary  by  specific  provision. 

The  consent  of  the  voters  of  a  public  corporation  may  be  made 
by  statute  or  by  constitutional  provision,  sufficient  and  neces- 
sary to  enable  the  public  corporation  to  adopt  new  powers.^ 
The  legislature  may  provide  that  certain  provisions  regulating 
city  government  shall  not  go  into  effect  unless  the  voters  of 
such  city  adopt  such  provisions  by  vote  at  an  election  at  which 
such  question  is  submitted  to  them.-  If  a  constitutional  provi- 
sion authorizes  assessments  only  if  based  upon  the  consent  of  a 
majority  in  value  of  property  owners,^  a  statute  which  author- 

*  State   V.   Moss,    44   Wash.   91,   86  *  Meier   v.    City   of   St.   Louis,    180 

Pac.  1129  [1906].  Mo.   391,   79   S.  W.   955    [1903];    See 

^  Reclamation     District     Xo.     3     v.  §    215. 

Kennedy,  58  Cal.  l24   [1881].  ^  See   §   780  et  seq. 

^  Anderson    v.    Hill.    54    Mich.    477.  -  State    of   jNIinnesota    ex    rel.   Mer- 

20  X.  W.  549  [1884];  Hixson  v.  Bur-  rick    v.    District    Court    of    Hennepin 

son.  54  0.  S.  470,  43  X.  E.  1000.  County.  33  IMinn.  235,  22  X.  W.  625 

^'See  Chapter  XIX.  [1885];    Alcorn   v.   Hamer,    38   Miss. 

=  Anderson    v.    Hill.    54    Mich.    477,  652   [I860]. 

20  X.  W.  549  [1884].  =' See   §   103. 


I 


351  STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT.        §§226,227 

jzes  an  assessment  without  any  provision  for  securing  the  eon- 
sent  of  property  owners  is  invalid.*  A  provision  requiring  the 
assent  of  the  voters  of  the  district  to  certain  forms  of  taxation 
applies  only  to  general  taxes  and  not  to  assessments  for  benefits.^ 

§  226.     What  is  statute. 

A  statute  can  exist  only  if  enacted  by  the  legislature  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  mandatory  provisions  of  the  state  constitu- 
tion.^  The  official  acts  of  those  charged  with  the  duty  of  de- 
termining specific  facts  necessary  to  its  enactment  cannot  ordi- 
narily be  impeached.  Where  an  act  is  found  among  the  public 
laws,  bearing  the  approval  of  the  Governor,  the  Supreme  Court, 
sitting  as  a  court  of  errors,  will  presume  that  such  act  was  con- 
stitutionally passed,  if  the  record  discloses  no  proof  to  the  con- 
trary. The  journals  of  the  legislature  will  not  be  examined  in 
the  Supreme  Court  for  the  first  time,  to  impeach  the  validity 
of  such  act,  or  to  determine  whether  or  not  it  was  passed  in 
compliance  with  constitutional  requirements.-  "Words  in  a  print- 
ed statute  which  were  not  in  the  law^  as  approved  by  the  Gover- 
nor have  no  proper  place  in  such  statute  and  are  not  a  part 
thereof.^  If  words  are  in  a  statute  as  passed  by  the  legislature 
and  as  approved  by  the  Governor  they  are  a  part  of  such  stat- 
ute even  if  they  are  contained  in  brackets.* 

§227.     Change  of  statute. 

In  the  absence  of  some  specific  constitutional  provision,  the 
legislature  may  modify  the  powers  and  organization  of  a  city  ^ 
or  of  an  assessment  district  -  so  as  to  affect  its  power  of  levy- 
ing local  assessments  without  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  voters 
of  such  district  to  such  modification.  Even  if  the  consent  of 
a  majority  of  the  electors  is  necessary  to  determine  that  cities 
and   towns   theretofore   organized    shall    organize   under    general 

H'liiifr  V.  T5oai(l  of  Improvoniont  of  oT  "Mirli.   127:   sub   nomine  Robertson 

Russcllville      Waterworks      Improve-  v.   Baxter,  2.3  X.  W.  711    [1885]. 

ment   Distriet.   84    Ark.    390,    105    S.  *  :\rnrpliy  v.  Dobben,  137  Mich.  505, 

W.  867   [1907].  100  X.  W.  891    [1904]. 

"  Sbuford  V.  Commissioners  of  Gas-  '  Tliomason    v.    Asliwortli.    73    C'al. 

ton  County.  8G  X.  C.  552   [1882].  73.    14    Pae.    015    [1887];    Brientwall 

^See  §§  79,  192  rKsrr/.  v.     Pliila.lclpliia.     103     Pa.     St.     156 

=  Beclarc/  v.  Hall,  44  111.  91    [1807].  [18S3]. 

'  Di-ain    Commissioners    v.    Baxter,  -People   ex    rel.    Miller    v.    Brislin. 

80   III.   423    [18751. 


§  228  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  352 

laws,  instead  of  their  special  charters,  the  legislature  may  pass 
a  general  law  affecting  the  charter  of  the  city  and  county  of 
San  Francisco,  without  obtaining  the  consent  of  such  cities  and 
counties.-^  Even  where  the  original  statute  for  a  park  district 
was  accepted  by  a  popular  vote  by  the  inhabitants  of  such  dis- 
trict,'' and  possibly  might  have  been  unconstitutional  but  for 
provision  for  such  acceptance  as  a  condition  precedent  to  its 
taking  effect,^  the  legislature  may  by  statute  modify  the  powers 
of  such  park  without  any  new  vote  of  the  inhabitants  thereof."^ 
Such  district,  when  once  formed,  is  subject  to  general  legis- 
lation in  the  same  way  that  any  other  municipal  corporation  is 
subject.  If  a  statute  which  controls  the  method  of  levying  an 
assessment  is  changed  after  contract  is  let  and  the  work  is  begun 
such  repeal  does  not  prevent  the  city  from  compelling  the  prop- 
erty owner  to  reimburse  it  for  expenses  incurred  and  obligations 
entered  into  by  said  city  under  its  contract  for  such  improve- 
ment/ A  different  rule  applies  where  no  work  has  been  done 
and  no  contract  has  been  entered  into  before  the  change  of  stat- 
ute. In  such  case  the  rights  of  the  city  are  measured  solely  by 
the  new  statute.^  A  change  of  statute  made  by  a  repealing  act 
which  contains  a  saving  clause  as  to  existing  assessments  leaves 
such  assessments  governed  by  the  prior  statute."  A  change  of 
statute  will  ordinarily  be  construed,  if  practicable,  as  having  a 
prospective  operation  only,  and  as  applying  solely  to  subsequent 
improvements.^**  Thus  a  statute  which  provides,  "Whenever 
.  .  .  common  council  .  .  .  shall  desire  to  construct  sewers," 
was  construed  to  apply  only  to  sewers  constructed  after  the 
passage  of  such  statute. ^^ 

§  228.     General  principles  of  statutory  construction. 

The  construction  of  a  statute  is  a  matter  for  the  court.     "Leg- 
islative   construction    of   past    legislation    has    no    judicial    force 

^Thomason    v.    Ashworth,    73    Cal.  543,  27  Pae.  474   [1891]. 

73,   14  Pac.  615    [1887].  "Board    of    Councilmen    of    Frank- 

*  Peope  ex  rel.  Wilson  v.  Salomon,  fort  v.  Mason  &  Foard  Co.,   100  Ky. 

51  111.  37.  48,  37  S.  W.  290  [1896];  State,  Brit- 

=  See  §   176  et  seq.  tin,   Pros.   v.   Blake,   36   N.   J.   L.    (7 

"People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Brislin,  83  Vr.)    442   [1872]. 

111.  423  [1875].  "Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     Cole,     132 

'City    of    Spokane    v.     Browne,    8  Fed.   668    [1904]. 

Wash.   317,   36   Pac.  26    [1894].  "Pennsylvania    Co.     v.     Cole,     132 

'Wilson  v.  City  of  Seattle,  2  Wash.  Fed.  668   [1904]. 


d 


353 


STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT. 


228 


except  for  the  future,"'  though  it  may  be  considered  as  an  aid 
in  extracting  the  intention  of  the  legislature  from  doubtful  lan- 
guage.- Intelligent  and  rational  action  on  the  part  of  the  legis- 
lature is  always  to  be  presumed.^  The  public  necessities  on 
which  the  power  of  assessment  is  based  must  be  considered  in 
determining  the  meaning  of  the  statute.*  A  statute  is,  if  possi- 
ble, to  be  construed  as  one  harmonious  whole,  every  part  thereof 
having  effect  in  carrying  out  the  general  intention  of  the  legis- 
lature.^ If  tw^o  sections  of  a  statute  relate  to  the  same  subject 
matter,  they  are  to  be  construed  together  in  order  to  ascertain 
from  both  the  intention  of  the  legislature,'"'  and  to  accomplish 
this  purpose  and  enforce  the  general  intent  of  the  legislature, 
particular  provisions  will,  if  necessary,  be  construed  as  having 
a  meaning  other  than  that  which  they  literally  bear.'^  Statutes 
in  pari  materia  are  to  be  considered  together,  as  though  they 
were  one  statute.^  Accordingly,  of  two  constructions,  one  of 
which  will  cause  inconsistencies  between  parts  of  statutes  in 
pari  materia,  and  the  other  of  which  will  reconcile  the  statutes 
and  prevent  inconsistencies,  the  latter  will  prevail.^  Repeals  by 
implication  are  not  favored.^"  Hence,  if  by  one  construction 
two  statutes  passed  at  different  times  may  be  construed  together 
so  as  to  give  full  force  and  effect  to  each,  and  by  another  con- 
struction they  are  inconsistent  so  that  the  later  statute  will 
operate  as  an  implied  repeal  of  the  prior  statute,  the  former 
construction  will  be  preferred.^^     Thus  a  special  charter  allow- 


'  Drain  Commissioners  v.  Tiaxter, 
57  ]\Iich.  127;  sub  nomine  Robortson 
V.  Baxter,  23  N.  W.  711    [188.11. 

"  Drain  Commissioners  v.  Baxter. 
07  Mich.  127,  sub  nomine  Robertson 
V.  Baxter,  23  N.  W.  711    [188.5]. 

'Taylor  v.  Palmer,  31  Ciil.  240 
[1806];  Verdin  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
131  Mr,.  20,  30  S.  W.  52,  33  S.  W. 
480   [1895]. 

*  Shaler  v.  McAleese,  —  N.  J.  Eq. 
,  68  Atl.  410   [19071. 

"Appeal  of  North  Beacli  &  Mission 
R.  R.  Co..  in  tlie  Matter  of  VVidoninn: 
Kearney  Street,  32  Cal.  499  [1867]; 
People  ex  rel.  Keeney  v.  City  of  Clij. 
caco,  1.52  111.  546,"  38  N.'  E.  744 
[1894]. 

"Taylor  v.  Palmer.  31  Cal.  240 
118661. 


'^  People  ex  rel.  Keeney  v.  City  of 
Chieaffo,  152  III.  540.  38  X.  E.  744 
[1894]. 

*  Lai<e  Shore  &  ^licliigan  Southern 
Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  Cliicasjo,  148 
111.  509,  37  N.  E.  88   [1894J. ' 

"Clarke  v.  Mead,  102  Cal.  510.  36 
Pac.  802  [18941;  Lake  Shore  &  Mich- 
igan Southern  Railway  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicacro,  148  111.  509,  37  X.  E.  88 
[18941. 

'"Ricli  V.  Citv  of  Chieasjo:  152  III. 
18,  38  X.  \V.  255  [1894];  Copeland 
V.  flavor  and  Aldermen  of  Sprintr- 
field.  160  Mass.  498.  44  X.  E.  005 
[1890]. 

"  Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111. 
IS.  38  X.  E.  255   [1894]. 


§  228  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  354 

ing  the  city  of  Springfield  to  construct  sidewalks  and  assess 
the  entire  cost  thereof  upon  the  owners  of  abutting  property  is 
not  repealed  by  implication  by  a  subsequent  statute  allowing 
all  cities  to  construct  sidewalks  and  assess  not  more  than  one- 
half  of  the  cost  thereof  upon  the  al)utting  property  owners. ^■- 
The  theory  that  the  different  sections  of  the  same  statute  or  the 
different  statutes  upon  the  same  subject  are,  if  possible,  to  be 
construed  together,  so  as  to  harmonize  them,  and  to  give  effect 
to  each  part  is  merely  a  prima  facie  theory  of  legislative  intent, 
and  yields  to  the'  affirmative  indication  of  the  opposite  intention, 
if  manifest  on  the  face  of  the  statute.  If  the  legislature  has  evi- 
dently intended  to  create  different  rules  for  two  or  more  par- 
ticular cases  arising  under  the  same  general  subject,  such  stat- 
utes will  not  to  this  extent  be  regarded  as  being  in  pari  materia.^' 
Thus,  if  a  legislature  has  provided  two  different  methods  of 
procedure  in  assessing  benefits  and  damages,  the  one  in  the  ordi- 
nary case  of  eminent  domain,  and  the  other  when  land  is  taken 
by  cities  or  villages  for  municipal  purposes,  the  courts  should 
not  regard  such  statutes  as  being  in  pari  materia  as  to  the  mat- 
ters upon  which  the  legislature  evidently  intended  to  prescribe 
distinct  rules. '^  A  revising  statute  which  covers  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  prior  statutes  and  is  inconsistent  therewith  is  regarded 
as  repealing  snch  statutes  by  implication.^'  Hence,  the  consoli- 
dation act,  which  was  intended  to  revise  and  consolidate  all 
statutes  concerning  the  government  of  New  York  City,  impliedly 
repeals  a  provision  requiring  the  expense  of  certain  improve- 
ments to  be  divided  between  the  city  and  the  property  owners 
and   substitutes  therefor  a   general   provision   permitting   an   as- 

^-  C'opcland    v.    Mayor    and    Alder-  matter    of    antecedent    statutes,    and 

men    of    Springfield,    106    Mass.    498,  such  plainly  appears  to  have  been  the 

44  X.  E.   G05    [1890].  legislative  intent,  it  is  to  be  deemed 

"  Lake  Shore  &  ^Iichiga)i  Southern  to    contain    the    entire    law    on    the 

Railway  Co.  v.   City  of  Chicago,   148  subject,   and   it   virtually   repeals   the 

111.   509,   37   N.   E.    88    [1894].  former   enactment,   although   there   is 

"  Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern  no    express    provision    to    that    effect, 

Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,   148  and    although    provisions   of   the   for- 

111.  509,  37  N.  E.  88    [1894].  mer  acts  are  omitted  in  the  revising 

-^  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  statute."     In  the  matter  of  the  Peti- 

the    Xew    York    Institution    for    In-  tion  of  the  New  York  Institution  for 

struction  of  Deaf  and  Dumb,  to  Va-  Instruction   of    the    Deaf   and    Diimb, 

cate   Assessments,   121   N.  Y.  234,  24  to    Vacate    Assessments,    121    N.    Y. 

X.   E.   378    [1890]:     "Wliere   a   revis-  234,  24  X.  E.  Rep.   378    [1890]. 
ing  statute  covers  the  whole  subject- 


355  STATUTORY    ArTIiORITV    FOR    ASSESSMENT.  §  228 

sessmeut  of  the  entire  expense  upon  the  property  owners,  though 
such  consolidation  act  contains  no  express  provision  repealing 
such  prior  clause. '''  If  the  later  statute  covers  the  same  subject 
matter  as  an  earlier  statute  and  is  clearly  inconsistent  there- 
with, it  operates  as  a  repeal  of  the  earlier  statute  by  implication.^^ 
The  intention  of  the  legislature  is  to  be  deduced  primarily  from 
the  language  which  it  has  seen  tit  to  employ.  In  determining 
the  intention  of  the  legislature  as  expressed  in  the  statute,  the 
primary  question  is.  "not  what  the  statute  should  be,  but  what 
it  is."'-  The  general  intention  of  the  legislature  as  deduced 
from  the  entire  statute  should  prevail  over  the  letter  of  the  law.'" 
The  literal  wording  of  a  statute  must  always  yield  to  the  legis- 
lative intent,  where  the  latter  is  clearly  apparent  fr(un  the  statute 
taken  as  a  whole.-''  A  statute  which  specifically  directs  a  par- 
ticular course  of  action,  impliedly  prohibits  a  course  of  action 
which  differs  materially  from  that  prescribed.-'  In  case  of  doubt 
the  title  of  a  statute  may  be  resorted  to  as  tending  to  aid  in 
determining  the  intention  of  the  legislature.--  The  title  is,  how- 
ever, of  l)ut  slight  imi)ortance  and  can  never  ])e  used  to  enlarge 
or  control  unequivocal  language  employed  in  the  body  of  the 
act.-"*  In  some  states  by  express  constitutional  provision  the  title 
of  a  statute  must  show  the  subject  matter  thereof.-*  The  pre- 
amble is  no  part  of  the  law.  ])ut  it  can  be  used  for  the  purpose 
of  identifying  the  subject  .matter  of  the  law  and  explaining  the 
motives  and  intention  of  the  legislature.-"'  Provisions  in  the  char- 
ter of  a  city  whieli  prescribe  the  matter  of  instituting  and  con- 
ducting proceedings  for  constructing  an  improvement  whereby 
an  assessment  is  to  be  levied  upon  proi)erty  owners,  do  not  limit 
or  restrict  the  ])ower  of  the  city  to  make  such  impi'ovement  if 
it  is  to  l)e  |)ai(l  for  by  general   taxation.-''' 

'"In  the  Matter  of  tlic  Petition  of  Mo.   20.    .".O   S.   \V.   480.   .-]('.   S.   W.   52 

the     New    York    Institution    for    In-  |  ISDol. 

struction  of  Deaf  and   Dumb,  to  Va-  -'City   of   New    TIavcn    v.    Whitney, 

cate  Assessments,   121    N.  Y.  234.  24  ?,C)  Conn.  373    [1870]. 

N.  E.  378    [18901.  =MIa<rar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 

'•Doremns  v.   People   e\-    rel.    Kocli-  Yolo  Comity,  47  Cal.  222    [18741. 

ersperger,    173    111.   (i3.    50   N.   E.   680  -' Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 

[18981.  Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222   [18741. 

'"Kelly   V.    The    City    of    Cleveland,  -*  See   §    192  cf   sr,,. 

34   0.  S.   408    [1878].  ="  Commonwealtli     to    use    of    Alle- 

"Verdin  v.   City  of  St.   Louis.    131  gheny    City    v.    :\Iarsl,all.    09    Pa.    St. 

Mo.  26.   33   S.   W".   480.   30   S.   W.   52  328   [1871]. 

|l«nSl.  =«  Allen    V.    City    of    Janesville.    .35 

="Yerdin  v.   City  of  St.   Louis.   131  Wis.  403   [1874]." 


5  229 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


356 


§  229.     Statutes  conferring  power  construed  strictly. 

Furthermore,  assessment  proceedings  are  proceedings  in  in- 
vitum,^  and  have  for  their  ultimate  object  the  taking  of  prop- 
erty from  the  individual  owner  without  his  consent.  As  is  the 
case  in  all  proceedings  of  a  similar  character,  such  as  taxation, 
the  statutes  conferring  the  power  to  impose  local  assessments 
must  be  construed  strietlv.-     The  intention  of  the  legislature  to 


^  City  Street  Improvement  Co.  v. 
Babcock,  139  Cal.  690,  73  Pac.  666 
[1903];  Sargent  &  Company  v.  Tut- 
tie,  67  Conn.  162,  32  L.  R.  A.  822; 
34  Atl.  1028  [1895];  Mound  City 
Land  &  Stock  Co.  v.  Miller,  170  Mo. 
240,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  727,  60  L.  R. 
A.  190,  70  S.  W.  721  [1902];  Gui- 
notte  V.  Egelhoff,  64  :\[o.  App.  356 
[1895];  Rose  v.  Trestrail,  62  Mo. 
App.  352  [1895];  Hutchinson  v.  City 
of  Omaha,  52  Xeb.  345,  72  X.  W. 
218   [1897]. 

-  Crofut  V.  City  of  Danbury,  65 
Conn.  294,  32  Atl".  365  [1894];'  City 
of  Xew  Haven  v.  Whitney,  36  Conn. 
373  [1870];  People  ex  rel.  Raymond 
V.  Field,  197  111.  568,  64  X.  E.  544 
[1902];  Lake  Shore  &  Michigan 
Southern  Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 148  111.  509,  37  X.  E.  88 
[1894];  Wriglit  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
20  111.  252  [1858];  Town  of  Green- 
dale  v.  Suit,  163  Ind.  282,  71  X.  E. 
658  [1904];  Xiklaus  v.  Conkling. 
118  Ind.  289,  20  X.  E.  797  [1888]; 
Churchman  v.  City  of  Indianapolis, 
110  Ind.  259,  11  X.  E.  301  [1886]: 
Overshiner  v.  Jones,  66  Ind.  452 
[1879];  Busenbark  v.  Clements,  22 
Ind.  App.  557,  53  X.  E.  665  [1899]; 
Ankeny  v.  Hennigsen,  54  la.  29,  6  X. 
W.  65  [1880];  Merriam  v.  Moody's 
Executors,  25  la.  163  [1868];  Mur- 
ray V.  Tucker,  73  Ky.  (10  Bush.) 
240  [1874];  Whitney  v.  Common 
Council  of  the  Village  of  Hudson,  69 
Mich.  189,  37  X.  W.  184  [1888]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Appeal  of  Pow- 
ers, 29  Mich.  504  [1874];  City  of 
Sedalia  to  use  of  Sedalia  Xational 
Bank  v.  Donohue,  190  Mo.  407.  80 
S.  W.  386  [19051:  Rose  v.  Trestrail, 
62  Mo.  App.  352   [1895];  Hutchinson 


V.  City  of  Omaha,  52  Xeb.  345,  72 
X.  W\  218  [1897];  Bergen  County 
Savings  Bank  v.  Township  of  Union, 
44  X.  J.  L.  (15  Vr.)  599  [1882]; 
State,  Peckham,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Xew- 
ark,  43  X.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  576  [1881]  -, 
Campion  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  41  X. 
J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  355  [1879];  State, 
Terhune,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Passaic. 
41  X.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  90  [1879]; 
State,  Wilkinson,  Pros.  v.  Inliabi- 
tants  of  the  Citj'  of  Trenton,  36  X. 
J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  499  [1873];  Carron  v. 
Martin,  26  X.  J.  L.  (2  Dutch.)  594, 
69  Am.  Dec.  584  [1857];  State, 
Townsend,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  Jersey  City,  26  X.  J. 
L.  (2  Dutch.)  444 '[1857];  State, 
Tims,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  Xewark,  25  X.  J.  L.  (1 
Dutch.)  399  [1856];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Petition  of  Van  Buren,  55 
How.  (X.  Y.)  513  [1878].  "It  is  un- 
necessary to  cite  authorities  on  these 
points.  The  A.  B.  C.  of  the  laws  of 
municipal  corporations,  that  the 
power  to  levy  special  assessments  is 
to  be  construed  strictly,  that  the 
mode  prescribed  is  the  measure  of 
power  and  that  material  require- 
ments must  be  complied  with  before 
there  is  any  liability  is  all  that  need 
be  quoted.  Spokane  Falls  v.  Browne, 
3  Wash.  34,  27  Pac.  1077  [1891]. 
An  assessment  made  contrary  to 
these  principles  is  void  and  an  in- 
junction lies  to  restrain  its  collec- 
tion." Buckley  v.  City  of  Tacoma, 
9  Wash.  253,  267.  37  Pac.  441  [1894] ; 
(quoted  in  Kline  v.  City  of  Tacoma, 
11  Wash.  193,  195,  39  Pac.  453 
[1895]). 


II 


357  STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT.  §  230 

confer  upon  public  corporations  the  power  of  levying  local  as- 
sessments must  appear  affirmatively.  In  ease  of  fair  and  rea- 
sonable doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  such  power,  the  presumption 
in  construing-  the  statute  must  be  against  its  existence.**  If,  how- 
ever, the  entire  statute,  taken  as  a  whole,  shows  that  the  legis- 
lature intended  to  confer  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments, 
full  effect  must  be  given  to  such  intention.  A  grant  of  power 
to  assess  damages  and  special  benefits  is  held  to  confer  the  power 
of  levying  a  special  assessment.*  A  grant  of  power  is  not  to  be 
limited  so  as  to  thwart  the  intention  of  the  legislature.-"'  Thus, 
power  to  fix  the  time  for  commencing  work.^which  is  to  be 
prosecuted  to  completion  with  reasonable  diligence,  and  power 
"to  extend  the  time  so  fixed  from  time  to  time."  includes  power 
to  extend  the  time  of  completion."  Provisions  inserted  for  the 
benefit  of  the  property  owner  are  to  be  so  construed  as  to  accom- 
plish such  purpose.'^ 

§  230.     Constr-uction  of  statutes  authorizing  assessments  for  per- 
formance of  legal  duty. 

The  power  of  a  public  corporation  to  compel  owners  of  land  to 
perform  legal  duties  owing  to  the  'public  with  reference  to  their 
land  and  in  default  thereof  to  perform  such  duty  itself  and  to 
charge  the  land-owner  with  the  expense  thereof,  is  one  which, 
if  it  exists  at  all,  is  construed  in  a  much  more  liberal  manner 
than  the  power  of  levying  assessments  on  the  theory  of  benefits.^ 
Since  this  is  a  true  case  of  exercise  of  the  police  power,  a  general 
grant  of  power  to  compel  performance  of  a  legal  duty  carries 
with  it  the  power  to  enforce  such  performance  by  appropriate 
and  suitable  means.-     Thus  a  general  grant  of  power  to  compel 

'  "Tf   thorp    is    roasonnhlo    doubt    as  °  Oakland    I'avinj;-    Co.    v.    Barstow, 

to   the    existence   of   any    such    power  79  Cal.  45,  21   Pac.  514    [1889]. 

(i.  e.  the  power  to  levy  local  assess-  ''The  People  e.v  rel.  v.  City  of  Chi- 

ments   for   special   benefits)    tlie   pre  cago,  152  111.  546.  38  X.  E.  744. 

sumption   is   that   it   does   not  exist."  '  Mayor   and   Board   of  Trustees   of 

Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad  Co.  the  Town  of  Xew  Iberia  v.  Fontelieu. 

V.  City  of  Xew  Haven,  77  Conn.  404,  108  La.  460.  .32  So.  369   [19011.     See 

497,  59   Atl.   737    flOO.i].  also    James    v.    Pino    BlulV,    49    Ark. 

*City     of     Ashovillo     v.     Wachovia  199,  4  S.  W.  760    [18871':    X'ugent  v. 

Loan  &  Trust  Co..  143  X.  C.  360,  5.)  City   of   ,Tacks(m.    7*2    Miss.    1040,    18 

S.  E.  800   [19061.  So."  493   []S9.-il. 

"Oakland    Pavinp    Co.    v.    Barstow,  ^  Mayor   and   Board  of   Trustees  ot 

79  Cal.  45,  21   Pac.  514   [1889].  the  Town  of  Xew  Iberia  v.  Fontelieu. 

108  La.  460.  32  So.  369  [1901). 


§  231  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  358 

owners  of  urban  property  to  construct  sidewalks  in  front  of 
their  lands  and  to  keep  them  free  from  obstruction  and  in  re- 
pair carries  with  it  a  grant  of  such  powers  as  are  necessary  to 
carry  into  effect  the  power  specitically  given. ^  In  this  respect 
it  differs  from  a  grant  of  power  to  assess  for  benefits,  since  power 
to  construct  a  given  improvement  which  may  be  paid  for  by 
general  taxation  does  not  carry  with  it  an  implied  power  to  levy 
a  local  assessment  to  pay  for  the  cost  thereof. 

§  231.  Power  to  construct  improvement  does  not  confer  power 
to  assess. 
A  grant  to  a  municipal  corporation  of  power  to  construct  a 
given  form  of  public  improvement  does  not  of  itself  confer  power 
to  pay  for  such  improvement  b.v  levying  special  assessments 
therefor.^  While  a  grant  of  power  carries  with  it,  without  spe- 
cific mention  thereof,  all  powers  incidental  to  the  main  power 
granted,  and  reasonably  adapted  to  carry  such  power  into  effect, 
the  power  of  special  assessment  cannot  be  regarded  as  inci- 
dental to  the  power  of  constructing  public  improvements,  since 
such  improvements  may  be  constructed  and  paid  for  out  of  funds 
raised  by  general  taxation.  Thus  a  grant  of  power  "to  grade, 
macadamize  and  pave  the  sidewalks  and  to  lay  out,  change  and 
open  new  streets,"  does  not  confer  the  power  of  levying  a  local 
assessment  to  pay  for  such  improvement.-  A  grant  of  power  to 
a  city  to  "regulate  and  improve  all  streets,  alleys  and  sidewalks" 

"Mayor  and   Board  of  Trustees  of  X.   Y.   588    [1875];    City   of   Greens- 

the  Town  of  New  roeria  v.  Fontelieu,  boro   v.   McAdoo,    112   N.   C.   359,    17 

108  La.  460,  32  So.  369   [1901].  S.  E.  178   [1893];   City  of  Raleigh  v. 

nVilcoxon  V.  City  of  San  Luis  Peace,  110  N.  C.  32,  17  L.  R.  A.  330, 
Obispo,  101  Cal.  508,  35  Pac.  988  14  S.  E.  521  [1892];  Mt.  Pleasant 
[1894];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Law,  144  Borough  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Rail- 
Ill.  569,  33  N.  E.  855  [1893];  City  road  Co.,  138  Pa.  St.  305,  11  L.  R. 
of  Fairfield  v.  Ratclilf,  20  la.  396  A.  520,  20  Atl.  1052  [1890];  Bor- 
[1866];  Mayor,  Recorder  and  Alder-  ough  of  Mauch  Chunk  v.  Shortz,  61 
men  of  the  City  of  Annapolfs  v.  Har-  Pa.  St.  399  [1869]  ;  Dietz  v.  City  of 
Avood,  32  Md.  471,  3  Am.  Rep.  151  Xeenah,  91  Wis.  422,  65  N.  W.  500, 
[1870];  State  v.  Smith,  99  Minn.  64  K  W.  299  [1895]  ;  Cain  v.  City  of 
59,  108  N.  W.  822  [1906];  Oster  Elkins,  57  W.  Va.  9,  49  S.  E.  898 
V.    City    of    Jefferson,    57    Mo.    App.  [1905]. 

485     [1894]:     Cxoodrich    v.     City    oJ  -"City    of    Greensboro    v.    McAdoo, 

Omaha,    10    Xeb.    98,    4    X\    W.    424  112  X.  C.  359,  17  S.  E.   178   [1893]; 

[1880];    State.   Hoetzel,   Pros.    v.    In-  City   of  Raleigh   v.   Peace,   110  N.  C. 

habitants   of   East   Orange.   50   X.   J.  32.    17    L.    R.   A.    330,    14   S.   E.   521 

L.   (21  Vr.)    354,  12  Atl.  911    [1888]:  [1892]. 
City  of  Watertown  v.   Fairbanks,   65 


I 


359  STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT.         §§232,233 

does  not  confer  power  to  levy  special  assessments  on  lots  for 
the  construction  of  a  sidewalk.'*  So  power  to  assess  a  part  of 
the  cost  of  an  improvement  upon  the  owners  of  the  property 
benefited  does  not  confer  power  to  levy  an  assessment  for  other 
parts  of  such  cost.* 

§  232.  Power  to  levy  general  tax  does  not  confer  power  to  as- 
sess. 
A  p^rant  of  power  to  levy  a  general  tax  for  the  purpose  of 
constructing  a  given  form  of  public  improvement  does  not  confer 
power  to  levy  a  local  assessment  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  the 
expenses  of  such  improvement.^  In  the  absence  of  some  statu- 
tory provision  expressly  granting  the  power  to  levy  local  as- 
sessments to  pay  the  cost  of  such  improvements,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  the  intention  of  the  legislature  that  the  cost  of  such 
improvement  is  to  be  paid  for  by  general  taxation  exclusively. 
If  the  context,  however,  shows  that  the  term  "tax"  was  used 
in  its  broad  sense,  including  local  assessment  as  well  as  general 
taxation,  a  grant  of  power  to  tax  will  confer  power  to  assess. - 
Thus  under  a  statute  authorizing  a  city  to  raise  money  for  pav- 
ing streets  or  making  sidewalks  by  a  tax  on  real  and  personal 
property,  "as  may  seem  proper,"  it  has  been  held  that  the  city 
may  recpiire  the  property  owners  to  pay  one-third  of  the  cost 
of  the  improvement  in  front  of  their  respective  lots."- 

§  233.     Power  to  levy  assessment  does  not  confer  power  of  gen- 
eral taxation. 
Conversely,  it  may  be  here  noted  that  the  mere  grant  of  i)0wei' 
to  levy  a  local  assessment  for  a  given  kind  of  pul)lie  im])n)vement 

'City    of    Fairfipld    v.    KatclifV.    20  Rep.   151    [1870];   State  v.  Smith.  09 

la.  3flti.  Minn.    59,    108    X.    W.    822    [190(5]; 

*  Reed   v.   City   of   Toledo.    18   Oliio  City  of  Watertown   v.   Fairbanks,   65 

161    [1849].        '  N.  Y.  588    [1875];   City  of  Asheville 

'  Wilcoxon    V.    City    of    San    Luis  v.   Wachovia  Loan  &   Trust   Co.,    143 

Obispo,    101    Cal.    5()8,    35    Pac.    988  X.  C.  3(i0.  55  S.  K.  800   [190G]. 
[1894];   City   Council   of   Aii<,nista  v.  -  Oakey  v.  Mayor.   1   La.   1    [1830]. 

Murphy,    79    Oa.    101,    3    S.    E.    320  » Oakey  v.  Mayor.    1   La.   1    [1830]. 

i  1887]  ;    Independent   School    District  In    this   case,   however,    anotlier    stat- 

of  Bnrlinfrton  v.  City  of  Burlinjxton.  ute  gave  tlie  power  of  compelling  the 

60    la.    500,    15    N.   W.    295    [1883];  "completion.    .    .    .    maintenance    and 

Hentig    v.    Oilmore,    33    Kan.    234,    fi  repair  of  side  pavements  at  the  cost 

Pac.    304    [1885]:     Mayor.    Recorder  of  the  proprietors  of  linuses.  lands  or 

and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Annap-  neighboring  lots."  . 
olis  v.   Harwood,   32  Md.   471.   3  Am. 


§234 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


360 


does  not  confer  the  power  to  levy  a  general  tax  therefor,  since 
such  grant  is  evidently  the  determination  by  the  legislature  to 
exercise  its  power  of  choosing  between  general  taxation  and  local 
assessment  in  favor  of  local  assessment.  Under  such  a  grant  of 
power  the  city  can  exercise  only  the  power  of  taxation  which 
the  legislature  has  conferred  upon  it.^         ' 

§  234.     Statutes  conferring  power  to  be  followed  strictly. 

The  statutes  conferring  such  power  must  be  followed  strictly 
by  the  public  corporation  which  is  seeking  to  levy  such  local 
assessment;  and  if  these  statutes  are  not  thus  strictly  followed 
the  assessment  is  invalid.^     A  statute  authorizing  an  assessment 


'  Oster  V.  City  of  Jefferson,  57  Mo. 
App.  485  [1894];  Rhinelander  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  New  York,  24  How. 
(N.  Y.)  304  [18G2];  Breen  v.  City 
of  Troy,  GO  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  417 
[1871];  In  the  matter  of  the  Appli- 
cation of  Tappan  to  Vacate  Certain 
Assessments,  54  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  225 
[1869];  In  the  Matter  of  Tappan, 
to  Vacate"  Certain  Assessments,  36 
How.    (N.  Y.)    390    [1869]. 

^  Tulare  Irrigation  District  v.  Shep- 
ard,  185  U.  S.  1,  46  L.  773,  22  S. 
531  [1902];  Watkins  v.  Griffith,  59 
Ark.  344,  27  S.  W.  234  [1894];  City 
Street  Improvement  Co.  v.  Babcock, 
139  Cal.  690,  73  Pac.  666  [1903]; 
San  Diego  Investment  Co.  v.  Shaw, 
129  Cal.  273,  61  Pac.  1082  [1000]; 
Ede  V.  Cuneo,  126  Cal.  167,  58  Pac. 
538  [1899];  Kelso  v.  Cole,  121  Cal. 
121;  53  Pac.  353  [1898];  Durrell  v. 
Dooner,  119  Cal.  411,  51  Pac.  628 
[1897];  Schwiesau  v.  IMahon,  110 
Cal.  543,  42  Pac.  1065  [1S95];  Sliip- 
man  v.  Forbes,  97  Cal.  572,  32  Pac. 
599  [1893];  Eeclamation  District 
No.  3  V.  Kennedy,  58  Cal.  124  [1881]  ; 
Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Yolo  County,  51  Cal.  474  [1876]; 
City  of  Stockton  v.  Whittmore,  50 
Cal'.  554  [1875];  Hewes  v.  Reis,  40 
Cal.  255  [1870];  Chambers  v.  Sat- 
terlee,  40  Cal.  497  [1871];  Nichol- 
son Pavement  Co.  v.  Painter.  35  Cal. 
699  [1868];  Dougherty  v.  Hitchcock, 
35  Cal.  512   [1868];   Himmelmann  v. 


Danos,  35  Cal.  441  [1868];  Smitli  v. 
Cofran,  34  Cal.  310  [1867];  Haskell 
V.  Bartlett,  34  Cal.  281  [1867]  ;  Mayo 
V.  Ah  Loy,  32  Cal.  477,  91  Am.  Dec. 
595  [1867];  Taylor  v.  Conner,  31 
Cal.  481  [1866];  Smith  v.  Davis,  30 
Cal.  537  [1866];  Creighton  v.  Man 
son,  27  Cal.  614  [1865];  Blanchard 
v.  Beideman,  18  Cal.  261  [1861]; 
Keese  v.  City  of  Denver,  10  Colo.  112, 
15  Pac.  825  [1887];  Fair  Haven  & 
Westville  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of  New 
Haven,  77  Conn.  494,  59  Atl.  737 
[1905];  Angus  v.  City  of  Hartford, 
74  Conn.  27,  49  Atl.  192  [1901]; 
Harris  v.  City  of  Ansonia,  73  Conn. 
359,  47  Atl.  672  [1900];  Sargent  & 
Company  v.  Tuttle,  67  Conn.  162. 
32  L.  R.  A.  822,  823,  34  Atl.  1028 
[1895];  Crofut  v.  Danbury,  65  Conn. 
294,  32  Atl.  365;  Hillhoiise  v.  City 
of  New  Haven,  62  Conn.  344,  26  Atl. 
393  [1892];  District  of  Columbia  v. 
P.urijdorf,  6  App.  D.  C.  465  [1895]; 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Weaver,  6 
A-op.  D.  C.  482  [1895];  Allman  v. 
Didtrict  of  Columbia,  3  App.  D.  C. 
8  [1894]  ;.  Johnson  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 6  Mackey  (D.  C.)  21  '[1887]  ; 
McLauren  v.  City  of  Grand  Forks, 
6  Dakota  397,  43  N.  W.  710;  Holli- 
day  V.  City  of  Atlanta,  96  Ga.  377. 
23  S.  E.  406  [1895];  People  ex  rel. 
Hanberg  v.  Peyton,  214  111.  376,  73 
N.  E.  768  [1905];  Gray  v.  Town  of 
Cicero,  177  HI.  459,  53  N.  E.  9! 
[18991;    Lingle    v.    City    of    Chica-n, 


i 


361 


STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT. 


§234 


for  an  improvement  if  upon  notice  the  property  owners  do  not 
themselves    construct   such    improvement,    does    not    empower    a 


172  III.  170,  50  X.  E.  192  [1898]; 
(West  Chicago  Park  Commissioners 
V.  Baldwin,  162  111.  87,  44  N.  E.  404, 
followed)  ;  Robeson  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Curry,  161.  111.  176,  43  N.  E.  619 
[1896];  McCliesney  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Kern,  148  111.  221,  35  N.  E.  739 
11894];    Davis  v.   City   of  Litchfield, 

145  111.  313,  21  L.  R.  A.  563,  33  N. 
E.  888  [1893];  Morrison  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  142  III.  660,  32  N.  E.  172 
[1893];  City  of  Carlyle  v.  The 
County  of  clinton,  140 '  111.  512,  30 
N.  E.  782  [1893];  Louisville  &  Nash- 
ville Railroad  Company  v.  City  of 
East  St.  Louis,  134  III.  656,  25  N. 
E.  962  [1891];  People  ex  rel.  Pol- 
lard V.  Swigert,  130  111.  608,  22  N. 
E  787  [1890];  Thorn  v.  West  Chi- 
cago Park  Commissioners,  130  111. 
594,  22  N.  E.  520  [1890];  Taylor  v. 
Peoi)le  ex  rel.  Reed,  66  111.  322 
[1872];  Workman  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 61  111.  463  [1871];  Skinner  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  42  III.  52  [1866]; 
Scammon  v.  Citj'  of  Chicago,  40  III. 

146  [1866];  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Wright,  32  111.  192  [1863];  Lill  v. 
The  "^  City  of  Chicago,  29  III.  31 
i  1862] ;  Fort  Chartres  &  Ivy  Land- 
ing Drainage  &  Levee  District  No. 
5  V.  Smalkand,  70  111.  App.  449 
[1897];  Shaw  v.  State  for  use,  97 
Ind.  23;  Case  v.  Johnson,  91  Ind. 
477  [1883];  Moberry  v.  City  of  Jcf- 
fersonville,  38  Ind.  198  [1871]; 
City  of  Bluffton  v.  Miller,  33  Ind. 
App.  521,  70  N.  E.  989  [1904]; 
Sleeper  v.  Bullen,  6  Kan.  300  [1870] ; 
Worthington  v.  City  of  Covington, 
82  Ky.  265  [1884];  Murray  v. 
Tucker,  73  Ky.  (10  Bush.)  241 
[1874];  Caldwell  v.  Rupert,  73  Ky. 
(10  Bush.)  179  [1873];  Broadway 
Baptist  Church  v.  McAtee.  71  Ky.  (8 
Bush.)  508.  8  Amer.  Rep.  480  [1871] ; 
City  of  Henderson  v.  Lnmbort.  77 
Ky]  (14  W.  P.  Bush)  24  [1878]; 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Watt, 
51      La.      Ann.      1345.      26      So.      70 


[1899];  Sirgi  v.  Matthews,  24  La, 
Ann.  613  [1872];  Second  Municipal- 
ity of  New  Orleans  v.  McDonogh,  9 
Robinson  ^La.)  408  [1845];  Pierce 
V.  County  Commissioners  of  Franklin 
County,  63  Me.  252  [1872];  Mayoi 
and  City  Council  of  Baltimore  v. 
Porter,  18  Md.  284,  79  Am.  Dec.  686 
[1861];  Henderson  v.  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Baltimore,  use  of 
Eschbach,  8  Md.  352  [1855];  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Baltimore  v.  Moore,  6  H.  & 
J.  (Md.)  375  [1825];  City  of  Manis- 
tee v.  Herley,  79  :Mich.  238,  44  N. 
W.  603  [1890];  M'Comb  v.  Bell,  2 
Minn.  295  [1858];  Collier  Estate  v. 
Western  Paving  &  Supply  Company, 
180  Mo.  362,  79  S.  W.  947  [1904]"; 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Koch,  169  Mo. 
587,  70  S.  W.  143  [1902];  City  of 
Nevada  to  use  of  Gilfillan  v.  Eddy, 
et  al.,  123  Mo.  546,  27  S.  \\.  471 
[1894];  Town  of  Trenton  v.  Coyle, 
107  Mo.  193,  17  S.  W.  643  [1891]; 
Cole  V.  Skrainka,  .  105  Mo.  303,  16 
S.  W.  491  [1891];  Barton  v.  Kansas 
City,  110  Mo.  App.  31,  83  S.  W. 
1093-  [1904];  West  v.  Porter,  89 
Mo.  App.  150  [1901];  Rose  v,  Tres- 
trail,  62  Mo.  App.  352  [1895];  City 
of  St.  Joseph,  to  use  of  the  Saxton 
National  Bank  v.  Landis,  54  Mo. 
App.  315  [1893];  Fruin-Bambrick 
Construction  Co.  v.  Ceist,  37  IMo. 
App.  509  [1889];  Morse  v.  City  of 
Omaha.  67  Neb.  426,  93  N.  W.  734 
[1903];  Harmon  v.  City  of  Omaha, 
53  Neb.  164,  73  N.  W.  671  [1897]; 
Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Hast- 
ings, 2  Neb.  UnolT.  337,  96  N.  W.  104 
[1902];  Nchasane  Park  Association 
v.  Lloyd,  167  N.  Y.  431,  60  N.  E. 
741  [1901];  Stebbins  v.  Kay,  123 
N.  Y.  31,  25  N.  E.  207  [1890];  In 
the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Pennie 
to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  108  N.  Y. 
364,  15  N.  E.  611  [1888];  Merritt  v. 
Village  of  Port  Chester.  71  N.  Y. 
309.  27  Am.  Rep.  47  [1877];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the  Second 


§234 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


362 


public  corporation  to  lev}'  an  assessment  for  such  improvement 
if  the  property  owners  have  not  been   given  an  opportunity  to 


Avenue  Methodist  Episcopal  Church, 
to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  66  N.  Y. 
395  [1876];  Newell  v.  Wheeler,  48 
N.  Y.  486  [1872];  Felthousen  v.  City 
of  Amsterdam,  69  Hun.  505,  23  N. 
Y.  Supp.  424  [1893];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Petition  of  Van  Buren  to 
Vacate  an  Assessment,  17  Hun.  527 
[1879];  Matter  of  Eager,  10  Abb. 
Pr.  N.  S.  229  [1871];  Matter  of 
Douglass,  9  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  84  [1870]  ; 
People  ex  rel.  Kerber  v.  City  of  Utica, 
7  Abb.  N.  C.  414  [1879];  Lathrop  v. 
City  of  Buflalo,  3  Abb.  Ct.  App.  30 
[1861];  Hopkins  v.  Mason,  61  Barb. 
469  [1871];  Brenn  v.  City  of  Troy, 
60  Barb.  417  [1871];  People  ex  rel. 
Johnson  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  23 
Barb.  180  [1856];  Hopkins  v.  Mason, 
42  Howard,  115  [1871];  Brady  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of  New  York, 
18  Howard,  343  [1859];  Pettigrew 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of  New 
York,  17  Howard,  492  [1859];  Hersie 
V.  City  of  Bullalo,  1  Sheldon,  445 
[1874];  City  of  Greensboro  v.  Mc- 
Adoo,  112  N.  C.  359,  17  S.  E.  178 
[1893];  Bradshaw  v.  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  Guilford  County,  92  N. 
C.  278  [1885];  Village  of  Pleasant 
Hill  V.  Commissioners,  71  0.  S.  133, 
72  N.  E.  896;  Smith  v.  City  of  To- 
ledo, 24  0.  S.  126  [1873];  Culbert- 
son  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  16  Ohio 
574  [1847];  City  of  Cincinnati  v. 
Coombs,  16  Ohio  181  [1847];  Allen 
V.  City  of  Portland,  35  Ore.  420,  58 
Pac.  509  [1899];  Smith  v.  Minto, 
30  Ore.  351,  48  Pac.  166  [1897]; 
Ladd  V.  Spencer,  23  Ore.  193,  31 
Pac.  474  [1892];  North  Pacific  Lum- 
bering &  ]\Ianufacturing  Co.  v.  East 
Portland,  14  Ore.  3,  12  Pac.  4  [18861-; 
Hawtliorne  v.  City  of  East  Portland, 
13  Ore.  271,  10  Pac.  342  [1886]; 
Morewood  Ave.,  Ferguson's  Appeal, 
159  Pa.  St.  39,  28  At\.  130  [1893]; 
Widening  of  Burnish  St.,  Pottsville 
Borough.  140  Pa.  St.  531.  21  Atl. 
500    [1891];    Borough  of   Greensburg 


v.  Laird,  138  Pa.  St.  533,  21  Atl.  96 
[1890]  ;  City  of  Meadville  v.  Dickson, 
129  Pa.  St.  1,  18  Atl.  513  [1SB9]; 
City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Richards,  124 
Pa.  St.  303,  16  Atl.  802  [1889]; 
Western  Pennsylvania  Railway  Co.  v. 
City  of  Allegheny,  92  Pa.  St.  100 
[1879];  Borough  of  Mauch  Chunk  v. 
Shortz,  61  Pa.  St.  399  [1869];  Fell 
V.  Philadelphia,  to  the  use  of  Cun- 
ningham, 81  Pa.  St.  (31  P.  F.  Smith) 
58  [1876];  City  v.  Lea,  5  Pliila  77; 
Reilly  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  60  Pa. 
St.  (10  P.  F.  Smith)  467  [1869]; 
Pittsburg  V.  Walter,  69  Pa.  St.  (19 
P.  F.  Smith)  365  [1871];  Mason  v. 
City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2  S.  D.  640,  39 
Am".  St.  Rep.  802,  51  N.  W.  770 
[1892];  Whyte  v.  ]\Layor  and  Alder- 
men of  Nashville,  32  Tenn.  (2  Swan.) 
364  [1852];  Breath  v.  City  of  Gal- 
veston, 92  Tex.  454,  49  S.  W.  575 
[1899];  Storrie  v.  Houston  Street 
Railway  Co.,  92  Tex.  129,  44  L.  R. 
A.  716,  46  S.  W.  796  [1898];  Connor 
v.  City  of  Paris,  87  Tex.  32,  27  S. 
W.  88  [1894];  Flewellin  v.  Proetzel, 
80  Texas  191,  15  S.  W.  1043  [1891]; 
Wood  V.  City  of  Galveston,  76  Tex. 
126,  13  S.  W.  227  [1890];  Frosh 
V.  City  of  Galveston,  73  Tex.  401,  11 
S.  W.  402  [1889];  Allen  v.  City  of 
Galveston,  51  Tex.  302  [1879];  Ard- 
rey  v.  City  of  Dallas,  13  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  442,  35  S.  W.  726  [1896];  City 
of  Dallas  v.  Ellison.  10  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  28,  30  S.  W.  1128  [1895];  Vio- 
lett  V.  City  Council  of  Alexandria,  92 
Va.  561,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  825,  31  L. 
R.  A.  382,  23  S.  E.  909  [1896];  Mc- 
Crowell  V.  City  of  Bristol,  89  Va.  652. 
20  L.  R.  A.  653,  16  S.  E.  867  [1893] ; 
Green  v.  Ward,  82  Va.  324  [1886]; 
City  of  New  Whatcom  v.  Bellingham 
Bay  Improvement  Co.,  9  Wash.  639, 
.38  Pac.  163  [1894];  City  of  Spokane 
Falls  V.  Browne,  3  Wash.  84,  27  Pac. 
1077  [1891];  Oshkosh  City  Railroad 
Company  v.  \Vinnebago  County.  89 
Wis.    435,    61    N.    W.    1107    [1895]; 


I 


363  STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT.  §231 

construct  it.-  A  statute  empowering  a  city  to  construct  a  sewer 
and  levy  an  assessment  therefor  if  it  has  not  already  commenced 
a  general  system  of  sewerage  by  the  levy  and  expenditure  of 
a  tax  therefor,  does  not  authorize  such  city  to  levy  an  assess- 
ment for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  in  case  the  city  had,  prior 
to  the  passage  of  such  act.  commenced  a  general  system  of  sew- 
erage by  the  levy  and  expenditure  of  a  tax  therefor.^  A  statute 
conferred  power  to  levy  a  local  assessment  for  a  certain  kind  of 
improvement,  without  reference  to  benefits.  This  statute  was 
held  to  be  unconstitutional.  Another  statute  conferred  the  pow- 
er of  levying  an  assessment  for  the  same  kind  of  improvement 
in  a  different  ma2iner  and  according  to  benefits.  The  city  at- 
tempted to  assess  under  the  unconstitutional  statute.  It  was 
held  that  the  assessment  could  not  be  sustained  under  either 
statute,  since  one  was  unconstitutional  and  the  city  had  not 
attempted  to  follow  the  provisions  of  the  other.*  The  rules  set 
forth  in  the  preceding  sections  are  very  broad  and  general — 
so  much  so  that  they  afford  but  little  real  help  in  determining 
the  rights  of  the  i)arties  in  actual  cases  when  presented  for 
consideration.  Examples  of  the  application  of  these  broad  prin- 
ciples to  particular  forms  of  deviation  from  the  rules  laid  down 
by  statute  are  found  elsewhere.  These  rules  of  statutory  con- 
struction are  applicable  where  there  is  no  specific  statute  pre- 
scribing the  rule  of  construction  applicable  thereto.  In  some 
jurisdictions,  however,  statutes  have  been  passed  which  provide 
for  a  more  liberal  construction  of  such  statutes  than  that  Avhich 
the  common  law  rules  permit.  Some  of  these  statutes  provide 
specifically  what  effect  shall  be  given  to  a  departure  from  the 
statutory  procedure  in  imposing  assessments.  Such  statutory 
provisions  of  course  supersede  the  common  law  rules  of  statutory 
construction  herein  set  forth. 

Dean    v.    Borchsonius,    30    Wis.    23r)  15uilin,2ton  v.  City  of  Burlington,  60 

[1872];  Kneeland  v.  City  of  Mihvau-  la.  500,  15  N.  W.  295  [1883]. 
kee,   18  Wi.s.  411   [1864];   "The  e.xer-  Mlarwood  v.  Street  t'onimissioners 

tise  of  the  power  must  strictly  pur-  of  the  City  of  Boston,  183  Mass.  348, 

sue    the    statutory    authority."      Lill  67    N.    E.    362    [1903];     (under    the 

V.  City  of  Cliica<^o,  20  III.  31.  37.  .  first   statute   an   assessment   could   be 

-State  V.  Foster,  94  Minn.  412.  103  levied    for    a    street    improvement    in- 

X.  W.   14    flOOo];    City  of  Westport  eluding    the    cost    of    a    sewer    built 

to  use   of   lloelzel   v.   Smith,   68   ^lo.  thereunder.      Under   the   second   stat- 

App.  63    [1896].     See   §   52  et  ftcq.  nte  the  assessment  was  to  be  for  the 

^  Independent     School     District     of  cost  of  tlie  street,  not   including  the 

cost  of  the  sewer.) 


§§235,236  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.'  364 

§  235.  Discretionary  power  as  to  assessment  or  taxation  pos- 
sessed by  the  legislature. 
The  legislature,  if  not  restrained  by  some  specific  constitu- 
tional provision,  has  the  power  to  provide  that  public  improve- 
ments of  kinds  for  which  local  assessments  may  be  levied  may 
be  constructed  either  at  the  expense  of  the  taxpayers  of  the 
public  corporation  by  general  taxation  or  at  the  expense  of  the 
owners  of  property  benefited  thereby,  by  special  assessment,  as 
the  legislature  may  in  its  discretion  determine.^  Even  after  the 
improvement  has  been  begun  on  the  assessment  plan,  the  legis- 
lature may  require  the  city  to  pay  the  cost  of  such  improvement 
by  general  taxatibn.-  "Whether  after  the  improvement  has  been 
begun  on  the  plan  of  payment  by  general  taxation  the  legisla- 
ture may  then  require  such  improvement  to  be  paid  for  by  local 
assessment,  is  a  question  which  is  discussed  elsewhere.'* 

§  236.  Discretionary  power  as  to  assessment  or  taxation  given  to 
public  corporation. 
It  is  well  settled  that  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  authorize  a  public  corporation  to  construct  a  public  improve- 
ment to  be  paid  for  either  by  general  taxation  or  by  local  as- 
sessments based  on  special  benefits,  as  such  corporation  may,  in 
its  discretion,  determine.^     The  question  of  which  method  is  the 

^  Chambers    v.    Satter'lee,    40    Cal.  People  ex  rel.  Thatclier  v.  Village  of 

497    [1871];    Burnett   v.    Mayor    and  Hyde  Park,   117  111.  462,  6  X.  E.  33 

Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Sac-  [1887];  Falch  v.  People  ex  fel.  John- 

ramento,    12    Cal.    76,    73    Am.    Dec.  son.  99   III.   137    [1881];    Ricketts  v. 

518   [1859];   O'Neill  v.  City  of  Hobo-  Village    of    Hyde    Park,    85    III.    110 

ken,  72  X.  J.  L.   (43  Vr.)   67,  GO  Atl.  [1877]  ;  Fagan  v.  City  of  Chicago;  84 

50    [1905];    O'Xeill    v.    City    of    Ho-  111.227   [1876];  People  ex  rel.  Miller 

boken,  73  X.  J.  L.    (44  Vr.)    189,  63  v.  Sherman,  83  111.  165  [1876]  ;  Sefton 

Atl.  986    [1906].  V.   Board   of   Commissioners   of   How- 

==  O'Neill  V.  City  of  Hoboken,  72  X.  ard   County,   IGO  Ind.   357,  66  N.  E. 

J.  L.   (43  Vr.)   07,  60  Atl.  50  [1905].  891    [1903];    Shelby  v.  City  of  Burl- 

^See  §  169.  ington,   125   la.   343,   101   N.   W.    101 

^Burnett    v.    ]\Iayor    and    Common  [1904];    Morton   v.   SulHvan,  —  Ky. 

Council    of    the    City   of    Sacramento,  .  96  S.  W.  807   [1906];   Blanchet 

12  Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec.  518  [1859];  v.  Municipality  No.  2,  13  La.  322 
Murphy  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of  the  '    [1839];   City  of  Greenville  v.  Harvie, 

City  of  Wilmington,  6  Houst.    (Del.)  79    Miss.    754,    31    So.    425     [1901]; 

108,    22    Am.    St.    Rep.    345    [1880];  Maybin    v.    City    of   Biloxi.    77    Miss. 

City  of  Chicago  v.  Blair,  149  111.  310,  673,  28  So.  566  [1900]  ;   City  of  Kan- 

24  L.  R.  A.  412,  36  XL  E.  829  flP94]  :  sas    City    to    the    use    of    Adiins    v. 

Kuehner  v.  City  of  Freepnrt.   143  111.  Richards.    34    :\ro.    .\ni..    521    [1889]; 

92,    17   L.   R.   A.    774.   32   X.   E.   372:  Wilson    v.    Citv    of    .*.uburn.    27    Neb. 


I 


365  STATUTORY    AUTHORITY    FOR    ASSESSMENT.  §  237 

fairer  and  more  just  in  the  particular  case  is  one  of  policy  if 
the  legal  power  to  exercise  both  is  given,  and  it  is  a  question 
which  can  be  determined  more  accurately  by  the  city  than  by 
the  state.  The  exercise  of  such  discretion  cannot,  according  to 
the  great  weight  of  authority,  be  controlled  by  the  courts.-  Even 
if  the  city  has  in  the  past  paid  for  im})rovemcnts  of  a  certain 
kind  by  general  taxation,  this  fact  will  not  prevent  it  from  levy- 
ing special  assessments  for  future  improvements  of  the  same 
kind.^  A  contrary  view  has  been  expressed  in  Kentucky.  Un- 
der similar  statutes  it  has  been  held  that  the  city  has  not  the 
arbitrary  and  unlimited  choice  of  paying  for  improvements,  but 
that  in  such  cases  the  city  is  bound  to  levy  local  assessments 
as  a  means  of  paying  for  public  improvements  except  in  cases 
in  which  local  assessment  would  so  exceed  the  benefits  conferred 
as  to  amount  in  effect  to  a  confiscation  of  the  property  assessed; 
and  that  in  such  case  the  city  is  bound  to  pay  for  the  improve- 
ment by  general  taxation.*  While  this  view  differs  from  that 
held  by  the  weight  of  authority  the  difference  exists  in  the  con- 
struction placed  by  the  Kentucky  court  upon  such  statutes,  and 
in  the  legislative  intent  which  that  court  deduces  from  the  lan- 
guage employed  by  the  legislature.  The  city  is  held,  it  is  true, 
to  have  a  very  limited  amount  of  discretion;  ])ut  there  is  no  at- 
tempt on  the  nart  of  the  court  to  exercise  discretion  conferred 
upon  a  city. 

§  237.     Power  to  tax  does  not  abrogate  power  to  assess. 

Since  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  confer  upon 
a  public  corporation  both  the  power  to  levy  a  general  tax  and 
the  power  to  levy  a  local  assessment,  with  discretion  to  determine 
in  which  method  it   will   pay  for  the   improvement   in   question, 

43.5.    4.3    X.    W.    2.57    [ISSOl:    In    re  of  Hyde  Park.   117   111.   4C2.  G  X.  E. 

Du<rro,  50   X.   Y.   513    [1872];   Astor  33    [1887]:    Falch    v.   People   ex    rel. 

V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  Johnson,  99   III.   137    [1881];    Shelby 

of  the  City  of  Xew  York.   37    X.   Y.  v.    City    of    Bnrlinjrton,    125    la.    343, 

Sup.   Ct.   539    [1874];    Beers   v.   Dal-  101   x'.   W.    101    [1904];    Blanchet  v. 

las   City,    16    Or.    334,    13    Pac.   835:  INIunicipality     Xo.     2.     13     La.     322 

In  re   Beechwood   Avenue.   Appeal   of  [1839];    Astor    v.    Mayor.    Aldermen 

O'Mara,   194  Pa.   St.  8fi.  45  All.   127  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 

[1890];  Boroiifrh  of  Greenslmr?  v.  York.  37  X.  V.  Sup.  Ct.  539  [1874]. 
Younir.  53   Pa.   St.   280    [IRfiO]:    Mc-  '  McChe?n<y    v.    City    of    Chicago, 

Culloueh     V.    Villase    of    Camphells-  152    111.    543.    38    X.    E.    7fi7    [1894]; 

port.    123    Wis.   334.    101    X.    \V.    709  .   *  City  of  Covinsrton  v.  WorthinErton, 

[1904].  88  Kv.  20r..   11   S.  W.   1038.   10  S.  W 

•People  ex  rel.  Thatcher  v.  Villaj?.'  790    [1889]. 


§  237  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  366 

a  grant  of  power  by  the  legislature  to  a  public  corporation  au- 
thorizing it  to  levy  a  general  tax  to  pay  for  a  certain  kind  of 
public  improvement  does  not  abrogate  another  grant  of  power 
authorizing  such  corporation  to  levy  special  assessments  to  de- 
fray the  expense  of  such  improvements/  So  a  grant  to  a  public 
corporation  of  authority  to  borrow  money  to  pay  for  improve- 
ments of  a  certain  class  does  not  prevent  such  corporation  from 
levying  special  assessments,  if  legislative  authority  therefor  ex- 
ists and  using  the  proceeds  of  such  assessments  to  reimburse 
the  city  for  the  debt  which  has  thus  been  contracted.'  Thus 
the  statute  authorized  what  was  known  as  a  "revolving  fund" 
to  be  created  as  follows.  The  city  was  to  issue  bonds,  and  thus 
raise  a  fund,  out  of  which  the  expense  of  constructing  certain 
improvements  was  to  be  paid  and  into  which  the  amount  derived 
from  local  assessments  levied  on  the  property  benefited  by  such 
improvements  respectively  was  to  be  paid.  It  was  held  that  a 
statute  of  this  sort  was  within  the  power  of  the  legislature,  both 
as  to  improvements  already  made  ^  and  as  to  improvements  to 
be  made  thereafter.*  Accordingly  the  mayor  of  such  city  could 
be  compelled  by  mandamus  to  sign  such  bonds. ^  A  limited  grant 
of  power  to  levy  a  general  tax  for  the  expense  of  a  public  im- 
provement does  not  abrogate  a  pre-existing  grant  of  power  to 
levy  a  local  assessment  therefor.®  On  the  same  principle  a  pro- 
vision in  a  state  constitution,  affirmatively  granting  the  power 
of  general  taxation  for  a  given  form  of  improvement  does  not 
restrict  or  destroy  the  power  of  local  assessment.  A  provision 
concerning  a  levee  district:  "...  It  may  levy  a  tax  not  to 
exceed  five  mills  on  the  taxable  property  situated  within  the 
alluvial  portions  of  said  districts  subject  to  overflow,"'^  does  not 
limit  the  power  of  local  assessment. '^    The  intention  of  the  framers 

^  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Sherman,  ■*  State   ex    rel.    Minnesota   Loan   & 

83   111.    165    [1876];    Sefton   v.   Board  Trust   Co.   v.   Ames,   87   Minn.   23,  91 

of  Commissioners  of  Howard  County,  N.  W.  18   [1902]. 

160  Ind.  357,   66   N.   E.  891    [1903];  ^  State   ex   rel.   Minnesota   Loan   & 

Gilmore  v.  City  of  Utica,   131   N.  Y.  Trust  Co.  v.   Ames,   87   Minn.  23,  91 

26,  29  N.  E.  841   [1892];   Borough  of  N.   W.    18    [1902]. 

Greensburg  v.  Young,  53  Pa.  St.  280  °  Gilmore  v.  City  of  LTtica,   131  N. 

[1866].  Y.  26,  29  N.  E.  841    [1892]. 

^In  re  Beechwood   Avenue,   Appeal  '' Article  214,  Constitution  of  Louis- 

of   O'Mara,    194   Pa.   St.   86,   45    Atl.  iana. 

127    [1899].  «  Excelsior  Planting  &  Manufactur- 

^  Alexander   v.    City   of   Duluth,   77  ing   Co.   v.    Green,   39   La.    Ann.    455. 

Mimi.  445,  80  N.  W."  623.  1  So.  873   [1887]. 


367  STATUTORY   AUTHORITY    FOR    xVSSESSMENT.         §§238,239 

of  the  constitution  in  drafting  this  article  was  to  grant  a  new 
and  additional  power  and  one  which,  but  for  such  express  grant, 
would  have  been  forbidden  by  other  articles  of  the  constitution. 
The  legislature  did  not  intend  thereby  to  destroy  the  power  of 
local  assessment  which  was  already  given.^ 

§  238.     Power  to  assess  does  not  abrogate  power  to  tax. 

If  the  power  of  general  taxation  is  given  in  a  clear  and  un- 
equivocal manner,  the  subsequent  grant  of  the  power  of  levying 
local  assessments  does  not  abrogate  the  power  of  levying"  r^eneral 
taxes, ^  since  the  evident  intention  of  the  legislature  in  cases  of 
this  kind  is  that  the  public  corporation  shall  have  the  choice 
between  these  two  methods  of  paying  for  a  public  improvement. 
Accordingly  if  the  city  constructs  an  improvement  without  tak- 
ing the  steps  necessary  in  case  of  levying  a  local  assessment, 
it  may  nevertheless  be  liable  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement 
and  may  pay  therefor  by  general  taxation. ^  If,  however,  the  in- 
tention of  the  legislature  is  to  deprive  the  municipality  of  the 
power  of  levying  a  general  tax  for  certain  improvements,  and 
to  restrict  it  to  the  levy  of  local  assessments  as  the  sole  means 
of  paying  for  such  improvements,  full  effect  nnist  l)e  given  to 
such  intention.^ 

§  239.     Discretionary  power  to  combine  assessment  and  general 
taxation. 

The   legislature,    if   not   restrained   by  some   specific   constitu- 
tional provision,  is  not  bound  to  choose  between  the  alternatives 

•Excelsior  Planting  &  Manufactur-  luth,    45    Minn.    4,    47    X.    W.    166 

ing   Co.   V.   Green,   .30   La.   Ann.   455,  [1890];     Pine    Tree    Lumber    Co.    v. 

1  So.  873  [18871.  City  of   Fargo,   12  N.  D.   360,  96  N. 

^Bradley   v.    Village    of   West   Du-  W.  357  [1903];  State  ex  rel.  The  City 

luth,    45    Minn.    4,    47    N.    W.    166  of  Columbus  v.  Strader,  25  0.  S.  527 

[1890];     Pine    Tree    Lumber    Co.    v.  [1874];  Stephens  v.  City  of  Spokane, 

City   of   Fargo.    12   N.  D.   360,   96  N.  11    Wash.    41.    39    Pac.    266    [1895]; 

W.357    [1903];    Stephens  v.  City  of  Soule  v.  City  of  Seattle.  6  Wash.  315 

Spokane,    11    Wash.    41,    39    Pac.    266  33  Pac.   384.   1080    [1893]. 
[1895];    Soulo    v.    City   of   Seattle.   6  'See   Rounds   v.   :Muniford.   2    P.    I. 

Wash.  315.  33  Pac.  384,  1080  [1893]:  154    [i852]    where   the  power  to   levy 

McCullougli   V.  Village  of  Campbells-  local    assessments    for    the    construc- 

port.    123   Wis.   334.    101    X.   W.   709  tion  of  sidewalks  existed,  but  it  was 

[1904];    Allen   v.  City   of   .Tanesville,  doubted,  though  not  decided,  whether 

35   Wis.   403    [1874].  the    power    to    levy    local    taxes    for 

■Bradley   v.   Village    of   West    Du-  such    purpose   existed. 


§  239  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT,  368 

providing  for  payment  of  the  cost  of  an  improvement  solely  by 
general  taxation  and  of  providing  for  such  payment  solely  by 
local  assessment.  It  ma}-,  in  its  discretion,  provide  that  the  im- 
provement in  question  shall  be  paid  for  in  part  by  local  assess- 
ment and  in  part  by  general  taxation.^  Statutes  are  not  infre- 
quent in  which  the  legislature  provides  that  a  certain  fixed  por- 
tion of  the  cost  shall  be  borne  by  the  property  owners  and  the 
rest  of  the  cost  shall  be  borne  by  the  city.  Such  provisions  are 
upheld  except  in  jurisdictions  in  which  the  assessment  of  the 
cost  of  an  improvement  or  of  a  fixed  portion  thereof  upon  the 
owners  of  property  benefited  b.y  such  improvement,  without  a  pre- 
liminary inquiry  as  to  the  existence  and  amount  of  the  benefits 
conferred  upon  such  property  owners  by  the  amount  of  such 
benefits,  and  without  a  specific  restriction  of  the  amount  of  as- 
sessment to  the  amount  of  such  benefits,  is  unconstitutional. " 
Even  in  the  latter  case,  however,  the  objection  is  not  to  the  use 
of  general  taxation  and  local  assessment  together,  but  to  the 
imposition  of  a  local  assessment  in  excess  of  benefits.  Statutes 
which  provide  that  the  land  benefited  by  the  improvement  shall 
be  assessed  up  to  the  extent  of  the  special  benefit  conferred  by 
the  improvement  and  that  the  rest  of  the  cost  of  such  improve- 
ment shall  be  paid  by  the  public  corporation  out  of  funds  raised 
by  general  taxation  are  held  valid.^ 

1  Brown  v.  Drain,  112  Fed.  582  40  X.  J.  L.  (11  Vr.)  244  [1878]; 
[inoi];  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Slier-  Smith  v.  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
man,  83  111.  163  [1876];  St.  John  v.  oil  of  the  City,  of  Xewark,  32  N.  J. 
Citv  of  East  St.  Louis,  50  111.  92  Eq.  (5  Stew.)"l  [1880];  In  the  Mat- 
[1869];  State  ex  rel.  Horrall  v.  ter  of  the  Application  of  Church  for 
Thompson,  109  Ind.  533,  10  X.  E.  305  the  Appointment  of  Commissioners. 
[1886];  Zumbro  v.  Parnin.  141  Ind.  etc.,  92  X.  Y.  1  [1883]:  Town  of 
430,  40  N.  E.  1085  [1895];  City  of  Muskegon  v.  Drainage  Commission- 
Torre  Haute  V.  Blake,  9  Ind.  App.  ers,  78  Wis.  40,  47  XL  W.  11  [1890]. 
403.  36  X.  E.  932  [1893]  ;  Eichardson  "See  §  114.  et  seq.;  §  709. 
V.  Morgan,  16  La.  Ann.  429  [1862]-.  ="  State,  Younarster,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
Hurford  v.  City  of  Omaha.  4  Xeb.  and  Aldermen  of  Paterson,  40  X.  J. 
336  [1876];  State,  Youno-ster.  Pros.  L.  (11  Vr.)  244  [1878]. 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Paterson, 


I 


CHAPTER  VII. 
BY  WHAT  AUTHORITY  ASSESSMENTS  MAY  BE  LEVIED. 

§  240.     Questions  involved  in  discussion  of  power  to  levy  assess- 
ment. 

The  question  of  the  power  oi  various  public  bodies  to  levy 
local  assessments  is  one  which  is  not  infrequently  presented  for 
judicial  consideration.  It  involves  certain  fundamental  theories 
of  the  organization,  and  powers  of  our  state  governments,  and 
of  the  legislative  branches  thereof.  Upon  these  principles,  fun- 
damental and  elementary  as  they  may  appear  to  be,  there  is  a 
marked  lack  of  harmony  among  the  different  courts.  The  chief 
of  the  general  fundamental  questions  involved  in  this  subject, 
are  the  following:  (1)  The  legislature  is  a  body  of  delegated 
power,  having  those  powers  conferred  upon  it  by  the  people  of 
the  state,  speaking  through  the  constitution  of  such  state.  lias 
the  legi.slature  the  power  to  create  inferior  public  corporations, 
and  to  delegate  to  them  the  governmental  powers,  including 
the  power  of  taxation,  and  the  power  of  special  assessment, 
which  have  been  conferred  upon  the  legislature  by  the  people 
of  the  state?  (2)  If  the  legi.slature  has  the  power  of  creating 
inferior  public  corporations  for  the  purposes  of  local  self-gov- 
ernment, is  the  legislature  bound  to  confer  upon  such  public 
corporations  matters  which  involve  local  self-government,  includ- 
ing local  taxation  and  special  assessment,  or  ma.y  the  legislature 
exercise  such  powers  itself  hy  direct  legislative  act?  (3)  If  the 
legislature  has  power  to  create  inferior  public  corporations  for 
purposes  of  local  self-government,  is  it  bound  to  admit  the  people 
within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  such  inferior  corporation 
to  the  control  of  such  corporation ;  or.  on  the  other  hand,  has 
the  legislature  power  to  create  an  inferior  public  corporation 
without  the  will  of  the  persons  who  are  subject  to  its  jurisdic- 
tion, and  without  giving  them  any  oi)portunity  t<)  choose  its  offi- 
cers, or  otherwise  to  control  its  ])ublic  action? 

§241.     Power  of  legislature  to  levy  assessment. 

The  power  of  local  assessment  is  sometimes  exercised  directly 
by  the  legislature  itself,  Avithout  the  intervention  of  any  inter- 

SfiO 


241 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


370 


mediate  public  corporation.  In  the  absence  of  any  specific  con- 
stitutional provision,  it  is  generally  assumed  by  the  courts,  and 
often  held  specifically,  that  the  legislature  has  power  to  levy 
local  assessments  directly.^  In  the  absence  of  specific  constitu- 
tional provision,  it  seems  to  be  assumed  that  the  legislature  may 
fix  such  elements  of  an  assessment  as  leave  to  the  local  public 
corporation  merely  the  perfunctory  duty  of  carrying  into  execu- 
tion the  mandates  of  the  legislature."  So  the  legislature  may 
fix  the  amount  of  an  assessment  for  sewer  purposes  at  a  certain 
amount  per  front  foot,^  or  it  may  determine  the  amount  to  be 
raised  for  a  given  improvement  and  the  district  to  be  taxed 
therefor.*  The  power  of  the  legislature  to  confirm  a  contract, 
which  has  been  attacked  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  by  enacting 
a  special  confirmatory  statute  and  providing  for  an  assessment 
to  pay  the  cost  of  such  improvement  has  been  questioned  by  the 


1  Matter  of  City  of  New  York,  190 
N.  Y.  350,  sub  nomine;  In  re  Water 
Front  in  City  of  New  York,  83  N.  E. 
299  [1907];  (modifying  judgment, 
105  N.  Y.  S.  750,  120  App.  Div.  849)  ; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Application  of 
Van  Antwerp  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, 56  N.  Y.  201  [1874];  City  of 
Raleigh  v.  Peace,  110  N.  C.  32,  17  L. 
R.  A.  330,  14  S.  E.  521    [1892]. 

"Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S. 
345,  31  L.  7G3,  8  S.  921  [1888];  (af- 
firming Spencer  v.  Merchant.  100  N. 
Y.  585,  3  N.  E.  082  [1885]. 

^  People  of  the  State  of  New  York 
ex  rel.  Scott  v.  Pitt,  169  N.  Y.  521, 
58  L.  R.  A.  372,  62  N.  E.  662  [1902]. 

*  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S. 
345,  31  L.  763,  8  S.  921  [1888];  (af- 
firming Spencer  v.  Merchant,  100  N. 
Y.  585,  3  N.  E.  682  [1885]);  King 
V.  Portland,  38  Or.  402,  52  L.  R.  A. 
812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900];  "The  legisla- 
ture may  commit  the  ascertainment 
of  the  sum  to  be  raised  and  of  the 
benefited  district  to  commissioners, 
but  it  is  not  bound  to  do  so,  and  may 
settle  both  questions  for  itself;  and 
when  it  does  so  its  action  is  neces- 
sarily conclusive  and  beyond  review. 
Here  an  improvement  has  been  or- 
dered and  made,  the  expense  of  which 


might  justly  have  been  imposed  upon 
adjacent  property  benefited  by  the 
change.  By  the  act  of  1881  the  leg- 
islature imposes  the  unpaid  portion 
of  the  cost  and  expenses  upon  that 
portion  of  the  property  benefited 
which  lias  thus  far  borne  none  of  the 
burden.  In  so  doing,  it  necessarily 
determines  two  things,  viz.,  tiie 
amount  to  be  realized  and  the  prop- 
erty specially  benefited  by  the  ex- 
penditure of  that  amount.  The  lands 
miglit  have  been  benefited  by  the  im- 
provement, and  so  the  legislative  de- 
termination that  they  were,  and  to 
what  amount  or  proportion  of  the 
cost  even  if  it  may  have  been  mis- 
takenly unjust,  is  not  open  to  out 
review.  The  question  of  special  bene- 
fit and  the  property  to  which  it  ex- 
tends is  of  necessity  a  question  of 
fact,  and  when  the  legislature  deter- 
mines it  in  a  case  within  its  general 
power,  its  decision  must  of  course 
be  final."  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  100 
N.  Y.  585,  3  N.  E.  682  T1S85];  (af- 
firmed as  Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125 
U.  S.  345,  31  L.  763,  8  S.  921  [1888] ; 
(quoted  in  Parsons  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 170  U.  S.  45,  53,  54,  52  L. 
943,  18  S.  521   [1898]). 


371  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  242 

lower  courts  of  New  York/'  but  on  the  other  hand  has  been 
recognized  by  such  courts.**  A  statute  appropriating  a  certain 
sum  for  repaying  and  repairing  streets  has  been  held  to  be  val- 
id/ and  where  in  obedience  to  such  law  the  council  passes  an 
ordinance  appropriating  such  sum  to  such  purpose,  the  work 
is  regarded  as  being  done  by  authority  of  the  legislature  and 
not  by  authority  of  the  council.^ 

§  242.     Specific  provisions  restricting  power  of  legislature  to  levy 

assessments. 
Specific  constitutional  provisions,  however,  which  are  in  force 
in  some  states,  secure  local  self-government,  and  prevent  the 
legislature  from  levying  taxes  or  local  assessments  directly.  The 
constitution  of  California  provides:  "The  legislature  shall  have 
no  power  to  impose  taxes  upon  counties,  cities,  towns,  or  other 
public  or  municipal  corporation,  or  upon  the  inhabitants  or 
property  thereof,  for  county,  city,  town,  or  other  municipal  pur- 
poses ;  but  may,  by  general  laws,  vest  in  the  corporate  authorities 
thereof,  the  power  to  assess  and  collect  taxes  for  such  pur- 
poses."^ Under  this  provision  the  legislature  has  no  power  to 
levy  a  local  assessment  directly  within  an  incorporated  city.' 
Thus  under  a  special  act  concerning  a  swamp  land  reclamation 
district,  by  which  the  trustees  were  required  to  make  up  a  sworn 
statement  of  the  cost  of  the  reclamation  work  "based  upon  the 
books  and  vouchers  thereof,"  and  the  amount  so  reported  was 
to  be  assessed  upon  the  lands,  it  was  held  that  this  was  in  effect 
a  levy  by  the  legislature  of  an  assessment  upon  the  lands  of  the 


"In  the  Matter  of  Rojjnlatinji  and  'Constitution    of    California,    Arti- 

Grading     Eightieth     Street     between       cle  XL,  §   12. 

Fifth  Avenue  and  the  East  River,  31  =  Scluimacker  v.  Toberman.  56  Cal. 

How.    (N.  Y.)    99    [186.5].  50S    [1880];    People   v.    Houston,    54 

Mn  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Cal.  530  [1S80];  Brady  v.  King,  53 
the  President,  ]\Ianagers  and  Com-  Cal.  44  [1878];  People  of  the  State 
pany  of  the  Delaware  &  Hudson  Ca-  of  California  v.  Lynch,  51  Cal.  15, 
nal  Co.  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  60  21  Am.  Rep.  677  [1875];  "Xor  can 
Hun.  (N.  Y.)  204,  UN.  Y.  Supp.  the  legislature,  by  a  direct  act,  make 
585   [1891].  an  assessment  within  an  incorporated 

city."  Schumacker  v.  Toberman,  56 
Cal.  508,  511  [1880];  (citing  Tay- 
lor V.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  240,  [1866]; 
People  of  the  State  of  California  v. 
Lynch,  51  Cal.  15  [1875]). 


'  Brady   v. 

Mayor    of    the    City    of 

New    York, 

35   "How.     (N.     V.)'     81 

[18681. 

'Brady   v. 

Mayor    of    the    City    of 

New    York. 

35    How.     (N.    Y.)"    81 

[18681. 

243 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


372 


district,  and  that  the  act  was  accordingly  unconstitutional.^  The 
legislature  may,  however,  authorize  the  board  of  supervisors  of 
a  county  to  levj^  an  assessment  to  pay  bonds  of  irrigation  dis- 
tricts if  the  directors  of  such  irrigation  districts  neglect  to  levy 
such  assessments.*  Under  a  provision  in  the  constitution  forbid- 
ding a  "special  act  for  the  assessment  or  collection  of  taxes, "^ 
an  act  authorizing  the  improvement  of  certain  streets  in  the 
third  ward  of  the  city  of  ]\Iilwaukee  and  the  levy  of  a  special 
tax  in  such  ward  therefor  has  been  held  valid  as  an  amendment 
to  the  city  charter  and  not  an  act  for  assessment  of  taxes.®  Un- 
der an  earlier  provision  of  the  constitution  of  Illinois/  it  was 
held  that  local  assessments  could  not  be  imposed  on  a  locality 
Avithout  the  consent  of  the  property  OAvners  affected.^ 

§  243.     Power  of  Congress  to  levy  assessment. 

A  corresponding  question  has  been  considered  in  cases  in  which 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  has  provided  for  local  assess- 
ments in  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  it  has  been  held  that 
Congress  has  complete  jurisdiction  over  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia,^ and  that  this  power  includes  the  right  to  provide  for  the 
levy  and  collection  of  local  assessments.-     It  is  also  competent 


^  People  V.  Houston.  .54  C'al.  536 
[1880]. 

*  Nevada  National  Bank  v.  Board 
of  Supervisors  of  Kern  County,  5 
Cal.  App.  638,  91  Pac.  122   [1907]. 

'^  Article  IV.,  §  31,  Svibdivision  6, 
Amendments  to  the  Constitution  of 
Wisconsin. 

'  Warner  v.  Knox,  50  V»'is.  429,  7 
N.  W.  372  [1880]. 

'  "The  corporate  authorities  of 
counties,  townships,  school  districts, 
cities,  towns  and  villages  may  be 
vested  with  power  to  assess  and  col- 
lect taxes  for  corporate  purposes, 
such  taxes  to  be  uniform  in  respect 
to  persons  and  property  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  body  improving 
the  same."  Article  IX.,  §  5,  Consti- 
tution  of  Illinois    [1848 J. 

^Updike  V.  Wright,  81  111.  49 
[1876]. 

^  Wight  V.  Davidson,  181  U.  S.  371, 
45  L.  900,  21  S.  616  [1901];    (revers- 


ing Davidson  v.  Wight,  16  App.  D. 
C.  371  [1900]);  Parsons  v.  District 
of  Columbia,  170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943, 
18  S.  521  [1898];  Bauman  v.  Ross, 
107  U.  S.  548,  42  L.  270,  17  S.  966 
[1897];  Shoemaker  v.  United  States, 
147  U.  S.  282,  37  L.  170,  13  S.  361 
[1893];  Gibbons  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 116  U.  S.  404,  6  S.  427:  Mat- 
tingly  V.  District  of  Columbia,  97  U. 
S.  687,  24  L.  1098  [1878];  Willard 
V.  Presbury,  81  U.  S.  (14  Wall)  676 
20  L.  719   [1869]. 

=  Wight  V.  Davidson,  181  U.  S.  371. 
45  L.  900.  21  S.  616  [1901];  (revers- 
ing Davidson  v.  Wight,  16  App.  D. 
C.  371  [1900]);  Parsons  v.  District 
of  Columbia,  170  U.  S.  45.  42  L. 
943,  18  S.  521  [1898];  Wilson  v. 
Lambert,  168  U.  S.  611,  42  L.  599, 
IS  S.  217  [1897];  (reversing  Craig- 
hill  V.  Van  Riswick,  8  App.  D.  C. 
185  [1896]);  Bauman  v.  Ross,  167 
U.    S.    548,    42    L.    270,    17    S.    966 


11 


373  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  244 

for  Congress  to  provide  that  an  assessment  of  a  certain  amount 
shall  be  levied  upon  property  abutting  on  improvements  of  a 
certain  character  and  that  its  action  thus  taken  is  conclusive 
of  the  question  of  benefits  to  abutting  property.''  An  example 
of  the  exercise  of  power  of  this  sort  is  found  in  a  statute  pro- 
viding for  an  assessment  of  one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per 
lineal  front  foot  on  all  land  abutting  upon  a  street,  road  or  alley 
in  which  a  water  main  should  be  laid.  Such  a  statute  was  held 
to  be  within  the  power  of  Congress.* 

§  244.  Legislative  delegation  of  power  to  levy  local  assessment, 
]\Iuch  more  frequently  than  the  attempt  of  the  legislature  to 
levy  local  assessments  directly  or  by  its  own  act,  are  its  at- 
tempts to  delegate  to  public  corporations  of  various  kinds  the 
power  to  levy  local  assessments.  This  attempt  has  been  attacked 
as  unconstitutional,  on  the  theory  that  the  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture is  itself  merely  a  delegated  power,  and  that  the  creation 
of  such  inferior  public  corporations,  with  power  to  tax  and  levy 
local  assessments,  is  a  delegation  of  power  which  itself  is  dele- 
gated. From  the  .standpoint  of  abstract  logic,  it  might  seem 
difficult  to  answer  objections  of  this  sort.  Here,  as  in  other 
ca.ses,  the  effect  of  the  written  constitution  is  greatly  modified 
by  the  pre-existing  practice  in  force  when  the  constitution  was 
adopted.  At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  written  constitutions 
in  the  United  States,  public  corporations  existed  everywhere  for 
the  purposes  of  local  self-government,  and  the  existence  of  such 
corporations  is  often  recognized  indirectly  by  the  written  consti- 
tutions. It  has  always  been  felt  that  the  written  constitutions 
were  not  intended  to  subvert  the  existing  form  of  government 
in  this  country,  except  where  specific  provisions  are  manifestly 
inconsistent  with  prior  practices.  Indeed,  it  has  been  felt  that 
written  constitutions  Avero  intended  to  preserve  and  perpetuate 
local  self-government,  rather  than  to  subvert  and  destroy  it.  The 
whole  spirit  of  the  written  constitutions  assumes  the  existence 
of   local    self-government.      Accordingly   it    is   held    that    in    the 

fl897];   Shoemaker  v.  United  States.  *  Parsons   v.  District   of  Columbia, 

147  U.  S.  282,  37  L.   170.   1.3  S.   361  170  U.   S.   45,  42   L.   943.  18   S.   521 

[1893];   Mattingly  v.  District  of  Co-  [1898]. 

lumbia,    97    U.    S.    687,    24    L.    1098  *  Parsons   v.  District   of  Columbia, 

[1878];    Willard   v.   Presbury.   81    U.  170   U.   S.   45,  42   L.   943,  18   S.   521 

S.   (14  Wall)    676.  20  L.  719   [1869].  [1898]. 


§244 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


374 


4 


absence  of  specific  constitutional  provisions  the  legislatures  have 
the  power  to  delegate  to  inferior  public  corporations  powers  of 
local  self-government,  including  the  power  to  levy  assessments.^ 


'■  French  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.,  181  U.  S.  324,  45  L.  879,  21  S. 
625  [1901];  (affirming  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  French,  158 
Mo.  534,  54  L.'ll.  A.  492,  58  S.  W. 
934  [1900J);  Baiiman  v.  Ross,  167 
U.  S.  548,  42  L.  270,  17  S.  966 
[1897] ;  (reversing  District  of  Colum- 
bia v.  Amies,  8  App.  D.  C.  393 
[1896];  Bauman  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D. 
C.  260  [1896];  Abbott  v.  Ross, 
9  App  D.  C.  289  [1896]);  Crane  v. 
Siloam  Springs,  67  Ark.  30,  55  S.  W. 
955  [1899];  City  Street  Improve- 
ment Co.  V.  Babcock,  139  Cal.  690, 
73  Pac.  666  [1903]  ;  Capron  v.  Hitch- 
cock, 98  Cal.  427,  33  Pac.  431  [1893]  ; 
Ede  V.  Cogswell,  79  Cal.  278,  71  Pac. 
Rep.  767  [1889];  Lent  v.  Tillson,  72 
Cal.  404,  14  Pac.  71  [1887];  Recla- 
mation District  No.  108  v.  Hagar, 
66  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  Rep.  945  [1884]; 
Reclamation  District  Xo.  3  v.  Gold- 
man, 61  Cal.  205  [1882];  People  of 
the  State  of  California  v.  Lynch,  51 
Cal.  15,  21  Am.  Rep.  677  [1875]; 
Wolff  V.  City  of  Denver,  20  Colo. 
App.  135,  77  Pac.  364  [1904];  Fair 
Haven  &  Westville  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  New  Haven,  75  Conn. 
442,  53  Atl.  690  [1903];  Angus  v. 
City  of  Hartford,  74  Conn.  27,  49 
Atl.  192  [1901];  Todd  v.  Macfarland, 
20  App.  D.  C.  176  [1902];  District 
of  Columbia  v.  Wormley,  15  App.  D. 
C.  58  [1899];  Allman  "v.  District  of 
Columbia,  3  App.  D.  C.  8  [1894]; 
Madderom  v.  City  of  Chicago,  194  HI. 
572,  62  X.  E,  846  [1902];  Andrews 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger,  173 
HI.  123,  50  X.  E.  335  [1898];  People 
ex  rel.  Gleason  v.  Yancey,  167  111. 
255,  47  X.  E.  521  [1897];  Delamater 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  158  III.  575,  42 
X.  E.  444  [1895];  Tucker  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Wall,  156  111.  108,  40  X.  E. 
451  [1895];  Rich  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
152    HI.    18,    38    X.    E.  "255    [1894]; 


Steele  v.  Village  of  River  Forest,  141 
111.  302,  30  X.  E.  1034  [1893];  Coch- 
ran v.  Village  of  Park  Ridge,  138  111. 
295,  27  X.  E.  939  [1893];  Murphy 
V.  City  of  Peoria,  119  111.  509,  9  X. 
E.  895  [1888];  Village  of  Hyde  Park 
V.  Spencer,  118  111.  446,  8  X.  E.  846 
[1888]  ;  Kedzie  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  114  111.  280,  2  X.  E, 
182  [1886];  Skinner  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 42  111.  52  [1866];  City  of  Clii- 
cago  V.  Wright,  32  111.  192  [1863]; 
Broadway  Baptist  Church  v.  McAtee, 
71  Ky.  (8  Bush.)  508,  8  Am.  Rep. 
480  [1871];  Surget  v.  Chase,  33  La. 
Ann.  833  [1881];  O'Leary  v.  Sloo, 
7  La.  Ann.  25  [1852];  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Ulman, 
79  Md.  469,  30  Atl.  43  [1894]  ;  May- 
or and  City  Council  of  Baltimore 
V.  Johns  Hopkins  Hospital,  56  Md.  1 
[1880];  Dashiell  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore,  use  of  Hax, 
45  Md.  615  [1876];  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Clunet,  23 
Md.  449  [1865];  Workman  v.  City 
of  Worcester,  118  Mass.  168  [1875]; 
Butler  V.  City  of  Worcester,  112 
Mass.  541  [1873]  ;  Godbold  v.  City  of 
Chelsea,  111  Mass.  294  [1873]  ;  Prince 
V.  City  of  Boston,  HI  Mass.  226: 
[1872]  ;  Whiting  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  the  City  of  Boston,  106  Mass. 
89  [1870];  Jones  v.  Board  of  Alder- 
men of  the  City  of  Boston,  104  Mass. 
461    [1870];    Chandler   v.   Heisler,  — 

Mich.   ,    116   X.   W.   626    [1908]  ; 

Kellogg  V.  Village  of  Janesville. 
34  Minn.  132,  24  N.  W.  359 
[1885];  State  of  :Minnesota  ex 
rel.  Burger  v.  District  Court  of  Ram- 
sey County,  33  Minn.  295;  23  X.  W. 
222  [1885];  Wilzinski  v.  City  of 
Greenville,  85  Miss.  393,  37  So.  807 
[1905]  ;  Heman  v.  Allen",  156  Mo.  534, 
57  S.  W.  559  [1900];  City  of  Spring- 
field to  use  of  Central  Xational  Bank 
V.    Weaver,    137    Mo.    650,    37    S.    W. 


4 


375 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


245 


§  245.  Specific  ccrporatiorxs  to  which  power  of  levying'  local  as- 
sessment may  be  given — Existing  municipal  corpora- 
tions. 

It  being  assumed  that  the  legislature  may  confer  upon  in- 
ferior public  corporations  the  power  to  levy  local  assessments, 
the  question  of  its  power  to  authorize  specific  existing  corpora- 
tions to  levy  local  assessments  presents  few  difficulties.  From 
this  general  principle  it  follows  that  statutes  which  confer  upon 
cities  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments,  are  valid. ^     Thus 


509,  39  S.  W.  27G  [189G];  Eyerman 
V.  Blaksley,  78  Mo.  145  [l883]; 
Smith  V.  Tobener,  32  Mo.  App.  601 
1  1S88]  ;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Stod- 
dard, 15  Mo.  App.  173  [1884];  Far- 
rington  v.  City  of  Mt.  Vernon,  166 
N.  Y.  233,  59  X.  E.  826  [1001];  Mc- 
Laughlin V.  Miller,  124  X.  Y.  510, 
26  N.  E.  1104  [1891];  In  the  matter 
of  the  Petition  of  the  Xew  York 
Institution  for  the  Instruction  of  the 
Deaf  and  Dumb  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, 121  X.  Y.  134,  24  X.  E.  378 
[1890];  In  the  matter  of  tlie  Appli- 
cation of  Tappan  to  Vacate  Certain 
Assessments,  54  Barb.  225  [1869]; 
Gilbert  v.  Havemeyer,  4  X.  Y.  Sup. 
Ct.  Rep.  506  [1849];  City  of  Greens- 
boro V.  McAdoo,  112  X."  C.  359,  17 
S.  E.  178  [1893];  City  of  Raleigh  v. 
Peace,  110  X.  C.  32,  17  L.  R.  A.  330, 
14  S.  E.  521  [18921;  Erickson  v. 
Cass  County,  11  X.  D.  494,  92  X.  W. 
841  [1902]";  Jones  v.  Ilolzapfel,  11 
Okla.  405,  68  Pac.  511  [1902];  Beers 
V.  Dalles  City,  16  Or.  334,  IS  Pac. 
835  [1888];  'Frederick  Street,  Han- 
over Borough's  Appeal,  150  Pa.  St. 
202,  24  Atl.  669  [1892];  Hand  v. 
Fellows,  148  Pa.  St.  456,  23  Atl. 
1126  [1802];  City  of  Reading 
V.  Savage,  124  Pa".  St.  328,  16 
Atl.  788  [1889];  Rounds  v.  Mum- 
fnrd,  2  R.  I.  154  [1852];  Tay- 
lor V.  Boyd,  63  Tex.  533  [1885]; 
Sands  v.  City  of  Richmond,  31  Grat- 
tan,  571,  31  Am.  Rep.  742  [1879]  : 
Xorfolk  City  v.  Ellis,  26  Grattan. 
224  [1875];  Heath  v.  McCrea.  20 
Wash.     342,     55     Pac.     432     [1898]; 


State  of  \  .'ashington  on  the  Relation 
of  Henian  v.  City  of  Ballard,  16 
Wasli.  418,  47  Pac.  970  [1897];  City 
of  Ballard  v.  West  Coast  Improve- 
ment Co.,  15  Wash.  572,  46  Pac. 
1055  [1896];  Town  of  Medical  Lake 
v.  Smith,  7  Wash.  195,  34  Pac.  835 
[1893];  McXair  v.  Ostrander,  1 
Wash.  110,  23  Pac.  414  [1890];  City 
of  Seattle  v.  Yesler,  1  Wash.  Terr. 
577  [1878];  Boyd  v.  City  of  Milwau- 
kee, 92  Wis.  456,  66  X.  W.  603 
[1896];  Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwau- 
kee, 88  Wis.  383,  6o"  X.  W.  270 
[1894]. 

'  French  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.,  181  U.  S.-324,  45  L.  879,  21  S. 
625  [1901];  (affirming  Barber  As- 
phalt Paving  Co.  v.  French,  158  Mo. 
534,  54  L.  R.  A.  492,  58  S.  W.  934 
[1900]);  Crane  v.  Siloam  Springs. 
67  Ark.  30,  55  S.  W.  955  [1899]; 
Ahern  v.  Board  of  Improvement  Dis- 
trict Xo.  3  of  Texarkana.  69  Ark  68. 
61  S.  W.  575  [1901]  ;  Rector  v.  Board 
of  Improvement,  50  Ark.  116,  6  S. 
W.  519  [1887];  Watkins  v.  (JritVith, 
59  Ark.  344,  27  S.  W.  2.34  [1894]: 
Hellman  v.  Shoulters,  114  Cal.  136. 
44  Pa(?.  915,  45  Pac.  1057  [1896]; 
Thomason  v.  Ashworth.  73  Cal.  73. 
14  Pac.  615  [1887]  ;  People  of  thr- 
State  of  California  v.  Lynch,  51  Cal. 
15,  21  Am.  Rep.  677  [1875];  City  of 
Denver  v.  Campbell,  33  Colo.  162,  80 
Pac.  142  [1905];  City  of  Denver  v. 
Londoner,  33  Colo.  104,  80  Pac.  117 
[1904];  Wolff  v.  City  of  Denver,  20 
Colo.  App.  135.  77  Pac.  364  [1904]; 
Bassett    V.    Citv    of   Xew    Haven.    76 


245 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


376 


Congress  can  confer  upon  the  city  of  Washington  and  the  Dis- 


Conn.  70,  55  Atl.  579  [1903];  Bar- 
tram  V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  55  Conn. 
122,  10  Atl.  470  [1887];  Gregory 
V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  52  Conn.  40 
[1884] ;  Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven, 
75  Conn.  442,  53  Atl.  960  [1903]; 
The  Norwich  Savings  Society  v.  City 
of  Hartford,  48  Conn.  570  [1881]; 
Nichols  V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  23 
Conn.  189,  60  Am.  Dec.  636  [1854]; 
Murphy  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of  the 
City  of  Wilmington,  0  Houst.  (Del.) 
108,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  345  [1880]; 
Bacon  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Sa- 
vannah, 91  Ga.  500,  17  S.  E.  749 
[1893];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Brede, 
218  111.  528,  75  N.  E.  1044  [1905]; 
Jones  V.  Town  of  Lake  View,  151 
111.  663,  38  N.  E.  088  [1894];  Light- 
ner  v.  City  of  Peoria,  150  111.  80; 
37  N.  E.  69  ]1894];  Davis  v.  City 
of  Litchfield,  145  HI.  313,  21  L.  R. 
A.  563,  33  N.  E.  888  [1893];  Linck 
V.  City  of  Lichtfield,  141  111.  469,  31 
N.  E.  123  [1893];  Huston  v.  Clark, 
112  111.  344  [1885];  Potwin  v.  John- 
son, 108  111.  70  [1883];  Falch  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Johnson,  99  111.  137 
[1881] ;  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Sher- 
man, 83  111.  165  [1876];  Greeley  v. 
People  of  the  State  of  Ilinois,  60  111. 
19  [1871];  Pittsburgh,  Cincinnati, 
Chicago  &  St.  Louis  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Oglesby,  105  Ind.  542,  76  N. 
E.  165  [1905]  ;  Cason  v.  City  of  Leba- 
non, 153  Ind.  567;  55  N.  E.  768 
[1899];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co. 
V.  Edgerton,  125  Ind.  455;  25  N.  E. 
436  [1890];  Leeds  v.  City  of  Rich- 
mond, 102  Ind.  372,  1  N.  E.  711 
[1885];  Bradley  v.  McAtee,  70  Ky. 
(7  Bush.)  667,  3  Am.  Rep.  309 
[1870];  City  of  Louisville  v.  Hyatt, 
2  B.  Monroe  (Ky.)  177,  36  Am.  Dec. 
594  [1841];  City  of  Lexington  v. 
McQuillan's  Heirs,  9  Dana  (Ky.) 
513,  35  Am.  Dec.  159  [1840];  Ex- 
celsior Planting  &  Manufacturing 
Co.  v.  Green,  39  La.  Ann.  455,  1  So. 
873   [1887];   Surget  v.  Chase,  33  La. 


Ann.  833  [1881];  Mayor  and  City 
Counsel  of  Baltimore  v.  Johns  Hop- 
kins Hospital,  56  Md.  1  [1880]; 
Grand  Rapids  School  Furniture  Co. 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  92  Mich. 
564,  52  N.  W.  1028  [1892];  Hoyt 
V.  City  of  East  Saginaw,  19  Mich. 
39,  2  Am.  Rep.  76  [1869];  Burns  v. 
City  of  Duluth,  96  Minn.  104,  104 
N.  "W.  714  [1905];  State  o'f  Minne- 
sota ex  rel.  Merrick,  v.  District  Court 
of  Hennepin  County,  33  Minn.  235, 
22  N.  W.  625  [1885];  City  of  Seda- 
lia  to  use  of  Sedalia  National  Bank 
V.  Donohue,  190  Mo.  407,  89  S.  W. 
380  [1905];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.  V.  French,  158  Mo.  534,  54  L.  R. 
A.  492,  58  S.  W.  934  [1900];  Heman 
V.  Allen,  156  Mo.  534,  57  S.  W.  559 
[1900];  City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  An- 
thony, 30  Mo.  537  [I860];  City  of 
Excelsior  Springs  to  use  of  McCor- 
mick  V.  Ettenson,  120  Mo.  App. 
215,  90  S.  W.  701  [1906];  City  of 
Excelsior  Springs  to  use  of  McCor- 
mick  V.  Mississippi  Valley  Trust  Co., 
—  Mo.  App.  — ,  96  S.  W.'707  [1906]  ;. 
Medland  v.  Linton,  60  Neb.  249,  82 
N.  W.  866  [1900];  Durrell  v.  City  of 
Woodbury,  74  N.  J.  L.  (45  Vr.)  206, 
65  Atl.  198  [1906];  In  the  Matter  of 
City  of  New  York,  190  N.  Y.  350, 
sub  nomine;  In  re  Water  Front 
in  City  of  New  York,  83  N.  E. 
299  [1907];  (modifying  judgment 
105  N.  Y.  S.  750,  120  App.  Div. 
849);  McLaughlin  v.  INIiller,  124 
N.  Y.  510,  26  N.  E.  1104  [1891]; 
In  the  matter  of  the  Application  of 
Church  for  the  Appointment  of  Com- 
missioners, etc.,  92  N.  Y.  1  [1883]; 
City  of  Asheville  v.  Wachovia  Loan 
&  Trust  Co.,  143  N.  C.  360,  55  S.  E. 
800  [1906]  ;  City  of  Raleigh  v.  Peace, 
110  N.  C.  32;  17  L.  R.  A.  330;  14 
S.  E.  521  [1892];  Portland  Lumber- 
ing &  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  City  of 
East  Portland,  18  Or.  21,  6  L.  R.  A. 
290,  22  Pac.  536  [1889];  Charleston 
V.  Werner,  38  S.  C.  488,  37  Am.  St. 
Rep.  776;   17  S.  E.  33   [1892];  Nash- 


i 


3Ti 


AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


245 


trict  of  Columbia  the  power  lo  .evy  .ocal  assessments.-  In  like 
manner  the  power  of  the  lej^islature  to  confer  the  power  of  local 
assessment  upon  other  public  corporations,  or  quasi-corpora- 
tions such  as  counties,"  or  townships,*  is  evcr\'where  recognized. 
If  a  public  corporation  has  been  annexed  to  a  larger  one/"*  or  has 
been  dissolved  and  has  become  a  part  of  an  incorporated  town- 
ship," the  officials  of  the  corporation  into  which  it  is  thus  merged 
are  the  ones  who  have  authority  to  levy  assessments  within  the 
territory  of  such  former  corporations.  The  assessment  is  to  be  made 
according  to  the  charter  of  the  resulting  city  if  this  differs  from  the 
law  applicable  to  the  original  corporation."  If  a  municipality  is 
annexed,  under  statutory  proceedings,  by  a  larger  municipality 
after  an  assessment  is  levied,  but  before  the  construction  of  the  im- 
provement for  which  said  assessment  is  levied,  the  city  into  which 
said  municipality  is  merged  may  discontinue  the  assessment  pro- 
ceeding and  abandon  the  improvement.^  An  ordinance  enacted 
by  a  public  corporation  while  organized  as  a  town,  remains  its 
ordinance  after  it  is  organized  as  an  incorporated  village.^  A 
drainage  district  is  held  to  change  to  one  organized  under  the 
levee  act,  by  virtue  of  a  popular  vote  for  such  change,  when  the 
record  of  the  certificate  of  the  county  clerk,  showing  that  a 
majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  such  election  were  for  a  change 
of  organization,  is  filed. ^'^ 


ville  V.  Berry,  2  Shan.  Cas.  (Tenn.) 
561;  Taylor' V.  Boyd,  63  Tex.  533; 
Lovenberg  v.  City  of  Galveston,  17 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  162,  42  S.  W.  1024 
[1897];  Hemen  v.  City  of  Ballard, 
40  Wash.  81,  82  Pac.  277  [1005]; 
City  of  Seattle  v.  Yesler,  1  Wash. 
Terr.  577  [1878];  State  ex  rel.  Bur- 
bank  V.  City  of  Superior,  81  Wis. 
640.  51  N.  W.  1014   [1892]. 

"Mattingly  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 97  U.'s".  687.  24  L.  1098  [1878]. 
Willard  v.  Presbury,  81  U.  S.  (14 
Wall.)    676,  20  L.  T'lO   [1869]. 

'Dowlan  v.  Sibley  County.  36 
Minn.  430,  31  X.  W.  517;  Darst  v. 
Griffin,  31  Neb.  668,  48  X.  W.  819 
[1891];  State  of  Xebraska  ex  rel. 
Abbott  v.  Board  of  County  Commis- 
sioners of  Dodge  County,  8  Xeb.  124, 
30  Am.  Rep.  819    [1879];    Seanor  v. 


l^oard  of  County  Commissioners,  13 
Wash.  48,  42  Pac.  552   [1895]. 

■*  Sessions  v.  CrunkiUon,  20  0.  S. 
349;  Reeves  v.  Treasurer  of  Wood 
County,  8  0.  S.  333  [1858];  Ander- 
son V.  Lower  Merion  Township.  217 
Pa.   St.   369;    66   Atl.    1115    [1907]. 

°  Gilpin  V.  Cily  of  Ansonin.  US 
Conn.  72,  35  All.  777;  City  of  Chi- 
cago V.  Weber,  94  111.  App.  561;  Bar- 
ber Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Field,  — 
Mo.  App.  .  Ill  S.  W.  907  [1908]. 

^  Adams  v.  County  of  Piscataquis. 
87  :Me.  503,  33  Atl.   12. 

'Gilpin.  V.  City  of  Ansonia.  6S 
Conn.  72,  35  Atl."  777. 

"City  of  Chicago  v.  Weber,  94  111. 
App.    5<51     [1900]. 

"  Neff  V.  Bates,  25  0.  S.  169. 

1"  Drainage  District  No.  3  v.  Tlie 
People  ex  rel.  Baron,  147  111.  404; 
35  X.  E.  238. 


§§  246,  247  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  378 

§  246.     De  facto  municipal  corporations. 

If  the  public  corporation,  which  has  constructed  an  improve- 
ment and  levied  an  assessment  therefor,  is  assuming  to  act  under 
legal  authority,  and  is  at  least  a  corporation  de  facto,  the  legality 
of  its  incorporation  cannot  be  questioned  in  a  proceeding  to  en- 
force the  assessment.^  While  a  city  may  levy  a  re-assessment 
after  re-incorporating,  for  an  improvement  constructed  under  the 
defective  incorporation,-  the  mere  act  of  re-incorporating  does 
not  make  prior  assessments  valid. '^  The  legi.slature  may  legalize 
the  re-incorporation  of  towns  and  cities  which  up  to  that  time 
had  been  illegally  incorporated  and  may  make  the  contracts  of 
such  towns  and  cities  legally  binding.* 

§  247.     Assessment  districts. 

Somewhat  different  fr(>ra  the  foregoing  cpiestions,  is  the  ques- 
tion of  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  create  a  public  corporation, 
or  quasi  corporation,  for  the  primary  purpose  of  levying  local 
assessments.  The  exercise  of  this  power  usually  takes  the  form 
of  the  creation  of  an  assessment  district,  consisting  of  the  prop- 
erty which  it  is  assumed  will  be  benefited  by  the  proposed  im- 
provement, and  the  conferring  upon  some  board,  public  body, 
and  the  like,  the  power  to  levy  local  assessments  in  such  district. 
The  power  of  the  legislature  to  create  an  assessment  district  con- 
sisting of  the  land,  which  is  benefited  by  the  improvement,  is 
very  generally  recognized  in  the  absence  of  some  specific  con- 
stitutional restriction.^     The  question  of  the  finality  of  the  legis- 

'  Swamp    Land    District    v.    Silver,  *  Abernathy    v.    Town    of    Medical 

98  Cal.  51,  32  Pac.  866  [1895];  Mill-  Lake.    9     Wash.     112,    37    Pac.    306 

likin  V.  City  of  Bloomington,  72  Ind.  [1894]. 

161;    Redden   v.   Town   of    Covington,  '^  Minnesota    &    M.    Land    Improve- 

29    Ind.    118;    Willard    v.    Albertson,  ment    Co.    v.    City    of    Billings,     111 

23  Ind.  App.   164,  53  N.  E.   1077,  54  Fed.    972,    50    C.    C.    A.    70    [1901]: 

X.  E.  403   [1899];   City  of  St.  Louis  Jonesboro,    Lake    City   &   Eastern   R. 

v.   Stoddard,    15   Mo.   App.    173;    con-  R.   Co.   v.    Board   of   Directors  of   St. 

ira,  Medical  Lake  v.  Smith,  7  Wash.  Francis  Levee   District,   80  Ark.   316. 

195,    34    Pac.    835.       See  .  also    City  97    S.    W.    281    [1906];    Crane   v.    Si- 

of   Ballard    v.    West   Coast   Improve-  loam   Springs,   67  Ark.  30,  55   S.  W. 

ment    Co.,     15    Wash.    572,    46    Pac.  955    [1899];    City   of  Little   Rock   v. 

1055.  Board  of  Improvements,  etc.,  42  Ark. 

-State   ex   rel.   Heman   v.    Ballard,  152    [1883];    Carson    v.    St.    Francis 

16  Wash.  418,  47  Pac.  "Rep.  970.  Levee  District,  59  Ark.  513,  27  S.  W. 

'Medical   Lake   v.   Smith,    7    Wash.  590  [1894];  Davis  v.  Gaines,  48  Ark. 

195,  34  Pac.  835.  370.  3  S.  W.   184;   Hensley  v.  Recla- 


379 


AUTHORITY    TO    LEW    ASSESSMENTS. 


§247 


lative  act  in  determinino-  that  the  property  within  such  district 
is  benefited,  is  considered  elsewhere.-  On  the  other  hand  it  has 
])een  said  the  legislature  cannot  authorize  a  city  to  make  "a  pri- 
vate property  of  small  extent  assume  the  name  of  an  assessment 
district."-'  The  existence  of  an  assessment  district  may  be 
shown  by  subsequent  legislation  which  recognizes  such  exist- 
ence.* Mere  failure  to  exercise  its  powers  does  not  terminate 
its  existence  '■  in  the  absence  of  legislation  depriving  it  of  its 
powers  or  of  the  judgment  of  a  court  of  competent  .jurisdiction. 
An  assessment  district,  such  as  a  drainage  or  reclamation  dis- 
trict, must  be  organized  in  substantial  compliance  whh  the  statu- 
tory provisions  on  the  subject.  Under  the  provisions  of  some 
statutes  an  assessment  district,  such  as  for  example,  a  drainage 
district,  is  organized  by  presenting  a  petition,  signed  as  required 
by  law,  to  the  proper  court,  and  by  the  action  of  the  court  in 


mation  District  Xo.  556,  121  Cal.  96, 
53  Pac.  401;  Swamp  Land  District 
V.  Silver,  98  Cal.  51,  32  Pac.  866 
11895];  Reclamation  District  No.  124 
V.  Gray,  95  Cal.  601,  30  Pac.  779 
[1892];  Lent  v.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404, 
14  Pac.  71  11887];  Pveclamation  Dis- 
trict No.  108  V.  Hagar,  66  Cal.  54, 
4  Pac.  945  [1884];  Pvogne  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Coedtner,  224  111.  4^9,  79  N. 
E.  662  [1906];  Carr  v.  People  ex  rel. 
floodtner,  224  111.  160,  79  N.  E.  648 
[1906];  Smith  v.  People  ex  rel.  De- 
trick,  140  111.  355.  29  N.  E.  676 
11893];  Springer  v.  Watters,  139  111. 
419,  28  N.  E.  761  [1893];  Wilson 
\'.  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Sanitary 
District  of  Chicago.  133  111.  443;  27 
X.  E.  203  [1891]  ;  People  ex  rel.  ]\Iil- 
Icr  V.  Scott,  132  111.  427,  23  N.  E. 
1119;  Kili;imr  v.  Drainage  Coinmis- 
sioiicrs.  Ill  111.  342;  Blake  v.  People 
for  iiM'  (,f  Caldwell,  109  111.  504 
I  1884]  :  Dunham  v.  Pe()i)le  ex  rel.  Mc- 
Crea.  96  III.  331  |  1880]  ;  People  ex 
rel.  Miller  v.  Brislin.  80  111.  423 
[1875];  Adams  v.  (  ity  of  Shelhyville. 
154  Ind.  467,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  484.  49 
L.  R.  A.  797.  57  N.  E.  114  [1899]; 
Board  of  Commissioners  of  County 
of  IMonroe  v.  Ilarrell,  147  Ind.  500, 
46  N.  E.  12-1    [1896]:  Citv  of  Kansas 


City  V.  Gibson,  66  Kan.  501,  72  Pac. 
222  [1903]  ;  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand 
Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874];  Meier 
V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  180  Mo.  391,  79 
S.  W.  955  [1903];  Mound  City  Land 
&   Stock  Co.  V.  Miller,    170  Mo.  240, 

94  Am.  St.  Rep.  727,  GO  L.  R.  A.  190, 
70  S.  W.  721  [1902];  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Ranken,  96  :\Io.  497,  9  S. 
W.  910  [1888];  Hilliard  v.  City  of 
Asheville,  118  N.  C.  845.  24  S.  E. 
738  [1896];  Hansen  v.  Hammer,  15 
Wash.   315,   46   Pac.   332    [1896]. 

■  See  §   552  cf  scq. 

U'ity  of  Detroit  v.  Daly.  68  Mich. 
503,  509,  37  X.  W.  11  [1888],  (citing 
Clay  v.  City  of  (Jrand  Rapids,  60 
Mich.  451.  27  \.  W.  596  [1886]. 
This,  however,  was  a  case  of  appro- 
l)riating  a  part  of  a  tract  of  land 
and  assessing  one-iiajf  of  the  expense 
hack  on  tlie  residue  not  taken;  a 
])roceeding  which  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions has  been  held  to  he  objection- 
able without  regard  to  the  area  of 
the  district.     See   §§  30S.  702. 

'  Swani])    Land    District    v.    Silver, 
98   Cal.   51.   32  Pac.  866    [1895]. 
Reclamation  District  Xo.  124  v.  Gray. 

95  Cal.    601,    30    Pac.    779    [1892].' 

"  Swamp  Land  District  v.  Silver, 
98  Cal.  51.  32  Pac.  866   [1S95|. 


§  247  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  ,       380 

finding  that  a  proper  petition  has  been  presented  and  that  the 
improvement  petitioned  for  is  necessary."    The  fact  that  the  peti- 
tion is  referred  to  the  drainage  commissioners  within   a  shorter 
time  than  that  specified  by  statute,  is  held  not  to  invalidate  the 
proceedings.^     If  an  organized  public  corporation,  such  as  a  city 
or  village,  determines  that  a  specified  portion  of  the  lands  with- 
in its  limits  needs  drainage,  and  sets  such  lands  apart  as  a  dis- 
trict to  be  drained,  this  amounts  to  an  organization  of  a  drain- 
age district,   and  no  preliminary  petition   is  necessary.^     If  the 
authorities  of  a  city  or  village  have  power  to  lay  ofl"  assessment 
districts,  their  determination  that  a  particular  portion  of  lands 
within  the  limits  of  such  village  or  city  needs  draining  amounts 
to  a  virtual  organization  of  such  land  as  a  drainage  district  and 
dispenses  with  the  necessity  of  a  petition  by  the  owners  of  land  in 
such  districts.''     Provision  is  made  for  a  hearing  of  a  quasi  judi- 
cial character  before  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  for  the  pur- 
pose  of  passing  upon  the  n£cessity   of  the   public   improvement 
which  it  is  sought  to  make  and  for  determining  what  land  will 
be  benefited  thereby  and  the  boundaries  of  the  assessment  dis- 
trict.^°     If  a  drainage  district  be  by  popular  vote  re-organized 
under  a  different  statute,  a  change  of  organization  is  effected 
from   the  time  that  the  record  of  the   certificate   of  the   proper 
•  officer  is  filed  showing  that  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  such 
election  were  for  such  re-organization.^^     The  swamp  land  clerk 
may   sign   a  notice   for   a   meeting   to   re-organize   a   reclamation 
district.^-     If  a  drainage  district  is  wholly  within  a   county,  re- 
port should  be  made  to  the  board  of  supervisors  of  such  county." 
Under  some  statutes,  a  drainage  association  is  provided  for  which 
must  be  organized  by  preparing  and  filing  articles  of  association 

^  Commissioners    of   ]Mason   &   Taz-  ^°  Gauen  v.  Moredock  &  Ivy  Land- 

enill    Special    Drainage    District    v.  ing  Drainage  District  No.  1,   131   111. 

Griffin,    134    111.    330,    25    N.    E.    995  446,  23  N.  E.  633   [1890]. 

[1891];   Blake  v.  The  People  for  use  ^^  Drainage  District  No.   3   v.   Peo- 

of    Caldwell,     109     111.     504     [1884];  pie    ex    rel.    Baron,    147    111.    404,    35 

McBride  v.   State  for  use  of  Clandy,  N.  E.  238  [1894]. 

130  Ind.  325,  30  N.  E.  699  [1891].  i=  Eeclamation    District    No.    3    v. 

'McBride     v.     State     for     use     of  Goldman,    65    Cal.    635,    4    Pac.    676 

Clandy,    130   Ind.   325,   30   N.   E.   699  [1884]. 

[1891].  "Swamp  Land  District  No.  150  v. 

'Village  of  Hvde  Park  v.  Spencer.  Silver,     98     Cal.     51,     32     Pac.     866 

118  111.  446,  8  N.  E.  346   [1888].  [1893]. 

'  Villasre  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Spencer, 
118  111.  446,  8  N.  E.  846  [1888]. 


I 


381  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  247 

showing  the  land  to  be  drained  and  the  nature  of  the  improve- 
ment.^^ If  the  articles  of  association  do  not  show  with  suffi- 
cient certainty  the  nature  of  the  improvement/''  or  the  land  to 
be  affected  thereby/"  such  articles  are  insufficient  to  form  a 
drainage  association  under  such  statutes.  A  slight  variance  be- 
tween the  corporate  name  and  the  name  in  which  the  assessment 
is  levied  is  immaterial.^"  Thus,  if  the  name  in  the  articles  of 
association  is  "The  Arctic  Ditchers"  and  the  assessment  of  bene- 
fits is  in  the  name  of  "The  Arctic  Ditchers'  Association,"  such 
variance  is  not  fatal  to  the  assessment  on  appeal. ^^  If  the  land 
to  be  drained  was  described  with  sufficient  accuracy  it  Avas  not 
necessary  to  describe  the  precise  method  of  draining.^''  A  drain- 
ing association  under  the  early  Indiana  statute  had  no  corporate 
existence  and  no  power  to  make  a  valid  assessment  until  its 
articles  of  association  had  been  recorded.-"  If  the  owners  of 
certain  lands  voluntarily  connect  the  system  for  the  drainage 
of  such  lands  w^ith  the  system  already  constructed  by  an  exist- 
ing drainage  district,  they  are  regarded  as  in  legal  effect  annex- 
ing themselves  with  such  drainage  district.-^  A  drainage  district 
cannot  be  so  laid  out  as  to  include  lands  which  cannot  possibly 
be  drained  by  the  system  available  for  draining  the  rest  of  the 
lands  in  such  district.-'-  Under  statutes  which  provide  therefor, 
a  drainage  district  may  be  so  laid  out  as  to  cross  township  or 
county  lines.-^ 


"  Smith     V.     Duck     Pond     Ditching  ""  Eel    River    Draining    Association 

Association,     54     Ind.     235      [1876];  v.   Carriger,   30'Ind.  213    [1808]. 

Chase  v.  Arctic  Ditchers,  43  Ind.  74  "^  People    ex    rel.    etc.,    v.    Drainage 

[1873];     West    v.    Biillskin    Prairie  Commissioners,     District     Xo.     1     of 

Ditching     Company,      32      Ind.      138  Town    of    Young    America,     143     111. 

[1869].                        "  417.   32   X.    E.    688    [1893];    Streuter 

^'  Smith     V.     Duck     Pond     Ditching  v.    Willow    Creek    Drainage    District, 

Association,     54     Ind.     235     [1876]-,  72   Til.  App.  561    [1897]. 

West    V.    Bullskin    Prairie    Ditching  -Klinger    v.    The    People    ox    rel. 

Company.  32  Ind.  138   [1869].  Conkle,    130    Til.    509,    22    X.    E.    600 

»°  Smith     V.    Duck     Pond     T)itching  [1890]. 

Association,  54   Ind.  235    [1876].  =^  Scott     v.     The     People     ex     rel. 

"Chase  V.  Arctic  Ditchers.  43  Ind.  Lewis.    120    III.    129,    11    X.    E.    408 

74    [1873].  [1889];    Commissioners   of  Hiirhwiiys 

"  Chase  v.  Arctic  Ditchers.  43  Ind.  of    the    Town    of    Colfax    v.    Commis- 

74   [1873].  sioners.     East     Lake     Fork     Special 

"  Seyberger    v.    Calumet    Draining  Drainage  District,  127  111.  581,  21  N. 

Company,  33  Ind.  330  [1870].  E.  206   [1890]. 


248 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


382 


§  248.     Assessment  district,  including  parts  of  other  political 
corporations. 

In  laying  off  such  assessment  district,  the  legislature  is,  in  the 
absence  of  specific  constitutional  restriction,  not  bound  to  pa,y 
any  attention  to  the  boundaries  of  pre-existing  political  subdi- 
visions of  the  state. ^  In  this  respect  the  power  of  local  assess- 
ment differs  from  the  power  of  general  taxation.  An  assess- 
ment apportioned  Recording  to  benefits  may  be  levied  upon  a 
district  laid  out  without  regard  to  the  boundaries  of  existing 
political  districts,  while  the  power  of  levying  general  taxation 
can  be  conferred  only  upon  existing  political  districts.-  The 
assessment  district  thus  created  may  include  the  entire  area  of  a 
city.''  It  may,  and  more  often  does,  include  a  part  of  the  area 
of  a  city  consisting  of  that  part  of  the  city  which  will  be  specially 
benefited  by  the  proposed  improvement.*  A  statute  which  provides 
for  local  assessments  upon  real  property  in  any  natural  division 
of  a  city  benefited  thereby  prevents  the  authorities  from  going 


^  Reclamation  District  Xo.  108  v. 
Hagar,  66  Cal.  54.  4  Pac.  945  [1884]  ; 
Kedzie  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners, 114  111.  280,  2  X.  E.  182, 
6  X.  E.  48  [1886];  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  County  of  Mon  'oe  v. 
Harrell,  147  Ind.  500,  46  X.  E.  124 
[1896];  Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss. 
652  [I860];  State,  Freeholders  of 
Hvidson  V.  Road  Commissioners,  42 
X.  J.  L.  (13  VrJ  608  [1880]; 
Makemson  v.  Kauffman,  35  0.  S.  444; 
Commissioners  of  Putnam  County  v. 
Young,  36  0.  S.  288  [1880]:  "There 
being  no  constitutional  prohibition 
the  legislature  may  create  a  district 
for  that  special  purpose  or  they  may 
tax  a  class  of  lands  or  persons  bene- 
fited to  be  designated  by  the  public 
agents  appointed  for  that  purpose 
without  reference  to  town,  county  or 
district  lines."  People  ex  rel.  Grif- 
fin V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  X. 
Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  "  [1851]  ; 
(quoted  l^fatter  of  Sackett  Street. 
4  Hun.  92,  03   [1875]). 

^  State,  Lydecker,  Pros.  v.  Dr.iinage 
and    Water     Commissioners    of    the 


Township  of  Englewood,  41  X.  J.  L. 
(12   Vr.)    154    [1879]. 

^  ^linnesota  and  M.  Land  Improve- 
ment Co.  V.  City  of  Billings,  111  Fed. 
972,  50  C.  C.  A.  70  [1901];  Crane 
V.  Siloam  Springs,  67  Ark.  30,  55  S. 
W.  955  [1899];  Grimmell  v.  City  of 
Des  Moines,  57  la.  144,  10  X.'  W. 
330  [1881]. 

*  Crescent  Hotel  Co.  v.  Bradley.  81 
Ark,  286,  98  S.  W.  971  [1906]; 
Springer  v.  Walters,  139  111.  419,  28 
X.  E.  761  [1893];  Village  of  Hyde 
Park  V.  Spencer,  118  111.  446,  8  X. 
E.  846  [1888];  Adams  v.  City  of 
Shelbyville.  154  Ind.  467,  77  Am".  St. 
Rep.  484,  49  L.  R.  A.  797,  57  X.  E. 
114  [1899];  City  of  Kansas  City  v. 
C4ibson,  66  Kan.  501,  72  Pac.  222 
[1903];  Voight  v.  City  of  Detroit. 
123  Mich.  547,  82  X.  W.  253  [1900]: 
(affirmed  184  U.  S.  115,  22  S.  337 
[1902]);  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand 
Haven.  30  Mich.  24  [1874];  Meier  v. 
City  of  St.  Louis.  180  Mo.  391.  79 
S.  W.  955  [1903];  St.  Louis  v.  Ran- 
ken.  96  Mo.  497,  9  S.  W.  910  [1888] ; 
Hilliard  v.  Citv  of  Asheville.  118  X. 
C.  845,  24  S.  E.  738   [1896]. 


383 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


249 


out  of  a  natural  division  of  the  city  for  the  purpose  of  laying 
out  an  assessment  district.^  Certain  improvements  will  confer 
benefits  alike  upon  land  within  cities  and  land  witliout.  In  such 
cases  the  legislature  has  power  to  lay  off  assessment  districts,  in- 
cluding city  and  county  alike.  A  road  district,'^  or  a  drainage  dis- 
trict may  be  so  created  as  to  include  both  city  and  county.'^  Cer- 
tain forms  of  improvement  may  confer  benefits  upon  two  or  more 
cities  or  towns.  In  such  cases  the  legislature  has  power  to  lay  off 
an  assessment  district  containing  twoor  more  cities  or  towns.'*  A 
drainage  district  may  be  formed  including  two  or  more  town- 
ships." A  reclamation  district  may  be  authorized  which  runs 
across  county  lines. ^"  A  road  district  may  be  created  less  in  area 
than  the  pre-existing  political  subdivision  in  which  it  is  located. ^^ 
One  drainage  district  may  be  created  within  the  limits  of  another 
drainage  district.^-  However,  the  same  tract  of  land  cannot  be 
so  placed  in  two  assessment  districts  that  it  can  be  assessed  twice 
for  the  same  improvement.^" 

§  249.      Assessment    districts    formed    on    petition    of    property- 
owners. 

Assuming  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  create  a  special  as- 
sessment district  for  the  purpose  of  levying  local  assessments, 
the  difficult  and  important  question  still  remains  of  the  power  of 
the  legislature  to  confer  authority  to  levy  such  assessments  upon 


=  City  of  Ottawa  v.  :Macy,  20  111. 
41.3    [18.581. 

°  ^lakenison  v.  KaiifViiian,  35  0.  S. 
444;  Commisisidners  of  Putnam 
County  V.  Young,  3G  O.  S.  288 
[18801. 

"Wilson  V.  Boanl  of  Trustees  of 
the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago 
1.33  III.  443,'  27  N.  E.  203  [1891] 
Town  of  Muskegon  v.  Drainage  Com 
missioners,  78  Wis.  40,  47  X.  W 
II  [1890];  State  ex  rel.  P.altzell  v 
Stewart,  74  Wis.  020,  0  L.  R.  A 
394,  43  N.  W.  947  [1889];  Bryant 
V.  Robbins,  70  Wis.  2.i8.  3.")  X.  W. 
54.5    [1887]. 

'Dunham  v.  People  ex  rel.  McCrea. 
96  111.  331  [1880];  People  ex  rel. 
Miller  v.  Brislin.  80  Til.  423  [1875]: 
Hundley  and  Pees  v.  ('(unniissioners 
of  Lincoln   Park.   67   111.  559    [1873]. 


°  Commissioners  of  Highways  of 
the  Town  of  Colfax  v.  Commissioners 
of  East  Lake  Fork  Special  Drainage 
District,  127  111.  581.  21  X.  E.  206 
[1890]. 

'"Reclamation  District  Xo.  108  v. 
Hagar,  66  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945   [1884]. 

"  State  Board  of  Chosen  Freehold- 
ers of  the  County  of  Hudson,  Pros. 
V.  Inferior  Court  of  Common  Pleas 
of  the  County  of  Hudson,  42  X.  J. 
T>.  (13  Vr.)  60S  [1880];  See  to  the 
same  elTect  in  taxation  as  distin- 
guished from  assessment,  Bowles  v. 
State  of  Ohio,  37  O.  S.  35   [1881]. 

"People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Scott,  132 
111.  427,  23  X.  E.  1119   [1891]. 

'' Aba  seal  v.  Bouny,  37  La.  Ann. 
538- 


§  250  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  384 

various  public  boards  or  governmental  bodies.  In  many  cases  the 
statute  providing  for  the  organization  of  an  assessment  district 
requires  that  it  should  be  organized  upon  the  petition  of  a 
certain  part  of  the  property  owners  therein.  Such  a  provision 
is  generally  held  to  give  sufficient  safeguard  to  the  rights  of  the 
property  owners  upon  whose  property  such  assessment  is  to  be 
levied,  and  therefore  to  be  a  constitutional  exercise  of  legislative 
power.^  The  fact  that  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  im- 
provement district  the  city  council  is  bound  to  levy  an  assess- 
ment and  that  if  it  refuses  to  do  so  it  may  be  compelled  by  man- 
damus proceedings  to  levy  such  assessment,-  and  that  the  board 
is  regarded  in  making  such  improvement  as  the  agent  of  the 
property  owners  and  not  the  agent  of  the  public  corporation  '' 
does  not  prevent  such  statute  from  being  constitutional.  No 
difficulty  is  found  where  the  assessment  district  is  formed  only 
if  a  majority  of  the  electors  within  its  limits  vote  for  its  forma- 
tion.* 

§  250.     Power  of  assessment  exercised  by  officers  elected  by  dis- 
trict. 

The  power  of  levying  local  assessments  is  usually  conferred  upon 
officers  elected  by  the  voters  of  the  assessment  district  of  the  po- 

^  Fallbrook    Irrigation     District    v.  missioners.  District  Xo.  1  of  Town  of 

Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  41  L.  369,  17  Young   America,    143    111.   417,   32   N. 

S.   56    [1896];    (reversing  Bradley  v.  E.  688  [1893];  Badger  v.  Inlet  Drain- 

Fallbrook      Irrigation      District,      68  age   District,    141    111.   540,   31    N.   E. 

Fed.  948  [1895]  )  ;  Board  of  Improve-  170  [1893]  ;  Commissioners  of  Mason 

ment    District    No.    60    v.    Cotter,    71  and    Tazewell    Special    Drainage    Dis- 

Ark.    556,    76    S.    W.    552     [1903];  trict  v.  Griffin,  134  111.  330,  25  N.  E. 

Stiewel  v.   Fencing  District  No.   6  of  995   [1891];  Owners  of  Lands  v.  Peo- 

Jolmson  County,  71  Ark.  17,  70  S.  W.  pie    ex    rel.    Stookey,     113    111.    296 

308;     (affirmed    on    re-hearing,    71    S.  [1886];     Huston    v.    Clark,     112    111. 

W.  247    [1902]);    Ahern  v.  Board  of  344    [1885];    State   ex   rel.   Ashby   v. 

Improvement  District  No.  3,  of  Tex-  Three    States    Lumber    Co.,    190    Mo. 

arkana,    69    Ark.    68,    61    S.    W.    575  430,  95  S.  W.  333    [1906];   McCarty 

[1901];     Fitzgerald     v.     Walker,     55  v.   Brick,   11   N.  J.  L.    (6   Halst.)    27 

Ark.  148,  17  S.  W.  702    [1891];    City  [1829];      Hansen     v.     Hammer,      15 

of  Little  Rock  v.  Board  of  Improve-  Wash.  315,  46  Pac.  332    [1896]. 

ments,  etc.,  42  Ark.  152    [1883];   Re-  ==  City   of   Little   Rock   v.    Board    of 

clamation  District  No.   124  v.   Gray,  Improvements,     etc.,     42     Ark.     152 

95  Cal.   601,  30  Pac.  779    [1892];   In  [1883]. 

the  Matter   of  the  Bonds  of  the  Ma-  ^Fitzgerald     v.     Walker,     55     Ark. 

dera  Irrigation  District,  92  Cal.  296,  148,  17  S.  W.  702   [1891]. 

27    Am.    St.   Rep.    106,    14   L.   R.    A.  *  Dunham  v.  People  ex  reL  McCrea, 

755.  28  Pac.  272,  28  Pac.  675  [1891]  ;  96  111.  331   [1880]. 
People  ex  rel.,  etc.,  v.  Drainage  Com- 


i 


385  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  250 

litical  subdivision  in  which  such  assessment  district  is  situated. 
Such  grant  of  power  affords  protection  to  the  interests  of  the  prop- 
erty owners  and  is  regarded  as  valid. ^  Power  to  levy  local  assess- 
ments is  sometimes  conferred  upon  officers  chosen  b.y  a  popular 
vote,  but  by  the  vote  of  the  electors  of  the  political  subdivisions 
which  are  included  in  whole  or  in  part  within  such  assessment  dis- 
trict, and  not  by  the  vote  of  the  electors  or  the  property  owners  of 
such  assessment  district  as  a  whole.  Such  officers  are  evidently  not 
chosen  for  the  express  purpose  of  levying  such  local  assessment, 
or  participating  therein,  but  such  duty  is  merely  incidental  to  the 
office  to  which  they  were  primarily  chosen.  Such  grant  of  power 
is  generally  held  to  be  valid.  Where  the  city  is  divided  into 
assessment  districts,  the  power  to  levy  assessments  is  very  often 
conferred  upon  the  officers  of  the  city  generally  without  giving 
to  the  voters,  or  the  property  owners  of  the  assessment  district, 
any  special  claim  to  a  voice  in  the  selection  of  such  officers.  Such 
grant  of  power  is  ordinarily  held  to  be  valid.^  The  earlier  cases 
denying  the  powder  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  a  city  to 
divide  its  territory  into  districts  for  the  purpose  of  local  assess- 
ment have  been  reversed  or  overruled,^  as  they  practically  deny 
the  existence  of  the  right  to  levy  local  assessments.  In  South 
Carolina  the  constitutional  provision  requiring  uniformity  of 
taxation  ■*  has  been  held  to  prevent  a  city  from  being  authorized 

'Lent    V.    Tillson.    140    U.    S.    316,  Atchison,   2   Kan.   454    (original   edi- 

35    L.    4in,    11    S.    825    [1891];     (af-  tion)    2    Kan.   448    (second    edition) 

firming  Lent  v.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404,  [18G4];    Warren    v.    City    of    Grand 

14     Pac.     71      [1887]);     Kilgour     v.  Haven,    30    Mich.    24    [1874];    Meier 

Drainage  Commissioners,  111  HI.  342  v.    City    of   St.    Louis,    180    Mo.   391, 

[1885];    Blake  v.   People   for   use   of  79    S.   W.    955    [1903];    St.   Louis   v. 

Caldwell,  109  111.  504   [1884].  Ranken,    96    Mo.    497,    9    S.    W.    910 

=  Minnesota    &    M.    Land    Improve-  [1888];    State,    McCloskey,    Pros.    v. 

nient  Co.  V.  City  of  Billings,  111  Fed.  Chaniberlin,    37    N.    J.    L.     (8    Vr.) 

972,   50   C.   C.   A.   70    [1901];    Crane  388    [1875];   People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v. 

V.    Siloam    Springs,    67    Ark.    30,    55  :\layor.    etc.,    of    Brooklyn,    4    N.    Y. 

S.  W.  955   [1899];   Davies  v.  City  of  419,   55    Am.   Dec.   266    [1851];    Hil- 

Los  Angeles,  86  Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771  Hard  v.  City  of  Asheville,   118  X.  C. 

[1890];    Liglitner   v.    City   of   Peoria,  845,    24   S.   E.    738    [1896];    State   v. 

150    111.    80,    37    X.    E.    69     [1894];  :Moss.    44    Wash.    91,    86    Pac.     1129 

Adams    v.    City    of    Shelbyville,    154  [1906]. 

Ind.    467,    77    Am.    St.    Rep.    484.    40  •''  People  ex  rel.  Post  v.  IMayor,  etc., 

L.  R.  A.  797,  57  X.  E.   114   [1S09];  of    Brookhm,    6    Barb.     (X.    Y.)    209 

City    of    Kansas    City    v.    Gibson.    66  [1849]. 

Kan.     501,     72     Pac.     222      [1903];  *  Article    X.,    §    5,    Constitution    of 

Burnes  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  South  Carolina   [1895].     See  §§   118, 

159. 


§  251  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  386 

to  divide  its  geographical  area  into  assessment  districts. °  This, 
however,  is,  in  effect,  the  reason  given  by  the  courts  of  this  state 
for  denying  in  toto  the  doctrine  of  the  validity  of  local  assess- 
ments. 

§  251.     Power  of  assessment  not  exercised  by  elective  officers — 
Local  self-government. 

In  some  cases,  statutes  have  conferred  upon  boards  which  are 
not  chosen  by  the  voters  or  property  owners  of  the  assessment  dis- 
trict, nor  of  the  political  subdivisions  therein  included,  the  power 
to  levy  local  assessments.  AVhether  such  a  -statute  is  a  valid 
exercise  of  legislative  power,  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is 
a  sharp  conflict  of  authority.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held 
that  the  right  of  local  self-government  is  a  constitutional  right, 
even  though  not  protected  by  any  specific  provision  of  the  con- 
stitution, and  that  such  statutes  are  unconstitutional  as  invasions 
of  such  right. ^  Similar  views  have  been  expressed  in  cases  not 
involving  local  assessments.-  Thus  a  statute  which  confers  upon 
a  city  water  board  the  additional  poAver,  not  previously  possessed 
by  it,  of  requiring  water-mains  to  be  laid  in  the  streets  and  of 
levying  assessments  therefor  indirectly,  by  providing  that  such 
board  shall  submit  its  report  to  council,  and  council  shall  levy 
an  assessment  in  accordance  with  such  report,  is  invalid.^  How- 
ever, a  statute  providing  for  a  change  in  the  term  of  drain  com- 

°  Mauldin  v  City  Council  of  Green-  to  tlie  lowest  grade  of  powers  while 
ville,  53  S.  C  285,  G9  Am.  St.  Rep.  the  power  to  tax  is  the  highest  that 
855,  43  L.  R.  A  101,  31  S.  E.  252  can  exist  in  local  municipal  govern- 
[1898]  (overruling,  42  S.  C.  293,  46  ment.  Xo  precedent  entitled  to  re- 
Am.  St.  Rep.  723,  27  L.  R.  A.  284,  spect  can  justify  such  a  change  of 
20  S.  E.  842    [1893]).  po\yers,   for    from    the   very   dawn   of 

^  Cook    Farm    Co.    v.    City    of    De-  our   liberties   the   principle   most   un- 

troit,    124   Mich.   426,   83   X.   W.    130  questionable  of  all  has  been  this;  that 

[1900];  People  ex  rel.  Board  of  Park  the  people   shall  vote  the  taxes  they 

Com.missioners    v.    Common    Council  are  to  pay  or  be  permitted  to  choose 

of    Detroit,    28    Mich.    228,    15    Am.  representatives      for      the     purpose." 

Rep.    202    [1873];    "In   making    con-  People   ex   rel.   Board   of   Park   Com- 

tracts  and  creating  debts  for  the  city  missioners  v.  Common  Council  of  De- 

the  commissioners  are  in  effect  exer-  troit,  28  Mich.  228,  248    15  Am.  Rep. 

cising  a  power  of  taxation  which  is  202   [1873]. 

one  of  the  highest  attributes  of  sov-  -Bailey  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  City  of 

ereignty,    and    the    distance    between  Xew   York,    3    Hill    (X.   Y.)    531,    38 

their  former  power  to  advise  and  the  Am.  Dec.  669   [1842]. 

power    now    claimed    to    compel    can  ^  Cook  Farm  Co.-  v.  City  of  Detroit, 

only    be    adequately    measured    -nrhen  124  Mich.  426,  83  N.  W.  130  [1900]. 
it    is   perceived    tliat   the  one   belongs 


387  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  251 

missioner  of  a  certain  county,  and  authorizing  the  Governor  to 
appoint  a  drain  commissioner  for  a  period  between  the  two 
terms  for  which  under  the  statute  no  drain  commissioner  would 
be  chosen,  was  held  not  to  violate  the  right  of  local  self-govern- 
ment.* In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  the  legislature  has 
the  general  power  to  make  laws,  except  where  restrained  by 
some  provision  of  the  federal  or  state  constitution,  and  that  in 
the  absence  of  specific  restraint  it  confers  the  power  of  local  self- 
government  as  a  privilege  and  not  as  a  right ;  that  it  may  ac- 
cordingly give  as  much  or  as  little  local  self-government  as  it 
chooses,  and  if  it  sees  fit  to  provide  for  the  levy  of  a  local  assess- 
ment by  a  board  which  the  voters  or  property  owners  of  the 
district  have  no  opportunity  to  choose,  no  legal  objection  can  be 
raised  to  such  a  statute,  the  sole  remedy  of  the  people,  if  dis- 
satisfied, being  political.'*  Thus,  by  the  powers  of  a  statute,  a 
levee  board  v/as  to  be  appointed  by  the  legislature,  and  their 
successors  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  Governor  and  vacancies 
filled  by  him.  Such  statute  was  held  to  be  valid,  the  corporation 
being  regarded  as  a  quasi-public  corporation  and  not  as  a  private 
corporation.  The  right  of  local  self-government  is  not  here  dis- 
cussed.**  A  statute  authorizing  supervisors  of  counties  of  a  cer- 
tain class  to  establish  reclamation  districts  Avhich  might  include 
lands  in  other  counties  without  the  consent  of  such  other  county, 
or  of  the  land  owners  thereof,  has  been  held  to  be  constitutional." 
A  statute  naming  three  commission-ers  and  providing  that  they 
should  make  a  street  improvement  and  levy  a  local  assessment 
therefor,  the  act'  to  take  effect  when  approved  by  the  city 
council,  was  held  to  be  valid.''  Where  commissioners  were  to  be 
appointed  to  take  charge  of  a  public  improvement,  at  the  expense 
of  the  property  OAvners,  the  city  having  no  control  over  such 
work,  it  was  assumed  that  such  statute  was  valid."     A  statute 

« Attorney  General  v.  ^k-Clear,  14G  'Lent  v.  Tillson,  140  U.  F,  310.  35 

Mich.  45,  109  X.  W.  27   [1900].  L.    419,    11    S.    285    [1S91]:     (aflirm- 

^  Carson  v.   St.   Francis  Levee   Dis-  ins;  Lent   v.  Tillson,   72   Cal.   404,    14 

trict,    59    Ark.    513,    27    S.    W.    590  Pac.  71   [18S7]).' 

[1894].  "Astoria  Heights  Land  Co.  v.  City 

"Carson   v.   St.   Francis  Levee   Dis-  of  New  York.    179   X.   V.   579,   72  X. 

trict,    59    Ark.    513,    27    S.    W.    590  E.    1139    [1904];     (affirming,   without 

[1894].  opinion,  86  X.  Y.  S.  651.  89  App.  Div. 

•Ilagar     v.     Reclamation     District  512   [1903]). 
Xo.  108,  111   r.  S.  701,  28  L.  569,  4 
S.  663   [1884]. 


§  252  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  388 

which  provides  that  improvements  can  be  constructed  only  if 
the  board  of  public  works  recommends  an  improvement  ordi- 
nance to  the  council  and  the  council  enacts  such  ordinance,  the 
council  havino:  ample  power  to  refuse  to  pass  it;  and  which  pro- 
vides that  such  board  is  to  make  a  preliminary  apportionment 
of  the  expense  when  the  work  is  completed,  and  that  the  council, 
after  hearing  objections,  has  power  to  pass  an  assessing  ordinance, 
does  not  deprive  the  city  of  its  control  of  local  affairs.^"  Indeed, 
while  local  self-government  is  often  referred  to  as  a  principle 
justifying  the  power  of  local  assessments,"  it  has  but  seldom 
been  considered  by  the  courts  to  what  extent,  if  any,  it  operates, 
in  the  absence  of  specific  constitutional  provisions,  as  a  restriction 
upon  such  power.  Probably  questions  of  this  sort  would  be  pre- 
sented for  judicial  consideration  more  frequently  if  it  were  not. 
for  specific  constitutional  provisions  forbidding  special  legisla- 
tion.^^ Under  these  constitutional  provisions,  only  general  laws 
can  be  passed ;  and  the  legislature  is  not  likely  to  deprive  the 
state  at  large  of  the  privilege  of  local  self-government  by  general 
laws. 

§  252.    Power  of  legislature  to  prescribe  specific  improvement. 

A  question  analogous  to  that  involving  the  power  of  the  legis- 
lature to  confer  upon  boards  not  chosen  by  the  voters  or  property 
owners  of  the  assessment  district,  or  of  the  political  subdivisions 
therein  included,  the  power  to  levy  local  assessments,  is  the 
(|uestion  of  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  designate  and  require 
the  construction  of  a  specific  improvement  leaving  to  the  mu- 
nicipal corporation,  or  other  public  corporation,  merely  the  min- 
isterial duty  of  carrying  into  execution  the  mandate  of  the  legis- 
lature. In  the  absence  of  some  specific  constitutional  provision 
forbidding  such  statute,  such  as,  for  example,  the  constitutional 
provision  forbidding  special  legislation,  it  is  generally  assumed 

*°  City    of    Denver    v.    Londoner,    33  based,   had  their   origin    in   the   prin- 

Colo.    104,  80  Pac.   117    [1904];    (not  ciple      of       local       self-government." 

affected  on  this  point  by  reversal  in  Board    of    Improvement    District   No. 

Londoner  v.  City  and  County  of  Den-  60  v.   Cotter,  71   Ark.  556,  76  S.  W. 

ver,  210  U.  S.  373,  28  S.  708   [1908].  552   [1903];    (citing  Crane  v.  Siloani 

"  "This  court  has  held,  in  constru-  Springs,    67   Ark.   300,   55   S.  W.  955 

ing   the   effect  of  these  statutes   that  [1899]). 

they    as    well    as    the    constitutional  ^- See  §   176  et  seq. 
provision     upon     which     they     were 


389 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS, 


§252 


that  the  legislature  has  the  power  to  require  the  construction  of 
a  specific  improvement  by  local  assessment.^  Thus,  in  the  District 
of  Columbia,  Congress  may  provide  that  certain  water-mains  shall 
be  laid,  and  that  the  abutting  property  owners  shall  pay  a  certain 
amount  per  front  foot  therefor.-  A  statute  has  been  upheld  in 
which  the  legislature  had  provided  for  the  widening  of  a  spe- 
cifically named  street.  In  this  case,  however,  the  statute  gave 
to  a  majority  of  the  property  owners  the  right  to  file  a  protest 
against  such  improvement,  and  thus  to  prevent  it."*  A  statute 
has  been  upheld  in  which  the  legislature  provided  two  different 
methods  of  repairing  the  streets,  one  method  for  one  portion  of 
a  specific  .street  and  the  other  method  for  the  other  portion.^  It 
has  been  held  that  the  legislature  can  authorize  a  city  to  raise, 
by  local  assessment,  an  additional  sum  over  and  above  the  con- 
tract price,  and  pay  the  sum  over  to  the  contradictor  by  whom  the 
public  improvement  for  which  the  original  assessment  was  levied 
was  constructed.-  Where  a  statute  of  this  sort  has  been  held  to 
be  unconstitutional,  it  has  been  on  account  of  some  constitutional 
provision  forbidding  special  legislation,  and  not  because  of  any 
unwritten  principle  of  the  constitution  securing  local  self-gov- 
ernment. Thus,  in  Ohio,  a  statute  of  this  sort  was  at  first  held 
to   be   valid.''     Subsequently   the    Supreme    Court    overruled    its 


*  Parsons  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943,  IS  8.  521 
[1898];  Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Kier, 
52  Cal.  270  [1877];  Hagar  v.  Board 
of  Supervisors  of  Yolo  County,  47 
Cal.  222  [1874];  In  tlio  Matter  ol 
the  Confirmation  of  tlie  Keport  of 
the  Commissioners  of  Assessment  for 
Grading,  Paving  and  Otlier\\;ise  Im- 
provins;  Saekett.  Douglas  and  De 
Grew  Streets  in  the  City  of  Brooklyn. 
74  N.  Y.  95  [1878]  ;  State  ex  rel. 
Baltzell  V.  Stewart.  74  \Yis.  fi20.  (5 
L.  P.  A.   394.   43  N.   W.  947    [1889]. 

^Parsons  v.  Distriet  of  Cnhnnbia. 
170  U.  S.  45.  42  L.  94.1,  IS  S.  521 
[189S]. 

"Lent  V.  Tillsnn.  140  V.  S.  310. 
35  L.  410.  11  S.  285  [1891]:  (af- 
firminir  Lent  v.  Tillson.  72  Cal.  404, 
14  Pac.   71    [1887]K 

'Oakland  Pnving  Co.  v.  Pier,  52 
Cal.  270   [18771. 


^  Brew.ster  v.  City  of  Syracuse,  19 
X.  Y.  116  [1859]';  In  Granger  v. 
City  of  Buffalo,  6  Abb.  N.  C.  238 
[1879]  such  a  statute  was  said  to 
be  a  "very  remarkable  legislative  en- 
actment," in  autliorizing  work  done 
under  a  prior  contract,  which  had 
been  held  invalid,  in  1  Sheldon  Sup. 
Ct.  445,  to  be  credited  as  performed 
of  a  subsequent  contract.  For  the 
same  principle  in  taxation  on  realty 
to  reind)ur?c  certain  individuals  who 
had  voluntnrily  entered  into  a  bond 
to  pay  extraordinary  expenses  of  the 
termination  of  a  canal  in  Utica; 
Thomas  v.  Leland.  24  Wend.  (X.  Y.) 
Go    [1840]. 

"State  ex  rel.  Ilibbs  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners  of  Franklin 
County.  35  O.  S.  458  [1880];  (A 
case  of  an  improvement  to  be  paid 
for  bv  general   taxation.) 


§253 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


390 


earlier  decision,  and  held  such  a  statute  invalid.  The  principle 
involved,  however,  was  the  effect  upon  such  statutes  of  a  pro- 
vision in  the  constitution  of  Ohio  requiring  laws  of  a  general 
nature  to  be  uniform.'^ 

§  253.    Public  character  of  assessment  districts. 

Assessment  districts  comprising  the  land  which  is  benefited 
by  the  proposed  assessment,  and  formed 'by  the  consent  of  the 
property  owners,  are  regarded  as  public  corporations,^  or  at  least 
as  quasi  public  corporations.-  and  not  as  private  corporations.^ 
Probably  ''public  quasi  corporation"  is  the  term  intended  to  be 
used  instead  of  "quasi  public  corporation."*  The  proceedings 
leading  up  to  the  formation  of  a  drainage  or  reclamation  district 
are,  in  legal  effect,  the  levying  of  a  local  assessment  for  benefits.^ 
The  organization  of  such  a  district  "results  in  putting  a  burden 
on  property  against  the  will  of  the  owners,  and  the  requirements 
as  to  the  proceedings  of  that  character  cannot  be  evaded  by  call- 
ing the  governmental  agency,  through  which  the  proceeding  is 


'Lewis  V.  Symmes,  61  0.  S.  471, 
76  Am.  St.  Rep.  428,  56  N.  E.  194 
[1900];  Hixson  v.  Burson,  54  O.  S. 
470,  43  X.  E.  1000  [1896];  State  ex 
rel.  V.  Commissioners,  54  0.  S.  333, 
43   N.   E.   587    [1896]. 

^  Davis  V.  Gaines,  48  Ark.  370,  3 
S.  W.  184  [1886];  Quint  v.  Hoffman. 
103  Cal.  506,  37  Pac.  514  [1894]; 
Reclamation  District  No.  124  v.  Grsy, 
95  Cal.  601,  30  Pac.  779  11892]; 
Springer  v.  Walters,  139  111.  419,  28 
N.  E.  761  [1893];  Elmore  v.  Drain- 
age Commissioners,  135  111.  269,  25 
Am.  St.  Rep.  383,  25  N.  E.  1010 
[1892]  ;  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
County  of  Monroe  v.  Harrell,  147 
Ind.  500,  46  K  E.  124  [1896];  New 
Eel  River  Draininjij  Association  v. 
Durbin,  30  Ind.  173  [1868];  Mound 
City  Land  &  Stock  Co.  v.  ]Miller,  170 
Mo.  240,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  727,  60  L. 
R.  A.  190,  70  S.  W.  721  [1902]; 
Columbia  Bottom  Levee  Co.  v.  IMeier, 
39  Mo.  53  [1866]. 

^  Kedzie  v.  West  Cliicapro  Park 
Commissioners.   114  111.  280.  2  X.  E. 


182  [1886].  Drainage  districts  are 
"created  for  public  purposes,  are  in 
no  sense  private  corporations,  but  on 
tlie  other  hand,  they  are  at  least 
quasi  public  corporations,  and  as  such 
the  laws  providing  for  their  organi 
zation  are  subject  to  be  changed,  mod- 
ified or  repealed,  as  the  wisdom  of 
the  legislature  may  direct."  Smith 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Detrick,  140  111. 
355,  29  X.  E.  676   [1893]. 

^Springer  v.  Walters,  139  111.  419, 
28  X.  E.  761    [1893]. 

*  Carson  v.  St.  Francis  Levee  Dis- 
trict, 59  Ark.  513,  27  S.  W.  590 
[1894];  To  the  same  effect  see:  Es- 
sex Public  Road  Board  v.  Skinkle, 
140  U.  S.  334,  35  L,  446,  11  S.  790 
[1891];  (affirming,  Essex  Public 
Road  Board  v.  Skinkle,  49  X.  J.  L. 
(20  Vr.)  65,  6  Atl.  435  [1886]  which 
was  affirmed  in  Essex  Public  Road 
Board  v.  Skinkle.  49  X.  J.  L.  (20 
Vr.)   641.  10  Atl.  379  [1887]). 

^  Reclamation  District  Xo.  537  of 
Yolo  County  v.  Burger,  122  Cal.  442, 
55  Pac.  156   [1898]. 


I 


391 


AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


§254 


conducted,  a  corporation.""  Accordingly  the  legislature  may 
take  away  from  such  assessment  district  a  part  or  all  of  the 
powers  which  it  has  conferred  upon  it,  as  long  as  it  does  not 
prejudice  those  who  have  extended  credit  to  such  corporation  in 
reliance  upon  the  statutory  powers  which  it  then  possesses/ 
Common  examples  of  such  corporations  are  drainage  districts^ 
park  districts "  and  road  districts.^" 

§  254.     De  facto  districts. 

If  there  is  in  existence  a  valid  law  under  which  an  assessment 
district  might  be  organized,  and  there  has  been  a  hona  fide  at- 
tempt to  comply  with  such  statute  in  organizing  a  district,  the 
question  of  the  regularity  and  validity  of  such  organization  can- 
not be  raised  collaterally  as  a  defense  in  a  suit  to  enforce  such 
assessment  or  in  an  injunction  suit  to  restrain  the  collection  of 
such  assessment/  An  assessment  levied  by  a  de  facto  assessment 
district  is  as  valid  as  one  levied  by  an  assessment  district  de  jure.- 


°  Reclamation  District  No.  537  ol 
Yolo  County  v.  Burger,  122  Cai.  442, 
55  Pac.   156   [1898]. 

''  Cooper  V.  Arctic  Ditchers,  56  Ind. 
233   [1877]. 

*  People  of  the  StAte  of  California 
V.  Hagar,  52  Cal.  171  [1877];  Smith 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Detrick,  140  111.  355, 
29  N.  E.  676  [1893];  Springer  v. 
Walters.  139  111.  419,  28  X.  E.  761 
[1893];  ^Yilson  v.  Board  of  Trustees, 
of  the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago, 
133  111.  443,  27  X.  E.  203  [1891  |; 
Mound  City  Land  &  Stock  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler, 170  Mo.  240,  94  Am.  St.  Pvcp. 
727,  60  L.  R.  A.  190,  70  S.  W.  721 
[1902]. 

*  Dunham  v.  People  ex  rel.  McCrea, 
96  111.  331  [1880];  People  ex  rel. 
Miller  v.  Brislin,  80  111.  423   [1875]. 

"Essex  Public  Road  Board  v.  Skin- 
kle,  140  I'.  S.  334,  35  L.  446.  11  S. 
790  [1891];  (afiirming  Essex  Public 
Road  Board  v.  Skinkle,  40  X.  J.  L. 
(20  Vr.)  65,  6  Atl.  435  [1SS()]  wliicli 
was  aflirmed  in  Essex  Publii"  Road 
Board  v.  Skinkle,  49  X.  .T.  L.  r20 
Vr.)  641,  10  Atl.  379  [1887]). 

^  Quint  V.  ITofTman,  103  Cal.  506. 
37  Pac.  514  [1894];  Morrell  v.  Union 


Drainage  District  Xo.  1,  118  111.  139, 
8  X.  E.  675  [1887];  Keigwin  v. 
Drainage  Commissioners  of  Hamilton 
Township,  115  111.  347,  5  X.  E.  575 
[1886];  Etchison  Ditching  Associa- 
tion V.  Hillis,  40  Ind.  408  [1872]; 
Etchison  Ditching  Association  v. 
Busenback,  39  Ind.  362  [1872];  Ex- 
celsior Draining  Co.  v.  Brown,  38 
Ind.  384  [1871];  Xew  Eel  River 
Draining  Association  v.  Durbin,  30 
Ind.  173  [1868]. 

"Lower  Kings  River  Reclamation 
District  Xo.  531  v.  Phillips,  108  Cal. 
,306,  39  Pac.  6.30,  41  Pac.  335  [1895]; 
Quint  V.  Hoffman,  103  Cal.  506,  37 
Pac.  514  [1894];  Reclamation  Dis- 
trict X"o.  124  V.  Gray,  95  Cal.  601, 
30  Pac.  779  [1892]  ;  Tucker  v.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Wall,  156  111.  108,  4fD  X. 
E.  451  [18951;  People  ex  rel.  Wood 
V.  Jones,  137  111.  35,  27  X.  E.  294 
[1892];  Wabash  Eastern  Railway 
Co.  of  Illinois  v.  Commissioners  of 
East  Lake  Fork  Drainage  District, 
134  HI.  384,  10  L.  R.  A.  285,  25  X. 
E.  781  [1891];  Evans  v.  Lewis,  121 
111.  478,  13  X.  E.  246  [1889J;  Mor- 
rell v.  I'nion  Drainage  District  Xo. 
1,   118  HI.   139.  8  X.  E.  675   [1887[; 


254 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


392 


The  same  principle  applies  to  an  irrigation  district.''  The  validity 
of  such  assessment  is  said  not  to  depend  in  any  way  upon  the 
question  whether  the  assessment  district  is  a  corporation  de  jure 
or  de  facto}  If  it  is  desired  to  attack  the  validity  of  the  organ- 
ization of  the  assessment  district,  this  must  be  done  directly  by 
a  proceeding  in  quo  icarranto.^  The  rule  that  no  collateral  at- 
tack can  be  made  upon  the  regularity  and  validity  of  the  organi- 
zation of  a  drainage  district  applies  with  a  special  force  in  cases 
where  there  has  been  a  full  opportunity  for  a  hearing  at  the  time 
of  the  organization  of  such  district,  and  where  the  party  who 
now  wishes  to  set  up  the  invalidity  of  the  organization  of  such 
district  has  omitted  or  neglected  to  raise  the  questions  which  he 
now  seeks  to  raise. "^  Under  some  statutes  and  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions no  opportunity  for  a  hearing  is  given  at  the  time  that  the 
district  is  organized,  and  the  owner  of  lands  which  it  is  sought 
to  assess  may  show  in  an  action  on  the  assessment  that  such 
district  has  no  legal  validity,  since  this  is  his  first  opportunity  to 


1 


Keigwin  v.  Drainage  Commissioners 
of  Hamilton  Township,  115  111.  347, 
5  X.  E.  575  [1886];  Blake  v.  People 
for  use  of  Caldwell,  109  111.  504 
[1884];  Etcliison  Ditching  Associa- 
tion V.  Hillis.  40  Ind.  408  [1872]; 
Etchison  Ditching  Association  v.  Bus- 
enback.  39  Ind.  362  [1872];  Excel- 
sior Draining  Co.  v.  Brown,  38  Ind. 
384  [1871];  New  Eel  Eiver  Draining 
Association  v.  Durbin,  30  Ind.  173 
[1868]. 

8  Quint  V.  Hoffman,  103  Cal.  506. 
37  Pac.  514   [1804], 

*  Quint  V.  Hoffman,  103  Cal.  506, 
37  Pac.   514    [1894J. 

^  People  ex  rel.  Wood  v.  Jones,  137 
111.  35,  27  X.  E.  294  [1892];  Wa- 
bash Eastern  Railway  Co.  of  Illi- 
nois V.  Commissioners  of  East  Lake 
Fork  Drainage  District,  134  111.  384, 
10  L.  P.  A.  285,  25  X.  E.  781  [1891]  ; 
Evans  v.  Lewis,  121  111.  478.  13  X. 
E.  246  [1889];  Keigwin  v.  Drainage 
Commissinncrs  of  TTnmilton  Town- 
ship, 11  o  HI.  347,  5  X.  E.  575 
[1886]:  Blake  v.  People  for  use  of 
Caldwell,  109  HI.  504  [18811. 


*  Lower  Kings  River  Reclamation 
District  Xo.  531  v.  Phillips,  108  Cal. 
306,  39  Pac.  630,  41  Pac.  335  [1895]  ; 
Reclamation  District  Xo.  124  v.  Gray. 
95  Cal.  601,  30  Pac.  779  [1892]; 
In  the  ^Matter  of  the  Bonds  of  the 
Madera  Irrigation  District,  92  Cal. 
296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106,  14  L.  R.  A. 
755,  28  Pac.  272,  675  [1891];  People 
ex  rel.  Selby  v.  Dyer,  205  111.  575. 
69  X.  E.  70  [1903]  ;"  Tucker  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Wall,  156  111.  108,  40  X.  E. 
451  [1895];  People  ex  rel.  Wood  v. 
Jones,  137  111.  35,  27  N.  E.  294 
[1892];  Wabash  Eastern  Railway  Co. 
of  Illinois  V.  Commissioners  of  East 
Lake  Fork  Drainage  District.  134  111. 
384,  10  L.  R.  A.  285,  25  X.  E.  781 
[1891];  Evans  v.  Lewis,  121  111.  478. 
13  X.  E.  246  [1889];  Morrell  v.  Un- 
ion Drainage  District  Xo.  1,  118  111. 
139,  8  X.  E.  675  [1887]:  Keig^vin  v. 
Drainage  Commissioners  of  Hamilton 
Township.  115  111.  347,  5  X.  E.  575 
[1886];  Blake  v.  People  for  use  of 
Caldwell,   109  111.  504   [1884]. 


I 


393  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMEiSTTS.  §  255 

raise  such  question.'  Such  defense  must,  however,  be  made 
specifically.  The  articles  of  association  of  the  drainage  district 
are  not  properly  a  part  of  the  complaint  in  a  proceeding  to 
enforce  the  assessment,  and  their  sufficiency  cannot  therefore  be 
tested  by  general  demurrer."  The  property  owners  have  a  right 
to  a  hearing  at  the  organization  of  the  district,  and  if  such  hear- 
ing is  denied  them  they  have  a  right  to  raise  the  question  of  the 
validity  of  the  organization  of  the  district  in  a  suit  upon  the 
assessment."  Where  a  statute  provides  a  lueans  for  direct  attack 
upon  the  validity  of  the  organization  di.strict,  such  means  may,  of 
course,  be  taken  advantage  of.  The  fact  that  the  district  has  not 
exercised  its  powers  or  acted  as  a  corporation  can  be  made  a 
ground  for  a  proceeding  to  forfeit  its  charter,  either  bj'  a  direct 
act  of  the  legislature  or  by  a  judgment  of  a  court  of  competent 
jurisdiction  acting  under  statutory  authority.^"  Such  non-user 
cannot,  however,  be  made  the  basis  of  a  valid  attack  upon  an 
assessment  levied  by  such  corporation.^'  If,  however,  a  corpora- 
tion does  not  purport  to  be  organized  under  a  statute  conferring 
certain  powers,  it  cannot  exercise  the  powers  given  by  the  statute. 
and  its  acts,  which  can  be  only  upheld  by  assuming  that  such 
powers  are  conferred  upon  it,  are  invalid. ^- 

§  255.    Assessment  by  private  corporations. 

The  legislature  has  occasionally  attempted  to  confer  upon  pri- 
vate corporations  the  power  to  construct  public  improvements 
and  levy  assessments  therefor.  In  some  cases,  such  statutes  have 
been  held  to  be  unconstitutional.'     The  theory  often   invoked  is. 

'Mack    V.    Polecat    Drainage    Dis-  '"  .^wamp  Land  District  Xo.  150  v. 

trict.    216     111.    50.    74    X.     E.     091  Silver,  98  Cal.  51.  32  Pac.  806  [1893]. 

[1905];     Newton     County     Draining  "Swamp  Land  District  Xo.   150  v. 

Co.  V.  Xofsinger.  43  Ind.  500  [1873] ;  Silver,  98  Cal.  51,  32  Pac.  866  [1893]. 

New  Eel  River  Draining  Association  "  Reclamation    District    Xo.    3    v. 

V.  Durbin,   30  Ind.   173    [1808].  Kennedy,  58  Cal.  124   [1881]. 

"Dobson    V.    Duck    Pond    Ditching  'Cypress    Pond    Draining    Co.    v. 

Association,     42     Ind.     312     [1873];  Hooper,  59  Ky.   (2  Met.)   350  [1859] ; 

Etchison      Ditching      Association      v.  State,   Kean.  Pros.  v.   Driggs   Drain- 

Hillis.  40  Ind.  408   [1872];   Etchison  age    Co.,    45    X.    J.    L.    (16    Vr.)    91 

Ditching    Association    v.    P.usenback.  [1883];    Coster   v.   Tide   Water   Com- 

39  Ind.  302   [1872]:   Excelsior  Drain-  pany.   18  X.  J.  Eq.    (3  C.  E.  Gr.)    54 

ing  Co.  V.  Brown.  38  Ind.  384  [1871].  [1800];      (afrirmed     in     Tide     Water 

"Reclamation    District   Xo.    537    of  Company  v.  Coster.   18  X.  J.  Eq.    (3 

Yolo  County  v.  Rurger,  122  Cal.  442,  C.    E.    Gr.)     518.    90    Am.    Dec.    634 

55  Pac.  150   [1898].  [1800]);    In   Allentown  v.   Henry.  73 


§  255  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  394 

that  such  a  statute  imposes  a  local  burden  for  the  private  benefit 
of  the  members  of  the  private  corporation.-  In  these  eases,  how- 
ever, the  assessment  imposed  has  been  objectionable  apart  from 
the  fact  that  it  was  levied  by  a  private  corporation.  In  one  statute 
the  area  of  the  drainage  district  in  question  contained  land 
amounting  to  more  than  one-third  of  the  total  area  which  would 
receive  a  very  slight  advantage  from  the  drainage  improvement, 
the  owners  of  which  land  had  nothing  to  do  with  obtaining  the 
passage  of  the  special  act  and  no  notice  of  the  application  there- 
for and  had  never  assented  to  the  provisions  thereof.  Such  act  was 
held  to  be  unconstitutional.^  So  a  statute  which  gave  to  the 
private  corporation  the  right  to  decide  what  land  should  be 
drained,  and  which  provided  for  the  payment  of  annual  dividends, 
thus  evidently  contemplating  that  the  corporation  would  operate 
at  a  profit.-  and  would  charge  the  property  owners  more  than  the 
cost  of  such  drainage,  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional.*  In  an- 
other case,  a  private  corporation  was  formed  to  drain  certain 
swamps,  under  a  contract  to  be  entered  into  between  them  and 
certain  commissioners  appointed  to  make  such  contract.  No  power 
was  given  to  the  OAvners  of  the  land  improved  to  prevent  such 
improvement.  For  these  reasons  the  statute  was  held,  in  the  lower 
court,  to  be  unconstitutional.^  This  decision  was  affirmed  in  the 
upper  court,  but  apparently  upon  the  sole  ground  that  the  amount 
of  the  assessment  was  not  limited  to  the  amount  of  the  benefits 
conferred  upon  the  land  by  the  improvement  for  which  such 
assessment  was  levied."  In  other  cases,  where  it  appears  that 
the  amount  of  the  assessment  is  limited  to  the  amount  of  the 
benefits  conferred  by  the  improvement  for  which  such  assessment 
is  levied,  statutes  authorizing  private  corporations  to  make  public 
improvements,  and  to  procure  assessments  therefor,  were  upheld 

Pa.  St.  404  [1873];  a  statute  author-  ^Cypress    Pond    Draining    Co.    v. 

izing  a  water  company   "to   lay  rea-  Hooper,  59  Ky.    (2  ]\Iet.)   350   [1859]. 

sonable  assessments"  was  said  to  be  *  State,     Kean,     Pros.     v.     Driggs 

unconstitutional.      This    observation.  Drainage  Co.,  45   X.  J.  L.    (16  Vr. ) 

however,    was    an    obiter   as   the    real  91    [1883]. 

point    decided    was    that    when    such  °  Coster    v.    Tide    Water    Company, 

powers   were   transferred   to   the   city  18  K  J.  Eq.   (3  C.  E.  Gr.)   54  [1866]. 

they   might  be   constitutionally   exer-  '  Tide  Water  Company  v.  Coster.  IS 

cised  by  .such  city.                       '  X.  J.  Eq.    (3  C.  E.  Gr.)    518,  90  Am. 

^Cypress    Pond    Draining    Co.    v.  Dec.  634   [1866]. 
Hooper,  59  Ky.   (2  Met.)   350  [1859]. 


395  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  256 

as  valid."  In  some  of  these  cases,  however,  the  assessment  was 
to  be  made  by  public  olficers,  acting  upon  the  application  of  the 
private  corporation.^  Occasionally  corporations  are  created  which 
in  form  are  private  corporations,  but  which  by  reason  of  their  com- 
position and  powers,  are  essentially  public  corporations.  Thus 
a  corporation  formed  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  a  free  turn- 
pike, and  levying  assessments  therefor,  the  officers  of  which  are 
really  county  or  township  officers  discharging  the  ordinary  public 
duty  of  attending  to  the  construction  of  a  public  road,  is  in  realty 
a  public  corporation." 

§  256.    Effect  of  specific  constitutional  provisions — Arkansas. 

The  power  of  the  legislature  to  confer  the  power  of  local  assess- 
ment upon  public  corporations,  quasi-corporations  and  assessment 
districts  has  been  considered  by  the  courts  of  some  jurisdictions 
with  reference  to  the  specific  provisions  of  their  respective  state 
constitutions.  The  constitution  of  Arkansas  provides:  ''Nothing 
in  this  constitution  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  prohibit  the  General 
Assembly  from  authorizing  assessments  on  real  property  for  local 
improvements  in  towns  and  cities  under  such  regulations  as  may 
be  prescribed  by  law,  to  be  based  upon  the  consent  of  a  majority 
in  value  of  the  property  holders  owning  property  adjoining  the 
locality  to  be  affected.  .  .  .  "^  This  provision  is  regarded  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Arkansas  as  not  constituting  a  restriction 
upon  the  power  of  the  legislature.  The  legislature  may  accord- 
ingly confer  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments  upon  bodies 
other  than  towns  and  cities,  such  as  levee  districts.-  and  improve- 
ment districts.''     The  legislature  furthermore  is  not  thereby  pre- 

'  Xpw  Haven  &   !■  ort  Wayno  Turn-  ^  Foster  v.  Comniis.-jioners  of  Wood 

pike  Co.  V.  Bird,  33  Ind.  325  [1870];  County,  9  O.  S.  540   [1859]. 

Turner    v.    Thorntown    &    ^lechanics-  ^  Article  XIX,  §  27,  Constitution  of 

burji;   Gravel    Road    Co.,    33    Ind.    317  Arkansas. 

[1S70];   Iloertz  v.  Jefferson  Southern  ^  Ritter  v.  Drainage  District  Xo.  1. 

Pond   Draining  Co.,    119   Ky.   824,  84  Poinsett  County,   78   Ark.   580,   94   S. 

S.  W.  1141.  27  Ky.  L.  R.  278  [1905];  W.  711   [1906];  Carson  v.  St.  Francis 

Xevv    Orleans    Drainage    Co.    praying  Drainage    District.    59    Ark.    513,    27 

for  the  confirmation  of  a  tableau.   11  S.   W.   590    [18941:    Davis   v.   Gaines. 

La.  Ann.  338  [1856].  48  Ark.  370,  3  S.  W.  184. 

'  Hoertz  v.  Jefferson  Soutliern  Pond  'Crane  v.  Siloam  Springs,  67  Ark. 

Draining  Co..   119  Ky.  824.  84  S.  W.  30,    55    S.    W.    955    [1899];    City    of 

1141.  27  Ky.  L.  R.  278    [1905];   Xew  Little    Rock    v.    Board    of    Improve- 

Orleans  Drainage  Co.  praying  for  the  nients,  etc.,  42  Ark.   152    [1883]. 
confirmation    of    a    tableau,     11     La. 
Ann.  338   [1856]. 


§  257  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  396 

vented  from  organizing  an  improvement  district  within  a  city,  or 
one  which  in  its  territorial  area  embraces  the  entire  territory  of 
a  city/  but  which,  after  its  organization,  is  beyond  the  control  of 
the  city.  A  provision  to  the  effect  that  "...  the  General  As- 
sembly may  delegate  the  taxing  power,  with  the  necessary  re- 
strictions, to  the  state's  subordinate,  political  and  municipal  cor- 
porations, to  the  extent  of  providing  for  their  existence,  main- 
tenance and  well-being,  but  no  further,"  ^  does  not  apply  to  local 
assessments  but  merely  to  general  taxation,  and  therefore  does 
not  restrict  the  legislature  in  granting  the  power  of  local  assess- 
ment.*^' Accordingly  a  statute  which  provided  that  the  city  council 
should  lay  off  the  city  into  improvement  districts;  that  upon  the 
petition  of  a  majority  in  value  of  the  owners  of  the  realty  in  any 
such  district  for  an  improvement,  the  council  should  appoint  three 
residents  as  a  board  to  make  such  improvement;  and  that  such 
board  should  make  such  improvement  and  report  the  cost  thereof 
to  the  council,  whereupon  the  council  should  levy  an  assessment 
for  the  cost  of  such  improvement,  was  held  to  be  valid  on  the 
ground  that  the  discretion  necessary  in  such  a  case  need  not 
necessarily  be  left  to  the  city  council  but  might  be  reposed  else- 
where." A  former  constitution  of  Arkansas  provided  that  the 
County  Court  "shall  have  .jurisdiction  in  all  matters  relating  to 
county  taxes,  disbursements  of  money  for  county  purposes,  and 
every  other  case  that  may  be  necessary  to  the  internal  improve- 
ment and  local  concerns  of  the  respective  counties."^  This  pro- 
vision was  held  applicable  to  public  internal  improvements  and 
local  concerns  for  general  county  purposes,  and  not  to  improve- 
ments for  special  local  purposes,  the  costs  of  which  were  to  be 
paid  by  assessments  upon  the  property  benefited  by  the  improve- 
ment.^ 

§  257.    Illinois — Restrictions  on  legislative  power. 

The  constitution  of  Illinois  provides:  "The  General  Assembl.v 
may  vest  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and  villages  with 

*  Crane  v.  Siloarn  Springs.  G7  Ark.  Improvements,     etc.,     42     Ark.     152 

30,  55  S.  W.  955    [1899].  [1883]. 

^  Article   II.,    §    23,   Constitution   of  '  x^rticle    VI,    §    9,    Constitution    of 

Arkansas  [1874].  Arkansas   [1836]. 

•Cribbs   v.    Benedict,    64   Ark.    555.  "  :\IcGehee    v.    Mathis,    21    Ark.    40 

44   S.   W.   707    [1897].  [I860];     (not   affected    on    this   point 

'  City    of   Little   Rock    v.    Board   of  by    reversal    in   McGee   v.   Mathis,   71 

U.  S.    (4  Wall)    143    [1866]). 


397  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY   ASSESSMENTS  §  258 

poAver  to  make  local  improvements  by  special  assessments  or  by 
special  taxation  of  contiguous  property  or  otherwise.  For  all 
other  corporate  purposes,  all  municipal  corporations  may  be 
vested  with  authority  to  assess  and  collect  taxes,  but  such  taxes 
shall  be  imiform  in  respect  to  persons  and  property  with  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  body  imposing  the  same."  ^  Prior  to  this  consti- 
tutional provision  giving  specific  authority  for  special  assessments, 
the  power  of  levying  local  assessments  was  so  restricted  by  the 
construction  placed  by  the  court  upon  the  constitutional  require- 
ment of  uniformity  in  taxation,  that  it  was  scarcely  practicable 
to  exercise  it.  The  court  held  that  local  assessment  must  be 
apportioned  either  according  to  benefits  eo  nomine  or  according 
to  value,  excluding  such  methods  as  according  to  frontage  and 
the  like.-  Accordingly,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  has  always 
tended  to  regard  this  constitutional  provision  as  conferring  the 
power  of  special  assessments,  and  not  as  limiting  the  pow^er  given 
by  the  general  grant  of  taxation.^  While  in  this  respect  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  entertains  a  view  different  from  that 
held  in  most  jurisdictions,  the  difference  really  dates  from  and 
is  caused  by  the  original  hostile  attitude  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Illinois  toward  local  assessments. 

§  258.    Upon  what  corporations  power  of  local  assessment  may  be 
conferred. 

After  the  adoption  of  this  constitutional  provision  there  has 
been  no  question  as  to  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  confer  the 
power  of  local  assessment  in  general  upon  cities,  towns  and  vil- 
lages.^ The  serious  questions  which  have  arisen  in  this  connection 
concern  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  confer  the  power  of  local 

'Article    TX..    §    9.    Constitution    of  'City  of  Chicivio  v.  Bredo.  218  111. 

Illinois   [18701.  528.  75  X.  E.    1044  -[10051  :   Jonos  v. 

-City   of   Chicago   v.    Baer.    41    111.  Town  of  Lake  View,   151   111.   Gt).3.  38 

306   [1866]  ;   City  of  Ottawa  v.  Spo.n-  X'.  E.  688;  Liijhtnor  v.  City  of  Pooria, 

cer.  40  111.  211    [1866];   City  of  Chi-  1.50    111.    80.    37    X.    E.    60     [1804]: 

Cairo   V.   Larned,    34   111.    203    [1864]:  Davis   v.    City   of   Litchfield.    145    111. 

The   early   attitude   of   the   courts   of  313.  21   L.   li.   A.   563,   33   X".   E.   888 

Illinois      toward      local      assessments  [1893];    Linck   v.    City   of  Litchfield, 

prior  to  this  constitutional  provision.  141    111.    469.    31    X".    E.    123    [1893]: 

has    been    discussed    elsewhere.      See  Potwin     v.     Johnson.      108      111.      70 

§  l-'^S.  [18831:   Falch  v.  People  ex  rel.  .Tohn- 

'Oivins    V.    Citv    of    Cl.ica^-o.    188  son.  90  111.  137  [1881]  :  People  ex  rel. 

Til.  348.  58  X\  E.  912  [19001:  Up-  Miller  v.  Sherman.  83  111.  165  [1876]. 
dike  V.  WriTht.  81   111.  49    [1876], 


§  258  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  398 

assessment  upon  public  corporations  other  than  cities,  towns  and 
villages^  and  the  meaning  of  the  term  "corporate  authorities." 
Under  this  provision  there  are  two  general  grants  of  power.  The 
second  grant  is  that  of  general  taxation,  and  is  conferred  upon 
"all  municipal  corporations."  The  first  grant  concerns  the  power 
to  make  local  improvements  by  special  assessments,  or  by  special 
taxation  of  contiguous  property.  This  power  is  not  conferred 
upon  municipal  corporations  generally,  Init  merely  upon  the 
corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and  villages.  The  phrase- 
ology of  this  provision,  therefore,  prevents  the  legislature  from 
conferring  the  power  of  special  assessment  of  special  taxation 
upon  any  municipal  corporations  other  than  cities,  towns  and 
villages,  or  upon  a  private  corporation.-  Under  this  provision, 
the  legislature  attempted  to  provide  for  the  creation  and  organi- 
zation of  drainage  districts,  and  the  construction  of  drainage  im- 
provements to  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments.  No  provision  was 
made  for  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  people  to  be  taxed,  and  the 
statute  provided  for  the  levying  of  assessments  for  drainage  im- 
provements by  commissioners,  or  juries,  or  by  the  County  Court. 
This  statute  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional.^  It  was  held  that 
under  such  constitutional  provision  the  power  of  levying  general 
taxes  might  be  conferred  upon  public  corporations  other  than 
cities,  towns  and  villages,  but  that  such  taxes  must  be  uniform 
vrithin  such  district  with  respect  to  persons  and  property.  This 
statute  was  also  said  to  be  unconstitutional  as  not  providing  for 
obtaining  the  consent  of  the  electors  of  the  district  to  the  organ- 
ization thereof,  to  the  construction  of  the  improvement,  or  to 
levying  a  local  assessment  for  the  cost  thereof.  As  a  result  of 
this  decision  the  constitution  of  Illinois  was  amended  so  as  to 
enable  the  legislature  to  provide  for  drainage  districts  by  the 
adoption  of  the  following  provision:  "The  General  Assembly 
may  pass  law\s  permitting  the  owners  of  lands  to  construct  drains, 
ditches  and  levees  for  agricultural,  sanitary  or  mining  purposes, 
across  the  lands  of  others,  and  to  provide  for  the  organization  of 
drainage  districts,  and  vest  the  corporate  authorities  thereof  with 
power  to  construct  and  maintain  levees,  drains  and  ditches,  and 
to  keep  in  repair  all  drains,  ditches  and  levees  heretofore  con- 
structed under  the  laws  of  this  state  by  special  assessments  upon 

2  Updike     V.     Wright,     81     111.     49  ^Updike     v.     Wright,     81     111. 

[1876].  [18761. 


399  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  259 

the  property  benefited  thereby."^  Alter  the  adoption  of  tiiis  last 
provision,  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  provide  for  the  creation 
and  organization  of  drainage  districts,  and  of  empowering  such 
districts  to  levy  local  assessments,  has  been  recognized  without 
question.-^  Furthermore,  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize 
cities  and  villages  to  levy  local  assessments  for  the  purpose  of 
drainage,  has  been  recognized.''  It  may  also  provide  for  drainage 
districts,  to  include  both  city  and  county." 

§  259.    Who  are  corporate  authorities. 

Under  both  of  the  foregoing  sections  of  the  Illinois  constitution 
it  is  provided  that  the  legislature  may  vest  the  "corporate  au- 
thorities" of  the  cities,  towns,  villages  and  drainage  districts  with 
the  power  of  levying  local  assessments.  Since,  as  has  been  before 
stated,  it  is  held  in  Illinois  that  the  legislature  derives  its  power 
to  authorize  special  assessments,  apportioned  upon  the  basis  of 
frontage  or  other  similar  basis  entirely  from  these  specific  pro- 
visions in  the  constitution,  it  follow^s  that  in  that  state  the  legisla- 
ture can  confer  the  powder  of  levying  local  assessments  only  upon 
the  corporate  authorities  of  the  public  corporations  named  in  the 
constitution.^  In  determining  the  meaning  of  the  term  "corporate 
authorities"  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  has  held  that  the  term 
implies  the  officers  in  charge  of  such  public  corporation  who  have 
been  elected  by  the  voters  of  such  corporation,  or  who  have  been 
chosen  by  officers  who  were  elected  by  such  voters.-     "The  cor- 

*  Article   IV.,   §   31    [1878].  "Wilson   v.    Board   of   Trustees,   of 

^  Rogne  V.  People  ex  rel.  Goedtner,  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago,  133  111. 

224   111.   449,   79   N.   E.   602    [1906];  443,  27  X.  E.  203   [1891]. 

Carr  v.  People  ex  rel.  Goedtner,  224  '  Givins  v.  City  of  Chicago,  188  111. 

111.    160,   79   X.   E.   648    [1906];    Peo-  348,    58    X.    E.    912    [1900];    Cornell 

pie  ex  rel.,  etc.,  v.  Drainage  Commis-  v.  People  ex  rel.,  107  111.  372  [1883]; 

sinners    District    Xo.    7,    of   Town    of  See  to  the  same  effect,  Board  of  Di- 

Young  America,    143    111.   417,   32   X.  rectors  v.  Houston,  71  111.  318  [1874]  ; 

E.     688      [1895];      Bad^^er     v.     Inlet  Gage  v.  Graham.  57  111.   144    [1870]; 

Drainage  District,  141  111.  540,  31  X.  Hessler    v.    Drainage    Conmiissioners, 

E.    170    [1893];    Wilson   v.   Board    of  53    111.    105    [1870];    Harward    v.    St. 

Trustees  of  the   Sanitary  District  of  Clair    &    ^lonroe    Levee    &    Drainage 

Chicago,    133    111.   443,   27    X.    E.   203  Co.,    51     111.    130    [1869];     People    v. 

[1891];    Owners   of  Lands   v.   People,  Solomon.   51    111.   37    [1869]. 

113  111.  297   [1885];  Huston  V.  Clark.  -Citizens'    Savings    Bank    &    Trust 

112   III.   344    [1885].  Co.   v.   City  of  Chicago,  215   111.   174, 

« Wilson    V.    Board    of    Trustees    of  74  ^.   E.   115    [1905];   Givins  v.  City 

the     Sanitary    District    of     Chicago,  of    Chicago,    188    111.    348,    58    X.    E. 

133  111.  443.' 27  X.  E.  203    [1891].  912    [lOOO]. 


§  259  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT,  400 

porate  authorities  upon  whom  the  power  of  taxation  may  be 
conferred  within  the  purview  of  this  provision  of  the  constitution 
are  the  authorities  of  the  municipality  who  are  either  elected  di- 
rectly by  the  people  to  be  taxed  or  appointed  in  some  mode 
to  which  they  have  given  their  assent."^  No  other  officials,  it 
seems  to  be  held,  can  be  made  the  corporate  authorities  of  the 
public  corporation  within  the  meaning  of  this  provision  of  the 
constitution.  Subject  to  this  limitation,  how^ever,  the  legislature 
has  the  power  of  determining  who  shall  constitute  the  corporate 
authorities  of  the  public  corporation,  and  what  the  powers  of 
such  corporate  authorities  shall  be.*  The  legislature  may  dispose 
of  the  revenues  of  such  corporations.^  Accordingly  the  legislature 
may  provide  for  the  formation  of  a  drainage  district  on  petition 
of  the  adult  land  owners  of  lands  lying  in  the  proposed  district 
amounting  to  one-half  in  number  of  such  owners,  and  to  one-third 
in  ownership  of  the  total  amount  of  land  in  such  district,  giving 
to  the  other  land  owners  in  the  district  an  opportunity  to  contest 
the  formation  of  such  district.  It  may  provide  that  the  county 
commissioners  shall  be  the  drainage  commissioners  of  such  district, 
although  they  are  not  elected  by  the  voters  or  land  owners  of  such 
district,  at  least  if  the  assessment  is  merely  a  lien  upon  the  property 
benefited  and  not  a  personal  charge  npon  the  owners  of  land.  It 
may  further  constitute  the  county  surveyor,  county  treasurer  and 
sheriff  a  board  of  appeal  from  the  orders  of  the  drainage  commis- 
sioners confirming  special  assessments,  giving  an  appeal  from  such 
'board  to  the  County  Court. °  The  corporate  authorities  of  a  city 
or  village  may  be  made  drainage  commissioners  within  such  city 
or  village  and  given  authority  to  determine  what  lands  require 
drainage.^     The  legislature  may  constitute  the  highway  commis- 


'  Givins  v.  City  of  Chicago,  188  111.  ^Owners  of  Lands  v.  People  ex  rel. 

348,    58    X.    E.   912    [1900];    Snell   v.  Stookey,   113   111.  296    [1886]. 

City   of   Chicago,    133   111.   413,    8   L.  "Owners  of  Land  v.  People  ex  rel. 

R.  A.   858,  24  N.  E.  532;    Wetheroll  Stookey,    113    111.   296    [1886].      This 

V.   Devine,   116   111.   631,  6  N.   E.   24;  case    was    decided    under    Article    V., 

Cornell  v.  People  ex  rel..  107  111.  372  §    10,    and   Article   IV.,   §    31    of   the 

[1883].  Constitution   of   Illinois:    and   Article 

*  Wilson    V.    Board    of    Trustees    of  IX.,    §    9,    of    such    Constitution   does 

the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago,  133  not  operate  to   restrict   the  power  of 

111.  443,  27  XL  E.  203    [1891];   Own-  the   legislature. 

ers  of  Land  v.  People  ex  rel.  Stookey,  ^  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Spencer, 

113  111.  29    [18861:   Huston  v.  Clark,  118   HI.  446,  8  X.  E.  846    [1888]. 
112  111.   344    [18851. 


401  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  259 

sioners  of  a  drainage  district  a  board  of  drainage  commissioners.^ 
The  supervisor  and  assessor  of  a  town  are  corporate  authorities 
within  the  meaning  of  these  constitutional  provisions,  and  the 
power  of  levying  special  assessments  may  accordingly  be  con- 
ferred upon  them."  The  legislature  may  provide  for  a  board  of 
local  improvements  and  confer  upon  it  power  to  do  preliminary 
work  with  reference  to  local  improvements.  It  may  provide 
that  if  a  majority  in  quantity  of  the  owners  of  property 
in  two  or  more  contiguous,  blocks  abutting  upon  the  street 
to  be  improved  shall  petition  for  an  improvement  the  board 
may  recommend  such  improvement,  and  on  such  recommen- 
dation an  ordinance  must  be  passed  therefor.  Such  board 
is  regarded  as  an  agent  of  the  municipal  corporation  for  the 
purpose  of  restricting  the  power  of  the  corporate  authorities 
thereof  in  the  interest  of  the  propert}^  owners.  Its  power  to  recom- 
mend such  improvements,  thereby  making  an  ordinance  therefor 
compulsory,  is  based  upon  the  petition  of  the  property  owners.^" 
The  legislature  may  authorize  the  formation  of  a  park  district 
consisting  of  several  towns,  and  may  authorize  the  corporate  au- 
thorities of  such  towns  to  issue  bonds  for  the  cost  of  such  im- 
provement." The  power  of  levying  local  assessments  may  be  con- 
ferred upon  such  park  districts,^-  though  such  board  is  appointed 
by  the  Governor  of  the  state,  the  act  being  submitted  to  popular 
vote.^"''    Accordingl3^  as  the  lands  in  such  park  are  under  the  ex- 

'  People    ex    rel,    etc.,    v.    Drainage  728    [1897];    Chicago    &   N.    W.    Ry. 

Commissioners  District  No.  1  of  Town  Co.   v.   West   Chicago   Park   Commis- 

of   Young   America,    143    111.   417,   32  sioners,  151  111.  204,  25  L.  R.  A.  .300, 

N.  E.  688   [1893];   Kilgour  v.  Drain-  37  N.  E.   1079;   Kedzie  v.  West  Chi- 

age  Commissioners,   111   111.  342.  cago    Park    Commissioners,     114    111. 

•Jones  V.  Town  of  Lake  View,  151  280,  2  N.  E.  182  [1886];  West  Chi- 
lli. 663,  38  N.  E.  688  [1894];  The  cago  Park  Commissioners  v.  Western 
People  ex   rel.  v.   Gago,   83   111.  486;  Union    Telegraph     Co.,     103     111.    33 

^"Givins    v.    City    of    Cliicago,    188  [1882];  People  v.  Walsh,  96  111.  232. 

111.  348,  58  N.  E.  912    [1900].  36  Am.  Rep.   135;    South  Park  Com- 

^'  Dunham  v.  People  ex  rel.  McCrea,  missioners    v.    Dunlevy,    91     111.    49 

96    III.    331     [1880];    People   ex    rel.  [1878] ;  Wilcox  v.  People,  90  111.  186 

Miller  V.  Brislin,  80  111.  423  [1875];  [1878];    People   v.    Salomon,    51    111. 

Under    the    Constitution    of    1848    a  37. 

statute   providing    for    the    organiza-  "Act   of    1869,    Feb.    27;     1    Priv. 

tion  of  such  park  district  and  giving  Laws,    1869,    p.    342.      West   Chicago 

it  the  power  of  general  taxation  was  Park    Commissioners    v.    Farber,    171 

held  valid.     People  ex  rel.  Wilson  v.  111.   146,  49  N.  E.  427    [1897.   1898]; 

Salomon.   51    111.    37    [1869].  West  Chicago  Park  Commissioners  v. 

"West  Chicacro  Park   Commission-  City  of  Chicago,   152   111.  392,   38  N. 

ers  v.   Sweet,   167   111.   326,   47   N.   E.  E.   697    [1894]. 


§  260  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  402 

elusive  control  of  the  park  commissioners  for  assessment  purposes 
the  city  cannot  levy  an  assessment  against  such  lands/*  The 
powers  of  such  park  district  may  be  amended  by  action  of  the 
legislature  without  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  voters  resident 
therein/^  though  such  park  districts,  as  originally  formed,  were 
accepted  by  the  vote  of  the  qualified  voters  resident  in  such  dis- 
tricts.^'' Accordingly,  a  statute  authorizing  the  park  commission- 
ers to  levy  assessments  for  park  purposes  independent  of  the  town 
authorities,  and  not  requiring  such  park  commissioners  to  act 
through  the  town  authorities,  as  before,  is  valid. ^^  A  special  as- 
sessment district  cannot  be  created  for  levee  construction.^*^  Under 
a  similar  provision  of  the  constitution  of  California,^''  power  to 
levy  an  assessment  on  an  irrigation  district  may  be  conferred  upon 
the  board  of  supervisors  of  the  county  in  case  the  directors  of  the 
irrigation  district  fail  to  levy  such  assessment.-"  Under  a  consti- 
tutional provision  to  the  effect  that  "all  city,  town  and  village 
officers  whose  election  or  appointment  is  not  provided  for  by  this 
constitution  shall  be  elected  by  the  electors  of  such  cities,  towns 
and  villages,  or  appointed  by  such  authorities  thereof  as  the  legis- 
lature shall  designate,"  the  legislature  may  confer  power  to  im- 
prove certain  streets  near  a  park  upon  the  park  commissioners.-^ 
A  provision  in  the  constitution  of  California  forbidding  the  legisla- 
ture to  levy  taxes  on  public  corporations,  but  authorizing  the  grant 
of  power  to  the  corporate  authorities  of  such  public  corporation 
to  assess  and  collect  taxes  is  not  violated  by  a  statute  which  au- 
thorizes an  assessment  and  levy  by  a  board  of  supervisors.-^ 

§  260.    Minnesota. 

The  constitution  of  Minnesota  provides:    "The  legislature  may, 
by  general  law  or  special  act,  authorize  municipal  corporations  to 

"Billings  V.   City   of   Chicago,   167  ers  v.  Farber,   171   111.   146,  49  N.  E. 

111.  337,  47   N.  E.  731    [1897];   West  427   [1897,  1898]. 

Chicago  Park  Commissioners  v.  City  "Updike    v.    Wright,     81     111.    49 

of    Chicago,    152    111.    392,    38    N.    E.  [1876]. 

697   [1894].  '»  Article  XI.,  §  12. 

**  Andrews  v.  People  ex  rel.   Rum-  -"  Nevada  National   Bank  v.   Board 

sey,    83    111.    529    [1876];    People    ex  of    Supervisors    of    Kern    County,    5 

rel.    Miller    v.    Brislin,    80    111.    423  Cal.    App.    638,    91    Pac.    122    [1907]. 

[1875].  ''^Astor    v.    Mayor,    62    N.    Y.    567 

"People  ex  rel.  Wilson  v.  Salomon,  [1875]. 

51  111.  37.  -2  Nevada  National   Bank   v.   Board 

"  West  Chicago   Park   Commission-  of    Supervisors    of    Kern    County,    5 

Cal.   App.    638,   91    Pac.    122    [1907]. 


i 


403  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  261 

levy  assessments  for  local  improvements  upon  the  property  front- 
ing upon  such  improvements,  or  upon  the  property  to  be  bene- 
fited. .  .  .  "  ^  Under  this  constitutional  provision  the  term 
"municipal  corporation"  seems  to  be  regarded  as  being  broad 
enough  to  include  any  public  corporation,^  such  as  a  board  of  park 
commissioners,^  or  a  county.*  The  legislature  is,  furthermore,  not 
restricted  in  the  form  of  city  government  which  it  may  provide. 
It  may  leave  the  determination  of  the  price  to  be  paid  for  the 
improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  to  be  levied,  to  the  board 
of  public  works,  without  any  restriction  as  to  the  maximum  price 
to  be  paid.^ 

§261.    Nebraska. 

The  constitution  of  Nebraska  contains  a  provision  which  is  sub- 
stantially identical  with  the  foregoing  provision  of  the  constitution 
of  Illinois,^  providing  that  "the  legislature  may  vest  the  corporate 
authorities  of  cities,  towns  and  villages  with  power  to  make  local 
improvements  by  special  assessment,  or  by  special  taxation  of 
property  benefited.  For  all  other  corporate  purposes,  all  munici- 
pal corporations  ma.y  be  vested  with  authority  to  assess  and  collect 
taxes.  .  .  .  "  -  The  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska  has  taken  a 
different  view  as  to  the  effect  of  this  constitutional  provision  from 
that  entertained  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois,  and  has  held 
that  this  provision  is  not  a  limitation  or  restriction  upon  the  power 
of  the  legislature  to  confer  the  power  of  local  assessment.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  there  held  that  the  power  of  local  assessment  is  a 
branch  of  the  general  power  of  taxation,  and  that  accordingly 
such  power  may  be  conferred  upon  other  public  corporations,^ 
such  as  counties,*   and   drainage  districts.'^     The  reason   for  this 

'Article   IX.,    §    1,   Constitution   of  'See   §  257. 

Minnesota.  ^  Article   IX.,   §   6,   Constitution   of 

-  State   of   Minnesota   ex    rel.   Mer-  Nebraska, 

rick    V.    District    Court    of    Hennepin  *  Darst  v.   Griffin,   31   Neb.  C68,   48 

County,  33  Minn.  235,  22  N.  W.  625  N.  W.  819  [1891];  State  of  Nebraska 

[1885].  ex    rel.   Abbott   v.    Board   of    Count^f 

'  State   of   ^Minnesota   ex   rel.   ]Mer-  Commissioners    of    Dodge    County,    8 

rick    V.    District   Court   of    Hennepin  Neb.  124,  30  Am.  Rep.  819   [1879]. 

County,  33  Minn.  235,  22  N.  W.  625  *  Darst  v.  Griffin,   31   Neb.   668,  48 

[1885].  K  W.   819    [1891]. 

*Dowlan     v.     Sibley     County,     36  =  State  of  Nebraska  ex  rel.  Abbott 

Minn.  430,  31  N.  W.  517   [1887].  v.  Board  of  County  Commissioners  of 

« Rogers    v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    22  Dodjre   County,   8   Neb.    124,   30   Am. 

Minn.  494   [1876].'  Rep.   819    [1879]. 


§§262,263  TAXxVTioN  by  assessment.  404 

difference  of  judicial  opinion  is  in  part  the  fact  that  in  Illinois  the 
power  of  special  assessment  was  much  limited  and  restricted  under 
the  prior  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  up  to  the 
adoption  of  the  constitutional  provision  concerning  local  assess- 
ments, while  in  Nebraska  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize 
local  assessment  was  never  so  restricted. 

§  262.    Washington. 

The  constitution  of  Washington  provides:  "The  legislature 
may  vest  the  corporate  authorities  of  cities,  towns  and  villages, 
with  power  to  make  local  improvements  by  special  assessment,  or 
by  special  taxation  of  property  benefited.  For  all  corporate  pur- 
poses all  municipal  corporations  may  be  vested  with  authority 
to  assess  and  collect  taxes.  .  .  .  "^  This  provision  differs  from 
the  provisions  in  Illinois  and  Nebraska,  in  that  in  the  constitution 
of  Washington  the  further  grant  of  power  is  for  "all  corporate 
purposes,"  while  in  Illinois  and  Nebraska  the  grant  of  power  is 
for  "all  other  corporate  purposes."  This  distinction  has  been 
noted  and  commented  upon.^  The  actual  result  reached  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Washington  is  in  harmony  with  the  Nebraska 
decisions,  and  contrary  to  those  of  Illinois;  and  is  to  the  effect  that 
the  legislature  is  not  restricted  by  such  constitutional  provision, 
but  that  the  legislature  may  confer  the  power  of  levying  local 
assessments  upon  public  corporations  other  than  cities,  towns  and 
villages,^  such  as  counties,*  and  diking  districts.^ 

§  263.     Statutory  provisions  conclusive  as  to  officers  by  whom 
assessment  may  be  levied. 

As  long  as  the  legislature  does  not  impair  the  constitutional 
right  of  local  self-government,^  it  has  full  power  to  determine  by 
what  officers  local  assessments  shall  be  levied.-  Even  if  by  consti- 
tutional provision  the  power  of  levying  special  assessments  is  con- 
ferred upon  public  corporations,  such  as  cities  or  villages,  such 

1  Article  VII.,  §  9,  Constitution  of  missioners,     13    Wash.    48,    42    Pac. 

Washington.  552    [1895]. 

^Hansen  v.  Hammer,  15  W^ash.  315,  ^Hansen  v.  Hammer,  15  Wash.  315, 

315,  46  Pac.  332   [1896].  46  Pac.   3.32    [1896]. 

^  Hansen  v.  Hammer,  15  Wash.  315,  ^  See  §  244. 

46  Pac.  332  [1896];   Seanor  v.  Board  =  Markley   v.   City   of   Chicago,    190 

of   County   Commissioners,    13   Wash.  111.  276,  60  N.  E.  512   [1901];   Craw- 

48,  42  Pac.  552   [1895].  ford   v.   The  People,   Rumsey,   83   111. 

*  Seanor  v.  Board  of  County  Com-  557   [1876]. 


405 


AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


263 


corporations  can  act  only  through  their  officers  or  agents,  and  it 
is  for  the  legislature  to  determine  who  these  officers  or  agents 
shall  be.^  Accordingly,  the  legislature  has  a  wide  range  of 
discretion  in  determining  by  what  officers  assessments  are 
to  be  levied  and  assessments  can  be  levied  only  by  the 
officers  thus  authorized  by  statute.*  Thus  where  an  as- 
sessment is  to  be  levied  by  commissioners,  the  county  col- 
lector cannot  levy  an  assessment  or  special  tax  against  a  lot 
not  assessed  by  them.°  If,  by  statute,  city  commissioners  are 
required  to  apportion  the  cost  in  proportion  to  benefits,  an  assess- 
ment made  by  the  council,  on  the  report  of  the  engineer,  with- 
out referring  the  matter  to  the  commissioners,  is  invalid."  So. 
if  a  board  of  viewers  is  to  determine  the  amount  to  be  assessed. 
the  board  of  county  commissioners  cannot  determine  such  amount 
without  referring  it  to  the  viewers.^  If  the  statute  requires  a 
reference  to  commissioners  and  to  a  disinterested  surveyor  who  is 
to  make  a  map  of  the  improvement,  reference  to  the  commis- 
sioners alone  is  insufficient.*  If  assessment  is  to  be  levied  by  the 
council,  the  clerk  of  the  village  cannot  levy  such  assessments  by 
certifying  them  to  the  auditor  of  the  county  to  be  entered  on  the 


'  Crawford  v.  The  People,  Rumsey, 
83  111.  557   [1876]. 

*  Walker  v.  District  of  Columbia,  6 
Mackey  (D.  C.)  352  [1888];  People 
V.  Patton,  223  111.  379,  79  N.  E.  51 
[1906];  Langlois  v.  Cameron,  201 
111.  301,  66  N.  E.  332  [1903]  ;  County 
of  Jefferson   v.   City   of   Mt.   Vernon, 

145  111.  80,  33  N.^E.  1091  [1893]; 
Crawford  v.  The  People,  Rvimsey,  83 
111.  557  [18761;  Pitt-^burgh,  Cincin- 
nati, Chicago  &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Oglesby,  165  Ind.  542,  76  N.  E  165 
[1905]";    Alley    v.    City    of    Lebanon, 

146  Ind.  125,  44  X.  E.  1003  [1896]; 
Board  of  Commissioners.  ]\[o7itgom- 
ery  Co.  v.  Fullen,  111  Ind.  410,  12 
N."  E.  298  [1887];  Second  Munici- 
pality of  New  Orleans  v.  Botts,  8 
Robinson,  (La.)  198  [1844];  State 
of  Minnesota  ex  rcl.  ilerrick  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Hennepin  County,  33 
Minn.  235,  22  X.  W.  625  [1885]; 
Stewart,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council    of   the   Citv    of  Hnboken.   57 


X.  J.  L.  (28  Vr.)  330,  31  Atl.  276 
[1894];  Burns  v.  Mayor  of  Xew 
York,  3  Hun.  212  [1874];  In  re  Lo- 
cust Ave.,  87  X.  Y.  S.  798.  93  App. 
Div.  416  [1904];  In  re  Opening  of 
Quarry  Road,  82  X.  Y.  S.  965,  84 
App.  Div.  418  [1903]:  Brewer  v. 
Village  of  Bowling  Creen,  Ohio,  7 
Ohio  C.  C.  489  [1893];  Horiston  v. 
City  Council  of  Charleston,  1  ]Mc- 
Cord  (S.  C.)  345  [1821];  Quarles  v. 
Town  of  Sparta,  2  Tenn.  Ch.  App. 
714   [1902]. 

=  Langlois  v.  Cameron,  201  111.  301. 
66  X.  E.  ,332   [1903]. 

«  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Oglesby,  165  Ind.  542,  76  "x.  E. 
165    [1905]. 

'  Board  of  Commissioners,  Mont- 
gomery Co.  V.  Fullen,  111  Ind.  410, 
12  X.  E.  298  [1887]. 

'  State,  White,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne.  40 
X.  J.  L.  (20  Vr.)"  311.  8*  Atl.  295 
[1887]. 


263 


TAXATION  BY    ASSESSMENT. 


406 


tax  duplicate  for  collection.''  Commissioners  appointed  to  ap- 
portion the  assessment  cannot  correct  any  mistake  which  the 
authorities  of  the  public  corporation  may  have  made  in  deter- 
mining the  nature  and  character  of  the  improvement.^"  So  if  an 
assessment  is,  by  statute,  to  be  levied  by  the  board  of  super- 
visors, the  township  supervisor  cannot  refuse  to  comply  with  their 
order  to  place  the  assessment  on  the  township  rolls  on  the  ground 
that,  in  his  judgment,  the  proceedings  were  irregular.^^  The 
power  thus  conferred  upon  special  officers  is  not  of  course  an 
arbitrary  one.  Since  assessments  must,  in  theory  at  least,  be 
apportioned  according  to  the  benefits,  power  cannot  be  given  to 
any  officers  to  levy  the  assessments  according  to  their  arbitrary 
personal  discretion.^-  The  legislature  may  of  course  alter  pre- 
existing statutory  provisions,  and  confer  the  power  of  ievjnng 
local  assessments  on  other  officers  than  those  theretofore  em- 
poAvered  to  levy  such  assessments."  A  subsequent  statute  which 
does  not  expressly  repeal  a  prior  statute,  and  which  can  be 
reconciled  therewith,  will  not  be  regarded  as  working  a  repeal 
by  implication,  and  the  officers  already  authorized  to  levy  such 
assessment,  will  retain  such  authority  under  the  new  statutes.^* 
A  change  of  statute  which  does  not  apply  in  express  terms  or  by 
necessary  implication  to  pending  proceedings  will  not  be  re- 
garded as  applying  thereto.^^  If  power  to  require  certain  im- 
provements to  be  made,  such  as  grade  crossings,  is  placed  in 
the  hands  of  railway  commissioners,  the  authorities  of  a  city 
cannot  require  such  improvements  to  be  made,  and  accordingly 
cannot  levy  local  assessments  therefor,  even  if  in  the  absence 
of  such  provision  conferring  power  on  the  railway  commission. 


"  Brewer  v.  Incorporated  Village  of 
Bo\vlin,£f  Green,  Ohio,  7  Ohio  C.  C. 
489   [1893]. 

""  County  of  Jefferson  v.  City  of 
Mt.  Vernon,  145  111.  80,  33  N.  e. 
1091    [1893]. 

"Scholtz  V.  Smith,  119  Mich.  634, 
78  N.  W.  668  [1899]. 

^-  State  V.  Hudson  County  Avenue, 
Commissioners,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.) 
12   [1874]. 

"State  V.  Jersey  City,  31  X.  J.  L. 
(2  Vr.)  575  [1865];  In  the  :\Iatter 
of   Livingston,    121   X.   Y.   94,   24   N. 


E.  290  [1890];  People  ex  rel.  Ward 
V.  Asten,  6  Daly  18  [1875];  Lewis 
V.  City  of  Seattle,  28  Wash.  639,  69 
Pac.   393   [1902]. 

"Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111. 
18,  38  N.  E.  ^255  [1894];  Kansas 
City  V.  Smart,  128  Mo.  272,  30  S.  W. 
773  [1895];  Bradshaw  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Guilford  Co.,  92  N.  C.  278 
[1885];  See  also  Wand  v.  Green,  7 
Mo.  App.  82  [1879];  Adams  v.  Lin- 
dell,  5  Mo.  App.  197    [1878]. 

^'  Cincinnati  v.  Davis.  58  0.  S.  225. 
50  X.  E.  918   [1898]. 


407 


AUTHORITY    TO    LEVI'    ASSESSMENTS. 


;§  264,  265 


power  to  construct  such  improvements  will  be  conferred  by  the 
general  grant  of  power  to  the  city.^" 

§  264.     Council. 

By  statutory  provisions,  power  to  levy  an  assessment  in  a 
public  corporation  is  often  conferred  upon  the  council  or  some 
corresponding'  body.^  If  by  statute  the  council  is  to  act  in  two 
separate  boards,  it  has  no  authority  to  act  at  a  joint  meeting 
of  such  boards.-  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  requiring  it,  the 
council  is  not  obliged,  as  a  preliminary  step,  to  determine  what 
land  is  benefited  by  the  improvement,  but  it  may  leave  such 
determination  to  commissioners  appointed  in  accordance  with 
statutory  authority.'^  If  by  statute  the  council  is  to  appoint  a 
special  committee  to  report  on  a  given  improvement,  a  standing 
committee  on  streets  and  sidewalks  is  not  the  proper  committee 
to  whom  to  refer  questions  of  street  improvements.'* 

§  265.     Boards  of  revision  or  review. 

Under  statutory  authority  therefor,  assessments  may  be  re- 
ferred to  boards  of  revision,  review,  and  the  like,  for  final  ap- 


"  Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad 
Co.  V.  City  of  New  Haven,  77  Conn. 
494,  59   Atl.  737    [1905]. 

'  Harris  v.  City  of  Ansonia,  73 
Conn.  359,  47  AIL  Rep.  672  [1900]; 
Birket  v.  City  of  Peoria,  185  111.  369, 
57  N.  E.  30  [1900];  County  of  Jef- 
ferson V.  City  of  ^It.  Vernon.  145 
111.  80,  33  X."e.  1091  [1893];  State 
ex  rel.  Keith  v.  Common  Council  of 
Michigan  City,  138  Ind.  455,  37  N. 
E.  1041  [1894];  City  of  Elkhart  v. 
Wickwire,  121  Ind.  331,  22  X.  E. 
342  [18891;  Jackson  v.  Smith,  120 
Ind.  520,  2Z  N.  E.  Rep.  .4.3'1  flSSO]; 
Moberry  v.  City  of  JpfVersonvillo,  3(1 
Ind.  198  [1871];  City  of  Lafayette 
V.  Fowler,  34  Ind.  140'[1870];  Hydes 
v.  Joyce,  4  Bush.  (07  Ky.)  464.  90 
Am.  Dec.  311  [18681:  ^Yhitney  v. 
Common  Council  of  Villasre  of  Hud- 
son. 69  Mich.  189,  37  X.  W.  184 
[18881  :  StPokert  v.  City  of  East  Sag- 
inaw, 22  Mich.  104  [1870];  Kan.sas 
City  V.  Bacon,  147  :Mo.  259,  48  S.  W. 


800  [1898];  City  of  Sedalia  to  use 
of  Sedalia  Xational  Bank  v.  Dono- 
hue,  190  Mo.  407,  89  S.  W.  386 
[1905];  City  of  Nevada  to  use  of 
Cilfillan  v.  Eddy,  123  Mo.  546,  27 
S.  W.  853  [1894];  Kiley  v.  Forsee, 
57  Mo.  390  [1874];  In  the  Matter  of 
Roberts.  81  X.  Y.  62  [1880];  Balti- 
niure  &  Ohio  Railroad  Co.  v. 
City  of  Bellaire,  60  O.  S.  301.  54 
X.  E.  263  [1899]:  Brewer  v.  Incor- 
porated Village  of  Bowling  Green, 
Ohio,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  489  [1893];  City 
of  Toletlo  for  the  use  of  Gates  v. 
Lake  Shore  Sc  Michigan  Southern 
Railway  Company,  4  Ohio  C.  C.  113 
I  1889];  Green  v.  Ward,  82  Va.  324 
11886]. 

■  Harris  v.  City  of  Ansonia,  73 
Conn.  359,  47  Atl.   Rep.   672    [1900]. 

'  State  ex  rel.  Peters  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  City  of  Xewark, 
31  X.  J.  L.   (2  Vr.)   360'  [1865]. 

*  Gregory  v.  City  of  Bridgeport,  52 
Conn.  40   [1884]. " 


§  266  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  408 

proval.^  By  statutory  provision  the  council  may  be  the  body 
which  is  to  act  as  such  board  of  revision  or  review.-  Such  a 
statute  is  not  invalid,  as  conferring  judicial  power  upon  legis- 
lative and  administrative  bodies.^  The  power  of  such  boards  of 
review  is  limited  by  the  statutory  grant  of  authority.  A  board 
of  review,  authorized  to  pass  on  questions  involving  the  appor- 
tionment of  the  assessment,  has  no  power  to  set  the  assessment 
aside  because  the  public  corporation  has  no  authority  to  impose 
such  assessment.*  If  by  statute  an  assessment  is  to  be  referred 
for  final  action  to  a  board  of  revision,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  common  council  should  confirm  such  assessment. "^  In  the 
absence  of  statute,  a  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment,  though 
having  power  to  revise  the  acts  of  its  predecessor,  the  board  of 
public  improvements  has  no  power  to  revise  its  own  determina- 
tions after  they  have  been  made  and  announced. " 

§  266.    Administrative  boards. 

The  power  of  constructing  public  improvements,  and  requiring 
assessments  to  be  levied  therefor,  may  be  conferred  upon  a  board 
of  improvements  within  a  city.^  If  the  council  refuses  to  levy 
an  assessment,  to  pay  for  improvements  ordered  by  the  board 
within  their  statutory  authority,  the  council  may  be  compelled 
by  mandamus  to  levy  such  tax.-  If  such  board  fails  to  make  the 
annual  report  required  by  law,  the  council  has  no  power  to  re- 

^  State     ex     rel.     Ashby    v.     Three  which  tlie  power  of  the  county  board 

States  Lumber  Co.,    198   Mo.   430,   95  of  equalization  was  recognized.  State 

S.  W.  333   [1906];   Wales  v.  Warren,  ex   rel.   Ashby   v.   Three   States  Lum- 

66  Neb.   455,  92  N.  W.  590   [1902];  ber  Co.,   198*  Mo.   430,   95   S.  W.  333 

In   the   Matter    of   Lange,    85    N.    Y.  [1906]. 

307    [1881];    In   the  Matter   of   Rob-  *  In  the  Matter  of  Lange,  85  N.  Y. 

erts,    81    N.    Y.    62     [1880];    In    the  307    [1881]. 

Matter    of    Palmer    to    have    Assess-  ^  In   the   Matter  of  Roberts,  81   N. 

ment    for    Building    Sewer    in    34th  Y.  62   [1880]; 

Street  Vacated,  31   Howard    (X.  Y.)  « Richards    v.    Low.    77    N.    Y.    S. 

42    [1865];    In  the  Matter  of  Lester,  1102,  38  Misc.  Rep.   500    [1902]. 

21   Hun.    (N.  Y!)    130    [1880];    Rich-  ^  Morrilton     Waterworks     Improve- 

ards   V.   Low,    77    N.    Y.    S.    1102.    38  ment  District  v.  Earl,  71    Ark.  4,  69 

Misc.  Rep.  500  [1902].  S.    W.    577,    71    S.    W.    666    [1903]; 

nVales  V.  Warren,  66  Xeb.  455,  92  City  of  Little  Rock  v.   Board  of  Im- 

N.  W.  590   [1902];  Heath  v.  McCrea,  provements,  etc.,  42  Ark.  152   [1883]. 

20  Wash.  342,  55  Pac.  432   [1898J.  =  City   of  Little  Rock   v.   Board   of 

^  Heath   v.   McCrea,  20  Wash.   342,  Improvements,     etc.,     42     Ark.     152 

55  Pac.  432  [1898].     Such  power  has  [1883]. 
been  said  to  be  judicial  in  a  case  in 


409 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


266 


move  them  by  ordinance  without  notice  and  to  appoint  their 
successors,  since  if  the  council  has  power  to  remove  such  offi- 
cers, it  must  be  for  cause  and  after  a  hearing  of  which 
notice  is  given.^  Such  board  is  not  technically  the  agent 
of  the  city.*  Provision  is  frequently  made  for  a  board  of  public 
works  which  is  to  determine  the  nature  and  character  of  im- 
provements to  be  constructed. °  If  such  board  has  power  to  de- 
termine the  necessity  of  improvements,  it  will  be  presumed  that 
it  acts  upon  its  own  motion  in  preparing  an  improvement  ordi- 
nance and  submitting  it  to  council,  although  council  may  have 
ordered  it  so  to  do ;  it  being  presumed  that,  since  council  had 
no  power  to  make  such  order,  the  board  of  improvements  re- 
garded such  order  as  a  mere  petition."  If  the  improvement  is 
ordered,  and  the  assessment  levied,  the  board  of  improvements 
has  no  power  to  make  a  material  change  in  the  nature  and  char- 
acter of  the  improvements.'  The  power  of  constructing  local 
improvements  to  be  paid  for  by  assessment  may  also  be  conferred 
upon  the  board  of  supervisors  of  a  city.**  The  territorial  area  of 
a  public  corporation,  such  as  a  city,  may  be  divided  between 
different  boards,  some  of  which  have  power  to  construct  improve- 


Waterworks  Improve- 
V.  Earl,  71  Ark.  4,  69 
S.  W.  6GG  [1903]. 
Waterworks  Tmprove- 
V.  Earl,  71  Ark.  4,  69 
S.  ^V.  ()()fl  [[1903]; 
Walker,    55    Ark.    148 


'  Morrilton 
ment  District 
S.  W.  577,  71 

*  ilorrilton 
ment  District 
S.   W.   577,    71 
Fitzperald 
[1801]. 

5  Heath  v.  Manson,  147  Cal.  694,  82 
Pac.  331  [1905];  In  the  Matter  of 
the  proceedinsrs  to  cliantje  tlie  gradft 
of  I^eale  Street  in  the  city  and  coun- 
ty of  San  Francisco,  39  Cal.  495 
[1870];  Houston  v.  IMcKenna,  22 
Cal.  550  [1863];  City  of  Denver 
V.  Londoner,  33  Colo.  104.  80  Pac. 
117  [1904];  Thorn  v.  West  Chi- 
cajo;)  Park  Conunissioiiers,  130  111. 
594,  22  X.  E.  520  [1890];  [Masonic 
Buildinix  Association  v.  Prownell.  1()4 
Mass.  306,  41  X.  E.  306  [1895]  v 
Ctoodwillie  v.  (  ily  of  Detroit.  103 
Mich.  283.  61  X.  W.  526  [1894]: 
CuminjT  v.  City  of  Crand  Pvapids.  46 
Mich.  150.  9'  X.  \\.  1  11  [1881]  ; 
State     ex     rel.     Ilurthes     v.     District 


Court  of  Ramsey  County,  95  Minn. 
70,  103  X.  W.  744  [1905];  State  of 
[Minnesota  ex  rel.  Lewis  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  33  Minn. 
164,  22  X.  W.  295  [1885];  The  Dol- 
lar Savings  Bank  v.  Ridge,  62  Mo. 
App.  324  [1895];  Heiser  v.  The 
[Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
Xew  York,  104  X.  Y.  68,  9  X."  E. 
866  [1887];  In  tlie  matter  of  De- 
Peyster,  80  X.  Y.  565  [1880];  In  the 
matter  of  DoPeyster,  18  Hun.  445 
11879];  Pittelkow  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 94  Wis.  651,  69  X.  W.  803 
[18971;  Liel)ermann  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee. 89  Wis.  336.  61  X.  \\'.  1112 
I1S95]. 

"Cage  V.  (  ity  of  Cliicago.  207  111. 
56,  69  X.  E.  .588    [1904]." 

"  Young  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond, 
196  111.  603,  63  X.  E.  1075   [1902]. 

n.ent  V.  Tillson,  1^0  U.  S.  316,  35 
L.  419,  11  S.  825  [1891];  (Affirming 
Lent  V.  Tillson.  72  Cal.  404,  14  Pac. 
71    [1887]). 


§  266  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  410 

ments  and  levy  assessments  for  certain  purposes  in  a  given  part 
of  the  area  of  such  city,  while  the  general  city  authorities  have 
power  to  construct  improvements  for  other  purposes  and  improve- 
ments in  the  remaining' parts  of  such  city.  A  common  example 
of  this  is  found  where  park  boards  are  given  authority  to  con- 
struct park  improvements,  and  levy  assessments  therefor,  while 
the  city  authorities  have  power  to  construct  improvements  other 
than  for  park  purposes  and  levy  assessments  for  such  improve- 
ments.'' Under  such  statutes  the  board  of  park  commissioners 
can  act  without  an  ordinance  of  the  council,^"  and  can  levy  as- 
sessments for  park  boulevards, ^^  or  for  improving  streets  giving 
access  to  the  park  and  part  of  the  general  park  system/^  but  not 
for  drainage  sewers  in  a  park  boulevard,  intended  to  drain  neigh- 
boring residences  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  boulevard,^^ 
nor  for  streets  not  included  within  their  territorial  .jurisdiction.^* 
Park  commissioners  may  be  authorized  to  levy  assessments  di- 
rectly, and  not  through  the  town  authorities.^"'  A  similar  division 
of  power  may  be  made  between  the  city  and  an  aqueduct  board,^*^ 
or  between  the  city  authorities  and  the  trustees  of  a  sanitary 
district."  If,  however,  the  power  of  the  trustees  of  a  sanitary 
district  becomes  exclusive  only  when  the  system  of  sewers  in  the 
sanitary  district  is  completed,  the  city  will  have  authority  to  levy 
such  assessments  in  the  absence  of  evidence  that  such  system 
has  been  completed.^^  The  power  of  levying  assessments  may  be 
conferred  upon  the  trustees  of  an  incorporated  village.^"     They 

"  West   Chicago    Park    Commission-  '^  Kedzie    v.    West    Chicago    Park 

ers  V.   Sweet,   1G7   111.   326,  47  N.  E.  Commissioners,   114  III.  280,  2  N.  E. 

728      [1897];      West     Chicago     Park  182   [188G]. 

Commissioners  V.  Farber,  171  111.  146,  ^^Kittinger  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  148 

49  N.  E.  427   [1897-1898];   Kedzie  v.  N.  Y.  332,  42  N.  E.  803   [1896]. 

West    Chicago    Park    Commissioners,  '^  Lingle    v.    City    of    Chicago,    172 

114    111.    280,    2    N..  E.    182    [1886];  111.  170,  50  N.  E.  192   [1898]. 

Dunham   v.    The    People   ex   rel.   Mc-  "  In  the  matter  of  Deering,  85  N. 

Crea,  96  111.  331    [1880];   Himdley  &  Y.   1    [1881]. 

Rees  V.  Commissioners,  etc.,  of  Lin-  '°  West  Chicago  Park  Commission- 
coin  Park,  67  111.  559  [1873];  Kit-  ers  v.  Farber,  171  111.  146,  49  N.  E. 
tinger  v.  City  of  Buffalo,   148  N.  Y.  427   [1898]. 

332,    42    N.    E.    803    [1896];    In   the  i"  Burns  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City 

matter  of  the  petition  of  Knaust,  101  of  New  York,  3  Hun.  212    [1874], 

N.  Y.   188,  4   N.   E.   338    [1886];    In  i' Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago,  225  111. 

the  Matter  of   Hearn,  96   N.  Y.   378  218,  80  N.  E.  127  [1907]. 

[1884];    In    the    matter    of    Deering,  '^Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago,  225  111. 

85  N.  Y.  1   [1881].  218,  80  N.  E.  127  [1907]. 

"In  the  matter  of  Knaust,   101  N.  "Crawford    v.    The    People    ex    rel. 

Y.   188,  4  N.  E.  338   [1886],  Rumsey,    83    111.    557    [1876];    Town 


411 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


§266 


cannot,  however,  act  arbitrarily  by  increasing  the  assessment 
without  any  examination  in  fact  of  the  benefits  conferred.'-"  The 
power  of  levying  assessments  for  local  improvements  is  frequently 
conferred  upon  the  officers  of  a  county,  such  as  the  boards  of 
supervisors,  county  commissioners,  and  the  like.-^  Special  boards 
of  water  commissioners  may  be  created  by  statute,  having  charge 
of  the  water  supply  and  with  power  to  levy  assessments  there- 
for.-- The  power  of  lev^'ing  assessments  may  be  conferred  upon 
the  trustees  of  a  road  district.-'^  In  the  absence  of  statute  re- 
quiring unanimous  action  on  their  part,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
all  the  trustees  concur  in  making  such  improvement.-*  The  power 
of  lev3nng  local  assessments  may  also  be  conferred  upon  a  drain- 
age district  board, -^  or  upon  a  drainage  commissioner.-''  Pro- 
vision is  occasionally  made  for  a  special  board  for  levying  as- 
sessments for  the  construction  of  levees.-'  Such  board  may  be 
authorized  to  determine  the  rate  of  taxation   as  well  as  to  de- 


of  Greenwood  v.  State,  ex  rel.  Law- 
son,  159  Ind.  267,  64  N.  E.  849 
[1902];  People  of  the  State  of  New 
York  ex  rel.  Gage  v.  Lohnas,  54 
Hun.  604,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  104  [1889]; 
ilerritt  v.  Village  of  Port  Chester,  29 
Hun.  619   [1883]. 

="  State,  Souther,  Pros.  v.  ViUage 
of  South  Orange,  46  N.  J.  L.  (  17  Vr.) 
317    [1884]. 

-'  Reclamation  District  Xo.  3  v. 
Goldman,  65  Cal.  635,  4  Pae.  676 
[1884];  ]Mayor  v.  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  Jay  County,  137  Ind.  367, 
36  N.  E.  1101,  34  X.E.  959  [1893]; 
Loesnitz  v.  Seolinger,  127  Ind.  422, 
25  N.  E.  1037,  26  N.  E.  887  11890]; 
Fleener  v.  Clanian,  126  Ind.  166,  25 
N.  E.  900;  Stipp  V.  Claman,  123  Ind. 
532,  24  X.  E.  131;  Anderson  v.  Cla- 
man, 123  Ind.  471,  24  X.  E.  175 
[1889];  White  v.  Fleming,  114  Ind. 
560,  16  X.  E.  487  [1887];  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  ilontgomery  Co.  v. 
Fullen,  111  Ind.  410.  12  X."  E.  298 
[1887];  Scholtz  v.  Smith,  119  Mich. 
634,  78  X.  W.  668  [1899];  :Morris  v. 
Merrill,  44  Xeb.  423,  62  X.  \V.  86.3 
[1895];  In  the  Matter  of  Cliurch, 
92  X.  Y.  1  [1883].  Such  power  may 
be  withheld  by  the  legislature  in  the 
case  of  streets  wliich  have  been  duly 


located.  Philadelphia,  \Yilmington  & 
])altimore  Railroad  Co.  v.  Shipley, 
72  Md.  88,  19  Atl.  1   [1890]. 

==  State  V.  Jersey  City,  31  X.  J.  L. 
(2  Vr.)  575  [1865];  Burns  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  the  City  of  Xew  York,  3 
Hun.  212   [1874].   . 

^Corry  v.  Gaynor,  22  0.  S.  584 
[1872].  ' 

-'  Corry  v.  Gaynor,  22  0.  S.  5S4 
[1872].  " 

-^People  ex  rel.  v.  Drainage  Com- 
missioners, of  the  Town  of  Young 
America,  143  111.  417,  32  X.  E.  688 
[1S93];  Commissioners  of  Mason  & 
Tazewell  Special  Drainage  District  v. 
Grinin.  134  111.  330,  25  X.  E.  995 
[1891  I:  Owners  of  Lands  v.  The 
People  ex  rel.  Stookey.  113  III.  296 
[1886];  Turnquist  v.  Cass  County 
Drainage  Commissioners,  11  X.  D. 
514,  92  X.  W.  852  [1902]. 

""  Attorney  General  ex  rel.  Alexan- 
der V.  McClear,  146  Mich.  45,  109  X. 
W.  27  [1906];  Roberts  v.  Smith,  115 
:\Iich.  5,  72  X.  W.   1091    [18971. 

^  Davis  V.  Gaines,  48  Ark.  370,  3 
S.  W.  184;  McGehee  v.  :Mathis,  21 
Ark.  40  [I860];  Missouri.  Kansas  & 
Texas  Railway  Co.  v.  Cambern.  66 
Kan.  365,  71  Pac.  809   [19031. 


§  267  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  412 

termine  what  lands  are  subject  to  be  taxed  for  the  construction 
of  the  levee.-*  Such  board  may  be  given  power  to  adjust  the 
assessment  and  levy  of  the  tax,  and  to  decide  all  questions  rela- 
tive thereto.-''  In  such  action  the  board  acts  as  a  ministerial, 
and  not  as  a  judicial  body.^"  By  a  special  statutory  authority 
the  board  of  commissioners  in  charge  of  the  construction  of  levees, 
may  act  as  viewers,  or  may  themselves  appoint  viewers.''^  Such 
board  ordinarily  has  discretion  in  determining  Avhether  an  im- 
provement is  necessary,  and  cannot  be  compelled  by  mandamus 
to  levy  assessments  for  repairs,  unless  their  action  is  shown  to 
be  arbitrary  or  fraudulent,  or  to  accomplish  their  own  personal 
or  selfish  ends."-  Authority  to  construct  public  improvements  and 
to  levy  assessments  therefor  may  by  statute  be  conferred  upon 
police  juries.^^  Provision  is  sometime ;  made  by  statute  for  a 
permanent  board  of  assessors  who  pre  to  assess  the  property 
benefited  by  public  improvements.^*  Statutory  authority  is  nec- 
essary, however,  for  appointing  such  a  board.  If  the  statute 
provides  for  the  appointment  of  three  impartial  commissioners 
to  determine  the  expense  of  an  improvement  w^hen  it  is  com- 
pleted, such  commissioners  must  be  appointed  for  each  specific 
case,  and  a  public  corporation  cannot  establish  a  permanent 
board  to  act  in'  all  cases.^^  If  a  permanent  board  or  set  of  offi- 
cials is  empowered  to  undertake  assessment  proceedings,  and  to 
levy  an  assessment,  the  fact  that  the  individuals  composing  such 
board  have  been  changed  during  the  proceedings,  does  not  invali- 
date such  proceedings.^® 

§  267.     Other  officers. 

Power  of  levying  assessments   may  be   conferred  upon   other 
of^eials,  and  thus  made  a  part  of  their  official  duties.     The  legis- 

■■^  Davis  V.   Gaines,  48   Ark.  370,   3  "*  Smith  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  159  N. 

S.  W.   184.  V.   427,  54  N.   E.   62    [1899];    People 

-"McGehee   v.   Mathis,    21    Ark.    40  ex   rel.    Ward   v.    Asten,    6   Daly,    18 

[ISfiO].  [1875]. 

'» :\IcGehee   v.   Mathis,    21    Ark.   40  =*'  State,  Ogden,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 

[1800].  Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Hud- 

3' Missouri,   Kansas   &   Texas  Rail-  son,    29    X.    J.    L.     (5    Dutcher)     104 

way    Co.   V.    Cambern,    66    Kan.    365,  [I860]. 

71  Vac.  809  [1903].  =•=  The     Central     Savings     Bank    of 

^-Bromwell    v.    Flowers,    217    111.  Baltimore    v.    The    Mayor    and    City 

174,  75  K  E.  466   [1905].  Council    of    Baltimore.    71    Md.    515 

5^  Barrow  v.   Helpler,   34  La.   Ann.  IS  Atl.  8G9,  20  Atl.  283   [1889];   In 

362   [1882].  the  Matter  of  Lewis,  35  Howard  162 

[1868]. 


413  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  267 

lature  may  provide  that  executive  officers/  such  as  assessors,- 
shall  determine  questions  of  fact  in  levying  the  assessment.  The 
supervisor  and  assessor  of  a  village  may  be  empowered,  as  cor- 
porate authorities,  to  levy  assessments.^  A  county  surveyor  may 
be  authorized  to  repair  existing  ditches,  and  to  certify  the  cost 
thereof  to  the  county  auditor,  who  may  then  be  required  to  draw 
his  warrant  in  favor  of  the  certificate  holders  upon  the  county 
treasurer  who  is  to  be  reimbursed  by  subsequent  assessments.* 
By  statute,  the  superintendent  of  streets  may  be  authorized  to 
assess  benefits  for  the  construction  of  sewers."'  Statutes  con- 
ferring such  authority  are  not  invalid,  although  the  street  su- 
perintendent is  not  a  member  of  the  council,*'  and  although  the 
exact  method  of  assessment  is  not  described.'^  If  such  power  is 
conferred  exclusively  upon  the  street  superintendent,  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  council  is  not  necessary.'^  If  the  street  superintendent 
is  authorized  by  statute  to  act  in  making  certain  repairs  in  public 
improvements,  and  he  makes  such  report,  signed  by  him  in  his 
official  capacity,  the  fact  that  a  superfluous  order  of  the  court 
appointed  him  superintendent  of  special  assessment  in  that  par- 
ticular proceeding,  does  not  impair  the  authority  conferred  upon 
him  by  statute.^  A  city  engineer  may  be  given,  by  statute,  au- 
thority to  act  in  proceedings  leading  up  to  local  assessments/" 
such  as  power  to  decide  upon  the  material  to  be  used,"  or  to  make 

*  Shimmons  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  104  wealth  for  use  of  City  of  Allegheny, 

Mich.  511,  02  X.  \V-.  725    [1895].  3G  Pa.  St.    (12  Casey)    (U   [1859]. 

-  Cleveland,    Cincinnati,    Chicago   &  *  Citizens'   Sav.   Bank   &   Trust   Co. 

St.    Louis   R.    R.    Co.    v.   People,   212  v.   City  of  Chicago,   215    111.   ITi,   74 

111.    638,    72    X.    E.    725    [1904];    Ex-  X.  E.  115   [1905]. 

tension  of  Hancock  Street,  10  Pa.  St.  ''  Greenwood   v.   Morrison,    128   Cal. 

(G  Harr.)    26   [1851].  350,  60  Pac.  971    [1900]. 

^  People  ex   rel.   Huck   v.   Gage,   83  *  Schenley     v.     Commonwealth     for 

111.   486    [1876].  use  of  City  of  Allegheny,  36  Pa.  St. 

♦State  ex   rel.   French   v.   Johnson,  (12  Casey)    64   [1859]. 

105  Ind.  463,  5  X.  E.  553  [1885]  ;  See  »  Storrs  v.  City  of  Chicago,  208  111. 

also  Kirkpatrick  v.  Taylor,   118  Ind.  364.  70  X.  E.  347. [1904]. 

329,  21  N.  E.  20   [1888].  '"  Linville  v.  State  ex  rel,  130  Ind. 

» Greenwood   v.   Morrison,   128   Cal.  210.   29   X.   E.    1129;    Van    Sickle   v. 

350,   60   Pac.   971    [1900];    Williams  Belknap,   129  Ind.  558,  28  X\  E.  305 

V.  Bergin,   116   Cal.   56,   47   Pac.   877  [1891];  Taber  v.  Grafmiller,  109  Ind. 

[1897];     Citizens'    Savings     Bank     &  206,    9   X.   E.    721    [1880];    Akers    v. 

Trust  Co.  V.  City  of  Chiclago,  215  HI.  Kolkemyer  &   Co.,  97   Mo.   App.  520, 

174,  74  X.  E.   115   [1905];   Storrs  v.  71  S.  W.  536  [1902];  Waud  v.  Green, 

City  of  Chicago.  208  111.   364,  70  X.  7  :\Io.  App.  82   [1879]. 

E.  347   [1904];  Schenley  v.  Common-  "Ray  v.  City  of  Jeflfersonville,  90 

Ind.  507   [1883]. 


§  268  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  414 

an  estimate  and  apportionment  of  the  cost  of  the  improvements- 
Statutes  are  occasionally  fonnd  authorizing  officers  of  a  town- 
ship to  construct  public  improvements  at  the  expense  of  the 
owners  of  property  benefited  thereby,  and  to  levy  and  collect 
assessments  for  such  improvements/^ 

§  268.     Combined  action  of  public  officials. 

It  is  frequently  provided  that  assessments  are  to  be  levied 
only  b^^  the  combined  action  of  two  or  more  public  officials  or 
sets  of  officials.^  The  board  of  public  works  may  be  given  power 
to  determine  the  limits  of  the  taxing  district,  the  council  may 
be  given  power  to  determine  the  purpose  for  which  money  is  to 
be  raised,  and  the  combined  action  of  the  two  may  be  necessary 
in  order  to  determine  how  much  shall  be  raised  for  the  improve- 
ment undertaken.-  A  similar  division  of  authority  may  be  made 
between  the  board  of  improvement  and  the  council,  giving  the 
council  power  to  lay  off  the  assessment  district  and  to  appoint 
the  board,  the  board  to  make  the  improvement  and  report  the  cost 
to  the  council  and  the  council  to  levy  the  assessment  therefor.^ 
The  council  may  be  given  authority  to  create  a  board  of  public 
works  which  is  to  take  charge  of  the  construction  of  public  im- 
provements.* Under  some  statutes  power  is  given  to  two  or 
more  boards  to  levy  local  assessments* only  when  acting  together 
at  a  joint  meeting.^  If  the  record  of  the  proceedings  is  ambigu- 
ous, it  will  be  presumed  that  the  officers  performed  their  legal 
duty,  and  that  the  meeting  was  a  joint  one.*'  If  action  is  not 
taken  at  a  joint  meeting,  it  has  been  held  that  such  defect  may 
be  cured  by  joint  action,  taken  at  a  subsequent  regular  meeting.' 

^-Reeves    v.    Grottendick,    1.31    Ind.  Improvements,    42   Ark.    1.52    [1883]; 

107,  30  N.  E.  889    [1891].  See    also    Morrilton   Waterworks   Im- 

"  The      Chicago      &      Northwestern  provement   District   v.   Earl,   71   Ark. 

Railroad  Company  v.   The  People  ex  4,  69  S.  W.  577,  71  S.  W.  666  [1903]. 

rel.     Miller,     S3  "  111.     467      11876]:  *  Green     v.     Ward,     82     Va.     324 

Weaver  v.  Templin,   113  Ind.  298,   14  [1886]. 

]Sr.  E.  600  [1887].  =Loesnitz    v.    Seelinger,     127    Ind. 

1  Lewis  V.  City  of  Seattle,  28  Wash.  422,    25    X.    E.    1037,    26    N.    E.    887 

639.  69  Pac.  393  [1902].  [1890];    Bradshaw  v.   Commissioners 

=  Rogers    v.    City    of    St.    Paul.    22  of  Guilford  Co.,  92  X.  C.  278  [1885]. 

Minn.   494    [1876];    See   also   City  of  « Loesnitz    v.     Seelinger,     127     Ind. 

Toledo  for  the  use  of  Gates  v.  Lake  422.    25    X.    E.    1037,    26    X.    E.    887 

Shore  &  Michigan  Southern  Railway  [1890]. 

Company,  4  Ohio  C.  C.   113    [1889].  'Bradshaw     v.     Commissioners     of 

HTtyof  Little   Rock   v.   Board   of  Guilford  Co.,  92  ^^  ^'.  T"''   nsSS]. 


415  AUTHORITY    TO    LE\^'    ASSESSMENTS.  §  269 

§  269.     Interest  of  public  officials. 

While  it  is  not  advisable  that  permanent  officers  of  a  cor- 
poration should  be  authorized  to  act  in  assessments,  or  indeed 
in  any  matters,  in  Avhich  they  have  personal  interests,  such  ques- 
tions should  be  addressed  to  the  discretion  of  the  legislature,  and 
not  to  the  courts,  and  if  the  legislature  sees  fit  to  authorize  offi- 
cers to  act  in  spite  of  their  interests,  they  may  so  act.^  Defects 
in  the  personal  qualification  of  public  officers  cannot  be  the  ground 
for  a  collateral  attack  upon  the  assessment  under  most  statutes.- 
If  the  city  engineer  in  office  when  the  work  is  done,  goes  out  of 
office  without  giving  the  certificate  of  performance,  his  successor 
in  office  at  the  time  the  certificate  is  given,  is  the  proper  person 
to  give  it.^  The  fact  that  one  who  acts  as  engineer  and  surveyor, 
OAvns  land  which  is  to  be  assessed,*  and  is  related  to  other  owner.i 
of  land  to  be  assessed,^  does  not  disqualify  him.  By  special 
statute  a  surveyor  may  be  forbidden  to  act  if  land  owned  by  him 
or  by  persons  related  to  him  within  certain  degrees  of  consan- 
guinity are  benefited  by  the  improvement  or  are  liable  to  assess- 
ment therefor."  In  the  absence  of  specific  statute  the  fact  that 
a  member  of  a  common  council  owns  land  which  is  subject  to 
assessment,  does  not  disqualify  him  from  acting.^  In  the  ab- 
sence of  specific  statute,  officers  such  as  county  commissioners,"* 
or  drainage  commissioners,?  are  not  disqualified  because  they  own 
land  liable  to  assessment.  It  is  said  that,  at  least,  the  proceed- 
ings are  not  absolutely  void,  but  are  at  most  merely  voidable. ^'^ 
It  is  not  necessary  that  the  election  and  qualification  of  town 
trustees  should  be  shown  affirmatively."  The  fact  that  a  trustee 
owns  land  subject  to  assessment  does  not  disqualify  him  in  the 

'  The  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Bris-  '  Corliss    v.    Village    of    Highland 

lin.    80    111.    42.3    [1875].  Park,    132  Mich.    152,  95   X.   ^Y.  254, 

^Dows  V.   Village   of   Irvington.  6G  93  X.  W.  610;    (Affirmed  on  re-hear- 

Howard   (X.  Y.;   93  [18S31.  ing,  95  X.  \V.  41G   [1903]). 

'Ilornung  V.  :McCarthy,  120  Cal.  17,  'Tlionipson    v.    Love,    42    O.    S.    31 

58  Pac.   303    [1899].      '  [1884|. 

Thompson  v.  fJoldthwait,  132  Ind.  "The  People  ex   rel.  Samuel,  Sr.  v. 

20,  31   X.  E.  451    [1892];    Thompson  Cooper,    139    111.    461,    29    X.    E.    872 

V.  Love,  42  O.  S.  61    [1884].  [1S93]. 

"Thompson  v.  Coldthwait,  132  Ind.  i"  Carr   v.    nnhme,    107    Ind.    76,    78 

20.  31  X.  E.  451   [1892].  X.  E.  322   [1906]. 

"Markley   v.   Rudy,    115    Ind.    533,  "  Slocum   v.   Dallas,    165    Ind.    710, 

18  X.  E.  50  [1888].  75  X.  E.  P23   [1005]. 


§  270  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  416 

absence  of  specific  statute.^-  It  has  even  been  held  that  a  trustee 
Avho  has  done  work  and  expended  money  in  constructing  the  im- 
provement, may  collect  therefor  where  his  vote  is  not  necessary 
for  the  allowance  of  his  claim  by  the  majority  of  the  board/^ 
If  the  court  before  which  assessment  proceedings  are  to  be  held 
is  by  reason  of  interest  incapable  of  acting,  provision  is  made 
for  appointing  other  judges  to  act.^*  Under  special  statutory 
provisions  it  has  been  held  that  a  member  of  a  board  of  public 
Avorks,  who  owns  property  affected  by  an  improvement  is  dis- 
qualified to  act  by  reason  of  his  interest,  and  that  if  he  does  act, 
the  ordinance  and  assessment  are  invalid. ^° 

§  270.     Exercise  of  authority  by  public  officers. 

The  public  officers  by  whom  an  assessment  may  be  levied  must 
exercise  the  authority  which  is  conferred  upon  them  in  substantial 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  statute  by  which  such 
power  is  conferred.^  Under  general  language  the  officers  of  a 
corporation  will  not  have  authority  to  levy  an  assessment  upon 
lands  outside  of  the  territorial  limits  of  the  corporation  of  which 
they  are  officers,  even  though  such  land  is  benefited  by  the  im- 
provement constructed.-  Thus,  authority  to  locate  "any  ditch" 
does  not  authorize  county  commissioners  to  locate  a  ditch  within 
the  limits  of  a  city  or  village,  and  levy  an  assessment  therefor, 
upon  land  within  such  municipal  corporation.^  If  the  statute 
speeifieally  provides  therefor,  land  which  is  benefited  by  the  im- 
provement may  be  assessed,  although  it  is  outside  the  territorial 
limits  of  the  corporation  making  the  assessment.*  Land  cannot, 
however,  be  included  in  two  or  more  assessment  districts,  where 
the   effect   is  to  assess  such  tract   in  excess  of  the  tax  imposed 

^^  Corliss    V.    Village    of    Highland  '  City    of    Joliet    v.    Spring    Creek 

Park,   132  Mich.   152,  95  N.  W.  254,  Drainage  District,  222  111.  441,  78  N. 

95  N.  W.  416   [19031.  E.    836    [1906];    Village   of   Pleasant 

^' Lower   Kings    River    Reclamation  Hill  v.  Commissioners,   71   0.  S.   133, 

District    No.    531    v.    JMcrufiah,    124  72  X.  E.  896   [1904]. 

Cal.  175,  56  Pac.  887   [1899].  *  Reclamation   District   Xo.    108    v. 

"In  the  Matter  of  Broadway  Wid-  Hagar,  66  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945  [1884]; 

ening.  63  P.arb.  572   [1872].  Hudson    v.    Bunch,  -116    Ind.    63.    18 

"Hunt  V.  City  of  Chicago,  60  111.  X.  E.   390   [1888];   Watkins  v.  State 

183    [1871].  ex  rel.  Van  Auken,   151    Ind.   123,  51 

^See  §  229,  2.34.  X.  E.  79,  49  X.  E.  169  [1898];  Crist 

^  Drain    Commissioner    v.    Baxter,  v.    State    ex   rel.   VVhitmore,   97    Ind. 

67  Mich.   127;   suh  nomine  Robertson  389   [1884]. 
V.  Baxter.  23  X.  W.  711   [1885]. 


417 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


§271 


upon  other  lands  similarly  situated."'  County  commissioners  may 
order  an  improvement  at  a  special  session.''  Oral  notice  of  such 
special  session  is  sufificient.^  They  cannot,  however,  during  an  ad- 
journment, without  a  call  for  a  special  session,  make  an  order  for 
an  improvement,  and  an  assessment  levied  for  an  improvement 
so  made  is  invalid.®  Where  an  improvement  is  constructed 
jointly  by  two  counties,  the  proceedings  are  not  absolutely  void, 
if  the  boards  of  commissioners  of  the  two  counties  act  as  one 
tribunal,  even  if  the  statute  contemplates  separate  action.  Such 
proceedings  may  be  irregular  but  are  not  absolutely  void."  A 
board  of  review  which  has  authority  to  correct  errors  and  irregu- 
larities in  assessment  proceedings  has  no  authority  to  adjudge 
such  proceedings  illegal.^" 


§  271.     Action  of  court  in  levying  assessment. 

The  legislature  may.  confer  upon  a  court  the  power  to  decide 
upon  the  necessity  of  the  improvement,^  as  in  the  case  of  a  drain- 
age district.-  It  may  be  provided  by  statute  that  a  public  cor- 
poration, such  as  a  city  or  village,  shall  construct  certain  im- 
provements by  filing  a  petition  therefor  with  the  proper  court 
and  securing  an  order  of  the  court  for  the  construction  of  such 
improvements  at  the  cost  of  the  owners  of  property  benefited 
thereby.^     It  may  be  provided  that  a  park  board  shall  petition 


•"'  Abascal  v.  Bouny.  37  La.  Ann. 
538    [1885]. 

*  Loesnitz  v.  Seelinger,  127  Ind.  422, 
25  N.  E.  1037,  26  N.  E.  887  [1890]; 
Fleener  v.  Claman,  126  Ind.  106,  25 
N.  E.  900;  Stipp  v.  Claman,  123  Tnd. 
532,  24  N.  E.  131;  Anderson  v.  Cla- 
man, 123  Ind.  471.  24  X.  E.  175 
[18S9];  White  V.  Fleminir,  114  Ind. 
560,   16  N.  E.  487    [1887]. 

^Loesnitz  v.  Seolin.L'er,  127  Ind. 
422,  25  X.  E.  1037.  26  X.  E.  887 
[1890]. 

'IMorris  v.  :\Icnill.  44  Xeb.  423, 
62  X.  W.  865   [1895]. 

"Sarber  v.  Pxankin,  154  Ind.  236. 
56  X.  E.  225   [1899]. 

"  Cavanauffh      v.      Sanderson,      — 

Mich. ,115   X.   W.   955    [1908]; 

Thayer  Lnmber   Co.   v.   City  of   Mns- 

keoron,  —  Mich. ,   115  X.  W.  957 

[1908]. 


*  State  of  Washington  ex  rel.  Mat- 
son  V.  Superior  Court  for  Skagit 
County,  42  Wash.  491,  85  Pac.  264 
[1905]. 

-  Payson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Parsons, 
175  III.  267,  51  X.  E.  588  [1898]; 
State  V.  Superior  Court  of  Skagit 
County,  42  Wash.  491.  85  Pac.  264 
[1905]. 

^Drainage  Improvement;  Stack  v. 
Peoi)le  ex  rel.  Talbott,  217  III.  220, 
75  X.  E.  347  [1905];  McChesney  v. 
Village  of  Hyde  Park,  151  111.  634, 
37  X.  E.  858  [1894];  Walker  v.  City 
of  Aurora,  140  111.  402.  29  X.  E. 
741  [1893]:  Hosnier  v.  The  Hunt 
Drainage  District.  134  111.  360.  26  X. 
E.  584  [1891]:  City  of  Calesburg  v. 
Searles,  114  111.  217.  29  X.  E.  680 
I  l'^86]  :  Kennedy  v.  State  ex  rel.  Dor- 
sett.  124  Ind.  2.39,  24  X.  E.  748 
[1890];   Street   Improvement;   In  the 


§271 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


418 


the  court  for  authority  to  open  a  driveway  through  the  parl\.* 
The  court  has  been  empowered  to  pass  upon  the  plan  of  the 
improvement.^  The  court  may  be  authorized  to  determine  what 
lands  are  benefited  by  the  proposed  improvement,"  as  in  the  case 
of  a  levee  district  ;'^  or  to  determine  the  amount  of  benefits  to 
each  tract  of  land.^  The  court  may  be  empowered  to  determine 
whether  a  sufficient  number  of  property  owners  have  petitioned 
for  an  improvement.^  The  court  may  be  authorized  to  appoint 
commissioners  by  whom  the  question  of  benefits  is  to  be  de- 
termined, and  by  whom  the  assessment  is  to  be  apportioned.^" 
The  court  may  be  authorized  to  adjust  assessments  already  lev- 
ied,^^  and  to  reduce  the  amount  thereof  so  that  the  assessments 
do  not   exceed  the  benefit   conferred  upon  the   property.^-     The 


Matter  of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 
York,  20  Johnson  2G9   [1822 J. 

*Astor  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New  York 
62  N.  Y.  5(37   [1875]. 

^In  the  Matter  of  the  ]Mayor,  Al- 
dermen and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of  New  York,  20  Johnson  269  [1822] ; 
(The  validity  of  such  grant  of  power 
was  questioned  in  this  case.)  See 
also  Badger  v.  Inlet  Drainage  Dis- 
trict, 141  111.  540,  31  N.  E.  170 
[1893]. 

^  Overstreet  v.  Levee  Dist.  No.  1  of 
Conway  County,  80  Ark.  402,  97  S. 
W.  676  [1906];  City  of  Valparaiso 
V.  Parker,  148  Ind.  379,  47  N.  E. 
330  [1897];  State  ex  rel.  Wilcox  v. 
Jackson,  118  Ind.  553,  21  N.  E.  321 
[1888];  State  of  Washington  on  the 
relation  of  Matson  v.  Superior  Court 
of  Skagit  County,  42  Wash.  491,  85 
Pac.  264   [1905]. 

^  Overstreet  v.  Levee  Dist.  No.  1  of 
Conway  County,  80  Ark.  462,  97  S. 
W.  670   [1906]. 

*  State  of  Washington  on  the  rela- 
tion of  Matson  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Skagit  County,  42  W'ash.  491,  85 
Pac.  264   [1905]. 

"  Blake  v.  The  People,  for  use  of 
Caldwell,  109  111.  504   [1884]. 

^"Trigger  v.  Drainage  District  No. 
I,   etc.,^193   111.   230,   61   N.   E.    1114 


[1901];  Davis  v.  City  of  Litchfield, 
155  111.  384,  40  N.  E.  354  [1895]; 
Sargeant  v.  City  of  Evanston,  154 
111.  268,  40  N.  E.  440  [1894];  Mc- 
Chesney  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park,  151 
111.  634,  37  N.  E.  858  [1894];  Smith 
V.  The  People  ex  rel.  Detrick,  140 
111.  355,  29  N.  E.  676  [1893];  Mur- 
phy V.  City  of  Peoria,  119  111.  509, 
9  N.  E.  895  [18-88];  Taylor  v.  Bur- 
nap,  39  Mich.  739  [1878];  Bakman, 
Pros.  v.  Hackensack  Improvement 
Commission,  70  N.  J.  L.  (41  Vr.) 
499,  57  Atl.  141  [1904];  Striker  v. 
Kelley,  2  Denio,  323  [1845];  In  re 
Main  St.  in  Borough  of  Nicholson,  27 
Pa.   Super.   Ct.  570    [1905]. 

"  Chicago  Consolidated  Traction 
Co.  V.  Village  of  Oak  Park,  225  111. 
9,  80  N.  E.  42  [1907]  ;  Birket  v.  City 
of  Peoria,  186  111.  369,  57  N.  E.  .30 
[1900]  ;  City  of  Jacksonville  v.  Hans- 
ill,  178  111.  235,  52  N.  E.  949  [1899]  ; 
Blanchet  v.  Municipality  No.  2,  13 
La.  322  [1839];  In  Report  of  Com- 
missioners of  Elizabeth,  49  N.  J.  L. 
(20  Vr.)  488,  10  Atl.  363  [1887]; 
In  the  Matter  of  Livingston,  121  N. 
Y.  94,  24  N.  E.  290  [1890];  In  the 
IVIatter  of  Auchmuty,  18  Hun.  324 
[1879]. 

^-  Chicago  Consolidated  Traction 
Co.  V.  Village  of  Oak  Park,  225  111. 
9,  80  N.  E.  42   [1907]. 


419  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  272 

court  may  be  authorized  to  levy  an  assessment  with  the  co- 
operation of  a  jury/^  or  to  order  commissioners  to  make  such 
levy.^*  Under  some  statutes  the  court  is  to  act  in  confirming 
an  assessment. ^^  The  amount  of  the  assessment  may  be  referred 
to  the  court  for  determination.^"  Under  a  statute  giving  to  the 
court  power  to  modify,  change,  alter  or  annul  an  assessment, 
the  court  may  deduct  a  certain  per  cent,  from  the  amount  assessed 
against  property  owners  and  impose  such  reduction  upon  the 
public  corporation.^"  In  the  absence  of  specific  authority  con- 
ferred by  statute  the  court  cannot  levy  an  assessment  if  no  ordi- 
nance has  been  passed.^"  If  by  statute  the  property  owners  are 
entitled  to  the  determination  of  commissioners  as  to  the  amount 
of  benefits,  the  court  cannot  determine  such  fact,^*'  nor  can  it 
decide  what  amount  should  be  raised  by  assessment.-"  If  the 
amount  of  damage  caused  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  emi- 
nent domain  is  to  be  determined,  as  well  as  the  amount  of  bene- 
fits caused  by  the  improvement,  a  judicial  inquiry  of  some  sort 
is  necessary.-^  In  taking  part  in  levying  an  assessment,  the 
judges  are  said  to  act  as  commissioners  rather  than  as  a  court." 

§272.     Jury. 

The  property  owners  have,  as  has  been  said  ])efore,^  no  con- 
stitutional right  to  a  jury  in  determining  the  question  of  the 
amount  and  apportionment  of  benefits.-  It  is  therefore  within 
the  power  of  the  legislature  to  provide  that  damages  should  be 
assessed  by  a  jury  and  benefits  by  drain  commissioners.'*  The 
legislature  has,  however,  full  power  to  provide  for  a  hearing  by 

*' Robeson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Curry,  -"Boskowitz  v.  Tlionqison,   144  C'al. 

161  111.   176,  43  X.  E.  619   [1896].  724,  78   Pac.   290    [1904]. 

"  Trigger  v.  Drainage  District.  No  -'  City  of  Chicago  v.  Ward,  30  111. 

One,    193    111.    230,    61    N.    E.    1114  9    [1864]. 

[1901].  "In  the  Matter  of  tlie  Mayor,  Al- 

'°  See  §  910  et  fir<i.  dermen  and  Commonalty  of  the  City 

'"Zahn  V.   Borough   of   Rutherford,  of  Now  York,  20  Johnson  269  [1822]. 

72    X.    J.    L.    (43    Vr.)    446,    60    Atl.  'See   §  201   et  seq. 

1123   [1905].  -"Irigger   v.   Drainage   District,   Xo 

'•In    the    Matter    of    Pike    Street.  One.  etc.,  193  111.  230.  61  X.  E.  1114 

Seattle,  42  Wash.  .551;    siih   nominee.  [1901];    The   Chicago   &    Alton    Rail- 

In   re    City    of    Seattle,    85    Pac.    45  way  Company   v.  City  of  Joliet,   153 

[1906].       *                                •  111.  649,  .39  X.  E.  Rep.   1077    [1894]; 

'*  Brewer    v.     Incorporated    Village  ''Ross    v.    Prante,    —    ^^.    D.    , 

of  Bowling  Creen.  Ohio.  7  Oliio  C.  C.  115  X.  W.  833  [1908];  Tyler  v.  Shea, 

489   [1893].  4  X.  D.  278,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  660,  61 

"Morrison  v.  City  of  Chicago,   142  X.  W.  468. 
111.  660,  32  X.  E.  172   [1893]. 


§  272  TAXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT.  420 

a  jun'  upon  the  question  of  benetits,  and  if  by  statute  it  is  pro- 
Anded  that  such  matters  must  be  determined  by  a  jury,  such 
statute  must  be  complied  with  substantially.^  If  the  statute  re- 
quires a  jury  without  specifying  the  number,  it  is  held  that 
the  term  jury  implies  twelve  men.^  If,  however,  the  statute 
provides  for  a  different  number,"  as  for  a  jury  of  six  men,^  com- 
pliance with  such  provision  is  sufficient.  At  a  meeting  to  correct 
an  assessment  of  damages  and  benefits  a  new  juror  cannot  be 
appointed  to  take  the  place  of  one  who  acted  in  making  the  pre- 
liminary assessment.**  The  jury  is  frequently  empowered  by 
statute  to  determine  certain  facts  essential  to  the  assessment 
proceedings,  leaving  the  remaining  steps  to  be  taken  by  the  city 
officials."  Thus  the  council  may  be  empowered  to  determine  the 
boundaries  of  the  district  benefited,  while  the  jury  is  to  find  as 
a  fact  how  much  the  benefits  are  to  each  tract  of  land.^"  Under 
a  statute  requiring  a  jury  without  any  provision  as  to  its  method 
of  selection  it  has  been  held  that  an  ordinance  requiring  the 
mayor  to  furnish  the  names  of  freeholders  from  whom  the  jury 
is  to  be  drawn  if  the  persons  whose  names  were  on  the  list  were 
"good  and  unexceptional  men,"  was  "perhaps  unwise  an.d  inex- 
pedient but  not  void.  "^^  It  has  been  held  that  clerical  errors 
in  a  verdict  may  be  corrected  by  the  foreman  after  the  jury 
has  separated,  where  by  statute  the  foreman  alone  is  to  certify 
to  the  assessment.^-  Under  some  statutes  provision  is  made  for 
levying  an  assessment  by  public  officers  or  commissioners  chosen 
for  that  purpose,  subject  to  the  revision  of  a  jury.^'^  If  a  trunk 
sewer  and  lateral  sewers  are  constructed  under  one  contract  as 
an   entire   improvement   the   property   owner   cannot   object   that 

'  Robeson  v.   People   ex   rel.   Curry,  '  Lity    of   Kansas   v.    Hill,    80   Mo. 

161    111.    176,    43    N.    E.    619    [1896]";  523    [1883]. 

Huston  V.  Clark,  112  111.  344  [1885];  *  Gilkerson    v.    Scott,    76    HI.    509 

Bibel   V.   The   People   for   use   of   the  [1875]. 

City    of    Bloomington,    67     HI.     172  » Kansas    City    v.    Bacon,    147    :Mo. 

[1873];    Taylor  v.  Burnap,  39  Mich.  259,  48   S.  W.  860    [1898]. 

739    [1878]";    In    the    Matter    of    the  "Kansas    City    v.    Bacon,    147    Mo. 

Appeal     of     Powers,     29     Mich.     504  259,  48  S.  W.  860   [1898]. 

[1874];    Kansas   City   v.   Bacon,    147  '^  State  of  Missouri  ex  rel.  Caven- 

Mo.  259,  48  S.  W.  860   [1898].  der  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  52  Mo.  574 

=  Bibel  V.  The  People  for  use  of  the  [1873]. 

City     of     Bloomington,     67     111.     172  '=  Huston    v.    Clark,     112     111.    344 

[1873].  [1885]. 

'City   of   Kansas   City    v.    Hill.    80  "Butler  v.  City  of  Worcester.   112 

Mo.  523    [1883].  Mass.  541    [1873]. 


421 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS 


273 


different  juries  were  not  appointed  to  view  the  trunk  sewer  and 
the  laterals.^* 

§  273.     Delegation  of  discretionary  power. 

Under  constitutional  provisions  which  confer  the  power  of  levy- 
ing local  assessments  upon  public  corporations,  the  legislature 
may  provide  what  agents  or  officers  of  the  corporation  shall 
have  power  to  levy  the  assessment.^  A  public  corporation  has 
no  power  to  act  except  by  and  through  its  officers,  and  accord- 
ingly such  constitutional  provision  must  be  regarded  as  contem- 
plating action  through  agents  or  officers  to  be  designated  by  the 
legislature.-  In  the  absence  of  a  statutory  authority  for  dele- 
gating power  to  subordinates  or  other  officials,  discretionary  pow- 
er vested  by  the  legislature  in  one  official,  or  set  of  officials,  can- 
not be  delegated  to  other  officials.^  Thus,  the  official  or  set  of 
officials  are  authorized  to  determine  the  necessity  of  the  improve- 
ment,* or  the  character,^  or  the  cost  thereof,*'  or  are  authorized 


"  In  re  Reynolds  Street  Sewer,  34 
Pa.   Super.   «.  209    [1907]. 

^  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  ]Mer- 
rick  V.  District  Court  of  Hennepin 
County,  33  Minn.  235,  22  X.  W.  625 
[1885]. 

^  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Mer- 
rick V.  District  Court  of  Hennepin 
County.  33  [Minn.  235,  22  X.  \V.  625 
[1885]. 

*  California  Improvement  Co.  v. 
Reynolds,  125  Cal.  88,  55  Pac.  802 
[1898];  Rauer  v.  Lowe,  107  Cal.  229, 
40  Pac.  337  [1895];  Warren  v.  Fer- 
guson, 108  Cal.  535,  41  Pac.  417 
[18951;  Bolton  v.  Gilieran.  105  Cal. 
244.  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  33,  38  Pac.  881 
[1894]:  Murrny  v.  Tucker,  10  Bush. 
(73  Ky.)  241  [1S74];  Hydes  v. 
Joyce,  4  Bush.  (67  Ky.)  464,  96  Am. 
Dec.  311  [1868];  Whitney  v.  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  Villasze  of  Hud- 
son, 69  :Mich.  189,  37  X.  W.  184 
[1888];  Scnfield  v.  City  of  Lansin?. 
17  Mich.  437  [1868];  City  of  Sedalia 
to  use  of  Sedalia  Xational  Bank  v. 
Donohue.  190  :\ro.  407,  89  S.  W.  386 
[1905]  ;  City  of  Xevada  to  use  of 
Gilfillnn  v.  Eddy.  123  :\ro.  546.  27  S. 
W.  471  [1804]:"  City  of  Westport  v. 
Whiting,    62    :\Io.    App.    647    [1895]; 


The  Dollar  Savings  Bank  v.  Ridge, 
62  Mo.  App.  324  [1895];  McQuiddy 
v.  Vineyard,  60  Mo.  App.  610  [1894]; 
The  King  Hill  Brick  Manufacturing 
Co.  v.  Hamilton,  51  Mo.  App.  126 
[1892];  State,  Mann,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  Jersey  City, 
24  X.  J.  L.  (4  Zabriskie)  662 
[1855];  In  the  ]\ratter  of  Hearn,  96 
X.  Y.  378  [1884];  In  the  Matter  of 
Emigrant  Industrial  Savings  Bank, 
75  X.  Y.  388  [1878];  Merritt  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Port  Chester,  29  Hun.  619 
[1883];  Whyte  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Xashville.  32  Tenn.  (2  Swan.) 
:{(i4    [1852]. 

MTydes  v.  Joyce.  07  Ky.  (4  P.ush.) 
464,  96  Am.  Dee.  311  [1868];  Whyte 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Xasliville, 
.32   Tenn.    (2   Swan.)    364    [1852]. 

"California  Im])rovement  Company 
V.  Reynolds.  123  Cal.  88,  58  Pac.  802 
[1898];  ^furray  v.  Tucker.  10  Bush. 
(73  Ky.)  241*  [1874]:  King  Hill 
Brick  ^fanufacturing  Company  v. 
Hamilton.  51   Mo.   App.   120    [1892]. 

"Bolton  V.  Gilieran.  105  Cal.  244. 
45  Am.  St.  Rep.  33.  38  Pac.  881 
[18941;  ilerritt  v.  Villaw  of  Port 
Chester.   29   Hun.   619    [18S31. 


§  274  TAXATION  BY    ASSESSMENT.  422 

in  their  discretion  to  dispense  with  a  formal  contract  for  the 
improvement/  or  are  authorized  to  issue  a  certificate  of  the  per- 
formance of  the  contract,*  or  are  empowered  to  define  the  limits 
of  the  tax  district."  or  are  anthorized  to  apportion  the  tax,  iss^^e 
tax  bills,  and  the  like,"  or  to  determine  what  proportion  of  the 
expense  is  to  be  borne  by  the  property  owners,^^  cannot  delegate 
to  other  officials  the  authority  to  exercise  such  discretionary 
powers.  If  by  statute  power  is  conferred  upon  certain  officials, 
or  sets  of  officials,  and  it  is  furthermore  provided  expressly  that 
such  power  may  be  conferred  by  such  officials  upon  others,  such 
statutes  are  valid ;  and  if  power  is  thus  conferred  by  the  officials 
specified  upon  other  ofSeials  in  the  manner  provided  for  by  stat- 
ute, the  latter  set  of  officials  may  exercise  such  power.^-  Such 
provisions  are.  however,  constructed  strictly.^''  Substantial  com- 
pliance with  the  provisions  of  the  statute  has,  however,  been 
held  to  be  sufficient.^'*  If,  by  statute,  an  engineer  is  authorized 
to  appoint  a  deputy  to  act  in  place  of  such  engineer,  and  the 
statute  requires  such  appointment  to  be  made  in  writing,  it  has 
been  held  that  if  such  deputy  has  been  appointed  orally,  but  he 
acts  as  a  deputy  and  is  recognized  as  such,  he  may  exercise  the 
powers  conferred  by  the  statute  upon  the  deputy.^^ 

§  274.     Delegation  of  non-discretionary  power. 

It  cannot,  however,  be  intended  by  the  legislature  that  the  chief 
officials  of  the  city  shall  personalh^  attend  to  all  the  details  of  the 

^Matter  of  Petition  of  Emigrant  [1891]);  City  of  Westport  v.  Whit- 
Industrial  Savings  Bank.  75  X.  Y.  ing,  62  Mo.  App.  647  [1805];  Dollar 
388  [1878].  Savings  Bank  v.  Ridge,  02  Mo.  App. 

»Rauer   v.   Lowe,    107    Cal.   229,   40  324    [1895];    State,    Mann,    Pros.    v. 

Pac.   337    [1895];    ^Yarren  v.   Fergu-  Mayor,    etc.,    of    Jersey    City.    4    Za- 

son,  108  Cal.  535,  4.1  Pac.  417  [1895].  briskie(24   X.   J.    L.)    662"   [1855]; 

'  Whitney    v.    Common    Council    ol  In   the   Matter   of   Hearn,    96   X.    Y. 

the  Village  of  Hvtdson,  69  Mich.  189,  378   [1884]. 

37  X.  W.  184   [1888].  "  Scofield    v.    City    of    Lansing,    17 

"Scofield    v.    City    of   Lansing,  .  17  Mich.  437  [1868]. 

Mich.  437   !:i868];   City  of  Sedalia  to  i- City    of    Chicago   v.    Xodeck,    202 

usa  of  Sedalia  Xational  Bank  v.  Don-  111.  257,  67  X.  E.  39   [1903]. 

ohue,    190    Mo.    407,    89    S.    W.    386  "City   of   Chicago   v.   Xodeck.   202 

[1905];      Dollar     Savings     Bank     v.  111.  257,  67  X.  E.  39   [1903]. 

Ridge,    183    Mo.    506,    82    S.    W.    50  "Kiley     v.     Forsee,     57     Mo.     390 

[1904];    City    of    Xevada    to    use   of  [1874]. 

GilfiUan  V.  Eddy,  123  Mo.  546;    (Re-  ^^viley     v.     Forsee,     57     Mo.     390 

versing    City    of    Xevada    to    use    of  [1874]. 
Gilfillan  v.  Morris,  43  Mo.  App.  586 


423  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  275 

various  tasks  placed  upon  them  by  statute.  Accordingly,  non-dis- 
cretionary ministerial  powers  may  be  delegated  by  such  officials  to 
subordinates,  or  to  other  officials.^  Thus,  if  the  officiak  to  whom 
discretionary  power  is  delegated  have  determined  aL  the  facts 
which  are  essential  to  the  validity  and  the  amount  of  the  as- 
sessment, and  only  a  mathematical  calculation  is  necessary  to 
determine  the  amount  of  the  assessment,  power  to  make  such 
mathematical  calculation  may  be  delegated  to  subordinates.-  So, 
the  work  of  making  out  an  apportionment  warrant  is  not  the 
same  thing  as  levying  a  tax.  and  may  accordingly  be  performed 
by  an   executive  board  which  has  no  authority  to  levy  a  tax.^ 

§  275.     Adoption  or  ratification  of  acts  of  subordinates. 

The  fact  that  a  given  body  is  authorized  hy  law  to  take  certain 
steps  with  reference  to  an  assessment,  while,  in  fact,  such  body 
appoints  a  committee  to  investigate  and  report  recommendations 
to  such  body,  which  recommendations  it  adopts,  and  upon  which 
it  acts,  does  not  amount  to  a  delegation  of  power  to  such  com- 
mittee, since,  while  the  original  investigation  is  made  by  the 
committee,  the  ultimate  action  is  taken  by  the  body  appointing 
such  committee.^  Upon  the  same  principle  the  fact  that  the  offi- 
cer or  officers  authorized  to  levy  the  assessment  ask  for  the  re- 
ports of  other  officers  upon  matters  relative  thereto,  and  act  upon 
such  reports,  does  not  anu)unt  to  a  delegation  of  power,  since 
the  ultimate  discretion  is  exercised  by  the  officer  to   whom  au- 

^  Kcesc  V.  City  of  Denver,  10  Colo.  City    of   Harrisbvirg   v.    Shepler,    190 

112,   15  Pac.   825    [1887];   Walker  v.  Pa.  St.  374,  42  Atl.  893    [1899]. 

District  of  Columbia,  D.  C.   (6  Mack-  ^  Barfield  v.  Gleason,   111   Ky.  491. 

ey)  352  [1888];  City  of  Burlington  v.  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  128,  63  S.  W.  964 

Quick,  47  la.  222  [1877];  Mayor  and  [1901]. 

City   Council   of   Baltimore   v.   Johns  '  Main  v.  Fort  Smith,  49  Ark.  480. 

Hopkins  Hospital,  56  Md.   1    [1880];  5  S.  W.  801   [1887];   Bassett  v.  City 

Heman    Construction    Co.    v.    Loevy.  of  Xew  Haven,  76  Conn.  70;  55  Atl. 

179  Mo.  455,   78   S.  W.   613    [1903];  579     [1903];     Bartram     v.     City     of 

City    of   Harrislmrji;    v.    Sheplor.    190  Bridjroport,    55    Conn.    122,    10    Atl. 

Pa.  St.  374.  42  Atl.  893   [1899].  470  [1887];  Bosell  v.  City  of  Marion. 

''Keese  v.  City  of  Denver.  10  Colo.       —    Ind.    App.    ,    79    X.    E.    105'i 

112,   15  Pac.  825    [1887];    Walker  v.  [1907];   Sears  v.  Board  of  Aldermen 

District  of   Columbia.   6   Mackey    (D.  of  Boston,  173  Mass.  71,  43  L.  R.  A. 

C.)  352  [1888]:  Citv  of  Burlington  v.  834,  53  X.  E.  138,  1  Mun.  Corp.  Cas. 

Quick,  47  la.  222   [1877]  :   Mayor  and  497     [1899];      Cruikshanks     v.     City 

City   Council    of    Baltimore    v.    .Tohn^  Council,      1      MoCord      ( S.     C.)      360 

Hopkins  Hospital.  56  Md.  1    [ISSO]:  [1821]. 


§276 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


424 


thorit}^  is  given  to  exercise  such  discretion.-  Thus,  if  a  subordi- 
nate computes  a  tax  bill,  and  such  computation  is  accepted  by 
the  authority  authorized  to  issue  the  bill,  and  the  bill  is  signed 
by  them,  such  tax  bill  is  sufficient.^  If  an  assessment  is  incor- 
rectly apportioned  by  mistake,  and  is  made  by  the  assistant  of 
the  engineer  under  a  statute  authorizing  the  engineer  to 
make  such  assessment,  such  fact  does  not  invalidate  a  sub- 
sequent assessment  apportioned  upon  a  correct  basis  and 
made  by  the  city  engineer.*  If  the  council  fixes  the  limits  of  an 
assessment  district  just  after  the  enactment  of  a  statute  con- 
ferring such  poAver  upon  the  board  of  public  works,  and  on  learn- 
ing of  such  amendment  the  board  of  public  works  proceeds  to 
fix  the  limits  of  the  assessment  district,  and  fixes  them  exactly 
as  they  were  fixed  by  the  council,  such  action  of  the  board  of 
public  works  is  valid.^  If  an  improvement  has  been  ordered  by 
an  officer  not  authorized  to  bind  the  city,  and  such  improvement 
has  been  constructed,  the  city  cannot,  after  the  construction  of 
such  improvement,  adopt  the  acts  of  such  unauthorized  officer. 
and  by  ratification  render  the  improvement  a  lawful  one  for 
which  the  property  owner  must  pay  the  assessment  imposed 
upon  him.'' 

§  276.     Assessment  by  de  facto  oflEicers. 

If  the  assessment  is  levied  by  persons  who  assume  to  be  lawful 
officers  of  the  public  corporation,  who  are  in  fact  exercising  the 
authority  conferred  by  statute,  and  are  de  facto  officers,  the 
validitv  of  their  exercise  of  official  powers  cannot  be  questioned 


^Bassett  v.  City  of  New  Haven, 
76  Conn.  70,  55  Ati.  579  [19031 ;  City 
of  Burlington  v.  Quick,  47  la.  222 
[1877];  Xevin  v.  Roach,  86  Ky.  492, 
5  S.  ^Y.  546  [1887];  Shimmons  v. 
City  of  Saginaw,  104  Mich.  511,  62 
X.  W.  725  [1895];  Cuming  v.  City 
of  Grand  Rapids,  46  Mich.  150,  9  X. 
W.  141  [1881] ;  Smith  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo, 90  Hun.  118,  35  X.  Y.  S.  635 
[1895].  See  also  Baisch  v.  City  of 
Grand  Rapids.  84  Mich.  666,  48  X. 
W.  176  [1891].  Coyitra,  the  adoption 
by  a  board  of  trustees  of  the  report 
of    commissioners    fixing    the    assess- 


ment is  not  the  determination  by  the 
board  of  the  costs  and  expenses ;  Mer- 
ritt  V.  Village  of  Port  Chester,  29 
Hun.   619    [1883]. 

^  Hem  an  Construction  Co.  v.  Loe- 
vy,  179  Mo.  455,  78  S.  W.  613 
[1903]. 

*  Casey  v.  City  of  Leavenworth,  17 
Kan.    189    [1876]. 

^  Shimmons  v.  City  of  Saginaw,  104 
Mich.   511,   62   X.   W.    725    [1895]. 

^  Second  Municipality  of  Xew  Or- 
leans V.  Botts,  8  Robinson  (La.)  198 
[1844]. 


42o  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §§277,278 

in  a  proceeding  to  enforce  the  assessment/  Thus  the  fact  that 
township  officers  omitted  to  take  an  oath  of  office  before  enter- 
ing upon  their  duties  does  not  render  invalid  an  assessment 
levied  by  them.-  The  right  to  exercise  the  powers  of  the  office 
which  the}^  are  exercising,  can  be  questioned  only  by  a  proceed- 
ing in  the  nature  of  quo  warranto/'  The  same  principle  has 
been  invoked  to  uphold  the  acts  of  commissioners  who  omitted 
to  take  the  prescribed  oath  of  office.*  If  one  who  assumes  to 
act  as  an  officer  is  neither  an  officer  de  jure  or  de  facto  the  prop- 
erty owner  who  is  assessed  can  have  no  relief  in  equity  as  his 
remedies  at  law  are  ample.'^ 

§  277.    Method  of  attacking  authority  of  officers. 

The  question  of  the  authority  of  public  officers  to  construct 
an  improvement  and  levy  an  assessment  therefor,  must  be  raised 
in  the  trial  court,  when  the  case  is  heard  upon  its  merits,^  and 
cannot  be  raised  for  the  the  first  time  by  a  motion  for  a  new  trial ,- 
or  by  collateral  attack.^ 

§  278.    Necessity  and  authority  of  special  commissioners. 

Provision  by  a  statute  is  frequently  made  for  the  appointment 
of  commissioners,  viewers,  and  the  like,  often  by  appointment 
in  each  particular  case,  who  are  to  co-operate  with  the  public 
authorities  in  determining  the  facts,  such  as  the  amount  of  bene- 
fits, the  exteuo  of  the  land  benefited,  and  the  like,  which  are  by 
statute  referred  to  them  for  determination.^     The  advantage  of 

^  Betts  V.   City   of  Xaperville,,   214  *  In   the  matter   of  Kendall.   85   N. 

111.  380,  73  N.  E.  75?   [1005];   Smith  Y.  302    [1881].     See  §  281. 

V.  The  People  e.\  rel  Detrick,  140  111.  'President.   Managers    Canal    Com- 

355,  29   N.   E.   67G    [1803];    Samuels  pany  v.  Atkins,  Collector,   121   N.  Y. 

V.   Drainage   Commissioners,    125   111.  246,   24  X.  E.   319    [1890]. 

536,    17   N.   E.   829    [1889];    Harmon  ^  Goodwine   v.   Leak,    127   Ind.   569, 

V.    Dallas,    165    Tnd.    710,    75    N.    E.  27   X.   E.    Kil    [1890]. 

823    [1905];    Deane    v.    Indiana   Ma-  -Goodwine   v.   Leak.   127    Ind.   569. 

cadam  &  Construction  Company,  161  27  X.  E.  161   [1890]. 

Ind.  371,  68  X\  E.  686  [1903]  ;  Akers  *  Downs  v.  Village  of  Irvington,  66 

V.    Kolkmeyer    &    Company,    97    Mo.  Howard     (X.    Y.)     93    1883.      See    § 

App.    520,    71     S.     \V.     536     [1902];  1375. 

Downs    V.    Village    of    Irvington,    66  -^Paulsen    v.    Portland.    149    U.    S. 

Howard    (X.  Y.)    93   [1883].  30,    37    L.    637,    13    S.    750    [1893]; 

^  Downs  V.  Village  of  Irvington,  66  (affirming  Paulson  v.  City  of  Port- 
Howard    (X.   Y.)    93    [1883].  land,   16  Or.  450,   1   L.   R.  A.  673.   19 

'Samuels  v.  Drainage  Commission-  Pac.  450   [1888])-.   Swamp  Land  Dis- 

ers.  125  111.  536,  17  X.  E.  829  [1S89].  trict  Xo.  307  v.  Gwynn.  70  Cal.  566, 


§278 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


426 


such  a  method  of  determining  i3encfi[.s  over  the  method  of  hav- 
ing the  council  determine  them  has  been  pointed  out  by  the 
courts.-  If  special  assessors  are  chosen  to  determine  the  fact 
and  amount  of  benefits,  and  to  apporti:^"  the  assessment  upon 
the  property  benefited,  such  assessors  can  determine  only  such 
questions  as  are  referred  to  them  by  statute.^  If  by  statute  the 
trustees  of  a  tOAvn  have  the  authority  to  determine  the  fact  that 
the  benefits  conferred  upon  real  property  equal  or  exceed  the 
cost  of  the  improvement,  the  commissioners  need  not  determine 
such  fact  again.'*  On  the  other  hand,  the  officers  of  the  town, 
or  public  corporation,  cannot  control  the  commissioners  in  mat- 
ters which  by  statute  are  left  to  the  determination  of  the  com- 
missioners.^    Commissioners  can  only  act  if  authorized  bv  stat- 


12  Pac.  462  [1880];  People  v. 
Hagar,  49  Cal.  229  [1874];  People 
V.  Coghill,  47  Cal.  361  [1874];  Sum- 
ner V.  Village  of  Milford,  214  111. 
388,  73  N.  E.  742  [1905];  Trigger 
V.  Drainage  District  No..  1,  193  111. 
230,  61  N.  E.  1114  [1901];  Ryder's 
Estate  V.  City  of  Alton,  175  III.  94, 
51  N.  E.  821  [1898];  Brethold  v. 
Village  of  Wilmette,  168  111.  162,  48 
N.  E.  38  [1897];  Pike  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  155  111.  656,  40  N.  E.  567 
[1895];  Wright  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
48  111.  285  [1808];  Scammon  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  42  111.  192  [1866];  Board 
of  Commissioners,  Montgomery  Co. 
V.  Fullen,  111  Ind.  410,  12  N.  E.  298 
[1887];  Crist  v.  State  ex  rel.  Whit- 
more,  97  Ind.  389  [1884];  Blanchett 
V.  Munieii>ality  No.  2,  13  La.  322 
[1839];  Kelley  v.  Minneapolis,  57 
Minn.  294,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  605.  26 
L.  R.  A.  92,  59  N.  W.  304  [1894]; 
Williams  v.  Monroe,  125  Mo.  574,  28 
S.  W.  853  [1894];  State.  King,  Pros. 
V.  Reed,  43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  186 
[1881];  State,  Johnson,  Pros.  v.  In- 
habitants of  City  of  Trenton,  43  N.  J. 
L.  (14  Vr.)  106  [1881];  State,  Free- 
holders of  County  of  Hudson,  Pros. 
V.  Inferior  Court  of  Common  Pleas 
of  County  of  Hudson,  42  N.  J.  L.  (13 
Vr.)  608  [1880];  State,  Simmons, 
V.  City  of  Passaic,  38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.) 
60  [i875];  State,  Peters,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  City 


of  Newark,  31  N.  J.  L.  (2  Vr.)  360 
[1865];  State,  Mann,  Pros.  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Jersey  City,  24  N.  J.  L.  (4 
Zab.)  662  [1855];  In  the  matter  of 
the  Application  of  Emily  P.  Woolsey, 
95  N.  Y.  135  [1884];  Olmsted  v.  Den- 
nis, 77  N.  Y.  378  [1879];  People  ex 
rel.  Kilmer  v.  McDonald,  69  N.  Y. 
362  [1877]  ;■  In  the  matter  of  the  Ex- 
tension of  Chui-ch  Street,  49  Barb. 
455  [1867];  Gilbert  v.  Havemeyer, 
4  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  506  [1849];  Vaca- 
tion of  Howard  Street,  142  Pa.  St. 
601,  21  Atl.  974  [1891];  Pittsburg's 
Petition  for  Board  of  Viewers,  138 
Pa.  St.  401,  21  Atl.  757,  759,  761 
[1890]  ;  Extension  of  Hancock  Street. 
18  Pa.  St.  (6  Harr.)  20  [1851]; 
In  re  Westlake  Avenue,  40  Wash. 
144,  82  Pac.  279  [1905];  Bryant  v. 
Bobbins,  70  Wis.  258,  35  N.  W.  545 
[1887]. 

-  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand  Haven, 
30  Mich.  24    [1874]. 

^  Union  Building  Association  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  61  111.  439  [1871.] 

*  Crawford  v.  People  ex  rel.  Rum- 
sey,   82   111.   557    [1876]. 

^  Steckert  v.  City  of  East  Saginaw, 
22  Mich.  104  [1870].  If  the  deter- 
mination of  the  amount  of  the  assess- 
ment is  left  by  statute  to  commission- 
ers, it  cannot  be  the  subject  of  arbi- 
tration; Smadbeek  v.  City  of  Mt 
Vernon,  109  N.  Y.  S.  70   [1908]. 


427  AUTHORITY    TO    LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  279 

ute,  and  accordingly  if  provision  is  made  for  a  jury,  commis- 
sioners can  not  act.''  A  formal  report  of  the  commissioners  is 
prima  facie  valid. '^  It  cannot  subsequently  be  impeached  by  the 
testimony  of  one  of  the  commissioners.^  .The  appointment,  as 
shown  by  the  record,  cannot  be  impeached  by  the  testimony  of 
one  of  the  commissioners. ** 

§  279.     Appointment  and  compensation  of  commissioners. 

The  commissioners  may  be  appointed,  and  are  required  to  be 
appointed,  in  the  manner  specified  by  statute.^  If  the  legislature 
chooses,  and  there  are  no  constitutional  provisions  preventing 
local  legislation,  the  legislature  may  appoint.^  The  legislature 
may  provide  that  the  commissioners  or  assessors  shalL  be  chosen 
by  the  electors  of  the  district,^  or  by  the  president  of  the  board 
of  local  improvements  in  a  village,*  or  by  the  township  com- 
missioners,^ or  by  the  city  council.®  Such  assessors  or  commis- 
sioners must  be  appointed  by  ordinance,  and  not  by  resolution.'' 
If  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  no  ordinance  can  be  passed  at  the 
meeting  at  which  it  has  been  introduced,  it  is  held  that  a  change 
of  name  of  one  of  the  commissioners  appointed  by  the  ordinance 
makes  it  necessary  to  lay  such  ordinance  over  for  another  week 
after  such  change  is  made.**  Under  a  statute  providing  that  com- 
missioners shall  appoint,  the  mayor  cannot  appoint."     It  is  fre- 

°  Taylor   v.    Burnap,    39   Mich.    739  =  People   ex   rel.   Kilmer   v.   McDon- 

[1878];  Strachan  V.  Brown,  39  Mich.  aid,   69   X.   Y.   362    [1877]. 

168    [1878].  MVilliams  V.  Corcoran,  46  Cal.  553 

^Trigger   v.   Drainage  District  No.  [1873]. 

1,   etc.,    193   111.   230,   61   N.   E.    1114  ^Sumner  v.  Village  of  :\Iilfor(l,  214 

[1901];    Allen    v.    City    of    Chicago,  111.  388,  73  N.  E.  742   [1905]. 

176  111.  113,  52  N.  E.  33  [1898].    See  =  Anderson  v.  Lower  Merion  Town- 

§§   923,   1283.  ship,     217     Pa.     369,     66     Atl.     1115 

'Ryder's   Estate  v.   City  of   Alton,  [1907]. 

175    111.    94,    51    N.    E.    821     [1898]:  "City  of  Elkhart  v.  Wickwire,   121 

Brethold  v.  Village  of  Wilmette,   168  Ind.  331;  22  X.  E.  .342  [1889];  Laim- 

111.    162,  48   X.   E.   .38    [1897].  beer   v.   ^Mnyor,    Ahlermen   and    Coni- 

°  Boynton   v.    People   ex    re!.   Kern.  monalty     of     City     of     Xew     York. 

155    111.   66,   39*X.   E.   622    [1895].  6    X.   Y.    Sup.    Ct!^  Rep.    109    [1850]; 

'Bihel       V.       The       People.       for  Scovill   v.  City  of  Cleveland,   1   O.  S. 

use   of  the   City  of   Blooniington,   67  12()   [1853]. 

111.   172   [1873];   Astor  v.  Mayor,  Al-  'State,   Gleason,   Pros.   v.   Town   of 

dermen  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  Bergen,  33  X.  J.  L.  (4  Vr.)    [1808.] 

of  Xew  York,  37  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  «  State,    Ackerman,    Pros.    v.    Town 

539    [1874].      As   to   the   edect   of   a  of  Bergen,  County  of  Hudson,  33  X. 

change  of  statute  as  to  the  appoints  J.  L.    (4  Vr.)    39    [1868]. 

ment    of    commissioners,    see    State,  °  Bihel    v.    The    People    for    use    of 
Copoland,    Pros.    v.    Village    of    Pas- 
saic, 36  X.  .L  L.   (7  Vr.)   382   [18731. 


§  279  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  428 

quentiy  provided  by  statute  that  the  commissioners  are  to  be 
appointed  by  a  court. ^°  Such  a  statute  is  valid  under  a  consti- 
tutional provision  to  the  effect  that  the  legislature  may  vest  the 
corporate  authorities  of  cities  with  the  power  to  make  local  im- 
provements by  special  assessment,  since  the  statute  does  not  con- 
fer upon  the  court  the  power  to  make  the  assessment."  What 
court  has  such  power,  is  determined  and  controlled  by  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  ;^-  as  is  also  the  question  of  the  term  of  the 
court  at  which  such  appointment  may  be  made.^^  If  the  appoint- 
ment is  made  by  the  judge  in  writing,  but  is  not  filed  as  a  part 
of  the  record  of  the  court,  such  appointment  must  be  shown  to 
be  genuine  in  order  to  be  admissible  to  show  the  power  of  such 
commissioner.^*  If  commissioners  are  appointed  in  an  improper 
manner  by  an  official  or  body  of  officials,  not  having  authority 
to  make  such  appointment,  subsequent  proceedings  are  invalid. ^^' 
Such  mistake  does  not,  however,  invalidate  prior  proceedings,  but 
it  is  sufficient  if  the  proceedings  are  corrected  at  the  point  at 
which  the  improper  appointment  of  a  commissioner  was  made.^" 
The  same  result  follows  if  the  record  does  not  shoAV  that  some 
of  the  persons  who  act  as  commissioners  were  appointed  at  all.^' 
If  the.  persons  who  certify  to  the  assessment  roll  are  not  assessors, 
either  de  jure  or  de  facto,  the  assessment  is  said  to  be  absolutely 
void.^®     An    objection   to    the    appointment    of   commissioners    '  i 

City    of    Bloomington,     67     111.     172  "  Bannister  v.  Grassy  Fork  Diteh- 

[1873].  ing  Association,  52   Ind.    178    [1875J. 

^"  Allen  V.  City  of  Chicago,  176  111.  'MYilliams    v.    Corcoran,    46    Cal. 

113,   52  N.  E.   33    [1898];    Township  553    [1873];    State,   Ackernian,   Pros. 

of    Whiteford    v.    Phinney,    53    Mich.  v.  Town  of  Bergen,  in  Covinty  of  Hiul 

130,    18    N.    W.    593    [1884];    In    re  son,  33  X.  J.  L.    (4  Vr.)    39    [1868]; 

Westlake  Avenue,   40  Wash.    144,   82  State  ex  rel.  Hosley,  Pros.  v.  ]\Iayor 

Pac.    279     [1905].  and  Aldermen  of   the  City  of  Pater- 

"/n  re  Westlake  Avenue,  40  Wash.  son,  37  X.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    409   [1875]; 

144,  82  Pac.  279   [1905].  State,    Hoetzel,    Pros.    v.    Inhabitants 

^=  Smith  V.  The  People  ex  rel.  De-  of  East  Orange,  50  X.  J.  L.   (21  Vr.) 

trick,    140    111.    355,    29    X\    E.    676  354,  12  Atl.  911   [1888]. 

[1893].  "■■Village  of  Melrose  Park  v.  Dun- 

"  Commissioners    may    be    appoint-  nelbecke.   210   111.   422,   71    X.   E.   431 

ed  at  a  probate  term.     Davis  v.  City  [1904]. 

of  Litchfield,    155   111.   384,   40   X.   E.  i"  ^lurphy   v.   City   of   Chicago.    186 

354   [1895];   :\Iurphy  v.  City  of  Peo-  111.   59,   57   X.   E.   847    [1900]. 

ria,  119  111.  509.  9  X.  E.  895  [1888].  ^^  People    ex    rel.    President,    Man- 

The  appointment  is  prima  facie  reg-  ager    and    Company    of    Delaware    & 

ular  if  the  record  can  be  so  construed  Hudson    Canal    Company    v.    Parker, 

fairly.     Sargent  v.  City  of  Evanston,  117  X.  Y.  86,  22  X.  E.  752  [1889]. 
154  111.  268,  40  X.  E.'440   [1894]. 


429  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  279 

waived  if  not  made  until  after  confirmation/'*  Such  objection 
cannot  be  interposed  under  a  statute  providing  that  an  assessment 
shall  not  be  vacated  for  irregularities.-*'  The  tribunal  which  is 
authorized  to  appoint  commissioners  or  assessors  is  generally  em- 
powered to  fill  vacancies  in  such  body.-^  If  one  of  the  commis- 
sioners is  interested  and  the  assessment  is  for  that  reason  set 
aside  on  confirmation,  new  commissioners  may  be  appointed  with- 
out a  new  petition.--  Under  most  statutes  it  is  necessary  to  fill 
vacancies  in  order  to  render  the  assessment  valid,  if  vacancies 
existed.-'^  Under  some  statutes  it  is  discretionary  with  the  ap- 
pointing officials  whether  to  fill  vacancies  or  not.-*  The 
power  to  fill  vacancies  is  liberally  construed.  Thus,  power 
to  appoint  a  successor  in  case  of  death,  absence,  or  other  dis- 
ability, is  regarded  as  conferring  power  to  appoint  in  case  of  the 
resignation  of  one  or  more  commissioners.-'^  If  no  provision  is 
made  for  filling  vacancies  it  is  said  that  the  surviving  commis- 
sioners can  act  and  that  no  power  to  appoint  successors  exists.-" 
The  tribunal  appointing  commissioners  is  held,  in  some  eases,  to 
have  power  to  remove  them.-^  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  said 
that  the  tribunal  appointing  the  commissioners  has  no  inherent 
power  to  remove  them  in  the  absence  of  some  statutes  specifically 
providing  therefor.-'*     If  the  council  has  authority  to  remove  one 

"Astor    V.    The    IMayor,    Aldermen  "MVilliams    v.    Little    White    Lick 

and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew  Gravel  Road  Company,  \Yilson's  Sup. 

York,  62  N.  ¥.580   [1875].  Ct.   Rep.    (Ind.)    7    [1871J. 

-"  Astor    V.    The    Mayor,    Aldermen  "^  State,  King,  Pros.  v.  Duryea,  45 

and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New  X.  J.  L.   (16  Vr.)   258   [1883];  State, 

York,  62  N.  Y.  580   [1875].  Water  Commissioners  of  Jersey  City, 

^  Osborn   v.   Sutton,    108   Ind.   443,  Pros.  v.  ]Mayor  and  Common  Council 

9   X.  E.   410    [ISSfi];    The  People  ex  of   City  of   Xewark,   27   N.   J.   L.    (2 

rel.  :\Ioore  v.  The  :\Iayor,  etc..  of  the  Dutcher)    185    [1858]. 

City  of  New  York,  5  Barb.  43  [1848];  ="  People  ex  rel.  Howlett  v.  Mayor 

Laimbeer    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen    and  and   Common   Council   of  tiie  City  of 

Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew  York,  Syracuse,   03   X.   Y.   291    [1875]. 

6   N.   Y.    Sup.    Ct.  "Rep.    109    [1850];  -'^Laimbeer     v.     ;Mayor,     Aldermen 

Rector  of  Trinity  Church  v.  Ilijiorins,  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 

27  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.   1    [1806].  York,    6    N.    Y."    Sup.    Ct.    Rep.    109 

"  Ewart     V.     Villafre     of     Western  [1850];    The    People    ex    rel.    Moore 

Springs.    180   111.   318,   54  X\   E.   478  v.    The   :Mayor.    etc.,   of   the    City   ot 

[1899].  New  York.  5  Barb.  43   [1848]. 

^  In    the    matter    of    Beekman.    31  ^  State,   Terhune,   Pros.   v.   City   of 

Howard   16   [1865];   Matter  of  Beek-  Passaic,    41    X\    J.    L.     (12    Vr.)    90 

man's  Petition,  1  Abb.  Pr.  X\  S.  449.  [1879]. 
affirminir  Beekman's  Petition.  19  Abb. 
Pr.    244    [18(-o]. 


§  280  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  430 

commissioner,  and  instead  of  so  doing  it  removes  three  commis- 
sioners, and  then  re-appoints  two  of  those  who  were  improperly 
removed,  together  with  another  commissioner,  it  has  been  held 
that  such  irregular  action  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment, 
since  it  is  equivalent  in  legal  effect  to  removing  and  appointing 
one  of  the  commissioners.-'-'  Acceptance  by  the  appointee  is 
necessary  to  enable  him  to  act  officially.^"  The  commissioners 
may  be  appointed  after  the  ordinance  is  signed  and  before  it  is 
approved  by  the  mayor  if  it  is  approved  ultimately.^^  If  the 
statute  requires  the  commissioner  to  qualify  bj^  giving  bond,  such 
bond  must  be  given. ^-  The  fact  that  the  commissioners  receive 
an  excessive  compensation,  is  not  ground  for  a  collateral  attack 
upon  the  assessment  proceedings.^*  If  compensation  is  provided 
for  the  assessment  commissioners  by  statute,  such  compensation 
is  proper.^®  Since  they  are  regarded  as  officers  of  the  court,  it 
is  not  necessary  that  a  special  appropriation  be  made  for  paying 
them.^" 

§  280.     Qualifications  of  commissioners. 

The  qualifications  of  commissioners  are  determined  by  statute.^ 
Under  a  statute  requiring  that  commissioners  shall  be  competent 
to  serve  as  jurors,  a  personal  privilege  of  exemption  from  jury 
duty  does  not  render  such  person  incompetent  to  serve  as  a 
commissioner.-  It  is  frequently  provided  by  statute  that  the  com- 
missioners must  be  freeholders.^  and  that  they  must  be  disinter- 

^  State,  Simmons,  Pros.  v.  City  of  State,    Bramhall,    Pros.    v.    Bayomie, 

Passaic,    42    N.    J.    L.     (13    Vr.)"524  35    X.    J.    L.     (6    Vr.)     476     [1872]; 

[1880 J.  State,   Clark,  Pros.  v.   City  of  Eliza- 

'» Township   of   Whiteford   v.   Phin-  betli,  32  X.  J.  L.   (3  Vr.)  357  [1867]. 

ney,    53    Mich.    130,    18   N.    W.    Rep.  ^  jjeej-man's   Heirs   v.   Municipality 

593  [1884].  No.   2,    15   Curry    (La.)    597    [1840]. 

^^  City  of  Galesburg  v.  Searles,  114  'City    of    Bridgeport    v.    Giddings, 

111.   217,  29   N.   E.   686    [1886].  43  Conn.  304   [1876];  Judson  v.  City 

»=  Township   of   Whiteford  v.   Phin-  of  Bridgeport,  25  Conn.  426   [1857]; 

ney,  53  Mich.  130,  18  N.  W.  Pvep.  593  Laughlin     v.     Ayers,     66     Ind.     445 

[1884],  [1879];    Seits   v.   Sinel,   62    Ind.   253 

'*Pittman  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  [1878] ;  State,  Coward,  Pros.  v.  May- 
City  of  New  York,  3  Hun.  370  [1875].  or,    etc.,    of   Xorth   Plainfield,    63   N. 

5=  Kimble  v.  City  of  Peoria,  140  111.  J.  L.  61,  42  Atl.  805  [1899];  Dederer 

157,   29   X.   E.   723    [1893].  v.    Voorhies,    81    X.    Y.    153    [1880]; 

'« Kimble    v.    City    of    Peoria,    140  Porter   v.    Purdy,    29    X.   Y.    106,    86 

111.  157,  39  X.  E.  723  [1893].  Am.   Dec.    283    [1864];    Pittsburg   v. 

'State,    Hampton,    Pros.    v.    Mayor  Cluley,  74  Pa.  St.    (24  P.   F.  Smith) 

and  Aldermen  of  the   City   of   Pater-  262   [1873]. 
son,  36  X.  J.  L.   (7  Vr.)   i59  [1873]; 


431 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY   ASSESSMENTS. 


§280 


ested."*  It  has  been  held  that  freeholders  cannot  act  unless  dis- 
interested, even  in  the  absence  of  such  specific  statutory  provision, 
on  the  theory  that  their  power  is  in  its  nature  judicial,  and  that 
it  is  accordingl3^  essential  that  they  be  impartial  and  disinter- 
ested." By  the  term  "disinterested,"  with  reference  to  commis- 
sioners or  other  persons  who  are  to  take  part  in  assessment  pro- 
ceedings, it  is  meant  that  such  persons  must  have  no  particular 
interest  in  the  property  affected  by  the  improvement,  or  to  be 
assessed  therefor.*'  The  owner  of  property  which  is  to  be  as- 
sessed is  not  a  disinterested  person.'  If  property  upon  the  line 
of  the  -improvement,  but  not  immediately  opposite  the  improve- 
ment is  not  subject  to  assessment,  the  owner  of  such  property  is 
a  disinterested  person.^     If,  however,   such  property  is  subject 


*  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Giddings, 
43  Conn.  304  [1876];  Murr  v.  Cit\ 
of  Xaperville,  210  111.  371,  71  X.  E. 
380  [1904];  White  v.  City  of  Alton, 
149  111.  626,  37  N.  E.  96  [1894]; 
Chase  v.  City  of  Evanston,  172  111. 
403,  50  N.  E.  241  [1898];  Philadel- 
phia &  Reading  Coal  and  Iron  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  158  111.  9, 
41  X.  E.  1102  [1895]  ;  Shreve  v.  Town 
of  Cicero,  129  111.  226;  sub  nomine 
Albertson  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  21  X. 
E.  815  [1890];  Pearce  v.  Village  of 
Hyde  Park,  126  111.  286,  18  X.  E. 
824  [1890];  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Wlieeler,  25  111.  478,  79  Am.  Dec. 
342  [1861];  Bradley  v.  City  of 
Frankfort,  99  Ind. "  417  [1884]: 
Laugh]  in  v.  Ayers,  60  Ind.  445 
11879];  Seits  v.*  Sinel,  62  Ind.  253 
[1878];  Combs  v.  Etter,  49  Ind.  535 
[1875];  Roberts  v.  Smith,  115  Mich. 
5,  72  X.  W.  1091  [1897];  McKusick 
V.  City  of  Stillwater,  44  :\linn.  372, 
46  X."  W.  769  [1890];  Plendrickson 
V.  Borougli  of  Point  Pleasant,  65  X. 
J.  L.  535,  47  Atl.  465  [1900];  State, 
Coward,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Xorth  Plainfield,  63  X.  J.  L.  (34 
Vr.)  42  Atl.  805  [1899];  State, 
Kingsland,  Pros.  v.  Township  of 
Union,  County  of  Bergen,  37  X.  J. 
L.  (8  Vr.)  268  [1874];  State,  Wi- 
nans,  Pros.  v.  Crane,  36  X.  J.  L.  (7 
Vr.)   394  [1873];  O'Reilley  v.  City  of 


Kingston,  114  X\  Y.  439,  21  X.  E. 
1004  [1889];  People  ex  rel.  Howlett 
V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council  of 
City  of  Syracuse,  63  X.  Y.  291 
[1875]  ;  O'Reilly  v.  City  of  Kingston, 
39  Hun.  285  [1886];  Hopkins  v.  Ma- 
son,  42  Howard,  115  [1871];  Hop- 
kins V.  Mason,  61  Barb.  469  [1871]; 
Main  Street,  Big  Run  Borough,  137 
Pa.  St.  590,  20  Atl.  711    [1890]. 

^  State,  Winans,  Pros.  v.  Crane,  36 
X\  J.  L.    (7  Vr.)    394  [1873]. 

*  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Giddings, 
43  Conn.  304    [1876]. 

"^  Xutwood  Drainage  and  Levee  Dis- 
trict V.  Reddish,  234  111.  130,  84  X. 
E.  750  [1908];  Commissioners  of 
Union  Drainage  District  Xo.  1  v. 
Smith,  233  111.  417,  84  X.  E.  376 
[1908];  Vandalia  Levee  and  Drain- 
age District  v.  Hutchins,  234  111.  31, 
84  X.  E.  715  [1908]  ;  Shreve  v.  Town 
of  Cicero,  129  111.  226;  suh  nomine 
Albertson  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  21  X, 
E.  815   [1890];   Batchelor  v.  Borough 

of  Avon-by-the-Sea,  —  X.  J.  ,  68 

Atl.  124  [1907];  State,  Kingsland, 
Pros.  v.  Inhabitants  of  Township  of 
I'nion,  in  County  of  Bergen,  37  X"^. 
J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  268  [1874];  State,  Wi- 
nans, Pros.  v.  Crane,  36  X.  J.  L.  (7 
Vr.)    394    [1873]. 

'  State,  Coward.  Pros.  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Xorth  Plainfield,  63  X.  J.  L. 
(34   Vr.)    61,   42   Atl.   805    [1899]. 


§280 


TAXATICiT  BY   ASSESSMENT. 


432 


to  assessment,  though  not  actually  upon  the  improvement,  the 
owner  of  such  property  is  not  disinterested."  The  trustee  of  a 
religious  corporation,  the  property  of  which  is  liable  to  assess- 
ment, is  a  disinterested  person  where  the  office  of  trustee  does 
not  confer  any  legal  interest  in  the  property  of  the  corjDoration, 
nor  render  the  trustee  personally  liable  for  its  debts  or  assess- 
ments.^" In  some  of  the  lower  New  York  courts  it  is  held  that 
a  pew  holder  who  is  a  regularly  contributing  church  member, 
has  such  a  pecuniary  interest  in  the  property  of  the  church  that 
he  is  incompetent  to  act  in  assessment  proceedings  by  which  the 
property  of  such  church  might  be  assessed. ^^  A  person  who  is 
interested  in  a  public  contract  may  act  in  spreading  the  assess- 
ment for  such  improvement.^-  Thus  if  A  is  to  act  as  engineer 
and  receive  as  compensation  five  per  cent,  of  the  total  cost,  but 
the  rights  of  the  property  owners  are  protected  by  requiring 
competitive  bidding  and  by  giving  the  property  owners  the  right 
to  do  the  work  if  they  elect  to  do  it,  A  may  act  as  commissioner 
in  spreading  the  assessment  and  is  not  disqualified  by  reason 
of  his  interest.^^  The  fact  that  commissioners  after  resignation 
undertake  part  of  the  work  and  receive  compensation  therefor. 
is  said  not  to  avoid  the  contract  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or 
injury  to  the  public  interests,  although  the  amount  paid  to  them 
as  compensation  must  be  deducted  from  the  amount  of  the  as- 
sessment.^* The  secretary  of  the  board  of  trustees  of  a  reclama- 
tion district  is  not  thereby  disqualified  to  act  as  a  commissioner, 
though  he  is  appointed  by  the  board  and  receives  a  salary  from 
them.^^  A  city  officer,  who  receives  a  fixed  percentage  on  the 
amount  of  special  assessment??  as  compensation  for  his  services, 
has  such  an  interest  as  disqualifies  him  from  acting  as  commis- 


» Main  Street,  Big  Rim  Boroiirrh, 
137  Pa.  St.  590.  2n'Atl.  711    [1890]. 

"  People  ex  rel.  Hewlett  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  the  City  of  Syracuse,  63  N. 
Y.   291    [1875]." 

'^Hopkins  v.  Mason,  42  Howard 
115  [1871];  Hopkins  v.- Mason,  61 
Barb.  469  [1871]. 

"Betts  V.  City  of  Naperville,  214 
HI.  380,  73  N.  E.  752  [1905];  (over- 
ruling Murr  V.  City  of  Naperville, 
210  HI.  371,  71  N."  E.  380  [1904], 
where  it  was  held  that  one  who  was 
employed  by  a  city  to  design  a  sys- 


tem of  waterworks,  and  to  make 
plans,  specifications  and  estimates 
for  a  certain  per  cent,  of  tlie  cost  of 
the  work  was   not   disinterested ) . 

"Betts  V.  City  of  Naperville,  214 
HI.  380,  73  N.  E.  752  [1905];  (over- 
ruling Murr  V.  City  of  Naperville, 
210  111.   371.  71   N.  E.  380   [1904]. 

"  Fii^her  v.  City  of  Rochester,  6 
Lansing  225   [1872]. 

"  Lower  Kings  River  Reclamation 
District  No.  531  v.  Phillips,  108  Cal. 
306,  39  Pac.  630,  41  Pac.  335  [1895]. 


433 


AUTHORITY   TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


§280 


sioner.^"  A  petitioner  for  an  improvement  is  disqualified  to  act 
as  a  commissioner  to  assess  damages  and  benefits  caused  thereby.^^ 
One  who  testifies  as  an  expert  witness  as  to  the  effect  of  the 
improvement  upon  other  property,  is  not  disqualified  from  act- 
ing as  a  commissioner  to  make  the  assessment  for  the  same  im- 
provement upon  another  tract  of  hmd.^^  In  the  absence  of  a 
specific  statutory  provision,  the  fact  that  one  of  the  owners  of 
property  to  be  assessed  is  a  near  relative  of  a  commissioner,  does 
not  render  the  latter  disqualified  to  act.^^  Thus,  the  fact  that 
the  son  of  one  of  the  assessors  owns  one  of  the  lots  assessed, 
and  that  a  hotel  is  located  thereon  in  which  such  assessor  lives, 
has  been  held  not  to  disqualify  him.  since  he  is  not  shown  to  be 
interested  in  the  property,  or  to  be  an  occupant  thereof.-"  The 
fact  that  one  commissioner  is  a  brother-in-law  of  a  person  whose 
property  is  not  assessed  does  not  dis(|ualify  him.-^  If,  by  statute, 
it  is  provided  that  the  commissioners  or  assessors  must  not  be 
of  kin  to  the  parties,  such  relationship  disqualifies  them  from 
actin-^.-^  Thus,  the  father-in-law  of  a  person  whose  property  will 
be  affected  by  the  improvement,  cannot  act  as  commissioner.-'^ 
The  fact  that  a  commissioner  was  an  employe  of  a  person  who 
is  the  agent  of  the  owners  of  some  of  the  property  assessed  in 
the  name  of  the  employer,  does  not  render  such  commissioner 
an   interested   person.-*     A   general   taxpayer   is   a   disinterested 


« Chase  v.  City  of  Evanston,  172 
111.  40.3,  ,50  N.  E.  241  [1898];  (a 
case  where  the  commissioner  was  also 
superintendent  of  special  assessments, 
receiving  one  per  cent,  of  the  total 
amount;  and  collector,  receiving  two 
per  cent,  of  the  total  amount  as  com- 
pensation) . 

^^  Hendrickson  v.  Borongli  of  Point 
rieasant,  65  N.  J.  L.  (.SO  Vr.)  5:55, 
47  Atl.  465  [1900];  (citing  Foster 
V.  Cape  May,  60  X.  J.  L.  (31  Vr.) 
78;  Traction  Co.  v.  Board  of  Works, 
56  X.  J.  L.  (27  Vr.)  431;  State, 
Winans,  Pros.  v.  Crane,  36  X.  J.  L. 
(7  Vr.)    394   [1873]. 

'*  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Coal  and 
Iron  Co.  V.  City  of  Chicago,  158  111. 
9,  41  X.  E.  1102   [18r51. 

"O'l^eilly  V.  City  of  Kingston.  114 
N.  Y.   430.   21    X.   E.    :004    [ISSO]. 


="  O'Reilly  v.  City  of  Kingston,  114 
X.  Y.  439,  21  X."  E.  1004  [1889]; 
O'Reilly  v.  City  of  Kingston,  39  Hun. 
285    [1886]. 

^  Rowe  V.  Commissioners  and  As- 
sessments of  East  Orange,  69  X.  J. 
L.    (40  Vr.)    600,  55  Atl.  649   [1903]. 

--Bradley  v.  City  of  Frankfort,  99 
Ind.  417  [1884];  Laughlin  v.  Aycrs, 
(iC)  Ind.  445  [1879];  Seits  v.  Sinel, 
62  Ind.  253  [1878];  Combs  v.  Etter, 
49    lad.   535    [1875]. 

=■'■  Bradley  v.  City  of  Frankfort,  99 
Ind.    417     [1884]. 

"*  Penrcc  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park, 
126  111.  287.  18  X.  E.  824  [1890 1; 
See  also  Rowe  v.  Commissioners  and 
Assessments  of  East  Orange,  19  X. 
J.  L.  (40  Vr.)  600,  55  Atl.  649 
[1903], 


§  280  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  434 

person  within  the  meaning  of  these  statutes.-^  A  commissioner 
may  be  a  resident  of  the  public  corporation  which  is  conduct- 
ing the  improvement  and  making  the  assessment  f'  and  it  is 
sometimes  provided  that  he  must  reside  in  such  city;-^  and  some- 
times that  the  commissioners  must  reside  in  different  wards. -^ 
If  the  commissioners  or  assessors  are  appointed  by  the  proper 
officers,  and  the  only  irregularity  in  such  appointment  is  the  fact 
that  such  commissioners  are  not  qualified,  such  objection  may  be 
made  at  the  time  of  the  appointment,  but  if  not  made  then  such 
objection  is  regarded  as  waived,  and  the  assessments  cannot  sub- 
sequently be  attacked  as  invalid  because  the  appraisers  are  not 
qualified.-"  Thus,  if  a  commissioner  or  assessor  is  not  a  free- 
holder, such  objection  must  be  interposed  when  such  commission- 
er is  appointed,  and  before  the  work  is  done,  and  the  assessment 
made.^°  An  objection  to  the  competency  of  a  commissioner  must 
be  made  at  the  time  of  the  appointment,  or  within  a  reasonable 
time  after  his  want  of  competency  becomes  known,  or  such  ob- 
jection will  be  regarded  as  being  waived. '^^  Failure  to  object 
until  the  commissioners  have  filed  their  report  waives  such  ob- 
jection.^- Objections  to  the  method  of  appointing  the  commis- 
sioners will  not  be  considered  after  the  commissioners  have  com- 
pleted the  public  improvement. '^^     Such  objections  are  waived  if 

'"Hibben  v.  Smith,   191   U.   S.  310,  =«  Dederer  v.  Voorhies,  81  N.  Y.  153 

24   S.    88    [1903],    (affirming   Hibben  [1880];   Astor  v.  The  Mayor,  Alder- 

V.  Smith,  158  Ind.  206,  62  N.  E.  447  men    and    Commonalty    of    the    City 

[1901]);   City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Gid-  of  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  580   [1875]; 

dings,   43   Conn.   304    [1876];    McKu-  Porter   v.   Purdy,    29   N.    Y.    106;    86 

sick  V.   City  of  Stillwater,   44  Minn.  Am.    Dec.    283    [1864];    Thurston   v. 

372,    46    n!    W.    769    [1890];    State,  City  of  Elmira,   10  Abb.  Pr.    (N.  S.) 

Conklin,  Pros.  v.  Bergen  County  Cir-  119    [1868];    Pittsburg  v.   Cluley,   74 

cuit  Court,  64  N.  J.  L.   (35  Vr.)   536,  Pa.  St.   (24  P.  F.  Smith)   262  [1873]. 

45   Atl.   981    [1900];    State,   Bowker,  ^"Porter   v.    Purdy,   29   N.   Y.    106, 

Pros.  V.  Wright,  54  N.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  86    Am.    Dec.    283    [1864];    Thurston 

130,  23  Atl. ""  116    [1891];    State,  Wi-  v.   City  of   Elmira,   10  Abb.   Pr.    (N. 

nans.    Pros.    v.    Crane,    36    N.    J.    L,  S.)    119    [1868]. 

(7  Vr.)    394    [1873].  ''City  of  Valparaiso  v.  Parker,  148 

=«McKusick    V.    City   of    Stillwater,  Tnd.    379,   47   jST.   E.   330    [1897];    O.s- 

44  Minn.  372,  46  N.  W.  709   [1890];  born  v.  Sutton,  108  Ind.  443,  9  N.  E. 

State,    Bowker,   Pros.    v.    Wright,    54  410    [1886]. 

N.  J.  L.    (25  Vr.)    130,   23   Atl.   116  =>=  City  of  Valparaiso  v.  Parker,  148 

[1891].  Ind.   379,   47   N.   E.   330    [1897]. 

=^  State,    Clark,    Pros.    v.    City    of  ^^^  State,    Skinkle,    Pros.    v.    Inhabi- 

Elizabeth,    32   N.   J.   L.    (3   Vr.)    357  tants    of    Township     of    Clinton,     in 

[1867].  County  of  Essex,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.) 

=' State,    Malone,     Pros.    v.    Mayor  056    [1877]. 
and  Common  Council  of  Jersey  City, 
28  N.  J.  L.    (4  Dutcher)    500  "[186o"]. 


435 


AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS. 


§280 


not  interposed  before  confirmation.''*  Whether  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  commissioners  have  the  proper  qualifications,  or 
whether  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  proper  qualifications  must 
appear  affirmatively  upon  the  record,  is  a  question  upon  which 
there  is  a  conflict  of  authority.  In  some  cases  it  is  held  that 
such  qualifications  are  presumed  where  the  court  appoints  the 
commissioners.^^  It  has  furthermore  been  held  that  where  public 
officials,  such  as  the  council,^"  or  the  county  commissioners,^'^  ap- 
point the  commissioners,  their  qualifications  will  be  presumed  to 
exist,  and  need  not  appear  affirmatively  upon  the  record.  In 
other  cases  it  has  been  held  that  where  public  officers,^^  such  as 
the  council,^-'  or  the  mayor,**^*  are  to  appoint  commissioners,  the 
qualification  of  such  commissioners  must  appear  affirmatively 
upon  the  record.  It  has  been  held  that  if  commissioners  have 
been  appointed  to  fill  vacancies,  their  qualifications  must  appear 
affirmatively.*^  While  there  is  some  conflict  of  authority  as  to 
whether  the  qualifications  of  commissioners  appointed  to  levy  as- 
sessments for  a  particular  improvement  must  appear  affirmatively 
upon  the  record,  it  is  generally  held  that  the  qualifications  of 
commissioners  who  are  permanent  officers  of  the  city  need  not 
appear  affirmatively  upon   the   record,   but   will   be   presumed.*^ 


'*  Nutwood  Drainage  and  Levee 
District  v.  Reddish,  234  111.  130,  84 
N.  E.  750  [1908];  Commissioners  of 
Union  Drainage  District  No.  1  v. 
Smith,  233  111.  417,  84  N.  E.  376 
[1008]. 

^^  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Coal  and 
Iron  Co.  V.  City  of  Chicago,  158  111. 
9,    n   N.  E.   1102    [1895]. 

=«  State,  Malone,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  Jersey  City, 
28  N.  J.  L.   (4  Dutcher)    500   [186o"l. 

'Hvellogg  V.  Price,  42  Ind.  360 
[1873]. 

^  State  ex  rel.  Speer,  Pros.  v.  City 
of  Passaic,  38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  108 
[1875]. 

39  Vreeland  v.  !Mayor  and  Council 
of  the  City  of  Bayonne,  54  N.  J.  L. 
(25  Vr.)  488,  24*  Atl.  486  [1892]; 
The  State,  Tims,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Newark,  25  N. 
J.  L.  (1  Dutcher)  399  [1856];  State 
ex  rel.  Little,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common    Council    of   Newark,    36    N. 


J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  170  [1873];  State, 
Pope,  Pros.  V.  Town  of.  Union,  in 
County  of  Hudson,  32  N.  J.  L.  (3 
Vr.)  343  [1867];  State,  Bramhall. 
Pros.  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of 
Bayonne,  35  N.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  476 
[1872];  State  ex  rel.  Harris,  Pros. 
V.  Mayor,  Aldermen,  etc.,  of  Jersey 
City,  38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  85  [1875]*; 
State,  ex  rel.  Hoslcy,  Pros.  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  the  City  of  Paterson,  37  N. 
J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    409    [1875]. 

*"  Judson  V.  City  of  Bridgeport,  25 
Conn.  426    [1857]. 

"  Vreeland  v.  Mayor  and  Council 
of  the  City  of  Bayonne,  54  N.  J.  L. 
(25  Vr.)  488,  24  Atl.  486  [1892]; 
The  State,  Tims,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Newark,  25  N.  J. 
L.    (1   Dutcher)    399    [1856]. 

*-  State,  Hoboken  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Company,  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Hoboken,  36  N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  291 
[1873]. 


§  281  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  436 

§  281.     Oath  of  commissioners. 

It  is  frequently  provided  by  statute  that  the  commissioners 
must  take  oath  in  some  prescribed  form.  If  such  oath  is  not 
taken,  or  if  it  is  taken  without  complying  substantially  with  the 
requirements  of  the  statute,  subsequent  proceedings  are  invalid.^ 
The  commissioners  must  be  sworn  for  each  particular  case.-  If 
commissioners  have  been  sworn  with  reference  to  a  particular 
improvement,  and  their  report  is  referred  to  them  for  recasting, 
it  is  not  necessary  that  they  be  sworn  a  second  time.^  If  the  evi- 
dence before  the  lower  courts  is  not  preserved,  it  will  be  presumed 
that  the  evidence  showed  that  the  commissioners  took  the  oath 
required  by  laAV.*  If  no  oath  has  been  taken,  it  has  been  said 
that  the  assessment  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally  on  such 
ground.^  This  is  true  especially  where  the  assessment  has  been 
confirmed  before  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.*'  The  oath 
must  be  in  substantial  compliance  with  the  statutory  formalities.'^ 
Additional  clauses,  not  inconsistent  with  the  statutory  require- 
ments, may  be  disregarded.^  Under  a  statute  requiring  an  oath 
"fairly  and  impartially  to  execute  the  duties  imposed  on  them 
by  statute,"  an  oath  that  the  commissioners  "will  fairly  and 
impartially  execute  duties  imposed  upon  them  by  the  above  ap- 
pointment, and  make  a  just  and  true  report  according  to  the 
best  of  their  skill  and  judgment,"  has  been  held  to  be  sufficient, 
the  latter  part  of  the  oath  being  regarded  as  surplusage.^  Under 
a  statute  requiring  an  oath  "faithfully  and  fully  to  discharge 
the  duties"  required  by  statute,  an  oath  by  the  commissioners 
that  each  would  perform  the  duties  "to  the  best  of  his  ability" 

MVheeler    v.    City    of    Chicago,    57  '  Scliemick  v.  City  of  Chicago,  151 

111.   415    [1870];    Heiitig  v.   Gilmore,  111.   336,   37   N.   E.   888    [1894]. 

33    Kan.    234,    6    Pac.    304     [1885];  *  Gross  v.  Village  of  Grossdale,  176 

Hendrickson     v.     Borough    of     Point  111.  572.  52  N.  E.  370    [1898]. 

Pleasant,  65   X.  J.   L.    (36  Vr.)    535,  '^  Caskey  v.  City  of  Greensburg.   78 

47    Atl.    465     [1900];     State,    Spear,  Ind.    233    [1881];    In    the    matter    of 

Pros.  V.  City  of  Perth  Amboy,  38  N.  Kendall.    85    X.    Y.    302    [1881]. 

J.    L.     (9    Vr.)     425     [1876];     State.  *  Walker  v.  People  ex  rel.   Kocher- 

■   Hosley,     Pros.     v.     Mayor     and     Al-  sperger,    169    111.    473,    48   N.    E.   694 

dermen   of    City   of   Paterson,    37   N.  [1897]. 

J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    409   [1875];   Merrit  v.  '  Eich    v.    City   of   Chicago,    59    111. 

Village    of    Port    Chester,    71    N.    Y,  286   [1871]. 

309,    27    Am.   Rep.    47    [1877].  'Rich   v.   City   of   Chicago,   59    111. 

^  State    ex    rel.    Graham.    Pros.    v.  286     [1871]. 

Mayor,  etc.,   of  City  of  Paterson,   37  "  State,    Wilkinson,    Pros.    v.    City 

N.   J.  L.    (8   Vr)    380    [1875].  of  Trenton,  35  N.  J.  L.    (6  Vr.)    485 

[1872], 


437  AUTHORITY    TO   LEVY    ASSESSMENTS.  §  282 

is  insufficient.^"  Under  a  statute  requiring  an  oath  to  perform 
duties  "impartially  and  according  to  their  best  judgment,"  a 
report  that  the  commissioners  have  been  sworn  "to  the  faithful 
discharge  of  their  duties,"  is  insufficient."  The  officer  specified 
by  statute  is  the  proper  one  to  administer  the  oath  to  the  com- 
missioners.^- If  the  commissioners  are  sworn  to  before  a  notary 
public  who  is  also  the  attorney  of  the  city,  such  action  is  irregu- 
lar; but  if  objection  is  not  made  to  such  proceedings  on  the 
ground  of  such  irregularity,  it  is  regarded  as  waived.^^  If  the 
petition  is  signed  "Joseph  E.  Paden,  City  Attorney,"  and  the 
certificate  to  the  oath  is  signed  "JT  E.  Paden,  Notary  Public." 
it  will  not  be  presumed  on  appeal  that  the  persons  were  identical.^'* 
A  notary  who  is  superintendent  of  the  assessment  department 
of  a  city  may  administer  the  oath  to  special  assessment  com- 
missioners, and  is  not  disqualified  on  the  ground  of  his  office. ^•^' 
An  oath  is  not  invalid  because  taken  at  an  earlier  time  than 
that  provided  for  by  law.^"  The  commissioners  are  required  to 
take  the  oath  before  acting,  but  not  before  giving  notice  of  their 
first  meeting.^'  It  has  been  held  to  be  sufficient  if  the  oath  is 
taken  after  the  assessment  is  made,  and  before  it  is  reported  to 
the  common  eouneil.^^  If  the  commissioners  are  sworn  when  they 
make  the  assessment  it  is  not  nece.ssary  that  they  be  sworn  before 
hearing  the  evidence  submitted  on  objections  to  the  assessment.^" 

§  282.     Exercise  of  pow^er  by  commissioners. 

The  commissioners  who  are  appointed  to  determine  benefits  and 
to  apportion  the  assessment,  must  exercise  their  authority  in  sub- 
stantial compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  subject  which  authorizes 
them  to  act.^     The  authority  of  assessment  commissioners  is  ex- 

"Merrit   v.   Village   of   Port   dies-  '"  Gurnee    v.    City    of    Chicago.    40 

ter,   71    X.   Y.   309,   27    Am.   Rep.   47  III.    105    [18G6]. 

[1877].  ''Page  v.  Mayor  and  City  Couneil 

"Cambria    Street.    75   Pa.   St.    (25  of   Baltimore.   34   Md.   55S    [18711. 

P.   F.   Smith)    357.  'M.aimbeer     v.'  Mayor,     Aldermen 

*-  Shreve    v.    'J'own    of    Cicero,    12!)  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 

111.    226;     ,siib    nomine    Albertson    v.  York.    G    N.    Y.    Sup.    Ct.    Rep.    109 

Town  of  Cicero,  21   X.  K.  815   [ISOOJ.  [18501. 

'»Linck    V.    City    of    Litchfield.    141  "Trigger  v.  Drainage  District,  103 

111.  469,  31   X.  E.   123   [18931.  ill.   230,   61    X".   E.    1114    [19011. 

"Linck  V.  City  of  Litchfield.  141  'The  details  of  the  method  of  ex- 
Ill.    469,   31    X.   E.    123    [18931.  ercising  this  power  are  considered  in 

"McChesney    v.    City    of    Chicago,  connection  with  the  method   of  levy- 

159  111.  223,  42  X.  E.  SOt   [1896].  ing  an  assessment  and  of  making  an 

apportionment.      See    Chapter    XV. 


282 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


438 


hausted  when  they  have  prepared  and  filed  a  formal  report  of 
their  proceedings,  and  they  cannot  act  subsequently  in  the  absence 
of  some  statutory  provision  specifically  authorizing  them  to  act 
further.-  If  a  special  committee  is  appointed  to  levy  an  assess- 
ment, or  make  out  a  special  tax  bill,  such  bill  must  be  in  writing, 
and  signed  and  certified  by  all  the  members  of  the  committee.^ 


-  People  ex  rel.  Reynolds  v.  City  of 
Brooklyn,  49  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  136 
[1867]". 

^  Vennum   v.   People   ex   rel.    Callo- 


way, 188  111.  156,  58  N.  E.  979 
[1900];  Murphy  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
186  111.  59,  57  N.  E.  847   [1900]. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

IMPROVEMENTS   FOR  WHICH  ASSESSMENTS   MAY   BE 

LEVIED. 

A.— GENERAL  NATURE  OF  IMPROVEMENT. 

§  283.  Nature  of  improvement  in  assessment  for  benefits — Must 
be  for  public  use. 
The  elements  which  an  improvement  must  possess  in  order  to 
be  one  for  which  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  based  on  the 
theory  of  benefits,  are  certainly  two  in  number,  and  possibly 
three.  (1)  In  order  to  .justify  a  local  assessment  the  improve- 
ment must  be  a  public  one  ;^  that  is,  it  must  be  one  which  con- 
fers a  general  benefit  upon  the  public  at  large,  and  which, 
therefore,  the  public  acting  through  its  government  may  con- 
struct without  the  consent  of  the  particular  individuals  af- 
fected thereby.  Local  assessment  for  benefits  is  a  form  of 
taxation  and  the  very  nature  of  taxation  implies  that  it 
is  for  a  public  interest.-  An  improvement  which  lacks  this 
element  is  essentially  a  private  improvement,  and  no  mat- 
ter how  useful  or  advantageous  it  may  be,  the  public  cannot 
compel  its  construction,  nor  can  it  pay  therefor  by  funds  raised 
by  general  taxation.^  Being  a  private  improvement  it  must  be 
left  to  the  judgment  and  voluntary  consent  of  the  owners  of 
the  private  property  affected  thereby.  "The  power  to  make  spe- 
cial assessments  is  refera])le  to  and  included  in  the  taxing  power. 
.  .  .  Even  the  owner  of  land  benefited  cannot  be  taxed  to  im- 
prove it  unless  public  considerations  are  involved,  but  must  be 

'In       the       Matter       of       opening  X.  E.   307    [1002];   Tn  the  Matter  of 

and  Gradinjj  Market  Street.   40  Cal.  Johnston    103    X.    Y.    200.    8    X.    E. 

54G    [18751;    Chambers    v.    Satterlee,  399   [1880]. 

40  Cal.  497    [18711;    Illinois  Central  ^People  on  the   Petition  of  Butler 

Railroad    Coni])aiiy   v.   City   of   Deca-  v.    Supervisors    of    Satrinaw    County, 

tur.  154  111.  173,  38  X.  E.  020  [1S941;  20  Mich.  22   [18711.     See   §§   4,  8. 
Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners  of  the  ^  Loan    Assneiation    v.    Topeka,    07 

City    of    Boston,    ISO    Mass.    274,    62  U.S.   (20  Wall.)   055.  22  L.  455. 

439 


§283 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


440 


left  to  improve  it  or  not  as  he  may  choose."*  Thus  a  statute 
providing  an  assessment  for  making  connection  Vv'ith  a  sewer  sys- 
tem put  down  by  a  private  contractor  is  invalid.^  Conversely 
a  corporation  to  which  the  power  of  levjnng  local  assessments 
can  lawfully  be  given  must  be  a  public  corporation."  If,  how- 
ever, an  improvement  which  is  to  be  used  hy  all  the  public  whose 
lands  are  so  situated  with  reference  thereto  that  it  can  be  used 
by  them,  such  as  a  sewer,  is  termed  a  "private  sewer."  it  may 
nevertheless  be  paid  for  by  local  assessment.''  It  is  not  what  the 
statute  calls  it,  but  what  in  its  essential  nature  it  is-  that  determines 
whether  its  cost  can  be  paid  b.v  local  assessment  or  not.  If  the 
expense  incurred  is  one  which  should  have  been  burne  by  a  private 
individual,  a  local  assessment  cannot  be  levied  therefor.  Thus, 
if  gas  pipes  must  be  moved  in  grading  a  street.-  or  in  laying  a 
sewer."  and  the  expense  is  one  which  should  be  borne  primarily 
by  the  gas  company  a  local  assessment  cannot  be  levied  therefor. 
Another  example  of  an  improvement  which  is  not  public  in  its 
nature  and  for  which  therefore  the  owners  of  property  benefited 
by  such  improvement  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay  local  assess- 
ments is  found  in  some  jurisdictions  where  assessments  cannot 
be  levied  for  draining  large  tracts  of  land,  where  no  considera- 
tions of  public  welfare,  utility  or  health  supervene,  although  the 
owners  of  such  property  will  be  greatly  benefited  by  such  im- 
provement.^°  The  courts  are  not  unanimous  in  their  applica- 
tion of  this  principle,  however,  requiring  the  use  to  be  a  public 
one.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  an  assessment  may  be  levied 
for  connections  running  from  the  lots  which  are  assessed  to  the 
pipes  of  a  private  water  company."  So  in  some  jurisdictions 
drainage  assessments  are  upheld  without  reference  to  any  pub- 
lic utilitv  to  be  subserved.^- 


*  Elmore  v.  Drainage  Commission- 
ers. 135  111.  209,  25  Am.  St.  Rep. 
363,  25  X.  E.   1010   [1892]. 

^Weaver  v.  Canon  Sewer  Co.,  18 
Colo.  App.  242,  70  Pae.  953   [1902]. 

"  Elmore  v.  Drainage  Commission- 
ers, 135  111.  209.  25  Am.  St.  Rep. 
363,  25  X.  E.   1010    [1892]. 

'Heman  v.  Allen,  156  Mo.  534,  57 
S.  W.  559  [1900]. 

*  In  the  ^Matter  of  the  Petition  of 


Deering  to  Vacate  an  Assessment, 
93  X.  Y.  361    [1883]. 

"In  the  Matter  of  Johnston,  103 
X.  Y.  260,  8  X.  E.  399  [1886];  Peo- 
ple of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex  rel. 
Jessup  V.  Kelley,  33  Hiin.  389  [1884]. 

"  See  334  et  seq. 

"Palmer  v.  City  of  Danville,  154 
111.  156,  38  X\  E.  1067  [1894];  Glea- 
son  V.  Waukesha  County,  103  Wis. 
225.  79  X.  W.  249  [1899]. 

"See  §  338. 


441 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§284 


§  284.     Improvement  must  confer  special  local  benefit. 

(2)  In  order  to  .justify  a  local  assessment,  the  improvement 
must  not  only  be  public  in  its  nature,  but  it  must  confer  an  especial 
and  local  benefit  upon  the  property  which  is  to  be  assessed  there- 
for.^ If  the  improvement  confers  an  especial  local  benefit,  it  is 
no  ob.jection  to  an  assessment  therefor  that  it  is  constructed  so 
as  to  benefit  the  public  as  much  as  possible  and  to  injure  it  as 
little  as  possible.-  Improvements  of  this  .sort  must  "have  a  double 
aspect  of  o'eneral  public  benefit  and  also  of  peculiar  local  bene- 
fit.""'' The  attempt  to  state  in  general  terms  what  constitutes 
a  local  special  benefit  has  often  been  made.  "Benefits  are  special 
when  they  increase  the  value  of  the  land,  relieve  it  from  a  burden, 
or  make  it  especially  adapted  to  a  purpose  which  enhances  its 
value."*  "Whatever  gives  an  additional  value  to  the  particular 
parcel  of  land  is  a  special  and  not  a  general  benefit,  and  it  may 
be  a  special  benefit,  although  not  an  immediate  one."'''  Without 
such  local  benefit  the  improvement  may  be  public  in  character, 
so  that  the  expense  thcx'eof  may  be  borne  by  general  taxation,  but 
a  local  assessment,  based  upon  the  theory  of  benefits,  cannot  be 
levied  therefor.*^ 


^  Ferguson  v.  Borougli  of  Stamford. 

00  Conn.  432,  22  Atl.  782  [1891]; 
City  of  Bridgeport  v.  New  York  & 
New  Haven  Railroad  Company,  30 
Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [I860]: 
Northwestern  University  v.  Village 
of  Wilmette,  230  111.  bO.  82  N.  E. 
615  [1907];  Village  of  Morgan  Park 
V.  Wi.swall,  155  111.  262.  40  N.  E. 
611  [1895];  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Decatur,  154  111. 
173,  38  N.  E.  626  [1804];  Gauen  v. 
Drainage  District,  131  111.  446,  23  N. 
E.  633;   Lipes  v.  Hand.  104  Ind.  503, 

1  N.E.  871,  4  N.  E.  160  [1885]  ;  Law 
V.  Madison,  Smyrna  &  (iraliam  Turn- 
pike Company.  30  Ind.  77  [1868]: 
Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 
City  of  Boston.  180  Mass.  274,  62 
L.  R.  A.  144.  62  N.  E.  307  [1002]: 
W.  F.  Stewart  Co.  v.  City  of  Flint. 
147  Mich.  697.  ill  N.  W.  352  [1007]  : 
Wrcford  v.  City  of  Detroit.  132  IMich. 
348.  93  N.  W.  876  [1903]:  Rogers 
V.    City   rf    St.    Paul.    22    :Minn.    494 


[1876];  Kansas  City  v.  Bacon.  157 
Mo.  450,  57  S.  W.  1045  [1900]; 
Morewood  Avenue,  Chamber's  Ap- 
peal, 159  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl.  123 
[1893]. 

-W.  F.  Stewart  Co.  v.  City  of 
Flint.  147  Mich.  697.  Ill  X.  W.  .352 
[1907]. 

^  Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners  of 
the  City  of  Boston.  180  Mass.  274, 
281,  62  L.  R.  A.  144.  62  X.  E.  397 
[1902]. 

*  Lipes  v.  Hand.  104  Ind.  503.  508, 
1  N.  E.  871,  4  X.  E.  160  [1885]; 
(citing  Allen  v.  City  of  Charleston, 
109  Mass.  243  [1872];  Whitney  v. 
City  of  Boston,  98  [Mass.  312  [1S67]: 
Farwell  v.  Cambrid<jre.  77  Mass. 
(11  Gray)  413  [1858]:  Milwau- 
kee, etc..  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Eble.  3 
Pinney    (Wis.)    334    [1851]). 

"Lipes  V.  Hand.  104  Ind.  503,  507, 
1  X.  E.  871.  4  N.  E.  160  [1885]. 

"See  §   360,   §   367   et  seq. 


§§285-287 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


442 


§  285.     Permanency. 

(3)  A  third  element  which  is  said  in  some  jurisdictions  to  be 
essential  is  that  of  permanency.  While  no  public  improvement 
can  be  said  to  be  absolutely  and  unqualifiedly  permanent,  and 
no  such  requirement  is  made  by  any  courts,  yet  some  improve- 
ments are  of  a  sort  calculated  to  last  ordinarily  for  a  very  con- 
siderable space  of  time,  while  others  are  ephemeral  in  their  dura- 
tion. In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  permanency  is  an  es.- 
sential  element  of  public  improvements  for  which  local  assessments 
may  be  made,  and  the  right  to  assess  is  denied  in  the  case  of 
improvements  of  the  transient  type.  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is 
denied  that  permanency  is  an  essential  element  of  such  improve- 
ments and  it  is  held  that  if  the  improvement  has  the  other  requi- 
site elements,  local  assessments  may  be  levied  therefor  even  though 
it  is  one  which  will  last  for  but  a  short  space  of  time.^ 


§286.     Meaning  of  "local  improvement." 

In  some  states  are  found  constitutional  provisions  which  per- 
mit local  assessments  to  be  levied  for  "local  improvements."^ 
The  term  "local  improvement"  thus  used  has  substantiall.v  the 
same  meaning  as  that  which  is  already  discussed.-  It  is  said  to 
be  a  public  improvement  by  which  the  realty  adjoining  or  near 
the  locality  of  such  improvement  is  especially  benefited,^  or  one 
which  is  confined  to  a  locality  and  enhances  the  value  of  adjacent 
property  in  addition  to  the  benefits  which  it  confers  upon  the 
public  generally.*  "A  local  improvement  within  the  meaning 
of  the  law  is  an  improvement  which  b.v  reason  of  its  being  eon- 
fined  to  a  localit.v  enhances  the  value  of  property  situated  within 
the  particular  district,  as  distinguished  from  benefits  diffused  by 
it  throughout  the  municipality."^ 

§  287.     Definition  of  local  improvement. 

In  view,  then,  of  the  foregoing  discussion  of  the  general  ele- 
ments of  a  public  improvement  for  which  a  local  assessment  may 


^  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  this 
Eiubject  see   §   367  et  seq. 

^Article  IX.,  §  9,  Constitution  of 
Illinois;  Constitution  of  Minnesota, 
Article  IX..  §   1. 

=  See  §  283  et  seq. 

^Rogers  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  22 
Minn.  494  [1876]." 


*  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Decatur,  154  111.  173, 
38   N.    E.    626    [1894]. 

=^City  of  Butte  v.  School  District 
Xo.  1,  29  Mont.  336.  339,  74  Pac.  369 
[1904];  (citing  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Blair.  149  111.  310,  3.14.  31.5,  24  L. 
R.  A.  412,  36  N.  E.  829   [1894]. 


1 


443  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE    LEVIED.  §§  288,  289 

be  levied  on  the  theory  of  benefits,  it  may  be  defined  as  follows: 
An  improvement  for  which  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  is 
one  which  confers  both  a  general  benefit  to  the  public  and  also 
an  especial  and  peculiar  local  benefit  to  the  neighboring  property.^ 

§  288.     Nature  of  improvement  in  assessment  for  legal  duty. 

In  considering  the  forms  of  improvement  for  which  assessments 
of  the  second  type  may  be  levied,  we  must  keep  in  mind  that  the 
theory  on  which  assessments  of  this  type  are  justified  is,  that  the 
owner  of  the  realty  owes  a  duty  to  the  public  to  do,  or  to  refrain 
from  doing,  certain  acts  with  reference'  to  his  realty,  that  he  has 
omitted  to  perform  his  duty,  and  that  accordingly  the  public 
has  the  power  to  do  such  act,  and  to  charge  the  owner  of  such 
realty  with  the  expense  thereof.  Accordingly,  the  essential  fea- 
ture of  such  an  improvement  is  that  it  must  be  some  act  which 
the  owner  was  bound  to  perform,  and  which  in  the  event  of  his 
failure  to  perform  the  public  has  the  right  to  do  at  his  expense.^ 
There  is  little  conflict  of  authority  as  to  the  general  nature  of 
such  an  improvement.  The  difficult  questions  which  are  pre- 
sented in  improvements  of  this  type  arise  out  of  the  conflict  of 
authority  upon  the  question  of  what  specific  improvements  or 
acts  the  owner  of  realty  is  legally  bound  to  do,  as  distinguished 
from  the  acts  w^hich  the  public  may  do,  but  which  if  done  must 
be  paid  for  out  of  funds  raised  either  by  general  taxation  or  by 
local  assessment. 

§  289.     Nature  of  improvement  in  assessment  for  goods  sold. 

In  determining  for  what  purposes  assessments  of  the  third 
type  may  be  levied,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  so-ealled  as- 
sessments of  this  sort  are  charges  against  the  owner  or  tenant 
of  property  for  personal  beiu^fit  of  some  sort  furnished  for  use 
upon  such  premises  and  voluntarily  used  by  such  owner  or  tenant, 
under  an  agreement,  express  or  implied,  that  he  is  to  make  com- 
pensation therefor.  Such  a  so-called  assessment  is,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  not  a  true  assessment,  but  a   form  of  genuine  con- 

iLipes    V.    Hand.    104    Tiid.    r^m.    1  X.   E.   307    [1902];    State   v.  Reis,  38 

N.    E.    871,    4    N.    E.     KiO     |  18S,5]  ;  Minn.   371,   38   N.  W.   97;    Mnrewood 

Thomas  v.  Woods,  —  Kv.  ,   108  Avenue,    Chamber's   Appeal,    159    Pa. 

S.    W.    878    [1908];    SeaVs    v.    Street  St.    20.   28   Atl.    123    [1893];    See    §§ 

Commissioners  of  the  City  of  Boston,  11.  283,  285. 

180  Mass.   274.  62   L.  K.   A.    144,   62  '  See  §   13. 


§  290  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  444 

tract  entered  into  by  the  voluntary  consent  of  the  parties  there- 
to. A  charge  of  this  sort  may  therefore  be  levied  for  anything 
which  the  municipal  corporation  or  other  corporation  has  a  right 
to  furnish  to  the  owner  or  tenant  of  property,  and  which  the 
owner  or  tenant  of  such  property  is  left  free  to  accept,  thus 
rendering  himself  liable  to  such  charge,  or  to  decline,  thus  pre- 
venting any  liability  for  such  charge,  as  he  may  choose.^ 


B.— EFFECT   OF  LEGISLATIVE   DETERMINATION. 

§  290.     Conclusiveness  of  legislative  determination  in  assessments 
for  benefits. 

In  determining  for  what  purposes  an  assessment  for  benefits 
may  l)e  levied,  we  are  met  with  the  question  of  the  effect  of  a 
legislative  determination  that  a  given  improvement  is  public  in 
its  nature,  and  that  it  confers  a  special  local  benefit.  Is  such 
a  legislative  determination  valid?  If  it  is  valid  in  all  cases, 
there  is  little  room  for  constitutional  questions,  since  an  assess- 
ment can  be  levied  for  any  purpose  for  which  the  legislatures 
may  see  fit  to  levy  an  assessment.  Is  the  correctness  of  the 
legislative  determination  to  be  inquired  into  in  each  case  as  a 
question  of  fact?  If  it  is,  then  the  validity  and  constitutionality 
of  an  assessment  statute  is  to  be  determined  in  each  case  as  a 
question  of  fact,  not  law.  This  is  only  one  phase  of  the  same 
question  which  arises  in  determining  what  property  is  benefited, 
and  is  liable  to  assessment,  nnd  in  determining  how  the  assess- 
ment is  to  be  apportioned  among  the  tracts  of  land  upon  which 
a  special  local  benefit  is  conferred  by  such  improvement.  In  de- 
termining this  question,  two  general  principles  must  be  kept  in 
mind:  (1)  A  legislature  has  power  to  tax,  but  under  Amprir-an 
constitutions  private  property  is  protected  from  confiscation  even 
by  the  legislature.  To  attempt  to  levy  a  general  tax  for  a  pur- 
pose which  is  not  public  in  its  nature,  is  to  attempt  to  take  pri- 
vate property  without  due  process  of  law.  To  attempt  to  levy 
a  local  assessment  for  a  purpose  which  is  not  public  in  its  nature, 
and  which  does  not  confer  a  special  local  benefit  upon  the  prop- 
erty which  it  is  sought  to  assess,  is  an  attempt  in  another  form 
to  take  property  without  due  process  of  law.     (2)    On  the  other 

'See  §  14. 


II 


445 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§291 


hand,  the  legislature  is  presumed  to  have  a  competent  knowl- 
edge of  the  subject-matter  concerning  which  is  legislates  to  un- 
derstand the  constitutional  restrictions  which  are  imposed  upon 
its  power,  and  to  exercise  only  such  power  as  is  thus  conferred 
upon  it  b}^  the  constitution  in  obedience  to  such  restrictions. 
While  these  two  general  principles  are  not  inconsistent,  widely 
different  results  may  be  reached  by  giving  more  force  to  the  one 
or  to  the  other  of  them.  From  their  joint  application  the  fol- 
lowing specific  results  have  been  reached  by  the  courts. 

§  291.     If  improvement  clearly  improper,  legislative  determina- 
tion ineffectual. 

If  the  improvement  is  one  which  in  its  nature  cannot  combine 
the  necessary  elements  of  a  public  use,  and  a  special  local  bene- 
fit, the  legislature  has  no  power  to  levy  a  local  assessment  there- 
for, and  its  action  in  attempting  so  to  do,  is  anconstitutional. 
A  statute  of  this  sort  has  no  legal  effect  and  the  legislative  de- 
termination that  such  an  improvement  is  a  proper  one  for  levy- 
ing local  assessments  is  subject  to  review  by  the  courts.^     While 


^  New  York  Life  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Prest,  71  Fed.  815.  37  U.  S.  App.  481 
[189(3];  Harts  v.  People  ex 
rel.  Kochensperger,  171  111.  458,  49 
N.  E.  538  [1S98];  O'Neill  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Kochensperger,  166  111.  561, 
46  N.  E.  1096  [1897];  Village  of 
:\Iorgan  Park  v.  Wiswall,  155  111.  262, 
40  N.  E.  611  [1895];  Crane  v.  West 
Chicago  Park  Commissioners,  153  111. 
348,  26  L.  R.  A.  311,  38  N.  E.  943 
[1894];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Blair,  149 
111.  310,  24  L.  R.  A.  412,  36  N.  E. 
829  [1894];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Law, 
144  111.  569,  33  N.  E.  855  [1893]; 
Elmore  v.  Drainage  Commissioners, 
135  111.  269,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  363,  25 
X.  E.  1010  [1892]:  Gifford  Drainago 
District  v.  Shroer,  145  Ind.  572.  44 
N.  E.  636;  Zigler  v.  :\Ieniies.  121  Ind. 
99,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  357.  22  N.  E. 
782  [1889];  Oliver  v.  Monona  Coun- 
ty, 117  la.  43,  90  X.  W.  510  [1902]: 
Kinnie  v.  Rare.  68  Midi.  625,  36  N. 
W.  672  [1889];  Peojjle  ox  rel. 
Butler  V.  Supervisors  of  Sagi- 
naw County,  26  Mich.  22  [1872]; 
State     ex     rel.     l^tick     v.     Board     of 


County  Commissioners  of  Polk 
County,  87  Minn.  325,  60  L.  R.  A. 
161,  92  N.  W.  216  [1902];  Kansas 
C  ity  V.  O'Connor,  82  Mo.  App.  655 
11899];  City  of  Butte  v.  School  Dis- 
trict No.  1,  29  Mont.  336,  74  Pac. 
869  [1904];  State,  Skinkle,  Pros.  v. 
Inlialiitants  of  the  Township  of  Clin- 
ton in  the  County  of  Essex,  39  N.  J. 
L.  (10  Vr.)  656*  [1877];  Chicago  & 
Erie  Railroad  Co.  v.  Keith,  67  O.  S. 
279,  60  L.  R.  A.  525,  65  N.  E.  1020 
[1902];  Reeves  v.  Treasurer  of  Wood 
County,  8  0.  S.  333  [1858];  Scran- 
ton  City  V.  Sturges.  202  Pa.  St.  182, 
51  Atl.  764  [1902];  Harrishurg  v. 
Funk  200  Pa.  St.  348,  49  Atl.  992 
[1901];  Leake  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia, 171  Pa.  St.  125^  32  Atl.  1110 
[1895];  Washington  Avenue,  69  Pa. 
St.  (19  P.  F.  Smith)  8  Am.  Rep.  255, 
352  [18711;  Hammett  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 65  Pa.  St.  (15  P.  F.  Smith) 
146,  3  Am.  Rep.  615  [1870];  Pettit 
V.  Duke,  10  Utah  311,  37  Pac.  568 
[1894];  In  re  Theresa  Drainage  Dis- 
trict, 90  Wis.  301,  63  X.  W.  288. 


§292 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


446 


there  is  upon  some  questions  great  divergence  of  judicial  opin- 
ion as  to  whether  certain  kinds  of  improvements  combine  the 
requisite  elements  of  public  use  and  especial  local  benefit — a  di- 
vergence illustrated  in  the  cases  cited — yet  upon  the  proposition 
in  question,  that  legislative  determination  of  the  existence  of  these 
elements  is  not  conclusive,  the  courts  are  practically  harmonious. 
Some  courts  have  said  that  the  act  of  a  public  corporation  in 
attempting  to  levy  a  local  assessment  for  an  improvement  which 
does  not  combine  the  requisite  elements  therefor  is  ultra  vires.- 
If  there  is  no  statutory  authority  therefor  such  an  act  is  of 
course  ultra  vires,  but  it  is  also  a  violation  of  constitutional 
rights. 


§  292.     Finality  of  legislative  determination  if  improvement  may 
be  proper. 

If  the  improvement  is  one  which  in  its  nature  may  possibly 
combine  the  elements  of  a  public  use  and  a  special  local  benefit, 
but  under  the  special  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  it  is 
claimed  that  it  does  not  combine  such  elements,,  we  find  a  di- 
vergence of  judicial  opinion.  According  to  one  theory  in  cases 
of  this  sort,  the  legislative  determination  that  the  improvement 
possesses  these  necessary  elements  is  final,  and  is  not  subject 
to  review  by  the  courts.^  In  other  cases  the  rule  is  stated  in  a 
less  positive  manner,  and  the  legislative  determination  is  said  to 
be  final  unless  clearly  mistaken.-  This  principle  has  been  applied 
where  the  legislature  provides  by  statute  for  a  specific  improve- 


=  City  of  Chicago  v.  Blair,  149  111. 
310.  24  L.  R.  A.  412,  36  X.  E.  829 
11894]. 

^  Carson  v.  Brockton  Sewerage 
Commissions,  182  U.  S.  398,  48  L. 
1115  [1901];  (affirming,  Carson  v. 
Sewerage  Commissioners  of  Brockton, 
175  Mass.  242,  48  L.  R.  A.  277,  5G 
X.  E.  1  [1900]);  Williams,  Treas- 
urer, V.  Eggleston,  170  U.  S.  304,  42 
L.  1047,  18  S.  617  [1898];  (affirm- 
ing State  V.  Williams.  68  Conn.  131, 
48  L.  R.  A.  465,  35  Atl.  24,  421 
[1896]);  Heath  v.  Manson  147  Cal. 
694,  82  Pac.  331  [1905];  Rich  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  18,  38  X.  E. 


255    [1894];   Otter  v.  Barber  Asphalt 

Paving   Co.,   —   Ky.   ,    96   S.   W. 

862  [1906];  Broadway  Baptist 
Church  V.  McAtee,  71  Ky.  (8  Bush.) 
508,  8  Am.  Rep.  480  [1871];  Mayor 
and  City  Council  of  Baltimore  v. 
Johns  Hopkins  Hospital,  56  Md.  1 
[1880];  Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Jewell 
135  Pa.  St.  320.  19  Atl.  947  [1890]. 
-Parsons  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943,  18  S.  521 
[1898];  Laguna  Drainage  District  v. 
Charles  Martin  Co.,  144  Cal.  209.  77 
Pac.  933  [1904];  Piper's  Appeal  in 
the  Matter  of  Widening  Kearney 
Slreet    32  Cal.  530   [1867]. 


447  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  293 

ment.''  Another  theory,  differing  from  the  former  both  in  form 
and  in  the  results  reached  thereunder,  is  that  if  an  improvement 
is  one  which  might  confer  a  public  benefit  and  a  special  local 
benefit,  but  under  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  ease,  one 
or  both  of  these  elements  is  lacking,  the  legislative  determina- 
tion that  such  an  improvement  is  a  proper  one  to  construct  by 
local  assessment  is  not  final,  but  that  the  courts  ma^'  investigate 
the  question  of  public  use  and  special  local  benefit  as  a  matter 
of  fact.  Under  this  theory,  accordingly,  if  under  the  special  facts 
the  improvement  does  not  combine  these  two  necessary  elements 
the  statute  will  be  held  to  be  unconstitutional.*  Thus  if  the  city 
charter  gives  to  the  council  the  power  to  order  a  street  improved 
whenever  it  shall  be  unsafe,  it  has  been  held  that  the  resolution 
of  the  council  declaring  the  street  to  be  unsafe  is  not  binding 
on  the  court,  but  that  the  street  must  be  unsafe  in  fact — a  ques- 
tion which  the  court  will  determine.^ 

§  293.     Delegation  of  discretion  to  public  corporation  as  finality. 

If  the  improvement  is  one  which  in  its  nature  may  combine 
the  necessary  elements  of  a  public  use  and  a  special  local  bene- 
fit, and  the  legislature  has  delegated  to  a  public  corporation  or 
quasi-corporation  the  power  to  determine  whether  the  improve- 
ment in  question  is  necessary  or  not,  Ave  find  a  difference  of 
.judicial  opinion  similar  to  that  which  exists  Avhere  the  legislature 
itself  has  undertaken  to  determine  the  necessity  of  the  improve- 
ment. In  many  jurisdictions,  it  is  held  that  the  legislature  may 
delegate  to  a  public  corporation  or  quasi-corporation  the  power 
to  determine  the  necessity  and  propriety  of  the  improvement  as 
a  finalit}'.  Under  this  theory,  if  the  legislature  confers  upon  the 
city  the  power  to  determine  whether  to  make  an  improvement 
of  this  sort  or  not,  the  action  of  the  city  in  determining  to  make 
such  improvement  upon  the  l)asis  of  local  assessment  is  final  and 
conclusive  as  to  the  question  tliat  the  improvement  is  both  public 
in  its  character  and  one  Avhich  confers  a  special  local  benefit. 
In  such  a  case  the  courts  have  no  power  to  pass  upon  the  ques- 

n'arsons   v.    District   of -Columbia,        14  Pac.  71    [1887]);   Oakland  Pavint,' 
170    r.    S.   45,   42   L.   943,    18    S.   521        Co.  v.   Pier,  52   Cai.  270    [18771. 
[ISnSl;    Lent    v.    Tillson.    140    U.    S.  *  Smith    v.    Minto.    30    Or.    351,    48 

31(1.  35  L.  419,  11  S.  825  [1891];   (af-        Pac.   Kifi   [18971. 

firming,  Lent  v.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404,  'Smith    v.    Minto,    30    Or.   351.    43 

Pac.  100   [18971. 


293 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


448 


tion  of  the  necessity  of  the  particular  improvement.^  Hence  it 
is  no  defense  in  a  proceeding  to  confirm  an  assessment  to  show- 
that  a  different  kind  of  improvement  made  out  of  different  ma- 


^  French  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.,  181  U.  S.  324,  45  L.  879,  21  S.  625 
[1901];  (affirming  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.  v.  French,  158  Mo.  534,  54 
L.  R.  A.  492,  58  S.  W.  934  [1900]  )  ; 
James  v.  Pine  Bluft",  49  Ark.  199,  4  S. 
W.  760  [1887];  Lent  v.  Tillson,  72 
Cal.  404,  14  Pac.  71  [1887];  Gilbert 
V.  City  of  New  Haven,  39  Conn.  467 
[1872];  Draper  v.  City  of  Atlanta, 
126  Ga.  649,  55  S.  E.  929  [1906]; 
Lingle  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Coni'rs., 
222  111.  384,  78  N.  E.  794  [1906]; 
Bromwell  v.  Flowers,  217  111.  174,  75 
N.  E.  4(;6  [1905];  Givins  v.  City  of 
Cliicago  188  111.  348,  58  N.  E.*912 
[1900];  Topliff  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
196  111.  215,  63  N.  E.  692  [1902]; 
Peyton  v.  Village  of  Morgan  Park, 
172  Hi.  102,  49  N.  E.  1003  [1898]; 
McChesney  v.  City  of  Chicago,  171 
111.  253,  49  N.  E.'548  [1898];  Pike 
v.  City  of  Chicago,  155  111.  656,  40 
N.  E.  567  [1895];  Illinois  Central 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  Deca- 
tur, 154  111.  173,  38  N.  E.  626 
[1894];  English  v.  City  of  Danville, 
150  111.  92,  36  N.  E.*  994  [1894]; 
Vane  v.  City  of  Evanston,  150  HI. 
616,  37  N.  E.  901  [1894];  Washing- 
ton Ice  Company  v.  City  of  Chicago 
147  111.  327,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  222, 
35  N.  E.  378  [1894];  The  Chicago, 
Burlington  &  Quincy  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Quincy,  139  111.  355, 
28  isT.  E.  1009  [1893];"  Chicago,  Bur- 
lington &  Quincy  Railroad  Company 
V.  City  of  Quincy,  136  111.  563,  29  Am. 
St.  Rep.  334,  27  N.  E.  192  [1892]; 
City  of  Bloomington  v.  The  Chi- 
cago -f^  Alton  Railroad  Company,  134 
111.  451,  26  N.  E.  366  [1891];  Louis- 
vjll'^  &  Nashville  Railroad  Company 
V.  Kjtij  of  East  St.  Louis,  134  111. 
656,  25  N.  E.  962  [1891]  ;  Murphy  v. 
City  of  Peoria,  119  111.  509  9  N.  E. 
895  [1888];  People  ex  rel.  Thatcher 
V.  Village  of  Hyde  Park,  117  111.  462, 


6  N.  E.  33  [1887];  Cason  v.  City  of 
Lebanon,  153  Ind.  567,  55  N.  E.  768 
[1899]  ;  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Com- 
pany V.  Edgerton,  125  Ind.  455,  25 
N.  E.  436  [1890];  Holden  v.  City  of 
Crawfordsville,  143  Ind.  558,  41  N. 
E.  370  [1898];  Sample  v.  Carroll, 
132  Ind.  496,  32  N.  E.  220  [1892]; 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Taylor,  118  Ind.  329, 
21  N.  E.  20  [1888]  ;  Leeds  v.  City  of 
Richmond,  102  Ind.  372  1  N.  E.  711 
[1885];  Yeakel  v.  City  of  Lafayette, 
48  Ind.  116  [1874];  Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  Michigan  City  v.  Rob- 
erts,  34   Ind.   471    [1870];    Coates  v. 

Nugent,  —  Kan.  ,  92  Pac.  597; 

McGrew  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  64 
Kan.  61,  67  Pac.  438  [1902];  Wilkin 
V.  Houston,  48  Kan.  584,  30  Pac.  23 
[1892];  State  of  Kansas,  on  the  re- 
lation of  Young  V.  City  of  Neodesha, 
3  Kans.  App.  319,  45  Pac.  122  [1896] ; 
Seward  v.  Rheiner,  2  Kan.  App.  95, 
43  Pac.  423  [1895];  Hydes  v.  Joyes, 
67  Ky.  (4  Bush.)  464,  96  Am.  Dec. 
311  [1868] ;  Parsons  v.  City  of  Grand 
Rapids,  141  Mich.  467,  104  N.  W. 
730  [1905];  Gates  v.  City  of  Grand 
Rapids,  134  Mich.  96,  95  N.  W.  998 
[1903];  Roberts  v.  Smith,  115  Mich. 
5,  72  N.  W.  1091  [1897];  Shimmons 
v.  City  of  Saginaw,  104  Mich.  511, 
62  N.  W.  725  [1895];  Wilkins  v.  De- 
troit, 46  Mich.  120,  8  N.  W.  701,  9 
N.  W.  427  [1881]  ;  Nugent  v.  City  of 
Jackson,  72  Miss.  1040,  18  So.  493 
[1895];  Heman  v.  Schulte,  166  Mo. 
409,  66  S.  W.  163  [1901];  Skinker  v. 
Heman,  148  Mo.  349,  49  S.  W.  1026 
[1898];  (reversing  64  Mo.  App.  441 
[1895] )  ;  Michael  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
112  Mo.  610,  20  S.  W."  666  [1892]; 
McCormack  v.  Patchin,  53  Mo.  33, 
14  Am.  Rep.  440  [1873];  Hemart  V. 
Ring-,  85  Mo.  App.  231  [1900];  City 
of  Marionville  to  use  of  Grubaugh 
v.  Henson,  65  Mo.  App.  397  [1895]; 
City   of   Kansas   City   to   the   use   of 


449 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED, 


§293 


terials  would  have  given  better  results  at  a  lower  cost,-  or  that 
the  improvement  was  not  necessary.^  The  public  corporation  may, 
however,  show  the  necessity  of  the  improvement  without  preju- 
dicing the  adversary  party.*  If  the  public  corporation  deems  it 
unwise  to  construct  a  given  improvement,  the  courts  will  not 
review  its  exercise  of  discretion  and  compel  it  to  construct  such 
improvement.^  So  the  commissioners  of  a  drainage  and  levee  dis- 
trict are  not  bound  to  petition  for  authority  to  levy  an  assess- 
ment for  repairs  if  no  funds  are  available.  It  is  within  their 
sound  discretion  to  determine  whether  to  make  such  repairs  or 
not,  and  unless  it  appears  that  their  action  is  arbitrary,  fraudu- 
lent, or  to  accomplish  their  own  personal  or  selfish  ends,  their 
discretion  will  not  be  controlled."  The  legislature  may,  of  course, 
provide  some  means  for  a  review  of  the  propriety  and  necessity 
of  the  improvement.'  This  usually  takes  the  form  of  a  direct  pro- 
ceeding attacking  the  order  for  tlie  improvement,  such  as  an 
appeal  from  the  order  of  the  common  council  for  the  improve- 
ment.^ Even  where  the  determination  of  the  public  corporation 
is  regarded  as  final,  it  is  subject  to  review  if  the  discretion  of 
the  public  corporation  has  been  abused." 


Adkins  v.  Richards,  34  Mo.  App.  521 
[1889];  Eyermann  v.  Blakesley,  1) 
Mo.  App.  231  [1880];  Seibert  v.' Tif- 
fany, 8  Mo.  App.  33  [1879];  Matter 
of  the  Extension  of  Churcli  Street 
from  Fulton  Street  to  Morris  Street, 
in  the  City  of  New  York,  49  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  455  [1867];  The  State  ex 
rel.  Hibbs  v.  Board  of  County  Com- 
missioners of  Franklin  County,  35 
O.  S.  458  [1880];  Beers  v.  Dallas 
City,  16  Or.  334,  18  Pac.  835  [1888]; 
Philadelpliia  to  use  v.  Jewell,  135 
Pa.  St.  329,  19  Atl.  947  [1890]; 
City  of  Williamsport  v.  Beck.  128 
Pa.  St.  147,  18  Atl.  329  [1889]; 
Michener  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  118 
Pa.  St.  535,  12  Atl.  174  [1888]; 
Brientnall  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
104  Pa.  St.  156  [1883];  Adams  v. 
Fishor,  75  Tex.  657,  6  S.  W.  772 
[1890]. 

"City  of  Blominjjton  v.  CTiicago  & 
Alton  Railroad  Company,  134  111. 
451,  26  N.  E.  366   [1891]". 


'Houston  V.  City  of  Chicago,  191 
111.  559,  61  N.  E.  396  [1901]. 

*  Chicago  &  Northern  Pacific  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
172  111.  66,  49  N.  E.   1006   [1898]. 

°  People  ex  rel.  Thatcher  v.  Village 
of  Hyde  Park,  117  111.  462,  6  N.  E. 
33   [i887]. 

°Bromwell  v.  Flowers,  217  111.  174. 
75  N.  E.  466   [1905]. 

'  Gilbert  v.  City  of  New  Haven, 
39  Conn.  467   [1872]. 

"Gilbert  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  39 
Conn.  467   [1872]. 

*  City  of  Bloomington  v.  Chicago  & 
Alton  Railroad  Company,  134  111.  451, 
26  N.  E.  366  [1891]  ;  Barfield  v.  Glea- 
son.  111  Ky.  491,  23  Ky.  L.  128,  63 
S.  W.  964  [19011;  "Speaking  in 
general  terms  the  authorities  of  a 
city  may  be  saiil  to  hav^  a  large  dis- 
cretion as  to  the  neco^^sity  or  expedi- 
ency of  the  ordinances  which  they 
adopt.  But  their  powers  in  this  re- 
gard are  by  no  means  omnipotent; 
otherwise  the  citizen  would  be  with- 


§§  294,  295  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  450 

§  294.     Delegation  of  discretion  to  specific  officers. 

By  the  terras  of  some  statutes,  power  to  determine  the  necessity 
and  propriety  of  certain  kinds  of  improvement  is  sometimes 
vested  in  certain  public  officials.  The  action  of  such  officials  is 
generally  regarded  as  final,  at  least  in  the  absence  of  circum- 
stances of  fraud  and  oppression.^  Thus  if  the  county  surveyor 
has  power  to  pass  upon  the  question  of  the  propriety  of  repair- 
ing a  public  ditch,  his  decision  is  final.-  By  the  application  of 
similar  principles  the  action  of  commissioners  who  are  appointed 
speciall}^  to  pass  upon  the  question,  is  regarded  as  final.^  So 
the  action  of  a  board  as  to  the  necessity  of  the  improvement  may 
be  final.*  The  same  result  follows  where  township  officials  are 
given  the  power  to  determine  whether  a  certain  improvement 
confers  a  public  benefit  and  a  special  local  benefit.^ 

§  295.     Unreasonable  and  oppressive  ordinances. 

It  is  often  said  that  by  the  principles  of  common  law  the  ordi- 
nances of  a  municipal  corporation  must  be  reasonable ;  and  that 
if  unreasonable  and  arbitrary,  such  ordinances  are  invalid  upon 
common  law  principles.^  Whether  this  common  law  principle  ex- 
ists, independent  of  constitutional  and  st^ftutory  restrictions,  or 
whether  it  is  merely  a  different  form  of  stating  certain  of  the 
constitutional  riohts  of  the  property  owners,  is  a  question  upon 
which  there  is  comparatively  little  direct  authority.-    It  has  been 

out  remedy  or   redress.     Those   pow-  "  Kirkpatrick    v.    Taylor,    118    Ind. 

ers    must 'be    exercised    within    the  329,  21  N.  E.  20   [1888]. 

bounds  of  reason  and  apparent  neces-  ^  State  ex  rel.  Baltzell  v.   Stewart. 

sity;    they   must   not    impose   a   bur-  74  Wis.  620,  6  L.  R.  A.  394,  43  X.  W. 

den   without   a   benefit,   and   the   rea-  947   [1882]. 

sonableness  of  their  exercise  is  a  fit  *  Simonton    v.    Hays,    88    Ind.    70 

subject    for    inquiry.      This    principle  [1882];    State,    Jersey    City    &    Ber- 

has  been  expressly  recognized  by  this  gen   R.   R.   Co.,   Pros.   v.   Mayor   and 

court,  Judge  Bliss  saying:   'That  cor-  Common    Council   of   .Jersey  City,    31 

porations  have  none  of  the  elements  X.  J.  L.    (2  Vr.)    575   [18C5]. 

of  sovereignty ;    that   they  cannot  go  ^  Reeves  v.  Treasurer  Wood  County. 

beyond  the  powers  granted  them,  and  8  0.  S.  333   [1858]. 

that  they  must  exercise  such  granted  ^  City   of   Belleville   v.   Perrin,   225 

powers   in   a   reasonable  manner,   are  111.  437,  80  X.   E.   270   [1907];   Bor- 

propositions  that  cannot  be  disputed.'  ough  of  Greensburg  v.  Young,  53  Pa. 

City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  St.  280   [1806]. 

547;"  Corrisan  v.  Gage    68  Mo.  541,  -Davis    v.    City    of   Litchfield,    145 

544,  545  [1878];  See  §  295  et  srq.  111.   313,   21    L.   R.   A.   563,   33  N.   E. 

^Kirkpatrick    v.    Tavlor,    118    Ind.  888   [1893]. 
329,  21  X.  E.  20   [1888]. 


J 


451  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  295 

said  that  the  common  law  rule  which  requires  the  ordinances  of 
a  corporation  to  be  reasonable  and  not  to  impose  a  burden  with- 
out a  fair  equivalent,  is  a  rule  which  operates  in  addition  to  the 
constitution  and  statutes  of  the  state. ^  An  ordinance  which  is  in 
compliance  with  the  provisions  of  a  constitutional  statute  cannot 
be  successfully  attacked  as  unreasonable.*  The  objection  that  an 
ordinance  is  unreasonable,  and  therefore  void,  is,  however,  made 
most  frequently  where  the  ordinance  is  defective  for  various  spe- 
cific reasons,  which  seem  to  be  summed  up  by  the  courts  under 
the  same  general  and  comprehensive  objection  of  unreasonable- 
ness. The  question  of  the  unreasonableness  of  an  ordinance  has 
been  raised  most  frequently  in  Illinois  in  special  taxation.  In  that 
state,  as  has  been  said  before,  a  special  tax  is  regarded  as  an 
equivalent  or  compensation  for  the  enhancement  of  value,  real  or 
presumptive,  due  to  the  improvement  for  which  such  special  tax 
is  levied."'  In  this  respect  it  resembles  the  special  assessment. 
It  differs  from  the  special  assessment  in  that  the  assessment  must 
be  apportioned  to  the  benefits,  and  provision  made  for  inquiry 
in  some  form  into  the  existence  and  amount  of  such  benefits; 
while  in  special  taxation  the  imposition  of  the  tax  is  said  to  be 
in  itself  a  determination  that  the  benefits  to  the  contiguous  prop- 
erty will  be  as  great  as  the  burden  of  the  taxation  imposed  there- 
on.'' Accordingly,  if  the  determination  of  the  city  is  arbitrary, 
and  imposes  a  tax  where  there  is  manifestly  no  benefit,  or  one 
which  is  manifestly  in  excess  of  the  benefit  conferred,  such  as- 
sessment ordinance  is  said  to  be  void  as  being  unreasonable.'^ 
Accordingly  the  application  of  this  doctrine  prevents  special  taxa- 

^  Borough  of  Greensburg  v.  Young.  E.  622   [1901];   Bickerdike  v.  City  of 

53  Pa.   St.   280    [1866].  Chicago,   185  111.  280,  56  X.  E.   1096 

«City  of  Kansas  to  the  Use  of  Ad-  [1900];    Davis  v.   City   of   Litchfield, 

kins   V.    Richards,    34   Mo.    App.    521  155   111.   384,   40   X.   E.   354    [1895]; 

[1889].  Palmer  v.   City  of  Danville,   154  111. 

=  Davis    V.    City   of   LitchfioUl.    145  156,  38  X.   E.   1067    [1894];    City  of 

111.   313,   21   L.   il.   A.   563,   33   X.   E.  Bloomington  v.  Chicago  &  Alton  Rail- 

888  [1893].  voad  Company,  134  111.  451,  26  X.  E. 

« Davis   V.    City   of   Litchfield.    145  366    [1891];    City    of    Springfield    v. 

111.   313,   21   L.  R.  A.   563,   33   X.   E.  Green,    120    111.   269,    11    X.   E.   261; 

888   [1893].  City  of  Sterling  v.  Gait,   117  111.  11, 

'Chicago  I^nion  Traction  C<mipany  7   X.  E.   471    11887];    City  of  Gales- 

v.  City  of  Chicago,  208  111.  187,  70  X.  burg   v.   Searles.    114    111.    217,   29    X. 

E.  234  [1904];   Gage  v.  City  of  Chi-  E.    686     [1886]:     Enos    v.    City    of 

ca-ro      191     111.    210,    60    X.    E.    896  Si)ringfield,  113  111.  65   [  1886]  ;   Craw 

[1901];    Job    V.    City    of    Alton.    189  v.    Tolono.   96   111.   255,   36   Am.    Rep 

111.  256,  81   Am.  St.' Rep.  448.  59  X.  143    [1880]. 


§  295  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  452 

tion  from  being  unconstitutional  as  an  exaction  in  excess  of  bene- 
fits.^ As  has  been  said  before,"  the  city  authorities  have  ordi- 
narily been  vested  by  the  legislature  with  a  wide  discretion  as  to 
the  type  and  nature  of  improvement  for  which  they  will  make 
provision.  Except  in  ease  of  a  clear  and  manifest  abuse  of  such 
discretion,  an  improvement  ordinance  cannot  be  attacked  as  un- 
reasonable on  the  ground  that  such  improvement  is  unnecessary.^" 
This  principle  is  a  general  one,  being  by  no  means  confined  to 
Illinois,  but  on  the  contrary  recognized  generally. ^^  The  council 
may  provide  for  the  improvement  of  several  contiguous  blocks, 
including  a  number  of  different  streets.^-  The  council  may  pro- 
vide for  paving  a  street  through  land  which  is  chiefly  open 
prairie,  with  but  few  houses,  the  occupants  of  which  none  of  them 
keep  vehicles,  where  it  appears  that  but  for  such  paving  the 
street  would  be  impassable  during  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
year.^^  The  council  may  provide  that  the  entire  width  of  the 
street  shall  be  graded,  but  that  a  strip  in  the  center  thereof 
shall  be  sodded  instead  of  graveled  for  traffic,  and  may  provide 
for  an  assessment  to  pay  the  cost  of  such  improvement."  The 
council  may,  if  exercising  a  reasonable  discretion,  determine  the 
width  of  that  part  of  a  street  which  is  to  be  used  for  a  roadway, 
and  the  width  thereof  which  is  to  be  used  for  a  sidewalk.^^  An 
abuse  of  the  discretion  of  the  council  may,  however,  render  the 
assessment  ordinance  for  paving  unreasonable.^^    Thus,  a  paving 

8 Job  V.  City  of  Alton,  189  111.  256,  "Winter  v.  City  Council  of  Mont- 
82  Am.  St.  Rep.  448,  59  N.  E.  622  gomery,  83  Ala.*  589,  3  So.  235 
[1901].  [1887];  James  v.  Pine  Bluff,  49 
"See  §  293.  Ark.  199,  4  S.  W.  760  [1887];  Van 
'"  Washington  Park  Club  v.  City  of  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
Chicago,  219  111.  323,  76  N.  E.  383  men  of  the  City  of  Paterson  67  N. 
[1906];  Ton  v.  City  of  Chicago,  216  J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  455,  51  Atl.  922 
111.    331,    74    K    E.     1044     [1905];  [1902]. 

Myers    v.    City    of    Chicago,    196    111.  ''Ton  v.   City  of   Chicago,  216  111. 

591,   63   N.   E.    1037    [1902];    Topliff  331,  74  N.  E.  1044   [1905]. 

V.   City  of   Chicago,    196   111.   215,   63  "Peyton     v.     Village     of     Morgan 

N.  E.  692   [1902];   Peyton  v.  Village  Park,    172    111.    102,    49    K    E.    1003 

of  Morgan  Park,   172  111.   102,  49  N.  [1898]. 

E.     1003     [1898];     Washington     Ice  **  Murphy    v.    City    of   Peoria,    119 

Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  147  111.  111.  509,  9  X.  E.  895   [1888]. 

327,   37   Am.   St.  Rep.   222,   35  N.  E.  ^^  Topliff   v.    City    of    Chicago,    196 

378     [1894];     Murphy     v.     City     of  111.  215.  63  N.  E.  692  [1902]. 

Peoria,    119    111.    509,    9    N.    E,    895  »« Chicago     Union     Traction     Com- 

[1888].  pany  v.  City  of  Chicago.  208  111.  187, 

70  N.  E.  234   [1904]. 


I 


453  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  296 

ordinance  which  provides  for  a  second  assessment  of  a  street 
intersection  for  which  an  assessment  has  already  been  levied,  is 
said  to  be  unreasonable  and  oppressive,  and  therefore  void.^^ 
In  such  a  case  the  ordinance  as  a  whole  is  void.  The  court  has 
no  power  to  regard  it  as  void,  as  far  as  it  affects  such  intersec- 
tions, and  valid  as  to  the  rest  of  the  improvement.^^  Whether 
a  paving  ordinance  is  so  oppressive  and  unreasonable  as  to  be 
void,  is  said  in  Illinois  to  be  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  determined 
by  the  tribunal  by  which  such  facts  are  to  be  adjudicated.^" 
Thus,  a  question  whether  a  paving  ordinance  which  required  a 
new  combined  curb  and  gutter  to  be  used  instead  of  providing 
for  making  use  of  the  old  curbing  which  was  in  place,  and  in 
fair  condition,  was  so  unreasonable  and  oppressive  as  to  be  void, 
is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  primarily  by  the  county 
court  on  objections  to  the  confirmation  of  the  assessment  for  the 
improvement,  and  the  finding  of  such  court  that  such  ordinance 
is  not  unreasonable  will  be  sustained  on  appeal,  unless  contrary 
to  the  clear  weight  of  the  evidence.-" 

§  296.     Unreasonable  sidewalk  improvement  ordinances. 

The  power  of  a  city  to  require  specific  types  of  sidewalk  im- 
provement has  frequently  been  exercised  in  a  manner  which  has 
been  attacked  by  the  persons  upon  whose  property  such  improve- 
ment is  charged,  as  unreasonable.  Upon  the  question  of  the 
validity  of  such  ordinances  the  courts  have  held  that  while  a 
city  must  not  exercise  its  power  in  a  capricious,  oppressive  or 
unreasonable  manner,^  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  type  of  im- 
provement which  is  necessary  and  desirable  in  the  particular 
location,  must  be  determined  by  the  city,  rather  tlian  by  the 
court,  and  unless  the  improvement  is  ch^arly  and  manifestly  an 
unreasonable  one,  the  courts  will  not  interfere  nor  attempt  to 
overrule  the  city's  exercise  of  discretionary  power.-     The  ques- 

"Cliicajrn     Union     Tractinn     Com-  "Lamb  v.  City  of  Chicafro.  210  111. 

pany  v.  City  of  Cliionfro.  2(lf?  111.  1S7.  229.  76  N.  E.  343  110001. 

70  y.  E.  234   [10041.  ="Lamb    v.    City    of    Chicajzo.    210 

"Cliica'zo     T'nioii     Tnu-tlon     Com-  Til.  220.  76  X.  E.  343   [10061. 

pany  v.  City  of  Cliioa'.'o.  209,  Til.  187  '  Winter   v.   City   Council    of  Mont- 

70   N.    E.    234    110041:     ((listin*ruish-  pomorv.  S3  .Ma.  580.  3  So.  235  [18871. 

injr    Xoonnn    v.    People    ex    rel.    "Ray-  -  Wintei-   v.   City   Council   of  Mont- 

monrl.     183     Til.    52,    55    N.    E.    070  [romerv.     S3     Ala!     580,     3     So.     235 

[ISOOD.  [1SS71:   James  v.  Pine  Bluff.  40  Ark. 


296 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


454 


tion  of  what  improvement  is  reasonable,  depends  largely  upon 
the  location  of  the  improvement,  the  size  and  wealth  of  the  city, 
and  the  general  type  of  improvement,  both  public  and  private,  of 
which  the  contemplated  improvement  is  to  form  a  part.  An 
ordinance  requiring  a  sidewalk  to  be  constructed  ten  feet  wide, 
and  to  be  made  of  brick,  with  a  curb,  has  been  held  to  be  rea- 
sonable on  the  theory  that,  in  the  absence  of  proof,  it  would  be 
presumed  that  brick  was  necessary  because  the  sidewalk  was 
within  the  fire  limits  of  the  city.^  The  determination  of  the 
authorities  of  a  city  to  require  a  new  sidewalk  made  of  brick, 
to  be  constructed  where  an  existing  board  sidewalk  could  be 
made  to  serve  the  purpose  in  an  adequate  manner,  making  moder- 
ate repairs,  cannot  be  reviewed  by  the  courts  on  the  ground  that 
such  ordinance  is  unreasonable.*  An  ordinance  of  the  city  of  St. 
Louis  requiring  that  sidewalks  which  become  out  of  repair  must 
be  replaced  by  stone  sidewalks  is  not  unreasonable,  although  it 
requires  a  stone  sidewalk  to  be  constructed  at  a  cost  of  three 
hundred  dollars  while  the  brick  walk  in  existence  could  be  re- 
paired at  a  cost  of  seven  dollars.^  However,  an  ordinance  re- 
quiring a  sidewalk  to  be  constructed  in  an  uninhabited  portion 
of  the  city,  not  connected  with  any  other  walk,  was  held  to  be 
unreasonable.''  The  extent  of  discretion  vested  in  the  authorities 
of  a  public  corporation  to  provide  for  the  construction  of  a 
sidewalk  along  the  side  of  a  street  or  to  pave  the  entire  width 
of  the  street,  making  no  provision  for  a  sidewalk  is  a  question 
upon  which  there  is  some  conflict  of  authority.  In  some  juris- 
dictions an  ordinance  which  makes  no  provision  for  a  sidewalk 
is  said  to  be  unreasonable  and  void.'     Thus  in  a  village  in  which 


199,  4  S.  W.  760  [1887];  Seward  v. 
Rheiner,  2  Kan.  App.  95,  43  Pac. 
423  [1895]:  Skinker  v.  Heman,  148 
Mo.  349,  49  S.  W.  1020  [1898];  (re- 
versing Skinker  v.  Heman,  04  Mo. 
App.  441  [1895]);  City  of  Marion- 
ville  to  the  Use  of  Grubaiigh  v.  Hen- 
son,  65  Mo.  App.  397   [1895]. 

'  James  v.  Pine  Bluff,  49  Ark.  199. 
4  S.  W.  760  [1887]. 

*  City  of  Marionville  to  the  Use  of 
Grubauffh  v.  Henson,  65  Mo.  App. 
397    [1895]. 

"Skinker  v.  Heman,  148  j\Io.  349. 
49    S.    W.    1026    [1898];     (reversing 


Skinker  v.  Heman,  64  Mo.  App.  441 
[1895]). 

*  Corrigan  v.  Gage,  68  Mo.  541 
[1878]. 

'  Carter  v.  City  of  Chicago,  57  111. 
283  [1870];  See  also  Fischback  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Tetherington  191  HI. 
171,  tvy  N.  E.  887  [1901];  Such  ob- 
jection must,  however,  be  raised  in 
the  proper  way.  If  not  interposed  in 
the  hearing  upon  the  question  of  con- 
firmation, it  is  too  late  to  interpose 
on  an  application  for  a  JTidgment  of 
sale.  Fischback  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Tetherington,  191  111.  171,  60  N.  E. 
887  [1901]. 


455  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  297 

a  general  ordinance  was  in  force  providing  for  a  sidewalk  upon 
each  side  of  the  street,  a  special  ordinance  applicable  to  one  street, 
and  providing  that  there  should  be  a  sidewalk  upon  one  side 
only,  and  that  the  paved  portion  of  the  street  should  extend  up  to 
the  lot  lines  on  the  other  side,  was  held  to  be  an  unreasonable 
ordinance.*  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  the  question  of 
the  width,  location  and  existence  of  a  sidewalk  is  for  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities  and  that  the  courts  cannot  interfere  with  the 
exercise  of  their  discretion.''  Thus  in  Michigan  the  common  coun- 
cil of  a  city  is  said  to  have  discretionary  power  to  pave  the  entire 
width  of  the  street,  including  those  portions  used  before  as  a 
sidewalk,  thus  indirectly  abolishing  the  sidewalk.^" 

§  297.     Other  unreasonable  and  oppressive  ordinances. 

The  doctrine  that  an  unreasonable  and  oppressive  ordinance 
is  void  finds  application  in  other  forms  of  improvement.  The 
size  and  cost  of  a  sewer  is  a  matter  peculiarly  within  the  discre- 
tion of  the  municipal  authorities  of  a  city  and  if  the  city  acts 
in  compliance  with  its  statutory  authority,  its  exercise  of  discre- 
tion in  determining  the  size  and  cost  of  such  sewer  cannot  be 
attacked  as  unreasonable.^  If  the  city,  in  providing  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  sewer,  requires  that  at  the  time  of  such  construction 
connections  be  laid  from  the  sewer  to  the  lot  lines,  so  as  to  pre- 
vent the  subsequent  necessity  of  tearing  up  the  street,  it  has  been 
held  that  such  requirement  is  not  unreasonable  if  the  connections 
thus  required  are  not  of  themselves  unreasonably  numerous  or 
expensive.-    Thus  it  has  been  held  that  a  provision  of  a  city  ordi- 

•  Mills    V.    Village    of    Xorwood.    6  or  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pat- 
Ohio  C.   C.  305    [18921.  erson    67   N.  J.  L.    (38  Vr.)    455,  51 

•In    Kentucky   it    is    s.-ad    to   be    a  Atl.  922   [1902]. 

question  for  the  determination  of  the  '  City  of  East  St.   Louis   v.   Davis, 

city   whether   there   shall   be   a   space  233    111.   553,   84   X.   E.   674    [19081; 

left  on  either  or  both  sides  of  a  street  Washington    Park    Club    v.    City    of 

for  a   sidewalk.     Xevin  v.   Roacli.  8fi  Chicago.   210    111.    323,   76   X.    E.   383 

Ky.  492,  5  S.  W.  546  [18871.  [10061;    Walker   v.   City   of  Chicago. 

"Brevoort   v.    City   of    Detroit.    24  202   111.   531,   67   X.   E.   .369    [19031; 

Mich.  322  [18721.  Duane    v.    City   of   Chicago.    198    111. 

*City  of  Kansas  to  the  Use  of  Ad-  471,   64  X.  E."  1033    [10021;    City  of 

kins   V.   Richards,    34   Mo.    App.   521  Chicago  v.  Corcoran.   106  111.   146.  63 

[1889].  X.  E.  600  [1902]  ;  Vandersyde  v.  Peo- 

'  Washington  Park  Club  v.  Hty  of  pie  ex  rel.  Raymond,  195  111.  200,  62 

Chicago,   210   111.   323.   76   X.   E. '  383  X.  E.  806  [1902]. 
[19061;  Van  Wagoner.  Pros.  v.  May- 


298 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


456 


nance  requiring  sewer  connections,  known  as  house  slants,  every 
twenty-five  feet,  is  not  an  unreasonable  or  arbitrary  division  of 
the  property  owner's  land,  and  that  such  house  slants  may  be 
constructed  at  the  expense  of  such  property  owner.^  On  the  other 
hand,  where  the  land  was  held  in  large  tracts,  used  chiefly  for 
agricultural  purposes,  and  not  for  residence  purposes,*  or  the 
land  was  divided  into  lots  of  about  fifty  feet  frontage  each,'' 
it  was  held  to  be  unreasonable  to  require  house  slants  to  be  con- 
structed every  twenty  feet.  Similar  considerations  apply  to  as- 
sessments for  the  construction  and  extension  of  water  pipes.  Un- 
less a  clear  abuse  of  discretion  is  shown,  the  courts  will  not 
attempt  to  review  the  action  of  a  public  corporation  in  determin- 
ing the  necessity  and  propriety  of  such  improvement."  Certain 
lots  which  were  worth  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  apiece 
were  assessed  eighteen  dollars  and  fifty  cents  each  for  the  cost 
of  extending  a  water  pipe.  In  the  absence  of  evidence  showing 
that  the  water  pipes  did  not  in  fact  confer  an  improvement  upon 
such  land,  it  was  held  that  the  court  could  not  regard  such  ordi- 
nance as  being  void  for  unreasonableness.^ 

§  298.     Reviev/  of  exercise  of  discretion. 

The  doctrine  that  the  exercise  of  discretion  by  a  public  cor- 
poration is  a  finality  is  one  ordinarily  advanced  in  cases  where 
the  ordinance  is  not  clearly  unreasonable  and  where  the  transac- 
tion is  apparently  free  from  oppression  and  fraud.  In  a  number 
of  cases  we  find  the  rule  laid  down  that  if  the  discretion  granted 
to  the  cit,y  is  exercised  in  a  reasonable  and  honest  manner,  the 
court  will  not  review  it,^  but  if  the  council  is  acting  in  a  manner 


*  Bickerdike  v.  City  of  Chicago.  185 
111.  280,  56  N.  E.  1096  [1900];  (dis- 
tinguished in  Vandersyde  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Raymond  195  111.  200,  G2  N. 
E.  806   [1902]). 

°  Gage  V.  City  of  Cliicago,  191  111. 
210,  60  N.  E.  896   [1901]. 

"Myers  v.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111. 
591,  63  N.  E.   1037    [1902]. 

'  Myers  v.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111. 
591,   63   N.   E.    1037    [1902]. 

1  James  v.  Pine  BhiflF,  49  Ark.  199. 
4  S.  W.  760  [1887];  Ton  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  216  111.  331,  74  N.  E.  1044 
[1905];    Walker  v.   City  of   Chicago, 


202  111.  531,  67  N.  E.  369  [1903]; 
Myers  v.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111. 
591,  63  N.  E.  1037  [1902];  Vane  v. 
City  of  Evanston  150  111.  616,  37  N. 
E.  901  [1894];  English  v.  City  of 
Danville,  150  111.  92,  36  N.  E."  994 
[1894];  MeChesney  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 171  111.  253,  49  N.  E.  548 
[1898];  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Decatur,  154  111. 
173,  38' N.  E.  626  [1894];  English 
V.  City  of  Danville,  150  111.  92,  36 
N.  E.  994  [1894];  Chicago,  Burling- 
ton &  Ouincy  RaWroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Quincy,  139  111.  355,  28  N.  E. 


457  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  298 

which  is  unreasonable  and  oppressive  and  for  the  purpose  of 
evading  the  law,  the  courts  will  review  the  question.'-  As  stated 
in  another  form  the  courts  will  review  only  in  case  of  manifest 
abuse  of  such  discretion.^  It  is  also  suggested  that  the  courts 
may  review  the  determination  of  the  city  as  to  the  necessity  of 
the  improvement  in  case  of  fraud.*  The  decision  of  the  city 
council  is  said  to  be  "final  and  conclusive  unless  perhaps  in  case 
of  fraud  or  mistake."^  "The  necessity  of  making  street  im- 
provements is  said  to  be  a  matter  for  the  exclusive  determination 
of  the  municipal  corporation  invested  with  the  power  to  make 
such  improvements,  and  when  it  acts  within  the  authority  given, 
and  its  determination  is  fairly  made ;  that  is,  without  fraud  or 
oppression,  it  cannot  be  interfered  with  by  the  court.""  These 
forms  of  stating  the  rule  are  probably  not  inconsistent  with  the 
general  rule  that  the  exercise  of  discretion  by  a  public  corpora- 
tion is  a  finality  and  is  not  subject  to  review  by  the  courts,  with 
reference  to  its  determination  as  to  the  necessity  and  propriety  of 
the  improvement.  It  may  be  confessed,  how^ever,  that  the  obiter 
found  in  some  of  the  cases  which  lay  down  the  principle  that  the 
discretion  of  the  public  corporation  is  not  subject  to  review  are 
inconsistent  with  the  obiter  found  in  other  cases,  which  hold  that 
in  case  of  fraud  or  oppression  the  courts  may  review  the  exercise 
of  discretion  by  the  public  corporation.  In  some  cases  still  less 
weight  seems  to  be  attached  to  the  decision  of  the  public  corpora- 
tion as  to  the  necessity  of  the  improvement.  Thus  it  is  said  to 
be  not  conclusive  but  entitled  to  serious  consideration."  Under 
the  last  doctrine  given,  the  necessity  of  the  improvement  seems 
to  be  subject  to  review  in  an  action  on  the  assessment  as  any 
other  question  of  fact.     In  some  jurisdictions  the  decision  of  the 

1069  [1893];  Barfield  V.  Gleason,  in  *  Louisville    &    Nashville    Railroad 

Ky.   491,   23    Ky.    L.    128,   63    S.    W.  Company  v.  City  of  East  St.   Louis. 

964  [19011.  134    111.    656,    25    X.   E.    962    [1891]; 

^  Kerfoot   v.    City    of    Chicago     195  Shimmons    v.    City   of    Saginaw,    104 

111.    229,    63    X.    E.    101    [1902];    Li-  Mich.  511,  62  X.  W.  72o  [1895];  He- 

gare  v.  City  of  Chicago,   139  111.  46,  man  v.   Rchulte,   166   Mo.   409,   66   S. 

32  Am.  St."  Rep.   179,  28  X.   E.  934;  W.   163   [1901]. 

"The    courts    will    look    beyond    the  ^  Rogers    v.    City    of    St.    Paul     22 

mere  face  of  the  ordinance  to  its  ef-  ilinn.  494   [1876]. 

feet  and  operation   and   judge   it   ac-  "Dewey  v.  City  of  Des  Moines.  101 

cordingly.      Ton   v.    City  of   Chicago.  la.   416,   70  N.  W.   Rep.   605    [1897]. 

216  111.  331,  74  N.  E.  1044  [1905].  'Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Monument 

*Lent   V.   Tillson.    72   Cal.   404,    14  Cemetery  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  170.  23  Atl. 

Pac.  71    [1887].  400    [1S92]. 


§§299,300  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  458 

city  may   be   reviewed   before   the   improvement   is   constructed, 
but  not  after.^ 

§  299.  Conclusiveness  of  legislative  determination  in  assessments 
for  legal  duty. 
In  assessments  or  charges  levied  upon  the  owner  of  property, 
to  reimburse  the  public  for  the  performance  of  some  duty  which 
rested  primarily  upon  the  owner  of  such  property,  the  question 
of  the  finality  of  the  determination  of  the  legislature  that  such 
legal  duty  does  rest  upon  the  owner  of  property  is  one  upon 
which  the  courts  are  not  in  harmony,  either  as  to  the  general 
principles  involved  or  as  to  the  specific  results  reached  in  apply- 
ing such  principles.  On  the  one  hand  it  seems  to  be  settled  by 
the  weight  of  authority  that  the  legislature  may  impose  certain 
duties  upon  the  owner  or  occupant  of  property,  over  and  above 
those  which  rested  upon  him  at  common  law.  On  the  other  hand 
the  power  of  the  legislature  to  impose  legal  duties  upon  the  owner 
or  occupant  of  realty,  is  by  no  means  unlimited.  The  legislature 
cannot  impose  upon  private  persons  duties  which  primarily  and 
essentially  devolve  upon  the  state,  or  one  of  the  public  corpora- 
tions thereof.  It  is  practically  impossible  to  state  an  abstract 
rule  which  will  indicate,  however,  just  how  far  this  discretion 
of  the  legislature  extends,  other  than  to  say  that  there  are  cer- 
tain duties  not  existing  at  common  law  which  the  legislature  may 
by  statute  devolve  upon  the  owner  or  occupant  of  realty.^ 

§  300.     Conclusiveness  of  legislative  determination  in  assessments 
for  goods  sold. 

In  determining  for  what  purpose  goods  may  be  furnished  to 
the  owner  or  occupant  of  property  at  his  request  the  legislature 
has  undoubtedly  a  wide  range  of  discretion.  If  the  purpose  is 
one  which  is  so  public  in  its  character  that  the  municipal  cor- 
poration, or  other  public  corporation,  may  be  authorized  to  un- 
dertake it,  there  seems  to  be  no  question  that  the  legislature  may 
authorize  charges  to  be  made  upon  persons  who  having  the  option 
to  make  use  of  such  goods,  or  to  decline  such  use,  see  fit  to  accept 
the  goods  and  use  them.  The  questions  as  to  the  power  of  the 
legislature  or  public  corporation  which  arise  in  this  connection, 

Draper    v.    City    of    Atlanta,    126  ^  See   §§   370,   372. 

Ga..  649,   95   S.   E.   929    [1906]. 


II 


459  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  301 

are  generally  questions  involving  the  right  of  a  public  corpora- 
tion to  furnish  to  some  property  of  the  sort  which  it  furnishes 
to  others.  If  the  purpose  were  not  one  which  the  city  could  be 
authorized  to  undertake,  but  if  the  city  did  in  fact  furnish  them, 
the  property  owner  who  voluntarily  accepted  such  goods  under 
the  understanding  that  he  was  to  pay  therefor,  would  undoubt- 
edly be  liable,  either  in  contract,  or  quasi-contract.^ 


C— SPECIFIC  EXAMPLES  OF  ORIGINAL  IMPROVEMENTS. 

§  301.     Streets. 

In  a  community  which  is  thickly  settled,  such  as  an  ordinary 
city  or  village,  a  public  street  makes  it  possible  for  the  public  at 
large  to  travel,  to  transport  goods,  and  to  communicate  freely 
both  within  the  community  itself  and  with  the  outside  world. 
A  public  street  is  therefore  undoubtedly  a  public  improvement 
of  the  most  unquestionable  type.  Municipal  corporations  are  al- 
most without  exception  given  ample  power  to  establish  and  con- 
struct such  streets.  In  the  absence  of  specific  constitutional  re- 
straint the  legislature  may  confer  upon  municipal  corporations 
the  power  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  public  streets  by  general  taxa- 
tion. In  most  instances,  a  public  street,  furthermore,  confers  a 
special  and  peculiar  advantage  upon  the  property  situated  upon 
it  or  near  to,  over  and  above  the  advantages  conferred  upon  the 
community  at  large.  Such  abutting  or  ad.jacent  property  is  by 
means  of  such  public  streets  given  a  facility  of  access  which  makes 
it,  if  suitable  either  for  business  or  for  residence  purposes,  much 
more  available  therefor.  Indeed,  without  public  streets,  land 
of  the  size  of  the  ordinary  city  lot  could  scarcely  be  used  at  all. 
With  the  increased  facility  of  access  and  increased  utility  comes, 
in  most  cases,  a  great  increase  in  market  value.  For  these  rea- 
sons, it  is  held  that  in  the  absence  of  specific  constitutional  re- 
strictions, local'  assessments  may  be  levied  upon  the  property  es- 
pecially benefited  by  public  streets  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  opening 
and  constructing  them.'     This  rule  is  so  thoroughly  recognized 

'See   §§   332,  353,  354.  land  City.   184   U.   S.   61     ^6  L.   431. 

'Hibben   v.   Smith,    191    U.    S.   310.  22    S.    290    [19021;     (affirming    King 

48  L.   195,  24  S.  88    [19031;    (affirm-  v.    City   of   Portland.    38   Or.   402,   55 

ing   Hibben   v.    Smith.    158    Tnd.    200,  L.    R."  A.    812.    63    Pac.    2    »^900l); 

62  N.  E.  447   [1901])  ;   King  v.  Port-  French  v.  Parbor  Asphalt  Pav.ng  Co., 


301 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


460 


that  in  few  of  the  eases  which  apply  is  there  any  discussion  of 
the  subject.  The  rule  is  assumed  without  discussion  and  the 
questions  actually  considered  by  the  courts  involve  the  validity 


181  U.  S.  324,  45  L.  879,  21  S.  625 
[1901];  (affirming  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.  v.  French,  158  Mo.  534, 
54  L.  R.  A.  492,  58  S.  W.  934 
[1900]);  Walston  v.  Nevin,  128  U. 
S.  578,  32  L.  544,  9  S.  192  [1888]; 
( affirming  Nevin  v.  Roach,  86  Ky. 
492,  5  S.  W.  546  [1887]);  Mattingly 
v.  District  of  Columbia,  97  U.  S. 
687,  24  L.  1098  [1878^;  Brown  v. 
Drain,  112  Fed.  582  [1901];  White 
V.  City  of  Tacoma,  109  Fed.  32 
[1901];  Zehnder  v.  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.,  108  Fed.  570  [1901]; 
City  of  Galveston  v.  Guaranty  Trust 
Co.  of  New  York,  107  Fed.  325,  46 
C.  C.  A.  319  [1901];  Farson  v.  City 
of  Sioux  City,  106  Fed.  278  [1901]; 
Burlington  Savings  Bank  v.  City  of 
Clinton,  Iowa,  106  Fed.  269  [1901]; 
Denny  v.  City  of  Spokane,  79  Fed. 
719,  25  C.  C.  A.  164,  48  U.  S.  App. 
282  [1897]  ;  Harton  v.  Town  of  Avon- 
dale,  147  Ala.  458,  41  So.  934  [1906] ; 
Irwin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Mobile,  57 
Ala.  6   [1876];   English  v.  Territory, 

—  Ariz. ,   89   Pac.   5G1    [1907]; 

Main  v.  Ft.  Smith,  49  Ark.  480,  5  S.1. 
W.  801  [1887];  Lambert  v.  Bates, 
148  Cal.  146,  82  Pac.  767  [1905]; 
Chase  v.  Trout,  146  Cal.  350,  80  Pac. 
81  [1905];  Duncan  v.  Ramish,  142 
Cal.  086,  76  Pac.  661  [1904];  Cum- 
mings  V.  Kearney  141  Cal.  156,  74 
Pac.  759  [1903]  ;  Williamson  v.  Joyce, 
140  Cal.  609,  74  Pac.  290  [1903]; 
City  Street  Improvement  Company  v. 
Laird,  138  Cal.  27,  70  Pac.  916 
[1902];  Pacific  Paving  Company  v. 
Sullivan  Estate  Company,  137  Cal. 
261,  70  Pac.  86  [1902];  Crane  v. 
Cummings,  137  Cal.  201,  69  Pac.  984 
[1902];  Potaluma  Paving  Company 
V.  Singley,  136  Cal.  616.  69  Pac.  42*6 
[1902];  Chapman  v.  Ames,  135  Cal. 
246,  67  Pac.  1125  [1901];  Blanchard 
V.  Ladd,  135  Cal.  214  67  Pac.  131 
[1901];    Cotton   v.   Watson.    134   Cal. 


422,  66  Pac.  490  [1901];  Belser  v. 
AUman,  134  Cal.  399,  66  Pac.  492 
[1901];  Reid  v.  Clay,  134  Cal.  207, 
66  Pac.  262  [1901];  Greenwood  v. 
Chandon,  130  Cal.  467,  62  Pac.  736 
[1900];  Hadley  v.  Dague,  130  Cal. 
207,  62  Pac.  500  [1900];  Warren  & 
Malley  v.  Russell,  129  Cal.  381,  62 
Pac.  75  [1900];  California  Improve- 
ment Company  v.  Moran  128  Cal. 
373,  60  Pac.  969  [1900];  Moffitt  v. 
Jordan,  127  Cal.  622,  60  Pac.  173 
[1900];  Williams  v.  Bergin,  127  Cal. 
.578,  60  Pac.  164  [1900];  Pacific 
Paving  Company  v.  Mowbray,  127 
Cal.  1,  59  Pac.  205  [1899];  Remish 
v.  Hartwell,  126  Cal.  443,  58  Pac. 
920  [1899];  Wilson  v.  California 
Bank,  121  Cal.  630,  54  Pac.  119 
[1898];  Girvin  v.  Simon,  116  Cal. 
604,  48  Pac.  720  [1897];  Buckman 
V.  Landers  111  Cal.  347,  43  Pac. 
1125  [1896];  Diggins  v.  Hartshorne, 
108  Cal.  154,  41  Pac.  283  [1895]; 
San  Francisco  Paving  Company  v. 
Bates,  134  Cal.  39,  66  Pac.  2  [1901]  ; 
Treanor  v.  Houghton,  103  Cal.  53,  36 
Pac.  1081  [1894];  Warren  v.  Postel, 
99  Cal.  294,  33  Pac.  930  [1893]; 
Bonnet  v.  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  65  Cal.  230,  3  Pac.  815 
[1884]  ;  Harney  v.  Heller,  47  Cal.  15, 
[1873];  Himmelman  v.  Woolrich,  45 
Cal.  249  [1873];  Himmelman  v. 
Hoadley  44  Cal.  213  [1872];  Lucas 
Turner  &  Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  7  Cal. 
462  [1856];  San  Francisco  Paving 
Company  v.  Dubois,  2  Cal.  App.  42, 
83  Pac.  72  [1905];  People  ex  rel. 
Russell  V.  Brown,  218  III.  375,  75  N. 
E.  989  [1905];  Connecticut  Mutual 
Life  Insurance  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  217  111.  352,  75  N.  E.' 365 
[1905];  Gage  v.  People  ex  rel.  Han- 
berg,  213  111.  457,  72  N.  E. 
1099  [1905];  Nelson  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  196  111.  390,  63 
N.     E.     738      [1902]:      Thomson     v. 


4G1 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§301 


of  the  steps  taken  in  levying  the  assessment,  the  right  to  assess 
the  specific  tract  in  question,  and  the  like,  all  based  on  the 
assumption   that   the   purpose   is   undoubtedly   one   for   which   a 


People  ex  rel.  Foote,  184  111.  17  50 
N.  E.  383  [1900];  Chicago  Rock  Is- 
land &  Pacific  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  139  111.  573,  28  N. 
E.  1108  [1893];  New  York  C.  &  St. 
Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.   City  of   Hammond, 

—  Ind.   ,   83   N.   E.   244    [1908]; 

Daly  V.  Giibbins,  —  Ind.  ,  82  N. 

E.  G59  [1907];  Pittsburgh  C.  C.  & 
St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Taber,  168  Ind. 
419,  77  X.  E.  741  [1906];  Low  v. 
Dallas,  165  Ind.  392,  75  N.  E.  822 
[1905];  Scott  V.  Hayes,  162  Ind. 
548,  70  N.  E.  879  [1903];  McKee  v. 
Town  of  Pendleton  162  Ind.  667,  69 
N.  E.  997  [1904];  Brown  v.  Central 
Bermudez  Company,  162  Ind.  542,  69 
N.  E.  150  [1903];  Deane  v.  Indiana 
Macadam  &  Construction  Company, 
161  Ind.  371,  68  N.  E.  686  [1903]; 
Pittsburgh,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  &  St. 
Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  i^'ish,  158  Ind.  525, 
63  N.  E.  454  [1901];  Leeds  v.  De- 
frees,  157  Ind.  392,  61  N.  E.  930 
[1901];  Cason  v.  City  of  Lebanon, 
153  Ind.  567,  55  N.  E.  768  [1899]; 
Van  Sickle  v.  Belknap,  129  Ind.  558, 
28  N.  E.  305  [1891];  Quill  v.  City 
of  Indianapolis  124  Ind.  292,  7  L. 
R.  A.  681,  23  X.  E.  788  [1890];  Law 
V.  Johnston.  118  Ind.  261,  20  N.  E. 
745  [1888];  Garvin  v.  Dussman,  114 
Ind.  429,  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  637,  16  N. 
E.  826  [1887];  Taber  v.  Ferguson, 
109  Ind.  227,  9  N.  E.  723  [1886]; 
Ray  V.  City  of  Jeffersonville,  90  Ind. 
567  [1883];  Chamberlain  v.  City  of 
Evansville,  77  Ind.  542  [1881]; 
Peru  &  Indianapolis  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Hanna,  68  Ind.  562  [1879];  Martin- 
dale  V.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411  [1875]; 
Indianapolis,  Peru  &  Chicago  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Ross,  47  Ind.  25 
[1874];  Ball'v.  Balfe  41  Ind.  221 
[1872];  City  of  Evansville  v.  Pfis- 
terer,  34  Ind.  36,  7  Am.  Ro]).  214 
[1870];  City  of  Greensburg  v.  Zol- 
ler,  28  Ind.  App.   126,    60  N.  E.   1007 


[1901];  Fralich  v.  Barlow,  25  Ind. 
App.  383,  58  N.  E.  271  [1900];  Lewis 
V.  Albertson,  23  Ind.  App.  147,  53 
N.  E.  1071  [1899];  Bozarth  v.  Mc- 
Gillicuddy,  19  Ind.  App.  26,  47  N.  E. 
397,  48  N.  E.  1042  [1897];  Dugger 
V.  Hicks,  11  I'jd.  App.  374,  36  N.  E. 
1085  [1894];  Mock  v.  City  of  Mun- 
cie,  9  Ind.  App.  530  37  X.  E.  281 
[1893];  Higman  v.  City  of  Sioux 
City,  129  la.  291,  105  X.  W.  524 
[1906];  Ft.  Dodge  Electric  Light  & 
Power  Company  v.  City  of  Ft.  Dodge, 
115  la.  568,  89  X.  W.  7  [1902];  Al- 
len V.  City  of  Davenport,  107  la.  90, 
77  N.  W.  532  [1898];  Smith  v.  City 
of  Des  Moines,  106  la.  590,  76  X.  \V. 
836  [1S9S];  City  of  Burlington  v. 
Quick,  47  la.  222  [1877];  Morrison 
V.  Hershire,  32  la.  271  [1871];  Un- 
ion Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Kansas  City,  73 
Kan.  571,  85  Pac.  G03  [1906]; 
Board  of  Commissioners  of  Franklin 
County  V.  City  of  Ottawa,  49  Kan. 
747,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  396,  31  Pac. 
788  [1892];  Barron  v.  City  of  Lex- 
ington, —  Ky. ,   105   S.  W.   395 

[1907];    Moxley    v.    Lawler,    —    Ky. 

,   97   S.  W.  365    [1906];    Lindsey 

V.  Brawner,  —  Ky.  ,  97  S.  W.  1 

[1906];    Morton   v.   Sullivan,  —   Ky. 

,    96    S.    W.    807    [1906];    Otter 

V.   Barber  Asphalt  Co.,  —  Ky.  , 

96  S.  W.  862   [1906];   Cabell  v.  City 

of  Henderson,  —  Ky.  .  88  S.  W. 

1095,  28  Ky.  L.  R.  89  [1905];  Lind- 
onberger  Land   Co.   v.  R.   B.   Park  & 

Co.,    —    Ky.    ,    85    S.    W.    213, 

27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  437  [1905];  Orth  v. 
Park'&  Co.,  117  Ky.  779,  80  S.  W. 
1108,  26  Ky.  L.  Rep.  184  [1904]; 
denying  rehearing  of  79  S.  W.  206; 
(decree  modified  26  Ky.  L.  R. 
342,  81  S.  W.  251);  Duker 
v.      Barber      Asphalt      Paving      Co., 

—  Ky.  ,  74  S.  W.  744,  25  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  135  [1903];  Barber  Aspliall 
Paving  Co.  v.  Gaar.   115  Kv.  334,  73 


§301 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


462 


local  assessment  may  be  levied.  The  different  elements  which 
enter  into  a  street  improvement  recjuire  separate  discussion,  since 
in  some  jurisdictions  at  least  such  different  elements  are  referred 


S.  W.  1106,  24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  2227 
[1903];  Preston  v.  Rudd,  84  Ky.  150 
[1886];  City  of  Ludlow  v.  Trustees 
of  the  Cincinnati  Southern  Railway 
Co.,  78  Ky.  357  [1880];  Preston  v. 
Roberts,  12  Bush.  (75  Ky.)  570 
[1877];  Bradley  v.  McAtee,  7  Bush, 
(70  Ky.)  667,  3  Am.  Rep.  309  [1870] ; 
City  of  Louisville  v.  Hyatt,  2  B. 
Mon.  (41  Ky.)  177,  36  Am.  Dec.  594 
[1841];  City  of  Lexington  v.  Mc- 
Quillan's Heirs,  9  Dana  (39  Ky.) 
513,  35  Am.  Dec.  159  [1840];  Grand 
Rapids  School  Furniture  Company  v. 
City  of  Grand  Rapids,  92  Mich.  564, 
52  N.  W.  1028  [1892];  Cuming  v. 
City  of  Grand  Rapids,  46  Mich. 
150,  9  N.  W.  141  [1881];  State  v. 
District  Court  of  Blue  Earth  County, 
102  Minn.  482,  113  N.  W.  697, 
114  N.  W.  654  [1907];  Morey 
V.  City  of  Duluth,  75  Minn. 
221,  77  N.  W.  829  [1899];  Edwards 
House    Co.    V.    City    of    Jackson     — 

Miss. ,  45  So.  14  [1907]  ;  Asphalt 

&  Granitoid  Const.  Co.  v.  Hauessler, 
201  Mo.  400,  100  ^.  W.  14  [1907]; 
(Affirming,  Asphalt  &  Granitoid 
Const.  Co.  V.  Hauessler,  —  Mo.  App. 

,   80   S.   W.   5    [1904];    Meier   v. 

City  of  St.  Louis,  180  Mo.  391,  79 
S.  W.  955  [1903]  ;  Seaboard  National 
Bank  of  New  York  v.  Woesten,  176 
Mo.  49,  75  S.  W.  464  [1903]  ;  City  of 
St.  Charles  ex  rel.  Budd  v.  Deemar, 
174  Mo.  122,  73  S.  W.  469  [1902]; 
City  of  Clinton  to  use  of  Thornton 
V.  Henry  County,  115  Mo.  557,  37 
Am.  St.  Rep.  415,  22  S.  W.  494 
[1893];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  ot 
McGrath  v.  Clemens,  49  Mo.  552 
[1872];  City  of  Excelsior  Springs,  to 
Use  of  McCormick  v.  Ettenson,  120 
Mo.  App  215,  96  S.  W.  701  [1906]; 
City  of  Sedalia  ex  rel.  Gilsonite  Con- 
struction Company  v.  Montgomery, 
109  Mo.  App.  197,  88  S.  W.  1014 
[1904];    Brick   &   Terra   Cotta   Com- 


pany V.  Hull,  49  Mo.  App.  433 
[1892];  McMillan  v.  City  of  Butte, 
30   Mont.    220,    76    Pac.    203    [1904]; 

Shaier  v.  McAleese,  —  N.  J.  Eq. , 

G8  Atl.  416  [1907];  Durrell  v.  City 
of  Woodbury,  74  N.  J.  L.  (45  Vr.) 
206,  65  Atl.  198  [1906];  State,  Pud- 
ney.  Pros.  v.  Village  of  Passaic,  37  N- 
J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  65  [1874];  Town  of  Al- 
buquerque V.  Zeiger,  5  N.  M.  674,  27 
Pac.  315  [1891];  McLaughlin  v.  Mil- 
ler, 124  N.  Y.  510,  26  N.  E.  1104 
[1891];  People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y. 
419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851];  Town 
of  Albuquerque  v.  Zeiger,  5  N.  M. 
674,    27    Pac.    315    [1891];    Alv.ey   v. 

City  of  Asheville,  —  N.  C.  ,  59 

S.  E.  999  [1907];  Hilliard  v.  City 
of  Asheville,  118  N.  C.  845,  24  S.  E. 
738  [1896];  Lima  v.  Cemetery  Asso- 
ciation, 42  0.  S.  128,  51  Am.  Rep. 
809  [1884];  Hubbard  v.  Norton,  28 
0.  S.  116  [1875];  Creighton  v.  Scott, 
14  0.  S.  438  [1863];  Maloy  v.  City 
of  Marietta,  11  0.  S.  636  [I860]; 
Northern  Indiana  Railroad  Company 
V.  Connelly,  10  0.  S.  160  [1859]; 
Oliver    v.    City    of    Newberg,   —    Or. 

,   91    Pac.   470    [1907];    King   v. 

Portland,  38  Or.  402  55  L.  R.  A. 
812,  63  Pac.  2  [1900];  Wilson  v. 
City  of  Salem,  24  Or.  504,  34  Pac. 
9,  691  [1893];  King  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 2  Or.  146  [1865];  In  re  Beech- 
wood  Avenue,  Appeal  of  O'Mara,  194 
Pa.  St.  86,  45  Atl.  127  [1899];  In 
the  Matter  of  College  Street,  8  R.  I. 
474  [1867];  In  the  Matter  of  Dor- 
rance  Street,  4  R.  I.  230  [1856]; 
Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Watertown,  1  S.  D.  46,  44  N.  W. 
1072  [1890];  Coimty  of  Harris  v. 
Boyd  70  Tex.  237,  7  S.  W.  713 
[1888];  Taylor  v.  Boyd,  63  Tex.  533 
[1885];  Bennison  v.  City  of  Galves- 
ton, 18  Tex.  Civ.  App.  20,  44  S.  W. 
613     [1898];     Lovenberg    v.    City    of 


463 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


§302 


to  different  theories  of  governmental  power  and  results  are 
reached  for  certain  of  these  elements  differing  widely  from  the 
results  reached  for  others.  Furthermore,  specific  constitutional 
provisions  are  applicable  to  certain  of  these  elements  but  not  to 
others.     They  will  accordingly  be  considered  in  detail. 


§  302.     Doctrine  in  South  Carolina. 

The  construction  which  the  Supreme  Court  of  South  Carolina 
has  placed  upon  the  constitutional  provision  protecting  persons 
from  being  deprived  of  property  except  by  the  law  of  the  land 
has  made  it  impossible  for  the  legislature  to  authorize  valid  assess- 
ments for  opening  or  constructing  streets.  The  constitution  of 
1790  provided  in  Article  nine,  section  two:  "No  freeman  of  this 
state  shall  be  .  .  .  disseized  of  his  freehold  ...  or  in  any 
manner  despoiled  of  his  life,  liberty  or  property,  but  by  the 
judgment  of  his  peers  or  by  the  law  of  the  land."  Under  this 
provision  a  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  on  lots  on  the  south 
side  of  a  street  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  a  strip  of  land  along  the 
north  side  of  such  street,  bought  for  the  purpose  of  widening  the 
street,  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional.^     In  the  constitution  of 


Galveston,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  162,  42 
S.  W.  1024  [1897];  Violett  v.  City 
of  Alexandria,  92  Va.  561,  53  Am. 
St.  Rep.  825,  31  L.  R.  A.  382,  23  S. 
E.  909  [1896];  Davis  v.  City  of 
Lynchburg,  84  Va.  861,  6  S.  E.  230 
[1888];    In    re    City    of    Seattle,    — 

Wash.    ,    91     Pac.    548     [1907]; 

Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  ot 
Seattle,  —  Wash.  - — ,  91  Pac.  244; 
City  of  Spokane  v.   Security  Savings 

Society,  —  Wash.  ,  89  Pac.  466 

[1907];  Lister  v.  City  of  Taconia,  44 
Wash.  222,  87  Pac.  126  [1906];  Los- 
ter  V.  City  of  Seattle,  42  Wash.  539, 
85  Pac.  14  [1906]  ;  State  of  Washing- 
ton on  the  Relation  of  the  Barber 
x\sphalt  Paving  Company  v.  City  of 
Seattle,  42  Wash.  370,  85  Pac!  11 
[1906]  ;  Frye  v.  Town  of  ■Mount  Ver- 
non, 42  Wash.  268,  84  Pac.  864 
[1906];  Johnson  v.  City  of  Tacoma, 
41  Wash.  51,  82  Pac.  1092  [1905]; 
In  the  Matter  of  Westlake  Avenue, 
Seattle,  40  Wash.  144,  82  Pac.  279 
[1905];    City   of   Aberdeen   v.   Lucas, 


37  Wash.  190,  79  Pac.  632  [1905]; 
MoNamee  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  24 
Wash.  591,  64  Pac.  791  [1901];  City 
of  New  Whatcom  v.  Bellingham  Ba'y 
Improvement  Company,  18  Wash.  181, 
51  Pac.  360  [1897];  City  of  New 
Whatcom  v.  Bellingham  Bay  Im- 
provement Company,  16  Wash.  131, 
47  Pac.  236  [1896];  Abernethy  v. 
Town  of  Medical  Lake,  9  Wash.  112, 
37  Pac.  306  [1894];  Austin  v.  City 
of  Seattle,  2  Wash.  667,  27  Pac.  557 
[1891];  Schintgen  v.  City  of  La 
Crosse,  117  Wis.  158,  94  N.  W.  84 
[1903];  Hennessy  v.  Douglas  County, 
99  Wis.  129,  74  N.  W.  983  [1898]; 
Wells  V.  Western  Paving  &  Supply 
Company,  96  Wis.  116,  70  N.  W.  1071 
[1897];  Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St. 
Paul  Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee.  89  Wis.  50(5,  28  L.  R.  A. 
249,  62  N.  W.  417  [1895]. 

'  State  ex  rel.  Horlbeck  v.  City 
Council  of  Charleston,  12  Rich.  (S. 
C.)    702   [18601. 


§  303  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  464 

1868  a  similar  clause  was  enacted  in  Article  one,  section  fourteen, 
which  provided :  "No  person  shall  be  .  .  .  despoiled  or  dispos- 
sessed of  his  property  ...  or  deprived  of  his  life,  liberty  or 
estate,  but  b}^  the  judgment  of  his  peers,  or  the  law  of  the  land." 
Under  this  clause  it  was  held  that  as  it  substantially  re-enacted 
the  former  provision,  it  must  receive  the  same  construction,  even 
in  opposition  to  the  great  weight  of  authority ;  and  that,  therefore, 
a  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  based  on  benefits  received 
from  a  street  improvement  was  unconstitutional.-  Under  this  con- 
struction of  the  constitution  not  only  street  assessments  but  all 
assessments  for  purposes  not  referable  to  the  police  power  are  held 
invalid.^  Even  this  concession  to  the  traditional  power  of  assess- 
ment was  subsequently  withdrawn ;  and  it  was  held  that  local  as- 
sessments could  not  be  levied  for  any  purposes.* 

§  303.    Constitutional  restriction  in  Virginia. 

The  constitution  of  Virginia,  which  went  into  effect  June  10, 
1902,  provides  in  Article  thirteen,  section  one  hundred  and  sev- 
enty: "No  city  or  town  shall  impose  any  tax  or  assessment  upon 
abutting  land  owners  for  street  or  other  public  local  improvements, 
except  for  making  and  improving  the  walkways  upon  the  existing 
streets,  and  improving  and  paving  then  existing  alleys,  and  for 
either  the  construction,  or  for  the  use  of  sewers;  and  the  same, 
when  imposed,  shall  not  be  in  excess  of  the  peculiar  benefits  re- 
sulting therefrom  to  such  abutting  land  owners.  Except  in  cities 
and  towns,  no  such  taxes  or  assessments,  for  local  improvements, 
shall  be  imposed  on  abutting  land  owners."  Under  this  section  it 
has  been  held  that  an  assessment  for  a  street  improvement  made 
after  the  constitution  took  effect  was  invalid,  even  though  section 
one  hundred  and  seventeen  of  the  same  constitution  provides  that 
municipal  charters  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  con- 
stitution shall  be  retained  except  in  so  far  as  they  may  be  amended 
or  repealed  by  the  General  Assembly,  since  the  same  section,  one 
hundred  and  seventeen,  expressly  amends  all  such  charters  so  as 
to  make  them  conform  to  the  limitations  and  powers  contained  in 
the  constitution.^ 

^  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green-  *  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green- 

ville, 42  S.  C.  29*3.  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  ville,  5.3  S.  C.  285,  69  Am.  St.  Rep. 
723.  27  L.  R.  A.  284.  20  S.  E.  842  855.  43  L.  R.  A.  101,  31  S.  E.  252 
[1893].  118981. 

^See  §   118,  §    159.  '  H'cks  v.   Citv  of  B-istoI.    102  Va. 

861,  47  S.  E.  1001   [1904]. 


i 


465  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  304 

§  304.    Thoroughfares. 

A  question  of  a  difiPerent  sort  is  presented  when  the  street  which 
is  to  1)6  improved  is  a  great  thoroughfare,  whose  improvement  is 
necessary  for  the  convenience  of  the  general  public,  whi'e  the  ex- 
tent and  cost  of  the  improvement  is  much  greater  than  is  necessary 
for  the  benefit  of  the  adjoining  property.  It  is  undoubtedly  fair, 
as  has  been  pointed  out  by  the  courts,  that  part  or  all  of  the  ex- 
pense of  such  an  improvement  undertaken  for  the  benefit  of  the 
general  public  primarily  should  be  paid  for,  in  part  or  in  whole, 
by  general  taxation.^  The  difficult  question,  however,  is  presented 
when  an  attempt  is  made  to  levy  a  local  assessment  to  pay  for 
part  or  all  of  such  an  improvement.  In  Iowa  an  assessment  was 
levied  on  abutting  property  to  pay  for  paving  a  street  which  was 
the  thoroughfare  from  the  city  to  the  state  fair  grounds,  and 
which,  up  to  that  time,  had  been  a  dirt  road.  The  assessment  was 
attacked  by  the  abutting  property  owners  as  fraudulent;  not  that 
any  actual  fraud  on  the  i)art  of  the  public  officials  was  claimed,  but 
on  the  ground  that  to  assess  the  abutting  property  for  an  improve- 
ment, which  was  intended  primarily  for  the  benefit  of  the  people 
of  the  whole  city,  or  of  the  state  at  large,  was  constructively 
fraudulent.  The  Supreme  Court  upheld  such  assessment  on  the 
ground  that  such  an  improvement  of  a  street  was  "a  public  ob,iect 
which  will  support  such  an  assessment  regardless  of  whether  or  not 
it  is  a  benefit  to  the  abutting  property."  -  On  this  point  this  case 
was  not  affected  by  its  reversal  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,"*  since  it  was  reversed  solely  on  the  ground  of  the 
personal  liability  of  the  property  OAvner  for  the  amount  of  the 
assessment,  the  Iowa  court  holding  that  personal  liability  could  be 
imposed  upon  any  owners  on  constructive  notice,  while  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  held  that  such  liability  eould 
not  be  imposed  upon  a  non-resident  owner  domiciled  in  anotlier 
state  upon  constructive  notice  merely.*  But  the  ground  upon 
which  the  holding  is  placed  is  rather  extreme,  since  the  weight  of 
authority  holds  that  the  amount  of  the  assessment  must  be  limited 
to  the  benefits  conferred  upon  the  property  by  the  imju'ovement. 

'  Frantz,  Jr.  v.  Jacob,  88  Ky.  525,  '  Dowry   v.    Dps    Moines.    173   U.    S. 

11  R.  W.  654  [18891:  Maybin  v.  City       103,  43  L.  665,  19  S.  379  [1899]. 
of  Biloxi,   77    Miss.   673.   28   So.   566  *  See  §  1046. 

[1900]. 

-  Dewey  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  101 
la.  416,  423,  7o'n.  W.  605   [1897]. 


§  304  TAXATION  BY    ASSESSMENT.  466 

In  Kentucky  a  statute  which  provided  for  assessing  abutting  prop- 
erty for  the  expense  of  constructing  a  great  public  highway  was, 
by  reason  of  its  peculiar  provisions,  unconstitutional.^  The  hold- 
ing of  the  court  in  this  case  was  not,  however,  placed  upon  the 
ground  that  property  could  not  be  assessed  for  such  an  improve- 
ment, but  on  the  ground  that  while  the  statute  required  a  petition 
of  the  abutting  propertj^  owners  in  case  of  the  improvement  of 
every  other  street  in  the  city  of  Covington,  it  provided  that  this 
street  could  be  improved  at  the  cost  of  the  abutting  property 
owners  without  any  petition  from  them  upon  the  unanimous  vote 
of  the  cit}'  council;  and  was  therefore  lacking  in  uniformity  and 
oppressive  in  its  application.  In  Pennsylvania  a  street  running 
through  land  partly  rural  in  character  was  widened  and  paved. 
In  an  action  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  assessment  evidence 
was  offered  by  a  property  owner  tending  to  show  that  the  street 
was  widened,  not  for  any  local  benefit  but  solely  as  a  pubMc  im- 
provement, to  keep  a  grand  avenue  of  a  uniform  width  through 
the  entire  city.  This  evidence  was  rejected  by  the  trial  court, 
which  ruling  the  Supreme  Court  held  to  be  error.^  The  recon- 
struction of  Broad  street  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia  raised  a 
question  of  this  sort  which  was,  however,  settled  by  thi^  adoption 
of  what  ultimately  developed  into  a  much  wider  principle.  In 
that  ease  an  existing  street  in  good  condition,  paved  with  cobble- 
stones, was  destroyed  to  lay  out  a  wide  pleasure  drive  for  the 
general  use  of  the  public.  It  was  held  that  local  assessments 
could  not  be  levied  for  such  new  improvement.^     The  theory  on 

^Howell    V.    Bristol,    8    Bush.     (71  izing  the  improving  of  Broad  atreet, 

Ky.)    493    [1871].  passed    March    23rd,    1866,     (Pamph. 

•Craig  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  89  L.   299),   for   evidence   that  it   is  for 

Pa.  St.  265   [1879].  the  general  public  good,  not  for  mere 

^  Hammet  v.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa.  local  benefit.  It  states  it  to  be  'for 
St.  (15  P.  F.  Smith)  146,  3  Am.  the  uses  and  purposes  of  tlie  public. 
Rep.  615  [1870] ;  "The  object  of  this  and  the  benefits  and  advantages  which 
improvement  is  not  to  bring  or  keep  will  inure  to  them  by  making  and 
Broad  street  as  all  the  other  streets  forever  maintaining  Broad  street  in 
within  the  built-up  portions  of  the  the  city  of  Philadelphia  for  its  en- 
city  are  kept,  for  the  advantage  and  tire  length,  as  the  same  is  now 
comfort  of  those  who  live  upon  it,  opened,  or  may  hereafter  be  opened, 
and  for  ordinary  business  and  travel,  the  principle  avenue  of  the  said 
but  to  make  a  great  public  drive —  city.'  Thus,  we  have  snecial  taxa- 
a  pleasure  ground — along  which  ele  tion  authorized,  for  an  object,  avowed 
gant  equipages  may  disport  of  an  on  the  face  of  the  act  to  be  general 
afternoon.  We  need  look  no  further  and  not  l-^cal,  which  relieves  the  case 
than  the  preamble  of  the  act  author-  of  all  difficulty  as  to  the  fact.     We 


467  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  *  §  304 

which  this  case  was  decided  has,  however,  been  developed  in  Penn- 
sylvania into  the  broad  principle  that  assessments  cannot  be 
levied  for  a  second  improvement  unless  the  improvement  is  one 
of  the  class  referable  to  the  police  power.*  It  will  be  seen,  there- 
fore, that  while  the  question  has  been  discussed  to  some  extent 
by  the  courts  there  is  but  little  specific  adjudication  upon  the 
point.  The  true  rule,  under  the  theory  of  assessments,  held  by 
the  majority  of  states,  seems  to  be  that  such  an  improvement  is 
one  for  which  an  assessment  may  be  levied  upon  adjacent  property, 
but  that  the  amount  of  such  assessments  must  be  limited  to  the 
benefits  conferred  upon  such  property  by  such  improvement, 
leaving  the  residue,  if  any,  to  be  raised  by  general  taxation  and 
paid  out  of  the  public  treasury.^  Assessments  of  this  sort  do  not 
seem  to  be  invalidated  by  the  fact  that  the  assessment  is  levied  to 
make  a  great  thoroughfare.^*^  It  was  said  to  be  unfair  to  lay  upon 
abutting  property  owners  the  cost  of  enlarging  and  increasing  the 
width  of  a  street  in  order  to  benefit  Fulton  market. ^^  The  court 
expressed  the  opinion  that  such  increased  cost  should  be  borne 
by  general  taxation  and  not  by  local  assessment.  A  thorough- 
fare is  a  "local  improvement"  within  the  meaning  of  constitu- 
tional and  statutory  provisions.^- 

have   only  to   advance   the   project   a  'thus  far   shalt   thou  go   and   no  far- 
few  steps  farther,  to  see  how  prepos-  ther.'     To  our  own  decisions,  as  far 
terous  is  the  idea  of  paying  for  such  as   they  have  gone,   we   mean   to   ad- 
an  improvement  by   assessments.     In  here,  but  we  are  now  asked  to  take  a 
the  natural  course  of  things,  we  may  step  much  in  advance  of  them.     This 
expect    that    it    will    be    proposed    to  we    wxjuld    not    be    justified    by    the 
adorn  this  principal  avenue  with  mon-  principles  of  the   constitution   in  do- 
uments,  statuary  and  fountains.     Will  ing."      Hammett   v.   Philadelphia,    65 
their  cost  be  provided  for  in  the  same  Pa.   St.    (15   P.   F.   Smith)    146,    156, 
way?     How  much  does  this  plan  dif-  157,  3  Am.  Rep.  615   [1870]. 
fer  from   a  proposition   to  erect  new  '  See  §  382  et  seq. 
public     buildings     on      Independence  *  See  Chapter  XIII. 
Square,   and   assess   the   cost   on   the  "  Appeal    of   North    Beach    &    Mis- 
lots     situated     on     the     neiirhboring  sion  R.  R.  Co.  in  the  Matter  of  Wid- 
streets?     On  the  same  principle,  lot',  ening    Kearney    Street,    32    Cal.    500 
on  the  public  square  could  be  asi5essed  [1867]:    Rosrers  v.   City  of  St.   Paul, 
to  pay  for  any  new  project  to  beau-  22  Minn.  404   [1876]. 
tify  and  adorn  them,  no  matter  how  "  ^fatter    of    the    Petition    of    the 
great     the     expense.       It     mi  dit     be  ^Mayor   of   New   York,   20   Johns    (X. 
arcued    with    equal    plausibility   that  Y.l   269   [1822]. 

their  value  was  increased  by  the  im-  ^-  Rogers    v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    22 

provement.      We    must    say    at    some  Minn.  494  [1876]. 
time  to  this  tide  of  special  taxation, 


§  305  *  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  468 

§  305.    Boulevards. 

A  question  somewhat  different  from  that  presented  in  the  case 
of  the  ordinary  street  occurs  when  the  legislature  provides  for  a 
street  improvement  which  is  intended  to  be  beautiful  as  well  as 
useful,  and  which  by  reason  of  its  beauty  is  more  costly  than  one 
constructed  for  mere  utility.  The  right  of  the  legislature  to 
authorize  a  local  assessment  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  establishing  a 
public  park  undoubtedly  exists,  and  is  discussed  elsewhere.^  Since 
the  greater  includes  the  less,  it  follows  that  the  legislature  has 
power  to  provide  for  the  construction  of  a  street,  which  is  not  only 
a  means  of  transportation  but  is  also  an  ornament  and  a  thing 
of  beauty.  Accordingly,  the  legislature  may  authorize  an  assess- 
ment for  constructing  a  boulevard.-  "It  is  the  contention 
of  appellant  that  the  powers  given  by  the  statute  we  have 
cited  have  reference  only  to  such  improvements  as  tend 
to  make  the  street  a  better  or  more  available  avenue  of 
public  travel  and  do  not  authorize  improvements  which  are 
merely  ornamental  or  beautiful.  The  facts  presented  by  the 
record  before  us  do  not  seem  to  necessitate  a  consideration 
of  this  question.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  the  author- 
ity here  expressly  provided  for  the  'parking'  of  streets  and 
avenues  can  scarcely  be  reconciled  with  the  proposition  that  all 
street  improvements  must  be  limited  by  the  single  consideration 
of  the  convenience  or  safety  of  the  traveling  public.  The  term 
'parking'  is  incapable  of  any  plausible  definition  which  does  not 
involve  the  idea  of  beautifying  those  portions  of  the  street  not 
necessarily  occupied  by  walks  and  roadways.  To  what  extent 
this  power  may  be  exercised  at  the  expense  of  abutting  property 
we  need  not  now  determine.  The  improvement  here  objected  to 
goes  no  farther  than  to  provide  that  the  paved  roadway  and  the 

iSee§356.  [1876];     Downing    v.    City    of    Des 

MVest    Chicago   Park    Commission-  Moines,   124  la.  289,  99  N.  W.   1066 

ers  V.  Farber,  171  111.  146,  49  X.  E.  [1904];   Bell  v.  City  of  Newton,  183 

427    [1898];    Thorn  v.   West  Chicago  Mass.    481,    67    N.    E.    599     [1903]; 

Park  Commissioners,  130  111.  594,  22  Jones  v.  Metropolitan  Park  Commis- 

N.  E.  520  [1890];  Chicago  and  North-  sioners,   181    Mass.   494,   64  N.   E.   76 

western   Railway   v.   People,    120    111.  [1902];  In  re  Spring  Valley  Park  in 

104.  11   N.  E.  418    [1889];   Kedzie  v.  Kansas  City,  208  Mo.  674,  106  S.  W. 

West    Chicago    Park    Commissioners,  531   [1907];   Hart  v.  City  of  Omaha, 

114    111.    280,    2    N.    E.-   182    [1886];  74  Neb.  836,  105  N.  W.  546   [1905]; 

People,   ex   rel.   McCrea   v.   Atchison,  Murphy  v.  City  of  Long  Branch,  — 

95  111.  452    [1880];    Andrews  v.  Peo-  N.  J.  L.  ,'61  Atl.  593    [1905]. 

pie     ex     rel.     Rumsey,    83     111.     529 


469  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  305 

space  reserved  for  parking  shall  be  separated  by  a  line  of  curbing, 
and  to  authorize  this  action  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  city  to 
draw  upon  its  power,  if  any  it  has,  to  improve  and  ornament  such 
park.  Counsel  for  appellants,  directing  their  vision  toward  the 
future,  see  the  park  thus  provided  for,  resplendent  with  trees, 
shrubs,  flowers  and  statuary  created  and  maintained  at  the 
expense  of  the  abutting  property  and  very  naturally  conclude 
from  the  lot  owner's  point  of  view,  that  'a  thing  of  beauty'  is  not 
necessaril.y  and  under  all  circumstances  'a  joy  forever.'  In  our 
judgment  these  prophetic  fears  cannot  be  well  grounded  upon  the 
circumstances  of  this  case,  nor  upon  the  assertion  of  municipal 
authority  here  upheld.  The  work  sought  to  be  enjoined  comes  well 
within  appellant's  own  definition  of  the  city's  authority  to  make 
such  improvements  as  directl.y  tend  to  the  betterment  of  the  street 
as  a  public  highway  and  not  a  mere  matter  of  ornamentation."^ 
There  is  danger  of  injustice  in  assessments  of  this  sort.  The  cost 
of  such  a  boulevard  may  greatly  exceed  the  cost  of  a  suitalile  and 
proper  street  of  the  ordinary  type.  However,  it  should  not  be  the 
cost  of  the  improvement  but  the  benefit  which  it  confers  which 
measures  the  amount  of  the  assessment.*  Any  departure  from  this 
principle  may  work  injustice,  but  the  fault  is  in  the  apportion- 
ment, not  in  the  improvement.  Another  danger  of  injustice  lies 
in  the*fact  that  the  benefits  conferred  may  be  so  great  that  the 
property  owners,  unable  to  pay  for  them,  may  be  improved  out 
of  their  property.  If  the  benefits  do  exist,  however,  questions  of 
what  type  of  improvement  is  advisable  are  peculiarly  within  the 
discretion  of  the  legislature,  a  discretion  which  may  be  conferred 
upon  the  city  or  other  public  corporation.^  The  right  to  levy  an 
assessment  for  the  construction  of  a  boulevard  has  been  recognized 
though  the  particular  assessment  has  been  held  invalid."  as  because 
it  was  divided  into  installments  without  statutory  authority,^  or 
because  a  prior  assessment  ecpial  to  the  full  amount  of  the  benefits 
had  already  been  levied,-  or  because  the  improvement  is  not  com- 

'DowninjT   v.    City    of   Des    Moines.  ^Culver   v.   People   ex   rel.    Kocher- 

124  la.  289,  291,  292.  99  N.  W.  10C6  sporper,    161    111.    89,    43    N.    E.    812 

[1904].  [18901. 

*  See  Chapter  XITI.  *  West   Chicago    Park    Commisssion- 

°See  §  290  et  neq.  ers   v.   Metropolitan   West    Side   Elo- 

'In  the   Matter  of  the   Petition  of  vated    Railroad    Co.,    182   111.   246     55 

Robbins  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  82  N.  E.  344   [1899]. 

N.  Y.  131    [1880]. 


§  305  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  470 

pleted  as  required  by  statute.^  A  common  form  of  such  an  im- 
provement consists  in  two  or  more  paved  roadways  in  the  street, 
separated  by  an  intervening  parkway.  Such  an  improvement  is 
held  so  to  combine  both  public  utility  and  private  benefit  that  a 
local  assessment  may  be  levied  therefor.^"  Such  an  assessment  has 
been  upheld  even  if  it  is  not  shown  that  the  parkway  confers  a 
benefit  upon  abutting  property,  where  the  paving  of  the  entire 
width  of  the  street  would  cost  more  than  the  cost  of  the  street 
constructed  with  such  parking/^  In  some  of  these  cases  the  as- 
sessment has  been  levied  for  such  expenses  as  sodding  the  park- 
way,^^  or  constructing  a  grass  plat,^^  which  do  not  facilitate  the  use 
of  the  street  for  travel,  but  are  primarily  for  beauty  and  ornament. 
In  other  cases  the  improvement  is  of  a  sort  tending  directly  to 
facilitate  travel  upon  the  street,  such  as  curbing  the  parkway." 
In  Kansas  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments  has  been  carried 
somewliat  farther.  An  assessment  for  the  purpose  of  planting 
maintaining  and  protecting  shade  trees  along  the  public  streets 
was  authorized  by  the  statute  of  that  state,  and  was  held  to  be 
within  its  power.^^  In  this  case,  however,  the  validity  of  the  as- 
sessment was  not  directly  involved.  The  city  let  a  contract  for 
planting  shade  trees,  to  be  paid  for  by  assessments  on  the  abutting 
property.  After  the  trees  were  planted,  in  performance  of  such 
contract,  the  city  repudiated  the  contract  and  refused  to  levy 
assessments  in  payment  thereof,  or  to  take  any  other  steps  toward 
raising  a  special  fund  to  pay  the  price  stipulated  for  in  the  con- 
tract. Suit  was  then  brought  against  the  city  by  the  contractor 
to  recover  the  contract  price.  It  was  held  that  the  city  was 
empowered  to  enter  into  such  contract  and  to  levy  such  assess- 
ments, and  that  by  its  refusal  to  levy  assessments  it  became  person- 
ally liable  to  the  contractor  for  the  contract  price.  While  it  has 
been  held  in  Indiana  that  a  street  improvement  resolution,  which 

'  Jones  V.  Metropolitan  Park  Com-  "  Downing  v.  City  of  Des  Moines, 

missioners,   181   Mass.   494,   64  N.  E.  124  la.  289,  99  N.  W.  1966  [1904]. 

76    [1902].  '2  Murphy  v.  City  of  Peoria,  119  111- 

1°  Thompson    v.    City    of    Highland  509,  9  N.  E.  895   [1888]. 

Park,    187    111.    265,    58    N.    E.    328  « People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Field, 

[1900];    Cummings  v.   West   Chicago  197  111.  568,  64  N.  E.  544   [1902]. 

Park    Commissioners,     181    111.     136,  "Downing  v.   City  of  Des  Moines, 

54    N.    E.    941     [1899];    Murphy    v.  124  la.  289,  99  N.  W.  1066  [1904]. 

City    of    Peoria,    119    111.    509,    9    N.  '=  Heller    v.    City    of    Garden    City, 

E.   895    [1888];    Downing  v.   City   of  58  Kan.  263,  48  Pac.  841    [1898]. 
Des   Moines,   124   la.   289,   99   N.   W. 
1060   [1904]. 


1 


471  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS   MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  306 

requires  the  space  between  the  sidewalk  and  the  curb  to  be 
graded  with  rich  dirt  and  to  be  sodded  at  the  expense  of  the  abut- 
ting property  owners,  is  unlawful,  and  that  no  assessment  can  be 
based  thereon,  the  decision  in  that  case  was  not  based  on  the  lack 
of  power  in  the  legislature  to  authorize  such  an  assessment,  but  on 
the  fact  that  the  statute  gave  power  only  to  grade  and  pave  at  the 
expense  of  the  abutting  property  owners,  and  that  such  an  assess- 
ment was  therefore  not  authorized  by  statute.^*'  In  Michigan  a 
similar  improvement  was  recognized  as  one  for  which  an  assess- 
ment might  have  been  levied  except  for  the  fact  that  in  the  par- 
ticular instance  the  improvement  was  a  repavement,  and  by  statute 
payable  out  of  the  repaving  fund  and  not  by  local  assessment.^' 

§  306.    Street  in  which  street  railway  is  located. 

Permission  is  often  given  to  railway  or  to  street  railway  com- 
panies to  lay  their  railway  tracks  in  public  streets,  and  to  run  their 
cars  thereon.  Such  permission  is  often  given  under  a  contract 
requiring  the  railway  company  to  pave  a  certain  portion  of  the 
street  thus  used  by  it.  The  effect  of  such  contract  upon  the  lia- 
bility of  the  street  railway  company  for  paving  is  discussed 
elsewhere  ;^  as  is  the  right  of  the  property  owner  to  insist  that  he 
shall  not  be  required  to  bear  any  part  of  the  burden  which,  under 
such  contract,  should  be  borne  by  the  street  railway  company. - 
The  fact  that  such  a  contract  is  entered  into,  however,  does  not 
deprive  the  city  of  the  power  to  improve  such  street,  and  to  levy 
assessments  therefor  upon  the  abutting  property  owners.  Even 
though  street-car  tracks  are  constructed  in  the  street,  it  still  af- 
fords means  of  transportation  to  the  public,  and  means  of  access 
to  the  abutting  property  which  makes  it  proper  for  the  legislature 
to  authorize  the  levy  of  local  assessments  for  its  improvement.^ 
Thus  a  contract  entered  into  between  a  city  and  a  railway  com- 
pany, by  which  the  railway  company  agrees  to  re-grade  and  gravel 
the  street  occupied  by  its  tracks,  and  keep  the  same  in  good  repair. 

"Adams  v.  City  of  Sliellm-ille,  154  Cason  v.   City   of  Lohanon,    153   Ind. 

Ind.  467,  77  Am."  St.  Rep.  484",  4!)  L.  567.  55  N.  e".  768   [1809]  ;   Parker  v. 

R.  A.  797,  57  N.  E.   114   [18991.  City  of  Atchison,  48  Kan.  574.  30  Pac. 

"Dickinson  v.  City  of  Detroit,  111  20;   Bagg  v.  City  of  Detroit,  5  Mich, 

Mich.  480,  69  X.  W.  728    [1897].  336     [1858];     State    v.    New    Bruns- 

'See  §  60,  §  599  et  seq.  wick,  34  N.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)   395;  State, 

^See  §  604.  Felix,   Pros.   v.   City   Council   of   At- 

'  Chicago,    Burlington    and    Quincy  lantic  Cits^  34  N.  J.  L.    (5  Vr. )    99 

Rairoad  Company  v.  City  of  Quincy,  [1869];    Richards  v.  City  of  Cincin- 

139  111.  355,  28  N.  E.    1069    [1893];  nati,  31  0.  S.  506   [1877]. 


§§  307,  308  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  472 

does  not  deprive  the  city  of  the  power  to  levy  a  local  assessment 
upon  abutting  property  for  the  improvement  of  such  street.* 

§  307.    Streets,  driveways  and  boulevards  in  parks. 

Since  assessments  may  be  levied  for  constructing  public  parks/ 
and  for  streets  -  and  boulevards/  it  follows  that  a  street  which  is 
in  a  public  park/  or  which  is  constructed  as  a  part  of  the  park 
system  of  the  city/  may  be  an  improvement  possessing  public 
utility  and  conferring  private  benefit  for  which  local  fssessments 
may  be  levied.  The  same  principle  applies  to  a  driveway  in  a 
public  park." 

§  308,    Opening  street. 

The  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  open  a  street,  to  appropriate  land  therefor  by  eminent 
domain  and  to  levy  a  local  assessment  upon  property  which  is 
peculiarly  and  especially  benefited  thereby  has  often  been  ques- 
tioned. The  weight  of  modern  authority  is  that  in  the  absence  of 
specific  constitutional  provisions,  local  assessments  may  be  author- 
ized by  the  legislature  to  pay  for  the  expense  of  opening  a  street, 
including  both  the  value  of  the  land  taken  and  the  damage,  if  any, 
done  to  the  abutting  realty  by  opening  such  street.^     Such  an  as- 

*Cason    V.    City    of    Lebanon,    153  D.   C.   393    [1896];    Bauman  v.  Eosi, 

Ind.  567,  55  N.  E.  768   [1899].  9  App.  D.  C.  260   [1896];   Abbott  v. 

^See  §356.  Ross,    9    App.    D.    C.    289    [1896]); 

^See  §301.  Hannewinkle  v.  Georgetown,  15  Wall. 

^See  §305.  (82   U.    S.)    547,   21   L.   231    [1872]; 

*  West  Chicago  Park  Commission-  Cohen  v.  City  of  Alameda,  124  Cal. 
ers  V.  Farber,  171  111.  146,  49  N.  E.  504,  57  Pac.  377  [1899];  Davies  v. 
427  [1898];  New  England  Hospital  City  of  Los  Angeles,  86  Cal.  37,  24 
for  Women  and  Children  v.  Street  Pac.  771  [1890];  Fenwick  Hall  Com- 
Commissioners  of  the  Citv  of  Boston,  pany  v.  Town  of  Old  Saybrooke, 
188  Mass.  88,  74  N.  E.  294  [1905].  69    Conn.    32,    36    Atl.    1068    [1897]; 

=  In  re  Beechwood  Avenue,  Appeal  Terry  v.  City  of  Hartford,  39  Conn, 

of  O'Mara,  194  Pa.  St.  86,  45  Atl.  127  286    [1872]  ;    Trinity  College  v.   City 

[1899].  of    Hartford,    32    Conn.    452    [1865]; 

*  Jones  V.  Town  of  Lake  View,  151  Nichols  v.  Bridgeport,  23  Conn.  189, 
111.  663,  38  N.  E.  688  [1894].  60   Am.   Dec.   636    [1854];    Fulton  v. 

^Goodrich  V.  Detroit,  184  U.  S.  432,  Town  qf  Dover,   8  Houst.    (Del.)    78, 

46    L.    627,    22    S.    397   [1902];     (af-  6  Atl.  633,   12  Atl.  394,  31  Atl.  974 

firming  Goodrich  v.   City   of  Detroit,  [1888]  Edgerton  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 

123  Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255  [1900])  ;  men    of    the    Town    of    Green    Cove 

Voigt  V.  Detroit  City,  184  U.  S.  115,  Springs,  19  Fla.  140  [1882];  Chicago 

46    L.    459,    22    S.    337    [1902];     (af-  Terminal  Transfer  Railroad  Company 

firming  Voigt  v.  City  of  Detroit,  123  v.   City  of  Chicago,   217   111.   343,   75 

Mich.    547,    82   N.   W.   253    [1900]);  K  E.  499   1905]:    Bass  v.  People  ex 

Bauman   v.   Ross,    167   U.   S.   548,   42  rel.  Raymond,  203   111.  206,  67  N.  E. 

L.  270,  17  S.  966   [1897];    (reversing  806     [1903]:     Shnrtleff    v.     City    of 

District  of  Columbia  V.  Armes,  8  App.  Chicago,   190   III.   473,   60   N.   E.   870 


473 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


§308 


sessment   was   said    to   be    "an    ordinary   exercise    of   lejirislative 


[1901]  ;  Fahnestock  v.  City  of  Peoria, 
171  111.  454,  49  X.  E.  490  [1898]; 
Aldis  V.  South  Park  Commissioners, 
171  111.  424,  49  X.  E.  565  [1898]; 
Culver  V.  City  of  Chicago,  171  111. 
399,  49  X.  E.'573  [1898];  Philadel- 
phia and  Reading  Coal  and  Iron  Co. 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  158  111.  9,  41  X\ 
E.  1102  [1895];  Jones  v.  Town  of 
Lake  View,  151  111.  663,  38  X.  E. 
688  [1894]  ;  Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
146  111.  499,  34  X.  E.  1034  [1893]; 
Goodwillie  v.  City  of  Lake  View,  137 
111.  51,  27  X.  E.  15  [1892];  Village 
of  H\de  Park  v.  Corwith,  122  111.  441, 
12  X.  E.  238  [1889];  People  ex  rel. 
Carroll  v.  Gary.  105  111.  332  [1883]; 
Andrews  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ramsey,  83 
111.  529  [1870];  Hemingway  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  60  111.  324  [1871];  Hig- 
gins  V  City  of  Chicago,  18  111.  276 
[1857];  Trustees  of  the  Illinois  and 
Michigan  Canal  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
12  111.  403  [1S51].  (In  City  of  Bloom- 
ington  V.  Latham,  142  111.  462,  18 
L.  R.  A.  487.  32  X.  E.  506  [1893],  a 
special  tax  was  laid  and  it  was  held 
that  since  the  special  tax  was  not 
restricted  to  benefits  or  apportioned 
according  to  benefits,  the  owner  of 
land  taken  could  not  be  paid  therefor 
by  a  tax  laid  on  his  remaining  land. 
This  case  was  distinguished  in  Wag- 
geman  v.  Village  of  Xorth  Peoria, 
155  111.  545,  40  X.  E.  485  [1895]. 
where  it  was  lield  constitutional  to 
pay  part  of  the  value  of  land  con- 
demned for  a  street  by  setting  ofl' 
again.st  such  value  the  special  bene- 
fits received  by  the  property  from 
which  such  strip  of  land  was  taken)  ; 
Corwith  V.  Village  of  Ryde  Park,  14 
Brad.  (111.)  635  [1884]:  Ilolden  v. 
City  of  Crawfordsville,  143  Ind.  558, 
41  X.  E.  370  [1895];  City  of  Rur- 
lington  V.  Quick,  47  la.  222  {1877]; 
Kansas  City  v.  Xapiecek,  —  Kan.  — 
92  Pac.  827  [1007] ;  City  of  Covington 
V.  Worthingtnn,  88  Ky.  206.  10  R.  W. 
790;  11  S.  W.  1038  [1889]-,  City  of 
Lexington  v.  ^ilrOuillan's  Heirs.  9 
Dana  (39  Ky.)  513.  35  Am.  Dec.  159 
[1840];  City  of  Xew  Orleans  praying 


for  opening  of  Casacaloo  and  Moreau 
streets,  20  La.  Ann.  497  [1868];  City 
of  Xew  Orleans  pi'aying  for  the 
opening  of  Philip  and  other  streets, 
10  La.  Ann.  313  [1855];  Municipal- 
ity Xumber  Two  for  the  opening  of 
Rollignae  street,  7  La.  Ann.  76 
[1852];  Blanchet  v.  Municipality  No. 
Two,  13  La.  322  [1839];  Philadel- 
phia, Wilmington  and  Baltimore 
Railroad  Company  v.  Shipley,  72  Md. 
88,  19  At!.  1  [{890];  Zion  Church 
of  the  City  of  Baltimore  v.  Mayor 
and  City  Council  of  Baltimore,  71  Md. 
524,  18  Atl.  895  [1889];  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Little 
Sisters  of  the  Poor,  56  Md.  400 
[1881];  Hawley  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore,  33  Md.  270 
[1870];  Benton  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Brookline,  151  Mass.  250,  23  X.  E. 
846  [1890]  ;  Chapin  v.  Worcester,  124 
Mass.  464;  Boston  Seamen's  Friend 
Society  v.  Boston,  116  Mass.  181,  17 
Am.  Rep.  153;  Bancroft  v.  City  of 
Boston,  115  Mass.  377  [1874];  Jones 
V.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  104  Mass.  461  [1870];  Mor- 
gan V.  City  of  Boston,  12  All.  (Mass.) 
223  [1806]  ;  Power  v.  City  of  Detroit, 
139  Mich.  30,  102  X.  W.  288  [1905]; 
Smith  V.  City  of  Detroit.  120  Mich. 
572.  79  X.  W.  808  [1899]:  Goodrich 
V.  City  of  Detroit.  123  IMicli.  559.  82 
X.  W.  255  [1900]:  Trowbridge  v. 
(  ity  of  Detroit.  09  .Mich.  443,  58  X. 
W."  368  [1894]:  Beechor  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  92  .Mich.  208,  52  X.  W."  731 
[1892];  State  ex  rel.  Stees  v.  Otis. 
53  Minn.  318,  55  X.  W.  143  [1893]; 
Fairchild  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  46 
Minn.  540.  49  X.  W.  325  [1891]; 
Williams  v.  Cammack,  27  ^Vliss.  209. 
61  Am.  Dec.  508  [1854];  City  of  St. 
Louis  v.  Annex  Realty  Company.  175 
:Mo.  63.  74  S.  W.  961  [1903];' Hook 
v.  Chicago  &  Alton  Railroad  Com- 
pany. 133  ^[o.  313,  34  S.  W.  549 
'[1895];  Kansas  City  v.  Smart,  128 
:\lo.  272.  30  S.  W.  773  [1895];  Bry- 
ant v.  Russell,  127  :\Io.  422.  30  S.  W. 
107;  State  ex  rel.  Chicago.  Burling- 
ton  &   Quincy   Railroad   Company   v. 


308 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


47-i 


power."  -    So  assessments  to  pay  for  land  taken  for  a  boulevard  ^ 


City  of  Kansas,  89  Mo.  34,  14  S.  W. 
515  [1886];  Jackson  County  v. 
Waldo,  85  Mo.  637;  State  ex  rel. 
Holden  v.  Gill,  84  Mo.  248  [1884]; 
City  of  Kansas  v.  Hill,  80  Mo.  523 
[1883];  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Riclie- 
son,  76  Mo.  470  [1882];  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Speck,  67  Mo.  403  [1878]; 
Leslie  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  47  Mo. 
474  [1871];  Garrett  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  25  Mo.  505,  69  Am.  Dec.  475 
[1857];  Kuhns  v.  City  of  Omaha,  55 
Xeb.  183,  75  N.  W.  562  [1898]; 
McCormick  v.  City  of  Omaha,  37  Neb. 
829,  56  N.  W.  626  [1893];  State, 
Buess,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  West  Hobo 
ken,  51  N.  J.  L.  (22  Vr.)  267,  17 
AtL  110  [1889];  State,  Brown,  Pros. 
V.  Village  of  South  Orange,  49  N.  J. 
L.  (20  Vr.)  104,  6  Atl.  312  [1886]; 
State,  White,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne,  49 
N.  J.  L.  (20  Vr.)  311,  8' Atl.  295 
[1887];  State,  Hettinger,  Pros.  v. 
City  of  Passaic,  45  N.  J.  L.  (16  Vr.) 
146  [1883];  Loweree  v.  City  of  New- 
ark, 38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  151  [1875]; 
State,  Simmons,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic, 38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  60  [1875]; 
State,  Gregory,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  34  N.  J. 
L.  (5  Vr.)  390  [1871];  State,  Peters, 
Pros.  V,  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  the  City' of  Newark,  31  N.  J.  L. 
(2  Vr.)  360  [1865]  Harriman  v.  City 
of  YoTikers,  181  N.  Y.  24,  73  N.  E. 
493,  affirming  81  N.  Y.  S.  823,  82 
App.  Div.  408  [1903];  Mayer  v. 
Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
the  City  of  New  York,  101  N.  Y. 
284,  4  N.  E.  336  [1886];  Genet  v. 
City  of  Brooklyn,  99  N.  Y.  296,  1 
N.  E.  777  [1885];  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Application  of  Church  for  the 
Appointment  of  Commissioners,  etc., 
92  N.  Y.  1  [1883];  Astor  v.  Mayor, 
Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of  City 
of  New  York  62  N.  Y.  580  [1875];. 
People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec. 
266  [i851];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Application  of  the  Board  of  Street 
Opening    and     Improvement    of    the 


City  of  New  York  to  acquire  title  to 
Forest  Avenue,  64  Hun.  (N.  Y. )  59, 
18  N.  Y.  Supp.  727  [1892];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Commissioners  of  Public  Parks,  etc., 
relative  to  opening  Railroad  Avenue, 
East,  47  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  302  [1888]; 
Loweree  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 
York,  46  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  253  [1887]; 
Elwood  V.  City  of  Rochester,  43  Hun. 
(N.  Y.)  102  [1887];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Taking  of  Lands,  etc.,  for 
widening  Carlton  Street  between 
Main  and  Jefferson  Streets  in  the 
City  of  Buffalo,  16  Hun.  497  [1879]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Farniss  to  vacate  an  assessment  (no 
opinion),  4  Hun.  624  [1875];  Gaston 
V.  Portland,  41  Or.  373,  69  Pac.  34, 
445  [1902];  Wilmington  Avenue, 
213  Pa.  St.  238,  62  Atl.  848  [1906]; 
Cummings  v.  City  of  Williamsport, 
84  Pa.  St.  472  [1877];  Chestnut 
Avenue,  68  Pa.  St.  (18  P.  F.  Smith), 
81  [1871];  Stroud  v.  Philadelphia, 
61  Pa.  St.  (11  P.  F.  Smith)  255; 
Commonwealth  for  use,  etc.,  v. 
Woods,  44  Pa.  St.  (8  Wright),  113 
[1862];  Schenley  v.  City  of  Alle- 
gheny, 25  Pa.  St.  (1  Casey)  128 
[1854];  Fenelon's  Petition,  7  Pa.  St. 
(7  Barr.)  173  [1847]:  M'Masters  v. 
Commonwealth,  3  Watts  (Pa.)  292 
[1834];  Second  Universalist  Society 
in  Providence  v.  City  of  Providence, 
6  R.  I.  235  [1859];  City  of  San 
Antonio  v.  Sullivan,  23  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
658,  57  S.  W.  45  [1900]  ;  In  re  How- 
ard Avenue,  North,  in  City  of  Seattle, 
44  Wash.  62,  86  Pac.  lil7  [1906]; 
State  of  Washington,  on  the  Relation 
of  Bock  V.  Case,  42  Wash.  658,  85 
Pac.  420  [1906];  In  the  Matter  of 
Westlake  Avenue,  Seattle,  40  Wash. 
144,  82  Pac.  279  [1905];  Koller  v. 
City  of  La  Crosse,  106  Wis.  369,  82 
N.  W.   341    [1900]. 

'  M'Masters  v.  Commonwealth,  3 
Watts    (Pa.)    292    [1834]. 

^Vanderbeck  v.  City  of  Rochester, 
46  Hun.  87   [1887]. 


475  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  308 

or  for  an  alley  *  may  be  authorized  by  the  legislature.  No  different 
principle  should  apply  where  a  street  is  opened  through  the  land 
of  a  given  owner,  and  after  he  is  compensated  for  the  value  of  his 
land  thus  taken  his  remaining  property  is  assessed  for  the  special 
benefits  conferred  upon  it  by  opening  such  street.  In  the  absence 
of  special  constitutional  provision  the  property  owner,  after  receiv- 
ing compensation  for  the  property  taken,  stands  in  the  same 
relation  to  the  public  as  if  he  had  not  owned  the  property  taken ; 
and  his  remaining  property  is  as  liable  to  assessment  in  the  one 
case  as  in  the  other.-'*  Accordingly  it  has  been  held  that  the  amount 
paid  to  the  owner  for  his  property  taken  for  the  street  may  be 
assessed  back  upon  him  as  compensation  by  him  for  the  benefits 
thus  conferred  upon  him.**  So  after  a  judicial  determination  that 
land  remaining  after  the  land  for  the  street  is  taken  has  not  been 
damaged  by  such  taking,  it  is  proper  to  assess  such  remaining  land 
for  the  cost  of  the  land  so  taken."  Tliis  principle  has  been  so  ap- 
plied that  the  owner  whose  land  is  taken  has  been  obliged  to  pay 
not  only  the  amount  which  he  has  received  for  his  land  but  also 
the  costs  and  expenses  of  the  proceeding  in  eminent  domain.**  In 
some  jurisdictions  assessments  to  pay  for  opening  a  street  have 
been  held  invalid,  but  on  grounds  which  leave  it  possible  to  pro- 
vide for  valid  assessments  in  such  jurisdictions  under  existing 
constitutional  provisions.  Thus,  since  the  assessment  must,  in  most 
jurisdictions,  be  restricted  to  the  amount  of  the  benefits  especially 
conferred  upon  the  realty  assessed,  a  statute  which  provides  ar- 
bitrarily that  one-half  of  the  cost  of  opening  the  street,"  or  that 
the  entire  cost  of  opening  the  street  ^"  shall  be  apportioned  upon 
the  property  benefited  by  such  improvement  has  been  held  invalid 

*Paul  V.  City  of  Detroit.  32  Midi.  H  ity   of   Detroit   v.   Juclfre   of   Rp- 

108    [1875].      "  cordor's  Court,   112  Mich.  588;    (City 

^  City    of    Covington    v.    Worthing-  of    Detroit   v.    Chapin,    42    L.    R.    A. 

ton,  88   Ky.   206,    11   S.   W.   1038,    10  (i38,    71    N.    W.    149    [1897]);    City 

S.  W.  790  [1889].  of  Detroit  v.  Daly,  68  Mich.  503,  37 

«Hannewinkle    v.    Georgetown,    82  N.  W.   11    [1888]. 

U.    S.     (15    Wall.)     547.    21    L.    231  '"  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  2G9. 

[1872].  43    L.    443,    19    S.    187    [1898];     (af- 

^  Quirk  V.  City  of  Seattle,  38  Wasli.  firming  74  Fed.  997  [1896] )  ;  Scott  v. 

25.  80  Pac.  207  [1905].  City  of  Toledo,  36  Fed.  385,   1   L.  R. 

« Rogers  v.  St.  Charles,  54  :Mo.  229  A.  688.    See,  also,  McKusick  v.  Still- 

[1873];    City   of   Cleveland   v.   Wick,  water,   44  Minn.  373,  46  N.  W.   769 

18  O.  S.  303  [1868].      (For  the  later  [1890]. 
Ohio    doctrine   see    §    113;    and   post 
this  section. 


§308 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


476 


since  it  ignores  the  question  of  benefits.  So  if  land  is  taken  under 
a  statute  which  provides  for  setting  off  benefits  to  the  remaining 
land  against  damages  sustained  by  such  taking,  benefits  to  the 
strip  taken  cannot  be  so  set  off;^^  nor  under  such  statute  can  an 
assessment  be  made  against  one  whose  land  is  not  taken  for  a 
street  opening.^-  So  under  a  constitution  requiring  taxation  by 
state,  county  and  corporate  bodies  to  be  uniform  according  to  val- 
ue, it  is  held  that  an  assessment  by  the  front  foot  to  pay  the  cost  of 
land  taken  to  open  a  street  is  invalid.^^  These  questions,  however, 
involve  principles  subsequently  discussed,^*  and  do  not  involve  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  prc'^^'^e  for  an  assessment  for  opening 
a  street.  The  present  constitution  of  Ohio  provides  that  if  private 
property  is  taken  for  public  use  compensation  therefor  shall  be 
made  in  money,  "and  such  compensation  shall  be  assessed  by  a 
.jury  without  deduction  for  benefits  to  any  owner  of  the  prop- 
erty."^' Under  this  constitutional  provision  it  was  at  first  held 
that  the  legislature  might  provide  for  taking  property  by  emi- 
nent domain  and  assessing  the  amount  paid  for  such  land  taken 
and  for  damages  to  the  residue  upon  the  owners  of  the  abutting 
property,  even  if  some  or  all  of  them  were  originally  owners  of  the 
land  taken  for  such  street.^"  The  general  principle  thus  laid  down 
was  followed  in  several  subsequent  eases,^'  even  where  for  special 

"  City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Crowther, 
142  Mo.  155,  43  S.  W.  786  [1897]. 

'-City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Speck.  4  Mo. 
App.  244   [1877]. 

'^  City  of  Norfolk  v.  Chamberlain, 
89  Va.   196,   16  S.  E.  730   [1892]. 

»  See  Chapter  XIIl. 

^^  Constitution  of  Ohio,  Article  I., 
§  19. 

'"City  of  Cleveland  v.  Wick,  18  0. 
S.  303  [1868].  In  this  case  the  court 
said,  on  page  310,  with  reference  to 
the  constitutional  provision  above 
quoted :  "It  simpljr  guarantees  to 
the  owner  of  the  land  condemned  a 
full  price.  When  that  is  paid  he 
stands  on  a  perfect  equality  with  all 
other  owners  of  adjoining  lands, 
equally  liable,  as  he  ought  to  be,  to  be 
taxed  on  his  other  land  with  them. 
He  has  the  full  price  of  his  land  in 
his  pocket  and  is  an  equal  participant 
with  them  in  benefits  to  adjoininij; 
lands.      To    throw    the    whole   burden 


upon  the  others  in  such  a  case  would 
be  to  do  them  the  precise  injustice 
which  was  done  to  him  under  the 
old  constitution.  To  do  so  would  be 
to  avoid  one  evil  only  to  run  into 
another.  It  would  be  to  avoid  the 
evil  of  withholding  from  him  a  full 
and  fair  price  for  his  lands  only  to 
run  into  the  equivalent  evil  of  pay- 
ing him  two  prices  for  it,  the  secon<l 
])rice  being  at  the  expense  of  his 
neighbors." 

"  Caldwell  v.  Village  of  Carthage. 
49  0.  S.  334,  31  N.  E.  602  [1892]; 
Raymond  v.  Cleveland,  42  0.  S.  522 
[1885]  ;  Village  of  Norwood  v.  Ogden, 
18  Ohio  C.  C.  869,  15  Ohio  C.  C. 
539,  8  Ohio  C.  D.  383  [1898];  Dixon 
V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio  C.  C. 
629  [1894].  The  unreported  case  of 
Henkel  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  58  0. 
S.  726,  51  N.  E.  1098,  was  disposed 
of  on  the  authority  of  City  of  Cleve- 
land  V.   Wick,    18   0.   S.   303    [1868]. 


477  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  308 

reasons  the  assessment  in  question  was  held  to  be  involved. ^^  In 
a  subsequent  case  ^'•'  a  similar  assessment  was  held  invalid,  but  on 
the  ground  that  the  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  was  not 
complied  with  in  levying  the  assessment.  In  this  case  the  statute 
required  the  amount  to  be  assessed  to  be  apportioned  according  to 
benefits.  The  court,  after  discussing  the  constitutioxidl  principles 
applicable,  held  that  these  principles  were  carried  into  the  stat- 
ute,-°  but  that  the  assessment  was  not  limited  to  the  amount  of  spe- 
cial benefits,  nor  was  it  apportioned  to  the  property  according  to 
special  benefits;  nor  did  it  purport  to  be  so  apportioned.  The  Cir- 
cuit Court  held  in  a  case  presenting  some  facts  like  those  in  Cham- 
berlain V.  City  of  Cleveland,-^  that  an  assessment  by  which  the  val- 
ue of  the  land  taken  and  the  costs  and  expenses  of  the  condemna- 
tion suit  were  assessed  back  on  the  abutting  property  without  any 
attempt  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  benefit,  or  whether  the  benefits 
exceeded  the  total  amount  thus  assessed,  and  without  any  attempt 
to  apportion  the  amount  of  the  assessment  according  to  the  bene- 
fits received  by  each  piece  of  property  benefited,  was  invalid.-- 
The  authority  of  City  of  Cleveland  v.  Wick,-^  was  recognized, 
though  the  case  at  bar  was  distinguished  therefrom.  Norwood  v. 
Baker,-*  was  a  case  arising  from  an  assessment  on  abutting  prop- 
erty owners  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  condemning  land  for  a  street 
and  the  amount  paid  for  such  realty.  An  abutting  property  owner, 
through  whose  tract  of  land  such  street  had  been  opened,  resisted 
the  assessment.  The  court  disclaimed  any  intention  of  ignoring  the 
doctrine  of  city  of  Cleveland  v.  Wick,^^  but  held  that  the  assess- 
ment in  this  case  ignored  special  benefits,  both  in  total  amount 
and  in  apportionment,  and  that  it  was  therefore  a  case  of  de- 
privation of  private  property  without  due  process  of  law,  in  viola- 
tion of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  The  general  principle  actually  involved  in  this 
case  was,  therefore,  consistent  with  that  of  Chanil)er]ain  v.  City  of 
Cleveland.-"     The  doctrine,  as  laid  down  by  the  Supreme  Court 

"Spanglor  v.  City  of  Clevoland.  35  ^^  18    O.    S.    303    [18681. 

0.  S.  469    [18801.  "*U2   IT.   S.   269,   43   L.   443,    19   S. 

"Chamberlain  V.  City  of  Clevohuul.  187    [18981;    anTirming    74    Fed.    997 

34  0.  S.  551   [18781.  [18961. 

^"See   opinion   of  court   p.   564.  ==  See   opinion  page   288   et   seq.  of 

='34   O.   S.   551    [18781.  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  U.  S.  269,  43 

="Rhoades  v.  City  of  Toledo,  G  Ohio  L.  443;    19  S.   187    [18981. 

C.   C.   9    [18901.  ="34  0.  S.  551    [18781. 


§  308  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  478 

of  the  United  States  in  Norwood  v.  Baker,-"  was  followed  b}'  the 
Circuit  Court  of  Ohio  f^  and  it  was  there  held  that  it  was  in  viola- 
tion both  of  the  state  constitution  and  of  the  Federal  Constitution 
to  assess  upon  the  abutting  land  owners  the  cost  of  their  land 
taken  for  widening  a  street,  without  any  reference  to  any  special 
benefit  which  they  might  sustain.  Subsequently  the  whole  ques- 
tion w-as  reconsidered  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio.^^  In  this 
case  a  right  of  way  for  a  street  some  twent}^  or  thirty  feet  over 
railway  tracks  was  appropriated  by  eminent  domain,  and  the 
railway  company  was  awarded  one  dollar  as  damages.  Thereafter 
an  assessment  was  made  to  re-imburse  the  city  for  the  amount 
paid  for  such  street,  and  the  railway  company  as  an  abutting 
property  owner  was  assessed  in  the  sum  of  over  five  hundred 
dollars.  The  court  agreed  that  such  assessment  could  not  be 
upheld.  The  majority  of  the  court  concurred  in  an  opinion 
expressly  overruling  City  of  Cleveland  v.  Wiek,^"  and  held  that 
"compensation  paid  to  a  land-owner  for  lands  taken  by  appro- 
priation proceedings  to  open  a  street  cannot  be  assessed  back 
upon  the  lands  of  the  owner  remaining  after  such  taking.  Neither 
can  the  costs  and  expenses  incurred  in  such  proceeding  be  so 
assessed.  "^^  ]\IinshalL  J.,  concurred  in  the  reversal,  but  solely 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  "physically  impossible  for  the  prop- 
erty of  the  railway  company  to  be  benefited  by  the  construction 
of  the  overhead  bridge  as  property  'abutting'  on  the  improve- 
ment."-'- The  question  still  remained  whether  an  assessment  to 
pay  for  land  appropriated  for  a  street  by  proceedings  in  emi- 
nent domain  could  be  levied  on  land  belonging  to  abutting  prop- 
erty owners  whose  lands  had  not  been  appropriated  for  such 
street.  The  dilemma  suggested  by  the  court  in  City  of  Cleve- 
land V.  Wick.^^  was  apparent.  If  it  was  impossible  to  assess 
those  whose  lands  had  been  taken  and  paid  for.  it  was  clearly 
unfair  to  assess  other  owners  whose  lands  were  not  taken.    When 

-172  U.   S.   269.   43  L.   443,   19   S.  =">  18  0.  S.  303  [1868]. 

187     [1898];     affirming    74    Fed.    997  ^'Cincinnati,    Lebanon    and    North- 

[1896].  ern  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  62 

^Dodswortli  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  O.  S.  465."  49  L.  R.  A.  566,  57  X.  E. 

18  Ohio  C.  C.  288,  10  Ohio  C.  D.  177  229   [1900],  second  s.vllabus. 

[1899].  ^-Cincinnati.    Lebanon    and    Xorth^ 

^  Cincinnati,    Lebanon    and    North-  ern  Ry.,  svprn.  p.  485. 

ern  Ry.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  62  ^^  See  ante,  note  16. 
0.  S.  465,  49  L.  R.  A.  566,  57  N.  E. 
229    [1900]. 


479 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


309 


the  question  was  presented,  it  was  aecordingl}'  held  that  no  local 
assessment  could  be  authorized  by  the  legislature  to  pay  for  land 
taken  in  opening  a  street,  even  upon  owners  of  property  no  part 
of  which  was  taken  for  such  street.^*  This  doctrine  was  expressly 
limited  to  assessments  to  pay  for  the  land  taken  for  the  street 
and  the  expenses  of  the  proceedings  in  eminent  domain ;  and  it 
was  stated  that  it  did  not  apply  to  improvements  of  other  char- 
acter. 

§  309.     Widening  a  street. 

Widening  a  street  is  an  improvement  which  confers  an  addi- 
tional benefit  upon  the  public  and  also  upon  the  abutting  prop- 
erty owners.  It  is  therefore  an  improvement  for  which  the 
legislature  may  authorize  a  local  assessment  to  be  levied,  in 
the  absence  of  specific  constitutional  restrictions,  according  to  the 
great   weight   of   authority.^      Thus   where   the    constitution   spe- 


"  City  of  Dayton  v.  Bauman,  66  0. 
S.  379,' 64  N.  E.  433  [1902];  see  to 
the  same  effect  Carlisle  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati.  29  Ohio  C.  C.  81    [1906]. 

'Lent  V.  Tillson,  140  U.  S.  316,  35 
L.  419,  11  S.  825  [1891];  (affirming 
Lent  V.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404,  14  Pac. 
71  [1887]);  Brooks  v.  City  of  San 
Luis  Obispo,  109  Cal.  50,  41  Pac.  791 
[1895];  Lent  v.  Tillson,  72  Cal.  404, 
14  Pac.  71  [1887];  Bucknell  v.  Story, 
46  Cal.  589,  13  Am.  Rep.  220  [1873]  ; 
Reese's  Appeal  in  the  Matter  of 
Widening  Kearney  Street,  32  Cal.  568 
[1867]  ;  Piper's  Appeal  in  the  Matter 
of  Widening  Kearney  Street.  32  Cal. 
530  [1867];  Appeal  of  Xortli  Beach 
and  Mission  R.  R.  Co.  in  the  Matter 
of  Widening  Kearney  Street,  32  Cal. 
500  [1867]  ;  South  Chicago  City  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  196 
111."  490,  63  X.  E.  1046  [1902];  Clii- 
cago  City  Railway  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  90  111.  573,  32  Am.  Rep.  54 
[1878];  Bigelow  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
90  111.  49  [1878];  Parmalee  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  60  111.  267  (1871)  :  Hays 
V.  City  of  Vincennes,  82  Ind.  178 
[1882];  Blanchet  v.  Municipality  No. 
Two,  13  La.  322  [18.39];  Frieden- 
wald   V.   Mayor   and   City   Council   of 


Baltimore,  74  Md.  IIG.  21  Atl.  555 
[1891];  Central  Savings  Bank  of 
Baltimore  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore,  71  Md.  515,  18*  Atl.  809. 
20  Atl.  283  [1889];  New  England 
Hospital  for  Women  and  Children  v. 
Str'^et  Commissioners  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  188  Mass.  88,  74  X.  E.294 
[1905];  Sears  v.  Street  Commission- 
ers of  the  City  of  Boston,  180  Mass. 
274,  62  L.  R."  A.  144,  62  X.  E.  397 
1902]  ;  Masonic  Building  Association 
V.  Bromwell.  164  Mass.  306,  41  X.  E. 
306  [1895];  Abbott  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Cottage  City,  143  Mass.  521,  58  Am. 
Rep.  143,  id  X.  E.  325  [1887]  Blackie 
V.  Hudson,  117  Mass.  181  [1875]  ; 
Bancroft  v.  City  of  Boston,  115  Mass. 
377  [1874] ;  Prince  v.  City  of  Boston. 
Ill  Mass.  226  [1872];  'Crandell  v. 
City  of  Taimton,  110  Mass.  421 
I1S72];  Dorgan  v.  City  of  Boston. 
12  All.  (94  :Mass.)  223*  1866];  Cook 
V.  Slocum,  27  :Minn.  509;  8  X.  W. 
755  [1881]:  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Ex- 
celsior Brewing  Company,  96  Mo. 
677,  10  S.  W.  477  [1888];  City  of 
St.  Louis  V.  Ranken,  95  Mo.  189,  8 
S.  W.  249  [1888];  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
City  of  Lexington  v.  Long,  31  ilo. 
369     [1861]:     State,    Boice.    Pros.    v. 


§309 


TAXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT, 


480 


cifieally  authorizes  local  assessments  to  pay  for  local  improve- 
ments, widening  and  straightening  a  street  is  held  to  be  a  local 
improvement.-  The  cost  of  the  land  thus  taken  to  widen  such 
street  is  a  proper  item  for  assessment.'^  Where  benefits  are  set 
off  against  damages  sustained  by  taking  private  property  for 
public  use,  benefits  received  by  widening  a  public  street  may 
be  set  off  against  damages  sustained  by  the  persons  part  of  whose 
I'and  is  taken.*  If  the  owner  of  realty  holds  under  a  deed  in 
which  is  a  provision  restricting  the  grantee  from  building  within 
twenty  feet  of  the  traveled  part  of  the  street,  the  condemnation 
of  a  strip  twenty  feet  wide  along  the  length  of  a  street  for  the 
purpose  of  beautifving  it  was  held  to  confer  a  benefit  upon  the 


City  of  Plainfield,  41  N.  J.  L.  (12 
Vr.)  138  [1879];  State,  Boice,  Pros. 
V,  Inhabitants  of  the  City  of  Plain- 
field,  38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  '95  [1875]  ; 
Genet  v.  City  of  Brooklyn,  99  N.  Y. 
296,  1  N.  E.  777  [1885];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Application  of  Wool- 
sey,  95  N.  Y.  135  [1884];  Sage  v. 
City  of  Brooklyn.  89  N.  Y.  189 
[1882];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Con- 
firmation of  the  Report  of  the  Com- 
missioners of  Assessment  for  Grading. 
Paving  and  Otherwise  Improving 
Sackett,  Douglas  and  DeGraw  Streets 
in  the  City  of  Brooklyn,  74  N.  Y.  95 
[1878];  People  ex  rel.  Kilmer  v. 
McDonald,  69  X,  Y.  362  [1877]; 
Astor  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  City  of  New  York,  62  N. 
Y.  580"[1875];"  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Ward  to  Vacate  Certain 
Assessments,  52  X.  Y.  395  [1873]; 
People  of  the  State  of  Xew  Y'ork  ex 
rel.  Gage  v.  Lohnas.  54  Hun.  604,  8 
X.  Y.  Supp.  104  [1889];  Mayer  v. 
Mayor.  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
the  City  of  Xew  York,  28  Hun. '587 
[1883];  In  re  City  of  Xew  Y^ork, 
94  X.  Y.  S.  146  [1905]:  Cincinnati 
V.  Batsche,  52  0.  S.  324.  27  L.  E.  A. 
536.  40  X.  E.  21  [1895];  Coates  v. 
Village  of  Xorwood.  16  Ohio  C.  C.  196 
[1898]:  Dixon  v.  Citv  of  CiTicinnati, 
11  Ohio  C.  C.  629  [1894];  Hunting- 
ton V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  2  Ohio  X. 


P.  35  [1895];  Wilmington  Avenue, 
213  Pa.  St.  238,  62  Atl.  848  [1906]; 
In  the  Matter  of  Pike  Street,  Seattle, 
42  Wash.  551,  85  Pac.  45   [1906]. 

2  Cook  V.  Slocum,  27  Minn.  509,  8 
X.  W.  755   [1881]. 

*  Whiting  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  the  City  of  Boston,  106  Mass.  89 
[1870];  Hendrickson  v.  Borough  of 
Point  Pleasant.  65  X.  J.  L.    (36  Vr.) 

535,  47  Atl.  465  [1900];  Cincinnati 
V.  Batsche,  52  0.  S.  324,  27  L.  R.  A. 

536.  40  X.  E.  21  [1895];  Coates  v. 
Village  of  Xorwood,  16  Ohio  C.  C. 
196  [1898].  In  Ohio  the  present  rule 
as  to  the  validity  of  assessments  to 
pay  for  appropriating  land  for  use 
as  a  street  (see  §  308)  would  prob- 
ably be  inconsistent  with  the  rule 
laid  down  in  City  of  Cincinnati  v. 
Batsche,  52  O.  S.  324,  27  L.  R.  A. 
536,  40  X.  E.  21  [1895],  and  this  case 
must,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  over- 
ruled. In  Dodsworth  v.  City  of  Cin- 
cinnati, 18  Ohio  C.  C.  288  [1899]. 
an  assessment  upon  abutting  prop- 
erty without  reference  to  special 
benefits,  to  pay  the  cost  of  land  taken 
to  widen  a  street  was  held  to  be  in 
violation  of  both  state  and  United 
States  constitutions. 

*  Abbott  V.  Inhabitants  of  Cottage 
City.  143  Mass.  521.  58  Am.  Rep.  143, 
10  X.  E.  325   [1887]. 


481 


WHEX    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


310 


owner  of  such  realty.''  In  jurisdictions  in  which  local  assessments 
cannot  be  levied  for  street  improvements  in  general,  assessments 
cannot  be  levied  for  the  purpose  of  widening  a  street."  The 
propriety  of  an  assessment  for  the  purpose  of  widening  a  street 
is  upheld  in  cases  in  which  because  of  the  method  of  apportioning 
benefits  or  levying  the  assessment  the  specific  assessment  is  held 
to  be  invalid.' 

§  310.     Extension  of  street. 

The  further  extension  of  a  street  already  laid  out  is  such  an 
improvement  that  as  in  the  case  of  the  construction  of  a  street 
de  novo,  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  to  pay  for  such  improve- 
ment.^ This  includes  assessments  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  the 
land  taken,-  as  well  as  for  the  expenses  of  the  surface  improve- 
ment.^ 


^  In  re  City  of  New  York,  100  App. 
Div.  31,  94  N.  Y.  Sup.  140  [1905 J; 
affirmed  In  re  Clinton  Avenue  in 
City  of  New  York,  185  X.  Y.  (501,  78 
X.  E.  1101,  106  App.  Div.  31   [1906]. 

•State  ex  rel.  Horlbeck  v.  City 
Council  of  Charleston,  12  Ricli.  ( S. 
C.)  702  [I860].  See  §  118,  §  302.  In 
Virginia,  before  the  present  constitu- 
tion, an  assessment  by  the  front  foot 
for  land  taken  for  opening  a  street 
was  held  to  violate  a  constitutional 
provision  to  the  effect  that  taxation 
must  be  uniform  in  proportion  ta 
value.  City  of  Xorfolk  v.  Chamber- 
lain, 89  Va.  196,  16  S.  E.  730  [1892]. 
I'nder  the  present  constitution  of 
Virginia,  street  improvement  assess- 
ments cannot  be  levied.     See  §  303. 

'Berdel  v.  City  of  Chicago,  217  111. 
429,  75  X.  E.  386  [1905];  McLaiigh- 
lin  V.  Miller,  124  X.  Y.  510,  26  X.  E. 
1104   [1891]. 

MVight  v.  Davidson,  181  U.  S. 
371,  45  L.  900,  21  S.  616  [1901]; 
(reversing  Davidson  v.  Wright,  16 
App.  D.  C.  371  [1900]):  Cohen  v. 
City  of  Alameda,  124  Cal.  504.  57 
Pac.  377  [1899];  Cill  v.  City  of  Dak- 
land.  124  Cal.  335,  57  Pac.  150 
[18991;  Pearson  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
162  111.  383,  44  X.  E.'  739  [1896]: 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Ward.  36  111.  9 
[1864];     Central     Savings    Bank    of 


Baltimore  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore,  71  Md.  515,  18  Atl. 
809,  20  Atl.  283  [1889];  Xew  Eng- 
land Hospital  for  W^omen  and  Chil- 
dren V.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 
City  of  Boston,  188  Mass.  88,  74  X. 
E.  294  [1905]  Vrana  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  164  Mo.  146,  64  S.  W.  180 
[1901];  Matter  of  the  E.xtension  of 
Church  Street  from  Fulton  Street  to 
Morris  Street,  in  the  City  of  Xew 
York,  49  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    455    [1867]. 

^  Wilkinson  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 22  App.  D.  C.  289  [1903]  Meiss- 
ner  v.  City  of  Toledo,  31  O.  S.  387 
[1877]  ;  Extension  of  Hancock  Street, 
18  Pa.  St.  (6  Harr.)  26  [1851].  In 
Ohio  the  doctrine  laid  down  in  recent 
cases  ( see  §  308 )  is  undoubtedly  in 
conflict  with  the  case  of  Meissner  v. 
Toledo,  31  0.  S.  387,  in  which  it 
was  held  that  an  assessment  could  be 
levied  for  land  taken  to  extend  a 
street,  and  this  ease  must,  therefore, 
be  regarded  as  overruled.  In  Rhodes 
V.  City  of  Toledo,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  9 
[1890],  an  assessment  for  land  taken 
for  the  extension  of  a  street  was  held 
to  l)e  invalid  because  it  was  arbi- 
trarily assessed  upon  the  abutting 
land  owners  without  any  regard  to 
the  special  benefits  to  them. 

^  See  cases  cited,  ante,  note   1. 


§  311  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  482 

§  311.     Appropriation  of  land  in  which  public  has  easement. 

An.  attempt  is  occasionally  made  to  levy  an  assessment  for  the 
purpose  of  acquiring  an  easement  for  a  public  use  in  land  which 
already  belongs  to  the  public,  or  in  which  the  public  already  has 
an  easement  of  such  a  character  that  it  may  use  such  land  for 
the  same  purpose  as  that  for  which  it  is  now  seeking  to  acquire 
it.  It  is  evident  in  such  a  case  that  neither  the  public  nor  the 
adjacent  property  acquires  any  benefit  as  a  result  of  such  pro- 
ceeding, since  the  right  to  devote  the  property  in  question  to 
such  public  use  already  existed.  Accordingly  unless  the  property 
owner  is  in  some  way  precluded  from  shownng  the  true  state  of 
facts,  no  local  assessment  can  be  levied  for  such  purpose.^  Thus 
where  land  between  the  line  of  the  levee  and  the  stream  was  by 
law  devoted  to  the  public  use  for  general  purposes,  no  assess- 
ment can  be  levied  for  acquiring  the  right  to  open  a  street  on 
such  land;  but  if  the  levee  has  been  advanced  by  public  authority 
so  as  to  include  such  land,  and  the  public  use  has  thus  been 
■extinguished,  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  opening  a  street 
on  such  land.-  If  land  has  been  dedicated  to  a  public  use,  other 
than  that  of  a  street,  or  if  it  has  been  appropriated  therefor  by 
proceedings  in  eminent  domain,  and  in  either  case  a  street  is 
subsequently  constructed  on  such  land,  abutting  property  owners 
Avho  are  assessed  therefor,  cannot  resist  payment  of  such  assess- 
ment, on  the  ground  that  the  municipal  corporation  has  not  ac- 
quired the  right  to  use  such  land  as  a  street;  since  the  original 
owners  of  such  land  may  recover  damages  for  such  change  in 
use,  but  cannot  recover  the  land  itself  and  exclude  either  the 
public  or  the  abutting  property  owners  from  its  use  as  a  street.% 
i  Thus  land  was  granted  to  the  state  for  canal  purposes.  Sub- 
sequently, the  state  granted  to  the  city  the  right  to  construct  a 
street  upon  part  of  such  land,  on  condition  that  the  plan  of  the 
improvement  v.'as  first  approved  by  the  board  of  public  works. 
Subsequently  the  board  of  public  works  approved  the  general 
•features  of  the  improvement,  but  did  not  pass  upon  the  details 
of  the  plan  in  so  far  as  they  affected  the  interests  of  the  lessees 
of  the  water  power  of  such  canal.    It  was  held,  that  the  abutting 

'Rusk    V.    Borlin.    17.3    111.    6.34.    .50  =  Municipality  Number  Two  for  the 

X.     E.     1071      ri'^98]:     ^Municipality  opening    of    Roffignac    Street,    7    La. 

Xuirber     Two     for     tlie     opening     of  Ann.   76    [1852]. 

Roflfi<rnac     Street,     7     La.     Ann.     70  ^Richards    v.    City    of    Cincinnati.. 

[8.52].  31   O.  S.  506   [1877]. 


483  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  312 

property  owners  could  not  resist  an  assessment  for  the  improve- 
ment of  such  street,  either  on  the  ground  that  the  public  had 
not  acquired  the  right  to  make  use  of  such  property  for  a  street, 
nor  upon  the  ground  that  the  board  of  public  works  had  not 
approved  the  details  of  such  plan.*j  However,  if  it  is  desired  to 
'extinguish  any  right  of  the  owner  of  the  realty  in  which  the 
city  has  an  easement,  the  cost  of  the  extinguishment  of  such 
right  is  a  proper  charge  for  assessment.^  A  statute  which  pro- 
vides that  land  owned  by  a  city  for  purposes  other  than  a  street 
or  an  alley  may  be  condemned  for  a  public  street  or  alley,  and 
which  provides  for  assessing  the  cost  of  the  land  so  taken  as  if 
the  city  were  the  private  owner  of  property  so  taken,  is  valid.*!^ 
If  the  objection  that  the  land  sought  to  be  condemned  for  a  street 
is  already  subject  to  a  public  easement  is  not  made  until  after 
a  judgment  of  confirmation  of  the  assessment  has  been  entered, 
such  objection  is  barred  by  such  judgment,  and  cannot  be  made 
in  the  supplemental  proceeding  to  levy  an  assessment.^  Neither 
can  such  objection  be  made  at  confirmation.^  If  the  court  in 
which  proceedings  to  appropriate  the  land  for  public  use  was 
had,  has  decided  that  such  land  is  private  property  and  proceeds 
to  condemn  it  for  a  public  use.  such  judgment  is  conclusive  if 
the  court  has  jurisdiction,  and  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally." 
If  the  court  goes  into  the  question  of  the  public  easement  prior 
to  condemnation  and  the  evidence  shows  that  such  land  had  not 
been  previously  dedicated,  it  is  proper  for  the  court  finally  to 
refuse  to  submit  the  question  to  a  jury.^^ 

§  312.     Abandonment  of  easement. 

Whether   the   abandonment   of   an   easement   in   a   pre-existing 
street  or  road  confers  a  special  benefit  for  which  a  local  assess- 

*  Richards    v.    City    of    Cincinnati.  E.    104G    [1902];    Oapre   v.    People   ex 

31   0.  S.  506    [1877].  rel.    Kochersperfrer,     163    111.    3!),    44 

*Page   V.  Mayor   and   City   Council  X.   K.   819    [1896];    Newman  v.   City 

of  Baltimore.  34  Md.  558    [1871].  "f    Ciiica;;o.    153    111.    469,    38    X.    E. 

'State   ex    rel.   Gotzian   v.   District  1053   [1894];   Gage  v.  City  of  Chica. 

Court   of   Ramsey   County.   77    Minn.  go,  146  111.  499.  34  X.  E.  1034  [1893] ; 

248,  79  X.  W.  971    [1899].  146   111.   499.   34  X^   E.    1034    [1893]; 

'South  Chicago  City  Railway  Com-  Ruddecke  v.  Ziegenheini,  122  ^lo.  239. 

pany  V.  City  of  Chicago.  196  111.  490,  26    S.    W.    696     [1894];     Michael    v. 

63  X.   E.   1046    [19021.  City  of  St.  Louis,  112  Mo.  610;  20  S. 

"Ga-je  V.   City  of  Cliica-o.    146   111.  W."  666    [1892]. 
409.   34   X.   E.    1034    [1893].  '"Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago.   146  111. 

•South  Chicago  City  Railway  Com-  499,  34  X.   E.    1034   1893]. 
pany  v.  Chicago,   196    111.   490.  63  X. 


§313 


TAXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT. 


484 


ment  may  be  levied  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  some  con- 
flict of  opinion.^  A  railroad  had  the  right  to  use  steam  power 
within  the  city  limits  and  to  use  a  tunnel,  which  had  made  it 
necessary'  to  raise  the  grade  of  the  street.  Subsequently  the  rail- 
road agreed  to  give  up  the  right  to  use  steam  power  within  the 
city  limits  and  to  substitute  horse  power  therefor ;  while  the 
tunnel  was  to  be  closed  and  the  street  restored  to  its  original 
grade.  It  was  held  that  this  was  an  improvement  of  a  public 
nature  and  at  the  same  time  conferring  a  local  benefit,  so  that 
a  local  assessment  might  be  levied  therefor  upon  the  property 
benefited  thereby.-  If  a  public  sewer  is  so  constructed  as  to  free 
certain  land  from  the  maintenance  of  an  ancient  sewer  for  the 
convenience  of  adjoining  estates,  the  release  of  such  easement 
is  a  benefit  which  may  be  set  off  against  the  damages  caused  by 
the  construction  of  such  sewer.^ 

§  313.     Grading. 

Grading  is  in  ordinary  eases  essential  to  the  improvement  of  a 
street,  and  indispensable  to  its  use  as  a  thoroughfare  and  means 
of  travel.  Accordingly  it  is  an  improvement  of  such  a  type  that 
local  assessments  mav  be  levied  therefor.^     An  assessment  may 


^See  §  320. 

^  People  ex  rel.  Crowell  v.  Law- 
rence, 36  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    178   [1862]. 

^French  v.  City  of  Lowell,  117 
Mass.   363    [1875].' 

iQ'Dea  v.  Mitchell,  144  Cal.  374, 
77  Pac.  1020  [1904]  ;  Warren  v.  Hop- 
kins, 110  Cal.  506,  42  Pac.  986 
[1895];  Smith  v.  Hazard,  110  Cal. 
145,  42  Pac.  465  [1895];  Warren  v. 
Riddell,  106  Cal.  352,  39  Pac.  781 
[1895];  Spaiilding  v.  North  San 
Francisco  Homestead  and  Railroad 
Association,  87  Cal.  40,  24  Pac.  600, 
25  Pac.  249  [1890];  Spaulding  v. 
Wesson,  84  Cal.  141,  24  Pac.  377 
[1890];  Fanning  v.  Bohme,  76  Cal. 
149,  18  Pac.  158  [1888];  Dyer  v. 
North,  44  Cal.  157  [1872];  Hewes 
V.  Reis,  40  Cal.  255  [1870]  ;  Emery  v. 
San  Francisco  Gas  Co.,  28  Cal.  346 
[1865];  Gross  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Kochersperger,  172  111.  571,  50  N.  E. 
334  [1898];  Shirk  v.  Hupp,  167  Ind. 
509,    78    N.    E.    242,    79    X.    E.    490 


[1906];  Casey  v.  City  of  Leaven- 
worth, 17  Kan.  189  [1876]; 
Gallaher  v.  City  of  Jefferson,  125 
la.    324,     101     N.    W.     124     [1904]; 

Morton  v.   Sullivan,  —  Ky.  ,  96 

S.  W.  807  [1906];  State  of  Minne- 
sota ex  rel.  Chapin  v.  District  Court 
of  Ramsey  County,  40  Minn.  5,  41  N. 
W.  235  [1889];  'state  of  Minnesota 
ex  lel.  Cunningham  v.  Board  of  Pub- 
lic Works  of  the  City  of  St.  Paul, 
27  Minn.  442,  8  N.  W.  161  [1881]; 
Stinson  v.  Smith,  8  Minn.  366 
[1863];  Xash  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  8 
Minn.  172  [1863];  McComb  v.  Bell, 
2  Minn.  295  [1858];  City  of  Omaha 
V.  Schaller,  26  Xeb.  522,  42  X.  W.  721 
[1889]  State,  Pardee  Works,  Pros. 
V.  City  of  Perth  Amboy,  59  N.  J.  L. 
(30  Vr.)  335,  36  Atl.  666  [1896]; 
Davis  V.  City  of  Xewark,  54  X.  J.  L. 
(25  Vr.)  lU,  23  Atl.  276  [1891]; 
Village  of  Passaic  v.  State,  Delaware, 
Lackawanna  and  Western  Railroad 
Company,  Pros.,  37  X.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.) 


i 


485 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§313 


include  grubbing  as  a  necessary  part  of  grading,  in  preparing 
the  surface  of  the  street  for  further  improvement.-  If  the  location 
of  a  suitable  grade  for  the  street  makes  it  necessary  to  fill  so 
as  to  raise  the  grade  from  the  natural  elevation  of  the  soil  to 
that  established  by  proper  authority,  the  expense  of  such  filling 
may  be  one  of  the  items  of  the  assessment,  according  to  the 
weight  of  authority.^  If  compensation  for  damages  caused  by 
the  change  of  grade  of  a  public  street  can  be  recovered  by  owners 
of  property  injured  by  such  change,  it  is  held  that  a  local  as- 
sessment to  pay  for  such  compensation  in  damages  may  be  levied 
upon  the  land  especially  benefited  by  such  street.*  Where  spe- 
cial benefits  are  to  be  set  off  against  damages  sustained  by  ad- 
joining and  abutting  property  owners  by  reason  of  a  street  im- 
provement, benefits  arising  out  of  the  change  of  grade  may  be 


538  [1875];  State,  Graham,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Paterson,  37  N.  J.  L. 
(SVr.)  380  [1875]  State,  Gregory, 
Pros.  V.  ilayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jer- 
sey City,  34  X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  390 
[1871];  State,  Mann,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Coiuicil  of  Jersey  City, 
24  N.  J.  L.  (4  Zab.)  662  [1855]; 
Buffalo  Cemetery  Association  v.  City 
of  Buffalo,  118  X.  Y.  61,  22  X.  E. 
962  [1889];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Deering  to  Vacate  an 
Assessment,  93  X.  Y.  361  [1883]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Upson  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  89 
N.  Y.  67  [1882];  Matter  of  Appeal 
of  Gardner  from  the  Assessment  for 
Grading  of  Scovell  Street  in  the  City 
of  Lockport,  and  from  the  order  con- 
firming the  same.  41  How.  (X.  Y.) 
255  [1871];  Creighton  v.  Scott,  14  0. 
S.  438  [18631;  Butler  v.  City  of 
Toledo,  5  0.  S.  225  [1855];  Jessing 
V.  City  of  Columbus.  1  Ohio  C.  C.  90 
[1885];  (affirmed  22  W.  L.  B. 
453)];  Davis  v.  Silverton.  47  Or. 
171,  82  Pac.  16  [1905]:  McKeesport 
Borough,  to  Use  of  McKeesport  City 
V.  Busch.  166  Pa.  St.  46,  31  Atl.  49 
[1895];  Scranton  City  v.  Bush,  160 
Pa.  St.  499.  28  Atl.  926  [1894]; 
Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls.  2  S. 
D.  640.  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  802,  51  X. 
W.    770    [1892];    State    v.    Moss,    44 


Wash.  91,  86  Pac.  1129  [1906]; 
Green  v.  Tidball,  26  Wash.  338,  55 
L.  R.  A.  879,  67  Pac.  84  [1901] ;  Find- 
ley  V.  Hull,  13  Wash.  236,  43  Pac. 
28  [1895]:  Town  of  Elma  v.  Carney, 
9  Wash.  466,  37  Pac.  707  [1894]*; 
City  of  Spokane  v.  Browne,  8  Wash. 
317,  36  Pac.  26  [1894];  Town  of 
Elma  V.  Carney,  4  Wash.  318,  30  Pac. 
732  [1892];  McXair  v.  Ostrander,  1 
Wash.  110,  23  Pac.  414   [1890]. 

-City  of  Spokane  v.  Browne,  8 
Wash.  317,   36   Pac.  26    [1894]. 

^Levy  V.  City  of  Chicago,  113  111. 
650  [1886];  Cram  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
139  111.  2G5,  28  X.  £.758  [1893]; 
State,  Mann,  Pros.  v.  ^layor  and 
Common  Council  of  Jersey  City.  24 
X.  J.  L.   (4  Zab.)   662  [1855]. 

*  Rogge  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  64 
X.  J.  L.  (35  Vr'.)  491,  46  Atl.  164 
[1900];  Clark  v.  City  of  Elizabeth, 
61  X.  J.  L.  (32  Vr.)  565;  40  Atl. 
616,  737  [1S9S]:  State.  Stewart, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Hobo- 
ken.  57  X.  J.  L.  (28  Vr.)  330.  31 
Atl.  278  [1894];  Davis  v.  City  of 
Xewark,  54  X.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  144, 
23  Atl.  276  [1891]:  State.  Aldridge. 
Pro*.  V.  Essex  Public  Road  Board, 
46  X.  J.  L.  (17  Vr.)  126  [1884]; 
Wray  v.  ^layor.  etc..  of  Pittsburg  for 
use,  etc..  46   Pa.  St.  3(i5    [1863]. 


§  313  _  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  486 

set  off  against  damages  caused  thereby.-''  It  has  been  held  that  the 
cost  of  grading  may  be  assessed  upon  abutting  lot  owners,  and 
that  the  amount  thus  payable  may  be  recovered  by  the  lot  owner 
from  the  city  as  part  of  the  damages  sustained  by  him  if  a  pre- 
viously established  grade  has  been  changed. '^  This  seems  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  general  theory  of  assessments,  which  regards 
the  assessment  as  an  equivalent  for  the  benefits  conferred  upon 
the  property"  by  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is 
levied ;'  and  which,  therefore,  declines  to  recognize  liability  to 
an  assessment  for  benefits  as  an  element  of  damage.*  In  some 
of  the  cases  which  recognize  this  doctrine,  the  particular  assess- 
ment has  been  held  invalid  because  of  failure  to  comply  with 
the  statute  authorizing  the  assessment.  Thus  in  Missouri  a  local 
assessment  can  be  -levied  for  grading  only  when  the  city  council 
declares  by  ordinance  that  the  revenues  of  the  city  are  not  suffi- 
cient to  justify  paying  the  cost  of  bringing  a  street  to  the  estab- 
lished grade  out  of  the  public  treasury.  Under  such  statute  an 
assessment  for  grading  is  invalid  unless  such  declaration  has 
been  made  f  but  in  the  cases  so  holding  the  propriety  of  an  as- 
sessment for  such  purpose  is  recognized.  The  propriety  of  levy- 
ing an  assessment  for  grading  has  been  recognized  where  the 
statute  did  not  authorize  such  assessment. ^°  On  the  other  hand, 
where  the  statute  has  been  held  not  to  authorize  local  assessment 
to  pay  for  damages  caused  by  a  change  of  grade,  the  justice  of 
such  assessments  has  been  severely  criticized,  in  terms  v/hich  really 
question  the  constitutionality  of  such  assessments.^^  "It  would 
be  highly  absurd."  said  the  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska,  ''to  de- 
nominate the  mere  formality  of  handing  a  sum  of  money  to  a 
lot  owner  as  damages   and   at   once   recovering   it  from  him  by 

"  City  of  Seattle  v.  Board  of  Home  v.  City  of  Poplar  Bluff,  149  Mo.  36, 

Missions     of     Methodist     Protestant  49  S.  W.  1088   [1898];   City  of  Seda- 

Church,    138    Fed.    307,    70    C.    C.   A.  lia  to  the  Use  of  Taylor  v.  Abell,  103 

597  [1905];  Cook  v.  City  of  Ansonia,  Mo.  App.  431,  76  S.  W.  497   [1903]; 

66   Conn.    413,    34   Atl.    183    [1895];  City    of    Carthage    ex    rel.    Carthage 

Davis  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council  National    Bank    v.    Badgley,    73    Mo. 

of  the  City  of  Newark,   54  N.  J.  L.  App.   123   [1897]. 
(25  Vr.)   595,  25  Atl.  336  [1892].  '"Little  Rock  v.  Fitzgerald,  59  Ark. 

^Stowell    V.    Milwaukee,    31     Wis.  494,   28   L.   R.   A.   496^  28   S.   W.   32 

523   [1872].  [1894]  ;  Keys  v.  City  of  Neodesha,  64 

'See  §   11.  Kan.  681,  68  Pac.  625   [1902]. 

« See  Chapter  XIII.  "  Goodrich   v.    City    of    Omaha.    10 

'Field    V.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving  Neb.  98,  4  N.  W.  424   [1880]. 
Co.,    117    Fed.    925    [19021:    Wheeler 


487 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


314 


means  of  a  special  assessment  upon  his  damaged  property,  a  pay- 
ment."^- Under  the  recent  decisions  in  Ohio  as  to  the  power  to 
levy  local  assessments  for  the  cost  of  condemning  land  for  use 
as  a  street,  and  for  the  amount  of  damages  awarded  to  the 
abutting  owners  for  injury  to  their  land  not  taken  for  such 
street,  it  is  held  that  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  to  pay  for 
the  damages  awarded  to  abutting  property  owners  by  reason 
of  a  change  of  the  previousl}"  established  grade  of  a  street. ^^ 
If  the  grade  of  a  street  is  established  in  order  to  bring  the  street 
under  the  grade  of  a  railway  which  crosses  it,  and  an  extensive 
excavation  is  necessary  for  that  purpose,  the  additional  cost  of 
such  excavation  cannot  be  imposed  upon  the  abutting  property 
owners." 


§  314.     Paving. 

Paving  a  street  which  has  already  been  acquired  for  the  use 
of  the  public  is  an  improvement  for  which  local  assessments  may 
be  levied,^  since  it  facilitates  public  travel  upon  such  street, 
makes  it  easier,  pleasanter  and  more  economical,  and  gives  better 
access  to  the  adjoining  and  abutting  property,  and  accordingly 


**  Goodrich  v.  City  of  Omaha,  10 
Neb.  98,  4  N.  W.  424   [1880]. 

"McGlynn  v.  City  of  Toledo,  22 
Ohio  C.  C.  34,  12 "  Ohio  C.  D.  15 
[1901];  affirmed  without  report  in 
Toledo  V.  McGlynn,  67  0.  S.  498,  67 
N.   E.    1103. 

"  Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v. 
Mehler,  112  Ky.  438,  64  S.  W.  396, 
652,  23  Ky.  L.R.  1335  [1901].  Tliis 
expense  is  said  to  he  "within  the  pur- 
view of   the   statute." 

'  Chadwick  v.  Kelly.  187  U.  S.  540, 
47  L.  293,  23  S.  175  [1903]  ;  (affirming 
Kelly  V.  Chadwick,  104  La.  719,  29 
So.  295  [1901]);  Cass  Farm  Co.  v. 
Detroit,  181  U.  S.  396,  45  L.  914,  21 
S.  644,  645  [1901]:  (affirming  Cass 
Farm  Co.  v.  City  of  Detroit.  124 
Mich.  433,  88  X."  W.  108  [1900]); 
French  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Co.,  181 
U.  S.  324,  45  L.  879.  21  S.  625 
[1901];  (affirming  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.  v.  French.  158  ^\o.  534, 
54  L.  R.  A.  492.  58  S.  W.  934  [1900]  )  ; 
Farrell  v.  West  Cliicago  Park  Com- 
missioners.  181   r.  S.  404,  45  L.  924. 


21  S.  609;  645  [1901];  (affirming 
Farrell  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners, 182  111.  250,  55  X.  E.  325 
[1899]);  Lombard  v.  West  Chicago 
Park  Commissioners,  181  U.  S.  33, 
45  L.  731,  21  S.  507  [1901];  (affirm- 
ing Cummings  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  181  111.  136,  54  X.  E. 
941  [1899]);  Ogden  City  v.  Arm- 
strong, 168  r.  8.  224,  42  L.  444,  18 
S.  98  [1897];  (modifying  Armstrong 
v.  Ogden  City,  12  Utah,  476;  43  Pac. 
119  [1895])";  City  of  Davenport  v. 
Allen,  120  Fed.  172  [1903];  Field  v. 
Barber  Asphalt  Co.,  117  Fed.  925 
[1902]  ;  Bidwell  v.  Huff,  103  Fed.  362 
[1900];  Citj'  CoTincil  of  Montgomery 
V.  Moore,  140  Ala.  638,  37  So.  291 
[1903];  Inge  v.  Board  of  Public 
Works  of  Mobile,  135  Ala.  187,  93 
Am.  St.  Rep.  20,  33  So.  678  [1902]: 
Fitzgerald  v.  Walker.  55  Ark.  148,  17 
S.  W.  702  [1891]:  Poay  v.  City  of 
Little  Rock.  .32  Ark.  31  [1877]: 
Warren  and  Malley  v.  Russell.  129 
Cal.  381.  62  Pac.  75  [19001;  Santa 
Cruz  Rock  Paving  Co.  v.  lloaton,  105 


§314 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


48S 


it   confers  both  a   general  benefit   to  the   public  at  large   and   a 


Cat.  162,  38  Pac.  G93  [1894];  N.  P. 
Perine  Contracting  and  Paving  Com- 
pany V.  Quackenbush,  104  Cal.  684, 
38  Pac.  533  [1894];  City  of  Denver 
V.  Londoner,  33  Colo.  104,  80  Pac.  117 
[1904];  Fair  Haven  and  Westville 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  New 
Haven,  75  Conn.  442,  53  Atl.  960 
[1903];  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Savannah  v.  Weed,  96  Ga.  670,  23 
S.  E.  900  [1895];  Wardens,  etc., 
of  St.  Mark's  Church  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Brunswick,  78  Ga.  541,  3 
S.  E.  561  [1887];  People  ex  rel. 
Price  v.  Bridgeman,  218  111.  568,  75 
N.  E.  1057  [1905]  ;  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Sherman,  212  111.  498,  72  N.  E.  396 
[1904]  ;  Chicago  Union  Traction  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  207  HI. 
544,"  69  N.  E.  849  [1904];  Chicago 
Union  Paving  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  202  111.  576,  67  N.  E.' 383 
[1903]  ;  Young  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 196  111.  603,  63  N.  E.  1075 
[1902];  McVey  v.  City  of  Danville, 
188  111.  428,  58  N.  e'.  955  [1900]; 
Thompson  v.  City  of  Higliland  Park, 
187  111.  265,  58  N.  E.  328  [1900]; 
Cramer  v.  City  of  Charleston,  176 
111.  507,  52  N.  E.  73  [1898];  Gait  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  174  111.  605,  5i  K 
E.  653  [1898];  Peyton  v.  Village  of 
Morgan  Park,  172  111.  102,  49  N.  E. 
1003  [1898];  Parker  v.  Village  of  La 
Grange,  171  111.  344,  49  N.  E.  550 
[1898];  Chicago  &  Northwestern 
Railroad  Company  v.  Village  of  Elm- 
hurst,  165  111.  148,  46  N.  E.  437 
[1897];  Harrison  Brothers  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  163  HI.  129,  44  N.  E.  "^395 
[1896];  People  ex  rel.  Mannen  v. 
Green,  158  111.  594,  42  N.  E.  163 
[1895];  Haley  v.  City  of  Alton,  152 
111.  113,  38  N.  E.  750  [1894];  Chica- 
go, Burlington  &  Quincy  Railroad  Co. 
V.  City  of  Quincy,  136  111.  563,  29 
Am.  St.  Rep.  334,  27  N.  E.  192 
[1892];  County  of  Adams  v.  City  of 
Qunicy,  130  111.  566,  6  L.  R.  A.  155, 
22  N.E.  624  [1890]  ;  City  of  Chicago 
V.  Baer,  41  HI.  306  [1866];  Shank  v. 
Smith,  157  Ind.  401,  55  L.  R.  A.  564, 


61  N.  E.  932  [1901];  Adams  v.  City 
of  Shelbyville,  154  Ind.  467,  77  Am. 
St.  Rep.  484,  49  L.  R.  A.  797,  57  N. 
E.  114  [1899];  Corey  v.  City  of  Ft. 
Dodge,  133  Iowa  666,  111  N.  W.  6 
[1907];  Owens  v.  City  of  Marion, 
Iowa,  127  la.  469,  103  N.  W.  381 
[1905];  Hackworth  v.  City  of  Ot- 
tumvva,  114  la.  467,  87  N.  W.  424 
[1901];  Talcott  Brothers  v.  Noel,  107 
la.  470,  78  N.  W.  39  [1899];  Eagle 
Manufacturing  Company  v.  City  ot 
Davenport,  101  la.  493,  38  L.  R.  A. 
480,  70  N.  ,W.  707  [1897];  Tuttle 
V.  Polk  &  Hubble,  92  la.  433,  60  N. 
W.  733  [1894];  Coggeshall  v.  City  of 
Des  Moines,  78  la.  235,  41  N.  W.  617, 
42  N.  W.  650  [1889]  ;  McGrew  v.  City 
of  Kansas  City,  64  Kan.  61,  67  Pac. 
438  [1902];  Moore  v.  City  of  Paola, 
63  Kan.  867,  66  Pac.  1040  [1901]; 
Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v.  Meh- 
ler,  112  Ky.  438,  64  S.  W.  396,  652, 
23  Ky.  L.  R.  1335  [1901]  ;  Gleason  v. 
Barnett,  106  Ky.  125,  50  S.  W.  67 
[1899];  Bacas  v.  Adler,  112  La.  806, 
36  So.  739  [1904];  City  of  Shreve- 
port  V  .Prescott,  51  La.  Ann.  1895, 
46  L.  R.  A.  193,  26  So.  664  [1899]; 
Barber  Asplialt  Paving  Company  v. 
Watt,  51  La.  Ann.  1345,  26  So.  70 
[1899]  ;  Rosetta  Gravel  Paving  &  Im- 
provement Co.  v.  Kennedy,  51  La. 
Ann.  1535,  26  So.  468;  Barber  As- 
phalt Paving  Company  v.  Gogreve, 
41  La.  Ann.  251,  5  So.  848  [1889]; 
City  of  New  Orleans  for  the  Use  oi 
Nicholson  &  Co.  v.  Stewart,  18  La. 
Ann.  710  [1866];  Surgi  v.  Snetch- 
man,  11  La.  Ann.  387  [1856];Mayor 
and  Coimcil  of  Hagerstown  v.  Startz- 
man.  93  Md.  606,  49  Atl.  838  [1901]  ; 
Gould  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 
Baltimore,  59  Md.  378  [1882]: 
Dashiell  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore,  use  of  Hax,  45  Md.  615 
[1876];  Clemens  v.  Mayor  and  Citv 
Council  of  Baltimore,  use  of  Volkmar, 
16  Md.  208  [I860];  Henderson  v. 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Baltimore, 
use  of  Eschbaeh,  8  Md.  352  [1855]: 
Auditor    General    v.     Hoffman,     132 


489 


WHEN   /ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


§314 


special   benefit   to   the   adjoining   and   abutting   property   owner. 


Mich.  198,  93  N.  W.  259  [1903]; 
Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  City  of  Detroit, 
124  Mich.  433,  83  N.  W.  108  [1900]; 
(affirmed  181  U.  S.  396,  45  L.  914, 
21  S.  044  [1901] )  ;  Goodwillie  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  103  Mich.  283,  61  N.  W. 
526  [1894];  Lake  Shore  &  Mich- 
igan Southern  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Grand  Rapids,  102  Mich.  374, 
29  L.  R.  A.  195,  00  N.  W.  7G7  [1894]  ; 
Powers  V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  98 
Mich.  393,  57  N.  W.  250  [1894]; 
Beniteau  v.  City  of  Detroit,  41  Mich. 
116,  1  X.  W.  899  [1879];  Attorney 
General  on  the  Relation  of  Coolv  v. 
City  of  Detroit,  26  Mich.  263  [1872]  ; 
Brevoort  v.  City  of  Detroit,  24  Mich. 
322  [1872];  Lefevre  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Detroit,  2  Mich.  586  [1853];  Dia- 
mond V.  City  of  Mankato,  89  Minn. 
48,  61  L.  r"!  a.  448,  93  N.  W.  911 
[1903];  State  ex  rel.  Wheeler  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ramsey  County,  80 
Minn.  293,  83  X.  W.  183  [1900]; 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  City 
of  St.  Joseph,  188  Mo.  451,  82  S.  W. 
64  [1904];  State  ex  rel.  Barber  As- 
phalt Paving  Co.  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
183  Mo.  230,  81  S.  W.'  1104  [1904]; 
Ross  V.  Gates,  183  Mo.  338,  81  S.  VV. 
1107  [1904];  Collier  Estate  v.  Wes- 
tern Paving  &  Supply  Company,  180 
Mo.  362,  79  S.  W.  947  [1904]; 
Morse  v.  City  of  West  Port,  110  Mo. 
502,  18  S.  W.  831  [1892];  Estes  v. 
Owen,  90  :\I().  113,  2  S.  W.  133 
[1886];  Morloy  v.  Weakley.  86  Mo. 
451;  Xeenan  v.  Smith,  60  Mo.  292 
[1875];  Inhabitants  of  Town  of  Pal- 
myra v.  Morton,  25  Mo.  593  [1857]; 
State  of  Xohraska  ex  rel.  City  of 
Omaha  v.  Birkhanser,  37  Xeb.  521, 
56  X.  W.  303    [1893];   Cassitt  Land 

Co.  V.  Xeuscheler,  —  X.  J.  ,  60 

Atl.  1128  [19051;  Hayday,  Pros.  v. 
Borough  of  Ocean  City,  69  X.  J.  L. 
(40  Vr.)  22.  54  Atl".  813  [1903]; 
State,  Johnston,  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants 
of  the  City  of  Trenton,  43  X.  J.  L. 
(14  Vr.)  166  [18811;  Voght  v.  City 
of  Buffalo.  133  X.  Y.  463.  31  X.  E. 
340  [1892]  ;  O'Reilly  v.  Citv  of  Kings- 


ton, 114  X.  Y.  439,  21  X.  E.  1004 
[1889];  People  ex  rel.  Thompson  v. 
Major,  etc.,  of  the  City  of  Syracuse, 
6  liun.  652  [1876];  Webster  v.  City 
of  Fargo,  9  X,  D.  208,  56  L.  R. 
A.  156,  82  X.  W.  732  [1900];  (af- 
firmed Webster  v.  Fargo,  181  U.  S. 
394,  45  L.  912,  21  S.  623,645  [1901] )  ; 
Rolph  V.  City  of  Fargo,  7  X.  D. 
640;  42  L.  R.  A.  646,  76  X.  W. 
242  [1898];  Shoemaker  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati,  68  O.  S.  603,  68  X.  E. 
1  [1903];  Schroder  v.  Overman,  61 
O.  S.  1,  47  L.  R.  A.  156,  55  X. 
E.  158  [1899];  Parsons  v.  City  of 
Columbus,  50  0.  S.  460,  34  X.  E. 
677  [1893];  Xorthern  Indiana  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Connelly,  10  0. 
S.  160  [1859];  Jessing  v.  City  of 
Columbus,  1  Ohio  C.  C.  90  [1885]; 
(affirmed  22  W.  L.  B.  453).  Frank- 
lin v.  Hancock,  204  Pa.  St.  110, 
53  Atl.  644  [1902];  City  of  Harris- 
burg  v.  Shepler,  190  Pa.  St.  374,  42 
Atl.  893  [1899];  City  of  Philadelphia 
to  Use  of  Mack  v. ' Gorges,  180  Pa. 
St.  296.  36  Atl.  868  [1897];  Fell  v. 
Philadelphia,  to  the  use  of  Cunning- 
ham, 81  Pa.  St.  (31  P.  F.  Smith)  58 
[1870];  Soullier  v.  Kern,  69  Pa.  St. 
(19  P.  F.  Smith)  16  [1871];  Spring 
Garden  v.  Wistar,  18  Pa.  St.  (6 
Harr.)  195  [1852];  Storrie  v.  Hous- 
ton City  Street  Railway  Company,  92 
Tex.  129,  44  L.  R.  A.  716.  46  S.  W. 
796  [1898];  Adams  v.  Fisher,  63 
Tex.  651  [1885];  McCrowell  v.  City 
of  Bristol,  89  Va.  652,  20  L.  R.  A. 
653,  16  S.  E.  807  [1893];  Davis  v. 
City  of  Lynchburg,  84  Va.  861,  6  S. 
E.  230  [1888];  Sands  v.  City  of 
Richmond,  72  Va.  (31  Gratt.)  571, 
31  Am.  Rep.  742  [1879];  Xorfolk 
City  v.  Ellis,  67  Va.  (26  Gratt.)  224 
[1875];  ]Mayor  and  Commonalty  of 
Alexandria  v.  Hunter.  16  Va.  (2 
Munf.)  228  [1811];  Dancer  v.  Town 
of  :Mannington.  50  W.  Va.  322,  40 
S.  E.  475  [1901]:  Young  v.  City  of 
Tacoma,  31  Wash.  153,  71  Pac.'742 
[1903];  McXair  v.  Ostrander,  1 
Wash,  110,  23  Pac.  414  [1890];  Meg- 


§  315  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  490 

The  statute  may  provide  for  paving  a  cartway  ^  as  well  as 
a  street.  Even  in  jurisdictions  in  which  it  is  held  that 
local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for  opening  streets,  to  pay 
for  the  cost  of  the  land  taken,  it  is  nevertheless  held  that 
such  surface  improvements  as  paving  may  be  paid  for  by  local 
assessments.^  Cases  are  found,  however,  in  which  the  purpose  of 
paving  the  street  in  question  was  not  to  facilitate  public  travel 
or  to  give  to  the  abutting  property  a  better  access,  but  for  some 
other  purpose  not  enuring  to  the  benefit  of  the  abutting  prop- 
erty. Thus  a  street  was  paved  in  order  to  prevent  debris  and 
sediment  from  washing  down  into  the  harbor  and  filling  it  up, 
thus  rendering  navigation  impossible.  It  was  held  that  such  an 
improvement  was  not  intended  to  benefit  the  adjoining  or  abut- 
ting property  and  that  a  local  assessment  could  not  be  levied 
therefor.*  Local  assessments  for  paving  have  also  been  upheld 
on  the  theory  that  paving  was  a  benefit  to  the  public  and  local 
health.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  health  of  the  locality 
is  endangered  by  the  condition  of  the  street  a  local  assessment 
can  be  levied  therefor.^  In  this  case  it  was  further  said  that  if 
the  health  of  the  whole  city  was  endangered  by  the  condition 
of  the  street  a  local  assessment  based  on  the  theory  of  the  pro- 
tection of  health  could  not  be  sustained, 

§  315.     Curbing  and  guttering. 

Such  improvements  as  guttering  and  curbing  are  essential 
parts  of  a  street  improvement,  though  not  always  regarded  as 
indispensable.  Accordingly,  under  the  general  doctrine  that  a 
street  improvement  may  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments,  both 

gett  V.   City  of  Eavi  Claire,   81   Wis.  no   application   to   prior   cases   which 

326,  51   N.  W.  566    [1892];    Dean  v.  involved    the    power    to    levy    assess- 

Borehsenius,    30    Wis.    236     [1872];  ments  for  surface  improvements,  and 

-Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Pemberton,  that   such   cases   are   not   affected   by 

208  Pa.   St.  214,  57  Atl.  510    [1904;  the  case  at  bar.     See  also  in  City  of 

Philadelphia    v.    Pemberton,    25    Pa.  Dayton    v.    Bauman,    66    O.    S.    379, 

Super.  Ct.  323    [1904].                              •  64  N.  E.  433    [1902],  the  opinion  of 

'  In   Cincinnati,   Lebanon   &   North-  the  court  on  p.   393,   recognizing  the 

ern  By.  Co.  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  62  right  to  assess  for   surface   improve- 

O.  S.  465,  49  L.  B.  A.  566,  57  N.  E.  ments. 

22i)    [1900]    see  opinion   of  the  court  *  Mayor,      etc..      of      Baltimore      v. 

on  pp.  481  and  482,  holding  that  the  Moore,  6  H.  &  J.    (Md.)   375   [1825]. 

doctrine  therein  stated,  that  the  cost  ®  Mayor  and  City  Coimcil  of  Balti- 

of  taking  land  for  a  street  cannot  be  more  v.      Hughes'  Adm'r.,   1    G.  &  J. 

assessed  upon  abutting  property,  has  (Md.)    480,   19  Am.  Dec.  243   [1829]. 


491  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  315 

curbing  ^  and  guttering  -  are  improvements  so  combining  public 
utility  and  especial  benefit  to  local  property  that  local  assess- 
ments may  be  levied  therefor.  The  propriety  of  an  assessment 
for  such  purpose  is  recognized  in  some  cases  in  which  the  spe- 
cific assessment  is  held  to  be  invalid.''  In  Colorado  it  was  once 
held  that  a  local  assessment  could  not  be  levied  for  curbstones  and 
gutters.*  This,  however,  was  on  the  theory  once  in  force  there 
that  assessments  could  not  be  levied  for  benefits  under  the  tax- 
ing poAver,  but  only  to  secure  the  performance  of  a  legal  duty 
under  the  police  power.^  Under  this  theory  an  assessment  could 
be  levied  for  a  sidewalk  as  under  the  police  power,  but  not 
under  the  taxing  power,  and  curbing  and  guttering  was  regarded 
as  part  of  the  street  and  not  as  part  of  the  sidewalk.®  This 
entire  theory  has  been  abandoned  in  Colorado  ;^  and  assessments 
for  benefit's  under  the  taxing  power  are  held  to  be  valid, ^  in- 
cluding assessments  for  curbing  and  guttering.^  In  South  Caro- 
lina an  assessment  for  curbing  was  held  invalid,  in  part  on  the 
ground  that  the  city  had  no  power  conferred  by  statute,  and 
in  part  on  the  ground  that  no  ordinance  authorized  the  pro- 
ceedings in  question.^**  Under  the  view  now  held  in  that  state, 
such  assessments  would  undoubtedly  be  held  invalid. ^^ 

'Edwards  v.   Berlin,    123   Cal.   544,  381     [1905];    Kendig    v.    Knight.    60 

56  Pac.   432    [1899];    King  v.   Lamb,  la.  29,   14  N.  W.  78    [1882];    Manley 

117    Cal.    401,    49    Pac.    561    [1897];  v.   Emen,   46   Kan.   655,   27   Pac.   844 

Lamb  V.  City  of  Chicago,  219  111.  229,  [1891];    City   of   Omaha   v.   Gsanter, 

76  N.  E.  343   [1906];   Adams  v.  City  4    Neb.    Unoflf.    52,    93    N.    W.    407 

of  Shelbj-v'ille,   154  Ind.  467,   77  Am.  [1903]. 

St.  Rep.' 484,  49  L.  R.  A.  797,  57  N.  ="  City     Street     Improvement     Com- 

E.    114    [1899];     Owens    v.    City    of  pany  v.  Taylor.  138  Cal.  364,  71  Pac. 

Marion,  Iowa,  127  la.  469,  103  N.  W.  446   [1903]. 

381    [19051;    Farwell   v.   Des   Moines  MVilson   v.   Cliilcott,    12   Colo.  600, 

Brick  Manufacturing  Company,  97  la.  21  Pac.  901    [1889]. 

286,   35   L.   R.   A.   63,   66   N.   W.    176  =  See  §   152. 

[1896];   Howe  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  « Wilson  v.   Cliilcott,   12   Colo.   600, 

114  Mass.  388  [1874]";  Oibson  v.  Kay-  21  Pac.  901   [1889]. 

ser's     E.xecutor,     16     Mo.     App.     -iOA  'City    of    Denver    v.    Knowles,    17 

[1885];   City  of  Omaha  v.  Gsanter,  4  Colo.   204,    17   L.   R.   A.    135,   30   Pac. 

Neb.  Unoft'.  52.  93  X.  W.  407   [1903]  :  1041    [1892]. 

In    the    Matter    of    tlie    Petition    of  '  See  §   152. 

Burmeister  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  ^  City    of    Denver    v.    Knowles,    17 

76    N.    Y.    174    [1879]:    Schenloy    v.  Colo.   204,    17   L.   R.   A.    135,   50   Pac. 

Commonwealtli    for    the    L'^se    of    the  1041    [1892];     (overruling   Wilson    v. 

City    of    Allegheny,    36    Pa.    St.     (12  Cliilcott.    12    Colo.    600.    21    Pac.    901 

Casey)   29.  78  Am.  Dec.  359   [1859].  [1889]). 

*Lambert  v.  Marcuse.   137  Cal.  44,  '"  ('ori)oration  of  Columbia  v.  Hunt, 

69  Pac.  620  [1902];  Owens  v.  City  of  5    Ricli.    ( S.   C.)    550    [1852]. 

Marion,  Iowa.  127  la.  469,  103  N.  W.  '^  See  §  118,  §  159. 


§§  316,  317  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  492 

§  316.     Retaining  walls. 

Whether  a  retaining  wall  built  in  connection  with  a  street 
improvement  can  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments  or  not  depends 
upon  whether  it  confers  any  especial  local  benefit  to  the  property 
assessed.  If  the  wall  is  built  in  front  of  a  tract  of  realty  to  fur- 
nish lateral  support  thereto  in  place  of  the  natural  soil  removed 
by  the  city  in  grading  the  street,  and  the  owner  of  such  realty 
has  as  against  the  city  the  right  to  have  his  land  supported 
laterally  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  upon  such  realty  for 
the  cost  of  constructing  such  retaining  wall.^  So  where  a  street 
was  divided  longitudinally  by  a  retaining  wall  for  one  hundred 
thirty  feet  and  the  two  halves  of  the  street  were  graded  at  dif- 
ferent grades  in  order  to  give  access  to  private  property  not 
adjoining  or  abutting  upon  such  street  it  was  held  that  local  as- 
sessments could  npt  be  levied  upon  the  abutting  property  to  pay 
the  cost  of  such  retaining  wall."  On  the  other  hand  it  was  held 
that  the  cost  of  a  retaining  wall  built  between  a  street  and  a 
canal  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  the  bank  of  the  canal  and 
of  keeping  it  from  bursting  and  flooding  the  street  was  an  item 
that  could  be  included  in  a  local  assessment  levied  for  the  ex- 
pense of  constructing  such  street,  on  the  theory  that  such  wall 
was  necessary  for  the  proper  protection  of  the  street.^  If  a  street 
is  built  on  a  hillside  and  a  retaining  wall  is  necessary  for  sup- 
porting one  side  of  the  'street  at  the  established  grade,  the  ex- 
pense of  constructing  such  wall  may  be  included  in  the  amount 
of  a  local  assessment.*  .It  has  been  held  that  property  owners 
who  had  constructed  retaining  walls  prior  to  the  improvement 
of  the  street   are  entitled  to   credit  therefor."^ 

§  317.     Intersections, 

Street  intersections  do  not  lie  in  front  of  the  property  of  pri- 
vate individuals.     At  the  same  time  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 

^  Armstrong  v.  City  of  St.  Paul.  30  provement  of  the  canal,  and  an  ex- 
Minn.  299,  15  X.  W."  174  [1883].  pense  which  .should  be  borne  by  the 

-  In  re  Grading,  Paving  and  Cvirb-  city  and  the  state. ) 

ing  Wick  Street,  Appeal  of  the  City  *  Perrysville      Avenue,      Marshall's 

of  Pittsburg.   184  Pa.  St.  93,  39  At'l.  Appeal,  210  Pa.  St.  537,  60  Atl.   160 

3   [1898].  [1904];   Johnson  v.  City  of  Taeoma, 

'Longworth  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  41  Wash.  51,  82  Pac.  1092   [1905]. 

34  0.  S.  101   [1877];    (One  judge  dis-  =  Johnson    v.    City    of    Taeoma.    41 

sented  in  this  case  on  the  ground  that  Wash.  51,  82  Pac.  1092   [1905]. 
the  wall  was  really  a  part  of  the  im- 


493  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  317 

improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied  should  be  in 
front  of  or  immediateh^  next  to  the  realty  assessed.^  Further, 
street  intersections  form  a  part  of  the  intersecting  streets  as 
they  do  of  the  street  which  is  intersected.  Nevertheless  a  street 
the  intersections  of  which  were  unpaved  v/ould  be  less  useful  in 
many  ways  than  an  unpaved  street.  The  improvement  is  an 
entirety  and  is  to  be  used  as  such.  Accordingly  if  the  statute 
provides  that  the  cost  of  intersections  is  to  be  included  in  the 
cost  of  the  work,  and  an  assessment  therefor  levied  upon  the 
property  benefited  by  such  improvement,  such  statute  is  valid 
if  the  assessment  is  not  in  excess  of  the  benefits  conferred  by 
such  improvement.-  If  the  intersecting  streets  are  paved  with 
different  materials,  the  intersections  can  form  a  continuous  pave- 
ment with  only  one  of  them,  and  the  city  council  may  be  em- 
powered to  determine  which  street  this  shall  be.^  Furthermore, 
the  city  council  may  be  empowered  to  determine  whether  the 
cost  of  intersections  shall  be  apportioned  among  the  owners  of 
property  abutting  upon  each  of  the  intersecting  streets  or  whether 
it  shall  be  apportioned  upon  the  owners  of  the  property  abutting 
upon  one  of  such  streets  onh^,  and  if  so,  upon  which.*  The  legis- 
lature may  authorize  assessments  for  the  intersections  of  side- 
walks,^' while  it  withholds  power  to  assess  for  street  intersections.^ 
Intersections  cannot  be  assessed  for  twice. '^  However,  two  as- 
sessment ordinances  for  the  same  intersections,  the  second  of 
which  repeals  the  first,  do  not  provide  for  double   assessment.® 

»See  §  G19.  '  Xoonan    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray- 

''Noonan    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray-  moiul,     183    111.    52,    55    X.    E.    079 

mond,     183    111.    52,    55    N.    E.    079  [1899]. 

[1899];   Wolf  V.  City  of  Keokuk,  48  *  Creigliton  v.   Scott,    U  0.   S.   438 

la.  129   [1878];   Motz  v.  City  of  De-  [1804]. 

troit,  18  Mich.  494   [1869];   State  ex  ■*  Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago,  203  111. 

rel.    Wheeler    v.    District    Court    of  20,    07    X.    E.    477    [1903];    Gage   v. 

Kamsey  County,  80  Minn.  293.  83  X.  City  of  Chicago,  192  111.  580,  61  X.  E. 

W.    183    [1900];    City    of   Sedalia   v.  849      [1901];      Heman     Construction 

Coleman,   82   Mo.   App.    560    [1899];  Company  v.  McManus,   102  Mo.  App. 

Gibson  v.  Kayser's  Executor,   10  Mo.  049,  77  S.  W.  310   [1903]. 

App.   404    [1885];    In   the   Matter   of  *  Gage  v.   City  of  Chicago,  203   111. 

the   Petition    of   :Murphy.    to    Vacate  26,  67  X.  E.  477  [1903]. 

or  Reduce  Assessments.  20  Hun.    (X.  ^Chicago  Union  Traction  Company 

Y.)    346    [1880];    Crei^hton   v.   Scott,  v.   City   of   Chicago,   208    111.    187.   70 

14    0.    S.    438     [18641;    Ridenour    v.  X.  E.  234   [1904]. 

Saffin,  1   Handy    (Ohio)    404   [1855];  « Xoonan    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray- 
King  V.  City  of  Portland.  38  Or.  402,  mond.     183    111.    52,    55    X.    E.    679 

55  L.  R.   a".  812,  63  Pac.  2    [lOOO].  11899]. 


§§318-321  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  494 

§  318.     Crossings, 

A  crossing,  though  not  in  front  of  the  property  assessed,  is 
essential  to  the  use  of  the  street  as  a  whole,  forming  as  it  does 
a  continuous  improvement  to  be  used  as  an  entirety.  Accord- 
ingly in  connection  with  paving  a  street  an  assessment  may  be 
levied  for  the  expense  of  laying  crossings.^ 

§  319.     Culverts. 

A  culvert  may  be  constructed  as  a  part  of  another  improve- 
ment, such  as  a  street  or  a  drain.  As  an  independent  improve- 
ment, it  is  not  a  common  one,  but  its  validity  has  been  upheld/ 
However,  an  ordinance  requiring  persons  who  wish  to  construct 
an  irrigation  ditch  across  a  street  to  construct  covered  flumes  for 
such  purpose  has  been  held  invalid.- 

§  320.     Vacation  of  streets. 

If  a  municipal  corporation  acting  under  authority  of  law  vacates 
an  existing  street,  such  vacation  must  be  a  benefit  to  the  public 
at  large  or  the  order  of  vacation  would  not  have  been  made.^ 
If,  then,  an  especial  local  benefit  enures  from  such  vacation  to  the 
adjoining  property  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  upon  the 
property  thus  benefited  to  pay  the  expenses  of  such  vacation.- 

§  321.    Alleys. 

An  alley  confers  some  benefit  upon  the  public  in  general,  of 
the  same  general  kind  of  benefit  as  a  public  street,  though  less 
in  degree ;  while  it  confers  a  special  and  peculiar  benefit  upon 

^  City     Street    Improvement     Com-  pensation.      Blackwell    E.    &    S.    Ry. 

pany  v.  Rontet,  140  Cal.  55.  73  Pac.  Co.    v.    Gist,    18    Okl.    516,    90    Pa'c. 

729' [1903];   Bates  v.  Twist,  138  Cal.  889    [1907];    In   re   Riiseomb    Street, 

52.  70  Pac.    1023    [1902];    In  Parker  33  Pa.  Super.  Ct.   148    [1907]. 
V.    Peay,    76    Cal.    103,    18    Pac.    124  =  Matter  of  the  Mayor  of  Xew  York 

[1888]     this    was     recognized     as     a  City,   157  X.  Y.  409,  52  X.  E.   1120: 

valid  purpose  for  levying  an  assess-  In    the    Matter    of    the    Petition    of 

nient  though   the  assessment  was  in-  Barclay,  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  91 

valid  as  levied  on  property  not  with-  X.    Y.    430    [1883];    ^Matter    of    Xew 

in  the  assessment  district.  York,  28  X.  Y.  App.  D.  143;  Vacation 

^  Shannon    v.    Village    of   Hinsdale,  of  Howard   Street,  Pliiladelphia.    142 

180  111.  202,  54  X.  E."l81    [1899].  Pa.   St.   601.  21   Atl.   974    [1891];    In 

=  Bountiful    City    v.    Lee.    27    Utah  re  Vacation  of  Center  Street,  115  Pa. 

183.  75  Pac.  368  "[1904].  St.  247,  8  Atl.  56   [1886]. 

^Property  owners  who  are  injured 
by  such  vacation  are  entitled  to  com- 


495 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MxVY    BE   LEVIED. 


§322 


the  abutting  or  adjoining  property.  Accordingly  such  an  im- 
provement is  held  to  be  one  for  which  a  local  assessment  may 
be  levied  upon  the  property  especially  benefited  thereby.^  An  as- 
sessment may  be  levied  for  opening,-  grading^  or  paving*  an 
alley.  The  propriety  of  an  assessment  for  such  purposes  has 
been  recognized  even  where  the  specific  assessment  has  been  held 
to  be  invalid,  as  where  notice  was  not  given  as  required  by  stat- 
ute before  the  levy  was  made.^ 


§  322.     Roads, 

A  public  road  in  the  country  where  the  houses  are  far  apart 
and  the  need  of  ready  access  is  less  felt  than  in  a  city  is  intended 
more  for  the  benefit  of  the  general  public  in  affording  a  means 
of  communication  and  transportation  between  one  city  or  village 
and  another  and  less  for  the  l)enefit  of  the  abutting  property 
than  is  a  street  in  a  thickly  settled  municipal  corporation.  Ac- 
cordingly there  is  greater  divergence  of  authority  as  to  whether 
the  abutting  owners  can  be  assessed  for  any  part  of  the  cost  of 
such  improvement.  In  most  cases  such  roads  are  paid  for  by 
taxation,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  such  a  purpose  is  a  public 
one  and  that  general  taxation  ma^'  be  levied  therefor.^  The 
difficulty  in  justifying  local  assessments  of  this  kind  rests  in  the 
comparative   absence   of  local  benefit  therefrom.     Where   provi- 


^  Martin  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 205  U.  S.  135,  27  S.  440 
[1907];  (reversing  26  App.  D.  C. 
140,  146  [1905];  Jones  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  213  111.  02,  72  N.  E.  798 
ri904];  Hemingway  v.  City  of  Chica- 
go, 60  111.  324   [1871];   Holt  v.  Figg, 

—   Ky.   ,   94    S.   W.    34,   29   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  613  [1906];  Hcman  v.  Gil- 
liam, 171  Mo.  258,  71  S.  W.  163 
[1902];  Lansing  v.  City  of  Lincoln. 
32  Neb.  457,  49  X.  W.  650  [1891]; 
Cincinnati  v.  Davis,  58  0.  S.  225,  50 
X.  E.  918  [1898];  Kerston  v.  City 
of  Milwaukee,  106  Wis.  200.  48  L.  R. 
A.  851,  81  X.  W.  1103.  948  [1900]; 
The  term  'alley'  has  a  definite  mean- 
ing in  law.  Paul  v.  Detroit.  32  ^licli. 
108  [1875]. 

•  Hemingway  v.  City  of  Chicago,  60 
111.  324   [1871]^ 

*  Kerston  v.  Citv  of  Milwaukee.  106 


Wis.  200,  48  L.  R.  A.  851,  81  X.  W. 
1103,  948   [1900]. 

'Heman  v.  Gilliam.  171  Mo.  258, 
71  S.  W.  163  [1902];  Lansing  v. 
City  of  Lincoln,  32  Xeb.  457,  49  X. 
W.  650  [1891];  Cincinnati  v.  Davis, 
58  0.  S.  225,  50  X.  E.  918  [1898]; 
Kersten  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  106 
Wis.  200,  48  L."  R.  A.  851,  81  X.  W. 
1103.  948   [1900]. 

"  Jones  V.  District  of  Columbia,  3 
App.  D.  C.  26   [1894]. 

K'hicago.  Indianapolis  &  Rt.  Louia 
Siiort  Line  Co.  v.  People  ex  rel. 
McCormick.  225  111.  519,  80  X.  E. 
336  [1907]:  Toledo,  St.  Louis  and 
Western  Railroad  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Prown.  225  111.  425,  80  X.  E.  283 
[1907];  Litchfield  &  ^Madison  Rail- 
way Company  v.  People,  ex  rel.  Mc- 
Cormick, 225  111.  301,  80  X\  E.  335 
[1907]. 


§322 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


496 


sion  is  made  for  special  assessments  to  pay  the  cost  of  such  im- 
provement the  weight  of  authority  is  that  in  the  absence  of  spe- 
cial constitutional  provisions  such  assessments  may  be  levied,- 
and  as  far  as  the  application  of  the  principle  of  local  assessment 
is  concerned  streets  and  highways  are  of  similar  nature.^  Where 
such  view  prevails  a  local  assessment  to  pay  for  land  taken  for 
use  as  a  public  hiorhway  is  valid,*  though  the  statute  which  au- 
thorizes such  assessment  must,  of  course,  be  complied  with  sub- 


-bpaulding  v.  Mott,  167  Ind.  58, 
76  X.  E.  620  [1906]  ;  Bowlin  v.  Coch- 
rane, 161  Ind.  486,  69  X.  E.  153; 
Sefton  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
Howard  County,  160  Ind.  357,  66  X. 
E.  891  [1903]  ;  Sniytli  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Braun,  158  Ind.  3^32,  62  X.  E.  449 
[1901];  Goodwin  v.  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  Wnrren  County,  146 
Ind.  164,  44  N.  E.  1110  [1896]; 
Bowen  v.  Hester,  143  Ind.  511,  41  X. 
E.  330  [1895];  Manor  v.  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  Jay  County,  137 
Ind.  367,  36  N.  E.  1101,  34  X.  E. 
959  [1893];  Tliompson  v.  Goldthwait, 
132  Ind.  20,  31  X.  E.  451  [1892]; 
Loesnitz  v.  Seelir.er,  127  Ind.  422, 
25  X.  E.  1037,  26  X.  E.  887  [1890]; 
Hobbs  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  oi 
Tipton  County,  116  Ind.  376,  19  X. 
E.  186  [1888];  Wliite  v.  Fleming, 
114  Ind.  560,  16  X.  E.  487  [1887]; 
Board  of  Commissioners  of  Montgom- 
ery County  V.  FuUen.  Ill  Ind.  410, 
12  X.  E.  298  [18871;  Xeptune  v. 
Taylor,  108  Ind.  459,  8  X.  E.  566 
[1886];  Brown  v.  Eagle  Creek  and 
Little  White  Liclv  Gravel  Road  Com- 
pany, 78  Ind.  421  [1881];  Hendricks 
V.  Gilchrist,  76  Ind.  369  [1881]; 
State  ex  rel.  Monroe  Gravel  Eoad  Co. 
V.  Stout;  61  Ind.  143  [1878];  Tur- 
pin  V.  Eagle  Creek  Gravel  Road  Co., 
48  Ind.  45;  Fall  Creek  and  Warren 
Township  Gravel  Road  Co.  v.  Wal- 
lace, 39  Ind.  435  [1872];  Turner  v. 
Thorntown  &  Mechanicshurg  Gravel 
Road  Company,  33  Ind.  317  [1870]; 
State  on  the  Relation  of  Ling-enfel- 
ter  V.  Danville  &  Xorth  Salem  Gravel 
Road  Company.  33  Ind.   133   [1870]; 


Center  &  Warren  Gravel  Road  Co.  v. 
Black,  32  Ind.  468  [1870];  Law  v. 
Madison,  Smyrna  &  Graham  Turn- 
pike Company,  30  Ind.  77  [1868]; 
Williams  v.  Little  White  Lick  Gravel 
Road  Company,  Wilson's  Sup.  Ct. 
(Ind.)  7  [1871];  Barrow  v.  Helpler, 
34  La.  Ann.  362  [1882];  Janvrin  v. 
Poole,  181  Mass.  463,  63  X.  E.  1066 
[1902];  Anderson  v.  Cortelyou,  — 
X.  J.  ,  68  Atl.  118  [19071;  (re- 
versing Cortelyou  v.  Anderson,  73  X. 
J.  L.  427,  63  Atl.  1095  [1906];  Eris- 
man  v.  Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders 
of  the  County  of  Burlington,  64  X.  J. 
L.  (35  Vr.)  516,  45  Atl.  998  [1900]; 
State,  Bergen  County  Savings  Bank, 
Pros.  V.  Inhabitants  of  the  Township 
of  Union  in  the  County  of  Bergen, 
44  X.  J.  L.  (15  Vr.)  "599  [1882]; 
State,  King,  Pros.  v.  Reed,  43  X.  J. 
L.  (14  Vr.)  186  [1881];  Jones  v. 
Town  of  Tonawanda,  158  X.  Y.  438, 
53  X.  E.  280  [1899];  Rounds  v. 
Whatcom  County,  22  Wash.  106,  60 
Pac.  139  [1900];  Seanor  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners,  13  Wash.  48. 
42  Pac.  552  [1895];  Johnson  v.  City 
of  Milwaukee,  40  Wis.  315  [18761; 
Halton  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  31  Wis. 
27  [1872];  Hale  v.  Kenosha,  29  Wis. 
599 ;  Soens  v.  City  of  Racine,  10  Wis. 
271   [I860]. 

^  Law  V.  Madison,  Smyrna  &  Gra- 
liam  Turnpike  Company,  30  Ind.  77 
[1868]. 

*  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  Xew  York 
&  Xew  Haven  Railroad  Company,  36 
Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869]; 
Wilcox  V.  City  of  Meriden,  57  Conn. 
120,  17  Atl.  .366   [1889]. 


497 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


§323 


stantially.^  Special  taxes  for  highways,  levied  upon  small  dis- 
tricts near  such  highways  have  been  upheld,"  but  in  some  juris- 
dictions these  are  regarded  as  general  taxes  levied  on  a  taxing 
district  of  small  area,  and  not  as  local  assessments,  because  they 
are  apportioned  according  to  value.'  In  other  jurisdictions,  how- 
ever, it  is  held  that  a  public  road  in  the  country  is  not  a  local 
improvement,**  and  that  an  assessment  therefor  is  unconstitu- 
tional." The  Pennsylvania  courts  hold  that  such  assessment  can- 
not be  levied.^"  This  holding,  however,  is  involved  with  the 
doctrine  that  improvements,  even  though  consisting  of  city 
streets,  cannot  be  levied  on  rural  property  if  apportioned  by  the 
front  foot  rule,^^  and  is  consistent  with  the  theory  that  local  as- 
sessments might  be  levied  for  the  construction  of  county  roads, 
if  the  assessment  were  apportioned  on  the  basis  of  benefits  eo 
nomine. 

§  323.     Sidewalks. 

A  sidewalk  is  an  improvement  which  combines  the  two  essen- 
tial elements  of  general  benefit  to  the  public  at  large  and  special 
benefit  to  the  abutting  property  owner.  It  is,  therefore,  such 
an  improvement  as  might  be  made  the  subject  of  local  assess- 
ment even   in  jurisdictions  in  which  the   power   of  local  assess- 


"City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Koch.  1G9 
Mo.  587,  70  S.  W.  143  [11102]. 

"  Carlisle  v.  Hetherin;j;ton,  47  0.  S. 
235,  24  N.  E.  488  [18!)0];  Thompson 
V.  Love,  42  0.  S.  61  [1884]  ;  Commis- 
sioners of  Union  County  v.  Greene, 
40  0.  S.  318  [1883];  State  v.  Com- 
missioners, 37  0.  S.  52G  [1882] ;  Com- 
missioners of  Putmini  Country  v, 
Yonnjr.  3G  O.  S.  288  [1880]  ;  Craig  v. 
Heis,  30  O.  S.  550  [187l)];  Dreake  v. 
Beasley,  26  O.  S.  315  [1875];  Foster 
V.  Commissioners  of  \Yoo(l  County.  9 
O.  S.  540  [18501  ;  And  see  as  rcco<r- 
ni/ing  tlie  same  doctrine,  Lewis  v. 
Laylin.  4(1  0.  S.  663,  23  X.  E.  288 
[1880]. 

'See  §  38. 

"Sperry  v.  Flyjrare.  80  :Minn.  325, 
81  Am.  St.  Rep.  261,  49  L.  R.  A.  757, 
83  X.  W.  177  [1900]. 

"  Conger   v.   C.raham.   —   Ky. , 

11  S.  W.  467.  11  Ky.  L.  R.  12  [1889]; 


Conger  v.   Bergman,  —  Ky.  ,   11 

S.  W.  84,  10  Ky.  L.  R.  899  [1889]; 
Graham  v.  Conger,  85  Ky.  582,  4  S. 
W.  327.  9  Ky.  L.  R.  133 1  (However, 
in  Malchus  v.  District  of  Highlands, 
67  Ky.  (4  Bush.)  547  [1869]  an 
assessment  according  to  acreage  for 
grading  and  paving  a  road  in  a  sub- 
luban  community  was  lield  to  be  con- 
stitutional ;  but  the  method  of  appor- 
tionment was  the  feature  of  this  leg- 
islation which  was  most  fiercely  at 
tacked.  1  Sperry  v.  Flygare,  80  ^Minn. 
325.  81  Am.  St."  Rep.  261.  49  L.  It.  A. 
757,  83  X.  W.  177   [1900]. 

*''City  of  Scranton  v.  Pennsylvania 
Coal  Co..  105  Pa.  St.  445  [1884]; 
Seely  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh.  82  Pa. 
St.  (1  Xoriis)  360,  22  Am.  Rep. 
760  [1876]:  \Vasliingt(m  Avenue,  69 
Pa.  St.  (19  P.  F.  Sniitli)  352,  8  Am. 
Rep.  255   [1871]. 

"See  §  610.  §  706. 


§323 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


493 


ment  is  referred  primarily  to  the  power  of  taxation.^  Further- 
more, a  sidewalk  is  one  of  the  improvements  the  burden  of 
which  is  traditionally  cast  upon  the  abutting  property  owmer; 
and  one  the  right  to  levy  local  assessments  for  which  is  in 
several  jurisdictions  referred  to  the  police  power.^  From  these 
considerations  it  follows  that  in  the  jurisdictions  in  which  it  is 
held  that  the  improvement  of  a  street  may  be  paid  for  by  local 
assessments,'^  the  improvement  of  a  sidewalk  may  also  be  paid  for 
in  the  same  way.*     In  South  Carolina  the  court  when  deciding 


^See  §  96. 
'See  §  96. 
'See  §  301. 

*  City    Council    of    Montgomery    v. 
Foster',     133    Ala.    587,    32    So.    610 
[1901];  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Ber- 
mingham  v.  Klein,  89  Ala.  461,  8  L. 
R.  A.  369,  7   So.  386    [1889];    (over- 
ruling Mayor,  Aldermen,  etc.,  of  Mo- 
bile V.  DaVgan,  45  Ala.  310    [1871]; 
and    Mayor,    Aldermen,    etc.,    of   Mo- 
bile  V.    Eoyal    Street   Railroad   Com- 
pany, 45  Ala.  322  [1871])  ;  Winter  v. 
City  Council  of  Montgomery,  83  Ala. 
589,    3    So.    235    [1887];    Diggins    v. 
Brown,    76    Cal.    318,    18    Pac.    373 
[1888];   Palmer  v.  ^Yay,  6  Colo.   106 
[1881];      District     of     Columbia     v. 
Wormley,   15   App.   D.   C.   58    [1899]; 
Allman    v.    District    of    Columbia,    3 
App.   D.    C.    8    [1894]:    Huff   v.    City 
of  Jacksonville,  39  Fla.  1,  21  So.  776 
[1897];  Speer  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council   of   Athens,    85   Ga.    49,   9    L. 
R.  A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890]  ;  Mar- 
shall   V.    People    ex    rel.    Smith,    219 
111.  99,   76  N.  E.   70    [1905];    Harris 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Knight,  218  HI.  4.39, 
75  N.  E.   1012   [1905];    City  of  Chi- 
cago V.  Wilson,  195  111.  19,  57  L.  R. 
A.  127,  62  N.  E.  843   [1902];   Ronan 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Shafter,  193  111.  631. 
61  N.  E.   1042    [1901];    Gage  v.  City 
of    Chicago,    192    111.    586,    61    X.    E. 
849    [1901];    .Job    v.    City    of    Alton. 
189  111.  256,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  448,  59 
N.  E.  622   [1901];  Hyman  v.  City  of 
Chicago,    188    111.   402,    59   X.    e!    10 
[1900] ;  Walker  v.  Village  of  Morgan 
Park,    175    111.    570,    51    N.    E.    636; 


Adcock   v.   City   of   Chicago,    172   111. 
24,    49    N.    E.'  1008    [1898];    People 
ex    rel.    Gleason   v.   Yancey,    167    111. 
255,  47  N.  E.  521  [1897]  ;  Boynton  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Kern,   159  111.  553,  42 
N.   E.   842    [1896];    Davis  v.   City  of 
Litchfield,    145   111.   313,  21   L.   R.  A. 
503,    33   N.    E.    888    [1893];    Watson 
v.  City  of  Chicago,   115  111.  78,  3  N. 
E.     430     [1886];,     Enos     v.     City     of 
Springfield,      113      111.     65      [1886]: 
Craw  V.  Tolono,  96  111.  255,  36  Am. 
Rep.  143   [1880];  White  v.  People  ex 
rel.  City  of  Bloomington,  94  111.  604 
[1880];'  Dyer  v.  Woods,  166  Ind.  44, 
76  X.  E.  624  [1906];  Town  of  Green- 
dale  V.  Suit,   163  Ind.  282,  71  X.  E. 
658  [1904];  Dooley  v.  Town  of  Sulli- 
van.   112    Ind.    451,    2    Am.    St.    Rep. 
209,  14  X.  E.  506;  Taber  v.  Grafmil- 
ler,  109  Ind.  206,  9  N.  E.  721  [1886]  ; 
Darnell  v.   Keller,   18   Ind.  App.   103, 
45   X.   E.   676    [1897];    City  of   Con- 
nersville  v.  Merrill,  14  Ind.  App.  303, 
42  X.  E.    1112    [1895];    Cemansky  v. 
Fitch,    121    la.    186,    96    X.    W.    754 
[1903];  Royce  v.  Town  of  Aplington. 
90  la.  352,^57  X.  W.  868;   Risdon  v. 
Shank,  37  la.  82   [1873];   Warren  t. 
Henly,    31    la.    31     [1870];    Buell    v. 
Ball,' 20  la.  282   [1866];   McGrew  v. 
Stewart,    51    Kan.    185,    32   Pac.    896 
[1893];    Manley   v.    Emlen,    46    Kan. 
655,    27    Pac.    844    [1891];    City    of 
Lawrence    v.    Killiam,    11    Kan.    499 
[1873];    Langan    v.    Bitzer,    —    Ky. 

,   82  S.  W.  280,  26  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

579  [1904];  Dumesnil  v.  Louisville 
Artificial  Stone  Co.,  109  Ky.  1,  58  S. 
W.   371    [1900];    Chesapeake  &   Ohio 


499 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§  323 


that  local  assessments  could  not  be  levied  for  street  improve- 
ments held  that  such  assessments  could  nevertheless  be  levied  for 
such   improvement   as   could,   like   sidewalks,   be   referred  to   the 


Railway  Company  v.  Mullins,  94  Ky. 
355,  22  S.  W.  558  [1893];  Hood  v. 
Trustees  of  the  Town  of  Lebanon,  15 
S.  ^Y.  (Ky.)  516,  12  Ky.  L.  E.  813 
[1891];  Hydes  v.  Joyes,  67  Ky.  (4 
Bush.)  464*,  96  Am.  Dec.  311  [1868]; 
Fayssoux  v.  Denis,  48  La.  Ann.  850. 
19  So.  760.  [1896];  C'onnell  v.  Hill, 
30  La.  Ann.  251  [1878];  Webber  v. 
Gottschalk,  15  La.  Ann.  376  [I860]; 
O'Leary  v.  Sloo,  7  La.  Ann.  25  [1852]  ; 
Tournier  v.  ^Municipality  No.  1,  5  La. 
Ann.    298    [1850];    Oakey   v.   Mayor, 

I  La.  1  [1830];  Henderson  v.  Mayor 
and  City  Council  of  Baltimore,  Use  of 
Eschbach,  8  Md.  352  [1855];  Dick- 
inson  v.  City  Council  of  Worcester, 
138  Mass.  555  [1885];  Howe  v.  City 
of  Cambridge,  114  Mass.  388  [1874]; 
Goddard,  Petitioner,  33  Mass.  (16 
Pick.)  504,  28  Am.  Dec.  259;  Lowell 
V.  Hadley,  49  Mass.  (8  Met.)  180; 
Woodbndge  v.  City  of  Detroit,  8 
Mich.  274  [1860]  ;" State  of  Minne- 
sota V.  Armstrong,  54  Minn.  457,  56 
N.  W.  97  [1893]:  Scott  County  v. 
Hinds,  50  Minn.  204,  52  X.  W.523 
[1892];    Griggs  v.   City   of   St.   Paul, 

II  Minn.  308  [1866];  Wilzinski  v. 
City  of  Greenville,  85  Miss.  393,  37 
So.' 807  [19051;  Nugent  v.  City  of 
Jackson,  72  Miss.  1040,  18  So.  493 
[1895];  Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty.  57 
Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451  [1879]; 
Haag  V.  Ward,  186  :Mo.  325,  85  S. 
W.  391  [1904];  City  of  Louisiana  v. 
Miller,  66  Mo.  467  [1877];  Weber  v. 
Schergens,  59  Mo.  389  [1875];  City 
of  Joplin  ex  rel.  Carthage  Dimension 
&  Flag  Stone  Co.  v.  Hollingshcad.  123 
Mo.  App.  602,  100  S.  W.  506  [1907]  : 
State  V.  Several   Parcels  of  Land,  — 

Neb.   ,    107    N.    W.    566    [1906]; 

State,  Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  Streets  and  Sewers  in  the 
City  of  New  Brunswick.  42  N.  J.  L. 
(13  Vr.)  510  [1880];  State,  Agens. 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  Newark.  37  N.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    415. 


18  Am.  Rep.  729  [1874];  State,  Van 
iassel,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  Jersey  City,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.) 
128  [1874];  State,  Wilson,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  thb 
City  of  Hudson,  32  N.  J.  L.  (3  Vr.) 
365  [1867];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  the  Mutual  Life  Insur- 
ance Company  of  New  York  to  Vacate 
an  Assessment,  89  N.  Y.  530  [1882]; 
Bulla lo  City  Cemetery  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo, 46  n'  Y.  506  [1871];  City  of 
Greensboro  v.  McAdoo,  112  N.  C.  359, 

17  S.  E.  178  [1893];  Wilhelm  v.  City 
of  Defiance,  58  0.  S.  56,  65  Am.  St. 
Rep.   745.  40  L.  R.  A.  294,  50  N.  E. 

18  [1898];  Bonsall  v.  Lebanon,  19 
Ohio  418;  Meanor  v.  Goldsmith.  216 
Pa.  St.  489,  10  L.  R.  A.  (N. 
S.)  342,  65  Atl.  1084  [1907]; 
Amberson  Avenue,  Appeal  of  Childs, 
179  Pa.  St.  634,  36  Atl.  354  [1897]; 
Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Meighan,  159 
Pa.  St.  495,  28  Atl.  304  [1894]; 
Whitney  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  147 
Pa.  St.  351,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  740.  23 
Atl.  395  [1892]:  Pliiladelphia  v. 
Pennsylvania  Hospital.  143  Pa.  St. 
367,  22  Atl.  744  [1891];  Wilkinsburg 
Borough  V.  Home  for  Aged  Women, 
131  Pa.  St.  109,  6  L.  R.  A.  531,  18 
Atl.  937  [1890];  Findlay  v.  City  of 
Pittsburg  (Pa.)  11  "  Atl.  678; 
Deblois  v.  Barker,  4  R.  I.  445;  In  the 
Matter  of  Dorrance  Street,  4  R.  I. 
230  [1856];  Rounds  v.  Mumford,  2 
R.  I.  154  [1852];  Tripp  v.  City  of 
Y'ankton,  10  S.  D.  516,  74  N.  W.'447 
[1898];  Lentz  v.  City  of  Dallas,  96 
Tex.  258,  72  S.  W.  59  [1903];  Luf- 
kin  V.  City  of  Galveston,  58  Tex.  545 
11883];  Highland  v.  City  of  Galves- 
ton. 54  Tex.  527  [1881] ;  City  of  Gal- 
veston v.  Heard,  54  Tex.  420  [1881]; 
Sands  V.  City  of  Richmond,  72  Va. 
(31  Gratt.)  571,  31  Am.  Rep.  742 
[1879]:  Wilson  v.  Town  of  Philippi, 
39  W.  Va.  75,  19  S.  E.  553  [1894]; 
Douglass   V.   Town    of    Harrisville,    9 


323 


TAXATION  BY    ASSESSMENT. 


500 


doctrine  of  the  police  power.^  At  a  subsequent  hearing  of  this 
case  the  Supreme  Court  reversed  itself  in  part  by  overruling  in 
part  the  opinion  just  cited  and  holding  that  no  local  assessments 
could  be  levied  for  sidewalks,  there  being  no  power  to  subdivide 
a  city  into  tax  districts."  In  Tennessee,  at  a  time  when  ordinary 
assessments  for  benefits  were  held  invalid/  assessments  for  side- 
walks were  regarded  as  valid  as  being  under  the  police  power.^ 
While  the  present  holding  of  the  Tennessee  courts  recognizes 
the  validity  of  ordinary  assessments  for  benefits,^  and  while  it 
is  no  longer  necessary  to  invoke  the  police  power  as  a  basis  for 
sidewalk  assesments,  the  validity  of  such  assessments  would  un- 
doubtedly be  recognized.  In  the  law  of  assessments  the  con- 
struction of  a  sidewalk  includes  grading/^  or  grading  and  laying," 
or  laying  with  any  proper  material,  such  as  flagstones,^^  cement 
concrete, ^^  cement "  and  planks  or  boards  ;^^  but  not  a  railing 
thereto.^"  This  power  extends  to  ordering  the  construction  of  a 
sidewalk  along  a  public  highway  ^^  or  along  the  side  of  a  turn- 
pike ^^  situated  within  the  limits  of  the  city  ordering  such  im- 
provement,  since   the   public   and  the   abutting  property   owner 


W.  Va.  162,  27  Am.  Rep.  548  [1876] ; 
Hemiessy  v.  Douglas  County,  99  Wis. 
129,  74  N.  W.  983  [1898];  State  ex 
rel.  Christopher  v.  City  of  Portage, 
12  Wis.  562  [I860];  Weeks  v.  City 
of  Milwaukee,   10  Wis.  242. 

^  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green- 
ville, 42  S.  C.  293,  46  Am.  St.  Rep. 
723,  27  L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S.  E.  842 
[1893]. 

"  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green- 
ville, 53  S.  C.  285,  69  Am.  St.  Rep. 
855,  43  L.  R.  A.  101,  31  S.  E.  252 
[1898]. 

'See  §   160. 

8  Nashville  v.  Berry,  2  Shan.  Cas. 
(Tenn.)  561;  Whyte  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Nashville,  32  Tenn.  (2 
Swan.)  364  [1852];  Washington  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Nashville,  31 
Teiin.  (1  Swan)  177  [1851]:  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  v.  Maberry,  25  Tenn. 
(6  Humph.)  368,  44  Am.  Dec.  315 
[1845]. 

»;See  §  160. 

^^  Lewis  v.  City  of  New  Britain,  52 
Conn.  568   [1885]. 


The  legislature  may  of  course  re- 
quire the  municipality  to  grade  the 
street  full  width  at  the  proper  grade 
before  the  abutting  owner  can  be  com- 
pelled to  construct  his  sidewalk  or  to 
pay  therefor.  President  and  Fellows 
of  Yale  College  v.  New  Haven,  57 
Conn.   1,   17  Atl.   139    [1889]. 

'^Schrum  v.  Town  of  Salem,  13 
Ind.  App.  115,  39  N.  E.  1050   [1895]. 

^-Peck  V.  Sherwood,  56  N.  Y.  615 
[1874]. 

^^Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111. 
512,  63  N.  E.   l"031    [1902]. 

"City  of  Chicago  v.  Wilson,  195 
111.  19,  57  L.  R.  A.  127,  62  N.  E. 
843    [1902]. 

"Kalbrier  v.  Leonard,  34  Ind.  497 
[1870];  Borough  of  Beltzhoover  v. 
Maple,  130  Pa.  St.  335,  18  Atl.  650 
[1889]. 

^^  Williams  v.  Brace,  5  Conn.  190 
[1824]. 

"  McGrew  v.  Stewart,  51  Kan.  185, 
32  Pac.  896   [1893 1. 

"Elmendorf  v.  City  of  Albany,  17 
Hun.    (N.  Y.)    81    [1879]. 


I 


501  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED  §  324 

each  have  an  easement  in  such  land.  A  statute  which  requires 
the  sidewalk  to  be  constructed  before  the  street  is  paved  is 
valid.^^  On  the  other  hand  the  council  may,  unless  restrained 
by  statute,  pave  the  entire  width  of  the  street,  leaving  no  part 
thereof  for  foot  passengers.-"  Statutes  in  some  states  requiring 
the'  repair  of  sidewalks  to  be  made  at  the  expense  of  the  ad- 
joining property  owners  are  held  to  be  valid. -^  However,  a  stat- 
ute recpiiring  the  abutting  property  owner  to  keep  the  sidewalk 
in  front  of  his  lot  in  repair  under  penalty  of  a  fine,  has  been 
held  to  be  invalid. -- 

§  324.     Sewers. 

A  sewer  is  a  "drain  or  passage  to  convey  off  water  and  filth 
underground."^  A  sewer  is  very  clearly  a  public  improvement, 
absolutely  essential  to  the  health  and  well-being  of  every  thickly 
settled  urban  community.  A  modern  city  simply  could  not  exist 
without  a  proper  and  adequate  system  of  sewers.  Nor  is  there 
any  serious  question  that  a  sewer  may  confer  a  great  benefit 
upon  the  land  which  is  drained  thereby,  rendering  it  inhabitable 
under  modern  conditions  of  civilized  life  and  thereby  benefiting 
it  over  and  above  the  general  benefit  received  by  the  community 
by  reason  of  better  conditions  of  general  health.  For  these 
reasons  it  is  generally  held  that  a  statute  is  a  valid  one  whieli 

"Challis    V.   Parker,    11    Kan.    384  120  Pa.  St.  357.   14  Atl.   170   [1888]. 

[18731:    Parker    v.    Challis,    9    Kan.  Sec  §   713,  §   717. 

155   [1872].  "City   of    Chicago    v.    Crosby,    HI 

^Brevoort   v.    City   of   Detroit,    24  111.    538     [1885];    The    invalidity    of 

Mich.   322    [1872];   contra,  Carter  v.  such   fine    rests   on  two   reasons    (1) 

City  of  Chicago,  57   111.   283    [1870].  that  non-payment  even  of  a  valid  as- 

See  §  2n(i.  sessment  cannot  be  punished  by  fines; 

'^  Heath   v.   Manson,    147    Cal.    004,  and   (2)    that  such  statute  in  requir- 

82  Pac.  331    [11)05];    Manley  v.  Em-  ing  each  owner  to  keep  in  repair  the 

len,  46  Kan.  G55,  27  Pac.  844  [1891] ;  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  house  ignores 

State  ex  rel.  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Dis-  the  question  of  benefits, 

trict  Court  Ramsey  County.  89  :Minn.  •  Drexel   v.  To\Vn  of  Lake,   127   111. 

292,    94    X.    W.    870    [1903];    Youni;  54.  57,  20  X.  E.  38  [1890];    (quotin^r 

V.    Village    of    Waterville.    39    :Minn.  Webster's  Dictionary.     Similar  defini- 

196,   39   X.    \V.    97    [1S8S];    City   of  tions  are  given  in  City  of  Valparaiso 

Pleasant  Hill  v.  Dasher,  120  Mo.  675,  v.    Parker,    148    Ind.    379,    47    X.    E. 

25   S.  W.   506    [1893];    Elmendorf  v.  330    [1897];    Clay   v.   City  of   Grand 

City  of  Albany,  17  Hun.    (X.  Y.)    81  Rapids.  60  Mich.  451.  27  X.  W.  596 

[1879];    Borough    of    Beltzhoover    v.  (1886]-.    and  Fuchs  v.  St.  Louis.   167 

Maple,   130   Pa.   St.  335.    18   Atl.   650  Mo.   620.   57   L.   R.  A.    136,  67   S.   W. 

[1889];   Smith  v.  King-ton  Borough,  610.) 


324 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


502 


provides  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  and  for  assessing  the 
expense  thereof  upon  property  which  is  especially  benefited  there- 
by.-    The  fact  that  the  land  does  not  receive  as  great  a  benefit 


°  Shumate  v.  Heman,  181  U.  S. 
402,  45  L.  922,  21  S.  645  [1901]; 
( affirming  Heman  v.  Allen,  156  Mo. 
534,  5/  S.  W.  559  [1900]);  Paulsen 
V.  Portland,  149  U.  S.  30,  37  L.  637, 
13  S.  750  [1893];  affirming  Paulson 
V.  City  of  Portland,  16  Or.  450,  1 
L.  R.  A.  673,  19  Pac.  450  [1888]); 
Mattingly  v.  District  of  Columbia,  97 
U.  S.  687,  24  L.  1098  [1878];  Minne- 
sota &  M.  Land  &  Improvement  Co. 
V.  City  of  Billings,  111  Fed.  972,  50 
C.  C.  A.  70  [1901];  Kramer  v.  City 
of  Los  Angeles,  147  Cal.  668,  82  Pac. 
334  [1905];  Haughawout  v.  Hub- 
bard, 131  Cal.  675,  63  Pac.  1078 
[1901];  Fitzhugh  v.  Ashworth,  119 
Cal.  393,  51  Pac.  635  [1897];  Har- 
ney V.  Benson,  113  Cal.  314,  45  Pac. 
687  [1896];  Pvauer  v.  Lowe,  107  Cal. 
229,  40  Pac.  337  [1895];  Fletcher 
V.  Prather,  102  Cal.  413,  36  Pac.  658 
[1894];  Anderson  v.  De  Urioste,  96 
Cal.  404,  31  Pac.  266  [1892];  Boyle 
V.  Tibbey,  82  Cal.  11,  22  Pac.  1128 
[1889];  City  of  Highlands  v.  John- 
son, 24  Colo.  371,  51  Pac.  1004 
[1897];  City  of  Pueblo  v.  Robinson, 
12  Colo.  593,  21  Pac.  899  [1889]; 
Wolff  V.  City  of  Denver.  20  Colo. 
App.  135,  77  Pac.  364  [1904];  Bas- 
sett  V.  City  of  New  Haven,  76  Conn. 
70,  55  Ati.  579  [1903];  Sargent  & 
Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  62 
Conn.  5io,  26  Atl.  1057  [1893];  Fer- 
guson V.  Borough  of  Stamford,  60 
Conn.  432,  22  Atl.  782  [1891];  New 
York,  New  Haven  &  Hartford  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  New  Bri- 
tain, 49  Conn.  40  [1881];  Park  Ec- 
clesiastical Society  v.  City  of  Hart- 
ford, 47  Conn.  89  [1879];  Hunger- 
ford  V.  City  of  Hartford,  39  Conn. 
279  [1872];  Clapp  v.  City  of  Hart- 
ford, 35  Conn.  66  [1868];  Cone  v. 
City  of  Hartford,  28  Conn.  363 
[1859];  English  v.  Mayor  and  Coun- 
cil of  Wilmington,  2  Marv.  (Del.) 
63,  37   Atl.   158   1896];   Gage  v.  Vil- 


lage of  Wilmette,  230  111.  428,  82 
N.  E.  056  [1907];  Cline  v.  People  ex 
rel.  Barlow,  224  111.  360,  79  N!  E. 
663  [1906];  Washington  Park  Club 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  219  111.  323,  76 
N.  E.  383  [1906];  Connecticut  Mu- 
tual Life  Insurance  Company  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  217  111.  352,  75  N.  E. 
365  [1905];  Close  v.  City  of  Chica- 
go, 217  111.  216,  75  N.  E.  479  [1905]  ; 
People  ex  rel.  Merriman  v.  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Company,  213  111. 
367,  72  N.  E.  1069  [1904]-  Fisher  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  213  111.  268,  72  N. 
E.  680  [1904]  ;  Walker  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 202  111.  531,  67  N.  E.  369 
[1903];  Smythe  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
197  111.  311,  64  N.  E."  361  [1902]; 
Vandersyde  v.  People,  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 195  111.  200,  62  N.  E.  806 
[1902];  Peters- V.  City  of  Chicago, 
192  111.  437,  61  N.  E.  438;  People 
ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Church,  192  111. 
302,  01  N.'e.  496  [1901];  Village  of 
Hinsdale  v.  Shannon,  182  111.  312,  55 
N.  E.  327  [1899];  Church  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Kochersperger,  179  111.  205, 
53  N.  E.  554  [1899];  Mason  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  178  111.  499,  53  N.  E. 
354  [1899];  Hynes  v.  The  City  of 
Chicago,  175  111.  56,  51  N.  E.' 705 
[1898];  Heinroth  v.  Kochersperger, 
173  111.  205,  50  N.  E.  171  [1898]; 
Walker  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 
ger, 166  111.  96,  46  N.  E.  761  [1897]; 
Beach  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern,  157 
in.  659,  41  N.  E.  1117  [1895];  Bar- 
ber V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  37. 
38  N.  E.  253  [1894]  ;  Rich  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  152  111.  18,  38  N.  E.  255 
[1894];  Rossiter  v.  City  of  Lake 
Forest,  151  HI.  489,  38  V.  E.  359 
[1894] ;  Kelly  v.  City  of  Chicago,  148 
111.  90,  35  N.  E.  752  [1894];  Leitch 
v.  La  Grange,  138  HI.  291,  27  N.  E. 
917  [1892];  City  of  Springfield  v. 
Sale,  127  111.  359.  20  N.  E.  86 
[1890];  City  of  Springfield  v.  Math- 
us,  124  HI.  88,  16  N.  E.  92;   City  of 


503 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§324 


from  a  sewer,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  mains  of  the  cit\   water 
works  have  not  been  extended  along  the  streets  upon  which  some 


Galesburg  v.  Searles,  114  111.  217,  29 
N.  E.  tiSG  11886J;  Village  of  Hyde 
Park  V.  Borden,  94  111.  26  [1879]; 
Boyce  v.  Tuliey,  103  Ind.  202,  70  X. 
E.  531  [1904]  f  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co. 
V.  City  of  New  Albany.  158  Ind.  2(38, 
63  X.  E.  458  [1901]';  Wray  v.  Fry, 
158  Ind.  92,  62  X.  E.  1004  [1901]; 
Alley  V.  City  of  Lebanon,  146  Ind. 
125,'  44  X.  E.  1003  [1896];  Kizer 
V.  Town  of  Winchester,  141  Ind.  694, 
40  X.  E.  265  [1895];  Swain  v.  Fiil- 
mer,  135  Ind.  8,  34  X.  E.  639  [1893]  ; 
Jackson  v.  Smith,  120  Ind.  520,  22 
X.  E.  431  [1889];  McGill  v.  Bruner, 
65  Ind.  421  [1879]:  Board  of  Com- 
missioners of  Allen  County  v.  Sil- 
vers, 22  Ind.  491  [1864];  Xorton  v. 
Fisher,  33  Ind.  App.  132,  71  X.  E. 
51  [1903];  O'Brien  v.  Bradley,  28 
Ind.  App.  487,  61  X.  E.  942  [1901]; 
Spaulding  v.  Baxter,  25  Ind.  App. 
485,  58  X.  E.  551  [1900];  Spades  v. 
Phillips,  9  Ind.  App.  487,  37  X.  E. 
297  [1893];  Lake  Erie  &  Western 
Railroad  Company  v.  Bowker,  9  Ind. 
App.  428,  36  X.  E.  864  [1893] ;  Hard- 
wick  V.  City  of  Independence,  —  la. 

,    114    X.    W.    14    [1907];    Com- 

stock  V.  Eagle  Grove  City,  133  Iowa 
589,  111  X.  W.  51  [1907];  Minne- 
apolis &  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lind- 
quist,  119  la.  144.  93  X.  W.  103 
[1903];  Grunewald  v.  City  of  Cedar 
Rapids,  118  la.  222,  91  X.  W.  1059 
[1902];  Dittoe  v.  City  of  Davenport. 
74  la.  66,  36  X.  W.  895  [1887]: 
Grimmell  v.  City  of  Des  Moines.  57 
la.  144.  10  X.  W.  330  [1881];  City 
of  Paola  v.  Russell,  75  Kan.  826, 
89  Pac.  651  [1907];  City  of  Kansas 
City  v.  Gibson,  66  Kan.  501.  72  Pac. 
222  [1903];  Gilmore  v.  Hentig.  33 
Kan.  156.  5  Pac.  781    [188.5];  Xolnnd 

V.   ^lildenberger.   —   Ky.   .   97    S, 

W.  24    [1906]:    City   of   CovinLrtoii    v. 

W.    T.    Xoland.    —    Ky.    .    89    S. 

W.  216.  28  Ky.  L.  R.  314  [1905]; 
Dressnian  v.  Simonin,  104  Ky.  693. 
47    S.    W.    767.    20    Kv.    L.    R.    868 


[1898];  Ilolzhauer  v.  City  of  Xew- 
port,  94  Ky.  396,  22  S.  W.  752 
[1893];  S.  i).  Moody  &  Co.  v.  Spot- 
orno,  112  La.  1008,  36  So.  836 
[1904];  City  of  Auburn  v.  Paul,  84 
Me.  212,  24'  Atl.  817  [1892];  Tay- 
lor V.  City  of  Haverhill,  192  Mass. 
287,  78  X.  E.  475  [1900];  Cheney 
v.  City  of  Beverly,  188  Mass.  81.  74 
X.  E.'306  [1905]';  Atkins  v.  City  of 
Boston,  188  Mass.  77,  74  X".  E.'292 
[1'jo5];  Smith  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Worcester,  182  Mass.  232,  59 
L.  R.  A.  728,  65  X.  E.  40  [1902]; 
Murphy  v.  Inhabitants  of  Clinton, 
182  Mass.  198,  65  X.  E.  34  [1902]; 
Weed  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Boston,  172  Mass.  28.  42  L.  R.  A. 
642,  51  X.  E.  204  [1898];  Smith  v. 
Abington  Savings  Bank,  171  Mass. 
178,  50  X.  E.  545  [1898];  Inhabi- 
tants of  Leominster  v.  Conant,  139 
Mass.  384,  2  X.  E.  690  [1885];  Snow 
V.  City  of  Fitchburg,  136  ilass.  183 
[1883]";  Butler  v.  City  of  Worcester, 
112  Mass.  541  [1873];  Brewer  v. 
City  of  Springfield,  97  Mass.  152 
[1807];  Parsons  v.  City  of  Grand 
Rapids.  141  Mich.  467,  104  X.  W. 
730  [1905]:  Walker  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 136  Mich.  6,  98  X.W.  744 
1  1904]  ;  Gates  v.  City  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids. 134  Mich.  96,  95  X.  W.  998 
[  1903] ;  Corliss  v.  Village  of  High- 
land Park.  132  Mich.  152.  93  X.  W. 
254.  93  X.  W.  010,  95  X.  W.  416 
[1903];  Warren  v.  City  of 
Granil  Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874]; 
'  'ty  of  Duluth  V.  Davidson,  97  Minn. 
378,  107  X.  W.  151  [1906];  City  of 
Duluth  V.  Dibblee.  62  Minn.  18.  63 
X.  W.  1117  [1895];  Dickey  v.  Por- 
ter, 203  Mo.  1.  101  S.'  W.  586 
[1907];  Curtice  v.  Schmidt.  202  Mo. 
703,  101  S.  W.  61  [1907];  South 
Highland  Land  &  Improvement  Com- 
jiany  v.  Kansas  City.  172  Mo.  523. 
72  S.  W.  944  [19021;  Prior  v.  Bueh- 
ler  &  Cooney  Construction  Companv, 
170   Mo.  439.   71    S.   W.   205    [1902]; 


§324 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


504 


of  the  land  which  is  to  be  assessed  for  such  sewer  is  situated,  as 
it  would  if  such  mains  had  been  so  extended,  does  not  prevent 


Hill  V.  Swingley,  159  Mo.  45,  60  S. 
W.  lU  [1900];"Heman  v.  Allen,  156 
Mo.  534,  57  S.  W.  559  [19uU]; 
Johnson  v.  Duer,  115  Mo.  366,  21  S. 
W.  800  [1892];  City  of  St.  Louis 
V.  Owen,  110  Mo.  445,  19  S.  W.  713 
[1892];  City  of  St.  Joseph  to  Use 
of  Gibson  v.  Farrell,  106  Mo.  437, 
17  S.  W.  497  [1891];  Eyerman  v. 
Blaksiey,  78  Mo.  145  [1883];  State 
of  Missouri  ex  rel.  Cavender  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  56  Mo.  277  [1874]; 
City  to  Use  of  Fox  v.  Schoenemann, 
52  Mo.  348  [1873]  ;  City  of  St.  Louis 
to  Use  of  Creamer  v.  Oeters,  36  Mo. 
45?  [1865];  Lockwood  v.  City  of  St. 
Loui.;,  24  Mo.  20  [1856];  Page  v. 
City  of  Ft.  Louis,  20  Mo.  136  [1854] ; 
Barton  v.  Kansas  Citj',  110  Mo.  App. 
31,  83  S.  W.  1093  [1904];  Akers  v. 
Kolkmeyer  &  Company,  97  Mo.  App. 
520,  71  S.  W.  536  [1902];  City  of 
St.  Joseph  to  the  Use  of  the  Saxton 
National  Bank  v.  Landis,  54  Mo. 
App.  315  [1893];  City  of  Kansas  to 
the  Use  of  Adkins  v.  Richards,  34 
Mo.  App.  521  [1889];  Heman  v. 
Wolf,  33  Mo.  App.  200  [1888]  ;  Eyer- 
mann  Provenchere,  15  Mo.  App.  256 
[1884];  Sheehan  v.  Martin,  10  Mo. 
App.  285  [1881];  Creamer  v.  Allen, 
3  Mo.  App.  545  [1877];  Prendergast 
V.  Richards,  2  Mo.  App.  187  [1876]; 
Miller  v.  Anheuser,  2  Mo.  App.  168 
[1876];  Shannon  v.  City  of  Omaha, 
73  Neb.  507,  103  N.  W.  53, 
106  N.  W.  592  [1905];  Hans- 
com  V.  City  of  Omaha,  11  Neb. 
37,  7  N.  W.'739  [1881];  Van  Cleve 
V.  Passaic  Valley  Sewerage  Commis- 
sioners, 71  N.  J.  L.  183,  58  Atl.  571 
[1904]  ;  Van  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  May- 
or and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pat- 
erson,  67  N.  J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  466,  51 
Atl.  922  [1902];  Brown  v.  Town  of 
Union.  65  N.  J.  L.  (36  Vr.)  601,  48 
Atl.  562  [1900];  State,  Central  New 
Jersey  Land  &  Improvement  Co.  v. 
Mayor  and  Council  of  the  City  of 
Bayonne,  56  N.  J.  L.    (27  Vr.)    297, 


28  Atl.  713  [1893];  DeWitt  v.  City 
of  Elizabeth,  56  N.  J.  L.  (27  Vr.) 
119,  27  Atl.  801  [1893];  State,  Pat- 
erson  and  Hudson  River  Railroad 
Company,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Passaic, 
54  N.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  340,  23  Atl.  945 
[1892];  State,  King,  Pros.  v.  Reed, 
43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  186  [1881]; 
State,  Henderson,  Pros.  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Jersey  City,  41  N.  J.  L.  (12 
Vr.)  489  [1879]  ;  Jones  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  New- 
ark, 11  N.  J.  Eq.  (3  Stock.)  452 
[1857];  People  of  the  State  of  New 
York  ex  rel.  Scott  v.  Pitt,  169  N.  Y. 
521,  58  L.  R.  A.  372,  62  N.  E.  662 
[1902];  Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse, 
158  N.  Y'.  274,  70  Am."  St.  Rep.  472, 
43  L.  R.  A.  678,  53  N.  E.  12  [1899]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the 
Trustees  of  the  Leake  &  Watts  Or- 
phan Home  in  the  City  of  New  York 
to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  92  N.  Y. 
116  [1883];  In  the  Matter  of  Low- 
den  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  89  N. 
Y.  548  [1882];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Merriam  to  Vacate  an  As- 
sessment, 84  N.  Y.  596  [1881]; 
Roosevelt  Hospital  v.  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermen of  the  Commonalty  of  the 
City  of  New  York,  84  N.  Y.  108 
[1881];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  De  Peyster  to  Vacate  an  As- 
sessment, 80  N.  \.  565  [1880];  City 
of  Watertown  v.  Fairbanks,  65  N. 
Y.  588  [1875];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  the  New  York  Protestant 
Episcopal  Public  Schools  to  Vacate 
Certain  Assessments,  47  N.  Y.  506 
[1872];  Meech  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  29 
N.  Y.  198  [1864];  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Petition  of  Williamson  to  Vacate 
an  Assessment  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  New 
York  City,  3  Hun.  65  [1874]; 
Ford  V.  city  of  Tole<lo,  64  O.  S.  92, 
59  N.  E.  779  [1901],  affirming  City 
of  Toledo  V.  'Ford,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  290 
[1900];  Wewell  v.  City  of  Cincin- 
nati, 45  O.  S.  407,  15  N.  E.  196 
[1887];     Hartwell    v.    Railroad.   Co., 


505 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED. 


§325 


an  assessment  for  sueli  improvement  if  it,  in  fact,  does  confer  a 
benefit.^  In  South  Carolina  it  was  formerly  held  that  a  local 
assessment  conld  be  levied  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,*  but 
under  the  view  of  the  general  invalidity  of  local  assessments  in 
force  in  that  state,  such  purpose  would  not  at  present  be  one 
for  which  an  assessment  could  be  levied.'^ 

§  325.     Storm  and  drainage  sewers. 

As  can  be  inferred  from  the  definition  of  a  scAver  already 
quoted,  a  sewer  constructed  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  rain 
water  off  the  public  streets  may  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments,^ 


40  O.  S.  155  [1883];  City  of  Cincin- 
nati for  use  of  Ashman  v.  Bickett, 
20  O.  S.  49  [1875];  Taylor  v.  Wapa- 
koneta,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  285  [1904]; 
City  of  Toledo  v.  Ford,  20  Ohio  C. 
C.  290  [1900];  ( afhrmed  in  Ford  v. 
City  of  Toledo,  04  O.  S.  92,  59  N.  E. 
779,  [1901])  ;  Conner  v.  City  of  Cin- 
cinnati, 11  Ohio  C.  C.  336  [1896]; 
(aHirmed  City  of  Cincinnati  v.  Con- 
nor, 55  0.  *S.  82,  44  X.  E.  582 
[1896]  )  ;  Jolinson  v.  Village  of  Avon- 
dale,  1  Ohio  C.  C.  229  [1885];  Wil- 
son V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  5  Ohio  X. 
P.  68  [1897];  Jones  v.  Holzapfel,  11 
Okl.  405,  68  Pac.  511  [1902];  Paul- 
son V.  City  of  Portland,  16  Or.  450, 
1  L.  E.  A.  673,  19  Pac.  450  [1888]; 
(affirmed  as  Paulsen  v.  Portland,  149 
U.  S.  30,  37  L.  637,  13  S.  750 
[1893]);  Beers  v.  Dallas  City,  16 
Or.  334,  18  Pac.  835  [1888];  Strow- 
bridge  v.  City  of  Portland,  8  Or.  67 
[1879];  Scranton  Sewer,  213  Pa. 
St.  4,  62  Atl.  173  [1-905];  hi  re 
Mill  Creek  Sewer,  196  Pa.  St.  183, 
46  Atl.  312  [1900];  City  of  Phila- 
dclpliia  V.  Phihuh'lphia  and  Reading 
Railroad  Company.  177  Pa.  St.  292, 
34  L.  R.  A.  564.  35  Atl.  610  [1896]; 
Philadel])hia  to  u?e  of  Yost  v.  Odd 
Fellows'  Hall  Association.  108  Pa. 
St.  105.  31  Atl.  917  [18951;  Citv  of 
Scranton  v.  Arnt.  148  Pa.  St.  210, 
23  Atl.  1121  [18921:  Wolf  v.  City 
of  Philadelphia,  105  Pa.  St.  25 
[1884]  :  Wain's  Heirs  v.  City  of  Phil- 
adelpliia  to  use  of  Armstrong.  99  Pa. 
St.  330  [1882];  Commonwealth  for 
use.    etc..    V.    Woods.    44    Pa.    St.     (8 


Wright)  113;  Bisliop  v.  Tripp,  15  R. 
1.  400,  8  Atl.  092  [1887];  Cleveland 
V.  Tripp,  13  R.  I.  50  [1880];  City  of 

Spokane   v.   Preston,  —  Wash.  , 

89  Pac.  400  [1907];  City  of  Parkers- 
burg  V.  Tavenner,  42  W.  Va.  486,  20 
S.  E.  179;  State  ex  rel.  Schintgen  v. 
]\Iayor  and  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  La  Crosse,  101  Wis.  208,  77 
X.  W.  167  [1898];  Hennessy  v. 
Douglas  County,  99  Wis.  129,  74  X. 
W.  983  [1898];  Meggett  v.  City  of 
Eau  Claire,  81  Wis.  326,  51  X.  W. 
566  [1892];  Robinson  v.  City  of 
:\rilvvaukee,  61  Wis.  585,  21  X.  W. 
010  [1884];  Massing  v.  Ames,  37 
Wis.   045    [1875]. 

=•  Walker  v.  City  of  Aurora,  140 
111.  402,  29  X.  E.  ^41    [1893]. 

*  Mauldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green- 
ville. 42  S.  C.  293,  46  Am.  St.  Rep. 
72:5.  27  L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S.  E.  842 
[1893]. 

'See  S    lis.   §    159. 

^City  of  Denver  v.  Dumars,  33 
Colo.  94,  80  Pac.  114  [1904];  Cone 
v.  City  of  Hartford,  28  Conn.  363 
[1859];  Xorthwestern  University  v. 
A'illage  of  Wilmette.  230  III.  80.  82 
X.  E.  615  [1907];  Kirkland  v. 
Board  of  Public  Works  of  the  Citv 
of  Indianapolis.  142  Ind.  123,  41  x\ 
E.  374  [18951;  :\linnoapolis  and  St. 
Louis  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Lindrpiist,  119  la. 
144,  93  X.  W.  103  [19031:  Parsons 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids.  141  Mich. 
467,  104  X.  W.  730  [1905];  Gates 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids.  134  Mich. 
90.   95   X".    W.    90S    [1003]. 


§§326,327  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  506 

as  well  as  a  sewer  constructed  for  the  purpose  of  draining  build- 
ings and  removing  house  sewage.  Even  if  there  is  an  existing 
system  of  sewers,  a  storm  sewer  may  be  a  proper  improvement 
to  be  constructed  on  the  assessment  plan  if  the  existing  system 
is  insufficient  to  carry  off  the  surface  water.- 

§  326.     Use  of  natural  stream  as  sewer. 

If  the  natural  topography  is  such  that  it  is  an  appropriate 
method  of  constructing  a  sewer  to  cover  over  and  wall  in  a 
natural  water  course  and  convert  it  into  a  sewer,  an  assessment 
for  this  purpose  is  as  valid  as  one  for  the  construction  of  a 
sewer  in  the  ordinary  way  would  be.^ 

§  327.     Main  sewers. 

Assessments  may  be  levied  for  the  construction  of  a  main  sewer 
or  trunk  sewer;  that  is,  a  sewer  intended  to  carry  sewage  from 
a  large  area  of  drainage.  All  property  drained  by  such  main 
sewer  and  by  the  lateral  sewers  connecting  therewith  is  es- 
pecially benefited  by  such  main  sewer  and  may  be  assessed  there- 
for.^ The  difficulty  of  apportioning  the  cost  of  the  main  sewer, 
however,  has  not  infrequently  led  the  legislature  to  provide  that 
the  cost  of  the  main  sewer  must  be  paid  for  out  of  the  general 
funds  of  the  municipality.-  A  similar  result  is  reached  by  a 
statute  providing  that  only  the  land  abutting  on  the  sewer  can 
be  assessed  therefor.^  Under  such  statute  if  a  larger  sewer  is 
constructed  than  is  needed  for  local  drainage,  in  order  to  serve 

^  Northwestern    University    v.    Vil-  ^  Bassett  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  76 

lage  of  Wilmette,  230  111.  80,  82  N.  Conn.  70,  55  Atl.  579   [1903];   Alley 

E.  615  [1907].  V.  City  of  Lebanon,  146  Ind.   125,  44 

1  Kramer   v.    City   of   Los   Angeles,  N.  E.   1003    [1896];    South   Highland 

147    Cal.    668,   82    Pac.    334    [1905];  Land   and   Improvement   Company  v. 

Hungerford  v.   City   of   Hartford,   39  Kansas  City,   172  Mo.  523,  72  S.  W. 

Conn.   279    [1872];"   Quinn   v.   James,  944    [1902];    City   of   Kansas   to   the 

174  Mass.  23,  54  N.  E.  343   [1899];  use   of    Adkins   v.   Richards,    34    Mo. 

Beals    V.    Inhabitants    of    Brookline,  App.   521    [1889];    Hanscom   v.    City 

174  Mass.    1,   54   N.   E.   339    [1899];  of  Omaha,   11   Neb.  37,  7  N.  W.  739 

Beals    V.    James,    173   Mass.    591,    54  [1881];    City   of  Toledo  v.   Ford,   20 

N.  E.  245- [1899];   Butler  v.  City  of  Ohio    C.    C."^  290    [1900];     (affirmed 

Worcester,     112    Mass.    541     [1873];  Ford  v.  City  of  Toledo,  64  0.  S.  92, 

Clay    V.    City    of    Grand    Rapids,    60  59  N.  E.  779  [1901]). 

Mich.    451,    27    N.    W.    596    [1886];  ^jjeman  v.  Handlan,   59  Mo.   App. 

Hanscom  v.   City  of  Omaha.   11  Neb.  490    [1894].     .See   §   663. 

37,  7  N.  W.  739   [1881].  MVitman   v.   City  of  Reading,   169 

Pa.   St.    375.   32    Atl.   576. 


507  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §§328,329 

as  a  trunk  sewer  for  another  drainage  section,  the  owner  of 
realty  drained  thereby  cannot  be  assessed  for  such  increased 
cost.^  Questions  arising  under  such  statutes,  as  well  as  questions 
of  apportionment  of  assessments  among  lands  benefited  by  the 
improvement  and  questions  as  to  what  lands  may  be  assessed 
for  such  improvements  are  discussed  elsewhere. 

§  328.     Lateral  sewers. 

Local  assessments  may  also  be  levied  for  local  or  lateral  sewers, 
that  is,  for  sewers  connecting  the  property  to  be  drained,  with  a 
main  sewer  or  a  branch  thereof,  either  directly  or  indirectly.^ 
So  assessments  may  be  levied  for  openings  from  main  sewers 
opposite  different  lots,  so  that  connections  with  house  drainage 
may  be  made  thereafter.-  This  is  recognized  even  in  cases  where 
the  provisions  for  such  lateral  sewers  or  connections  were  invalid 
as  being  indefinite,^  or  unreasonable.* 

§  329.    Assessment  for  outlet. 

A  sewer  without  an  outlet  which  can  be  used  as  of  right  is  as 
useless  a  thing  as  can  be  imagined.  The  right  to  assess  for  a 
sewer,  which  has  no  outlet,  involves  the  theory  of  public  improve- 
ments on  private  property,  and  is  discussed  elsewhere.^  A  local  as- 
sessment may  be  levied  on  land  drained  by  a  sewer  to  secure  an 
outlet  therefor;-  and  the  fact  that  such  outlet  must  be  sought 

*  Park    Avenue    Sewers,    Appeal    of  [1902];  Vandersyde  v.  People  ex  i-el. 

Pinker,   1G9  Pa.  St.  433,  32  At!.  574  Raymond,   195  111.  200,  62  N.  E.  80() 

[1895].  [1902]. 

1  Payne  v.  Village  of  South  Spring-  MVetmore  v.  City  of  ("liicago.  200 

field,  'l61     111.    285,    44    N.    E.    105  111.   307,   69   N.   E.  "234    [1903]:    Van 

[1896];    Palmer  v.  City  of  Danville,  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 

154  111.   156,  38   N.  E.1067    [1894];  men  of  the   City  of  Paterson,  67   N. 

People's    National    Bank    of    Brattle  J.    L.     (38    Vr.)     455.    51    Atl.    922 

boro,  Vermont,  v.  Ayer,  24  Ind.  App.  [1902]. 

212,  56  N.  E.  207   [1899];   Byram  v.  M^tage  v.  City  of  Chicago,   191   111. 

Foley,    17    Ind.    App.    629,    47    N.    E.  210,    00    X.    E.    896    [1901];    Bicker- 

351     [1897];    Coburn    v.    Bossert;    13  dike  v.  City  of  Chicago,  185  111.  280, 

Ind.  App.  359,  40  N.  E.  281    [18951;  50     X.     K.      1090      [1900]:      (distin- 

Coates   V.   Xugent,   —   Kan.   .   92  guished    in    Vandersyde   v.    People   e.^ 

Pac.  597   ]1907].  rel.  Raymond,   195  111.  200,  62  X.  E. 

=  Duane    v.    City    of    Chicago,     198  806   [1902]). 

111.     471,     04     X."  E.     1033     [1902];  ^8ee§401. 

Smythe   v.   City   of   Chicago.    197   111.  'Board    of    Improvement    District 

311,   64   N.    E.    301    [1902];    City   of  Xo.   5   of   Texarkana   v.   OfTenhausor, 

Chicago  V.  Corcoran,  196  111.   146,  63  84      Ark.     257.      105      S.     W.     205; 

N.   E.    690    [1902];    Oaie    v.    City   of  Cr:iy  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  177  111.  459. 

Chicago,    195    111.    490,    G3   X.    E."  184  53   X.   E.   91    [1S99]:    Atkins   v.   City 


§  330  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  508 

outside  the  limits  of  the  municipal  corporation  does  not  invali- 
date the  assessment ;  ^  although,  ordinarily,  property  cannot  be 
assessed  for  an  improvement  in  another  municipality  or  political 
district.  The  fact  that  the  outlet  of  the  sewer  is  carried  to  a 
point  at  which  sewage  could  be  discharged  with  the  minimum 
injury  to  public  health,  and  without  polluting  a  stream,  does  not 
prevent  the  levy  of  local  assessments  therefor.'* 

§  330.     Pumping  station. 

Where  the  country  is  flat  and  level,  sewage  cannot  always  be 
made  to  flow  off  by  the  force  of  gravitation,  as  there  may  not 
be  sufficient  slope  between  the  land  to  be  drained  and  the  outlet 
to  secure  a  natural  flow.  Under  such  circumstances  some  addi- 
tional force  is  necessary  to  secure  a  proper  flow  of  sewage ;  and 
this  additional  force  is  very  often  sought  in  pumping  stations  to 
drive  the  sewage  on  in  some  way.  either  by  propulsion  or  by 
lifting  it  to  a  greater  height  and  thus  securing  a  greater  slope 
for  the  outlet  sewer.  Can  the  cost  of  such  a  pumping  station  be 
assessed  upon  the  land  drained  by  such  sewers?  In  Illinois  it  is 
held  that  such  a  pumping  station,  under  these  conditions,  is  an 
essential  part  of  a  system  of  sewers ;  that  its  cost  can  be  classed 
with  the  cost  of  the  sewers  themselves,  especially  with  the  cost 
of  main  or  trunk  sewers,  and  can  be  assessed  upon  the  land 
which  is  benefited  by  such  system  of.  sewers.  The  leading  case 
on  this  point  is  one  involving  a  pumping  station  for  a  drainage 
system,^  and  it  has  been  followed  by  a  series  of  cases  which  up- 
hold the  validity  of  assessments  for  such  pumping  stations  used 
in  connection  with  sewers.-     In  these  cases  it  is  held  that  such  a 

of   Boston,    188   Mass.    77,    74   X.    E.  *  W.    F.    Stewart    Co.    v.    City    of 

292    [1905];    W.    F.    Stewart    Co.    v.  Flint,     147    Mich.    G97,     111    X.    W. 

City  of  Flint,  147  Mich.  697,  111  X.  352    [1907]. 

W.^  352     [1907];     Prior    v.    Buehler  ^  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Spencer, 

and    Cooney    Construction    Company,  118    111.   446,    8    X.    E.    846    [1888]. 

170  Mo.  439,  71  S.  W.  205   [1902].  ^  Q\o?,e  v.  City  of  Chicago,  217  111. 

^Callon    V.    City    of    Jacksonville,  216,    75    X.    E.    479    [1905];    Fisher 

147   111.    113,   35   X.   E.   223    [1894];  v.   City   of  Chicago,   213   111.   268,   72 

Majnvood  County  V.  Village  of  May-  X.    E.    680     [1904];     McChesney    v. 

wood,  140  111.  216,  29  X.  E.  216,  29  Village   of  Hyde   Park,    151   111.   634, 

X.    E.    704    [1893];    Cochran   v.    Vil-  37  X.  E.  858  [1894];  Drexel  v.  Town 

lage  of  Park  Roads,   138  111.  295,  27  of    Lake,    127    111.    54.    20    X.    E.    38 

X.    E.    939    [1893];    Shreve   v.    Town  [1890];    Pearce    v.    Village    of    Hyde 

of   Cicero,    129   111.    226;    sul   nomine  Park,    126    111.    287,    18  "X.    E.    824 

Albertson   v.   Town  of   Cicero,   21   X.  [1890]. 
E.   815    [1890]. 


509  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE    LEVIED.  §§  331,  332 

pumpiuj^  station  is  of  local  utility-  and  that,  therefore,  such  assess- 
ments are  valid ;  in  distinction  from  cases  of  a  general  water- 
works plant,  or  a  general  plant  for  street  lighting,  which  are 
said  to  be  of  general  utility,  and,  therefore,  improvements  for 
which  local  assessments  cannot  be  made.  The  force  of  the  dis- 
tinction is  not  easy  to  grasp.  In  each  ease  the  central  plant  is  an 
essential  part  of  the  general  .system,  and  if  the  reasons  assigned 
justify  local  assessments  for  one  they  should  justify  it  for  the 
others.  Can  the  running  expenses  of  such  a  pumping  station  be 
assessed  upon  the  land  drained  by  such  sewerage  system?  It  is 
held  where  such  question  has  been  raised  that  such  expenses 
cannot  be  met  by  local  assessment.''  In  Illinois  such  result  seems 
to  depend  on  the  provisions  of  the  statute,  and  it  is  there  held  that 
repairs  may  be  paid  for  by  assessments.*  In  New  Jersey  the 
statute  expressly  provided  for  a  surface  tax  on  land  drained  to 
defray  the  expense  of  running  and  maintaining  a  pumping  sta- 
tion ;  and  such  statute  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional.^ 

§  331.    Sewer  without  lateral  connections. 

A  so-called  sewer,  constructed  for  sanitary  purposes  and  for 
which  council  provides  no  connections,  so  as  to  afford  a  means 
of  draining  sewage  from  the  land  which  it  is  sought  to  assess, 
is  not  a  sewer  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  allowing  local  assess- 
ments for  sewers.^  The  fact  that  later,  and  before  tax-bills  issued 
the  park  board  ordered  such  connections  was  held  not  to  render 
such  assessments  valid,  the  council,  and  not  the  park  board,  hav- 
ing authority  to  assess." 

§  332.    Charge  for  privilege  of  making  sewer  connection. 

A  statute  wliieli  i)rovides  that  if  a  sewer  has  been  built,  to  be 
paid  for  by  local  assessments,  and  such  assessments  have  been 
declared  to  be  invalid,  a  property  owner  who  has  not  paid  such 
assessment  cannot  connect  his  premises  with  such  sewer  unless 

'McChesnoy  v.  Villajre  of  Hyflt'  ^  State,  M'Closkey,  Pros.  v.  Cham- 
Park,  1.51  111.  6.34,  .37  X.  E.  'SoS  I.erlin,  .37  X.  J.  L.  (S  Vr.)  388 
[18941;     State,    M'Closkey,    Pros.    v.  [18751. 

Chamherlin,    37    X.    J.    L.     (8    Vr.)  'Barton    v.    Kansas    City,    110    Mo. 

388   [18751.  App.  31,  83  S.  W.   1093    [19041. 

*  ^fcChesney    v.    Village     of    Ilyde  ^Barton    v.    Kansas   City,    110    Mo. 

Park.     151     Til.    034.    37    X.    E.    858  App.    31,    83    S.    \V.    1093    [1904]. 
[1894]. 


§§333,334  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  510 

he  pays  a  special  charge  for  such  privilege  is  valid.^  However,  if 
no  such  provision  is  made  by  statute,  and  a  regular  license  fee 
is  provided  for  by  statute,  the  city  cannot  impose  an  additional 
charge  upon  the  owners  of  realty  who  have  not  paid  such  invalid 
assessment.- 

§  333.     Private  sewer. 

If  a  sewer  is  constructed,  not  as  a  public  improvement  but  as 
a  private  enterprise,  it  is  not  an  improvement  for  which  an  as- 
sessment can  be  levied.^  Thus,  A.  constructed  a  private  sewer 
system  under  an  ordinance  authorizing  him  to  construct  such 
system,  and  giving  him  the  exclusive  right  to  construct  the  same, 
and  authorizing  him  to  collect  reasonable  annual  compensation 
from  all  persons  using  such  system.  B.  made  connection  with  a 
sewer,  so  that  B.'s  land  received  the  benefit  of  such  system.  It 
was  held  that  A.  could  not  collect  from  B.  for  such  use.-  How- 
ever, the  question  of  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize 
such  extension  was  not  involved  in  this  case,  since  the  statute  did 
not  authorize  such  ordinance. 

§  334.    Drainage  a  special  local  benefit. 

The  drainage  of  wet  and  marshy  land  renders  it  suitable  for 
use  as  agricultural  land,  or  for  residence  and  manufacturing  pur- 
poses. It  makes  useful  land,  which,  before,  was  useless.  There 
can  be  no  question  but  that  drainage  confers  a  great  benefit  upon 
the  owner  of  the  property  which  is  drained.^  Possibly  the  special 
and  local  benefit  is  clearer  in  drainage  than  it  is  in  any  other  of 
the  public  improvements  for  which  assessments  are  levied.  The 
improvements  of  drainage,  and  its  beneficial  effect  upon  the  land 
drained  are  matters  of  general  knowledge  which  have  often  been 
commented  upon  by  the  courts.-  In  order  to  justify  a  special  assess- 

1  Carson  v.  Brockton  Sewerage  ^  Weaver  v.  Canon  Sewer  Corn- 
Commission,  182  U.  S.  398,  45  L.  pany,  18  Colo.  App.  242,  70  Pac. 
115i;    21    S.    860    [1901];     (affirming  953    [1902]. 

Carson    v.    Sewerage    Commissioners  ^Weaver   v.    Canon    Sewer    Co.,    18 

of  Brockton,  175  Mass.  242,  48  L.  R.  Colo.  App.  242,  70  Pac.  953   [1902]. 

A.  277,  56  N.  E.  1   [1900]).  ^  Zigler    v.    Menges,    121    Ind.    99, 

=  State   of   Ohio   ex   rel.   Burner   v.  16   Am.   St.   Hep.   357,   22  N.   E.   782 

Graydon,   6   Ohio   C.    C.    634    [1892]:  [1SS9];   Donnelly  v.  Decker,  58  Wis. 

(affirmed  by  a  divided  court,  30  W.  461,  46  Am.  Rep.  637,  17  N.  W.  389 

L.    351).      An    additional    charge    of  [1883]. 

two  dollars  per  front  imposed  by  the  -Hagar     v.     Reclamation     District 

city   authorities   for   the   privilege   of  No.    108,    111    U.    S.    701.    28    L.    469, 

connecting   with    the    sewer   was   held  4  S.  663  [1884];    (affirming  Reclama- 

to  be  invalid  in  this  case.  tion    District    Xo.    108    v.    Hagar,    4 


511 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED. 


335 


ment  on  the  theory  of  benefits,  however,  it  is  necessary  not  merely 
that  the  improvement  confer  a  special  benefit,  but  that  it  also 
shall  be  of  a  public  character,  in  order  to  justify  the  legislature 
in  providing  for  such  improvement,  either  at  public  expense  or 
at  the  expense  of  the  owners  of  property  benefited.  In  the  case 
of  assessments  for  drainage  improvements,  the  great  difficulty  is 
to  find  in  all  cases  a  public  use  and  benefit  which  justifies  the 
public  in  constructing  the  improvement  and  compelling  the 
owners  of  land  benefited  to  contribute  thereto. 

§  335.    Theory  of  benefit  to  public  health. 

If  land  in  its  natural  condition  is  generally  or  often  covered 
with  stagnant  water  it  is  likely  to  be  a  menace  to  public  health. 
The  danger  to  health  is,  of  course,  greater,  if  the  land  is  so 
poorly  drained  by  nature  as  to  be  q^  marsh  or  a  swamp.  Under 
these  circumstances  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  drainage  of  such 
land,  by  artificial  means,  is  an  improvement  which  confers  a  bene- 
fit upon  the  public  at  large. ^  As  far  as  the  element  of  public  in- 
terest is  required  the  public  health  is  a  sufficient  basis  for  local 
assessments  for  purposes  of  drainage.^     At  the  same  time  it  has 


Fed.  36G  [1880]);  Chicago,  Burl- 
ington &  Quincy  Ry.  Co.  v.  People, 
212   111.   10.3.  72"  N.  E.  219    [19041. 

Mlagar  v.  Reclamation  District 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569. 
4  S.  663  [1884];  ( anirming  Reclam- 
ation District  Xo.  108  v.  Hagar,  4 
Fed.  366  [1880]);  Laguna  Drain- 
age District  v.  Charles  Martin  Co., 
144  Cal.  209,  77  Pac.  933  [1904]; 
Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222  [1874]; 
Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Ry. 
Co.  V.  People,  212  Til.  103,  72  N.  E. 
219,  (see  discussion  on  p.  119) 
[19041;  Zigler  v.  Mengos,  121  Ind. 
99,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  357,  22  N.  E. 
782   [1889]. 

'^  Laguna  Drainage  District  v. 
Charles  Martin  Co.,  144  Cal.  209,  77 
Pac.  933  [1904];  TIefTnor  v.  Cass 
and  Morgan  Counties,  193  Til.  439. 
58  L.  R.  A.  353,  62  N.  E.  201  [1901]  ; 
Bate  V.  Sheets.  64  Tnd.  209  [1878]; 
Tillman    v.     Kircher,     64     Ind.     104 


[1878];  Oliver  v,  Monona  County. 
117  la.  43,  90  N.  W.  510  [1902i; 
State  ex  rel.  Utick  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners  of  Polk  Coun- 
ty, 87  Minn.  325,  60  L.  R.  A.  Kil, 
87  N.  W.  216  [1902];  Lien  v.  Board 
of  County  Commissioners  of  Norman 
County,  80  :\linn.  58,  82  N.  W.  1094 
[1900];  :\Iound  City  Land  &  Stock 
Co.  v.  Miller,  170  Mo.  240,  94  Am. 
St.  Rep.  727,  60  L.  R.  A.  190,  70 
S.  W.  721  [1902];  O'Neill  v.  City 
of  Hoboken,  72  N.  J.  L.  67,  60  Ati. 
50  [1905];  Matter  of  Ryers,  72  N, 
V.  1.  28  Am.  Rep.  88;  Thompson  v.' 
Treasurer  of  Wood  County.  11  0.  S. 
678  [ISfiO]:  Rude  v.  Town  of  St. 
Afario.  121  Wis.  634.  90  X.  W.  4(iO 
[19011;  Stilt"  e\  rel.  Wittc  v.  Cur- 
tis. 86  Wis.  140.  56  X.  W.  475; 
State  ex  rel.  Baltzell  v.  Stewart.  74 
Wis.  620.  6  L.  R.  A.  394.  43  X.  W. 
947  [1889];  Bryant  v.  Robluns,  70 
Wis.  258.  35  X.'w.  545    [1887]. 


§    336  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  •  512 

been  held  that  lands  which  are  not  actually  drained  by  artificial 
means  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  expense  of  such  drainage,  even 
though  the  public  health  throughout  the  whole  neighborhood  may 
be  improved  by  means  of  such  drainage.  Benefits  of  this  sort 
are  said  to  be  too  uncertain  and  too  indirect.^  This,  however,  is 
merely  a  special  application  of  the  principle  that  assessments 
cannot  be  levied  for  general  benefits.*  It  seems  not  to  be  neces- 
sary that  the  legislature  should  declare  specifically  that  the  im- 
provement authorized  will  benefit  public  health.  It  is  sufficient, 
if  the  court  can  take  judicial  knowledge  of  the  topography  of  the 
country  and  see  that  benefit  to  the  public  health  exists.^  If, 
however,  the  statute  does  not  purport  to  limit  the  purpose  of  the 
drainage  improvement  to  public  health,  convenience  and  welfare, 
the  statute  may  be  held  invalid,  though  in  the  particular  case 
such  considerations  may  exist.*' 

§  336.    Theory  of  benefit  to  public  highways. 

While  improvement  of  the  public  health  is  the  usual  form  of 
benefit  to  the  public  arising  out  of  such  improvement  it  is  not 
the  only  form  of  public  benefit.  The  benefit  that  the  public  high- 
ways may  receive  from  the  drainage  of  large  tracts  of  land  has 
been  held  to  be  sufficient  to  authorize  the  levy  of  special  assess- 
ments to  pay  for  such  drainage.^  "That  the  drainage  of  large 
tracts  of  wet  and  overflowed  lands  will  operate  beneficially  to 
the  public  there  can  be  no  serious  doubt.  Statutes  authorizing 
and  providing  for  such  drains  have  been  enacted  and  in  force 
in  this  country  for  over  a  century  and  have  been  sustained  on 
various  grounds.  Some  have  been  upheld  where  large  tracts  of 
agricultural  lands  have  been  reclaimed  and  made  suitable  for 
cultivation,  independent  of  any  effect  the  drainage  of  such  lands 
might  have  upon  the  public  health ;  it  being  held  in  those  cases 

^  State,    Skinkle,    Pros.    v.    Tnhabi-  ^  Commissioners     of     Highways    of 

tants  of  the  Township  of  Clinton   in  the   Town   of   Colfax   v.    Commission, 

the    County    of    Essex,    39    N.    J.    L.  ers  of  East  Lake  Fork  Special  Drain- 

(10  Vr.)    656   [1877].  age  District,   127    111.   581,   21   N.   E. 

*  See  §  654.  206      [1890];       Oliver      v.      Monona 

=  State   ex   rel.   Utick   v.    Board   of  County,    117    la.    43,   90   N.    W.    510 

County       Commissioners       of       Polk  [1902];   State  ex  rel.  Utick  v.  Board 

County,   87   Minn.   325.   60   L.   K.   A.  of    County    Commissioners    of    Polk 

161,  92  N.  W.  216   [1902].  County,   8*7   Minn.    325,   60   L.   R.   A. 

« Reeves     v.     Treasurer     of     Wood  161,   92   N.   W.   210    [1902]. 
County,   8   0.   S.   333    [1858]. 


1 


513  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  337 

that  draining  considerable  portions  of  the  public  domain  and  bene- 
fiting all  lands  through  which  the  drain  may  pass  and  others  ad- 
jacent, perhaps,  is  a  public  benefit  within  the  meaning  of  the 
law.  While  the  element  of  public  health  is  often  made  an 
important  factor  in  the  consideration  of  statutes  of  this  kind,  it 
is  believed  that  any  public  benefit,  such  as  the  improvement  of 
highways  or  the  reclamation  of  large  tracts  of  otherwise  waste 
lands  is  sufficient  to  support  them.  "^  Thus,  where  the  drainage 
did  not  benefit  the  public  health,  but  did  benefit  the  public  high- 
ways, and  did  also  render  several  hundred  acres  of  land  more 
valuable  and  productive,  it  was  held  that  a  local  assessment 
therefor  could  be  levied  on  the  lands  benefited  thereby,  even 
though  such  lands  Avere  not  benefited  by  the  improvement  of  the 
public  highways.^ 

§  337.    Extent  of  special  benefit  does  not  constitute  public  benefit. 

Greater  difficulty  is  presented  where  the  condition  of  the  land 
is  not  such  as  to  be  an  acute  menace  to  public  health,  and  yet 
where  the  drainage  of  the  land  will  be  of  great  benefit  to  the 
owners  of  the  land  thus  drained.  Upon  this  question  there  are 
two  theories,  inconsistent  in  the  form  in  which  they  are  expressed, 
though  not  so  often  inconsistent  in  the  results  actually  reached 
tinder  such  theories.  According  to  the  statement  of  one  theory 
as  set  out  in  many  cases,  if  the  drainage  system  established  is 
intended  solelv  for  the  private  gain  of  the  owners  of  land  v^b'oh 
is  to  be  drained  thereby,  and  is  not  intended  to  subserve  the  public 
health,  convenience  or  welfare,  such  an  improvement  cannot  be 
oon<5tructed  or  authorized  by  the  state,  nor  can  a  local  assessment 
thorpfor  be  levied,  even  upon  lands  which  are  greatlv  benefited 
thereby.^     As  in  other  cases  of  assessment,  the  underlying  theory 

*  State   ex    rel.   TTtick    v.   Board    of  City,  9  Ciish.  233;  In  re  Drainage  of 

County       Commissioners       of       Polk  Lands,    35    N.    J.    L.     (6    Vr. )     497 

County,    87    Minn.    325.    335,    60    L.  [1872];   French  v.  Kirkland.  1   Pai<je 

R.   A.    161,    177.    178.   92   N.   W.   216  (N.    Y.)     117;    Ohio    v.    Commission- 

119021;    (citinsr  Wnrts  v.  Hoa<rland,  ors.  41   0.  S.  423). 

114  U.  S.  606.  29  L.  229.  5  S.   1086  '  Heick    v.    Voi-rht,    110    Ind.    279, 

[18851;     Head    v.    Amo^kpac    Manu-  11  X.  E.  306  [1886]. 

facturing    Co..    113    TT.    R.    9,    5    S.  >  El^^ore   v.    Draina^^e   Commission- 

441,    28    L.    889:     O'Tfeillv    v.    Kan-  ers.    1.35    111.    269.    25    Am.    St.    Rep. 

knkee     Valley     DrairiinT     Company,  363.   25   N.    E.    1010    [1892];    CifTord 

32    Ind.     169:     Lowell    v.    Citv.     Ill  Drainage  Di=!trift  v.  Rhroer.  145  Ind. 

Mass.  454.   15    Am.  Ren.  39:    Coomes  572.  44  N.  E.  636;   Zigler  v.  Menses, 

V.    Burt.    22    Pick.    422;    Wright    v.  121    Ind.    99,    16    Am.    St.   Rep.   357, 


§337 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


514 


must  be  public  good,  not  private  advantage.-  Unless  public  good 
demands,  the  owner  of  private  property  cannot  be  compelled  to 
improve  it  against  his  will,  no  matter  how  wise  it  may  be  to  make 
such  improvement  or  how  much  it  may  add  to  the  utility  or 
value  of  his  land.  "If  the  sole  purpose  of  the  ditch  was  to  im- 
prove certain  specified  lands  for  the  direct  pecuniary  benefit  of 
the  owners  thereof,  then  the  whole  statute  w^ould  be  unconstitu- 
tional; for  the  owner  of  one  piece  of  property  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  contribute  to  the  expense  of  the  improvement  of  another 
piece  of  property,  nor  can  the  land  of  one  owner  be  taken  for 
the  purpose  of  furnishing  an  outlet  for  the  drainage  of  the  land 
of  another.  The  statutory  provisions  which  are  involved  in  this 
case  are  supported  on  the  theory  that  the  public  health  conven- 
ience and  welfare  are  promoted  by  the  construction  of  the 
improvement^not  simply  that  the  lands  of  particular  owners 
are  rendered  more  valuable.""  The  fact  that  by  reason  of  the 
improvement  the  lands  drained  would  be  benefited,*  and  that  such 
land  would  be  rendered  more  fertile  and  productive,^  or  more 
valuable,*^  is  held  not  to  be  such  a  public  purpose  as  will  enable 
the  legislature  to  authorize  an  assessment  for  such  drainage,  if 
no  considerations  of  public  health,  welfare,  or  utility  supervene. 


22  N.  E.  782  [1889];  Bate  v.  Sheets, 

64  Ind.  209  [1878];  Tillman  v.  Kir- 
Cher,  64  Ind.  104  [1878];  Oliver  v. 
Monona  County,  117  la.  43,  90  N. 
W.  510  [19021;  Fleming  v.  Hull. 
73  la.  598,  35  N.  W.  673,  22  Am.  & 
Eng.  Corp.  Ca.  310;  Hull  v.  Baird, 
73  la.  528,  35  N.  W.  613;  Kinnie  v. 
Bare,  68  Mich.  625,  36  X.  W.  672; 
People  ex  rel.  Butler  v.  Super- 
visors of  Saginaw  County,  26 
Mich.  22  [1872];  State  ex  rel!  Utick 
V.  Board  of  County  Commissioners 
of  Polk  County,  87  Minn.  325,  60  L. 
R.  A.  161,  92  N.  W.  216  [1902]; 
Jenal  v.  Gi-een  Island  Draining  Co., 
12  Xeb.  163,  10  N.  W.  547  [1881]; 
Chicago  &  Erie  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Keith,  67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R.  A.  525, 

65  N.  E.  1020  [1902];  McQuillen  v. 
Hatton,  42  O.  S.  202;  Miller  v.  Gra- 
District,  90  Wis.  301,  63  N.  W.  288. 
ham,  17  O.  S.  1  [1866];  Reeves  v. 
Treasurer  of  Wood  County,  8  0.  S. 
333   [1858];   In  re  Theresa  Drainage 


=  Patterson  v.  Baumer,  43  la.  477 
[1876]. 

^Oliver  v.  Monona  County,  117  la. 
43,  55,  56,  90  X.  W.  510  [1902]; 
(citing  Patterson  v.  Baumer,  43  la. 
477  [1876],  and  Fleming  v.  Hull,  73 
la.   598,  35  X.  W.   673). 

'  Elmore  v.  Drainage  Commission- 
ers, 135  111.  269,  25  Am.  St.  Rep. 
363,  25  X.  E.  1010  [1892];  Gifford 
Drainage  District  v.  Shroer,  145 
Ind.  572,  44  X.  E.  636;  Zigler  v. 
Menges,  121  Ind.  99,  16  Am.  St.  Rep. 
357,  22  X.  E.  782  [1889];  State  ex 
rel.  Utick  v.  Board  of  County  Com- 
missioners of  Polk  County,  87  Minn. 
325,  60  L.  R.  A.  161,  92*  N.  W.  216 
[1902];  Chicago  &  Erie  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Keith,  67  0.  S.  279,  60  L.  R. 
A.  525,  65  X.  E.  1020  [1902];  Reeves 
V.  Treasurer  of  Wood  County,  8  O. 
S.  333    [1858]. 

=  McQuillen  v.  Hatton,  42  O.  S.  202. 

"Oliver  v.  Monona  County,  117  la. 
43,  90  X.  W.  510    11902]. 


515  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  338 

In  New  York,  under  an  amendment  to  the  constitution,  providing 
"General  laws  may  be  passed  permitting  the  owners  or  occupants 
of  agricultural  lands  to  construct  and  maintain  for  the  drainage 
thereof  necessary  drains,  ditches  and  dykes  upon  the  lands  of 
others,  under  proper  restrictions  and  with  just  compensation,"' 
it  was  held  that  local  assessments  for  such  drains  were  not  au- 
thorized and  that  a  statute  providing  for  such  assessments  was 
unconstitutional.**  In  this  case  the  court  divided  on  the  question 
of  whether  such  drainage,  if  solely  for  the  benefit  of  the  land 
drained  was  a  public  purpose.  "Under  its  provisions  the  au- 
thority to  tax  may  be  exercised  in  favor  of  a  single  person  for  the 
improvement  of  a  single  acre  of  agricultural  land — a  result  which 
we  feel  certain  was  not  within  the  contemplation  of  the  framers 
of  the  constitutional  provision."^ 

§  338.    Theory  of  public  interest  in  condition  of  land. 

Under  the  other  theory  it  is  held  that  the  reclamation  of  a 
large  tract  of  ground,  so  as  to  convert  it  from  marshy  or  swampy 
land  into  land  suitable  for  use  by  man,  of  which  uses  agriculture 
is  the  most  common,  is  of  itself  a  use  so  pul)lic  in  its  nature  as  to 
justify  public  corporations  in  requiring  such  work  to  be  done  and 
in  levying  local  assessments  therefor,  if  authorized  by  statute.^ 
The  public  is  said  to  have  an  interest  in  the  condition  of  land 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  state  over  and  above  its  interest 
based  upon  considerations  of  the  public  health.  "The  public  has 
an  interest  beyond  the  mere  sanitary  condition  of  land,  and 
founded  upon  other  iind  different  principle's  than  the  controlling 

"Constitution    of    New    V()ri<,    Arti-  County.    l(i:5    X.    V.    1.3.3,    70    Am.    St. 

cle   I.,   8   7,  ailojitcd  in   isn4.  lU'p.  574,  49  L.  R.  A.  781,  792.  57  X. 

"In  tlie  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  K.  30.3  [1900]. 
Tutliill  for  the  Appointment  of  '  Wurts  v.  Hoa<>;Iand,  114  U.  S. 
Commissioners  to  Drain  Certain  Wet  (iOO.  29  L.  229,  5  S.  1086  [18851: 
and  Low  Lands  in  the  Towns  of  (affirming  Hoagland  v.  State,  Simon- 
Chester  and  Blooming  Grove  in  ton.  Pros.,  43  X'^.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.) 
Orange  County,  163  X.  Y.  133.  79  450  [18811;  which  affirmed  Matter 
Am.  St.  Rep.  574.  49  L.  R.  A.  781.  of  Drainage  of  the  Great  Jfeadows 
57  X.  E.  303    [19001.  on    Request    River,    42    X".    J.    L.    (13 

"Opinion      of      appellate      division  \'r.)    553    [1880]    without   opinion.); 

quoted  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  TLigar    v.    Reclamation    District    No. 

of    Tuthill    for    the    Appointment    of  lOS.    Ill    V.   S.   701.   28   L.   569.   4   S. 

Commissioners  to  Drain  Certain  Wet  063    [18841;    Haear   v.   Board   of  Su- 

and  Low  Lands  in  the  Towns  of  Ches-  pervisors    of    Yolo    County,    47    Cal. 

ter   and   Blooming   Grove   in    Orange  222   [1874]. 


§  338  TAX^VTION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  516 

or  abatement  of  nuisances  where  any  considerable  number  of  per- 
sons are  concerned  or  tract  of  laud  is  useless,  and  improvements 
may  be  made  commensurate  to  the  benefits  received  and  the  land 
itself  may  be  taxed  for  such  benefits.  The  principle  requires 
careful  application  but  many  illustrations  of  its  existence  can  be 
found  sustained  by  the  highest  authority. ' '  -  This  interest  has 
been  suggested  to  be  one  arising  from  an  increase  in  the  taxable 
value  of  the  land  caused  by  drainage.  "The  community  is  bene- 
fited by  anything  that  makes  considerable  bodies  of  land  arable 
and  adds  to  their  taxable  value,  and  so  it  is  by  anything  that 
lessens  disease."^  Many  of  the  cases  which  uphold  statutes  pro- 
viding for  the  compulsory  drainage  of  wet  or  marshy  lands  at 
the  expense  of  the  owners  thereof,  do  so  on  the  theory  that 
such  statutes  are  to  be  upheld  "independently  of  any  effect  upon 
the  public  health,  as  reasonable  regulations  for  the  general  ad- 
vantage of  those  who  are  treated  for  this  purpose  as  owners  of 
a  common  property."*  This  theory  is  inconsistent  with  the  one 
previously  discussed,  since  it  requires  no  public  benefit  to  support 
such  a  statute  other  than  that  which  will  enure  to  the  public 
through  the  private  gain  of  the  owners  of  the  land  benefited  by 
such  drainage.^  At  the  same  time  it  will  be  found  that  the  same 
court  will  uphold  assessments  now  on  the  one  theory,  now  on  the 
other,  and  occasionally  upon  both  the  theory  of  benefit  to  the 
public  health  and  the  theory  of  reclamation  of  large  tracts  of 
land  in  combination.  The  theory  that  the  improvement  and 
reclamation  of  large  tracts  of  land  is  of  itself  a  public  benefit  and 
use  sufficient  to  justify  local  assessments  for  drainage  was  at  one 
time   advanced   in   Wisconsin.*'     These   remarks   were,   however, 

=  Lewis     County     v.     Gordon,      20       553    [1880]    without   opinion.);    Cos 
Wash.  80,  90,  91,  54  Pac.  779  [1898].       ter   v.   Tide   Water   Company,    18   N. 


»Zigler    V.    Menkes,     121     Ind.    99,  J.   Eq.    (13   C.  E.  Green)    54    [] 

102,   16  Am.   St.  Rep.   357,  22  N.  E.  =  Zigler  v.  Menges,  121  Ind.  99,   16 

782   [1899].  Am.    St.    Eep.    357,    22    N.    E.    782 

*  Head    v.    Amoskeag    Manufactur-  [1899]. 

ing   Co.,    113   U.   S.   9,   28   L.   889,"  5  'In  speaking  of  drainage   and   the 

S.  441.  See  also  as  expressing  similar  nature  of  the  public  use  and  benefit 

views,    Wurts    v.    Hoagland,    114    U,  the    court    said:     "The    primary    ob- 

S.  606,  29  L.  229.  5  S.  1086   [1885];  ject   is   solely   to   restore   such   lands 

(affirming  Hoagland  v.  State,  Simon-  to  a  proper  condition  for  tillage  and 

ton.  Pros..  43  X.  J.  L.    (14  Vr.)    456  agriculture    by     the     several     owners 

[1881];     which    affirmed    Matter    of  and  for  their  use  alone.  It  enhances 

Drainage    of   the   Great    Meadows   on  their   value    intrinsic   and    in   market 

Pequest  River,  42  X.  J.  L.    (13  Vr.)  .   .  .  This    is    the    only    object    which 


J 


517  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §339 

obiter,  and  while  subsequently  approved  in  other  states,'  they 
have  been  criticised  in  Wisconsin,  and  the  theory  thus  advanced 
has  been  repudiated.* 

§  339.    Drainage  assessments  held  part  of  common  law. 

The  right  to  levy  local  assessments  to  pay  for  compulsory 
drainage,  where  any  public  benefit  of  any  kind  can  be  found,  even 
though  the  real  motive  in  requiring  such  drainage  is  primarily 
to  benefit  the  property  owners  whose  lands  are  drained  thereby 
i^  a  matter  of  history  and  tradition.  In  New  Jersey  the  right 
to  levy  local  assessments  for  the  improvement,  by  drainage,  of  the 
land  of  private  owners,  was  said  to  rest  neither  on  the  right  of 
taxation  nor  on  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  but  to  exist  as  a 
"part  of  the  local  common  law. "^  By  reason  of  the  antiquity  of 
the  system,  rather  than  by  its  conformity  to  the  principles  of 
constitutional  law,  it  was  upheld  on  the  theory  that  it  was  "quite 
too  late  to  revert  to  first  principles  in  order  to  overthrow  a 
system  of  procedure  which  is  possessed  of  such  antiquity  and  has 
to  its  credit  so  many  recognitions."  -  In  a  subsequent  decision  on 
the  same  facts  and  between  the  same  parties  the  court  upheld 
local  assessments  for  drainage,  as  based  on  the  right  of  eminent 
domain,  and  as  therefore  a  case  in  which  the  amount  of  the  assess- 
ment was  not  necessarily  limited  to  the  benefits  conferred  by  the 
improvement.^  The  decision  of  the  state  courts  upon  this  question 
is  final.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  will  not  review 
their  decisions  upon  the  theory  that  such  an  assessment,  if  not 
for  a  public  purpose,  is  a  taking  without  due  process  of  law.* 

concerns   their    use    and    that   use    is  "  Hoagland   v.   Wurts,   41    X.   J.   L. 

strictly  private."     Donnelly  v.   Deck-  (12    Vr.)     175,    180    L1S7!)|;     (aflirm- 

er,   58   Wis.   4(31,   4G8,   40    Am.    Rep.  ing,     Matter     of     Commissioners     to 

63i;    17   N.   W.   389    [1883].  Drain   Great   Meadows,   39    N.    J.   L. 

'Zigler  V.  Menges,  121  Ind.  99.   Iti  (10   Vr.)    433    [1877]). 

Am.    St.    Rep.    hi,    22    X.    E.    782  =>  Matter  of  Drainage  of  the  Great 

[1899].  Meadows  on  Pequcst  River,  42  X.  J. 

'RudiJ  V.   Town   of  St.   Marie,    121  L.-    (13   Vr.)    553    [1880];     (affirmed 

Wis.  634,  99  X.  W.  400  [1904].  without   opinion   Hoagland    v.    State, 

^Hoagland    v.   Wurts,    41    X.   .T.    L.  Simonton.    Pros.,    43    X.    J.    L.     (14 

(12   Vr.)     175,    180    [1879];     (affirm-  Vr.)     450     [1881];     affirmed    by    the 

ing     Matter     of     Commissioners     to  Sui)rpnie  Court  of  the  United  States 

Drain    Great    Meadows,    39    X.    J.    L.  in    Wurts    v.    Hoagland,    114    U.    S. 

(10    Vr.)     433    [1877]);    See    State,  000,  29  L.  229.  5   S.   1080    [1885]). 

Britton,  Pros.  v.  Blake,  36  N.  J.  L.  •  Wurts    v.    Hoagland,    114    U.    S. 

(6  Vr.)   208   [1871].  606,    29    L.    229,    5    S.    1086    [1885]: 


§340 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


518 


§  340.    Drainage  held  proper  purpose  for  assessment. 

If  a  statute  provides  for  a  drainage  improvement  which  con- 
fers any  form  of  public  benefit,  it  is  held  that  local  assessments 
may  be  levied  to  pay  therefor.^ 


(affirming  Matter  of  Drainage  of 
Great  Meadows  on  Pequest  River,  42 
N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  553  [1880]  which 
was  affirmed  as  Hoagland  v.  State 
Simonton,  Pros.,  43  N.  J.  L,  (14 
Vr.)    45G   [1881]  without  opinion). 

^  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569, 
4  S.  6G3  [1884];  (affirming  Reclam- 
ation District  No.  108  v.  Hagar,  4 
Fed.  36G  [1880]);  Davidson  v.  New 
Orleans,  96  U.  S.  97,  24  L.  616 
[1877];  (affirming  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Commissioners  of  the  First 
Draining  District,  27  La.  Ann.  20 
[1875]);  United  States  ex  rel.  Kil- 
patrick  v.  Capdevielle,  118  Fed.  809, 
55  C.  C.  A.  421  [1902];  Hale  v. 
Moore,  82  Ark.  75,  100  S.  W.  742 
[1907];  Ritter  v.  Drainage  Dist. 
No.  1  Poinsett  County,  78  Ark.  580, 
94  S.  W.  711  [1906];  Cribbs  v. 
Benedict,  64  Ark.  555,  44  S  W.  707 
[1897];  Reclamation  Disti.ct  No. 
536  v.  Hall.  131  Cal.  662,  63  Pac. 
1000  [1901];  Weinrich  v.  Hensley, 
121  Cal.  .647,  54  Pac.  254  [1898]; 
Reclamation  District  No.  551  v. 
Runyan,  117  Cal.  164,  44  Pac.  131 
[1897];  Swamp  Land  District  No. 
307  V.  Glide,  112  Cal.  85,  44  Pac. 
451  [1896];  Lower  Kings  River  Re- 
clamation District  No.  531  v  Phil- 
lips, 108  Cal.  306,  39  Pac.  630,  41 
Pac.  335  [1895];  Swamp  Land  Dis- 
rict  No.  150  v.  Silver,  98  Cal.  51, 
32  Pac.  866  [1893];  Reclamation 
District  No.  124  v.  Gray,  95  Cal.  601, 
30  Pac.  779  [1892];  Hntson  v. 
Woodbridge  Protection  District  No. 
1,  79  Cal.  90,  16  Pac.  549,  21  Pac. 
435  [1889];  People  v.  Hulbert,  71 
Cal.  72,  12  Pac.  43  [1886];  Swamp 
Land  District  No.  307  v.  Gwynn,  70 
Cal.  566,  12  Pac.  462  [1886];  Re- 
clamation District  No.  3  v.  Parvin, 
07  Cal.  501,  8  Pac.  43  [1885];  Re- 
clamation District  No.   108  v.  Hagar, 


66  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945  [1884];  Re- 
clamation District  No.  108  v.  Evans, 
61  Cal.  104  [1882];  Bixler  v.  Board 
of  Supervisors  of  the  County  of  Sac- 
ramento, 59  Cal.  698  [1881];  Peo- 
ple of  the  State  of  California  v.  Ha- 
gar, 52  Cal.  171  [1877];  Hagar  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  Yolo  County, 
47  Cal.  222  [1874];  Iroquois  & 
Crescent  Drainage  District  v.  Har- 
roun,  222  111.  489,  78  N.  E.  780 
[1906];  City  of  Joliet  v.  Spring 
Creek  Drainage  District,  222  111. 
441,  78  N.  E.  836  [1906];  Barnes  v. 
Drainage  Commissioners  of  Drainage 
District  No.  1,  etc.,  221  111.  627,  77 
N.  E.  1124  [1906];  People  ex  rel. 
Young  V.  Prust,  219  111  116,  76  N. 
E.  68  [1905]  ;  Drainage  Commission- 
ers of  District  No.  1  v.  Village  of 
Cerro  Gordo,  217  111.  488,  75  N.  E. 
516  [1905]  ;  Stack  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Talbott,  217  111.  220,  75  N.  E.  347 
[905] ;  Lacey  Levee  and  Drainage 
District  v.  Langellier,  215  111.  271, 
74  N.  E.  148  [1905];  Pinkstaff  v. 
Allison  Ditch  District  No.  2  of  Law- 
rence County,  213  511.  186,  72  N.  E. 
715  [1904];  Drainage  Commission- 
ers of  Drainage  District  No.  2  v. 
Drainage  Commissioners  of  Union 
Drainage  District  No.  3,  211  111.  328, 
71  N.  E.  1007  [1904];  (affirming 
113  111.  App.  114;  Trigger  v.  Drain- 
age District  No.  1,  etc.,  193  HI.  230, 
61  N.  E.  1114  [inOl];  Elgin,  Joliet 
&  Eastern  Railway  Company  v. 
Hohenshell,  193  111."  159,  61  N.  E. 
1102  [1901];  People  ex  rel.  Herman 
V.  Commissioners  of  Bi:g  River 
Special  Drainage  District,  189  111. 
55,  59  N.  E.  605;  Hammond  v.  Peo- 
ple, 178  111.  254,  52  N.  E.  1030 
[1899] ;  Hammond  v.  People,  for 
Use,  etc.,  169  111.  545,  48  N.  E.  573 
[18971:  People  of  the  State  of  Illi- 
nois v.  Weber,  164  111.  412,  45  N.  E. 
723   [1807];    Tucker  v.  People  eK  rel. 


J 


519  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  340 

This    statement    leaves    for    discussion    elsewhere    the    the- 


Wall.  156  111.  108.  40  X.  E.  4ol 
ri8<t5]:  Drainage  District  No.  3  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Baron,  147  111.  404, 
.•J5  N.  E.  238  [1894];  People  ex  rel., 
etc.  V.  Drainage  Comrs.,  District 
No.  1  of  Town  of  Yonng  America, 
143  111.  417,  32  X.  E.  088  [1893]; 
Walker  v.  City  of  Aurora,  140  III. 
402,  29  X.  E.  741  [1893];  Briggs  v. 
I'nion  Drainage  District  Xo.  1,  140 
HI.  53.  29  X.  E.  721  [1893];  People 
(■\  rel.  Famuel,  Sr.  v.  Cooper,  139 
[II.  4C1,  29  X.  E.  872  [1893];  Com- 
missioners of  Lake  Fork  Special 
Drainage  District  v.  The  People  ex 
rel.  Bodman,  138  111.  87,  27  X.  E. 
857  [1892];  Wabash  Eastern  Rail- 
way Company  of  Illinois  v.  Commis- 
sioners of  East  Lake  Fork  Drainage 
District,  134  111.  384,  10  L.  R.  A. 
285.  25  X.  E.  781  [1891];  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Company  v.  Com- 
missioners of  East  Lake  Fork  Special 
Drainage  District,  129  111.  417,  21 
X.  E.  925  [1890];  Commissioners  of 
Highways  of  the  Town  of  Colfax  v. 
Commissioners  of  East  Lake  Fork 
Special  Drainage  District,  127  111. 
581.  21  X.  E.  200  [1890];  People  ex 
rel.  Barber  v.  Chapman.  127  111.  387, 
19  X.  E.  872  [1890];  Samuels  v. 
Drainage  Comm.issioners.  125  111.  53(i. 
17  X.  E.  829  [1889];  Scott  v.  Peo- 
l)le  ex  rel.  Lewis,  120  111.  129,  11 
N.  E.  408  [1889];  Morrell  v.  Union 
Drainage  District  Xo.  1,  118  HI.  139. 
8  N.  E.  675  [1887];  Keigwin  v. 
Drainjif'c  Commissioners  of  Hamilton 
'i'own-lii;).  115  UK  347,  5  X.  E.  575 
[1880]:  People  ex  rel.  Little  v.  Clay- 
ton. 115  III.  150.  4  X.  E.  193  [1880]; 
Kilgonr  v.  Drainage  Commissioners, 
111  HI.  342  [1885];  Drainage  Com- 
missioners V.  Hudson,  109  HI.  059 
[1885]:  Moor.'  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Lewis,  100  111.  370  [1883];  Com- 
missioners of  Spoon  River  Drainage 
District  in  C'lampaign  Countv  v. 
Conner.  121  Til.  Api>.  450  [1905] ; 
Streuter  v.  Willow  Creek  Draina'je 
District.  72  111.  .App.  501  [1897]; 
Carr    v.    Dnhme.    107    Tiid.    70.    78   X. 


E.  322  [1900];  Taylor  v.  Strayer,  107 
Ind.  23,  78  X."  E.  230  [1900]; 
Quick  V.  Parrott,  107  Ind.  31,  78  X. 
E.  232  [1900];  Ager  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Heaston,  102  Ind  538,  70  X.  E.  808 
[1903];  Skelton  v.  Sharp,  101  Ind. 
383,  07  X.  E.  535  [1903];  Sample 
V.  Carroll,  132  Ind.  496,  32  X".  E. 
220  [1892];  Racer  v.  State  for  Use 
of  Rhine,  131  Ind.  393,  31  X.  E.  81 
[1891];  McBride  v.  State  for  Use  of 
Clandy,  130  Ind.  525,  30  X.  E.  099 
[1891];  White  v.  ]McGrew,  129  Ind. 
S3,  28  X^.  E.  322  [1891];  Budd  v. 
Reidelbach,  128  Ind.  145,  27  X.  E. 
349  [1890];  Goodwine  v.  Leak,  127 
Ind.  569,  27  X.  E.  101  [1890];  Zig- 
ler  V.  Menges,  121  Ind.  99,  10  Am. 
St.  Rep.  357,  22  X.  E.  782  [1889]; 
Otis  V.  De  Boer,  110  Ind.  531,  19  X. 
E.  317  [1888];  Harris  v.  Ross,  112 
Ind.  314,  13  X.  E.  873  [1887];  In- 
dianap(5lis  &  Cumberland  Gravel 
Road  Co.  V.  State  ex  rel.  Flack,  105 
Ind.  37,  4  X.  E.  316  [1885];  Mc- 
Kinney  v.  State  for  Use  of  Xixon, 
101  Ind.  355  [1884];  Albertson  v. 
State  ex  rel.  Wells,  95  Ind.  370 
[1883];  Bannister  v.  Grassy  Fork 
Ditching  Association,  52  Ind.  178 
[18751;  Bate  v.  Sheet.s,  50  Ind.  329 
[1875];  Chase  v.  Arctic  Ditcher«. 
43  Ind.  74  [1873];  Etchison  Ditch-, 
ing  Asociation  v.  Hillis.  40  Ind. 
408  [1872];  Etchison  Ditching  Asso- 
ciation V.  Jarrell.  33  Ind.  131  [1870]; 
Jordan  Ditching  &  Draining  As- 
sociation V.  Wagoner,  33  Ind,  50 
[1870]:  Saiber  v.  Rankin.  154  Ind, 
23().  50  X.  E,  225  [1899];  Osborn 
V.  Maxinkuckee  Lake  Ice  Company, 
154  Ind.  101.  50  X.  E.  33  [1899]; 
Reamer  v.  Hogg.  142  Ind.  138.  41  X. 
E.  353  [1895];  Rogers  v.  Voorhees, 
124  Ind.  409.  24  X.  E.  374  [1S90]: 
Louisville.  Xew  AIban>-  &  Cliicago 
Railway  Company  v.  State  for  the 
use  of  Beckman.  122  li.d.  413.  24 
X.  E.  350  [18S9];  Johnson  v.  State 
for  use  of  Davidson.  1  l(i  Ind.  374, 
19  X.  E.  298  [1888];  Pre/.inger  v. 
Harness,    114   Inil.   -191.   10  X.   E.  495 


§340 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


520 


ory    of    the    measure    of    the    aiuount    of    assessments    in    such 


[1887]:  Hackett  v.  State  for  use  of 
Martindale,  113  Ind.  532,  15  N.  E. 
70!)  [1887];  Laverty  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Hill,  109  Ind.  217,  9  N.  E.  77-4 
[1880];  Deegan  v  State  for  use  of 
Stoddard,  108  Ind.  155,  9  N.  E.  148 
[1880];  Frazer  v.  State  for  Use  of 
Ingerman,  106  Ind.  471,  7  N.  E. 
203  [1886];  Lipes  v.  Hand,  104  Ind. 
503,  1  N.  E.  871,  4  N.  E.  100  [1885]  ; 
Xevins  &  Otter  Creek  Township 
Draining  Company  v.  Alkire,  36  Ind. 
189  [1871];  Seyberger  v.  Calumet 
Draining  Company,  33  Ind.  330 
[1870]  :  Large  v.  Keen's  Creek  Drain- 
ing Company,  30  Ind.  263,  95  Am. 
Dee.  696  [1868];  Eel  River  Drain- 
ing Association  v.  Topp,  16  Ind.  242 
[1861];  Beck  v.  Tolen,  62  Ind.  409 
[1878]:  Ellison  v.  Branstrator,  34 
Ind.  App.  410,  73  N.  E.  146  [1904]; 
State  for  Use  of  Cram  v.  Elliott,  32 
Ind.  App.  605,  70  N.  E.  397  [1903]: 
Hoefgen  v.  State  ex  rel.  Brown.  17 
Ind.  App.  537,  47  N.  E.  28  [1896]; 
Zinser    v.    Board    of    Supervisors    of 

Buena    Vista     County,   —    la.   , 

114  N.  W.  51  [1907];  Sisson  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  Buena  Vista 
County,  128  la.  442,  70  L.  R.  A.  440, 
104  N.  W.  454  [1905];  Oliver  v. 
Monona  County,  117  la.  43,  90  X. 
W.  510  [1902] ;  Wormley  v.  Board 
of  Supervisors  of  Wright  County, 
Iowa,  108  la.  232,  78  X.  W.  824 
[1899]:  Hoertz  V.  Jefferson  South- 
ern Pond  Draining  Company,  119 
Ky.  824,  84  S.  W.  1141,  27  Ky.  L. 
R."  278    [1905];    Dixon  v.   Labry,   — 

Ky.  ,   78   S.  W.   430,  25   Ky.   L. 

Rep.  1679  [1902];  (denving  rehear- 
ing of  24  Ky.  S.  Rep.  697,  09  S.  W. 
791  [1902]);  Burguires  v.  Sanders, 
111  La.  109,  35  So.  478  [1903]; 
Benls  v.  Inhabitants  of  Brookline, 
174  Mass.  1,  54  X.  E.  339  [1899]; 
Beals  v.  James,  173  Mass.  591,  54 
X".  E.  245  [1899];  Dean  v.  Treasurer 
of  Clinton  County,  140  Mich.  645, 
109  X.  W.  1131  [1906];  Attorney- 
General  V.  ^klcClear.  146  :\rich.  45.  109 
N,  W.  27  [1906];  Murphy  v.  Dobben, 


137  Mich.  565,  100  X.  W.  891  [1904]  ; 
Polock  V.  Sowers,  137  Mich.  368. 
100  X.  W.  596  [1904];  Township  of 
Flynn  v.  Woolman,  133  ]\Iich.  508, 
95*  X.  W.  567  [1903];  Anketell  v. 
Hayward,  119  Mich.  525,  78  X.  W. 
557  [1899];  Brady  v.  Hayward,  114 
Mich.  326,  72  X.  W.  233  [1897]; 
Hilton  v.  Dumphey,  113  Mich.  241, 
71  X\  W.  527  [1897];  Mogg  v.  Hall, 
83  Mich.  576,  47  X.  W.  553;  Brown- 
ell  V.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  Grat- 
iot County,  49  Mich.  414,  13  X.  W. 
798  [1882];  Taylor  v.  Burnap,  39 
Mich.  739  [1878];  State  ex  rel. 
Utick  V.  Board  of  Covmty  Commis- 
sioners of  Polk  County,  87  Minn.  325, 
60  L.  R.  A.  161,  92  X.  W.  216 
[1902];  Clapp  v.  Minnesota  Grass 
Twine  Company,  81  ISIinn.  511,  84 
X.  W.  344-  [1900];  Lien  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners  of  Xorman 
County,  80  Minn.  58,  82  X.  W.  1094 
[1900];  Mound  City  Land  &  Stock 
Company  v.  Miller,  'l70  Mo.  240,  94 
Am.  St."  Rep.  727,  60  L.  R.  A.  190, 
70  S.  W.  721  [1902];  State  ex  rel. 
Mispagel  v.  Angert,  127  Mo.  456,  30 
S.  W.  118  [1894];  Sheridan  v. 
Fleming,  93  Mo.  321,  5  S.  W.  813 
[1887]:  Dodge  County  v.  Acorn,  72 
Xeb.  71,  100.  X.  W.  136  [1904]: 
(affirming  on  rehearing  County  of 
Dodge  V.  Acom,  61  Xeb.  376,  85  X^. 
W.  292  [1901]);  Zeliff  v.  Bog  &  Fly 
INIeadow  Company,  68  X.  J.  L.  (39 
Vr.)  200,  56  Atl."  302  [1902];  Mayor 
and  City  Council  of  East  Orange  v. 
Hussey,  72  X.  J.  L.*  (43  Vr.)  71,  59 
Atl.  i060  [1905];  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  East  Orange  v.  Hussey, 
70  X.  J.  L.  (41  Vr.)  244,  57  Atl. 
1086  [1903];  State,  Kean,  Pros.  v. 
Driggs  Drainage  Company,  45  X.  J. 
L.  (16  Vr.)  91  [1883];  State,  Brit- 
tin,  Pros.  V.  Blake,  36  X.  J.  L.  (7 
Vr.)  442  [1872];  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Application  for  Drainage  of 
Lands  between  Lower  Chatliani  and 
Little  Falls  in  the  Counties  of  Pas- 
saic. Essex  and  i^^orris,  35  X.  J.  L. 
(0  Vr.)    497    [1872];    State.    Brittin. 


J 


521 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    IviAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§341 


cases,2  the  apportionment  thereof,'"'  and  the  (luestion  of  the  gov- 
ernmental power  to  which  the  right  to  make  such  assesvsments, 
is  to  be  referred,^  it  may  be  said,  as  a  general  propositi. )n,  that 
the  courts  uphold  the  power  to  provide  for  local  assessments  to 
pay  for  the  compulsory  drainage  wherever  any  public  benefit 
can  be  found — the  private  benefit  in  such  cases  being  so  clear 
that  it  is  not  the  difficult  question. 

§  341.     Purposes  auxiliary  to  drainage. 

In  connection  Avith  and  as  part  of  a  system  of  drainage  local 
assessments  may  be  levied  for  clearing  out  rivers  ^  for  tiling  and 
ditching,-  for  levees  to  aid  in  drainage.^  and  for  pumping  stations 
in  connection  with  such  drainage  system.^  An  assessment  may  be 
levied  for  a  large  trunk  ditch  or  main  ditch,  if  so  constructed  as 
to  enable  the  owners  of  the  land  to  be  drained  to  connect 
Page  521 


Pros.  V.  Blake,  35  N.  J.  L.  (0  Vr.) 
208  [1871];  McCarty  v.  Brick,  11 
N.  J.  L.  (6  Halst.)  27  [18201:  Al- 
stad  V.  Sim,  15  N.  D.  629,  109  X. 
W.  06  [1906];  State  v.  Fisk,  15  X. 
D.  219,  107  N.  W.  191  [1906]; 
Turnqiiist  v.  Cass  County  Com'rs.. 
11  X.  D.  514,  92  X.  W.  852  [1902]: 
Erickson  v.  Cass  County,  11  X.  D. 
494,  92  X.  W.  841  [1902];  Sessions  v. 
Crunkilton,  20  0.  S.  349  [1870]; 
Kellogg  V.  Ely,  15  0.  S.  64  [1864]; 
Thompson  v.  Treasurer  of  Wood 
County,  11  0.  S.  678  [I860];  Seely 
V.  Sebastian,  4  Or.  25;  Rutherford 
V.  Maynes,  97  Pa.  St.  78;  Drain- 
age District  Xo.  15  of  Skagit  County 
V.  Armstrong,  44  Wash.  23,  87 
Pac.  52  [1906];  State  of  Washing- 
ton on  the  Relation  of  ^latson  v. 
Superior  Court  for  Skagit  County. 
42  Wash.  491,  85  Pac.  264  [19061; 
Espy  Estate  Company  v.  Pacific 
County,  40  Wash.  67,  82  Pac.  129 
11905];  Eraser  v.  jMulany.  129  Wis. 
377,  109  X.  W.  139  [1906];  In  re 
Dancy  Drainage  Dist..  129  Wis.  129. 
108  "X.  W.  202  [1906];  Stone  v. 
Little  Yellow  Drainage  District.  118 
Wis.  3S8.  95  X.  W.  405  |  1903]  ; 
Town  of  iluskego  v.  Drainage  Com- 
missioners, 78  Wis.  40,  47  X.  W. 
11    [1890];    State  ex   rel.    Paltzell   v. 


Stewart.  74  Wis.  620,  6  L.  R,  A. 
394,  43  X.  W.  947  [1889];  Bryant 
V.  Rohbins,  70  Wis.  258,  35  X.'  W. 
545  [1887];  Donnelly  v.  Decker,  58 
Wis.  461,  46  Am.  Rep.  G37,  17  N. 
W.  389. 

-  See  §  659. 

^See  Chapter   XIII. 

*  See  §  89   et  aeq. 

'Wurts  V.  Hoagland,  114  U.  S. 
606,  29  L.  229,  5  S.  1086  [1885]; 
(affirming  Hoagland  v.  State,  Simon- 
ton,  Pros.,  43  X.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.) 
456  [1881]  which  affirmed  without 
opinion,  JIatter  of  Drainage  of  Great 
Meadows  on  Request  River,  42  X.  J. 
L.  (13  Vr.)  553  [1880]);  Lipes  v. 
Hand,  104  Ind.  503,  1  N.  E.  871,  4 
X.  E.  1160  [1885];  Brown  v.  Keener, 
74  X.  C.  714   [1876]. 

'Goodrich  v.  City  of  Minonk,  62 
111.    121    [1871]. 

'Cooper  V.  Arctic  Ditchers,  56  Ind. 
233  ;    See   §  343. 

*  Swamp  Land  District  Xo.  150  v. 
Silver,  98  Cal.  51,  32  Pac.  866 
[1893];  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v. 
Si)encor.  118  111.  446,  8  X\  E.  846 
[1888];  (However  in  this  case  the 
ujiocrtainty  of  the  description  of  the 
imjirovement  invalidated  the  assess- 
ment.) 


§  342  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  522 

therewith. °      Without    statutory    authority    no    power   exists,    of 
course,  to  convert  a  living  stream  into  a  ditch." 

§  342.    Preventing  accumulation  of  stagnant  water. 

If  land  is  so  far  below  the  grade  of  the  surrounding  land  that 
stagnant  water  can  accumulate  there  so  as  to  be  a  menace  to  the 
health  of  the  neighborhood,  the  state  may  authorize  a  municipal 
corporation  or  other  public  corporation  to  fill  up  such  land  so 
as  to  prevent  the  accumulation  of  such  stagnant  water,  and  may 
authorize  the  public  corporation  to  assess  the  expense  of  such 
filling  upon  the  owner  of  the  property  thus  filled  in.^  The  power 
to  assess  for  such  filling  has  been  recognized  in  New  York ;-  though 
in  some  of  the  cases  involving  such  doctrine  the  specific  assess- 
ment has  been  held  invalid,  as  where  such  improvement  was  made 
without  the  petition  therefor  of  the  property  owners  affected,  as 
required  by  the  statute  then  in  force,^  or  where  distinct  improve- 
ments were  so  intermingled  that  realty  was  assessed  for  work 
from  which  it  received  no  benefit.*  Such  an  improvement  or 
assessment,  therefor,  is  not,  however,  an  assessment  referable  to 
the  power  of  taxation,^  and  measured  by  the  amount  of  the  bene- 
fits received  by  the  realty  thus  improved.*'  This  power  is 
to  be  referred  to  the  police  power  ^  and  rests  upon  the  power  of 
the  state  to  abate  nuiisances  at  the  expense  of  persons  responsible 

■*  Lipes   V.    Hand,    104    Ind.    503,    1  -  In  the  Matter  of  the  Application 

N.    E.    871,    4    N.    E.    160     [1885];  of  Tappan  to  Vacate  Certain  Assess- 

"Where    the   construction   of   a   large  ments,  54  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   225   [1869]; 

ditch    enables    land-owners    to    carry  See   also   to   the   same   effect,   In   the 

their  lateral  ditches   into   it,   and   to  Matter  of  tlie  Petition  of  Van  Buren 

thus    secure    good    drainage    without  to   Vacate   an   Assessment,   79   N.   Y. 

encroaching  upon   the   rights  of  oth-  384    [1880];    In    the    Matter    of    the 

ers,  there  is  a  special  benefit."  Lipes  Petition  of  Van  Buren,  55  How.    (N. 

V.  Hand,   104  Ind.  503,  508,   1  N.  E.  Y.)    513    [1878];    In    the   Matter   of 

871,  4  N.  E.   160    [1885].  the  Petition  of  Banta  to  Vacate   an 

"Commissioners   of   Greene   County  Assessment,  60  N.  Y.   165   [1875]. 

V.   Harbine,   74   O.   S.   318,   78   N.   E.  'In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

521    [1906].  Banta   to  Vacate   an  Assessment,   60 

^Horbach    v.    City    of    Omaha,    54  N.  \.   165   [1875]. 

Neb.  83,  74  N.  W.  434  [1898];   Bliss  *  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

V.  Kraus.   16   0.   S.   54    [1864];    City  Van  Buren  to  Vacate  an  Assessment. 

of    Philadelphia   v.    Gratz   Land    Co.,  79  N.  Y.  384   [1880];   In  the  Matter 

38   Pa.   St.   359    [1861]:    Kennedy  v.  of    the    Petition    of    Van    Buren,    55 

Board    of    Health,     2     Pa.     St.     366  How.    (N.  Y.)    513   [1878]. 

[18451;   Watkins  v.  City  of  Milwau-  'See  §   9. 

kee,  55  Wis.  335,  13  K  W.  222.  "See  §  717. 

'See  §  93. 


4 


523  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  342 

for  the  creation  or  continuance  thereof.^  Accordingly,  the  owner 
cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  filling  the  lot  to  any  greater 
heighth  than  is  reasonably  necessary  to  prevent  the  accumulation 
of  stagnant  water.''  If  the  nuisance  is  created  by  the  action  of 
the  municipality  itself  the  owner  of  the  property  on  which  the 
stagnant  water  accumulates  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of 
the  filling  necessary  to  remove  it.^°  Thus  A.  o-v\Tied  a  tract  of  low 
land  which  was  naturally  drained  by  a  stream.  The  city  con- 
structed a  street  across  such  stream  at  such  a  grade  as  to  fill  up 
the  channel  of  the  stream  at  the  point  of  crossing;  and  accord- 
ingly A. 's  land  was  converted  thereby  into  a  pond  of  stagnant 
water.  It  was  held  that  A.,  could  not  be  assessed  for  the  expense 
of  filling  up  such  lot.'^  However,  it  has  been  held  that  if,  in  the 
proper  and  reasonable  grading  of  a  street,  a  nuisance  is  created 
upon  a  private  lot  because  no  proper  provision  is  made  for  sewer- 
age, such  nuisance  may  be  abated  by  the  city  at  the  cost  of  the 
lot-owner.^-  Since  such  an  improvement  and  assessment  therefor 
are  referable  to  the  police  power,  the  validity  of  assessments  for 
this  purpose  was  recognized  by  the  courts  of  South  Carolina;'"' 
although  under  their  construction  of  their  constitution  assessments 
which  are  referable  to  the  power  of  taxation  are  unconstitu- 
tional." Assessments  for  filling  vacant  lots  have  been  held  invalid 
for  want  of  statutory  authority  therefor.  Under  a  statute  au- 
thorizing a  city  "to  prevent  and  remove  nuisances"  it  was  held 
doubtful  if  a  city  could  assess  the  owner  of  low  land  for  the  cost 
Of  filling  it  in.^^ 


"Bush  V.  City  of  Dubiifiuc   (i!)   la.  '-Smith   v.   City  of   Milwaukee,    18 

233,    28    N.    W.    542     |188lil:     City  Wis.   63    [18041;     (exphiining   Weeks 

Council  of  Charleston  v.  Wcrnor.  4(1  v.   City   of   Milwaukee,    10   Wis.    242 

S.    C.    323,    24    S.    E.    207     [18!)5|;  [1800]). 

Watkins    v.    City    of    Milwaukee,    55  '•''  C  ity     Council     of    Cluiileston     v. 

Wis.  335,  13  N.  W.  222.  Werner,   46   S.   C.   323,   24   S.   E.  207 

"Bush  V.  City  of  Dubuque,  69   la.  [1895];   Charleston  v.  Werner,  38  S. 

233,  28  N.  W.  542   [1880].  C  488,  37   Am.  St.  Rep.  776,   17   S. 

"Lasbury  v.  McCagiie,  56  Neb.  220,  E.  33   [1892]. 

76  N.  W.  802   [18081.  "See    §    118,    §    159,    in   which   the 

"  City  of  Hannibal  v.  Richards,  82  present  view  of  the  courts  of  South 

Mo.    330     [1884];     Lasbury    v.    Mc-  Carolina  is  set  forth. 

CaETue,   56   Neb.    220,    76   N.   W.    862  'MValker   v.   District   of   Columbia, 

11898];  Weeks  v.  City  of  Milwaukee.  6  Mackey   (D.  C.)    352   [1888].     This 

10  Wis.  242   [I860].  point,    however,    was    not   before    the 

court  for  decision. 


§  343  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  (524 

§  343.    Levees. 

A  levee  built  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  low  land  from  being 
flooded  by  high  water  when  neighboring  rivers  are  swollen  by 
rain  and  melting  snow,  is  undoubtedly  a  special  benefit  to  the 
land  thus  protected  from  inundation.^  As  in  the  case  of  systems 
of  public  drainage,^  the  difficulty  in  upholding  local  assessments 
for  constructing  levees  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  real  object  in  con- 
structing them  is  the  private  benefit  and  gain  of  those  whose 
lands  are  thus  protected.  If  the  statute  providing  for  the  con- 
struction of  levees  by  some  public  corporation  is  intended  solely 
for  the  private  benefit  of  the  land  owners  in  question,  such  statute 
is  unconstitutional,^  and  no  local  assessment  can  be  levied  there- 
under.* Such  improvement  can  be  made  and  local  assessments 
levied  therefor  only  where  the  public  welfare  will  be  subserved 
in  some  way.^  It  has  been  suggested  by  the  courts,  however,  that 
local  assessments  to  pay  for  the  construction  of  levees  may  be 
sustained  on  grounds  of  public  health,  since  widespread  disease 
is  likely  to  follow  an  overflow;®  and  that  for  this  reason  "the 
police  power  of  the  state  is  broad  enough  to  authorize  the  law 
in  question."  '  The  theory  that  levees  promote  public  health  and 
abate  nuisances  has  been  suggested.^  Other  courts,  in  analogy  to 
the  theory  advanced  in  some  jurisdictions  in  the  case  of  general 
systems  of  drainage,®  appear  to  hold  that  the  protection  of  land 
subject  to  overflow  and  the  benefit  conferred  upon  them  is  suffi- 
cient to  justify  the  exercise  of  governmental  power  in  making 
such  improvement  and  in  levying  local  assessments  therefor." 
Resting  in  part  on  these  theories  and  in  part  on  the  necessity  of 

^  Overstreet  v.  Levee  Dist.  No.  1  of  *  Morrison  v.  Morey,   146  Mo.  543, 

Conway  County,   80  Ark.   462,   97   S.  48   S.   W.   629    [1898]. 

W.    676    [1906];    Jonesboro   L.   C.   &  ^Morrison  v.  Morey,   146  Mo.  543, 

E.   R.   Co.   V.   Board   of   Directors   of  562,    48    S.   W.    629    [1898];    See   to 

St.    Francis   Levee   District,   80   Ark.  the    same    effect    Eldridge    v.    Treze- 

316,  97  S.  W.  281    [1906];    Daily  v.  vant,    160   U.   S.   452,   40   L.   490,   16 

Swope,  47  Miss.  367    [1872];   Morri-  S.  345. 

son  v.  Morey,  146  Mo.  543,  48  S.  W.  *  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 

629    [1898].  Yolo   County,   47   Cal.   222    [1874]. 

=  See  §  335  et  seq.  "  See   §   338. 

^  Smith  v.   Atlantic  &   Great   Was-  "  Missouri,   Kansas   &   Texas   Rail- 
tern  R.  R.  Co.,  25  O.  S.  91.  way   Company   v.   Cambern,   66   Kan. 

*  Wright  V.  Thomas,   26  O.   S.   346  365,    71    Pac."^  809    [1903];    Daily   v. 

[1875].  Swope,  47  Miss.  367   [1872]. 

*Jenal  v.  Green  Island  Draining 
Co.,  12  Neb.  163,  10  N.  W.  547 
[1881]. 


OZO 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


§34:5 


some  means  of  providing  for  protection  to  the  flooded  alluvial 
lands  along  the  great  rivers,  the  courts  have,  with  few  exceptions, 
held  that  the  construction  of  a  levee  is  an  improvement  so  com- 
bining public  benefit  and  especial  local  advantage  that  local  as- 
sessments may  be  levied  therefor."  In  some  of  these  states  the 
question  of  the  propriety  of  levying  assessments  for  the  con- 
struction of  levees  is  settled  as  far  as  state  constitutions  are 
concerned  by  specific  constitutional  provisions  authorizing  the 
construction  of  levees  as  a  public  purpose.  "A  levee  system  shall 
be  maintained  in  the  state  and  a  tax,  not  to  exceed  one  mill,  may 
be  levied  annually  on  all  property  subject  to  taxation,  and  shall 
be  applied  exclusively  to  the  maintenance  and  repair  of  levees."  ^■- 
"The  legislature  shall  impose  for  levee  purposes,  in  addition  to 
the  levee  taxes  heretofore  levied  or  authorized  by  law,  a  uniform 
tax  of  not  less  than  two  nor  more  than  five  cents  an  acre,  per 
annum,  upon  every  acre  of  land  now  or  hereafter  embraced  within 
the  limits  of  either  or  both  of  said  levee  districts.  .  .  .  "  ^^  ''The 
legislature  shall  have  full  power  to  provide  such  system  of  taxa- 
tion for  said  levee  districts  as  it  shall,  from  time  to  time,  deem 


"  Ford  V.  Delta  &  Pine  Land  Com- 
pany, 164  U.  S.  662,  41  L.  590,  17  S. 
230  [1897];  (affirming  Ford  v.  Delta 
&  Pine  Land  Co.,  43  Fed.  181  [1890] )  ; 
Heine  v.  Levee  Commissioners,  86 
U.  S.  (19  Wall.)  655,  22  L.  223 
[1873];  (affirming  Heine  v.  Levee 
Commissioners,  11  Fed.  Cas,  1033,  1 
Woods  246  [1872]);  Hart  v.  Love 
Commissioners,  54  Fed.  559;  Buck- 
ner  v.  Sugg,  79  Ark.  442,  96  S. 
W.  184  [1906];  Redfork  Levee  Dist. 
v.  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co.,  80 
Ark.  98,  96  S.  W.  117  [1906]; 
Altlieimer  v.  Plum  Bayou  Levee 
Dist..  79  Ark.  229,  95  S.  W.  140 
[190C];  Memphis  Land  &  Timber 
Company  v.  St.  Francis  Leveo  Dis- 
trict. 64  Ark.  258,  42  S.  W.  763 
[1897];  Carson  v.  St.  Francis  Levee 
District, -59  Ark.  513,  27  S.  W.  590 
[1894];  Fit7hu<ih  v.  Levee  District. 
54  Ark.  224,  15  S.  W.  455  [1891]; 
Davis  V.  Gaines,  48  Ark.  370.  3  S. 
W.  184;  Clavton  v.  Lafar<nie.  23 
Ark.  137  [1861];  :\rcDermntt  v. 
Mathis,  21  Ark.  60   [I860];   M'Gehee 


v.  Mathis,  21  Ark.  40  [I860];  Re- 
clamation District  No.  537  of  Yolo 
County  V.  Burger,  122  Cal.  442,  55 
Pac.  156  [1898];  Hagar  v.  Board  of 
Supervisors  of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal. 
222  [1874];  Chambliss  v.'  Johnson, 
77  La.  611,  42  N.  W.  427  [1889]; 
Richman  v.  Supervisors  of  Musca- 
tine County,  77  La.  513,  14  Am.  St. 
Rep.  308,  4  L.  R.  A.  445,  42  X.  W. 
422  [1889];  Missouri,  Kansas  & 
Texas  Railway  Company  v.  Cambern, 
66  Kan.  365,  71  Pac.  809  [1903]; 
State  ex  rel.  Asliby  v.  Three  States 
Lumber  Co.,  198  Mo.  430,  95  S.  W. 
333  [1906];  State  ex  rel.  Stotts  v. 
Wall.  153  Mo.  216,  54  S.  W.  465 
[1899];  Morrison  v.  ]\Iorey,  146  Mo. 
543,  48  S.  W.  629  [1898];  Columbia 
Bottom  Levee  Company  v.  Meier,  39 
Mo.  53  [1866];  Egyptian  Levee  Co. 
V.  Hardin,  27  Mo.  495,  72  Am.  Dec. 
276    [18581. 

»- Article  238,  Constitution  of 
Louisiana. 

"Article  XL.  §  236,  Constitution 
of  Mississippi. 


§  344  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  526 

wise  and  proper."  ^*  Under  these  and  similar  provisions  there  can 
be  no  doubt,  as  far  as  state  law  is  concerned,  that  a  levee  is  of 
general  public  benefit.  As  we  have  seen,^^  there  is  no  doubt  that 
a  levee  confers  an  especial  local  benefit.  Accordingly,  in  these 
states  assessments  for  the  construction  of  levees  are  upheld.^"  The 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  acquiesced  in  this  rule 
and  follows  the  state  law  upon  this  question." 

§  344.    Illinois  doctrine  concerning  levees. 

While  assessments  for  the  construction  of  levees  were  held  un- 
constitutional in  Illinois,^  the  question  of  the  nature  of  the  im- 
provement was  not  involved,  but  the  decision  turned  on  certain 
provisions  of  the  constitution  of  Illinois  limiting  the  general 
taxing  power  of  the  legislature.  Under  a  provision  that  the  legis- 
lature might  confer  the  power  of  taxation  upon  counties,  town- 
ships, school  districts,  cities,  towns  and  villages,  but  that  such 
taxes  must  be  "uniform  in  respect  to  persons  and  property  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  bod}^  imposing  the  same,"  '  it  was  held  that 
the  legislature  could  not  grant  power  to  levy  taxes  to  any  other 
body  than  the  corporate  authorities  of  the  municipality  or  district 
to  be  taxed ;  ^  and  hence,  could  not  authorize  a  levee  district  with 

"Article    XI.,    §    237,    Constitution  Ann.    329    [1847];    Smith    v.    Willis, 

of  Mississippi.  78    Miss.    243,    28    So.    878    [1900]; 

^'  See  ante  this  section.  Carlisle   v.   Yoder,   69   Miss.    384,    12 

^^  Hill    V.    Fontenot,    46    La.    Ann.  So.   255 ;    Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss. 

15G3,    16    So.    475    [1894];    State   ex  652    [I860];    Williams   v.    Cammack, 

vel.  Hill  V.  Judges,  46  La.  Ann.  1292.  27     Miss.     209.     61     Am.     Dec.     508 

16  So.  219;   George  v.  Young,  45  La.  [1854]. 

Ann.  1232,  14  So.  137  [1893];  Mun-  "Ford  v.  Delta  &  Pirie  Land  Corn- 
son  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of  pany,  164  U.  S.  662.  41  L.  590,  17 
The  Atchafalaya  Basin  Levee  Dis-  S.  230  [1897];  (affirming  Ford  v. 
trict,  43  La.  Ann.  15,  8  So.  906  Delta  &  Pine  Land  Co.,  43  Fed.  181 
[1891];    Excelsior  Planting  &  Manu-  [1890]). 

facturing  Company  v.  Green,   39  La.  '  Updike     v.     Wright,     81     111.     49 

Ann.   455,    1    So.   873    [1887];    Char-  [1876]. 

nock    V.    Fordoche    and    Grosse    Tete  ^Constitution    1848,   Article   IX.,   § 

Special   Levee   District   Company,   38  4. 

La.   Ann.   323    [1886];    Board  of  Le-  ^  Board    of    Directors    v.    Houston, 

vee  Commissioners  v.  Lario  Bros.,  33  71   111.  318;   Gage  v.  Graham,  57  111. 

La.  Ann.  276   [1881];   Richardson  v.  144;  Hessler  v.  Drainage  Coriimission- 

Morgan,    16    La.    Ann.    429     [1862];  ers,  53  111.  105;  Harward  v.  St.  Clair 

Wallace  v.  Shelton,  14  La.  Ann.  498  &   Monroe   Levee   and   Drainage   Dis- 

[1859];  Yeatman  v.  Crandall,  11  La.  trict,  51  111.  130;  People  ex  rel.  South 

Ann.  220   [1856]  ;   Gillispie  v.  Police  Park   Commissioners   v.   Salomon,   51 

Jury   of   Concordia,    5    La.   Ann.    403  111.  37. 
[1850];    Crowley    v.    Copley,    2    La. 


527  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  344 

power  to  levy  local  assessments.  A  provision  in  the  constitution 
of  1870  enabled  the  General  Assembly  to  "vest  corporate  author- 
ities of  cities,  towns  and  villages  with  power  to  make  local  im- 
provements by  special  assessments,  or  by  special  taxation  of 
contiguous  property,  or  otherwise,"*  but  for  all  other  purposes 
required  taxation  which  should  be  uniform  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  body  imposing  the  same.  Since  a  levee  district  was  not  a 
"city,  town  or  village,"  it  received  no  authority  under  this  section 
to  make  local  assessments.  Another  section  of  the  constitution 
of  1870^  provided:  "The  General  Assembly  may  make  general 
laws  permitting  the  owners  or  occupants  of  lands  to  construct 
drains  and  ditches  for  agricultural  and  sanitary  purposes  across 
the  lands  of  the  others."  However,  the  levee  in  question  was  not 
to  be  constructed  as  incidental  to  a  system  of  drains  and  ditches, 
but  was  a  levee  running  for  many  miles  along  the  Wabash,  in- 
tended as  an  independent  and  separate  improvement.  Accord- 
ingly it  was  held  that  in  view  of  these  restrictions  on  the  taxing 
power,  local  assessments  for  levee  purposes  were  not  authorized 
by  the  constitution."  Following  this  decision  an  amendment  to 
the  constitution  was  adopted,'^  which  provides:  "The  General 
Assembly  may  pass  laws  permitting  the  owners  of  lands  to  con- 
struct drains,  ditches  and  levees  for  agricultural,  sanitary  or  min- 
ing purposes,  across  the  lands  of  others  and  provide  for  the  organ- 
ization of  drainage  districts,  and  vest  the  corporate  authorities 
thereof  with  power  to  construct  and  maintain  levees,  drains  and 
ditches,  and  to  keep  in  repair  all  drains,  ditches  and  levees  here- 
tofore constructed  iinder  the  laws  of  this  state  by  special  assess- 
ments upon  the  property  benefited  thereby."  Under  this  amend- 
ment statutes  authorizing  the  construction  of  levees  to  be  paid  for 
by  local  assessments  levied  upon  the  property  benefited  thereby 
have  been  upheld.'* 

*  Constitution  of  1870,  Article  IX..  « Stack    v.    People   ex    rel.    Talbott, 

§  9.  217    111.   220,   75   N.   E.   347    [1905]; 

"Article  IV.,   §   31.  Robeson  v.  People  ex  rol.  Curry,  161 

•O'Brien    v.    Wheelock,    184    IT.    S.  111.   170,  43  N.  E.  619   [1896]  ;"  Rieb- 

450,   46   L.    636,    22    S.    354    [19021;  linir   v.    People,    145    111.    120,    33    N. 

(alTirminii,    O'Brien    v.    Wheelock,    9.3  E.   1090;   Spear  v.  DrainaQ;e  Commis- 

Fed.    8S3,    37    C.    C.    A.    309    [1S991;  sioners,   113  111.   632    [1880];    Owners 

which  anirnied  78  Fed.  073)  ;   l^pdike  of    Land    v.    People    ex    rel.    Stookey, 

V.   Writrht,   81    III.   49.  113     111.     290      [1886];     Huston     v. 

'Constitution  of   1870,  Article   IV..  Clark,    112    111.    344     [1885];     Blake 

§   31,   adopted   as   an   amendment   in  v.    People   for   Use   of   Caldwell,    109 

1878.  111.    504    [1884]. 


§.§  345,   346  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  528 

§  345.    Tennessee  doctrine  concerning  levees. 

In  Tennessee,  the  courts  formerly  recognized  no  distinction  in 
apportionment  between  a  tax  and  an  assessment  based  on  the 
theory  of  benefits,  and  accordingly  upheld  assessments  only  when 
the  improvement  could  be  justified  on  the  theory  of  the  police 
power.^  An  .assessment  for  a  levee  has  been  held  to  be  unconsti- 
tutional under  this  theory,  the  court  holding  that  the  improvement 
was  primarily  for  the  private  benefit  of  the  owners  of  realty  pro- 
tected from  inundation  by  such  levee,  and  that  accordingly  such 
improvement  could  not  be  justified  under  the  police  power.^  With 
the  repudiation  of  the  fundamental  theory  of  the  invalidity  of 
assessments  for  benefits  in  Tennessee,^  it  is  likely  that  assessments 
for  levees  would  now  be  upheld. 

§  346.    Waterworks  and  water-pipes. 

A  system  of  waterworks  by  which  water  can  be  supplied  to  the 
inhabitants  of  a  municipality  for  domestic  use,  and  can  be  made 
use  of  by  the  municipality  in  extinguishing  fires  and  for  other 
public  purposes,  undoubtedly  confers  a  general  benefit  upon  the 
public.  It  is  one  of  the  purposes  for  which  taxes  may  be  levied. 
Such  a  system  may  be  paid  for  out  of  the  public  treasury.  There 
appears,  also,  to  be  a  private  benefit  enuring  to  the  owners  of 
land,  available  for  residence  or  business  purposes,  which  is  thus 
supplied  with  water.  Is  this  benefit  of  such  a  nature  that  local 
assessments  may  be  levied  therefor?  In  determining  this  question 
a  distinction  is  made  by  some  courts  between  the  water-mains — 
pipes  which  bring  the  water  to  the  land  in  question,  hydrants  and 

^  See  §  93.  the  construction  of  the  contemplated 

^Reelfoot    Lake    Levee    District   v.  levee,  and  the  consequent  prevention 

Dawson,   97   Tenn.    151,   34   L.   R.   A.  of  periodical  overflows;  but  those  are 

725,    36    S.    W.    1041     [1896]-,    "The  the  most  remote  of  the  benefits  to  be 

paramount  and   controlling  idea   dis-  anticipated   from    such   a   work,   and 

closed  in  every  part  of  the  act  is  to  were    likely    not    thought    of    by    the 

raise  a  fund  with  which   to  reclaim  members    of    the    general    assembly. 

from     frequent     inundation     a     large  Without  further  enlarging  upon   the 

body    (some   three   hundred   thousand  subject   we   hold   unhesitatingly    that 

acres)  of  land  in  the  Mississippi  Val-  this  legislation   is  in  no  sense  refer- 

ley    and    thereby    enhance    its    value  able  to  the  police  power  of  the  state 

and  the  wealth  of  its  owners.  Strict-  and  that  it  cannot  be  justified  there- 

ly  sneakine  it  is  without  an  element  under."      Reelfoot    Lake    Levee    Dis- 

or  feature  of  reqfulatinn.     Tbe  health  trict    v.    Dawson,    97    Tenn.    151,    34. 

of   the   peonle    in    the   localitv   mio-ht  L.    "R.    A.    725,    731,    36    S.    W.    1041 

be  somewhat  improved   and   even   life  [1896]. 

itself  might  be  saved  accordingly  by  ^  See   §    160. 


529 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


§347 


the  like,  and  the  pumping  station  by  which  water  is  supplied  to 
the  entire  system. 

§  347.     Water-pipes. 

The  courts  are  practically  unanimous  in  holding  that  the  mains 
and  pipes  by  which  water  is  conducted  to  the  land  supplied  there- 
with, constitute  an  especial  local  benefit  for  which  such  lands  may 
be  assessed.^  If  the  assessment  is  levied  in  proportion  to  the 
benefits  conferred,  an  assessment  for  water-pipes  may  be  levied 
upon  property  upon  which  there  is  no  imuiediate  need  for  the  use 
of  water,-  such  as  vacant  lots.^    The  general  principle  seems  to  be 


*  Parsons  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943,  18  S.  521 
[1898];  (affirming,  Parsons  v.  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  8  App.  D.  C.  391 
[1896];  which  followed  Burgdorf  v. 
District  of  Columbia,  7  App.  D.  C. 
405 )  ;  Parsons  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 8  App.  D.  C.  391  [1896];  (af- 
firmed in  Parsons  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 170  U.  S.  45,  42  L.  943,  18 
S.  521  [1898];  and  following  Burg- 
dorf V.  District  of  Columbia,  7  App. 
D.  C.  405)  ;  District  of  Columbia  v. 
Burgdorf,  6  App.  D.  C.  465  [1895]; 
McChesney  v.  City  of  Chicago,  226 
111.  238,  80  X.  E.  770  [1907];  Betts 
V.  City  of  Xaperville,  214  111.  380, 
73  N.  E.  752  [1905]  ;  Town  of  Cicero 
V.  Green,  211  111.  241,  71  X.  E.  884 
[1904];  Gordon  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
201  111.  623,  66  X.  E.  823  [1903]; 
Myers  v.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111. 
591,  63  X.  E.  1037;  Harts  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Kochorsperger,  171  111.  458, 
49  X.  E.  538  [1898];  Hewes  v.  Glos, 
170  111.  463,  48  X.  E.  922;  O'Xeill 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger,  166 
111.  561,  46  X.  E.  1096  [1897];  Pal- 
mer V.  City  of  Danville,  166  111.  42, 
46  X.  E.  629  [1897];  Hughes  v.  City 
of  Momence,  163  111.  535,  45  X.  E. 
300  [1896];  Palmer  v.  City  of  Dan- 
ville. 154  111.  156,  38  X.*  E.  1067 
[1894];  Mc-^  hesnoy  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago. 152  111.  543,  38  X.  E.  767 
[18041;  Murphv  v.  People.  120  111. 
234,  11  X.  E.  202;  EicVetts  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Hvde  Park.  85  111.  110 
[1877];     Village    of    Hvde    Park    v. 


Waite,  2  Brad.  (111.)  443  [1878]; 
Young  V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  47  Mo. 
492  [1871];  City  of  Philadelphia  v. 
Union  Burial  Ground  Society  of  the 
City  and  County  of  Philadelphia, 
178  Pa.  St.  533,  36  L.  R.  A=  263,  36 
Atl.  172  [1896];  City  of  Allentown 
V.  Hower,  93  Pa.  St.  (12  Xorris) 
332  [1880];  Allentown  v.  Hear^,  73 
Pa.  St.  (23  P.  F.  Smith)  404  [1873]; 
Britton  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  32 
Pa.  St.  (8  Casey)  387  [1859];  City 
of  Philadelphia  v.  Cooke,  30  Pa.  St. 
(6  Casey)  56  [1858];  Xorth- 
ern  Liberties  v.  Coates'  Heirs,  15  Pa. 
St.  (3  Harr.)  245  [1850];  Xorthern 
Liberties  v.  St.  John's  Church,  15 
Pa.  St.  (3  Harr.)  104  [1850];  City 
V.  MoClamont,  6  Phil.  (Pa.)  543 
[1868];  Batterman  v.  City  of  Xew 
York,  65  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  576  [1901] ; 
Allen  V.  Drew,  44  Vt.  174  [1872]; 
R.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Lynch- 
burg,  81    Va.   473    [1866];    Vreeland 

V.    City   of   Tacoma,   —   Wash.   ', 

94  Pac.  192  [1908];  Smith  v.  City 
of  Seattle,  25  Wash.  300,  65  Pac. 
612  [1901];  Moran  v.  Thompson.  20 
Wash.  525,  56  Pac.  29  [1899]; 
Gleason  v.  Waukesha  County,  103 
Wis.   225,    79   X.   W.   249    [1899]. 

=  Dasey  v.  Skinner,  33  X.  Y.  State 
R.  15,  il  X.  Y.  Supp.  821  [1890]; 
(The  benefits  in  this  ease  consisted 
in  increased  fire   protection.) 

'Jones  V.  Water  Commissioners,  34 
:Mich.  273:  Crawford's  Estate.  14 
Phila.    (Pa.)    323. 


.§  348  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  530 

recognized  in  cases  in  which  the  specific  assessment  was  held  to 
be  invalid  for  some  defect  not  going  to  the  question  of  the  pro- 
priety of  authorizing  assessments  for  such  a  purpose,*  as  where 
the  apportionment  was  arbitrary,^  the  land  already  supplied  with 
water-pipes,®  the  city  not  empowered,  by  statute,  to  levy  such 
assessment,'^  the  property  assessed  not  described  with  sufficient 
accuracy,^  or  the  assessment  not  levied  in  the  manner  authorized 
by  statute."  So  under  an  ordinance  for  buying  water-pipes,  hy- 
drants cannot  be  purchased.^"  It  has  been  held  that  protection 
against  fire  is  a  sufficient  local  benefit  and  that  an  assessment 
may  be  levied  for  the  cost  of  constructing  water-pipes  that  are 
restricted  to  use  in  case  of  fire.^^ 

§  348.    Connections,  hydrants  and  valves. 

Assessments  mny  be  levied  for  incidental  appliances,  necessary 
to  the  local  use  of  a  system  of  waterworks.  Thus  an  assessment 
may  be  levied  for  the  cost  of  connections  with  the  main  water- 
pipes  of  the  city,  running  from  such  water-pipes  to  the  lot  lines ;  ^ 
or  even  for  connections  with  pipes  belonging  to  a  private  water 
company,  and  pipes  from  such  connections  to  the  curb  line  of  the 
street.-  An  assessment  may  be  levied  for  extending  an  existing 
system  of  water-pipes.'*  A  regulation  that  persons  desiring  to  use 
city  water  must  lay  service-pipes  from  their  lands  to  the  main 
pipes  at  their  owm  expense  has  been  upheld.*     While  the  assess- 


*  Cook  Farm  Co.  v.  City  of  Detroit.  sessment  was   on   dwellings   not   sup- 

124  Mich.  426,  83  N.  W.  130  [1900]:  plied  with  hydrants.) 

City  of  Allentown  v.  Hower,  93  Pa.  "Town  of  Cicero  v.  Green,  211  111. 

St.    (12  Norris)    32    [1880].  241,   71   N.  E.   884    [1904]. 

"Warren   v.    City   of   Chicago,    118  '^  City  v.  McClamont,  6  Phil.   (Pa.) 

111.  329,  11  K  E.  218   [1888].  543   [1868]. 

"  McChesney  v.  City  of  Chicago,  213  ^  Prindiville  v.  Jackson,  79  111.  337 

111.  592,  73  N.  E.  368   [1905]  ;   Baker  [1S85J  ;    (In  this  case  the  city  merely 

V.    Gartside,    86    Pa.    St.    (5    Xorris)  required    the    owner    to    pay    for    the 

498.  cost    of    such    connection    when    he 

■^  Alvord   V.   City   of   Syracuse,    163  wished  to  make  use  of  it.) 

N.  Y.   158,  57  N.  E.  310   [1900].  -Palmer   v.    City   of   Danville,    154 

« Bensinger  V.  District  of  Columbia,  111.     156,     38     N.     E.     1067     [1894]; 

6  Mackey    (D.  C.)    285   [1888].  Gleason  v.   Waukesha   Co.,    103   Wis. 

•Allentown    v.    Henry,    73    Pa.    St.  225,  79  N.  W.  249   [1899]. 

(23    P.    F.    Smith)    404    [1873];     (A  ^ Myers  v.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111. 

case  in  which  the  statute  authorized  591,  63  N.  E.   1037    [1902]. 

an  assessment  on  the  land  on  streets  *  Prindiville  v.  Jackson,  79  111.  337 

where  pipes  were   laid;    and   the   as-  [1875]. 


531  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  349 

ments  already  referred  to  have  been  for  water-pipes  or  mains," 
other  purposes  have  been  treated  as  local  so  as  to  permit  of  local 
assessments,  such  as  hydrants  and  valves  in  addition  to  the  pipes," 
lawn  hydrants  for  sprinkling  lawns, ^  or  reservoirs  and  fire  hy- 
drants in  addition  to  the  pipes.^ 

§  349.    Defective  apportionment  in  assessment  for  water-pipes. 

In  the  eases  thus  far  discussed  the  apportionment  has  been 
fairly  proportional  to  the  benefits  received  from  the  laying  of  the 
water-pipes,  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied.  If  such  charge  is 
not  apportioned  with  regard  to  special  benefits  received  by  the 
realty  assessed  it  is  held  that  such  charge  is  not  a  valid  assess- 
ment.^ If  not  apportioned  according  to  the  value  of  the  po'operty 
legally  assessed  for  taxation  at  its  true  value,  it  is  not  valid  as  a 
tax.-  These  questions  are  outside  of  the  scope  of  this  chapter  and 
are  discussed  elsewhere.^  They  are  referred  to  here  in  order  to 
arrive  at  a  clear  unaorstanding  of  the  force  and  effect  of  the  New 
Jersey  cases  cited.  They  are  often  regarded  as  laying  down  the 
general  rule  that  local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for  a  water 
supply.  This  is  not,  however,  the  real  principle  on  Avhich  these 
cases  rest,  as  the  defect  in  the  assessment  in  question  was  that 
there  was  no  attempt  to  levy  such  assessments  upon  any  theory 
of  benefits.*    An  assessment  of  seventy-five  cents  per  foot  frontage 

°Hewes   v.    GIos,    170    111.    436,    48  L.   (14  Vr.)    135);  State,  United  New 

N.   E.   922;    Hughes   v.    City   of   Mo-  Jersey  Railroad  &  Canal  Co.  v.  May- 

mence,    163    111.    535,    45    N.    E.    300  or  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  41 

[1896].  X.    J.    L.     (12    Vr.)     471 ;"  Provident 

'Belts   V.    City    of    Xaperville,    214  Institution   for   Savings   v.   Allen,   37 

111.  380,  73  X.  E.  752    [1905];    :\rurr  X.    J.    Eq.     (10    Stew.)     627    [1883]; 

V.    City    of    Xaperville,    210    111.    371,  (affirming    without    report    Provident 

71  N.  E.  380   [1904].  Institution  for   Savings   v.    Allen.   37 

'Lingle     v.     West     Chicago     Park  N.  J.   Eq.    (10   Stew.)    36    [1883]). 

Commissioners,  222  111.  384,  78  N.  E.  =  Mayor,    etc.,    of    Jersey    City    v. 

794  [1906].  State, 'Vreeland,    43    X.    J.    L.     (14 

*  Harts   V.    People   ex    rol.    Kocher-  Vr.)    638;    (affirming  State,  Vreeland 

sperger,    171    111.   458,   49   X.   E.   538  v.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of    Jersey 

[1898];     O'Xeil     v.     People    ex     rel.  City,    43    X.    J.    L.    (14    Vr.  I     135); 

.  Kochersperger,  166  111.  561,  46  X.  E.  State,    United    Xew    Jersey    Railroad 

1096   [1897].  &    Canal    Co.    v.    Mayor    knd    Alder- 

^  State,  Culver,  Pros.  v.  flavor  and  men  of  Jersey  City,  41   X.  J.  L.    (12 

Aldermen   of   Jersey   Citv,   45    X.    J.  Vr.)    471. 

L.     (16    Vr.)     256"   [1883];     Mayor,  'See  §   147   et  seq.;  Chapter  XIII. 

etc.,   of   Jersey   City   v.   State,   Vree-  *  See    discussion    of   these   cases    in 

land.  4?  N.  J.  L.   (14  Vr.)   638;    (af-  Doughten  v.   City   of  Cnmden.   71   X. 

firming  State,  Vreeland  v.  Mayor  and  J.  L.   426,   59  Atl.    16    [1904]. 
Aldermen    of   Jersey    City,    43    X.    J. 


§  350  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  532 

was  levied  for  the  cost  of  laying  water-pipes.  In  the  lower  court 
such  assessment  was  held  valid  at  least  as  far  as  concerns  owners 
of  realty  who  made  no  objection  to  the  work  and  who  made  use 
of  the  water  furnished  through  the  pipes  for  which  such  assess- 
ment was  levied.^  This  case  was,  however,  reversed  in  the  court 
of  last  resort  on  the  ground  that  the  charge  was  invalid  as  an 
assessment  as  not  apportionate  according  to  benefits,*'  and  that  if 
not  an  assessment  it  could  not  be  upheld  as  it  was  not  a  valid 
exercise  of  the  police  power.''  The  peculiarity  of  the  New  Jersey 
eases  rests  in  their  views  on  the  subject  of  apportionment,®  and 
not  in  their  views  as  to  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  assess  for 
laying  water-pipes.  The  propriety  of  levying  an  assessment  for 
such  purpose  has  been  recognized,  although  the  specific  assessment 
has  been  held  invalid  as  being  levied  against  farm  land  and  at  the 
same  time  apportioned  by  the  front  foot  rule,^  a  system  of  appor- 
tionment not  allowed  in  Pennsylvania  as  to  rural  or  farm  land.^'^ 

§  350.    Special  views  in  certain  jurisdictions. 

In  Minnesota,  prior  to  any  specific  constitutional  provision  upon 
this  subject,  the  purpose  of  laying  water-pipes  was  not  seriously 
questioned  as  one  which  was  not  proper  for  local  assessment ;  but 
practical  difficulties  were  found  in  levying  such  assessments,^  and 
subsequently  the  constitution  of  Minnesota  was  amended  by  the 
addition  of  the  following  provision:  "And  provided  further,  that 
for  the  purpose  of  defraying  the  expenses  of  laying  water-pipes 
and  supplying  any  city  or  municipality  with  water,  the  legislature 
may,  by  general  or  special  law,  authorize  any  such  city  or  munic- 
ipality having  a  population  of  five  thousand  or  more,  to  levy  an 

°  Doughten  v.   City  of  Camden,   71  an    arbitrary    charge    on    realty    and 

N.    J.    L.    426,    59    Atl.    16    [1904]  •,  had    not    fixed    tlie    charge    to    meet 

(distinguishing    State,    Vreeland,    v.  either   the   cost   of   laying   the   pipes 

Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  or  the  benefit  accruing  therefrom). 

43   N.   J.   L.    (14   Vr.)    135;    Mayor,  "See  §   118;   Chapter  XIII. 

etc.,   of   Jersey   City   v.    State,   Vree-  "^  Doughten  v.   City  of  Camden,   72 

land,  43  N.  J.  L.    (14  Vr.)    638;   and  N.  J.  L.  451,   111   Am.  St.  Rep.  680, 

State,    Culver,    Pros.    v.  ■  Mayor    and  3  L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    817,  63  Atl.   170 

Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  45  N.  J.  L.  [1906]. 

(16  Vr.)   256  [1883];  as  cases  where  *  See  Chapter   XIII.,   §   690   et  seq. 
the   city   had   not   been   given   power  '  City    of    Allentown    v.    Adams,    5 
by  the'leo-islature  to   charge  the  ex-  Sadler    (Pa.)    253    [1887]. 
pense  of  constructing  water  mains  on  ^^  See  §  610,  §  706. 
the   property   benefited    thereby;    and  ^  Minnesota  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Pal- 
where  furthermore  the  city  had  made  mer,  20  Minn.  468    [1874]. 


533  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  350 

annual  tax  or  assessment  upon  the  lineal  foot  of  all  lands  fronting 
on  any  water-main  or  water-pipe  laid  by  such  city  or  municipality 
within  corporate  limits  of  said  city  for  supplying  water  to  the 
citizens  thereof  without  regard  to  the  cash  value  of  such  property ; 
and  to  empower  such  city  to  collect  any  such  tax,  assessments  or 
fines,  or  penalties  for  failure  to  pay  the  same,  or  any  fine  or 
penalty  for  any  violation  of  the  rules  of  such  city  or  municipality 
in  regard  to  the  use  of  water,  or  for  any  water  rate  due  for  the 
same.  .  .  .  "^  Accordingly,  under  such  constitutional  provis- 
ion, such  assessments  have  been  upheld  in  Minnesota  after  some 
hesitation ;  the  vacillation  of  judicial  opinion  being  due  to  the 
supposed  effect  of  the  United  States  Constitution  upon  the  method 
of  apportioning  such  assessments,  and  not  to  any  doubt  as  to  the 
effect  of  the  state  constitution.  An  assessment  for  the  construc- 
tion of  water-mains  and  pipes  levied  on  the  realty  in  front  of 
which  such  mains  and  pipes  were  laid  and  apportioned  according 
to  frontage,  was  originally  held  valid  under  the  state  constitution.' 
Subsequently,  in  view  of  the  supposed  holding  in  Norwood  v. 
Baker,*  such  assessment  was  held  to  be  invalid,  as  being  in  conflict 
with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  ^  but  this  last  decision 
was  subsequently  reversed  on  re-argument  and  the  assessment 
was  held  to  be  valid.*^  In  Massachusetts  it  has  been  held  that  in 
estimating  the  benefits  enuring  from  a  number  of  improvements 
it  is  proper  to  include  the  benefits  caused  bj^  laying  water-pipes.^ 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  many  jurisdictions  have  passed  upon  the 
validity  of  such  assessments  and  have  upheld  them.  The  con- 
struction which  the  courts  of  South  Carolina  have  placed  upon  the 
clause  of  their  constitution,  which  protects  property  from  being 
taken  except  by  due  process  of  law,  has  practically  done  away 


^Article   IX.,    §    1,   Constitution  of  Ramsey   County   v.   Robert   P.   Lewis 

Minnesota,   amended    1881.  Co.,  53  L.  R.  A.  421   [1901]. 

'State  of   Minnesota  v.   Robert   P.  *  State  v.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  82 

Lewis    Co.,    72   Minn.   87,    75    N.    W.  Minn.  402,  86  N.  W.  611 ;  su6  «o)?7tnc 

108;   sub   nomine  Ramsey  County  v.  Ramsey   County   v.   Robert   P.   Lewis 

Robert    P.    Lewis    Co.,    42    L.    R.    A.  Co.,  53  L.  R.  A.  427 ;  See  also  as  up- 

639   [1898];  Noonan  v.  City  of  Still-  holding  an  assessment  for  pipes  for  a 

water,    33    Minn.    198,    53    Am.    Rep.  water-works  sj'stem,  State  v.  Trustee* 

23,  22  N.  W.  444.  of  Macalester  Collejie,  87  Minn.   165, 

*172  U.   S.   269,   43   L.   443,    19   S.  91  N.  W.  484   [1902]. 
187    [1898].  'Lincoln   v.   Board   of   Street   Com- 

•  State  V.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  82  missioners  of  the  City  of  Boston,  176 

Minn.  390,  85  N.  W.  207;  s!/b  nomine,  Mass.    210,   57    N.    E.    356    [1900]. 


§  351  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  534 

with  the  possibility  of  local  assessments  in  that  state.*  Accord- 
ingly, we  find  that  local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  on  lots 
abutting  the  streets  on  which  w^ater-pipes  are  laid  to  pay  for  the 
purchase  of  a  waterworks  plant."  No  distinction  was  made  in  this 
holding  between  assessing  to  pay  for  the  pumping  station  and 
assessing  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  the  water-pipes,  but  the  entire 
assessment  was  treated  as  violating  the  constitutional  provision. 

§  351.    Pumping  station. 

In  some  jurisdictions  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  levy  local 
assessments  on  realty  supplied  with  water  by  means  of  a  water- 
works system  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  pumping  station  and  other 
parts  of  the  plant  other  than  the  local  pipes.  Whether  such 
assessments  can  be  levied  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  a 
conflict  of  authority.  In  Arkansas  such  assessments  have  been 
levied  under  a  statute  specially  authorizing  local  assessments  for 
such  a  purpose,  and  the  courts  have  held  that  such  assessments 
may  be  authorized  without  violating  the  constitutional  rights  of 
the  property  owner. ^  In  Illinois  such  assessments  have  been  levied 
under  statutory  and  constitutional  provisions  authorizing  munci- 
palities  to  assess  for  "local  improvements."  Under  such  pro- 
visions it  has  been  held  that  the  pumping  station  and  similar  parts 
of  the  plant  are  not  "local  improvements"  within  the  meaning  of 
either  the  constitution  or  the  statute;  and  that  accordingly  local 
assessments  cannot  be  levied  therefor.^  Under  this  theory  it  has 
been  held  that  local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for  a  stand-pipe 
and  engine-house,^  for  a  reservoir,  well,  stand-pipe   and  pumping- 

«See  §   118,  §  159.  sperger,    171    111.   458,   49   N.   E.   538 

•Stehmeyer     v.     City     Coiincil     of  [1898];   Hewes  v.  Glos,   170  111.  436, 

Charleston,    53   S.    C.    259,    31    S.    E.  48   N.   E.   922;    O'Neill  v.   People   ex 

322  [1898].  rel.   Kochersperger,    166    111.   561,   46 

'Morrilton  Waterworks  Improve-  N.  E.  1096  [1897];  Hughes  v.  City 
ment  District  v.  Earl,  71  Ark.  4,  69  of  Momence,  163  111.  16,  45  N.  E. 
S.  W.  577,  71  S.  W.  666  [1903];  302  [1896];  Hughes  v.  City  of  Mo- 
Crane  V.  Siloam  Springs,  67  Ark.  30,  mence,  164  111.  535,  45  N.  E.  300 
55  S.  W.  95  [1899].  The  statute  in  [1896];  Village  of  Blue  Island  v. 
question  authorized  the  municipality  Eames,  155  111.  398,  40  N.  E.  615; 
or  district  to  take  steps  for  the  "pur-  Village  of  Morgan  Park  v.  Wiswall, 
chase  of  land  or  erection  of  houses,  155  111.  262,  40  N.  E.  611  [1895]. 
reservoirs  or  other  improvements  ^  O'Neill  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kocher- 
necessary  for  the  proper  construe-  sperger,  166  111.  561,  46  N.  E.  1096 
tion   and   operation  of  water-works."  [1897]. 

*  Harts   V.    People   ex    rel.   Kocher- 


535  WHEN    xVSSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  351 

works,*  or  for  pumping-works,  pumps  and  a  stand-pipe.''  These 
two  theories  are  irreconcilable.  While  the  Arkansas  court  has 
endeavored  to  reconcile  the  cases  by  pointing  that  in  Illinois  the 
legislature  had  not  specially  authorized  local  assessments  for  such 
a  purpose,  but  in  Arkansas  it  had  expressly  authorized  such  an 
assessment,^  the  fact  remains  that  the  Illinois  courts  base  their 
holding  on  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "local  improvement," 
which  occurs  both  in  statute  and  in  constitution.  The  truth  is 
that  the  two  jurisdictions  differ  in  one  respect  at  least  in  their 
fundamental  theories  of  local  improvements,  the  Arkansas  courts 
holding  that  an  improvement  which  is  at  once  public  in  its  nature 
and  confers  a  special  benefit  upon  the  real  property  assessed  is 
a  local  improvement,  even  if  such  real  property  may  include 
all  the  realty  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  municipality 
which  makes  the  improvement^  while  the  Illinois  courts  take  the 
position  that  if  the  benefit  is  shared  by  all  the  realty  in  the  mu- 
nicipality the  improvement  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  local  one.^ 
This  inconsistency  in  the  theory  of  local  assessment  is  discussed 
elsewhere.®  It  may  here  be  observed  that  the  Illinois  courts  have 
thus  reached  the  conclusion  that  a  pumping-station  for  a  water 
system  cannot  be  a  local  improvement,  while  a  pumping  station 
for  a  system  of  sewers  may  be  a  local  assessment.^"  Apart  from 
the  peculiar  construction  put  upon  the  constitution  of  Illinois 
by  its  courts,  no  good  reason  appears  for  discriminating  between 
pumping-station  of  a  waterworks  system  and  the  pipes  Neither 
is  of  any  benefit  without  the  other.  All  the  reasons  which  make 
it  proper  to  assess  for  the  local  pipes  forbid  us  to  say  that  as  a 
matter  of  law  the  pumping  station  cannot  be  of  any  especial 
benefit  to  the  property  supplied  thereby.  The  propriety  of  levy- 
ing a  local  assessment  to  pay  the  interest  upon  a  debt  incurred 
for  constructing  a  system  of  waterworks,  including  apparently 
the    central   pumping   station,   has    been    recognized    in    cases    in 

*  Hughes  V.  City  of  Tklomence,   164  'Crane  v.   Siloam   Sjirinp.   07  Ark. 

111.  16,  45  N.  E.  302  [18!)6]:  Hughes  .30,  55  S.  W.  955   [1899]. 

V.  City  of  Momence,   103   111.  535.  45  "Village   of   Morgan    Park    v.    Wis 

N.  E.  300   [1890].  wall,     155    111.    202.    40    X.    E.    Oil 

'Harts   V.    People    ex    rel.    Kocher-  [1S95]. 

sperger,   171    111.   458,   49   N.   E.   538  "See  §  283  et  seq.;  §  654. 

[1898].  '"See  §   330. 

•See  the  discussion  of  the  Illinois 
cases  in  Crane  v.  Siloam  Rjirings.  67 
Ark.  30,  55  S.  W.  9.-^5  [1899]. 


§  352  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  536 

which  the  specific  assessment  has  been  held  to  be  invalid,  as 
where  not  levied  in  compliance  with  the  statute,"  or  where  the 
statute  is  invalid  as  not  providing  for  hearing  and  notice.^- 

§  352.    Wells  and  cisterns. 

Wells  and  cisterns  for  furnishing  water  for  domestic  use  and 
for  extinguishing  fires  are  as  clearly  a  public  benefit,  though  to 
a  slighter  degree,  as  a  system  of  waterworks.  Such  improve- 
ments are  so  clearly  a  public  benefit  that  it  is  well  settled  that 
a  public  corporation  may  construct  them  and  may  pay  therefor 
out  of  funds  raised  by  general  taxation.  If  the  pipes  and  hydrants 
of  a  system  of  waterworks  confer  an  especial  and  local  benefit 
for  which  local  assessments  may  be  levied,  as  it  is  held  that  they 
do,^  the  same  principles  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  cisterns 
and  wells  constructed  for  public  purposes  furnish  such  a  local 
benefit  that  local  assessments  may  be  levied  therefor  upon  prop- 
erty especially  benefited  thereby.  While  statutes  authorizing  as- 
sessments for  this  purpose  are  rather  rare,  it  has  been  held 
specifically  that  such  assessments  may  be  levied;^  and  the  consti- 
tutional validity  of  such  assessments  has  been  upheld  in  cases  in 
which  the  petition  in  action  to  recover  the  same  was  held  insuffi- 
cient on  demurrer  because  while  it  set  forth  the  special  ordinance 
providing  for  such  improvement  at  the  cost  of  "the  owners  of 
property  chargeable  therefor  under  the  city  charter  and  ordi- 
nances," it  did  not  set  forth  the  general  ordinance  which  sr)ecified 
the  distance  from  the  cistern  within  which  property  should  be,  to 
be  charged  with  the  cost  of  such  improvement.^  The  propriety 
of  an  assessment  for  such  purpose  has  been  impliedly  recognized 
even  where  a  sale  was  held  to  be  invalid  as  a  means  of  enforcing 
such  assessment.* 

"  Wheeler    v.    Treasurer    of    Musk-  ^  Abraham  v.  City  of  Louisville,  — 

ingum    County,    3    Ohio    C.    C.    596        (Ky.)    ,   62   S.' W.   1041,  23  Ky. 

[1889].  L.    R.    375;    Louisville    Steam    Forge 

^-In  the  Matter  of  the  Application       Co.  v.   Anderson,  —    (Ky.)    ,  57 

of  the  Trustees  of  Union  College  for  S.  W.  617,  22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  397;  City 

an  Order  Directing  the  Treasurer  of  of  Louisville  v.  Osborne,  73  Ky.    ( 10 

Long  Island   City  to   Cancel   Certain  Bush.)    226    [1874]. 

Water   Rates   and   Rents,    129   X.   Y.  ^Stephens   v.    Guthrie,    67    Ky.    (4 

308,   29   N.   E.   460    [1891];    Remsen  Bush.)   462  [1868];  Babbitt  v.  Wool- 

v.  Wheeler,   105  N.  Y.  573,  12  N.  E.  ley,  66  Ky.    (3  Bush.)    703    [1868]. 

564   [1887].  *  Sharp   v.    Spier,   4   Hill    (N.   Y.) 

^See  §§  346,  347.  76. 


537  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §353 

§  353.    Water  rates  as  charges  for  water  used. 

Water  rates  or  charges  for  the  use  of  water  and  the  benefit 
received  from  the  continued  operation  of  the  waterworks  sys- 
tem, are  often  referred  to  indiscriminately  as  "assessments"  and 
"  taxes.  "^  The  term  has  no  exact  meaning,  as  it  is  used  to 
denote  two  or  three  very  different  forms  of  exacting  compen- 
sation. The  term  is  often  employed  to  denote  a  charge  upon  the 
consumer  for  the  amount  of  water  actually  used,  based  upon  a 
price  known  to  the  consumer  in  advance.  In  such  a  case  the 
liability  of  the  consumer  is  based  upon  his  voluntary  assent  to  the 
proposition  for  the  sale  of  water,  which  consists  of  his  acceptance 
and  use  of  the  water  furnished.  If  he  does  not  choose  to  use 
any  water,  he  is  under  no  liability.  This  is  evidently  neither  a 
tax  nor  a  local  assessment,  but  an  ordinary  contract  of  sale, 
which  on  performance  by  the  vendor  leaves  the  vendee  liable  for 
the  purchase  price.-  Since  such  a  charge  is  neither  a  tax  nor 
an  assessment,  notice  to  the  party  against  whom  such  charge  is 
made  in  order  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  on  the 
question  of  the  rate  to  be  charged  and  the  amount  to  be  assessed 
against  him,  is  not  necessary. ^^  Furthermore,  such  charge  is  not 
required  to  be  uniform.*  A  flat  rate  may  be  charged  depending 
on  the  size  of  the  building  as  determined  by  the  rules  laid  down 

^Cook  County  v.   City  of  Chicago,  198,   107   N.   W.  393    [1906];    Powell 

103  111.  64(5   [1882].  v.   City   of   Duluth,   91   Minn.   53,   97 

="  Provident  Institution  for  Savings  N.  W.  450   [1903];   Burke  v.  City  of 

V.    Mayor    and    Aldermen    of    Jersey  Water  Valley,  87  Miss.  732.  112  Am. 

City,  113  U.  S.  506,  28  L.   1102,  5  S.  St.    Rep.    468,    40    So.    820    [1905]; 

612   [1884];    (affirming  Provident  In-  Vreeland  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen   of 

stitution  for  Savings  v.  Allen,  37  X.  .Jersey  City,  37  N.  .T.  Eq.   (10  Stew.) 

J.  Eq.    (10  Stew.)   627   [1883];  which  574    [1883];     (aninning.  Vreeland    v. 

affirmed    without    opinion    Provident  O'Xeil.  36  X.  J.  Eq.    (9  Stew.)   399); 

Institution   for   Savings   v.   Allen,   37  Silkman  v.  Board  of  Water  Comniis- 

N.    -J.    Eq.    (10    Stew.)    36    [1883]);  sioners   of   City    of    Yonkers,    152    X. 

Wagner  v.  City  of  Rock  Island.   146  Y.  327.  37  L.  R.  A.  827,  46  X.  E.  612 

111.    139,  21   L.  R.   A.   519,   34   X.   E.  [1897];  Pittsburg  v.  Brace  Brothers. 

545    [1893];    Young    v.    Boston.    104  158  Pa.  St.   174.  27  Atl.  8,54    [1893]. 

Mass.  95;    Board   of  Water   Commis-  *  Silkman  v.  Board  of  Water  Coni- 

sioners  of  City  of  Detroit  v.  Commis-  missioners   of   City    of   Yonkers,    152 

sioners  of  Parks  and  Boulevards,  126  X.   Y.   327.   37   L.   R.   A.   827,   46   N. 

Mich.  459,  85  X.  W.  1132;   Preston  v.  E.   612    [1897]. 

Board    of    Water    Commissioners    of  *  Wagner    v.    City    of    Rock    Island, 

Detroit,  117  Mich.  589.  76  X.  W.  92;  146  111.   139.  21   l!  R.  A.  519,  34  N. 

City  of  East   Grand    Forks   v.   Luck,  E.  545   [1893]. 
97  Minn.  373,  6   L.   R.   A.    (X.   S.) 


§353 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


538 


by  the  city.^  A  table  of  rates  may  be  adopted  charging  the 
large  consumers  less  for  a  given  amount  than  the  small  con- 
sumers." So  if  the  city  thinks  it  best  to  supply  meters  and  re- 
fuses to  furnish  water  except  to  persons  who  receive  their  supply 
through  meters  thus  furnished,  it  has  the  power  so  to  do,"^  even  if 
the  meter  rates  exceed  the  fiat  rates  ;^  and  it  may  compel  con- 
sumers who  are  supplied  from  large  service  pipes  to  use  meters." 
So  if  authorized  by  statute  the  city  may  furnish  water  to  persons 
outside  the  city  limits  and  enforce  a  lien  therefor.^"  A  similar 
transaction  exists  where  one  city  is  bound  to  furnish  water  to 
another  city  at  a  fixed  rate.^^  The  business  of  furnishing  water 
is  not,  however,  a  private  one  if  engaged  in  by  a  city  under 
statutory  authority.'-  Thus,  if  the  pipes  are  allowed  to  become 
clogged  and  damages  thus  caused  in  case  of  fire,  the  city  is  not 
liable  therefor  even  if  negligent.^"  Charges  of  this  sort  often 
have,  by  legislative  provision,  certain  incidents  of  taxes ;  especially 
with  reference  to  their  enforcement  and  collection.  In  a  West 
Virginia  case  what  appears  to  be  a  charge  of  this  sort  was  referred 
to  as  a  "water  rent."  and  a  "water  rent  or  tax.'"*  This  point 
was  not,  however,  involved  in  the  decision,  as  the  question  pre- 
sented was  whether  a  creditor  of  the  party  owing  such  water  rent 
might  recover  the  amount  of  such  tax  paid  in  to  the  collector,  if  the 
tax  was  justly  due,  but  had  not  been  so  assessed  by  the  council 


=  Provident  Institution  for  Savings 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey 
City,  113  U.  S.  506,  28  L.  1102,  5 
S.  012  [1885];  (affirming  Provident 
Institution  for  Savings  v.  Allen,  37 
N.  J.  Eq.  (10  Stew.)  G27 ;  which  af- 
firmed withovit  opinion,  Provident  In- 
stitution for  Savings  v.  Allen,  37  N. 
J.  Eq.  (10  Stew.)  36  [1883]);  Allen 
v.  Drew,  44  Vt.   174   [1872]. 

"Powell  V.  City  of  Duluth,  91 
Minn.  53,  97  N.'  W.  450  [1903]; 
Silkman  v.  Board  of  Water  Commis- 
sioners of  City  of  Yonkers,  152  N. 
Y.  327,  37  L.  E.  A.  827,  46  N.  E. 
612    [1897]. 

'  Wagner  v.  City  of  Rock  Island, 
146  111.  139,  21  l".  R.  a.  519,  34  N. 
E.  545  [1893];  Powell  v.  City  ot 
Duluth,  91  Minn.  53,  97  N.  W.  450 
[1903]. 


"Powell  V.  City  of  Dulutli,  91 
Minn.  53,  97  N.  W.  450  [1903]; 
(citing  Jones  v.  Water  Commission- 
ers, 34  Mich.  273). 

°  State  ex  rel.  Hallauer  v.  Gosnell, 
110  Wis.  006,  61  L.  R.  A.  33,  93  N. 
W.  542   [1903]. 

"  Pittsburg  V.  Brace  Brothers,  158 
Pa.    St.    174,    27    Atl.    854    [1893]. 

^'  City  of  Chicago  v.  Town  of  Ci- 
cero, 210  111.  290,  71  N.  E.  356 
[1904]. 

'^  Springfield  Fire  &  Marine  Insur- 
ance Co.  v.  Village  of  Keeseville,  148 
N.  Y.  46,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  667,  30 
L.  R.   A.   660,   42  N.   E.   405    [1895]. 

"  Springfield  Fire  &  Marine  Insur- 
ance Co.  V.  Village  of  Keeseville,  148 
N.  Y.  46,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  667,  30  L. 
R.  A.  660,  42  N.  E.  405   [1895]. 

"  Aumann  v.  Black,  15  W.  Va.  773 
[1879]. 


539  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  353 

that  a  lev}'  could  have  been  made ;  and  it  was  held  that  no  re- 
covery could  be  had.  It  was  referred  to  as  a  tax  because  of  the 
summary  method  of  collection  which  was  provided  therefor. 
Charges  of  this  sort  were  said  to  be  "not,  strictly  speaking,  taxes, 
and  certainly  not  taxes  on  property  to  be  regulated  under  article 
twelve  of  the  constitution ;"  ^■'■'  but  the  court  held  that  such 
charges  could  be  regarded  as  taxes  other  than  taxes  on  property 
and  hence  that  they  might  be  turned  into  the  general  revenue 
fund.  So  charges  for  the  use  of  water  were  held  to  be  taxes 
within  the  meaning  of  the  term  in  a  statute  giving  taxes  priority 
of  payment  out  of  estates  for  whieli  a  receiver  has  been  ap- 
pointed.^** The  legislature  may  provide  that  such  charges  shall 
be  a  lien  upon  the  estate  of  the  person  by  whom  the  water  was 
received  and  used  on  such  realty. ^^  Under  such  statute  the  in- 
terest of  a  lessor  cannot  be  sold  for  charges  for  water  used  by 
a  lessee.^ ^  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  restricting  the  lien  to  the 
estate  of  the  person  receiving  and  using  the  water,  there  seems 
to  be  no  objection  to  making  such  charge  a  lien  upon  the  realty, 
irrespective  of  the  various  estates  therein.^**  Accordingly,  a  reg- 
ulation making  the  owner  liable  for  the  cost  of  water  furnished 
to  his  tenant  is  reasonable.-"  However,  it  has  been  held  that 
a  rule  that  the  water  shall  be  turned  off  in  case  of  delinquency 
in  making  payment  and  not  turned  on  again  until  the  delinquency 
is  paid,  is  unreasonable  and  void  if  so  applied  as  to  prevent  a 
tenant  who  tenders  payment  for  the  amount  due  from  himself 
from  obtaining  water  unless  he  also  pays  the  amount  due  from 
a  former  tenant.-^  If  the  ordinance  provides  that  the  lien  shall 
be  lost  if  the  water  is  not  turned  off  thirty  days  prior  to  thf 
expiration  of  a  collection  period  and  the  water  is  not  so  turned 

'=  Alter  V.  Cincinnati,  Sfi  0.  S.  47,  Eq.    (6  Stew.)    27    [1880].     The  sub- 

()7,  35  L.  R.  A.  737,  4(1  X.  E.  69.  ject  of  the  lien  of  assessments  is  dis- 

*"  Waite  V.  Worcester  Brewing  Co..  cussed     in     detail      elsewhere.       See 

176  Mass.  283,  57  X.  E.  4()0.  Chapter  XX. 

'"Provident    Institution    for    Sav-  ""City    of    East    Grand    Forks    v. 

ings  V.  Mayor  and   Aldernu-n  of  Jer-  Luck,  97   Minn.   373,  6  L.  R.  A.    (N. 

sey  City,   113   V.  S.  oOG,  28  L.   1102.  S.)    198,   107  X.   W.  393   [19061. 

5  S.  612   [18841;    Vreeiand  v.  Mayor  -'"City     of     East    Grand     Forks    v. 

and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City.  37  X.  Euck.  97  Minn.  373.  6  L.  R.  A.    (X. 

J.  Eq.    (10  Stew.)    574    [18831;    (af  S.)    198,   107   X.  W.   393    [19061. 

firming  Vreeiand  v.  O'Xcil.  36  X.  J.  -'  Burke   v.   City   of   Water   Valley, 

Eq.    (9  Stew.)    399).  87  Miss.  732,   112  Am.  St.  Rep.  468, 

"Carpenter  v.  Mayor  and  Council  40   So.   820    [1905]. 
of    the    City   of    Hoboken,    33    N.    J. 


§  354  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  540 

off,  the  vendee  of  realty  cannot  be  held  for  arrearages  aecruinir 
prior  to  his  purchase  of  such  realty  the  lien  whereof  has  been 
lost.'-  Under  a  statute  providing  that  water  rent  shall  be  a  lien 
against  the  real  estate  upon  which  the  wat^r  was  furnished,  no 
personal  liability  exists  against  the  owner  of  the  realty.^^ 

§  354.     Other  meaning  of  water  rates. 

The  term  "water  rates"  is  employed  in  another  sense  as  a 
charge  upon  realty  to  which  water  can  be  furnished  by  the  water- 
works system,  irrespective  of  whether  water  is  actually  received 
and  used  on  such  realty  or  not.  If  such  charge  is  apportioned 
according  to  the  benefit  received  by  such  property  in  such  a  way 
as  to  limit  the  amount  of  the  charge  to  the  actual  benefits  re- 
ceived by  the  property  assessed,  the  charge  is  a  form  of  local 
assessment  and  is  valid  if  governed  by  the  principles  which  con- 
trol the  validity  of  local  assessments.^  Protection  against  fire 
is  a  form  of  benefit  held  to  be  so  especial  as  to  justify  local 
assessments.^  In  Ohio  the  orignal  expense  of  a  waterworks  sys- 
tem was  to  be  borne  by  general  taxation,  but  the  running  ex- 
penses, including  interest  on  the  debt  incurred  for  such  system 
are  to  be  paid  by  assessments  on  realty  abutting  upon  the  streets 
through  which  the  water-pipe  is  laid.^  If  vacant  land  receives 
any  actual  benefit  from  the  supply  of  water  it  may  be  assessed.* 

^'-City    of    Chicago    v.    Northwest-  -  Dasey  v.  Skinner,  11  N.  Y.  Supp. 

ern  Mutual   Life   Insurance   Co.,   218  821. 

111.  40,   1   L.  R.  A.    (N.  S.)    770;    75  While    this    general    principle    was 

N.  E.   803    [1905].  posi^ibly  recognized,  the  particular  as- 

^'  Theobald    v.    Sylvester,    27    Pa.  sessment    was    held    invalid    on    the 

Super.   Ct.   362;    On   the   question   of  ground   that   the   property   to   be   as- 

charges     for     water     furnished,     see  sessed    was    selected    arbitrarily,    the 

Weidman  v.   Wilson,   —  Mich.  .  statute  providing  for  assessing  real- 

116    N.    W.    593     [1908];     Board    of  ty    within    five    hundred    feet    of    a 

Public    Works    of    City    of    Mies    v.  hydrant.      Still    in    its    opinion    the 

pji^pli^  Mich.  ,  116  N.  W.  408  court  referred  to  fire  protection  as  a 

[1908];     American    Brewin<j    Co.    v.  general  benefit  to  the  public.     Village 

St.  I.ouis,  Mo. ,  108  S.  W.  1  of  Canaseraga  v.  Green,  88  N.  Y.  S. 

[1907,     1908];     Regan    Land    Co.    v.  539   [1903]. 

Citv  of  Carthao-e,  —  Mo.  App.  ,  ^  Wheeler   v.   Treasurer  of  Muskin- 

108     S.     W.     589     [1908];     Hoboken  gum  County,  3  Ohio  C.  C.  596  [1889]. 

Manufacturers  Co.  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  ^  For    the   general    problem    of   the 

Citv  of  H-^boken.  —  N.   J.  L.  ,  efl"ect    of    use    or    non-use    of    realty 

68  Atl.   1098   [1908].  upon   the   ritrht  to   levy  local   assess- 

^D-^sev  V.  Skinner,  33  N.  Y.  State  ments  on  such  realty  see  §  578  et  seq. 
R    15,   11   N.  Y.   Sunn.   821    [1890]; 
Allen   V.   Drew,   44   Vt.    174    [1872]; 


II 


541  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  35o 

Thus  an  assessment  on  land  which  could  be  supplied  with  water 
from  the  water  works  system  amounting  to  eight  cents  a  front 
foot  for  vacant  land ;  twelve  cents  a  front  foot  for  land  on  which 
was  a  one-story  building,  and  sixteen  cents  a  front  foot  for  land 
on  which  was  a  two-story  building  has  been  upheld.^  The  power 
to  levy  local  assessments  upon  vacant  realty  in  return  for  the 
benefits  thereto  has  been  upheld  or  at  least  recognized  in  cases 
where  the  specific  assessment  was  held  to  be  invalid  for  want  of 
notice  to  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed,  and  for  want  of  an 
opportunity  for  him  to  be  heard.''  If,  however,  a  charge  is  im- 
posed upon  vacant  property  not  in  proDortion  to  the  benefits 
enuring  to  it  from  the  construction  of  a  waterworks  system, 
it  cannot  be  sustained  as  an  assessment  for  benefits,  and  since 
water  is  not  used  upon  such  premises,  it  cannot  be  sustained 
as  an  assessment  for  goods  sold.  Such  an  exaction  cannot  there- 
fore be  sustained  upon  either  theory.'^  ThiLs  a  charge  upon  eaeh 
lot  which  abuts  on  any  street  through  which  water  supply  pipes 
are  laid  and  which  can  be  supHied  therefrom  conveniently, 
amounting  to  two  dollars  and  a  half  per  annum  plus  the  charge 
for  water  used,  was  held  to  be  invalid.^ 

§  355.     Irrigation. 

Irrigation  is  undoubtedly  a  great  and  especial  local,  benefit. 
By  its  means  land  previously  arid  and  unproductive  has  been 
converted  into  the  best  of  agricultural  land.  The  difficulty  in 
determining  whether  it  is  a  purpose  for  which  local  assessments 
can  be  levied  is  to  find  a  general  benefit  above  the  especial 
benefit  to  the  owners  of  the  realty  irrigated,  since  the  real  pur- 
pose of  irrigation  is  undoubtedly  the  private  benefit  of  the  land- 
owners, and  it  is  difficult  to  find  the  argument  of  public  health 
which  can  be  urged  in  case  of  drainage.^     However,  the  courts 

"Allen  V.  Drew,  44  Vt.  174  [18721.  135     [1881];     Provident     Institution 

"In  the  Matter  of  tlie  Application  for   Pavings   v.    Allen,   37   N.   J.    Eq. 

of  tlip  Trustees  of  Union  College  for  (10  Stew.)    36    [1883]. 

an  Order  Directing  the  Treasurer  of  ''Village   of   Lemont   v.   Jenks,    197 

Long   Island   City   to   Cancel   Certain  111.  3(i3.  90  Am.  St.  Rep.   172,  04  N. 

Water    Rates   and    Rents,    129    N.    Y.  E.  302    [1902]. 

308,   29    N.    E.    400    [1891];    Remsen  'See  §  335. 

V.  Wheeler,  105  N.  Y.  573,  12  X.  E.  Public  liealth  and  tlie  abatement  of 
564  [1887].  nuisances  have  been  suggested  as  the 
'Village  of  Lemont  v.  Jenks,  197  real  foundation  for  such  assess- 
Ill.  363,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  172,  64  N.  ments.  Hasrar  v.  Board  of  Super- 
£.  362  [1902];  State,  Vreeland.  visors  of  Y'olo  County,  47  Cal.  222 
Pros.  V.  ^Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  [1874]. 
Jersey   City,   43   N.   J.   L.    (14   Vr.) 


§356 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


542 


have  found  a  public  benefit  in  the  supply  of  water  by  a  regular 
waterworks  system,^  and  they  have  managed  to  extend  the  same 
principle  to  irrigation.  It  has  been  held  to  be  a  purpose  so 
public  in  its  nature  that  the  power  of  eminent  domain  may  be 
exercised  in  its  behalf,^  and  it  is  held  that  such  an  improvement 
may  be  paid  for  by  general  taxation.*  If  these  principles  are 
correct,  and  they  have  been  settled  by  judicial  decisions  of  over- 
whelming weight,  irrigation  is  an  improvement  which  confers  a 
general  benefit  to  the  public  and,  since  the  private  benefit  of 
the  owners  of  the  realty  irrigated  is  clear,  it  is  an  improvement 
for  the  expense  of  which  local  assessments  may  be  levied.^  While 
a  statute  which  provided  for  the  construction  of  an  artesian 
Avell  and  of  Avater  courses,  the  expense  thereof  to  be  met  by  an 
assessment  levied  upon  realty  "with  reference  to  the  relative  dis- 
tance of  such  lands  from  the  well  itself  and  the  water  courses," 
was  held  to  be  unconstitutional,  the  objection  thereto  was  the 
method  of  apportioning  the  assessment  and  not  the  purpose  for 
which  the  assessment  was  levied.*' 


§  356.     Public  parks. 

A  public  park  is  undoubtedly  a  public  benefit.     Under  modern 
ideas  of  the  scope  of  the  functions  of  a  municipal  corporation. 


^See  §  346  et  seq. 

^  Clark  V.  Xash,  198  U.  S.  361,  25 
S.  676  [1905];  (affirming  Nash  v. 
Clark,  27  Utah  158,  101  Am.  St. 
Rep.  953,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  208,  75 
Pac.  371  [1904]);  Ellinghouse  v. 
Taylor,  19  Mont.  462,  48  Pac.  757 
[1897];  Cummings  v.  Hyatt,  54  Xeb. 
35,  74  N.  W.  411  [1898];  Prescott 
Irrigation  Co.  v.  Flathers,  20  Wash. 
454,  55  Pac.  635   [1899]. 

*  State  of  Washington  on  the  Re- 
lation of  Witherop  v.  Brown.  19 
Wa.sh.   383,  53  Pac.  548    [1898]. 

°  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District  v. 
Bradley,  164  U.  S.  112,  41  L.  369, 
17  S.  56  [1896];  (reversing  Bradley 
V.  Fallbrook  Irrigation  District,  68 
Fed.  948  [1895]);  Best  v.  Wohlford, 
144  Cal.  733,  78  Pac.  293  [1904]; 
Boskowitz  V.  Thompson.  144  Cal.  724, 
78  Pac.  290  [1904];  Merchant's  Na- 
tional  Bank  of  San  Dieo-o  v.  Escon- 
dido    Irrigation    District,    144    Cal. 


329,  77  Pac.  937  [1904];  Perry  v. 
Otay  Irrigation  District,  127  Cal. 
565,  60  Pac.  40  [1900];  Quint  v. 
Hotlman,  103  Cal.  506,,  37  Pac.  514 
[1894];  Quint  v.  McMillen,  103  Cal. 
381,  37  Pac.  381  [1894];  Tregea  v. 
Owens,  94  Cal.  317,  29  Pac.  643 
[1892];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Bonds 
of  the  Madera  Irrigation  District. 
92  Cal.  296.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106,  14 
L.  R.  A.  755,  28  Pac.  272,  28  Pac. 
675  [1891];  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Su- 
pervisors of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal. 
222  [1874];  Anderson  v.  Grand  Val- 
ley Irrigation  District,  35  Colo.  525. 
85  Pac,  313  [1906];  Pioneer  Irriga- 
tion District  v.  Bradley,  8  Ida.  310. 
101  Am.  St.  Rep.  201.  68  Pac.  295; 
Board  of  Directors  of  Alfalfa  Irri- 
gation District  v.  Collins.  46  Neb. 
411.  64  N.  W.  1086. 

'Tripp  V.   City   of  Yankton.   10  S. 
D,  516,  74  N.  W.  447  [1898], 


543  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  356 

it  is  felt  that  it  is  derelict  in  its  duties  unless  it  provides  parks 
as  breathing  places,  i)lay-grounds  and  places  of  beauty  for  its 
inhabitants.  There  is  now  no  serious  question  but  that  a  munici- 
pal corporation  may  expend  public  funds,  raised  by  general  taxa- 
tion, for  the  purpose  of  buying  land  for  a  park  and  beautifying 
it  after  the  land  is  bought.  So  it  is  a  proper  subject  for  the 
exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain.^  Whether  a  public 
park  confers  an  especial  benefit  upon  abutting  and  adjoining 
property  is  a  question  which  has  caused  more  trouble  and  discus- 
sion for  the  courts.  It  seems  to  be  well  settled  by  this  time, 
however,  that  the  undoubted  advantage  of  having  an  open  space 
opposite  to  one's  land  is  an  especial  benefit  for  certain  uses  of 
realty;  while  the  convenience  of  access  to  a  public  park  is  an 
additional  source  of  especial  benefit.-  An  investigation  and  analy- 
sis of  the  objections  to  assessments  for  public  parks  has  convinced 
the  courts  that  to  sustain  such  objections  would  be  to  overthrow 
the  entire  system  of  special  assessments  for  all  purposes.  "Upon 
a  final  analysis,  this  proposition  (i.  e.,  that  a  public  park  can 
be  paid  for  only  by  general  taxation  and  not  by  local  assess- 
ment) will  be  found  to  resolve  itself  into  a  denial  of  the  validity 
of  special  assessments  in  any  case  where  the  work  in  question 
is  undertaken  by  the  public  authorities  without  the  express  assent 
or  desire  of  the  property  holders.  The  effort  made  to  distinguish 
between  streets  and  highways,  as  constituting  proper  subjects 
of  taxation  for  special  benefits,  and  public  parks  as  matters  of 
such  a  general  nature  as  not  to  justify  special  assessment,  does 
not  appear  to  us  to  be  successful.  Legislation  of  this  character, 
both  in  respect  to  its  justice  and  its  constitutional  validity 
has  been  thoroughly  discussed  by  the  judicial  tribunals  of 
nearly    every    state    in    the    Union."''     Accordingly,    it    is    very 

■Shoemaker  v.   United   States.    147  W.   800   [1890];    Kansas  City   v.  Ba- 

U.    S.    282,    37    L.    170,    1:3    S.    301  con,    147    Mo.    2.)9,    48    S.    W.    860; 

1 18931;     Matthews    v.     Kinil)all,     70  County  Court  of  St.  Louis  County  v. 

Ark.    4.51,    00    S.   W.    651,    09    S.    W.  Criswohl,  ,58  Mo.   175;   Vernon  Park. 

547;     West    Chicago    Park    Com.    v.  103  Pa.  St.  70,  29  Atl.  972;   City  of 

Western    Union    Telegraph    Co..    103  Memphis  v.  Hastings,  113  Tenn.   142. 

111.   33;    Cook   V.    South    Park    Com.,  69  L.  R.  A.  750,  86  S.  W.  609  [10041. 

61    III.    115;    People   v.   Williams.   51  ^  State  ex  rel.  City  of  St.  Paul   v. 

Til.    63;    Andrews    v.    People    ex    rel.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  Countv.  75 

Rumsey.   83   111.   529    [18761:    People  Minn.   292.   77   X.   W.   968    [18991. 

ex    rel.    Ruck    v.    Oaw.    83    111.    486  'Wilson  v.  Lambert.  108  U.  S.  611. 

[18761;    State    of   :\rinnesota    ex    rel.  014.    42    L.    .599.    18    S.    217    [18981; 

Merchant   v.    District    Court    for    St.  (reversing  Crai"-hill  v.  Van  Riswick, 

Louis   Countv.    60   Minn.    161.   08   X.  8  App.  D.  C.   185   [1896]). 


§356 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT, 


544 


generally  held  that  a  public  park  so  combines  public  ad- 
vantage and  especial  private  that  local  assessments  may  be 
levied  to  pay  for  the  expenses  thereof.*  Nor  is  it  necessary 
in  order  to  justify  local  assessments  for  a  public  park  that  the 
use  of  such  park  should  be  limited  to  that  locality  or  to  that 
municipality.  The  fact  that  Congress  has  declared  that  a  park 
shall  be  a  national  park  as  well  as  a  local  park  does  not  do  away 
with  the  right  to  levy  local  assessments  on  the  property  benefited 
thereby  to  pay  the  expense  thereof.     "    .    .    .   So  far  from  being 


^Lombard  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  181  U.  S.  33,  45  L. 
731,  21  S.  507  [1901];  Wilson  v. 
Lambert,  1G8  U.  S.  611,  42  L.  599, 
18  S.  217  [1898];  (reversing  Craig- 
hill  V.  Van  Riswick,  8  App.  D.  C. 
185  [1896]);  Shoemaker  v.  United 
States,  147  U.  S.  282,  37  L.  170,  13 
S.  361  [1893];  West  Cliicago  Park 
Commissioners  v.  Farber,  171  111. 
146,  49  N.  E.  427  [1898];  West  Chi- 
cago Parlv  Commissioners  v.  Sweet, 
167  111.  326,  47  N.  E.  728  [1897]; 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  People, 
120  111.  104,  11  N.  E.  418,  Kedzie  v. 
West  Chicago  Park  Commissioners, 
114  111.  280,  2  N.  E.  182  [1886]; 
People  ex  rel.  Johnson  v.  Springer, 
106  111.  542  [1883];  McChesney  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Johnson,  99  111.  216 
[1881];  Dnnham  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Mc'rea,  96  111.  331  [1880];  Smith  v. 
^~  -'-  ox  rel.  Huek.  87  111.  74 
[1877]  ;  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Bris- 
lin,  80  111.  423  [1875];  Hundley  and 
Rees  V.  Commissioners  of  Lincoln 
Park,  67  III.  559  [1873];  New  Eng- 
land Hospital  for  Women  and  Chil 
dren  v.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 
City  of  Boston,  188  Mass.  88,  74  N.  E. 
294  [1905]  ;  De  Las  Casas,  Petitioner, 
178  Mass.  213,  59  N.  E.  664  [1901]; 
Briggs  V.  Whitney,  159  Mass.  97, 
34  isT.  E.  179  [1893];  Kingman,  Peti- 
tioner. 153  Mass.  566,  12  L.  R.  A. 
417,  27  N.  E.  778  [1891;  Foster  v. 
Park  Commissioners  of  Boston,  133 
Mass.  321:  Foster  v.  Park  Commis- 
siiTipvs  of  Bost'in.  131  Mass. 
225;  Holt  V.  Citv  Council  of  Somer- 
ville,    127   Mass.    408    [1879];    State 


ex  rel.  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  75  Minn. 
292,  77  N.  W.  968  [1899];  State  ex 
rel.  Spencer  v.  Ensign,  55  Minn.  278, 
56  N.  W.  1006  [18931;  Kansas  City 
V.  Bacon,  157  Mo.  450,  57  S.  W.  1045 
[1900];  Kansas  City  v.  Bacon,  147 
Mo.  259,  48  S.  W.  860  [1898];  Kan- 
sas City  V.  Ward,  134  Mo.  172,  35 
S.  W.  600  [1896];  St.  Louis  County 
Court  V.  Griswold,  58  Mo.  175;  Kit- 
tinger  v.  City  of  BufTalo,  148  N.  Y. 
332,  42  N.  E.  803  [1896];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 
of  the  City  of  New  York,  99  N.  Y. 
569  [1885];  (affirming  34  Hun.  (N. 
\.)  44  [1885])  ;  Brooklyn  Park  Com- 
missioners V.  Armstrong,  45  N.  Y. 
234,  6  Am.  Rep.  70  [1871];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Central  Park 
to  Confirm  the  Report  of  the  Com- 
missioners of  Estimate  and  Assess- 
ment for  Opening  Riverside  Park, 
63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  282  [1872];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Central  Park 
for  and  in  Behalf  of  the  City  of 
New  York,  Relative  to  the  Opening 
of  Certain  New  Avenues,  Roads  and 
Public  Squares  or  Places  as  Laid  Out 
by  the  Commissioners  of  Central 
Park,  60  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  132;  In  the 
Matter  of  Deering,  55  How.  (N.  Y.) 
296  [1878];  Jn  re  Beechwood  Avenue, 
Appeal  of  O'Mara,  194  Pa.  St.  86, 
45  4tl.  127  [18991;  Oilman  v.  City 
of  Milwaukee,  55  Wis.  328,  13  N.  W. 
266   [1882]. 


I 


545  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  %  357 

injured  by  the  declaration  that  the  park  shall  also  have  a  na- 
tional character,  it  is  apparent  that  thereby  the  welfare  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  district  will  be  promoted.  Whatever  tends  to 
increase  the  attractiveness  of  the  city  of  Washington  as  a  place 
of  permanent  or  temporary  residence  will  operate  to  enhance  the 
value  of  the  private  property  situated  therein  or  adjacent  there- 
to."^ Land  acquired  by  a  municipal  corporation  for  park  pur- 
poses may  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments."  Under  the  general 
power  to  assess  for  park  purposes,  local  assessments  may  be 
levied  for  streets  and  roadways  in  a  park,"  and  for  hydrants  for 
sprinkling  and  electric  cables  for  lighting.® 

§357.     Public  squares. 

A  public  square,  being  intended  for  the  public  use,  is  undoubt- 
edly a  public  benefit.  It  is  an  improvement,  therefore,  which 
may  be  undertaken  by  a  public  corporation  and  paid  for  by 
general  taxation.  Since  streets^  and  parks-  are  both  looked  upon  as 
conferring  such  an  especial  and  local  benefit  that  local  assessments 
may  be  levied  therefor  upon  realty  benefited  thereby,  no  reason 
appears  why  a  public  square  w^hich  is  in  some  respects  of  a  nature 
intermediate  between  a  street  and  a  park  may  not  be  paid  for 
by  local  assessments.  Accordingly  it  is  held  that  a  public  square 
is  such  an  improvement  that  local  assessments  may  be  levied  to 
pay  the  cost  thereof.^    This  principle  has  apparently  been  recog- 

=  Wilson    V.    Lambert,     1(>8    U.    S.  ^  See  §  301. 

611,  617,  42  L.  599,  18  S.  217  [1898]  ;  =  See  §   356. 

(reversing  Craighill  v.  Van  Riswick,  'Owners  of  Ground  v.  Albany,   15 

8   App.   D.   C.    185    [1896]).  Wend.      (N.     Y.)      374;      "A     public 

*  Shoemaker   v.   United   States,   147  square   depends   on   the   same   princi- 

U.    S.    282,    37    L.    170,    13    S.    301  pie    (i.  e.,  as  a  public  street);    it  is 

[1893];     Holt    v.     City     Council     of  for  public  use,  wliether  it  is  intended 

Somerville,    127    Mass.    408     [1879]-,  to  be  traveled  on  or  not.     The  mode 

Kansas  City  v.'  Bacon.   147  Mo.  26d.  of  compensation  for  sucli  property  is 

48  S.  W.  860   [1898];    hi  re  Mayor.  not  important.     It  was  formerly  out 

etc.,    of    New    York.    89    N.    Y.    S.    6,  of  the  public  purse;   but  there  is  no 

95  App.  Div.  552    [1904];   Oilman  v.  injustice    in    requirin<i:   tliose    individ- 

City  of  Milwaukee.   55   Wis.   328,    13  uals    to   make   compensation    wlio    re- 

N.  W.  266   [1882].  ceive  from  tlie  improvement  an  equiv- 

'  Kittinijer   v.   City  of   P>uil'alo.    148  alent  or  more  in   tlie  enhanced  value 

N.    Y.    332,    42    N.    E.    803    [1896]  ;  of  their  own  adjacent  property;   and 

In  re  Beechwood   Aveniie,   Appeal   of  whctlier     the     number     is     larcre     or 

O'Mara,   194  Pa.   St.   86.  45   Atl.    127  small    does   not   affect    the   question." 

[1899].  Owners    of    Ground    v.    Albany,     15 

"Lingle     v.     West     Chicago     Park  Wend.    (N.   Y.)    374. 
Commissioners,  222  111.  384,  78  N.  E. 
794   [1906]. 


§  358  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT,  546 

nized  where  not  directly  involved.*  Thns  land  was  taken  by 
eminent  domain  for  enlarging-  a  public  square.  Apparently  in  this 
case  it  was  to  be  made  chiefly  into  a  small  park.  Before  the 
city  took  possession  of  the  land  it  leased  it  to  the  Milwaukee 
Industrial  Exposition  Company  for  a  term  of  fifty  years.  The 
assessment  was  assumed  to  lie  valid  except  for  such  diversion  of 
use,  and  was  resisted  on  that  ground  alone.  The  court  upheld 
the  assessment,  however,  on  the  theory  that  such  diversion  of  use 
was  no  defense  if  the  citj^  had  acquired  title  to  such  realty,  the 
remedy  being  to  pay  the  assessment  and  enjoin  such  diversion."' 

§  358.     Public  market  place. 

A  public  market  place  is  a  benefit  to  the  public  in  general. 
Whether  a  market  place  is  also,  an  especial  and  local  benefit  to 
the  adjoining  property  is  a  question  upon  wdiich  there  is  but 
little  direct  authority.  Such  an  assessment  has  been  upheld  in 
Missouri.^  This  assessment  was  levied  under  a  statute  giving  a 
city  power  to  vacate  streets  and  establish  market  places.  The 
market  place  for  which  such  assessment  w^as  levied  was  used  as 
a  market  for  only  a  small  part  of  each  day,  and  in  other  respects 
the  space  was  used  as  any  other  public  street.  In  New  York 
the  validity  of  an  assessment  for  such  purposes  seems  to  have 
been  recognized,  though  the  particular  assessment  in  question 
was  held  to  be  invalid  since  the  common  council  made  no  effort 
to  determine  what  lands  w^ere  benefited  by  such  improvement, 
but  delegated  the  determination  of  this  question  to  the  assessors. - 
On  the  other  hand  an  attempt  to  discontinue  a  prior  plan  of  laying- 
out  a  street,  and  to  lay  it  out  on  a  new  plan,  larger  and  more 
expensive  to  benefit  Fulton  Market  was  said  to  be  unfair  to  the 
abutting  land-owners  who  were  to  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of 
such  improvement,  on  the  ground  that  the  cost  of  such  an  im- 
provement should  be  borne  by  the  city."  In  determining  this 
question,  however,   the   court  seems  to  have   been   acting  under 

*Gilman  v.   City  of  Mihvaukee.  53  ^  In   the  Matter   of  the  Petition  at 

Wis.  .328.   1,3  X.  W.  -266    [1882].  the    Mayor,   Aldermen    and    Comnion- 

■'  Gilman     v.    Milwaukee,     55     Wis.  alty    of    the    City    of    New    York    for 

328.    13   N.   W.   266    [1882].  Enlarging,  Extending  and  Improving 

^  Donovan    v.    Coles,    33    Mo.    App.  Beckman    Street    in     Said    City,    20 

161    [1888].  Johns    (N.  Y.)    269   [1822]. 

-  Savage     v.     City    of    Bufl'alo,    59 
Hun.  606,  14  N.  Y.'Supp.  101   [1891]. 


I 


547  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  359 

a  statutory  p,rant  of  power,  as  commissioners  passing  upon  the 
advisability  of  such  an  improvement  and  assessment,  rather  than 
as  a  court  exercising  judicial  functions.  So  in  Illinois  the  pro- 
priety of  levying  local  assessments  for  a  public  market  seems  to 
be  assumed,  though  on  account  of  the  apportionment  the  specific 
assessment  was  held  to  be  invalid.*  In  Indiana  a  local  assessment 
for  the  improvement  of  land  to  be  used  as  a  market,  has  been 
held  to  be  invalid.  The  (|uostion  decided,  however,  was  not  one 
of  constitutional  authority,  but  turned  on  the  construction  of  the 
statutes  giving  authority  to  the  city  to  levy  assessments.  By  these 
statutes  the  city  Avas  authorized  to  assess  for  improving  streets 
and  alleys;  and  it  was  held  that  under  such  a  grant  of  power, 
local  assessments  could  not  be  levied  for  a  market  place."' 

§  359.     Bridges  and  viaducts. 

A  bridge  which  is  built  to  furnish  the  means  of  raising  a  public 
street  above  what  would  otherwise  be  its  grade,  is  really  the 
substructure  of  such  street;  and  is  an  improvement  which  is  a 
general  benefit  to  the  public  at  large  as  clearly  as  is  the  street 
itself.  Whether  a  bridge  confers  an  especial  benefit  upon  ad- 
joining or  abutting  property,  so  that  a  local  assessment  may  be 
levied  on  such  property  for  the  construction  of  .such  bridge  is 
a  (|uestion  of  greater  difficulty.  An  improvement  of  this  sort 
stands  on  a  different  footing  from  ordinary  grading.^  The  l)ene- 
fit  conferred  by  means  of  a  bridge,  upon  the  public  in  general, 
is  much  greater,  while  that  conferred  upon  the  abutting  or  ad- 
joining property  is  usually  iinich  less  or  at  least  no  greater  than 
in  case  of  a  street.  It  seems  unjust  to  charge  property  in  the 
inunediate  neigh])orhood  with  the  expense  of  an  improvement 
which  enures  to  the  benefit,  it  may  be.  of  the  entire  municipality. 
This,  however,  is  but  another  form  of  the  problem  jiresented  by 
the  improvement  of  great  public  thoroughfares;-  and  in  this  case 
as  in  the  former,  the  considerations  urged  serve  to  show  that 
in  apportioning  the  assessment,  a  comparatively  small  part  there- 
of should  be  assessed  against  the  adjoining  property,  but  do  not 

*  Bcrdel    v.    City    of    Chicajio,    217  nietliod  of  gradinf^  stroots."     Scliiu-i- 

111.  429.  75  N.  E."  3Sf)    [1905].  dor  v.  City  of  Detroit,  72  Mich.  240, 

'City    of    Fort    Wayne    v.    ShoafF.  247.    2    L.    IJ.    A.    .54.    40    N.    W.    329 

lOG  Ind.  66,  .5  N.  E.   403    [1885].  |  1888]. 

^  "The      construction       of      l)ri(l,<:e-*  ^  See   §   304. 
...  is    not    the    ordinarv    i>v    usual 


359 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


548 


^;how  that  no  local  assessment  of  any  kind  whatever  should  be 
levied.  Accordingly  by  the  weight  of  authority,  local  assessments 
may  be  levied  for  the  expense  of  constructing  bridges  on  which 
streets  may  be  carried  over  streams,  at  a  proper  grade. ^  An 
assessment  may  be  levied  to  pay  the  cost  of  property  taken  for  an 
approach  to  a  bridge."*  In  some  cases  the  method  of  enforcing 
compensation  by  the  individual  is  in  that  intermediate  class  which 
consists  in  apportioning  the  cost  of  an  improvement  among  two 
or  more  public  corporations,  and  which  possesses  some  of 
the  attributes  of  general  taxation  and  some  of  local  assess- 
ment f  but  which  recognizes  and  enforces  the  liability  of  the 
owner  of  property  especially  benefited  to  make  compensa- 
tion in  some  way  for  such  benefit.  The  benefit  accruing  to 
adjoining  property  from  the  expectation  that  a  bridge  would  be 
built  in  the  future  at  the  point  where  a  newly-opened  street 
crosses  a  river  has  been  held  to  be  an  element  which  may  be  con- 
sidered in  determining  the  benefits  accruing  from  the  opening 
of  such  street.**  In  an  early  case  in  South  Carolina  it  was  ap- 
parently held  that  a  local  assessment  for  the  construction  and 
repair  of  a  bridge  might  be  levied.^  This  point  was  not,  how- 
ever, specifically  passed  upon  and  the  court  divided  equally  upon 
the  question  of  the  propriety  of  an  injunction.  The  later  South 
Carolina   cases  have  apparently  done   away  with   the   system   of 


^Williams,  Treasurer  v.  Eggleston, 
170  U.  S.  304,  42  L.  1047,  18  S.  617 
[1898] ;  (affirming  Stato  ex  rel.  Bulk- 
eley  v.  Williams,  68  Conn.  131,  48  L. 
R.  A.  465,  35  Atl.  24,  421  [1896]): 
State  V.  Ensign,  54  Minn.  372,  56  N. 
W.  41 ;  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel. 
Burger  v.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 
County,  33  Minn.  295,  23  N.  W.  222 
[1885];  People  ex  rel.  Knox  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Yonkers,  39  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
266  [1863];  King  v.  Portland,  38 
Ore.  402.  52  L.  R.  A.  812,  63  Pac. 
2    [19001. 

*  State  ex  rel.  Ryan  v.  District 
Court  of  -Ramsey  County,  87  Minn. 
146,  91  N.  W.  300   [1902]. 

"Williams,  Treasurer,  v.  Eggleston, 
170  U.  S.  304,  42  L.  1047.  18  S.  617 
[1898]  ;  (affirming  State  v.  Williams, 
68  Conn.  131,  48  L.  R.  A.  405,  35 
Atl.    24.     421     [1896]);     Maltby    v. 


Tautges,  50  Minn.  248,  52  N.  W.  858 
[1892];  Guilder  v.  Town  of  Otsego, 
20  Minn.  74,  20  Gil.  59.  The  nature  of 
a  similar  proceeding  is  discussed 
while  considering  the  effect  of  the  act 
which  repealed  it,  in  Town  of  Un- 
derhill  v.  Town  of  Essex,  64  Vt.  28, 
23  Atl.  617  [1891];  in  which  an  as- 
sessment apportioned  among  several 
towns  in  proportion  to  the  benefits 
received  by  each  from  the  bridge  for 
which  such  assessment  was  levied, 
was  said  to  be  referable  to  the  doc- 
trine of  eminent  domain.  See  also 
on  the  same  subject  Wardsboro  v. 
Jamaica,  59  Vt.  514,  9  Atl.  11;  Tun- 
bridge  V.  Royalton,  58  Vt.  212,  1  Atl. 
487. 

"  Dickson  v.  City  of  Racine,  65 
Wis.  306,  27  N.  W.  58  [1886]. 

^  Lindsay  v.  Commissioners,  2  Bay 
(S.  C.)   38  [1796]. 


549  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  350. 

local  assessments,^  unless  it  may  be  those  apportioned  according 
to  the  value  of  the  property  assessed.  A  question  presenting 
an  analogy  to  the  doctrine  of  assessments  was  presented  Avhere 
an  adjoining  property  owner  whose  land  was  not  taken  for  the 
bridge,  but  whose  access  to  such  property  was  impaired,  brought 
suit  against  the  municipal  corporation  to  recover  damages  for 
such  injury.  It  was  held  that  the  city  while  liable  for  such  dam- 
ages could  set  off  against  them  the  benefit  received  by  such  prop- 
erty from  the  construction  of  such  bridge  as  shown  by  its  in- 
crease in  price. **  Where  the  power  to  assess  for  the  construction 
of  a  bridge  is  denied  in  the  particular  instance,  it  is  for  reasons 
which  do  not  affect  the  general  power  of  the  legislature  to  au- 
thorize assessments  for  such  improvements.  Thus  an  assessment 
was  levied  for  the  construction  of  a  new  bridge  in  the  line  of  a 
public  thoroughfare.  The  court  held  that  such  an  improvement 
should  be  paid  for  by  the  public,  as  it  was  primarily  for  the  pub- 
lie  benefit  \^^  that  if  any  assessment  could  be  levied,  it  would  be 
in  proportion  to  the  benefits  actually  received  by  the  adjoining 
property,"  and  that  in  any  event  it  was  doubtful  if  an  assess- 
ment could  be  levied  in  a  case  where  an  existing  bridge  had 
been  removed  and  a  new  bridge  constructed  in  its  place. ^-  So 
under  a  statute  authorizing  a  city  to  grade  and  pave  streets, 
an  assessment  for  constructing  a  bridge  cannot  be  levied. ^^  So 
under  a  statute  providing  that  bridges,  including  those  across  the 
Mississippi  and  other  natural  streams  and  those  across  railroad 
tracks,  shall  be  built  and  repaired  as  a  general  city  charge,  an  as- 
sessment cannot  be  levied  for  the  cost  of  a  bridge  across  rail- 


See  §   118,  §   159.  ject   and   character   are   palpable,   as- 

'  Hurt  V.  City  of  Atlanta,   100  Ga.  sessment    of    individual    property    to 

274,  28  S.  E.  65   [1896].  meet  its  cost  would  be  justified  only 

"  "The   bridge   was   constructed    to  by  affirmative  and  distinct  proof  ap- 

serve  an  apparent  and  essential  pub-  pearing  on   the   record   of   individual 

lie  interest,  a-vl  to  impose  the  cost  of  benefits    actually    conferred    and    of 

it  on  individuals  selected  out  of  the  their    nature,   extent   and   value."   In 

mass  of  the  community  on   any   con-  re  Saw  ^lill   T?ridjre,  Ballentine's  Ap- 

ceivable     rule     that     viewers     (■(nild  peal.  85  Pa.  St.   10.'].  160   [IS""!- 

adopt  would  be  the  placing  of  public  '-In  Pennsylvania   tlic  ]iros(Mit   rule 

burdens       on       private       shoulders."  is  that   a    local   assessment  cannot  be 

In  rr  Snw  >rill   Run   Bridge.  P.allen-  levied     for     a     reconstruction     unless 

tine's    Appeal.    85    Pa.    St.    1(!8.    168  solelv  under  the  police  power.     See  § 

[18771.  .382. 

''"At  the  very  utmost,  in   the  case  '''State  ex    rel.  Vauah  v.  Mayor  ot 

of  an  improvement  whose  public  ob-  Ashland,  71  Wis.  502.  37  X.  W.  809. 


359 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


550 


road  tracks/*  Considerations  similar  to  those  which  apply  in 
the  case  of  an  ordinary  bridge  apply  in  case  of  a  viaduct  over 
railroad  tracks.  Whether  referable  to  the  police  power,  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  or  the  power  of  taxation,  the  weight  of  au- 
thority recognizes  the  right  to  construct  a  viaduct  for  the  pur- 
pose of  carrying  the  street  across  the  railroad  tracks  above  their 
level,  and  to  assess  the  cost  thereof  upon  property  benefited  or 
upon  the  railroad.^-'  The  entire  cost  of  carrying  the  railroad  over 
the  street  may  be  imposed  upon  the  railroad  in  question,^''  or  may 
be  apportioned  between  two  railroads,  both  of  which  are  con- 
cerned,^^ or  it  may  be  apportioned  between  the  city  and  the  rail- 
road.^- The  charge  may  be  imposed  by  virtue  of  a  provision 
in  the  charter  of  the  corporation,^^  or  by  virtue  of  a  reservation 
of  power  to  amend  the  charter  in  the  future.-'^  Such  charge  is 
imposed  upon  the  railroad  on  the  theory  that  it  cannot  be  per- 
mitted to  obstruct  a  public  highwcny  when  the  traffic  upon  the 
highway  and  the  extent  of  business  upon  the  railroad  make  a 
grade  crossing  a  practical  obstruction  of  traffic.  The  legislature 
may  authorize  an  apportionment  of  the  cost  by  a  board  of  com- 
missioners.-^    While  some  cases  deny  the  validity  of  specific  as- 

»  State  V.  Smith,  99  Minn.  59,  108 
N.  W.  822   [1906]. 

'=  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  v.  Duhith, 
208  U.  S.  583  [1908];  (affirming 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  Duluth  v. 
Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.,  98  Minn. 
429,  108  N.  W.  269);  Chi- 
cago, Burlington  &  Quincy  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Nebraslia  ex  rel. 
Omaha,  170  U.  S.  57,  42  L.  948,  18 
S.  513  [1898];  (affirming  Chicago, 
Burlington  &  Quincy  Railroad  Co.  v. 
State  of  Nebraska,  47  Neb.  549,  53 
Am.  St.  Rep.  557,  41  L.  R.  A.  481. 
66  N.  W.  624  [1896])  ;  City  of  Den- 
ver V.  Kennedy,  33  Colo.  80,  80  Pac. 
122,  80  Pac.  467  [1905];  Fairfield's 
Appeal,  57  Conn.  167;  West  Chicago 
Park  Commissioners  v.  Sweet,  167 
111.  326,  47  N.  E.  728  [1897];  Louis- 
ville &  Nashville  Railroad  Company 
V.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,  134  111. 
656,  2*5  N.  E.  962  [1891];  Kelly  v. 
Minneapolis.  57  Minn.  294,  47  Am. 
St.  Rep.  605.  26  L.  R.  A.  92,  57  N.  W. 
294  [1894].;  In  re  Park  Avenue  Via- 
duct Assessment,  78  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1030.  77  App.  Div.  136   [1902]. 


1"  Fairfield's  Appeal,  57  Conn.   167. 

^'  Woodrufi'  V.  Catlin,  54  Conn. 
277. 

'-"New  York  &  X.  E.  R.  Co.'s  Ap- 
peal, 58  Conn.  532. 

'"  State  V.  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  R. 
Co.,  39  Minn.  219;  State  v.  St.  Paul, 
M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn.  246;  State 
V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  35  Minn. 
131.  59  Am.  Rep.  313;  Raritan  Town- 
ship V.  Port  Reading  R.  Co.,  49  N.  J. 
Eq.  1 1 ;  Newark  v.  Delaware,  L.  & 
W.  R.  Co.,  42  N.  J.  Eq.  196;  Central 
R.  Co.  of  New  Jersey  v.  State,  32  N. 
J.  L.  220. 

="New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co.  v, 
Bristol,  151  U.  S.  550.  38  L.  269; 
(affirming  New  York  &  N.  E.  R.  Co. 
Appeal,  62  Conn.  527 )  ;  Roxbury  v. 
Boston  &  P.  R.  Corp.,  6  Cush.  424; 
People  V.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  70  N. 
Y.  569. 

^  Boston  and  L.  Ry.  v.  Winches- 
ter, 156  Mass.  217.  .30  N.  E.  1139; 
Northampton's  Petition,  158  Mass. 
299,  33'  N.  E.  568;  Boston  & 
A.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Hampden  County  Com- 
missioners.   116    ^lass.   73. 


551  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  360 

sessments  for  the  construction  of  a  viaduct,  they  do  so  ordinarily 
on  grounds  that  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of  the 
right  to  assess  for  such  purpose.  Thus  it  lias  been  held  that  a 
municipal  corporation  cannot  determine  that  an  existing  l)ridg'e 
over  a  railroad  track  is  insufficient,  construct  a  new  one,  and 
assess  the  entire  expense  thereof  upon  the  property  of  the  rail- 
road company,  when  no  notice  was  given,  no  examination  or 
hearing  had,  no  attempt  made  to  find  what  the  benefits  actually 
were,  or  what  were  the  benefits  to  the  adjoining  property  owners 
or  to  the  street  railway  company,  which  made  use  of  the  bridge 
and  on  account  of  whose  heavy  cars  the  new  bridge  was  ordered. --' 
Different  principles  appl}^  where  the  bridge  is  constructed  to 
cari-y  the  tracks  of  the  railroad  across  a  public  street  and  above 
the  grade  thereof.  A  municipal  corporation  provided  by  ordi- 
nance what  sort  of  a  railway  bridge  must  be  built  to  carry  a  rail- 
way across  one  of  the  streets  of  the  municipal  corporation  above 
the  grade  thereof,  and  provided  for  constructing  such  bridge 
itself,  and  levied  a  special  tax  upon  the  property  of  the  railway 
company  to  pay  the  cost  of  constructing  such  bridge.  It  was 
held  that  such  assessment  was  invalid;  that  such  bridge  was  not 
a  local  improvement;  that  the  railway  company  had  to  build  a 
bridge  across  such  street  as  part  of  its  own  right  of  way;  that 
tin-  bridge  would,  when  l)uilt,  belong  to  the  railway  company  and 
the  railway  company  was  responsible  to  the  public  for  the  proper 
construction  thereof,  and  that  therefore  it  should  be  allowed  to 
construct  a  bridge  in  its  own  way  and  according  to  its  own 
specifications.-^ 

§  360,     River  and  harbor  improvements. 

To  widen  and  deepen  navigal)le  streams,  or  to  improve  streams 
originally  non-navigable  so  that  they  become  navigable  or  to  con- 
struct or  improve  harl)ors  are  imj^rovements  of  a  public  nature, 
conferring  a  general  benefit  on  the  jiuhlic  They  may  l)e  paid 
for  out  of  the  general  tr(>asury  from  funds  raised  by  general  taxa- 
ti(m.  Thus  a  state  may  authorize  a  county  to  imjirove  a  ]iublie 
harbor    to    i)e    paid    therefoi'    l)y    Ijonds    which    were    ultimatidy 

"  Pooplp  of  tho  State  of  Xow  York  -■'City    of    r)looniiimton    v.    Cliieairo 

ex  i-el.  Western  New  York  and  Penn-  i^'    Alton   Railroad   Company.    134    111. 

svlvania  Railroad  Company  v.  Adam^  4.-)l,  26  X.  E.  3(i()  [1891]. 
88  Hun.   1-22.  .34  X.  Y.  S.  570   [1895]. 


360 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


552 


to  be  paid  for  by  general  taxation  upon  the  property  in  the 
county.^  So  the  state  may  create  a  special  district  situated  on 
a  river  capable  of  being  rendered  navigable,  and  may  authorize 
it  to  improve  such  river  so  as  to  have  a  depth  of  twenty-five 
feet  up  to  and  through  such  district  and  pay  the  expense  thereof 
by  general  taxation.-  Whether  such  improvement  confers  such 
especial  local  benefit  that  local  assessments  may  be  levied  to  pay 
therefor  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  a  conflict  of  authority. 
In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  it  cannot  be  said  as  a  matter 
of  law  that  no  local  benefit  can  exist.  In  such  jurisdictions,  accord- 
ingly, if  a  special  local  benefit  does  exist,  local  assessments  may  be 
levied  to  pay  for  such  improvement.^  The  reasons  which  justify  as- 
sessments for  roads  and  other  highways  are  said  to  justify  as- 
sessments for  waterways.*  This  theory  has  been  applied  in  uphold- 
ing assessments  for  widening  ^  and  improving  ®  a  navigable  river, 
or  for  removing  obstructions  therefrom,'^  even  if  the  obstruction 
consisted  of  the  wreck  of  a  float  which  the  city  had  negligently 
allowed  to  sink,  and  on  the  wreck  of  which  other  wrecks  had 
sunk,^  or  for  excavating  waterways  in  tide  lands,**  or  for  con- 
structing piers  and  breakwaters,  for  protecting  the  lake  front. ^" 


^  County  of  Mobile  v.  Kimball.  102 
U.  S.  691,  26  L.  238  [1880];  (af- 
firming Kimball  v.  :Mobile,  14  Fed. 
Cas.   489,   3   Woods,   555.) 

=  Cook  V.  Port  of  Portland,  20  Or. 
580,  13  L.  Pv.  A.  533,  27  Pac.  2t33 
[1891]. 

*  People  of  the  State  of  New  York  ex 
rel.  Lehigh  Valley  Railway  Company 
V.  City  of  Buflalo,  147  N.  Y.  675,  42 
N.  E.  344  [1895];  Delaware  and 
Hudson  Canal  Co.  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 
39  App.  Div.  333,  56  N.  Y.  Supp. 
967,  affirmed  on  authority  of  opinion 
below  in  Delaware  and  Hudson  Canal 
Co.  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  167  N.  Y. 
589,  60  N.  E.  1119  [1901];  Buffalo 
Union  Iron  Works  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 
13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  141  [1S70]; 
Seattle  and  Lake  Washington 
Waterway  Company  v.  Seattle 
Dock  Co.,  35  Wash.  503,  77  Pac.  845 
[1904];  Teegarden  v.  City  of  Eacine, 
56  Wis.  545.  14  N.  W.  614  [1883]; 
Holton  V.  City  of  Milwaukee.  31  Wis. 
27   [1872];   Hale  v.  City  of  Kenosha, 


29   Wis.   599    [1872];    Soens   v.   City 
of  Racine,   10  Wis.  271    [I860]. 

*  Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  40 
Wis.   315    [1876]. 

=  Holton  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  31 
Wis.  27   [1872]. 

^  People  of  the  State  of  New  York 
ex  rel.  Lehigh  Valley  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Buffalo,  147  X.  Y. 
675,"  42  N.  E.  344   [1895]. 

'  Bufl'alo  Union  Iron  Works  v.  City 
of  Buffalo,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  14*1 
[1870]. 

*  Buffalo  L^nion  Iron  Works  v.  City 
of  Buffalo,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  141 
[1870]. 

"  Seattle  and  Lake  Washington 
Waterway  Co.  v.  Seattle  Dock  Co.,  35 
Wash.  503,  77  Pac.  845  [1904];  (af- 
firmed in  Seattle  Dock  Co.  v.  Seattle 
and  Lake  Washington  Waterway  Co., 
195  U.  S.  624,  25  S.  789  [1904]')  ;  in 
a  per  curiam  without  report. 

^"  Teegarden  v.  City  of  Racine,  56 
Wis.  545,  14  N.  W.  614  [1883]: 
Soens  V.  City  of  Racine,  10  Wis.  271 
[I860]. 


553  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  360 

A  statute  allowing  a  city  to  improve  a  harbor,  and  to  assess  all 
lands  subject  to  taxation,  not  including  improvements,  to  pa}^  for 
the  cost  thereof,  was  upheld,  and  the  charge  was  said  to  be  a 
local  assessment,"  but  in  a  subsequent  case  it  was  doubted  if 
this  was  really  an  assessment.^-  The  propriety  of  an  assessment 
for  such  purpose  has  been  recognized,  though  the  specific  assess- 
ment has  been  held  invalid  as  where  not  restricted  to  or  appor- 
tioned to  the  benefits  conferred.^''  In  ^Minnesota  the  power  to 
assess  for  the  improvement  of  navigation  was  impliedly  recog- 
nized in  a  case  involving  a  proceeding  under  a  statute  passed 
for  the  "improvement  of  navigation,  preservation  of  public  health 
and  for  public  advantage,  benefit  and  use."  The  improvement 
was  intended  to  keep  the  water  of  Lake  Minnetonka  at  a  uniform 
height  intermediate  between  the  extremes  of  high  and  low  water. 
The  specific  proceeding,  however,  was  held  not  sufficient  to 
support  a  valid  assessment,  as  no  provision  was  made  for  com- 
pensating the  riparian  owners  whose  lands  would  be  submerged 
permanently  by  such  improvement  for  such  loss.^*  In  Illinois 
assessments  for  deepening  navigable  rivers  were  at  one  time  im- 
pliedly recognized,  though  in  the  specific  eases  held  invalid.  Un- 
der a  charter  which  provided  for  assessments  for  widening  a 
river  it  was  held  that  the  city  of  Chicago  could  not  levy  an  as- 
sessment for  deepening  Chicago  River,^^  and  under  a  contract 
by  which  the  city  was  to  pay  a  contractor  for  dredging  and 
deepening  Chiengo  River,  the  city  to  levy  assessments  to  raise 
such  fund,  it  was  held  that  such  assessments  could  not  be  levied, 
but  that  the  city  was  liable  to  the  contractor.^*^  Assessments  were 
held  valid  to  pay  the  expense  of  widening  a  navigable  river; 
and  it  was  held  that  such  deepening  thereof  as  was  a  mere  inci- 
dent to  widening  might  be  included  in  such  assessment.^'  A  subse- 
quent statute,  following  the  language  of  tlie  constitution  then  in 
force,  conferred  power  to  make  "local  improvements  by  special  a.s- 
sessment  or  by  special  taxation."  It  was  held  that  the  widening  of 

"Bond  V.  City  of  Kenosha.  17  Wis.  494,  58  X.  W.  295. 

284   [18631.  1"  Wright  v.  City  of  Chicago,  20  111. 

"Hale  V.  City  of  Konoslia.  29  Wis.  252   [18581. 

599.                     '  "':MalH'r  v.  City  of  Cliieago,  38  111. 

"Johnson  v.  City  of  MSlwnukeo.  40  206    [18051. 

Wis.  315   [18701.  '' Elston  v.  City  of  Chicago,  40  III. 

"/n  re  Minnetonka  Lake  Improve-  514.  89  Am.  Dec.  361    [1866]. 
ment,  50  Minn.  51.^.  45  .Am.  St.  Rep. 


§  361  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  554 

Chicago  River  was  not  a  "local  improvement"  within  the  meaning 
of  such  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions.^^  An  additional  ob- 
jection to  such  assessment  was  that  as  Chicago  River  was  navigable 
and  under  the  control  of  the  United  States,  it  could  not  be  im- 
proved by  a  municipal  corporation  unless  the  Secretary  of  War 
had  approved  the  plan  of  the  improvement,  and  such  approval 
was  not  shown.  In  some  of  these  cases  the  dredging  and  deep- 
ening of  the  streams  or  harbors  is  primarily  for  the  purpose  of 
affording  access  for  vessels  of  deeper  draft  to  docks  to  be  con- 
structed on  private  land  by  the  owner  thereof  for  his  own  bene- 
fit. The  special  local  benefit  is  clearer  in  such  cases  than  it  is 
in  cases  where  the  improvement  is  solely  for  general  public 
navigation,  and  assessments  therefor  are  held  valid. ^'^  The  im- 
provement made  has  consisted  of  the  excavation  of  waterways  in 
tide  lands  while  owned  by  the  state,  the  state  then  selling  such 
lands  to  purchasers  who  by  agreement  took  sub.ject  to  the  lien 
for  such  improvement.  Such  liens  were  held  valid  against  such 
purchasers.- '  This  is  not.  however,  a  case  of  an  assessment  against 
an  owner  of  land  who  does  not  consent  thereto,  but  rather  one 
against  a  vendee  who  expressly  agrees  to  pay  such  charge.-'^ 
The  power  to  assess  for  widening  and  deepening  streams  as  in- 
cidental to  a  system  of  drainage  is  discussed  elsewhere.^-  An 
assessment  levied  may  also  be  levied  for  filling  up  a  slip.-'^ 

§  361.     Canals. 

A  canal  has  been  held  to  be  a  "highway,"^  and  hence  a  pub- 
lic purpose  within  the  rule  permitting  taxation  for  a  public  pur- 
pose. Thus,  where  certain  individuals  entered  into  a  bond  to 
pay  the  excess  of  certain  extraordinary  expenses  for  securing  the 
termination  of  a  canal  at  Utica,  and  the  legislature  voted  a  tax 

"  City  of  Chicago  v.  Law,   144  111.  Seattle  and  Lake  Washington  Water- 

509.  .33"^  X.  E.  855  [1893].  way    Co.,    195    U.    S.    624,    25    S.    789 

^"Delaware  and  Hudson  Canal  Co.  [1904]);    in    a    per    curiam    withoiit 

V.  City  of  Buffalo,  39  App.  Div.    (N.  report. 

Y.)      "333,     56     N.     Y.      Sup.      976;  =' See  §  10,  §  20. 

(affirmed  on  authority  of  opinion  of  "-See   §   341. 

court  below  in  Delaware  and  Hudson  -'  ^layor,     etc..     of     New     York     v. 

Canal  Co.  v.  City  of  Buffalo,   167  N.  \Vhitney,      7      Barb.      ( N.      Y.)      485 

Y.  589,  60  N.  E.  1119   [1901]).  [1849]  ;  Ross  v.  Mayor  of  New  York. 

-"Seattle     and     Lake     Washington  3  Wend.    (N.  Y.)   333. 

Waterway   Co.    v.    Seattle   Dock   Co.,  ^  Thomas  v.  Leland,  24  Wend.    ( X. 

35   Wash.    503,    77   Pac.    845    [1904];  Y.)    65. 
( affirmed     in     Seattle     Dock     Co.     v. 


555  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  362 

on  realty  in  I^'tiea  to  reimburse  them,  the  ease  was  said  to  be 
the  "ordinary  one  of  local  taxation  to  make  or  improve  a  high- 
way. "  -  It  is  a  purpose  so  public  in  its  nature  that  land  may 
be  appropriated  for  its  construction  and  for  supplying  it  with 
water.^  Where  such  an  improvement  causes  an  especial  local 
benefit  to  adjoining-  realty,  it  seems  to  be  held  that  an  assess- 
ment for  the  cost  of  such  improvement  is  valid. ^  Thus  the  pro- 
priety of  levying  an  assessment  to  pay  the  cost  of  constructing 
a  ship  canal  has  been  recognized."'  In  this  case  the  specific  assess- 
ment was  held  to  be  invalid,  because  it  was  not  levied  in  com- 
l)liance  with  the  statute.  The  comptroller  was  authorized  to 
make  out  a  new  assessment  roll,  showing  the  realty  assessed 
where  the  former  roll  described  the  property  imperfectly.  In 
making  out  such  new  roll,  he  inserted  the  name  of  another  person 
as  owner  of  a  certain  realty,  and  such  person  was  given  no  notice 
of  the  insertion  of  his  name,  nor  was  he  given  an  opportunity, 
secured  to  propert}'  owners  by  statute,  to  apply  for  correction 
of  such  assessment.  The  court,  however,  seemed  to  hold  that  if 
the  assessments  were  levied  in  accordance  with  the  statute  the 
purpose  was  a  proper  one.  Where  land  has  been  taken  for  a 
canal,  an  assessment  of  the  indirect  sort,  consisting  of  a  deduc- 
tion of  the  benefits  received  from  the  damages  for  taking  such 
land,  has  been  permitted.'' 

§  362.     Docks. 

The  proi)riety  of  an  assessment  for  the  construction  of  a  public 
(lock  has  rarely  been  presented  to  the  courts  for  judicial  con- 
sideration. In  a  recent  Wisconsin  case,  a  property  owner  was 
ordered  to  construct  a  dock  upon  his  land,  which  if  constructed 
was  to  be  a  public  dock.  The  owner  refused  to  construct  such 
dock,  and  the  city  then  constructed  it.  and  attempted  to  levy 
an  assessment  against  the  owner  for  the  cost  thereof.  This,  it 
will  be  observed,  was  not  an  assessment  based  upon  the  theory  of 

=  Thomas  v.  Lelaiul.  24  Wend.    (N.  314,  11  Biss,  13   [1878]);   Bennett  v. 

Y.)   65.  City  of  Buffalo,  17  X.  Y.  383   [1858]. 

'  Waterloo    Woolen    Manufacturing  ^  Bennett  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  17  N. 

Co.  V.   Shanalian.    128   N.   Y.   345.    14  Y.  :^83   [1S581. 

L.   R.   A.   481,   28   N.   E.   358    [1891].  "Kennedy    v.    Indianapolis,    103    U. 

'Kennedy    v.    Indianapolis,    103    U.  S.  59!).  26  L.  550    [18801;    (affirmin;,' 

S.  599.  26  L.  550   [1880];    (affirming;  Kennedy    v.    Indianapolis.     14    F.    (\ 

Kennedy    v.    Indianapoli.s,    14    F.    C.  314,   11   Biss.   13    [1878]). 


§  363  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  556 

benefits,  but  was  one  based  on  the  theory  that  the  owner  was 
legally  bound  to  construct  such  dock  upon  demand,  and  that 
in  the  event  of  his  refusal  so  to  do  he  might  be  charged  with 
the  cost  of  such  construction,  irrespective  of  the  amount  of  bene- 
fits. It  was  held  that  an  assessment  of  this  type  could  not  be 
levied  for  such  purpose.^  This  case  does  not,  however,  involve 
the  question  whether  an  assessment  limited  to  and  apportioned 
according  to  benefits  conferred  by  the  construction  of  a  dock, 
could  l>e  levied  upon  the  properties  especially  benefited  by  such 
construction.  Under  statutory  authority  to  improve  a  street  un- 
successful attempts  have  been  made  to  improve  a  way  from  the 
high-water  mark  of  a  navigable  river  to  the  low-water  mark 
thereof  as  a  means  of  access  to  wharves  and  wharfboats ;-  or  to 
improve  a  street  running  between  water-lots  to  give  access  to  a 
dock.^ 

§  363.     Fences. 

A  fence  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  live  stock  from  stray- 
ing away  and  from  destroying  crops  is  undoubtedly  a  pri- 
vate benefit  to  the  owner  of  the  stock  and  to  the  owner 
of  the  crops.  The  existence  of  a  general  public  benefit 
of  such  a  nature  that  a  public  corporation  may  be  author- 
ized to  compel  the  property  owners  to  pa,y  the  expense  of  such 
an  improvement  is  not  so  clear.  It  would  seem  difficult  to 
justify  the  application  of  funds  raised  by  general  taxation  to 
such  a  purpose.  Such,  an  improvement  may,  however,  be  referred 
to  the  power  of  the  state  to  prescribe  regulations  for  the  man- 
agement of  property  which  can  be  managed  and  improved  in  a 
more  satisfactory  manner  by  the  co-operation,  voluntary  or  in- 
voluntary, of  the  property  owners  concerned.^  It  is  on  this  prin- 
ciple that  partition  fences  may  be  constructed  at  the  expense  of 
the  adjoining  owners  by  public  authorities.-     Another  analogy 

^Lathrop    v.    City    of    Racine.    119  225    111.    384,    80   N.    E.    253    [1907]; 

Wis.  461,   97   N.   W.    192    [1903].  McCormick     v.     Tate,     20     111.     334 

-Terrell  V.  City  of  Paducah,  —  Ky.  [1858];     (involving    liability   for    re- 

,  5  L.  R.  A.    (N.   S.)    289,  92  S.  moving     a     partition     fence     without 

W.  310   [1900].  notice);    Tonilinson   v.   Bainaka,    163 

^Reed  v.  Erie,  79  Pa.  St.  346.  Ind.  112,  70  N.  E.  155  [1904];  State 

^  See   §   93,   §   338.  ex    rel.    Magnet    v.    Kemp,    141    Ind. 

=  Maudlin   v.    Hanscombe,    12    Colo.  125,  40  K  e.  661    [1894];   Bruner  v. 

204.  20   Pac.   619;    Sharp  v.   Curtiss,  Palmer,    108    Ind.   397.   9   N.   E.   354 

15  Conn.  526    [1843];    Hill   v.  Tohill,  [1886];  Rhodes  v.  Mummerv.  48  Ind. 


557 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED. 


§363 


may  be  found  in  the  power  of  the  state  to  compel  railroad  com- 
panies to  fence  their  tracks,  a  power  well  recognized  by  judicial 
decisions  and  referable  to  the  police  power  of  the  state.''     But 


216  [1874];  Bartlett  v.  Adams,  43 
Ind.  447  [1873];  Cook  v.  Morea,  33 
Ind.  497  [1870];  Brady  v.  Ball,  14 
Ind.  317  [1800];  Haines  v.  Kent,  11 
Ind.  126  [1858];  Myers  v.  Dodd,  9 
Ind."  290,  68  Am.  Dec.  624 ;  Burck  v. 
Davis,  35  Ind.  App.  648,  73  N.  E. 
192  [1905];  McKeever  v.  Jenks,  59 
la.  300,  13  X.  W.  295  [1882];  Talbot 
V.  Blacklege,  22  la.  572  [1867]; 
Wills  V.  Waters,  o  Bush.  (68  Ky.) 
351;  Gilson  v.  Munson,  114  Mich. 
671,  72  N.  W.  994  [1897];  Oden- 
welder  v.  Frankenfiehl,  153  Pa.  St. 
526,  26  Atl.  97;   Stallcup  v.  Bradley, 

43  Tenn.  (3  Coldw.)  406  [1866]; 
Carpenter  v.  Cook,  67  Vt.  102,  30 
Atl.  998   [1898]. 

'Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  By.  Co.  v. 
Emmons,  149  U.  S.  364,  37  L.  769. 
13  S.  870;  Minneapolis  &  St.  L.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Beckwith,  129  U.  S.  26.  32  L. 
585.  9  S.  207;  Johnson  v.  Oregon 
Short  Line  Co.,  7  Ida.  355,  53  L.  R. 
A.  744,  63  Pac.  112  [1900];  Patrie 
V.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  Co.,  6  Ida. 
448,  56  Pac.  82;  Chicago,  Milwaukee 
and  St.  Paul  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dumser, 
109  111.  402  [1884];  Cairo  and  St. 
Louis  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Peoples,  92  111. 
97,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  112  [1879]; 
Terre  Haute  &  Logansport  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Erdoll.  163  Ind.  348,  71  N."  E.  960 
[1904]  Terre  Haute  &  Logansport 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Salmon,  161  Ind.  131.  67 
N.  E.  918  [1903];  Indianapolis  and 
Cincinnati  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker,  29 
Ind.  471  [1868];  Terre  Haute  &  L. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Earhart.  35  Ind.  App.  50. 
73  N.  E.  711  [1905]:  Titus  v.  Chi- 
cago, Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.. 
128  la.  194.  103  X.  W.  343;  Small 
V.  Chicairo,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co..  50  la. 
338  [1879]:  lola  Electric  R.  Co.  v. 
Jackson.  70  Kan.  791,  79  Pac.  662; 
Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Harrelson, 

44  Kan.  253.  24  Pac.  465;  Parish  v. 
Louisville  &  X.  R.  Co.,  —  Ky.  , 


78  S.  W.  186,  25  Ky.  L.  R.  1524 
[1904];  Owensboro  &  X.  R.  Co.  v. 
Townsend,  107  Ky.  291,  53  S.  W. 
602 ;  Owensboro  &  X'.  R.  Co.  v.  Todd, 
91  Ky.  175,  11  L.  R.  A.  285,  15  S.  W. 
50,  45  Am.  &  Eng.  Railroad  Cases, 
461;  Cotton  v.  Wiscasset,  Waterville 
&  Farmington  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Me.  511, 
57  Atl.  785  [1904];  Wilder  v.  Maine 
Central  R.  R.  Co.,  65  Me.  332,  20 
Am.  Rep.  698  [1876];  Eames  v.  Sa- 
lem and  Lowell  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mass. 
560,  96  Am.  Dec.  676  [1868];  Hatha- 
way V.  Detroit,  T.  &  M.  Ry.  Co..  124 
Mich.  610,  83  X.  W.  598  [1900]; 
Xeversorry  v.  Duluth  Soutli  Shore 
and  Atlantic  R.  Co.,  115  Mich.  146, 
73  X^.  W.  125;  Mattes  v.  Great  Xorth- 
ern  Ry.  Co.,  95  Minn.  380,  104  N. 
W.  234  [1905];  Marengo  v.  Great 
Xorthern  Ry.  Co.,  84  Minn.  397,  87 
Am.  St.  Rep.  309,  87  X.  W.  1117 
[1901]  ;  Croft  v.  Chicago  Great  West- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  72  Minn.  47,  74  X.  W. 
898,  80  X.  W.  028  [1898];  W'inona 
and  St.  Peter  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Waldron, 
11  Minn.  515,  88  Am.  Dec.  100 
[1800];  Kingsbury  v.  Missouri,  Kan- 
sas &  Texas  Ry.'  Co.,  150  Mo.  379, 
57  S.  W.  547  [1900];  Dickson  v. 
Omaha  and  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  124  Mo. 
140,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  429,  25  L.  R. 
A.  320,  27  S.  W.  476;  Downey  v. 
Mississippi  River  &  B.  T.  Ry.  Co., 
94  Mo.  App.  137,  67  S.  W.  945; 
Webb  V.  Southern  Missouri  &  A.  Ry. 
Co..  92  Mo.  Ai)p.  53  [1902];  Acord 
V.  St.  Louis  Southwestern  R}\  Co., 
113  Mo.  App.  84,  87  S.  W.  537;"^  Sulli- 
van V.  Oregon  Ry.  and  Xav.  Co.,  19 
Or.  319,  24  Pac.  408:  Missouri,  Kan- 
sas &  Texas  Ry.  Co.  of  Texas  v.  Wetz, 
97  Tex.  581.  80  S.  W.  988  [1904]; 
Texas  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Childress.  64 
Tex.  346;  Thorpe  v.  Rutland  R.  Co., 
27  Vt.  140.  62  Am.  Dec.  625;  San-jer 
v.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Ry.  Co..  102 
Va.  86.  45  S.  E.  750   [1903];   Brown 


§  363  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  558 

while  these  analogous  cases  rest  upon  the  police  power  the  eases 
in  which  it  has  been  held  that  the  legislature  may  provide  for  the 
organization  of  fencing  districts  and  for  levying  assessments  to 
pay  for  the  cost  of  such  fencing  treat  such  assessments  as  made 
on  the  theory  of  special  benefits,  and  as  being  referable  to  the 
taxing  power  of  the  state,  without  discussion  as  to  the  power  of 
the  state  under  this  theory  to  compel  such  improvement.  Stat- 
utes of  this  sort  are  not  common  and  but  few  cases  have  arisen 
under  them,  but  where  the  question  has  been  presented  the  courts 
have  treated  such  statutes  as  constitutional  and  have  upheld  such 
assessments  if  otherwise  valid.*  The  difficulty  of  upholding  such 
assessments  is,  however,  no  greater  than  in  the  case  of  ditches 
and  drainage  systems.^  In  both  fencing  assessments  and  drain- 
age assessments  the  power  of  the  state  to  regulate  the  use  and 
control  of  private  property  is  somewhat  difficult  to  explain,  and 
yet  is  recognized  by  the  courts.  In  justifying  such  assessments, 
we  find  that  the  courts  prefer  to  dwell  upon  the  advantage  that 
enures  to  the  property  owner.  "The  general  law  requires  a 
sufficient  fence  to  be  built  and  kept  up  around  all  cultivated 
land  to  protect  it  from  the  depredations  of  stock  at  a  very  great 
and  unceasing  expense,  becoming  the  more  onerous  as  the  mate- 
rial used  in  its  construction  becomes  scarcer  and  more  costly. 
The  enactment  proposes  to  dispense  with  separate  enclosures  for 
each  man's  land  and  substitute  a  common  fence  around  the  county 
boundary  to  protect  all  agricultural  lands  from  the  inroads  of 
stock  from  abroad,  and  a  fencing  in  of  stock  within  its  limits. 
It  creates  a  community  of  interest  in  upholding  one  barrier  in 
place  of  separate  and  distinct  barriers  for  each  plantation  and 
thus  in  the  common  burden  lessens  the  weight  that  each  culti- 

V.   Milwaukee   and   Prairie   du   Cliien  City  of  Raleigh   v.  Peace,   110  N.  C. 

Ry.  Co.,  21  Wis.  39,  91  Am.  Dec.  45G  32,    17   L.   R.    A.    330,    14   S.    E.   521 

[i86(5].  [1892];    Bradshaw  v.  Board  of  Com- 

*  Stiewel  v.  Fencing  District  No.  6  missioners  of  Guilford  County,  92  N. 

of   Johnson   County,   71    Ark.    17,   70  C.     278     [1885];     Commissioners     of 

S.  W.  308,  affirmed  on  rehearing,  71  Greene    County    v.    Commissioners   ot 

S.  W.  247   [1902];  Commissioners  of  Lenoir  County,  92  N.  C.  180  [1885]; 

Chatham     County    v.     Seaboard     Air  Slniford  v.   Commissioners  of  Gaston 

Line    Railway    Company,    133    N.    C.  County,   86   N.   C.   552    [1882];    Cain 

216,  45  S.  E.  566   [1903];   Harper  v.  v.    Commissioners    of    Davie    County, 

Commissioners      of      New      Hanover  86  N.  C.  8    [1882];   Simpson  v.  Com- 

Countv,  133  N.  C.   106,  45  S.  E.  526  missioners,  84  N.  C.    158. 

[1903];  Hilliard  v.  City  of  Asheville.  ^  See  §  335  et  seq. 
118  N.  C.  845,  24  S.  E.  738   [1896]; 


559  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §§364,365 

vator  of  the  soil  must  otherwise  individually  bear.  x\.s  the  greater 
burden  is  thus  removed  from  the  land-owner,  he,  as  such,  ought 
to  bear  the  expense  by  which  this  result  is  brf^uaht  about.  The 
special  interest  benefited  by  the  law  is  charged  with  the  pay- 
ment of  the  sum  necessary  in  securing  the  benefit.  This,  and  no 
more,  is  what  the  statute  proposes  to  do,  and  in  this  respect 
is  obnoxious  to  no  just  objection  from  the  taxed  land  proprietor, 
as  it  is  free  from  any  constitutional  impediments.""  It  is  really 
the  public  nature  of  such  improvement  that  needs  discussion 
and  demonstration.  In  New  York  the  validity  of  a  statute  au- 
thorizing assessments  for  fencing  vacant  lots  in  a  city  was  as- 
sumed, though  the  particular  assessment  against  the  tract  of  land 
in  question  was  held  to  be  invalid  as  not  being  in  the  name  of 
the  true  owner,  and  as  it  was  not  shown  that  the  public  officials 
were  misled  as  to  the  ownership  of  the  realty.^ 

§  364.     Union  station. 

It  has  been  held  that  where  a  union  station  was  erected  by 
railway  corporations  and  in  connection  therewith  the  city  pro- 
vided an  access  thereto  by  widening  and  improving  certain 
streets,  the  city,  if  authorized  by  statute,  might,  in  estimating 
the  benefits  in  levying  local  assessments  consider  the  increase  in 
value  of  the  neighboring  realty  caused  by  such  station  and  street 
improvement  and  the  increased  public  travel  along  such  streets, 
caused  by  such  improvement.^  The  fund  raised  by  such  assess- 
ment was,  however,  to  be  applied  to  the  expense  of  the  street 
improvement  and  not  to  the  cost  of  l)uilding  the  station. 

^  365.     Railroads, 

A  railroad  constructed  by  a  corporation  organized  for  the 
profit  of  its  members,  and  engaged  in  business  as  a  common 
carrier  combines  a  general  benefit  to  the  public  at  large  with 
the  private  gain  of  the  members  of  the  corporation.  The  weight 
of  authority  liolds  that   a   railroad  is  operated  for  a   purpose  so 

'Cain    V.    Coinniissionerr;   f)f    Dnvirt  'Wells  v.  Strcot   Commissionors  of 

rounty,   86   N.   C.   8.    10,    17    |1S821;  Boston,  187  Mas.s.  4.-)l.  73  X.  K.  504; 

t|uoto(l    in    Harper    v.    Commissionors  Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 

of   New   Hanover   Conntv.    13.3   N.    C.  City  of  Boston.   ISO  ilass.  274.  (12  L. 

106.    111.  Ar,   S.   E.  526    [19031.  R.   A.    144.   62   X.   E.   307    [19021. 

'  Paillot  V.  Vonncrs.  6  X    Y.  Super- 
ior Ct.    (4   S.•^}vU.)    .50    [18.50]. 


365 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


560 


far  public  in  its  nature  that  the  legislature  may  authorize  a 
public  corporation  to  aid  a  railroad  by  means  which  will 
eventually  result  in  the  levy  of  general  taxation,^  though  there 
is  some  partial  and  ([ualified  dissent  from  this  view.-  The  at- 
tempt to  treat  a  railroad  as  an  improvement  of  a  public  nature 
which  confers  a  special  and  local  benefit  upon  certain  realty 
has  rarely  been  made;  but  when  made,  it  has  been  held  not  to 
be  a  purpose  for  which  local  assessments  may  be  levied,'  the 
court  observing  that  while  it  was  very  difficult  to  discriminate 
between  improvements  which  conferred  a  local  benefit  and  those 
which  conferred  a  benefit  solely  upon  the  public  at  large,  it  was 
clear  that  taxation  to  aid  a  railroad  must  be  justified  as  taxation 
for  a  purpose  purely  public  in  its  nature  if  it  was  to  be  .justified 
at  all.*  It  has  been  said  that  if  a  city  acting  under  authority 
of  statute  were  to  construct  a  railroad  within  the  city  limits, 
it  might  levy  an  assessment,  proportioned  to  and  limited  to  the 
benefits  conferred  by  such  improvement,  upon  the  realty  thus 
benefited."'     This  observation  was,  however,  an  obiter.     The  real 


^  Rogers  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  154  U. 
S.  546,  18  L.  74,  14  S.  1162;  Rock 
Creek  Township  v.  Strong,  96  U.  S. 
271,  24  L.  815;  Olcott  v.  Fond  du 
Lac  County,  83  U.  S.  (16  Wall.)  678, 
21  L.  382;  People  v.  San  Francisco, 
27  Cal.  655;  Society  for  Savings  v. 
New  London,  29  Conn.  174;  Chicago, 
Danville  &  Vincennes  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Smith,  62  111.  268,  14  Am. 
Rep.  99;  Pittsburgh  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
den, 137  Ind.  486;  37  N.  E.  324; 
Leavenworth  County  v.  Miller,  7 
Kan.  479,  12  Am.  Rep.  425;  Marion 
County    V.    Louisville    and    Nashville 

R.   Co".,  —  Ky. ,   78   S.   W.   437, 

25  Ky.  L.  R.  1600  [1904];  Bradley- 
Ramsay  Lumber  Co.  v.  Perkins,  109 
La.  317,  33  So.  351;  Vicksburg.  S.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Goodenough,  108  La. 
442,  66  L.  R.  A.  314,  22.  So.  404 
[1902]  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Inhabi- 
tants of  Williamstown,  156  Mass.  70. 
30  N.  E.  472:  Finlayson  v.  Vaugh, 
54  Minn.  331,  56  N.  W.  49;  Colbnrn 
V.  McDonald.  72  Neb.  431.  100  N. 
W.  961  [1904];  Knox  Countv  '". 
Niehols,  14  O.  S.  260;  Commonwealt'i 


v.  Pittsburg,  41  Pa.  St.  278;  Sharp- 
less  v.  Philadelphia,  21  Pa.  St.  147, 
59  Am.  Dec.  759;  Red  River  Furnace 
Co.  V.  Tennessee  Central  Railway  Co., 
113  Tenn.  697,  87  S.  W.  1016;  Louis- 
ville and  Nashville  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  County  Court  of  Davidson 
County,  33  Tenn.  (1  Sneed.)  637,  62 
Am.  Dec.  424  [1854];  Nichol  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Nashville,  28 
Tenn.  (9  Hump.)  252;  City  of  Jef- 
ferson V.  Jennings  Banking  and 
Trust  Co.,  35  Tex.  Civ.  App.  74,  79 
S.  W.  876  [1904];  Jennings  Bankiu'^ 
and  Trust  Co.  v.  City  of  Jeflferson,  30 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  534^  70  S.  W.  1005 
[1902]. 

^  State  v.  Wapello  County,  13  la. 
388;  Dodge  v.  Van  Buren  Circuit 
Jiulge,  118  Mich.  189,  76  N.  W.  315; 
Whiting  V.  Sheboygan  R.  Co.,  25  Wis. 
167,  3  Am.  Rep.  30. 

^  Dyar  v.  Farmington  Village  Cor- 
poration, 70  Me.  515   [1878]. 

*  Dyar  v.  Farmington  Villacre  Cor- 
poration,  70  Me.   515,  527    [1878]. 

'^  Hnle  V.  City  of  Kenosha,  29  Wis. 
599    [?872]. 


i 


561  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §§  366,  367 

question  decided  in  that  case  was  that  where  the  city  subscribed 
in  aid  of  the  construction  of  a  railroad  extending  beyond  its 
limits,  and  to  meet  the  cost  of  such  subscription  levied  a  tax 
upon  all  the  lands  in  the  city,  this  was  held  to  be  a  tax  as 
disting-uished  from  a  local  assessment,  and  therefore  subject  to 
the  constitutional  requirement  of  uniformity." 

§  366.     Location  of  public  buildings  and  institutions. 

Whether  the  location  of  i)ublic  buildings,  institutions  and  the 
like  can  confer  such  a  special  benefit  that  an  assessment  can 
be  levied  therefor  is  a  ({uestion  which  has  been  consid- 
ered only  incidentally.  The  location  of  a  county  seat  at  a  given 
city  has  been  said  to  be  such  a  benefit  to  such  city  that  the  legis- 
lature might  authorize  the  expense  of  the  location  to  be  laid 
upon  the  city.^  So  it  has  been  held  that  the  legislature  may 
authorize  a  tax  to  be  levied  to  reimburse  citizens  who  have  vol- 
untarily advanced  money  for  the  construction  of  a  courthouse, 
although  there  was  no  prior  legal  liability  for  such  advances.- 
In  these  cases,  however,  the  question  was  as  to  the  power  to 
impose  the  charge  upon  the  public  corporation,  which  was  to 
be  reimbursed  by  general  taxation;  and  no  attempt  was  made 
to  pass  upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  assess  such  charge 
upon  the  property  of  individuals  which  was  especiall}^  benefited 
thereby. 

§  367.     Temporary  improvements. 

Whether  a  local  assessment  can  be  levied  for  an  improvement 
of  a  purely  temporay  nature  where  a  permanent  improvement  is 
possible  is  a  (juestion  which  has  received  but  little  consideration, 
as  the  question  is  rarely  presented.  In  an  Iowa  case  it  was  held 
that  where  the  grade  was  fixed  by  resolution  instead  of  being 
fixed,  as  it  should  have  been,  by  a  regular  ordinance,^  the  city 
had,  under  its  charter,  no  authority  to  assess  al)utting  property 
for  the  expense  of  improving  the  street  at  such  temporary  ami 
unauthorized    grade.-      Since    the    statute    gave    no    autliority    to 

"Hale  V.   Kenosha.  29   Wis.   500.  'See  §   802,   §   Sn."?. 

'  Sehenck   v.   City   of  Jeffersonville,  =]\IeMainis     v.     TTaniadav.     99     la. 

152  Ind.  204.  52  X.  E.  212.  .        507,  08  X.  W.  812   11800]! 

"Commissioners  v.  Snyder,  45  Kan. 
030.  2.3  Am.  St.  Rep.  742,  26  Pae.  21 
[1891]. 


§  367  TAXATION    SY    ASSESSMENT.  562 

assess  for  such  an  improvement,  this  case  throws  but  little  light 
on  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  assessments  for  such 
temporary  improvements.  Similar  questions  arise  where  the  stat- 
ute authorizes  the  construction  of  certain  imp;  ovements  and  the 
levying  of  assessments  therefor  only  if  the  grade  has  been  fixed. 
Under  such  statutes  an  assessment  is  invalid  if  the  grade  has  not 
been  fixed  as  provided.''  Here  again  the  nature  of  the  statute 
prevents  consideration  of  the  constitutional  questions  involved. 
If  no  statute  requires  the  grade  to  be  fixed,  an  improvement 
made  before  such  grade  is  fixed  may  be  paid  for  by  local  assess- 
ment.* So  assessments  may  be  levied  for  the  construction  of  a 
sewer,  though  no  general  system  of  sewers  is  adopted.^  It  would 
seem  doubtful,  however,  whether  such  a  power  exists.  An  im- 
provement of  a  more  or  less  permanent  type  as  far  as  its  nature 
will  permit,  may  and  often  does  confer  benefits  for  which  assess- 
ments may  be  levied.  An  improvement  of  a  temporary  character 
as  incident  to  an  improvement  of  a  permanent  type  may  be  upheld 
as  a  mere  incident  to  the  permanent  improvement."  Thus  during 
the  construction  of  a  street,  the  owners  of  land  to  be  assessed 
therefor  may  be  charged  with  the  cost  of  temporary  drains  and 
culverts  to  protect  the  street  during  such  construction.^  But  an 
improvement  of  such  a  character  as  a  street  avowedly  intended 
as  a  mere  temporary  make-shift  is  clearly  for  the  benefit  of  the 
public  since  the  benefit  to  the  property  owner  is  no  greater  than 
if  an  improvement  of  a  permanent  type  were  constructed  in  the 
first  instance.  However,  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  grade  and 
width  of  a  street  were  established  it  might  be  planked  before  it 
was  graded.^^  "Whether  a  city  may  levy  a  local  assessment  on  ad- 
joining realtv  to  pay  the  expense  of  laying  a  temporary  water- 
pipe  to  furnish  w^ater  for  less  t..an  a  week  to  the  camp  of  the 
soldiers'  reunion  was  raised  but  not  decided  in  a  Wisconsin  case," 


"City  of  Napa  v.  Easterby,  61  Cal.  [1885];    City   of   Duluth   v.    Dibblee. 

509    [1882];    State   of   Minnesota   ex  62  Minn.  18,  63  N.  W.   1117   [1895]: 

rel.    Sliannon    v.    Judges    of    District  Fitzliugh  v.  City  of  Dulutli,  58  Minn. 

Court  of  Eleventh   Judicial   District.  127,   59   N.  W.   1041. 

51    Minn.   539,   53   N.   W.   800,   55   N.  'See  Chapter  IX. 

W.    122    [1892];    City  of  De   Soto  v.  'Russell    v.    Adl-cins,    24    Mo.    App. 

Showman,    100   Mo.    App.    323,    73    S.  605    [1887]. 

W.  257    [1903].  •     *  Knowles   v.   Seale,   64   Cal.   377,    1 

*Cliase    V.    Board    of    Aldermen    of  Tac.   159   [1883]. 

Springfield,    119  Mass.   556    [1876].  '  Cilman  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  61 

=  Inhabitants      of      Leominster      v.  Wis.  588,  21  N.  W.  640   [1884]. 
Conant,   139  Mass.   384,  2  X.  E.  690 


563  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  368 

the  decision  tnrnino-  on  the  point  that  while  a  temporary  exten- 
sion was  petitioned  for,  such  petition  was  acted  upon  as  one  for 
a  permanent  improvement.'" 

§  368.     Lighting-  streets. 

The  lighting  of  the  city  streets  is  undoubtedly  a  public  bene- 
fit. Accordingly  it  is  clearly  settled  that  statutes  which  authorize 
municipal  corporations  to  construct  plants  for  lighting  their 
streets  and  to  pay  for  them  by  general  taxation  are  valid/  as 
are  statutes  which  authorize  municipal  corporations  to  pay  the 
expense  of  operating  such  plant  and  of  furnishing  such  light, 
by  general  taxation.  Whether  the  expense  of  any  of  these  items 
may  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments  upon  the  property  especially 
benefited  thereby  is  a  question  which  has  received  but  little  con- 
sideration, because  statutes  of  this  class  are  comparatively  rare. 
Most  rare  of  all  are  attempts  to  levy  local  assessments  for  the 
construction  of  a  central  plant  to  furnish  light  for  the  entire 
system.  In  Illinois  it  has  been  held  that  the  cost  of  the  power- 
house and  generator  plant  of  an  electric  lighting  system  and 
the  engine,  generator  and  appliances  which  are  located  at  the  pow- 
er-house cannot  be  met  by  local  assessment,  since  such  an  improve- 
ment is  not  a  "local  improvement"  within  the  meaning  of  the 
constitution  and  statutes  of  Illinois.-  The  theory  which  this  court 
had  applied  to  water-works  ^  was  expres.sly  adopted  and  applied 
by  analogy  to  this  case  of  an  electric  lighting  plant.  The  analogy 
is  practically  perfect.  If  the  court  is  right  in  the  one  case  it  is 
in  the  other.  The  objections  to  the  entire  theory  have  been 
stated  elsewhere. ■•  In  Iowa  it  lias  been  assumed  witlu)ut  being 
decided  that  an  assessment  might  be  levied  for  such  purpose.^ 
The  question  decided  in  this  case,  however,  did  not  concern  as- 
ses.sments  directly.  A  suit  was  brought  in  eipiity  to  cancel  a  con- 
tract for  the  construction  of  an  electric  light  plant  entered  into 

"See  §  800.  *  See  §  330.  §  351. 

^Mitchell  V.  City  of  Xegaunee,  113  ■"'...  grant  tliat  the  city  had  a 

Mich.  359.  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  468,  38  L.  right  to  levy  a  special  assessment  for 

R.   A.   157,   71    N.   \V.   646    [1897].  the  purpose  of  maintaining  and  oper- 

*  Ewart     V.     Vilhige     of     Western  ting     an     electric     iiglit     plant  .  .  ." 

Springs.    ISO    111.    318,   54   N.   E.   478  Windsor  v.   City  of  Des   :Moines,   110 

[1899'l.  la.    175,   80  Am*.   St.   Rep.  280,  81  N. 

»See  S  351.  W.  4  76    [1900]. 


§  368  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  564 

by  the  city,  and  it  was  held  that  even  if  the  city  had  the  power 
to  levy  local  assessments  to  pay  for  such  improvement,  it  could 
not  anticipate  its  revenues  therefor  and  thus  incur  a  debt  in 
excess  of  the  limit  fixed  by  statute.  More  common  are  attempts 
to  levy  local  assessments  for  the  parts  of  a  lighting  plant  which 
are  designed  to  conduct  the  means  of  lighting  to  the  premises 
benefited,  and  to  furnish  light  thereto.  Such  appliances  are  gen- 
erally held  to  be  improvements  of  such  sort  that  local  assess- 
ments may  be  levied  therefor.  In  Illinois  it  is  held  that  poles, 
electric  conductors,  lamps  and  appliances  connected  therewith 
are  local  improvements  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution 
and  the  statutes ;  and  that  local  assessments  may  be  levied  there- 
for.*' In  other  cases  this  doctrine  has  been  recognized,  though 
the  specific  assessment  has  been  held  invalid  for  some  defect. 
Thus  lamp-posts  and  connections,'^  electric  lamp-posts,  conduits, 
cables,  switches  and  lamps,*  boulevard  lamps  ^  and  lamp  tops, 
cables,  lamp-posts  and  arc  lamps  ^°  have  been  recognized  as  im- 
provements for  which  local  assessments  might  be  levied,  though 
the  assessment  was  'attacked  on  other  grounds  and  often  resisted 
successfully.  In  New  York  it  seems  to  be  recognized  that  an 
assessment  for  lamp-posts  and  lamps  might  be  valid.^^  As  this 
was  an  action  for  breach  of  a  covenant  of  seizin  in  a- deed  and 
the  case  turned  on  whether  a  valid  assessment  and  sale  had  been 
proved,  this  point  was  not  specifically  decided.  In  Michigan, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  towers  for  electric  lighting 
are  not  local  improvements.^-  This  case,  however,  did  not  involve 
the  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  an  assessment  for  such 
purpose,  but  turned  on  the  power  of  the  municipality  under  its 
charter.  The  question  whether  such  towers  were  local  improve- 
ments was  involved  l)ecause  if  local  improvements  for  which  a 

"  Lingle     v.     West     Chicago     Park  sessment      ordinance      provided      for 
Commissioners,  222  111.  384,  78  N.  E.  lamp-posts  only). 
794     [1906];     Ewart    v.    Village    ol'  "West    Chicago.  Park    Commission- 
Western  Springs,  180  111.  318,  "54  X.  ers  v.  City  of  Chicago,   152  111.   392, 
E.  378   [1899].  38   X.   E.   697    [1894]. 

'Otis  V.   City   of   Chicago,    161    111.  "  Halsey  v.  Town  of  Lake  View,  188 

199,  43   N.   E.'715    [1896]^;    (the   as-  111.   540.  59  X.   E.   234    [1901];    (the 

sessment   in   this   case  was  held  void  assessment    was    held    valid    in    this 

for  uncertainty  in  description).  case). 

*  Smith  V.  City  of  Chicago,  169  111.  "  Kennedy    v.    Xewman.    3    X.    Y. 

257,   48  X.   E.   445    [1897]:     (the   as-  Sup.  Ct.   187    [1848]. 

sessment   was    invalid    since    the    as-  ^-Putnam  v.  City  of  Grand  Eapids, 

58  Mich.  416,  25  X.  W.  330   [1885]. 


J 


565  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  369 

local  assessment  could  be  levied,  the  statutory  restriction  on  in- 
curring indebtedness  would  not  apply.  A  fact  to  which  the 
court  seemed  to  attach  considerable  importance  was  that  the 
general  system  of  lighting  was  not  owned  by  the  municipality. 
Another  question  which  has  been  rarely  considered  is  whether  a 
local  assessment  can  be  levied  for  the  purpose  of  operating  and 
maintaining  a  system  of  lighting.  In  Iowa  such  power  was  spoken 
of  as  one  which  possibly  might  exist.^"*  The  question  was  not, 
however,  presented  for  decision,  as  the  real  point  involved  was 
whether  the  city  could  incur  the  debt  which  it  was  attempting 
to  incur  by  its  contract  for  lighting;  and  it  was  held  that  it  could 
not  incur  such  debt  under  the  statutory  limitation  upon  its  pow- 
ers,-even  "granting  that  the  city  had  right  to  levy  a  special  as- 
sessment for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  and  operating  an  electric 
light  plant."  ^*  In  Ohio  such  right  seems  to  be  recognized, 
though  the  specific  assessment  was  held  to  be  invalid.^'' 

§  369.     Lighting  railway  crossings. 

A  statute  authorizing  a  municipal  corporation  to  recjuire  a 
railway  company,  which  owns  tracks  running  through  the  ter- 
ritory of  municipal  corporation  to  light  street  crossings  where 
their  tracks  cross  the  streets  of  such  municipality,  and  providing 
that  on  default  of  such  railway  companj^  to  light  such  crossings 
after  proper  notice,  such  municipal  corporation  may  light  such 
crossings  and  assess  the  cost  of  such  lighting  upon  the  railway 
company,  has  been  held  to  be  a  valid  provision  under  the  police 
power  of  the  state, ^  but  such  assessment  has,  however,  been  held 
not  to  be  a  local  assessment  Avithin  the  meaning  of  the  statute 

"Windsor   v.   City   of   Des   Moines,  277,   02   Am.   St.   Rep.   41S.   .37   L.   R. 

110    la.    175,    80    Am.    St.    Rep.    280,  A.    175,    40    X.    E.    570    [180GJ,    and 

81    N.   W.   476    [19001.  City  of  Shelbyville  v.  Cleveland,  Clii- 

"  Windsor   v.   City   of  Des   Moines,  cage  and  St.  Louis  Railway  Co.,  146 

110  la.  175.  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  280,  81  Ind.  66,  44  X.  E.  929    118901);   Vil- 

X.  W.  476   [1900].  lage  of  St.   Marys  v.  Lake   Erie  and 

'•'■Jonas   V.   City   of   Cinciiiiiati.    13  Western  Railroad  Company.  60  0.  S. 

Ohio,  318   [1849l".  1.36,  53  X.  E.  795  [18991;  Cincinnati, 

'Chicago,    Indianapolis   and    Louis-  Hamilton  &  Dayton  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Vil- 

ville    Railway    Company    v.    City    of  lage  of  Rowling  Green.  57  O.  S.  330, 

Crawfordsville,  104  Tnd.  70.  72  X.  E.  41  L.  R.  A.  422,  49  X.  E.  121   [18971; 

1025    [1904];     (modifying   Cleveland,  Cincinnati,  Hamilton   and  Dayton  R. 

Cincinnati,  Chicago  and  St.  Louis  Ry.  R.    Co.    v.    Sullivan,    32    0.    S.    152 

Co.  V.  City  of  Connersville,   147  Ind.  [1877]. 


§  370  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  566 

providing  for  collection.-  This  topic,  also,  is  considered  in  con- 
nection with  the  question  of  the  form  of  exaction  which  the 
assessment  may  assume. '' 

§  370.     Cleaning,  sweeping  and  sprinkling  streets. 

Cleaning,  sweeping  and  sprinkling  the  public  streets  of  a  city 
undoubtedly  benefit  the  public  at  large.  Disease  is  thereby  pre- 
vented and  the  comfort  of  the  public  in  using  such  streets  is 
greatly  increased.  Accordingly  it  is  clearly  settled  that  the 
expense  of  cleaning,  sweeping  or  sprinkling  ^  the  public  streets 
of  a  city  is  work  which  may  be  done  by  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion and  the  expense  of  which  may  be  met  by  general  taxation, 
even  if  some  especial  advantage  may  accrue  to  the  owners  of 
property  abutting  upon  the  streets  thus  cleaned.-  Whether  the 
local  and  especial  benefit  received  by  owners  of  property  abut- 
ting on  such  street  is  of  such  a  nature  that  a  local  assessment 
may  be  levied  upon  the  property  benfited  thereby  to  pay  the  cost 
of  such  work,  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  a  conflict  of  au- 
thority arising  from  a  difference  as  to  the  essential  and  funda- 
mental characteristics  of  the  nature  of  improvements  for  which 
local  assessments  may  be  levied.  In  son  e  jurisdictions  it  is  held 
that  in  order  to  justify  any  local  assessment,  the  improvement 
for  which  it  is  levied  must  have  some  appreciable  degree  of  per- 
manency, and  must  benefit  the  property  assessed  by  increasing 
its  market  value.     In  jurisdictions  where  this  view  of  local  as- 

==  Cincinnati.  Hamilton  and  Dayton  Ky.  885.  889,   105  Am.  St.  Rep.  245, 

R.  R.   Co.  V.   Snllivan,   32   0.   S.   152  03    L.    R.    A.    655,    70    S.    W.    1091 

[1877];     (therefore,    it   must   be    col-  [1903]. 

lected  by  suit  and  cannot  be   placed  -  "The  owners  of  property  abutting 

upon  the  tax  duplicate).  upon    the    highways    sprinkled    may 

^See  §  59.  get  some  local  advantage  distinguish- 

^  Maydwell    v.    City    of    Louisville.  able  from  that  of  the  traveling  pub- 

116  Ky.   885,    105  Am.   St.   Rep.   245,  lie;    but   this  always  happens   in  the 

63    h.    R.    A.    655,    76    S,     W.    1091  discharge    of    public    duties.  ...  All 

[1903].      "It    cannot    be    successfully  the    citizens    have    a    right    to    travel 

denied  that  the  dust  upon  the  streets  the  public  streets,  and,  in  order  that 

of  large  cities  is  a  fruitful  source  of  their  health  and  convenience  may  be 

disease   as   well    as   of   annoyance   to  conserved,  the  city  may  provide  that 

the     citizens.       The     same     principle  they   are   reasonably   safe,   clean   and 

which    authorizes    the    streets    to    be  free    from    substances    deleterious    to 

cleaned  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  public  health."    Maydwell  v.  City 

noisome  odors  and  epidemics  of  dis-  of  Louisville,   116  Ky.   885,  890,   105 

ease  authorizes  them  to  be  sprinkled."  Am.   St.    Ren.   245.   63   L.   R.   A.   655. 

Maydwell   v.   City   of   Louisville,    110  76  S.  W.   1091    [1903]. 


567 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§370 


sessraents  is  taken,  aud  where  it  is  denied  that  cleaning,  sweeping 
and  sprinkling  the  public  streets  have  any  effect  upon  the  mar- 
ket value  of  property  abutting  thereon,  it  is  held  that  local  assess- 
ments cannot  be  levied  for  cleaning,  sweeping  or  sprinkling  ^  the 
public  streets.  In  some  of  these  cases  the  decision  is  expressly  based 
on  the  fact  that  such  an  improvement  is  not  permanent.*  In  Illi- 
nois the  decision  is  based  on  the  theory  that  sprinkling  streets  is  not 
a  local  improvement  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution  and 
statutes.^  In  Missouri  it  is  said  not  to  be  a  proper  subject  for  an  as- 
sessment as  being  too  intangible."  So,  in  Montana,  while  the  ((ues- 
tion  decided  was  whether  school  property  could  be  assessed  to 
pay  the  expense  of  sprinkling  the  streets,  the  court  in  holding 


^  New  York  Life  Co.  v.  Prest,  71 
Fed.  815  [1896];  City  of  Chi- 
cago V.  Blair,  149  111.  310.  24  L.  R. 
A.  412,  36  N.  E.  829  [18941;  Kansas 
City  V.  O'Connor,  82  Mo.  App.  655 
I  1899]  ;  Pettit  v.  Duke,  10  Utah,  311. 
37  Pac.  568   [1894]. 

^  New  York  Life  Co.  v.  Prest.  71 
Fed.  815  [1896];  Pettit  v. 
Duke,  10  Utah,  311,  37  Pac.  568 
[1894].  "It  could  hardly  be  said, 
with  reason,  that  running  a  sprink- 
ling cart  now  and  then  in  front  of 
such  a  lot  {i.  e.,  a  vacant  lot)  adds 
to  its  market  value ;  nor  is  there  in 
such  an  occasional  'laying  of  the 
dust'  any  semblance  of  permanency. 
It  is  as  evanescent  as  the  early  and 
the  later  dew,  and,  in  my  judgment, 
it  is  no  more  within  the  power  of  a 
municipality  thus  to  create  liens  on 
the  citizens'  property  than  to  hire  a 
'rain  maker'  to  vex  the  skies  for  re- 
freshing showers,  and  charge  the  lots 
adjacent  to  the  raindrops  with  the 
cost  thereof.  As  the  sprinkling  of 
the  j)ublic  highways  of  a  city,  liko, 
the  cleaning  thereof,  contributes 
much  to  the  comfort  and  enjoyment 
of  the  public,  its  cost  should  be  made 
a  general  and  not  a  special  burden." 
New  York  Life  Co.  v.  Prest.  71  Fed. 
815,  818   [1896]. 

"City  of  Chicago  v.  Blair.  149  Til. 
310.  24  L.  P.  A."  412.  36  N.  E.  820 
[1894L  "It  i-;.  however,  insisted 
that  the  snrinklinij-  ot  the  streets  dur- 


ing the  summer  months  renders  the 
occupation  of  adjacent  property  more 
enjoyable  and  comfortable,  and  that, 
therefore,  the  property  is  enhanced 
in  value.  Doubtless  the  same  result 
would  follow  by  placing  vases  at  con- 
venient points  in  the  street  to  be 
filled  every  morning  with  fresh  cut 
flowers,  or  by  open  air  concerts  in 
which  music  should  be  selected  with 
reference  to  the  taste  of  the  adjacent 
dwellers.  So  the  employment  of  an 
efficient  police  force,  whereby  greater 
safety  was  felt,  would  add  to  the 
enjoyment  and  comfort  of  persons  re- 
siding upon  the  street.  The  proper 
watering  and  clipping  of  grass  upon 
lawn  and  terrace,  the  removal  of 
garbage  from  tlie  premises,  besides 
saving  expense  to  the  occupant  would 
add  to  the  enjoyment  and  possibly 
the  healthfulness  of  tlie  locality. 
These  all  might  be  improvements  and 
increase,  while  they  continued,  the 
desirability  of  property  in  their  lo- 
cality. But  they  are  not  improve 
ments,  either  of  property  or  of  the 
street,  within  the  legislative  eontem- 
|il;iliiiii  when  granting  ])owiT  to  muki' 
liicil  ini])i'ovemenls  by  sp(>ciul  assess- 
ment." Ci(y  of  Chicago  v.  Blair.  1  !'.) 
111.  310.  317.  318;  24  L.  K.  A.  412. 
36  N.  E.  820  [ISO  I]:  (quotiMl  in 
New  York  Life  Co.  v.  Prest.  71  Fed. 
815.    817    [1806]). 

"Kansns  Tjtv  v.  O'Connor.  82  Mo. 
Api).   655    [1899]. 


§370 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


568 


such  assessment  invalid  as  levied  on  school  property  used  lan- 
guage which  intimated  that  such  an  improvement  had  not  suffi- 
cient permanency  to  be  the  basis  of  a  local  assessment.'^  In  other 
jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  such  an  improvement  does  confer  an 
especial  benefit  upon  realty  abutting  on  and  adjoining  the  streets 
thus  cleaned,  swept  or  sprinkled ;  and  according  it  is  held  that 
local  assessments  may  be  levied  for  sprinkling,*  or  for  sprinkling 
and  sweeping^  the  public  streets.^"  Such  work  has  been  held  in 
Minnesota  to  constitute  a  "local  improvement"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  that  term  in  the  constitution.^^  The  propriety  of  an  as- 
sessment for  such  purposes  has  been  recognized  in  cases  in  which 
the  specific  assessment  has  been  held  to  be  invalid,^-  or  the- sale 
for  non-payment  of  such  assessment  has  been  held  to  be  invalid.^^ 
A  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  for  sprinkling,  apportioned 
according  to  frontage  without  regard  to  benefits  in  fact  has  been 
held  to  be  unconstitutional." 


"City  of  Butte  v.  School  District 
No.  21,  29  Mont.  336,  74  Pac.  869 
[1904];  (citing  Witter  v.  Mission 
School  District,  121  Cal.  350,  66  Am. 
St.  Rep.  33,  53  Pac.  905  [1898]), 
"That  which  partalces  of  the  nature, 
of  a  luxury — is  ephemeral  in  dura^ 
tion  and  evanescent  in  character — 
lasts  but  a  single  day  and  then  dis- 
appears and  leaves  the  property  in 
the  same  condition  it  was  before,  is 
not  such  an  improvement  as  justifies 
the  expenditure  of  a  school  fund 
which  the  constitution  says  'shall 
forever  remain  inviolate.' "  City  of 
Butte  V.  School  District  No.  1,  29 
Mont.  336,  340,  341,  74  Pac.  869 
[1904]. 

*  Palmer  v.  Nolting,  13  Ind.  App. 
581,  41  N.  E.  1045  [1895];  Corcoran 
V.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  Cambridge, 

—  Mass.  -,  85  N.  E.  155   [1908]; 

Stark  V.  City  of  Boston,  180  Mass. 
293,  62  N.  E.  375  [1902];  Trustees 
of  Phillips  Academy  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Andover,  175  Mass.  118,  48  L.  R.  A. 
550,  55  N.  E.  841,  [1900]; 
Sears  v.  Board  of  Aldermen 
of       the       City       of       Boston,       173 


Mass.  71,  43  L.  R.  A.  834,  1  Mun. 
Corp.  Cas.  497,  53  N.  E.  138  [1899]; 
Hawes  v.  Fliegler,  87  Minn.  319,  92 
N.  W.  223  [1902];  Keigher  v.  City 
of  St.  Paul,  69  Minn.  78,  72  N.  W. 
54  [1897] ;  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel. 
Stateler  v.  Reis,  38  Minn.  371,  38  N. 
W.  97   [1888]. 

°  Reinken  v.  Fuehring,  130  Ind.  382, 

30  Am.  St.  Rep.  247,  15  L.  R.  A.  624, 
37  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  354,  30 
N.  E.  414  [1891]. 

^"  Beaumont  v.  Wilkesbarre  City, 
142  Pa.  St.  198  [1891];  Washington 
v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Nashville, 

31  Tenn.  (1  Swan)  177  [1851]: 
Lumsden  v.  Cross,  10  Wis.  282. 

"  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  State- 
ler v.  Reis,  38  Minn.  371,  38  N.  W. 
97    [1888]. 

'-  Dawley  v.  City  of  Antigo,  120 
Wis.  302,  97  N.  W.  1119  [1904]; 
Borgman  v.  City  of  Antigo,  120  Wis. 
296,  97  N.  W.  936    [1904]. 

"Hawes  v.  Fliegler,  87  Minn.  319. 
92  N.  W.   223    [1902]. 

^*  Stevens  v.  City  of  Port  Huron, 
149  Mich.  536,  113  *N.  W.  291  [1907]. 


569  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §§371,  3  <2 

§  371.     Removal  of  ice  and  snow. 

Whether  the  removal  of  ice  and  snow  from  the  sidewalk  in  front 
of  the  land  of  the  person  to  whom  it  is  sought  to  charge  with  the 
cost  of  such  removal,  is  a  proper  subject  for  which  to  levy  a  local 
assessment  is  a  question  on  which,  in  obiter  at  least,  there  is  a 
sharp  divergence  of  judicial  authority.  As  far  as  assessments 
for  benefits  are  concerned  the  questions  rests  almost  entirely 
in  obiter.  Statutes  or  ordinances  which  provide  that  the  work 
shall  be  done  by  the  public  at  the  cost  of  the  owner  of  the  ad- 
joining or  abutting  property  are  rare,  and  have  scarcely  ever 
been  considered  by  the  courts.  The  common  form  of  ordinance, 
presented  for  judicial  consideration,  is  one  which  requires  the 
jwner  to  remove  the  snow  or  ice  and  provides  for  the  imposition 
of  some  fine  or  penalty  in  case  of  his  refusal  so  to  do.  Questions 
arising  under  statutes  or  ordinances  of  this  sort  are  considered 
in  connection  with  the  form  of  exaction  which  the  assessment 
may  assume.^ 

§  372.     Removal  of  garbage. 

The  accumulation  of  garbage  and  filth  is  undoubtedly  a  menace 
to  public  health  and  the  state  may  authorize  municipal  corpora- 
tions or  other  public  corpc  rations  to  remove  such  garbage  if  the 
owner  of  the  property  upon  which  it  accumulates  does  not,  or 
to  require  the  owners  of  the  premises  on  which  it  has  been  al- 
lowed to  accumulate  to  remove  it.  The  legislature  furthermore 
has  power  to  require  that  it  be  removed  by  certain  prescribed 
agencies,'  and  at  the  cost  of  the  owners  of  the  realty  from  which 
it  is  removed.-  The  city  may  forbid  any  person  to  remove  filth 
or  garbage  unless  he  has  obtained  a  license  from  the  city  so  to 
do,^  and  may  grant  to  certain  persons  a  monopoly  of  removing 

^See  §58;    State   v.    McMahon,    76  :?()(),  21   Am.  St.  Rep.  524,  45  X.  \V. 

Conn.   97,   55   Atl.   591    [19031.  058;    Her   v.    Ross,    64   Neb.    710.   97 

1  California   Reduction   Co.   v.   San-  Am.   St.   Rep.   676.  57   L.   R.   A.   895. 

itary  Reduction  Works  of  San  Fran-  90  X.  W.  8C9    [1902]. 
Cisco,     199    U.    S.    306,    26     S.     100  =  Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591. 

[1905];     (amnuing    126    Fed.    29.    01  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222.  28  L.  R.  A.  679. 

C.   C.   A.   91    [19031:    wliicdi    affirmed  37  X.  E.   402,  39   X.   E.  869    [1894]: 

Sanitary    Reduction    Works    v.    Cali-  Vandine,     Petitioner.     23     IMass.      (6 

fornia    Reduction    Co..    94    Fed.    693  Pick.)    187,  17  Am.  Dec.  351. 
[1899]);    State    v.    Payssan.    47    La.  'State  v.  Orr,  68  Conn.  101.  34  L. 

Ann.   1029,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.   390.   17  R.    A.    279.    35    Atl.    770:    Boehm    v. 

So.  481;   People  v.  Gordon,  81   Mich.  Mayor  of  Baltimore,  61  Md.  259. 


§  372  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  570 

such  materials.*  Thus  where  the  land-owner  was  not  forbidden 
to  destroy  the  garbage  upon  his  own  premises  without  removing 
it,  it  was  held  that  he  might  be  forbidden  to  remove  it,  that 
the  city  might  provide  an  exclusive  agency  for  removing  it, 
and  that  such  removal  be  at  the  expense  of  the  owner  of  the 
property  from  which  it  was  removed."'  Such  a  charge,  however, 
was  said  not  to  be  a  local  assessment,  because  the  charge  was 
incurred  only  by  the  voluntary  act  of  the  owner  of  the  realty 
in  not  destroying  all  the  garbage  on  his  realty,  because  the  amount 
of  the  charge  could  not  be  determined  until  it  was  ascertained 
how  much  garbage  the  owner  failed  to  destroy,  and  because  the 
eliarge  was  not  a  lien  upon  the  realty  from  which  the  garbage 
was  removed.  This  case,  it  may  be  added,  involved  primarily  the 
validit.y  of  the  contract  entered  into  by  the  city  for  the  removal 
of  garbage,  and  involved  the  validity  of  such  charges,  not  di- 
rectly, but  only  by  way  of  determining  that  such  contract  was 
valid."  The  right  of  the  public  to  have  garbage  and  refuse  destroyed 
at  once,  thus  preventing  disease,  unpleasant  odors  and  the  like, 
is  thus  regarded  as  paramount  to  the  property  right  of  uhe  owner 
thereof,  even  if  such  garbage  might  have  a  value  for  some  pur- 
poses.'^ On  the  other  hand  it  has  been  held  that  the  owner  has 
a  property  right  in  garbage  and  the  like,  and  that  while  he  can- 
not allow  it  to  become  a  nuisance,  he  has  a  right  not  only  to 
destroy  it  upon  the  premises  in  a  proper  way,  but  to  remove  it 
himself,  or  through  the  agency  of  others,  or  to  sell  it  and  have 
it   removed   by   the   vendee.*     Thus,    if   a    domestic    animal   dies. 

*  California  Reduction  Co.  v.  Sani-  '*  Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591. 
tary  Reduction  Works  of  San  Fran-  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222.  28  L.  R.  A.  679. 
Cisco.  199  U.  S.  306,  26  S.  37  X.  E.  402,  39  N.  E.  869  [1894]. 
100  [1905];  (affirming  126  Fed.  "  Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591, 
29,  61  C.  C.  A.  91  [1903],  which  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  23  L.  R.  A.  679. 
affirmed  Sanitary  Reduction  Works  37  N.  E.  402,  39  N.  E.  869  [1894]. 
V.  California  Reduction  Co.,  94  Fed.  '  California  Reduction  Co.  v.  Sani- 
693)  ;  City  of  Ouray  v.  Corson,  14  tary  Reduction  W^orks  of  San  Fran- 
Colo.  App.  345.  50  Pac.  876;  Walker  cisco.  199  U.  S.  306,  26  S. 
V.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591.  49  Am.  St.  100  [1905];  (affirming  126  Fed 
Rep.  222,  28  L.  R.  A.  679.  37  X.  E.  29.  61  C.  C.  A.  91  [1903],  which  af- 
402,  39  XT.  E.  869  [1894];  Grand  firmed  Sanitary  Reduction  Works  v. 
Rapids  V.  De  Vries,  123  Mich.  570,  California  Reduction  Co..  94  Fed. 
82  N.  W.  269;  Coombs  v.  MacDonald,  693   [1899] ). 

43    Xeb.    632,    62    X.    W.    41;    Smiley  » Mann  v.  District  of  Columbia,  22 

V.  MacDonald,  42  Xeb.  5,  47  Am.  St.  App.   D.    C.    138    [1903]. 
Rep.    684,    27    L.    R.    A.    540,    60    N. 
W.   355. 


571  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  •  §  373 

the  right  of  the  owner  thereof  continues  as  a  property  right  in 
the  body,  and  he  has  a  right  to  remove  it  himself  or  to  sell  it 
and  the  municipal  authorities  cannot  remove  it  themselves  at  his 
expense  without  giving  him  a  reasonable  time  in  "which  to  re- 
move it  or  to  have  it  removed."  If  a  reasonable  time  is  given  to 
the  owner  to  remove  the  body  the  city  may  provide  for  its  re- 
moval by  certain  exclusive  designated  agencies.'"  A  city  cannot, 
however,  grant  an  exclusive  privilege  of  removing  refuse  not  in 
itself  offensive  which  will  not  become  a  nuisance  unless 
allowed  to  accumulate  in  large  quantities.'^  While  a  board  of 
health  may  abate  a  nuisance  at  the  expense  of  the  property 
owner,'-  and  may  require  privy  vaults  to  be  cleaned  and  puri- 
fied,'"' it  cannot  have  water  closets  and  connections  therefor  con- 
structed at  the  expense  of  the  property  owner  without  his  con- 
sent.'* Some  of  the  cases  which  deny  the  right  of  a  municipal 
corporation  to  levy  a  special  tax  or  local  assessment  upon  the 
realty  from  which  garbage  is  removed,  for  the  cost  of  the  re- 
moval thereof  are  based  upon  statutory  construction  and  involve 
the  question  of  the  power  of  the  municipality  as  defined  by  the 
legislature.  Without  statutory  authority  a  city  cannot  levy  a 
special  tax  or  local  assessment  for  such  purpose.'^ 


D.— REPAIRS. 

§  373.     General  principles  involved  in  assessments  for  repairs. 

If  an  improvement  of  a  sort  for  the  construction  of  which  local 
assessments  may  be  levied,  is  in  such  condition  that  repairs  are 

"Mann  V.  District  of  Columbia.  22  ^' Her    v.    Ross.    64    Neb.    710,    97 

App.  D.  C.   1.38   1 100.31.     For  similar  Am.   St.   Rep.   070,   57   L.   R.  A.   895, 

views   as   to   the   riglit   of   the   owner  90  X.  W.  809   [1902|. 

of  the  dead   body   of  an   animal,   see  '-Kennedy   v.    Board    of    Health,    2 

State  V.  Morris.  47  La.  Ann.  1000.  IS  Ta.  St.    (2   I'.arr.)    300    |18451. 

So.     710;     River     Render! iii;'     Co.     v.  '^  r]iilad(d])]iia     v.     Provident,     etc.. 

Behr,    77    Mo.    91.    4li    Am.     Rep.    (1  Trust   Co..    132    Pa.    St.   224.    18    Atl. 

118821;     (reversin-r    7    ^\o.    Ajip.    34.1  1114    118901. 

|1879|):    I^nderwood   v.  Creon,   42   N.  "  riiihidelphiu     v.     Prnvident.     etc.. 

Y.   140  [18701.  Trust    Co..    132    Ra.    St.    224.    13    Atl. 

"National    Fortili/er    Co.    v.    T.am  11 U    [18901. 

liert,    48    Fed.    4.58;     Alpers    v.    San  '"Trephauen      v.      City      of     South 

Francisco,     32     Fed.     503;     City     of  Omaha,    09    Neb.    577.    Ill    Am.    St. 

Loui.sville  v.  Wible.  84  Kv.  290.   1   S.  Rep.   570,   90   N.   W.   248    [19031. 
W.  605. 


§  373 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


572 


necessary  to  enable  it  to  serve  its  purpose,  the  question  arises 
whether  such  repairs  can  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments  levied 
on  the  property  which  is  benefited  by  such  repairs.  This  involves 
the  question  whether,  as  a  matter  of  law,  any  property  can  be 
said  to  receive  a  special  local  benefit  from  the  maintenance  of 
such  improvement  in  good  condition,  or  whether  the  benefit  there- 
from enures  solely  to  the  public  at  large.  According  to  the 
weight  of  authority  repairs  of  such  improvements  may  confer  a 
special  local  benefit,  and  local  assessments  can  in  such  case  be 
levied  therefor.^  However,  "repairs."  within  the  meaning  of 
this  rule,  includes  only  those  which  are  necessary  when  the  as- 
sessment is  levied,  and  not  those  which  may  become  necessary 
in  the  future  by  reason  of  the  subsequent  deterioration  of  the 
improvement.-  Whether  the  cost  of  future  repairs  for  a  given 
space  of  time  can  be  included  in  the  cost  of  original  construction 
and  the  entire  amount  assessed  against  the  property  owners  is 


^  Carson  v.  Brockton  Sewerage 
Commission,  182  U.  S.  398,  45  L. 
1151,  21  S.  860  [1901];  (affirming 
Carson  v.  Sewerage  Commissioners 
of  Brockton,  175  Mass.  242,  48  L.  R. 
A.  277,  56  X.  E.  1  [1900])  ;  Parsons 
V.  District  of  Columbia,  170  U.  S.  45, 
42  L.  94.3,  18  S.  521  [1898];  (af- 
firming Parsons  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia. 8  App.  D.  C.  39  [1896], 
which  followed  Burgdorf  v.  District 
of  Columbia,  7  App.  D.  C.  405 
[1896]);  Willard  v.  Willard.  154  U. 
8.  508,  38  L.  1088,  14  S.  1215  [1870]  •, 
Heath  v.  Manson,  147  Cal.  094,  82 
Pac.  331  [1905];  Village  of  Hyde 
Park  V.  Spencer,  118  111.  446,  8  X. 
E.  846  [1888];  Lux  &  Talbott  Stone 
Company  v.  Donaldson,  162  Ind.  481, 
68  N.  E.  1014  [1903];  Poundstone 
V.  Baldwin,  145  Ind.  139,  44  N.  E. 
191  [1890]:  Yeomans  v.  Piddle.  84 
la.  147,  50  N.  W.  886  [1891]  ;  Broad- 
way Baptist  Church  v.  McAtee,  8 
Bush.  (71  Ky.)  508,  8  Am.  Rep.  480 
[1871];  State  ex  rel.  Woiilfe  v.  St. 
Paul.  107  La.  777,  32  So.  88  [1902]; 
Lanning  v.  Palmer,  117  Mich.  529,  70 
N.  W.  "2  [1898];  Shimmons  v.  City 
of  Saginaw,  104  Mich.  511,  62  X.  W. 
725    [1895];    McMillen    v.    Board    of 


County  Commissioners  of  Freeborn 
County,  93  Minn.  16,  100  X.  W.  384, 
1125  [1904];  State  ex  rel.  Wheeler 
V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County, 
80  Minn.  293,  83  X.  W.  183  [1900]: 
Estes  V.  Owen,  90  Mo.  113,  2  S.  W. 
133;  McCormack  v.  Patchin,  53  Mo, 
33;  Gilmore  v.  City  of  Utica,  131 
X.  Y.  26,  29  X.  E.  841  [1892];  Mat- 
ter of  Phillips,  60  X.  Y.  16;  People 
ex  rel.  Bull  v.  City  of  Bufi'alo,  52 
App.  Div.  (X.  Y.)  157,  65  X.  Y. 
Supp.  163  [1900]-;  (affirmed  166  X. 
Y.  604,  59  X.  E.  1128  [1901])  ;  Tay- 
lor V.  Crawford,  72  0.  S.  560,  69 
L.  R.  A.  805,  74  X.  E.  1065  [1905]: 
( reversing  Crawford  v.  Taylor,  27 
Ohio  C.  C.  245  [1905]  )  ;  Ladd  v.  City 
of  Portland,  32  Or.  271,  67  Am.  St. 
Rep.  526,  51  Pac.  654  [1898];  Adams 
V.  Fisher,  75  Tex.  657,  6  S.  W.  772 
[1890];  Rude  v.  Town  of  St.  Marie. 
121  Wis.  634,  99  X.  W.  460  [1904]; 
Adams  v.  City  of  Beloit,  105  Wis. 
363,  47  L.  R.  A.  441,  81  X.  W.  869 
[1900]. 

-  Portland  v.  Bituminous  Paving 
Co.,  33  Or.  307,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  713, 
44  L.  R.  A.  527,  52  Pac.  28  [1898]; 
see  §  516  et  seq. 


573  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  374 

a  question  which  involves  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  levy 
such  assessment  only  in  jurisdictions  in  which  repairs  cannot  be 
made  the  subject  of  local  assessment."  In  other  jurisdictions  the 
question  is  a  statutory  one,  turning  entirely  upon  the  question 
whether  the  legislature  has  authorized  such  assessment.  The 
subject  is  considered  elsewhere.*  It  is  difficult  in  some  of  the 
cases  to  decide  whether  the  particular  improvement  is  repair  or 
reconstruction.-'^  Except  in  a  few  jurisdictions''  the  constitutional 
questions  involved  are  the  same  for  the  two  kinds  of  improve- 
ment. The  distinction  between  repair  and  reconstruction  will 
be  discussed  in  connection  with  the  question  of  the  power  con- 
ferred by  statute  to  make  assessments. 

§  374.     Repair  of  streets,  roads  and  sidewalks. 

In  accordance  with  these  principles,  a  public  street  may  be 
repaired  and  the  expense  thereof  paid  for  by  local  ftssessments.^ 
"The  powder  to  grade  and  improve  streets  is  a  legislative  power 
and  a  continuing  one,  unless  there  is  some  special  restraint  im- 
posed in  the  charter  of  the  corporation.  The  power  to  compel 
property  owners  to  pave  generally  extends  to  compelling  them 
to  repair  when  required  by  the  municipal  authorities. ' '  -  The 
validity  of  such  assessments  has  been  recognized  where  the  spe- 
cific assessment  was  held  to  be  invalid  as  not  levied  in  accord- 


"Kee  §  377,  §  378,  §  516  et  seq.  Estes  v.  Owen,  90  Mo.   113,  2  S.   W. 

*See  §  51G  et  seq.  133;    Farrar  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  80 

"See  Adams  v.  Fisher,  75  Tex.  657,  Mo.   379    [1883];    (iilmore  v.  City  of 

6   S.  W.   772    [1890 J.  Utiea,    131    X.    Y.   20,   29   X.    E.   841 

*'See  §  379  e(  se(/.  [1892];     People    ex    rel.    Markey    v. 

MVillard  V.  Presbury,  14  Wall.   (81  City    of     Brooklyn,     Go     X.     V.     349 

U.   S.)    676,   20   L.    719    [1869|;    Chi-  [1875];    In   the   Matter   of   the   Peti- 

cago   and   Xorthern   Pacific   Railroad  tion  of  Pengnet  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 

Conipany  v.  City  of  Chicago,  172  111.  ment.    5    Hun.    434    [1875];    In    the 

66,    49    X.    E.    1006    [1898];    Lux   &  Matter   of   the   Petition   of   Lewis   v. 

Talbott    Stone    Company    v.    Donald-  Mayor,  etc.,  of  tlie  City  of  X'^ew  York, 

son.    162    Ind.    481,    68*  X.    E.    1014  35  How.    (X.  Y.)    162   [1868];   Ladd 

[1903];  Broadway  Baptist  Church  v.  v.   City  of  Portland,   32   Or.   271,   67 

McAtee,    8    Bush'    (71     Ky.)     508,    8  Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  51  Pac.  654  [1898]  ; 

Am.  Rep.   480    [1871];    State  ex  rel.  Adams  v.   Wisher,  75  Tex.  657,  6  S. 

Woulfe  V.   St.  Paul.   107  La.  777,  32  W.    772    [1890];    Adams    v.    City    of 

So.  88    [1902];    Shimmons  v.  City  of  Belnit.  105  Wis.  363.  47  L.  R.  A.  441, 

Saginaw.    104    Mich.    511,    62    X.    W.  81    X.   W.   869    [1900]. 

725   [1S95];    State  ex   rel.  Wheeler  v.  =  Farrar    v.    City    of    St.    Louis.    80 

District  Court  of  Ramsey  County.  SO  :Mo.   379    [1883];    quoted    in   Estes  v. 

Minn.    293,    83    X.    W.    183    [1900];  Ow-n,  90  Mo.  113,  115,  2  S.  W.  133. 


§§  375,  376 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


574 


ance  with  the  statute  authorizing  it.^  So  an  assessment  may  be 
levied  for  the  repair  of  public  roads.*  A  local  assessment  may 
be  levied  for  the  repair  of  sidewalks.^ 

§  375.     Repair  of  sewers,  drains,  ditches  and  levees. 

In  accordance  with  the  same  general  principles,  local  assess- 
ments may  be  levied  for  the  repair  of  sewers.^  On  the  same  prin- 
ciple local  assessments  may  be  levied  for  the  purpose  of  repair- 
ing ditches  and  drains,-  and  for  the  expense  of  cleaning  drains 
and  ditches  so  as  to  facilitate  the  flow  of  water  through  them,^ 
and  for  deepening  and  widening  them,*  or  for  the  repair  of  levees."^ 

§  376.     Repair  of  water-works  system. 

The  principles  applicable  to  repairs  in  general,  control  assess- 
ments  for   repairs  to   a   system   of   \A'ater-works.      If   the   original 


^  Blancliard  v.  Beideman,  18  Cal. 
261  L1801] ;  Cook  v.  City  of  Portland, 
35  Or.  383,  58  Pac.  353  11890]. 

*  Barrow  v.  Hepler,  34  La.  Ann. 
362   [1882]. 

=^  Heath  v.  Manson,  147  Cal.  694. 
82  Pac.  331  [1905];  Heman  v.  St. 
Louis  Merchants'  Land  Improvement 
Company,  75  Mo.  App.  372  [1898]; 
City  of  Marionville  to  the  use  of 
Ginbaugh  v.  Henson,  65  Mo.  App. 
397   [1895]:  Lisbon  Avenue  Land  Co. 

V.  Town  of  Lake,  —  Wis.  ,   113 

N.    W.    1099    [1907]. 

^  Carson  v.  Brockton  Sewerage 
Commission,  182  U.  S.  398,  45  L. 
1151,  21  S.  860  [1901];  (affirming 
Carson  v.  Sewerage  Commissioners 
of  Brockton,  175  Mass.  242,  48  L.  R. 
A.  277,  56  N.  E.  1  [1900]);  Smith 
v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Worcester, 
182  Mass.  232,  59  L.  R.  A.  728,  65 
N.  E.  40  [1902]. 

-Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Spencer, 
118  HI.  446,  SN.  E.  846  [1888]; 
Roudenbush  v.  Mitchell.  154  Ind 
616,  57  N.  E.  510  [1900];  Pound- 
stone  V.  Baldwin,  145  Ind.  139,  44 
N.  E.  191  [1896];  Millikan  v.  Wall, 
133  Ind.  51,  32  N.  E.  328  [1892]: 
Scott  V.  Strinoley,  132  Ind.  378,  31 
N.  E.  953  [1892]",  dofi'  v.  McGee.  128 
Ind.  394.  27  X.  E.  754   [1891];   Kirk- 


patrick  v.  Taylor,  118  Ind.  329,  21 
X.  E.  20  [1888];  Weaver  v.  Templin. 
113  Ind.  298,  14  X.  E.  600  [1887]; 
Harris  v.  Ross,  112  Ind.  314,  13  X. 
E.  873  [1887];  Trimble  v.  McGee. 
112  Ind.  307,  14  X.  E.  83  [1887]; 
State  ex  rel.  French  v.  Johnson,  105 
Ind.  463,  5  X.  E.  553  [1885];  Davi- 
son v.  Campbell,  28  Ind.  App.  688,  63 
X.  E.  779  [1901];  Morrow  v.  Geet- 
ing,  15  Ind.  App.  358,  41  -N.  E.  848, 
44  X.  E.  59;  Crawford  v.  Hedrick, 
9  Ind.  App.  356,  36  X.  E.  771  [1893]  ; 
Yeomans  v.  Riddle,  84  la.  147,  50  X. 
W.  886  [1891];  McMillan  v.  Board 
of  County  Cimimissioners  of  Free- 
born County,  93  Minn.  16,  100  X.  W. 
384,   1125    [1904]. 

^  Terre  Haute  and  Logansport  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Soice,  128  Ind.  105, 
27  X.  E.  429  [1890];  Lanning  v. 
Palmer,  117  Mich.  529,  76  X.  W.  2 
[1898];  Angell  v.  Cortright,  111 
Mich.  223,  69  X.  W.  486  [1896]; 
Taylor  v.  Crawford,  72  0.  S.  560,  69 
L.  R.  A.  805,  74  X.  E.  1065  [1905]; 
( reversing  Crawford  v.  Taylor,  27 
Ohio  C.  C.  245    [1905]). 

'Rude  v.  Town  of  St.  Marie,  121 
Wis.  634,  99  X.  W.  460   [1904]. 

°  Blake  v.  People  for  use  of  Cald- 
well. 109  111.  504  [1884];  (under 
specific  constitutional  provision). 


575  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  377 

construction  may  be  paid  for  by  assessment,  then  in  jurisdictions 
where  assessments  may  be  levied  for  repairs,  assessments  may 
be  levied  for  the  repair  of  such  part  of  a  system  of  water  works. 
Thus  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  for  the  repair  of  the  local 
pipes,  of  a  water-works  s.ystem,^  or  in  some  jurisdictions  for 
repairs  to  parts  of  the  system,  such  as  the  pumping  station,  the 
original  construction  of  which  could  be  paid  for  by  local  assess- 
ment in  such  jurisdictions.-  A  different  result  would  l)e  reached 
in  jurisdictions  in  which  assessments  could  not  be  levied  for  re- 
pairs.^ 

§  377.     Doctrine  of  repairs  in  Illinois. 

In  Illinois  under  an  earlier  provision  of  the  constitution  an 
assessment  for  repairing  a  street  was  treated  as  valicl.^  An  ordi- 
nance imposing  a  penalty  for  failure  to  keep  a  sidewalk  in  re- 
pair was  held  to  be  invalid.-  The  objection  to  the  latter  type 
of  ordinance,  however,  is  rather  its  method  of  enforcing  a  duty 
by  criminal  proceedings  than  a  want  of  power  to  levy  local  as- 
sessments.'' It  has  been  held  that  under  the  present  constitution 
authorizing  local  assessments  for  "local  improvements"  "*  a" local" 
improvement  involves  an  idea  of  permanency  in  the  improve- 
ment."' So  the  repair  of  a  boulevard  is  not  a  local  improvement 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution  or  of  a  statute  using  the 
same  language,  since  it  has  no  element  of  permanency.''  A  spe- 
cial provision  of  the  constitution  of  Illinois  '  authorizes  local 
assessments  for  the  repair  of  drains,  ditches  and  levees.  Under 
this  provision  local  assessments  may  be  made  for  the  purpose  of 
strengthening  and  repairing  levees,^  or  for  the  purpose  of  keep- 

'  Parsons   v.   District   of   Columbia,  ^  ^ee 'Chapter  IV. 

170  U.   8.   45,   42   L.   943,    18    S.    521  'See  §§285,  28G. 

[18981;     (allirming    Parsons    v.    Dis-  °  Crane  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 

trict  of  Cnlunil)ia,  8  App.  D.  C.  391  missioners,   153  III.  348.  26  L.  R.  A. 

[189(;i,    wliicli    followed    Biirizdorf    v.  311.    .38    X.    E.    943    [1894];    City    of 

District    of   Cohuiibia,    7    Ajjp.    D.    C.  Chicago  v.   Blair,   149   111.  310,  24  L. 

405);     Batterman     v.     City    of    New  R.   A.  412.  3(5  X.   E.  829    [18941:    see 

York,  65  App.  Div.    (X.  Y.)    576,  73  S   285. 

X.  Y.  Supp.  44.  "  Crane  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 

=  See  §  377,  X.  10.  missioners.   153   111.  348,  26  L.  R.  A. 

'See   §   377,   §   378.  311.  38  X.  E.  943   [18941. 

>  Scammon   v.   City   of   Chicago.    42  'Art.   IV..   §   31;    see   §   257.   §   258. 

[11.  192   [18661.  '^Hosmcr    v.     Hunt    Drainage    Dis- 

=  City  of  Chicago  V.  Crosby,  111  111.  trict.     134     111.    360.    26    X.    E.    584 

5.38   118851.                                "  [18911. 


.§§  378,  379  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  576 

ing  them  in  repair.^  So  local  assessments  may  be  levied  for  the 
cost  of  repairing  the  pumping  station  of  a  sewer  system,  but  not 
for  the  cost  of  running  it,^°  or  for  repairing  drains  and  ditches.^^ 

§  378.     Doctrine  of  repair  in  Pennsylvania. 

In  Pennsylvania  where  local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for 
most  forms  of  reconstruction  ^  it  is  held  that  assessments  cannot 
be  levied  for  repairs  of  improvements,  for  which  assessments 
can  be  justified  only  upon  the  theory  of  special  benefits,  such  as 
streets.-  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  construc- 
tion and  repair  of  sidewalks  is  referable  to  the  police  power,  and 
that  a  local  assessment  may  therefore  be  levied  for  the  repair  of 
sidewalks.^ 

E.— RECONSTRUCTION. 

§  379.     Reconstruction  where  original  improvement  not  subject 
for  assessment. 

If  an  improvement  of  any  one  of  the  classes  for  which  local 
assessments  may  be  levied  has  once  been  constructed,  and  subse- 
quently the  public  corporation  having  charge  of  such  improve- 
ment seeks  to  construct  a  new  improvement  in  place  of  the  old 
one,  and  to  levy  local  assessments  therefor,  the  question  arises 
whether  a  statute  authorizing  such  local  assessment  is  constitu- 
tional. In  determininp-  this  onpstion  it  must  first  be  noted  that 
in  .iurisdictions  in  which  local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for 
lof'al  improvements  when  originally  constructed,^  such  assessments 
cannot  of  course  be  levied  for  a  reconstruction  of  such  improve- 
ment. Thus  under  the  rule  adopted  by  the  courts  of  South 
Carolina  it  has  been  said  that  the  cost  of  new  sidewalks  and 
drains  made  necessary  solely  by  reason  of  a  change  of  gr^de  of 
the  street  cannot  be  assessed  upon  the  abutting  property.-     This 

'Hammond  v.  Carter,  161   111.  621,  phia,    65   Pa.   St.    (15   P.    F.   Smith) 

44  N.  E.  274   [1896].  146,  3  Am.  Rep.  615   [1870]. 

"  McChesney    v.    Village    of    Hyde  '  Philadelpliia  to  use  v.  Monument 

Park,    151    111.    634,    37    N.    E.    858  Cemetery    Co.,    147    Pa.    St.    170,    23 

[1894].  Atl.  400   [1892];    Smith  v.  Kingston 

1^  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Spencer,  Borough,    120    Pa.    St.    357,    14    Atl. 

118   111.   446,   8   N.   E.   846    [1888].  170    [1888]. 

^See  §382   et   seq.  'See  §  118. 

=  Washington    Avenue,    09    Pa.    St..  =  IManldin  v.  City  Council  of  Green- 

(19   P.   F.   Smith)    352,   8   Am.   Rep.  viUe.  53   S.  C.   285,  69  Am.  St.  Rep. 

255    [1871];    Hammett    v.    Philadel-  855.   43  L.   R.   A.   101,   31   S.   E.   252 

[1898]. 


577  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  380 

case  might  have  been  placed  upon  the  ground  that  the  existing 
improvement  was  in  good  condition  and  still  suitable  for  its 
original  purpose,  and  was  replaced  by  another  for  a  purpose  in 
which  the  public  at  large  was  interested  and  not  the  abutting 
property.  If  this  had  been  the  reason  assigned,  this  case  would 
have  been  in  harmony  with  views  held  in  some  jurisdictions.^ 
It  was,  however,  placed  upon  the  broad  ground,  elsewhere  dis- 
cussed, that  local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  in  South  Caro- 
lina.* 

§  380.  Reconstruction  where  original  improvement  is  in  bad  con- 
dition. 
In  the  next  place  we  must  consider  the  cases  in  which  the 
original  improvement  has  by  use  and  by  lapse  of  time  become 
worn  out,  in  bad  condition,  or  unsuited  for  the  uses  for  which  it 
is  intended,  and  it  is  sought  to  construct  a  new  improvement  to 
take  the  place  of  original  improvement  now  worn  out.  In  cases 
of  this  class  the  great  weight  of  authority  holds  that  if  such  an 
improvement  combines  the  requirements  of  benefit  to  the  public 
at  large  and  especial  local  benefit  to  the  property  which  it  is 
sought  to  assess,  the  same  considerations  which  make  it  proper 
to  levy  local  assessments  for  the  original  improvement  make  it 
proper  to  levy  such  assessments  for  new  improvements  to  take 
the  place  of  the  original  ones.  No  reason  is  thought  to  exist, 
in  these  jurisdictions,  for  holding  that  the  power  of  the  state 
is  exhausted  by  one  local  improvement  of  a  given  kind,  and  an 
assessment  therefor,  nor  is  it  thought  that  the  act  of  making 
such  improvement  and  assessment  therefor  amounts  to  a  con- 
tract with  the  property  owners  that  the  improvement  shall  when 
worn  out  be  replaced  at  the  public  expense.  Such  assessments, 
therefore,  are  looked  upon  as  proper  if  authorized  by  the  legis- 
lature.* 

'See  §  387.  [189.31;    Lux  &   Talbott  Stone  Com- 

'See  §    118,  §   302.  pany  v.  Donaldson.    IG2   Ind.  481,  68 

MVillard  V.  Willard.  154  U.  S.  568,  X.   E.    1014    [1903];    Yeakel   v.    Citv 

38    L.    1088;     14    S.    1215;    Wells    v.  of    Lafayette,    48    Ind.    116     [1874]"; 

Wood,     114     Cal.     255,    46    Pac.    96  Koons  v.  Lucas,  52  la.   177,  3  N.  W. 

[1896];    McVerry    v.    Boyd,    89    Cal.  84    [1879];    Hackworth    v.   Louisville 

304,    26    Pac.    885    [1S91];     Chicago  Artificial  Stone  Co..  106  Ky.  234,  50 

and   Xortliorn  Pacific   Railroad   Com-  S.   W.  33    [1899]:    Broadway   Baptist 

pany  v.  City  of  Chicago.  172  111.  66,  Church  v.  McAtoo.  8  Bush.    (71   Ky.) 

49  X.  E.   1006   [18981;   Cram  v.  City  .508.   8    Am.   Rep.   480    [18711;    Brad- 

of  Chicago,  139  111.  265,  28  X.  E.  758  ley  v.  McAtee,  7  Bush.   (70  Ky.)   667, 


381 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


578 


§  381.     Examples  of  reconstmction. 

In  accordance  with  these  general  principles  we  find  that  the 
reconstruction  of  a  street  is  an  improvement  for  which  the  legis- 
lature may   authorize  local   assessments.'      This  includes   the   re- 


3  Am.  Eep.  309  [1870];  Schmitt  v. 
City  of  New  Orleans,  48  La.  Ann. 
1440,  21  So.  24  [1896];  Alberger  v. 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more, 64  Md.  1,"20  Ail.  988  [1885]; 
Hall  V.  Street  Commissioners  of 
Boston,  177  Mass.  434,  59  N.  E.  68 
[1901];  Auditor  General  v.  Chase, 
132  Mich.  630,  94  N.  W.  178  [1903]; 
Williams  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit, 
2  Mich.  560  [1853];  State  ex  rel. 
Wheeler  v.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 
County,  80  Minn.  293,'  83  N.  W.  183 
[1900];  Farrar  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
80  Mo.  379  [1883];  McCormack  v. 
Patchin,  53  Mo.  33,  14  Am.  Rep.  440 
[1873];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Com- 
pany V.  Muchenberger,  105  Mo.  App. 
47,  78  S.  W.  280  [1903];  Dunker  v. 
Stiefel,  57  Mo.  App.  379  [1894]; 
O'Meara  v.  Green,  25  Mo.  App.  198; 
Morley  v.  Carpenter,  22  Mo.  App. 
640  [1886];  O'Meara  v.  Green,  16 
Mo.  App.  118  [1884];  Mayor  and 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne  v. 
Morris,  61  N.  J.  L.  -(32  Vr.)  127, 
38  Atl.  819  [1897];  Conde  v.  City 
of  Schenectady,  164  X.  Y.  258,  58 
N.  E.  130  [1900];  Spencer  v.  Mer- 
chant, 100  N.  Y.  585,  3  N.  E.  682 
[1885];  Matter  of  Phillips,  60  X.  Y. 
21 ;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Sharp  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  56 
N.  Y.  257,  15  Am.  Rep.  415  [1874]; 
Hastings  v.  Columbus,  42  O.  S.  585 
[1885];  Ladd  v.  City  of  Portland,  32 
Or.  271,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  51  Pac. 
654  [1898]  Adams  v.  City  of  Beloit, 
105  Wis.  363,  47  L.  R.  A.  441,  81 
K  W.  869  [1900];  Boyd  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  92  Wis.  456,  66  N.  W. 
603  [1896]  ;  Warner  v.  Knox,  50  Wis. 
429,  7  N.  W.  372  [1880];  Blount  v. 
City  of  Janesville,  31  Wis.  648 
[1872]. 

1  Willard  v.  \Yillard,  154  U.  S.  568. 
38   L.    1088,    14    S.    1215;    Willard   v. 


Presbury,  14  Wall.  (81  U.  S.)  676. 
20  L.  7i9  [1869];  MeVerry  v.  Boyd, 
89  Cal.  304,  26  Pac.  885  [1891]; 
Blanchard  v.  Beideman,  18  Cal.  261 
[1861];  Bush  v.  City  of  Peoria,  215 
111.  515,  74  N.  E.  797  [1905];  Le 
Moyne  v.  City  of  Chicago,  175  111. 
358,  51  N.  e'  718  [1898];  Chicago 
a7ul  Northern  Pacific  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  172  111.  66, 
49  N.  E.  1006  [1898];  Pike  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  155  111.  656,  40  N.  E.  567 
[1895];  The  Jacksonville  Railway 
Company  v.  City  of  Jacksonville,  114 
111.  562,  2  N.  E.  478  [1886];  Gurnee 
v.  City  of  Chicago,  40  111.  165 
[1866];  Lux  &  Talbott  Stone  Com- 
pany V.  Donaldson,  162  Ind.  481,  68 
N.  E.  1014  [1903];  Yeakel  v.  City  of 
Lafayette,  42  Ind.  116  [1874];  Koons 
v.  Lucas,  52  la.  177,  3  N.  W.  84 
[1879];  Broadway  Baptist  Church  v. 
McAtee,  8  Bush!  (71  Ky.)  508,  8 
Am.  Rep.  480  [1871];  Schmitt  v. 
City  of  New  Orleans,  48  La.  Ann. 
1440,  21  So.  24  [1896];  Auditor 
C'eneral  v.  Chase,  132  Mich.  630,  94 
N.  W.  178  [1903];  Shimraons  v.  City 
of  Saginaw,  104  Mich.  511,  62  N.  W. 
725  [1895];  Wilkins  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 46  Mich.  120,  8  N.  W.  701,  9 
N.  W.  427  [1881];  State  ex  rel. 
Wheeler  v.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 
County,  80  Minn.  293,  83  N.  W.  183 
[1900];  Farrar  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
80  Mo.  379  [1883];  McCormack  v. 
Patchin.  53  Mo.  33,  14  Am.  Rep. 
440  [1873];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Company  v.  Muchenberger,  105  Mo. 
App.  47,  70  S.  W.  280  [1903];  Dim- 
ker  V.  Stiefel,  57  Mo.  App.  379 
[189^];  O'Meara  v.  Green.  25  Mo. 
App.  198;  Morley  v.  Carpenter,  22 
Mo.  App.  640  [1886];  O'Meara  v. 
Green,  16  Mo.  App.  118  [1884]; 
Conde  v.  City  of  S-heneetaily.  164 
N.    Y.    258,    58    N."   E.    13:)    |1900]; 


579 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§  381 


paving  of  a  street  -  and  the  regrading  of  a  street,  ^  as  well  as  the 


Jonos  V.  Town  of  Tonawanda,  158 
N.  Y.  438,  53  X.  E.  280  [1809]; 
Genet  v.  Brooklyn,  99  N.  Y.  29(3,  1 
X.  E.  777;  Ladd  v.  City  of  Portland. 
32  Or.  271,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  51 
Pac.  654  [1898];  Adams  v.  Fisher. 
75  Tex.  657,  6  S.  \V.  772  [1890]; 
Adams  v.  City  of  Beloit,  105  Wis. 
31J3,  47  L.  R.  A.  441,  81  X.  W.  869 
[1900];' Boyd  v.  City  of  Milwaukee. 
92  Wis.  456,  60  X.  "w.  603  [1896]; 
Warner  v.  Knox,  50  Wis.  429,  7  X. 
W.   372    [1880]. 

-Willard  v.  Presbury,  SI  U.  S. 
(14  Wall.)  676,  20  L."719  [1869]; 
Oakland  Pavinji  Co.  v.  Rier,  52  Cal. 
270  [1877];  The  Jacksonville  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Jackson- 
ville, 114  111.  562,  2  X.  E.  478 
[1886];  Giirnee  v.  City  of  Chicago. 
40  111.  165  [1866];  Lux  &  Talbott 
Stone  Company  v.  Donaldson,  162 
Ind.  481,  68  "x.  E.  1014  [1903]: 
Schmitt  v.  City  of  X'ew  Orleans,  48 
La.  Ann.  1440,  21  So.  24  [1896]: 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more v.  Jolins  Hopkins  Hosjjital,  56 
Md.  1  [1880]:  Auditor  General  v. 
Chase,  132  :\Iieh.  630,  94  X.  W.  178 
[1903]:  Wilkins  v.  City  of  Detroit. 
46  Mich.  120,  8  X.  W.-Voi,  9  X.  W. 
427  [1881];  State  ex  rel.  Wheeler 
v.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County, 
so  Minn.  293.  83  X.  W.  183  [1900]; 
Dunker  v.  Stiefel,  57  ^lo.  A])p.  37!^ 
[18941:  Farrar  v.  St.  Louis.  80  Mo. 
392:  Smith  v.  Tobener.  32  Mo.  App. 
601  [1888]:  O'Meara  v.  Green.  25 
]\ro.  App.  198:  :\[or.ley  v. 
Carpenter,  22  Mo.  App.  640  [1886]; 
Gibson  v.  Kayser's  Executor,  16  ^lo. 
App.  404  [1885]:  State.  .TelifT,  Pros. 
V.  !Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  tlie 
City  of  X'^ewark.  48  X.  J.  L.  (19  Vr.) 
101.  2  Atl.  627  [18861:  affirmed 
Jelifr  V.  X>wark.  49  X.  J.  L.  (20 
Vr.)  239,  12  Atl.  770;  Conde  v.  City 
of  Schenectady.  164  N.  Y.  258,  58 
X.  E.  130  [19001:  Jones  v.  Town  of 
Tonawanda.  158  X".  Y.  438.  53  X'.  E. 
280  [1899] ;  Voght  v.  City  of  Buffalo, 


133  X.  Y.  463,  31  X.  E.  340  [1892]; 
Spencer  v.  Merchant,  100  X.  Y.  585, 
3  X.  E.  682  [1885];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Petition  of  Lord  to  Vacate  an 
Assessment,  78  X\  \\  109  [1879]; 
In  the  ^Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Willet  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  70 
X.  Y.  490  [18771;  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Petition  of  Peugnet  to  Vacate  an 
Assessment,  67  X\  Y.  441  [1876]; 
People  V.  Brooklyn,  65  X.  Y.  349; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Burke  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  62 
X.  Y.  224  [1875]  ;  Matter  of  Phillips, 
60  X.  Y.  21;  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Sharp  to  Vacate  an  As- 
sessment, 56  X"^.  Y.  257,  15  Am.  Rep. 
415  [1874]:  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Astor  to  Vacate  an  As- 
sessment for  Paving  Forty-sixth 
Street  with  Trap  Block  Pavement, 
etc.,  53  X\  Y.  017  [1873];  Ten  Eyck 
V.  Rector  and  Inliabitants  of  the  City 
of  Albany  in  Communion  with  the 
Protestant  Episcopal  Church  in  the 
State  of  Xew  York,  65  Hun.  194,  20 
X.  Y'.  Supp.  757  [1892]:  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  Petition  of  Welsh  to 
Vacate  an  Assessment,  30  Hun.  372 
[1883]:  Moran  v.  City  of  Troy,  9 
Hun.  (X.  V.)  540  [1877];  In'  the 
flatter  of  tlie  Petition  of  Serrill  to 
\'acat('  an  Assessment,  9  Hun.  233 
[1876]:  Tilden  v.  ^Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 
York.  56  Barb.  (X.  V.)  340  [1870]; 
In  the  flatter  of  the  Petition  of 
Lewis  v.  ^Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  o\ 
Xew  York,  35  How.  (N.  \".)  162 
[1868];  Ha.stings  v.  Columbus.  42  0. 
S.  585  [1885]:  Adams  v.  City  of 
Beloit,  105  Wis.  363,  47  L.  R.  A. 
441,  81  X.  W.  869  [19001:  Boyd  v. 
City  of  :Milwaukee.  92  Wis.  456,  66 
X'.  W.  603  [1896]:  Warner  v.  Knov. 
50  Wis.  429.  7  X.  W.  372  [1880]-, 
Blount  v.  City  of  Jancsville.  31  Wis. 
648   [1872]. 

=':McVerry  v.  Boyd.  89  Cal.  304.  26 
Pac.  885  [1891]:'  Brenn  v.  City  of 
Troy,  41   How.    (X.  Y.)    475   [1871]. 


381 


TxVXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


580 


regrading  and  repaving  of  a  street  as  one  improvement,*  or  re- 
grading,  repaying  and  recurbing  a  street.^  Even  if  the  original 
improvement  and  assessment  were  under  a  statutory  provision 
to  the  effect  that  the  owner  should  not  be  assessed  for  a  second 
improvement,  such  statute  is  not  a  contract,  and  if  the  legisla- 
ture subsequently  provides  for  constructing  a  second  imnrove- 
ment  at  the  expense  of  the  owners  of  realty  benefited  thereby, 
such  provision  for  a  second  assessment  is  constitutional."  The  re- 
building of  a  sidewalk  is  also  an  improvement  for  which  a  local 
assessment  may  be  authorized.  If  a  previously  existing  sidewalk 
becomes  defective,  unfit  for  use  and  worn  out,  a  statute  providing 
for  the  construction  of  a  new  sidewalk  at  the  expense  of  the 
abutting  property  owners  is  valid.'  So  if  a  sewer  becomes  de- 
fective or  inadequate,  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  to  con- 
struct another  sewer  to  take  its  place,*  or  to  extend  the  old  sewer 
so  as  to  secure  an  adequate  outlet.®  Under  some  statutes,  how- 
ever, a  new  sewer  cannot  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments,  but 
the  old  sewer  should  be  rebuilt,  if  it  is  desired  to  levy  assess- 
ments therefor.^*^ 


*  Wells  V.  Wood,  114  Cal.  255,  46 
Pac.  96  [1896];  Adams  v.  Fisher,  75 
Tex.   657,  6   S.  W.  773    [1890]. 

=>]\IcSherry  v.  Wood,  102  Cal.  647. 
36  Pac.  1010  [1894];  Alberger  v. 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more, 64  Md.  1,  20  Atl.  988   [1885]. 

«Ladd  V.  City  of  Portland,  32  Or. 
271,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  526,  51  Pac. 
654  [1898];  see,  also,'  Bradley  v. 
McAtee,  7  Bush,  (70  Ky).  667.  3  Am. 
Rep.  309  [1870], 

^  Heath  v.  Manson,  147  Cal.  694.  82 
Pac.  331  [1905];  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Wilson,  195  111.  19,  57  L.  R.  A.  127. 
62  N.  E.  843  [1902];  Hyman  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  188  111.  462."  59  X.  E.  10 
[1900];  Wilkin  v.  Houston.  48  Kan. 
584,  30  Pac.  23  [1892];  Hackworth 
V.  Louisville  Artificial  Stone  Co.,  106 
Ky,  234,  50  S.  W.  33  [1899];  State 
ex  rel.  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County.  89  Minn. 
292,  94  X.  W.  870  [1903];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Burmeister 


to  Vacate  an  Assessment  for  regu- 
lating, etc..  Forty-sixth  Street  be- 
tween Eleventh  Avenue  and  Hudson 
River  in  the  City  of  Xew  York,  56 
How.    (X.   Y.)    416    [1879], 

*  Hall  V.  Street  Commissioners  of 
Boston,  177  Mass.  434,  59  N.  E.  68 
[1901];  Shannon  v.  City  of  Omaha, 
73  Xeb.  507,  103  X.  w'  53,  106  -N. 
W.  592  [1905];  Mayor  and  Council 
of  the  City  of  Bayonne  v.  Morris, 
61  X,  J.  L.  (32  Vr.)  127,  37  Atl.  819 
[1897];  Wilson  v.  Cincinnati,  7  Ohio 
Dec.  242. 

^  ilayor  and  Council  of  the  City  of 
Bayonne  v.  Morris,  61  X.  J.  L.  (32 
Vr.)  127,  38  Atl.  819  [1897];  State, 
Green,  Pros.  v.  Hotaling,  44  X.  J.  L. 
(15  Vr.)  347  [1882];  State,  Vander- 
beck,  Pros.  v.  ilayor  and  Common 
Council  of  Jersey  City,  29  X.  J.  L. 
(5  Dutch.)    441    [1861]. 

^^  State,  Fiacre,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Jersey  City,  34 
X.   J.   L.    (5   Vr.)    277    [1870].' 


581 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§382 


§  382.     Pennsylvania  doctrine  as  to  reconstruction. 

The  contrary  view  of  this  question  is  taken  in  Penn.s.vlvania. 
In  that  state  it  is  held  that  when  the  original  improvement  has 
once  been  constructed  the  particular  and  especial  benefits  to  the 
adjoining  property  are  then  and  there  received  and  enjoyed  by 
such  property,  and  that  any  attempt  to  levy  local  assessments 
for  a  second  improvement,  no  matter  how  necessary  it  may  be, 
by  reason  of  the  defective  condition  of  the  original  improve- 
ment, is  an  attempt  to  assess  for  benefits  which  the  property  al- 
ready is  enjoying.^  Accordingly  it  is  held  in  Pennsylvania  that 
for  the  reasons  given,  a  local  assessment  for  a  second  improve- 
ment cannot  constitutionally  be  authorized  or  levied.^  This  view 
was  originally  expressed  ^  and  has  since  been  repeated  *  in  cases 
in  which  the  original  improvement  was  still  in  good  and  service- 
able condition ;  and  was  destro^^ed  to  make  room  for  another 
improvement  of  a  different  character  to  suit  a  change  of  plan 
made  by  the  municipal  corporation  for  the  general  benefit  thereof. 
Thus  where  a  good  cobble-stone  pavement  was  torn  up  and  an 
expensive  wooden  pavement  was  put  down  to  make  a  large  public 
driveway.^  or  a  good  curb  was  ordered  to  be  replaced  on  account 
of  a  change  in  the  nature  of  paving  the  street,*'  or  a  change  in 


^Hanimptt  v.  Pliiladlephia.  C>o  Pa. 
St.  (15  P.  F.  Smith)  UG,  3  Am. 
Rep.  615   11870]. 

^Scranton  City  v.  Sturges,  202  Pa. 
St.  182,  51  Atl.'764  [1902];  Harris- 
burg  V.  Funk.  200  Pa.  St.  348.  49 
Atl.  992  [1901];  City  of  Philadel- 
.phia  V.  Yewdill,  190  Pa.  St.  412,  42 
Atl.  956  [1809];  West  Third  Street 
Sewer,  Appeal  of  the  City  of  Wil- 
liamsport,  187  Pa.  St.  565,  41  Atl. 
476  [1898];  L«ake  v.  City  of  Phila- 
delphia, 171  Pa.  St.  125,  32  Atl.  1110 
[1895];  ]\Iore\vood  Avenue,  Cham- 
ber's Appeal,  159  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl. 
123.  132  [1893]  •  City  of  Erie  v. 
Russell,  148  Pa.  St.  384.  23  Atl.  1102 
[1892];  Borough  of  Greensburg  v. 
Laird.  138  Pa.  St.  533,  21  Atl.  96 
[1890];  City  of  Williamsport  v. 
Beck.  128  Pa.  St.  147,  18  Atl.  329 
[18S0]:  Alcorn  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia. 112  Pa.  St.  494.  4  Atl.  185 
[1886];    Wistar    v.    City    of    ihila- 


dclpliia.  Ill  Pa.  St.  604,  4  Atl.  511 
I  1886]  ;  Appeal  of  tlie  Protestant  Or- 
phan Asylum  of  Pittsburgh  and  Al- 
legheny, 111  Pa.  St.  135,  3  Atl.  217 
[1885];  Wistar  v.  Philadelphia,  80 
Pa.  St.  505.  21  Am.  Pvep.  112;  Ham- 
met  V.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa.  St.  (15 
P.  F.  Smith)  146,  3  Am.  Rep.  615 
[1870];  City  of  Chester  v.  Evans. 
32    Pa.  Super.   Ct.  041    [1907]. 

■Mlammett  v.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa. 
St.  (15  P.  F.  SmitJi)  146.  3  Am. 
Rep.  615   [1870]. 

*  Wi.star    v.    City    of    Philadelphia. 

111  Pa.  St.  604.  4  Atl.  511  [1886]; 
Wistar  v.  Philadelphia,  80  Pa.  St. 
(.30  P.   F.   Smith)    505.  21    Am.  Rep. 

112  [1876];  Philadelphia  v.  Wistar, 
92  Pa.  St.    (11   Xorris)    404. 

Mlammet  v.  Philadolpliia.  65  Pa. 
St.  (15  P.  F.  Smilh)  146.  3  Am. 
Rep.   615   [1870]. 

"Wistar  v.  City  of  Philadelphia. 
Ill  Pa.  St.  604.  4  Atl.  511    [1886]. 


§  383  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  582 

the  width  of  the  sidewalk,"  it  was  held  that  a  local  assessment 
could  not  be  levied  for  such  new  improvement.  If  the  Pennsyl- 
vania rule  were  limited  to  cases  of  this  class  it  would  find  sup- 
port in  other  jurisdictions.'*  It  is  not.  however,  sO'  limited,  but 
is  applied  in  cases  where  it  appears  that  the  original  improve- 
ment is  worn  out  and  must  be  replaced  both  for  the  needs  of  the 
public  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  adjoining  realty.''  Furthermore, 
while  this  view  has  been  expressed  in  cases  in  which  the  original 
improvement  was  paid  for  by  local  assessments  on  abutting  prop- 
erty,^°  it  is  not  limited  to  cases  of  this  class.  The  true  rule 
as  laid  down  by  the  Pennsylvania  courts  is  that  where  the  cost 
of  the  original  improvement  may  be  assessed  against  the  abut- 
ting or  adjoining  property,^^  the  cost  of  a  second  improvement 
cannot  be  assessed  against  such  property  even  if  the  original 
improvement  was  paid  for  by  general  taxation.^-  However,  the 
fact  that  a  street  is  regraded,  but  no  part  of  the  cost  of  regrading 
is  included  in  the  assessment  for  benefits,  does  not  prevent  the 
city  from  levying  an  assessment  for  paving  a  street.^' 

§  383,     Original  construction  of  streets  in  Pennsylvania. 

Accordingly,  in  this  state  tlie  question  whether  an  improve- 
ment of  the  street  amounts  to  an  original  paving  or  not  is  of 
the  highest  importance,  since  if  it  is  an  original  paving,  no  local 
assessment  can  be  levied  thereafter  for  a  subsequent  paving  of 
such  street,  while  if  the  improvement  does  not  amount  to  an 
original  paving,  such  local  assessment  can  thereafter  be  levied 
for  a  later  improvement  which  amounts  to  a  paving.  An  origi- 
nal pavement  in  tbis  sense  is  one  which  is  either  put  down  origi- 
nally with  the  intention  of  changing  the  prior  road  or  tract  of 

'  Wistar    v.    Pliiladelphia,    80    Pa,  '^  Borovigh  of  Greensburg  v.  Laird, 

St.    (30   P.    F.    Smith)    505,   21    Am.  138   Pa.  St.  533,  21  Atl.  96    [1890]; 

Rep.     112     riS76];     Philadelphia    v.  City    of    Williamsport    v.    Beck,    128 

Wistar,  92  Pa.  St.   (11  Norris)   404.  Pa.' St.  147,  18  Atl.  329  [1889]. 

*See  §  387  et  seq.  '=  Boyer   v.    Reading   City,    151    Pa. 

"Scranton  City  v.  Sturges,  202  Pa.  St.    185,   24  Atl.    1075;    City  of  Har- 

St.  182,  51  Atl.'764   [1902];   City  of  risburg    v.    Segelbaiim,    151    Pa.    St. 

Williamsport    v.    Beck,    128    Pa.    St.  172,   20  L.   R.   A.   834,   24   Atl.    1070 

147,   18  Atl.   329    [1889].  [1892];      City     of     Williamsport     v. 

'"Apijeal  of  the  Protestant  Orphan  Beck,    128   Pa.   St.    147,    18    Atl.   329 

Asylum     of     Pittsburgh     and      Alle-  [1889]. 

gheny,    111    Pa.    St.    135,    3   Atl.    217  ^^  Amberson      Avenue,      Appeal      of 

[1885].  Childs.   179   Pa.  St.  634,  36  Atl.  354 

[1897]. 


583  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  38;] 

ground  destined  therefor  into  a  street,  or  which  is  adopted  sub- 
sequently for  that  purpose  or  acquiesced  in  with  such  intent.^ 
Whether  the  prior  improvement  amounted  to  an  original  paving 
or  not  is  a  f|uestion  of  fact,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the 
improvement,  the  nature  of  the  action  of  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion in  regard  thereto,  and  the  intention  and  purpose  of  such 
municipal  corporation  in  making  or  adopting  sueli  prior  im- 
provement.- If  the  municipal  corporation  has  itself  improved  the 
surface  of  the  road  the  application  of  these  principles  will  de- 
termine whether  the  improvement  is  an  original  pavement  or 
not.  Mere  surfacing  of  the  road,  even  if  done  carefully  and  ex- 
pensively, will  not  amount  to  an  original  paving  unless  done  with 
the  intention  of  changing  the  road  into  a  street.''  If  the  surface 
of  a  road  is  macadamized  it  is  said  that  in  larger  towns  it  would 
not  prima  facie  be  an  original  paving  within  the  meaning  of  this 
rule,  while  in  a  smaller  town  it  would  l)e.*  However,  if  the  road  is 
macadamized  with  the  intention  of  converting  it  into  a  street,  such 
macadamizing  will  he  regarded  as  an  original  improvement,^'  and 
local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for  a  sul)sequent  asphalt  pave- 
ment."' Where  the  council  has  the  sole  right  to  determine  what 
streets  shall  be  paved  and  what  the  character  of  the  paving  shall 
l)e.  the  fact  that  the  council  appropriated  money  for  the  repair  of 
a  street  and  the  highway  deiKirtment  used  such  money  in  mac- 
adamizing such  street,  will  not  constitute  such  macadamizing  an 
original  })aving'  and  will  not  prevent  the  levy  of  a  local  assess- 
ment for  a  new  pavement  of  vitrified  brick.'* 

If  the  original  improvement  has  been  constructed  by  a  private 
individual   voluntarily  without  the  consent  and  approval  of  the 

'Dick   V.   Pliihulelphin.    107   Pa.   St.  i)liia    to    Use    of    Mack    v.    iMldlciiian, 

467,47  Atl.  750  [19011:  Pliiladclpliia  Hi!)   Pa.  St.  4.52,  32  Atl.  689    [1895]. 

to    Use    of    Mack    v.    Eddlcnian.    169  '' Leake  v.  City  of  Pliiladelpliia,  171 

Pa.   St.    452,   32   Atl.   639    [1895].  Pa.    St.    125,    32    Atl.    1110    [1895]; 

-  Harrisburfi  v.   Funk,   200   Pa.   St.  'I'liat   niacadami/ing   may   amount   t.) 

348,    49    Atl.    992     [1901];     Dick    v.  an  oiijiinal  construction,  see,  City  of 

Pliiladclidiia.  197   i'a.  St.  467.  47  Atl.  Harrislmr<>-    v.     Segelbaum,     151     Pa. 

750    [19011:    /((    IT    Lincnln    Avonuc.  St.    172,    20    L.    U.    A.    834.    24    Atl. 

denkinson's   Api)oal.    193    I'a.  St.  435,  1070    [1892]. 

44   Atl.    1102    118991:    Leake    v.   City  "  Leake  v.  City  of  Pliil;i<lelp1iia.  171 

of  Philadelpliia.    171    Pa.   St.    125,   32  Pa.   St.    125.    32   Atl.    1110    [1895|. 

-■^tl.    1110    [1895].  •  Pliiladelphia    to    I'se    v.    Dibcler. 

*Dick  V.   Pliilade]i)liia,    l'.t7   Pa.   St.  147   Pa.  St.  261,  23  AtL  567    [1892]. 

467,  47  Atl.  750   [19011.  M^liiladelphia    v.    Diheler,    147    Pa. 

'Dick   V.  Pliiladelpliia.    197   Pa.  St.  St.   261.  23  Atl.  567    [1892]. 
467.    47    All.    750    [1901];    Philadel- 


§  383  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  584 

municipal  corporation,  such  improvement  is  not  such  an  original 
paving  that  the  city  is  precluded  from  levying  local  assessments 
thereafter  for  a  new  pavement."  If,  hoAvever,  the  improvement 
is  constructed  by  the  owner  with  the  consent  and  approval  of 
the  municipal  corporation,  it  is  regarded  as  an  original  improve- 
ment and  local  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for  second  improve- 
.ments."  Thus  if  an  owner  of  realty  has  set  curb-stones  in  front 
of  his  land  in  a  proper  manner  in  conformity  with  the  require- 
ments then  in  force  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay  for  new  curb- 
stones made  necessary  because  the  width  of  the  sidewalk  has 
been  increased  by  ordinance,^^  or  because  the  paving  of  the  street 
has  been  changed  from  cobble-stones  to  Belgian  block. ^-  If  the 
improvement  has  been  constructed  before  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion acquires  control  of  the  street,  the  question  then  turns  on 
whether  the  municipal  corporation  adopted  such  improvement  or 
not.  Mere  failure  to  destroy  such  improvement  at  once,  and 
merely  allowing  it  to  be  used  does  not  constitute  an  adoption.^'' 
Thus  repairing  a  road  with  broken  limestone  ^*  or  repairing  the 
planking  of  a  plank  road  ^''  or  regrading  a  plank  road  after 
acquiring  it  free  from  the  right  to  take  toU,^**  does  not  in  either 
case  amount  to  an  adoption  of  such  improvement.  If  a  street 
has  been  paved  in  part  and  in  part  left  unpaved,^^  as  where  a 
strip  in  the  center  has  been  left  unpaved  for  use  as  a  market 
place,^*  or  for  planting  trees  and  shrubbery,^''  and  such  unpaved 
part  is  thereafter  paved,  an  assessment  may  be  levied  upon  the 
abutting  property  for  the  expense  of  such  improvement,  since 
it  concerns  a  part  of  the  street  not  originally  improved.     If.  how- 

'  Leake  v.  Phila.,   150  Pa.  St.  643,  coin  Avenue,  Jenkinson's  Appeal,  193 

24  Atl.  351    [1892];   Philadelphia  to  Pa.   St.   435,   44  Atl.    1102    [1899]. 
Use  V.  Baker,  140  Pa.  St.  11.  21  Atl.  "  Harrisburg  v.  Funk,  200  Pa.  St. 

238    [1891].  348,  49  Atl.  992    [1901]. 

"Wistar   v.    City    of   Philadelphia,  ^^  East   Street,   Evans'   Appeal,   210 

111  Pa.  St.  604,  4  Atl.  511    [1886];  Pa.  St.  539,  60  Atl.   154   [1904]. 
Wistar    v.    Philadelphia,    80    Pa.    St.  ^»  Dick  v.  Philadelphia,  197  Pa.  St. 
(30   P.   F.  Smith)    505,  21   Am.  Rep.  467,  47  Atl.  750    [1901]. 

112  [1876];    Philadelphia  V.  Wistar,  "Philadelphia    to    Use    v.    Evans, 
92  Pa.  St.    (11  Xorris)    404.  139  Pa.  St.  483,  21   Atl.  200   [1891]; 

"Wistar    v.    Philadelphia,    80    Pa.  Alcorn  v.   City   of   Philadelphia,    112 

St.    (30   P.    F.   Smith)    505,   21    Am.  Pa.  St.  494,  4  Atl.   185   [1886]. 

Rep.  112   [1876].  '« Philadelphia    to    Use    v.    Evans, 

1' Wistar    v.    City   of   Philadelphia,  139  Pa.  St.  483,  21  Atl.  200   [1891]. 

Ill  Pa.  St.  604,  4  Atl.  511    [1886].  "Alcorn   v.    City    of    Philadelphia, 

^'Harrisburg  v.   Funk,  200  Pa.  St.  112   Pa.   St.   494,   4   Atl.    185    [1886]. 
348,   49   Atl.   992    [1901];    In   re  Lin- 


585  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §§  384-386 

ever,  a  street  is  widened  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  paving 
such  part  of  the  street  as  was  nnpaved  before,  bnt  cannot  be 
levied  for  paving-  such  part  of  the  street  as  was  paved  before.-' 

§  384.    Reconstruction  of  sewers. 

The  principles  applicable  in  Pennsylvania  to  assessments  for 
the  reconstruction  of  streets  have  been  said  to  be  applicable 
to  assessments  for  the  reconstruction  of  sewers.^  If  a  sewer 
has  been  constructed  -  either  by  assessments  levied  upon  real- 
ty benefited  thereby,^  or  even  if  paid  for  out  of  funds 
raised  by  general  taxation.*  a  local  assessment  cannot  be  levied 
to  pay  for  the  expense  of  a  reconstruction  thereof. 

§  385.    Reconstruction  of  sidewalks. 

A  different  principle  is  applied  in  case  of  the  reconstruction 
of  sidewalks,  however.  This  improvement  is  referred  to  the  police 
power,  not  to  the  taxing  power.  Accordingly  it  is  held  that  the 
owner  may  be  compelled  to  reconstruct  a  new  sidewalk  in  place 
of  a  former  one  if  the  earlier  improvement  is  in  such  condition 
that  it  must  be  replaced.^  This  principle  is  extended  to  allow 
assessments  for  repairs  of  sidewalks.- 

§  386.     Illinois  doctrine  as  to  reconstruction. 

While  in  Illinois  a  repair  is  looked  upon  as  so  lacking  in  per- 
manency as  not  to  be  a  "local  improvement"  within  the  meaning 
of   the    constitutional    provision    authorizing    an    assessment    for 

-"City  of   Pliiladolpliia  v.   Ycwdall,  liad  paid   part  of  the  cost  of  sewers 

190  Pa.  St.  412,  42  Atl.  956   [1899].  previously    constructed    and    in    fact 

^  City   of  Erie   v.   Russell,    148   Pa.  adequate    to    the    needs    of    the    eom- 

St.   384,  2.3  Atl.    1102    [1892].  munity.     Ilammet  v.  Philadelphia,  65 

2 City  of   Erie   v.   Russell,    148   Pa.  Pa.  St.   (15  P.  F.  Smith)    14G,  3  Am. 

St.  384,  23  Atl.   1102   [1892].  Rep.    615    [1870];    Washington   Ave- 

»City   of  Erie   v.   Russell,    148   Pa.  nue,    69    Pa.    St.    (19    P.    F.    Smith) 

St.  384,  23  Atl.   1102   [1892].  .352,   and  Wistar  v.  Philadelphia,  80 

MVest  Third  Street  Sewer.  Appeal  Pa.  St.  (30  P.  F.  Smith)  505.  21  Am. 

of  the  City  of  Williamsport.  187  Pa.  llep.     112     [1870]  ;     were    tlbere    re- 

St.   565,   41    Atl.    476    [1898]  :    Phila-  viewed    and    distinguished. 

delphia    v.    Meighan,    27    Pa.    Super.  ^  Wilkinsburg     15or.     v.     Home    for 

Ct.    160    [1905];    However    in    Miclie-  Aged   Women.    131    Pn.   St.    109,   6   L. 

ner  v.  City  of  Philadeli)liia,    IIS    Pa.  R.     A.     531,     IS     All.     937     [1890]; 

St.  535,   12   Atl.    174    [1888];    it  was  Smith  v.  Kingston   Borough,    120  Pa. 

held  that  an  owner  of  land  might  bs  St.   357,   14  Atl.    170    [1888]. 

assessed  for  a  sewer  even  tliough  he  =  See  §§   373-378. 


§  387  TAXA-ilON    BY    ASSESSMENT.  586 

"local  improvements,"^  a  reconstruction  is  regarded  as  so  per- 
manent in  its  nature  that  it  is  a  "local  improvement"  within  the 
meanino-  of  such  constitutional  provision. - 

§  387.     Reconstruction  where  original  construction  is  in  good  con- 
dition— Theory  that  court  can  review. 

Another  class  of  new  improvements  remains  for  consideration. 
Cases  are  found  in  which  the  original  improvement  is  in  good 
and  substantial  condition,  capable  of  serving  the  purpose  for 
which  it  Avas  originally  constructed.  However,  the  public  cor- 
poration, often  for  some  purpose  of  its  own.  having  nothing  to 
do  with  the  special  interests  of  the  adjoining  property  holders, 
such  as  a  change  of  grade  to  conform  to  some  grade  established 
elsewhere  in  the  municipality,  a  different  idea  of  the  proper  effect 
to  be  obtained  from  the  appearance  of  the  completed  improvement 
and  the  like,  may  decide  to  destroy  such  useful  and  substantial 
improvement  and  construct  another  one  serving  the  same  pur- 
pose as  the  one  which  has  been  destroyed,  but  better  adapted  to 
the  wishes  of  those  who  are;  for  the  time  being,  officers  of  the 
public  corporation.  Can  the  adjoining  or  abutting  property  own- 
ers be  assessed  for  the  expense  of  such  new  improvement  ?  In  a 
case  like  this,  whatever  the  benefit  to  the  general  public,  the 
especial  benefit  to  the  adjoining  property  is  reduced  to  a  mini- 
mum. The  real  object  of  such  improvement  is  to  benefit  the 
public.^  Naturally  statutes  providing  specifically  for  improve- 
ments of  this  sort  are  not  common,  and  the  cases  presenting 
this  problem  are  usually  cases  involving  ordinances  passed  under 

'See  §   377.  of  Jacksonville,  114  111.  562,  2  N.  E. 

2-Bush  V.  City  of  Peoria.  215  111.  478  [1880];  Gurnee  v.  City  of  Chi- 
515,  74  X.  E.  797  [1905];  Field  v.  ca.iro.  40  111.  165  [1866]. 
City  of  Chicago,  198  111.  224,  64  N.  '  "Local  assessments  can  onl^/  be 
E.  840  [1902];  City  of  Chicago  v.  constitutional  when  imposed  to  pay 
Wilson,  195  111.  19,  57  L.  R.  A.  127.  for  local  improvements,  clearly  con- 
G2  N.  E.  843  [1902];  Le  ^loyne  v.  ferring  special  benefits  on  the  prop- 
City  of  Chicago.  175  111.  356,  51  N.  erties  assessed,  and  to  the  ext^^nt  of 
E.  718  [1898];  Chicago  and  North-  those  benefits.  They  cannot  be  so  im- 
ern  Pacific  Railroad  Company  v.  City  posed  when  the  improvement  is  eith- 
of  Chicago.  172  111.  66.  49  X.  E.  er  expressed  or  appears  to  be  for 
1006  [1898];  Pike  v.  City  of  Chicago,  general  public  benefit,"  Hammett  v. 
155  111.  656,  40  X.  E.  567  [1895]:  Philadelphia.  65  Pa.  St.  (15  P.  F. 
Cram  v.  City  of  Chicago.  139  111.  Smith)  146.  157,  3  Am.  Rep.  615 
265,  28  X.  E.  758  [1893];  The  Jack-  [1870]. 
sonville    Railway    Company    v.    City 


II 


587 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


387 


statutes  conferring  in  general  terms  power  to  pave  and  repave. 
In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  if  the  existing  improvement 
is  in  good  condition,  such  an  ordinance  is  so  unreasonable  and 
oppressive  as  to  be  void.-  Thus  if  a  street  is  in  good  condition  it 
has  been  held  that  a  new  street  cannot  be  constructed  at  the  cost 
of  the  abutting  property  owners,^  as  where  the  attempt  was  made 
to  replace  a  good  cedar  block  street  with  a  paving  of  brick*  or 
to  replace  a  new  macadam  street  with  asphalt;"*  or  to  replace  with 
asphalt  a  macadam  street,  not  new,  but  in  good  condition. **  So  an 
ordinance  requiring  a  curbing  which  is  in  good  condition  to  be 
removed  and  a  new  combined  curb  and  gutter  substituted  has 
been  held  void  as  unreasonable  and  oppressive."  So  an  ordinance 
which  requires  the  destruction  of  an  existing  street  which  is  in 
good  condition,  in  order  to  replace  it  with  a  wider  street  for 
the  benefit  of  the  public  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  property 
owners,®    or   to   replace    it    v\'ith    an    expensive    wooden    pavement 


-Lamb  v.  City  of  C'liicago,  219 
111.  229,  70  N.  E.  343  [1906];  City 
of  Cliicago  V.  Brown,  205  111.  568, 
69  N.  E.  65  [1903];  McFarlane  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  185  111.  242.  57  N. 
E.  12  [1900];  Hav.es  v.  City  of  Clii- 
cago, 158  111.  653,  30  L.  R.  A.  225 
42  N.  E.  373  [1895];  Wreford  v 
City  of  Detroit,  132  Mich.  348,  93 
X.  W.  876  [1903];  Dickinson  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  111  INIich.  480,  69  N.  W. 
728  [1897];  Philadelphia  to  Use  of 
Parker  v.  Henry.  161  Pa.  St.  38,  28 
Atl.  946  [1894]';  Pittsburg  v.  Shaf- 
fer, 66  Fa.  St.  (16  P.  F.  Smitli) 
454  [18/0];  Hammett  v.  Pliiladel- 
phia,  6o  Pa.  St.  (15  P.  F.  Sinitli) 
146,  3  Am.  Rep.  615  |1S7<)|;  "If 
Avliile  the  pavement  is  good  and 
stands  in  no  need  of  repair,  the  city 
may  tear  it  up.  relay  and  charge  the 
owner  again  with  one  excessively 
costly,  t!iat  would  be  exacti:)n.  n  )! 
taxation."  Wistar  v.  Philadelphia 
80  Pa.  St.  (30  P.  F.  Siiiitli)  505. 
S12,  21  Am.  Rep.  112  11876].  Jn 
tliis  state  however  the  courts  havtt 
pone  far  beyond  this  restriction  and 
hold  that  as  a  broad  and  genei-al  rule 
no  local  assessment  can  be  leviml 
for  a  second  improvement.     See  also 


Case  of  Isle  of  Ely,    10   Rep.    141a. 

'Lamb  v.  City  of  Chicago,  219  111. 
229,  76  N.  E.  343  [1906];  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Brown,  205  111.  568,  69 
X.  E.  65  [1903];  McFarlane  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  185  III.  242,  57  X.  E.  12 
[1900];  Wreford  v.  City  of  Detroit. 
132  Mich.  348,  93  X.  W.  876  [1903]; 
Plammett  v.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa.  St. 
(15  P.  F.  Smith)  146.  3  Ani.  Rep. 
615    [1870]. 

'  McFarlane  v.  City  of  Chicago,  185 
111.  242.  57   X.   E.    12    [IDOO].  ^ 

•'City  of  Cliicago  V.  Brown,  205 
111.    568,    69    X.    E.    65    [1903]. 

"  Field  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co. 
117   Fed.   925    [1902]. 

'  Lam!)  v.  City  of  Cliicago.  219 
ill.  229.  76  X".  E.  343  [1906]; 
( Whether  such  ordinance  is  unreas- 
onable or  not  is  a  qnesti(m  of  fact.) 

-Wreford  v.  City  of  Detroit,  132 
Mich.  348.  93  X.  W.  876   [1903]. 

"The  principle  upon  which  abut- 
ting owners  are  charged  with  the  ex- 
])ens(>  of  paving  the  street  in  the  first 
instance  is  that  their  property  is  ben- 
efited by  the  pavement.  After  the  im- 
provement has  once  been  made,  its 
care  belonffs  to  the  entire  public; 
and    it   must   be   kept    in   repair   and 


§387  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  588 

to  make  a  great  public  driveway,''  each  has  been  held  to  be  in- 
valid. However,  if  it  is  necessary  either  to  repair  a  street  in 
a  substantial  manner  or  to  repave  it,  the  determination  of  the 
city  to  repave  it  seems  to  be  regarded  as  final.^"  An  agreement 
between  counsel  for  the  city  and  counsel  for  the  property  owners 
that  the  city  should  repair  the  pavement  instead  of  repaving, 
made  at  an  informal  presentation  of  the  question  to  the  county 
.judge  and  not  made  a  matter  of  record  does  not  prevent  the  city 
from  repaving  such  street  subsequently  at  the  cost  of  the  prop- 
erty owners."  So  if  an  existing  sidewalk  is  in  good  condition 
and  the  municipal  corporation  requires  that  it  be  replaced  by 
a  sidewalk  of  another  type  or  of  another  width  or  on  another 
grade,  such  ordinance  is  unreasonable,  unjust,  oppressive  and 
void.^-  However,  one  whose  sidewalk  is  in  bad  condition,  need- 
ing to  be  replaced,  cannot  resist  an  assessment  on  the  ground 
that  the  ordinance  is  oppressive  as  to  other  property  owners 
whose  sidewalks  are  in  good  condition."  So,  if  land  is  drained 
sufficiently  by  existing  sewers,  it  has  been  held  that  no  assess- 
ment can  be  levied  for  the  construction  of  a  new  sewer.^*  In 
order  to  prevent  the  public  corporation  from  levying  an  assess- 
ment for  a  neAV  improvement  w^hile  the  old  improvement  is  in 
good  condition,  the  old  improvement  must  have  been  constructed 
by  the  public  corporation,  or  authorized  by  it,  or  adopted  by  it. 
The  voluntary  act  of  a  private  individual  in  constructing  an  im- 
provement near  to  or  adjoining  his  property  cannot  prevent  the 
public    corporation    from    making    such    improvement    as    it    sees 

in  condition  or  widened  or   improved  St.     (15    P.    F.    Smith)     146,    3    Am. 

in    any    manner,    by    the    public    and  Rep.   615    [1870J. 

not    at    the    expense    of    the    owners.  ^"  Howe  v.  City  of  Chicago,  224  III. 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  what  bene-  95,   79  N.  E.  421    [1906]. 

fit  accrues  to  abutting  owners  where.  ^^  Howe    v.    City    of    Chicago,    224 

as  in  this  instance,  their  shade  trees  111.  95,  79  N.  E.  421    [1906]. 

are  cut  down,  the  grass  plots  in  front  '-  Hawes    v.    City    of    Chicago,    158 

of    their    property    removed    and    the  111.   65.3,   30   L.   R.   A.   225,   42   N.   E. 

travel  upon  the  street  with  its  dust  373    [1895];    Philadelphia   to  Use  of 

and    noise,    brought    nearer    to    their  Parker  v.  Henry.   161   Pa.   St.  38,  28 

dwellings.       Such    improvements    are  Atl.  946    [1894]. 

clearly  not  for  the  benefit  of  private  ^^  Hyman    v.    (  ity    of    Clncago.    189 

owners,    but    for    the    benefit    of    the  111.  462.  59  N.  E.   10. 

public."     Wreford  v.  City  of  Detroit,  "Potter  v.  Vilhu-e  of  Xnrwond.  21 

132  Mich.  348.  93  N.  W.  876   [1903].  Ohio    C.    C.    461     [1901] -.     Miller    v. 

^Hammett  v.   Philadelphia.   65   Pa,  Toledo,  7  Ohio  X.  P.  477    [1900]. 


589 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§38S 


fit,  and  levying  assessments  therefor. ^-^     This  principle  has  been 
applied  to  street  assessments.^"  and  to  sewer  assessments.^^ 

§  388.     Theory  that  determmation  of  city  is  final. 

In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  if  the  improvement  is  one 
which  the  council  may  order  in  a  proper  case,  the  question  of 
the  necessity  of  a  new  improvement  is  one  to  be  determined  by 
the  council,  and  that  the  courts  cannot  interfere.  Accordingly, 
if  the  council  thinks  it  wise  to  destroy  an  improvement  and  re- 
place it  with  a  new  one,  a  local  assessment  levied  for  such  new 
improvement  is,  under  this  theory,  held  to  be  valid. ^  A  similar 
view  has  been  expressed  by  the  Michigan  courts:  "It  is  true 
that  sound  policy  should  have  placed  some  check  on  the  power 
to  repave  without  necessity.  But  if  the  other  provisions  of  the 
charter  are  faithfully  carried  out  that  abuse  will  be  reasonably 
restrained.  In  such  matters  something  must  be  left  to  the  good 
faith  of  the  public  agencies."-  This  remark  was  possibly  an 
obiter,  as  it  seems  likely  that  in  this  case  the  new  improvement 
was  reasonably  necessary,  but  it  sets  forth  the  theory  held  by 
some  jurisdictions,  that  the  action  of  the  city  authorities  is  final 
and  conclusive  in  a  clear  and  concise  statement.  This  view  seems 
to  be  adopted  in  Kansas,  where  it  has  been  held  that  the  munici- 
pal authorities  may  in  their  discretion  levy  local  assessments 
for  widening  and  reconstructing  a  sidewalk.^     So  where  a  side- 


''  Lux  &  Talbott  Stone  Comininy  v. 
Donaldson,  1G2  Ind.  481,  68  N.  E, 
1014  [1903];  City  of  Atchison  v. 
Price,  45  Kan.  296,  25  Pac.  605 
[1891];  City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Owen, 
110  Mo.  445,  19  S.  W.  713  [1892]; 
Parsons  v.  City  of  Columbus,  50  O. 
S.  460,  34  N.  E.  677  [1893];  Pliila- 
delphia  to  Use  v.  Baker.  140  Pa.  St. 
11,  21  Atl.  238   [1891]. 

■^"Parsons  v.  City  of  Columbus. 
50  O.  S.  400,  34- N.  E.  677  [1893]; 
Philadelphia  to  Use  v.  Baker.  140 
Pa.  St.   11,  21   Atl.  238   [1891]. 

"  City  of  Atchison  v.  Price.  45 
Kan.  296,  25  Pac.  605  [1891];  City 
of  St.  Joseph  V.  Owen,  110  :Mo.  445. 
19  S.  W.  713   [1892]. 

^City  of  Koknmo  v.  :Mahan.  100 
Ind.     242      1884]  ;      Yeakel     v.     City 


of  Lafayette.  4S  Ind.  lUi  [1874]; 
City  of  Lafayette  v.  Fowler,  34  Ind. 
140  [1870];  "Wilkins  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 46  Midi.  120,  8  X.  'w.  701, 
9  N.  W.  427  [1881];  Williams  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit.  2  Mich.  560 
[1853];  McCormack  v.  Patchin.  rr.i 
Mo.  33,  14  Am.  Rep.  440  [1873]. 

=  Wilkins  v.  City  of  Detroit.  46 
Mich.  120,  122.  8  X.  W.  701.  9  X. 
W.   427    I  ISSl]. 

•■' Wilkin  V.  Houston.  48  Kan.  584. 
30  Pac.  23  [1S921;  (Tliis  improve- 
ment was  made  under  a  statute 
which  provided  for  tlie  reconstruc- 
tion of  sucli  sidewalks  as  are  in  the 
judfrment  of  tlie  council  worn  out 
and  unfit  for  re]iair,  and  making  as- 
sessments therefor ) . 


§  388  TAXATION  .  BY    ASSESSMENT.  590 

walk  made  of  plank,  in  fairly  good  condition,  was  destroyed  to 
construct  one  of  stone,  it  was  said  that  the  determination  of  the 
mayor  and  council  was  final.*  A  qualified  form  of  this  rule  is 
entertained  in  some  jurisdictions  where  it  is  held  that  the  wis- 
dom of  making  the  new  improvement  is  primarily  a  question 
within  the  discretion  of  the  municipal  corporation,  and  that  the 
courts  will  interfere  only  when  it  appears  that  such  discretion 
has  clearly  been  abused  and  that  the  property  owners  involved 
have  been  prejudiced  thereby.'"'  Under  either  theory  it  is  held 
that  if  it  is  necessary  in  the  reasonable  management  of  the 
property  involved,  to  construct  a  new  improvement,  a  local  as- 
sessmeuT  may  be  levied  ftir  such  new  improvement  even  if  some 
use  might  have  been  made  of  it  for  some  time  longer.  Thus  if  a 
street  has  been  paved  with  cedar  blocks  for  eight  years,  but  it 
has  become  necessary  to  take  up  such  pavement  and  lay  a  more 
durable  one,  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  for  a  new  pavement 
of  asphalt."  So  uneven  and  badly  worn  plank  sidewalks  may  be 
replaced  with  cement  sidewalks  twenty  feet  wide,  where  the  prop- 
erty is  a  very  valuable  one  and  is  in  an  excellent  business  and  resi- 
dence locality.'^  So  an  ordinance  which  provided  that  in  a  speci- 
fied district  in  St.  Louis  any  sidewalk,  which  becomes  out  of 
repair  shall  be  replaced  by  a  stone  pavement,  was  held  to  be 
valid  even  in  a  case  where  a  brick  sidewalk  was  in  bad  condi- 
tion, but  could  be  repaired  for  seven  dollars,  while  the  stone 
pavement  to  replace  it  Avould  cost  three  hundred  dollars.^  So  a 
macadamized  street  which  is  somewhat  worn  but  not  in  bad  con- 
dition, may  be  surfaced  with  asphalt  at  the  expense  of  the  ad- 
joining property."  The  property  owner  who  wishes  to  object  to 
the  construction  of  a  new  sidewalk  at  his  expense  on  the  ground 
that  the  old  sidewalk  is  in  good  condition  must  do  so  before  the 
new  sidewalk  is  constructed.^^  So  if  a  new  sewer  confers  a  bene- 
fit upon  realty,   such   realty   may  be   assessed   even   though   an 

'Seward   v.    Rheiner,   2    Kan.    App.  49    S.    W.    1026     [1898];     (reversing 

95.  43  Pae.  423    [18951.  Skinker  v.   Heman,   64  Mo.  App.  441 

"Regenstein  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  98  [1895]). 

Ga.    167,   25   S.   E.   428    [1896].  "Field    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving 

«Galt  V.   City  of  Chicago,   174   111.  Co.,  194  U.  S.  618,  48  L.  1142,  24  S. 

605,  51  N.  E.  653    [1898].  784     [1904];      (modifying     Field     v. 

^  City    of    Chicago    v     Wilson.    195  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  117  Fed. 

111.    19,   57   L.    R.    A.    127,   62   N.   E.  925   [1902]). 

843   [1902].  "Heman    v.    Ring,    85    Mo.    App. 

« Skinker   v.   Heman,    148   Mo.   349,  231    [1900]. 


591  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §§  389,  39J 

existing  se\A'er  furnished  satisfactory  drainage."  So  it  has  been 
held  to  be  within  tlie  discretion  of  village  trnstees  to  determine 
whether  an  old  culvert  sliould  be  removed  and  replaced  by  a 
new  one,  and  if  so  whether  it  was  practicable  to  make  use  of 
the  material  of  the  culvert.^-  Questions  of  this  sort  are  more 
often  discussed  in  considering  whether  the  contract  for  the  new 
improvement  operates  as  a  fraud  npon  the  property  owners,^^ 
or  whether  under  the  authoritj^  conferred  by  the  statute  the 
municipal  corporation  may  levy  such  assessment "  than  upon  con- 
stitutional grounds. 

§  389.     Nature  of  assessment  involved. 

The  questions  here  discussed  involve  the  very  nature  of  the 
assessment  for  benefits  and  of  the  power  of  the  legislature  with 
reference  thereto.  Under  the  true  theory  of  such  assessments^ 
it  would  seem  that  if  the  new  improvement  does  in  fact  confer 
a  benefit  upon  the  property  assessed  greater  than  that  conferred 
by  the  original  improvement  in  the  condition  in  which  it  was 
when  the  new  improvement  was  made,  an  assessment  should  be 
allowed,  if  the  legislature  authorizes  it,  for  the  difference  in 
amount  between  the  benefits  conferred  by  the  new  improvement 
and  the  benefits  so  conferred  by  the  original  improvement.  This 
amount  may  be  exacted  under  the  theory  of  assessments.  To 
exact  more  would  be  confiscation.-  The  reasons  which  have 
moved  the  courts  to  hold  such  assessments  either  valid  or  in- 
valid really  apply  to  the  determination  of  the  amount  of  such 
assessment  rather  than  to  its  inherent  validity. 

F._LOCATI()X  OF  DIPROVIilIMENT?;. 

S  390.     Location  of  improvement — Land  in  which  public  has  in- 
terest. 

Whether  the  general  imblic  or  the  adjoining  oi-  abutting  prop- 
erty owners  receive  any   bcnclit    from   a    given    iniin-ovement   de- 

"  I'ark     Ecclesiastical      Society      v.  ticnij    of    I'ciiiisylv  aula    cases.      ,Sce    § 

City     of      Hartford.      47      Conn.      «'•♦  :5S4. 

fl87rtl.      For  soniewliat   similar  facts  '-Sliannoii    v.    X'illajfc   of    Hinsdale, 

see;    In    the    Matter   of    the    Contract  ISO   111.  202.   'U   X.   K.    ISl    [1899]. 

for    the    Fiftli    Avenue   Sewer,    in    tlic  '•''See   §§   484-4S(i. 

City  of  Pittslnn-f,'.  4   Brewster    (Pa.)  "See   §§   462-4()4. 

364  [1870] :  a  case  which  seems  to  be  '  See  §   11. 

ont    <if    harmony     with     the    general  "See  §   118.  Cliajjter  XIII. 


§  391  t.\j5:ation  by  assessment.  592 

poids  not  only  upon  the  nature  of  the  improvement  itself,  but 
also  upon  the  ownership  of  the  property  upon  which  such  im- 
provement is  located.  If  the  improvement  is  constructed  upon 
land  in  which  the  municipal  corporation  or  other  public  corpora- 
tion has  either  a  fee  or  an  easement  of  such  a  character  that  it 
has  a  right  to  make  use  of  such  land  for  that  purpose,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  neither  the  general  public  nor  the  adjoining  or  abut- 
ing  property  owner  can  be  prevented  by  the  arbitrary  action 
of  any  third  person  from  making  use  of  such  improvement  ac- 
cording to  its  nature.  Accordingly,  if  the  improvement  is  of  such 
a  kind  that  local  assessments  could  be  levied  to  pay  for  the  cost 
of  its  construction,  its  location  upon  land  on  which  the  public 
has  an  interest  of  this  sort  assures  the  public  and  the  property 
owner  of  the  benefit  from  such  improvement  and  renders  the 
property  benefited  liable  to  assessment.^  As  long  as  the  interest 
of  the  public  corporation  is  of  such  a  character  as  to  enable  it 
and  the  adjoining  and  abutting  property  owners  to  make  use 
of  the  improvement  constructed,  it  makes  no  difference  what 
that  interest  is  or  how  it  is  acquired.-  Under  a  statute  providing 
that  on  appeal  no  question  of  fact  shall  be  tried  which  may 
arise  prior  to  the  making  of  contract  for  the  improvement,  the 
fact  that  the  third  person  claimed  title  to  the  ground  on  which 
such  improvement  was  constructed  cannot  be  interposed  as  a  de- 
fense.^ 

§  391.     Interest  acquired  by  eminent  domain. 

The  interest  of  the  public  in  the  land  upon  which  the  improve- 
ment is  located  may  be  acquired  by  eminent  domain.^  If  the  pro- 
ceedings in  eminent  domain  are  before  a  court  having  jurisdic- 
tion and  are  regular  in  form,  no  serious  question  can  arise  about 
the  right  to  assess  for  such  improvement  as  far  as  it  concerns 

1  Prescott  V.  City  of  Chicago,  60  ^  South  Chicago  City  Railway  Corn- 
Ill.  121  [1871];  Jackson  v.  Smith,  pany  v.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111.  490. 
120   Ind.   520,  22   N.   E.   431    [1889],  63  N.  E.   1046   [1902];   Gage  v.  City 

-Huelfield  v.   Covington,  —    (Ky.)  of    Chicago,    146    111.    499,    34    X.    E. 

,  60  S.  W.  296    [1901];   Bagg  v.  1034    [1893];    Carpenter    v.    City    of 

City  of  Detroit.  .5  Mich.  336   [1858]:  St.  Paul.  23  Minn.  232   [1876];   City 

State,   Parker,   Pros.   v.   Mayor,   etc..  of   St.   Louis   v.   Annex   Realty   Com- 

of    the    City   of   New    Brunswick.    30  pany,    175    Mo,    63,    74    S.    W.    961 

X.  J.  L.    (1  Vr.)    395   [1863].  [1903]. 

'•^icGill    V.    Bniner,    65    Ind.    421 
[1879]. 


593  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  392 

the  location  of  the  improvement.  If  the  proceedings  in  eminent 
domain  are  brought  before  a  court  having,  jurisdiction,  but  are 
irregular  or  erroneous,  the  judgment  rendered  in  such  a  proceeding 
is  valid  as  against  collateral  attack ;  and  it  is  a  form  of  collateral 
attack  to  set  up  irregularities  or  errors  in  the  original  proceed- 
ings in  eminent  domain  as  an  objection  to  levying  and  collecting 
assessments  for  such  improvement.  A  public  improvement  lo- 
cated on  land  acquired  by  such  a  proceeding  is  therefore  one  for 
Avhich  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied.-  If,  however,  by  a  direct 
attack  upon  an  irregular  or  erroneous  judgment  in  eminent  do- 
main the  judgment  has  been  set  aside  or  vacated,  the  fact  that 
such  judgment  has  been  so  set  aside  or  vacated  may  be  shown 
in  a  proceeding  to  levy  or  collect  an  assessment  and  will  consti- 
tute a  valid  objection  thereto.''  If  the  court  before  which  pro- 
ceedings in  eminent  domain  were  brought  had  no  jurisdiction,  its 
judgment  is  a  nullity  and  void,  and  this  fact  may  be  shown  by 
way  of  collateral  attack.  Accordingly,  if  a  public  improvement 
is  located  upon  land  in  which  the  public  corporation  has  not  ac- 
quired any  interest  other  than  by  this  means,  the  lack  of  juri.s- 
diction  may  be  shown  in  a  proceeding  to  levj'  and  collect  an  as- 
sessment for  such  improvement.* 

§  392.     Interest  acquired  in  other  ways. 

If  the  improvement  is  located  upon  property  which  has  been 
dedicated  to  the  public  use  for  a  purpose  which  includes  im- 
provements of  the  kind  in  question,  such  location  is  no  objec- 
tion to  the  validity   of  an   assessment  therefor.^     If  an   interest 

-  Bass   V.   People  ex  rel.   Raymond.  Meredith  v.  City  of  Perth  Amboy,  63 

203    111.   206,    67    X.    E.    806    [1903];  X.  J.  L.    (34  Vr.)    523,  44  Atl.    1101 

Royal    Insurance    Company   v.    South  [1890]. 

Park  Commissioners,  175  111.  491,  51  *  Brusli  v.  City  of  Detroit,  32  Mich. 

X.    E.    558    [1898];    Bass    v.    South  43  [  1875]  ;  Smith  v.  City  of  St.  Paul, 

Park  Commissioners,  171   111.  370.  49  69    Minn.   276,   72   X.   W.    104,   72   X. 

X.  E.  549   [1898];  Carpenter  v.  City  W.  210   [1897];   Leslie  v.  City  of  St. 

of   St.    Paul.    23   Minn.    232    [1876];  Louis,    47    Mo.    474     [1871];     State. 

City    of    St.    Louis   v.    Annex    Realty  Kerrigan,  Pros.  v.  Township  of  West 

Company.   175  Mo.  63.  74  S.  W.  961  Hohoken,    37    X\    J.  *L.    (8    Vr.)     77 

[1903];    :Merritt   v.   Village   of   Port  [1874];  See  Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago, 

Chester,  29  Hun.   (X.  Y.)   619  [1883].  146   111.  499,   34  X.  E.   1034    [1893]; 

'  Hennessy  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  44  for    effect    of    insudicient    description 

Minn.    306,    46    X.    W.    353    [1890];  of  realty  taken  in  eminent  domain. 

Butler  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of  ^  City    of    Seattle    v.    Kelleher,    195 

the    To\vn   of    Keyport,    64    X.    .L    L.  U.   S.  351.  25   S.  44    [1904];    City  of 

(35   Vr.)    181,   44   Atl.   849    [1899];  Meriden     v.     Camp.     46     Conn.     284 


^392 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


594 


either  in  fee  or  by  way  of  easement  has  been  conveyed  to  the 
public  corporation  by  deed,  a  public  improvement  locjited  on  land 
thus  conveyed  is  one  the  benefit  of  which  is  assured  both  to  the 
public  and  to  the  adjoining  and  abutting  property  owners  and 
an  assessment  may  be  levied  therefor.-  If  the  public  corporation 
has  acquired  an  interest  in  realty  by  prescription,  and  by  its 
adverse  user  has  acquired  a  right  to  construct  and  maintain  an 
improvement  of  the  kind  in  question,  a  local  assessment  may  be 
levied  for  such  an  improvement  located  on  land  in  which  an  in- 
terest has  been  acquired  by  this  means.^  If  the  owner  of  realty 
has  acted  in  such  way  that  he  is  estopped  to  deny  the  right  of 
the  public  to  construct  and  maintain  a  public  improvement  upon 
his  realty,  and  the  right  of  the  adjoining  or  abutting  owners 
to  make  proper  use  of  it,  a  case  exists  in  which  the  public 
and  the  adjoining  or  abutting  owners  cannot  be  deprived  of  the 
benefit  of  such  improvement,  and  accordingly  a  local  assess- 
ment may  be  levied  therefor.*  If  a  public  improvement  is 
constructed  on  land  which  the  owner  has  agreed  to  convey 
to  the  public  corporation  by  a  valid  and  subsisting  contract,  the 
corporation  may  compel  the  performance  of  such  contract,  and 
accordingly  the  benefits  to  the  public  and  to  the  adjoining  and 
abutting  property  holders  may  be  secured,  without  the  necessity 
of  any  other  or  further  consent  thereon  on  the  part  of  the  owner 
of  such  property.  Accordingly,  in  case  of  this  sort  a  local  assess- 
ment may  be  levied  for  such  improvement.^ 


[1878]  ;  Terrell  v.  Hart,  —  Ky.  . 

90  S.  W.  953,  28  Ky.  L.  R.  901 
[1906];  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand 
Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874];  Skrainka 
V.  Allen,  2  Mo.  App.  387  [1876]; 
State,  Felix,  Pros.  v.  City  Council  of 
Atlantic  City,  34  N.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  99 
[1869];  State,  Moran,  Pros.  v.  City 
of  Hudson,  34  N.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  25 
[1869]  ;  State  v.  Dean,  23  N.  J.  L.  (3 
Zab.)  335  [1852];  City  of  Toledo  for 
Use  of  Horan  v.  Barnes,  1  Ohio  N.  P. 
187  [1894];  Schenley  v.  Common- 
wealth for  the  Use  of  the  City  of  Al- 
legheny. 36  Pa.  St.  29,  78  Am.  Dec. 
359    [1859]. 

=  Leeds  v.  City  of  Richmond.  102 
Ind.  372,   1  K  E.  711    [1885]. 

°  Speir  V.  Town  of  New  Utrecht. 
121  N.  Y.  420,  94  N.  E.  692   [1890]; 


(modifying  Speir  v.  Town  of  New 
Utrecht,  49  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  294,  2  N. 
\.  S.  526   [1888]). 

*  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Borden. 
94  HI.  726  [1897];  City  of  St.  Louis 
to  the  Use  of  the  Saxton  National 
Bank  v.  Landis,  54  Mo.  App.  315 
[1893];  Hawver  v.  City  of  Omaha. 
52  Neb.  734,  73  N.  W.  217  [1897]; 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  New 
ark  V.  State,  Batten,  Pros.,  32  N. 
J.  L.  (3  Vr.)  453  [1865];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  McGown 
to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  18  Hun. 
(N.  Y.)  434  [1879];  Wilson  v.  City 
of  Cincinnati,  5  Ohio  N.  P.  68 
[1897]. 

^  Sears  v.  Street  Commissioners  of 
the  City  of  Boston,  180  Mass.  274. 
62  L.  R.  A.  144,  62  N.  E.  397  [1902]. 


595  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  393 

§  393.    Improvement  on  land  in  which  public  has  no  interest. 

A  different  situation  arises  where  a  public  improvement  is  con- 
structed upon  land  in  which  the  public  has  acquired  neither  the 
fee  nor  an  easement  nor  any  other  interest.  In  cases  of  this  sort 
it  is  evident  that  the  owner  of  the  land  may,  if  he  chooses,  exclude 
the  public  and  the  owners  of  adjoining  or  abutting  property  from 
any  use  of  such  improvement  unless  by  means  of  proceedings  in 
eminent  domain,  he  can  be  compelled  against  his  will  to  part  with, 
his  interest  in  such  property.  In  some  jurisdictions  at  least  we 
find  that  a  distinction  is  made  between  cases  in  which  the  public 
can  acquire  an  interest  by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain  insti- 
tuted after  the  public  improvement  is  constructed,  and  the  cases 
in  which  under  the  laws  in  force  the  public  has  no  opportunity  or 
power  to  secure  such  interest  by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain. 
If  an  interest  can  be  taken  against  the  will  of  the  owner  by  pro- 
ceedings in  eminent  domain,  it  is  said  in  some  jurisdictions  that 
the  benefit  of  the  public  and  of  the  adjoining  and  abutting  prop- 
erty owners  is  secured  fully,  since  the  owner  of  the  realty  on  which 
the  improvement  is  constructed  cannot  prevent  the  use  thereof, 
and  the  parties  interested  are  not  dependent  on  securing  his  con- 
sent to  such  use.^  In  the  earlier  Illinois  cases,  language  was  used 
implying  that  a  local  assessment  could  not  be  levied  unless  the 
public  had  ac(iuired  an  estate  or  ea.sement  in  the  property  on 
which  the  improvement  was  located  when  such  assessment  was 
levied ;  -  but  that  such  defense  could  not  be  made,  as  was  at- 
tempted in  this  case,  on  an  application  for  judgment  for  sale  of 

•People    ox    rel.    Raymond    v.    Tal-  Hyde    Park,    130    111.    l.")t;.    22    X.    E. 

madge,    194    III.    G7,    61    X.    E.    104!)  486     [1890];    Holmes    v.    Village    of 

[1901];    Payne    v.   Village   of    South  Hyde    Park,    121    HI.    128,    1.3    X.    E. 

Springfield,  "^161    111.    285,    44    X.    E.  540    [1889];    Village    of    Hyde   Park 

105    [1896];    Boynton    v.    People    ex  v.   Borden,   94   111.   26    [1879];    John- 

rel.  Kern,  159  111.  553,  42  X.  E.  842  son  v.  Duer,   115  Mo.   366,  21   S.  W. 

[1896];    Maywood    Co.    v.    Village   of  800;      State,     Vanderbeck,     Pros.     v. 

^laywood,  140  111.  216,  29  X.  E.  704  ^layor      and      Common     Council     of 

[1893];    Cochran   v.  Village   of  Park  .Jersey  City,  29  X.  J.  L.    (5  Dutch.) 

Ridge,    138    111.    29.5.    27    X.    K.    939  441     [1861]-.    .Moore    v.    City    of    Al- 

[1893];    Burhans   v.   Village   of    Nor-  bany.   98    X.    Y.    396    [1885];    People 

wood    Park,    138    111.    147,    27    X.    E.  etc.,  ex  rel.  Butts  v.  Common  Coun- 

1088    [1892]:    Goodwillie   v.    City   of  cil  of  the  City  of  Rochester,  5  Lans. 

Lake    View,    1.37    111.    51.    27    x".    E.  (X.   Y.)    142    [1871]. 

15    [1892];   Lehman  v.  City  of  Lake  ^  Lehmer   v.   People   ex    rel.   Miller, 

View,    131    111.    388,    23    N.    E.    346  80  111.  601    [1875]. 
[1890]:     Hunerberg     v.     Village     of 


§  393  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  596 

the  property  to  pa}^  such  assessment,  the  proper  place  to  make 
it  being  on  application  for  confirmation  of  such  assessment.^  This 
language  was  obiter  as  the  court  held  that  the  assessment  was 
valid  as  there  was  no  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  city  had 
not  acquired  such  interest  or  easement.  Accordingly  this  lan- 
guage was  disapproved  in  a  later  Illinois  case  •*  in  which  it  was  ex- 
pressly held  that  if  the  city  has  power  to  acquire  private  prop- 
erty for  public  use  it  is  not  necessary  that  this  power  should  be 
exercised  before  the  city  levies  a  local  assessment  to  pay  the 
expense  of  constructing  a  public  local  improvement  upon  such 
private  property.  This  case  also  expressly  disapproves  language 
in  a  case  decided  a  short  time  before,^  in  which  it  was  intimated 
that  failure  on  the  part  of  the  city  to  acquire  the  private  property 
might  be  a  defense  to  a  local  assessment.  A  statute  passed  in  1897 
provided ''  that  no  special  assessment  could  be  levied  for  a  local 
improvement  "until  the  land  necessary  therefor  shall  be  acquired 
and  in  possession  of  the  municipality."  It  has  been  held  under 
such  statute  that  if  the  municipality  has  not  acquired  such  land, 
the  objection  may  be  raised  on  application  to  confirm  the  judg- 
ment, but  that  it  is  too  late  to  make  it  upon  application  for 
judgment  of  sale,  since  it  restricts  the  power  of  the  city  in  levy- 
ing the  assessment  but  does  not  oust  the  county  court  of  its  juris- 
diction to  confirm."  The  presumption  is  that  the  city  is  n'ot  con- 
structing a  public  improvement  upon  private  property,  and  the 
burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  party  alleging  such  fact.^  It  has 
been  held  that  the  question  whether  land  which  it  is  sought  to 
condemn  is  already  a  highway  by  prescription  or  not,  is  not  a 
question  which  can  be  submitted  to  a  jury  in  eminent  domain  and 
assessment  proceedings  since  by  statute  the  only  questions  upon 
which  the  jury  is  to  pass  concern  compensation  and  benefits.^  In 
jurisdictions  which  take  this  view  there  is  some  divergence  of  judi- 
cial opinion  as  to  the  remedy  to  be  pursued  if  the  assessment  is 
levied  and  the  public  corporation  does  not  proceed  to  institute 

=^'See  §  918,  §  986  et  seq.  'People    ex    rel.    Raymond    v.    Tal- 

*  People    ex    rel.    Kochersperger    v.  madge,    194    HI.    07,    61    N.    E.    1049 

Sass,    171    111.    357,    49    K    E.    501  [1901]. 

[1898].  '^Cline    v.    People    ex    rel.    Barlow, 

^Boynton   v.   People,   ex   rel.   Kern,  224  111.  360,  79  N.  E.   663    [1906]. 

159   111.   553,   42   N.   E.   842    [1896].  ^  Tliomas   v.    City   of   Chicago,   204 

«§  53  of  such  act.  111.  611,  68  N.  E.  653   [1903]. 


i 


597  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  393 

proceedings  in  eminent  domain,  and  thereby  acqnire  an  interest  in 
such  realty.  It  has  been  suggested  that  proceedings  to  levy  and 
collect  such  assessment  might  be  enjoined  until  the  necessary  in- 
terest in  the  property  on  which  the  improvement  is  located  was  ac- 
quired by  eminent  domain. ^'^  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  the 
remedy  of  the  property  owner  against  whom  the  assessment  is 
levied  is  to  pay  his  assessment,  and  by  proceedings  in  mandamus 
to  compel  the  public  corporation  to  acquire  the  necessary  interest 
in  the  realty  on  which  such  improvement  is  located."  Further- 
more, it  has  been  held  that  if  the  public  corporation  agrees  to 
bring  proceedings  in  eminent  domain  and  thus  induces  the  owner 
of  the  property'  assessed  to  withdraw  his  objections  to  the  assess- 
ment and  to  allow  it  to  be  confirmed,  and  the  public  corporation 
subsequently  dismisses  all  proceedings  in  eminent  domain  and 
repeals  the  ordinance  Avhich  it  has  passed  for  the  appropriation 
of  such  realty,  the  confirmation  of  the  assessment  which  has  thus 
been  secured  must  be  set  aside. ^-  In  other  jurisdictions  the  rule 
is  laid  down,  often  in  general  terms,  that  a  local  assessment  can- 
not be  levied  for  a  public  improvement  upon  private  property.'"" 
In  some  of  these  cases  the  question  of  the  right  of  the  public  cor- 
poration to  bring  proceedings  in  eminent  domain,  and  thus  subse- 
quently to  acquire  the  necessary  interest  in  the  property  in  ques- 
tion, does  not  seem  to  be  considered. ^^  In  other  jurisdictions  the 
court  ^eem  to  take  the  view  that  the  property  owner  cannot  be 
assessed  while  he  is  dependent  ujion  the  future  action  of  the 
public  corporation  to  secure  for  him  by  proceedings  in  eminent 
domain  an  indisputable  right  to  the  benefit  of  such  improve- 
ments.^''    These   cases,   however,   are   affected   by   local   statutes 

•"Burlians    v.    Villago    of    Norwood  540,  97  X.  W.  425   [1903];   Miller  v. 

Park,    138    111.    147,    27    N.    E.    1088  Anheuser,  2  Mo.  App.   168   [1870]. 

[1892];    Holmes   v.   Village   of   Hyde  "  HoUiday   v.   City   of   Atlanta.   96 

Park,    121    111.    128,    13    X.    E.    540  Ga.  377,  23  S.  E.  406   [1895]. 

[1889 1    .  '=  Barker  v.  Board  of  Commission- 

"  People    ex    rel.    Kochersperger    v.  ers    of   Wyandotte    County,    45    Kan. 

Sass,     171     111.    357,    49    X.    E.    501  G81,    26    Pae.    585    [1891];    De    Gril- 

[1898];    Barnert   v.    Board   of   Alder-  leau    v.    Frawley,    48    La.    Ann.    184. 

men   of   the  City  of  Paterson,  69  X.  19  So.   151    [1896];   Mayor  and  City 

J.    L.     (40    Vr.)     122.    54    Atl.    227  Council    of    Baltimore   V.    Hook,    62 

[1903].  Md.   371    [1884];    Carroll    v.    City  of 

'=  Dempster  v.  City  of  Chicago,  175  St.   Louis,   4   Mo.    App.    191    [1877]; 

TU.  278,  51  X.  E.  7io  [1898].  Lorenz    v.    Armstrong.    3    :\Io.    App. 

"State  ex  rel.  McKune  v.  District  574;   City  of  Philadelphia  to  Use  v. 

Court   of   Ramsey   County,-  90   Minn.  Ball,    147    Pa.    St.    243,    23    Atl.    5G4 

[1892]. 


§  394  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  598 

which  in  effect  provide  for  the  improvement  of  ''public  roads," 
"public  streets,"  and  the  like,  and  thus  restrict  the  power  of  as- 
sessment to  improvements  on  property  in  which  the  public  has  al- 
ready acquired  an  interest.^"  This  objection  cannot,  however,  be 
interposed  on  appeal  where  by  statute  no  question  of  fact  may 
be  tried  which  may  arise  prior  to  the  making  of  the  contract.^' 
While  there  is  some  conflict  of  authority  as  to  the  power  to  levy 
assessments  where  the  improvement  is  situated  on  property  which 
at  the  time  is  private  property,  but  which  can  be  taken  by  pro- 
ceedings in  eminent  domain,  there  is  no  question  that  if  the  law 
gives  no  method  of  acquiring  an  interest  in  such  property  by 
eminent  domain  no  local  assessment  can  be  levied  for  such  im- 
provement, since  both  the  public  and  the '  adjoining  property 
owners  are  at  the  mercy  of  the  owner  of  the  realty  npon  which 
such  improvement  is  situated.  He  may  make  any  terms,  no  mat- 
ter how  hard,  for  his  assent  to  the  use  of  such  public  improve- 
ment, or  he  may  withhold  such  assent  altogether.  Accordingly, 
as  a  matter  of  law,  under  circumstances  like  this,  no  benefit  to 
the  general  public  or  to  the  abutting  property  owner  can  be  said 
to  exist. ^^ 

§  394.    Location  of  street — Land  acquired  by  eminent  domain. 

Under  the  general  principles  already  set  forth  ^  a  street  other- 
wise public  in  its  character,  cannot  be  treated  as  a  public  im- 
provement if  situated  on  private  property  in  which  the  public 
neither  has  an  easement  nor  can  acquire  one.  Such  an  improve- 
ment cannot  enure  to  the  benefit  of  the  general  public  since  the 
owner  of  the  private  property  may,  if  he  chooses,  prevent  them 
from   making  use  of  such  improvement;  nor  can  it  confer  any 

"See  §  455.  X.    Y.    105     [1877];     People    ex    rel. 

"McGill  V.  Bnmer,  G5  Ind.  421.  NMlliams    v.    Haines,    49    N.    Y.    587 

^Carpenter    v.    Board    of    County  [1872];    In  tlie   Matter  of  One  Hun- 

Coni'rs     of     Hennepin     County.     5G  dred  Twenty-Seventh  Street,  66  How. 

Minn.   513,   45   Am.   St.  Rep.   494,  58  (N.   Y.)    60    [1878];    The   New  York 

N.  W.  295    [1894];    State,  Kerrigan,  cases   above   cited   are   recognized    as 

Pros.  V.  Township  of  West  Hoboken.  correct     but     are     distinguished     in 

37   N.   J.   L.    (8   Vr.)    77    [1874];    In  Moore  v.   City   of   Albany,   98   N.   Y. 

the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Cheese-  396   [1885];   decided  under  a  statute 

brough,    to    Vacate    an    Assessment,  which     permitted     the     property     on 

78    N.    Y^.    232     [1879];     Olmsted    v.  which    the    public    improvement    was 

Dennis,    77    X.    Y.    378     [1879];     In  located    to    be    taken    by    subsequent 

the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Rhine-  procedings   in   eminent    domain. 

lander   to  Vacate  an   Assessment,   68  '  See  §§  390-393. 


599  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  394 

benefit  on  the  adjacent  property  for  like  reasons.  For  these  rea- 
sons no  local  assessment  can  be  levied  for  a  street  laid  out  on 
private  land,  over  which  the  general  public  and  the  adjoining 
property  owners  have  no  easement  and  cannot  acquire  one.  At 
the  same  time  if  the  public  and  the  adjoining  owner  are  given  a 
legal  right  as  against  the  owner  of  such  private  property  it 
makes  no  difference  as  affecting  the  validity  of  the  assessment 
how  such  right  is  acquired.-  If  proceedings  in  eminent  domain 
have  been  instituted  to  acquire  either  a  fee  or  an  easement  in 
such  property,  mere  irregularities  or  errors  in  such  proceedings 
will  not  affect  the  validity  of  an  assessment  for  such  street  im- 
provement if  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter  and 
the  parties.^  Such  an  objection  to  the  validity  of  the  assessment 
is  a  collateral  attack  upon  the  judgment  in  eminent  domain  and 
cannot  be  permitted.  Thus  in  a  proceeding  involving  the  valid- 
ity of  the  assessment  the  judgment  in  eminent  domain  cannot 
be  attacked  on  the  ground  that  the  certificate  of  pul)lication  of  the 
notice  was  defective  in  failing  to  state  the  last  day  of  its  inser- 
tion,* or  on  the  ground  that  the  judgment  did  not  assess  any 
benefits  to  the  public  against  the  city,°  or  on  the  ground  that  in 
the  condemnation  proceedings  the  realty  was  not  described  Avith 
sufficient  accuracy  "  since  such  irregularities  do  not  affect  the 
validity  of  the  judgment.  So  the  fact  that  a  land-owner  entitled 
to  damages  in  a  condemnation  proceeding  has  not  been  paid  the 
amount  of  such  damages  does  not  invalidate  an  assessment  levied 
for  the  improvement  of  such  realty,'  at  least  as  long  as  the  fail- 

=  Jackson   v.    Smitli.    120    Tml.    520,  '  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Annex  Realt.y 

22  N.  E.  4.'51    [18891.  Company,    175  ^Mo.   08.  74  S.  W.  901 

3  South  Chicago  City  Railway  Com-  |1!)0:51. 

pany    v.    City    of    Chicago,     190    111.  "Cage  v.   City  of  Chicago.    140   111. 

490,"   03    111.  '  1046     [19021;     Cage    v.  499.    34    X.    E.    1034    [1893]. 

City  of  Chicago,   140   111.  499,  34  N.  '  Boynton   v.   People   ex   rel.   Kern. 

E.   1034    [1893];    Prescott  v.   City   of  159    111.    553,    42   N.    E.    842    [1896]; 

Chicago,  60  111.  121   [1871];   Carpen-  Louisville   Steam   Forge   Co.   v.   Meh- 

ter    V.    City    of    St.    Paul.    23    Minn.  ler,   112  Ky.  438.  04  S.  W.  390,  052. 

232     [1876];     City    of    St.    Louis    v.  23   Ky.   L.   R.    1335    |  1901]  ;    Barfield 

Annex  Realty  Com])any,   175   Mo.  03.  v.    Cleason.    Ill    Ky.    491,    63    S.    W. 

74    S.    W.    961     [1903];    Michael    v.  9iil.   23    Ky.    L.    R.    128    [1901];    :\[(- 

City   of   St.   Louis,    112   Mo.    010,    20  Chiiddy    v.    Smith.    07    Mo.    App.    205 

S.    W.    006    [18921;    INlerritt    v.    Vil-  [1890];    City    of    Springfield    to    the 

lage    of    Port    Chester,    29    Ilmi.     (X.  '  I'se  of  Tuttle  v.  Baker,  5()  Mo.  A])]). 

Y.)    619    [1883].  637    [1894];    See    also    as    presenting 

*  Prescott    V.    Ciiv    nf    Cliifago.    00  sonn-what  similar  facts,  though  prob- 

111.    121    [1871].  "I'l.v    tlicre    was    no    encroachment   on 


394 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


600 


ure  to  pay  such  damages  does  not  prevent  the  city  from  acquir- 
ing the  property  condemned  or  an  easement  therein.  A  different 
question  is  presented  when  a  party  to  the  proceeding  in  eminent 
domain  has,  by  proceding  in  error,  appeal  or  certiorari  in  the 
nature  of  a  direct  attack  upon  the  judgment,  succeeded  in  having 
such  judgment  reversed,  set  aside  or  vacated.  Under  such  circum- 
stances the  original  judgment  is  of  no  validity  whatever.  Indeed 
to  claim  it  as  still  valid  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  collateral 
attack  upon  the  judgment  of  the  reviewing  court.  Accordingly 
in  such  cases  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for  such  street  im- 
provement.* Under  such  circumstances  a  property  owner  who 
has  not  attacked  the  judgment  whereby  land  was  taken  may  take 
advantage  of  the  fact  that  another  property  owner  whose  land 
is  taken  by  such  judgment  has  defeated  such  proceeding  by  prose- 
cuting certiorari.^  If  an  appeal  from  the  judgment  in  eminent  do- 
main has  been  taken  and  the  city  has  no  right  to  enter  the  realty 
condemned  by  the  judgment  appealed  from,  it  cannot  levy  an 
assessment  for  such  an  improvement  without  giving  such  bond.^" 
If,  however,  there  is  a  jurisdictional  defect  in  the  proceedings  in 
eminent  domain,  the  property  owner  whose  land  it  is  sought  to 
take  by  such  proceedings  is  not  bound  thereby  and  may  insist  on 
his  rights  in  such  land  notwithstanding  such  judgment.  Accord- 
ingly the  public  has  acquired  no  interest  in  this  realty  by  the  pro- 
ceedings in  eminent  domain ;  nor  have  the  adjoining  property 
owners,  as  a  result  of  such  proceedings,  acquired  any  new  right 
of  access  to  their  property.  Under  these  circumstances  therefore  no 
local  assessment  can  be  levied  for  such  a  street  improvement,^^ 


private    property,    City   of   Indianap- 
olis V.  Gilmore,'  30  Ind.  414    [1868]. 

*  Butler  V.  Board  of  Commission- 
ers of  the  Town  of  Keyport,  64  N. 
J.  L.  (35  Vr.)  181,  44  Atl.  849 
[1899];  Meredith  v.  City  of  Perth 
Amboy,  63  X.  J.  L.  (34  Vr.)  523. 
44  Atl.   1101    [1899]. 

*  Butler  V.  Board  of  Commission- 
ers of  the  Town  of  Keyport,  64  X. 
J.  L.  (35  Vr.)  181.  44  Atl.  849 
[1899]. 

^"Hennessy  v.  City  of  St.  Paul, 
44  Minn.  306,  46  X.  W.  353    [1890]. 

"Brush  V.  City  of  Detroit.  32 
Mich.  43  [1875]; '  Smith  v.  City  of 
St.   Paul,    69   Minn.   276,    72    N."  W. 


104,  210  [1897];  Leslie  v.  City  of 
St.  Louis,  47  Mo.  474  [1871];  Long- 
well  V.  Kansas  City,  69  Mo.  App. 
177  [1896];  State,  "^ Kerrigan,  Pros. 
V.  Township  of  West  Hoboken,  37 
X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  77  [1874];  State. 
Grant,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  Xewark,  28  N.  J.  L.  (4 
Dutch.)  491  [I860];  Carron  v.  Mar- 
tin, 26  X\  J.  L.  (2  Dutch.)  594,  69 
Am.  Dec.  584  [1857];  (reversing 
:\Iartin  v.  Carron.  26  X.  J.  L.  (2 
Dutch.)  228  [1857]);  Astor  v.  May- 
or, Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of  the 
City  of  Xew  York,  37  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
539    [1874]. 

"If  the  condemnation  judgment  is 


601 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE    LEVIED. 


394 


except  in  jurisdictions  in  which  assessments  may  be  levied  for  im- 
provements on  private  property.^-  Thus  if  the  real  owner  of  the 
land  sought  to  be  taken  in  eminent  domain  is  not  made  a  party  to 
the  proceeding,"  or  is  not  properly  notified/*  or  if  some  jurisdic- 
tional condition  precedent  such  as  an  attempt  to  agree  with  the 
property  owner  as  to  the  terms  of  purchase  before  instituting  pro- 
ceedings in  eminent  domain/"*  or  a  petition  in  writing  by  three- 
fourths  of  the  owners  of  land  lying  on  the  road  or  street  to  be 
opened  ^'^  is  omitted,  the  owner  of  realty  against  which  an  assess- 
ment is  sought  to  be  levied  may  resist  such  lev}^  So  if  the  statute 
in  force  has  taken  from  the  council  the  power  to  lay  out  streets, 
and  subsequently  the  council  does  lay  out  a  street,  a  property 
owner  may  resist  an  assessment  to  pay  for  the  land  so  taken. ^^ 
However  it  has  been  held  that  the  omission  to  make  a  mortgagee 
a  party  to  a  proceeding  to  condemn  land  for  street  purposes  does 
not  deprive  the  court  of  jurisdiction  in  eminent  domain,  if  there  is 
enough  land  left  to  satisfy  the  mortgage,  and  the  city  actually 
takes  possession  of  the  street  as  condemned.  Under  such  special 
circumstances,  therefore,  a  property  owner  cannot  take  advantage 
of  such  defect  in  the  proceedings  in  eminent  domain. ^^     In  an- 


entered  without  jurisdiction  it  may 
be  collaterally  attacked  in  the  pro- 
ceeding to  confirm  the  special  assess- 
ment." r?ass  V.  The  People  ex  rel. 
Raymond,  203  III.  206,  208,  67  X. 
£.806  [19031;  (citing  Dickey  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  152  III.  468,  38  K. 
E.  932  [18941;  Ayer  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 149  III.  262,  37  X.  E.  57;  Good- 
willie  V.  City  of  Lake  View,  137  111. 
51,   27   X.   E.    15    [18921). 

However  in  the  case  of  Dasliioll  v. 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more, use  of  Hax,  45  ^Id.  615 
[1876];  the  property  owner  who 
was  resisting  an  assessment  objected 
to  the  introduction  in  evidence  of  the 
record  of  proceedings  for  the  open- 
ing and  condemnntiim  of  that  part 
of  the  street  in  qucstinn.  on  the 
ground  that  the  record  did  not  show 
on  its  face  that  sixty  days  notice 
of  the  application  for  the  condemna- 
tion oj'dinance  had  been  given  and 
that  no  evidence  of  such  notice  was 
given.     The  court  held  that  such  no- 


tice was  essential  to  the  validity  of 
the  condemnation  ordinance,  raised 
but  did  not  decide  the  question 
whether  such  invalidity  would  be  a 
defense  to  the  assessment,  and  held 
that  if  it  were  a  defense  the  burden 
was  on  the  party  resisting  the  as- 
sessment to  show  that  such  notice 
was  not  given. 

'"feee   §    393. 

'•^Smitll  V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  69 
-Minn.  276.  72  X.  W.  104,  210  [18971. 

''Brusli  V.  City  of  Detroit,  32 
Midi.  43  [1875]. 

'=  Leslie  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  47 
Mo.  474  [1871]. 

'"Carron  v.  Martin,  26  X.  J.  L. 
(2  Dutch.)  594,  69  Am.  Dec.  594 
[1857]:  (reversing  ^Martin  v.  Car- 
ron.  26  X.  J.  L.  (2  Dutch.)  228 
[18571). 

"  State,  Grant.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Xewark,  28  X. 
J.  L.    (4  Dutch.)    491    [1860]. 

"Smith  V.  City  of  Detroit.  120 
Mich.  572,  79  X.  W.  808   [1899]. 


§  395  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  602 

other  jurisdiction  it  has  been  said  that  a  mortgagee  is  not  a  nec- 
essary party  in  proceedings  to  condemn  land  for  a  street/'' 

Not  aflfeeting  the  principle  in  question  but  limiting  its  applica- 
tion is  the  rule  Avhich  is  subsequently  discussed  at  length  -''  that 
if  an  opportunity  is  afforded  at  a  certain  stage  of  assessment  pro- 
ceedings, such  as  confirmation,  to  interpose  a  certain  defense,  a 
failure  to  interpose  a  given  defense  at  such  stage  operates  as  a 
waiver  thereof.  If  a  judgment  of  confirmation  is  entered  by  a 
court  of  competent  jurisdiction  it  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally 
thereafter.-^  Accordingly  in  such  jurisdictions  it  has  been  held 
that  a  judgment  of  confirmation  which  is  not  attacked  directly 
will  preclude  the  parties  on  whose  property  such  assessment  has 
been  levied  from  subsequently  interposing  as  a  defense  the  fact 
that  the  court  which  rendered  the  judgment  in  eminent  doma'in 
was  without  jurisdiction.--  So  if  a  mortgage  lien  upon  property 
taken  for  a  street  is  not  satisfied,  it  may  be  possible  to  interpose 
the  existence  of  such  lien  to  prevent  confirmation  of  the  assess- 
ment and  entry  of  judgment,  but  if  such  objection  is  not  made 
then  it  is  waived.-'"  If  the  ordinance  authorizing  condemnation  is 
to  take  effect  only  in  case  certain  realty  is  dedicated  by  the  owner 
no  proceedings  can  be  had  under  such  ordinance  unless  such 
dedication  is  made.-* 

§  395.    Location  of  street  on  land  acquired  in  other  manner. 

If  the  street  has  been  dedicated  by  the  prior  owner  of  such 
realty,  so  that  the  public  has  acquired  either  the  fee  thereof  or  an 
easement  therein,  an  assessment  for  the  improvement  of  such 
street  may  of  course  be  levied.^    Dedication  after  suit  was  brought 

'"  ISchumaker  v.  Toberman,   .56   <-'al.        [1878];  Terrell  v.  Hart,  —  Ky.  . 

508    [1880].  00    S.    W.    953.    28    Ky.    L.    R.    901 

^^See  §  910  ct  scq.,  §  986  ct  seq.  [1906];     Siebert    v.    Allen,    61    Mo. 

-"^  See  §  910  ei  seg.'  482     [1876];     Skrainka    v.    Allen,    2 

-Bass  V.  People  ex  rel.  Eaymond,  Mo.    App.    387    [1876];    State.   Pros. 

203   111.   206,   67   N.   E.   806    [1903]:  v.    City    Council    of    Atlantic    City, 

People  ex  rel.  Raymond  V.  Talmadge.  34    X.    J.    L.     (5    Vr.)     99     [1869]; 

194  111.   67,  61   N.  E.   1049    [1901].  State,  Moran,   Pros.   v.   City  of  Hud- 

^^Morey    v.     City    of     Dulutli.     75  son.  34  X.  J.  L.    (5  Vr.)    2*5   [1869] : 

INIinn.    221,   77    X.   W.    829    [1899].  Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  Xew- 

"' City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Cruikshank,  ark  v.  State.  Batten,  Pros.,  32  N.  J. 

16  Mo.'^App.  495   [1885].  L.     (3     \r.)     453     [ISeS];     State    v. 

^City    of    Seattle    v.    Kelleher.    195  Dean.    23    X.    J.    L.     (3    Zab.)     335 

IT.  S.  351,  25  S.  44   [1904];   City  of  11852];    Neff  v.   Bates,  25  O.  S.   169 

Meriden     v.     Camp,     46     Conn.     284  11874]:    Schenley    v.    CommonweaUli 


603  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  395 

on  the  assessment  and  before  trial  has  been  held  sufficient.-  The 
property  owners  who  have  dedicated  such  street  are  not  thereby 
relieved  from  assessment  on  property  retained  by  them.''"  If  land 
properly  dedicated  as  a  street  has  been  vacated  without  authority 
of  the  law,  an  assessment  subsequently  levied  for  improving  the 
street  so  vacated  is  not  invalid  by  reason  of  such  vacation.  Thus 
where  surveyors  of  highways  have  no  authority  to  vacate  streets.* 
tliey  attempted  to  vacate  a  street.  Subsequently  an  assessment 
was  levied  for  improving  such  street;  and  it  was  held  that  the 
assessment  was  not  void  by  reason  of  the  attempted  vacation  of 
the  street."'  If  a  street  is  not  dedicated  when  the  original  assess- 
ment is  levied,  but  it  is  dedicated  subsequently  and  a  re-assess- 
ment is  levied,  such  re-assessment  may  be  valid."  If  the  street 
has  been  acquired  by  the  public  by  purchase,  so  that  the  public 
has  either  a  fee  or  an  easement  therein,  an  assessment  for  the  im- 
provement of  such  street  may  be  levied.  It  is  not  necessary  that 
a  formal  conveyance  should  have  been  made  to  the  city  passing 
the  legal  t^tle  to  the  property  to  be  used  as  a  street.  If  a  valid 
and  subsisting  contract  has  been  entered  into  between  the  city 
and  the  owner  of  the  property  to  be  used  as  a  str(!et,  whereby  the 
owner  of  such  property  agrees  to  convey  it  to  the  city  for  such 
use,  an  assessment  for  a  street  improvement  constructed  upon  .such 
land  before  such  conveyance  has  been  made  is  held  to  be  invalid.^ 
The  form  which  such  purchase  assumes  is  not  material  as  long  as 
either  fee  or  easement  passes  to  the  public.  Thus  by  a  statute 
passed  in  1857  the  power  of  laying  out  pul)]ic  greets  in  the  City 
of  Newark,  New  Jersey,  was  taken  from  the  common  council  and 
vested  in  a  board  of  commissioners.  Under  such  statute  an  ordi- 
nance laying  out  a  new  street  passed  by  the  mayor  and  council 

for  the  U.se  of  the  City  of  Alleshony.  '  Holmes   v.    Jersey    City.    12    X.    .T. 

3(>  Pa.  St.  (12  Casey)  29.  78  Am.  Dc".  Kf|.    (1    Hcas. )    299." 

350   flSSOl.  'Mayor    and    Common    Council    of 

■City    of    'i'olodo    for    the    Use    of  .Tersey  C'ity  v.  State,  Howeth,   Pros.. 

IForan     v.     Barnes,     1     Ohio     X.     P.  .'JO   X.  J.   L.    (1    Vr.)    .521    [186.3]. 

187      [1894];     rontrn     Spauldint:     v.  "City  of  Toledo  v.   Barnes,    1   Ohio 

Wesson.    11.5    Cal.    441.    47    Pac.    249  X.   P.    187. 

[189fil.  'Sears  v.   Street   Commissioners  of 

'State.     .Moran.     Pros.    v.    City    ot  the    City    of    Boston,    180    Mass.    274, 

Hudson.    .34     N.    .T.     L.     (5     Vr.i     25  (-,2     L.     R.     A.     144,     62    N.     E.    397 

n8()9]:    State    v.    Dean.   23    X.    J.    L.  |  1902]. 
{3  Zab.)   335   [1852J. 


§  395  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  604 

after  such  statute  took  effect  was  void.*  It  appeared,  however, 
in  another  case  based  on  a  similar  ordinance  that  the  owners  of 
such  realty  had  agreed  to  transfer  it  to  the  city  for  use  as  a 
street,  and  that  such  ordinance  was  passed  in  performance  of  such 
agreement.  It  Avas  held,  accordingly,  that  an  assessment  for  the 
improvement  of  such  street  was  valid."  If  the  public  has  ac- 
quired an  easement  in  realty  by  prescription,  it  has  a  right  to 
make  such  use  of  the  property  which  it  has  thus  acquired  without 
the  consent  of  the  property  owner.  Accordingly  an  assessment 
may  be  levied  for  improving  a  street  upon  land  in  which  the 
public  has  acquired  an  easement  for  use  as  a  street  by  prescrip- 
tion.^" If  the  owner  of  property  taken  for  a  street  has  by  his 
conduct  estopped  himself  from  denying  that  it  is  a  public  street, 
owners  of  property  assessed  for  the  improvement  of  such  street 
cannot  resist  assessments  on  the  ground  that  such  land  had  not 
been  acquired  as  a  street,  since  by  the  force  of  the  estoppel  both 
the  public  and  the  ad.joining  land-owners  will  receive  as  much 
benefit  from  the  street  as  though  such  land  had  been  acquired 
regularly.^ ^  Thus  A.  attempted  to  dedicate  certain  land  as  a 
public  street.  Subsequently  B.,  who  succeeded  A.  in  interest,  al- 
lowed the  village  to  improve  such  street  under  a  contract  by  which 
the  contractor  agreed  to  receive  the  assessments  in  full  satis- 
faction, the  village  to  be  under  no  liability  whatever  B.  knew 
that  the  improvement  was  to  be  paid  for  by  such  assessments.  It 
was  held  that  B.  was  estopped  from  resisting  payment  of  such 
assessments  to  the. contractor  on  the  ground  that  the  land  taken 
for  a  street  was  not  legally  dedicated.^-  So  A. 's  land  was  taken 
for  a  street  hy  proceedings  in  eminent  domain.  Subsequently  A. 
brought  suit  against  the  city  to  recover  the  value  of  the  land  thus 
taken  on  the  ground  that  the  prior  proceedings  in  eminent  domain 
were  void   for  want   of  jurisdiction.    A.   recovered  judgment    in 

^  State,  Grant,  Pros.  v.  ]Mayor  and  "  Grimm  v.  Shickle,  4  Mo.  App.  585 

Common    Council   of   NevA^ark,   28   N.  (appendix)  ;      Hawver     v.      City     of 

J.  L.    (4  Dutch.)    491    [I860].  Omaha,   52  Neb.   734,   73  N.   W.   217 

*Mavo:     and    Common    Council    of  [1897];   Neff  v.  Bates,  25   0.  S.   169 

Newark    v.    State,    Batten,   Pros.,    32  [1874];      Darlington      v.      Common- 

X.  J.  L.    (3  Vr.)   453   [1865].  wealth  for  the  Use  of  the  City  of  Al- 

'"Speir    V.    Town    of   'Sew    Utrecht,  legheny,    41    Pa.    St.    (5    Wright)    68 

121  X.  Y.  420,  24  X.  E.  692  [1890];  [1861]. 

(modifyins:    Speir    v.    Town    of    Xew  '- Xeff     v.     Bates,     25     0.     S.     169 

Utrecht.   49  Hun.    (X.  Y.)    294.  2  X.  [1874]. 
Y.  S.  426    [1888]). 


605  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE    LEVIED.  §  396 

such  suit.  Subsequently  an  assessment  for  improving  such  street 
was  levied  upon  A. 's  abutting  property.  It  was  held  that  A.,  by 
his  election  to  recover  the  value  of  the  land  taken  for  use  as  a 
street,  was  estopped  from  denying  the  right  of  the  city  to  such 
easement,  and  that  A.  could  not,  therefore,  resist  such  assessment 
on  the  ground  that  the  proceedings  in  eminent  domain  were  void.^^ 
So  deeds  given  by  the  property  owner  resisting  the  assessment, 
whereby  he  conveyed  other  realty  on  the  street  in  question,  in 
which  deeds  he  recognized  the  existence  of  such  street,  may  be 
considered  as  bearing  on  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  such  street.^* 
So  owners  of  property  which  abuts  on  a  strip  of  land  which  has 
for  years  been  used  by  the  property  owners  and  the  city  as  a  street, 
cannot  resist  assessments  for  improving  such  street  on  the  ground 
that  the  city  has  no  title  thereto. ^^ 

§  396.    Location  of  street  on  land  in  which  public  has  no  interest. 

If  a  municipal  corporation  attempts  to  construct  a  street  on 
realty  in  which  it  has  neither  the  fee  nor  the  easement,  the  ques- 
tion of  the  validity  of  an  assessment  for  such  an  improvement  is 
one  upon  some  phases  of  which  there  is  a  conflict  of  authority. 
Without  considering  the  effect  of  future  acquisition,  by  proceed- 
ings in  eminent  domain,  of  the  right  to  make  use  of  such  land  for 
a  street,  it  may  be  said  that  the  general  rule,  supported  by  the 
great  weight  of  authority  is  that  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied 
for  a  street  improvement  to  be  constructed  on  land  in  which  the 
public  has  neither  the  fee  or  the  easement.^    This  principle  is  rec- 

I'Hawver    v.    City    of    Omaha,    52  S.    W.    C58    [190G];    De    Grilleau    v. 

Neb.   734,   73   N.   W.   217    [1897].  Frawley,    48    La.    Ann.    184,    19    So. 

"Darlington  v.  Commonwealth  for  151   [1896];  Philbrook  v.  Inliabitants 

the  Use  of  the  City  of  Allegheny,  41  of   the   County  of   Kennebec,    17   Me. 

Pa.   St.    (5   Wright)    68    [1861].  196   [1840];  Mayor  and  City  Council 

"Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2  of    Baltimore    v.    Hook,    62    Md.    371 

S.  D.   640,   39   Am.   St.  Rep.   802.   51  [1884];    Morse   v.   Stocker,   83   Mass. 

N.  W.  770    [1892].  (1   All.)    150   [1861];    People  on  the 

*  Spaulding    v.    Wesson,     115     Cal.  Relation   of   Butler   v.   Board   of   Su- 

441,    47    Pac.    249    [1896];    Cook    v.  pervisors     of     Saginaw     County,     26 

Sudden,    94    Cal.    443,    29    Pae.    949  Mich.    22    [1872];    Coates    v.    Camp- 

[1892];     Spaulding     v.     Bradley.     79  bell,    37    Minn.    498,    35    N.    W.    366; 

Cal.  449,  22  Pac.  47    [1889];    Pacific  Carroll   v.   City   of   St.  Louis,   4   Mo. 

Bridge  Co.  v.   Kirkham.   54  Cal.  558  App.    191     [1877];    Lorenz    v.    Arm- 

[1880];  Snyder  v.  Foster,  77  la.  638,  strong,  3  Mo.  App.  574    (appendix); 

42  X.  W.   506;    Dulaney  v.   Fi-rg.   —  Speir   v.   Town   of  New  TTtrecht,    121 

Ky.  ,   29   Ky.   Law' Rop.   678,   94  X.    V.    420,    24    X.    E.    692    [1890]; 


§  396  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  606 

ognized  even  where  the  ({uestion  is  not  properly  presented,  and  the 
defense  is  therefore  ineffectual.-  Occasionally,  however,  we  find 
it  held  that  no  owner  except  the  true  owner  can  resist  an  assess- 
ment on  the  ground  that  the  land  on  which  the  street  is  located 
is  private  property.^  The  difficult  questions  that  are  presented  in 
this  connection  are  those  arising  out  of  the  possibility  of  the 
public's  acquiring  by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain  after  the 
levy  of  an  assessment,  an  interest  in  the  land  on  which  the  street 
in  question  has  been  constructed.  According  to  some  authorities 
an  assessment  in  such  cases  is  invalid  even  if  it  might  be  possible 
to  secure  a  fee  or  easement  in  such  realty  by  subsequent  proceed- 
ings in  eminent  domain.'*  This  holding  is  based  on  the  theory  that 
the  adjoining  property  owner  receives  no  real  and  present  bene- 
fit from  such  improvement ;  but  that  there  is  at  best  a  mere  pos- 
sibility that  he  may  at  some  time  in  the  future  receive  a 
benefit  if  the  municipal  corporation  proceeds  to  attempt  to  appro- 
priate the  property  by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain,  and  if  it  is 
successful  in  such  attempt.  In  other  cases  the  same  result  is 
reached  where  the  statute  or  ordinance  under  which  the  assess- 
ment is  made  provides  that  the  street  shall  be  first  dedicated  or 
properly  opened.^  So  an  assessment  for  improving  a  private  al- 
ley in  which  only  the  abutting  property  owners  had  easements 
was  held  to  be  invalid  under  a  statute  providing  for  levjnng  an 
assessment  for  the  improvement  of  a  "street  or  part  thereof" 
since  such  alley  was  not  a  street  Avithin  the  meaning  of  the 
statute."  In  such  case  there  is  no  legislative  authority  for  the  ordi- 
nance  and  the  question  of  power  to  authorize  is  not  involved. 

(modifying    Speir    v.    Town    of    New  Council    of    Baltimore    v.    Hook,    62 

Utrecht,  49  Hun.    (N.  Y.)    294,  2  N.  Md.    371    [1SS4];    Carroll    v.    City   of 

Y.    S.    426    [1888]);    Western    Penn-  «t.   Louis,   4   Mo.   App.    191    11877J; 

sylvania    Railway    Company    v.    City  Lorenz    v.    Armstrong,    3    Mo.    App. 

of    Allegheny,    92    Pa.    St.     (11    Nor-  574    (appendix);    State,  Grant,  Pros, 

ris)    100    [1879].  v.    Mayor    and    Common    Council    of 

'Moberry  v.   City  of  Jeffersonville.  Newark,    28    N.    J.    L.     (4    Dutch.) 

38   Ind.    198    [1871].  491     [I860];     McKeesport    lioro.,    to 

'Beck    V.    Holland,    29    Mont.    234.  Use    of    McKeesport    City    v.    Busch, 

74  Pac.  410    [1903].  166  Pa.  St.  46,  31   Atl.  49   [1895]. 

*Diggins    V.    Hartshorne.    108    Cal.  ^  City    of    Philadelphia    to    Use    v. 

154,   41    Pac.   283    [1895];    Spaulding  Ball,    147    Pa.    St.    243,    23    Atl.    564 

V.   Bradley.   79   Cal.   449,   22   Pac.   47  [1892]. 

[1889];   Bodley  v.  Finley's  Exr..   Ill  "  De    Grilleau    v.    Frawley,    48    La. 

Ky.    618,    64    S.    VY.    439,    23    Ky.    L.  Ann.   184.   19  So.   151    [1896]. 
Ren.    851     [1901];    Mayor    and    City 


4 


607  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  396 

Even  in  jurisdictions  holding  that  such  an  assessment  cannot  be 
levied,  it  is  held  that  a  property  owner  who  has  paid  assessments 
for  the  improvement  of  such  a  street  may,  under  some  circum- 
stances, compel  the  municipal  corporation  to  bring  proceedings 
to  condemn  such  realty  for  public  use  as  a  street.  Thus  a  street 
was  opened  by  virtue  of  a  statute  which  required  an  assessment 
of  damages  and  benefits  to  property  along  the  line  of  the  street  to 
be  opened.  No  assessment  of  either  damages  or  benefits  was  made 
against  a  tract  of  land  owned  by  a  railroad  which  such  street 
crossed.  A.,  an  abutting  property  owner  paid  an  assessment  for 
opening  such  street,  and  subsequently  paid  another  assessment 
for  grading,  curbing  and  guttering  such  street.  Later,  on  learn- 
ing that  no  assessment  had  been  made  for  damages  or  benefits 
against  such  tract  belonging  to  the  railroad  company  A.  applied 
to  the  board  of  aldermen  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  open  such 
street.  An  ordinance  for  that  purpose  was  introduced  but  failed 
to  pass.  A.  then  applied  for  a  writ  of  mandamus  to  compel  the 
municipal  corporation  to  open  such  street.  The  court  held  that 
the  objection  that  the  discretion  of  the  board  of  aldermen  could 
not  be  controlled  by  mandamns  was  a  formida])le  one,  but  that 
it  might  not  be  fatal,  and  that  as  the  question  .should  be  put  in 
form  to  permit  of  a  decision  in  the  court  of  last  resort,  an  alter- 
native writ  of  mandamus  should  be  awarded.'^  In  jurisdictions 
which  take  a  similar  view  of  the  rights  of  the  owner  of  realty 
which  has  been  assessed  to  pay  for  improving  a  street  in  which 
the  public  has  neither  a  fee  nor  an  easement  it  has  l)een  held 
that  under  such  circumstances  the  fact  that  the  owner  of  the 
realty  on  which  the  street  is  situated  has  dedicated  it  to  the 
public  after  the  assessment  is  levied  does  not  make  such  as.ses.s- 
ment  valid.''  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  if  the  munici- 
pal corporation  has  power  to  appropriate  the  land  on  which  the 
street  is  constructed  by  subsequent  proceedings  in  eminent  do- 
main, an  assessment  for  a  street  improvement  is  valid  though  the 
public  has  neither  a  fee  nor  an  easement  in  the  land  on  which 
such  street  is  situated."     Thus,  where  a  street  embankment  was 


'  Barnert  v.  Board  of  Aldormen  of  of   Toledo   for   the   Use   of   Horan   v. 

the    City   of    Paterson,    09    X.    J.    L.  Uarnes,  1  Ohio  N.  P.  187  [1894]. 

(40  Vr.)    122,  54  Atl.  227    [1903].  "Allen  v.  City  of  Chicairo.   176  111. 

«Spauldin2    v.     Wesson,     115     Cal.  113.   .52  N.   E.   33    [18981:    Royal   In- 

44L  47  Pac.  249   [1890];  cnnirn  City  siirance     Comjiany     v.     Sniitli     Park 


396 


TAXxVTION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


608 


sloped  so  as  to  extend  over  upon  private  ground,  it  was  held 
that  an  assessment  for  the  improvement  of  the  street  was  not  in- 
validated by  such  use  of  private  property,  since  there  was  a 
means  provided  by  law  by  which  such  easement  could  be  acquired 
by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain.^"  The  earlier  Illinois  cases 
appear  to  recognize  the  doctrine  that  a  public  improvement  like 
a  street  cannot  be  constructed  on  private  property,^^  even  in 
cases  where  such  objection  could  not  be  raised;  as  where  the  ob- 
jection was  made  on  application  for  judgment  on  the  special  as- 
sessment, and  it  was  held  that  it  should  have-  been  made  before  the 


Commissioners,  175  111.  491,  51  N.  E. 
558  [1898];  Bass  v.  South  Park 
Commissioners,  171  111.  370,  49  N. 
E.  549  [1898];  People  ex  rel.  Koch- 
ersperger  v.  Sass,  171  111.  357,  49 
N.  E.  501  [1898];  (overruling  con- 
trary observations  in  Boynton  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Kern,  159  111.  553,  42 
X.  E.  842  [1890];  and  disapproving 
the  language  used  in  Lehmer  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Miller,  80  111.  601 
[1875]);  Jones  v.  Town  of  Lake 
View,  151  111.  6t)3,  38  X.  E. 
688  [1894];  Goodwillie  v.  City 
of  Lake  View,  137  111.  51, 
27  N.  E.  15  [1892];  Leman  v. 
City  of  Lake  View,  131  111.  388,  23 
N.  E.  346  [1890];  Hunerberg  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Hyde  Park,  130  111.  156,  22 
N.  E.  486  [1890];  Holmes  v.  Village 
of  Hyde  Park,  121  111.  128,  13  N. 
E.  540  [1889];  Moore  v.  City  of  Al- 
bany, 98  N.  Y.  396  [1885];  (dis- 
tinguishing In  the  Matter  of  the  Pe- 
tition of  Cheesebrough  to  Vacate  an 
Assessment,  78  N.  Y.  232  [1879]; 
and  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Rhinelander,  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, 68  N.  Y.  105  [1877];  which 
were  cases  holding  that  an  assess- 
ment could  not  be  levied  for  a  sewer 
on  private  land,  as  being  cases  de- 
cided under  a  statute  w^  ich  gave 
no  means  for  the  public  to  acouire 
title  thereafter.)  In  Beck  v.  Hol- 
land. 29  Mont.  234,  74  Pac.  410 
[1903]  it  was  said  that  an  abutting 
property  owner  who  claims  no  inter- 
est in  the  land  used  as  an  alley  can- 


not resist  an  assessment  for  open- 
ing such  alley  on  the  ground  that  the 
land  does  not  belong  to  the  city. 
There  was  neither  discussion  nor  ci- 
tation of  authorities  on  this  point 
and  it  does  not  appear  whether  the 
objection  went  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court  in  eminent  domain  or  not. 

"Moore  v.  City  of  Albany,  98  N, 
V.  396  [1885].  Furthermore  in  this 
case  such  an  embankment  was  held 
to  be  a  benefit  to  the  abutting  prop- 
erty owners  since  they  would  un- 
dovibtedly  wish  to  grade  their  lots  to 
the  level  of  the  street,  and  this  em- 
bankment would  save  them  that 
amount  of  grading  and  filling.  A 
similar  question  was  presented  in 
Dixon  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio 
C.  C.  629,  5  Ohio  C.  D.  301  [1894], 
but  was  not  specifically  passed  on 
by  the  court.  It  appeared,  however, 
that  the  owners  of  the  property  oc- 
cupied by  the  sloping  embankment 
were  willing  to  accept  damages  for 
such  use  of  their  property  with- 
out formal  condemnation  proceedings. 
The  objection  of  the  property  own- 
ers was  to  the  inclusion  of  such  dam- 
ages in  the  amount  of  the  assess-. 
ment.  The  court  held  that  such  in- 
clusion was  proper  as  the  c^st  of  a 
retninin?  wall  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  necessary  would  have  been 
much  greater. 

"  Facan  v.  City  of  Chicasro,  84 
111.  227  [1876]]  Lehmer  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Miller,  80  HI.  601    [1875]. 


I 


609  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  396 

assessment  was  confirmed.'-  fSo  it  was  held  that  the  owner  who 
was  assessed  for  benefits  for  opening  a  street  could  not  interpose 
the  objection  that  he  had  been  allowed  to  keep  one  and  ninety- 
five  one-hundredths  of  a  foot  of  land  in  the  line  of  such  street, 
since  if  there  was  any  wrong  done  it  was  to  his  advantage."  The 
later  cases  have  repudiated  this  doctrine  however/*  and  it  is 
hold  that  it  cannot  be  interposed  as  a  defense  even  at  confirmation 
that  the  municipal  corporation  had  not  acquired  title  to  the  land 
to  be  used  as  a  street.'^  The  modern  Illinois  doctrine  seems  to  be 
that  if  the  power  of  eminent  domain  exists,  whereby  the  public 
may  acquire  either  a  fee  or  an  easement  in  the  property  to  be 
improved  if  it  wishes  to  acquire  it,  an  assessment  may  be  levied  be- 
fore such  public  right  may  be  acquired.^*'  This  court  has  said 
that  if  there  is  any  probability  that  the  municipal  corporation 
would  not  acquire  title  to  the  street,  a  court  of  equity  would  en- 
join the  proceeding  until  the  title  is  acquired.^"  If  the  law  does 
not  provide  a  valid  method  of  appropriating  land  for  public  use 
as  a  street,  an  assessment  for  such  street  improvement  is  invalid.'^ 
Such  an  assessment  is  said  to  be  invalid  because  "there  is  no  pro- 
vision that  the  street  or  way  shall  ever  be  made  a  public  way,  or 
that  any  use  of  it  shall  ever  be  secured  to  the  person  who  is  com- 
pelled to  contribute  to  its  construction.""  Thus  when  the  stat- 
ute in  force  gave  no  means  of  assessing  damages  to  the  owners  of 
land  taken  for  public  use,  an  assessment  ordinance  for  damages 

^-Lehmer  v.  People  ex  rel.  Miller,  Commissioners,    175    111.    491,    51    N. 

80  111.  GOl   [1875].  E.    558    [1898];    Burhans   v.   Village 

"Fagan    v.    City    of    Chicago,    84  of    Norwood    Park,    138    111.    147,   27 

111.  227    [1876].  X.    E.    1088    [1892];    Leman    v.   City 

"People    ex    rel.    Kochersperger    v.  of  Lake  View,   131   111.  388,  23  N.  E. 

Sass,    171    111.    357,    49    N.    E.    501  34(5   [1S90];   Hunerberg  v.  Village  of 

i:Hy8]     disapproving     the     language  Hyde    Park.    130    111.    156,    22    N.    E. 

used  in  Lehmer  v.  People  ex  rel.  INIil-  486     [1S90|:     Holmes    v.    Village    of 

ler,   80    111.   601    [1875]    as   far   as   it  Hyde    Park,    121     111.    128,    13    N.    E. 

intimates  that  sucli  defense  might  be  540    [1889]. 

interi)()sed  at  confirmation,  and  over-  ''Holmes  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park, 

ruling  the  language  used  in   Boynton  121    111.    128,    13    N.    E.    540    [1889]; 

V.  People,  ex  rel.  Kern.   I.IO   111.  553,  To  the  same  effect  see  Goodwillie  v. 

42  N.  E.  842  [1896].  City   of   Lake   View,    137    111.   51,   27 

"Holmes  v.  Villa^re  of  Hyde  Park.  N.  E.   15    [1892]. 

121    111.    128.    13   N.   E.   540    [1889];  "•  Morse    v.    Stoeker,    83    Mass.     (1 

(follnwin?  Villacrp   nf   Hvde    Park   v.  All.)     150    [1861];     State,    Kerrigan, 

Borden,   94   111.   26    [18791).  Pros.    v.    Township    of    West    Hobo- 

"Allen    V.    Citv    of    Chica-jco.    176  ken,  37  M".  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    77   [1874]. 

111.   113,  52  N.  E.  33   [1898];    Royal  "Morse    v.    Stoeker,    83    Mass.     (1 

Insurance    Company    v.    South    Park  All.)    150,   159   [1861]. 


§  397  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  610 

and  benefits  based  on  such  law  was  passed.  It  was  held  that  as 
the  provision  for  assessing  damages  was  without  authority,  the 
assessment  of  benefits  was  also  invalid.-" 

§  397.    Improvement  of  toll  road. 

If  a  toll  road  or  part  thereof  is  taken  into  the  eit}^  a  statute 
which  authorizes  such  municipal  corporation  to  improve  such  road 
and  to  assess  the  cost  of  such  improvement  upon  the  property 
especially  benefited  thereby  is  upheld  as  valid,  since  the  owners 
of  such  property  have  a  right  to  use  such  street  and  the  benefit 
of  such  improvement  cannot  be  denied  to  them.^  The  right  to  levy 
such  assessment  exists  even  though  it  may  be  doubtful  whether  as 
against  the  toll  road  company  the  city  had  a  right  to  make  such 
improvement.  If  the  improvement  is  in  fact  made,  whether  right- 
fully or  not,  the  owners  who  receive  the  benefit  thereof  must  pay 
the  assessment  for  such  benefits,  and  cannot  set  up  the  violation 
of  the  rights  of  the  toll  road  company  as  a  defense.-  Thus  where 
it  was  doubted  wdiether  the  power  to  change  the  grade  existed  it 
was  held  that  the  power  to  pave  undoubtedly  existed,  and  such 
grading  as  was  merely  incidental  to  paving  could  be  made  at  the 
expense  of  the  property  benefited.^  A  statute  authorizing  a 
municipal  corporation  to  assess  a  plank  road  company  for  im- 
proving the  land  on  which  such  road  is  located  has  been  upheld.* 
The  cases  denying  or  doubting  the  right  to  levy  such  assessment 
do  so  on  the  ground  that  the  statute  controlling  in  such  cases  does 
not  provide  for  such  assessment. °    Upon  this  ground  assessments 


^"  State,   Kerrigan,   Pros.   v.   Town-  ]\Iayor,    etc..    of    the    City    of    New 

ship   of   West   Hoboken,   37   N.   J.   L.  Brunswick,   30  X.  J.  L.    (1   Vr.)    395 

(8  Vr.)    77   [1874].  [1863]. 

'  Huelfeld   v.    Covington,   —    (Ky.)  ^  State,    Parker,    Pros.    v.    City    of 

,  60  S.  W.  296   [1901];   Bagg  v.  New  Brunswick.  32  N.  J.  L.   (3  Vr.) 

Detroit,  5   Mich.   336    [1858];    State,  548    [1867]. 

Parker,   Pros.   v.   Mayor,  etc.,   of   the  *  People  of  the  State  of  New  York 

City  of  New  Brunswick,  30  N.  J.  L.  ex  rel.   Cayadutta  Plank  Road  Com- 

(1    Vr.)     395    [1863];     State,    Town  pany   v.    Cummings,    166    N.    Y.    110, 

send,    Pros.    v.    Mayor    and    Common  59  N.   E.   703    [1901]. 

Council   of  Jersey   City,   26   N.   J.   L.  "  Philadelphia    to    use     v.     ffowen, 

(2    Dutch.)     444     [1857];     See    also  202   Pa.    St.    453,   52    Atl.   3    [1902]; 

McHenry  v.  Salvage,  99  Ky.  232,  35  Breed   v.    City   of   Allegheny,   85   Pa. 

S.  W.  645.  St.    (4   Norris)    214    [1877]*;    Wilson 

^Bagg  v.   City  of  Detroit,  5  Mich.  v.  Allegheny  City,  79  Pa.  St.    (29  P. 

336    [1858];    State,   Parker,   Pros,   v.  F.   Smith)    272    [1875]. 


611  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §§  398,  399 

for  grading "  or  widening  ^  a  private  toll  road,  which  the  city 
has  not  sought  to  condemn  and  in  which  it  has  not  acquired  an 
easement,  have  been  held  invalid.  It  has  been  held  that  a  citj'' 
ma,v  improve  a  plank  road  and  assess  the  road  company  for  the 
benefits  thus  conferred.^ 

§  398.     Appropriation  by  mistake. 

If  the  city  has  made  no  attempt  as  a  public  corporation  to  ap- 
propriate land  for  use  as  a  street,  but  its  officials  have  made  a  gen- 
uine mistake  concerning  the  location  of  the  boundary  line  and 
under  such  mistake  have  encroached  upon  A. 's  land,  A.  cannot 
on  account  of  such  encroachment  enjoin  an  assessment  for  such 
improvement  nor  can  he  otherwise  resist  such  assessment.  His 
sole  remedy  is  an  action  for  damages.^ 

§  399.    Location  of  sidewalks  and  roads. 

Other  applications  of  the  general  principles  already  discussed 
are  found  in  cases  of  other  public  improvements  like  streets  in 
their  general  nature.  If  a  sidewalk  has  been  laid  on  A. 's  private 
property  and  no  formal  or  regular  steps  are  taken  by  the  public 
corporation  to  acquire  title  thereto.  A.  cannot  be  excluded  by  any 
person  from  the  enjoyment  of  such  improvement  and  his  property 
is  therefore  benefited  thereby,  and  is  accordingly  liable  to  local 
assessment.^  Conversely  the  fact  that  A.  has  constructed  his  build- 
ing over  the  line  of  his  property  so  that  the  sidewalk  cannot  be 
constructed  of  the  width  specified  in  the  ordinance  does  not  in- 
validate the  assessment.-  No  assessment  can  be  levied  for  im- 
proving as  a  public  road  a  strip  of  land  in  which  the  public  has 
not  acquired  any  title. ^ 

•■•Wilson   V.  Alleglieny   City.  79   Pa.  :\l()()rc    v.    City    of    .■\il)aiiy.    !)S    X.    Y. 

St.    (29   P.   F.   Smit!i)'272    118751.  :VM;    [1885|. 

"Breed    v.    City    of    Allegheny,    85  '  Boyiiton    v.    I'eople    e\    rel.    Kern. 

Pa.  St.   (4  Norris)   214   [1877].  150    111.    55:}.   42   N.    E.   842    [1896]; 

*  People    ex    rel.    C'ayadutta    Plank  City   of    Indianapolis   v.   Cyilmore,   30 

Road    Co.    V.    Cumniings,    1()(>    N.    Y.  Ind.  414    [1868]. 

110,  59  N.  E.  703   [1901].  -  Hyman    v.    City    of    Chicago,    188 

'Dixon  V.  City  of  Cincinnati.  11  111.  462,  59  N.  E.  10  [1900]. 
Ohio  C.  C.  629,  5  Ohio  C.  D.  301  'Barker  v.  Board  of  Coniniission- 
[1894];  Davis  v.  Silvorton.  47  Or.  ers  of  Wyandotte  County,  45  Kan. 
171,  82  Pac.  16  [1905];  This  is  es-  681.  26  Pac.  585  [1891];  Pierce  v. 
pecially  true  if  the  city  has  the  County  Commissioners  of  Franklin 
power  to  acquire  title  by  eminent  do-  County.  03  Me.  252  [1872];  Phil- 
main    to    the    property    so    occupied.  brook   v.   Inhabitants   of   the   County 


§  400  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT,  612 

§  400.     Location  of  sewers. 

If  a  sewer  is  constructed  over  private  property  under  such  cir- 
cumstances that  the  owner  of  such  private  property  is  estopped  to 
deny  the  right  of  the  public  and  the  abutting  property  owners  to 
make  use  of  the  same,  no  objection  can  be  interposed  to  the  val- 
idity of  the  assessment  on  the  ground  that  the  sewer  is  built  on 
private  property.^  Thus  if  the  owner  of  such  private  property 
knows  that  the  sewer  is  being  built  on  his  property  as  a  public 
sewer,  and  if  he  makes  no  objection  thereto  -  or  acquiesces  there- 
in, ^  or  consents  thereto,  *  he  is  estopped  from  denying  the  right 
of  the  public  to  use  such  sewer  and  no  objection  to  an  assessment 
can  be  interposed  on  the  ground  that  the  sewer  is  constructed  on 
private  property.  If  a  sewer  is  built  through  private  property  un- 
der a  contract  with  the  owner  thereof,  by  which  he  is  bound  to 
permit  such  public  use  to  continue,  no  objection  to  such  assess- 
ment can  be  interposed  on  the  ground  that  the  sewer  is  situated 
on  private  property.^  If,  however,  the  contract  merely  provides 
for  the  laying  and  maintenance  of  such  sewer,  and  does  not  pro- 
vide that  adjoining  property  owners  may  have  the  right  to  con- 
nect with  such  sewer  upon  such  private  property,  no  assessment 
therefor  can  be  levied  upon  property  which  cannot  be  connected 
with  such  sewer  except  across  such  private  property."  If  a  sewer 
is  constructed  which  runs  in  whole  or  in  part  through  private  prop- 
erty, the  question  of  the  validity  of  a  local  assessment  for  the 

of    Kennebec,    17    Me.    196     [1840];  ==  Village  of  Hyde   Park  v.   Borden, 

Copcutt  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  59  Hun.  94  111.  26    [1879];    In  the  Matter  of 

(N.    Y.)    212,    13    N.    Y.    Supp.    452  the    Petition    of   McGown   to   Vacate 

[1891].      The    question    involved    in  an  Assessment,  18  Hun.    (N.  Y. )   434 

the  above  cases  are,  however,  largely  [1879]. 

statutory,  depending  on  the  pow^er  of  ^  Wilson    v.    City    of    Cincinnati,   5 

the    legislature    to    levy    assessments  Ohio  N.  P.  68   [1897]. 

under   statutes   authorizing   improve-  *City  of  St.  Joseph  to  the  Use  of 

ments  on  "public  roads,"  or  on  "coun-  the  Saxton  National  Bank  v.  Landis, 

ty    roads."  54  Mo.  App.  315   [1893]. 

'  Village  of  Hyde  Park  v.  Borden,  ^  Kramer   v.    City   of   Los   Angeles, 

94  111.  26   [1879];  City  of  St.  Joseph  147    Cal.    668,    82    Pac.    334    [1905]; 

to   the  Use   of   the   Saxton   National  Leeds  v.  City  of  Richmond,  102  Ind. 

Bank    v.    Landis,    54    Mo.    App.    315  372,  1  N.  E.'711   [1885];   City  of  St. 

[1893];    In   the   Matter   of   the   Peti-  Joseph    to    the    Use    of    the    Saxton 

tion  of  McGown  to  Vacate  an  Assess-  National    Bank    v.    Landis,    54    Mo. 

ment,   18  Hun.    (N.  Y.)    434   [1879];  App.  315  [1893]. 

Wilson     V.     City     of     Cincinnati,     5  "  State  ex  rel.   McKune  v.  District 

Ohio  N.  P.  68   [1897 J.  Court   of   Ramsey   County,    90    Minn. 

540,  97  N.  W.  425    [1903]. 


613  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED.  §  400 

cost  of  such  sewer  is  determined  by  the  general  considerations  al- 
ready discussed.  If  the  municipal  corporation  has  in  any  way 
acquired  the  right  to  lay  and  maintain  the  sewer  upon  the  pri- 
vate property  on  which  it  has  in  fact  been  laid,  and,  if  necessary, 
the  right  to  authorize  abutting  property  owners  to  make  connec- 
tions therewith  on  such  private  property,  the  authorities  are  prac- 
tically unanimous  in  holding  that  the  fact  that  such  sewer  is  lo- 
cated upon  private  property  is  no  objection  to  an  assessment 
therefor.  If  the  sewer  is  laid  in  realty  dedicated  to  the  public  for 
a  street,  such  dedication  renders  such  land  subject  to  be  appro- 
priated for  any  or  all  of  the  uses  to  which  public  streets  are  de- 
voted to  meet  the  wants  and  convenience  of  the  general  public. 
Among  these  uses  is  included  the  laying  of  sewers  in  public 
streets.'^  Accordingly  if  a  sewer  is  laid  in  a  public  street  neither 
the  public  nor  the  abutting  property  owners  can  be  prevented  by 
the  former  owner  of  such  realty  from  making  use  of  such  sewer; 
and  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  the  cost  of  such  sewer.* 
Accordingly  if  the  owner  of  land  conveys  a  part  of  it  reserving  a 
right  of  way  for  owners  of  other  lots  along  a  platted  street  which 
has  never  been  opened  by  the  city,  and  permits  the  public  to  use 
such  street  as  a  highway,  such  acts  amount  to  a  dedication  to 
public  use.  and  the  city  may  lay  a  sewer  in  such  street  and  levy 
an  assessment  therefor.''  So  if  land  has  been  dedicated  by  parol 
dedication  for  use  as  a  sewer,  the  city  may  lay  a  sewer  therein 
and  levy  an  assessment  therefor,  even  if  the  city  has  made  an  in- 
effectual attempt  to  appropriate  such  land  by  eminent  domain.^" 
So  if  a  sewer  is  ordered  in  a  private  way,  but  before  the  sewer  is 
built  such  private  way  is  dedicated  as  a  street,  an  assessment  for 
such  sewer  cannot  be  resisted  on  the  ground  that  the  sewer  as 
originally  ordered  was  situated  in  a  private  way.^^  If  the  muni- 
cipal corporation  or  other  public  corporation  has  not  acquired  the 
right  to  lay  and  maintnin  a  sewer  upon  the  private  property  upon 
which  it  has  in  fact  been  laid,  we  find  as  in  cases  of  other  im- 

^Warren  v.  City  of  ariind  Havon.  Streets,  4  Hun.   (X.  Y.)    495   [1875]; 

30  Mich.  24   [1874].  (affirmed  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 

*Cone    V.     City    of    Hartford.    28  tion   of   In«?raham   to   Vacate   an   As- 

Conn.    303    [1859];    Warren    v.    City  sessment,  G4  N.  Y.   310   [1870]). 

of  Grand  Haven.  30  :Micli.  24  [1874].  '"Creamer    v.     Allen.    3    Mo.    App. 

•Tn    the  :\ratter  of  the   Petition   of  54.^    [1877]. 

Inffrn'-am    to    Vacate    an    A>^se<;sment  "  P.i^^hon   v.  Tripp.    15   R.   T.  466.   8 

on     Eiffhtv-eiffhth     and     Ninety-first  Atl.  692  [1887]. 


§  400  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  614 

provements,  some  conflict  of  authority.'-  In  some  jurisdictions  it 
is  held  that  local  assessments  cannot,  under  such  circumstances, 
be  levied  for  the  expense  of  constructing  the  sewer,^^  and  a  statute 
which  authorizes  an  assessment  for  such  an  improvement  has  been 
held  to  be  invalid.^*  In  some  of  these  cases  the  possibility  of  ac- 
quiring a  public  easement  for  the  sewer  by  subsequent  proceedings 
in  eminent  domain  is  not  referred  to.^^  The  validity  of  such 
assessment  has  been  denied  even  where  the  owner  of  the  land 
taken  has  subsequently  sued  for  damages  for  the  taking  of  his 
land,  and  recovered  them.'''  The  presumption,  however,  is  that 
the  city  has  acquired  a  right  to  make  use  of  such  land  for  sewer 
purposes;  and  the  party  resisting  such  assessment  must  show  af- 
firmatively that  the  city  has  not  acquired  such  right.''  If  a 
part  of  the  sewer  runs  through  A. 's  land  which  has  been  regu- 
larly taken  for  sewer  purposes  by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain, 
and  part  of  it  runs  through  A.'s  land  which  has  not  been  so  taken, 
it  has  been  held  that  an  assessment  may  ])e  levied  on  A.'s  land 
for  that  part  of  the  sewer  running  through  the  land  which  has 
been  regularly  condemned,  since  no  one  can  keep  A.  from  using 
the  sewer,  but  that  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for  that  part 
of  the  sewer  which  runs  through  land  not  condemned.'*  Where 
the  city  made  a  mistake  in  pointing  out  to  the  contractor  the  lines 
of  the  street  so  that  the  sewer  is  constructed  in  part  on  private 
property,  it  has  been  held  that  the  owners  of  land  drained  by  such 
sewer  must  pay  for  at  least  so  much  thereof  as  is  in  the  public 
street.  In  such  a  case  it  is  possible  to  rebuild,  in  the  street,  that 
part  of  the  sewer  outside  of  the  street  lines,  and  thus  the  use  of 
such  improvement  can  be  secured  to  the  owners  of  land  drained 

^'«ee  §  393,  §  396.  ^^  Holliday    v.    City   of   Atlanta,   9C. 

"Holliday  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  90  Ga.  377,  23  S.  E.  406  [1895];  Fur- 
Ga.  377,  23  S.  E.  406  [1895];  State  thermore  in  this  case  a  curative 
ex  rel.  McKune  v.  District  Court  of  statute  had  been  passed  subsequent- 
Ramsey  County,  90  Minn.  540,  97  ly  authorizing  such  re-assessment. 
N.  W.  425  [1903];  Anderson  v.  Such  statute  was,  however,  held  un- 
Lower  Merion  Township.  217  Pa.  constitutional.  See  Ch.  XVII. 
St.  3G9,  66  Atl.  1115   [1907].  '■  Cline    v.    People   ex   rel.   Barlow, 

"Anderson  v.  Lower  Merion  Town-  224  111.  360,  79  N.  E.  663   [1906]. 

ship,     217     Pa.     369,     66     Atl.     1115  '"Miller   v.   Anheuser,   2   Mo.   App. 

[1907].  1(58    [1876].     The  latter  part  of  this 

'"State  ex  rel.  McKune  v.  District  holding  depends  in  part  on  the  stat- 

Court   of   Ramsey   County.   90    Minn.  iite     under     which     such     assessment 

540.  97  N.  W.  425   [1903].  was  levied,  and  does  not  involve  the 

constitutional  ()uestion  directly. 


615  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  400 

thereby.'^  If  the  location  of  the  private  property  through  which 
the  sewer  runs  is  such  that  A.  cannot  make  use  of  such  sewer 
without  trespassing  on  such  private  land,  A.  may  resist  an  assess- 
ment therefor,  even  if  the  city  has  an  easement  to  maintain  the 
sewer.-"  This,  however,  involves  not  the  nature  of  the  improve- 
ment but  the  benefit  to  the  land  assessed  and  is  discussed  else- 
where.^^ In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  if  a  sewer  is  laid 
in  private  property  and  if  under  the  law  it  is  possible  to  acquire 
a  public  easement  in  such  property  by  subsequent  proceedings  in 
eminent  domain,  the  fact  that  the  sewer  is  laid  in  private  property 
is  no  defense  to  an  assessment  therefor,  since  the  easement  may 
be  acquired  as  well  before  making  the  improvement  as  after;  and 
it  will  be  presumed  that  the  public  corporation  will  do  its  duty, 
while  ordinarily  means  will  exist  for  compelling  it  to  do  its  duty.^^ 
Still,  even  in  jurisdictions  taking  this  view,  there  is  some  authority 
for  holding  that  if  the  municipal  corporation  secures  confirmation 
of  the  assessment  by  means  of  an  agreement  to  condemn,  and  sub- 
sequently, after  the  objections  of  the  property  owners  have  been 
withdrawn  and  a  confirmation  has  been  had,  the  city  repeals  the 
ordinance  to  condemn  the  property  and  dismisses  its  proceedings 
for  that  purpose,  the  property  owners  may  have  the  confirmation 
set  aside.-''  If,  however,  there  is  no  way  provided  for  by  law  by 
which  the  land  on  which  the  sewer  has  been  constructed  can  be 
taken  in  eminent  domain,  it  is  evident  that  the  public  and  the 
owners  of  land  which  such  sewer  is  intended  to  drain  are  at  the 
mercy  of  the  owner  of  the  land  on  which  the  sewer  has  been 
constructed.  Xo  use  of  it  can  be  liad  unless  his  consent  is  in  some 
way  obtained.  Accordingly  it  is  held  that  in  contemplation  of  the 
law,  the  owners  of  land  t)  be  drained  hy  such  sewer  receive  no 
benefit  fi'om  siu-h  improvcincnt  and  accordingly  local  assessments 

"Johnson    v.    Duer,    115    :\r().    306,  l?ordi'n.    04    111.    20     [1870];     State, 

21   S.  W.  800    [18021.  Vandorbeck,     Tros.     v.     Mayor     and 

-°  State  ex  rel.  McKune  v.  District  Common   Council   of   Jersey   City,   29 

Court   of    Ramsey   County,   00    Minn.  X.   J.  L.    (5   Dutch.)    441    [1801]. 
540,    97    N.    W.    425    [1003];    contra  -'Dempster  v.  (Mty  of  Chicairo,  175 

Heman   v.   Schulto,    100   Mo.   409,   66  111.   278,   51    N.   E.   710    [1808];    But 

S.  W.   103   [1001].  .see    for   the    theory    that    the    remedy 

'^  See   §   563.  of  the  property  owner   is  to  pay  the 

^Maywood  Co.  v.  Village  of  May-  assessment  and  bring  suit  to  compel 

wood,    140    111.    216,    29    N.    E.    704  the    city    to    proceed    with    the    con- 

[1803];    Holmes   v.    Village   of   Hyde  demnation  proceedings,  §  393.  X.   11; 

Park.    121     III.     128.    13    X.    E.    540  S    1408  rt  firq. 
[18801;     Village    of    Hvde     Park    v. 


§401 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


616 


1 


cannot  be  levied  therefor.-*  This  view  has  been  taken  where  the 
land  through  which  the  drain  is  constructed  is  the  land  sought 
to  be  assessed.*^^  In  Rhode  Island  it  has  been  held  that  if  a  sewer 
is  constructed  in  a  private  road,  not  regularly  laid  out  as  a  street, 
nor  dedicated  by  the  owner  and  accepted  by  the  public,  no  assess- 
ment can  be  levied  therefor,  even  if  such  land  is  subsequently  laid 
out  as  a  street.-**  This  holding,  however,  is  based  on  the  local 
statute  under  which  such  assessment  was  levied,  which  authorized 
assessments  for  sew^ers  ' '  made  in  any  of  the  streets. ' ' 

§  401.    Sewer  without  outlet. 

If  an  outlet  to  the  se\yer  has  not  in  fact  been  obtained,  but  if 
under  the  law  such  outlet  can  be  obtained,  as  by  proceedings  in 
eminent  domain,^  it  has  been  held  that  an  assessment  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  sewer  is  valid,  though  the  outlet  therefor  is  still 
to  be  obtained  across  private  property,-  or  along  a  highway  out- 
side of  the  limits  of  the  village  ^  Thus  where  a  company  had 
filled  a  river  and  thus  reclaimed  land  it  was  held  that  an  assess- 
ment could  be  levied  for  a  sewer  to  pass  through  such  reclaimed 
land  to  secure  an  outlet  since  if  the  company  had  a  right  to  make 
such  accretion  there  was  "ample  power  in  the  city  to  open  a 
way  to  the  river."*  If  the  ordinance  provides  a  sufficient  outlet 
on  its  face,  objections  to  the  sufficiency  of  such  outlet  do  not  affect 


=*In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Cheesbrough  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, 78  N.  Y.  232  [1879];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Rliine- 
lander  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  G8 
N.  Y.  105  [1877];  While  the  court 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  In- 
graham  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  64 
N.  Y.  310  [1876]  at  first  observed 
that  one  property  owner  could  not 
complain  of  trespass  to  another  in 
laying  a  sewer  on  the  land  of  such 
other,  it  finally  held  on  application 
for  a  rehearing  that  the  question  of 
the  validity  of  the  assessment  would 
depend  on  the  question  whether  the 
land  had  been  dedicated  for  a  street 
or  not;  and  if  not,  whether  the 
owner  of  the  property  had  assented 
to  the  laying  of  the  sewer  on  his 
land. 


"'  In  the  Matter  of  One  Hundred 
Twenty-Seventh  Street,  46  How.  (N. 
Y.)  60  [1H78J.  This,  however,  de- 
pends  in  part  upon  statutory  con- 
struction. 

-"Bishop  V.  Tripp,  15  R.  I.  466. 
8  Atl.  692   [1887J. 

^See    §§    393,  400. 

=  Harney  v.  Benson,  113  Cal.  314, 
45  Pac.  687  [1896];  Payne  v.  Vil- 
lage of  South  Springfield,  161  Ind. 
285,  44  N.  E.  105  [1896];  South 
Highland  Land  &  Improvement  Com- 
pany V.  Kansas  City,  172  Mo.  523. 
72   S.   W.   944    [1902]. 

'  Cochran  v.  Village  of  Park  Roads. 
138  111.  295,  27  N.  E.  939   [1893]. 

''  South  Highland  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Company  v.  Kansas  City,  172 
Mo.   523,   72   S.   W.   944    [1902]. 


617  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §401 

the  validity  of  the  ordinance.^  So  if  an  outlet  is  in  the  form  of 
another  sewer  with  which  connection  is  to  be  made,  the  assess- 
ment is  not  invalid  because  such  sewer  has  not  as  yet  been  con- 
structed.*' If  an  ordinance  provides  for  the  outlet  of  a  sewer  "at 
the  north  branch  of  the  Chicago  river,"  it  will  be  assumed  that  the 
real  bed  of  the  stream  is  intended  even  if  by  another  ordinance 
the  "north  branch"  of  such  river  is  fixed  at  a  point  some  four  hun- 
dred feet  east  of  its  actual  location.^  It  has,  however,  been  inti- 
mated that  the  assessment,  while  not  invalid,  should  not  be  col- 
lected until  the  right  to  construct  an  outlet  over  private  property 
has  been  secured  by  eminent  domain  or  otherwise,  and  that  pro- 
ceedings to  assess  benefits  might  be  enjoined  until  such  outlet  is 
thus  secured.*  If  the  ordinance  shows  on  its  face  that  no  outlet 
exists  it  is  invalid."  In  other  jurisdictions  it  has  been  said  that  if 
an  extension  to  secure  an  outlet  is  contemplated  when  the  assess- 
ment for  the  construction  of  the  sewer  was  levied  and  if  such  ex- 
tension is  in  fact  made,  no  objection  to  the  assessment  can  be 
interposed  on  the  ground  that  the  outlet  was  not  secured  when  the 
assessment  was  levied.^"  If  no  method  of  securing  an  outlet  exists, 
the  sewer  cannot  be  used  without  the  consent  of  owners  of  private 
property  and  an  assessment  therefor  is  invalid.^ ^  It  is  essential 
under  the  laws  governing  some  cities  in  Missouri  that  a  sewer 
be  so  constructed  as  to  have  an  outlet  either  into  a  public  sewer, 
district  sewer  or  natural  drainage.^-  Such  connection  may  be 
through  an  intermediate  sewer  over  which  the  city  has  control," 

"Bickerdike  V.  City  of  Chicago,  185  "Johnson    v.    Duer,    115    Mo.    366, 

111.   280,   56   N.   E.    1096    [1900].  21   S.  W.   800    [1892J;    City  of  Kan- 

"  Kyder's   Kstate   v.    City   of   Alton,  sas    City    to    the    Use    of    the    Frear 

175  111.  94,  51  N.  E.  821   [1898].  Stone    &    Pipe    Manufacturing    Com- 

''Bickerdike    v.    City    of    Chicago,  pany  v.  Swope,   79   Mo.  446    [1883] -, 

185   111.   280,   56  N.   E.    1096    [1900].  City   of   St.   Joseph   ex   rel.   Danaher 

"Burhans    v.    Village    of    Norwood  v.   Dillon,   61   Mo.   App.   317    [1895]; 

Park,    138    111.    147,    27    N.    E.    1088  City   of   St.   Joseph   ex   rel.    Uanaher 

[1892].  V.  Wilshire,  47  Mo.  App.  125  [1891]; 

•Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago,   191   111.  Baylia    v.    Taylor,    36    Mo.    App.    427 

210,   60  N.   E.   896.  [1889];    Kansas   City   v.   Ratekin,   30 

"Wilson    V.    Citj"  of    Cincinnati,    5  !Mo.  App.  416. 

Ohio   N.   P.   68,   9   Low.   Dec.    (Ohio)  "  Eyerman  v.  Rlakcsley.  78  Mo.  14.5 

242    [1897].  [1883];       (affirming      Eyerniann      v. 

"In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Hlakesiey,   9   Mo.   App.   231    1 1880]  )  ; 

Brainerd    to    Vacate    an    Assessment  Heman   v.    Payne,    27    Mo.   App.   481 

for     Sewers     in     Tenth     Avenue,     51  [1887]. 
Hun.    (N.   Y.)    380;    3    N.   Y.    Supp. 
889   [1889]. 


§.§  402,  403  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  618 

even  if  it  has  not  been  established  b.y  ordinance. ^^  Such  require- 
ment is  made  by  statute  in  that  state  and  the  question,  therefore, 
turns  on  the  construction  of  such  statutes  and  will  be  considered 
elsewhere  in  detail.^^ 

§  402.    Outlet  in  stream. 

If  a  sewer  has  an  outlet  in  a  stream,  lake  or  river,  the  water  of 
which  is  polluted  by  the  sewage  thus  discharged  into  it,  in  viola- 
tion of  statnte,  it  has  been  held  that  such  fact  does  not  prevent  an 
assessment  from  being  levied  for  the  construction  of  such  sewer,^ 
at  least  if  the  outlet  is  in  fact  used  for  the  discharge  of  sewage. 
This  holding  has  been  placed  on  the  theory  that  such  statute  pro- 
vides against  pollution  of  streams  but  does  not  prevent  such  dis- 
posal of  sewage  unless  it  is  in  fact  pollution.-  An  assessment  has 
been  upheld  where  it  was  shown  that  the  discharge  of  sewage 
into  a  stream  might  be  a  nuisance  but  there  was  no  evidence  to 
show  that  the  discharge  was  in  fact  a  nuisance,  nor  was  it 
shown  that  the  owners  of  land  through  which  the  stream  ran  had 
not  consented  to  such  use.^  Accordingly  a  city  ordinance  which 
provides  for  discharging  sewage  into  Lake  Michigan  has  been 
said  not  to  be  so  far  against  public  policy  as  to  be  void.* 

§  403.    Location  of  drains  and  ditches. 

The  applic2tion  of  these  general  principles  to  drains  and  ditches 
is  substantially  the  same  as  their  application  in  case  of  sewers.  A 
drain  may  be  located  in  a  public  street,  since  this  purpose  is  one 
for  which  it  must  be  considered  that  land  is  taken  when 
acquired  for  purposes  of  a  street.^  If  land  has  been  appropri- 
ated for  a  drain  by  proceedings  in  eminent  domain,  mere  irregu- 
larities not  affecting  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  enter  a  judg- 
ment appropriating  such  land  can  defeat  an  assessment  for  such 
drain.-     If  land  has  been  conveyed  as  a  right  of  Avay  for  a  ditch 

"Akers  v.  Kolkmeyer  &  Company,  ^  Rich  v.   City  of  Chicago,   152  111. 

97     Mo.    App.    520,    71     S.    W.    536  18,  38   X.  E.   255    [1894]. 

[1902].  'Steele  v.  ViHage  of  River  Forest, 

^"iSee   §§   444-448.  141    111.   302,   30   N.   E.    1034    [1893]. 

'Clener.y  v.  Norwood,  137  Fed.  962  '^  Laverty  v.  State  ex  rel.  Hill,  109 

[1905];    Walker   v.    City   of   Aurora,  Ind.   217,  9  N.   E.   774   [1886];   Lau- 

140  111.  402,  29  N.  E.  741    [1893].  bach    v.    O'Meara,    107    Mich.    29,    64 

-Walker    v.    City    of    Aurora,    140  :N.  W.  865    [1895].     A  ditterent  rule, 

111.  402,  29  N.  E.  741   [1893].  of    course,    applies    in    direct    attack 

^  Cone     V.     City     of     Hartford,     28  upon  the  proceedin;-'s  in  eminent  do- 

(  onn.    3(53    11859].  main.       See    Scott    v.     Rrackett,    89 


619  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  404 

and  such  deeds  are  defective  in  form,  but  are  sufficient  to  {)a.s.s  an 
equitable  title,  at  least  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  the  county 
has  taken  possession  of  such  land  and  has  constructed  such  drain, 
such  defect  is  not  a  sufficient  ground  for  resisting  an  assessment 
for  the  cost  of  such  ditch. ^  On  the  other  hand  if  a  drain  is  lo- 
cated on  private  land,  and  there  is  no  method  provided  under  the 
law  for  acquiring  an  interest  in  such  land  by  proceedings  in  emi- 
nent domain,  no  assessment  can  be  levied  for  such  an  improve- 
ment.* A  revocable  license  from  the  owner  of  the  land,  permitting 
the  public  to  make  temporary  use  of  such  drain  is  insufficient  to 
make  an  assessment  therefor  valid. '''  If  a  method  of  securing  a 
permanent  right  of  way  for  a  drain  by  proceedings  in  eminent 
domain  exists,  an  asessment  may  be  levied  for  a  drain  over  private 
land.' 

§  404.    Location  of  other  improvements. 

An  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for  the  cost  of  constructing  a 
bridge  which  is  in  part  situated  on  private  property,  if  the  owner 
of  such  property  will  be  able  to  prevent  the  public  and  the  owners 
or  occupants  of  the  property  assessed  for  such  improvement  from 
using  it.^  However  in  some  jurisdictions,  if  the  public  can  ac- 
quire an  interest  in  the  realty  on  which  the  improvement  is  located, 
by  means  of  proceedings  in  eminent  domain,  without  the  consent 
of  the  owner  of  such  property  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  for 
a  bridge  constructed  on  such  private  property.-  Like  considera- 
tions apply  in  case  of  an  assessment  to  pay  for  an  improvement 

liul.  41.3,  as  distiiiguislicd  in  Lavorty  ■*  Olmsted   v.   Dennis,   77   N.   Y.   378 

V.  State  ex  rel.  Hill,    l(»!l    ind.  217,  9  1  1S79]. 

X.   E.    774    [1886].  "  Iroquois    and     Crescent    Drainage 

'  Erickson    v.    Cass    County,    11    N.  District    No.    1    v.    Ilarroun,    222    111. 

D.  494,  92  N.  W.  841    11902].  4S9,   78  N.   E.   780    [190()1;    Moore  v. 

*  People  on  the  Relation  of   Butler  City  of  Albany,  98  N.  Y.  390  fl8S5]. 
V.   Board  of   Supervisors  of   Sajrinaw  '  Pacific    Bridjre    Co.    v.    Kirkham, 
County,  26  Midi.   22    [1872];    In   tlie  54  Cal.  558  [1880].     A  tax  cannot  be 
Matter  of  the  Petition   of  Clieesebor-  levied    for    the   cost    of   a    bridge    sit- 
ough    to    Vacate    an    Assessment,    78  uated    in    what    is    not    a    legal    high- 
N.   Y.   232    [1879];    Olmsted    v.    Den-  wny.       Manning    v.    City    of    Devil's 
nis,    77    N.    Y.    378    [1879];    People  Lake,  13  N.  D.  47,  112  Am.  St.  Pep. 
ex  rel.  Williams  v.  Haines,  49  N.  Y.  (;52.  99  N.  W.  51    [1904]. 
587    [1872];    In    the    Matter    of    the  =  People,  etc..  ex  rel.  Butts  v.  Com- 
petition,   Church    Wardens    and    Yes.  mon    Council   of   the   City   of   Roches- 
trymen  of  the  Church  of  Holy  Sepul-  ter.    5   Lans.    (N.    Y.)     142    [1871]. 
cher    to    Vacate    an    Assessment,    61 
How.    {N.  Y.)    315    [1880]. 


§405  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  620 

which  is  intended  to  promote  and  facilitate  navigation.  Thus,  an 
improvement  of  Lake  Minnetonka  Avas  provided  for  by  statute. 
The  vv^aters  of  this  lake  varied  in  height  from  time  to  time  with 
a  variation  of  six  feet  between  the  two  extremes,  and  the  proposed 
improvement  was  designed  to  keep  the  water  of  the  lake  at  a 
uniform  and  steady  level  intermediate  between  the  two  extremes 
No  provision  was  made  for  compensating  the  owners  of  land  which, 
as  matters  stood  were  covered  with  water  a  part  of  the  time  only, 
but  which  after  the  improvement  was  constructed  would  be  sub- 
merged all  the  time ;  and  it  was  held  that  since  no  compensation 
was  provided  for,  there  was  no  way  of  acquiring  the  right  to  flood 
their  lands;  and  that  therefore  since  the  benefit  of  such  improve- 
ment could  not  be  secured  to  the  adjoining  property  owners,  no 
assessment  could  be  levied.^ 

§  405.    Presumption  of  validity  of  public  acts. 

If  an  assessment  is  resisted  on  the  ground  that  the  improvement 
is  on  private  land,  the  ordinary  presumption  that  public  officials 
are  performing  their  duty  and  acting  in  compliance  with  the  law  ^ 
applies,  and  it  will  be  presumed  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the 
contrary  that  the  public  has  an  estate  or  easement  in  the  realty 
upon  which  the  improvement  is  situate  sufficient  to  protect  the 
rights  of  the  public  and  to  secure  to  them  the  use  of  such  improve- 
ment irrespective  of  the  wishes  of  private  individuals.-  Accord- 
ingly the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  person  who  resists  the  assess- 
ment and  claims  that  the  improvement  is  on  private  ground.'' 
Thus  it  it  is  sljown  that  a  sewer  is  located  in  a  street  and  that  the 

*ln  re  Minnetonka   Lake  Improve-  224   111.   360,    79   N.   E.   663    [1906]; 

ment,  Carpenter  v.  Board  of  County  Royal    Insurance    Company   v.    South 

Com'rs.     of     Hennepin     County,     56  Park  Commissioners,  175  111.  491,  51 

Minn.  513,  45   Am.  St.  Rep.   494,  58  N.    E.    558    [1898];    Bass    v.    South 

N.  W.  295   [1894].  Park  Commissioners,  171  111.  370,  49 

'«ee  §  1279.  N.  E.  549  [1898];  Prescott  v.  City  of 

^Cline    V.    People    ex    rel.    Barlow.  Chicago,    60    111.    121    [1871];    Jack- 

224    111.    360,    79   N.    E.    663    [1906];  son  v.  Smith,   120  Ind.  520,  22  N.  E. 

Aldis   V.   South  Park   Commissioners,  431    [1889];    Lewis   v.   Albertson,    23 

171    111.   424,   49   N.   E.   565    [1898];  Ind.  App.  147,  53  N.  E.  1071  [1899]; 

Prescott  V.   City   of   Chicago,   60   111.  Dashiell   v.  Mayor   and   City  Council 

121     [1871];    State,    Society    for    Es-  of  Baltimore,  Use  of  Hax,  45  Md.  615 

tablishing       Useful       Manufactures,  [18.76];   State,  Society  for  Establish- 

Pros.   V.   City  of   Paterson,   40   N.   J.  ing    Useful    Manufactures,    Pros.    v. 

L.    (11  Vr.)    250   [1878].  City   of   Paterson.    40   N.    J.   L.    (11 

•Cline    V.    People    ex    rel.    Barlow,  Vr.)   250  [1878]. 


621  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE  LEVIED.  §§  406,  407 

city  has  acquired  title  to  but  one  lateral  half  of  the  street  it  will  be 
assumed  in  the  absence  of  proof  that  the  sewer  was  located  in 
the  city's  half  of  such  street.*  The  fact  that  a  plan  of  the  sewer 
shows  its  course  across  a  tract  of  land  which  constitutes  a  subdivi- 
sion and  is  platted  into  lots  is  not  enough  to  show  that  the  city  has 
not  acquired  the  right  to  use  such  property  for  a  sewer.^ 

G.— TIME  OF  MAKING  IMPROVEMENTS  WITH 
REFERENCE    TO    ASSESSMENT. 

§  406.  Assessments  for  pre-existing  improvements — General  nature. 
"Whether  an  assessment  can  be  levied  for  an  improvement  which 
was  constructed  before  such  assessment  was  levied  is  a  question 
which  has  received  some  consideration  from  the  courts,  but  upon 
which  there  is  an  unfortunate  lack  of  harmony.  The  questions 
involved  are  in  part  constitutional  questions  involving  the  power 
of  the  legislature  to  levy  assessments  or  to  authorize  public  corpor- 
ations to  levy  them,  and  in  part,  statutory  questions  involving  the 
power  of  the  public  corporation  as  determined  by  the  construction 
of  the  statutes  conferring  such  power.  These  questions  will  be 
considered  in  detail. 

§  407.    Assessments  for  pre-existing  improvements  held  valid. 

Statutes  in  some  jurisdictions,  provide  that  assessments  may  be 
levied  for  the  cost  of  pre-existing  public  improvements  which  have 
been  already  constructed  under  circumstances  such  that,  but  for 
the  particular  statute  under  discussion,  no  assessment  could  be 
levied  for  such  improvement.  Whether  the  legislature  has  power 
to  authorize  an  assessment  for  an  improvement  constructed  be- 
fore the  public  corporation  decided  to  pay  for  it  by  assessment, 
the  benefits  of  which  have  already  been  received  and  enjoyed  by 
the  property  to  be  assessed,  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  com- 
paratively little  authority.  When  the  question  has  been  pre- 
sented for  decision  some  courts  have  held  that  in  the  absence  of 
some  specific  constitutional  provision  the  Icgisbilui-c  has  the  power 

*  In   the   matter  of  tlie   Petition   of  on     Ei;ility-Eislith    and     Ninety-First 

Ingraham    to   Vacate   an   Assessment.  Streets.  4  Ilun.   (X.  Y. )   495   [1875]). 
64    N.     Y.     310     [187C];      (amrmin;^  =  (line    v.    People    ex    rel.    Barlow, 

In    tlie    matter    of    the    Petition    of  1^-24   111.  .3(i(».  7!)   X.   E.  ()()3    [190G]. 
Ingraham    to   Vacate   an   Assessment 


§408 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


622 


to  authorize  local  assessments  for  such  public  improvements/  An 
analogy  to  this  rule  is  to  be  found  in  the  principle  that  a  general 
tax  may  be  levied  to  pay  a  pre-existing  debt  of  the  public  corpora- 
tion levying  such  tax.  The  power  to  levy  local  assessments  is  or- 
dinarily regarded  as  a  branch  of  the  taxing  power  ^  and  governed 
by  many  of  the  principles  that  control  ordinary  taxation.  Another 
and  closer  analogy  is  to  be  found  in  the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  authorize  re-assessments  if  for  any  reason  the  original  assess- 
ment proves  invalid.^  Both  of  these  analogies  have  been  pointed 
out  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  "The  principles 
of  taxation  are  not  those  of  contract.  A  special  assessment  may 
be  levied  upon  an  executed  consideration,  that  is  to  say  for  a 
public  work  already  done.  If  this  were  not  so  it  might  be  hard 
to  justify  re-assessments."  * 

§  408.     Statutes  authorizing  assessments  for  improvements  made 
when  no  statutory  authority  for  assessment  exists. 

Improvements  are  sometimes  made  when  there  is  no  statutory 
authority  for  levying  local  assessments  therefor,  and  when  accord- 
ingly no  assessment  can  be  levied.^  Subsequently  the  legislature 
has  passed  a  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  for  improvements 
of  this  sort,  and  either  the  terms  of  such  statute  are  broad  enough 


iCity  of  Seattle  v.  Kelleher.  195 
U.  S.  351,  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904]  ; 
Lombard  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  181  U.  S.  33,  45  L. 
731,  21  S.  507  [1901];  (affirming 
Cummings  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  181  111.  136,  54  N.  E. 
941  [1899]);  Boul  v.  The  People  ex 
rel.  Baker,  127  111.  240,  20  X.  E. 
1  [1890];  Warren  v.  Street  Commis- 
sioners of  tlie  City  of  Boston,  187 
Mass.  290,  72  N.  E.  1022  [1905]; 
Hall  V.  Street  Commissioners  of  Bos- 
ton, 177  Mass.  434,  59  N.  E.  68 
[1901];  Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss. 
652  [I860];  Williams  v.  Cammack. 
27  IMiss.  209.  61  Am.  Dec.  508 
[1854];  Howard  Savings  Institution 
V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council  of 
City  of  Newark,  52  N.  J.  L.  (23  Vr.) 
1,  18  Atl.  672  [1889];  Matter  of 
CuUen,  119  N.  Y.  628.  23  N.  E.  1144; 
(affirming  53   Hun.   534,   6   N.  Y.   S. 


625);  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition 
of  Roberts  to  Vacate  an  Assessment, 
81  N.  Y.  62  [1880];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Confirmation  of  the  Report  of 
the  Commissioners  of  Assessment  for 
Grading.  Paving  and  Otherwise  Im- 
proving Sackett,  Douglas  and  De 
Graw  Streets  in  the  City  of  Brooklyn, 
74  N.  Y.  95  [1878];  hi  re  Hollister, 
98  App.  Div.  501,  89  N.  Y.  Supp. 
518  [1904];  (affirmed  in  180  N.  Y. 
518,  72  N.  E.  1143);  Wetmore  v. 
Campbell,  4  N.  Y.  Sup.  341  [1849]; 
Doughty  V.  Hope,  3  Den.  (X.  Y.) 
249  [1846];  Bellows  v.  Weeks,  41 
Vt.  590;  Mills  v.  Charleton,  29  Wis. 
400,  9  Am.  Rep.  578   [1872]. 

^See  §  8;  §  89. 

"See  Chapter  XVII. 

*  Seattle  v.  Kelleher,  195  U.  S. 
351,  359.  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904]. 

^See  Chapter  VI.,  §  775. 


II 


G23 


WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


§408 


to  include  improvements  already  made,  or  by  express  terms  they 
include  such  pre-existing  improvements.  The  power  of  the  leg- 
.slature  to  impose  upon  the  owners  of  property  benefited  by  such 
mprovement  a  burden  which  up  to  the  time  of  the  passage  of  such 
statute  devolved  upon  the  entire  community  has  been  recognized 
in  some  jurisdictions.-  The  courts  which  take  this  view  do  so  on 
the  theory  already  stated,  that  the  principles  of  assessment  are  not 
those  of  contract,  and  that  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  an 
executed  consideration.  This  view  was  expressed  in  a  case  in 
which  planking  was  laid  down  at  a  time  when  under  the  law  it 
was  to  be  paid  for  by  general  taxation.  A  subsequent  statute 
authorized  the  levy  of  assessments  to  pay  for  such  improvements, 
and  assessments  were  thereupon  levied.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  held  that  such  statute  and  assessment  were  valid, 
pointing  out  that  while  it  was  doubtful  if  the  planking  was  origin- 
ally authorized,  the  improvement  had  been  adopted  by  the  city 
and  presumably  paid  for.''     So  it  has  been  held  that  the  legisla- 


='City  of  Seattle  v.  Kelleher,  195 
U.  S.  351,  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904] ; 
Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss.  652 
[I860];  Williams  v.  Cammack,  27 
Miss.  209,  61  Am.  Dec.  508  [1854]; 
Zahn  V.  Borough  of  Rutherford,  72 
N.  J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  446,  60  Atl.  1123 
[1905];  Brown  v.  Town  of  Union, 
65  N.  J.  L.  (36  Vr.)  601,  48  Atl. 
562  [1900];  City  of  Elizabeth  v. 
State,  Meker,  Pro's.,  45  N.  J.  L.  (16 
Vr.)  157  [1883];  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Confirmation  of  the  Report  of 
the  Commissioners  of  Assessment  for 
Grading,  Paving  and  Otherwise  Im- 
proving Sackett.  Douglass  and  De 
Graw  Streets  in  the  City  of  Brook- 
lyn, 74  N.  Y.  95  [1878]';  Howell  v. 
City  of  Buffalo,  37  N.  Y.  267;  Mat- 
ter of  Van  Antwerp,  1  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct. 
423;  Butler  v.  City  of  Toledo,  5  0. 
S.  225  [18551;  Cleveland  v.  Tripp. 
13  R.  I.  .50  [1880].  'Ihe  validity  ot 
such  legislation  has  been  recognized 
where  the  specific  assessment  is  not 
within  the  terms  of  the  stitute;  Dean 
V.  Charlton.  23  Wis.  590,  99  Am. 
Dec.   205    [18fi91. 

'City  of  Seattle  v.  Kelleher,  195 
V.    S.    351,    49    L.    232,    25    S.    44 


[1904J.  Upon  this  question  the 
court  said:  "The  answer  to  the  other 
objections  may  be  made  in  a  few 
words.  If,  as  said,  planking  was  not 
authorized  under  the  word  'side- 
walks' in  Ordinance  No.  1285,  the 
city -has  done  or  adopted  the  work 
and  presumably  has  paid  for  it.  At 
the  end  the  benefit  was  there,  on  the 
ground,  at  the  city's  expense.  The 
principles  of  taxation  are  not  those 
of  contract.  A  special  assessment 
may  be  levied  upon  an  executed  con- 
sideration, that  is  to  say,  for  a  pub- 
lic work  already  done.  Bellows  v. 
Weeks,  41  Vermont  590,  599,  600; 
Mills  v.  Charleton,  9  Am.  Rep.  578 
29  Wi.sconsin,  400,  413  [1872];  Hall 
v.  Street  Commissioners,  177  Massa- 
chusetts 434,  439.  If  this  were  not 
so  it  might  be  liard  to  justify  re-as' 
sessments.  See  Norwood  v.  Baker, 
172  U.  S.  269,  293,  19  S.  187,  43  L. 
443  [1898];  Williams  v.  Supervisors 
of  Albany,  122  U.  S.  154,  30  L.  1088, 
7  S.  1244;  Frederick  v.  City  of  Seat- 
tle, 13  Washington  428,  43  Pac.  364 
[18961:  (line  v.  City  of  Seattle,  13 
Washington  444,  43  Pac.  367  [1896]; 
Bacon   v.   City  of   Seattle,    15   Wash. 


§4Q8 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


624 


ture  could  adopt  and  sanction  an  improvement  which  it  could  have 
authorized  in  advance ;  and  could  provide  for  an  assessment  to 
pay  therefor  after  the  improvement  was  constructed.*  So  it  has 
been  said  that  a  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  for  levees,  and 
providing  that  part  of  such  assessment  shall  be  expended  for  levees 
which  have  already  been  built  and  shall  be  applied  to  paying 
such  pre-existing  debts  is  valid. ^  So  an  assessment  was  levied  for 
a  street  improvement,  based  on  the  preliminary  estimate  of  the 
cost.  Such  assessment  proved  to  be  insufficient  to  pay  the  cost  of 
such  improvement.  At  that  time  there  was  no  statutory  authority 
for  a  supplementary  assessment  and  the  excess  of  the  cost  of  the- 
improvement  over  the  amount  of  the  assessment  was  to  be  borne 
by  the  city.  After  the  improvement  was  constructed  a  statute  was 
passed  authorizing  supplementary  assessments-  in  case  of  defi- 
ciency and  applying  to  improvements  already  constructed.  The 
court  held  that  such  statute  as  applying  even  to  pre-existing  im- 
provements was  valid.''    So  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  private 


ington  701,  47  Pac.  1102;  Cooley, 
Taxation,  3d.  ed.  1280.  The  same 
answer  is  sulRcient  if  it  be  true  that 
when  the  work  was  done  the  cost  of 
planking  could  not  be  included  in  the 
special  assessment,  which  again  de- 
pends on  the  meaning  of  the  words 
'sidewalk'  and  'pave'  in  the  old  Char- 
ter Sec.  8,  taken  with  the  special 
provision  for  planking  in  Section  7, 
Laws  of  1885-1886,  pp.  238-241.  The 
charge  of  planking  on  the  general 
taxes  was  not  a  contraict  with  the 
land-owners,  and  no  more  prevented 
a  special  assessment  being  authorized 
for  it  later  than  silence  of  the  laws 
at  the  same  time  as  to  how  it  should 
be  paid  for  wovild  have.  In  either 
case  the  legislature  could  do  as  it 
thought  best.  Of  course,  it  does  not 
matter  that  this  is  called  a  re-assess- 
ment. A  re-assessment  may  be  a 
new  assessment.  Whatever  the  leg- 
islature could  authorize  if  it  were  or- 
dering an  assessment  for  the  first 
time  it  equally  could  authorize,  not- 
withstanding a  previous  invalid  at- 
tempt to  assess.  The  previous  at- 
tempt left  the  city  free  'to  take  such 
steps    as    were    within    its    power    to 


take,  either  under  existing  statutes, 
or  under  any  authority  that  might 
thereafter  be  conferred  upon  it,  to 
make  a  new  assessment  upon  the 
plaintiff's  abutting  property'  in  any 
constitutional  way.  Norwood  v. 
Baker,  172  U.  S.  269,  293;  McNamee 
V.  Tacoma,  24  Washington,  591 ;  An- 
nie Wright  Seminary  v.  Tacoma,  23 
Washington  109."  City  of  Seattle  v. 
Kelleher,  195  U.  S.  351,  359-360,  49 
L.  232,  25  S.  44   [1904]. 

*  In  the  Matter  of  the  Confirma- 
tion of  the  Report  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  Assessment  for  Grading, 
Paving  and  Otherwise  Improving 
Sackett,  Douglass  and  De  Graw 
Streets  in  the  City  of  Brooklyn,  74 
N.  Y.  95   [1878]. 

^  Alcorn  v.  Hamer,  38  Miss.  652 
[I860];  (citing  Williams  v.  Cam- 
mack,  27  Miss.  209,  61  Am.  Dec. 
508    [1854]). 

"Butler  V.  City  of  Toledo,  5  0.  S. 
225  [1855].  A  complication  existed 
in  the  fact  that  in  the  meantime  the 
property  had  been  sold  to  a  third 
person.  The  court  said:  "Here  the 
])roperty  of  the  complainant  had 
reaped  the  benefit  of  a  local  improve- 


II 


625  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §-109 

sewer  is  constructed  and  is  subsequently  bought  by  a  public  cor- 
poration, assessments  may  be  levied  for  the  purchase  price  there- 
of.^ This  may,  however,  be  explained  on  the  theory  that  the  ex- 
tinguishing of  the  rights  of  the  former  owners  of  such  sewers  was 
a  new  benefit.  So  some  courts  hold  that  extinguishing  the  rights 
of  the  owners  of  a  private  toll  road  is  a  new  benefit  for  which  as- 
sessments may  be  levied.*  Conversely  if  an  improvement  is  be- 
gun to  be  paid  for  by  local  assessments,  the  legislature  may  by 
subsequent  statute  make  such  improvement  a  charge  upon  the 
public  corporation,  to  be  paid  for  out  of  general  taxation." 

§  409.    Such  statutes  held  invalid. 

The  courts  are  not,  however,  unanimous  in  upholding  such 
statutes.  There  are  some  jurisdictions  which  seem  to  hold  that  a 
statute  authorizing  a  local  assessment  for  an  improvement  already 
constructed  under  circumstances  which  did  not  make  the  adjoin- 
ing or  abutting  property  liable  to  assessment  for  such  improve- 
ment, is  unconstitutional.^  If  no  statute  authorized  special  assess- 
ments when  the  improvement  was  made,  none  could  then  have  been 
levied.  The  property  owners  received  full  benefit  from  the  con- 
struction of  the  improvement.  To  levy  assessments  at  a  later 
time,  under  a  statute  passed  subsequently  is  to  charge  them  for  a 
benefit  which  they  possess  already.    Accordingly  in  some  jurisdic- 

ment,  for  the  making  of  which  the  chased  his  lots  subject  to  any  bur- 
property  was  originally  and  justly  den  which  the  state  might  lawfully 
liable  to  contribute.  By  a  mistake  impose,  and  we  cannot  perceive  how 
in  the  preliminary  estimate  of  cost —  the  vested  rights  of  com])lainant  are 
a  thing  of  no  rare  occurrence,  and  any  more  impaired  than  are  those  of 
affording  no  presumption  of  fraud —  every  recent  purchaser  of  real  estate 
the  fund  first  assessed  proved  to  be  in  Ohio,  whose  estate  is  now  yearly 
insufHcient.  It  is  but  just  that  ho  taxed  for  the  payment  of  interest 
should  contribute  ratably  to  supply  and  principal  on  a  state  debt  con- 
the  deficiency,  and  if  ho  refuses,  it  is  tracted  long  before  his  purchase." 
but  just  to  compel  him.  Nor  do  wo  Butler  v.  City  of  Toledo,  5  0.  S. 
.see  how  any  vested  right  is  impaired  225,  231-233  [18,55]. 
by  the  fact  of  his  purchase  inter-  "  Slocum  v.  Selectmen  of  Brookline. 
mediate  the  assessment  and  re-assess-  103  Mass.  23.  30  X.  E.  351  [1S!)51. 
ment.     He  voluntarily  purchased  lots  "  See   §   412. 

in  a  young  and  thriving  city,  to  tlio  "O'Xoill     v.    (  ity    nf    Hoboken,    72 

prosperity  and  growth   of  wliich,   as-  X.    J.    L.     (43    \  r. )     07,    (50    Atl.    50 

sessments   for    purposes   of    local    im-  I  1!MI5J. 

provement  were   absolutely   essential,  '  Holliday    v.    City    of    Atlanta.    DO 

and  which,  as  a  reasonable  being,  ho  (ia.  377,  23  S.  E.  406   [1895]. 
must     have     anticipated.       lie     pur- 


§410 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


626 


tions  it  is  held  that  such  statutes  are  invalid  as  far  as  they  apply 
to  previous  work.-  Thus  a  street  was  constructed  while  a  stat- 
ute was  in  force  which  did  not  authorize  a  local  assessment  for 
the  cost  of  the  intersections.  Subsequently  a  statute  was  passed 
authorizing  a  local  assessment  for  the  cost  of  the  intersections.  It 
was  held  that  such  statute,  as  far  as  it  authorized  assessments  for 
work  already  done,  was  invalid.^  Assessments  levied  to  pay  pre- 
existing debts  have  been  held  invalid.*  In  these  cases,  however, 
the  legislature  had  not  authorized  such  assessments.  Constitution- 
al questions  were  not  involved.  The  view  was  expressed,  however, 
that  if  the  statute  authorized  the  levy  of  assessments  upon  land 
outside  of  the  limits  of  the  municipality  making  the  improvement 
at  the  time  that  such  improvement  was  made,  such  statute  would 
be  unconstitutional.^  If  an  improvement  has  been  begun,  to  be 
paid  by  general  taxation,  the  city  cannot  subsequently  levy  an  as- 
sessment therefor.*' 

§  410.     Assessments  for  improvement  under  invalid  contract. 

If  the  improvement  was  made  under  a  contract  which  is  in- 
valid and  imposes  no  liability  upon  the  city,  or  if  it  is  made  under 
other  circumstances  which  leave  no  liability  of  any  kind  enforce- 
able against  the  city,  there  are  authorities  which  hold  that  no 
assessment  can  thereafter  be  levied  therefor.^  Thus  it  has  been 
held  that  no  assessment  can  be  levied  for  work  done  two  or  three 


=  Kelly  V.  Luning,  7G  Cal.  309.  18 
Pac.  335  [1888];  District  No.  110  v. 
Feck,  60  Cal.  403  [1882];  Reclama- 
tion District  No.  3  v.  Kennedy,  58 
Cal.  124  [1881];  In  the  Matter  of 
Opening  and  Grading  Market  Street, 
49  Cal.  546  [1875];  Gilmore  v.  Nor- 
ton, 10  Kan.  491    [1872]. 

» Kelly  V.  Luning,  76  Cal.  309,  18 
Pac.  335  [1888];  (citing  Brady  v. 
King,  53  Cal.  44  [1878],  and  People 
of  the  State  of  C'alifornia  v.  Lynch, 
51  Cal.  15,  21  Am.  Rep.  677   [1875]). 

'First  xNational  Bank  of  Sterling 
T.  Drew,  93  111.  App.  630  [1900J: 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Assessments  of 
Lands  in  the  Town  of  Flatbnsh  for 
the  Extension  of  Prospect  Park  in 
the  City  of  Brooklyn,  60  N.  Y.  398 
[1875]." 


^  In  the  Matter  of  the  Assessments 
( f  Lands  in  the  Town  of  Flatbush 
for  the  Extension  of  Prospect  Park 
in  the  City  of  Brooklyn,  60  N.  Y. 
398   [1875]'. 

°  Bennett  v.  City  of  Emmetsburg, 
—  la.  ,   115  N.  W.  582    [1908]. 

'  De  Haven  v.  Berendes,  135  Cal. 
178,  67  Pac.  780  [1901];  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  Opening  and  Grading  Market 
Street,  49  Cal.  546  [1875];  Dorathy 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  53  111.  79  [1869]; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Rosenfeld,  24  111. 
495  [I860];  Peck  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
22  111.  578;  Pease  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
21  111.  500;  Gilmore  v.  Norton,  10 
Kan.  491  [1872];  K«ane  v.  Klaus- 
man,  21  Mo.  App.  485  [18861;  Reilly 
V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St. 
(10  v'.  F.  Smith)    467   [1869]. 


II 


627  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  410 

years  before  under  an  invalid  contract.-  If  improvements  are 
made  by  private  persons  and  subsequently  adopted  by  the  city,  it 
is  held  that  the  city  cannot  levy  assessments  therefor."'  In  these 
cases,  however,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  city  paid  for  the  im- 
provement, except  voluntarily  and  without  authority.  No  statu- 
tory authority  for  making  such  payments  or  levying  such  assess- 
ments seems  ever  to  have  been  granted.  The  city  might  have 
omitted  from  assessment  the  property  in  front  of  which  the  own- 
ers thereof  had  made  such  improvements,*  but  it  could  not  assess 
other  property  owners  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement.  Ac- 
cordingly where  the  improvement  was  made  by  the  city  itself  or 
at  its  expense,  without  levying  an  assessment  therefor,  and  sub- 
sequently after  such  improvement  is  completed,  an  assessment  is 
levied,  such  assessment  has  been  held  to  be  valid.^  There  is,  how- 
ever, some  authority  for  holding  that  even  express  authority  from 
the  legislature  to  enforce  such  assessments  would  be  invalid.®  A 
street  was  constructed  voluntarily  by  certain  persons  and  subse- 
quently the  city  levied  an  assessment  to  pay  therefor.  Such  as- 
sessment was  held  to  be  invalid,  even  though  the  legislature  had 
expressly  authorized  it.'' 

Some  cases,  however,  have  gone  to  an  extreme  in  the  opposite 
direction.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  after  an  improvement  has 
been  constructed  under  a  contract  and  the  contract  price  paid 
therefor,  the  legislature  may  authorize  an  assessment  in  order  to 
pay  a  gratuity  to  the  contractor  and  thus  reimburse  him  for  his 
loss  under  the  contract. **  Cases  of  this  sort  seem  like  taking  pri- 
vate property  without  compensation,  in  order  to  make  a  present  of 
it  to  a  third  person.  The  purpose  is  not  one  for  which  general 
taxation  could  be  justified,  even  in  much  stronger  eases,''  and  no 

*In    the    Matter    of    Openinsr    and  city;    I'eck    v.    City    of    Chicago,    22 

Oraflin?  Market   Street.   49   Cal.   540  111.    578; 'Pease   v.    City   of   Chicago, 

flS75L  iiO  III.  500). 

'Creote  v.  City  nf  Chicago,  56  111.  'Cxilmore    v.    Norton.    10    Kan.    491 

422   [18701;   Dorathv  v.  City  of  Chi-  [1872]. 

cago,  53  111.  79  [18091;   City  of  Chi-  '  Gilmore   v.    Norton,    10   Kan.   491 

cago  V.  Rosenfelfl,  24  111.  495  [18001  ;  [18721. 

Peck  V.  City  of  Chicago.  22  111.  578;  'Brewster  v.  City  of  Syracnse,   19 

Pease  v.  City  of  Chicago,  21  111.  500.  N.  Y.   116   [18591. 

'Nee  §  640.  'State    v.    Osawkee.    14    Kan.    418, 

"Ricketts  v.  Village  of  Hyrle  Park,  19   Am.   Rep.   99;    Lowell   v.   City  of 

85    Til.    110    [18771;     (flistinciiishing  Boston,   111   Mass.  454.   15   Am.  Rep. 

as  cases  where  the  improvement  was  39;    Deerinsr    v.    Peterson,    75    Minn, 

made  hy  private  persons  on  their  own  118.  77  N.  W.  568. 
account  not  under  contract  with  the 


§§  411,  412 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


628 


reason  appears  why  local  assessments  for  such  purpose  should  be 
in  any  better  position  than  general  taxation.  The  lower  courts  of 
New  York  have  taken  a  different  view  of  such  statutes.  Thus  an 
assessment  and  contract  were  held  void.^*^  A  curative  statute  au- 
thorizing a  contract  with  the  specifically  named  contractor  and 
providing  that  such  work  done  by  him  before  the  passage  of  the 
act  should  be  regarded  as  performance  was  characterized  as  a 
"very  remarkable  legislative  enactment,"  ^^   and  held  invalid.^^ 

§  411.    Purchase  of  private  improvement. 

If  a  private  person  has  constructed  an  improvement  of  a  kind 
which  the  public  might  have  constructed  and  for  which  it  is  per- 
mitted to  levy  local  assessments,  a  statute  authorizing  the  public 
corporation  to  buy  such  improvement  and  to  levy  an  assessment 
to  pay  for  the  cost  of  such  purchase  is  valid  as  long  as  such  assess- 
ment is  not  levied  upon  the  land  of  owners  who  had  previously  ac- 
quired a  vested  right  to  make  use  of  such  improvement  while  it 
was  owned  by  such  private  person.^  Thus  a  city  may  be  author- 
ized to  buy  a  private  sewer  and  to  levy  an  assessment  to  pay  the 
cost  thereof  upon  the  ow^ners  of  abutting  property,  as  long  as  such 
owners  had  not  acquired  fixed  rights  to  use  such  sewer.^ 

§  412.     Conversion  of  toll  road  into  public  road. 

The  acquisition  of  the  rights  of  the  owners  of  a  toll  road  therein, 
and  the  conversion  of  such  road  into  a  public  road  is  a  public  pur- 
pose,  the   expense   of  which   may   be   met   by   general   taxation.^ 


'"  Hersee  v.  City  of  BufTalo,  1 
Sheldon  Sup.  €t.   (N.  Y.)   445  [1874]. 

^^  Granger  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  6 
Abb.  N.  C.    (N.  Y.)    238,  243   [1879]. 

^2  The  court  said:  "To  say  that 
one  man's  property  can  by  special 
law  be  taken  or  incumbered  in  a  man- 
ner and  by  proceedings  that  do  not 
apply  to  all  is  tyranny  and  revolt- 
ing to  the  theory  and  sentiment  of 
republican  equality.  If  it  is  com- 
petent for  the  legislature  thus  to  ex- 
press its  will  in  regard  to  property 
situated  upon  the  line  of  one  of  our 
highways  why  is  it  not  competent 
for  it  to  prescribe  hiws  differing  from 
the  general  laws  governing  the  rest 
of    society    as    to    the    personal    privi- 


leges and  liberties  of  those  who  own 
that  same  property  and  wherein 
would  then  consist  the  assured  safety 
and  permanence  of  the  constitutional 
riglits  of  property  or  liberty? 
Such  an  enactment  is  more  like  revo- 
lution than  the  administration  of 
just  and  equal  laws  and  has  no  war- 
rant in  the  law  or  in  the  customs  of 
our  fathers."  Granger  v.  City  of 
Buffalo,  6  Abb.  (X.  C.)  238,  245,  246 
[1879]. 

^  Slocum  V.  Selectmen  of  Brookline. 
1G3  Mass.  23,  39  N.  E.  351   [1895]. 

-  Slocum  V.  Selectmen  of  Brookline, 
163  Mass.  23,  39  N.  E.  351   [1895]. 

^  Warder  v.  Commissioners,  38  0. 
S.  639    [1883]. 


629  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §  412 

The  difficulty  in  upholding-  assessments  for  this  purpose  lies  in 
finding  a  special  or  peculiar  benefit  to  the  adjoining  property.  If 
the  abutting  property  owners  have  in  fact,  access  to  their  prop- 
erty over  a  turnpike  or  toll  road,  and  it  is  proposed  to  appropriate 
or  to  purchase  such  road  for  use  as  a  public  road  or  street,  the 
question  is  presented  whether  such  use  as  a  public  road  gives  the 
abutting  property  owner  any  additional  benefit  over  and  above 
that  which  he  already  possessed.  Upon  this  point  the  authorities 
are  few  and  divergent.  In  New  Jersey  it  is  held  that  such  proceed- 
ings confer  no  benefit  to  the  adjacent  land-owner,  as  he  has  no  ad- 
ditional right  of  access;  and  the  land  upon  which  such  road  is 
situated  is  still  subject  to  the  easement  in  favor  of  the  public. 
It  is  held  therefore  that  it  is  neither  a  case  of  opening  a  street 
nor  one  of  vacating  a  street  and  the  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such 
acquisition  is  accordingly  invalid.-  In  Ohio  the  courts  have  held 
that  if  a  toll  road  within  the  city  limits  has  been  appropriated  by 
the  city  in  eminent  domain,  an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such  pro- 
ceedings less  two  per  cent,  which  the  statute  provided  should  be 
paid  by  the  city  might  be  assessed  upon  the  abutting  property 
owners.'^  The  Circuit  Court  in  its  opinion  reached  this  conclusion 
with  reluctance  as  upholding  an  assessment  which  was  unjust  but 
constitutional.  Probably  a  different  result  would  be  reached  under 
later  Ohio  decisions  which  hold  that  local  assessments  cannot  be 
levied  for  paying  for  the  cost  of  opening  a  street.*  In  jurisdictions 
where  local  assessments  may  be  levied  for  acquiring  land  for  a 
public  road  or  street  ^  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  the  acquisition  of  an 
existing  road  which  could  be  used  only  upon  payment  of  com- 
pensation therefor  is  not  a  benefit  to  the  property  dependent  there- 
on for  access.  The  fact  that  some  form  of  access,  upon  payment 
of  consideration,  already  existed  should,  it  would  seem,  affect  only 
the  amount  of  the  assessment,  and  not  the  power  of  levying  assess- 
ments for  such  purpose. 

■•So  held  in  cases  where  the  public  Ohio   Dec.   291;    same   result   reached 

purchased   such  toll   road;    State.  Al-  on    appeal     in    Winslow    v.    City    of 

dridfre.    Pros.    v.    Essex    Public    Koad  Cincinati,   10  Ohio  C.  C.   191,  6  Ohio 

Board.   48  X.   J.  L.    (19   Vr.)    3(50,   5  ('.    D.    150    [18941;    the    latter    case 

Atl.   784    [ISSfi];    State.   Speer.  Pros.  aflRrnied  by  the  Supreme  Court  with- 

V.   Essex   Public   Road   Board.   47   X.  out  report  in  Winslow  v.  City  of  Cin- 

J.  L.    (18  Vr.)    101    ri8851;   State  v.  cinnati.  53  0.  S.  665,  44  N."  E.   1150 

Laverack,  ,34  X.  J.  L.    (5   Vr.)    207;  [18951. 

Carter  v.  Wripht    (3  Dutch.)    207.  *  See  §   308. 

'Winslow  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  2  'See  §  308. 


§§  413.  -114 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


630 


§  413.    Assessments  without  valid  ordinance. 

Under  many  of  the  statutes  on  the  subject  of  local  assessments, 
the  ordinance  providing  for  the  public  improvement  must  show  the 
determination  of  the  public  corporation  that  such  improvement 
shall  be  paid  for  by  local  assessment,  or  else  it  will  be  impossible 
by  subsequent  ordinance  to  levy  assessments  to  pay  for  such  im- 
provements. Questions  of  this  class  involve  statutory  construc- 
tion, do  not  involve  any  constitutional  questions  and  are  else- 
where discussed  in  detail.^  Here  it  may  be  observed  that  under 
such  statutes,  if  the  city  constructed  an  improvement  without  an 
ordinance  for  such  improvement,  a  subsequent  assessment  there- 
for is  invalid,  in  the  absence  of  a  prior  statute  providing  that  the 
omission  of  such  prior  ordinance  shall  have  some  other  and  differ- 
ent effect,  and  in  the  absence  of  some  subsequent  curative  statute.- 
Thus,  if  the  resolution  for  construction  of  a  sewer  provides  that  its 
cost  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  general  fund  of  the  city,  the  city  can- 
not after  the  work  is  completed,  on  finding  that  the  city  is  indebted 
beyond  the  constitutional  limit,  assess  the  owners  of  property  bene- 
fited by  such  sewer  for  the  cost  thereof.^ 


§  414.    Re-assessments  held  valid. 

Objections  of  this  sort  are,  however,  chieflj'  statutory.     If  the 
legislature  has  provided  specifically  concerning  the  effect  of  the 


'  See  Chapter  XV. 

^-Ue  Haven  v.  Berendes,  135  Cal. 
178,  67  Pac.  786  [1901];  Partridge 
V.  Lucas,  99  Cal.  519,  33  Pac.  1082 
[1893];  Donnelly  v.  Howard,  60  Cal. 
291  [1882];  City  of  Paxton  v.  Bo- 
gardus,  201  HI.  628,  66  X.  E.  853 
[1903];  Connecticut  Mutual  Life  In- 
surance Company  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
185  111.  148.  56*  X.  E.  1071  [1900]; 
Pells  V.  City  of  Paxton,  176  111.  318, 
52  X.  E.  64  [1898];  Davis  v.  City 
of  Litchfield,  155  111.  384,  40  X.  E. 
354  [1895];  Freeport  Street  Railway 
Company  v.  City  of  Freeport,  151  111. 
451,  38"  X.  E.  137  [1894];  City  of 
East  St.  Louis  v.  Albrecht.  150  111. 
.506,  37  X.  E.  934  [1894];  Weld  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Kern,  149  111.  257.  36 
X.  E.  1006  [1894];  City  of  Carlyle 
V.  The  County  of  Clinton.  140  111. 
512.  30  X.  E."  782  [1893];  City  of 
Alton  V.  Foster,  74  111.  App.  511 
[1897];     Zalesky    v.    City    of    Cedar 


Rapids,  118  la.  714,  92  X.  W.  657 
[1902];  Lux  &  Talbott  Stone  Com- 
pany V.  Donaldson,  162  Ind.  481,  68 
X.  E.  1014  [1903];  Xewman  v.  City 
of  Emporia,  32  Kan.  456,  4  Pac.  815 
[1884];  Second  Municipality  of  Xew 
Orleans  v.  Botts,  8  Rob.  (La.)  198 
[1844];  Brown  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Fitchburg.  128  Mass.  282 
[1880];  Dickey  v.  Holmes,  109  Mo. 
App.  721,  83*  S.  W.  982  [1904]; 
Smith  V.  Small,  50  Mo.  App.  401 
[1S92];  Donohue  v.  Brotherton,  7 
Ohio  X.  P.  367  [1900];  Folz  v.  City 
of  Cincinnati,  2  Handy  (Ohio),  261 
[1855];  Appeal  of  Harper,  109  Pa. 
St.  9,  1  Atl.  791  [1885];  Reilly  v. 
City  of  Philadelphia.  60  Pa.  St.' (10 
P.  F.  Smith)  467  [1869];  Buckley  v. 
City  of  Tacoma,  9  Wash.  253.  37  Pac. 
441    [1894]. 

'  Spaulding  v.  Baxter.  25  Ind.  App. 
4S5.  58  X".  E.  551   [1900]. 


1 


631 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


§414 


omission  to  pass  a  valid  ordinance  before  an  assessment  is  made, 
and  such  specific  provision  declares  in  express  terms  or  in  effect 
that  such  assessment  is  valid,  full  effect  is  given  in  most  jurisdic- 
tions to  such  statutes.^  Thus,  if  the  city  is  given  power  to  modify 
its  requirements  concerning  the  construction  of  sewers,  a  sewer  be- 
gun under  a  defective  ordinance  but  constructed  under  a  subse- 
quent valid  ordinance  may  be  paid  for  b}'  assessment.^  If  the  ordi- 
nance provides  that  the  improvement  shall  be  paid  for  by  assess- 
ments, and  such  ordinance  is  valid  as  to  the  improvement  therein 
provided  for,  but  invalid  as  to  the  particular  form  of  assessment 
to  be  levied,  it  is  possible  for  the  city  to  levy  an  assessment  by  a 
subsequent  assessment  ordinance.'^  So  a  drainage  commissioner 
may  levy  a  subsequent  assessment  to  pay  the  cost  of  a  prior  im- 
provement.* If  the  public  corporation  has  made  a  public  improve- 
ment and  at  the  time  of  making  such  improvement  has  made  an 
invalid  and  ineffectual  attempt  to  levy  an  assessment  therefor,  a 
statute  curing  such  defect  and  providing  for  a  re-assessment  for 
such  improvement  is  valid,  if  the  defect  concerned  a  matter  with 
which  the  legislature  could  have  dispensed  at  the  outset.®     Such 


'See  Chapter   XVIII. 

^  City  to  use  of  Fox  v.  Schoene- 
mann,'52  Mo.  348    [1873]. 

^  Cummings  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  181  111.  13G.  54  X.  E. 
941  [1899];  (affirmed  in  Lombard  v. 
West  Chicago  Park  Commissioners, 
181  U.  S.  33,  45  L.  731,  21  S.  507 
[1901])  ;  Helm  v.  Witz,  35  Ind.  App. 
131,  73  N.  E.  846    [1904]. 

*  Dean  v.  Treasurer  of  Clinton 
County,  146  Mich.  645,  109  X.  W. 
1131  [1901].  In  this  case,  however, 
the  subsequent  assessment  was  levied 
on  a  larger  area  than  the  original 
assessment,  and  accordingly  it  was 
held  that  the  surplus  left  after  pay- 
ing for  widening  cleaning  and  ex- 
tending the  drain  could  not  be  used 
for  paying  debts  due  for  the  original 
construction. 

"City  of  Seattle  v.  Kelleher.  105 
TT.  R.  .351,  49  L.-232,  25  S.  44  [1904]  -. 
Jjombard  v.  W^est  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners.  181  U.  S.  33.  45 
U  731,  21  S.  507  [19011;  (affirming 
Cumminsis     v.     West     Chicago     Park 


Commissioners,  181  111.  136,  .54  X\  E. 
941  [1899]);  Spencer  v.  Merchant, 
125  U.  S.  345,  31  L.  763,  8  S.  921 
[1888];  (affirming  Spencer  v.  Mer- 
chaat.  100  X.  Y.  585,  3  X.  E.  682 
[1885]);  Ross  V.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  Wright  County,  Iowa,  128 
la.  427,  1  L.  R.  A.  (X. 's.)  431,  104 
X^  W.  506  [1905];  Kansas  City  v. 
Silver,  74  Kan.  851,  85  Pac.  '  805 
[1906];  X'ewman  v.  City  of  Emporia, 
41  Kan.  583,  21  Pac.  593  [1889]; 
Mason  v.  Spencer,  35  Kan.  512,  11 
Pac.  402  [1886];  City  of  Emporia  v. 
Bates.  16  Kan.  495  [1876];  City  of 
Enipcria  v.  Xorton.  13  Kan.  569 
[187-1];  CJilmore  v.  X'orton,  10  Kan. 
491  [1872]:  :Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore  v.  Ulman,  79  Md.  469. 
.30  Atl.  43  [1894];  :\[ayor  and  Citv 
Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Horn.  26 
^fd.  194  [18661:  Warren  v.  Street 
Commissioners  of  the  Citv  of  Bn>ton. 
187  Mass.  290.  72  X.  E.  1022  [1905]  : 
TIall  V.  Street  Commissioners  of  Bos- 
ton. 177  Mass.  434.  59  X.  E.  [1901]; 
State    V.    District    Court    of    Ramsey 


§414 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


632 


statutes  are  not  looked  upon  with  favor  and  are  construed  even 
more  strictly  than  original  assessment  statutes."  After  judgment 
has  been  rendered  declaring  a  specific  assessment  invalid  the  leg- 
islature cannot  annul  such  judgment  and  ratify  such  assessment.^ 


County,  98  Minn.  63,  107  N.  W. 
726  [1906];  McMillan  v.  Board  of 
County  Commissioners  of  Freeborn 
County,  93  Minn.  16,  100  N.  W.  384. 
1125  [1904];  State  ex  rel.  Gotzian 
V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County, 
77  Minn.  248,  79  N.  W.  971  [1899]; 
S.  D.  Mercer  Co.  v.  City  of  Omaha, 

—  Neb.  ,  107  N.  W.  565  [1906] ; 

City  of  East  Orange  v.  Hussey,  72  N. 
J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  71,  59  Atl. 
1060  [1905J;  DeWitt  v.  City 
of  Elizabeth,  56  M.  J.  L. 
(27  Vroom)  119,  27  Atl.  801 
[1893];  In  re  Report  of  Commission- 
ers, etc.,  of  Elizabeth,  49  N.  J.  L. 
(20  Vr.)  488,  10  Atl.  363  [1887]; 
State,  Bergen  County  Savings  Bank, 
Pros.  V.  Inhabitants  of  the  Township 
of  Union  in  the  County  of  Bergen,  44 
N.  J.  L.  (15  Vroom")  599  [1882]; 
State,  Peckham,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  New- 
ark, 43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vroom)  576 
[1881];  State,  Walter,  Pros.  v.  Town 
of  Union  in  the  County  of  Hudson, 
33  N.  J.  L.  (4  Vr.)  350  [1869]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Application  of 
the  Trustees  of  Union  College  for  an 
Order  directing  the  Treasurer  of 
Long  Island  City  to  cancel  certain 
water  rates  and  rents,  129  N.  Y.  308, 
29  N.  E.  460  [1891];  People  ex 
rel.  Kilmer  v.  McDonald,  69  N.  Y. 
362  [1877];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Application  of  Van  Antwerp  to  va- 
cate an  assessment,  56  N.  Y.  261 
[1874] ;  Brewster  v.  City  of  Syracuse. 
19  N.  Y.  116  [1859];  Hatzung  v. 
City  of  Syracuse,  92  Hun.  203,  30 
N.  Y.  S.  521  [1895];  Moran  v.  City 
of  Troy,  9  Hun.  540  [1877];  Hopkins 
V.  Mason  42  Howard  (N.  Y.)  115 
[1871];  In  the  Matter  of  Regulating 
and  Grading  Eightieth  Street  be- 
tween Fifth  Avenue  and  the  East 
River,  31  Howard,  99   [1865];   Astor 


V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 
of  the  City  of  New  York,  37  N.  Y. 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  539  [1874];  Miller  v. 
Graham,  17  0.  S.  1  [1866];  Butler 
V.  City  of  Toledo,  5  0.  S.  225  [1855] ; 
Duniway  v.  Portland,  47  Or.  103,  81 
Pac.  945  [1905];  Thomas  v.  Portland 
40  Or.  50,  66  Pac.  439  [1901]; 
Whitney  v.  City  of  Pittsburg  147 
Pa.  St.  351,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  740,  23 
Atl.  395  [1892];  Donley  v.  Pittsburg, 
147  Pa.  St.  348,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  738, 

23  Atl.  394  [1892]';  City  of  Chester 
v.  Black,  132  Pa.  St.  568,  6  L.  R.  A. 
802,  19  Atl.  276  [1890];  Erie  City 
V.  Rleed,  113  Pa.  St.  468,  6  Atl.  679; 
Hewitt's  Appeal,  88  Pa.  St.  55; 
Kelley  v.  City  of  Pittsburg,  85  Pa. 
St.  170,  27  Am.  Rep.  633  [1877]; 
Commonwealth  to  use  of  Allegheny 
City  V.  Marshall,  69  Pa.  St.  (19  P. 
F.  Smith)  328  [1871];  Magee  v. 
Commonwealth  for  the  use  of  the 
City  of  Pittsburg,  46  Pa.  St.  358  ( 10 
Wright)  358  [1863];  Schenley  v. 
Commonwealth  for  the  use  of  the 
City  of  Allegheny,  36  Pa.  St.  (12 
Casey)  64  [1859]"^;  Lewis  v.  City  of 
Seattle,  28  Wash.  639,  69  Pac.  393 
[1902]  ;  McNamee  v.  City  of  Tacoma. 

24  Wash.  591,  64  Pac.  791  [1901]; 
Abernethy  v.  Town  of  Medical  Lake. 
9  Wash.  112;  37  Pac.  306  [1894]; 
Haubner  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  124 
Wis.  153,  101  N.  W.  930  (re-hearing 
denied,  102  N.  W.  578  [1905]); 
Schintgen  v.  City  of  LaCrosse,  117 
Wis.  158,  94  N.  W.  84  [1903];  Mills 
V.  Charleton,  29  Wis.  400,  9  Am. 
Rep.  578  (1872];  Dean  v.  Charlton, 
27  Wis.  522  [1871];  see  Chapter 
XVII. 

"Dean  v.  Charlton,  27  Wis.  522 
[1871]. 

''  Searcy  v.  Patriot  and  Barkworks 
Turnpike  Company,  79  Ind.  274 
[1881];   Thomas  v.   Portland.  40  Or. 


633  WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY   BE   LEVIED.  §415 

"It  would  not  be  competent  for  the  legislature  to  validate  such  an 
assessment  notwithstanding  an  adjudication  of  a  court  declaring 
it  a  nullity  and  thus  permit  it  to  be  enforced  in  the  manner  pointed 
out  by  the  charter,  through  the  issuance  of  a  warrant  and  levy  and 
sale  of  the  property  thereunder.  A  statute  which  operates  to  an- 
nul or  set  aside  the  final  judgment  of  a  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction and  to  disturb  or  defeat  rights  thus  vested  is  inoperative 
and  void.  By  reason  of  the  distribution  of  powers  under  the  con- 
stitution assigning  each  its  separate  and  distinct  functions,  one 
department  is  not  permitted  to  trench  upon  the  functions  and 
powers  of  the  other."*  In  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been  held 
that  "the  legislature  cannot  legalize  a  void  assessment."^  So  a 
statute  attempting  to  cure  assessment  proceedings  under  an  uncon- 
stitutional statute  has  been  held  invalid. ^'^  However,  a  statute  au- 
thorizing another  assessment  for  the  same  improvement  is  not  ob- 
jectionable as  setting  aside  a  pre-existing  judgment  declaring  a 
former  assessment  invalid.'^  Such  re-assessment  statute  recog- 
nizes and  is  based  upon  the  theory  that  the  original  assessment  is 
invalid. 

§  415.     Contract  may  precede  assessment. 

If  the  statute  permits  the  assessment  to  be  levied  after  the  con- 
tract is  made,  full  effect  is  given  to  such  statute.  No  constitutional 
restrictions  seem  to  compel  the  legislature  to  require  that  the  as- 
sessment shall  be  levied  before  the  contract  is  made.^     In  such 

50,    66    Pac.    439     [1901];     Mills    v.  State   of   Kansas   on   the   relation   of 

Charleton.  29   Wis.  400,   9  Am.   Rep.  Young   v.   City   of  Xeodesha,   3   Kan. 

578   [18721.  App.  319,  45  Pac.  122  [1896];   Princ  > 

« Thomas    v.    Portland,    40    Or.    50,  v.    City    of    Boston,     111    Mass.    226 

52,   60   Pac.   439    [1901].  [1872];    Wiiiting   v.    Mayor    and    Al- 

°  Schumacker  v.  Toberman.  56  Cal.  (h'rnicii    <;f    the    City    of    Boston,    106 

508,   511    [1880];     (citing   People    of  :\rass.  89    [1870];   Jones  v.  Board  of 

the  State  of  California   v.   Lynch,  51  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Boston.   104 

Cal.    15,   21    Am.   Rep.   677    [1875]);   ■  Mass.  4(il    [1870]  ;   Butler  v.  Detroit. 

Taylor      v.      Palmer.      31      Cal.      240  43  :Mich.  552,  5  X.  W.   1078;   Lefevre 

[1866].       To     the     same     etlect     see  v.    Mayor,    etc..    of    Detroit,    2    Mich. 

Brady  V.  King,  53  Cal.  44   [1878].  586    118.53];    Keigher   v.    City   of   St. 

'"State,    Peckham.    Pros.    v.    Mayor  Paul.    ()!)    :\Iiiiii.    78.    72    N."    W.    54 

and  Common   Council   of  the  City  of  [1897]  ;   Khvood  v.  City  of  Rochester 

Newark,   43   N.   J.   L.    (14  -Vr.)    576  43  Hun.   (X.  Y.)   102  [1887]:  Webber 

[1881].  V.    Common    Council    of    the    City   of 

"Mills   V.   Charleton.   29   Wis.   400.  Lockport,     43     How.      (X.     Y.)      368 

9  Am.  Rep.  578   [18721.  [1872];     Addyston     Pipe    and     Steel 

'Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     Cole.     132  Company   v.   City   of   Corry,    197    Pa. 

Fed.  668    [1904];   Gilmore  v.   Hentig,  St.  41.  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  812.  46   M\. 

33    Kan.     156,    5    Pac.    781     [1885]:  1035    [1900]. 


§416 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


634 


cases  the  work  is  begun  under  circumstances  which,  if  not  modi- 
fied by  the  subsequent  action  of  the  public  corporation  would 
make  the  cost  of  the  improvement  a  charge  upon  the  public  cor- 
poration, to  be  paid  for  out  of  the  revenues  accruing  from  general 
taxation,^  but  the  validity  of  such  statutes  is  not  affected  thereby. 
Property  owners  are  bound  to  know,  when  the  improvement  is 
begun,  that  the  public  corporation  has  not  made  a  final  election 
to  pay  for  such  improvement  by  general  taxation,  but  that  it  may 
still  assess  therefor. 

§  416.    Payment  by  city  does  not  invalidate  assessment. 

If  authorized  by  statute  the  city  or  other  public  corporation  may 
pay  for  the  cost  of  a  public  improvement  out  of  its  treasury,  from 
funds  raised  by  general  taxation  and  then  proceed  to  reimburse 
itself  in  whole  or  in  part  by  levying  an  assessment  for  the  cost 
of  such  improvement.^  This  rule  applies  even  if  by  statute  the 
public  corporation  should  have  paid  the  cost  of  such  improve- 
ment only  out  of  the  fund  created  by  the  assessment.^  So  the  fact 
that  the  improvement  is  paid  out  of  a  fund  raised  by  several  local 
assessments  does  not  prevent  the  levy  of  local  assessments.''  The 
fact  that  the  public  corporation  has  borrowed  money  *  as  by  issu- 


-  Smith  V.  Duck  Pond  Ditching 
Association,  54  Ind.  235  [1876];  In 
the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Roberts 
to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  81  X.  Y.  62 
[1880];  Doughty  v.  Hope,  3  Denio 
(N.  Y.)  249  [1846];  Wetmore  v. 
Campbell,  4  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  341 
[1849];  Strowbridge  v.  City  of  Port- 
land, 8  Or.  67   [1879]. 

^  Sweet  V.  West  Chicago  Parlv  Com- 
missioners, 177  111.  492,  53  N.  E.  74 
[1899];  City  of  Elkhart  v.  Wick- 
wire.  121  Ind.  331.  22  N.  E.  342 
[1889];  City  of  Lafayette  v.  Fowler, 
34  Ind.  140  [1870];  City  of  Burling 
ton  V.  Quick,  47  la.  222  [1877]  ;  Pat 
terson  v.  Baumer.  43  la.  477  [1876] 
Burns  v.  City  of  Duluth,  96  Minn 
104,  104  N.  W.  714  [1905];  Bradley 
V.  Village  of  West  Duluth,  45  ^linn 
4,  47  N.  W.  166  [1890]  ;  State.  Jelliff 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  the  City  of  Newark,  48  N.  J.  L. 


(19  Vr.)  101.  2  Atl.  627  [U 
Elwood  V.  City  of  Rochester,  43  Hun. 
(X.  Y.t  102  [1887];  Heath  v. 
:McCrea,  20  Wash.  342,  55  Pac.  432 
[1898];  Town  of  Tumwater  v.  Pix, 
18    Wa>^h.    153,    51    Pac.    323    [1897]. 

-Pi'tterson  v.  Baumer,  43  la.  477 
[1876]. 

^  Burns  v.  City  of  Duluth,  96  Minn. 
104,  104  N.  VV.  714  [1905J.  The 
money  raised  by  the  various  local  as- 
sessments was  deposited  in  a  "revolv- 
ing fund"  out  of  which  new  improve- 
ments were  paid  for  in  advance:  and 
then  assessments  were  levied  for  such 
improvements  to  replenish  such 
fund. 

*  Davis  V.  City  of  Xewark,  54  N.  J. 
L.  (25  Vr.)  144,  23  Atl.  276  [1891]; 
In  re  Beechvvood  Avenue,  Appeal  of 
O'Mara.  194  Pa.  St.  86,  45  Atl. 
[1899]. 


1 


635 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE   LEVIED. 


417 


ing  bonds,'  and  has  thus  paid  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement 
does  not  prevent  the  subsequent  levy  of  an  assessment  against  the 
property  benefited  by  such  improvement  to  reimburse  the  city.  So 
if  the  public  corporation  has  paid  for  the  improvement  by  issu- 
ing warrants  to  the  contractor "  or  to  one  who  loans  money  to  pay 
for  such  improvement ''  it  may  reimburse  itself  by  levying  an  as- 
sessment. 

§  417.     Benefit  dependent  on  future  action. 

The  property  owner  must  have  a  fixed  right  to  the  improvement 
and  the  benefits  which  accrue  therefrom  to  render  him  liable  to 
assessment  therefor.  If  he  is  not  vested  with  such  rights,  and  he 
may  or  may  not  continue  to  enjoy  such  benefits,  dependent  upon 
the  future  action  of  a  natural  person  or  of  a  private  or  public  or>r- 
poration,  such  benefit  is  too  precarious  to  be  the  basis  of  an  as- 
sessment for  benefits.^  Thus  if  owners  of  water  seek  damages  for 
diverting  water,  the  city  cannot  set  off  the  value  of  the  use  of  the 
returned  sewage  if  the  city  is  under  no  legal  obligation  to  return 
such  sewage.-  An  assessment  for  improving  a  navigable  stream 
was  held  invalid  among  other  reasons,  because  such  improvement 
was  dependent  upon  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  which 
approval  had  not  yet  been  secured  and  might  never  be  secured.-' 
However,  if  a  bridge  has  actually  been  constructed  across  a  navi- 
gable stream  to  connect  the  parts  of  a  street  upon  either  bank, 
the  legality  of  such  bridge  will  be  presumed  and  the  assent  of  the 


"People  ex  rel.  Wood  v.  Jones.  137 
111.  35,  27  N.  E.  294  [18921;  Loes- 
nitz  V.  Seelinjier,  127  Incl.  422,  25  N. 
E.  1037,  26  N.  E.  887  [18901;  Cit? 
of  Atchison  v.  Price,  45  Kan.  29(i, 
25  Pac.  605  [18911;  State  of  Minne- 
sota V.  Norton.  63  Minn.  497.  65  N. 
W.  935  [18961;  State,  Hand.  Pros. 
V.  City  Council  of  the  City  of  Eliza- 
beth, 31  N.  J.  L.   (2  Vr.)   .547   [1S64|. 

'City  of  Atchison  v.  Lou,  48  Kan. 
138,  29  Pac.  467  [18921;  City  of 
Port  Angeles  v.  Lauridsen,  26  Wash. 
153,  66  Pac.  403    [19011. 

'  (Virliss  V.  Village  of  Highland 
Park.  132  Mich.  152,  93  X.  W.  610. 
95  X.  W.  254;  aflirnied  on  rehearing 
95   X.   W.    416    [19031. 

*  City     of     Waukegan     v.     Burnett, 


234  111.  460.  S4  X.  E.  1061  [19081; 
(Juge  V.  City  of  Chicago,  191  111. 
210,  60  X.  E.  896  [19011;  Title  Guar 
antee  and  Trust  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 162  111.  505.  44  x!  E.  832 
[18961;  Edwards  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
140  111.  440,  30  X.  E..350  [18931; 
Ilutt  V.  City  of  Chicago,  132  III.  352, 
23  X.  E.  ioiO  [18911:  Swenson  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  Town  of  Hal- 
lock.  95  Minn.  161,  103  X.  W.  895 
[19051  Langmead  v.  City  of  Cincin- 
nati. 29  Ohio  C.  C.  64  [19001;  In  re 
P.arre  Water  Co..  72  Vt.  413.  48  Atl. 
653. 

-  hi  re  Barre  Water  Co..  72  Vt. 
^13.    48    Atl.    653. 

'City  of  Chicago  v.  Law.  144  111. 
569,    33    X.   E,   855    [1893]. 


.§■418  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  636 

Secretary  of  War  need  not  be  shown.*  Relief  will  be  given  against 
an  assessment  of  which  confirmation  is  obtained  by  means  of  a 
promise  to  condemn  the  land  on  which  the  improvement  is  located, 
where  the  city  abandons  the  condemnation  proceedings  after  ob- 
taining such  confirmation.^  The  most  common  form  of  attempted 
assessment  in  such  cases  is  found  where  a  public  corporation  seeks 
to  levy  assessments  for  improvements  to  be  made  in  the  future. 

§  418.    Assessments  for  future  improvements. 

Cases  are  occasionally  presented  in  which  an  improvement  has 
been  constructed  which  does  not  of  itself  confer  any  benefit,  or 
which  does  not  confer  a  benefit  upon  land  which  it  is  sought  to  as- 
sess but  which  will  prove  beneficial  in  the  future  if  the  municipal 
corporation  or  other  public  corporation  proceed  to  construct  a 
further  and  additional  improvement.  If  the  public  corporation 
has  resolved  to  construct  such  improvement,  it  is  generally  held 
that  a  statute  authorizing  the  levy  of  an  assessment  for  the  bene- 
fits which  will  be  conferred  by  such  improvement,  already  resolved 
upon  but  to  be  constructed  in  the  future,  is  constitutional.^  A 
public  corporation  is  regarded  as  under  a  legal  obligation  to 
construct  such  improvement,  an  obligation  which  may  be  enforced 
by  the  owners  of  the  property  assessed  in  case  such  public  corpor- 
ation does  not  voluntarily  construct  such  improvement.  In  the 
cases  thus  far  considered,  a  public  corporation  was  under  some 
legal  obligation  to  construct  the  future  improvement  which  would 
cause  a  benefit  to  inure  to  the  property  assessed,  in  return  for 
which  benefit  the  assessment  is  levied.  DifiPerent  considerations 
apply  where  the  public  corporation  is  not  under  any  legal  obliga- 
tion to  construct  such  improvement,  but  is  free  to  construct  it.  or 
not  to  construct  it,  as  in  its  discretion  it  may  deem  best.  In  cases 
of  this  sort  the  property  owner  has  no  means  of  compelling  a  public 
corporation  to  construct  the  improvement  so  as  to  benefit  him  in 
any  way.  Accordingly,  it  is  generally  held  that  in  such  cases  the 
local  assessment  cannot  be  levied,  since  the  property  owner  has 
no  assurance  that  the  improvement  will  ever  be  so  constructed  as 
to  confer  a  benefit  upon  his  property  which  it  is  sought  to  assess 

*  Pearson   v.   City   of   Chicago,    162  missioners,  222  111.  384.  78  N.  E.  794 

111.  383,  44  N.  E.  739   [1896].  [1906];   Reed  v.  City  of  Cedar  Rap 

« Dempster  v.  City  of  Chicago,  175  ids,    —    la.    ,    111    N,    W.    1013 

111.  278,  51  N.  E.  710   [1898].  [1907]. 

'  Lingle  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 


637 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS   MAY   BE   LEVIED. 


418 


for  such  improvement.^  Thus  a  street  was  laid  out  across  a  river, 
but  no  provision  for  a  bridge  was  made.  It  was  held  that  the 
benefits  which  would  accrue  in  the  future  if  the  bridge  was  con- 
structed could  not  be  estimated  in  determining  the  amount  of  the 
assessment.^  Thus  no  assessment  can  be  levied  against  land  which 
will  be  benefited  by  a  sewer  only  if  the  sewer  is  extended.*  Thus 
it  has  been  held  that  no  assessment  can  be  levied  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  sewer  on  land  a  third  of  a  mile  away  which  could 
be  drained  by  such  sewer  if  a  lateral  sewer  were  constructed, 
where  the  public  corporation  is  not  bound  to  construct  such  lateral 
sewer.^  So  no  assessment  can  be  levied  or  charge  made  for  drain- 
age for  a  benefit  which  will  probably  result  in  the  future,  in  ac- 
cordance with  past  custom,  as  a  result  of  the  construction  of  a 
highway,  the  town  not  being  bound  to  construct  such  highway  so 
as  to  cause  drainage.'''  There  is,  however,  some  authority  for  al- 
lowing such  assessments.  Thus  a  street  would  prove  beneficial  to 
its  full  extent  only  if  a  bridge  were  built  to  connect  the  two  sec- 
tions of  the  street  on  opposite  sides  of  a  river.  It  was  held  proper 
to  levy  the  assessment  on  the  assumption  that  such  bridge  would 
be  built.^ 


^  City  of  Waukegan  v.  Burnett, 
234  111.  460,  84  X.  E.  1061  [1908]; 
Clerk  V.  City  of  Chicago,  214  111. 
318,  73  N.  E.  358  [1905];  Gage  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  191  111.  210,  60  N. 
E.  896  [1901];  Holdom  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  169  111.  109,  48  N.  E.  164 
[1897];  Title  Guarantee  and  Trust 
Co.  V.  City  of  Chicago,  162  111.  505. 
44  N.  E.' 832  [1896];  Edwards  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  140  111.  440,  30  N. 
E.  350  [1893];  Hutt  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 132  111.  352,  23  X.  E.  1010 
[1891];  Swenson  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  Town  of  Hallock,  95  Minn. 
161,  103  X.  W.  895  [1905];  Ilansconi 
V.  City  of  Omaha,  11  Xeb.  37,  7  X. 
W.  739  [1881];  People  ex  rel.  Mar- 
vin V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  23  Barb.  (X. 
Y.)    166    [1856]. 

'Hutt  V.  City  of  Chicago.  132  111. 
352,  23  X.  E.  'lOlO  [1S91];  contra: 
Dickson  v.  City  of  Racine,  65  Wis. 
306,  27  X.  W.  58  [1886]. 


*  Edwards  v.  City  of  Chicago,  140 
ill.  440,  30  X.  E.  350  [1893].  To 
the  .same  eflect.  see  Clark  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  214  111.  318,  73  X.  E.'358 
[1905];  Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago,  191 
111.  210,  60  X.  E.  896  [1901];  Title 
Guarantee  and  Trust  Co.  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  162  111.  505.  44  X.  E.'832 
[1S96]. 

°  State,  Xevv  Jersey  Railroad  and 
Transportation  Company,  Pros.  v. 
City  of  Elizabeth.  37  X.  J.  L.  (8 
Vr.)  3.30  [1875].  To  the  same  elfect. 
see  Hanscom  v.  City  of  Omaha,  11 
Xeb.  37  [1881];  People  ex  rel.  Mar- 
vin V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  23  Barb.  (X'. 
Y.)    166  ["l856]. 

'  Swenson  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Town  of  Hallock,  95  Minn.  161, 
103  X.  W.  895    [1905]. 

'  Dickson  v.  City  of  Racine.  65  Wis. 
306,  27  X.  W.  58   [1886]. 


§  419  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  638 


H.— CLASSES  OF  IMPROVEMENTS  WITH  REFERENCE  TO 
TYPES  OF  ASSESSMENT. 

§  419.     Classes  of  improvements  for  which  assessments  for  bene- 
fits may  be  levied. 

In  determining  whether  an  improvement  of  a  given  type  is  one 
for  which  the  public  corporation  making  such  improvement  may 
levy  an  assessment  for  benefits,  or  whether  it  is  an  improvement 
for  which  an  assessment  for  the  performance  of  a  legal  duty  owing 
by  the  owner  of  the  real  property  may  be  levied,  or  whether  it 
is  one  for  which  a  so-called  assessment  in  return  for  goods  de- 
livered or  work  and  labor  done  may  be  levied,  we  find  that  the 
courts  are  not  harmonious  in  determining  how  certain  types  of 
improvement  are  to  be  classed.  Furthermore,  some  improvements 
are  regarded  as  being  for  a  public  purpose,  and  conferring  a 
special  local  benefit  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  as  being 
a  performance  of  a  duty  which  the  law  imposes  upon  the  owner 
of  the  property  assessed  therefor.  In  the  case  of  such  improve- 
ments the  legislature  may  provide  for  an  assessment  either  upon 
the  theory  of  benefits  or  upon  the  theory  of  a  charge  for  the  per- 
formance of  a  legal  duty.^  Thus  while  ^he  legislature  may  re- 
quire the  property  owner  to  construct  a  sidewalk  in  front  of  his 
property  on  the  theory  of  performance  of  a  legal  duty  ^  yet  if  the 
legislature  requires  a  sidewalk  to  be  constructed  on  the  theory  of 
an  assessment  for  benefits,  the  city  cannot  compel  the  property 
owner  to  construct  the  improvement  in  front  of  his  property.' 
According  to  the  great  weight  of  authority,  public  streets  in  a 
city,  town,  or  village,  constitute  improvements  for  which  assess- 
ments may  be  levied  upon  the  theory  of  benefits,  and  on  no  other 
theory.*  This  general  principle  includes  laying  out  and  opening 
of  streets,  and  grading  them  and  paving  them.-'^  An  assessment 
based  on  the  theory  of  the  performance  of  a  legal  duty  cannot  be 
levied  for  such  improvements.®  It  also  includes  such  improve- 
ments as  curbing  and  guttering,  where  such  improvements  are  re- 
garded as  a  part  of  the  street.'^     Assessments  for  thoroughfares 

iSee  §§  .323.  324.  ei  seq..  334  et  seq.  'Whaler  v.  McAleese,  —  N.  J.   ^q. 

2  Pee  §§96.  323.  •  68  Atl.  416  [1907];  see  §95. 

'Arndt    v.    City    of    Cullman.    132  'See  §§  95,  301  et  seq. 

Ala.  540,  90  Am.  St.  Rep.  922.  31  So.  « Motz  v.  City  of  Detroit.  18  Mich. 

47S.  494   [18691. 

"See   §§  95.  315. 


639  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  419 

and  boulevards  are  generally  upheld  and  placed  within  this  class.* 
Where  assessments  for  public  roads  in  the  country  are  upheld, 
it  is  ordinarily  upon  the  theory  that  such  assessments  are  levied 
in  return  for  the  special  benefits  conferred  upon  the  property  as- 
sessed by  such  an  improvement."  Assessments  for  parks  are  up- 
held upon  the  theory  of  special  benefits  conferred  by  such  im- 
provement.^" The  same  principles  apply  to  assessments  for 
bridges,  fences,  and  river  and  harbor  improvements  where  they 
are  regarded  as  valid.^^  A  sidewalk  seems  to  be  regarded  as  an 
improvement  which  confers  a  special  benefit  and  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions to  be  also  regarded  as  an  improvement  which  it  is  the  legal 
duty  of  the  adjoining  land-owner  to  make.  Accordingly,  we  find 
that  in  some  jurisdictions  an  assessment  for  a  sidewalk,  made  upon 
the  theory  of  benefits,  is  regarded  as  valid. ^^  In  view  of  the  nature 
of  the  improvement,  this  is  probably  not  inconsistent  with  the 
view  elsewhere  expressed,  that  an  assessment  for  a  sidewalk  based 
on  the  theory  that  it  is  the  legal  duty  of  the  owner  of  the  ad- 
joining property  to  construct  it  at  his  own  expense,  is  valid.  As- 
sessments for  sidewalks  have  been  held  valid  upon  one  of  these 
theories  without  undertaking  to  decide  which  one.^''  From  this 
standpoint,  sewers  may  be  classed  with  sidewalks.  They  are  gen- 
erally regarded  as  conferring  a  special  benefit  upon  the  prop- 
erty drained  thereby.  In  some  jurisdictions  at  least  it  is  held  that 
the  owner  of  property  is  legally  bound  to  construct  a  sewer  to 
drain  the  same,  if  required  to  do  so  by  statute.  Accordingly,  we 
find  that  assessments  for  sewers  on  the  theory  of  benefits  are  gen- 
erally upheld  as  valid. ^*  This  view  is  probably  consistent  with 
the  theory  adopted  in  some  jurisdictions,  that  assessments  for 
sewers  based  on  the  theory  of  legal  duty,  are  valid. ^^  Similar 
considerations  apply  to  drains  and  ditches.  They  confer  a  special 
benefit  upon  the  property  drained  thereby,  and  further,  in  some 
jurisdictions  at  least  it  is  held  that  the  legal  duty  of  constructing 
such   drains   may   be   imjiosed   upon   the   owner   of   the   property 

»8ee  §§.304.  .305.  "See  §§359,  SCiO.  363. 

•See  §322;    Baunian   v.   Russ.    107  ■- §§  96,  323. 

U.    S.    548,    42    L.    270,    17    S.    966  "  Lentz  v.  City  of  Dallas.  96  Tex 

[18971;     (reversinp    District    of    Co-  258,  72  S.  W.  59   [1903]. 

luniliia   V.   Armes.   8   Ai)p.   D.   C.   393  "§§97.  324   et  seq.;  Wolf  v.  City 

[18961,   Banman   v.   Ross,  9  App.   D.  of     Philadelphia.     105     Pa.     St.     25 

C.  260  [18061.  Abbott  V.  Ross,  9  App.  [18841;     Bishop    v.    Tripp,    15    R.    I 

D.  C.   289    [18961).  466,  8  Atl.  692  [1887]. 
"See  §356.  "§97. 


§  420  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  640 

benefited.^®  Accordingly^  assessments  for  the  construction  of 
drains,  based  upon  the  theory  of  benefits,  are  generally  held  to  be 
valid.^^  In  some  jurisdictions  it  seems  to  be  assumed  that  assess- 
ments for  the  construction  of  drains,  based  on  the  theory  of  the 
performance  of  a  legal  duty,  are  also  valid. ^*  Where  assessments 
for  sprinkling,  sweeping  and  cleaning  the  streets  are  upheld,  it  is 
generally  upon  the  theory  of  assessments  for  benefits."  This  view, 
however,  is  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  such  statutes  are  ordinar- 
ily based  upon  the  theory  of  benefits,  and  if  upheld  at  all  must 
be  upheld  upon  that  theory. 

§  420.     Classes  of  improvements  for  which  assessments  for  legal 
duty  may  be  levied. 

In  determining  what  improvements  belong  in  the  class  for  which 
assessments  may  be  levied,  based  on  the  theory  that  it  is  the 
legal  duty  of  the  property  owner  to  construct  such  improvement, 
at  his  own  expense,  and  that  if  he  omits  or  neglects  to  do  so  the 
public  may  construct  .such  improvement  and  charge  such  owner 
with  the  cost  thereof,  we  find  a  greater  divergence  of  judicial 
opinion.  There  is  some  authority  for  intimatihg  that  the  con- 
struction of  streets  ^  and  public  roads '  may  be  placed  in  this 
class.  This  view,  however,  is  contrary  to  that  taken  by  the  great 
weight  of  authority.^  In  many  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  the 
construction  of  sidewalks  is  a  purpo.se  for  which  aesessments  of 
this  type  may  be  levied.*     While  this  view  has  not  been  taken 

"§§97,  334.  of  Bloomington,   94  111.   604    [1880]; 

"  §§  97,  334.  Town  of  Greendale  v.  Suit,   163  Ind. 

"§§  97,  334  €t  seq.  282,   71   N.  E.   658    [1904];    Sloan  v. 

'"  See  §  370.  Beebe,  25   Kan.   343 ;    Langan  v.   Bit- 

1  Adams    v.    Fisher,    63    Tex.    651  zer,  —  Ky.  ,   82   S.   W.   280,  26 

[1885].  Ky.    L.    R.    579     [1904];     Hydes    v. 

-Barrow    v.    Hepler,    34    La.    Ann.  Joyes,  67  Ky.   (4  Bush.)   464,  96  Am. 

362   [1882].  Dec.   311    [1868]    O'Leary  v.   Sloo,   7 

'See  §95.  La.  Ann.  25   [1852];    City  of  Lowell 

*Arndt    v.    City    of    Cullman,    132  v.    Hadley,    49    Mass.    (8*  Met.)     180 

Ala.   540,   90   Am.    St.   Rep.    922,    31  [1844];    Flint  v.  Webb,  25  Minn.  93 

So.  478;  Speer  v.  Mayor  and  Council  [1878];    Nugent  v.   City  of  Jackson, 

of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,9  L.  R.  A.  402,  72   Miss.    1040,    18    So.    493    [1895]; 

11  S.  E.  802   [1890];  Winter  v.  City  Town   of   Macon   v.    Patty.    57   Miss. 

Council  of  Montgomery,  83  Ala.  589,  378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451    [1879];   Kem- 

3  So.  235    [1887];    City  of  Pueblo  v.  per  v.  Kine,  11  Mo.  App.  116  [1881]; 

Robinson,   12   Colo.  593,  21   Pac.  899  City  of  Lincoln  v.   Janesch,   63  Neb. 

[1889];   Palmer  v.  Way,  6  Colo.  106  707,   93  Am.  St.  Rep.  478,  56  L.  R. 

[1881];  White  v.  People  ex  reL  City  A.  762,  89  N.  W.  280;   State,  Kirk- 


641 


WHEN   ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED. 


420 


by  all  the  courts,  on  the  other  hand  the  contrary  view  is  rare. 
In  many  states  the  legislature  has  not  attempted  to  levy  assess- 
ments of  this  sort  for  sidewalk  improvements.  The  fact,  there- 
fore, that  such  assessments  have  not  been  upheld  does  not  show 
that  they  might  not  be  upheld  if  the  question  were  presented  for 
judicial  determination.  A  curbstone  and  a  gutter,^  or  a  railing 
on  the  side  of  the  sidewalk,''  or  grading  and  excavating  that 
part  of  the  street  to  be  occupied  by  the  sidewalk  ^  have  been 
held  not  to  be  part  of  a  sidewalk  proper,  and  hence  assessments 
for  such  improvements  must  be  justified,  if  at  all,  on  the  theory 
of  benefits.  A  gutter  has,  however,  been  held  not  to  be  an  im- 
provement within  this  class.^  In  many  jurisdictions  the  construc- 
tion of  sewers  is  a  purpose  for  which  assessments  of  this  type 
may  be  levied.'^     Under  this  theory  the  cost  of  a  sewer  connec- 


patrick,  Pros.  v.  Commissioners  of 
Streets  and  Sewers  in  the  City  of 
New  Brunswick,  42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.) 
510  [1880];  State,  Agens,  Pros,  v 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  New- 
ark, 37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  415,  18 
Am.  Rep.  729  [1874];  State,  Van 
Tassel,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  Jersey  City,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.) 
128  [1874];  'state,  Sigler,  Pros.  v. 
Fuller,  34  xN.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  227 
[1870];  Buffalo  City  Cemetery  Co 
V.  City  of  Buffalo,  46  N.  Y.  506 
[1872];  Wilhelm  v.  City  of  Defiance 
58  O.  S.  56,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  745,  40 
L.  R.  A.  294,  50  N.  E.  18  [1898]; 
Philadelphia  v.  Pennsylvania  Hospi- 
tal, 143  Pa.  St.  367,  22  Atl.  744 
[1891];  Smith  v.  Kingston  Borough 
120  Pa.  St.  357,  14  Atl.  170  [1888]; 
Wilvert  v.  Sunbury  Borough,  81 1/^ 
Pa.  St.  (32  P.  F.  Smith)  57  [1871]; 
Deblois  v.  Barker,  4  R.  I.  445;  Tripp 
V.  City  of  Yankton,  10  S.  D.  516,  74 
X.  W."  447  [1898];  Whyte  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Nashville,  32  Tenn. 
(2  Swan)  364  [1852]  Washington  v. 
Ma^'or  and  Aldermen  of  Nashville,  31 
Tenn.  (1  Swan)  177  [1851];  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  v.  Maberry,  25  Tenn. 
(6  Humph.)  368,  44  Am.  Dec.  315 
1 1845 J;  Taylor,  McBean  &  Co.  v. 
Chandler,  56  Tenn.  (9  Ileisk.)  346; 
sub   nomine  McBean  v.   Chandler,  24 


Am.  Rep.  308  [1872];  NashviUe  v. 
Berry,  2  Shannon's  Cases  (Tenn.) 
561;  Lentz  v.  City  of  Dallas,  96  Tex. 
258,  72  S.  W.  59  [1903];  Wilson  v. 
Town  of  Philippi,  39  W.  Va.  75,  19 
S.  E.  553  [1894];  Stowell  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  31   Wis.   523   {1872]/ 

MVilson  V.  Chilcott,  12  Colo.  600, 
21  Pac.  901  [1889];  State,  Robins, 
Pros.  V.  Commissioners  of  Streets 
and  Sewers  in  the  City  of  New  Bruns- 
wick, 44  N.  J.  L.  (15  Vr.)  116 
[1882]. 

"Williams  v.  Brace,  5  Conn.  190 
[1824]. 

'  State,  Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Com- 
missioners of  Streets  and  Sewers  of 
New  Brunswick,  42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.) 
510  [1880];  State,  Cronin,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City 
38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  410  [1876]; 
State,  Van  Tassell,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  37  N. 
J.  L.   (8  Vr.)    128  [1874]. 

"  State,  Kirkpatrick,  Pros.  v.  Com- 
missioners of  Streets  and  Sewers  in 
the  City  of  New  Brunswick,  42  N.  J. 
L.    (13'Vr.)    510   [1880]. 

•  Gray  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of 
Boston,'  139  Mass.  328,  31  N.  E.  734; 
Van  Wagoner  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  City  of  Paterson,  67  N.  J.  L. 
(38  Vr.)    455,  51   Atl.  922   [1902]. 


§420 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


642 


tion  from  the  property  in  ({uestion  to  the  public  sewer  may  be 
imposed  upon  such  property.^"  The  construction  of  drains,  also, 
if  payable  by  assessment,  is  to  be  referred  to  this  class  in  some 
jurisdictions.^^  At  one  time  the  Supreme  Court  of  South  Caro- 
lina was  inclined  to  uphold  assessments  for  side-\valks,  drains 
and  sewere,  as  being  assessments  of  this  type,  while  assessments 
of  the  first  type  were  held  to  be  invalid.^-  This  distinction  has 
since  been  repudiated  and  assessments  of  the  second  type  as 
well  as  those  of  the  first  have  been  held  to  be  invalid. ^^  Statutes 
imposing  upon  railroads  the  cost  of  constructing  viaducts  over 
railroad  tracks  are  in  effect  assessments  of  this  class.^*  Under 
this  theory  a  railroad  may  be  compelled  to  build  a  viaduct  at 
its  own  expense."  While  a  railroad  may  be  required  to  con- 
struct a  suitable  bridge  for  carrying  its  tracks  above  the  street 
so  as  to  avoid  the  grade  crossing,  the  city  cannot  prescribe  the 
kind  of  bridge  which  shall  be  built,  nor  can  it  build  a  bridge 
for  the  railroad  at  the  expense  of  the  latter.  Since  the  railroad 
is  primarily  responsible  for  the  safe  construction  of  such  bridge, 
it  must  be  given  the  discretion  as  to  the  kind  of  bridge  which 
it  will  construct.^"  Assessments  for  abatement  of  nuisances,^' 
such  as  filling  up  land  upon  which  filth  or  stagnant  water  col- 
lects,^^  and  for  the  maintenance  of  lights  at  railroad  crossings,^® 
are  to  be  referred  to  this  class.     Where  a  property  owner  may 


"•  State,  Van  Wagoner.  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of 
Paterson.  67  K.  J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  455, 
51  All.  922   rin02]. 

"See  S97;  State,  Brittin.  Pros.  v. 
Blake,  36  X.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  442 
11872];  Town  of  Muskego  v.  Drain- 
age Commissioners,  78  Wis.  40,  47 
X.  W.  11  [1890];  State  ex  rel.  Bait- 
zell  V.  Stewart,  74  Wis.  620.  6  L.  R. 
A.  394.  43  X.  W.  947  [1889]:  Bryant 
V.  Bobbins.  70  Wis.  258,  35  X.  W. 
545    [1S87]. 

'-'Maiildin  v.  City  Council  of 
Cxreenville.  42  S.  C.  293.  46  Am.  St. 
Rep.  723,  27  L.  R.  A.  284,  20  S.  E. 
842    [1893]. 

"  See  §  302. 

'*  See   §  359. 

^'  Xorthern  Paeific  Ry.  v.  Dnhith, 
208     I'.    S.    583     [1908];      (affirming 


State  ex  rel.  Citj'  of  Duluth  v.  Xorth- 
ern Pacific  Ry.  Co..  98  Minn.  429,  108 
X.  AV.  269)  ;"see  §  359. 

"  City  of  Bloomington  v.  Chicago 
and  Alton  R.  R.  Co.,  134  111.  451,  26 
X.  E.  366   [1890]. 

"  Kennedy  v.  Board  of  Health,  2 
Pa.  St.  366' [1845]:  Rude  v.  Town  of 
St.  Marie.  121  Wis.  634,  99  X.  W. 
460  [1904]:  Smith  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee. 18  Wis.  63   [1864].' 

"  Watkins  v.  C  ity  of  Milwaukee, 
55  Wis.  335,  13  X.  W.  222;  see  §  342. 

"Chicago,  Indianapolis  and  Louis- 
ville Ry.'Co.  V.  City  of  Crawfords 
ville,  164  Ind.  70,  72  X.  E.  1025 
[1904]:  Cincinnati,  Hamilton  and 
Dayton  R.  Co.  v.  Village  of  Bowling 
Green,  57  O.  S.  336,  41  L.  R.  A.  422. 
49  X.  E.  121   [1897];  see  §369. 


643  WHEN    ASSESSMENTS    MAY    BE    LEVIED.  §  421 

be  required  to  remove  ice  and  snow  from  a  sidewalk  at  his  own 
expense,  it  is  in  effect  an  assessment  of  this  type.-"^  Statutes  or 
ordinances  requiring  the  property  owner  to  remove  ice  and  snow 
from  sidewallis  are  generally  based  upon  the  theory  that  a  legal 
duty  to  remove  such  ice  and  snow  rests  upon  the  property  owner, 
and  not  upon  any  theory  of  benefits.  Accordingly,  if  upheld  at 
all,  they  must  be  upheld  upon  the  theory  of  an  assessment  for  a 
legal  duty.  While  it  has  been  attempted  to  justify  assessments 
for  laying  water  pipes  upon  the  theorj^  of  the  performance  of 
a  legal  duty,  such  attempt  has  failed,  and  it  has  been  held  that 
unless  such  assessment  can,  in  the  particular  case,  be  justified 
on  the  theory  of  benefits,  it  cannot  be  upheld.-^ 

§  421.     Classes  of  improvements  for  which  assessments  for  goods 
sold  may  be  le/ied. 

In  determining  for  what  purposes  so-called  assessments  may 
be  levied  for  goods  sold,  or  work  and  labor  done,  we  find  that 
the  legislature  has  attempted  to  provide  for  few  charges  of  this 
kind  outside  of  charges  for  furnishing  water.  Charges  of  this 
sort  are  upheld  as  being  assessments  of  this  type.^  Under  a  stat- 
ute providing  that  water-ways  should  be  excavated  upon  tide 
lands  of  the  state,  and  that  a  lien  for  the  cost  of  such  excavation 
.should  attach  to  such  land,  and  that  the  lands  should  be  sold  to 
private  individuals  subject  to  such  lien,  purchasers  of  such  land 
were  held  bound  to  pay  such  lien,  the  theory  of  the  court  appar- 
ently being  that  such  assessment  was  a  charge  voluntarily  assumed 
by  the  purchaser  of  such  land.-  So  statute  providing  that  a  land- 
owner must  pay  the  cost  of  construction  and  maintf^nance  of  a 
sewer  if  he  wishes  to  make  use  of  it,"*  or  the  cost  of  a  service 
water-pipe  from  the  main  pipe  to  the  lot.  if  he  wishes  to  make 
use  of  it,'  are  valid   enactments,   and   may   ))e   upheld   as  assess- 

~See  §§.58,  371.  T)n<-k  Co..  .S.")  Wash.  ,50.3.  77  Pac.  84.5 

=>  Dougliton   V.  City   of  Camden.   72  |  19041). 

N.  ,T.  L.  451.  3  L.  K.  A.   (X.  S. )   817.  "Carson      v.      Brockton      Sewerage 

{)3   Atl.    170    fl906].  Commissioners.   182  U.  S.   398,  45  L. 

'Pee  §§298,  353.  1151.   21    S.    860    [1901];     (alTirminT 

^Seattle    Dock    Co.    v.    Seattle    and  Carson  v.  Sewerage  Commissioners  of 

Lake  Washington  Waterway  Co..   195  Brockton.  175  Mass.  242,  48  L.  R.  A. 

U.      S.     624,      25      S.      789      119041;  277.  56  X.  E.  1    [19001)". 

(affirming       in        a       per       runnm  •  Prindiville  v.  Jackson,  79  111.  337 

without     report,     Seattle     and     Lake  [1875]. 
Washington  Waterway  Co.  v.  Seattle 


§  421  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  644 

ments  of  this  tj^pe.  It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  assessments 
of  the  latter  class  might  be  upheld  on  the  theory  of  benefits, 
without  reference  to  the  assent  of  the  property  owner,^  and  in 
exacting  the  cost  from  the  property-  owner  only  if  he  chooses 
to  make  use  of  the  improvement,  the  legislature  is  exacting  less 
than  it  might.  Where  an  assessment  based  on  the  theory  of  bene- 
fits and  levied  to  pay  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  has  been 
resisted  successfully  by  some  of  the  property  owners,  a  rule 
requiring  such  owners  to  pay  an  amount  equal  to  such  assessment 
in  case  they  wish  to  make  use  of  such  sewer  is  valid." 

'  Prindiville  v.  Jackson,  79  111.  337  *  Hermann   v.   State   ex   rel.,   54   O. 

[1875].  S.   506,   32   L.   R.   A.   734,   43   N.   E. 

990  [1896]. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

STATUTORY  PROVISIONS  CONCERNING  PUBLIC 
IMPROVEMENTS. 

§  422.     Construction  of  legislative  provisions  with  reference  to 
public  improvements. 

Since  the  legislature  has  a  wide  discretion  in  determining  what 
improvements  confer  a  general  benefit  to  the  public  at  large  so 
that  they  may  be  constructed  by  the  public  under  the  taxing 
power  and  also  confer  especial  benefit  upon  the  property  affected 
thereby  so  that  local  assessments  may  be  levied  therefor/  it  fol- 
lows that  if  the  improvement  is  one  for  which  it  is  possible  that 
a  local  assessment  may  be  levied,-  the  determination  of  the  legis- 
lature is  final  as  to  whether  such  improvement  shall  be  constructed 
or  not,  and  if  so,  whether  it  shall  be  paid  for  by  general  taxa- 
tion or  by  special  assessment,  or  in  part  by  each.''  After  it  is  once 
determined  that  the  improvement  falls  within  one  of  the  classes 
of  those  for  which  the  legislature  may  levy  local  assessments, 
further  ((uestions  as  to  the  power  of  the  city  or  other  public  cor- 
poration or  officer  to  levy  local  assessments  for  given  kinds  of  im- 
provements turn  on  the  statutory  grant  of  authority  by  the  legis- 
lature and  involve  the  construction  of  the  statutes  granting  such 
authority.  As  has  been  said  before,'*  power  to  pay  for  an  im- 
provement by  general  taxation  is  not  of  itself  power  to  levy 
local  assessments  for  such  improvement.-^  Under  the  distinc- 
tion made  in  Illinois  between  special  taxation  and  special  assess- 
ment, power  to  levy  a  special  tax  for  a  given  kind  of  improve- 
ment is  not  power  to  levy  a  special  assessment  therefor."  Thus  a 
statute  providing  for  the  construction  of  sidewalks  to  be  paid 
for  by   special   taxation   does   not   extend   the    power   of   special 

•See  §290.  »  Krumberg   v.    City   of   Cincinnati. 

*See  §292.  29  0.  S.  09   \\H75]. 

'See  8  292.  "People  ex   rei.   Raymond   v.   Field. 

'See  §231.  197  111.  5G8,  04  X.  E.  544   [1902]. 
645 


§423 


TiVXATlON    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


646 


taxation  to  improvements  of  other  types  and  does  not  authorize 
special  assessments  for  the  construction  of  sidewalks.^ 

§  423.     Cost  of  pre-existing  improvements. 

Whether  an  assessment  can  be  levied  for  improvements  already 
constructed  and  not  undertaken  originally  upon  the  assessment 
plan  is  a  question  the  constitutional  aspect  of  which  has  been 
discussed  elsewhere.^  Even  where  such  assessments  may  be  levied 
they  cannot  be  levied  except  by  specific  statutory  authority.  Un- 
der most  assessment  statutes  the  proceeding,  if  to  be  on  the  as- 
sessment plan,  must  be  commenced  and  carried  on  in  the  manner 
designated.  Such  statutes  do  not  give  any  authority  for  levy- 
ing assessments  for  improvements  already  undertaken  if  not  com- 
menced on  the  assessment  plan.-  If  an  improvement  has  been 
begun  by  general  taxation  an  assessment  therefor  cannot  be 
levied  after  such  improvement  is  completed.''  After  an  improve- 
ment has  been  begun  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  changing 
the  method  of  collection  from  that  which  was  prescribed  v/hen 
the  improvement  was  begun.*  If  a  pn])lic  improvement  has  been 
commenced  upon  the  assessment  plan  the  fact  that  such  improve- 
ment is  commenced  and  completed  before  the  assessment  is  levied 
does  not  invalidate  an  assessment  therefor.''     Unless  the  statute 


'  People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Field. 
197  111.  568,  64  N.  E.  544   [1902]. 

^  See  §  406  et  seq. 

Mvelly  V.  Liming,  76  Cal.  309,  18 
Pac.  335  [18881;  District  No.  110  v 
Feck,  60  Cal,  403  [1882];  In  the 
Matter  of  opening  and  grading  Mar- 
ket Street,  49  Cal.  546   [1875]. 

"  Spaulding  v.  Baxter,  25  Ind.  App 
485,  58  N.  E.  551   [1900]. 

*  Fowler  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  37 
Mo.   228    [1866]. 

^  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Cole,  132 
Fed.  668  [1904];  City  of  Meriden  v. 
Camp,  46  Conn.  284  [1878];  Sweet 
V.  West  Chicago  Park  Commission- 
ers, 177  111.  492,  53  N.  E.  74  [1899]; 
The  People  ex  rel.  Wood  v.  Jones. 
137  111.  35,  27  N.  E.  294  [1892]; 
City  of  Elkhart  v.  Wickwire,  121  Ind. 
331,  22  N.  E.  342  [1889];  Geiger  v. 
Bradley.  117  Ind.  120,  19  N.  E.  760 
[1880];    Burlington  v.  Quick,   47   la 


222  [1877];  Patterson  v.  Baumer,  43 
la.  477  [1876];  City  of  Atchison  v. 
Leu,  48  Kan.  138,  29  Pac.  467 
[1892]  ;  City  of  Atchison  v.  Price,  45 
Kan.  296.  25  Pac.  605  [1891];  Gedge 

V.  City  of  Covington,  —  Ky.  ,  80 

S.  W.  1160,  26  Ky.  Law!  Rep.  273 
[1904];  Corliss  v.  Village  of  High- 
land Park,  132  Mich.  152,  93  N.  W. 
254,  93  N.  W.  610;  (affirmed  on  re- 
hearing 95  X.  W.  416  [1903])  ;  Burns 
V.  City  of  Duluth,  98  Minn.  104,  104. 
N.  W.  714  [1905];  State,  JellifT, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  the  City  of  Newark,  48  N.  J.  L. 

(19  Vr.)  'lOl,  2  Atl.  627  [1886]; 
State,  Hand.  Pros.  v.  City  Council  of 
the    City   of   Elizabeth,   31    N.   J.   L. 

(2  Vr.)"  547  [1864];  In  the  Matter 
of  Roberts,  81  N.  Y.  62  [1880]; 
Heath  v.  McCrea,  20  Wash.  342,  55 
Pac.   432   [1898]. 


647  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS  CONCKRNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  423 

sjpeeifically  requires  the  assessment  to  be  levied  before  the  im- 
provement is  constructed  the  city  has  power  to  defer  such  levying 
until  after  the  improvement  is  constructed.  Thus  under  a  stat- 
ute authorizing  the  city  to  assess  "the  probable  amount  of  ex- 
pense" of  a  public  improvement,  it  was  held  that  an  assessment 
might  be  levied  after  performance.^  Accordingly  the  city  may 
pay  the  cost  of  a  public  improvement/  as  by  constructing  such 
improvement  at  its  own  expense,^  or  by  paying  for  the  same  by 
issuing  bonds.''  and  subsequently  levy  an  assessment  to  reimburse 
itself  for  the  expense  thus  incurred.  If  a  city  is  authorized  to 
issue  bonds  payable  out  of  assessments  without  any  special  elec- 
tion ;  but  it  is  required  to  hold  a  special  election  if  the  credit  of 
the  city  is  to  be  pledged  in  excess  of  current  revenue,  bonds  which 
are  issued  without  a  special  election  and  to  secure  which  there 
is  pledged  both  the  amount  to  be  raised  by  special  assessment 
and  also  the  faith  and  credit  of  the  city,  are  valid  as  to  the 
amount  to  be  raised  by  special  assessment,  though  invalid  as 
affecting  the  personal  liability  of  the  city.^"  Holders  of  bonds  are 
not  responsible  for  the  proper  application  of  the  funds  raised 
by  the  sale  of  such  bonds.' ^  Accordingly,  the  fact  that  such 
funds  have  been  wasted  in  litigation  does  not  prevent  the  levy 
o'f  the  assessment  to  pay  such  bonds.'-'  Furthermore,  the  city 
may  pay  the  contract  ])riee  of  the  public  improvement  to  the 
contractor,'-'  as  by  making  such  payment  out  of  funds  raised  by 
general   taxation,'*   and   then   reimburse   itself  by   special   a.ssess- 

"City     of     Moriden     v.     Camp,     40  State,  Hand.  Pros.  v.  City  Council  of 

Conn.   284    [1878].  the  City  of  Eli/.al)Ptii.  31    X.  J.  L.    (2 

'Sweet  V.  West  Cliicago  Park  Com-  \'r.)   547   [18<)41. 

missioners,   177   111.  492.  53  N.  E.  74  '"  Gedge   v.   City    of   Covington.   — 

[1899];   Patterson  v.  Paumer,  43   la.        Ky.  ,  80  S.  W.  1100.  20  Ky.  Law 

477    [1876];    In   the   Matter   of   Rob-  Rep.   273    [1904]. 

erts,  81   N.  Y.   02    [1880];    Adkins  v.  "  Loesnitz     v.     Solinfrer.     127     Ind. 

Toledo,    27     Ohio    Cir.    Ct.     R.     417  422,    25    X.    E.    1037.    20    X.    E.    807 

[1905].  [1880]. 

*City    of    Pnrliiiglon    v.    (^iiick.    47  '- Loesnitz     v.     Selinger.     127     Ind. 

la.  222   [1877  1.  422.    25    X.    E.    1037.    20    X.    E.    887 

•People  ex  rel.  Wond  v.  Jones,  137  |  1890]. 

111.  35,  27  X.  E.  294  [1892]  ;  Loesnitz  'M  ity  of  Elkhart  v.  Wickwire.  121 

V.   Selinger,    127    Ind.   422,    25    X.    E.  hnl.  331,  22  N.  E.  342    |1SS9]:    City 

1037,  20  X.   E.   887    [1890];    City  of  of  Atchison  v.  Leu.  48   Kan.   138,  29 

Atchison    v.    Price.    45    Kan.    290,    25  Pac.    407    [1892];    TIeath    v.    McCrea, 

Pac.    005    [1891]:    Hedge    v.    City    of  20    Wash.    342.    .55    Pac.    432    [1898]. 

CovingtMii.    —    Ky.    ,    80    S.    W  '*  I'atter.son   v.   Paunier,  43   la.  477 

1100.  20    Ky.   Law  Rep.   273    [1904];  [1870];   Burns  v.  City  of  Duluth.  90 


§424 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


648 


ment.  The  city  may  pay  for  such  improvement  by  borrowing 
money  and  then  levy  a  special  assessment  to  reimburse  itself.^' 
Where  a  sewer  was  constructed  upon  land  belonging  to  a  private 
owner  and  at  the  time  such  improvement  was  constructed  no 
assessment  therefor  could  have  been  levied  a  statute  passed  sub- 
sequently authorizing  an  assessment  for  such  improvement  has 
been  held  to  be  retro-active  and  unconstitutional.^" 

§  424.    Improvement  constructed  without  proper  ordinance. 

If  an  improvement  is  constructed  before  the  passage  of  a  valid 
ordinance  for  constructing  such  improvement  at  the  cost  of  the 
abutting  property  owners,  the  city  cannot  in  the  absence  of  some 
specific  statutory  authority  therefor,  levy  an  assessment  by  sub- 
sequent ordinance  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement.^  This  is 
especially  true  where  the  work  has  been  done  by  private  property 
owners  and  has  subsequently  been  adopted  by  the  city  and  the 
city  has  then  attempted  to  levy  an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such 
work.^  However,  under  a  statute  specifically  giving  authority 
therefor,  it  has  been  held  that  a  city  may  purchase  a  private 
sewer  already   constructed   by   individual   land-owners   and   then 


Minn.  104,  104  X.  W.  714  1905]; 
State,  Jelliff,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  the  City  of  Newark, 
48  X.  J.  L.  (19  Vr.)  101.  2  Atl.  627 
[1886]. 

^^  Corliss  V.  Village  of  Highland 
Park,  132  Mich.  152,  93  X.  \V.  254, 
93  N.  W.  610;  affirmed  on  rehearing, 
95   X.   W.   416    [1903]. 

^^Holliday  v.  City  of  Atlanta,  96 
Ga.  377,  23  S.  E.  406   [1895]. 

^  City  of  Paxton  v.  Bogardus,  201 
111.  628,  66  X.  E.  853  [1903]; 
Connecticut  Mutual  Life  Insurance 
Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  185  111. 
148,  56'x.  E.  1071  [1900];  Pells  v. 
City  of  Paxton.  176  111.  318,  52  X.  E. 
64  [1898]:  Thaler  v.  West  Chicago 
Park  Commissioners.  174  111.  211, 
52  N.  E.  116  [1898];  Winkelman  v. 
Moredock  and  Ivy  Landinsr  Drainage 
District,  170  111.  37.  48  X.  E.  715 
[1897];  Davis  v.  City  of  Litchfield, 
155  111.  384,  40  X.  E.  354  [1895]: 
Citv   of  East   St.   Louis  v.   Albrecht,. 


150  111.  506,  37  X.  E.  934  [1894]; 
Weld  V.  People  ex  rel.  Kern,  149  111. 
257,  36  X.  E.  1006  [1894];  City  of 
Carlyle  v.  The  County  of  Clinton,  140 
111.  512,  30  X.  E.  782  [1893];  Dolese 
V.  McDougall,  78  111.  App.  629 
[1897];  City  of  Alton  v.  Foster,  74 
111.  App.  5li  [1897];  Badger  v.  Inlet 
Swamp  Drainage  District,  42  111. 
App.  79  [1890];  Xewman  v. 
City  of  Emporia,  32  Kan.  456,  4  Pac. 
815  [1884];  Second  Municipality  of 
Xew  Orleans  v.  Botts,  8  Robinson 
(La.)  198  [1844];  Keane  v.  Klaus- 
man,  21  Mo.  App.  485  [1886];  Folz 
V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  2  Handy 
(Ohio),  261  [1855];  Donohue  v. 
Brotherton.  7  Ohio  X.  P.  367  [1900]; 
Appeal  of  Harper,  109  Pa.  St.  9,  1 
Atl.  791  [1885]:  Buckley  v.  City  of 
Tacoma,  9  Wash.  253,  37  Pac.  441 
[1894]. 

^  Creote  v.  City  of  Chicago,  56  III 
422  [18701:  Dorathv  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago,  53   111.   79    [1869], 


649  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  425 

levy  an  assessment  for  such  purchase  price.''  So  it  has  been  held 
in  some  jurisdictions  that  a  city  may  purchase  a  toll  road  or  turn- 
pike and  levy  an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such  purchase.^ 
Statutes  are  found  in  many  states  which  authorize  a  city  to  levy 
an  assessment  for  work  done  before  the  passage  of  a  valid  ordi- 
nance providing  for  constructing  such  improvements  at  the  cost 
of  the  property  owners.  Such  statutes  are  regarded  as  valid,'^ 
are  given  full  force  and  effect,  and  assessments  levied  for  such 
improvements  under  such  statutes  are  valid."  So  it  has  been 
held  that  the  legislature  may  authorize  the  city  to  levy  an  assess- 
ment to  pay  an  additional  amount  to  the  contractor  over  and  above 
the  contract  price,  which  under  the  charter  of  the  city  it  was  for- 
bidden to  pay.^  The  power  to  levy  assessments  for  pre-existing 
improvements  is,  however,  limited  by  the  terms  of  the  statute 
authorizing  such  assessments.^  Thus,  under  a  statute  authorizing 
the  acceptance  of  grading  previously  done  and  crediting  the  owner 
who  has  done  such  grading  for  the  cost  thereof  upon  his  assess- 
ment, no  such  allowance  can  be  made  for  macadamizing  and 
curbing  already  done."  If  work  has  been  begun  under  a  defec- 
tive ordinance  and  before  the  performance  of  the  contract  an 
ordinance  has  been  passed  curing  the  defect,  an  assessment  for 
such  improvement  has  been  held  to  be  valid.^" 

§  425.    Expense  of  apropriation  of  property  for  public  use. 

It  is  very  frequently  provided  by  statute  that  the  expense  of 
appropriating  property  by  eminent  domain  for  the  purpose  of 
constructing  a  public  improvement  is  one  of  the  items  which  may 
be  included  in  special  assessments  for  such  improvements,  if  the 
improvement  is  one  of  the  types  for  which  a  special  assessment 


'  Slocum  V.  Selectmen  of  Brookline^  Syracuse,  19  N.  Y.  116  [1859];  Duni- 

163  Mass.   23,  39  N.   E.   351    [1895].  way  v.  Portland,  47  Or.  103,  81  Pac. 

♦See  §  412.  945    [1905];    Cleveland   v.   Tripp,    13 

°See   §  413.  R.   I.  50   [1880]. 

•Seattle  v.  Kelleher,  195  U.  S.  351,  'Brewster  v.  City  of  Syracuse,    19 

49    L.    232,    25    S.    44    [1904];    New  N.  Y.  116   [1859].  ' 

England    Hospital    for    Women    and  *  De   Haven   v.   Berendes.    135    Cal. 

Children   v.   Street   Commissioners   of  178,  67  Pac.   780    [1901]. 

the  City  of  Boston,  188  Mass.  88,  74  »  De    Haven    v.    Berendes,    135    Cal. 

N.    E.    294    [1905];    In    the    ^Matter  178,  67  Pac.  786   [1901]. 

of    Sackett,    DouErlass    and    De    draw  '"  Kiley     v.     Craner,     51     Mo.     541 

Streets   in   the  City  of   Brooklyn,   74  [1873]. 
N.  Y.  95  [1878]  ;  Brewster  v.  Citv  of 


§426 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


650 


may  be  levied/  There  must  be  a  valid  statute  for  appropriating 
land  in  order  to  justify  a  special  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such 
proceedings.-  Such  assessment  cannot  be  levied  if  the  appropria- 
tion proceedings  are  entirely  void.''  The  cost  of  appropriating 
land  cannot  be  made  the  subject  of  assessment  unless  the  statute 
provides  therefor.*  If  the  statute  provides  that  the  cost  of  ap- 
propriation must  be  paid  for  by  general  taxation,  a  local  assess- 
ment canot  be  levied  therefor.^ 


§  426.     Value  of  land  appropriated. 

The  value  of  the  land  which  has  been  taken  by  proceedings  in 
eminent  domain  is  one  of  the  most  important  items  of  cost  in 
appropriation  proceedings  and  under  most  statutes  may  be  levied 
upon  the  land  which  is  benefited  by  the   improvement.^     Under 


iBauman  v.  Ross,  167  U.  S.  548. 
42  L.  1270,  17  S.  966  [1897];  (re- 
versing District  of  Columbia  v. 
Armes,  8  App.  D.  C.  393  [1896]; 
Bauman  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C.  260 
[1896]  ;  Abbott  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C 
289  [1896]);  In  the  Matter  of  the 
proceedings  to  change  the  grade  of 
Beale  Street  in  the  City  and  County 
of  San  Francisco,  39  Cal.  495  [1870] ; 
Judson  V.  Bridgeport,  25  Conn.  426 
[1857];  Edgertan  v.  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermen of  the  Town  of  Green  Cove 
Springs,  19  Fla.  140  [1882];  Wagge- 
man  v.  Village  of  North  Peoria,  155 
111.  545,  40  N.  E.  485  [1895];  (dis- 
tinguishing City  of  Bloomington  v. 
Latham,  142  111!  462,  18  L.  R.  A.  487, 
32  N.  E.  506  [1893])  ;  People  ex  rel. 
Thatcher  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park, 
117  111.  462;  6  N.  E.  33  [1887]; 
Page  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 
Baltimore,  34  Md.  558  [1871]  ;  Gardi- 
ner V.  Street  Commissioners  of  the 
City  of  Boston,  188  Mass.  223.  74  N. 
E.  341  [1905];  State  ex  rel.  Chicago. 
Burlington  and  Quincy  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Kansas,  89  Mo. 
34,  14  S..  W.  515  [1886];  Clark  v. 
City  of  Elizabeth,  61  N.  J.  L.  (32 
Vr.)  565.  40  Atl.  616,  40  Atl.  737 
[1898]  Davis  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Newark,  54 
N.  J.  L.    (25  Vr.)    595,   25   Atl.   336 


[1892];  State,  Aldridge,  Pros.  v. 
Essex  Public  Board,  46  N.  J.  L.  (17 
Vr.)  126  [1884];  Pratt  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  93  Wis.  658,  68  N.  W. 
392   [1896]. 

-  State,  Kerrigan,  Pros.  v.  Town- 
ship of  West  Hokoken,  37  N.  J.  L. 
(8  Vr.)  77  [1874];  Carron  v.  Mar- 
tin, 26  N.  J.  L.  (2  Dutcher)  594,  69 
Am.  Dec.  584    [1857]. 

^  State,  Kerrigan,  Pros.  v.  Town- 
ship of  West  Hoboken,  37  N.  J.  L. 
(8  Vr.)  77  [1874];  Carron  v.  Mar- 
tin, 26  N.  J.  L.  (2  Dutcher)  594,  69 
Am.  Dec.  584   [1857]. 

*  In  the  Matter  of  the  Assessments 
of  lands  in  the  Town  of  Flatbush 
for  the  Extension  of  Prospect  Park 
in  the  City  of  Brooklyn,  60  N.  Y. 
398    [1875]". 

°  Krumberg  v.  City  of  Cincinnati, 
29  O.  S.  69   [1875].  ^ 

'  South  Chicago  City  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  196  111.  490, 
63  N.  E.  1046  [1902];  Goodwillie  v. 
City  of  Lake  View,  137  111.  51,  27 
N.  E.  15  [1892];  Andrews  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Rumsey,  84  111.  28  [1876]; 
Municipality  Number  Two  for  the 
opening  of  Rnffignac  Street,  7  La. 
Ann.  76  [1852]:  Mayor  and  City 
(^ouncil  of  B.Tltimore  v.  Porter,  18 
Md.  284.  79  Am.  Dec.  696  [1861]; 
Gardiner  v.  Street  Commissioners  of 


■*.: 


I 


651  STATUTORY    PROVISIO^;S    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  426 

a  statute  authorizing  assessments  for  the  value  of  lands  appro- 
priated, the  value  of  land  owned  by  a  cit}'  and  formerly  used  for 
public  park,  but  since  taken  for  the  purpose  of  widening  streets," 
or  acquired  by  the  city  for  a  pipe-line  and  afterwards  taken  for  a 
street,^  or  property  held  b.y  the  city  in  trust  for  school  purposes,* 
may  be  included  in  the  assessment.  The  value  of  property  which 
has  been  used  as  a  right  of  way  appurtenant  to  certain  land  and 
which  has  been  taken  for  a  public  street  may  be  included,  since 
no  public  easement  exists  therein.'^'  The  value  of  property  be- 
tween a  levee  and  a  stream  where  such  property  is  subject  to  a 
public  use  cannot  be  included,"  but  if  the  levee  has  been  ad- 
vanced by  public  authorities  so  as  to  include  such  property  and 
the  public  use  has  thereby  been  extingui.shed,  an  assessment  may 
be  levied  therefor.^  If  the  appropriation  proceedings  are  dis- 
tinct from  the  assessment  proceedings,  a  judgment  appropriating 
the  property  is  final  both  as  to  the  necessity  and  as  to  the  right 
of  appropriation  and  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally.*'  Hence, 
in  an  assessment  proceeding  the  defense  cannot  l)e  interijosed 
that  the  land  appropriated  for  a  street  had  already  been  dedi- 
cated to  the  public."  In  some  jurisdictions  the  power  of  levying 
local  assessments  for  tlie  cost  of  land  appropriated  has  been  lim- 
ited or  entirely  denied.'"  If  there  is  no  authority  for  assessing 
such  items  of  expense  against  the  property  owners,  they  will  be 
presumed  to  be  included  in  the  part  of  the  assessment  apportioned 
to  the  city.'*     In  Illinois  it  is  held  that  the  cost  of  land  appro- 

the  City  of  Boston,  188  Mas.s.  22.3.  74  and   Commonalty   of   New   York,    186 

\.   E.   .341    11905]:    Leslie   v.   City  of  X.  Y.  237,  78  N.  E.  9rv2   [1906]. 

St.  Louis,  47  Mo.  474    [18711:    State  *  Fagan  v.  City  of  Chicago,  84   III. 

V.   Several   Parcels  of  Land.  —  Xeb.  227    [1876]. 

,   110  N.  W.   753    [1907]:    State.  'Hemingway  v.  City  of  Chicago.  60 

White,   Pros.   v.   ^Nlayor    and   Council  111.   324    [1871]. 

of  the  City  of  Bayonne.  49  X.  J.  L.  *  JIunicipality  Xninber  Two  for  tlie 

(20    Vr.)     311,    8'Atl.    295    [1887];  Opening    of    Roffignac    Street,    7    Lfi 

State,  Aldridge.  Pros.   v.   Essex   Pub-  Ann.  76    [1852]. 

lie  Road  Board.  46  X.  .1.  L.    (17  Vr.)  '  IMunicipality  Xumber  Two  for  the 

126    [1884];    In   re  Opening  of    178th  Opening    of    Roffignac    Street.    7    La 

Street,  City  of  X>w  York.  94  X.  Y.  Ann.  76   [18.52]. 

S.    838,    107    App.    Div.    22     [1905]:  "Cage  v.  City  of  Chicago.    146   111. 

Jn  re  Mill   Creek   Sewer.   196   Pa.   St.  499.  34   X.   E.    1034    [1893]. 

183,  46  Atl.  312   [1900].  "Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago.    146   111. 

^In   the   Matter   of   Widening   and  499.  34  X"^.  E.   1034   [1893]. 

Improving    X^inth    Avenue    and    Fif  '"City   of   St.   Joseph   v.   Crowther. 

t^'enth   Street   in   the   City  of  Brook-  142  Mo.  155.  43  S.  W.  786  [1897]. 

l.vn.  45  X\  Y.  729    [1871].  " /«    re  Reynolds   Street   Sewer,   34 

'Matter   of    the    Mayor,    Aldermen  Super.  Ct.  209   [1907]. 


§  426  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  652 

priated  may  be  paid  for  by  special  assessment  where  the  actual 
benefits  are  inquired  into,^-  but  not  by  special  taxation  where 
the  question  of  benefits  is  not  inquired  into.^^  In  Ohio  it  was 
held  originally  that  while  the  cost  of  appropriating  land  could 
not  be  included  in  a  special  assessment  in  the  absence  of  specific 
statutory  authority,^*  it  might  be  so  included  if  authorized  by 
statute.^^  Subsequently,  in  passing  upon  the  Ohio  statute,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  that  a  statute  pro- 
viding for  assessing  the  entire  cost  of  appropriating  property 
upon  the  adjoining  property,  a  part  of  which  had  been  appro- 
priated, and  apportioning  this  entire  cost  according  to  frontage 
was  unconstitutional  as  amounting  to  a  taking  of  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law/''  Subsequently  this  decision  was  followed 
in  Ohio.^"  It  will  be  observed  that  this  decision  does  not  neces- 
sarily hold  that  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for  such  items, 
but  merely  that  the  method  of  apportioning  such  assessment  is 
invalid  under  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case.^*  The 
later  decisions  in  Ohio  have,  however,  gone  farther  than  the  de- 
cision of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  and  have  held 
that  an  assessment  cannot  constitutionally  be  le^^ied  even  under 
express  statutory  authority,  either  upon  property  a  part  of  which 
has  thus  been  appropriated,^"  or  upon  other  property,-"  It  is 
ordinarily  assumed  that  a  grant  of  power  to  appropriate  property 
includes  power  to  acquire  such  property  by  contract.-^     Where 

^^Waggeman    v.    Village    of    North  See,  also,  Scott  v.  City  of  Toledo,  30 

Peoria,    155    111.    545,    40    N.    E.    4S5  Fed.   385.    1    L.   R.   A.   688    [1888]. 

[1895];        (distinguishing      City      of  "  Dodsworth  v.  City  of  Cincinnati, 

Bloomington  v.  Latham,  142  111".  462,  18    Ohio    C.    C.    288,    10    Ohio    C.    D 

18    L.    R.    A.    487,    32    N.  .  E.    506  177   [1899]. 

[1893]).  i^See,  also,  Rhoades  v.  City  of  To- 

"City  of  Bloomington  v.   Latham,  ledo,    6    Ohio    C.    C.    9    [1890]. 

142  111.  462,   18  L.  R.  A.  487,  32  X.  "Cincinnati,    Lebanon    and    North- 

E.  506   [1893].  ern  Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Cin- 

"  Krumberg  v.  Cincinnati,  29  O.  S  cinnati,   62   O.   S.   465,   49   L.   R.   A. 

69  [1875].  566,  57   N.  E.  229   [1900]. 

'"  City    of    Cleveland    v.    Wick,    18  -"  City  of  Dayton  v.  Bauman,  66  0. 

O.    S.    303    [1868];    Village    of   Nor-  S.  379,' 64  N.  E.  433   [1902]. 

wood  V.  Ogden,  15  Ohio  C.  C.  539,  18  ^  Kramer   v.   City   of  Los  Angeles, 

Ohio    C.    C.    869,    8    Ohio    C.    D.    383  147    Cal.    668,    82  "Pac.    334    [1905]; 

[1898].  Lower  Kings  River  Reclamation  Dis- 

"  Village  of  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172  trict  No.  531   v.  MeCullah,   124  Cal. 

U.    S.    269,    43    L.    443,    19    S.    187  175,    56    Pac.    887    [1899];    State   v. 

[1898];    (affirming   Baker   v.   Village  Several    Parcels    of    Land,    —    Neb. 

of    Norwood,    74    Fed.    997    [1896]).       ,  110  N.  W.  753   [1907]. 


653  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  427 

this  theory  is  entertained  the  contract  price  mfiv  form  one  of 
the  items  for  which  the  assessment  is  to  be  levied.--  The  exist- 
ence of  this  power  has,  however,  been  doubted.-^ 

§  427.     Value  of  building  taken  by  appropriation. 

The  value  of  buildings  upon  land  appropriated  for  a  public 
improvement,  which  must  be  removed  or  destroyed  in  the  con- 
struction of  such  improvement,  forms  a  proper  item  of  assess- 
ment.^ By  statute  it  may  be  provided  that  if  no  buildings  are 
taken,  the  assessment  district  shall  not  extend  beyond  the  center 
line  of  the  blocks  adjacent  to  the  streets  improved,  while  a  wider 
area  may  be  assessed  if  buildings  are  taken.-  Under  such  stat- 
utes it  is  equally  improper  to  assess  the  entire  cost  of  building.s 
upon  the  adjacent  blocks,^  and  to  assess  non-adjacent  blocks  for 
more  than  a  proportionate  part  of  the  cost  of  buildings.*  By 
statute  in  New  York  it  has  been  provided  that  a  map  or  plan 
of  the  proposed  streets  may  be  filed  and  that  no  damages  can  be 
recovered  for  the  value  of  l)uildings  erected  upon  ground  to  be 
occupied  by  such  proposed  streets  after  the  filing  of  such  plan.^ 
Such  provision  has  been  held  not  to  amount  to  a  taking  of  prop- 
erty without  just  compensation."  A  similar  statute  has  been  held 
to  be  valid  in  Pennsylvania.^ 

§  428.     Damage  caused  by  appropriation. 

The  damage  caused  by  a  public  improvement  to  land  which  is 
not  appropriated  for  such  improvement  is  another  item  for  w^hich 
it  is  often  provided  by  statute  that  assessments  may  be  levied 

-=  Lower   Kings   River   Reclamation  'In    the    ]\Iatter    of    tlie    Board    of 

District    No.    531    v.    McC*iillah,    124  Street  Opening.   74   Ilun.   501.   20   N. 

Cal.   175,  56  Pae.  887    [1899].  Y.  Supp.   855   [189.3]. 

"-^  Lake  Shore  and  Michigan  Soutli-  *  In    the    Matter    of    the    Board    of 

ern  Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Chi-  Street    Opening.    04    Hun.    59.    18    N. 

cago,  148  111.  509,  .37  X.  E.  88  [1894].  V.  Supp.  727    [1892]. 

^  In  re  Avenvie  L   in   City  of   New  '^  In    the    flatter    of    One    Hundred 

York.  95  N.  Y.  S.  245.  107  App.  Div.  and  Twenty-Seventh  Street.  50  How- 

581     [1905];    In    the    Matter  , of    the  ard.  00   [1878]. 

Board    of    Street    Opening.    74    Hun.  "  In    the    Matter    of    One    Hundred 

561,  26  N.  Y.   Supp.  855    [189,3]:    In  and    Twcnty-seventli    Street,   56   How- 

the    Matter    of    the    Board    of    Street  ar<).    00    [1878]. 

Opening,  64  Hun.  59.  18  N.  Y.  Sujip.  'Forbes   Street.   70   Pa.   St.    (20  P. 

727   [1892].  F.     Smith)      125     [1871];     Pittsburg 

^'In    the    IMatter    of    fhe    Board    of  City     Di.strict.    2     Watts    &     C.     320 

Street   Opening.   74  Hun.   561.   26  N.  [1S41]. 
Y.  Supp.  855  [1893]. 


§  429  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  654 

upon  property  benefited  by  the  improvement.^  One  of  the  most 
common  forms  of  damage  in  such  cases  is  that  caused  by  change 
of  the  grade  of  a  street.-  Unless  the  statute  specifically  au- 
thorizes an  assessment  for  damages,  no  assessment  can  be  levied.'' 
If  the  city  is  authorized  to  change  the  grade  of  a  street  but 
there  is  no  specific  provision  for  assessing  the  cost  of  such  change 
upon  property  benefited,  such  expense  must  be  paid  for  by  gen- 
eral taxation.*  It  has  been  said  that  a  construction  of  the  stat- 
ute which  would  require  payment  of  damages  to  an  abutting 
owner  followed  by  an  assessment  upon  him  to  reimburse  the  city 
for  such  payment  would  be  absurd."'  However,  it  has  been  held 
proper  to  assess  the  cost  of  grading  upon  a  lot  and  then  in  case 
the  grade  had  previously  been  established  to  allow  the  lot  owner 
to  recover  as  one  of  his  items  of  damages  the  amount  of  such 
assessment."  In  Ohio,  in  analogy  to  the  rule  now  adopted  which 
holds  assessments  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  land  appropriated  to  be 
invalid,^  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  on  abutting  property 
owners  to  reimburse  the  city  for  the  damages  which  it  has  been 
obliged  to  pay  to  such  owners  for  such  change  of  grade.^  The 
taking  of  an  alley  to  open  a  street  in  its  place  is  said  not  to 
cause  damage  to  abutting  property,  since  the  alley  furnished  the 
same  access  as  the  street.® 

§  429.     IrregiQarities  in  appropriation  proceedings. 

Under  some  statutes  a  provision   is  made  for  assessing  dam- 
ages and  benefits  in  one  proceeding.    Under  such  statutes  the  ques- 

^  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Chapin  City  of  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio  C.  C.  629, 
V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County,  5  Ohio  C.  D.  301  [1894]. 
40  Minn.  5,  41  N.  W.  235  [1889];  •' Croodrich  v.  City  of  Omaha,  10 
State,  Ropes,  Pros.  v.  Essex  Public  Xeb.  98,  4  N.  W.  242  [1880];  Bar- 
Road  Board,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  335  nett's  Case,  28  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  361 
[1875]:     People     ex     rel.     Doyle     v.  [1905]. 

Green,  3  Hun.   755    [1875];   Dixon  v.  'Goodrich    v.    City    of    Omaha,    10 

City  of  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio  C.  C.  629,  Xeb.  98,  4  N.  W.  242   [1880]. 

5  Ohio  C.  D.  301  [1894];  Saunderson  =  Goodrich    v.    City    o-f    Omaha,    10 

V.  Herman.  95  Wis.  48.  69  X.  W.  977  Xeb.  98,  4  X.  W.  242    [1880]. 

]1897];      (following     Liebermann     v.  '  Stowell  v.  Milwaukee,  31  Wis.  523 

City  of  Milwaukee,   89   Wis.   336,   61  [1872]. 

X.  'w.  1112  [1895]);  Stowell  v.  Mil-  ^  See   §   308,   §   426. 

waiikee.  31  Wis.  523  [1872].  "  McGlynn    v.    City    of    Toledo,    22 

-State,  Ropes,  Pros.  v.  Essex  Pub-  Ohio  C.  C.  34   [1901]. 

lie  Road  Board,  37  X.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)  "Pagan  v.  City  of  Chicago,  84  HI. 

335    [1875];    People  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  227   [1876]. 
Green,  3  Hun.  755   [1875];   Dixon  v. 


655  STATl'TORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  430 

tion  of  the  value  of  the  property  taken  is  to  be  determined  in 
the  same  proceeding  as  that  in  which  the  amount  of  benefits 
is  determined.^  Under  other  statutes  the  value  of  the  property 
taken  is  determined  in  a  proceeding  different  from  that  in  which 
the  assessment  is  apportioned.  In  proceedings  of  the  latter  type 
the  determination  of  the  value  of  the  property  taken,  made  in 
the  appropriation  proceedings,  is  final  and  the  question  of  value 
cannot  be  inquired  into  in  the  assessment  proceedings.-  If  au- 
thority to  appropriate  land  by  eminent  domain  exists,  a  mere 
irregularity  in  the  appropriation  proceedings  does  not  invalidate 
an  assessment  therefor  if  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  ease.^ 
However,  the  fact  that  the  certificate  of  appointment  of  three 
disinterested  freeholders  of  the  city  to  assess  damages  caused  by 
laying  out  a  street  does  not  show  that  they  were  disinterested 
freeholders,  has  been  held  to  invalidate  the  assessment  of  dam- 
ages and  the  assessment  of  benefits  to  pay  for  such  damages.* 
A  judgment  in  a  proceeding  in  which  both  benefits  and  damages 
are  to  be  assessed  and  the  one  set  off  against  the  other,  is  con- 
clusive, both  as  to  the  city  and  the  property  owner.^  It  therefore 
prevents  a  subsequent  assessment  of  such  property  for  benefits 
arising  from  such  improvement." 

§  430.     Interest  and  costs  in  appropriation  proceedings. 

Where  by  statute  the  title  of  property  appropriated  passes  be- 
fore the  levy  of  the  assessment  it  has  been  held  proper  to  include 
interest  on  the  value  of  the  property  from  the  time  of  the  passing 
of  title  as  an  item  of  asses.sment.^     Whether  the  costs  in  con- 


*  Andrews   v.   People   ex   rel.   Rum-  whose    property    lias    been    sold    for 

sey,  83  111.  520   [1876].  such  assessment  tx)   recover  from  the 

"Goodwillie  v.  City  of  Lake  View,  city    the    money    received    by    it    on 

137  111.  51,  27  X.  E."  15   [1892];   An-  such  sale). 

drews   v.   People   ex    rel.    Rumsey,    84  *  Davis     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

111.    28     [1870];     /"     >-c    Opening    of  Council    of    the    City    of    Newark.    54 

178th  Street,   City   of   New   York,   94  N.   J.   L.    (25  Vr.)    595,   25    Atl.   33(5 

N.    Y.    S.    838.     107    App.    Div.    22  [1892]. 

[1905].    See   §   997.  *  Davis     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

'South  Chicago  City  Railway  Com  Council    of    the    City    of    Newark.    54 

pany  v.  City  of  Chic^o.  19G  111.  490.  X.  .1.   L.    (25   Vr.)    595.   25    Atl.   336 

t)3  X.  E.   1040   [1902];   Pratt  v.  Citv  [1892]. 

of  Milwaukee.  93  Wis.  658.  68  X.  W.  ^  In   re   Mayor,   etc.,  of  Xew   York. 

392   [1896].  89    X.    Y.    S.    6,    95    App.    Div.    552 

Shidson   V.   City  of  Bridgeport.   25  [1904]. 
Conn.    426    [1857];     (a    suit    by    one 


§430 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


656 


demnation  proceedings  can  be  made  the  item  of  assessment  is  a 
question  upon  which  there  is  some  diversity  of  opinion  arising 
chiefly  from  differences  in  wording  of  the  respective  statutes 
which  apply.  In  Illinois  it  has  been  said  to  be  error  to  add  the 
costs  of  a  proceeding  to  appropriate  land  for  widening  a  street 
to  the  amount  for  which  the  assessment  is  to  be  levied.^  Thus, 
where  the  damages  amounted  to  over  eight  thousand  dollars  it 
was  held  to  be  error  to  add  an  item  of  ninety-six  dollars  for 
compensation  for  the  city  attorney,  the  printer,  the  surveyor,  the 
clerk  of  the  court  and  the  commissioners.^  In  Louisiana  it  has 
been  held  that  the  fees  of  commissioners  cannot  be  included  in  an 
assessment  for  opening  a  street.*  A  different  result  has  been 
reached  under  other  statutes.  Thus  it  has  been  held  proper  to 
include  the  compensation  of  appraisers  who  are  to  assess  damages 
for  opening  a  street  in  an  assessment  for  such  improvement."* 
In  Ohio  the  costs  and  expenses  of  proceedings  in  appropriation 
have  been  placed  upon  the  same  basis  as  the  damages  for  the 
value  of  the  land  taken,  being  regarded  as  proper  items  of  as- 
sessment w^here  the  value  of  the  land  taken  is  regarded  as  proper." 
and  improper  when  it  has  been  held  that  the  value  of  the  land 
taken  cannot  be  included  in  the  assessment.^  Whether  the  ex- 
pense of  searching  title  to  land  which  it  is  proposed  to  appropriate 
for  opening  a  street  can  be  included  in  an  assessment  has  been 
discussed  but  not  decided.^ 


^Trustees  of  the  Illinois  and  Mich- 
igan Canal  v.  City  of  Chicago,  12  111. 
403  [1851];  Morris  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 11  111.  650  [1850];  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Cook,  105  111.  App.  353 
[1903];  judgment  affirmed  68  X.  E. 
538. 

'Morri-,  v.  City  of  Chicago.  11  111. 
650  [1850]. 

*  City  of  New  Orleans  praying  for 
the  opening  of  Phillip  and  other 
streets,    10    La.    Ann.    313    [1855]. 

^  Kuhns  V.  City  of  Omaha,  55  Xeb. 
183,  75  N.  W.  562   [1898]. 

«City  of  Cleveland  v.  Wick,  18  0. 
S.  303  [1868];  Village  of  Norwood 
V.  Ogden.  15  Ohio  C.  C.  539.  18  Ohio 
C.  C.  869,  8  Ohio  C.  D.  383   [1898]. 


'Village  of  Norwood  v.  Baker,  172 
U.  S.  269,  43  L.  443,  19  .S.  187 
[1898];  (affirming  Baker  v.  Village 
of  Norwood,  74  Fed.  997  [1896]); 
Scott  V.  City  of  Toledo,  36  Fed.  385, 
1  L.  R.  A.  688  [1888];  City  of  Day- 
ton V.  Bauman,  66  O.  S.  379,  64  is'. 
E.  433  [1902];  Cincinnati,  Lebanon 
and  Northern  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Cincinnati,  62^  0.  S.  465,  4!1 
L.  R.  A.  566,  57  N.  E.  229  [1900]; 
Rhoades  v.  City  of  Toledo,  6  Ohio  C. 
C.   9    [1890]. 

^  State,  Raymond,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Council  of  the  Borough  of 
Rutherford.  55  N.  J.  L.  (26  Vr.)  441. 
27  Atl.  172   [1893]. 


657  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  431 

§431.     Highways  included  in  term  "street." 

Since  a  street  is  a  public  improvement  for  which  local  assess- 
ments may  be  levied/  the  power  of  a  city  or  other  public  cor- 
poration or  public  officer  to  levy  local  assessments  therefor  turns 
on  questions  of  statutor}^  construction.  Power  may  be  given  to 
construct  a  street  by  general  taxation,-  or  to  construct  it  by  local 
assessment  to  the  exclusion  of  general  taxation,"*  or  to  construct 
it  by  either  method  in  the  discretion  of  the  city.*  Power  to  im- 
prove streets  by  local  assessment  is  very  generally  given  by  stat- 
ute.^ The  term  "street"  in  this  connection  is  a  generic  one  and 
is  broad  enough  to  include  boulevards.^  It  is  also  broad  enough 
to  authorize  the  city  to  construct  a  parkway  separating  the  drive- 
ways of  a  street.'  and  to  provide  for  sodding  such  parkway  and 
planting  trees.^  However,  under  a  statute  authorizing  the  grad- 
ing and  paving  of  a  street,  it  was  held  that  the  city  had  no  power 
to  require  the  space  between  the  sidewalk  and  the  curb  to  be 
filled  with  rich  earth  and  sodded  at  the  expense  of  the  abutting 
property  owners.''  The  term  "street"  is  regarded  as  broad 
enough  to  include  a  public  road  or  a  turnpike  which  has  been 
taken  into  the  city  limits.^*'     The  existence  of  this  power  has. 


'  See  §  301  ef  se?.  Park.    187    111.    265,    58    N.    E.    32S 

-State  ex  rel.  The  City  of  Colum-  [1900];    Cummings   v.   West  Chicago 

bus  V.  Strader,  25  O.  S.  527    [1874].  Park  Commissioners.   181   111.  136,  51 

'Rhinelander    v.    Mayor,    etc.,    of  X.  E.  941    [1899]. 
New  York,  24   Howard    (N.   Y. )    304  *  Thompson    v.    Cit.v    of    Highland 

[1862].  Park,    187    111.    265,    58    N.    E.    328 

*  Oakland  Paving  Company  V.  Rier.  [1900];    Murphy   v.    Citv   of   Peoria, 

52  Cal.  270   [1877].  "  119   111.   509,   9X.   E.   895    [1888]. 

''Perine    v.    Forlnish,    97    Cal.    305.  "  Adams  v.  City  of  Shelb-yn'ille,  154 

32  Pac.  226   11893]:   Scoville  v.  City  Ind.    467,    77    Am.    St.   Rep.    484.   49 

of  Cleveland,    1   0.   S.    I2G;    Clark  v.  L.  R.  A.  797,  57  X.  E.  114  [1899]. 
City     of     Cleveland.     1     O.     S.     139  i»  Huelefeld    v.    City   of    Covineton. 

[1853];  Jessing  v.  City  of  Columbus,  —  Ky.   ,   60   S.   W.   296,   22   Ky. 

1  Ohio  C.  C.  90   [1885]:    (affirmed  22  L.     Rep.      1188      [1901];      Lewis     v 

W.  L.  B.  453)  :  Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Schmidt.  —  Ky.  ,  43  S.  W.  433, 

Pembertnn.   208   Pa.   St.   214.   57   Atl.  19    K'y.    L.    Rep.    1315;    State,   Town- 

516    [19041).  sfivl.    Pros.    v.    :Mayor    and    Comm-.n 

"West    Chicago    Park    Commission-  Council    of   .Terscy   City.   26   X.   .1.   L. 

ers  V.  Farber.   171   111.   146,  49  X.  E.  (2    Dutch.)     444     [1857];    People    of 

427     [1898]:     Thompson    v.    City    of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex  rel.  Caya- 

Highland  Park.  187  111.  265.  58  N.  E.  dutta  Plank  Road  Company  v.  Cum- 

328   [1900]:   Cumminors  v.  W>st  Chi-  mines.   166  X\  Y.   110.  59  X.  E.   703 

caoro    Park    Cofnmis«ionprs.    181     Til.  [1901];      Philadelphia      to      u^e      v. 

136.  54  X\  E.  941   [1899].  fUnvcn.    202    Pa.   St.    453,    52    Atl.    3 

'Thompson    v.    City    of    Highland  [1902]. 


§  431  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  65S 

however,  been  doubted/^  While  a  turnpike  company  may  have 
a  right  to  object  to  an  improvement  of  its  road  within  city  limits 
by  the  city,  property  owners  cannot  object  thereto  if  the  turn- 
pike company  does  not  see  fit  to  do  so.^-  Under  an  ordinance 
providing  that  no  street  shall  be  accepted  for  public  use  of  a 
less  width  than  thirty  feet  and  that  streets  must  be  first  dedi- 
cated or  properly  opened,  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for 
paving  a  street  the  width  of  which  on  the  city  plan  is  thirty 
feet,  but  which  has  been  opened  for  a  less  width.^^  The  fact  that 
a  railroad  track  is  located  in  a  street  does  not  prevent  it  from 
being  a  street  within  the  meaning  of  these  statutes.^*  Even  if  the 
surface  of  the  street  is  covered  with  railroad  tracks,  it  has  still 
been  held  to  be  a  street  so  that  the  city  may  improve  it  at  the 
expense  of  the  abutting  propert.y  owners  under  a  statute  au- 
thorizing such  improvement  of  the  street. ^'^  The  fact  that  a  rail- 
road company  whose  tracks  occupy  a  street  has  agreed  to  grade 
and  pave  such  street  and  to  keep  it  in  good  repair  does  not  pre- 
vent the  city  from  repairing  such  street  itself  at  the  expense  of 
the  abutting  property  owners.^"  A  street  crossing  a  railroad  at 
a  grade  which  carries  the  street  below  the  railroad  and  below  the 
natural  surface  of  the  ground  is  said  to  be  "a  subway  but  still 
a  street"  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  authorizing  the  paving 
of  streets.^"  The  term  ''street"  has  been  held  not  to  include  a 
cause-way  running  out  into  the  lake  between  water  lots  and 
connecting  the  shore  with  a  pier.'^  Such  improvement  is  intended 
primarily  for  the  public  benefit,  is  chiefly  intended  for  through 
traffic,  and  does  not  benefit  the  adjoining  water  lots  in  the  way 
that   an   ordinary   street   benefits   lots   abutting   thereon.     Under 

^^  State,    Parker,    Pros.    v.    City    of  Quincy  Railroad  Company  v.  City  of 

Xew  Brunswick,  32  X.  J.  L.   (3  Vr.)  Quincy,  136  111.  563.  29  Am.  St.  Rep. 

548    [1867].  334.  27   X.  E.   192    [1892]. 

"  Bagg  V.  City  of  Detroit,  5  Mich.  "  Richards    v.    City    of    Cincinnati. 

336    [1858];    State,   Parker,    Pros.   v.  31   O.  S.  506    [1877];   contra,  Saxton 

Mayor,  etc..   of   City   of   New   Bruns-  National    Bank   v.    Haywood,    62   Mo. 

wick,    30     N.     J.     L.     (1     Vr.)     395  App.  550   [1895]. 

[1863].  "Cason    v.    City    of    Lebanon,    153 

i^CJty    of    Philadelphia    to    use    v.  Ind.  567,  55  N.  E.   768    [1899]. 

Ball.    147    Pa.    St.    243,    23    Atl.    564  "Louisville    Steam    Forge    Co.    v. 

[1892].  Mehler,    112   Ky.  438,   64   S.  W.  396, 

"  Chicago,    Burlington    and    Quiiicy  64  S.  W.  652,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1335 

Railroad    Company    v.    City    of    Chi-  [1901]. 

cago,    139    111.    355,    28    N.    E.    1069  '*  Reed  v.  Erie,  79  Pa.  St.   (9  P.  F. 

[1893];      Chicago,     Burlington     and  Smith)    346   [1875]. 


659  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  432 

statute  authorizing  the  improvement  of  a  street  or  a  portion 
thereof,  it  has  been  held  that  a  private  alley  appurtenant  to  the 
abutting  lots  is  not  a  street/''  On  the  other  hand  a  strip  of  land 
used  in  fact  as  a  street  with  reference  to  which  abutting  lots 
had  been  sold  fronting  thereon  is  held  to  be  a  public  street  with- 
in the  meaning  of  the  statutes.-"  A  way  running  down  a  river 
bank,  between  high-water  mark  and  low-water  mark  is  not  a 
"street"  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  authorizing  the  im- 
provement of  a  street  at  the  expense  of  the  property  owners.^^ 
The  term  "another  road"  with  reference  to  an  improvement 
within  two  miles  of  which  land  is  to  be  assessed,  may  be  used 
to  denote  another  section  of  the  same  road.^^ 

§432.     Other  improvements  included  in  "street." 

The  term  "street"  in  its  broadest  sense  includes  sidewalks.^ 
Authority  to  improve  a  street,  therefore,  includes  authority  to 
improve  sidewalks.-  Authority  to  pave  a  street  includes  authority 
to  pave  the  space  reserved  for  sidewalks."*  A  statutory  grant 
of  authority  "to  pave,  gravel  or  macadamize  any  street,  avenue, 
square,  public  place  or  alley"  was  held  to  be  sufficiently  com- 
prehensive to  include  the  paving  of  a  sidewalk.*  So  authority 
to  pave  a  "street  or  public  place"  includes  authority  to  pave  a 
sidewalk.^     So   in   a  provision   for   grading   a  street,   grading  a 

"•De   Grilleau   v.    Frawlcy,   48    La.  In   the   Matter  of   Burnieister,   76   N. 

Ann.   184,   19  So.   151    [1890].  Y.     174     [1879];     reversing     In     the 

^"  Rteinacker  v.  Gest,  —  Ky.  ,  Matter    of    Burnieister,    9    Hun.    61.3 

89  S.  W.  481,  28  Ky.  Law  Rep.  573  [1877]. 

[1905].  -'Taber  v.  Grafmiller,  109  Ind.  206, 

=' Terrell    v.    City   of    Padm-ali.    —  9  X.  E.  721    [1886]. 

Ky.   ,   5   L.    "R.    A.    (N.    S.)    289,  Mn   the   Matter   of    Burnieister,   76 

92  8.  W.  .310   [1906].  N.   Y.    174    [1879];    reversin<j   In    the 

=^St.    Benedict's    Abbey    v.    Marion  Matter    of    Burnieister.    9    Hun.    61.3 

County,    —    Or.    .    93    Pac.    231  [1877]. 

[1908].  *  City    Council    of    Montgomery    v. 

'City    Council    of    Montgomery    v.  Foster,    133    Ala.    587.    32    So.    610 

Foster,    133    Ala.    587,    32    So.' 610  [1901]. 

[1901];    Bonnet  v.   City  and   County  "In   the  Matter   of  Burnieister,   76 

of    San    Francisco.    65    Cal.    2.30,    3  N.   Y.    174    [1879];    reversing  In   the 

Pac.  81    [1884];  Taber  v.  Grafmiller,  Matter    of    Burmeister.    9    Hun.    613 

109   Ind.   206,   9   N.   E.   721    [1886];.  [1877];    In  the  Matter  of  Buri<e,  62 

Gallaher  v.  City  of  .Tefferson.  125  la.  N.   Y.  224    [1875]:    In  the  matt€r  of 

324,  101  N.  VV.  124  [1904];  \Yilliamii  Phillips,  60  N.  Y.   16   [1875];    In  the 

V.  Mayor,  2  Mich.  560   [1853];   City  matter  of  Belmont,   12  Hun.    (N.  Y.) 

of  Independence  to  the  use  of  Smith  558    [1878]. 
V.  Briggs,   58  Mo.    App.  241    [1894]; 


§  432  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  '  660 

sidewalk  is  included."  A  petition  and  notice  for  grading  and 
paving  a  street  has  been  held  sufficient  to  support  an  ordinance 
which  provides,  in  addition  to  filling  and  paving,  for  curbing, 
guttering,  laying  cross-walks  and  intersections  and  paving  side- 
walks.^ A  statute  may.  however,  show  by  its  context  that  a 
narrower  sense  is  to  be  given  to  the  term  street.'^  Thus,  if  by 
statute  specific  provisions  are  made  for  improving  streets  and 
other  specific  provisions  are  made  for  improving  sidewalks,  the 
statutes  applicable  to  street  improvements  cannot  be  extended  to 
sidewalks.  A  resolution  of  intention  to  curb  and  macadamize  a 
street  does  not  include  the  construction  of  the  sidewalk. **  An 
ordinance  for  paving  a  street  does  nbt  require  the  paving  of  an 
existing  sidewalk. ^*^  A  sidewalk  has  been  held  not  to  be  a  "pub- 
lic way.  "^^  Power  to  levy  an  assessment  for  sidewalks  and 
gutters  does  not  include  power  to  levy  a  special  assessment  for 
paving  a  street.^-  Whether  a  sewer  situated  in  a  street  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  part  of  a  street  within  the  meaning  of  statutes 
concerning  the  improvement  of  a  street  is  a  question  which  turns 
chiefly  upon  the  character  of  the  sewer.  If  built  primarily  for 
the  purpose  of  draining  off  surface  water,  it  is  regarded  as  a 
part  of  the  street."  Accordingly,  under  authority  to  assess  for 
grading  and  graveling  a  street  the  council  may  by  resolution 
include  the  construction  of  a  storm  Avater  sewer  and  mav  levy 
an  assessment  therefor."  If  built  primarily  for  affording  drain- 
age to  houses  on  abutting  land,  it  is  not  regarded  as  a  part  of 
the  street. ^"^     Under  a  resolution  of  council  for  the  construction 

'  City   of   Independence   to   the   vise  W.     1046,     28     Ky.     Law     Rep.     09(1 

of  Smith  V.  Briggs,  58  Mo.  App.  241  [1900]. 

[1894].      See    also    Gallaher    v.    City  '- :*IcCro\velI  v.  City  of  Bristol,  89 

of  Jefferson,  125  la.  324,   101   X.  W.  Va.   652,  20   L.   R.   A.   653,   16   S.   E. 

124    [1904].  867     [1892]. 

'State.     Malone,     Pros.     v.     Mayor  '''Murphy    v.    City    of    Peoria,    119 

and  Common  Council  of  Jersey  City,  111.   509,  9   N.   E.   895    [1888];    Kirk- 

28  X.  J.  L.    (4  Butcher)    500  [I860].  hind  v.  Board  of  Public  Works  of  the 

"  Himmelmann  v.  Satterlee,  50  Cal.  City    of    Indianapolis,    142    Ind.    123, 

08    [1875].  41  X.  E.  374  [1895];  Parsons  v.  City 

"Dj'er  V.  Chase,  52  Cal.  440  [1877]  :  of  Grand  Rapids,  141  Mich.  467,  104 

Himmelmann    v.    Satterlee,    50    Cal.  X'.  ^V.  730   [1905];   Taylor  v.  Wapa- 

68    [1875].  koneta.     26     Ohio     Cir.'    Ct.     R.     285 

•"County    of    Adams    v.    County    of  [1904]. 

Quincy,    130    111.    566.    22    X.    E.    624  » Gates   v.    City    of   Grand   Rapids. 

[1889].  134  Mich.  96.  95  X\  W.   998    [1903]. 

"Mudge    V.    Walker    (Ky.).    90    S.  i=  Peek    v.    City   of    Grand    Rapids, 

125  Mich.  416.  84  X\  W.  614   [1900]; 


661  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  432 

of  a  street  the  city  cannot  levy  an  assessment  for  the  construction 
of  a  sewer  to  provide  for  the  disposal  of  sewage  from  the  ad- 
joining property.^®  However,  a  grant  of  power  to  cities  to  repair 
their  streets  and  to  keep  them  in  order  has  been  held  to  authorize 
the  construction  of  sewers,  without,  apparently,  any  distinction 
as  to  the  purpose  of  the  sewer.^^  Power  to  do  the  work  of 
"regulating,  grading  or  otherwise  improving"  a  certain  street 
is  held  to  confer  power  to  construct  a  sewer  therein.^**  Property 
was  detached  from  a  municipality  under  a  statute  providing  that 
proceedings  for  "improving  any  street"  within  the  area  detached 
could  be  finished.  It  was  held  that  under  this  provision  the  lay- 
ing of  water-pipes  could  be  continued  and  completed.^^  The  term 
"street"  does  not  include  retaining  walls,-^  railings  and  barriers,-^ 
or  a  bridge  over  a  railroad.--  Hence,  on  the  one  hand  the  cost 
of  retaining  walls  cannot  be  included  in  the  assessment.-''  On 
the  other  hand  failure  to  erect  railings  and  barriers  does  not 
prevent  the  improvement  from  being  completed.-^  One  reason 
for  not  including  the  cost  of  retaining  walls  in  an  assessment 
for  street  improvement  is  that  the  retaining  wall  in  the  particular 
case  was  necessary  to  furnish  to  the  abutting  lot  the  lateral  sup- 
port to  which  it  was  entitled  by  law  and  of  which  it  had  been 
deprived  by  the  city's  act  in  removing  the  natural  soil  from  the 
street. ^'^  A  retaining  wall  in  the  street  dividing  the  street  length- 
wise into  two  parts  of  different  grades  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
access  to  property  not  on  the  line  of  the  street  was  regarded 
as  conferring  no  benefit  upon  the  owners  of  abutting  property 
and  hence   was   not   included    in    the   street   improvement.-"      On 

McMakin    v.    City    of    Cincinnati,    7  "^  Chase   v.   Board   of   Aldermen    of 

Ohio  N.  P.  203   [1900];   City  of  Cin-  Springfield,   119   Mass.  55(5   [1876]. 
cinnati  for  the  use  of  Wilson  v.  Fug-  --  Friedemvald   v.    Shipley.    74    Md. 

man,  5   Ohio  N.   P.    14    [18971 1  220,  21  Atl.  790,  24  Atl.   15«   [18911. 

'"Peck    V.    City    of    (irand    Rapids,  ^  Loesnitz    v.    Seelinger,    127     Ind. 

125  Mich.  416,  84  N.  \V.  014   [1900].  422,    25    X.    E.    1037,   2G    X.    E.    887 

"Johnson    v.    City    of    Milwaukee,  [1890];    Xaltner    v.    Blake,    50    Ind. 

88   Wis.   383,   60   X."  W.    270    [1894].  127    [1877]. 

'"  In  the  matter  of  ttie  Trustees  of  -*  Chase    v.    Board    of    Aldermen    of 

the  I^ake  and   Watts  Orpiian   Home.  Springfield,   119  Mass.   556    [1876]. 
92  X.  Y.   116   [1883].         '  =^  Armstrong   v.    City   of   St.    Paul, 

"Town  of  Cicero  v.  Green.  211    111.  30  Minn.  299,   15  N.  W.   174    [1883]. 
241,  71   X.   E.   884    [1904].  ""In  re  Grading,  Paving  and  Curb- 

^  Loesnitz    v.    Seelinger,     127     Ind.  lug  Wick  Street,  Appeal  of  the  City 

422,    25    X.    E.    1037,    26    X.    E.    887  of  Pittsburg,  184  Pa.  St.  93;  39  Atl. 

[1890];    Xaltner    v.    Blake,    56    Ind.  3    [1898]. 
127    [18771. 


§§433,434  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  662 

the  other  hand  where  it  was  necessary  to  construct  a  retaining 
wall  to  separate  a  street  from  a  canal  and  the  wall  was  necessary 
solely  for  the  preservation  of  the  street,  it  was  held  proper  to 
include  its  cost  in  an  assessment  for  street  improvements.-^ 

§  433.     Location  of  street  to  be  improved. 

Ordinarily  a  city  is  authorized  to  improve  only  streets  within 
such  city.^  The  rules  for  determining  whether  the  ordinance  and 
the  resolution  show  that  the  street  is  within  the  city  are  dis- 
cussed elsewhere.-  If  there  is  no  constitutional  provision  against 
special  legislation,  the  city  may  be  authorized  to  improve,  in 
certain  ways,  streets  in  given  portions  of  the  city,  without  re- 
ceiving authority  to  improve  in  like  manner  other  streets  in  the 
same  city.''  It  will  be  presumed,  however,  that  a  city  has  general 
power  over  all  its  streets  under  statutes  authorizing  street  im- 
provements, unless  the  legislature  clearly  shows  its  intention  to 
restrict  its  power  to  certain  streets  only.*  Under  authority  to  lay 
out  any  street,  the  city  may  lay  out  more  than  one  street.^  In 
describing  the  street  to  be  improved  the  popular  name  of  such 
street  may  be  employed.  By  the  use  of  such  name  will  ordi- 
narily be  intended  the  whole  street  known  by  such  name,"  even 
if  a  part  of  such  street  bears  another  official  name.^  If  the  city 
is  authorized  to  improve  streets  of  a  certain  width  as  a  mini- 
mum, it  cannot  levy  an  assessment  for  improving  a  street  of  less 
width.®  Park  commissioners  may  be  restricted  to  improving  the 
streets  which  they  have  laid  out  and  opened.^ 

§  434.     Opening  and  vacating  street. 

The  cost  of  appropriating  land  to  be  used  as  a  street  is  in 
most  .jurisdictions  regarded  as  a  proper  item  of  expense  if  pro- 

-''  Longworth  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  °  Murpliy  v.  City  of  Long  Branch, 

34  0.  S.  101    [1877]."  —    N.    J."  Sup. ,    Gl    Atl.    593 

^  Moberry  v.  City  of  Jeffersonville,  [1905]. 

38  Ind.  198   [1871];  Mayor  and  City  'Lynch  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  44 

Council    of    Baltimore    v.    Porter,    18  Kan.   452,   24   Pac.   973    [1890]. 

Md.  284,   79  Am.  Dec.   686    [1861].  'Lynch  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  44 

^See  §   859.  Kan.' 452,  24  Pac.  973   [1890]. 

*  Houston  V.  McKenna,  22  Cal.  550  **  City  of  Philadelphia  to  use  v. 
[1863];  In  the  matter  of  the  Emi-  Ball,  147  Pa.  St.  243,  23  Atl.  564 
grant    Industrial    Savings    Bank,    75  [1892]. 

N.   Y.   388    [1878].  »  In   the  matter  of   the  Petition  of 

*  Houston  V.  McKenna,  22  Cal.  550       Deering.  85  X.  Y.  1    [1881]. 
[1863]. 


fl 


663  STATUTOKV    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  434 

vision  therefor  is  made  b.y  statute.^  The  statutes  occasionally 
provide  for  assessments  for  opening  streets.  The  term  "opening" 
is  said  not  to  include  improving  as  by  grading  and  paving."^  What 
the  term  "opening"  does  include  has  been  said  to  be  so  uncer- 
tain that  a  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  for  "opening"  a 
street  cannot  be  enforced.-'  In  other  jurisdictions  the  terra  "open- 
ing" appears  to  include  the  cost  of  appropriating  the  property 
for  a  public  use  and  removing  such  obstructions  as  existed  upon 
the  surface  of  the  land  when  taken.*  Under  a  statute  which  pro- 
vided for  "laying  out"  a  street,  it  was  held  that  an  order  passed 
by  the  proper  board  reciting  the  necessity  of  widening  a  given 
street  and  providing  for  a  notice  to  the  abutters  of  the  intention 
of  the  board  to  lay  out  the  street  by  taking  a  portion  of  the  land 
of  such  abutting  owners;  and  another  order  repeating  the  find- 
ing as  to  necessity  of  widening  the  street,  reciting  the  giving  of 
notice  aforesaid,  and  adjudging  that  the  land  should  be  taken 
as  a  part  of  the  street  and  assessing  the  damages  therefor, 
amounted  together  to  an  order  "laying  out"  the  street.^  When 
applied  to  sewers  the  term  "laying  out"  is  said  to  mean  "the 
designation  by  the  common  council  of  the  locality  of  the  sewer 
or  drain  and  its  dimensions  and  mode  of  construction. "  "^  The 
different  meanings  which  may  be  attached  to  the  term  "laying 
out"  have  been  noticed  in  other  cases."     Under  a  statute  which 

^  See   §   308.  the  throwing  open  to  the  public  what 

^'Reed   v.   City   of   Toledo,   18   Ohio  already  was  appropriated  to  individ- 

161  [1849].    It  does  not  include  grad-  ual    use    and    the    removing    of    such 

ing  and  graveling.     Wilcoxon  v.  City  obstructions  as  exist  on   the   surface 

of  San  Luis  Obispo,  101  Cal.  508,  35  of    the    earth   rather   than   any   arti- 

Pac.   988    [1894].  licial    improvement    of    the    surface, 

*  State,    Gaines,    Pros.    v.    Hudson  and  we  think  in  the  charter  this  dis- 

County  Avenue  Commissioners.  37  N.  tinction  is  very  clearly  drawn."  Reed 

J.   L.    (8   Vr.)    12    [1874].      [By   the  v.   City  of  Toledo,   18  Ohio,   161,   165 

terms  of  this  statute,  it  was  provid-  [1849]. 

ed    that    the    opening    of    an    avenue  ^Masonic    Building    Association    v. 

should    be    paid    for    by    assessments  Brownell,    164    Mass.    306,    41    X.    E. 

while    the    cost    of    constructing    this  306    [1895]. 

avenue  should  be  borne  by  the  county  "Cone  v.  City  of  Hartford  28  Conn, 

at  large.]  363    [1859].      [The  court  assumed  in 

'  "By  the  term  opening  we  do  not  this  case  that  "laying  out"  as  ap- 
understand  the  im])rovement  of  a  plied  to  higliways  had  a  more  tech- 
street  or  highway  by  grading,  cul-  nical  meaning  than  the  same  term 
verting,  etc.  The  term  is  generally  as  applied  to  sewers.] 
(we  think  always)  clearly  distin-  '"The  words  'laid  out'  used  in  ref- 
guishable  from  such  kind  of  improve  erence  to  ways  do  not  always  have 
nient.      The    term    opening    refers    to  the  same  signitication.     They  will  be 


§§435,436  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  664 

provides  for  opening  and  improving  streets  ana  levying  an  as- 
sessment therefor  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for  the  im- 
provement of  a  street  already  in  existence.*  Under  provisions  of 
a  statute  for  vacating  a  street,  the  damage  caused  by  such  vaca- 
tion may  be  included  in  an  assessment  to  be  levied  upon  the 
owners  of  property  benefited  by  such  vacation." 

§  435.     Widening  street. 

Authority  to  levy  assessments  for  widening  a  street  is  gen- 
erally given  by  statute.^  If  the  exercise  of  such  power  is  held 
invalid,  it  is  for  special  reasons  peculiar  to  each  case.  Thus, 
under  a  statute  providing  that  the  cost  of  repaving  shall  be  paid 
out  of  the  repair  fund,  it  was  held  that  an  assessment  could  not 
be  levied  for  widening  a  street  where  the  improvement  was  not 
for  the  benefit  of  the  owners  but  of  the  public  and  resulted  in 
the  reconstruction  of  the  street  already  paved.-  An  assessment 
for  widening  a  street  may  be  invalid  if  the  assessment  is  grossly 
in  excess  of  the  benefits.^  This  is  true  especially  if  the  benefits 
have  once  been  deducted  in  a  condemnation  proceeding  and  it 
is  subsequently  sought  to  assess  for  such  benefits.*  An  assess- 
ment for  widening  a  street  may  be  invalid  because  the  improve- 
ment of  widening  is  combined  with  another  improvement,  such 
as  grading  and  graveling,  which,  by  statute,  is  made  a  distinct 
proceeding.^ 

§  436.     Power  to  grade  street. 

Power  conferred  upon  a  city  to  grade  a  street  implies  power 
to  fix  the  grade  of  such  street.^     If  a  city  has  power  to  grade 

found    to   be    used    as    descriptive    of  *  Whiting  v.  Mayor   and  Aldermen 

all   conditions   of   a   way,   such   as   a  of  the  City  of  Boston,   106  Mass.  89 

way  voted   to  be   built,   a  way  being  [1870];    City   of   Asheville   v.   Wach- 

built,   or    a    way   built.      The   context  ovia  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  143  X.  C.  360, 

usually    determines    the    meaning    of  55   S.   E.  800    [1906]. 

the   expression."      Mansur   v.    County  ^  Wreford   v.    City    of   Detroit,    132 

Commissioners   of  Aroostook  County.  Mich.  348,  93  X.  W.  870   [1903]. 

83  Me.  514,  523.  22  Atl.  358   [1891].  *  City   of   Xorfolk    v.    Chamberlain. 

*  Municipality  Xumber  Two  v.  Mc-  89   Va.    196,    16   S.   E.   730    [1892]. 

Donough,  16  La.  533   [1840];   Second  *  City   of   Xorfolk   v.    Chamberlain. 

Municipality  of  Xew  Orleans  v.  Mc-  89  Va.' 196,  16  S.  E.  730  [1892]. 

Donough,   9   Robinson    (La.)     [1845].  ^Mendenhall    v.    Clugish,    84    Ind. 

°In  the  matter   of  Barclay,  91   X.  94    [1882]. 

Y.  430   [1883];   Vacation  of  Howard  '  Himmelmann  v.  Hoadley,  44  Cal. 

Street,  Philadelphia,  142  Pa.  St.  601,  213    [1872]. 
21   Atl.   974    [1891]. 


665  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  436 

streets,  it  ordinarily  has  power  to  change  a  grade  once  estab- 
lished,- subject  in  some  states  to  liability  to  damages  for  chang- 
ing an  established  grade.  A  statute  authorizing  park  commission- 
ers to  establish  the  grade  of  streets  in  a  certain  territory  "where 
the  same  have  not  heretofore  been  fixed  and  established  by  law," 
does  not  give  to  such  commissioners  power  to  change  established 
grades  whether  established  by  statute  or  by  ordinance  of  the  coun- 
cil.^ Power  to  grade  does  not  of  itself  confer  power  to  levy  a 
local  assessment  for  grading.*  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  spe- 
cifically authorizing  the  levy  of  an  assessment  therefor  the  cost 
of  grading  must  be  paid  for  by  general  taxation.^  The  power  to 
assess  for  the  cost  of  grading  is  frequently  given  by  statute  and 
if  so  given  ma,y  be  exercised."  Under  some  statutes  it  is  provided 
that  the  cost  of  grading  can  l)e  paid  for  by  local  assessment  only 
if  the  general  funds  or  the  revenues  of  the  city  are  not  suffi- 
cient to  justify  paying  such  expense  out  of  the  city  treasury. 
Under  such  statutes  the  cost  of  grading  cannot  be  assessed  upon 
property  owners  unless  the  city  council  declares  formally  that 
the  revenues  of  the  city  are  not  sufficient  to  justify  paying  the 
cost  of  grading  out  of  the  city  treasury.'^  Under  authority  to  levy 
an  a.ssessment  for  grading,  it  has  been  held  that  an  improvement 
consisting  of  "grading,  grubbing,  guttering  and  curbing"  the 
streets  may  be  paid  for  by  assessment.'*  Under  authority  to  grade 
and  gravel  a  street  a  sewer  cannot  be  constructed.'*  Whether  an 
order  to  grade  a  strei^t  would  justify  macadamizing  a  street  was 

'Mason   v.   City  of   Sioux   Falls,   2  509   [1882];   Emery  v.  San  Francisco 

S.    Dak.    G40,    39    Am.    St.    Rep.    802,  Oas    Company,    28    Cal.    340    [1865|: 

51    N.    W.    770    [18921.  Sutler  v.  City  of  Toledo.  5  O.  S.  225 

*  In  the  matter  of  the  Mutual  Life  |  1855] ;  Ridenour  v.  Saflin,  I  Handy 
Insurance  Company,  89  N.  Y.  530  (Ohio  )  464  [1855]:  McXair  v.  Os- 
[1882].                        "  trander,    1    Wasli.    110,    23    Pao.    414 

*  Field    V.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving  [1890]. 

Company.   117  Fed.  925   [1902];   Sco-  'Wheeler  v.   City  of  Poplar  Bluff, 

field  V.  City  of  Council  Blufls,  68  la.  149   Mo.   36,   49   S.   \V.    1088    [1898]; 

695,    28    N.    W.    20    [1886];    Keys   v.  (  ity  of  Sedalia  to  the  use  of  Taylor 

City   of   Xeodesha,    64    Kan.    681,    68  v.    Abell,    103    Mo.    App.    431,    70    S. 

Pac.  625    [19021;   Hentig  v.  nilmorc,  \V.   97    [1903];    City   of   Carthage   ex 

33  Kan.  234,  0  Pac.  .304   [1885].  rcl.  Carthage  National  Bank  v.  Badg- 

°  Keys  V.  City  of  Xeodesha.  04  Kan.  ley,   73   Mo.   A]>]^.    123    [1897]. 

681,   68   Pac.   625    [1902]:    ITcntig   v.  "^City     of    Spokane    v.     Browne,    8 

Gilmore.    33    Kan.    234,    0    Pac.    304  Wash.  317.  36  Pac.  20   [1894]. 

[1885].  "Peck    v.    City    of    Grand    Rapids, 

•City  of  Napa  v.  Easterby.  01  Cal.  125  Mich.  416.  84  X.  W.  614   [1900]. 


§437 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


66G 


held  to  depend  on  the  i)lan  of  work  to  be  done  which  was  before 
the  board  when  the  order  was  made,  which  was  to  be  regarded 
as  part  of  such  order;  but  which  was  not  put  in  evidence  in  the 
case  so  as  to  enable  the  court  to  determine  the  question.^"  Under 
authority  to  levy  an  assessment  for  grading  an  item  of  expense 
for  removing  gas  pipes  cannot  be  included,  since  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  gas  company  to  remove  its  own  gas  pipes  when  public 
necessities  require  it."  Under  a  statute  providing  for  assessing 
upon  abutting  property  the  cost  of  altering  the  grade  of  a  street, 
it  has  been  held  that  the  cost  of  altering  such  grade  in  order 
to  carry  the  street  under  a  railroad  and  thus  avoid  a  grade  cross- 
ing is  "not  within  the  purview  of  this  statute. "^- 

§  437.     Power  to  pave  street. 

Many  statutes  provide  for  levying  assessments  for  paving  a 
street;  and  assessments  under  such  statutes  are  valid. ^  The  ques- 
tion presented  under  such  statutes  is  as  to  the  meaning  of  "pav- 
ing" and  the  forms  of  improvement  Avhich  may  be  included 
thereunder.  Paving  consists  in  producing  by  any  means  a  hard, 
firm,  smooth  surface  for  travel.-  Paving  consists  in  producing 
a  compact,  even,  hard  surface,''  or  covering  the  street  with  stone 
or  brick  so  as  to  make  a  convenient  surface  for  travel."'  Many 
different  forms  of  paving  have  been  provided  for  by  statute  and 
considered  by  the  courts.  Among  such  forms  of  paving  for  w^hich 
local  assessments  may  be  levied  are  macadamizing  ^  and  special 


^^  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Lewis 
V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County, 
33  Minn.   164,  22  N.  W.  295   [1885]. 

"  In  the  matter  of  Deering,  93  N. 
Y.  361    [1883]. 

"  Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v. 
Meliler,  112  Ky.  438,  64  S.  W.  396, 
64  S.  W.  652,  23  Ky.  Lew.  Rep.  1335 
[1901]. 

^  Washington  &  Georgetown  Rail- 
road Company  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 108  U.  S.  522,  27  L.  807,  2  S. 
865  [1883];  Emery  v.  San  Francisco 
Gas  Company,  28  Cal.  346  [1865]; 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Savannah  v. 
Weed,  96  Ga.  670,  23  S.  E.  900 
[1895];  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 
Baltimore  v.  Hughes'   Adm'r,   1    Gill 


&  Johnson  (Md.)  480,  19  Am.  Dec 
243  11829];  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Balti- 
more V.  Moore,  6  Harris  &  Johnson 
(Md.)  375  [1825];  Breevort  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  24  Mich.  322  [1872]; 
Franklin  v.  Hancock,  204  Pa.  St.  110. 
53   Atl.    644    [1902]. 

-  Philadelphia  to  use  of  Mack  v. 
Eddleman,  169  Pa.  St.  452,  32  At!. 
639    [1895]. 

^  State  of  Florida  ex  rel.  City  of 
Jacksonville  v.  JacksonvllJe  Street 
Railroad  Company,  29  Fla.  590,  10 
So.   590    [1892]. 

nVarren  v.  Henly.  31  la.  31 
[1870]. 

^Partridge  v.  Lucas,  99  Cal.  519, 
33   Pac.    1082    [1893];    Alameda  Ma- 


667 


STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS. 


§437 


forms  thereof,"  block  pavements. '  including  granite  block**  and 
wooden  block."  such  as  the  Nicholson  block.'"  planking  ^^  and 
asphalt  pavements.'-  The  only  objection  raised  to  the  use  of 
any  of  these  materials  for  paving  arises  under  statutes  providing 
for  competitive  bidding,  where  the  specifications  call  for  such  of 
these  materials  as  are  patented  and  cannot  therefore  be  open  to 
free  competition.'"  Under  a  statute  providing  for  paving  streets 
and  filing  liens  therefor,  "as  is  now  practiced  and  allowed  by 
law,"  the  latter  expression  refers  to  the  lien  and  not  to  the 
paving  and  does  not  restrict  the  city  to  methods  of  paving 
known  and  used  when  such  statute  was  passed.'^     leaving  is  a 


cadamizing  Company  v.  Williams,  70 
Cal.  534,  12  Pac.  530  L1880J;  Amery 
V.  City  of  Keokuk,  72  la.  701,  30  N. 
VV.  780  [1887J;  Sanger  v.  Rice,  43 
Kan.  580.  23  Pac.  633  L1890];  Hines 
V.  City  of  Leavenworth,  3  Kan.  180 
[1865J;  Ross  v.  Gates,  183  Mo.  338, 
81  S.  \V.  1107  [19041;  (macadam 
held  to  be  "paving"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  an  ordinance)  ;  Saxton  v.  City 
of  St.  Joseph.  00  Mo.  153  [1875]; 
Kiley  v.  Cranor,  51  Mo.  541  [1873]; 
Neenan  v.  Donoghue,  50  Mo.  493 
[1872];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  the  use 
of  Lohrum  v.  Coons,  37  Mo.  44 
[1865];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  of 
Carrol  v.  Hardy,  35  Mo.  261  [1864]; 
Powell  V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  31  Uo. 
347  [1861];  City  of  St.  Joseph  v. 
Anthony,  30  Mo.'  537  [I860];  Oster 
V.  City  of  Jeflerson,  57  Mo.  A])p.  485 
[1894];  Gibson  v.  Zimmerman,  27 
Mo.  App.  90  [18871;  Union  Cemetery 
Association  v.  McCojinell,  124  N.  Y. 
88,  26  N.  E.  330   [1891]. 

*  In  the  matter  of  P.ehnont.  12 
Hun.  558   [1878]. 

'Gleason  v.  Barnett.  106  Ky.  125. 
50  S.  W.  67  I  1899]  ;  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Raymo,  68 
Md.   569,    13   Atl.    383    [1888]. 

*Cole  v.  Skrainka,  105  Mo.  .303.  16 
S.  W.  491  [1891];  Philadelphia  to 
use  V.  Evans.  139  Pa.  St.  483.  21  Atl. 
200    [18911. 

'Owens  v.  City  of  Milwaukrc.  47 
Wis.  4(il,  3  X.  W.  3   [1879]. 

"  Nicholson  Pavement  Co.  v.  Pain- 


ter, 35  Cal.  699  [1868];  Martindale 
V.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411  [1875];  How- 
ell v.  Bristol.  71  Ky.  (8  Bush.)  493 
[1871];  Motz  V.  City  of  Detroit,  18 
Mich.  494  [1869];  Hobart  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  17  Mich.  246,  97  Am.  Dec. 
185;  Rogers  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  22 
Minn.  494  [1876];  Dean  v.  Borchse- 
nius,  30  Wis.  236  [1872];  Mills  v, 
Charleton,  29  Wis.  400.  9  Am.  Rep. 
578    [1872]. 

''City  of  Seattle  v.  Kelleher,  195 
U.  S.  351,  25  S.  C.  44,  49  L.  232 
[1904];  Knowles  v.  Seale.  64  Cal. 
377,  1  Pac.  1.59  [1883];  Deady  v. 
Townsend,  57  Cal.  298  [1881];  Em- 
ery V.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.,  28  Cal. 
346    [1865]. 

'"X.  P.  Perine  Contracting  &  Pav- 
ing Company  v.  Quackenbush,  104 
Cal.  684,  38  Pac.  533  [1894];  Bar- 
ber Aspjialt  Paving  Company  v.  Edg- 
erton,  125  Ind.  455.  25  X.  E.  436 
[1890];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co. 
V.  Gaar,  115  Ky.  334,  73  S.  W.  1106, 
24  Ky.  L.  Rep."  2227  [1903]:  Barber 
Asi)halt  Paving  Co.  v.  French,  158 
Mo.  534,  54  L.  R.  A.  492,  58  S.  W. 
934  I  1900]  ;  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.  v.  niman.  137  Mo.  543,  38  S. 
W.  458  [1896]:  City  of  Schenectady 
V.  Trustees  of  I'lii m  College,  66  Hun. 
(X.  V.)  179.  21  \.  V.  Su])p.  147 
I1S921;  City  of  Krie  ii-*e  Erie  Pav- 
iii','  Co.  v.  :\loo(lv.  171  Pa.  St.  610. 
:53    Atl.    378    [1S951. 

'■■See    §   515. 

"  Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Evans.  139 
Pa.   St.  483.  21   Atl.  200    [1891]. 


§438 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


668 


term  applicable  as  well  to  sidewalks  as  to  streets/''  and  includes 
flagging.^"  Paving  a  street  does  not  necessarily  involve  any 
change  in  grade. ^'  The  city  may,  if  it  sees  fit,  pave  only  a  part 
of  the  width  of  the  street,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  specifically 
providing  the  width  which  must  be  paved. ^*  The  city  may  omit 
to  pave  the  part  of  a  street  between  the  tracks  of  a  railroad 
located  therein.^"  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  paved  part  of  a 
street  be  in  the  center  thereof.-^  This  is  "a  matter  within  the 
discretion  of  the  city  officers. "  ^^ 

§  438.     Distinction  between  grading  and  paving. 

Grading  and  paving  are  ordinarily  to  be  distinguished.^  Au- 
thority to  levy  an  assessment  for  paving  is  not  authority  to  levy  an 
assessment  for  grading.-  The  change  of  grade  of  a  street  is  held 
not  to  be  necessarily  a  proceeding  relative  to  an  assessment  for 
paving.^  However,  power  to  make  assessments  for  "pitching, 
paving,  regulating  and  repa'iring  streets"  was  held  to  include 
power  to  assess  for  grading.*  In  some  jurisdictions  the  cost  of 
grading  cannot  be  paid  for  by  assessments,  while  the  cost  of 
paving  can.''     In  such  .jurisdictions  the  actual  preparation  of  the 


'^  In  the  matter  of  Burmeister,  76 
N.  Y.  174  [1879];  (reversing  In  the 
matter  of  Burmeister,  9  Hun.  (N. 
Y.)  613  [1877]);  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Petition  of  Burke  to  Vacate  an 
Assessment,  62  N.  Y.  224  [1875]; 
In  the  matter  of  Phillips  to  Vacate 
an  Assessment,   60  X.  Y.   16    [1875]. 

'"  In  tlie  matter  of  Burmeister,  76 
N.  \.  174  [1879];  (reversing  in  the 
matter  of  Burmeister,  9  Hun.  (N. 
Y.)    613   [1877]). 

"  State  of  Florida  ex  rel.  City  of 
Jacksonville  v.  Jacksonville  Street 
Railway  Company,  29  Fla.  590,  10 
So.  590    [1892]. 

"  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Savannah,  86  Ga.  301,  12  S.  E.  580 
[1890];  Topliff  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
196  111.  215,  63  N.  E.  692  [1902]; 
County  of  Jefferson  v.  City  of  Mt. 
Vernon,  145  111.  80,  33  N.  E.  1091 
[1893];  Downing  v.  City  of  Des 
Moines,  124  la.  289.  99  N.  W.  1066 
[1904]. 

"Matter  of  McCormack.  10  Abb. 
Pr.  N.  S.    (N.  Y.)   234   [1870]. 


-°  McGrew  v.  City  of  Kansas  City, 
64  Kan.  61,  67  Pac.  438   [1902]. 

^  McGrew  v.  City  of  Kansas  City, 
64  Kan.  61,  62,  67  Pac.   438    [1902]. 

1  Fort  Street  &  Elmwood  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Schneider,  15  Mich.  74  [1866]; 
Green   v.   Ward,   82   Va.   324    [1886]. 

^  Bucroft  V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs, 
63    la.    646,    19   N.    W.    807. 

^  In  the  matter  of  Buhler,  32  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  79  [1859].  See  also,  where 
an  assessment  could  be  levied  for 
paving  but  not  for  a  change  of  grade 
to  carry  a  street  under  a  railroad; 
Louisville  Steam  Forge  Co.  v.  Meh- 
ler,  112  Ky.  438,  64  S.  W.  396,  652. 
23   Ky.  Law  Rep.   1335   [1901]. 

*  People  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  Green.  3 
Hun.    (N.    Y.)    755    [1875]. 

=  Allen  V.  City  of  Davenport,  107 
la.  90,  77  N.  W.  532  [1898];  Sco- 
field  V.  City  of  Council  Bluffs.  68 
la.  695,  28  N.  W.  20  [1886]  ;  City  of 
Poplar  Bluff  to  use  of  Wheeler  v. 
Hoag.  62  Mo.  App.  672  [1895];  Gib- 
son V.  Kayser's  Executors.  16  Mo. 
App.  404   [1885]:   Farrington  v.  City 


669 


STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS. 


§439 


surface  of  the  ground  so  as  to  make  it  suitable  for  receiving  the 
pavement  is  not  regarded  as  grading  within  the  meaning  of  these 
statutes,  but  is  a  part  of  paving.'"'  A  contract  l)y  a  street  railway 
company  to  pave  its  track  does  not,  however,  make  it  liable  for 
excavation  incident  thereto."  On  the  other  hand,  macadamizing 
a  street  is  not  looked  upon  as  grading,  although  it  makes  a  slight 
change  in  the  grade. ^ 

§  439.     What  is  included  in  paving. 

A  provision  for  paving  a  street  impliedly  includes  the  neces- 
sarj'-  processes  incident  thereto/  such  as  leveling  the  surface,- 
and  sand  filling.-^  Whether  a  provision  for  paving  includes  curb- 
ing, guttering,  sewers  and  the  like  is  a  question  upon  which 
there  is  some  conflict  of  authority.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  seems 
to  be  held  that  improvements  of  these  classes  are  not  included 
under  a  general  provision  for  paving.*  Thus  a  provision  for 
assessing  for  paving  has  been  held  not  to  include  curbing.''  A 
provision  for  macadamizing  has  been  held  not  to  include  curb- 


of  Mt.  Vernon,  166  N.  Y.  233,  59  IST. 
E.  826  [1901];  Green  v.  Ward,  82 
Va.   324    [1886]. 

"  Field  V.  Barber  Asi)halt  Paving 
Company,  117  Fed.  925  [1902];  Al- 
len V.  City  of  Davenport,  107  la.  90. 
77  N.  W.  532  [1898];  Scofield  v. 
City  of  Council  Bluffs,  68  la.  695. 
28  N.  W.  20  [1886];  City  of  Poplar 
Bluff  to  use  of  Wheeler  v.  Hoag,  62 
Mo.  App.  672  [1895]  ;  Gibson  v.  Kay- 
cer's  Executors,  16  Mo.  App.  404 
[1885];  State,  Parker,  Pros.  v.  City 
of  New  Brunswick,  32  X.  J.  L.  (3 
Vr.)  548  [1867];  Farrington  v.  City 
of  Mt.  Vernon,  166  X.  Y.  233.  59  x\. 
E.  826  [1901];  Blount  v.  City  of 
Janesville,   31    Wis.   648    [1872]. 

"Where  an  alley  has  been  suffi- 
ciently graded,  or  where  it  does  not 
need  to  be  graded,  the  small  cost  of 
preparing  it  for  pavement  might  be 
included  in  the  cost  of  the  pavement 
as  a  mere  incident  thereto."  Hentig 
V.  Gilmore.  33  Kan.  2.34.  243,  6  Pac. 
304  [1885].  Such  form  of  grading 
is  said  to  be  "that  slight  alteration 
of  the  surface  of  the  ground  usually 


incident  to  the  laying  of  pavements 
and  the  paving  of  gutters."  State. 
Parker,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Xew  Bruns- 
wick, 32  X.  J.  L.  (3  Vr.)  548  [1867] ; 
See  to  the  same  effect  O'Reilley  v. 
City  of  Kingston,  114  X.  Y.  439,  21 
X.    E.    1004    [1889]. 

'  Fort  Street  &  Elmwood  R.  R.  Co. 
v.    Schneider,    15    Mich.    74    [1866]. 

"Warren  v.  Henly,  31  la.  31 
[1870]. 

^  People  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  Green,  3 
Hun.  (X.  Y.)  755  [1875];  Dean  v. 
Borchsenius,    30    Wis.    236    [1872]. 

^  People  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  Green, 
3    Hun.    (X.    Y.)    7.55    [1875]. 

•■'  Dean  v.  Borchsenius,  30  Wis.  236 
[1872]. 

*  City  Street  Improvement  Co.  v. 
Taylor,  138  Cal.  364,  71  Pac.  446 
[1903];  Partridge  v.  Lucas,  99  Cal. 
519,  33  Pac.  1082  [1893] ;  Beaudry 
v.  Valdez.  32  Cal.  269   [1867]. 

"  City  Street  Improvement  Co.  v. 
Taylor.  138  Cal.  364,  71  Pac.  446 
[1903]. 


§440 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


670 


ing,"  the  construction  of  rock  gutters,"  or  the  construction  of 
sidewalks."  A  contract  for  paving  and  macadamizing  a  street 
may  be  performed  fully,  although  no  curbing  or  guttering  has 
been  done.**  In  other  .jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  a  power  to 
pave  includes  many  other  types  of  improvement  as  incidental 
thereto.'^'  Thus,  authority  to  pave  has  been  held  to  include  re- 
moving earth  for  paving,  and  setting  curbstones,"  the  construc- 
tion of  gutters,^-  curbing  and  guttering. ^'^  and  filling  and  ad.just- 
ing  sewers,  catch-basins  and  manholes.^*  Under  a  provision  for 
additional  macadamizing,  rock  on  the  roadway  may  be  removed 
and  such  part  of  the  roadway  relaid  with  new  rock.^'^ 


§  440.     Intersections. 

Who  shall  pa,y  for  the  cost  of  paving  the  intersection  of  two 
streets  which  cross  each  other,  is  a  question  which  rests  in  the 
discretion  of  the  legislature.^  The  legislature  may  provide  that 
the  street  shall  pay  the  cost  of  such  intersections  out  of  its  funds 
raised  by  general  taxation.-  If  the  statute  specifically  provides 
that  the  city  shall  pay  the  cost  of  intersections  out  of  its  general 
funds,^  or  if  it  provides  for  paying  the  cost  of  such  intersections 
out  of  a  ward  fund,^  or  if  it  provides  for  levying  an  assessment 
for  a  street  improvement  excluding  intersections,^  the  intention 
of  the  legislature  to  relieve  abutting  property  owners  from  the 
cost   of   such    improvements    is    clear.      A    street    intersection    is, 

"Beaudry  v.  Valclez,  32  Cal.  269 
[1867]. 

'Partridge  v.  Lucas.  99  Cal.  519. 
33  Pac.   1082    [1893]. 

*  Himmelniann  v.  Satterlee,  50  Cal 
68    [18751. 

*  Fox  V.  Middlesborough  Town 
Company.  9(i  Ky.  262.  28  S.  W.  776 
[18941.' 

"  City  of  Springfield  to  use  of  Cen- 
tral National  Bank  v.  Weaver.  137 
Mo.  650;  37  S.  ^V.  509.  39  S.  W.  276 
[1896]. 

"Steckcrt  v.  City  of  East  Sagi- 
naw, 22  Mich.    104    [1870]. 

1^  Warren  v.  Henly,  31  la.  31 
[1870]. 

^^  Owens  V.  City  of  Marion,  127  la. 
4-69,  103  N.  W.  381  [1905];  Williams 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit,  2  Mich. 
560  [1853];  City  of  Omaha  v.  Gsan- 


ter.  4  Neb.  UnoflT.  52,  93  N.  W.  407 
[1903]. 

'*  Sawyer  v.  City  of  Chicago,  183 
111.  57,  55  N.  E.  645  [1899]-;  Cochran 
V.  Village  of  Park  Roads,  138  111. 
295,  27   N.  E.   939    [1891]. 

"^  Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Rier,  52 
Cal.   270    [1877]. 

'  Doane  v.  Houghton,  75  Cal.  360. 
17  Pac.  426  [1888]:  In  the  matter 
of  Murphy.  20  Hun.  346  [1880].  See 
S   317. 

-  Beniteau  v.  City  of  Detroit,  41 
Mich.    116.    1   N.  W.   899    [1879]. 

■'Beniteau  v.  City  of  Detroit,  41 
Mich.   116.   1   N.  W.   899    [1879]. 

'Blount  V.  City  of  Janesville.  31 
Wis.    648    [1872].' 

^  Moale  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore,  61  Md.  224   [1883]. 


671  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  440 

however,  a  part  of  a  street  and  is  necessary  to  its  continuity. 
The  legislature  may  and  often  does  provide  for  including  the 
cost  of  street  intersections  in  the  general  cost  of  the  street  and 
assessing  the  same  upon  the  property  benefited  by  the  street." 
As  long  as  the  assessment  does  not  exceed  the  benefits  it  may 
be  left  to  the  city  to  determine  whether  to  levy  assessments  for 
the  cost  of  street  intersections,  and  its  determination  to  assess 
for  such  cost  is  final.'  If  the  statute  provides  that  the  assessment 
shall  be  "for  an  amount  which  shall  not  exceed  the  actual  cost 
and  value  of  the  improvement,"  it  is  left  in  the  discretion  of 
the  city  whether  to  levy  an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  inter- 
sections or  not.**  If  a  statute  provides  originally  that  the  "entire 
cost  of  the  improvement"  is  to  be  divided  by  the  number  of 
feet  fronting  or  abutting  on  the  improvement  and  that  the  quo- 
tient shall  be  the  sum  assessed  per  front  foot ;  and  this  statute 
is  modified  so  as  to  provide  that  the  "cost  of  the  improvement 
fronting  on  the  property  to  be  assessed"  is  to  be  divided  by  the 
number  of  feet  fronting  on  such  improvement,  the  cost  of  inter- 
sections is  to  be  included  in  the  cost  of  the  improvement  under 
the  statute  as  amended.^  Special  provisions  are  occasionally  found 
with  reference  to  the  cost  of  street  intersections.  Thus  it  may  be 
provided  that  lots  in  a  block  may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  work 
extending  to  the  middle  line  of  the  cross  streets  at  each  end  of 
the  block.^''  The  cost  of  paving  intersections  may  be  separated 
from  the  general  cost  of  the  street  and  assessed  upon  the  prop- 
erty at  or  near  the  intersection  paved  on  the  theory  that  such 
property  is  especially  benefited  thereby.'^  Under  such  statutes 
it  is  improper  to  include  the  property  near  the  intersection  but 
not  within  the  assessment  district  for  the  general  street  improve- 
ment in  assessing  for  the  cost  of  the  street  improvement  gener- 

«  Corey  v.  City  of  Fort  Dodge,   133  58{i.  (51   X.  K.  849  111)011;   Walters  v. 

la.    606,    111    N.    W.    6    [19071    Gage  Town  of  Lake,    129    111.   23,  21   N.   E. 

V.   City   of  Chicago,    192    111.   58(5.    01  ooO    [18901. 

X.  E.849    [19011;    Walters   v.   Town  ■*  Lewis  v.  City  of  Seattle.  28  Wash, 

of    Lake,    129    111.    23,    21    X.    E.    55',i  ()39.  69  Pao.  393    [19021. 

[18901;    Conde    v.    City    of    Schenec-  *  Brandluiher   v.   City  of   Pierre,   — 

tady.    164   N.   Y.   258,   58   X.    E.    130       S.  D.  .   113  X.  W.  oCO   [19071- 

[19001;    Young    V.    City    of    Tacoma.  "^Cibson    v.    Kayser's   Exeentor,    16 

31    Wash.    153,   71    Pac'   742    [19031;  :\ro.  App.  404    118851. 

Lewis   V.   City   of   Seattle,   28   Wash.  "  In    the    matter    of    Murphy.    20 

639.  69  Pac.  393   [19021.  Hun.   346    [18801. 

'Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago,   192   111. 


§440 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


672 


ally.^-  One-fourth  of  the  cost  of  the  street  intersection  may  be 
imposed  npon  each  corner  lot.^^  In  the  absence  of  statutes  spe- 
cifically providing  therefor,  the  cost  of  paving  street  intersections 
cannot  be  assessed  upon  the  cross  streets  and  thus  indirectly 
cast  upon  the  city/*  or  upon  the  owners  of  the  ultimate  fee, 
subject  to  the  public  easement.^'  This  result  is  usually  reached 
under  statutes  which  provide  for  assessing  abutting  lots  or  land. 
Within  the  meaning  of  these  statutes  cross  streets  are  not  re- 
garded as  lots  or  land.^*^  Since  the  assessment  cannot  exceed 
the  cost  of  the  improvement  and  the  proper  items  incidental 
thereto  even  if  less  than  the  aggregate  amount  of  the  benefits," 
street  intersections  cannot  be  charged  for  twice  in  levying  as- 
sessments.^* However,  where  an  ordinance  providing  for  paving 
intersections  with  asphalt  and  such  ordinance  was  subsequently 
repealed  by  a  subsequent  ordinance  providing  for  paving  such  in- 
tersections with  wooden  blocks,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no 
attempt  to  assess  twice  for  the  same  intersections.^*^  If  cross 
streets  are  paved  with  diiferent  materials,  the  intersection  evi- 
dently can  be  paved  with  the  same  material  as  only  one  of  the 
streets.  In  such  a  case  the  city  has  the  right  to  determine  which 
street  shall  be  regarded  as  continuous  so  as  to  pave  intersections 
with  that  material.'-"  The  city  may  determine  to  which  of  the 
intersecting  streets  it  will  charge  the  cost  of  street  intersections 
or  whether  it  will  charge  them  to  both  in  part.-^     A  resolution 


"In  the  matter  of  Murphy,  20 
Hun.    346    [1880]. 

I'Wolf  V.  City  of  Keokuk,  48  la. 
129   [1878]. 

'^Holt  V.  City  of  East  St.  Louis, 
150  111.  530,  37  N.  E.  927  [1894]; 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  Columbus  v. 
Mitchell,  31  0.  S.  592  [1877].  In 
Dick  V.  City  of  Toledo,  11  Ohio  C. 
C.  349  [1896],  it  was  said  that  a 
part  of  the  cost  of  the  extra  width 
of  a  street  to  make  a  market  space 
must  be   borne   by   the   city. 

'"  City  of  Schenectady  v.  Trustees 
of  Union  College.  144  k.  Y.  241,  26 
L.  R.  A.  614,  39  N.  E.  67  [1894]; 
reversing  City  of  Schenectady  v. 
Trustees  of  Union  College,  66  Hun. 
179,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  147   [1892]. 

'«See  §  587,  §   630. 


''See  §  466,  §  716,  §  719. 

'^  Chicago  Union  Traction  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  208  111.  187, 
70  N.  E.  234  [1904];  (distinguish- 
ing Noonan  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 183  111.  52,  55  N.  E.  679 
[1899]). 

"  Noonan  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 183  111.  52,  55  N.  E.  679 
[1899];  (distinguished  in  Cliicago 
Union  Traction  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  208  111.  187,  70  N.  E.'234 
[1904]). 

="  Bates  V.  Twist,  138  Cal.  52,  70 
Pac.  1023  [1902];  Noonan  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Raymond,  183  111.  52,  55  N. 
E.    679    [1899]. 

^'Creighton  v.  Scott,  14  0.  S.  438 
[1863]. 


673  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  441 

for  providing  for  paving  an  avenue  from  Forty-second  to  Eighty- 
sixth  street,  and  for  laying  cross  walks  at  the  several  inter- 
secting streets  and  avenues  authorizes  the  paving  of  Eighty-sixth 
street  as  an  intersecting  street."-  Whether  by  the  use  of  "in- 
tersection" or  some  similar  expression,  the  legislature  or  city 
council  refers  to  streets  or  sidewalks,  or  both,  is  a  question  of  de- 
pending upon  the  context  for  its  determination,  since  both  streets 
and  sidewalks  intersect.  Under  a  statute  providing  that  all  im- 
provements of  the  squares  or  areas  formed  by  the  crossing  of 
streets  should  be  paid  by  the  city  out  of  its  general  funds,  it  was 
held  that  the  cost  of  the  sidewalks  at  the  corners  of  such  squares, 
as  well  as  the  cost  of  the  intersection  of  the  streets,  should  be 
paid  out  of  the  general  funds.-''  In  an  ordinance  which  refers 
to  sidewalk  improvements  and  describes  intersections  as  being 
upon  the  corners  of  the  streets,  the  term  "intersections"  is  re- 
garded as  applying  to  sidewalk  intersections  only  and  not  to 
intersections  of  streets.-* 

§  441.    Curbing  and  guttering. 

Power  to  curb  and  gutter  is  generally  given  by  statute.  Provi- 
sion is  often  made  for  including  these  expenses  as  items  of  the  as- 
sessment upon  the  owners  of  property  benefited  by  the  improve- 
ment.^ Where  specific  mention  of  curbing  and  guttering  is  made, 
and  it  is  provided  that  assessments  may  be  levied  therefor,  it  is 
ordinarily  immaterial  whether  curbing  and  guttering  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  part  of  the  street  or  a  part  of  the  sidewalk.-  If  no 
specific  mention  is  made  of  curl)ing  and  guttering  and  a  different 
method  is  provided  for  paying  for  the  cost  of  constructing  a 
street  from  that  which  is  provided  for  paying  the  cost  of  con- 
structing a  sidewalk,  it  is  quite  material  to  determine  whether 
curbing  and  guttering  are  to  be  regarded  as  parts  of  the  street 
or  parts  of  the  sidewalk.  Upon  this  question  there  is  a  plain 
conflict  of  authority.  From  a  negative  standpoint  some  of  the 
courts  have  held  that  a  curb  is  not  a  part  of  a  street  improvement.^ 

«Tn    the    matter    of    :\rnrpliy.    20  La.   Ann.  25   [18521;   City  of  Omaha 

Hun.  346    [18801.  v.  Csanter.  4  Xol).  I'nofV.  52.  93  X.  W. 

^City   of    Lawrence   v.    KiUain.    11  407    |1003|. 

Kan.  499   [18731.  -  Pittsbnrfj    v.    Cluley.    06    Pa.    St. 

2«Gaire  v.  City  of  Chicago.  203  111.  (16    P.    F.    Smith)    449    [1870]. 

26.  67  N.  E.  477   [19031.  ^  P.eaudry    v.    Valdez,    32    Cal.    269 

^Burk   V.   Altschnl.   66   Cal.   533.   6  |  1S671  :  Citv  to  u*e  of  Brooks  v.  Lea. 

Pae.  393   [1885];   O'Leary  v.   Sloo,  7  9  Phila.    (Pa.)    106   [1872]. 


§441 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


674 


Hence,  macadamizing  a  street  does  not  include  curbing  the  side- 
walk.* Other  courts  have  held  that  a  curb  and  gutter  are  not  a 
part  of  a  sidewalk  improvement.'^  Whether  a  curb  is  a  part  of  a 
gutter  is  said  to  be  a  question  of  fact,  depending  on  the  usual  and 
customary  way  of  constructing  the  gutter."  From  an  affirmative 
standpoint  some  courts  have  held  that  a  curb  and  a  gutter  are  a 
part  of  a  street  improvement.'  Other  courts  have  held  that  a  curb 
is  a  part  of  a  sidewalk."  A  curb  has  been  regarded  as  a  part  of 
the  sidewalk,  even  if  there  is  not  enough  of  the  street  left  on  that 
side  to  construct  the  rest  of  the  sidewalk."  In  some  jurisdictions 
this  latter  result  is  reached  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
statute  applicable,  which  seems  to  treat  curbing  and  guttering 
as  a  part  of  the  sidewalk.^''  It  has  been  said  to  be  a  question  of 
fact  to  be  determined  from  the  circumstances  of  each  particular 
case  whether  a  curb  and  gutter  are  a  part  of  the  street  or  a  part 
of  the  sidewalk."     An  assessment  for  paving  is  not  invalid  for 


*Beaudry  v.  \^aldez,  32  Cal.  269 
[1867]. 

MVilson  V.  Chilcott,  12  Colo.  600 
21  Pac.  901  [1889].  A  gutter  is  not 
part  of  the  sidewalk;  Harton  v. 
Town  of  Avondale,  U7  Ala.  458.  41 
So.  934  [1906].  A  curb  is  not  part 
of  the  sidewalk;  Job  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Tetherington,  193  III.  609,  61  N.  E 
1079    [1901]. 

*  Phoenixville  Borough  v.  Miller, 
34   Pa.   Super.   Ct.    16    [1907]. 

'  Harton  v.  Town  of  Avondale,  147 
Ala.  458,  41  So.  934  [1906];  Wilson 
V.  Chilcott,  12  Colo.  600,  21  Pac.  901 
[1889];  Allnian  v.  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, 3  App.  D.  C.  8  [1894];  Job 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Tetherington,  193 
111.  609,  61  N.  E.  1079  [1901];  Gates 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  134  Mich. 
96,  95  N.  W.  998  [1903];  In  Matter 
of  Burmeister,  76  N.  Y.  174  [1879]; 
reversing  in  the  Matter  of  Burmeis- 
ter, 9  Hun.  613  [1877].  A  curb  is 
a  part  of  the  street  where  there  is 
not  sufficient  space  to  construct  a 
sidewalk.  Marshall  v.  Barber  As- 
phalt Paving  Company.  —  Ky.  

66  S.  W.  734.  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1971 
[1902]:  substitute  for  opinion  in 
Marshall  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Company,  66  S.  W.  182,  which  modi- 


fied Marshall  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Pav- 
ing Company,  —    (Ky. )    ,  52   S. 

W.    1117,   21    Ky.   L.   Rep.   712. 

*  Howe  V.  City  of  Cambridge,  114 
Mass.  388  [1874];  Joyes  v.  Shad- 
burn,  —  Ky.  ,  13  S.  W.  361,  11 

Ky.  L.  Rep.  892  [1890];  State,  Rob- 
ins, Pros.  V.  Commissioners  of 
Streets  and  Sewers  in  the  City  of 
New  Brunswick,  44  N.  J.  L.  (15  Vr.) 
116  [1882].  Curbing  is  held  to  be 
a  part  of  the  sidewalk  and  guttering 
a  part  of  the  roadway  in  State,  Kirk- 
pat  rick.  Pros.  V.  Commissioners  of 
Streets  and  Sewers  in  the  City  of 
New  Brunswick,  42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.) 
510   [1880]. 

°  Marshall  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Pav- 
ing Company,  —    (Ky. )    ,  66  S. 

W.  734,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1971  [1902]; 
( substitute  for  opinion  in  Marshall 
v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co..  66  S. 
W.  182,  which  modified  Marshall  v. 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  —  (Ky.) 

.   52   S.   W.    1117,   21   Ky.   L.   R. 

712]. 

'"Joyes  V.  Shadburn.  —  Ky.  • 

13  S.  "W.  361,  11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  892 
[1890]. 

"  Ehni  V.  Citv  of  Columbus.  3  Ohio 
C.  C.  494  [18891;  (here  held  to  be 
a  part  of  the  street). 


675  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  442 

want  of  curbing:  and  guttering  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  show 
that  such  omission  rendered  the  pavement  defective.^- 

§  442.    Alleys. 

An  alley  is  an  improvement  for  the  construction  of  which  an 
assessment  may  be  levied,  if  authorized  by  statute.^  Under  a 
statute  which  provides  that  the  grading  of  new  streets  and  alleys 
and  the  repair  of  ..11  alleys  is  to  be  paid  out  of  the  general  revenue 
fund  of  the  city,  and  that  materials  for  the  roadways  and  the  re- 
pairs of  all  alleys  are  to  be  charged  upon  the  adjoining  property 
as  a  special  tax,  property  which  adjoins  an  alley  may  be  subject 
both  to  a  special  assessment  for  repairs,  and  also  for  the  cost  of 
constructing  a  roadway  or  an  alley.- 

§  443.    Sidewalks. 

A  grant  of  power  to  construct  a  sidewalk  did  not  confer  power 
to  levy  special  assessments  for  the  cost  thereof.^  Thus,  under  a 
statute  providing  that  a  city  may  "regulate  and  improve  all 
streets,  alleys  and  sidewalks."  it  was  held  that  the  city  could  not 
levy  an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  constructing  a  sidewalk.-  Power 
to  assess  for  constructing  a  sidewalk  is  very  often  given  by  statute 
and  where  given  may  be  exercised  in  the  manner  provided  for 
by  statute.^  Since  the  term  "street"  often  includes  sidewalks, 
power  to  assess  for  paving  a  street  includes  power  to  assess  for 
paving  a  sidewalk  where  the  term  "street"  is  used  with  this 
broad  meaning.*  Since  the  construction  of  a  sidewalk  is  one  of 
the  improvements  which  may  be  charged  against  the  property 
owner  on  the  theory  of  compelling  him  to  jiay  for  the  perform- 
ance of  a  legal  duty  which  rested  upon  him  primarily,  it  has  been 
held  in  jurisdictions  which  entertain  this  view  of  the  nature  of  a 
sidewalk   improvement.   th;it   the   al)utting  -owikm's   may   be   com- 

'*  Wilvert     v.     Rnnburv     Borough,  '  Ronan   v.    People  ex    id.   Sliafter, 

81  y^    Pa.    St.    (32    P.    F.    Sniitli)    .57  103   111.  (531.   fil    X.   E.   1042    [1901]; 

[1874],  O'Leary     v.     Sioo,     7     La.     Ann.     2.5 

'  Heman   v.    Gilliam,    171    Mo.    2.58.  [1852];     Kemper     v.     King,     11     Mo. 

71   S.  W.   IfiS    [1902].     See  §  .321.  App.    116    [18811;    hi    re    Beeclnvn-.l 

"Heman   v.   fJilliani.    171    Mo.    2.58.  Avenue,    Appeal    of   O'Mara,    104    Pa. 

71   S.  W.   1(53    [10021.  St.  86,  45  Atl.  127   [18901. 

■City    of    Fairfield    v.    Ratcliir.    20  MVarren     v.     Henly,     31      la.     31 

fa.  396   [18001.  [1870]. 

=  City    of    Fairfield    v.    RatclifT.    20 
la.    396    [18661. 


§  443  TAXxVTION    BY    ASSESSMENT  676 

pelled  to  construct  sidewalks  in  front  of  their  property,  even  if 
no  authority  is  given  to  levy  assessments  therefor  on  the  theory 
of  benefits  conferred  by  such  improvements.^  Thus,  under  a 
statute  authorizing  a  city  "to  regulate  and  make  improvements 
to  the  streets,  alleys,  sidewalks,  public  squares,  wharves  and 
other  public  property  and  places,"  the  city  maj^  compel  owners 
of  land  fronting  on  a  street  to  construct  and  keep  in  repair  the 
sidewalks  in  front  of  their  respective  lands."  In  some  jurisdictions 
sidewalk  improvements  do  not  seem  to  be  referred  to  the  power 
to  compel  the  property  owner  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  performing 
a  legal  duty  which  rested  primarily  upon  him.'^  Where  this  theory 
is  entertained  the  city  cannot  require  the  owner  to  construct  a 
sideAvalk  in  front  of  his  property  or  pay  for  the  cost  of  such  con- 
struction,^ at  least  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  authorizing  the 
imposition  of  such  charge.  If  a  city  is  empowered  to  charge  prop- 
erty owners  with  the  cost  of  constructing  a  sidewalk,  it  is  held  in 
many  jurisdictions  that  this  power  does  not  include  the 
power  to  compel  the  property  owner  to  grade  that  part 
of  the  street  which  is  to  be  occupied  by  the  sidewalk  when 
constructed.*  Such  grading  must  be  done  by  the  city  at 
its  own  expense,  or  must  be  paid  for  in  the  manner  author- 
ized for  paying  for  the  grading  of  the  street.  Even  under  a 
statute  which  provides  for  a  lien  upon  abutting  land  in  case  the 
owner  neglects  "to  perform  the  thing  or  things  required  by  an 
order  of  the  common  council  for  the  making,  raising,  grading, 
paving  or  flagging  any  sidewalks  in  the  city  adjacent  to  such 
land,"  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  land  to  be  occupied  by  the 


'Mayor  and  Board  of  Trustees  of  of   Portage,    12   Wis.   562    [I860], 
the  Town  of  New  Iberia  v.  Fontelieu,  '  Little     Rock     v.     Fitzgerald,     59 

108    La.    460,    32    So.    3G9     [1901];  Ark.  494,  28  L.  R.  A.  496,  28  S.  W. 

State,    Agens,    Pros.    v.    Mayor    and  32   [1894];  Hillhouse  v.  City  of  New 

Common   Council    of   Newark,   37   N  Haven,    62    Conn.    344,    26    Atl.    393 

J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    415,  18  Am.  Rep.  729  [1892];     President    and    Fellows    of 

[1874];     People    ex    rel.    Johnson    v.  Vale   College  v.   City  of  New  Haven 

City     of     Brooklyn,     23     Barb.     180  57  Conn.  1,  17  Atl.  139  [1889];  Dick- 

[1856];    Wilkinsburg    Bor.    v.   Home  inson  v.   City   Council   of   Worcester, 

for  Aged  Women,  131  Pa.  St.  109,  6  138  Mass.  555  [1885];  State,  Cronin, 

L.  R.  A.   531,   18  Atl.  937    [1890].  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jer- 

« Mayor   and  Board  of  Trustees  of  sey    City,   38   N.   J.   L.    (9   Vr.)    410 

the  Town  of  New  Iberia  v.  Fontelieu.  [1876]  ;    State,  Van   Tassel,   Pros.  v. 

108  La.  460,  32  So.  369  [1901].  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City 


'See  §  420.  37  N.  J.  L.   (8  Vr.)    128   [1874]. 

'  State  ex  rel.   Christopher  v.  City 


I 


677  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS   CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS  §  443 

sidewalk  is  above  or  below  the  level  of  a  street,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  city  to  grade  the  entire  width  of  the  street.^"  If  the  city 
orders  a  sidewalk  to  be  constructed  upon  a  sea-wall  the  city  must 
put  such  sea-wall  in  repair  so  as  to  make  a  suitable  foundation  for 
such  sidewalk.  The  city  cannot,  under  color  of  compelling  an 
owner  of  land  to  construct  a  sidewalk,  compel  him  to  reconstruct 
such  sea-wall. ^^  Under  authority  to  grade  a  street  the  city  may, 
therefore,  grade  that  part  of  a  street  which  is  to  be  occupied  by 
a  sidewalk.^-  Power  to  compel  the  construction  of  a  sidewalk 
does  not  include  power  to  compel  the  building  of  a  railing  along 
the  side  thereof.^'^  Accordingly,  such  improvement  may  be  com- 
pleted without  such  railing.^*  Authority  to  construct  a  sidewalk 
by  assessments  does  not  include  authority  to  levy  an  assessment 
for  banking  the  sides  of  the  walk  with  earth. ^^  An  ordinance 
which  provides  for  constructing  a  new  sidewalk  in  place  of  the 
old  without  specifying  the  grade  of  the  new  walk,  in  effect  leaves 
the  grade  as  it  was  before.^"  In  the  absence  of  statute  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  width  of  the  sidewalk  to  be  constructed  should 
be  established  before  proceedings  for  doing  the  work  are  begun. ^^ 
Under  a  statute  which  requires  sidewalks  to  be  paved  for  the  full 
width  thereof  an  ordinance  for  laying  a  sidewalk  need  not  specify 
the  width  to  be  paved.^''  Under  a  statute  for  assigning  the  cost 
of  constructing  sidewalks  at  the  expense  of  the  property  owners 
benefited  and  providing  that  property  owners  Avho  have  built 
their  own  walks  shall  not  be  charged  "except  for  the  pro 
rata  cost  of  intersections,"  it  was  held  that  a  property 
owner  who  constructed  the  sidewalk  in  front  of  liis  property  and 
the  intersection  ad.joiiiing  thereto  under  a  j)ermit  which  made  no 

'"  Hillhouse  v.  City  of  Xew  Haven.  "Chase   v.    Board    of   Aldermen   of 

62  CVnn.  ,344,  26  Atl.  303   [1892].  Springfield,    119    Mass.    556    [1876]. 

'I  President    and    Fellows    of    Yale  '^  People  v.  Patton,  223  111.  379,  79 

College    V.    City    of    Xew    Haven.    57  N.  E.  51  [1906]. 

Conn.  1,  17  Atl.  139   [1889].  '« Gaertner    v.    Louisville    Artificial 

i-Dashiell  v.  Mayor  and  City  Conn-  Stone  Co..  114  Ky.  160.  70  S.  \V.  2Sn 

cil  of  Baltimore,  Use  of  Hax,  45  Md.  [1902];    City   of  Augusta   v.   McKili 

615  [1876];    (This  holding  was  justi-        ben.   —   Ky.  .   60   S.  W.   291,   22 

fied  on  the  theory  that  such  grading  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1224. 

was  necessary  for  laying  and  protect  "  Doane  v.  Houghton.  75  Cal.  360 

ing  the  work  of  the  paving  and  gut-  17  Pac.  426   [1888]. 

tering  which  was  included  in  the  gen-  "In  the  Matter  of  the  Mutual  Life 

eral  work  of  paving.)  Insurance    Company.    89    X.    Y.    530 

"Williams   v.   Brace,   5   Conn.    190  [1882]. 
ri824]. 


§444 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


678 


reference  to  the  cost  of  intersections  did  not  thereby  relieve  him- 
self from  liability  for  his  pro  rata  share  of  the  cost  of  all  the 
sidewalk  intersections  contracted  for  in  that  improvement."  The 
city  may  provide  that  property  owners  shall  pay  the  cost  of  side- 
walk intersections.-'^  Where  a  hearing  is  given  as  to  the  existence 
of  benefits  as  a  fact  the  property  owners  may  submit  the  question 
whether  the  city  should  not  pay  for  such  intersee'tions,  but  the 
finding  of  the  trial  court  is  regarded  as  final.^^ 

§  444.    Sewers. 

A  sewer  is  an  improvement  for  the  construction  of  which  an 
assessment  may  be  levied,  if  authorized  by  statute.^  In  the  absence 
of  a  statute  specifically  authorizing  an  assessment,  mere  authority 
to  construct  a  sewer  does  not  confer  authority  to  assess.^  Thus, 
under  a  statute  which  authorizes  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  and 
which  authorizes  an  assessment  for  the  value  of  land  taken  for 
the  construction  of  roads,  streets  or  highways,  the  cost  of  land 
taken  for  a  sewer  or  damaged  by  its  construction  cannot  be  in- 
cluded in  the  assessment.^  Statutes  frequently  authorize  the  levy 
of  local  assessments  for  the  construction  of  sewers  and  full  effect 
is  given  to  such  statutes.*    A  city,  acting  under  a  special  charter 


'•  Heman  Construction  Company  v 
McManus,  102  Mo.  App.  649,  77  S. 
W.  310  [1903].  The  reason  assigned 
for  this  view  was  that  "the  permit 
under  which  respondent  constructed 
the  sidewalk  adjacent  to  her  property 
was  silent  respecting  intersections," 
Heman  Construction  Company  v.  Mc- 
Manus, 102  Mo.  App.  649,  656,  77  S. 
W.  310   [1903]. 

»Hyman  v.  City  of  Chicago,  188 
111.  462,  59  N.  E.  10  [1900]. 

^  Hyman  v.  City  of  Chicago,  188 
111.  462,  59  X.  E.  10  [1900]. 

'  See  §  324  et  seq. 

^  Heman  v.  Handlan,  59  Mo.  App. 
490  [1894];  City  of  Watertown  v 
Fairbanks.  65  N.  Y.  588  [1875];  Bor- 
ough of  Mauch  Cliunk  v.  Shortz,  61 
Pa.  St.  (11  P.  F.  Smith)  399  [1869]; 
Cain  V.  City  of  Elkins.  57  W.  Va.  9, 
49  S.  E.  898    [1905]. 

'Mill  Creek  Sewer.  196  Pa.  St. 
183.  46  Atl.  312   [1900]. 

*  Park     Ecclesiastical     Society     v. 


t  ity  of  Hartford,  47  Conn.  89 
[1879];  Clapp  V.  City  of  Hartford. 
35  Conn.  66  [1868];"  Rich  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  152  III.  18,  38  N.  E.  255 
I  1894]  ;  Alley  v.  City  of  Lebanon. 
146  Ind.  125,  44  N.  E.  1003  [1890]; 
Murphy  v.  City  of  Peoria,  119  111. 
509,  9  X.  E.  895  [1888];  Jackson  v. 
Smith,  120  Ind.  520,  22  X.  E.  431 
[1889];  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
Allen  Co.  v.  Silvers,  22  Ind.  491 
[1864];  Smith  v.  Mayor  and  Alder 
men  of  Worcester,  182  Mass.  232,  59 
L.  R.  A.  728,  65  X.  E.  40  [1902]; 
Warren  v.  City  of  Grand  Haven.  30 
Mich.  24  [1874];  South  Highland 
Land  and  Improvement  Company  v. 
Kansas  City.  172  Mo.  523,  V2  S.  W. 
944  [1902];  City  of  St.  Joseph  t.i 
l"se  of  Gibson  v.  Farrell.  106  Mo. 
437.  17  S.  W.  497  [1891];  Akers  v. 
Kolkmeyer  &  Companv.  97  Mo.  App. 
520.  71  S.  W.  536  [1902];  Shannon 
v.  Citv  of  Omaha,  73  Xeb.  507.  103 
X.    W'.    53,    106   X.    W.    592    [1905]; 


679 


STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS. 


444 


which  does  not  authorize  the  levy  of  assessments  for  sewers,  may 
levy  such  assessments  under  a  general  law  which  the  city  is  au- 
thorized to  adopt.''  A  general  law  authorizing  an  assessment  for 
the  construction  of  sewers  and  applicable  to  any  city  operating 
under  a  special  charter  and  authorized  by  such  charter  to  construct 
sewers  may  be  acted  upon  by  any  city  whose  special  charter,  either 
expressly  or  impliedly,  authorizes  it  to  construct  sewers."  Au- 
thority to  repair  streets  and  to  keep  them  in  order  is  construed  as 
conferring  implied  authority  to  construct  sewers.'^  A  statute 
authorizing  a  system  of  drainage  in  a  city  or  town  is  regarded  as 
conferring  power  to  construct  a  system  of  sewers  and  not  simply 
as  conferring  power  to  construct  drainage  for  surface  water.^  Un- 
der a  statute  authorizing  cities  to  drain  stagnant  water  off  land, 
to  dispose  of  rubbish  and  to  drain  city  lots  at  the  expense  of  the 
property  owner,  it  has  been  held  that  a  city  cannot  assess  property 
owners  for  the  cost  of  public  sewers  in  its  streets  and  alleys.^  A 
grant  of  power  to  construct  a  sewer  does  not  confer  power  to  fill 
low  land  upon  which  stagnant  water  may  accumulate ;  "  nor  does 
it  confer  power  to  provide  for  constructing  flagstone  crossings  upon 
the  street  over  the  sewer.^^  The  power  to  construct  sewers  is  ordi- 
narily said  to  be  a  continuing  one  which  may  be  exercised  when- 
ever the  public  need  demands  its  exercise.^-    Accordingly,  where  a 


State,  Vanderbeck,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  Jersey  City, 
29  N.  J.  L.  (5  Dut(:h.)  441  [18611; 
Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  88 
Wis.  383,  60  N.  W.  270   [1894]. 

'Murphy    v.    City    of    Peoria,    119 
111.  509,   9  N.   E.   895    [1888]. 

"  .Johnson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  88 
Wis.  383,  60  N.  W.  270   [1894]. 

■  Johnson  V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  88 
Wis.  383,  60  N.  W.  270   [1894]. 

'City  of  Valparaiso  v.  Parker,  148 
Ind.  379,  47  N.  E.  .330  [1897].  "It 
may  be  true  that  theji  the  term  drain- 
age is  used  with  reference  to  lands, 
that  ordinarily  draina;;e  of  waters 
is  intended,  but  it  is  clear  that  when 
that  term  is  used  with  reference,  to 
a  city  or  town  it  includes  sewerage, 
that  is,  such  drainage  is  and  may  be 
used  for  the  removal  of  surface  and 
storm  water,  the  overflow  of  foun- 
tains, cisterns,  public  fountains,  wa 
ter-troughs.   water   closet*,    sinks,    all 


filth  and  refu.se  liquids  and  the  di- 
version of  natural  water  courses." 
(  ity  of  Valparaiso  v.  Parker,  148 
Ind".   379,  381,  47   X.   E.   .330    [1897]. 

'  The  statute  in  question  gave 
j)ower  "to  cause  to  be  filled  up,  raised 
or  drained  by  or  at  the  expense  of 
the  owner  any  town  lot  or  tract  of 
land  covered  or  subject  to  be  cov- 
ered by  stagnant  water;  .  .  .  and 
for  the  proper  draining  of  city  lots 
and  other  parcels  of  land  by  or  at  the 
expense  of  the  owner  or  occupant 
thereof."  Cain  v.  City  of  Elkins,  57 
N.   Va.   9.   49   S.   E.   898    11905]. 

"  In  the  Matter  of  Van  Buren.  17 
Hun.    (X.    Y.)    527    [1879]. 

'•  In  the  Matter  of  the  Contract 
for  the  Fifth  Avenue  Sewer  in  the 
City  of  Pittsburgh.  4  Brewster  (Pa.) 
364    [1870]. 

"Shannon  v.  City  of  Omaha,  73 
Xeb.  507,   103  X.  W.  53   [1905]. 


§  -144  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  680 

system  of  sewers  has  been  laid  out  and  b}'  reason  of  the  growth 
of  the  city,  additional  sewers  become  necessary,  assessments  may 
be  levied  therefor  as  for  the  sewers-  constructed  in  the  original 
system.^^  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  land  which  is 
already  drained  by  a  sewer  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  expense  of 
making  changes  therein  which  are  necessary  because  a  new  sewer 
is  to  be  connected  with  the  pre-existing  sewer/'*  If  by  statute  the 
city  is  given  power  to  construct  sewers  and  it  is  further  provided 
that  if  a  city  should  determine  that  it  was  necessary  to  provide 
a  system  of  sewerage  and  drainage  for  such  city,  it  might  provide 
a  general  plan  therefor,  a  city  may  construct  separate  sewers  with- 
out reference  to  any  general  system  as  long  as  it  is  not  formally 
determined  that  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  general  plan  of  sewer- 
age.^^  If  a  proper  and  reasonable  method  of  providing  for  drain- 
age requires  a  city  to  cover  over  a  running  stream  and  convert  it 
into  a  sewer,  this  may  be  done  as  a  part  of  the  cost  of  constructing 
a  sewer  system.^*'  An  assessment  cannot  be  levied  if  the  drainage 
of  the  property  assessed  depends  upon  the  construction  of  another 
sewer  which  the  city  has  not  undertaken  to  construct  and  is  in  no 
way  obliged  to  construct.^'  Under  a  statute  authorizing  an  assess- 
ment for  the  construction  of  a  new  sewer,  an  assessment  may  be 
levied  for  taking  land  for  the  construction  of  a  new  channel  for 
a  sewer.^^  Under  authority  to  assess  for  the  construction  of  a 
sewer,  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer 
completed  before  the  assessment  was  levied  where  such  sewer  was 
constructed  upon  the  assessment  plan.^"  If,  however,  the  sewer  in 
question  was  not  constructed  upon  the  assessment  plan,  persons 
w^hose  lands  are  drained  by  a  sewer  built  subsequently  and  con- 
necting with  Sicch  existing  sewer  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost 


'=  Shannon    v.    City    of    Omaha,    73  185  111.  280,  56  X.  E.   1096    [1900]: 

Xel).  507.  103  N.  W.  53   [1905].  Ryder   Estate   v.   City   of  Alton,    175 

"Boyden  and  Herrick  v.  Village  of  111.   94,   51   N.   E.   821    [1898];    Title 

Brattleboro,  65  Vt.   504,  27   Atl.    164  Guarantee   and  Trust  Co.   v.   City  of 

[1873].  Chicago,   162   111.   505.   44  K   E.   832 

'"Hartwell    v.    Railroad   Co..   40    0.  [1896];    Vreeland   v.   Mayor,   etc.,  of 

S.  155  [1883].  Bayonne.   58  X.  J.   L.    (29  Vr.)    126. 

i^Hungerford   v.   City  of  Hartford  32 'Atl.   68    [1895]. 

39  Conn.  279   [1872]  ;   Butler  v.  City  "Atkins    v.    City    of    Boston,    188 

of  Worcester,  112  Mass.  541    [1873];  Mass.  77,  74  X\  E.  292   [1905]. 

Sherwood  v.  City  of  Duluth.  40  Minn.  "  Fairbanks   v.    Mayor    and   Alder- 

22,  41  N.  W.  234   [1889].  men     of     Fitchburg,     132    Mass.     42 


"Bickerdike    v.    City    of    Chicago        [1882]. 


J 


681  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  445 

of  such  existing  sewer.'-"  17nder  authority  to  levA*  an  assessment 
for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  it  has  been  held  that  the  city  can 
include  the  expense  of  removing  and  relaying  the  pipes  of  a  gas 
company.-^  While  it  was  said  that  the  item  of  damages  to  gas 
mains  should  not  be  included,  the  determination  of  the  commis- 
sioners that  no  substantial  injustice  was  done  by  including  such 
item  was  regarded  as  final. "- 

§  445.    Public  sewer. 

A  public  sewer  in  the  ordinary'  meaning  of  the  term,  that  is, 
one  which  belongs  to  and  is  under  control  of  a  city  or  other 
public  corporation,  may  be  constructed  by  private  individuals  on 
private  land  and  subsequently  acquired  by  the  city.^  Under  some 
statutes  the  term  "public  sewer"  is  applied  to  sewers  to  be  con- 
structed for  the  benefit  of  the  city  at  large  and  paid  for  by  general 
taxation.^  Under  such  statute  a  sewer  which  is  recommended  by 
the  board  of  public  improvements  in  accordance  with  the  statute 
as  a  private  sewer  and  the  construction  of  which  is  directed  by  an 
ordinance  of  the  municipal  assembly  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  private 
sewer  within  the  meaning  of  such  statute,  no  matter  how  beneficial 
it  may  be  to  the  public  at  large. ^  On  the  other  hand,  a  sewer  paid 
for  from  the  general  fund  is  a  public  sewer,  even  if  authorized  in 
an  irregular  manner."*  Authority  to  levy  assessments  for  the 
construction  of  a  public  sewer  does  not  confer  power  to  assess 
for  a  sewer  constructed  by  a  private  person  under  a  grant  to  him 
by  the  city  of  the  exclusive  right  of  constructing  and  operating 
a  system  of  sewers  inside  the  city  limits.'^ 


"Brown  v.  ^layor  and  Aldermen  of  v.   Kolkmeyer.   97    Mo.    App.   520.    71 

Fitchhurg,    128    Mass.    282    [1880].  S.  W.  5.36*  [10021. 

"'In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  ==  Heman  v.   Allen.   150  Mo.  5.34,  57 

.Johnson,   103  X.  Y.  260,  8  N.  E.  39!)  S.  W.  5.59   [1900]. 

[1886].  »Heman  v.  Allen,   156  Mo.  534,  57 

'=  People  of  the  State  of  New  York  S.  W.  559  [1900];  (This  rule  ap- 
ex rel.  Jessup  v.  Kelley,  33  Hun.  jjlies  even  if  a  tract  of  twenty-five 
(N.  Y.)  389  [1884];  (The  total  as-  acres  not  witliin  the  ori<,nnal  sewer 
sessment  was  over  one  hundred  district  is  subsequently  drained  into 
twenty-five      tliousand      dollars,      of  the  sewer.) 

which    over    four     thousand     dollars  *  Akers  v.  Koikmevcr,  97   Mo.  App. 

was  for  the  item  of  damafxes   to  ga>  520.  71  S.  W.  536   [1902]. 

mains.)  *  Weaver  v.  Canon  Sewer  Conipanj'. 

'  Slocum  V.  Selectmen  of  Brooklinc.  18     Colo.     A])p.     242.     70     Pac.     953 

163  Mass.  23,  39  X.  E.  351    [1895]:  [1902]. 
To  the  same  effect  see  obiter  in  Akers 


§  446  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  682 

§  446.    Main  and  lateral  sewers. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  authorizing  assessments  for  the  cost 
of  constructing  main  sewers,  such  assessment  cannot  be  levied.^  If 
the  statute  provides  specifically  that  the  cost  of  a  main  or  trunk 
sewer  is  to  be  paid  out  of  the  general  revenue  funds  of  the  city, 
assessments  cannot  be  levied  therefor.-  Under  statutes  specifically 
authorizing  an  assessment  for  main  or  trunk  sewers,  it  is  usually 
held  that  assessments  may  be  levied  therefor.^  This  principle  has 
been  applied  even  where  the  main  sewer  was  not  intended  for  local 
drainage  and  could  not  be  used  for  that  purpose  since  it  was  above 
the  level  of  the  lots  to  be  drained.*  Where  assessments  for  main 
sewers  have  been  held  invalid  under  statutes  specifically  author- 
izing assessments  therefor,  it  has  usually  been  because  the  assess- 
ment might  be  so  levied  as  to  exceed  the  benefits.  Thus  it  has 
been  held  that  a  property  owner  cannot  be  assessed  with  the  cost 
of  a  fifteen-inch  main  sewer  where  sufficient  drainage  could  have 
been  obtained  by  a  local  drainage  sewer."  This  theory,  however, 
is  really  inconsistent  with  the  one  before  suggested.  The  difference 
between  the  two  results  is  not  merely  a  question  of  the  apportion- 
ing of  benefits  but  turns  on  the  question  whether  the  legislature 
has  power  to  treat  a  sewer  system  as  a  unit,  assessing  therefor  all 
the  land  benefited  thereby,  whether  receiving  local  drainage  from 
the  main  sewer  or  not ;  or  whether  the  legislature  must  regard  each 
sewer  as  a  distinct  improvement,  assessing  therefor  only  the  prop- 
erty benefited  thereby.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  to  as- 
sess all  the  property  which  drains  into  a  main  sewer  for  the  cost  of 
the  construction  thereof  is  to  assess  property  benefited  in  different 
degrees  by  different  iinprovements  in  one  entire  assessment." 
Lateral  sewers  connecting  with  the  larger  sewers  are  an  essential 
part  of  a  sewer  system  and  power  to  levy  assessments  for  such 


^Heman  v.   Handlan,  59   Mo.   App.  Ford  v.  City  of  Toledo.  04  0.  S.  92. 

490   [1894];   Cain  v.   City  of  Elkins,  5^,  N.  E.  779   [1901]). 

57  W.  Va.  9,  49  S.  E.  898  [1905].  'City  of  Toledo   v.   Ford,   ?.0  Ohio 

=  Heman   v.   Handlan,   59   Mo.   App.  C.   C.  290    [1900];    (affirmed   Ford  v. 

490   [1894].  City   of   Toledo,    64    0.    S.    92,   59   X. 

='Bassett    v.    City    of    New    Haven.  E.  779  [1901]). 

7(1    Conn.    70,    55    Atl.    579     [1903];  'Park    Avenue    Sewers,    Appeal    of 

DeWitt  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  56  N".  J.  Parker,   169  Pa.  St.  433,  32  Atl.  574 

L.     (27    Vroom)     119.    27    Atl.    801  [1895]. 

[1893];    City  of  Toledo   v.    Ford,    20  "Park    Avenue    Sewers,    Appeal    of 

Ohio    C.    C."   290     [1900]:      (affirmed  Parker,   169  Pa.  St.  433,  32  Atl.  574 

[1895]. 


683  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  447 

laterals  is  included  in  the  power  to  levy  assessments  for  the  con- 
struction of  sewers/  The  fact  that  a  tract  of  land  has  been  as- 
sessed for  the  construction  of  a  main  sewer  does  not  prevent  the 
levy  of  an  assessment  for  the  construction  of  laterals.^  In  fact  a 
statute  which  makes  no  provision  for  lateral  sewers  or  connec- 
tions of  any  sort  has  been  said  to  be  void  as  being  unreasonable 
where  it  provided  for  aji  assessment  upon  land  which  would  have 
been  drained  by  such  sewer  had  laterals  been  provided  for."  The 
fact  that  a  public  sewer  was  provided  for  and  begun,  but  not  com- 
pleted, while  the  ordinance  therefor  was  repealed,  does  not,  under 
statute,  prevent  a  city  from  constructing  a  local  sewer  and  levying 
an  assessment  therefor.^" 

§  447.    Outlet  to  sewer. 

An  outlet  to  a  sewer  system  is  an  essential  part  thereof.  Ac- 
cordingly an  assessment  may  be  levied  to  secure  an  outlet  for  a 
sewer,^  even  if  such  outlet  is  situated  outside  of  the  city  or  other 
public  corporation  which  constructs  such  sewer.-  However,  if 
the  statute  provides  that  the  cost  and  expense  of  constructing  a 
sewer  shall  be  assessed  against  the  lots  or  pieces  of  ground  con- 
tained in  the  district  in  which  the  same  is  situated,  an  assessment 
cannot  be  levied  for  a  discharging  sewer  situated  outside  of  the 
district  upon  which  the  assessment  is  levied.^  Under  some  statutes 
it  may  be  provided  that  a  sewer  cannot  be  constructed  at  the  cost 
of  property  owners  unless  it  connects  with  a  public  sewer  of  some 
kind  or  with  a  natural  course  of  drainage.  Under  such  statutes 
an  assessment  cannot  bo  b'vied  for  a  sewer  not  so  connected.''     If 

'  Snydacker     v.     Village     of     West  Cochran    v.    Villa<;o    of    Park    Ridge, 

iraminond,  225   111.   154,  80  N.  K.  93  1.S8    III.    295,    27    N.    E.    9.39    [18931; 

119071;  DeWitt  v.  City  of  Elizabeth,  (  ity    of   St.    Joseph    e.\    rel.    Danalier 

56  N.  J.  L.    (27  Vroom)    119.  27  Atl.  v.    Dillon,    Gl    Mo.    App.    317    [18951 
801    [18931.  -Callon    v.    City    of    Jacksonville, 

"Snydecker     v.     Village     of     West  147    III.    113,    35    k.    E.   223    [18941; 

Hammond,  225    111.    154.  80  X.   E.  93  Cochran    v.    Village    of    Park    Ridge 

[19071.  138   111.  295,  27  \.  E.  9.39   [1893]. 

'  Village  of   Hyde  Park   v.   Carton,  '  City   of    Fort   Scott    v.    Kanfman 

132    111.    100,   2.3"  N.    E.    .590    [18911;  44   Kan.    137.   24   Pac.   fi4    [1890]. 
Barton  V.  Kansas  City.  110  Mo.  App.  *  Johnson    v.    Diier,     115    Mo.    360, 

31,  83  S.  W.   1093    [1904].  21    S.    W.    800    [1893];    City    of   St. 

'"City    of    St.    .Joseph    to    Use    of  .Joseph   ex    rel.    Danaher   v.    Wilshire, 

r,ib.son   V.    Farrell,    100   Mo.    437,    17  47   Mo.   App.    125    [1891];    Bayha   v. 

S.   W.   497    [1891].  Taylor,    30    Mo.    App.    427     [1889]; 

'Gallon    V.    City    of    .Tacksonville,  Kansas  City  v.  Ratekin.  30  Mo.  App 

147    111.    113.    35    X.    E.    223    [1894]  ;  410   [1888]! 


§  448  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  684 

the  sewer  empties  into  what  was  once  the  bed  of  a  creek,  but  has, 
by  obstructions,  been  turned  into  a  pond,  this  is  not  a  natural 
course  of  draiuage  and  no  assessment  can  be  levied  for  such  sewer.^ 
If  the  sewer  does  not  connect  in  the  manner  required  by  statute 
when  it  is  constructed,  the  fact  that  a  public  sewer  is  subsequently 
so  built  as  to  connect  therewith,  does  not  authorize  the  city  to 
levy  an  assessment  therefor.®  If  the  conn-ecting  sewer  itself  con- 
nects with  another  public  sewer  so  as  to  have  an  outlet,^  or  if  the 
connecting  sewer  is  in  fact  a  public  one,  whether  established  by 
ordinance  or  not,^  the  statute  is  complied  with  substantially.  The 
fact  that  a  private  owner  has  reclaimed  land  by  filling  in  a  river 
across  the  outlet  to  the  proposed  server  does  not  make  it  impos- 
sible to  construct  such  sewer  on  the  assessment  plan  since,  if  such 
owner  has  the  right  to  make  such  connection,  the  city  has  ample 
power,  under  its  charter,  to  open  a  way  to  the  river.®  The  ordi- 
nance which  x)perates  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  need  not 
show  upon  its  face  that  the  sewer  to  be  constructed  does  in  fact 
connect  with  a  public  sewer.^'^  The  existence  of  a  statute  pro- 
hibiting the  pollution  of  rivers  and  lakes  does  not  invalidate  an 
assessment  for  a  sewer  system  so  constructed  as  to  discharge  its 
sewage  into  a  river.^^ 

§  448.     House  connections,  man-holes  and  catch-basins. 

House  connections  extending  from  the  sewer  to  the  lots  abutting 
thereon  are  necessary  to  afford  drainage  to  such  property.  The 
property  owner  may  be  required  to  construct  such  connections 
when  he  wishes  to  connect  his  property  with  a  sewer  system.^  At 
the  same  time  efficiency  and  economy  in  the  construction  of  the 
sewer  and  due  care  for  the  condition  of  the  street  under  which  the 

^  City  of  Kansas  to  the  Use  of  the  ^  South  Highland  Land  &  Improve- 

Frear    Stone    &    Pipe    Manufacturing  ment    Company   v.    Kansas   City,    172 

Company     v.     Swope,     79     Mo.     44G  Mo.  523,  72  S.  W.  944   [1902]. 

[1883].  "City   of   St.   Joseph   ex   rel.   Dan- 

*  Bayha  v.  Taylor,  36  Mo.  App.  427  aher    v.   Wilshire,    47    Mo.    App.    125 

[1889].                "  [1891]. 

'  Eyermann   v.     Blakesley,    78    Mo.  "  Walker   v.    City    of    Aurora,    140 

145   [1883];   Eyermann  v. 'Blakesley,  111.   402,  29   N.   E.'741    [1893]. 

9   Mo.   App.    231    [1880];    Heman   v.  *  Van  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 

Payne,  27  Mo.  App.  481    [1887].  Aldermen    of    the    City    of    Paterson. 

«Akers  v.  Kolkmeyer  Company,  97  67   N.   J.   L.    (38   Vr.)    455.    51    Atl. 

Mo.  App.  520,  71   S.  W.  536   [1902]:  922    [1902]. 
Eyermann   v.   Blakesley,   9   ^lo.   App. 
231    [1880]. 


6So  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  44S 

sewer  is  located  require  that  such  house  connections  should  be  con- 
structed when  the  sewer  is  built.-  Under  statutes  authorizing  as- 
sessments for  the  construction  of  sewers  it  has  been  held  that 
the  city  may  include  the  cost  of  house  connections.^  If  the  prop- 
erty is  not  platted  into  lots,  it  seems  to  be  held  that  the  house 
connections  may  be  constructed  at  intervals  which  will  probably 
be  the  distance  apart  of  houses  constructed  upon  the  property  as 
finally  platted.*  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  provide  for  a  house  con- 
nection opposite  each  lot,  piece  or  parcel  of  land.^  A  provision  for 
two  house  connections  for  each  corner  lot,  one  for  each  street  upon 
which  it  abuts,  is  held  not  to  be  unreasonable.'''  The  fact  that  an 
ordinance  which  provides  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  author- 
izes property  owners  assessed  therefor  to  make  connections  with 
such  sewer  does  not  grant  away  the  police  power  of  the  city  to 
control  the  method  of  making  such  connections  but  the  city  can 
still  regulate  the  manner  in  which  connections  are  to  be  made  by 
the  property  owners  who  have  been  assessed  for  the  cost  of  such 
sewer.''  Under  an  ordinance  authorizing  a  sewer  "for  sanitary 
and  drainage  purposes"  a  sewer  for  drainage  purposes  only,  with- 
out house  connections,  is  unauthorized.^  Authority  to  construct  a 
sewer  includes  authority  to  provide  for  man-holes  therefor."  A 
paving  ordinance  has  been  held  not  to  be  invalid  for  failure  to 
provide  for  man-holes,  if  a  sufficient  sewer  has  been  constructed. ^"^ 
If  the  ordinance  provides  for  man-holes  and  catch-])asins,  and  these 
are  omitted,  the  pr()j)erty  owner  cannot  resist  tlie  assessment  on 


■Van  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  ]\Iayor  and  IVople  ex  rel.  Raymond,  105  III.  200, 

Aldermen    of    the    City    of    Paters(m,  (i2  X.  E.  806   [in()'21. 

67   X.   J.   L.    (38   Vr.)    45.).   51    At).  =  Pmythe    v.    City    of    Cliicairo,    197 

922    [1902],  111.   311,  04  X.   E.'361    [  19021 -,    (Jajie 

'Smythe    v.    City    of    Cliicafro,    197  v.   City   of  Cliicajro.    195    III.    490,    0.^ 

III.   311,  64  X.   E."  301    [19021:    City  X.  E.  184   [19()2|. 

of  Chicago  v.  Corcoran,   190   111.   140,  "  Duane    v.    (  ity    of    Chicago,     198 

63    X.    E.    690     [19021;     Vandersyde  III.  471.  04  X.  E.   1033   [19021. 

V.    People   ex    rel.    Raymond.    195    111.  'Cray   v.   Town   of  Cicero,    177    III. 

200.  62  X.  E.  800   [19021:  Van  Wag  459.   53    X.   E.   91    [18991. 

oner.   Pros.    v.   Mayor   and    Aldermen  "Barton    v.    Kansas    City.    110    Mo. 

of  the  City  of  Paterson.  07   X.  J.  L.  App.  31,  83   S.  W.    1093. 

(38  Vr.)    455.  51    Atl.  922    [19021.  "Steele  v.  Village  of  River  Forest. 

'City   of  Chicago  v.  Corcoran.    19()  141    Til.    .302.   .30   X.    E.    10.34    [18931. 

111.   140.  03  X.  E.  090   [19021:   (Jaire  '"Vane    v.    City    of    Evanston,    1.50 

V.   City   of  Chica-ro.    195    III.   490.   03  111.  016.  37  X.  E.  901. 
X.    E.     184     [19021;     Vandcrsyde     v. 


§  449  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT,  686 

that  ground,  but  his  remedy  is  by  mandamus  to  compel  the  city  to 
construct  such  improvement  in  accordance  with  the  ordinance. ^^ 

§  449.    Drains. 

•  A  right  to  construct  a  drain  through  private  land  does  not  exist 
at  common  law  but  exists  solely  by  virtue  of  statutory  provisions 
granting  such  right. ^  So  important  and  necessary  are  systems  of 
drainage  in  many  parts  of  the  country,  that  statutes  have  been 
enacted  providing  specifically  for  the  construction  of  drains  and 
conferring  the  right  to  construct  them  through  private  property 
where  necessary.^  Such  statutes  often  provide  for  paying  for  the 
cost  of  these  systems  of  drainage  by  assessments  upon  property 
benefited  thereby,  and  where  such  statutes  exist  full  force  is  given 
to  them.^  Assessments  cannot  be  levied,  however,  except  by  virtue 
of  statutory  provisions.*  Thus,  if  a  special  statute  authorizes  the 
construction  of  a  certain  described  ditch  to  be  paid  for  by  assess- 
ment and  the  commissioners  in  charge  of  that  improvement  con- 
struct in  addition  to  the  specified  ditch  a  lateral  drain,  it  is  held 
that  the  cost  of  such  lateral  drain  could  not  be  included  in  the 
assessment.^  The  legislature  may  authorize  the  officials  in  charge 
of  the  construction  of  a  system  of  drainage  to  include  an  existing 
water  course  in  such  system. "^  In  the  absence  of  specific  statutory 
authority  they. cannot  convert  a  living  stream  of  water  into  a  ditch 
by  proceedings  for  locating  and  constructing  a  ditch. ^  Even  if  a 
statute  provides  specifically  for  the  exercise  of  discretion  in  lo- 
cating a  ditch,  and  specifically  refers  to  a  water-course,  and  pro- 
vides in  another  section  that  the  word  "ditch"  shall  be  held  to 
include  a  drain  or  a  water-course,  it  is  held  that  the  word  "water- 

"  Heinroth    v.    Kocherspe'-ger.    173  v.    Board    of    County    Commissioners 

111.  205,  50  N.  E.  171   [1898].  of  Polk   County,   87   Minn.   325,   335, 

'Taylor    v.    Strayer,    167    Ind.    23,  60    L.    R.    A.     161,    92    N.    W.    216 

78   N.  E.   236    [1906].  [1902];     Lien    v.    Board    of    County 

"Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Peo-  Commissioners    of    Norman    County, 

pie   ex    rel.,   212    111.    103,    72   N.    E.  80  Minn.  58,  82  N.  W.  1094   [1900]; 

219   [1904].     See   §§   334-341.  Jenal  v.  Green   Island  Draining  Co.. 

'Wurts    V.    Hoagland.    114    U.    S.  12   Neb.    163,   10  N.   W.   547    [1881]. 

606,    29    L.    229,    5    S.    1086    [1885];  *  In   the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

(affirming  matter  of  drainage  of  the  Van   Buren,   79   N.  Y.   384    [1880]. 

Great  Meadows  on  Request  River,  42  ^Mitchell  v.  Lane,  62  Hun.   (N.  Y.) 

N.  J.  L.   (13  Vr.)   553   [1880];  which  253.  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  707   [1891]. 

was     affirmed     without     opinion     in  "  Beals  v.  Inhabitants  of  Brookline. 

Hoagland   v.    State.    Simonton,   Pros.  174  Mass.  1.  54  N.  E.  339   [1899]. 

43   N.   J.  L.    (14   Vr.)    456    [1881]);  'Commissioners   of   Greene   County 

Roberts  v.  Smith,  115  Mich.  5,  72  N.  v.   Harbine,   74   0.   S.   318,   78   N.   E. 

W.  1091   [18971 1  State,  ex  rel.  Utick  521    [1906]. 


687  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  450 

course"  is  equivalent  to  the  word  drain,  and  does  not,  as  so  used, 
give  authority  to  convert  a  living  stream  into  a  ditch.**  Authority' 
to  construct  drains  and  remove  obstructions  from  the  natural  or 
artificial  channels  of  streams  does  not  confer  power  to  establish 
a  system  of  drainage  which  will  destroy  a  navigable  river  and 
lake."  When  used  with  reference  to  the  drainage  of  land  outside 
of  cities  the  term  ''drain"  is  equivalent  to  the  term  " ditch. "^" 
Statutory  authority  to  construct  a  ditch  does  not  include  authority 
to  construct  a  levee.^^  Authority  to  construct  a  system  of  drainage 
includes  authority  to  incur  such  incidental  and  necessary  expense 
as  erecting  and  maintaining  a  pump.^-  Authority  to  assess  for 
the  construction  of  a  system  of  drains  does  not  include  authority 
to  assess  for  the  construction  of  a  bridge  at  a  point  where  a  large 
drain  crosses  a  highway. ^^  Authority  to  county  commissioners  to 
locate  any  ditch  does  not  authorize  them  to  construct  ditches  in 
municipal  corporations  and  levy  assessments  therefor,  where  by 
statute  it  is  provided  that  the  council  may,  by  resolution,  author- 
ize the  mayor  to  sign  a  petition  for  the  ditch  on  behalf  of  the  city 
and  requires  notice  of  the  construction  of  the  ditch  to  be  given  to 
the  mayor.**  A  drainage  district  having  authority  to  levy  an  as- 
sessment for  the  construction  of  a  .system  of  drainage  cannot  in- 
clude the  cost  of  a  bridge  over  a  drain  as  an  item  of  such  assess- 
ment.*' 

§  450.    Bridges. 

A  bridge  is  :n  improvement  for  which  a  special  assessment  may 
be  levied  if  the  legislature  has  authorized  such  assessment  by 
statute.*  Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  the  city  shall  pay 
out  of  its  general  funds  the  cost  of  all  bridges  in  the  city  crossing 
the  Mississippi  River,  or  any  other  natural  stream,  and  all  liridges 

"Commissioners   of   Greene   County  Silver,  08  Cal.  .51.  32  Pac.  80(5  [189.3]. 

V.   Harbine,   74   O.   S.   318,   78   N.   E.  "  Rigney  v.   Fischer.   113   Ind.   313. 

521    [19(Mi].  15  X.  E.  594  [1887]. 

"In  re  Dancy   Drainage   Dist.,    129  'M'iliago  of  Pleasant  Hill  v.  Com- 

Wis.   129,   108  N.  \V.  202   [1901)].  missioners,    71    O.    S.    133,   72   N.    E. 

'"Royse     v.     Evansvilje     &      Terre  890   [1904];   See  also  City  of  Dayton 

Haute    Railroad    Coni])aiiy.    100    hul.  v.    Taylor's    Administrator.    02    0.    S. 

.')92,  67    N.   E.   440    [19031.  11,  50  X.  E.  480. 

"  Royse     v.      Evansville     &     Terre  '*  HefTner     v.     Cass     and     Morgan 

Haute    Railroad    Company.    100    Ind.  Counties,    193    111.    4.39.    58    L.    R.    A. 

.592,  67  X.  E.  440   [1903].  353.  62  X.  E.  201    [1901]. 

'-Swamp  Land  District  Xo.   150  v.  ^  See   §   359. 


§  451  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  68S 

crossing  railroad  tracks  and  the  immediate  approaches  thereto,  the 
cost  of  building  and  maintaining  a  bridge  across  a  railroad  track 
cannot  be  levied  upon  property  abutting  on  the  approaches  of  the 
bridge.-  After  the  repeal  of  a  statute  authorizing  the  levy  of  as- 
sessments for  constructing  a  bridge,  no  further  assessments  can 
be  levied.^ 

§  451.    Water-pipes  and  mains. 

If  the  legislature  has  by  statute  provided  therefor,  an  assessment 
may  be  levied  for  laying  water-pipes.^  Where  such  assessments 
are  held  to  be  invalid,  it  is  ordinarily  because  of  a  defective 
apportionment.-  Even  if  the  water-mains  are  used  only  to  fur- 
nish water  for  the  purpose  of  extinguishing  fires  assessments  may 
be  levied  therefor.^  Authority  to  levy  assessments  for  the  cost 
of  constructing  water-pipes  includes  authority  to  levy  assessments 
for  such  necessary  incidentals  thereto  as  confer  local  benefit.* 
Thus,  the  cost  of  hydrants  may  be  included  in  such  assessment.'' 
However,  if  the  ordinance  provides  for  an  assessment  for  cast  iron 
water-pipes,  such  ordinance  gives  no  authority  to  include  in  the 
assessment  the  cost  of  hydrants."  Whether  authority  to  levy  as- 
sessments for  water-pipes  includes  authority  to  levy  an  assessment 
for  the  cost  of  a  pumping-station  is  a  question  which  has  arisen 
in  the  courts  of  Illinois  more  frequently  than  in  other  jurisdictions. 


estate     V.     Smith,     99     ^[iiin.     59,  of    Seattle,    25    Wash.    300,    65    Pac. 

108  N.  W.  822   [1906].  612   [1901]. 

'Town    of    Underhill    v.    Town    of  "Village    of    Canaseraga    v.    Green, 

Essex,  64  Vt.  28.  23  Atl..  617   [1891];  88  X.  Y.  S.  539   [1903].     Even  if  the 

Warilsboro    v.    Jamaica,    59    Vt.    514  general  policy  of  the  city  has  been  to 

[1887];    Timbridge    v.    Royalton,    58  pay  for  the  cost  of  water  mains  out 

Vt.  212    [1885].  of  its  water  tax,  such  city  may  if  au- 

^  Murr  V.  City  of  Naperville,  210  thorized  by  statute  levy  special  as- 
Ill.  371,  71  N.  E.  380  [1904];  Harts  sessments  for  such  cost.  McChesney 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger,  171  v.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  543.  38 
111.  458,  49  N.  E.  538  [1898];  O'Neil  N.  E.  767  [1894]. 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger,  166  ^  City  v.  McCalmont,  6  Phil.  543 
111.     561,    46     N.     E.     1096     [1897];  [1868]'. 

Hughes    V.    City    of    Momence,    163  *  Lingle     v.     West     Chicago     Park 

111.  535,  45  N.  E.  300  [1896];  North-  Commissioners,    222    111.    384,    78    N. 

ern    Liberties    v.    St.    Johns    Church,  E.    794    [1906]. 

13   Pa.    St.    (1    Ilarr.)     104;    City    of  =  Lingle     v.     West     Chicago     Park 

Philadelphia    v.    Neil,    25    Pa.    Super  Commissioners,  222  111.  384,  78  N.  E. 

Ct.  347    [1904];    City  v.  McCalmont,  794    [1906]. 

6    Phil.    543    [1868];    Smith   v.    City  "Town  of  Cicero  v.  Green,  211   HI. 

.241,  71  N.  E.  884  [1904]. 


689 


STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  45^ 


In  this  state  both  the  constitution  and  the  statutes  give  authority 
to  levy  assessments  for  local  improvements.'  While  a  pumping- 
station  is  an  essential  feature  of  most  systems  of  water-works,  it 
is  held  in  Illinois  not  to  be  a  local  improvement  but  to  be  an  im- 
provement of  a  general  character  which  must  be  paid  for  by 
general  taxation  and  not  by  special  assessment  or  by  special  taxa- 
tion.^ A  stand-pipe  and  an  engine-house  are  not  within  the  term 
"local  improvements."  ^  A  city  has  power  to  regulate  the  method 
of  making  connections  between  abutting  property  and  water- 
pipes.^"  It  has  been  held  that  while  this  power  authorizes  the  coun- 
cil to  prescribe  the  terms  and  methods  of  making  connections  by 
ordinance,  it  does  not  give  power  to  levy  assessments  for  making 
such  connections."  It  is  generally  held,  however,  that  a  city  has 
power  to  assess  for  the  cost  of  such  connections,^-  even  if  the  wa- 
ter-pipes belong  to  a  private  company.^''  If  providing  for  connec- 
tions from  water-pipes  to  abutting  property,  the  city  cannot  sub- 
divide the  platted  lots  and  require  a  service-pipe  to  be  laid  to 
each  half  lot.'^  The  cost  of  removing  water-boxes,  which  were 
put  in  by  the  city,  is  a  proper  item  to  include  in  an  assessment 
for  paving  a  street.'^'"' 

§  452.    Lighting. 

The  lighting  of  a  city  by  electricity,  or  other  means,  is  an  im- 
provement for  which  a  local  assessment  -may  be  levied.^  Assess- 
ments may  be  levied  for  improvements  which  are  incident  to  and 
a  part  of  a  general  system  of  lighting,  such  as  cables,  lamp  posts, 
arc  lamps  and  the  like.-  If,  however,  the  assessment  ordinance 
provides  for  llie  erection  of  electric  lamp  ])osts.  it  does  not  justify 

'See  §  51.  §   1.5.3.  '^Alvord   v.   City   of   Syracuse,    103 

"Harts   V.    People    e.K    rel.    Koeher-  X.  Y.   158.  57  X.  E.  31o"[1900]. 

sperjier,    171    111.   458,   49   X.   E.   53a  "  Gleason     v.     Waukesha     County. 

[18981;   Hughes  v.  City  of  Alomenoe,  103   Wis.  225.  79  X.  W.  249    [1899]. 

164    111.    10.    45    X\    E.    3()-2    |  isnoi  ;  '^Cleason     v.     Waukesha     County. 

mij,Mies  V.  City  of  Monionce,    1()3   111  103   Wis.  225.  79  X.  W.   249    [1899). 

535.  45  X.  E.  300   f  18901;   Villa<re  of  "Warren   v.    City   of   Chieatro.    118 

Morjran    Park    v.    Wiswall.     155     111.  111.  329.    11    X.  E.  218    [18871. 

202.  40  X.  E.  611    [18951.  '"Ackiin   v.   Parker.   29   Ohio   C.   C. 

"O'Xeil    V.    People   ex    rel.    Koeher-  025   [19071. 

aperfrer.    100    111.   501,   46   X.   E.    1090  '  Ewart     v.      Villatre     of     Western 

[18971.  Sprin'js.    180    111.    318.   54   X.    E.    47S 

'"Alvord    V.    City  of   Syracuse,    IOC  |IS99|.     See  §  308. 

X.  Y.   158,  57  X.  E.  310   [1900].  'Halsey    v.    Town    of    Lake    View, 

188  111.  540,  59  X.  E.  234   [1901]. 


§  453  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  690 

an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  conduits,  cable  switches  and  lamps 
in  addition  to  the  cost  of  the  posts.^  If  an  assessment  ordinance, 
as  originally  passed,  assumes  that  lamp-tops  will  be  donated  by 
the  park  board,  and  they  are  not  so  donated,  a  second  ordinance 
providing  for  special  assessments  for  such  lamp-tops  does  not 
amount  to  a  double  assessment  for  the  same  improvement.*  A 
power-house  and -a  generator  plant  do  not  constitute  a  "local  im- 
provement" within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  authorizing  an  assess- 
ment for  local  improvements.^ 

§  453.    Filling  and  grading  lots. 

Under  a  statute  authorizing  such  charge,  an  assessment  may  be 
levied  for  the  cost  of  filling  lots  so  as  to  prevent  the  accumulation 
of  stagnant  water.^  Under  such  a  statute  the  city  may  require 
not  merely  the  removal  of  the  stagnant  water  then  upon  the  prem- 
ises but  the  filling  of  the  lots  in  question  so  as  to  prevent  a  re- 
currence of  the  nuisance.-  Whether  a  land-owner  can  be  com- 
pelled, under  such  power,  to  remove  a  nuisance  which  is  due  to 
the  construction  of  public  improvements,  such  as  streets  by  the 
city,  without  providing  for  drainage,  as  incident  thereto,  is  a 
question  upon  which  there  is  some  conflict  of  authority.  It  is 
generally  held  that  assessments  cannot  be  levied  under  such  cir- 
cumstances. In  other  jurisdictions  it  seems  to  be  held  that  the 
assessment  is  valid,  although  the  property  owner  has  a  right  of 
action  against  the  city.^  The  right  of  a  city  to  require  lots  to  be 
filled  as  a  part  of  a  street  improvement  has  been  discussed  but 
not  passed  upon.*  lender  authority  to  fill  slips,  it  has  been  held 
that  where  the  filling  of  a  slip  resulted  in  the  extension  of  a  street, 
the  improvement  might  be  regarded  by  the  city  as  the  filling  of 
the  slip  and  an  assessment  levied  under  such  statute.^ 

'Smith    V.    City    of    Chicago,    169  ^  Smith   v.   City   of   Milwaukee,    18 

III.  257,  48  N.  £.445   [1897].  U  is.  63   [1864].     See  §  342. 

*  Halsey  v.  Town  of  Lake  View,  188  *  Blake    v.    City    of    Brooklyn,    26 

111.  540,  59  N.  E.  234  [1901].  Barb.   301    [1857]'.      (The  decision   in 

^  Ewart     V.     Village     of      Eastern  this  case   turned   upon   the   fact  that 

Springs,    180   111.   318,   54   N.   E.   478  the  plaintiff  had  sued  in  equity  when 

[1899].  his  remedies  in  law  were  adequate.) 

^  In  the  Matter  of  Tappen,  36  How.  ^  Mayor,     etc.,     of     New     York     v. 

390   11869J.     See  §  342.  Whitney,     7     Barb.      (N.     Y.)      485 

=  Bliss     V.     Kraus,     16     O.     S.     54  [1849]. 
[1864]. 


I 


691  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS   CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  454 

§  454.    Market  places. 

Under  statutory  authority,  assessments  may  be  levied  in  some 
jurisdictions  for  market  places.^  Such  power  must  be  conferred 
expressly,  or  by  necessary  implication,  however.  Under  a  statute 
conferring  power  to  assess  for  improving  streets  and  alleys  the 
city  council  cannot  provide  for  paving  a  space  to  be  used  as  a 
market  place.^ 

§  455.     Improvement  on  private  land. 

A  city  or  other  public  corporation  may  levy  assessments  for  the 
construction  of  improvements  upon  private  property,  if  such 
city  or  public  corporation  has  the  means  of  securing  an  easement 
in  such  property  by  subsequent  proceedings  in  eminent  domain.^ 
If,  however,  the  statute  provides  for  levying  assessments  only  for 
the  improvement  of  a  public  street,  road  and  the  like,  such  statute 
does  not  authorize  an  improvement  unless  the  public  easement  has 
been  secured  in  some  way  before  the  improvement  is  made.'-  Such 
objection  must,  however,  be  made  in  the  proper  way.  If  the  ob- 
jection is  not  made  until  after  confirmation,  the  judgment  of  con- 
firmation is  regarded  as  conclusive  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  the 
assessment.^  In  Illinois  such  assessment  may  be  levied  before  the 
easement  is  acquired,  and  accordingly  such  objection  cannot  be 
made  even  at  confirmation.*  No  objection  can  be  made  that  a  part 
of  the  interest  of  the  complainant  in  the  street  has  not  been  con- 
demned but  that  he  has  been  allowed  to  keep  it.^ 

§  456.    River  and  harbor  improvements. 

In    some   jurisdictions    assessments    for    river    and    har])or    im- 

'  Donovp.n    v.    Coles,    .33    Mo.    App.  -  Barker   v.   Board   of   Commission- 

161    [1888].      "The   statute   here   con-  ers    of    Wyandotte    County,    45    Kan. 

sidered  gave  specific  power  to  vacate  081,    26    Pac.    58.5     [1S!>11;     In    the 

streets   and    establish    market    places  Matter  of  One  Hundred  and  Twonty- 

The   space   for   the   paving   on   which  Seventh  Street.  56  How.    (X.  Y.)    60 

the   assessment  was   levied   was   used  [1878];   McKeesport  Borough  to  Use 

for  a  market  for  a  small  part  of  the  of  McKeesport  City  v.  Buseh,  166  Pa 

day   and   in  other   respects   the   space  St.  46,  31   Atl.  49    [1895]. 

was  used   as  any  other  public   street  *  People    ex    rcl.    Raymond    v.    Ta! 

in  St.  Louis."     Donovan  v.  Coles,  33  madge,    194    111.    67.    61    X.    E.    1049 

Mo.  App.  161,  164   [1888].  [1901]  ;  Lehmer  v.  People  ex  rel.  Mil 

»City    of    Fort    Wayne    v.    ShoafT.  ler,  80  HI.   601    [1875]. 

106  Ind.  66.  5  X.  E.  403   [1885].  "Holmes  v.  Village  of  H.vde  Park 

'See  §  390  rt  srq.;  Holmes  v.  Vil-  121    111.   128,   13  X.   E.  540   [1889]. 

lage  of  Hyde   Park,    121   111.   128,   13  *  Fagan  v.  City  of  Chicago,  84  111 

N.  E.  540'  [1888].  227   [1876]. 


§  457  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.       *  692 

provements  have  been  held  to  be  valid,  if  authorized  by  statute.^ 
A  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  for  widening  a  river  does  not 
authorize  an  assessment  for  deepening  such  river,  except  as  far 
as  the  deepening  is  a  mere  incident  to  widening.-  In  jurisdictions 
in  which  the  validity  of  such  assessments  was  recognized  the  power 
of  a  city  to  levy  such  assessments  has  since  been  denied.^  This 
conclusion  has  since  been  reached  under  constitutional  and  statu- 
tory provisions  authorizing  assessments  for  local  improvements. 
The  improvement  of  a  navigable  river  is  held  not  to  be  a  local 
improvement  within  the  meaning  of  these  provisions.  An  addi- 
tional consideration  rendering  such  assessment  invalid  is  the  fact 
that  navigable  rivers  are  under  the  control  of  the  United  States.* 
However,  where  a  bridge  had  been  constructed  across  a  navigable 
river  connecting  two  parts  of  a  street  separated  by  such  river,  it 
was  held  that  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War  might  be  pre- 
sumed. The  bridge  in  this  case  was  to  be  paid  for  by  general 
taxation.'"'  Whether  such  assessments  can  be  levied  has  been  dis- 
cussed but  not  decided  in  some  of  the  cases."  Where  such  assess- 
ments have  been  held  valid,  it  has  been  held  that  an  assessment 
may  be  levied  for  removing  an  obstruction  from  a  navigable 
stream,  even  if  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  city.'' 

§  457.    Removal  of  ice  and  snow. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  it  has  already  been  pointed  out,^  a 
city  may  compel  a  property  owner  to  remove  ice  and  snow  from 
sidewalks    adjoining    his    property    under    a    statutory    grant    of 


^Bond  V.  City  of  Kenosha.   17  Wis.  cago,     162     HI.    383,    44    N.    E.    739 

284     [1863];     (In    Hale    v.    City    of  [1896]). 

Kenosha,  29  Wis.  599,  it  was  doubted  ^Pearson   v.    City   of    Chicago,    162 

whether  such  a  charge  was  an  assess-  111.  383,  44  N.  E.  739   [1896]. 

ment  or  a  tax  in  the  narrower  sense.  "  Hamilton  v.  City  of  Fon  du  Lac. 

See  §   360.  25  Wis.  490   [1870]. 

2  Wright    V.    City    of    Chicago,    20  '  Buffalo  Union  Iron  Works  v.  City 

111.    252    [1858];    Elston    v.    City    of  of    Buttalo,    13    Abb.    Pr.    N.    S.    (JN. 

Chicago,    40    111.    514,    89    Am.    Dec.  Y.)    141    [1870].      (In   this   case   the 

361   [1866].  obstruction  consisted  of  a  float  which 

^  City  of   Chicago  v.   Law,    144   111.  the    city    had    negligently    towed    out 

569,  33  N.  E.  855  [1893].  into  the  stream  and  allowed  to  sink 

*  City  of   Chicago  v.   Law,    144   111.  and  about  which  the  wrecks  of  other 

■569,    33    N.    E.    855    [1893];     (distin-  vessels  had  accumulated.) 

guished    in   Pearson   v.    City   of   Chi-  i  See  §  58. 


693  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS   CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  458 

power.-  This  power  is  sometimes  granted  specifically  by  statute.'' 
It  may  be  granted  by  statutes  which  confer  in  general  terms 
power  to  regulate  nuisances.^  In  other  jurisdictions  cities  are  held 
not  to  have  the  power  to  compel  property  owners  to  remove  ice 
and  snow  from  the  adjoining  sidewalks,'^  and  questions  of  this  sort 
accordingly  do  not  arise.  Thus  a  statutory  grant  of  power  to 
construct  local  improvements  has  been  held  not  to  give  authority 
to  compel  property  owners  to  remove  ice  and  snow.'' 

§  458.    Sprinkling  streets. 

The  sprinkling  of  city  streets  is  a  public  benefit  and  may  be  paid 
out  of  funds  raised  by  general  taxation.^  In  many  juris- 
dictions as  has  been  said  before,-  it  is  held  that  local  as- 
sessments cannot  be  levied  for  sprinkling.^  In  some  cases  the 
reason  for  this  holding  is  based  on  constitutional  grounds  and 
statutes  giving  specific  authority  for  such  assessments  are  held 
unconstitutional.*  A  statute  conferring  power  to  levy  assessments 
for  "local  improvements"  is  held  not  to  confer  power  to  levy  as- 
sessments for  sprinkling.'^  A  statute  authorizing  local  assessments 
for  "sewerage,  paving  and  other  like  purposes,"  is  held  not  to 
confer  power  to  assess  for  sprinkling. "^  In  other  jurisdictions, 
assessments  for  sprinkling  may  be  levied.'^  A  statute  which  pro- 
vides that  the  board  of  public  works  shall  let  sprinkling  contracts 


^  State   V.   McMahon,   70   Conn.   97.  88  111.  554,  30  Am.  Rep.  5GG   [1878]. 

55   All.   591    [1903];    Union   Railway  '  Maydwell    v.    City    of    Louisville, 

Company  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  116   Ky.  885,  76  S.  W.   1091    [1903]. 

Cambridge,  11  All.  287   [1865];  God-  ^  See  §  370. 

dard,    Petitioner,    16    Pick.     (Mass.)  'New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Prest, 

504,   28   Am.   Dec.   259    [1835];    City  71   Fed.  815   [1896];   City  of  Chicago 

of  Helena  v.  Kent,  32  Mont.  279,  80  v.    Blair,    149    III.    310,    24   L.    R.    A 

Pac.   258    [1905]:    Carthage   v.    Fred-  412,    36    N.    E.    829    [1894];    Kansas 

erick,  122  N.  Y.  268,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  City   v.   O'Connor,   82   Mo.   App.    655 

490,   10  L.  R.  A.   178,  25  N.  E.  480.  [1899];  Pettit  v.  Duke,  10  Utah  311, 

'State   V.   McMahon,    76    Conn.    97.  37   Pac.   568    [1894]. 

55   Atl.   591    [1903].  *  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.   Prest. 

'City  of  Helena  v.  Kent,  32  Mont.  71    Fed.  815    [1896]. 

279,  80  Pac.  258    [1905].  Hity  of  Chicago  v.   Blair.   149   III. 

=  Chicago   V.   O'Brien,    111    111.   .532.  310,   24   L.   R.   A.   412,   36   X.   E.   829 

53    Am.    Rep.    640    [1884];    (irideley  [1894]. 

V.   City  of   Bloomington.   88   111.   554,  "Pettit   v.   Duke,    10   Utah   311,   37 

30   Am.    Rep.    566    [1878];    State    v.  Pac.  568   [1894]. 

Jack-man.  69  X.  H.  318.  42  L.  R.  A.  'Palmer   v.   Xolting.    13    Ind.   App. 

438,  42  Atl.   347    [1898].  581,  41  N.  E.   1045    [18951. 

"Grideley  v.   City   of   Bloomington, 


§  459  TAXATION    BY   ASfESSMENT.  694 

and  that  the  cost  of  such  sprinkling  shall  be  assessed  pro  rata  upon 
the  property  owners  along  the  line  of  the  street  sprinkled  as  the 
cost  of  public  improvements  is  assessed  authorizes  such  assess- 
ment.® 

§  459.    Other  types  of  improvement. 

A  culvert  is  a  part  of  a  street  improvement  or  of  a  system  of 
drainage.  Assessments  ma.y  be  levied  therefor  under  statutory 
authority/  Whether  a  provision  in  a  contract  for  grading  in- 
cludes constructing  culverts  was  not  decided,  since  if  the  eon- 
tractor  constructed  culverts  he  could  not  recover  therefor  from  the 
property  owners  under  the  head  of  grading,  as  by  statute,  grading 
was  to  be  paid  for  by  the  city.-  Under  statutory  authority  an 
assessment  may  be  levied  to  compensate  a  railroad  for  giving  up 
its  right  to  use  steam  power  within  the  city  limits.''  A  road  in  the 
country  is  an  improvement  for  which  in  some  jurisdictions  local 
assessments  may  be  levied.*  A  statute  providing  for  the  method 
of  levying  and  collecting  assessments  for  such  improvement  is 
applicable  to  a  road  partially  constructed  at  the  time  of  the 
passage  of  such  statute,  if  the  construction  of  such  road  is  begun 
upon  the  assessment  plan.''  If  there  is  statutory  authority  there- 
for assessments  may  be  levied  for  the  purchasing  of  land  for  use 
as  a  park  and  the  improvement  thereof.''  Under  a  statute  which 
gives  to  the  park  department  the  exclusive  power  to  pave  roads 
in  a  park  while  the  city  council  has  exclusive  power  to  pave 
roads  outside  of  the  park,  the  park  department  may  include  in  an 
assessment  for  park  purposes,  work  done  on  streets  outside  of 
the  park  necessary  to  complete  the  paving  in  the  park,  to  make 
the  connecting  streets  and  approaches  safe  for  travelers,  and  to 
furnish  the  park  with  proper  drainage.'^  Even  where  assess- 
ments can  be  levied  for  the  cost  of  removing  garbage  no  such 


'Palmer   v.   Nolting,    13   Ind.   App.  Gravel  Road  Company  v.  Wallace,  39 

681,  41   N.  E.   1045    [1895].  Ind.  435   [1872]. 

^Shannon   v.   Village    of   Hinsdale.  '^  Kittinger  v.  City  of  Buffalo,   148 

180  111.  202,  54  N.  E.   181    [1899].  ^;.    Y.    332,    42    N.    E.    803    [1896]; 

^  City    of    Covington    v.    Dressman,  In    the    Matter    of    the    Commission- 

69  Ky.    (6  Bush.)   210   [1869].  ers   of   Central    Park,    63    Barb.    (N. 

'People    ex    rel.    Crowell    v.    Law  V.)    282   [1872].     See  §  356. 

renee,  36  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    178   [1862].  '  Kittinger  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  148 

*iSee  §  322.  X.  Y.   332,   42   N.  E.  803    [1896]. 

*  Fall  Creek  and  Warren  Township 


695  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS   CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  460 

assessment  can  be  levied  in  the  absence  of  statutory  authority 
therefor.^ 

§  460.     Temporary  improvements. 

A  temporary  improvement  which  is  incident  to  an  improve- 
ment of  a  permanent  character  is  one  for  which  a  local  assess- 
ment may  be  levied  under  a  statutory  grant  of  power.^  Thus  a 
statute  which  provides  for  assessments  for  grading  and  paving- 
streets  and  further  provides,  "the  work  done  in  constructing  any 
street  may  be  protected  from  surface  water  by  temporary  drains 
and  culverts  put  in  under  the  direction  of  the  city  engineer," 
authorizes  the  expense  of  temporary  culverts  used  to  protect  the 
work  already  done  from  surface  water,  to  be  assessed  upon 
the  property  to  be  benefited  by  the  permanent  improvement.- 

§  461.     Repairs. 

The  question  of  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  as- 
sessments for  improvements  of  this  type  has  already  been  dis-- 
cussed.^  Questions  of  constitutional  and  statutory  construction 
are  so  closely  connected  that  some  repetition  of  questions  already 
discussed  is  necessary  to  a  clear  presentation  of  the  subject.  Pow- 
er to  provide  for  constructing  and  maintaining  streets  is  a  con- 
tinuing power.-  The  repair  of  pre-existing  streets  is  an  improve- 
ment for  which  a  local  assessment  may  be  levied  under  statutory 
authority.^  By  statute  in  many  jurisdictions  it  is  expressly 
provided  that  the  repair  of  an  existing  street  is  to  be  paid  foi- 
by  general  taxation.*  Statutes  providing  for  general  taxation  for 
repairs  frequently  describe  such  improvements  as  "ordinary  re- 

•Trephagen      v.      City      of      South  rA5.  74  X.  E.  797   [1905];   Perkinson 

Omaha,    (19    Neb.    577,    111    Am.    St.  v.    Schnaake.    108   Mo.    App.    255,   S:i 

Rep.  570,  96  N.  W.   248    [190.31.  S.    W.    301    [1904];    Barber    Asphalt 

^Russell    V.    Adkins,    24    Mo.    App.  Paving     Company     v.     Muchenberjior. 

605  [18871.  105    Mo.    App.   '47,    78    S.    W.    2S0 

=>  Russell    V.    Adkins,    24    Mo.    App.  [190.3]:    O'Meara    v.    Green,    25    Mo. 

f.05  [18871.  App.   198;   O'.Meara  v.  Green,  16  Mo. 

'See  §§  373-378.  App.    118    [1884];    Robertson   v.   City 

-Estes   V.   Owen,   90   Mo.    113,   2   S.  of  Omaha,  55  Neb.   718.  44  L.  R.   A. 

\V.  133  [1886];  McCormaek  V.  Patch-  534,    70    X.    \Y.    442    [1898];    Rrenn 

in,    53    Mo.    33,     14    Am.    Rep.    440  v.   City   of   Troy,    CO    Barb.    (X.    Y.) 

[1873].  417   [1871];   Inthe  Matter  of  Fulton 

"Estes  V.   Owen,   90   Mo.    113,   2   S.  Street,      29      Howard      429      [ISOo]: 

W.   133   [1887].  Blount  v.  City  of  Janesville,  31  Wis 

*Bush    V.    Citv    of    Peoria.    215    111.  648    [1872]. 


§461 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


696 


pairs. "^  Under  a  statute  authorizing  assessments  for  "local  im- 
provements" repairs  are  held  not  to  be  local  improvements.** 
An  assessment  may  be  levied  for  repairs,  although  the  contractor 
who  constructed  such  improvement  was  bound  by  contract  to 
keep  the  improvement  in  repair  for  a  given  space  of  time  which  has 
not  yet  elapsed.  While  the  primary  duty  in  such  cases  rests  upon 
the  contractor,  yet  in  case  he  is  insolvent  the  contract  does  not 
discharge  the  property  owners  from  liability  to  assessment  for 
such  improvement.'^  By  statute  it  is  frequently  provided  that 
the  cost  of  repairing  sidewalks  must  be  paid  for  by  general 
taxation.^  Other  sta^tutes  authorize  the  city  to  require  the  abut- 
ting property  owners  to  repair  sidewalks  on  which  their  property 
abuts."  Such  a  statute  authorizes  the  city  to  make  a  contract 
for  the  repair  of  sidewalks  in  case  the  abutting  property  owners 
neglect  or  refuse  to  make  such  repairs  when  notified  to  do  so.^'' 
Under  a  statute  authorizing  the  same,  assessments  may  be  levied 
for  repairing  and  maintaining  an  existing  sewer."  The  repair  of 
.ditches  constructed  for  drainage  purposes  is  an  improvement  for 
which  an  assessment  can  be  levied  under  a  statute  authorizing  the 
same.^-  Under  such  statute  a  new  ditch  cannot  be  constructed 
under  color  of  proceedings  to  repair  a  ditch. ^-^  However,  the  fact 
that  the  ditch  is  made  wider  by  the  process  of  cleaning  it  out 
does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.^*  Under  authority  to  construct 
drains  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  item  of  filling  land  below  the 
level   of  the  surrounding  land  can  be  included.^''     Authority  to 


°  Robertson  v.  City  of  Omaha,  55 
Neb.  718,  44  L.  R.  A.  534,  76  N.  W. 
442  [1898];  Brenn  v.  City  of  Troy, 
60  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    417    [1871]. 

'Crane  v.  West  Chicago  Parle  Com- 
missioners, 153  111.  348,  26  L.  R.  A. 
311,  38  N.  E.  943  [1894]. 

'State  ex  rel.  Woulfe  v.  St.  Paul, 
107  La.  777,  32  So.  88   [1902]. 

'  Bonnet  v.  City  and  County  of  San 
Francisco,  65  Cal.  230,  3  Pac.  815 
[1884]. 

'  Young  V.  Village  of  Waterville, 
39  Minn.   196,  39  N.  W.  97   [1888]. 

1°  Heath  v.  Manson.  147  Cal.  694. 
82  Pac.  331    [1905]. 

"  Smith  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Worcester,  182  Mass.  232,  59  L.  R. 
A.  728,  65  N.  E.  40  [1902]. 


'-Village  of  Hyde  Parle  v.  Spencer, 
118  HI.  446,  8  "n,  e.  846  [1887]; 
Scott  V.  Stringley,  132  Ind.  378,  31 
N.  E.  953  [1892];  Weaver  v.  Temp- 
lin,  113  Ind.  298,  14  K  E.  600 
[1887]  ;  State  e.x  rel.  French  v.  John- 
son, 105  Ind.  463,  5  N.  E.  553 
1 1885]  ;  Dean  v.  Treasurer  of  Clinton 
County,  146  Mich.  645,  109  N.  W. 
1131  [1906];  Angell  v.  Cortright.  Ill 
Mich.  223,  69  N.  W.  486   [1896]. 

'^'Millikan  v.  Wall,  133  Ind.  51,  32 
N.  E.  828    [1892]. 

"Angell  V.  Cortright.  Ill  Mich. 
223,  69  N.  W.  486   [1896]. 

'°  It  was  held  that  filling  was  not 
authorized  in  In  the  Matter  of  Viin 
Buren,  55  Howard  (N.  Y.)  513 
[1878];    but    this    question    was    not 


697  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  |  462 

construct  an  improvement  of  which  a  culvert  is  a  part  does  not 
confer  authority  to  levy  an  assessment  for  repairs  to  such  culvert 
which  became  necessary  during  the  progress  of  the  work.^^ 

§  462.     What  constitutes  original  construction. 

In  New  York  by  statute  assessments  for  reconstruction  may  be 
set  aside  upon  many  grounds  upon  which  assessments  for  original 
construction  could  not  be  set  aside.  Under  the  New  York  statute, 
therefore,  the  question  of  what  an  original  construction  was  be- 
came material  and  was  frequently  discussed.  To  constitute  an 
original  improvement  of  a  street  there  must  have  been  a  sub- 
stantial paving  of  the  part  of  the  street  improved.^  Accordingly, 
a  street  which  was  curbed  and  guttered,  but  upon  each  side  of 
which  a  narrow  strip  was  laid  with  cobble  stones  to  protect  the 
gutter  and  by  which  sidewalks  had  been  laid  was  held  not  to  be 
paved  within  the  meaning  of  this  statute.-  Since  the  term 
"street"  in  its  broad  sense  includes  "sidewalks,"  the  work  of 
paving  and  setting  curb  stones  and  gutter  stones  is  a  part  of  the 
work  of  paving  the  street  and  the  reconstruction  of  such  im- 
provements subsequently  is  a  repavement  within  the  meaning 
of  these  statutes.^  These  statutes  apply  only  where  the  prior 
improvement  was  constructed  upon  the  assessment  plan  and  such 
assessments  have  in  fact  been  paid.  The  mere  presumption  of 
payment  arising  from  a  lapse  of  time  is  not  sufificient  to  protect 
the  property  only  in  such  cases."*  The  paving  of  a  street  at  the 
expense  of  the  property  owners  voluntarily  and  Avithout  any  as- 
sessment does  not  constitute  an  oi-igiiial  improvement  within  tlie 
meaning  of  these  statutes."'  Where  the  city  owns  certain  prop- 
erty at  the  time  that  a  former  improvement  was  made  and  the 
city  paid  the  assessment  thereon  and  subsequently  conveyed  the 

decided  in  the  Court  of  Appeals,  in  In  ineister,    70    X.    \'.    174    [1S70];     (re- 

the  Matter  of  Petition  of  Van  Buren,  versinjj  In  tlie  Matter  of  Petition  of 

79  N.  Y.  384   [18S0].  Purmeister.     0     Hun.     (X.     Y. )     (ii:? 

i«Spanrrler  V.  City  of  Cleveland.  .3o  I1877J);     In    the    Matter    of    i^urke. 

0.  S.  469   [1880].  (;2  X.  Y.  224   ri87.-)l:  :^Iatter  of  Phj]. 

^  In  the  Matter  of   tlie  Petition   of  lips.  (10  X.  V.    1(>. 
Brady,  85  N.  Y.  2fi8  [18811.  Mn    the    ^Matter    of    Willet,    70    X. 

'In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition   of  V.  490  [1877]:  In  the  Matter  of  Ser- 

Brady,    85    N.    Y.    268     [18811;  (Ae-  rill.   9   Tlun.    (N.    Y.)    2.3.3    [1876]. 
cordiniily  a  subsequent  pavement  was  'Petition  of  Astor.  2  Sup.  Ct.    (T. 

not  a   repavejiient.)  &    C.)    488    [1874]. 

^  In  the  Matter  of  Petition  of  Bur- 


§  462  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  698 

property  to  a  third  person,  such  improvement  is  not  an  original 
improvement  within  the  meaning  of  the  statutes."  In  Pennsyl- 
vania the  attitude  of  the  courts  was  from  the  first  strongly  against 
permitting  assessments  for  reconstruction.  Under  statutes  au- 
thorizing the  paving  of  streets  but  not  providing  specifically  for 
reconstruction,  the  court  declined  to  construe  such  statutes  so  as 
to  permit  the  repaving  of  a  street  in  place  of  a  pre-existing  street 
in  good  condition.^  Even  where  authority  to  pave  was  construed 
not  to  include  authority  to  repave,  it  was  said  that  a  statute  au- 
thorizing local  assessments  for  such  repaving  would  be  uncon- 
stitutional.^ Subsequently  under  statutes  which  provided  spe- 
cifically for  assessments  for  repaving  it  was  held  that  such  stat- 
utes were  unconstitutional,"  whether  the  original  improvement 
was  paid  for  by  local  assessments,^"  or  whether  it  was  paid  for 
by  general  taxation."  or  whether  a  pavement  not  constructed  by 
the  city  on  either  plan  is  subsequently  adopted  or  acquiesced  in.^- 
This  principle  has  not,  however,  been  applied  to  improvements 
such  as  sidewalks,  assessments  for  which  are  justified  not  on 
the  theory  of  benefits  but  on  the  theory  that  the  owner  of  prop- 
erty may  be  required  to  pay  the  cost  of  performing  a  legal  duty 
which  he  has  neglected  to  perform."  Since  in  Pennsylvania  the 
legislature  has  no  power  to  authorize  an  assessment  for  recon- 
struction, the  question  of  what  is  an  original  construction  is 
material.     An   original   construction   within   the   meaning   of  the 


•^  In  the  Matter  of  Welsh,  30  Hiin.,  1070     [1892];      West     Third     Street 

(N.  Y.)   372  [1883].  8evver,   Appeal   of   the   City   of   VVill- 

■  Wistar    v.    Philadelphia,     80    Pa.  iamsport,  187  Pa.  St.  565,  41  Atl.  476 

St.    (30    P.    F.    Smith)    505,    21    Am.  [1898];     Appeal     of    the    Protestant 

Rep.    112    [1876];    Hammett   v.   Phil-  Orphan    Asylum    of    Pittsburgh    and 

adelphia,  65  Pa.  St.   ( 15  P.  F.  Smith)  Allegheny,    111    Pa.    St.    135,    3    Atl. 

146,  3  Am.  Rep.  615    [1870].      (This  217   [1885]. 

improvement  was  undertaken  for  the  ^^  Appeal  of  the  Protestant  Orphan 

purpose    of    making    a    great    public  Asylum  of  Pittsburgh  and  Allegheny, 

driveway   by  widening   and   repaving  111  Pa.  St.  135,  3  Atl.  217   [1885]. 

with    wooden    blocks    a    street    upon  "  City     of     Harrisburg     v.     Segel- 

which  there  was  a  good  cobble  stone  baum,    151   Pa.   St.   172,  20  L.  R.  A. 

pavement.)  834,     24     Atl.     1070     [1892];     West 

*  Hammett  v.   Philadelphia,   65   Pa.  Third    Street    Sewer,    Appeal    of    the 

St.     (15    P.    F.    Smith)     146,    3    Am.  City    of    Williamsport,    187    Pa.    St. 

Rep.  615    [1870].  5C5,  41  Atl.  476   [1898]. 

«Scranton  City  v.  Sturges,  202  Pa.  «  Dick  v.  Philadelphia,  197  Pa.  St. 

St.   182,  51  Atl.  764   [1902];   City  of  4G7,  47  Atl.  750   [1901]. 

Harrisburg    v.    Segelbaum,     151    Pa.  ^^  Smith  v.  Kingston  Borough,   120 

St.    172,    20    L.    R.    A.    834,    24    Atl.  P<.  St.  357,   14  Atl.   170   [1888]. 


699  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  462 

rule  which  i)rotects  a  property  owner  from  assessments  for  re- 
constructions is  said  to  be  one  which  is  put  down  originally  or 
adopted  or  acquiesced  in  subsequently  by  the  authorities  of  the 
public  corporation  for  the  purpose  and  with  the  intent  of  chang- 
ing an  ordinary  road  into  a  street."  The  existence  of  an  origi- 
nal construction  depends  therefore  in  part  upon  the  nature  of 
the  improvement  and  the  material  with  which  it  is  made  and  in 
part  upon  the  intenti-on  with  which  it  is  done.^''  If  there  is  no 
intention  of  changing  the  road  into  a  street,  a  surfacing  of  the 
road,  no  matter  how  carefully  or  expensively  done,  does  not 
amount  to  an  original  construction.^"  Macadamizing  a  road  is 
said  prima  facie  to  be  an  original  construction  in  a  small  town 
or  city  but  not  an  original  construction  in  a  large  city.^'  Repair- 
ing a  pre-existing  highway  and  maintaining  it  in  use  as  such 
does  not  amount  to  an  original  costruction.^*  Still  less  does 
use  of  a  turnpike  as  a  road  amount  to  a  construction  where  the 
turnpike  company  has  stoned  less  than  one-half  the  width  of  the 
road,- and  at  the  time  it  ceased  to  own  such  road  the  stoning  was 
in  a  ruinous  condition,  was  removed  by  the  borough  in  paving 
such  street  and  the  borough  has  never  used  nor  adopted  such 
road  as  a  street.'**  Repairing  a  plank  road  to  keep  it  in  con- 
dition fit  for  travel  until  a  permanent  improvement  could  be  made 
is  not  an  original  construction  within  the  meaning  of  the  stat- 
ute.^"    Repairing  a   roadway   with   broken   limescone   is   not   an 


'♦Dick  V.  Philadelpliia.  197  Pa.  St.  IfiO  Pa.  St.  452,  32  All.  639   [1895]; 

467,    47    All.    750    [1901];    Pliiladel-  .Macadamizing    may    be    an    original 

phia   to   Use   of   Mack   v.    Eddlcman.  jjaving.     City  of   Harrisburg  v.   Se<r- 

169  Pa.  St.  452.  32  At).  039   [1895).  «dl)aum.  ISl'Pa.  St.  172.  20*^1^.  R.  A. 

"East   Street.    Evans'   Appeal.   210  834,  24  Atl.   1070   [18921. 
Fa.   St.  539,   60  Atl.    154    [1904]  ;    hi  » Ea.st   Street.    Evans'    Appeal,   210 

re    Lincoln     Ave.,     Rodger's     Appeal,  Pa.    St.    539,    60    Atl.     154     [1904]; 

193  Pa.  St.  432,  44  Atl.  1102  [1899];  Harrisburg" v.  Funk,  200  Pa.  St.  .348*, 

Philadelphia   to   I'se  of   Mack   v.    Ed-  49   Atl.   992    [1901];    Philadelphia   to 

dleman.  169  Pa.  St.  452.  32  Atl.  639  Use   of    Mack    v.    Eddleman.    169    Pa. 

[1895].  St.    4.52,   32    Atl.    6.39    [1895];    Phila- 

'•Dick  V.  Philadelphia.  197  Pa.  St.  delphia    to    T^se    v.    Dibeler.    147    Pa. 

467,    47    Atl.    750    [1901]:     Philadel-  St.  261.  23   Atl.  567    [1892]. 
phia    to    Vse   of    Mack    v.    Eddleman.  "  In  re  Lincoln  Ave..  Rodger's  Ap- 

169  Pa.  St.  452.  32  Atl.  639    [1895].  peal.    193    Pa.    St.    432.   44    Atl.    1102 

"Dick  V.  Philadelphia.  197  Pa.  St.  [1899]. 
467,    47    Atl.    750    [1901];     Philadel-  ="  East    Street,    Evans'    Appeal,   210 

phia    to    Use    of    Mack    v.    Eddleman.  Pa.  St.  539.  60  Atl.  154   [1904]. 


§  462  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  700 

original  construction.-^  The  use  of  a  plank  road  after  freeing  it 
from  tolls,  and  subsequent  regrading  of  it  so  as  to  destroy  the 
planking  does  not  amount  to  an  original  construction  so  as  to  re- 
lieve the  abutting  owners  from  assessment  for  a  vitrified  brick 
pavement.--  If  a  part  of  a  street  has  been  paved  and  a  part 
left  unpaved,-^  as  where  a  part  of  a  street  was  left  for  use  as 
a  market  place, ^*  or  has  been  left  as  a  parkway  down  the  center 
of  a  street,-^  the  subsequent  paving  of  such  previously  unpaved 
part  of  the  street  is  not  a  reconstruction  but  is  regarded  itself 
as  an  original  construction.  In  Kentucky  under  statutes  spe- 
cifically authorizing  it,  assessments  for  the  reconstruction  of 
streets  have  been  held  to  be  valid.-*'  Original  constructions  are 
controlled  by  some  statutes  different  from  those  applicable  to 
subsequent  constructions,  and  the  question  of  what  an  original 
construction  is,  is  therefore  material.-^  The  ordinance  for  an 
original  improvement  must  be  enacted  with  certain  specified  for- 
malities.-^ By  statutes  applicable  to  some  cities  original  con- 
struction of  public  ways  is  to  be  at  the  exclusive  cost  of  the  abut- 
ting owners  while  the  reconstruction  is  to  be  one-half  at  the  cost 
of  the  abutting  owners  and  one-half  at  the  cost  of  the  city.-®  By 
such  a  statute  a  sidcAvalk  is  held  not  to  be  a  public  way  and  hence 
the  reconstruction  of  a  sidewalk  may  be  entirely  at  the  cost  of  the 
abutting  owners.^'-  Under  statutes  applicable  to  other  cities 
it  is  provided  that  the  cost  of  reconstruction  must  be  borne  en- 
tirely by  the  city."^  Under  the  statutes  in  force  in  Kentucky  ap- 
plicable to  some  cities,  assessments  cannot  be  levied  for  a  recon- 

"  Harrisburg  v.  Funk,  200  Pa.  St.  in    connection   with    an    improvement 

348.    49    Atl.    992    [1901];    Philadel-  refers  to  an  improvement  when  first 

phia   to   Use   v.   Dibeler,    147   Pa.    St.  made."      Thomas    v.    Woods.    —    Ky. 

261,  2.3  Atl.  567   [1892].  ,  108  S.  W.  878,  880   [1908]. 

=^Dick  V.  Philadelphia,  197  Pa.  St.  ^Thomas    v.   Woods.   —   Ky.  — -. 

467,  47   Atl.  750   [1901].  108  S.  W.  878  [1908]. 

^Philadelphia    to    Use    v.    Evans.  ^  Miidire  v.  Walker.  —  (Ky.)  , 

139  Pa.  St.  483,  21  Atl.  200   [1891];  28  Ky.  Law  Rep.  996.  90  S.'w.  1046 

Alcorn   v.    City   of   Philadelphia.    112  [1906]. 

Pa.  St.  494,  4  Atl.  185   [1886].  ="' Mudge  v.  Walker,  —  (Ky.)  

"Philadelphia    to    Use    v.    Evans  28  Ky.  Law  Rep.  996.  90  S.  W.  1046 

139  Pa.  St.  483,  21  Atl.   200    [1S91].  [1906];    (The  probability  of  this  con- 

=^  Alcorn    v.    City    of    Philadelpliia,  struction    is    aided    by    the    fact   that 

112  Pa.  St.  494,  4  Atl.   185    [1886].  the  statute  contained   a   specific  pro 

^Broadway  Baptist  Church  v.  Mc-  vision  for  assessing  the  cost  of  side- 

Atee,   8   Bush.    (71    Ky.)    508,  8   Am.  walks  upon  abuttins  owners.) 

Rep.  480  [1871];   Bradley  v.  McAtee^  =i  City   of   Louisville   v.    Tyler,    111 

7   Bush.    (70   Ky.)    667,   3   Am.   Rep.  Ky.  588,  64  S.  W.  415.  65  S.  W.  125 

309   [1870].  [1901]. 

'"  "The   word    'original'   when    used 


701  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  462 

struction  even  if  the  original  construction  was  not  at  the  cost 
of  the  abutting  owners.^-  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  original 
construction  should  have  been  authorized  by  ordinance  when 
made.'*^  The  fact  that  the  street  was  originally  improved  by 
building  a  "turnpike"  road  which  was  said  to  mean  a  macadam 
pavement,  does  not  prevent  such  improvement  from  being  an 
original  construction  so  that  no  assessment  can  be  levied  for  a 
subsequent  improvement.^*  The  fact  that  no  sidewalk  was  built 
on  the  side  of  the  street  does  not  prevent  the  improvement  from 
being  an  original  construction.^'  Property  owners  were  allowed 
to  improve  a  strip  sixteen  feet  wide  in  the  center  of  a  thirty- 
foot  street,  by  paving  the  same.  This  was  held  to  be  an  original 
construction  so  that  assessment  could  not  be  levied  for  a  subse- 
quent construction,  although  the  city  had  given  such  permission 
under  a  resolution  that  the  street  was  not  then  "in  condition 
for  a  more  perfect  and  complete  construction."'"'  Grading  a 
dirt  road  so  ;)s  to  level  the  center  for  drainage  purposes  and 
leveling  inequalities  upon  its  surfaee,^^  or  temporarily  repairing 
a  street  from  time  to  time  by  putting  crushed  stone  upon  it.''^ 
or  grading  and  covering  the  surface  of  a  street  with  cinders  and 
mill  ashes.-''''  or  covering  a  strip  eighteen  feet  wide  in  the  center 
of  a  road  with  macadam  a  foot  deep  without  curbing  or  gutter- 
ing,*" are  none  of  them  original  constructions  of  the  street.  Ac- 
cordingly, a  subsequent  paving  of  such  streets  is  regarded  as  an 
original  construction  and  not  a  reconstruction.  If  a  macadamized 
road,*^  or  a  turnpike  road,*-  is  taken  into  the  city  limits,  the 
subsequent  paving  thereof  is  regarded  as  an  original  construction 
and  not  a  reconstruction. 

'=City   of   Louisville   v.   Tyler,    111  [1901];     (citinp:    Mackin    v.    Wilson. 

Ky.  588,  G4  S.  W.  415,  G5  S.  W.  125  45    R.    W.    663,    20    Ky.    L.    R.    218; 

[19011.  Ormsby  v.  Jamison,  9  Ky.  L.  R.  325). 

"City   of   Louisville   v.   Tyler,    111  ^  Lindsey  v.  Brawner,  —  Ky.  , 

Ky.  588.  64  S.  W.  415.  65  S.  W.  125  97  S.  W.  1    [1906]. 

[1901L  '"Adams    v.    City    of    Ashland,    — 

'U'ity   of    Louisville    v.    Tyler,    111        Ky.  .  80  S.  W.'  1105,  26  Ky.  Law 

Ky.  588,  64  S.  W.  415.  65  R.  \V.   125  Rep.  184   [1904]. 

[1901].  *"Heim    v.    Fipcr.   —   Ky.   ,   89 

■■•^City   of   Louisville   v.    Tyler,    111  R.    W.    301.    28    Ky.    Law    Rep.    .396 

Ky.  5S8.  64  R.  W.  415.  65  R.  W.  125  \]f)Or,]. 

[19011.  ■"City  of  CatlettsburjT  v.   Relf,   115 

^nieason  v.  Barnett.   115  Ky.  890.  Ky.  669.  74  R.  W.   1064.  25  Ky.  Law 

61    R.  W.  20   [10031.  Ren.   161    [1003]. 

"  Barfield  v.  Cleason.  Ill    Ky.  491  *=  MeTIenrv  v.  Relvage,  99  Ky.  232, 

63  R.  W.  964.  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.   128  35  R.  W.  645  [1896]. 


§  463  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  702 

§  463.     Distinction  between  repairs  and  reconstruction. 

Since  the  method  of  paying  for  the  cost  of  reconstructions  is 
in  many  jurisdictions  different  from  the  cost  of  paying  for  re- 
pairs, the  question  whether  a  given  improvement  is  a  recon- 
struction or  a  repair  is  often  material.  Whether  an  improvement 
is  a  repair  or  a  reconstruction  has  been  said  to  be  a  question  of 
fact.^  It  is  more  accurate  to  say  that  it  is  a  mixed  question  of 
law  and  fact  to  be  determined  largely  by  the  character  of  the 
work  and  the  relation  of  the  new  work  to  the  old.-  The  council 
cannot  change  the  legal  character  of  a  repair  by  calling  it  a 
reconstruction.^  If  new  material  is  used  in  the  improvement  of 
a  different  kind  from  the  old,  and  the  old  material  is  entirely 
replaced,  the  improvement  is  evidently  a  reconstruction  and  not 
a  repair.*  Thus  if  a  street  which  has  been  graded  and  paved 
with  stone  is  subsequently  regraded  and  paved  with  a  Nicholson 
block  pavement,  the  latter  improvement  is  not  a  repair  but  a 
reconstruction.^  Accordingly  it  has  been  said  that  the  difference 
between  reconstruction  and  repairs  is  that  in  reconstruction  a 
new  material  is  used  and  it  may  be  a  different  kind  of  material; 
and  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  improvement  may  also  be 
involved;  while  in  repairs  the  same  kind  of  material  of  which 
the  improvement  was  originally  composed  is  used,  and  the  struc- 
ture of  the  improvement  must  not  be  changed  in  any  material 
way.®  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  to  remove  all  the  old  mate- 
rial in  cases  of  reconstruction.'^  Furthermore,  a  rule  of  a  street 
commissioner  which  designates  as  reconstruction,  only  the  work 
in  which  a  new  and  different  kind  of  paving  is  used,  is  held  to 
be  a  rule  which  may  often  be  incorrect,  and  which  if  incorrect, 
cannot  control  the  true  character  of  the  work.*  Specific  examples 
may  be  helpful  in  illustrating  the  difference  between  reconstrue- 

^  O'Meara    v.    Green,    16    Mo.    App.  ^Blount   v.    City   of   Janesville,   31 

118   [1884].  Wis.  648   [1872].' 

^  O'Meara    v.    Green,    25    Mo.    App.  '  Farrell    v.    Rammelkamp,   64   Mo. 

198   [1887].  App.  425  [1896]. 

'O'Meara    v.    Green,    25    Mo.    App.  'Field  v.  City  of  Chicago,   198  111. 

198  [1887].  224,   64   N.  E.   840    [1902];    Rackiiffe 

*  Santa  Cruz  Rock  Pavement  Com-       v.  Duncan.  —  Mo.  App.  ,  108  S. 

pany  v.   Broderick,   113   Cal.   628.   45  W.  1110   [1908]. 

Pac.   863    [1896];    In   the   Matter   of  « Ritterskamp     v.     Stifel,     59     Mo. 

Repaving   Fulton   Street,   39   Howard  App.  510  [1894]. 

(N.  Y.)    429    [1865];    Blount  v.  City 

of  Janesville,  31   Wis.  648    [1872]. 


703  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING    IMPROVEMENTS.  §  'id'-i 

tion  and  repairs.  An  improvement  consisted  of  a  concrete  base, 
a  binder  course  and  a  surface  of  asphalt.  The  asphalt  surface 
had  become  Sadly  worn  and  in  many  places  both  the  asphalt 
surface  and  the  binder  coat  has  disintegrated  and  had  worn  away 
through  to  the  concrete  base.  The  street  had  been  repaired 
twice  and  finally  the  asphalt  coat  and  the  binder  coat  were  re- 
moved and  a  new  asphalt  coat  and  binder  coat  were  placed  upon 
the  concrete  foundation.  This  was  held  to  be  a  reconstruction 
and  not  a  repair.''  In  a  case  presenting  similar  facts  the  asphalt 
coat  was  removed  and  the  old  concrete  base  was  left  wherever 
it  was  in  good  condition,  and  Avhere  necessary,  was  built  up  so 
as  to  bring  it  to  a  certain  level.  Upon  the  base  thus  made  a  coat 
of  asphalt  was  laid.  The  trial  court  found  that  this  was  a  re- 
construction and  not  a  repair  and  the  court  of  appeals  held  that 
such  finding  could  be  supported  upon  the  evidence."  However, 
an  improvement  consisting  of  relaying  a  new  three-inch  asphalt 
surface  on  the  original  macadam  base  without  disturbing  the 
latter  is  held  to  be  a  repair  and  not  a  reconstruction.^^  An  im- 
provement consisted  of  wooden  blocks  laid  upon  a  concrete  base. 
After  the  blocks  were  worn  out  they  were  removed  and  vitrified 
brick  was  laid  on  the  old  base.  This  was  held  to  be  a  reconstruc- 
tion and  not  a  repair.'-  The  old  paving  stones  were  removed  and 
new  paving  stones  were  used  in  paving  an  alley,  and  the  grade 
was  changed  a  few  inches,  although  it  was  not  at  the  outset  in- 
tended that  the  grade  should  be  changed.  This  was  held  to 
amount  to  reconstruction  and  not  to  a  repair.'^  A  street  had 
been  covered  with  refuse  stone  from  a  neighboring  quarry  with- 
out gutters  or  curbstones.  Seven  years  afterward  it  was  in  bad 
condition,  below  the  grade  and  lower  in  the  middle  than  at  the 
sides.  At  the  time  it  was  ordered  that  the  street  should  be 
graded,  curbstones  set,  the  gutters  paved  with  stone  and  the  street 
macadamized  with  six  inches  of  broken  stone  covered  with  two 
inches  of  gravel.  This  was  held  to  be  a  reconstruction  and  not  a 
repair.'*     A  street  which  had  never  been  so  improved  was  paved 

'  Bui=ih    V.    City   of   Pooria,    21.')    111.  ute,  and  not  tlie  property  owners.) 

515.  74  N.  E.  707   flOO.')].  '^  Robertson   v.    City  of   Omaha,   55 

'"Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company  Neb.  718.  44  L.  R.  A.  534,  76  N.  W. 

V.    Muchenborger.    105    Mo.    App.    47.  442   [ISOSl. 

78  S.  W.  280   [1903].  "  Rlttorskamp     v.     Stifel.     59     Mo. 

"City  of  Covington   v.   Bullock.  —  App.  510    [1894]. 

Ky.    — -,    103    S.    W.    270    [1907];  "  Koons  v.  Lucas,  52  la.  177,  3  N. 

(The  city  is  therefore  liable,  by  stat-  W.  84   [1879]. 


463 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


704 


with  bituminous  rock  on  a  macadam  foundation.  This  was  held 
to  be  a  reconstruction.^^  A  macadamized  roadbed  was  scraped, 
cleaned,  filled  and  rolled  so  as  to  present  an  even  surface  and 
covered  with  a  new  coating  of  macadam  six  and  one-half  inches 
thick.  This  was  held  to  be  a  reconstruction  and  not  a  repair, 
since  it  was  not  necessary  to  constitute  a  reconstruction  that  the 
old  material  should  be  removed  entirely  and  replaced  with  mate- 
rial of  a  different  character.^"  A  brick  sidewalk  was  taken  up, 
a  new  trench  dug,  a  new  foundation  of  sand  laid  and  a  number 
of  new  bricks  used  in  relaying  the  walk.  This  was  held  to  amount 
to  a  reconstruction  and  not  a  repair.^^  A  street  was  graded  and 
paved  so  as  to  leave  grass  plots  between  the  sidewalks  and  the 
roadways  in  which  shade  trees  grew.  Subsequently  the  grass  plots 
and  trees  were  destroyed  and  the  space  formerly  occupied  by 
them  was  covered  with  an  extension  of  the  paving  of  a  street. 
This  was  regarded  as  a  repaving  and  not  as  an  original  construc- 
tion.^* However,  where  a  sidewalk  consisted  of  two  strips  of  ce- 
ment walk  with  a  wooden  walk  between  the  two  and,  as  the  wood- 
en walk  was  in  bad  condition,  the  owner  was  ordered  to  construct 
a  cement  sidewalk  in  place  thereof,  this  was  held  to  be  a  proper 
exercise  of  power  under  a  statute  giving  the  Board  of  Public 
Works  power  to  specify,  in  the  notice  to  the  property  owners, 
what  material  should  be  used  in  repairs.^"  Straightening  a  curb 
and  replacing  rotten  stones  with  new  ones  where  the  old  stones 
were  in  bad  condition  is  a  repair  and  not  a  reconstruction. ^° 
Resetting  flagstones  and  curbstones  is  a  repair.-^  An  ordinance 
requiring  a  turnpike  to  be  put  in  repair  requires  the  holes  in  such 


"Santa  Cruz  Kock  Pavement  Com 
pany  v.  Broderick,  113  Cal.  628,  45 
Pac.  863  [1896]. 

"Field  V.  City  of  Cliicago,  198 
111.  224,  64  N.  E.  840  [1902]. 

"  Farraher  v.  City  of  1  eokiik,  111 
la.  310,  82  N.  W.  773  [1900].  (An 
assessment  for  such  an  improvement 
was  accordingly  void  since  the  prop- 
erty owners  had  not  petitioned  there- 
for.) 

i^Vreford  v.  City  of  Detroit,  132 
Mich.  348,  93  N.  W.  876  [1903].  See 
for  a  similar  case,  Dickinson  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  111  Mich.  480,  69  N.  W. 
728    [1897]. 


"  Heath  v.  Manson,  147  Cal.  694, 
82  Pac.  331   [1905]. 

^Perkinson  v.  Schnaake,  108  Mo. 
App.  255,  83  S.  W.  301  [1904].  In 
Kacklitie  v.  Duncan,  —  Mo.  App. 
,  108  S.  W.  1110  [1908]  an  im- 
provement which  consisted  of  making 
the  street  over,  although  the  old 
curb  and  gutter  stones  were  used 
wherever  serviceable,  was  held  to  be 
a  reconstruction. 

=^  State,  Cronin,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  38  N. 
J.  L.    (9  Vr.)   410   [1876]. 


705  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS   CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  464 

pike  to  be  filled  and  the  surface  made  even.  It  does  not  require 
the  construction  of  a  new  road  to  a  new  grade.^^  Improvements 
which  from  their  nature  would  amount  to  repairs  cannot  be 
treated  as  reconstructions  because  the  original  construction  was 
made  by  property  owners  who  at  the  time  such  construction  was 
made  were  outside  of  the  city  limits,  even  if  such  repairs  are 
the  first  improvement  made  after  such  road  has  been  taken  into 
the  city.-^  In  Wisconsin,  by  statute,  an  original  permanent  im- 
provement in  case  of  graveling  a  street  is  defined  as  placing 
gravel  at  least  one  foot  in  depth  by  sixteen  feet  in  width.  Un- 
der such  a  statute,  the  placing  of  crushed  stone  on  a  street  ten 
feet  in  width  and  eight  inches  in  depth  was  held  not  to  be  an 
original  permanent  improvement.-* 

§  464.     Reconstruction. 

Whether  the  legislature  may  authorize  a  special  assessment  for 
the  reconstruction  of  an  improvement  which  has  once  been  con- 
structed is  a  question  which  has  been  discussed  heretofore.^  Where 
such  assessments  are  held  to  be  valid  statutes  are  frequently 
found  authorizing  assessments  for  reconstructions.  Full  effect  is 
given  to  such  statutes.-    Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  the 

^Milford  V.  Cincinnati,  Milford  &  Orleans,    48    La.    Ann.    1440,    21    So. 

Loveland    Trac.    Co.,    26    Ohio    C.    C.  24    [1896];    State  ex  rel.  Wheeler  v. 

271    [1904].  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County,  80 

=^0'Meara    v.    Creen,    10    Mo.    App.  Minn.    293,    83    N.    W.    183    [1900]; 

118    [1884].  Skinker  v.   Heman,   148   Mo.   349,   49 

"'McMillan   v.   Fond  du   Lac  Cnun-  S.    W.    1026    [1898];     (reversing    64 

ty,    —    Wis.    ,    114    N.    W.    1119  Mo.    App.    441     [1895]);     Smith    v. 

L1908J.  Hence  the  abuttinjj  property  Tobener,    32    Mo.    App.    601    [1888]; 

could    be    assessed    for    a    subsequent  Morley    v.    Carpenter,    22    Mo.    App. 

improvement.  640    [1886];    State,    Jelliff,    Pros.    v. 

^  See  §  379  ct  scq.  Mayor   and   Common   Council    of   the 

*  Field    V.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving  City    of    Newark,    48    N.    J.    L.     (19 

Co.,   194  U.  S.  618,  24  S.  784.  48  L.  Vr.)    101,  2   Atl.   627    [1886];    Conde 

1142     [1904];      (modifying    Field    v.  v.    City    of    Schenectady,    164    N.    Y. 

Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  117  Fed.  258,  58  N.  E.   130   [1900];   Moran  v. 

925    [1902]);    -NlcVeery   v.    Boyd,   89  City   of   Troy,   9    Hun.    (N.   Y.)    540 

Cal.  304,  20   Pac.   885    [18911;   Bush  [1877];    In   the  Matter   of  Repaving 

V.  City  of  Peoria,  215  111.  515.  74  N.  .Fulton    Street.    29    Howard    (X.    Y.) 

E.    797    [1905];    Gurnee    v.    City    of  429  [1863] ;  Adams  v.  City  of  BeLnt, 

Chicago,   40   HI.   165    [1866];    Lux   &  105  Wis.  363.  47  L.  R.  A."  441,  81  N. 

Talbot  Stone  Company  V.  Donaldson  W.    869    [1900];    Warner    v.    Knox. 

162  Ind.  481,  08  N.  E.   1014   [1903];  50    Wis.    429.    7    X.    W.    372    [1880]; 

City  of  Lafayette  v.  Fowler,  34  Ind.  Blount  v.  City  of  Janesville,  31  Wis. 

140   [1870];   Schmidt  v.  City  of  New  648   [1872]. 


§464 


T^iXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


706 


"expense  of  maintaining,  relaying-,  keeping  in  repair,  and  clean- 
ing of  streets"  is  to  be  borne  by  general  taxation,  "relaying" 
means  only  relaying  in  the  course  of  ordinary  repairs  and  does 
not  mean  repaying.''  Authority  to  construct  an  original  im- 
prceinsnt,  such  as  paving,  is  regarded  as  a  continuing  power 
and  in  the  absence  of  some  specific  statutory  provision  to  the 
contrary  confers  authority  to  assess  for  repaving.*  So  under  a 
statute  authorizing  the  city  to  charge  seventy-five  cents  per  foot 
of  frontage  upon  land  which  borders  on  streets  through  which 
water  pipes  are  laid,  the  city  may  make  such  charge  where  new 
pipes  are  laid  in  place  of  the  old  pipes  which  had  been  laid  by 
a  water  company.'  The  discretion  of  the  city  in  determining 
when  reconstruction  is  necessary  is  final,**  if  not  grossly  abused. 
Where  this  power  exists  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  a  re- 
construction, even  though  the  property  owner  has  already  paid 
an  assessment  for  the  original  improvement."  Under  many  stat- 
utes it  is  provided  that  the  expense  of  repaving  must  be  borne 
by  the  city  out  of  funds  raised  by  general  taxation.^  Under 
other  statutes  repaving  is  to  be  paid  out  of  the  general  funds  of 
the  city  except  in  special  cases.^  Thus  it  may  be  provided  that 
repaving  cannot  be  paid  for  by  special  assessment  unless  a  ma- 
jority of  the  property  owners  to  be  assessed,  petition  therefor.^" 
By  statute  is  may  be  provided  that  no  assessment  can  be  levied 


*  Adams  v.  City  of  Beloit,  105  Wis. 
363,  47  L.  R.  A*.  441,  81  N.  W.  809 
[1900]. 

*City  of  Lafayette  v.  Fowler.  34 
Ind.  140  [1870];  State  ex  rel. 
Wheeler  v.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 
County,  80  :\Iinn.  293,  83  N.  W.  183 
[1900];  Smith  v.  Tobener,  32  Mo. 
App.  601  [1888];  Morley  v.  Carpen- 
ter, 22  Mo.  App.  640  [1886];  State, 
Jellifl',  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Newark,  48 
N.  J.  L.  (19  Vr.)"  101.  2  Atl.  627 
[1886];  Conde  v.  City  of  Schenec- 
tady, 164  N.  Y.  258.  58  X.  E.  130 
[1900];  Bhiunt  v.  City  of  Janesville. 
31  Wis.  648  [1872].  "To  repave  is 
to  pave,"  Schmitt  v.  City  of  New 
Orleans,  48  La.  Ann.  1440,  1442.  21 
So.  24   [1896]. 

*Doughten  v.  City  of  Camden,  71 
N.  J.  L.  (42  Vr.)"426,  .59  Atl.  16 
[1904];  (reversed  in  Doughten  v. 
City  of  Camden,  72  N.  J.  L.   (43  Vr.) 


451,  63  Atl.  170  [1906]  as  not  ap- 
portioned according  to  benefits). 

"  Dumesnil  v.  Louisville  Artificial 
Stone  Co.,  109  Ky.  1,  58  S.  W.  371 
[1900];  (A  case  in  which  a  sidewaliv 
which  had  been  laid  twenty-two 
years  but  was  in  fair  condition  was 
rebuilt.) 

■McVeery  v.  Boyd,  89  Cal.  304.  26 
Pac.  885  [1891]. 

'Dickinson  v.  City  of  Detroit.  Ill 
Mich.  480.  69  N.  W.  728  [1897]; 
Heman  v.  Ring,  95  Mo.  App.  231 
[1900]:  Winnebago  Furniture  Manu- 
facturing Company  v.  Fond  du  Lac 
County,  113  Wis.  72.  88  N.  W.  1018 
[1902]. 

"  Blanehard  v.  Biedeman,  18  Cal. 
261    [1861]. 

'"  Farraher  v.  City  of  Keokuk.  1 1 1 
la.  310,  82  N.  W."  773  [1900];  In 
the  Matter  of  Garvey,  77  N.  Y.  523 
[1879]. 


707  STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    CONCERNING   IMPROVEMENTS.  §  464 

for  repaving  unless  the  street  is  unsafe."  Under  such  statute  it 
was  held  that  a  street  which  was  impassable  for  heavily  loaded 
teams,  but  was  not  otherwise  unsafe,  could  not  be  paved  on  the  as- 
sessment plan.'-  By  statute  it  may  be  provided  that  assessments 
may  be  levied  for  new  work,  or  improvements  or  alterations 
not  in  the  nature  of  ordinary  repairs.^^  Under  such  statutes  the 
expense  of  grading  a  new  street  is  regarded  as  new  work.'^ 
Under  a  statute  providing  that  "all  expenses  of  making,  main- 
taining and  altering  highways"  should  be  paid  for  by  general 
taxation,  but  that  the  expenses  of  "any  sewer  or  other  public 
work  or  improvement  might  be  paid  for  by  special  assessment," 
it  was  held  that  the  former  provision,  being  more  specific,  con- 
trolled in  the  case  of  street  improvements  and  that  macadamizing 
a  street  was  "maintaining"  it  within  the  former  provision  and 
was  not  a  "public  improvement"  within  the  meaning  of  the  last 
provision. '•''  Whether  an  ordinance  which  recjuires  the  recon- 
struction of  an  improvement  while  the  old  imj^rovement  is  still 
in  existence  is  so  unreasonable  and  oppressive  as  to  be  void  is 
regarded  as  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  tribunal 
trying  disputed  questions  of  fact.^"  If  regrading  is  necessary  to 
prepare  the  surface  of  a  street  for  paving  and  the  cost  of  re- 
grading  is  not  included  in  the  assessment,  the  property  owners 
cannot  be  heard  to  object  to  the  regrading.^'  Under  a  statute 
authorizing  the  city  to  take  up  a  defective  sewer  and  rebuild 
it,  the  city  cannot,  if  the  existing  sewer  becomes  defective  con- 
.struct  a  new  and  different  sewer  at  the  expense  of  the  abutting 
property  owners."  If  water  pipes  have  once  been  laid  they  may 
.subsequently,  if  it  is  neces.sary,  be  lowered  ;ind  relaid  nt  the  cost 
of  the  owners  of  abutting  property.'" 

"Smith    V.    :Minto.    :5n    Or.    351,    48  '' Amherson      .\vomie,      Ap|)oal      of 

Pac.   KUi   [1897].  ("hilds.    179   Pa.   St.   034.   3r>   Atl.   354 

"Smith   V.    Minto.    30    Or.    3.51,    48  [18971. 

Pac.   166    [1897].  '"State.  Fiacre  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 

"Breen   v.   City   of  Trov.   (iO   Barb.  Common   ('onncil    of   .lerspy    City,    34 

(N.  Y.)   417  [1871].           '  X.  J.  L.    (5  Vr.)    277   [1870]. 

"  Breon  v.   City  of  Troy,   60   Barb.  ""  Minnesota     Linseed     Oil     Co.     v. 

(N.  Y.)   417   [1871].  Palmer.   20   Minn.    424    [18741:    Ank- 

>°City   of   New   TTaven   v.   Wliitney.  cny  v.  Palmer.  20  :\Iinn.  431    [1874]; 

36  Conn.  373   [1870].  (A   ohar«j;e   therefor   cannot,   however. 

"Lamb  v.  City  of  Chicago.  219  111.  exced     the     actual     expense     of     the 

229;  76  N.  E.  343   [1906].  change.) 


CHAPTER  X. 

SPECIFIC   ITEMS   INCLUDED    IN   ASSESSMENT. 

§  465.  Necessity  of  statutory  authority  to  include  items  in  as- 
sessment. 
Since  the  only  authority  which  a  public  corporation  has  to 
levy  an  assessment  for  local  improvements  is  that  conferred  by 
statute,^  a  public  corporation  cannot  levy  an  assessment  for  items 
not  authorized  by  statute.-  What  items  are  included  within  the 
terms  and  the  meaning  of  the  different  statutes  must  therefore 
be  considered  in  detail. 


'See  §  223. 

-Partridge  v.  Lucas,  99  Cal.  519, 
33  Pac.  1082  [1893];  Frick  v.  Mor- 
ford,  87  Cal.  576,  25  Pac.  764 
[1891];  Donnelly  v.  Howard,  60  Cal. 
291  [1882];  Dyer  v.  Chase,  52  Cal. 
440  [1877];  Spalding  v.  City  of  Den 
ver,  33  Colo.  172,  80  Pac.  126  [1905] ; 
McClellan  v.  District  of  Columbia,  7 
Mackpy  (D  C.)  94  [1889];  Chicago 
Union  Traction  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  208  111.  187,  70  X.  E.  234 
[1904];  Farr  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Commissioners,  167  111.  355,  46  N. 
E.  893  [1897]  ;  Morris  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 11  111.  650  [1850];  'Ross  v. 
Van  Natta,  164  Ind.  557,  74  N.  E. 
10  [1905];  Loesnitz  v.  Seelinger, 
127  Ind.  422,  25  N.  E.  1037,  26  N. 
E.  887  [1890];  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  Montgomery  County  v. 
Fullen,  118  Ind.  158,  20  N.  E.  771 
[1888];  Naltner  v.  Blake,  56  Ind. 
127  [1877];  Allen  v.  City  of  Daven- 
port, 107  la.  90,  77  N.  W.  532 
[1808];  City  of  Louisville  v.  Sel- 
vage, 106  Ky.  730,  51  S.  W.  447,  52 
S.  W.  809  [1899];  Wells  v.  Street 
Commissioners  of  City  of  Boston,  187 


Mass.  451,  73  N.  E.  554  [1905]; 
Power  V.  City  of  Detroit,  139  Mich. 
30,  102  N.  W.  288  [1905];  Xeenan 
V.  Smith,  60  Mo.  292  [1875];  Kansas 
City  V.  O'Connor,  82  Mo.  App.  655 
[1899];  City  of  St.  Joseph  ex  rel. 
Danaher  v.  Dillon,  61  Mo.  App.  317 
[1895]  ;  Davis  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
.Council  of  the  City  of  Newark,  54 
X.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  595,  25  Atl.  336 
[1892];  State,  Randolph,  Pros.  v.  In- 
habitants of  the  City  of  Plainfield. 
38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  93  [1875];  Poth 
V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 
of  the  City  of  New  York,  151  X.  Y. 
16,  45  X.  E.  372  [1896]  ;  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  Petition  of  Deering  to  Va- 
cate an  Assessment,  93  X.  Y.  361 
[1883];  In  the  Matter  of  Upson  to 
Vacate  an  Assessment,  89  X.  Y.  67 
[1882];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Merriam  to  Vacate  an  As- 
sessment, 84  X.  Y.  569  [1881]; 
Mitchell  V.  Lane,  62  Hun.  (X.  Y.) 
253,  16  X.  Y.  Supp.  707  [1891];  In 
the  Matter  of  Auchumty,  18  Hun. 
(X.  Y.)  324  [1879];  People  ex  rel. 
Knox,  V.  Village  of  Yonkers,  39  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  266  [1863];  Aimie  Wright 
708 


i 


709  SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  466 

§  466.     Assessment  limited  to  cost  of  improvement  and  incidental 
items. 

While  an  assessment  is  levied  upon  the  theory  of  benefits  to 
the  property  conferred  by  the  public  improvement  in  which  the 
assessment  is  levied,  it  is  also,  in  theory,  levied  for  the  cost  of 
such  improvement.  Accordino:ly.  if  the  benefits  exceed  the  cost 
the  assessment  can  only  be  for  the  actual  cost  of  the  work  to- 
gether with  the  proper  items  incident  thereto.  The  excess  of 
benefit  over  such  expenses  inures  to  the  benefit  of  the  property 
owner.  He  cannot  be  required  to  pay  such  excess  into  the  pub- 
lic treasury.^  Thus,  where  the  cost  of  lowering  and  relaying  a 
water  main  was  three  hundred  and  thirty  dollars  and  an  assess- 
ment therefor  of  one  dollar  per  foot  was  levied  aggregating  an 
amount  of  six  hundred  and  sixty  dollars,  such  assessment  was 
held  to  be  invalid.^  If,  however,  the  cost  of  maintenance  and  re- 
pair may  be  properly  included  in  the  assessment,  the  fact  that 
the  amount  of  the  assessment  exceeds  the  actual  cost  of  the 
work  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.^  Thus  a  water  pipe 
was  laid  at  a  cost  of  one  dollar  and  fift.v  cents  per  foot.  An 
assessment  of  one  dollar  and  twenty-five  cents  per  front  foot  was 
levied  on  the  property'  on  each  side  of  the  street,  making  the  as- 
sessment two  dollars  and  fifty  cents  per  foot  of  pipe.  Such  as- 
sessment was  held  to  be  valid.*  A  statute  limiting  the  assessment 
to  the  cost  of  the  improvement  paid  by  the  city  means  the  entire 
cost  without  deduction  for  any  re-imbursement  bv  assessment."' 


Seminary     v.     City     of    Tacoma,     23  Commonalty    of    the     City     of    New 

Wash.    109,   62   Pac.   444    [innoi;Mc-  York,  68  X.  Y.  214   [1877];   City  of 

AUister  v.  City  of  Tacoma.  9  Wash.  Asheville  v.  Wachovia  Loan  &  Trust 

272,  37   Pac.  447,  658    [1894];    Wells  Co.,    143    N.    <J.    3(50,    55    S.    K.    800 

V.    Western    Paving   &    Supply    Com-  fl906];   hi  re  Mill  Creek  Sewer,  196 

pany,   96    Wis.    116,   70   N.   W.    1071  Pa.   St.    183,   46   Atl.   312    [1900]. 

[1897];     Dean     v.     Borchsenius,     30  'Minnesota  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Pal- 

Wis.  236  [1872].  mer,  20  Minn.  468,  followed  without 

*  Davis    V.    City    of   Litchfield,    145  opinion    in    Ankeny    v.    Palmer,    20 

111.  313.   21    L.   R.   A.   563.   33   N.   E.  Minn.  477   [1874|.  ' 

888  [18931;  Union  Buildinor  A«socia-  'Parsons   v.   District  of   Columbia, 

tion  V.  City  of  Chicago,   61    Til.   439  170   U.   S.   45,  42   L.   943,    18   S.   521 

[1871];     State    on    the    Relation    of  [1898]. 

Lingenfelter    v.    Danville    and    North  *  Parsons   v.   District   of   Columbia, 

Salem     Gravel     Road     Company.     33  170   V.   S.   45.   42   L.   943,    18   S.   521 

Ind.   133    [1870];   Minnesota   Linseed  [1S98]. 

Oil     Co.    V.    Palmer,    20    ^finn.    468  '  .Tone'*  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  the 

[1874];  Eno  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  City  of  Boston,  104  Mass.  461  [1870]. 


§  46  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  710 

In  jurisdictions  where  an  assessment  may  be  levied  and  con- 
firmed before  the  improvement  is  constructed  and  the  cost  of  the 
improvement  definitely  determined,  the  property  owner  can  re- 
sist collection  of  the  assessment  over  the  actual  cost  of  the  im- 
provement and  the  proper  items  of  incidental  expense  even  after 
confirmation."  If  a  property  owner  is  obliged  to  pay  the  entire 
assessment  he  may  recover  the  excess  of  such  assessment  over 
the  actual  cost  of  improvement  and  the  proper  items  of  inci- 
dental expense.^  The  actual  cost  of  doing  the  work,  is,  in  the 
absence  of  fraud,  an  item  for  which  the  assessment  may  be  lev- 
ied,^ subject  always  to  the  rule  that  the  assessment  must  not 
exceed  the  actual  or  theoretical  amount  of  benefits.  If  inquiry 
as  to  the  cost  of  the  work  is  material,  the  cost  must  be  that  of 
doing  the  work  at  that  time  in  that  city  and  not  the  price 
charged  in  other  cities  at  other  times.'-*  The  expense  of  prospect- 
ing to  find  material  suitable  for  use  in  the  improvement  is  not  an 
item   which    can    be    included   in   the    cost    of   the    assessment.^" 

§  467.     Credit  for  material  used  by  contractor. 

In  constructing  a  new  improvement  the  contractor  occasion- 
ally makes  use  of  the  material  of  the  old  improvement.  It  has 
been  said  that  the  value  of  the  material  so  used  by  the  contractor 
should  be  deducted  from  the  assessments  levied  on  the  property 
owners.^  On  the  other  hand,  the  city  cannot  credit  itself  for 
the  value  of  such  material,  since  it  belongs  to  the  property  own- 
er.^ Under  an  ordinance  which  requires  that  the  granite  paving 
on  the  old  driveways  should  be  sold  to  the  highest  bidder  and 
the  proceeds  of  the  sale  used  in  paying  the  cost  of  the  improve- 

*  People  ex  rel.  McCormack  v.  Mc-  '  Scott  v.   Stringley,    132   Ind.   378, 

Wethy,    177    111.    334,   52    N.    E.    479  31  N.  E.  953   [1892]! 

[1898];    People    ex    rel.    McCormack  '  Amberson      Avenue,      Appeal      of 

V.  McWethy,    165   111.  222,   46   N.  E.  Childs.     179    Pa.    St.    634,    36    Atl. 

187    [1897]!     Conversely   if  it  is  not  354   [1897]. 

shown  that  the  cost  of  the  improve-  '"  Manor   v.   Board   of   Commission- 

ment    has    been    collected    the    objec-  ers  of  Jay  Co.,  137  Ind.  367,  34  N.  E. 

tion   that  the   amount   of   the   assess-  959.  36  N.  E.   1101    [1893];    (A  case 

ment   is   too   large   cannot   be   raised.  wliore  it  is  sought  to  include  the  cost 

Gross  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond,  193  of  prospecting  for  gravel  to  improve 

111.  260,  86  Am.  St.  Rep.  322,  61  N.  a   gravel   road.) 

E.  1012   [1901].  'Hastings   v.    Columbus,    42    0.   S. 

'However  he  must  sue  within  the  585   [1885]. 

time  liruited:  Grosbeck  V.  Cincinnati.  'Fisher    v.    City    of    Rochester,    6 

51  O.  S.  365,  37  N.  E.  707   [1894].  Lansing   (N.  Y.)    225   [1872]. 


711  SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCI.UDED    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  468 

ment,  it  is  not  necessary  that  such  pavement  be  sold  before  the 
assessment  is  levied.  It  is  sufficient  if  it  is  sold  within  a  rea- 
sonable time."*  If  old  material  is  used  but  no  charge  therefor 
is  included  in  the  assessment,  the  property  owner  cannot  object 
to  an  assessment  for  the  labor  necessary  in  making  such  im- 
provement.* If  two  or  more  streets  are  graded  under  separate  eon- 
tracts,  it  has  been  held  that  the  contractor  may  make  use  of  the 
surplus  material  excavated  from  one  street  to  fill  depressions  in 
the  other  and  that  the  assessments  for  such  streets  may  include 
the  cost  of  excavation  and  the  cost  of  filling  as  separate  items.'' 
If  the  contract  provides  that  the  surplus  dirt  accumulating  from 
excavations  shall  be  the  property  of  the  contractor,  it  has  been 
said  that  the  validity  of  such  provision  cannot  be  questioned  in 
proceedings  to  enforce  an  assessment."  Under  a  contract  which 
provides  that  credit  shall  be  given  for  dirt  furnished  by  the  city 
and  used  in  filling  depressions,  it  has  been  said  not  to  amount 
to  fraud  if  the  contractor  presents  a  bill  for  the  entire  contract 
price  without  any  allowance  for  earth  taken  from  another  street 
and  used  upon  the  street  in  question  to  fill  in  depressions.'^  Earth 
furnished  by  the  city  for  filling  a  street  but  which  is,  without 
the  fault  of  the  contractor,  used  to  fill  up  a  lot  and  not  to  fill  up 
the  street,  is  an  item  which  should  not  be  deducted  from  the  con- 
tract price.**  If  a  contractor  hires  a  steam  roller  from  the  city, 
the  price  paid  by  him  therefor  should  not  be  deducted  from  the 
amount  of  the  assessment." 

§  468.    Compensation  of  surveyor  and  engineer. 

Whether  surveyor's  fees  form  an  item  wliieh  may  be  included 
in  the  assessment  is  a  matter  within  the  discretion  of  the  legis- 
lature.    If  such   an   item   is  provided   for  by   statute   it   may  be 

'Aldis  V.  Routli  Park  Commission-  codure   wliioli   made    it    impossible   in 

ers,  171  111.  424,  49  N.  E.  505  [1S981.  an    action    to   enforce   an   assessment 

*  In    the    Matter    of    Anderson,    60  to  go   back   to   matters  arisinjj   prior 

Barb.    (N.    Y.)    375    [18711;    In    the  to  the  execution  of  the  contract.) 

Matter  of  Anderson.  39  Howard    (N.  'Darlington    v.   Coninioinvealtli    for 

Y.)    184   [1870].  I'se  of  City  of  Allcgln'iiy,  41    Pa.  St. 

"Schenley     v.     Conimonwealtli     for  (5  Wright)    08   [1S()11. 

the  Use  of  the  City  of  Allegheny.  30  "Richards  \'.  City  of  (  iiuiiinati.  31 

Pa.  St.    (12   Casey)    04    [18591."  O.  S.  500  [18771. 

•Jenkins   v.    Stetler.    118    Ind.   275,  » McClynn    v.    City    of    Toledo,    22 

20   N.    E.    788    [18881;     (This    result  Ohio  C.  C.  34   [1901]. 
was   reached,   however,   under   a    pro- 


468 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


712 


included  in  the  assessment.'  Only  the  actual  fees  can  be  included 
in  the  assessment.-  It  was  held,  however,  on  error,  that  if  the 
exact  cost  of  such  fees  is  not  given,  yet  an  approximation  thereto 
is  given  and  if  the  charge  does  not  appear  to  be  unreasonable  or 
excessive,  the  assessment  is  valid. ^  The  cost  of  supervision  is  a 
necessary  item  of  expense  in  a  public  improvement  and  may  be 
included  in  the  assessment  under  statutory  authority  therefor.* 
The  services  of  an  engineer  are  necesssary  in  all  public  improve- 
ments of  any  magnitude.  The  cost  of  securing  such  services  is 
a  proper  item  of  assessment,  if  authorized  by  statute.^  Any  ob- 
jection to  the  propriety  of  such  item  is  waived  if  appeal  is  not 
taken  in  the  manner  provided  for  by  statute.®  The  fact  that  the 
engineer  is  employed  by  the  city  at  a  monthly  or  annual  salary 
does  not  in  some  jurisdictions  prevent  the  city  from  reimbursing 
itself  by  including  a  fair  compensation  for  his  services  in  assess- 
ments.^ The  city  engineer,  who  has  constructed  maps  and  plans 
under  an  abandoned  resolution,  cannot  recover  compensation  by 
having  his  services  included  in  an  assessment  under  a  new  reso- 
lution, if  such  new  resolution  referred  to  his  plans  and  the  new 
city  engineer  was,  to  some  extent,  aided  by  the  former  plans.^ 


*  Burns  v.  City  of  Duluth,  90  Minn. 
104,  104  N.  W.  714  [1905];  State, 
Kohler,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Guttenberg, 
38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  419  [1876];  In 
the  Matter  of  Johnson,  103  N.  Y. 
260,  8  N.  E.  399  [1886];  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  Lowden,  89  N.  Y.  548  [1882]; 
In  the  Matter  of  Merriam,  84  N.  Y. 
596  [1881];  In  the  Matter  of  Low- 
den to  Vacate  Assessment,  25  Hun. 
(N.  Y.)   434  [1881]. 

*  In  the  Matter  of  Lowden,  25  Hun. 
(N.  Y.)   434  [1881]. 

'  In  the  Matter  of  Lowden,  89  N. 
Y.  548   [1882]. 

*  Gibson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  22  111. 
567  [1859];  City  of  Atchison  v. 
Price,  45  Kan.  296,  25  Pac.  605 
[1891];  Beniteau  v.  City  of  Detroit, 
41  Mich.  116,  1  N.  W.  899  [1879]; 
Burns  v.  City  of  Duluth,  96  Minn. 
104,   104  N.  iv.  714    [1905]. 

'  Gibson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  22  111. 
567  [18591;  McGilvory  v.  City  of 
Lewiston,    13    Ida.   338,   90   Pac.   348 


[1907];  Vandalia  Levee  &  Drainage 
District  v.  Hutchins,  234  III.  31,  84 
N.  E.  715  [1908];  City  of  Atchison 
V.  Price,  45  Kan.  296,  25  Pac.  605 
[1891];  Cuming  v.  City  of  Grand 
Rapids,  46  Mich.  150,  9  N.  W.  141 
[1881];  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  Mullen, 
27  Minn.  78,  6  N.  W.  424  [1880]; 
The  State  v.  Counoil  of  City  of  Eliz- 
abeth, 30  N.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.)  365 
[1863]  ;  In  the  Matter  of  Lowden,  89 
N.  Y.  543  [1882];  In  the  Matter  of 
Tappen,  36  How.  Pr.  390  [1869]; 
Adkins  v.  Toledo,  27  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R. 
417   [1905]. 

« Boyle  V.  Hitchcock,  66  Cal.  129, 
4   Pac.   1143    [1884]. 

'  Gibson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  22  111. 
566. 

'  Fitzhugh  V.  Ashworth,  119  Cal. 
393,  51  Pac.  635  [1897].  (The  ques- 
tion whether  the  former  city  engineer 
had  any  le^al  remedy,  and  if  so,  what 
it  was,  was  not  passed  upon.) 


713  SPECIFIC    ITEMS   INCLUDED   IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  469 

In  other  jurisdictions  the  value  of  the  services  of  a  city  engineer 
employed  on  a  salary  does  not  form  a  proper  item  of  assessment.' 
The  value  of  the  services  of  a  city  engineer,  who  is  employed  on 
a  fixed  salary,  is  properly  omitted  from  the  ordinance  and  the 
estimate,  even  if  by  the  terms  of  the  contract  the  contractor  is 
bound  to  pay  all  engineering  expenses.^'*  The  assignment  of  an 
assessment  to  a  contractor  cannot  include  the  expense  of  an 
engineer's  services.^^ 

§  469.    Expense  of  levying  assessment. 

Whether  the  cost  of  levying  an  assessment  can  be  included  in 
the  assessment  depends  upon  the  provisions  of  the  statute.  It  is 
an  item  which  the  legislature  is  authorized  to  include  and  which 
in  many  jurisdictions,  the  legislature  has  included.^  Only  the 
actual  cost  of  the  levy  can  be  included.-  Accordingly,  if  the  city 
has  resisted  the  original  claim  for  the  cost  of  the  levy  and  has 
succeeded  in  having  such  item  reduced,  only  the  actual  cost  thus 
paid  by  the  city  should  be  included  in  the  assessment,  and  the 
owner  should  be  given  the  benefit  of  such  reduction.''  It  is  so 
necessary  to  include  the  cost  of  levying  an  assessment  in  the 
assessment  that  the  failure  of  a  committee  to  include  such  cost 


"Board  of  Commiasioners  of  Mont-  715     [1908];     Dobler    v.    Village    of 

gomery    County    v.    Fullen,    118    Ind.  Warren,    174   111.   92,   50   N.   E.    1048 

158,    20    N.    E.    771     [1888];    Long-  [1898];   Ware  v.  City  of  Jerseyville, 

worth  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  34  0.  S.  158   111.   234,   41   N.   E.    736    [1895]; 

101    [1877];    Smith  v.   City   of  Port-  Davis   v.   City   of  Litchfield,    145   111. 

land,  25  Or.  297,  35  Pac.  6(55  [1894];  313,   21   L.  R.  A.   563,  33  N.   E.  888 

In   the    Matter    of   the    Contract   for  [1893];    Kimble    v.    City    of    Peoria, 

the  IMfth  Avenue  Sewer  in  the  City  140   111.    157,   29   N.   E.   723    [1892]; 

of  Pittsburgh,  4  Brewster    (Pa.)    364  Thayer  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  82 

[1870].  Mich.    298,    46    X.    W.    228    [1890]; 

"  City  of  Excelsior  Springs,  to  Mayer  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Corn- 
Use  of  McCormick  v.  Ettenson,  120  monalty  of  tlie  City  of  New  York. 
Mo.  App.  215,  96  S.  W.  701  [1906];  101  N.  Y.  284,  4  x!  E.  336  [1880]: 
(Such  contract  is  not  invalidated  In  the  Matter  of  Tappan.  54  Barb, 
thereby).  225  [1869]. 

"Corry    v.    Gaynor,    22    O.    S.    584  ^  Mayer    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

[1872];    (It  was  not  decided  wliether  Commonalty     of     the     City     of    New 

such    item   could    have   been    included  York.    101    N.    Y.    284,    4    N.    E.    336 

in  the  assessment.)  [1886]. 

'Nevada   National    Bank   v.    Board  'Mayer    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

of    Supervisors    of    Kern    County,    5  Commonalty     of     the     City     of    New 

Cal.   App.   638,   91    Pac.    122    I  1907 1;  York,    101  'n.    Y.    284,    4    N.   E.    336 

Vandalia  Levee   &   Drainage   District  [1886]. 
V.    Hutchins,    234    111.    31,    84   N.    E. 


§469 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


714 


in  its  estimate  is  a  fatal  defect/  The  fact  that  the  assessment 
is  made  by  salaried  officers  does  not  prevent  the  city  from  in- 
eluding  the  actual  cost  of  making  the  levy  in  the  assessment/' 
On  the  other  hand,  many  states,  and  among  them  some  of  which 
had  regarded  the  cost  of  the  levy  as  included  in  the  assessment 
where  not  specifically  provided  for,  have  provided  that  such  cost 
must  be  paid  by  general  taxation.''  Under  such  statutes  it  is 
error  to  include  the  cost  of  making  and  levying  the  assessment 
in  the  assessment  on  confirmation  upon  the  statement  of  the 
counsel  for  the  city  that  it  would  be  deducted  from  the  judg- 
ment.'^ Where  the  statute  has  been  changed  so  as  to  require  the 
cost  of  levying  an  assessment  to  be  paid  out  of  the  general  funds, 
such  change  of  statute  applies  to  proceedings  pending  when  such 
act  took  effect.^  If  a  petition  for  confirmation  is  filed  after  such 
act  takes  effect  the  new  statute  is  applicable.''  If  the  cost  of 
levying  the  assessment  is  included  erroneously,  the  reviewing 
court  cannot  strike  out  such  item  and  direct  the  County  Court 
to  deduct  such  amount  from  its  judgment  but  it  must  refer  the 
case  to  the  trial  court  for  a  new  assessment.^"  The  trial  court 
may  recast  the  assessment  and  eliminate  such  improper  item.^^ 


*Ware  v.   City   of   Jerseyville,    158 
111.  234,  41  N.  E.  736   [1895]. 

"  In  the  Matter  of  Tappen,  36  How. 
(N.  Y.)    390   [1869]. 

'  Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg, 
207  111.  377,  69  N.  E.  840  [1904]; 
Thompson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg, 
207  111.  334,  69  N.  E.  842  [1904]; 
McChesney  v.  City  of  Chicago,  205 
111.  528,  69  N.  E.  38  [1903];  Thomp- 
son V.  City  of  Chicago,  197  111.  599, 
64  N.  E.  392  [1902] ;  Gage  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  196  111.  512,  63  N.  E.  io31 
[1902];  Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago,  195 
111.  490,  63  N.  E.  184  [1902];  Ker 
foot  V.  City  of  Chicago,  195  111.  229. 
63  N.  E.  101,  [1902];  In  the  Matter 
of  Wood,  51  Barb.  275  [1868];  In 
the  Matter  of  Lewis,  51  Barb  82 
[1868];  In  the  Matter  of  Lewis,  35 
Howard  102  [1868].  Such  was  the 
effect  of  the  act  of  1901  in  Illinois, 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg,  207 
111.   377,   69   N.   E.   840    [1904];    Mc- 


Chesney V.  City  of  Chicago,  205  111. 
528,  69  N.  E.  38  [1903];  McChes- 
ney V.  City  of  Chicago,  201  111.  344. 
66  N.  E.  217  [1903];  Thompson  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  197  111.  599,  64  N. 
E.  392  [1902];  Gage  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 196  111.  512,  63  N.  E.  1031 
[1902];  Gage  v.  City  of  Chicago,  195 
111.  490,  63  N.  E.   184   [1902]. 

'  Kerfoot  v.  City  of  Chicago,  195 
111.  229,  63  N.  E.   101    [1902]. 

»Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago,  196  III. 
512,  63  N.  E.   1031    [1902]. 

"Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago,  195  111. 
490,  63  X.  E.   184   [1902]. 

"Thompson  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
197  111.  599,  64  X.  E.  392  [1902]. 

"  Thompson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Han- 
berg, 207  111.  334,  69  N.  E.  842 
[1904];  Gage  v.  People  ex  rel.  Han- 
berg, 207  111.  377,  69  N.  E.  840 
[1904];  McChesney  v.  City  of  Chi 
cago,  205  HI.  528,  69  N.  E.  38 
[1903]. 


715  SPECIFIC    ITEMS   INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  470 

A  new  ordinance  is  not  necessary.'-  The  cost  of  making  out  the 
tax  duplicate  cannot  be  charged  to  a  fund  raised  by  assessment 
in  the  absence  of  statutory  authority.^'*  The  expense  of  main- 
taining a  board  of  local  improvements,  not  being  incurred  solely 
for  the  specific  assessment  in  question,  cannot  be  included  in  such 
assessment.^*  If  the  board  of  local  improvement  is  made  up  of 
members  of  the  council  and  the  statute  does  not  contemplate 
payment  to  them  of  any  additional  compensation  as  members  of 
such  board,  they  cannot  be  paid  out  of  the  assessment,  even  under 
a  statutory  provision  for  including  the  cost  of  levying  the  assess- 
ment as  an  item  of  expense.^''  If  no  provision  is  made  for  com- 
pensating the  county  auditor  for  services  rendered  in  an  assess- 
ment proceeding,  compensation  for  such  services  cannot  be  made 
a  proper  item  of  assessment.^"  Plans  and  specifications  are 
necessary  to  the  successful  construction  of  most  improvements 
and  are  generally  required  by  statute.'"  If  there  is  statutory 
authority  therefor  it  is  ordinarily  proper  to  include  the  cost  of 
such  plans  and  specifications  in  the  assessment  as  an  item  there- 
of.^'' The  cost  of  making  estimates,  plans  and  assessments,  and 
making  up  the  books  of  assessment  may  be  included.'^  The  cost 
of  probable  jury  trials,  which  will  be  necessary  if  objections  to  an 
application  for  judgment  of  confirmation  are  filed,  cannot  be  esti- 
mated in  advance  and  included  as  part  of  the  cost  of  making 
and  levying  the  assessment.^** 

tj  470.    Printing. 

Various  items  of  expense  for  printing  are  ordinarily  required 
by  the  assessment  statutes.  If  the  statute  so  provides  the  expense 
of  such  printing  may  lie  included  as  an  item  of  assessment.^    Thus 

'-Gage   V.   People   ex    rel.    ITaiiherfj.  '"Burns     v.     City     of     Diihitli.     OH 

207    III.    377.    69   X.    E.    840    [H)041:  Minn.    104.   104   N."  W.   714    [100.5]. 

McChesney   v.    City    of   Chicago.    205  "Thayer  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids. 

111.  .528,  69  N.  E.'SS   [1903].  82  Midi.  298.  46  N.  W.  228    [1S90|. 

"Manor   v.   Board    of   Commission-  *' Dohler  v.  Village  of  Warren,   174 

era  of  Jay  Countv.   137   Ind.   367.   34  111.  92.  50  N.  E.   1048    [18981. 

X.  E.  959.  36  X.  E.  1101    [18931.  '  Burk   v.   Altschnl.   66   Cal.   533.  6 

"Betts   V.   Citv    of   Xaperville.   214  Bae.   .393    [18851:    Thayer  v.   City   of 

III.  380.  73  X.  E.   752    [1905].  Grand    Rapids.    82   Mich.    298.   46    X 

"Gace  V.  Villaee  of  Wilmette.  2.30  \V.    228    [18901:    Cumine   v.    City   of 

Til.  428.  82  X.  E.  656   [19071.  Grand  Banids.  46  IMirh.  1.50.  9  x".  W. 

'"  Board  of  CommissioTiers  of  ;Mont-  141    [18811:    State.    Kohler.    Pros.   v. 

pomerv    Connty    v.    EtiUen.    118    Ind.  Town  of  Guttenberir.   38  X\  J.  L.    (9 

158.  20  XT.   E.   771    [18881-  Vr.)    419   [18761. 

"See  §  819  et  aeq. 


§  471  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT,  716 

the  cost  of  printing  abstracts  of  title  to  the  land  upon  which  the 
improvement  was  to  be  located  may  be  included  in  the  assess- 
ment.^ Any  question  as  to  the  propriety  of  including  such  items 
is  waived  if  an  appeal  is  not  taken  in  a  manner  provided  for  by 
statute.^ 

§  471.     Advertisement  and  notice. 

Under  most  assessment  statutes  advertisement  of  various  kinds 
is  required.  If  the  statute  so  provides,  the  cost  of  such  adver- 
tisement may  be  included  as  an  item  of  assessment.^  A  special 
assessment  judgment  for  the  "special  assessment,  printer's  fees 
and  costs,"  is  not  subject  to  the  objection  of  allowing  a  double 
recovery  for  printer's  fees.-  If  the  number  of  papers  in  which 
the  advertisement  is  to  be  inserted  is  not  fixed  by  law,  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  city,  if  not  abused,  controls  and  the  cost  thus  in- 
curred is  a  proper  item  of  assessment.^  Thus  it  is  proper  to  in- 
clude in  the  assessment  the  cost  of  advertising  for  bids.*  If  an 
assessment  is  assigned  to  a  contractor  for  compensation  for  his 
work,  such  assignment  cannot  include  the  assessment  for  adver- 
tising.^ Under  assessment  statutes  notice  of  various  forms  is 
frequently  required  and  is  indeed  often  indispensable.®  If  the 
statute  so  provides,  the  cost  of  mailing  and  serving  such  notices 
may  be  included  in  the  assessment.'^  If  they  are  made  and  served 
by  one  who  is  not  bound  in  law  to  do  such  work  without  compen- 
sation, it  is  proper  to  charge  therefor.^  If  the  statute  provides 
what  fees  shall  be  charged  for  making  and  serving  notices  no 


» Thayer  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  22.5   111.   144,   80  N.   E.   90    [1907]. 

82  Mich.  298,  46  N.  W.  228    [1890].  'Cincinnati  v.  Davis,  58  0.  S.  225, 

"Boyle   V.   Hitchcock,   66   Cal.    129,  .50  N.  E.  918   [1898]. 

4   Pac.    1143    [1884];    Burke   v.    Alt-  '  Beniteau    v.    City   of   Detroit,   41 

schul,  66  Cal.  533,  6  Pac.  393  [1885].  Mich.   116,  1   N.  W.  899   [1879]. 

*  Gage   V.   People   ex   rel.   Hanberg,  ^  Corry   v.    Gaynor,    22    0.    S.    584 

219   111.   369,   76   N.   E.   498    [1906];  11872J."   (The  propriety  of  including 

Michael  v.  City  of  Mattoon,   172  111.  such  item  in  the  assessment  was  not. 

394,  50  N.  E.    155    [1898];    Beniteau  pas«ed  upon.) 

V.   City  of  Detroit,   41    Mich.    116,    1  'See  Chapter  XIV. 

N.  W.  899   [1879];   City  of  St.  Paul  '  Watkins  v.  State  ex  rel.  Van  Au- 

V.  Mullen,  27  Minn.  78,  6  N.  W.  424  ken,   151   Ind.   123,  49  N.  E.   169,  51 

[1880];  Cincinnati  v.  Davis.  58  O.  S.  X.   E.  79    [18981:    Adkins  v.  Toledo. 

225,  50  N.  E.  918   [1898]:   Adkins  v.  27   Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R.  417   [1905]. 

Toledo,    27     Ohio    Cir.    Ct.    R.    417  "Wntl-ins  v.  State  ex  rel.  Van   *u- 

[1905].  ken.   151   Ind.   123,  49  N.  E.   169.  51 

"Gage  V.   People   ex   rel.   Hanberg  N.  E.  79  [1898]. 


717 


SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT. 


§472 


cliarge  can  be  made  as  an  item  of  assessment  in  excess  of  sueii 
staiatory  rate."  In  the  absence  of  statutory  authority  such  ex- 
penses cannot  be  included  in  the  assessment.^" 

§  472.    Cost  of  collection. 

The  cost  of  collecting  an  assessment  is  a  necessary  item  of 
expense  and  may  be  included  in  the  assessment  if  the  statute  so 
provides.^  Failure  to  include  the  cost  of  collecting  in  the  esti- 
mate of  expenses  is,  under  such  statutes,  fatal  to  the  proceedings. - 
A  statute  may  provide  for  adding  a  certain  percentage  of  the 
total  amount  of  the  assessment  for  the  expense  of  collection.-' 
No  charge  can  be  made  in  the  assessment  for  fees  for  collection 
in  excess  of  those  allowed  by  law.*  If  the  statute  provides  a 
certain  percentage  for  collection,  it  is  improper  to  add  a  per- 
centage in  excess  of  that  fixed  by  statute.^  If  the  court  has  power 
to  deduct  such  erroneous  charge,  including  it  does  not  invalidate 
the  assessment;  but  it  may  be  so  deducted."  Unless  specifically 
provided  for  by  statute,  only  the  actual  cost  of  collection  can 
be  included.'  In  the  absence  of  statutory  authority  it  is  improper 
to  add  a  certain  percentage  of  the  assessment  as  the  estimated 


°McGlynn  v.  City  of  Toledo,  22 
Ohio  C.  C.  34  [1901].  (A  charge  of 
$2.50  as  a  fee  for  writing  a  lett«r  to 
a  non-resident  giving  him  notice  of 
the  assessment.) 

'"  Manor  v.  Board  of  Commission- 
ers of  Jay  .Co.,  137  Ind.  3G7,  34  N. 
E.  959,  36  N.   E.   1101    [1893]. 

KJage  V.  Village  of  Wilniette,  230 
111.  428,  82  N.  E.  fwO  [1907]  ;  Cage  v. 
People  ex  rol.  Ilanberg,  225  III.  144, 
80  N.  E.  90  [1907];  Goodwillie  v. 
City  of  Lake  View,  137  111.  51,  27 
N.  E.  15  [1891];  Davis  v.  City  of 
Litchfield,  145  111.  313,  21  L.  K.  A. 
563,  33  N.  E.  888  [1893];  Gibson  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  22  111.  567  [18.)91; 
Board  of  Commissioners  of  Pulaski 
County  V.  Vurpillat.  22  Ind.  App. 
422,  53  N.  E.  1049  [1899];  Dasliidl 
V.  Mayor  and  Citv  Council  of  Balti- 
more. Use  of  Ha\,  45  Md.  615 
[1876];  Warren  v.  Citv  of  Grand 
Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874];  Wil- 
liams   V.    Mayor,    etc.,    of    Detroit,    2 


:\[ich.  5G0  [1853];  State,  Kohler, 
I'ros.  V.  Town  of  Guttenberg,  38  N. 
J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  419  [1876];  In  the 
Matter  of  Eager,  58  Barb.  557 
[1871];  In  the  Matter  of  Eager,  41 
How.  107  [1870];  Matter  of  Eager, 
12   Abb.  Pr.    151    |1871]. 

-Ware  v.  City  of  Jorsoyvillc,  158 
111.  234,  41  X.  E.  73(5   [1895]. 

'  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand  Haven. 
30  Mich.  24  [1874];  Williams  v 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit.  2  Midi.  5(10 
11853];  In  the  Matter  of  Eager,  58 
Barb.  557  [1871];  In  the  Matter  of 
Eager,  41    How.    107    |1870]. 

*  In  the  Matter  of  :\IcCormack,  60 
Barb.  128  [1870];  Matter  of  IMcCor- 
niaok.   10  Abb.  Pr.  X.  S.  234   [1870]. 

°  In  tlie  Matter  of  McCormack,  60 
Barb.    128    [1870]. 

"  In  the  Matter  of  McCormack,  60 
Barb.  128  [1870];  Matter  of  McCor- 
mack,  10  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  234   [1870]. 

'  The  Northern  Liberties  v.  St. 
Johns  Church,  13  Pa.  St.  104  [1850]. 


§  472  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  718 

cost  of  collection.^  The  fact  that  this  percentage  was  to  be 
paid  to  the  treasurer,  if  the  assessment  was  collected  by  him,  did 
not  justify  including  such  item  if  other  means  of  collection  were 
available  by  statute.''  By  some  statutes  it  is  provided  that  the 
cost  of  collection  cannot  be  included  in  the  assessment  but  must 
be  paid  for  out  of  the  general  funds  of  the  city.  Under  such 
statutes  the  cost  of  collection  is  not  a  proper  item  of  assessment.^" 
Where  by  statute  it  is  provided  that  assessments  must  be  paid  to 
the  county  treasurer,  that  he  shall  receive  three-fourths  of  one 
per  cent,  on  all  money  collected  by  him  as  taxes,  and  that  the 
cost  of  a  street  improvement  shall  be  assessed  upon  adjacent 
property  without  making  specific  provision  for  including  the 
cost  of  collection,  it  is  held  that  such  cost  cannot  be  included  in 
the  assessment. ^^  Under  a  statute  giving  to  the  collector  of  as- 
sessments a  certain  commission,  it  has  been  held  that  he  cannot 
collect  such  commission  upon  any  assessment  assessed  against 
the  city.^-  Printing  the  list  of  property-owners  who  have  been 
delinquent  in  paying  assessments  is,  under  many  statutes,  a  neces- 
sary item  of  expense  in  collecting  the  assessments.  If  the  statute 
so  provides,  such  item  of  expense  may  be  included  in  the  assess- 
ment." Indeed,  it  has  been  held  that  such  item  of  expense  can- 
not be  paid  out  of  the  general  fund  of  the  city  but  that  it  must 
be  paid  solely  out  of  the  special  fund  raised  .by  assessment.^* 
The  coiirt  costs  which  will  be  incurred  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
the  assessment  proceedings  may  be  included  in  tlie  assessment.^"' 
Such  costs,  if  excessive,  may  be  retaxed  by  the  trial  court. ^"  It 
is  not  necessary  that  the  property  owner  bring  a  separate  suit 
in  equity  therefor.^^     If  there  is  statutory  authority  therefor,  a 

*  Spangler  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  35  "  Brooks  v.  City  of  San  Luis  Obis- 

O.  S.  469   [1880];  The  Northern  Lib-  po,  109  Cal.  50,  41  Pac.  791    [1895]; 

erties  v.  St.  Johns  Church,  13  Pa.  St.  The    Chicago    &    Northwestern    Rail- 

104    [1850].  road  Company  v.  People  ex  rel.  Mil- 

»  Spangler  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  35  ler,  83  III.  467   [1876]. 

O.  8.  469   [1880].  "Brooks  v.  City  of  San  Luis  Obis- 

"McChesney    v.    City    of    Chicago,  po,   109  Cal.  50,  41  Pac.  791    [1895]. 

201    111.   344,  "66   N.   E.   217    [1903];  '=  Michael  v.  City  of  Mattoon,   172 

Higman   v.   City   of   Sioux   City,    129  111.  394,  50  N.  E.  155   [1898]. 

la.  291,  105  N.  W.  524  [1906].  '"Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of  New 

'1  Higman    v.    City   of    Sioux    City,  York    v.    Cornell,    9    Hun.     (N.    Y.) 

129  la.  291,  105  N.  W.  524   [1906].  215   [1876]. 

'2 People  of  the  State  of  New  York  "Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of  New 

V.   Starkweather,   42   N.   Y.   Sup.   Ct.  York  v.  Cornell,  9  Hun.   (N.  Y.)   215 

Rep.  325   [1877].  [1876]. 


719  SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT.       §§473,474 

part  of  the  fund  raised  by  special  assessment  may  be  appro- 
priated to  retain  special  counsel  to  collect  unpaid  assessments.^^ 
By  special  statutory  authority,  an  attorney's  fee  may  be  recov- 
ered in  a  suit  to  collect  an  assessment  or  to  enforce  the  lien 
thereof.^'-*  This  is  in  the  nature  of  a  penalty.-"  A  statute  pro- 
viding for  such  attorney's  fee  is  applicable  to  an  assessment 
levied  before  the  statute  is  passed  where  the  suit  to  enforce  the 
lien  is  begun  subsequently.-^  Only  one  attorney's  fee  can  be  re- 
covered in  one  suit,  no  matter  how  many  causes  of  action  are  in- 
volved.^^ 

§  473.    Penalties  for  delinquency. 

As  a  means  of  compelling  prompt  payment  of  assessments  the 
legislature  may  provide  that  a  penalty  shall  be  added  to  the' 
amount  of  the  assessment  in  case  of  non-payment  thereof.^  Such 
penalties  cannot  be  added  unless  there  is  statutory  authority 
therefor,  however.^  If  a  penalty  is  added  without  authority 
the  property  owner  cannot  enjoin  the  collection  of  the  assessment 
and  penalty  unless  he  has  offered  to  pay  that  part  of  the  assess- 
ment which  is  properly  due.^ 

§  474.    Excess  charges  due  to  failure  to  pay  cash. 

If  the  credit  of  the  city,  or  the  method  proposed  for  paying 
an  assessment,  is  such  that  a  greater  sum  must  be  paid  for  the 

"Reclamation   District  No.    108   v.  "'Cleveland,   Cincinnati,   Chicago  & 

Ilagar,  OG  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945  [1884].  St.  Louis   Ry.   Co.   v.   Porter,   :?8   Ind. 

'"Reid    V.    Clay,    134    Cal.    207,    66  App.  226,  74  N.  E.  200,  76  X.  E.  179 

Pac.  202  [1901];  Scott  v.  Hayes,  162  [1905]. 

ind.     548     [190.3];     70     N.     E.     879  '- Hughes  v.  Alsip.  112  Cal.  587,  44 

[190.3];    P.rown  v.   Central   Bermudez  Pac.   1027   [1890]. 

Company.   162  Tnd.  452,  09  N.  E.  150  '  Eyerman  v.  Rlaksloy.  78  Mo.   145 

[1903];    Cleveland,    Cincinnati,    Chi-  [1883];   City  of  St.  Louis  to  Use  of 

cago  &   St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Porter,  Seibert  v.   Allen.  53   Mo.  44   [1873]; 

38  Ind.  App.  220.  74X.  E.  260,  76  N.  Raker  v.   French,   18  Ohio  C.   C.  420 

E.  179  [1905];  Palmer  v.  Xnlting.  13  [1S99];    Yates   v.   Borough   of   Mead- 

Ind.  App.  581,  41   X.  E.  1045   [1S95J.  ville,  56  Pa.  St.    (0  P.   F.  Smith)    21 

Such  act  has  been  held  to  be  uncon-  [1807]. 

stitutional    because    the    title    thereof  -Annie    Wriglit    Seminary    v.    City 

did    not   express    the    subject    matter  of  Tacoma,  23  Wasli.  109,  t)2  Pac.  444 

Turnquist     v.     Cass     County     Drain  [1900]. 

Commissioners,    11    X.   D.   514,   92   X  'Annie    Wriglit    Seminary    v.    City 

W.  852   [1902].  of   Tacoma,    23    Wash.    109*,    02    Pac. 

*  Brown  v.  Central  Bermudez  Com  444  [1900]. 
r-'Mv.    102    Tnd.    452,    09    X'.    E.    150 
[1903]. 


§  474  TiVXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  720 

improvement  than  would  be  necessary  if  the  contractor  were  as- 
sured of  prompt  payment  in  cash,  the  question  arises  whether 
the  loss  thus  suffered  must  be  borne  by  the  city  out  of  its  general 
funds  or  whether  it  may  be  assessed  upon  the  property  owners 
benefited.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  seems  to  be  assumed  that 
the  expense  of  the  improvement  may  be  computed  with  reference 
to  the  manner  of  payment  and  on  the  basis  thereof.^  Accord- 
ingly, if  bonds  are  issued  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  improvement 
in  anticipation  of  the  assessment  and  by  statutory  authority, 
such  bonds  are  sold  below  par,  the  discount  can  be  included  in 
the  assessment  and  charged  upon  the  owners  of  property  bene- 
fited.- If  the  contractor  is  paid  in  city  warrants,  and  by  reason 
of  their  depreciation  the  city  is  obliged  to  pay  more  in  such  war- 
rant to  such  contractor  than  it  would  have  to  pay  in  cash,  it  has 
been  held  that  such  loss  may  be  charged  upon  the  property- 
owners  and  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  the  full  amount 
paid  by  the  city.-'^  A  fencing  di.-jtrict  is  held  to  have  authority 
to  levy  an  assessment  for  the  amount  which,  discounted  at  six  per 
cent,  will  pay  the  cost  of  the  improvement.*  In  other  jurisdic- 
tions the  discount  due  to  the  bad  financial  standing  of  the  city  or 
the  uncertainty  of  payment  must  be  borne  out  of  the  generrl 
funds  of  the  city.^  This  result  is  often  reached  under  statutes 
providing  expressly  or  by  implication  for  charging  such  items 
upon  the  city.  If  bonds  can  be  sold  only  for  less  than  par  it  has 
been  held  that  the  discount  must  be  borne  by  the  city  and  cannot 
be  charged  upon  the  property  owners.**  So  if  the  credit  of  a  city 
is  such  that  in  constructing  sidewalks  on  credit  it  must  pay 
more  than  it  would  have  to  pay  in  cash,  such  losses  cannot  be 
charged  upon  the  property  owners.^  Where  a  contractor  offers 
to  do  certain  work  for  a  certain  amount  in  cash  and  for  a  larger 
amount  in  assessments  to  be  assigned  to  him  and  collected  by  him. 


^  Yarnold   v.    City  of   Lawrence,    15  of    Johnson    County,    71    Ark.    17,    70 

Kan.  103   [1875].   "  S.  W.  308,  71   S.  W.  247    [1902]. 

-Tacketts   v.    Spraker,   77    Ind.    371  =  Doyle     v.     Austin,     47     Cal.     353 

[1881];    State,   Baker,    Pros.   v.    City.  [1874];    City  of  Galveston  v.  Heard, 

of  Elizabeth,  37  N.  J.  L.    (8  Vroom")  54  Tex.   420    [1881]. 
142    [1874].  'Doyle     v.     Austin,     47     Cal.     353 

=>  Warren     v.     Henly,     31      la.     31  [1874]. 
[1870].  'City    of    Galveston    v.    Heard,    54 

*Stiewel  v.  Fencing  District  No.  6  Tex.  420    [1881]. 


721  SPECIFIC   ITEMS   INCLUDED   IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  475 

a  property  owner  cannot  be  assessed  for  more  than  the  cash 
value  of  the  work,  even  if  the  city  agreed  to  pay  the  larger 
amount  in  assessmehts.^  If,  however,  a  contract  provides  for  a 
certain  rate  of  compensation,  if  the  contractor  was  paid  at  the 
regular  time  for  paying  taxes,  about  nine  months  after  the  per- 
formance of  the  contract ;  and  also  provides  that  the  lot  owner 
may,  by  paying  a  much  smaller  sum  at  once,  discharge  all  liability 
for  such  improvement,  a  lot  owner  who  has  not  elected  to  make 
prompt  payment  cannot  subsequently  object  because  of  the  in- 
crease in  the  contract  price  due  to  such  owner's  act  in  deferring 
payment." 

§  475.     Interest. 

The  legislature  has  power  to  determine  in  advance  whether 
interest  may  be  included  in  assessments  or  whether  interest  is 
not  an  item  which  can  be  included.  The  question  is  entirely  one 
of  policy.^  It  may  fix  the  rate  of  interest  which  tax  certificates 
shall  draw.-  The  legislature  may  delegate  to  the  city  the  power 
of  fixing  the  rate  of  interest.^  Thus,  the  city  may  be  authorized 
to  fix  any  rate  of  interest  not  exceeding  eight  per  cent.*  The 
ordinary  rule  is  that  in  the  absence  of  some  statute  expressly  or 
impliedly  authorizing  interest,  interest  cannot  be  allowed  on 
an  assessment  nor  included  therein.-"'  Statutes  which  provide 
for  interest  on  judgments  do  not  authorize  interest  on  assess- 
ments, even  in  jurisdictions  in  which  an  assessment  is  regarded 
for  many  purposes  as  analogous  to  a  judgment."  A  statute  au- 
thorizing interest  on  taxes  is  not  regarded  as  authorizing  an 
interest  on  assessments  since  the  word  "tax"  is  regarded  as  being 

» Bliss     V.     Kraus,     10     0.     S.     54  v.   Gofrrevo,   41    La.   Ann.   251,   5   So. 

[18G4].  848    [1889]. 

"City   of   Lawrence    v.    Killam,    11  ■*  People  of  the  State  of  California 

Kan.  375   [1873].  v.  Ilajrar,  52  Cal.  171    [1877];   Doyle 

Klermond    v.    City    of    Taconia.    fi  v.  Austin,  47   Cal.  353    [1874];   Has- 

Wash.   3C5,   33   Pac.'oOl    [1893].  koll  v.  Bartlett,  34  Cal.  281    [1807]; 

=  Edwards    &     Walsh     Construction  Himmelniann    v.    Oliver,    34   Cal.    240 

Co.    V.    Jasper   County,    117    la.    3i;5,  [1807];   Wcher  v.  City  of  San   Fran- 

94  Am.  St.  Rep.  301.  90  X.  W.   1000  cisco,    1    Cal.   4:).-)    [18.il];    Sar"o'it  & 

[1902].  Company  v.  Tutlle.  07  Conn.   102.  32 

MIellman    v.    Shoulters,    114    Cal.  L.   R.   A.   822,   34    Atl.    1028    [1895]; 

130,     44     Pac.     915,     45     Pac.     1057  Morrow  v.  Ceetin<r.  23  Tnd.  App.  494, 

[1890].  55   N.  E.   787    [1899]. 

*  Barber   Asphalt   Paving   Company  "Morrow  v.   Cccliii".  23   Tnd.  App. 

494,  55  X.  E.  787   [1899]. 


§  475  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  722 

used  in  this  connection  in  its  narrower  meaning.'  A  statute  which 
provides  that  neither  the  principal  nor  interest  of  an  assessment 
shall  be  collected  until  the  work  is  completed  may  recognize  the 
right  of  the  legislature  to  add  interest  to  an  assessment,  but  it 
does  not  of  itself  operate  as  a  provision  for  such  interest.*  Au- 
thority to  a  city  to  divide  an  assessment  into  installments  bearing 
interest  does  not  authorize  the  city  to  charge  interest  where  the 
assessment  is  to  be  paid  in  one  payment.®  If  a  city  is  authorized 
to  borrow  money  for  the  purpose  of  constructing  an  improvement, 
the  interest  on  such  loan  may  be  included  in  the  assessment  as  a 
proper  item  of  expense. ^°  An  assessment  may  be  levied  so  as  to 
include  the  cost  of  the  improvement  and  the  rate  of  discount 
necessary  to  obtain  the  present  value  of  such  assessment.^^  If  the 
statute  authorizes  a  cit,y  to  issue  bonds  in  anticipation  of  the 
subsequent  payments  of  the  assessments  in  order  to  pay  for  the 
improvements,  the  interest  on  such  bonds  may  be  included  in  the 
assessment  as  a  proper  item  tliereof.^-  If,  however,  the  money 
borrowed  by  the  city  by  the  sale  of  bonds  to  pay  for  an  improve- 
ment, has  been  used  in  the  meantime  for  other  purposes,  property 
OAvners  cannot  be  charged  with  interest  thereon  for  such  time  as 
a  part  of  the  assessment. ^^  The  legislature  has  power  to  fix  the 
rate  of  interest  in  advance,^*  or  to  authorize  the  city  to  fix  the 
rate  of  interest.^^  Naming  the  rate  of  interest  which  bonds  are 
to  bear  in  an  ordinance  which  provides  for  issuing  the  bonds  is 
a  sufficient  fixing  of  the  rate  of  interest. ^'^  Interest  which  is  due 
to  the  contractor  upon  the  contract  price  for  his  work  may  be 

^  Sargent  &  Company  v.  Tuttle,  67  ^-  Hulbert   v.   City   of   Chicago,   213 

Conn.   102.  32  L.  R.  A.   822,  34  Atl.  111.    452,    72    N.    E.     1097     [1905]; 

1028  [1895].  Scott  v.  Hayes,   162  Ind.  548,  70  N. 

» Sargent  &  Company  v.  Tuttle,  67  E.     879     [1903];     Erickson    v.     Cass 

Conn.    162,   32  L.  R.  A.   822,   34  Atl.  County,   11  N.  D.  494,  92  N.  W.  841 

1028    [1895].  [1902]. 

'McChesney    v.     City    of    Chicago.  "State,    Baker,    Pros.    v.    City    of 

213  111.  592,  73  N.  E.  368   [1905].  Elizabeth,    37    N.    J.    L.    (8   Vroom) 

'"Davis  V.   City   of  Newark,  54  N.  142   [1874]. 

J.    L.     (25    Vr.)'     144,    23    Atl.    276  "Hulbert   v.    City  of  Chicago,   213 

[1891];    State,   Skinkle,   Pros.  v.   In-  111.  452,  72  N.  E.  "l097   [1905]. 

habitants    of    the    Township    of    Clin-  «  Scott  v.  Hayes,   162  Ind.  548,  70 

ton,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.)   656  [1877].  N.  E.  879   [1903]. 

"  Stiewel  v.  Fencing  District  No.  6  "  Scott  v.  Hayes,   162  Ind.  548,  70 

of  Johnson  County,  71  Ark.  17,  70  S.  N.  E.  879   [1903]. 
W.  308,  71  S.  W."247   [1902]. 


723 


SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT. 


§475 


included  in  the  assessment  by  statutory  authority.^'  The  statute 
may  provide  for  paying  the  contractor  by  issuing  warrants  or 
vouchers  to  him  for  the  amount  of  work  done.  In  the  absence  of 
statute  such  warrants  or  vouchers  do  not  bear  interest."*  If,  how- 
ever, the  statute  so  provides  such  vouchers  may  bear  interest 
and  the  interest  so  added  may  be  included  in  the  assessment.^" 
If,  by  ordinance,  vouchers  are  to  be  issued  which  do  not  bear  in- 
terest, interest  upon  such  vouchers  cannot  be  included  in  the 
assessment.'-"  If  it  is  erroneously  so  included  and  the  amount  of 
such  interest  can  be  separated  from  the  amount  lawfully  due, 
the  amount  of  the  assessment  may  be  eliminated  without  invali- 
dating the  entire  assessment.-^  If,  however,  the  amount  allowed 
for  the  payment  of  such  interest  does  not  appear  from  the  assess- 
ment the  entire  assessment  is  void.--  Assessment  vouchers  issued 
by  a  city  for  its  proportionate  share  of  assessments  may,  by  stat- 
utory provisions,  bear  interest  until  paid.-^  If  the  value  of  land 
to  be  appropriated  is  to  be  estimated  and  the  title  thereto  is  to 
pass  before  payment  of  the  amount  fixed  by  appropriation  pro- 
ceedings, interest  may,  by  statute,  be  allowed  thereon.'-*  Statutes 
frequently  provide  for  interest  upon  assessments  after  they  are 
due.    Full  effect  is  given  to  such  statutes.^"'     Such  a  provision  is 


"  In  the  ^Matter  of  Deering,  14 
Daly  (i\.  Y.)  89  [1886].  Since  a 
contract  does  not  bear  interest  until 
the  time  fixed  for  the  payment  of 
money  thereon  unless  there  is  some 
special  provision  in  snch  contract  for 
intorost.  a  contract  by  a  city  to  paj' 
a  contractor  when  the  assessments 
should  be  collected  and  if  they  should 
not  be  collected  at  the  end  of  two 
years  the  amount  then  unpaid  to 
the  contractor  was  to  become  due, 
does  not  bear  interest  before  the  end 
of  two  years.  Booth  v.  Pittsburg. 
154  Pa.  St.  482,  25  Atl.  80.3   [18931. 

"Haskell  V.  Bartlott,  34  Cal.  281 
[1867];  United  States  ex  rel.  Thomp- 
son V.  Dent,  1  Mackey  (D.  C.)  403 
[18821. 

"  Fitzgerald  v.  Walker,  55  Ark. 
148.  17  S.  W.  702  [18911;  Town  of 
Cicero  v.  Oreen.  211  111.  241,  71  N. 
E.  884  [19041;  Storrie  v.  Houston 
City    Street    Railway    Company,    92 


Tex.  129,  44  L.  R.  A.  71G.  40  S.  W. 
796   [1898]. 

^' Cratty  v.  City  of  Chicago,  217 
111.  453,  75  X.  £.343  [1905];  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Hulhert.  205  111.  340, 
68  N.  E.  786  [1903]. 

="City  of  Chicago  v.  Ilulbort,  205 
111.   346,  68  N.  E.  786    [1903]. 

-Cratty  v.  City  of  Chicago,  217 
111.  453,  75  X.  E.  343   [1905]. 

^  C  ity  of  Chicago  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Union  Trust  Company,  21.")  111.  235, 
74  X.  E.  115  [1905]." 

-*  In  re  Mayor,  etc.,  of  X'ew  York. 
89  X.  Y.  S.  6,  95  App.  Div.  552 
[1904];  In  re  East  One  Hundred  and 
Fifty-Eighth  Street.  80  X.  Y.  S.  594, 
39    Misc.    598    [1903]. 

*  Dougherty  v.  Henarie,  47  Cal.  9 
[1873];  Palmer  v.  Xolting,  13  Ind. 
App.    581,    41    X.    E.     1045     [1895]; 

Langan  v.  Pitzer  —  Ky.  ,  82  S. 

W.  280.  26  Ky.  Law  Rep.  579  [1904]  ; 
Moale  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 


§  475  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT  724 

upheld,  as  in  the  nature  of  a  penalty.-"  If  the  assessment,  as 
originally  levied,  is  defective,  and  by  reason  of  such  defect  the 
exact  amount  thereof  cannot  be  determined,  it  is  generally  held 
that  interest  cannot  be  charged  upon  such  assessment  until  the 
amount  thereof  is  definitely  and  correctly  ascertained.-^  This 
result  is  reached  sometimes  under  statutes  which  provide  spe- 
cifically for  interest  and  penalty  only  "if  the  assessment  pro- 
ceedings shall  appear  to  be  regular."-^  Under  such  statute  there 
is  no  authority  for  allowing  interest  if  the  assessment  proceedings 
are  irregular.-**  However,  where  an  item  for  the  fees  and  ex- 
penses of  the  commissioners  who  made  the  assessment  was  made, 
it  was  held  that  while  the  property  owner  could  have  the  benefit 
of  such  reduction,  he  was  liable  to  interest  from  the  date  of  the 
assessment.^"  The  theory  of  this  holding  was  that  this  reduction 
was  in  the  nature  of  a  credit  to  be  applied  on  a  conceded  debt. 
If  the  assessment  proceedings  are  irregular,  but  a  reassessment 
is  not  necessary,  the  assessment  may  bear  interest  in  the  absence 
of  a  statute  restricting  interest  to  cases  where  the  proceedings 
are  regular.^^  Where  the  court  has  power,  in  ease  of  defective 
assessment  proceedings,  to  determine  the  amount  to  be  charged 
against  the  lot  owner,  the  court  may  allow  interest  upon  the 
amount  properly  due  from  the  time  fixed  by  the  city  for  the 


Baltimore,  61  Md.  224  [1883];  Bar-  rel.  Miller  v.  Love,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8 
ber  Asphalt  Paving  Company  v.  Vr. )  261  [1874];  In  the  matter  of 
Peck,  186  Mo.  506,  85  S.  W."  387  Pelton,  85  N.  Y.  651  [1881];  In  the 
[1905];  Eyerman  v.  Blaksley,  78  matter  of  St.  Joseph's  Asylum,  69  N. 
Mo.  145  [1883];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  Y.  353  [1877];  In  the  matter  of  Mil- 
use  of  Seibert  v.  Allen,  53  Mo.  44  ler,  24  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  637  [1881]. 
[1873];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  of  -'City  of  Seattle  v.  Hill,  23  Wash. 
Cornelli  v.  Armstrong,  38  Mo.  167  92,  62  Pac.  446  [1900]. 
[1866];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  of  ^  See  also  City  of  St.  Joseph  ex  rel. 
McGrath  v.  Clemens,  36  Mo.  467  Gibson  v.  Forsee,  110  Mo.  App.  237,. 
[1865];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  of  84  S.  W.  1138  [1905]. 
Creamer  v.  Oeters,  36  Mo.  456  ^''  Mayer  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
[1865];  State,  Kohler,  Pros.  v.  Town  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 
of  Guttenberg,  38  N.  J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  York,  101  N.  Y.  284,  4  N.  E.  336 
419  [1876];  City  of  Galveston  v.  [1886J;  (affirming  Mayer  v.  Mayor, 
Heard,  54  Tex.  420   [18S1].  Aldermen    and    Commonalty    of    the 

="  Eyerman  V.  Blaksley,  78  Mo.  145  City    of    New    York,    28    Hun.    587 

[1883].  [1883]). 

2'Laflin  v.  City  of  Chicago,  48  111.  "' Langan   v.    Bitzer,   —   Ky.   .• 

449  [1868]  ;  Gcsnell  v.  City  of  Louis-  82  S.  W.  280,  26  Ky.  Law  Eep.  579 

ville,   104  Fy  201,  46  S.  W.  722,  20  [1904]. 
Ky.  Law  Rep.   519    [1898];    State  ex 


I 


725  SPECIFIC    ITEMS   INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  475 

payment  of  the  assessment.'-  If  the  time  for  the  payment  of  an 
assessment  or  an  installment  thereof  is  postponed  to  a  future 
date,  such  assessment  or  installment  thereof  does  not  bear  interest 
until  it  is  due  in  the  absence  of  some  specnfie  provision  for  in- 
terest before  maturity.'*'*  If  the  original  assessment  is  invalid 
and  a  reassessment  is  authorized  by  statute,  interest  upon  the 
amount  which  should  have  been  charged  on  the  first  assessment 
from  the  date  thereof  may  be  included  as  a  proper  item  of  re- 
assessment.''* It  has  been  said  to  be  proper  to  include  interest 
at  least  from  the  date  of  the  curative  act,^'  or  from  the  date  of 
the  second  levy.^"  If  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  interest  shall 
run  from  a  given  time,  full  effect  must  be  given  to  such  provision 
since  without  statutory  authority  no  interest  can  be  allowed.^" 
Thus  the  statute  may  provide  for  interest  upon  an  unpaid  assess- 
ment beginning  thirty  days  from  the  date  that  the  tax  bill  is 
issued  to  the  contractor  and  providing  for  an  increased  rate  of 
interest  if  the  tax  bill  is  not  paid  within  six  months.^^  A  provision 
that  an  assessment  ''shall  be  paid  in  cash  within  ninety  days  after 
the  work  is  done,  or  in  notes  .  .  .  bearing  interest  at  the  rate 
of  eight  per  cent,  a  year,"  imposes  liability  for  interest  at  the 
end  of  such  period  of  ninety  days.""*  If  execution  may  lawfully 
be  issued  on  an  assessment,  the  assessment  bears  interest  at  least 
from  the  date  of  such  execution.'*^  If  the  statute  provides  that 
an  assessment  is  not  due  or  a  lien  until  the  title  thereof  is  entered 
in  the  record  of  titles,  interest  cannot  be  allowed  thereon  from  the 
date  of  confirmation.*"     If  a  tax  bill  is  not  due  until  demand  for 

'^Gest    V.    City    of    Cincinnati,    26  ^"Newman  v.   City  of  Emporia.  41 

O.  S.  275    [18751;    Fricke  v.  City  of  Kan.  583,  21  Pac.  593   [ISS!)]. 

Cincinnati,    1    Ohio  N.   P.   98    [18941.  »« City  of  St.   Louis   to  use  of  Cor- 

''Mall  V.  City  of  Portland,  35  Or.  nelli     v.     Armstrong,     38     Mo.      Ku 

89,    50    Pac.    G54    [1899];    Connor    v.  [18661. 

City  of  Paris,  87   Tex.  32,  27   S.  W.  "City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  of  Cor- 

88   [18941.  r\e\U     v.     Armstrong.     38     Mo.     167 

'•State,  Johnson,  Proa.  v.  Inhab-  [1806]. 
itants  of  the  City  of  Trenton,  43  N.  ^Second  Municipality  of  the  City 
J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  166  [18811;  State,  of  New  Orleans  v.  McFarlane,  3  Rob- 
Watson,  Pros.  V.  City  of  Elizabeth.  inson  (La.)  406  [1843]. 
42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  508  [1880];  »  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 
Heath  v.  McCrea.  20  Wash.  342.  55  Savannah,  105  Ga.  62,  31  S.  E.  127 
Pac.  432    [1898];   Philadelphia  Mort-  [1898]. 

page    &    Vrust    Company    v.    City    of  *"  In  the  matter  of  Willis,  30  Hun. 

New  Whatcom.  19  Wash. -225,  52  Pac,  (N.  Y.)    13  [1883];  In  the  matter  of 

1003   [1898].  Deering,  55  How.   296    [1878]. 

» Blount  V.   City  of  Janesville,   31 
Wis.  648   [1872].' 


§  475  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  726 

payment,  interest  does  not,  in  the  absence  of  a  specific  provision 
therefor,  commence  until  such  demand  is  made,*^  though  interest 
may  run  from  the  date  of  suit  in  the  absence  of  a  demand.*-  By 
statute  deferred  installments  of  a  special  tax  bear  interest  from 
thirty  days  after  confirmation.*^  On  the  other  hand,  by  statute 
an  assessment  may  bear  interest  before  it  is  due.**  Whether  the 
legislature  may  change  the  law  with  reference  to  interest  upon 
an  assessment  after  such  assessment  has  been  levied  is  a  question 
upon  which  there  is  some  apparent  conflict  of  authority.  In 
some  jurisdictions  it  has  been  said  that  the  legislature  cannot 
increase  the  rate  of  interest  upon  assessments  levied  before  the 
statute  was  passed.*^  On  the  other  hand,  if  an  improvement  is 
begun  when  the  statute  authorizes  the  council  to  regulate  tht; 
rate  of  interest  on  overdue  assessments  and  the  council  fixes  the 
rate  at  eight  per  cent.,  a  subsequent  statute  providing  that  assess- 
ments should  be  subject  to  the  same  interest  and  penalties  as 
that  provided  for  by  other  statutes  therein  referred  to,  was  held 
not  to  apply.***  If  a  contract  for  a  street  improvement  is  made 
and  an  assessment  provided  for,  a  subsequent  statute  providing 
that  overdue  installments  shall  bear  interest,  was  held  to  be  valid 
as  against  constitutional  objections,  though  applying  to  such  prior 
assessment.*^  A  drainage  assessment  was  divided  into  install- 
ments at  a  time  when  the  statute  provided  that  such  installments 
should  draw  interest  only  from  the  time  they  became  payable. 
Subsequently  the  statute  was  amended  so  as  to  provide  that  as- 
sessments should  draw  interest  from  the  time  of  cotifirmation. 
Subsequently  the  original  division  of  assessments  into  install- 
ments was  set  aside  and  a  new  division  made.  It  was  held  that 
such  installments  bore  interest  from  confirmation  under  the 
amending  statute.**  If  no  judgment  is  rendered  upon  an  assess- 
ment, as  where  the  assessment  is  collected  by  a  summary  sale, 

"Storms   V.    Stevens,    104   Ind.   46,  '^  Jackson    Fire    Clay    Sewer    Pipe 

3  N.  E.  401    [1885];   Barber  Asphalt  &  Tile  Company  v.  Snyder,  93  Mich. 

Paving    Company    v.    Peck,    186    Mo.  325,  53  N.  W.  359    [1892]. 

506.  85   S.  W.  387    [1905].  "Camp  v.  Xeiischeler,  67   N.  J.  L. 

'=Eyerman   v.   Provenchere,   15   Mo.  (38  Vr.)    21,  50  Atl.  597   [1901]. 

App.  256    [1884].  *' Dougherty  v.   Henarie,  47  Cal.  9 

"Village    of    Western    Springs    v.  [1873]. 

Hill,     177    111.    634,    52    N.    E.    959  "People  of  the  State  of  Illinois  v. 

[1899].  Weber,    164    111.    412.    45    N.    E.    723 

"Steese    v.    Oviatt,    24    O.    S.    248  [1897]. 
[1873]. 


727  SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  475 

interest  is  ordinarily  to  be  calculated  down  to  the  date  of  the 
sale.*'-*  If  a  judgment  is  rendered  as  in  a  former  action  to  enforce 
the  assessment,  interest  should  be  calculated  on  the  assessment 
down  to  the  date  of  the  judgment,'^"  and  the  judgment,  after  its 
rendition,  bears  the  rate  of  interest  provided  for  by  statute."'^  If 
interest  on  deferred  installments  is  made  to  run  from  a  time 
later  than  is  provided  for  by  the  ordinance,  the  property  owner 
cannot  complain  of  such  irregularity."'-  If  a  part  of  an  aijsess- 
ment  is  apportioned  against  a  municipality,  such  part  bears  in- 
terest in  the  same  way  as  an  assessment  against  a  private  owner 
of  property,  in  the  absence  of  some  statute  making  specific  pro- 
vision for  the  assessment  against  the  municipality.^''  A  statute 
which  provides  for  a  remission  of  penalties  and  interest  on  ''taxes" 
for  certain  years  does  not  apply  to  local  assessments."'*  The 
right  to  charge  interest  on  overdue  assessments  is  in  the  nature 
of  enforcing  a  penalty  and  may  be  justified  upon  that  theory."' 
Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  assessments  shall  be  paid  to 
the  treasurer,  with  six  per  cent,  interest,  and  shall  be  collected 
as  other  taxes,  and  provides  in  another  section  that  if  the  munic- 
ipality sues  to  enforce  an  assessment,  it  may  recover  interest  at 
ten  per  cent.,  a  private  person  who  sues  to  enforce  an  assessment 
can  recover  only  six  per  cent."'"  A  propert}"  owner  who  resists 
an  assessment  because  interest  is  illegally  included  therein  can- 
not have  affirmative  relief  in  equity  unless  he  first  pays  or  offers 
to  pay  the  amount  legally  due."'"  A  statute  which  provides  for 
compromising  an  assessment  by  accepting  in  full,  payment  of 
one-third  of  the  original  amount,  may  provide  for  computing  in- 
terest on  such  one-third.'** 

••Brookbank   v.    City   of   JpfTerson-  "'City  of  Seattle  v.  Wliittlosey.   17 

ville,   41    Ind.   40(5    [1872].  Wash.  292.  49  Pac.  489   [1897].* 

•"City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  of  Sei-  "  Eyerniann     v.     Blaksley.     9     Mo. 

bert  V.  Allen,  53  Mo.  44   [1873].  App.  231    [1S80]. 

"  Himmelmann    v.    Oliver,    34    C"al.  °*  Des  Moines  Brick  Manufaeturinji 

246   [1867];  City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  Company    v.    Smith.    108    la.    307.    79 

of  Seibert  v.  Allen,  53  Mo.  44  [1873].  X.  W.  77   I  1899]. 

"  Halsey    v.    Town    of    Lake    View,  "Spalding   v.    City    of    Denver.    33 

188    111.    540,    59    N.    E.    234    [1901];  Colo.   172,  80  Pae.   126   [190.5];   Allen 

Bradford  v.  City  of  Pontiae.   165   111  v.  City  of  Davenport,   107   la.  90,  77 

612,  46  N.  E.  794   [1897].  N.    W.    532    [1898];    Annie    \Vri<,'ht 

*'Citv    of   Chicago    v.    People.    215  Seminary     v.     City    of    Tacoma.     23 

111.   235,   74   N.   E.    137    [1905]:     (af  Wash.  109.  62  Pac.  444   [1900]. 

firming    116    111.    App.    564    [19041);  ■•"  (Jilfeather   v.  Grout.  01   X.  Y.   S. 

Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Company    v.  533.    101    App.    Div.    150    [1905]. 
City  of  St.  Joseph,    183   Mo.   451.  82 
S.  W.  64    [1904]. 


§§476,477 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


728 


§  476.    Damages. 

Damages  for  which  a  city  is  liable  by  reason  of  injuries  which 
are  caused  by  negligence  in  the  construction  of  a  public  improve- 
ment, are  not  part  of  the  expenses  of  constructing  such  improve- 
ment. Such  items  of  expense  cannot  be  assessed  against  the 
property  benefited  by  the  improvement.^  They  must  be  paid  out 
of  the  public  treasury.^  On  the  same  principle  the  expense  in- 
curred in  the  unsuccessful  defense  of  damage  suits  brought 
against  a  public  corporation  for  its  illegal  and  negligent  conduct 
in  constructing  a  public  improvement  cannot  be  included  in  an 
assessment  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement.^  So  the  possible 
damages  which  a  city  may  be  obliged  to  pay  in  a  pending  suit 
in  case  such  suit  is  decided  adversely  to  the  city  cannot  be  in- 
cluded in  the  assessment.* 

§  477.     Cost  of  prior  defective  assessment. 

The  costs  of  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  sustain  an  invalid 
assessment  cannot  be  included  in  the  costs  of  an  improvement  on 
making  a  second  and  valid  assessment  therefor.^  Accordingly, 
neither  the  attorney's  fees  in  such  unsuccessful  suit  to  uphold 
an  assessment,-  nor  the  cost  of  the  copy  of  the  opinion  in  such 
unsuccessful  suit,^  can  be  included  in  such  assessment.  Under 
some  statutes,  however,  it  seems  to  be  held  that  the  expense  of 
irregular  and  defective  proceedings  may  be  included  in  the  final 
assessment  for  the  improvement.*     Costs  made  on  an  unsuccess- 


'  Leeds  v.  City  of  Richmond,  102 
Ind.  372,   1   N.  E.  711    [1885]. 

^  Leeds  v.  City  of  Richmond,  102 
Ind.  372,  1  N.  E.  711    [1885]. 

'State,  De  Witt,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  Borough 
of  Rutherford,  57  N.  J.  L.  (28  Vr.) 
619,   31    Atl.   228    [1895]. 

*  Gurnee  v.  City  of  Chicago,  40  111. 
165  [1866]. 

^  Farr  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners, 167  111.  355,  46  N.  E.  893 
[1897];  Laflin  v.  City  of  Chicago,  48 
111.  449  [1868];  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  Montgomery  County  v. 
Fullen,  118  Ind.  158,  20  N.  E.  771 
[1888];  (holding  that  the  costs  of 
the  former  proceeding,  reported  in 
Board    of    Commissioners    of    Mont- 


gomery County  V.  Fullen,  111  Ind. 
410,  12  N.  E.  298  [1887];  cannot  be 
included  in  second  assessment.)  ;  In 
the  Matter  of  Opening  Locust  Ave- 
nue in  Village  of  Port  Chester,  185 
N.  Y.  115,  77  N.  E.  1012  [1906]; 
(affirming  with  modification  97  N.  Y. 
S.   508,    110   App.   Div.   774    [1906]). 

^  Farr  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners, 167  111.  355,  46  N.  E.  893 
[1897];  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
Montgomery  County  v.  Fullen,  118 
Ind.   158,  20  N.  E.  *771    [1886]. 

'  Farr  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners, 167  111.  355,  46  N.  E.  893 
[1897]. 

*Anketell  v.  Hayward,  119  Micii. 
525,  78  N.  W.  557   [1899]. 


729  SPECIFIC    ITEMS   INCLUDED   IN    ASSESSMENT.       §§-478,479 

ful  remonstrance  against  the  public  improvement  cannot  be   in- 
cluded in  the  cost  of  the  improvement.'^ 

§  478.    Contingent  expenses. 

Since  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  in  an  amount  exceeding 
the  actual  cost  of  the  improvement  for  which  it  is  levied,^  an 
amount  for  contingent  expenses  cannot  be  added  to  the  specific 
items  enumerated  in  the  assessment.-  So  an  assessment  cannot 
be  levied  for  the  amount  of  damages  which  may  possibly  be  re- 
covered against  the  city  in  a  suit  then  pending,  where  the  liability 
of  the  city  for  damages  and  the  amount  for  which  it  might  be 
held  liable  were  both  contingent  on  the  outcome  of  the  pending 
suit."*  There  is  some  authority  for  allowing  an  amount  for  con- 
tingent and  unspecified  items  of  expense.  The  allowance  of  one 
thousand  dollars  for  contingent  expenses  does  not  invalidate  the 
contract.*  Usually,  however,  the  items  of  expense  must  be  cer- 
tain, and  they  must  be  specified  in  advance. 

§  479.    Effect  of  including  improper  items. 

Whether  the  inclusion  of  unauthorized  items  to  a  substantial 
amount  invalidates  the  entire  assessment  or  merely  avoids  the 
assessment  as  to  such  unauthorized  items  is  a  question  upon  which 
there  is  some  diverge  ice  of  authority.  In  some  jurisdictions  an 
assessment  is  regarded  as  an  entirety,  possessing  no  validity 
excepting  that  conferred  upon  it  by  statute,  and  accordingly  the 
inclusion  of  an  invalid  item  is  regarded  as  invalidating  the  en- 
tire assessment.^  This  view  is  expressed  in  cases  in  most  of 
which,  probably,  the  assessment  does  not  afford  the  means  of  sep- 
arating the  legal  items  from  the  illegal  ones.  The  assessment  would 

"Zigler  V.  Menkes,  121  Ind.  99,  16  Schirmer     v.     Iloyt,     54     Cal.     2S0 

Am.    St.    Kep.    :i57,    22    N.    E.     782  [1880];    Dyer  v.   Chase,   52   Cal.   440 

11889].  [1887])  ;   Partridge  v.  Lucas,  99  Cal. 

»See   8   466.  519,    33    Pac.    1082    [1893];    Borland 

*  People  ex  rel.  Knox  v.  ViJlajrc  of  v.  Berpson.  78  Cal.  637,  21   Pac.  537 

Yonkers,     39     Barb.      (N.     Y.)      266  [  18S9]  ;  Wilson  v.  Poole,  33  Ind.  443 

[1863].  [1870];     Poth    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen 

'Giirnee  v.  City  of  Chicago,  40  111.  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 

165    [1866].          "  York.    151    N.    Y.    16,   45    X.    E.    372 

•Betts   V.    \Villiamslmrg,    15    Barb.  [1890];    Mitchell    v.    Lane,    62    Hun. 

255   [1853].  (X.    Y.)     253.    16    N.    Y.    Supp.    707 

'Ryan    v.    Alt^chul.    103    Cal.    174.  [1891];     McAllister    v.    City    of    Ta- 

37   Pac.  339    [1894];    (citing  D.mnel-  cmn.  9  Wash.  272,  37  Pac.  447,  658 

ly   V.    Howard,   60    Cal.    291    [1882];  [1894]. 


§479 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


730 


therefore  be  invalid  under  a  less  extreme  theory."  At  any  rate  this 
view  is  a  more  extreme  one  than  that  entertained  in  most  juris- 
dictions. If  the  illegal  items  are  severed  from  the  legal  ones 
by  the  terms  of  the  assessment  so  that  by  inspection  of  the  pro- 
ceedings the  amount,  which  is  properly  assessable,  can  be  ascer- 
tained, the  assessment  is  invalid  as  to  the  illegal  items  and  valid 
as  to  those  which  are  legal.'*  If  the  assessment  does  not  sever  the 
legal  from  the  illegal  items,  it  is  held  in  most  jurisdictions  that 
the  court  has  no  power  to  determine  the  amount  of  the  legal 
items  bv  extrinsic   evidence,   and  that   the  entire  assessment  is 


^  See  post  this  section,  N.  4. 

"  tSpaulding  v.  Wesson,  115  Cal. 
441,  47  Pac.  249  [1896];  McDonald 
V.  Mezes,  107  Cal.  492,  40  Pac.  808 
11895];  Flick  v.  Morford,  87  Cal. 
576,  25  Pac.  764  11891];  Donnelly  v. 
Howard,  60  Cal.  291  [1882];  Dyer  v. 
Chase,  52  Cal.  440  [1877];  Spalding 
V.  City  of  Denver,  33  Colo.  172,  80 
Pac.  126  [1905];  Mcl'lellan  v.  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  7  Mackey  (D.  C.) 
94  [1889];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Hnl- 
bert,  205  111.  346,  68  N.  E.  786; 
Shannon  v.  Village  of  Hinsdale,  180 
111.  202,  54  N.  E.  181  [1899];  Farr 
V.  West  Chicago  Park  Commission- 
ers, 167  111.  355,  46  N.  E.  893 
[1897];  Ross  v.  Van  Natta,  164  Ind. 
557,  74  N.  E.  10  [1905];  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  Montgomery  Coun- 
ty V.  Fullen,  118  Ind.  158,  20  N.  E. 
771  [1888];  New  Eel  River  Draining 
Association  v.  Durbin,  30  Ind.  173 
[1868];  Gallaher  v.  Garland,  126  la. 
206,  101  N.  W.  867  [1904];  Allen 
V.  City  of  Davenport,  107  la.  90,  77 
N.  W.  532  [1898];  City  of  Louis- 
ville V.  Selvage,  106  Ky.  730, 
51  S.  VV.  447,  52  S.  VV. 
809  [1899];  S.  D.  Moody  &  Co. 
V.  Sewerage  and  Water  Board,  117 
La.  360,  41  So.  649  [1906];  Power 
V.  City  of  Detroit,  139  Mich.  30,  102 
N.  W.  288  [1905];  Neenan  v.  Smith, 
.60  Mo.  292  [1875];  City  of  Boon- 
ville   ex   rel.   Cosgrove   v.   Rogers,  — 

Mo.     App.    ,     101     S.     W.     1120 

[1907];  City  of  St.  Joseph  ex  rel. 
Danaher  v.  Dillon,   61   Mo.   App.   317 


[1895];  Davis  v.  Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  City  of  Newark, 
54  N.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  595,  25  Atl.  336 
[1892];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Deering  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, 93  N.  Y.  361  [1883];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Auchmuty, 
90  N.  Y.  685  [1882];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Petition  of  Auchmuty,  18  Hun. 
(N.  Y.)  324  [1879];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Petition  of  LTpson  to  Vacate 
an  Assessment,  89  N.  Y.  67  [1882]; 
In  the  Matter  of  Lord,  78  N.  Y.  109 
[1879];  In  the  Matter  of  Schell,  76 
N.  Y.  432  [1879];  In  the  Matter  of 
Walter,  75  N.  Y.  354  [1878];  In  the 
Matter  of  New  \ork  Protestant  Epis- 
copal School,  75  N.  Y.  324;  In  the 
Matter  of  Mead,  74  N.  Y.  216 
[1878];  In  the  Matter  of  Hebrew- 
Benevolent  Orphan  Asylum,  70  N.  Y. 
476  [1877];  In  the  Matter  of  Cram, 
69  N.  Y.  452  [1877];  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Petition  of  Merriam  to  Va- 
cate an  Assessment,  84  N.  Y.  596 
[1881];  Matter  of  McCormack,  60 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  128  [1870];  Matter 
of  McCormack,  10  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  (N. 
V.)  234  [1870];  Jaeger  v.  Burr,  36 
0.  S.  164  [1880];  McGlynn  v.  City 
of  Toledo,  22  Ohio  C.  C."  34  [1901]; 
Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2  S.  D. 
640,  39  Am.' St.  Rep.  802,  51  N.  W. 
770  [1892];  Annie  Weight  Seminary 
V.  City  of  Tacoma,  23  Wash.  109,  62 
Pac.  444  [1900];  Wells  v.  Western 
Paving  &  Supply  Company,  96  Wis. 
116,  70  N.  W.  1071  [1897];  Dean  v. 
Borchsenius,    30   Wis.    236    [1872]. 


J 


731  SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT.  §  479 

therefore  invalid.^  If  the  record  does  not  show  the  means  of 
separating:  the  valid  items  from  the  invalid  it  may  be  proper  to 
set  the  assessment  aside,"'  while  if  in  another  action  on  the  same 
assessment  the  record  shows  the  means  of  separating  the  legal 
items  from  the  illegal  items,  the  amonnt  of  the  assessment  may 
be  reduced  and  the  assesment,  as  reduced,  may  be  upheld."  In 
other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  the  court  may  determine  from 
extrinsic  evidence  what  is  proper  assessment  for  the  amount  of 
the  legal  items  and  may  enforce  such  assessment  as  to  such  legal 
items  without  regarding  it  as  entirely  invalid.^  Thus,  if  the  con- 
tract for  constructing  a  street  was  for  a  gross  amount  which 
included  both  the  cost  of  original  construction  and  the  cost  of 
maintenance,  and  a  street  railway  company  could  not  be  charged 
with  the  cost  of  maintenance  since  it  remained  liable  to  the  city 
under  its  franchise  to  keep  that  part  of  the  street  between  its 
tracks  in  repair,  it  was  held  that  the  court  might  determine,  from 
extrinsic  evidence,  what  part  of  the  contract  price  was  intended 
for  original  construction  and  what  part  for  maintenance  and 
enforce  the  assessment  as  to  the  cost  of  the  original  construction." 
So  where  it  is  held  that  a  guaranty  to  keep  a  street  in  repair 
for  five  years,  to  be  secured  by  the  deposit  in  bonds  of  ten  per 
cent,   of  th?   contract   price,   cannot   be   included   in   the   assess- 

'SpauUling    v.     Wesson,     115    Cal.  S.   W.   52    [1895];    City  of  Joplin  ex 

441,    47    Pac.    24!>    11890] ;     Chicago  rel.   v.    Freeman,    125   Mo.   App.   717, 

Union  Traction   Company   v.   City  of  103   S.   W.    130    [1907];    City   of   St. 

Chicago,   208    111.    187,    70   N.   E.   234  Joseph   ex    rel.    Danaher   v.   Wilshire, 

[1904];    Xaltner    v.    Blake,    56    Ind.  47  Mo.  App.  125  [  1891] ;   In  the  Mat- 

127    [1877];    Kansas   City   v.    O'Con-  ter    of    the    Petition    of    Roscnbaum, 

nor,  82  Mo.   App.  055   [1899];    State.  119  N.  Y.  24,  23  >T.  E.   172    [1890]; 

Randolph,  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants  of  tlie  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the 

City    of   PlainfieM.    38    X.    J.    L.    (9  Trustees  of  Leal<e  and  Watts  Orphan 

Vr.)    93    [1875]:     In    the    Matter    of  Home.   92  X.  Y.    116    [1883];    In   the 

Mew      York       Protestant       Episcopal  Matter    of    Mead.    13    Hun.     (X.    Y.) 

School,  75  X.  Y.   324    [1878).  349   [1878];   Williamsport  v.  Iluglies, 

Mn  the  Matter  of  Xew   York    l'n>-  21  Pa.  Super,  Ct.  443   [1902];   Young 

testant    Episcopal    Scliool.    75    X.    ^  .  v.  City  of  Taeoma,  31  Wash.  153.  71 

324    [1878].  Pac.    742     [1903];     Cook    v.    City    of 

"In   the  Matter   of  tlie   Petition   of  Racine,    49    Wis.    243.    5    X.    W.    352 

Auchmuty.  90  X.  Y.  085   [1882].  [1880]. 

'Fair  Haven  &   Westville  Railroad  "Fair  Haven  &   Westville   Railroad 

Company   v.   City   of  Xew   Haven.   77  Company  v.   City  of   Xew   Haven,   77 

Conn.  667.  60  Atl.  651    [1905];    Feh-  Conn.  007,  60  Atl.  651    [1905].     See 

ler  V.  Gosnell.  99  Ky.  380.  35  S.  W.  also  to  the  same  effect  Williamsport 

1125    [1896];    Verdin   v.   City  of   St.  v.    Hughes.    21    Pa.    Super.    Ct.    443 

Louis.  131   Mo.  26.  33  S.  W.  480.  36  [1902]. 


§  479  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  732 

ment,  the  court  may  regard  the  amount  of  such  bond  as  the  amount 
of  the  increase  in  price  due  to  such  provision  for  maintenance." 
So  if  a  contract  has  been  let  at  a  price  so  exorbitant  as  to  amount 
to  fraud,  the  court  may  determine  from  extrinsic  evidence  what 
a  proper  price  would  be  and  may  reduce  the  assessment  to  such 
price.^"  So  if  a  contract  has  been  let  without  competitive  bid- 
ding, the  court  may  determine  how  great  is  the  excess  over  the 
price  that  could  have  been  obtained  under  competition.^^  A 
statute  authorizing  a  deduction  from  the  amount  of  the  assess- 
ment instead  of  the  vacation  of  the  entire  assessment  is  not  re- 
tro-active and  does  not  applj^  to  proceedings  had  before  the 
passage  of  such  statute. ^^  In  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the 
contrary,  it  will  be  presumed  that  improper  items  have  not  been 
included  in  the  assessment.^^  Thus,  where  in  repairing  a  ditch 
more  work  is  done  than  is  authorized,  but  the  amount  of 
the  assessment  does  not  exceed  the  amount  actually  paid  for 
repairs,  it  will  not  be  presumed  that  such  assessment  is  ex- 
cessive.^* Where  an  ordinance  for  constructing  a  sidewalk 
provided,  in  excess  of  the  authority  of  the  city,  that  if  areas 
or  vaults  had  not  been  roofed  over,  the  necessary  arching 
should  be  built  by  the  contractor  under  specifications  to  be 
furnished  by  the  city  engineer,  it  was  held  that  a  tax  bill  issued 
under  such  ordinance  which  recited  that  it  was  for  constructing 
sidewalks  and  contained  no  reference  to  the  construction  of 
arches  would  be  presumed  to  be  valid  in  the  absence  of  a  showing 
that  such  part  of  such  bill  represented  the  cost  of  constructing 
such  arches.^^  Under  some  statutes  the  only  remedy  against  in- 
cluding improper  items  in  an  assessment  is  an  appeal  to  a  desig- 
nated board.  Failure  to  take  such  appeal  operates  as  a  waiver  of 
such  defect.^''    If  the  objection  to  certain  items  as  improper  is  not 

»  Fehler  v.  Gk)snell,  99  Ky.  380,  35  "  Scott  v.  Stringley,   132  Ind.  378, 

S.   W.    1125    [1896];    Young   v.    City  31  N.  E.  953   [1892];   Haag  v.  Ward, 

of   Tacoma,    31    Wash.    153,    71    Pac.  186  Mo.  325,  85  S.  W.  391   [1904]. 

742    [1903].  "Scott  v.  Stringley,   132  Ind.  378, 

"•In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  31  N.  E.  953   [1892]. 

the  Trustees  of  the  Leake  and  Watts  i"  Haag  v.   Ward,    186  Mo.  325,  85 

Orphan  Home,  92  N.  Y.   116   [1883].  S.  W.  391    [1904]. 

"  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  "  Frick    v.    Morford,    87    Cal.    576, 

Rosenbaum,   119   N.  Y.   24,   23  N.  E.  25  Pac.  764  [1891];  Dyer  v.  Scalma- 

172    [1890].  nini,  69  Cal.  637,  11  Pac.  327  [1886]; 

12  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Blair  v.  Luning.  76  Cal.  134,  18  Pac. 

Eager,  46  N.  Y.   100   [1871].  153    ^i<^'^'^'      ^"Snm^clmann   v.   Hoad- 


733  SPECIFIC    ITEMS   INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT,  §  480 

taken  in  the  court  below,  it  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time  in 
proceedings  in  error/^  While  appeal  may  be  the  exclusive  remedy 
where  there  is  statutory  authority  for  including  the  items  in 
question  if  such  authority  is  improperly  exercised/*  it  is  not 
exclusive  if  there  is  no  statutory  authority  for  such  items.^® 

§  480.    Immaterial  errors  in  including  items. 

In  accordance  with  the  maxim  de  minimis  non  curat  lex,  an  as- 
sessment may  include  unauthorized  items,  but  the  amount  of  such 
items  may  be  so  small  in  proportion  to  the  entire  assessment  that 
the  assessment  will  not  be  disturbed  by  the  courts  on  account  of 
such  improper  items.^  On  the  other  hand,  the  amount  of  the 
improper  items  included  may  be  small  and  yet  it  may  be  of  such 
magnitude  with  reference  to  the  assessment  that  it  will  not  fall 
within  this  maxim;  and  the  inclusion  of  such  improper  items  will 
avoid  the  assessment.-  When  the  maxim  applies  and  when  it  does 
not  are  questions  upon  which  there  is  some  conflict  of  authority; 
and  which  can  better  be  illustrated  by  specific  examples  than  by 
abstract  statements.  Including  in  an  assessment  an  unauthorized 
fee  for  serving  notices  amounting  to  two  dollars  and  fifty  cents 
has  been  held  to  be  within  the  maxim.''  In  an  improvement  the 
total  cost  of  which  was   over  nineteen   thousand   dollars,   there 

ley,  44  Cal.  270    [18721;   Loesnitz  v.  Newark,    35    N.    J.    L.    (6    Vr.)     1G8 

Seelinjjer,  Treas.,  127  Ind.  422,  2.5  N.  [1871];    In   the   Matter   of   the   Peti- 

E.  10.37,  26  N.  E.  887   [1890].  tion  of  Lowden  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 

'M)eady  v.  Townsend,   57   Cal.  298  ment,   89   N.   Y.   548    [18821;    In   tlie 

11881].    '  Matter   of   the   Petition   of   The   Mu- 

'"  Ilimrrielmann  v.  Hoadley,  44  Cal.  tual  Life  Insurance  Company  of  New 

276    [1872].  York    to    Vacate    an    Assessment,    89 

'"City    Street     Improvement    Com-  N.    Y.    530     [1882];     People    of    the 

pany  v.  Taylor,  138  Cal.  304,  71  Pac.  State  of  New  York  ex  rel.  Jessup  v. 

446    [1903];    Himmelmann    v.    Hoad-  Kelley,  33  Hun.   (N.  Y.)   389   |1884|; 

ley,  44   Cal.  276    [1872].  McGlynn   v.  City  of  Toledo,  22   Ohia 

1  Chicago      Consolidated      Traction  C.   c'  34    [1901]. 

Company  v.  Village  of  Oak  Park,  225  -Morris  v.  City  of  (  hicago,  11   III. 

111.  9;   80  N.  E.  42   [1907];   Gardiner  650    [1850];    In    the    :\Iatter    of    the 

V.   Street  Commissioners  of  the  City  Petition  of  Deering  to  Vacate  an  As- 

of   Boston,   188   Mass.   223.   74   N.   E.  sessment,   93   N.    Y.    361    [1883];    In 

.341  [1905];  Workman  V.  City  of  Wor-  the   Matter   of   Willis,   30   Hun.    (N. 

center.   118  Mass.   108   [1875*];   State,  Y.)    13    [1883]. 

Raymond.  Pros.    v.  Mayor  and  Conn-  ^McOIynn    v.    City    of    Toledo,    22 

cil  of  tlio  Borough  of  l^utherford.  55  Ohio  C.   C.   34    [1901].      (The  assess- 

X.  J.   L.    (20   Vr.)    441.   27   Atl.    172  ment   in   this  case  was,   however,   set 

[1893];  State,  Agens.  Pros.  v.  ^Mayor  aside   upon  other  grounds.) 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 


§480 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


734 


was  included  the  cost  of  constructing  thirty-nine  additional  feet 
improperly  included  by  the  ordinance  at  a  cost  of  twenty-seven 
dollars  and  thirty  cents.  The  proportion  of  this  item,  which  was 
charged  upon  a  street  railway  company,  was  two  dollars  and 
forty-five  cents.  It  was  held  that  this  amount  was  too  trifling  to 
render  the  ordinance  unreasonable,  oppressive  or  void.*  Under 
an  order  for  assessing  four  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars 
for  drains  and  sewers  the  fact  that  four  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand and  one  dollars  were  assessed  did  not  invalidate  the  assess- 
ment.'^ The  maxim  has  been  applied  in  cases  where  the  excess 
cost  bore  a  larger  proportion  to  the  cost  of  the  entire  improve- 
ment. Thus,  where  the  total  amount  of  the  assessment  was  over 
one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  dollars  and  it  included  an 
item  improperly  allowed  for  damages  to  gas  mains  exceeding  four 
thousand  dollars  and  the  commissioners  regarded  such  amount 
as  falling  within  the  application  of  the  maxim  de  minimis  non 
curat  lex,  it  was  held  that  the  commissioners  could  apply  such 
maxim  where  courts  of  law  could  not  and  their  action  should 
be  affirmed.'"'  The  excess  of  six  cents  in  an  assessment  exceeding 
twenty-nine  thousand  dollars  has  been  held  to  be  immaterial.^  So 
an  excess  of  five  cents  upon  an  assessment  has  been  held  to  be 
within  the  operation  of  the  maxim. ^  Where  an  unlawful  item  has 
been  larger  in  proportion  to  the  total  assessment,  the  maxim  has 
been  held  not  to  apply.  Thus,  an  unlawful  and  unauthorized 
item  of  seven  dollars  has  been  held  to  avoid  an  assessment  of 
nearly  two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars ; "  an  unauthorized  item  of 
ninety-six  dollars  has  been  held  to  avoid  an  assessment  of  nearly 
nine  thousand  dollars;  ^*'* and  the  addition  to  an  assessment  of 
over  twelve  hundred  dollars  of  an  item  of  four  hundred  and 
sixty  dollars  for  contingencies  has  been  held  to  avoid  the  assess- 
ment.^^    In  some  jurisdictions  excesses  no  greater  than  those  re- 


*  Chicago  Consolidated  Traction 
Company  v.  Village  of  Oak  Park,  225 
111.  9,  80  N.  E.  42   [1907]. 

^  Workman  v.  City  of  Worcester, 
118  Mass.   168    [1875]. 

'  People  of  the  State  of  New  York 
ex  rel.  Jessiip  v.  Kelley,  33  Hun.  (N. 
Y.)    389    [1884]. 

'  State,  Agens,  Pros.  v.  "Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  New- 
ark. 35  N.  J.  L.    (6  Vr.)    168   [1871]. 


"Coleman  v.  Shattuck.  68  N.  Y. 
349. 

'  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Deering  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  93 
N.    Y.    361    [1883]. 

^"Morris  v.  City  of  Chicago,  11  111. 
650   [1850]. 

'1  People  ex  rel.  Knox  v.  Village  of 
Yonkers,  39  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  266 
[1863]. 


735  SPECIFIC    ITEMS    INCLUDED    IN    ASSESSMENT  §  480 

garded  in  other  courts  as  falling  within  the  application  of  the 
maxim  have  been  held  to  invalidate  the  assessment.  Thus,  where 
a  contract  for  making  an  improvement  was  let  at  one  dollar  a 
foot  an  assessment  of  eighty- three  dollars  and  eighty-four  cents 
upon  a  lot,  the  front  of  which  was  eighty-two  and  one-half  feet, 
was  held  to  be  unauthorized.^-  An  addition  of  excessive  interest 
amounting  to  one  dollar  has  been  held  to  avoid  the  assessment.'^ 
If  unauthorized  items  have  been  included  in  computing  the  cost 
of  an  improvement,  but  the  assessment  as  levied  is  for  less  than 
the  amount  of  the  authorized  item,  the  inclusion  of  the  unauthor- 
ized items  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.^*  If.  however,  the 
greater  part  of  the  expense  is  incurred  under  a  contract  invalid 
because  bids  were  not  advertised  for,  it  has  been  held  that 
assessments  levied  for  such  improvement  were  invalid  even  if 
an  amount  in  excess  of  the  assessments  was  expended  legally, 
since  the  assessment  was  levied  for  benefits  received  from  the 
entire  improvement  and  not  merely  from  the  part  thereof  for 
which  legal  expenditures  were  made.''  If  unauthorized  work 
has  been  done  in  an  improvement,  but  there  is  no  evidence  to 
show  that  a  charge  therefor  is  included  in  the  assessment,  the 
fact  that  such  work  is  done  does  not  make  the  assessment  in- 
valid.'" 

i-Wilson     V.     PooIp.     3.3     Tml.     443  L.   (26  Vr.)   441.  29  Atl.  172  [1893]; 

[18701.  In  tlie  Matter  of  tlie  Petition  of  The 

"In  the  matter  of  Willis.  30  Hun.  Mutual    Life    Insurance   Company   of 

(N.  Y.)    13    [18831.  New   York  to  Vacate  an  Assessment, 

"Morse  v.  Charles.  —  Mass. .  89  X.  Y.  530   [1882]:   In  the  Matter 

83    N.    E.    891     [1908];    Gardiner    v.  of  the  Petition  of  Lowden  to  Vacate 

Street  Commissioners  of  the  City  of  an  Assessment,  89  X.  Y.  .^48  |  1882]. 
Boston,   188  :Mass.  223,  74  X.  E.  341  ''Warren   v.   Street   Commissioners 

[19051;   Wells  V.  Street  Commission-  of  the  City  of   Boston,    181    Mass.   G, 

ers  of  City  of  Boston,  187  Mass.  451,  02   X.   E.  951    [1902]. 
73    X.    E.\554    [1905];    State.    Ray-  '«  Field  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Pav.  Co., 

mond.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of  117  Fed.  925   [1902J. 
the  Borough  of  Rutherford,  oo  X.  J. 


CHAPTER  XI. 
THE  IMPROVEMENT  CONTRACT. 

§  481.     Power  to  let  contract. 

A  grant  of  power  to  a  city  to  construct  an  improvement  im- 
pliedly confers  powers  upon  such  city  to  let  contracts  for  the  con- 
struction of  such  improvements.^  Thus,  statutes  which  authorize 
a  city  to  require  the  owners  or  occupants  of  adjoining  prop- 
erty to  repair  streets,  alleys  or  sidewalks  which  are  out  of  re- 
pair,- or  a  statute  authorizing  a  public  corporation  to  provide 
for  the  construction  of  lateral  sewers  and  to  apportion  the 
actual  cost  of  labor  or  material  expended,^  each  of  them  au- 
thorizes the  public  corporation  to  let  a  contract  for  such  im- 
provement instead  of  constructing  it  by  employing  laborers  and 
purchasing  material.  So  a  statute  authorizing  municipal  cor- 
porations to  cause  any  lot  upon  which  water  should  become 
stagnant  to  be  filled  up  or  drained  or  which  provides  that  in 
case  of  failure  or  refusal  of  the  owner  to  do  so  it  is  to  be  done 
at  the  expense  of  the  municipal  corporation,  authorizes  the  mu- 
nicipal corporation  to  let  a  contract  for  such  work  and  to  assess 
the  cost  thereof  upon  the  owners  of  such  property.*  So  where 
a  city  authorizes  the  majority  of  the  property  owners  upon  a 
certain  street  to  pave  the  same,  and  a  majority  avail  themselves 
of  such  privilege  and  enter  into  a  contract  with  a  third  person 
to  pave  such  street  it  is  held  that  such  contractor  has  done  the 
work  under  the  authority  of  the  city,  that  he  is  to  be  regarded 
as  the  agent  of  the  city  for  the  purpose  of  doing  such  work 
and  that  accordingly  the  defense  cannot  be  made  that  the  work 
was  not  done  by  the  city  or  any  of  its  agents.-'^ 

^  Heath   v.    Manson,    147    Cal.    094,  ^  Jones  v.  Hokapfel,   11   Okla.  405, 

82   Pac.   331    [1905];    Jones   v.   Holz-  68   Pac.   511    [1902]. 

apfel.     11     Okla.    405,    68    Pac.    511  ♦  Bliss  v.  Kraus,  16  0.  S.  54  [1864]. 

[1902];   Bliss  v.  Kraus,   16   0.  S.  54  'City    of    Philadelphia    v.    Wistar, 

[1864].  35   Pa.   St.   427    [I860].      (Snch  con- 

=  Heath   v.   Manson,    147    Cal.    694,  tractor   was   authofi>ed    to   file   liens 

82  Pac.   331    [1905].  in  the  name  of  the  city  for  liis  use.) 

736 


737  THE  IMPROVEMENT  CONTRACT.  §  482 

§  482.     Necessity  of  letting  contract. 

Whether  a  city  is  bound  to  let  contracts  for  the  construction 
of  public  improvements  or  whether  it  has  poAver  to  employ  men 
and  purchase  material  and  so  construct  improvement  itself  is 'a 
question  which  depends  entirely  upon  the  provisions  of  the  stat- 
ute conferring?  power  upon  public  corporations.  In  the  absence 
of  a  statute  specifically  requiring  the  city  to  let  contracts,  it 
is  not  necessary  that  the  city  should  do  so.  It  may,  if  it  pleases, 
construct  an  improvement  by  employing  men  by  the  day  and 
by  purchasing  the  necessary  material.^  If  there  has  been  no 
violation  of  statutory  provisions  requiring  the  letting  of  a  con- 
tract or  competitive  bidding,  the  fact  that  no  competition  was 
invited,  no  contract  was  let  and  the  workmen  paid  by  the  day, 
is  not  in  the  absence  of  fraud  a  defense  to  the  assessment.-  A 
statute  which  authorizes  a  public  corporation  to  let  contracts 
does  not  require  them  so  to  do  in  the  absence  of  some  mandatory 
provision.  Thus  a  statutory  provision  that  a  fencing  district 
"may  advertise  for  proposals  for  doing  any  work  by  contract" 
is  a  directory  and  not  a  mandatory  provision  and  such  board 
may  let  a  contract  without  advertisement  if  it  sees  fit.'^  In  the 
absence  of  a  statute  requiring  the  letting  of  contracts  for  the 
construction  of  public  improvements  a  city  may  construct  a  part 
of  a  street  itself  and  let  contracts  for  the  construction  of  the 
rest  of  the  street.*  Under  a  statute  requiring  a  city  to  let  con- 
tracts by  advertisement  and  in  the  absence  of  bidders  to  con- 
struct the  work  itself,  a  city  has  no  power  in  the  absence  of 
bidders  to  let  a  contract  without  advertisement.'^  Under  many 
statutes  it  is  provided  that  improvements  exceeding  a  certain 
amount  in  value  must  be  constructed  by  contract,  let  in  the 
manner  prescribed  by  statute.     Such  statutes  are  mandatory  and 

*  Scott  V.   Strin^ley,    1.32   Tnd.   378,  ^Scott   v.   Rtrinpley,    132   Iiul.   378, 

31  N.  E.  9.53    [18021;    In  the  Matter  31  X.  E.  953   [1892]." 

of  the  Petition  of  tlie  Trustees  of  the  ^Stiewel  v.  Fencing  District  Xo.  6 

Leake   and    Watts    Or|)han    Home    in  of   Johnson   County,   71    Ark.    17,    70 

the  City  of  Xew  York,  92  X.  Y.   11 G  S.  \V.  308,  71  S.  W.  247   [1902]. 

[1883];    \Vel)l)er  v.   Common    Council  *  Town    of    Tumwater    v.    Pix,     18 

of  the  City  of  Lockport.  43  TTowanl  Wash.    153,  51    Pac.   353   [1897]. 

(N.  Y.)    308    [1872];   City  of  Pliila-  °  City    of    Elsberry    v.    Black.    120 

delphia    v.    Bur<rin.    50    Pa.    St.    (14  Mo.    App.    20,    90    S.    W.    250,    257 

Wright)    539   [ISfio];   Town  of  Tum-  [1906]. 
water  v.  Pix.   18  Wash.   153.  51    Pac. 
353  [1897]. 


§  482  T.VXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  73S 

an  improvement  constructed  except  as  provided  for  by  statute, 
cannot  be  paid  for  by  assessment  upon  property  owners."  Under 
a  statute  which  provides  that  any  work  involving  an  expenditure 
of  over  one  thousand  dollars  shall  be  let  by  contract  in  a  specified 
manner  and  providing  elsewhere  that  the  department  of  public 
works  shall  have  the  powers  and  functions  previously  possessed 
by  the  old  department  of  public  works,  the  new  department  of 
public  works  is  bound  to  let  contracts  if  the  expenditure  exceeds 
one  thousand  dollars,  although  the  old  board  was  not  so  re- 
stricted.^ If  the  statute  authorizes  a  certain  majority  of  the 
council  to  dispense  with  the  letting  of  contracts  such  power  must 
be  exercised  by  the  council  in  each  specific  case  and  cannot  be 
delegated  generally  by  a  three-fourths  vote  to  other  public  offi- 
cials.^ Thus  an  ordinance  adopted  by  the  council  by  three- 
fourths  vote  and  authorizing  the  commissioners  of  public  works 
to  do  certain  work  as  they  might  deem  expedient  and  for  the 
best  interests  of  the  city  and  property  owners  was  held  not  to 
authorize  the  commissioners  to  do  the  work  which  involved  an 
expenditure  of  over  one  thousand  dollars  by  day's  work  and  w^ith- 
out  a  contract."  A  statute  which  requires  public  improvements 
to  be  constructed  under  a  contract  let  in  the  manner  specified  by 
statute  does  not  apply  to  improvements  already  commenced  un- 
der pre-existing  statutes.^"  Thus  where  the  work  was  begun  on 
the  day  before  the  act  took  effect,  it  was  held  that  such  statute 
did  not  apply."  Omission  to  let  a  contract  where  the  expendi- 
ture exceeds  the  amount  limited  has  been  said  not  to  be  a  fraud 
or  legal  irregularity  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  authoriz- 
ing  the    vacation    of   an    assessment    on    those    grounds.^-      Thus 

"City     Improvement     Company     v.  '^  In   the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

Broderick,   125  Cal.  139,  57  Pac.  776  the      Emigrant      Industrial      Savings 

[1899];    Town   of  Clay  City  v.   Bry-  Bank,    75    X.   Y.    388    [18781. 

son.  30  Ind.  App.  490,   66  k.  E.  498  "In  the  Matter  of   the  Petition  of 

[1902];    In   the   Matter    of   the    Peti-  the      Emigrant      Industrial      Savings 

tion     of     Blodgett,     91     X.     Y.     117  Bank,  75  X\  Y.  388   [1878]. 

[1883];    In  the  Matter  of  the  Appli-  "  Tripler   v.   Mayor,   Aldermen   and 

cation  of  Lange  to  Vacate  an  Assess-  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew  York, 

ment,   85   X.   Y.   307    [1881];    In   the  125  X.  Y.  617.  26  X.  E.  721    [1891]. 

Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Robhins  to  "  Smith  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Vacate  an  Assessment,  82  X.  Y.   131     .  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew  York. 

[1880];    In    the   Matter   of   the   Peti-  82  Hun.   (X.  Y.)    570,  31  X.  Y.  Supp. 

tion  of  the  Emigrant  Industrial  Sav-  783    [1894]. 

ings  Bank,  75  X.  Y.  388   [1878].  '-Miller's  Case,    12   Abb.   Prac.    (X. 

'In  the  Matter   of  the  Petition  of  Y.)    121    [1861]. 
Blodgett,  91  X.  Y.   117    [1883]. 


739  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  483 

under  a  statute  authorizing  a  tax  for  lighting  and  water  to  be 
levied  when  the  town  trustees  have  made  a  contract  for  light  and 
water,  such  tax  cannot  be  levied  before  such  contract  is  made.'"' 
The  fact  that  a  drain  commissioner  has  not  declared  a  contract 
void  for  non-performance  and  that  he  has  not  relet  the  contract 
does  not  justify  the  board  of  supervisors  in  refusing  to  levy  an 
assessment  for  the  w^ork.'* 

§  483.     Necessity  of  valid  contract. 

If  a  contract  for  the  construction  of  the  public  improvement 
has  been  let  and  an  assessment  levied  to  pay  such  contract  price, 
the  validity  of  such  contract  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the 
assessment  since  otherwise  the  assessment  would  be  levied  to 
pay  the  claim  not  legally  due  against  the  city.^  Thus  if  a  con- 
tract is  invalid  because  let  without  a  petition  for  the  improve- 
ment by  a  majority  of  the  lot  owners,-  or  because  it  is  entered 
into  by  persons  who  are  not  officers  of  the  city  either  de  facto  or 
de  jure  and  who  act  only  under  an  unconstitutional  statute,'*  an 
assessment  therefor  is  invalid.  If  a  contract  has  been  let  under 
a  defective  ordinance,  such  contract  cannot  be  corrected  by  a 
subsequent  resolution  of  the  council.  If  it  can  be  corrected  at  all, 
it  must  be  by  a  new  ordinance  passed  in  proper  form.*  If  no 
contract  at  all  exists  but  a  specific  statute  has  been  passed  for 
levying  an  assessment  to  pny  a  gratuity  to  oiu^  who  performed 
work,  it  has  been  held  that  such  assessment  is  valid.  The  pro- 
priety of  this  holding  is  very  doubtful   and   it   seems  to  be  con- 

'*  Brewer   v.   Bridges.    1(14    liid.   :?r>S,  |1S!)11:    State,    \':ui    Honie.    Pros.    v. 

73  N.  E.  811    [190.51.  Town    of     Ber<,'en.    W    N.    J.    1..     (1 

"Nash   V.   Kenyon,  —    Mieli.   ,  X'rooni)      307      I18(>31;      Portland     v. 

ll.)   \.   W.   4,5    finosi.  IJitnniinous   Pa.vinjj  Co..   33    Or.   307. 

>r;ray  v.  Pueliardsoii.   124  Cal.  4(50.  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  713.  44  L.  R.  A.  527. 
57     Pae.    385     |18!)0|:     Scliwiesavi    v.  .52   Pac.  28    118081;   Town  of  llamil- 
Malion.    110    Cal.    543,    42    Pae.    100.5  ton  v.  Cliopard.  0  Wash.  352,  37  Pac. 
[1S')51:  Nieolson  Pavement  Company  472     f  18941:     Dean     v.     Borelisenius. 
V.  Painter,  35  Cal.  iW.)   [18(18]  ;    But-  30  Wis.   23()    11872]. 
ler  V.  Detroit.  43  Midi.  5.52.  5  X.  W.  -'Nieolson  Pavement  Co.  v.  Painter. 
1078    [1880];    State  of  Minnesota  ex  35   Cal.    009    11868]. 
rel.  City  of  St.  Paul  V.  District  Court  ^State    of    ^Minnesota    ex    rel.    {  ity 
of  Ramsey  County,  72  :Minn.  226.  71  of  St.  Paul  v.  District  Court  of  Ram- 
Am.    St.    Rep.    480,    75    N.    W.    224  sey    County.    72    Minn.    226.    71    Am. 
11898]:   Verdin  v.  City  of  St.  Louis.  St.  Rej).  480,  75  N.  W.  224   [18981. 
131  Mo.  26.  33  S.  W.  480.  :i(i  S.  W.  52  'City   of  St.   Joseph   ex   rel.   Dana- 
I1S95]:    City    of    St.    -Iiocph    ex    rel.  lier    v.    Wilshire.     47    Mo.     Apj..     125 
Danaher  v.  Wilshire.  47  Mo.  Apj..  125  |1S91]. 


§  488  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  740 

trary  to  the  general  weight  of  authority.'  If  by  statute  a  specific 
method  is  provided  for  testing  the  validity  of  the  contract,  the 
property  owner  must  resort  to  the  means  thus  provided.  If  he 
omits  such  method  of  testing  the  validity  of  the  contract,  he 
waives  his  objection  thereto  and  cannot  interpose  such  objection 
as  a  defense  to  an  action  on  the  assessment.*'  A  property  owner 
is  said  not  to  be  a  person  "aggrieved"  and  hence  not  entitled 
to  appeal  from  the  action  of  the  street  superintendent  in  letting 
the  contract  even  if  his  property  has  been  assessed  under  a  void 
contract.'  If  the  invalidity  of  the  contract  is  due  solely  to 
the  failure  of  certain  subordinate  city  officers  to  comply  with  the 
directions  of  superior  city  officers,  such  as  the  city  council,  such 
superior  city  officers  may,  by  ratification,  make  valid  such  con- 
tracts, as  they  could  have  authorized  in  advance.'^  Since  the 
legislature  may  dispense  with  advertisement,  receipt  of  bids,  or 
letting  a  contract,''  it  may  provide  that  after  the  contract  has 
in  fact  been  performed,  the  property  owner  cannot  inquire  into 
its  original  validity. ^'^  It  may,  by  provisions  for  re-assessment. 
make  valid  a  contract  which  was  originally  invalid. ^^  Especially 
in  assessment  proceedings  where  the  cost  of  an  improvement  is  to 
be  charged  upon  the  owners  of  property  benefited  by  the  improve- 
ment is  it  true  that  a  city  cannot  incorporate  in  its  contract 
items  for  which  the  city  has  no  authority  to  contract.^-  If  the 
city  acts  in  good  faith  in  constructing  a  public  improvement,  the 

^  Sucli  a  statute  was   said  to  be  a  ^  Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Jewell,  140 

-very    remarkable    legislative    enact-  Pa.  St.  9^  21  Atl.  239   [1891];   Phila 

ment"  and  invalid  in  Granger  v.  City  delphia  to  use  v.  Jewell,  135  Pa.  St 

(if  Buffalo,  6  Abb.  N.  C.   (N.  Y.)   238  329,    19   Atl.   947    [1890];    Pepper   v 

[1879];     but    it    was    held    valid    in  City   of  Philadelphia   to  use  of  Hor 

Brewster  v.   City  of  Syracuse,   19  N.  ter,"  114  Pa.  St.  96,  6  Atl.  899  [1886]; 

Y.  116  [1859].  City  to  use  of  O'Rourke  v.  Hays,  93 

"Spaulding  v.   Xorth   San   Francis-  Pa.   St.   72    [1881]. 
CO    Homestead    &    Railroad    Associa-  'See    §§    482,   496-504. 
tion.  87  Cal.  40.  24  Pac.  600,  25  Pac.  '"  Brientnall    v.    City    of    Philadel- 
249    [1890];    Oakland    Paving    Com-  phia  to  use,  103  Pa.  St.   156   [1883]. 
pany    v.    Rier,    52    Cal.    270    [1877];  (This  case  was  decided  under  a  pro- 
Everett  V.   Deal,   148  Ind.   90,  47  N.  cedure    in    which    the    city    as    local 
E.  219   [1897] ;   Alley  v.  City  of  Leb-  plaintiff   sued   on   behalf   of  the  con- 
anon,    146    Ind.    125,    44    X.    E.    1003  tractor  as  equitable  plaintiff.) 
[1896];    City   of   Greenfield   v.    State  "State   v.    District    Court   of   Blue 
ex  rel.  Moore,  113  Ind.  597,  15  X.  E,  Earth    County,    102    Minn.    482,    113 
241  [1887];   Scranton  v.  Jermyn.  15G  X.  W.  697,  114  X.  W.  654    [1907], 
Pa.    107,   27    Atl.   66    [1893].  "  Inge  v.  Board  of  Public  Works  of 

^  Brock  V.  Luning.   89  Cal.  316.  26  :VIobile.  135  Ala.  187,  93  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Pac.    972    [18911,  20.    .33     So.    678     [1902]:     Chippewa 


i 


741  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  484 

fact  that,  by  reason  of  such  improvement,  the  proi)erty  of  a  cor- 
poration which  has  rightfully  been  laid  in  or  upon  a  public  street 
is  damaged  does  not  render  the  city  liable  therefor,  since  the 
right  of  the  corporation  to  k^ep  its  property  in  or  upon  a  public 
street  is  always  subservient  to  the  right  and  duty  of  the  city  to 
maintain  such  street  in  condition  suitable  for  public  use.^"*  As 
has  already  been  said  the  city  cannot  include  such  items  of  ex- 
penditure in  an  assessment  against  an  abutting  property  owner.^* 
Accordingly  a  provision  in  a-  contract  for  a  street  improvement, 
whereby  the  contractor  agreed,  in  making  excavations,  to  sup- 
port water  and  gas  pipes  situated  in  the  street,  to  be  liable  to 
injury  to  such  water  and  gas  pipes,  and  for  waste  of  water  and 
gas  due  to  any  injury  caused  by  such  excavations,  and  to  be 
liable  to  a  street  railway  company  for  any  damage  to  its  tracks, 
is  invalid.^"'  Such  provisions  operating  to  increase  the  cost  of 
the  work  and  being  incorporated  in  the  specifications  upon  which 
bids  were  based,  make  the  entire  contract  illegal  and  unen- 
forceable.^" An  assessment  levied  to  pay  the  contractor  for  work 
done  under  a  contract  which  has  been  held  void  has  been  held 
to  be  invalid,  though  specifically  authorized  by  statute.^^  Such 
contract  was  held  in  this  case  to  be  unconstitutional.  A  special 
statute  authorizing  a  special  assessment  to  pay  to  the  contractor 
a  gratuity  over  and  above  his  contract  was,  however,  held  valid 
in  the  same  jurisdiction.^" 

§  484.     Effect  of  fraud. 

In  most  jurisdictions  an  assessment  can  be  attacked  by  reason 
of  fraud  and  collusion  between  the  public  oflficials  and  the  con- 
tractor whereby  the  property  owners  are  wronged.  Such  fraud 
invalidates  the  assessment  affected  thereby.^     By  statute  in  New 

Bridge    Co.    v.    City   of   Durand,    122  >"  Anderson  v.   Fuller.  51    Fla.   380, 

Wis.   85.    lOfi   Am.    St.   Rep.   031.   nO  41  So.  684   [lOOG]. 

N,  W.  603   [1904].  "  Grander    v.    City    of    Buflalo,    6 

"New   Orleans   Gas   Co.   v.    Drain-  Abb.  N.  C.    (X.  Y.)' 238   [1879]. 

age  Commission  of  New  Orleans,  197  "Brewster  v.  City  of  Syracuse,   19 

U.    S.    453,    49    L.    831.    25    S.    471  N.  Y.    116    [1859]. 

[19P5];    National    Water   Works   Co.  'Brady    v.    Bartlett.    56    Cal.    350 

V.  City  of  Kansas,  28  Fed.  921 ;   Kir-  [1880]  ;  Mason  v.  City  of  Des  Moines, 

by  V.  Citizens  Railway  C'nnipany.  48  108    Ta.   658,    79    N.    W.   389    [1899]; 

Md.  168.  .30  Am.  Rep.  455.  Pleasants  v.  City  of  Slireveport.   110 

"See  §   461.  La.    1046.   35   So.   283    [1903];    Dixon 

"Ande-sm   v.   Fuller.   51    Fla.   380,  v.  City  of  Detroit.   86   Mich.  516.   49 

41   So.  684   [1906].  N.   \V.   628    [1891];    Weston   v.   City 


§484 


T^YXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


742 


York,  assessments  may  be  attacked  for  fraud,  although  they  are 
made  valid  as  against  most  other  dei'enses.-  -It  has  been  said 
that  fraud,  in  the  sense  at  least  of  actual  fraud,  implies  collu- 
sion between  the  public  officials  and  the  contractors."  In  accord- 
ance with  this  theory  the  defense  of  fraud  cannot  be  made  if  the 
contractor  did  not  participate  therein.*  However,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  fact  that  the  officers  of  the  public  corporation  are 
innocent  of  the  fraud  does  not  prevent  the  existence  of  fraud 
which  might  invalidate  the  assessment.^'  If  a  sufficient  remedy 
against  fraud  is  provided  such  fraud  may  not  for  that  reason 
render  invalid  an  assessment  which  otherwise  would  be  aff'ected 
thereby."  Thus  the  fact  that  a  city  fraudulently  relieved  certain 
contractors  from  doing  a  part  of  the  work  contracted  for  by 
them  and  was  about  to  pay  other  contractors  for  doing  the  same 
work,  was  said  not  to  be  a  ground  for  enjoining  the  collection 
of  the  assessment,^  since  adequate  relief  could  be  obtained  by 
enjoining  the  city  from  paying  out  such  funds  improperly. 
Furthermore,  the  property  owner  could  also  maintain  an  action 
against  the  improvement  board  and  the  contractor  for  respec- 
tively constructing  and  accepting  the  public  improvement  inferior 
to  that  required  by  the  contract.^ 


of  Syracuse.  158  N.  Y.  274,  70  Am. 
St.  i?ep.  472.  43  L.  R.  A.  678,  53  N. 
E.  12  [1899];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Livingston,  121  N.  Y. 
94,  24  N.  E.  290  [1890]  ;  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  Trustees  of  the  Leake  and 
Watts  Orphan  Home,  92  N.  Y.  116 
[1883];  In  the  Matter  of  Righter, 
92  N.  Y.  Ill  [1883];  Eno  v.  Mayor, 
Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of  the 
City  of  New  York,  68  N.  Y.  214 
[1877];  In  the  Matter  of  Raymond, 
21  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  229  [1880];  In  the 
Matter  of  Meade,  13  Hun.  (N.  Y.) 
349  [1878];  In  the  Matter  of  Eager, 
41  Howard  (N.  Y.)  107  [1870];  In 
the  IMatter  of  Beekman,  18  Howard 
(X.  Y.)  460  [1859];  Matter  of 
Eightieth  Street,  17  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
324  [1864];  Foote  v.  City  of  Mil- 
waukee, 18  Wis.  270  [1864];  Cook  v. 
City  of  Racine.  49  Wis.  243,  5  N. 
W.  352  [1880].  The  public  officials 
who  are  guilty  of  the  fraud  are  per- 
sonally liable  to  the  property  owner 
injured    thereby;    Gage    v.    Springer, 


211  111.  200.  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  191. 
71  N.  E.  800  [1904]  ;  (reversing  Gage 
V.  Springer,  112  111.  App.  103 
[1904]). 

-  Astor  V.  The  Mayor,  62  N.  Y.  580 
[1875];  In  the  Matter  of  Meade,  13 
Hun.  (N.  Y.)  349  [1878];  Miller's 
Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  121 
[1861];  Matter  of  Keyser,  10  Abb. 
Pr.    (N.  Y.)    481    [I860]. 

^  Seaboard  National  Bank  of  New 
York  V.  Woesten,  147  Mo.  467.  48 
L.  R.  A.  279,  48  S.  W.  939  [1898]; 
In  the  Matter  of  Eightieth  Street, 
31    Howard    (N.   Y.)    99    [1865]. 

*  Seaboard  National  Bank  of  New 
York  V.  Woesten,  147  Mo.  467,  48 
L.  R.  A.  279,  48  S.  W.  939   [1898]. 

°  Pleasants  v.  City  of  Shreveport, 
110   La.    1046,   35   So.   283    [1903]. 

"  Heinroth  v.  Kochersperger,  173 
111.   205,   50   N.   E.    171    [1898]. 

'  Heinroth  v.  Kochersperger.  173 
111.  205,  50  N.  E.  171   [1898]. 

^Gaoe  V.  Springer,  211  111.  200,  103 
Am.    St.    Rep.     191.     71     N.    E.    860 


743  THE  IMPROVEMENT  CONTRACT.  §  485 

§  485.     Nature  of  fraud. 

The  nature  of  the  fraud  which  invalidates  an  assessment  has 
been  discussed  by  the  courts  repeatedly.^  If  a  resolution  by  the 
common  council  modifying  a  sewer  contract  is  passed  by  means 
of  fraud  and  corruption,  such  conduct  renders  such  modifica- 
tion invalid.-  The  existence  of  material  alterations  in  a  written 
contract  wrongfully  and  fraudulently^  increasing  the  contract  price 
is  ground  for  defeating  the  assessment.''  The  mayor  of  a  city, 
hearing  that  the  legislature  had  passed  a  statute  ])reventing  the 
mayor  from  making  contracts  on  his  sole  authority,  on  April 
17th  sent  for  a  contractor,  and  on  April  22d  without  public  com- 
l)etition  he  let  a  number  of  contracts  to  him  with  the  under- 
standing that  they  should  not  be  of  any  effect  if  this  new  statute 
had  already  become  a  law;  and  they  were  accordingly  locked 
up  until  it  could  be  learned  whether  such  statute  had  become 
a  law.  The  statute  in  fact  became  a  law  on  April  30th.  It  was 
lield  that  this  amounted  to  fraud.*  An  excessive  price  for  a 
pul)lic  improvement  may  be  so  grossly  excessive  as  to  suggest 
fraud.''  Thus  where  the  contract  price  was  over  one  hundred  and 
seventy  thousand  dollars,  while  a  reasonable  price  for  the  same 
work  was  about  forty-one  thousand  dollars,  it  was  said  that  fraud 
existed."  So.  wIkm-c  rock  excavation  worth  four  dollars  a  cubic 
yard  was  let  at  fourteen  dollars  a  cubic  yard;  pipe  culvert  worth 
one  dollar  and  fifty  cents  per  foot  was  let  at  over  seven  dollars  a 
foot ;  and  a  briclc  sewer  worth  about  four  dollars  and  fifty  cents  a 
foot  was  let  at  twenty-five  dollars  a  foot,  fraud  was  held  to 
exist.''     So  where  filling  is  let  at  one  dollar  and  forty-seven  cents 

[19041;    (reversing  f!a<iP  v.  Sprin.'^or,  121    X.  Y.   04.  24   X.   E.   290    [18901; 

112    ill.    App.    103    119041).  In  the  Matter  of  the  Trustees  of  the 

^Matter    of    Keyser,    10    Abh.    Pr.  Leake    and    Watts   Orphan    Home.   92 

(N.  Y.)    481    [18(101.  X.  Y.    IKi    [18831;    In   the  Matter  of 

==  Weston   V.   City   of   Syracuse,    158  Rijrhter,   92    X.    V.    Ill    [18831;    Kno 

X.  Y.  274,  70   Am.  St.   Rep.  472,   43  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 

L.   Pv.   A.   678,   53   X.   E.    12    [18991;  of  the   City  of  Xcw   York,   08   X.   Y. 

(reversinp   Weston    v.    City    of    Syra-  214   [1877]:    In  tlie  Matte'-  of  Meade, 

euse,  82  Ilun.    (X.   \.)    (17,   31    X.  Y.  13   Hun.    i  X.    V.)    349    [18781;    Cook 

S.    ISC).  V.  City  of   Racine.  49  Wi-^.  243.  5  X. 

'Miller's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.   (X.  Y.)  W.  3.12   [18801. 
121    [1861].  "In   the  Matter   of   I.ivi.i-j-stnn,    121 

'  Tn    the    matter    of    Pvaymond.    21  X.   ^'.  94.  24  X.  E.  290   [18901. 
Hun.   229    [18801.  '  In    the  Matter  of  the  Trustees  ot 

'•Dixon  V.  City  of  Detroit.  8i;  Midi.  tlie  Leake  and  Watts  Orjihan   Home. 

516,    49    X.    W.' 628    [18911;     In    tlie  92   X.   Y.    116    [18831. 
Matter  of  tlie  Petition  of  Livinfiston, 


§  485  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  744 

per  cubic  yard  when  the  usual  price  therefor  is  <'!^hty  cents  per 
cubic  yard,  such  excessive  price  is  at  least  evide::ec  of  fraud." 
The  fact  that  a  part  of  the  assessment  is  imposed  upon  the  city 
as  a  property  owner,  leaving  to  be  imposed  upon  the  property 
owners  benefited  an  assessment  not  exceeding  the  reasonable  value 
of  the  work  done,  does  not  make  such  assessment  valid,  since 
the. city  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  property  owner  and  the  assess- 
ment should  be  apportioned  among  the  property  owners.**  A 
different  result  is  reached  if  the  given  charge  is  made  upon  the 
city,  not  as  property  owner,  but  on  the  theory  that  a  part  of  the 
cost  of  the  improvement  is  to  be  borne  by  general  taxation. 
Unless  the  excess  over  a  reasonable  price  is  so  gross  as  to  sug- 
gest fraud,  or  unless  fraud  is  otherwise  shown  to  exist,  the  price 
to  be  paid  for  work  or  materials  is  w^ithin  the  discretion  of  the 
public  corporation  making  the  improvement ;  and  the  assessment 
cannot  be  attacked  successfully  on  the  ground  that  the  price  was 
greater  than  market  price. ^"  Thus,  an  agreement  to  pay  a  con- 
tractor a  uniform  price  per  square  yard  for  brick  pavement  with- 
out regard  to  the  streets  or  the  locality  to  be  improved  is  valid." 
Private  contracts  entered  into  between  the  public  contractor  and 
some  of  the  property  owners  for  doing  w^ork  for  them  on  terms 
different  from  those  on  which  the  rest  of  his  work  is  done  have 
been  presented  for  adjudication.  Such  a  contract  is  said  to  avoid 
the  public  contract  which  is  obtained  thereby.^-  If  provision  is 
made  by  statute  for  testing  its  validity  by  a  direct  attack  upon 
it,  it  is  said  that  such  private  contract  must  be  made  the  ground 
for  a  direct  attack  upon  the  public  contract  or  such  ob.jection 
will  be  waived.^^  A  statute  forbidding  the  allowance  of  rebates 
to  property  owners  is  held  not  to  apply  to  the  remission  of  a 
small  amount  in  a  settlement  made  more  than  four  years  after 
the  work  is  accepted  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  to  show 
that  there  was  a  prior  contract  for  such  remission.^*  If  the  privi- 
lege of  entering  into  the  special  arrangement  in  question  is  given 


'In   the  Matter   of  Ei.ghter,   02  X.  '=  Brady    v.    Bartlett,    56    Cal.    350 

Y.    Ill    [1883].                  "  [1880]. 

°  In  the  Matter  of  Livinffston,   121  "  Himmelmann  v.  Hoadley,  44  Cal. 

X.  Y.  04,  24  X.  E.  290  [1890].  213   [1872]. 

'"  Palmer   v.   City  of  Danville,    166  ^*  In  re  Ayers  Asphalt  Paving  Co., 

111.  42,  46  X.   E.   629    [1897].  118  La.  640,"  43  So.  262  [1907]. 

^^  City   of   Galveston   v.   Heard,   54 
Tex.    420    [1881]. 


I 


745  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  485 

to  all  the  property  owners,  no  fraud  exists.^-''  An  agreement  by 
certain  property  owners  who  had  by  statute  a  right  to  take  the 
contract  themselves  whereby  they  agreed  to  give  up  such  right 
in  consideration  of  a  reduction  of  twenty-five  per  cent  in  their 
assessment  is  held  not  to  be  fraudulent  where  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  complaining  property  owner  could  have  done  the  work 
below  the  contract  price  if  the  other  property  owners  had  com- 
bined with  him  or  that  he  desired  to  take  the  contract.^"  An 
oral  agreement  between  a  property  owner  and  the  contractor 
whereby  the  contractor  agrees  to  accept  in  pa^^ment  of  the  assess- 
ment a  certain  tract  of  land  and  to  pay  to  the  owner  thereof 
the  cash  difference  between  the  agreed  price  thereof  and  the  as- 
sessment is  unenforceable.^'  If  the  property  owners  have  by  stat- 
ute the  right  to  elect  to  do  the  work,  the  fact  that  the  city  gives 
an  unreasonable  short  time  for  their  performance  of  such  work 
when  the  city  has  already  secured  most  of  the  men,  teams  and 
material  necessary  to  perform  such  contract  has  been  regarded 
as  amounting  to  fraud  and  avoiding  a  subsequent  assessment. ^^ 
Fraud  is  also  said  to  exist  if  an  assessment  is  levied  greatly  in 
excess  of  the  ascertained  cost  of  the  work,^*^  or  for  work  which 
has  been  entirely  omitted.-"  On  this  question  the  certificate  of 
the  authorized  inspector  is  said  to  be  conclusive  in  the  absence 
of  fraud. -^  A  false  certificate  by  the  inspector  as  to  the  rates 
at  which  the  work  is  done  is  said  to  amount  to  fraud.--  Apart 
from  constructive  fraud,  which  is  considered  .subsequently,-''  fraud 
which  avoids  an  assessment  means  actual  fraud  and  not  omis- 
sions, errors  or  negligence.-''  The  fact  that  an  assessment  is 
levied  before  the  work  is  done.'-'^  or  the  fact  that  a  man  of  con- 
siderable political  experience  and  influence  is  employed  by  a 
paving  company  as  its  agent  to  secure  paving  contracts,-"  none 

"  German    Savings    and    Loan    So-  "  Tn  the  Matter  of  Lewi's,  35  How- 

ciety    V.    Ramish,    138    Cal.    120,    69  ard    (N.  Y.)    162   [1868]. 

Pac.  89,  70  Pae.   1067    [1902].  "In    the    Matter    of    T?eoknian,    IS 

"Duncan  v.  Ramish,  142  Cnl.  686.  Howard    (N.   Y.)    460    [1859]. 

76  Pac.   661    [1904].  -■'See  §  486. 

"Perine   v.    Forbush,   97    Cal.   305.  ^Rich's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.    (N.  Y.l 

32  Pac.  226    [1893].  118    [1861]. 

"Foote    V.    City    of   Milwaukee,    18  ==Beekman's    Petition.    1     Abb.    Pr. 

Wis.  270    [1864].  449    |  18(151. 

"Union     Building     Association     V.  '"Barber  Asphalt  Pavinji  Company 

City  of  Chicago,  61    111.   430    [1871].  v.   Field,   188  Mo.   182,  80  S.  W.  860 

"In  the  iMatter  of  Eager.  41  IIow-  [1905]. 
ard    (X.  Y.)    107   [1870]. 


§  485  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  746 

of  them  amount  to  fraud.  The  fact  that  one  of  the  directors  of 
a  levee  district  stated  to  a  land-owner  that  the  approximate  cost 
of  the  work  would  be  a  certain  sum  when  in  fact  the  cost  was 
much  greater  does  not  constitute  fraud. -'^  The  reservation  by 
the  city  officials  of  the  right  to  alter  the  dimensions  and  quan- 
tities provided  for  in  the  contract  does  not  of  itself  amount  to 
fraud.-^  Omitting  for  good  cause  a  part  of  the  street  specified 
in  the  ordinance  and  not  levying  an  assessment  for  such  part  is 
not  fraud.-"  The  fact  that  one  who  takes  a  contract  for  grading 
and  filling  several  streets  makes  use  of  the  earth  which  he  has 
removed  from  one  street  in  filling  depressions  in  another  is  said 
not  to  amount  to  fraud.''"  Fraud  is  said  not  to  exist  even  if  the 
contractor  has  agreed  to  allow  a  drawback  for  dirt  furnished 
by  the  city  and  he  presents  a  bill  for  the  full  contract  price 
without  allowance  for  dirt  procured  from  another  street  at  no 
cost  to  him.^^  Wilfully  defective  performance,^-  as  by  using 
much  less  cement  than  the  specifications  call  for  and  thus  making 
an  inferior  job  ^^  is  said  to  amount  to  fraud.  Failure  to  award 
a  contract  to  the  lowest  bidder  is  said  not  to  be  technical  fraud,^* 
especially  where  not  required  by  statute,"'^  unless  done  in  pur- 
suance of  an  actually  fraudulent  scheme.^"  Letting  a  contract 
after  a  judgment  of  confirmation  has  been  reversed  is  not  bad 
faith  so  as  to  preclude  a  re-assessment.-"  If  actual  fraud  is 
alleged  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  party  who  claims  fraud."^^ 

-''  Overstreet  v.   Levee   District  No.  Protestant  Episcopal   School,  8  Hun. 

1    of    Conway    County,    80    Ark.   462,  (N.  Y.)  457  [1876];  Horn's  Case,  12 

97  S.  W.  676   [1906].  Abb.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)    124    [1861];    San- 

^  In    the    Matter    of    Merriam,    84  ford  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  New  York,  12 

N.  Y.  596   [1881].  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)   23   [I860]. 

=«In    the    Matter    of    Pinckney,    22  '^  In    the    Matter    of    the    Delaware 

Hun.    (N.  Y.)    474    [1880].  &   Hudson   Canal   Company,   60  Hun. 

^»It    is    said    that    the    city    could  204,    14   N.   Y.   Supp.   585    [1891]. 

reap  no  benefit  from  such  use  of  ma-  ■■"Matter    of    Eiglitieth    Street,    17 

terial;     Schenley     v.     Commonwealth  Al)b.   Pr.    (N.  Y.)    324    [1864]. 

for  the  use  of  the  City  of  Allegheny,  ^"  City  of  Chicago  v.  Clark,  233  111. 

36  Pa.  St.    (12  Casey)    64    [1859].  404,  84  N.  E.  363   [1908]. 

^  Darlington  v.  Commonwealth  for  "'  Field    v.    Barber    Asphalt   Paving 

the  use  of  the  City  of  Allegheny,  41  Company.    117    Fed.  925    [1902];    not 

Pa.    St.    (5    Wright)    68    [1861].  affected  in  this  point  by  modification 

"=  Mason    v.    City    of    Des    Moines.  in    194  U.   S.   618,  48  L.    1142,  24   S 

108  la.  658,  79  N.  W.  389   [1809].  7S4  [1904];  Seaboard  National  Bank 

'^  Mason  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  108  of   New    York    v.    Woesten,    147    Mo. 

la.  658,  79  N.  W.  389   [1899].  467,  48  L.   R.  A.   279,  48  S.  W.  9."') 

'♦In  the  Matter  of   the  New  York  [1898]. 


11 


747  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  486 

He  must  allege  the  specific  facts  and  not  merely  charge  fraud 
in  general  terms.'''* 

§  486.     Constructive  fraud. 

Fraud  may,  in  some  eases,  be  presumed  from  the  relations  of 
the  parties  and  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.  A  con- 
tract whereb}^  a  city  enters  into  a  contract  with  one;  of  its  own 
officials  who  has  duties  to  perform  in  the  protection  of  the  city's 
interests  in  the  transaction  is  invalid,  since  the  same  person  is 
thereby  placed  in  a  position  representing  two  antagonistic  and 
inconsistent  interests.'  Thus  a  contract  of  a  city  with  one  of  its 
own  school  trustees  for  a  street  improvement,^  or  a  contract  be- 
tween a  town  treasurer  and  the  town  for  the  improvement  of  a 
public  street,^  is  each  void  and  cannot  serve  as  the  basis  of  a 
valid  assessment.  A  member  of  the  council  was  a  large  stock- 
holder and  business  manager  for  a  lumber  company.  A  con- 
tractor who  sought  a  public  contract  after  the  construction  of 
sidewalks  agreed  to  buy  his  lumber  from  such  company  before 
the  contract  was  let  to  him.  It  was  held  that  under  a  statute 
providing  that  no  city  official  should  ])e  interested  directly  or 
indirectly  in  a  city  contract  a  claim  based  on  such  contract 
was  void.*  If  there  is  a  specific  statute  which  forbids  payment 
upon  such  contracts,  the  doctrino  of  estoppel  is  said  not  to  apply 
and  the  contract  and  assessment  based  thereon  is  said  to  be 
invalid   even    after   performance.''      In   other   jurisdictions   under 

'"ITarrislnirjj;    v.    Baptist.     150    Pa.  :{2    S.    W.    1091,    and    do    not    merely 

St.  52{),  27  Atl.  8    [180.3].  disqualify    the    councilman.      Bradley 

K'apron  v.  Hitchcock,  98  Cal.  427,       v.   Jacques,   —   Ky.   ,    110   S.    W. 

.S.3  Pac.  431   [189.3];   Benton  v.  Ham-  8.3()   [1908]. 

ilton,    110    Ind.    294,    11    N.    E.    238  =(ity    of    Xorlhport    v.    Xorthport 

[18861;   City  of  Xorthport  v.  North-  Townsite  Company.  27  Wash.  .')43.  (iS 

port    Townsite    Company,    27    Wash.  Pac.   204    [1902];     (distinjiuishinji;  as 

.543,  68  Pac.  204   [1902].     This  result  cases  where  such  contract   is  held   to 

is  reached  usually  under  specific  stat-  he   merely   voidahle.   and    if   it   is    af- 

utory  provisions.  firmed,   compensation   nnist   he   made. 

='Capron  v.  Hitchcock,  98  Cal.  427.  Call    Puhlishinor    Co.    v.    Lincoln,    20 

33  Pac.  431    [189.3].  Xeh.   149.  4o  N.  W.  245    [1890],  and 

*  Benton  V.  Hamilton.  110  Ind.  294,  Crand  Island  Gas  Co.  v.  West.  28 
11  N.  E.  238   [1880].  Xeb.  852,  45  N.  W.  242   [1890].  and 

*  City  of  Xorthport  v.  Xorthport  distin/ruishinc;  Pickett  v.  School  Dis- 
Townsite  Company.  27  Wash.  543,  68  trict,  25  Wis.  551,  3  Am.  Rep.  105 
Pac.  204  [1902].  Such  statutes  make  [1870].  as  a  case  where  the  contract 
the  contract   void,  as  in  Xnnnemacli-  is  not  forbidden  hy  statute). 

er  V.  City  of  T.nuisville.  98   Kv.   .334, 


§  486  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  748 

such  statutes,  it  has  been  said  that  the  contract  cannot  be  at- 
tacked after  performance  except  in  case  of  actual  fraud.*^  In 
some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  in  the  absence  of  actual  fraud 
a  contract  between  the  city  and  the  officer  thereof  cannot  be  at- 
tacked after  performance,'  and  after  such  performance  an  as- 
sessment for  such  improvement  cannot  be  resisted  upon  the  ground 
of  such  constructive  fraud. ^  Thus  under  a  statute  forbidding 
members  of  the  city  council  from  being  interested  in  any  con- 
tract for  work  or  service  with  the  city,  a  property  owner  who 
makes  no  objection  until  after  the  work  is  done  and  who  does 
not  make  objection  thereto  when  opportunity  is  given  to  him  in 
compliance  with  statute  cannot  resist  his  assessment,  it  not  ap- 
pearing that  the  cost  of  the  work  was  increased  in  any  way." 
In  the  absence  of  statute  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  vote  of  the 
officer  who  has  entered  into  a  contract  with  the  public  corpora- 
tion is  not  necessary  to  give  the  requisite  majority  for  the  al- 
lowance of  his  claim,  such  contract  is  valid. ^"^  Thus,  where  one 
of  the  trustees  of  a  reclamation  district  had  performed  work  and 
expended  money  in  the  construction  of  a  levee,  it  was  held  that 
if  no  fraud  existed  in  fact  and  his  vote  was  not  necessary  to  an 
allowance  of  his  claim,  such  claim  could  be  allowed.^^  Where 
a  property  owner  cannot  inquire  into  the  validity  of  the  contract 
between  the  city  and  the  contractor,  he  cannot  attack  the  assess- 
ment on  the  ground  that  certain  of  the  city  officials  were  interested 
in  the  contract.^-  A  contract  entered  into  between  the  city  and 
one  who  was  not  a  public  officer  when  such  contract  was  made 
is  not  rendered  invalid  by  the  fact  that  such  contractor  was, 
either  before  or  afterwards,  a  city  official.^-'*  Thus  where  a  part- 
nership had  a  contract  with  the  city  to  build  sidewalks  and  sub- 

*  Driver   v.   Keokuk   Savings   Bank,  '°  Lower   King's   River  Reclamation 
126  la.  691,  102  X.  W.  542  [190.5].            District    No.    531    v.    McCullah,    124 

'Argenti  v,  City  of  San  Francisco,  Cal.   175,  56  Pac.  887    [1899]. 

16   Cal.  256    [I860];   Mayor  v.  Huff,  "Lower  King's  River  Reclamation 

60   Ga.   221;    Diver   v.   Keokuk   Sav-  District    Xo.    531    v.    McCullah,    124 

ings   Bank,    126   la.   691,    102   N.   W.  Cal.    175,  56  Pac.  887    [1899]. 

542    [1905];    Currie    v.    School    Dis-  '- Schenley    v.    Commonwealth    for 

trict,    35   Minn.    163,   27    N.   W.    922  the  use  of  the  City  of  Allegheny,  36 

[1861];  Lucas  Coimty  v.  Hunt,  5  O.  Pa.  St.  29,  78  Am".  Dec.  359   [1859]. 

S.    488,    67    Am.   Dec.   303    [1856].  "White  v.  City  of  Alton,   149  111. 

*  Diver    v.    Keokuk    Savings    Bank,  626,    37    N.    E.    96    [1894];    City   of 
120   Ta.   691,    102  N.   W.   542    [1905].  Lawrence    v.    Killara,    11    Kan.    499 

"Diver    v.    Keokuk    Savings    Bank.        [1873]. 
126  la.  691,  102  X.  W.  542   [1905]. 


749  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  487 

sequently  a  member  of  such  partnership  became  a  member  of  the 
city  council  and  Avas  a  member  while  such  contracts  were  being 
performed/*  or  where  an  alderman  of  the  city  who  was  a  member 
of  the  committee  to  estimate  the  cost  of  a  proposed  street  im- 
provement resigned  and  after  his  resignation  was  accepted  be- 
came a  bidder  upon  such  contract  and  obtained  the  same/^  such 
contracts  are  valid  in  each  case  and  assessments  may  be  levied 
therefor.  Where  one  councilman  was  a  stockholder  in  a  cor- 
poration that  furnished  brick  to  the  contractors,  there  being  no 
evidence  that  the  contractors  were  aware  of  such  fact,  and  an- 
other councilman  Avas  employed  by  the  contractors  as  a  timer 
keeper,  it  was  held  that  a  finding  by  the  trial  court  that  no  fraud 
existed  could  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  be  reversed.^""'  A  remote 
relationship  between  the  contractor  and  the  city  official  does  not 
in  the  absence  of  a  specific  statute  affect  the  validity  of  the  con- 
tract.^^  Thus  a  contract  entered  into  between  the  city  and  the 
son-in-law  of  a  deputy  civil  engineer  of  the  city  was  held  to  be 
valid.^^ 

§  487.     Certificate  of  freedom  from  fraud. 

In  some  states  it  has  been  provided  by  statute  that  certain 
designated  officials  shall  examine  the  proceedings  leading  up  to 
the  assessment  and  shall  give  a  certificate  that  such  proceedings 
are  free  from  fraud  if  they  find  such  to  be  the  fact.  Sucli  statu- 
tory provisions  are  held  to  be  valid. ^  A  certificate  given  under 
such  statute  makes  valid  a  contract  which  was  originally  in- 
valid because  bids  were  not  advertised  for,  and  such  contract 
was  not  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,"  or  ])ecause  the  price  of  an  item, 
such  as  rock  excavation,  was  fixed  arbitrarily  and  not  submitted 
to  competition.'*     Such  statute  applies  to  improvements  in  which 

"City   of   Lawrence   v.   Killani,    11  Matter    of    Kendall,    S5    X.    Y.    302 

Kan.  499   [18731.  TlSSl];    In    the    Matter   of   Peugnet, 

>=>  White  V.  City  of  Alton,   149   111.  07  X.  Y.  441   fl87G];   Brown  v.  May- 

626,  37  N.  E.  96   [1894].  or,  63  X.  Y.  2.39  [1875]  ;  In  the  Mat- 

"  Ferguson    v.    City    of    CofTeA'Aillc,  ter   of   Auchnnity.    11    Ilun.    (X.    Y.) 

—  ITan.  ,  94  Pac.  1010  [1908].  76    [1877]. 

"  Caaon    v.    City    of    Lebanon.    153  *  In  the  Matter  of  Johnson,  103  X. 

Ind.  .507,  5.5  X.  E.  768    [1899].  Y.  260,  8  X.  E.  399   [1886].     To  the 

^''Cason    V.    City   of    Lebanon,    153  same    efTect    see    In    the    Matter    of 

Ind.  5C7,  55  X.  E.  768   [1899].  Marsh,    21    Hun.    582    [1880]. 

»Tn  the  matter  of  .Tolni^(.n.   103  X.  'In   tlie   Matter   of   Kendall.   85    X. 

Y.  260,  8  X.  E.  399    [1880];    In   the  Y.  302    [1881]. 


§  488  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  750 

the  work  is  done  after  the  passage  of  the  act.*  Such  certificate 
is  said  to  be  final  and  conclusive.^  Under  such  statute  a  cer- 
tificate can  be  given  only  as  to  a  contract  which  has  previously 
been  authorized  by  the  council.*^  The  commissioners  have  no 
power  to  change  the  contract  so  as  to  make  it  conform  to  such 
ordinance  where,  as  actually  made,  it  does  not  so  conform.'^ 

§  488.    Mistake. 

A  mistake  which  goes  to  an  essential  element  of  the  contract 
may  invalidate  such  contract.^  Thus,  where  a  contractor  offered 
a  bid  at  forty-two  cents  and  his  bid  was  accepted  upon  the  under- 
standing that  it  Avas  for  twenty-two  cents  and  that  he  was  ac- 
cordingly the  lowest  bidder,  such  contract  was  held  to  be  invalid 
on  the  ground  of  mistake.-  The  difficulty  involved  in  questions 
like  this  is  that  if  the  offer  is  in  writing  and  the  adversary  party 
had  an  opportunity  to  become  acquainted  with  its  terms,  he  is 
ordinarily  estopped  from  alleging  that  he  did  not  know  the  con- 
tents of  such  offer.^  So  it  has  been  held  that  where  A  offers  in 
writing  to  do  certain  macadamizing  at  thirty-two  cents  per  square 
yard,  to  a  depth  of  eight  inches;  and  council  accepts,  thinking 
that  A's  proposition  is  thirty-two  cents  per  cubic  yard  and  ac- 
cordingly rejecting  B's  bid  of  thirty-three  cents  per  cubic  yard 
as  higher  than  A's,  the  contract  between  A  and  the  city  is  valid.* 
However,  a  contract  to  grade  and  remove  dirt  at  twenty-five 
cents  per  square  yard  has  been  construed  as  meaning  that  rate 
per  cubic  yard.^  If  an  assessment  is  attacked  as  invalid  by  reason 
of  mistake  it  has  been  said  that  the  party  objecting  cannot  show 
the  existence  of  fraud,*'  even  under  a  statute  authorizing  the  court 
to   review   an   assessment   in   case   of  fraud  or  mistake   of  fact." 

*In  the  Matter  of  Peugnet,  67  N.       —    S.    C.    ,    61    S.    E.    96    

Y.  441    [1876].  [1908]. 

*  In  the  Matter  of  Auchmiity,  11  ^  City  of  Louisville  v.  Hyatt,  41 
Hun.    (N.   Y.)    76    [1877].          '  Ky.   (2  B.  Monroe)    177,  17  Am.  Dee. 

*  People    ex    rel.    Trundy    v.    Van  594   [1841]. 

Nort,  65  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    331    [1873].  *  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Powell 

■^  People    ex    rel.    Trundy    v.    Van-  v.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County, 

Nort,  65  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    331    [1873].  47  Minn.  406,  50  N.  W.  476   [1891]. 

'  Pettigrew   v.   Mayor,   etc.,   of   the  (The  objection  here  was  to  assessing 

City  of  New  York,  17  How.    (N.  Y.)  lots   on   another   street   as   much   for 

492    [1859].  grading  as  those  on  the  street  where 

^Pettisrrew    v.    Mayor,   etc.,    of   the  the    grading   was    done.) 

City  of  New  York,  17  How.    (N.  Y.)  'State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Powell 

492    [1859].  V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County. 

'See  Paae  on  Contracts,  §  76.  47  Minn.  406,  50  N.  W.  476   [1891]. 

*  Blasingame    v.    City    of    Laurens. 


751  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §§489,490 

§  489.     Form  of  contract. 

If  by  statute  it  is  provided  that  the  eontraet  between  the  city 
and  the  eontraetor  must  be  in  writing',  sufh  re(|uirements  must  be 
complied  with.^  A  contract  not  in  writin.u:  is,  under  such  stat- 
utes, invalid.-  Acceptance  by  the  city  of  a  written  bid  does  not 
constitute  a  written  contract  within  the  meaninji  of  these  stat- 
utes.-^ If  the  statute  does  not  require  such  contract  to  be  in 
writing  it  may  be  that  wise  policy  would  indicate  that  it  should 
be  in  writing  in  any  event,  but  it  is  not  illegal  if  not  in  writ- 
ing.* A  .suit  on  the  assessment  is  said  not  to  rest  upon  the  con- 
tract between  the  city  and  contractor  as  a  basis.  It  is  therefore 
not  necessary  to  show  affirmatively  that  such  contract  is  in  writ- 
ing.^ Indeed  it  is  held  that  an  averment  that  a  contract  was 
entered  into  is  sufficient,  at  least  in  the  absence  of  motion,  as  it  will 
be  assumed  that  the  contract  was  entered  into  in  such  form  as  to 
be  enforceable  unless  the  contrary  is  shown.''  In  other  jurisdic- 
tions under  a  statute  requiring  the  contract  to  be  in  writing  it 
has  been  said  that  if  the  complaint  does  not  aver  that  it  is  in 
writing  and  does  not  have  a  copy  of  the  contract  annexed,  it  will 
be  presumed  that  the  contract  is  not  in  writing.^ 

§  490.     Incorporation  of  document  in  the  contract. 

A  contract  may  so  refer  to  another  written  document  as  to  in- 
corporate such  document  in  the  contract  and  make  its  terms  a 
part  thereof.  Under  this  principle  a  contract  for  a  public  im- 
provement may  so  refer  to  the  ordinance  or  to  plans  and  specifi- 
cations as  to  make  them  a  part  thereof  or  they  may  be  made  a 
part  thereof  by  the  operation  of  statute.^  Thus  an  ordinance 
which  directs  aji  improvement  is  a  part  of  the  contract  and  the 
basis  thereof  if  it  is  properly  referred  to.-'     Plans  and  specifica- 

•  Overshim-r  v.  Jones,  OG  Ind.  452  'M',4,  05  X.  E.  i)  [19021;  Powers  v. 
118701:  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Im-  Town  of  New  Haven,  120  Ind.  185, 
berry,   17    Ind.    175    [18(ill;    Stephens       21  X.  E.  108.3  [18891. 

V.  City  of  Sopkane.    11   Wash.  41,  .39  "Stephens   v.    City   of   Spokane,    11 

Pac.  260    [18951.  Wasli.   41,   .39   Pac.   200    [1895]. 

^Overshiner   v.   .Tones,   Ot)    Ind.    452  '  Overshiner    v.   .Jones,   00    Ind.   452 

[18791;    Arnott    v.    City   of   Spokane.  [1X79]. 

0  Wash.  442.  .3:{  Pac.   1003   [1893].  '  Ihitt  et  al.  v.  (  ity  of  Chicago.  1.32 

•' Overshiner   v.   .lones,   00    Ind.    452  111.  352,  23  X.  E.  1010   [18901. 

[18791.  =  State    ex    rel.    Keith    v.    Common 

*  Drew  V.  Town  of  TJeneva.  159  Tnd.  Council  of  the  City  of  Michigan  City, 
304.  05  X.  E.  9    [19021.  138   Ind.  455,  37   X.  E.   1041    [1894]. 

'Drew  V.  Town  of  (leneva,   159   Ind. 


§  490  TAXx\.TION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  752 

tions  prepared  under  proper  authority  for  a  public  improvement 
may  if  referred  to  in  the  order  for  the  public  improvement  be 
made  a  part  of  such  order  and  therefore  a  part  of  the  contract/' 
Thus  where  an  engineer's  report  contained  a  plan  in  which  the 
course  of  a  proposed  sewer  was  indicated  by  a  red  line,  it  was 
held  that  the  adoption  of  such  plan  by  the  town  located  the  sewer 
with  sufficient  certainty.*  Specifications  prepared  and  referred 
to  in  the  notice  are  incorporated  therein  and  hence  made  a  part 
of  the  estimate.^  Accordingly,  a  notice  to  bidders  is  not  defec- 
tive for  failure  to  state  the  kind  of  material  to  be  used  or  the 
time  of  performance  where  the  specifications  referred  to  in  the 
notice  show  such  facts."  Specifications  may  be  incorporated  in 
a  contract  by  proper  reference  made  therein  and  thus  may  be- 
come a  part  of  such  contract."  Plans  and  specifications  which  are 
referred  to  in  an  ordinance  and  notice  of  an  improvement  are 
incorporated  therein  and  become  a  part  thereof.^  So  plans,  speci- 
fications and  profiles  of  the  work  referred  to  in  the  contract  are 
incorporated  therein  and  become  a  part  thereof.®  It  is  a  gen- 
eral rule  that  the  document  Avhich  is  to  be  incorporated  in  a 
written  contract  by  reference  therein  must  be  in  existence  at  the 
time  such  contract  is  made.  If,  however,  an  ordinance  is  suffi- 
ciently definite,  the  fact  that  it  refers  to  plans  and  specifications 
not  then  in  existence  does  not  invalidate  it.^"  Thus  an  ordinance 
which  provides  that  the  roadway  of  a  certain  street  between 
two  specified  points  shall  be  of  a  designated  width  and  shall 
be  improved  by  grading,  curbing  and  paving  with  vitrified 
brick  or  block  pavement,  with  corner  stones  at  the  inter- 
sections   of    streets    and    alleys,    and    footways    crossing    across 

'  City   of   Stockton   v.   Skinner,   53  "  Owens   v.   City   of   Marion,   Iowa. 

Cal.    8*5    [1878];    Taylor    v.    Palmer,  127    la.  469,    103   N.   W.   381    [1905]. 

31  Cal.  240   [1866];   Smith  v.  Abin  ■-  '  Whittemore  v.  Sills,  76  Mo.  App. 

ton  Savings  Bank,  171  Mass.  178,  50  248    [1898];    Dunn    v.    McNeely,    75 

X.   E.   545    [1898];    Bowditeli   v.    Su-  Mo.  App.  217  [1898]. 

perintendent  of  streets  of  Boston.  168  *  Louisville    &    ^ashville    Railroad 

Mass.    239,    46    N.    E.    1046    [1S97];  Company  v.   City  of  East  St.  Louis. 

State  of  Minnesota   ex  rel.   Lewis  v.  134    111.    656,   25    X.   E.   962    [1891]: 

District  Court  of  Ramsey  County.  33  Clinton  v.   City  of  Portland,   26   Or. 

Minn.    1G4,    22    X.    W.    295    [1885];  410,   38   Pac.   407    [1894]. 

Roth  V.  Hax,  68  Mo.  App.  283  [1896].  U'uming  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids. 

*  Smith  V.  Abineton  Savinss  Bank,  46  Mich.  150,  9  X.  W.  141   [1881]. 

171  Mass.  178.  50  X.  E.  545   [1898].  '"Richardson    v.    Mehler,    111    Ky. 

"Owens   V.    City   of   Marion.    Iowa,  408.   63   S.  W.  957,  23  Ky.  Law  917 

127   la.   469,   lOs"  X.   W.   381    [1905].  [1901]. 


I 


753  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  491 

all  intersecting  streets  and  alleys,  in  accordance  with  the 
plans  and  specifications  on  file  in  the  office  of  the  board 
of  public  works,  is  sufficiently  definite,  although  the  plans  and 
specifications  were  not  in  existence  when  the  ordinance  was 
passed;  and  accordingly  could  not  be  regarded  as  a  part  thereof.*^ 
On  the  other  hand,  a  bid,  invalid  when  made,  cannot  be  made 
valid  by  a  bond  attached  thereto  executed  by  the  contractors 
and  their  sureties  and  misreciting  the  bid  or  proposal  to  which 
it  is  attached.^- 

§  491.     Time  within  which  contract  must  be  entered  into. 

By  statute  it  is  sometimes  provided  that  a  contract  for  certain 
forms  of  public  improvements  must  be  entered  into  within  a 
certain  time.  Such  a  provision  is  mandatory  and  not  directory 
and  a  failure  to  comply  therewith  invalidates  the  contract' and 
assessment  based  thereon.^  Accordingly,  if  the  statute  requires 
a  contract  to  be  entered  into  witliin  fifteen  days  after  the  first 
posting  of  the  notice  of  the  award  to  the  contractor  a  contract 
entered  into  after  such  time  is  invalid  if  it  is  not  shown  that  the 
delay  in  entering  into  the  contract  was  not  caused  by  any  fault 
of  the  contractor.-  Where  by  statute  an  ordinance  does  not  go 
into  effect  until  it  is  pul)lished,  an  ordinance  approved  on  the 
fifteenth  of  the  montli  and  pul)lished  on  the  nineteenth  requir- 
ing a  written  contract  to  be  entered  into  in  ten  days  authorizes 
a  contract  and  bond  executed  and  deposited  with  the  city  clerk  on 
the  twenty-third  of  the  month,  though  marked  filed  on  the  twenty- 
fifth  and  not  approved  by  the  mayor  until  the  twenty-eighth ;  since 
the  ten  days  run  from  the  pulilication  of  the  ordinance.''  Every 
presumption  is  made  under  such  statutes  in  favor  of  the  validity 
of  a  contract  which  is  apparently  otherwi.se  regular.*  Thus  un- 
der a  statute  requiring  the  first  step  for  letting  a  contract  to  be 
taken  within  fifteen  days  after  the  final  determination  of  the  ap- 

"Riohanlson    v.    :Mehlpr,    111    Ky.  =Libbey   v.   Elswortli,   97   C'al.   .31(1, 

408.  0.3   S.   W.   957,  23   Ky.  Law  917        32    Pac.    228    [18931:    Peiine    v.    1 


hor- 


[19011.  busli.  97  Cal.  305.  32  Pac.  220  [1893 J. 

''Williams  v.  r?er<,nn,  129  Cal.  4fil,            ••■  (  ity   of   Sprinsfield   ex    rel.   Updo- 

62  Pap.  59   [19001.  f^rafT   v.   Mills.   99    Mo.   App.    141;    72 

'Lil)l)y    V.    Elsworth.    97    Cal.  310,       S.    W.   402    [19031. 

32   Pac.   228    [18931;    Pcrino   v.  For-           '  Gaee   v.    People   ex    rel.    Hanborfr. 

bush.     97     Cal.     305,     32     Pac.  226       213   111.   347,   72  N.   E.    1062    [19041. 
[18931. 


§  492  T.VXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  754 

peal  from  the  judgment  of  confirmation  of  the  special  assess- 
ment for  the  work,  the  fact  that  bids  were  advertised  for  six 
months  after  the  affirmance  of  the  judgment  of  confirmation  does 
not  invalidate  the  assessment  in  the  absence  of  evidence  show- 
ing that  no  step  toward  letting  the  contract  had  been  taken 
within  such  fifteen  days.^  So  under  a  statute  which  provides 
that  the  first  step  towards  letting  the  contract  must  be  taken 
within  ninety  days  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  at  which  the 
judgment  of  confirmation  is  entered,  a  contract  will  be  regarded 
as  valid  if  the  first  step  is  taken  on  a  day  which  was  within 
ninety  days  from  the  day  to  which  such  term  might  have  been 
continued,  and  there  is  no  evidence  as  to  the  fact  of  such  con- 
tinuance.^ In  the  absence  of  statute  fixing  the  time  within 
Avhich  the  contract  must  be  entered  into,  a  delay  in  entering  into 
the  contract  may  discharge  the  contractor,  but  does  not  invali- 
date the  contract  if  the  contractor  does  not  avail  himself  of  the 
delay.  The  fact  that  the  city  delays  five  years  after  a  bid  is 
made  before  accepting  it  while  it  may  authorize  the  contractor 
to  refuse  to  enter  into  such  contract,  does  not  authorize  the 
property  owner  to  object  to  an  assessment  levied  to  pay  the  cost 
of  such  improvement  if  the  contractor  performs  the  contract  and 
it  is  not  shown  that  the  property  owner  is  obliged  to  pay  more 
than  he  would  have  had  to  pay  had  the  contract  been  entered 
into  when  the  bid  was  accepted."  Thus,  a  delay  of  a  year  and  one- 
half  between  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  and  the  making  of 
the  contract  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.^ 

§  492.     Execution  of  contract. 

A  corporation  may  bind  itself  by  a  contract  made  in  a  name 
differing  from  its  corporate  name  if  its  identity  is  clear.'  If 
the  board  of  trustees  or  directors  of  a  corporation  pass  a  reso- 
lution conferring  upon  the  president  of  a  corporation  full  power 
with  reference  to  municipal  street  work,  such  president  is  thereby 
given  authority  to  contract  with  the  city  on  behalf  of  the  cor- 
poration for  the  improvement  of  a  public  street.-     Even  if  the 

^  Gage   V.    People   ex   rel.   Hanberg,  "  Jaicks  v.  Middlesex  Inv.  Co.,  201 

213  111.  347,  72  X.  E.  1062  [1904].  Mo.    Ill,   98   S.   W.   759    [1906]. 

'  Gage   V.   People   ex   rel.   Hanberg,  '  Xeff  v.   Covington   Stone   &   Sand 

213  111.  468,  72  X.  E.  1108   [1&05].  Co.,   108   Ky.   457,   55   S.   W.  697,  56 

'City    of    Philadelphia    to    use    v.  S.  W.  723   [1900]. 
Hood,     211     Pa.     189,     60    Atl.     721  ^  Oakland  Paving  Company  v.  Rier, 

[1905].  52    Cal.    270    [1877]. 


755  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  492 

power  conferred  upon  the  president  were  defective,  yet  if  the 
contract  purported  to  be  made  with  the  corporation  and  it  was 
performed  by  the  corporation,  both  city  and  corporation  would 
be  estopped  to  deny  the  validity  of  the  contract.^  The  power  of 
the  president  of  a  corporation  to  bind  a  corporation  by  contract 
for  a  public  improvement  will  be  presumed  if  the  contract  has 
been  performed  by  the  corporation  and  the  corporation  is  seeking 
to  enforce  the  assessment.*  Thus,  it  has  been  said  that  a  con- 
tract purporting  to  be  that  of  the  corporation,  but  without  the 
corporate  seal,  and  signed  "A.,  Pres.,"  is  prima  facie  valid. ^  So 
if  a  contract  which  purports  to  be  made  by  a  corporation  is 
signed  in  the  name  of  tlie  corporation  by  its  secretary  and  such 
contract  is  performed  by  the  corporation,  the  authority  of  the 
secretary  will  be  presumed,"  especially  if  the  corporate  seal  has 
been  affixed  and  the  corporation  has  treated  such  contract  as 
valid.''  After  a  contract  has  been  performed  it  will  be  presumed 
that  a  power  of  attorney  given  by  the  contractor  to  another  per- 
son authorizing  such  person  to  enter  into  a  contract  witih  the  city 
on  behalf  of  the  contractor  will  be  presumed  to  be  valid."  Stat- 
utes which  provide  how  a  contract  is  to  be  executed  on  behalf 
of  a  city  must  be  complied  with  in  at  least  a  substantial  manner. 
By  statute  it  may  be  provided  that  if  the  mayor  of  a  city  signs 
a  contract,  such  signature  makes  the  contract  valid  as  far  as  au- 
thority is  concerned  and  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  due  ob- 
servance of  all  antecedent  forms  and  requirements  of  law."  Un- 
der a  statute  requiring  that  contracts  should  be  executed  on  the 
part  of  a  city  by  the  president  of  the  board  of  public  works  or 
such  of  their  members  as  the  board  should  designate,  that  the 
seal  of  the  board  should  be  attached  thereto  and  that  the  contract 
should  then  be  countersigned  by  the  city  comptroller,  it  was  held 
that  a  contract  executed  properly  by  the  president  of  the  board 
of  public  works  is  valid,  although  the  comptroller  has  not  coun- 
tersigned it.  as  in  such  case  his  countersigning  is  a  mere  clerical 

'  Oakland  Paving  Company  V.  Ricr,  v.    Bato.s,     134    Cal.    3!).    filJ    Pac.    2 

52  Cal.   270   [18771.  11901]. 

*City     Street     Improvement    Com-  '  Reid    v.    Clay.    134    Cal.    207,    C)6 

pany  v.  Laird.    138  Cal.  27,   70  Pac.  Pac.   262    [19011. 

910    [1902].  "McVerry  v.  Boyd.  8!)  Cal.  304,  26 

'City     Street     Improvement     Com-  Pac.  885   [1891]. 

pany  v.   Laird.   138   Cal.  27,  70   Pac.  » Bruning    v.     Chadwick.     109     La. 

916" [1902].  1067,  34  So.  90   [1903]. 

'  San    Francisco    Paving    Company 


§  493  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  756 

duty  which  the  contractor  or  board  could  have  compelled  him  to 
perform.^"  The  omission  of  the  signature  of  the  officer  who  is 
authorized  to  make  public  contracts  on  behalf  of  the  city  in- 
validates the  contract."  Thus,  if  by  statute  the  superintendent 
of  streets  is  to  sign  such  contracts,  a  contract  not  signed  bj^  him 
is  invalid.^-  Under  a  statute  providing  that  an  assessment  should 
not  be  set  aside  except  in  a  case  where  fraud  was  shown,  a  mere 
defect  of  authority  to  enter  into  a  contract  was  held  not  to 
amount  to  fraud  so  as  to  invalidate  the  assessment.^^  A  contract 
for  a  public  improvement  must  ordinarily  be  made  in  the  name 
of  the  public  corporation  by  which  such  improvement  is  con- 
structed." Thus  where  the  commissioners  of  public  works  of  a 
city  entered  into  a  contract  in  the  name  of  the  commissioners 
of  public  works,  it  was  said  to  be  questionable  whether  the 
contract  had  any  validity.  It  was  said  that  in  such  case  a  con- 
tract should  be  made  in  the  name  of  the  city  of  which 
they  were  officers.^^  By  statute  it  may  be  provided  that  a  con- 
tract cannot  be  entered  into  unless  the  head  of  the  department 
concerned  files  a  certificate  that  such  work  is  necessary.  A  con- 
tract entered  into  under  such  statute  without  such  certificate  is 
invalid  and  the  contractor  cannot  recover  thereon.^" 

§  483.     Vote  necessary  to  validity  of  contract. 

The  statutes  occasionally  provide  what  vote  of  the  council  or 
other  body  of  public  officials  is  necessary  to  enter  into  a  con- 
tract to  make  a  public  improvement.  Substantial  compliance 
with  such  statutes  is  sufficient.^  A  resolution  awarding  a  public 
contract  and  directing  the  city  auditor  to  enter  into  a  contract 
with  a  bidder  is  not  a  resolution  of  a  "permanent  or  general 
nature,"  and  hence  does  not  require  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the 
council.-    A  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  council  to  enter  into  a  street 

"State   of  Minnesota  ex   rel.   Benz  '^  Lutes  v.  Briggs,  5  Hun    (N.  Y.) 

V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County,  67    [1875]. 

32  Minn.   181,  19  N.  W.  732   [1884].  '"  Burns  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City 

"Manning  v.  Den,  90  Cal.  610,  27  of   New    York,   3    Hun    (N.   Y.)    212 

Pac.   435    [1891].  [1874]. 

"Manning  v.  Den,  90  Cal.  610,  27  'Brown  v.  Central  Bermudez  Com- 

Pac.  435    [1891].  pany,    162    Ind.    452,    69    N.    E.    150 

"In   the  Matter  of  the  New  York  [1903]. 

Protestant    Episcopal    Puhlic    School,  -  City  of  Cincinnati  for  use  of  Ash- 

8  Hun.    (N.  Y.)    457    [1876].  man  v.  Bickett,  26   0.   S.  49   [1875]. 

"Lutes  V.  Briggs,  5  Hun    (N.  Y.) 
67    [1875]. 


757  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  494 

improvement  contract  is  good  as  against  collateral  attack.^  A 
statutory  provision  to  the  effect  that  no  public  work  which  in- 
volved an  expenditure  of  more  than  ten  thousand  dollars  should 
be  undertaken  unless  it  was  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  electors 
of  the  city,  was  held  to  apply  only  to  improvements  which  af- 
fected the  public  at  large  and  were  to  be  paid  for  by  the  city.* 

§  494.     Parties  to  contract. 

There  is  no  constitutional  requirement  making  it  necessary 
that  the  council  of  a  city  should  approve  contracts  for  the  con- 
struction of  public  improvements  at  the  expense  of  owners  of 
abutting  property.^  Such  an  act  is  ministerial  and  an  executive 
board  may  be  empowered  by  statute  to  perform  the  same.-  If 
the  statute  specifically  provides  that  the  city  council  shall  let 
contracts  for  public  improvements,  such  provision  is  mandatory 
and  a  contract  let  by  any  other  agency  is  invalid;  and  a  valid 
assessment  cannot  be  levied  therefor.'*  Thus,  under  such  a  stat- 
ute a  committee  of  the  council  cannot  accept  a  bid  or  award  a 
contract.*  In  some  states,  however,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
contract  made  by  a  committee  of  the  council  may  be  ratified  by 
the  council  and  thus  made  valid."'  Thus,  under  an  ordinance 
which  provided  that  contracts  for  street  improvements  should  be 
let  to  the  lowest  bidder  and  that  the  lowest  bid  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  council  for  action,  it  was  held  that  where  a  com- 
mittee appointed  for  the  purpose  let  a  contract  and  subsequently 
the  council  with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts  made  an  order  au- 
thorizing the  committee  to  employ  a  superintendent  of  the  work, 
such  order  was  an  acceptance  of  the  bid."  Under  a  statute  re- 
quiring nil  contracts  for  street  improvements  to  be  referred  to 
a  committee  of  the  city  council,  a  contract  not  so  refei-rcd  is  in- 
valid.''    A  contract  entered  into  by  the  mayor  without  the  cou- 

'  Brown  v.  Cantral  Bormudoz  Com-  '  City   of   Stockton   v.   Creanor,    45 

pany.    162    Tnd.    452.    (lil    N.    E.    150  Cal.   643    [1873];    State,  Van  Home. 

[10031.  Tros.  V.  Town  of  Bergen,  30  N.  J.  1.. 

*The    Bark     Ecclesiastical     Society  (1  Vroom)    307   [1863]. 

V.    City    of    Ilartfrtrd.    47    Conn.    89  *  City    of    Stockton    v.    Creanor.    45 

11870]'.  Cal.    643    [1873]. 

»Barfie1(l   v.  (ileason.    Ill    Ky.  401.  '^  ]\lain  v.  Fort  Smitli.  40  Ark.  480. 

63    S.    W.    964,    23    Ky.    L.    B.     128  5  S.  W.  801    [1887]. 

11001].  «Main  v.  Fort  Smith.  40   Ark.  4S0. 

»Barfiel(l   v.  Cleason.    Ill    Ky.  491,  5  S.  W.   801    [1887]. 

63    S.    W.    0(U,    23    Ky.    L.    B.     128  MVortliinfrton    v.    City    of    ('(.vin-i 

[1901].  tun.   S2    Ky.   265    [1884]. 


§  494  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  758 

currence  of  the  council  is  under  such  statute  invalid.^  By  stat- 
ute the  co-operation  and  approval  of  some  boards,  such  as  the 
board  of  public  works,  may  be  necessary  to  the  execution  of 
a  contract  for  a  public  improvement.-'  Under  such  statutes  a 
contract  not  concurred  in  by  a  majority  of  the  board  specified 
is  invalid.^"  Thus,  where  by  statute  the  mayor,  the  civil  en- 
gineer and  three  commissioners  were  to  constitute  the  board, 
it  was  held  that  the  vote  of  the  mayor  and  civil  engineer  for 
the  improvement,  one  commissioner  voting  against  it  and  the 
other  two  being  absent,  was  insufficient,  and  that  an  assessment 
for  such  improvement  was  invalid. ^^  A  statute  requiring  the 
board  of  public  works  to  place  before  the  council  a  detailed  esti- 
mate of  the  cost  of  a  public  improvement  is  held  to  be  complied 
with  substantially,  where  the  board  of  public  works  places  before 
the  council  an  estimate  of  the  gross  cost  of  s  ich  improvement, 
which  estimate  the  council  accepts  and  upon  which  it  acts.^^ 
If  by  statute  it  is  provided  that  a  foreign  corporation  must  com- 
ply with  certain  requirements  in  order  to  be  permitted  to  do  busi- 
ness in  that  state  and  it  is  held  that  a  contract  made  by  a  foreign 
corporation  which  has  not  complied  with  such  requirements  is 
invalid,  a  city  should  not  make  a  contract  for  a  public  improve- 
ment with  a  foreign  corporation  which  has  not  complied  with  such 
requirements.  However,  if  the  improvement  is  a  proper  one,  for 
which  an  assessment  may  be  levied,  and  the  property  assessed  is 
benefited  thereby  to  an  amount  equal  to  or  greater  than  the 
amount  of  the  assessment,  equity  will  not  relieve  the  property 
owner  even  if  the  contract  is  void.^^  An  ordinance  which  re- 
([uires  persons  engaged  in  the  original  construction  of  public 
works  to  obtain  a  license  before  undertaking  such  work  was  held 
to  be  unconstitutional.^*  However,  it  was  not  shown  that  such 
ordinance  was  enforced  or  that  any  one  was  thereby  prevented 

"  Murphy   v.   City  of  Louisville.   72  "  Brophy  v.  Landmau,  28  0.  S.  542 

Ky.    (9  Bi'ish.)    180   [1872].  |  1876]. 

"  Goodwillie     v.     City     of     Detroit,  '"Goodwillie  v.  City  of  Detroit,  10.'? 

103  Mich.  283.  61  N.  W.  526  [1894];  :\Iich.    283,    61    N.   W.    526    [1894]. 
Baisch   v.   City   of  Grand  Rapids,   84  ^^  Beaser  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 

Mich.    660,    48    N.    W.    176     [1891];  Company,    120    Wis.    599,    98    N.    W. 

Verdin  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  131  Mo.  525  [1904]. 

26,  33  S.  W.  480,  36  S.  W.  52  [1895]:  "Pvichardson    v.    Mehler,    111    Ky. 

Broi)liy    v.    Landman,    28    O.    S.    542  408,  63  S.  W.  957.  23  Ky.  Law  Eep. 

[1876].  917    [1901]. 

'"Bropliy  V.  Landman,  28  O.  8.  542 
[1876]. 


759  TUE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  495 

from  bidding.  The  contract  was  let  and  the  work  was  performed. 
The  invalidity  of  such  ordinance  requiring  a  license  could  not  then 
be  urged  to  defeat  the  validity  of  the  assessment.^^ 

§  495.     Letting  contract  on  competitive  bidding. 

In  the  absence  of  statute  it  is  not  necessary  that  a  contract  for 
a  public  improvement  should  be  let  on  competitive  bidding  or 
should  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder.^  A  provision  that  a  public  cor- 
poration "may  advertise  for  proposals  for  doing  any  contract"  is 
directory  and  does  not  require  advertisement  for  bids.-  A  statute 
which  provides  "all  city  improvements  of  whatever  kind  or  char- 
acter including  the  erection  of  public  buildings  made  or  to  be 
erected  at  the  expense  of  the  city  shall  be  let  by  contract  to  the 
lowest  and  best  bidder,"  has  been  held  not  to  apply  to  work  done 
at  the  expense  of  the  abutting  property  owner."*  By  modern  stat- 
utes it  is,  however,  often  provided  that  contract  must  be  let  to  the 
lowest  bidder.  Such  provisions  are  intended  to  protect  the  proper- 
ty owners  and  are  mandatory.*  A  statute  requiring  a  contract  to 
be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  in  case  of  an  improvement  to  be  paid  for 
by  special  assessment  and  in  case  of  "such  improvements  as  the 
city  council  shall  by  ordinance  prescribe"  includes  a  contract 
for  the  construction  of  additions  to  its  existing  waterworks  sys- 
tem.-'' The  provision  requiring  contracts  to  be  let  to  the  lowest 
l)idder  are   generally   applicable  to   contracts  for   improvements 

'* Richardson    v.    Mehlor,    111    Ky.  Southern    Railway   Company   v.    City 

408,  G3  R.  W.  957,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  of    Chicago,    144    111.    391,    33    N.    E. 

917    [1901].  602     [18931;     City     of     Elsberry     v. 

'Scott   V.   Strinjxley,    132    Ind.   378,  Black,    120   Mo.    App.    20,   96    S.    W. 

31    X.    E.    953    [18921:    Yeomans    v.  256,  257    [19061;   Mullane  v.  City  of 

Riddle,    84    la.    147,    50    X.    W.    886  Xewark,   —  X.  J.  ,   68  Atl.   412 

[1891];  In  the  ]\Iatter  of  the  Peti-  1 1905  i  ;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Knanst,  101  X.  Y.  188,  4  X.  tion  of  tlie  Emigrant  Industrial  Sav- 
E.  338  [18861;  Tarentum  Borough  ings  Bank,  75  X.  Y.  388  [1878]  ;  Bra- 
V.  Moorhead,  26  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  273  dy  v.  Xew  York,  7  Ahl).  Pr.  (X.  Y.) 
11904].  234;   Loueliheim   v.  City  of  Philadel- 

-Stiewel  v.  Fencing  District  Xo.  6  jjhia.     21S     Pa.     100.     (id     Atl.     1121 

of   Johnson    County,    71    Ark.    17,    70  119(171;     Ardray    v.    City    of    Dallas. 

S.  W.  308,  71  S.  W.  247   [19031.  13  Tex.  Civ.  App.  442,  35  S.  W.  Rep. 

"Kansas    City    Transfer     Company  726;    Moran   v.   lliompson,   20   \Vash. 

V.   Iluling,  22   Mo.   App.   654    [1886].  525,    56    Pac.    29     [1899];     Dean    v. 

*  Flickinger    v.    Fay,    Hi)    Cal.   590,  Charlton,  27   Wis.  522    [18711. 
51    Pac.    855    [1898];    Siegel    v.    City  'Moran    v.    Thompson,    20     Wash, 

of  Chicago,  223  111.  428.  79  X.  E.  280  525.  56  Pac.  29  [1899]. 
[1906];    Lake    Sliore    and    Michigan 


§  495  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  760 

exceeding  a  certain  amount  in  value.  The  contract  cannot  be 
valid  if  based  upon  proposals  which  tend  to  restrict  free  compe- 
tition.*' A  statute  providing  that  contracts  shall  be  let  to  the 
lowest  bidder,  evidently  contemplates  that  the  proposals  should 
be  made  upon  a  common  basis  and  that  there  should  not  be  any 
change  therein  after  the  bids  are  received  and  before  the  contract 
it  let ;  since  if  a  change  were  allowed  it  would  be  impossible  to 
determine  who  the  lowest  bidder  was.  Accordingly  it  has  been 
held  that  a  city  has  no  power  to  change  the  terms  of  a  contract 
so  as  to  differ  materially  from  the  advertisement  or  specifications 
which  form  the  basis  of  the  bids.''  Under  a  statute  permitting 
recovery  of  an  assessment  if  the  work  has  been  done  and  the 
property  is  properly  to  be  charged  therefor,  notwithstanding  any 
informality,  irregularity  or  defect,  a  variance  between  the  con- 
tract and  the  ordinance  or  advertisement  is  said  not  to  be  juris- 
dictional and  if  not  prejudicial  to  property  owners  to  be  an 
irregularity  which  should  be  disregarded.^  Under  a  statute  re- 
quiring the  letting  of  contracts  to  the  lowest  bidder  a  provisioa 
in  the  contract  that  the  contractor  should  do  such  extra  work  as 
the  street  commissioner  should  direct  at  a  price  to  be  fixed  by  the 
commissioner  was  held  not  to  avoid  the  contract.®  Under  such 
statutes  the  assessment  is  invalid  if  the  improvement  is  not 
described  in  the  ordinance  with  sufficient  accuracy,^**  since  the 
bidders  cannot  know  in  advance  for  what  they  are  bidding,  and 
the  public  officials  cannot  determine  who  the  lowest  bidder  is." 
If  the  contract  does  not  define  what  work  is  to  be  done  and  eon- 
tains  no  reference  to  the  ordinance  or  specifications  which  might 
supply  such  deficiency,  such  contract  is  so  indefinite  that  it  can- 
not be  enforced  and  an  assessment  therefor  is  invalid.^-  Whether 
proposals  may  be  advertised  for  and  bids  received  without  speci- 
fying the  materials  to  be  used,  leaving  the  public  corporation  freo 
to  determine  what  material  is  to  be  used  after  learning  the  price 
at  which  each  can  be  furnished  is  a  question  upon  which  there 

"Anderson  v.   Fuller,   51    Fla.   380,  '"See  §  856  et  seq. 

41  So.  684  [1906].  "Piedmont  Paving  Co.  v.   Allman, 

'Mohr  V.  City  of  Chicago,   114  111.  136    Cal.    88,    68    Pac.    493     [1902]; 

App.  283   [1904].  Wells     v.     Burnham,     20     Wis.     112 

*  Ottumwa    Brick    &     Construction  [1865]. 

Co.  V.  Ainley,   109  la.  386,  80  N.  W.  '=  Schwiesau    v.    Mahon,     110    Cal. 

510    [1899].  543,   42   Pac.    1065    [1895]. 

»  Allen  V.  Rogers,  20  Mo.  App.  290 
[1886]. 


761  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  *  §  495 

is  a  conflict  of  authority.  Under  some  statutes  it  is  held  that  such 
manner  of  ascertaining-  the  lowest  bidder  is  proper  and  that  the 
material  to  be  used  need  not  be  determined  until  after  bids  have 
been  received.^^  Under  other  statutes  it  is  said  that  the  object 
of  requiring  bids  is  to  secure  them  for  definite  amounts  for  a 
particular  kind  of  work,  and  that  there  can  be  no  competitive 
bid  in  which  the  quality  of  the  material  to  be  furnished  is  to  be 
considered  as  well  as  the  price  to  be  charged."  A  property 
owner  who  wishes  to  object  on  the  ground  that  the  contract  was 
not  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  must  interpose  his  objection  before 
the  contract  has  been  performed. ^^  If  a  provision  is  made  for 
confirming  an  assessment  on  a  formal  hearing,  such  objection 
must  be  interposed  at  that  time.  The  property  owner  cannot 
wait  until  application  is  made  for  a  judgment  of  sale  for  failure 
to  pa}^  such  assessment/"  If  a  bid  is  made  for  doing  work  such 
as  excavation  at  a  certain  amount  per  cubic  yard  instead  of 
at  a  gross  sum  it  has  been  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  such  bid 
is  invalid. ^^  In  other  jurisdictions  a  contract  in  which  the  price 
is  fixed  at  a  certain  rate  per  unit'of  quantity  is  valid  although  the 
quantity  is  not  fixed.^*  Where  it  is  impossible  from  the  nature 
of  the  improvement  to  determine  in  advance  the  amount  of  exca- 
vation necessary,  an  assessment  is  valid  although  the  ordinance 
does  not  specify  the  amount  of  excavation  to  be  made  if  the  con- 
tract is  let  at  a  certain  rate  per  cubic  yard."  Where  the  amount 
of  wood  sheeting  to  be  used  could  not  be  determined  in  advance 
and  accordingly  no  (piantity  was  specified,  it  was  held  that  an 

^^Ex    parfe    City    of    Paducah,    —  S.  W.  800  [l.'WSl;  Saiifonl  v.  :\raynr. 

Ky.  ,  89  S.  W.  302,  28  Ky.  Law  etc.,    of    the    City    of    New    York.    33 

Rep.    412    [1905];     Attorney-General  Ilarb.    (N.   Y.)    i47    [ISC.Ol;    Sanford 

on   the   Relation   of   Cook   v.    C  ity   of  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  New  York,  12  Abb. 

Detroit,  26  Mich.  263    [18721;   War-  Pr.    (X.   V.)    23   [1860]. 

ren    Brothers    Co.    v.    City    of    Now  '"  Givin.s  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond, 

York,    190   N.    Y.    297.    S3    N.    E.    59  194  111.  150,  88  Am.  St.  Rep.  143,  62 

[19071;    In    the    Matter    of    Ford,    6  X.  E.  534   [19021. 

Lansing    (X.   Y.)    92    [1872];    Parker  "Brady    v.    Mayor    of    Xew    Y'ork. 

V,   City   of   Phihidelpliia,   —   Pa.    St.  20  N.  Y."  312   [1859]; 

,  G9  Atl.  670   [1908].  «  Cady  v.  City  of  San  Bernardino. 

"Piedmont  Paving  Co.   v.  Allman,       —    Cal.    ,    94    Pac.    242    [1908]; 

136  Cal.  88,  68  Pac.  493;   Coggeshall  (contract  for  electric  liuhts)  ;  Dickey 

V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  78  la.  235.  41  v.  Porter.  203  Mo.   1,   101   S.  W.  586 

N.  W.  617,  42  N.  W.  650   [1889].  [1907];    (amount  of  masonry). 

"(ity    of    Bloomingtcm    v.    Phelps.  "  Dickey  v.  Porter,  203  Mo.  1,   101 

149   Ind.  596,  49   X.  E.  581    [1897];  S.  W.  586   [1907]. 
Johnson    v.    Duer,    115    Mo.    366,    21 


495 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


762 


agreement  to  pay  at  one  dollar  per  lineal  foot  per  sewer  for  such 
sheeting  as  should  be  left  in  by  the  direction  of  the  engineer  did 
not  invalidate  the  assessment.-'^  A  contract  in  which  neither  the 
(piantity  nor  the  price  is  fixed  is  clearly  invalid.-^  The  legislature 
may  provide  that  certain  officials  shall  examine  the  work  and 
give  a  certificate  that  the  proceedings  are  free  from  fraud  if  they 
find  such  to  be  the  fact.  A  certificate  of  this  character  is  held 
to  cure  the  omission  to  advertise  for  bids  and  let  to  the  lowest 
bidder.--  Accepting  a  bid  which  is  not  the  lowest  is  not  a  legal 
irregularity  within  the  meaning  of  the  New  York  statutes  for 
vacating  assessments  and  recovering  money  paid  in.-''  If  the 
statute  requires  the  contract  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  the 
city  has  no  right  to  provide  that  it  will  determine  who  the  lowest 
bidder  is  upon  certain  items  only  of  the  work  to  be  done,  since 
the  bidder  who  is  the  lowest  upon  the  specified  items  may  be  the 
highest  ui)ou  the  entire  contract.-^  Under  such  statutes  the  city 
has  no  power  to  Avithhold  one  or  more  material  items  from  compe- 
tition by  fixing  arbitrarily  the  amount  to  be  paid  for  the  per- 
formance of  certain  kinds  of  work.-"^  Thus,  the  city  cannot  fix 
an  arbitrary  rate  for  rock  excavation.-'"  Such  assessment  is  not, 
however,  entirely  void,  but  void  only  as  to  the  amount  to  be  paid 


-"  City  I  f  Cincinnati  v.  Anchor 
White  Lead  Co.,  44  O.  S.  243,  7  N. 
E.   11    [1886]. 

-'  McBrian  v.  City  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids, 56  Mich.  95,  22  N.  W.  206. 

-  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Johnson,  103  N.  Y.  260,  8  N.  E.  399 
[1886];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Kendall,  85  N.  Y.  302  [1881] ; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Marsh,  21  Hun.    (X.  Y.)   582   [1880]. 

^  In  the  Matter  of  the  Application 
of  Lange  to  Vacate  an  Assessment, 
85  N.  Y.  307  [1881] ;  Sanford  v.  May- 
or, etc.,  of  Xew  York,  12  Abb.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  23  [I860];  Horn's  Case,  12 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  124  [1861];  Ben- 
nett's Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  127 
[1861]. 

^  Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  tlie  City 
of  New  York,  20  X.  Y.  312  [1859]'; 
Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of 
XewYork,  18  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)"343 
( affirming  Brady  v.  Mayor.  Aldermen 
and    Commonalty    of    Xew    York,    Irt 


How.  Pr.  ( X.  Y. )  432 ;  Brady  v.  Xew 
York,  7  Abb.  Pr.   (X.  Y.)   234). 

-^  State,  Hampton,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pater- 
son,  36  X.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  i59  [1873]; 
Mutual  Life  Insurance  Company  of 
Xew  York  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 
York,  144  X.  Y.  494,  39  "x.  E.  386 
[1895];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Pelton  to  Vacate  an  Assess- 
ment, 85  X.  Y.  651  [1881];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Merriam 
to  Vacate,  an  Assessment,  84  X.  Y. 
596  [1881];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  the  Manhattan  Savings 
Institution  to  Vacate  an  Assessment. 
82  X.  Y.  142  [1880]. 

^In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Pelton  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  85 
X.  Y.  651  [1881];  Mutual  Life  In- 
surance Company  of  Xew  York  v. 
Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 
of  the  City  of  Xew  York,  144  N.  Y. 
494.    39    X.    E.    386    [1895];    In    the 


16''i  THE    IMPROVKMENT    CONTRACT.  §  495 

for  rock  excavation.-'  So  where  the  rock  excavation  was  seven- 
eighths  of  the  work  and  it  was  possible  to  determine  the  quantity 
of  such  rock,  a  contract  let  on  bids  for  the  rest  of  the  work  and 
allowing  to  the  lowest  bidder  on  such  remainder  whatever  price 
he  chose  to  ask  for  the  rock  excavation  is  invalid.-''  If  by  statute 
the  contract  is  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  on  the  entire  con- 
tract, the  cit.y  cannot  let  the  contract  to  one  who  bids  at  a  certain 
rate  per  unit  of  quantity.  The  price  thus  offered  depends  upon 
the  quantity  of  the  work  to  be  done  which  is  to  be  determined 
later  and  which  may  prove  much  higher  than  some  of  the  gross 
bids  made  in  competition  therewith.  The  city  has.  however, 
power  to  fix  an  arbitrary  ratio  between  the  prices  of  different 
kinds  of  work.-"  Thus,  the  action  of  the  city  in  requiring  bids 
to  be  made  per  cubic  .yard  for  rock  excavation  and  allowing 
one-fourth  of  that  price  per  cubic  yard  for  earth  excavation  has 
been  held  not  to  be  a  violation  of  the  statute.^"  Accordingly  the 
city  hat'  a  right  to  reject  the  lowest  l)id  offered  if  in  such  bid 
the  price  for  earth  excavation  was  slightly  more  than  one-fourth 
of  that  for  rock  excavation."'^  Under  such  a  method  of  bidding, 
however,  the  fraudulent  conduct  of  the  city  officials  in  over- 
estimating the  quantity  of  rock  to  be  excavated  and  underesti- 
mating the  quantity  of  earth  to  be  excavated,  thus  letting  the 
contract  to  one  whose  bid  is  the  lowest  on  the  estimated  (juanti- 
ties  but  is  not  the  lowest  with  reference  to  the  actual  quantities 

Matter   of    the    Petition    of    Merriam  ^  Brady  v.  ^Mayor,  etc..  of  (lie  City 

to   Vacate   an   Assessment.   84   X.   Y.  of  Xew  York.  20  X.   V.  .312   [1859]; 

596  [18811:   In  the  Matter  of  tlie  Pe-  Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc..  of  the  City  of 

tition  of  the  Manhattan  Savings  In-  Xew  York.  18  IIow.  Pr.  (X.  Y. )  343; 

stitution  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  82  (affirniing  Brady  v.  IMayor,  Aldermen 

X.  Y.   142    [1880];    Brady   v.   Mayor,  and    Commonalty    of    Xew    York,    16 

etc.,   of    the    City    of    Xew    York,    18  IIow.  Pr.  X.  Y.  432). 

How.  Pr.    (X.   Y.)    343    [18591;     (af-  =»  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

firming    Brady    v.    flavor,    Ahlermen  Marsli    to   Vacate   an   Assessment,   83 

and    Commonalty    of    Xew    York.    16  X.  Y.  431    [18811. 

How.  Pr.    (X.  Y.)    4321.  -"In    the    .Matter    of    Marsh.    83    X. 

^Mutual   Life    Insurance   Company  'S'.    431    [18811. 

of    Xew    York    v.    Mayor.    Ahh^rmen  '^  In  the  ]\Iatter  of  tlie   Petition  of 

and  Commonalty  of  tlie  City  of  Xew  Marsh    to   Vacate   an    Assessment,   83 

York.    144   X.    v.    494.   39   X.   E.    386  X.    V.    431     [18811.       (In    this    case, 

[18951;    In    the    Matter   of   the   Peti-  while    the    accepted    hid    was   not   the 

tion   of   Pelton    to  Vacate  an   Assess-  lowest  on  the  estimated  quantities,  it 

tnent.   85   X.   Y.   651    [1881]-.    In    the  proved    tf)    he    the    lowest    with    refer- 

Mattcr   of   the   Petition   of   Merriam.  ence  to  the  actual  quantities  of  earth 

84  X.  Y.  596   [18811.  :i"'l  '""ck  to  he  excavated.) 


§495 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


764 


of  rock  and  earth  excavation  entitles  the  property  owner  to 
relief.^-  So  does  an  honest  but  excessive  mistake  as  to  the  actual 
quantities  of  excavation  to  be  done.^*  Under  a  statute  requiring 
the  letting  of  a  contract  to  the  lowest  bidder  it  has  been  held 
that  the  city  has  power  to  notify  contractors  in  advance  that 
bids  in  excess  of  a  certain  charge  would  not  be  considered.^^ 
The  fact  that  a  bid  on  a  single  section  was  lower  than  the  price 
at  which  the  entire  contract  was  let  does  not  invalidate  the  con- 
tract and  assessment. ^'^  Under  a  statute  requiring  the  contract 
to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  a  private  contract  between  the 
successful  bidder  and  the  owners  of  some  of  the  land  to  be  assess- 
ed whereby  he  agreed  to  do  the  work  at  a  certain  rate  in  place  of 
that  awarded  by  the  city  was  held  to  operate  as  a  fraud  upon 
the  other  owners  and  avoid  the  contract.^^  Conduct  of  this  sort 
may  also  amount  to  fraud  so  as  to  invalidate  the  assessment.^^ 
Under  a  statute  which  authorizes  the  city  to  do  the  work  if  no 
bids  are  received,  a  city  has  no  power  to  let  a  contract  without 
competitive  bidding,  though  no  bids  were  received  upon  the 
first  advertisement  for  bids,  ^®  or  though  all  bids  were  rejected.*" 
If  the  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  requires  the  record 
of  the  common  council  to  show  that  there  was  a  bidder  for  the 
performance  of  a  local  improvement  whose  bid  was  accepted, 
an  assessment  made  without  such  record  is  said  to  be  a  nullity.*^ 
It  is  frequently  provided  that  certain  city  ofificials  shall  have 
power  to  dispense  with  the  letting  of  contracts  to  the  lowest 
bidder.*-     Thus,   such  requirements  may   be   dispensed   with   by 


'=  Matter  of  Eightieth  Street.  17 
Abb.  Pr.    (N.  Y.)    324   [1864]. 

^*  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Anderson,  47  Hun.  (X.  Y.)  203 
[1888]. 

'^  Seaboard  National  Bank  of  New 
York  V.  Woesten,  147  Mo.  467.  48 
L.  R.  A.  279,  48  S.  W.  939  [1898]. 
The  members  of  the  Board  of  Public 
Improvements  had  agreed  among 
themselves  not  to  consider  any  bid 
for  maintenance  in  excess  of  fifty 
cents  per  square  per  annum. 

^  Patterson  v.  Baumer,  43  la.  477 
[1876]. 

=' Brady  v.  Bartlett,  56  Cal.  350 
[1880]. 

^See  §  485. 


'"City  of  Elsberry  v.  Black,  120 
Mo.  App.  20,  96  S.  W.  256,  257 
[1906]. 

^"  Zorn    V.    Warren-Scharf    Asphalt 

Paving    Co.,    —    Ind.    App.    ,   81 

X.  E.  672  [1907].  (The  specifica- 
tions were  changed  as  to  material 
and  the  contract  let  to  one  of  the 
original  bidders  after  reconsideration 
of  the  vote  letting  the  contract  to 
another   bidder. ) 

*^  Whitney  v.  Common  Council  of 
tlie  Village  of  Hudson,  69  Mich.  189. 
37   N.  W.   184    [1888]. 

"  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
the  Emigrant  Industrial  Savings 
Bank,  75  X.  Y.  388    [1878]. 


765  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  495 

three-fonrths  of  the  common  council.*^  or  tAvo-thirds  of  the 
coiineil.*''  It  may  be  provided  that  if  the  order  and  contract 
for  an  improvement  are  adopted  by  a  vote  of  more  than  two- 
thirds  of  the  aldermen  elected,  lettinof  to  the  lowest  bidder  is 
not  necessary.'*"'  A  conncil  cannot  delegate  to  any  other  official 
discretion  as  to  dispensing  with  such  requirements.*"  If  it  is  not 
shown  that  the  required  number  of  the  council  dispensed  with 
advertising  for  bids,  advertisement  will  be  presumed  to  be  neces- 
sary.*" The  city  council  not  having  authority  to  dispense  with 
the  requirement  for  letting  contracts  to  the  lowest  bidder  in  the 
first  instance  cannot  ratify  a  contract  which  is  invalid  for  that 
reason.*^  The  legislature  has  authority  to  dispense  with  such 
requirements  in  the  first  instance  and  accordingly  may  ratify 
and  make  valid  contracts  otherwise  invalid  by  reason  of  omission 
to  comply  with  such  requirements.*^  In  some  jurisdictions,  stat- 
utes making  valid  such  contracts  have  been  construed  very  strict- 
ly. Thus,  a  statute  which  provided  for  a  re-assessment  if  the  tax 
had  been  adjudged  void  for  any  irregularity  in  any  of  the  pro- 
ceedings in  levying  it,  for  any  omission  to  comply  with  the  forms 
of  the  law  under  which  it  was  assessed  or  for  non-compliance 
with  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  city  charter,  in  ordering  or  let- 
ting the  work  or  making  the  contracts,  was  held  not  to  include  a 
contract  void  for  failure  to  let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  since  such  con- 
duct was  said  to  be  a  misfeasance  and  a  violation  of  a  plain  pro- 
vision of  the  law  in  fraud  of  the  rights  of  the  property  own- 
ers.'^" A  bid  of  a  lump  sum  for  several  different  improvements 
cannot  be  the  basis  of  a  valid  contract,  since  the  cost  of  each 
improvement  is  not  fixed  by  competitive  bidding.^^ 


"In  the  Matter  of  tho  Petition  of  (X.   Y.)    234;    Brady  v.   Mayor,   etc., 

the     Emiiirant      Industrial      Savinfrsi  of  Xew  York,  20  N.  Y.  312  [1.S59]. 

Bank,   73   X.   Y.   388    [18781.  '"In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

"Siewel  V.  City  of  Chicago,  223  111.  the    President,    ^Managers    and    Coni- 

428,   79  X.   E.   280    [lOOOl.  pany  of  tlie  Dehnvare  &  Hudson  Ca- 

"City  of  Chicago  v.  Slierwood.  101  nal   Company.   (iO  Hun.    (X.  Y.)    204, 

111.  549   [1882].     '  14   X.  Y.   Rupp.   585    [18911. 

"In  the  ]\Iatter  of  the   Petition  of  '"'Dean    v.    Charlton.    27    \Vis.    522 

the      Emi'frant      Indiistrial      Savings  [18711. 

Bank.   75    X.   Y.   388    [1878].  "People     v.     Common     Council     of 

'■Siporel  V.  City  of  'liica'To.  223  111.  Cily   of   Kingston.    189   X.   Y.   66.   81 

-I2S.  79  X.  E.  280   [19061.  X.  '  E.    557     [19071;     (order    reversed 

'"B-.ady  v.  Xew  York,   7   Abb.  Pr.  99  X.   Y.   S.   657.   114   App.  Div.   326 

[1906]). 


496 


TiVXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


766 


§  496    Advertising  for  bids. 

There  is  no  constitutional  necessity  of  advertising  for  bids 
for  a  public  improvement  to  be  paid  for  by  assessment.^  The 
legislature  has  power  to  provide  for  an  assessment,  although 
there  is  no  provision  for  advertising  Jor  bids  or  for  letting  the 
contract  to  the  lowest  bidder.-  Provisions  are  frequently  found 
in  modern  statutes  which  provide  that  contracts  for  public  im- 
provements must  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  after  letting  of  such 
contract  has  been  given.-''  It  has  been  suggested  that  these  stat- 
utes have  been  enacted  in  part  for  the  purpose  of  affording  tt) 
all  an  equal  opportunity  to  obtain  the  employment  which  will 
be  afforded  by  the  construction  of  the  public  improvement.* 
While  this  motive  may  have  existed  in  part  in  the  mind  of  the 
legislature,  the  real  purpose  of  such  statutes  is  to  secure  com- 
petition, obtain  the  loAvest  available  price  for  the  work  to  be 
done,  prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  fraudulent  combinations  between 
public  oiYicers  and  contractors,  and  thus  to  benefit  tax  payers 
or  the  property  owners  against  whom  assessments  are  to  l)e  levied 
for  the  improvement."'  Whether  it  is  necessary  to  give  notice 
of  the  letting  of  a  contract  and  to  let  it  to  the  lowest  bidder  is 
therefore  a  matter  of  statutory  construction.  A  statute  which 
provides  for  an  estimate  to  be  made  by  the  city  engineer  and 
provides  that  in  advertising  for  bids  such  estimate  shall  not  be 
published  does  not  prevent  a  cit.y  from  making  a  valid  contract 
without  advertisements  for  bids  and  does  not  require  the  city 
to  let  the  contract  to  the  lowest  bidder."  If  the  statute  provides 
that  the  letting  of  the  contract  must  be  advertised  or  published 
in  some  way,  such  provision,  being  for  the  benefit  of  the  property 
owners,  is  mandatory  and  cannot  be  dispensed  with  by  the  city.' 


i^City  of  Denver  v.  Campbell,  33 
Colo.  162,  80  Pac.  142  [1905];  Yar- 
nold  V.  City  of  Lawrence,  15  Kan. 
126  [1875];  Dean  v.  Borclisenius.  30 
Wis.  236   [1872]. 

^City  of  Denver  v.  Campbell.  33 
Colo.  i62,  80  Pac.  142  [1005];  Ben- 
nett V.   City   of   Emmetsburg,   —   la. 

,  115  N.  W.  582   [1908]  ;  Dean  v. 

Borchf5enius,  30  Wis.  236  [1872]. 

^See   §   495. 

^Galbreath  v  Xewton.  30  :\Io.  App. 
381. 

=  Mayor    and    (  itv    Couneilmen    of 


Baltimore  v.  Johnson,  62  Md.  225 
[1884];  Galbreath  v.  Xewton,  30  Mo. 
App.   381. 

"  Yarnold  v.  City  of  Lawrence,  15 
Kan.   126    [1875]. 

^  City  Improvement  Co.  v.  Broder- 
ick,  125  Cal.  139,  57  Pac.  776  [1899]; 
Siegel  V.  City  of  Chicago,  223  III. 
428,  79  N.  E.  280  [1906];  Rogne  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Coedtner,  224  111.  449. 
79  N.  E.  662  [1900]  ;  Bennett  v.  City 

of  Emmetsbnrg.  —  la.  ,  115  N.  W. 

582  [1908];  Comstock  v.  Eagle  Orove 
Citv.     133     la.    589,     111     X.    W.    51 


767 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


Hoe 


Under  such  statutes  an  assessment  cannot  be  enforced  if  the 
contract  is  let  or  the  improvement  is  constructed  without  such 
advertisement  for  bids."  On  the  same  principle,  if  the  city  by 
ordinance  requires  the  board  of  public  improvements  to  give 
notice  of  the  letting  of  a  public  contract,  such  requirement  is 
mandatory  and  the  board  of  public  improvements  cannot  dis- 
pense therewith.*^  Bids  ma}'  be  advertised  for,  submitted  and 
accepted  before  the  improvement  ordinance  is  passed,  if  the  im- 
provement provided  for  in  the  contract  is  the  same  as  that  ordered 


11907];  Brookbank  v.  City  of  Jef- 
fersonville,  41  Ind.  400  [1872];  Mc- 
Evven  v.  Gilker.  38  Ind.  233  [1871]; 
Kretsch  v.  Helm,  38  Ind.  207  [1871]; 
City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Imberry,  17 
Ind.  175  [18(31];  Coggesball  v.  City 
of  Des  :.Ioines,  78  la.  235.  41  X.  W. 
617,  42  N.  W.  650  [1889]  ;  Warren  v. 
Street  Commissioners  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  181  Mass.  6,  62  X.  E.  951 
1 1902] ;  Bowditch  v.  Superintendent 
of  the  Streets  of  Boston,  168  Mass. 
239,  46  N.  E.  1046  [1897];  Dickey  v. 
Holmes,  109  Mo.  App.  721,  83  S.  W. 
982  [1904];  Galbreatli  v.  Xewton,  30 
Mo.  App.  381;  Poth  V.  Mayor,  Al- 
dermen and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of  Xew  York,  151  X.  Y.  16,  45  X. 
E.  372  [1896];  In  the  :\Iatter  of  the 
Petition  of  Rosenbaum  to  Vacate  an 
Assessment,  119  X.  Y.  24,  23  X.  E. 
172  [1890];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Rosenbaum,  53  Hun.  478, 
6  X.  Y.  Supp.  184  [1889];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Pcnnie,  108 
X.  Y.  364,  15  X.  E.  611  [1888];  In 
the  Matter  of  tlie  Petition  of  Pennie 
to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  45  Ilun. 
(N.  Y.)  391  [1887];  In  the  :Matter 
of  the  Application  of  Lange  to  Va- 
cate an  Assessment,  85  X.  Y.  307 
[18811;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  the  Emigrant  Industrial  Sav- 
ings Bank,  75  X.  Y.  388  [1878]; 
Mutual  Life  Insurance  Company  of 
Xew  York  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 
York.  79  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  482, .  29  X. 
Y.  S.  980  [18941;  Steese  v.  Oviatt, 
24    O.    S.    248    [18731;    Upington    v. 


Oviatt.  24  O.  S.  232  [1873];  Appeal 
of  Harper,  109  Pa.  St.  9,  I  Atl.  791 
[1885J;  Breath  v.  City  of  Galveston. 
92    Tex.   454,   49   S.   W.   575    [1899]. 

"  Rogne  V.  People  ex  rel.  Goedtner. 
224  HI.  449,  79  X.  E.  662  [1906]; 
Brookbank  v.  City  of  JetTersonville, 
41  Ind.  406  [1872];  McEwen  v.  Gil- 
ker, 38  Ind.  233  [1871];  Kretsdi  v. 
Helm,  38  Ind.  207  [1871];  Moberry 
v.  City  of  Jeffersonville,  38  Ind.  198 
[1871];  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Im- 
berry, 17  Ind.  175  [1861];  Cogges- 
ball V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  78  la. 
235,  41  X.  W.  617.  42  X.  W.  050 
[1889];  Bowditch  v.  Superintendent 
of  Streets  of  Boston,  168  Mass.  239. 
46  X.  E.  1046  [1897];  Dickey  v. 
Holmes,  109  Mo.  App.  721,  83  S.  W. 
982  [1904];  Poth  v.  Mayor,  Alder- 
men and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of 
Xew  York.  151  X.  Y.  16,  45  x"!  E. 
372  [18961  :  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Pennie,  108  X.  Y.  304, 
15  X.  E.  611  [18881;  In  the  Matter 
of  the  Petition  of  Pennie.  45  Hun  39] 
[18871;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appli- 
cation of  Lange,  85  X.  Y.  307  [1881]  ; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the 
Emi'irant  Inihistrial  Savings  Bank. 
75  X.  V.  388  [18781;  In  the  Matter 
nf  the  Petition  of  Rosenbaum,  53 
Hun.  (X.  Y.)  478.  0  X.  Y.  Supp.  184 
[1889];  Appeal  of  Harper.  109  Pa. 
St.  9,  1  Atl.  791  [1885]:  Breath  v. 
City  of  Galveston.  92  Tex.  454.  49  S. 
W.  575    [1899]. 

"  Keane  v.  Cushing.  15  Mi>.  App. 
96    [1884]. 


§497 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


768 


by  the  ordinance.^"  Advertisement  for  bids  is  notice  of  an  im- 
provement ordinance  but  is  not  notice  of  an  assessment  ordinance 
passed  subsequently.^^ 

§  497.     Discretionary  power  to  determine  bidder. 

Statutes  which  provide  for  letting  public  contracts  on  compe- 
tition usually  grant  some  discretionary  power  to  the  city  or  other 
public  corporation  which  receives  bids,  to  determine  what  bid  is 
the  most  advantageous  to  the  public  interest.  It  is  usually  not 
required  by  such  statutes  that  the  bid  should  in  all  cases  be  let 
to  the  lowest  bidder  irrespective  of  other  considerations  as  to 
the  advisability  or  non-advisability  of  letting  the  contract  to 
him.  The  discretion  of  the  public  authorities  in  determining 
who  the  best  bidder  is,  is  ordinarily  not  subject  to  review  if  fairly 
exercised.^  The  language  employed  in  describing  the  person  to 
whom  the  contract  is  to  be  let  frequently  shows  that  some  dis- 
cretion is  conferred  upon  the  city.  Thus  a  provision  that  the 
contract  should  be  let  to  the  lowest  responsible  bidder  ^  or  the 
lowest  reliable  and  responsible  bidder '  or  that  bidders  must 
satisfactorily  prove  their  ability  to  perform  their  contracts  * 
shows  that  the  city  is  to  exercise  its  discretion  in  determining 
not  only  which  of  the  bids  is  lowest  in  terms  but  which  of  the 
bidders  are  reliable  and  responsible.  A  city  has  power  to  reject 
a  bid  even  of  the  lowest  responsible  bidder  if  it  results  from  a 
combination  of  the  bidders  or  if  the  successful  bidder  has  so  acted 
as  to  stifle  competition  and  increase  the   contract  price.''     If  a 


'» City  of  Springfield  to  use  of  Cen- 
tral National  Bank  v.  Weaver,  137 
Mo.  650,  37  S.  W.  509,  39  S.  W.  276 
[18961;  (overruling  in  part  Feane 
V.  Cushin'T.  15  Mo.  App.  96   [1884]). 

^^Villa-e  of  Mor-an  Park  v.  Ga- 
han,  35  111.  App.  646   [lF9ni. 

^  In-'e  V.  Board  of  Public  Works 
of  Mobile,  135  Ala.  187,  93  Am.  St. 
Rep.  20,  33  So.  678  [1902]  ;  Girvin  v. 
Simon,  116  Cal.  6')4,  48  Pac.  720 
[1897];  City  rf  Denver  v.  Dumars. 
33  Colo.  94,  80  Pac.  114  [1904]; 
Ci'Mis  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond, 
194  111.  150,  88  Am.  St.  Rep.  143,  62 
X.  E.  534  [1002];  Clapton  v.  Taylor, 
-49  Mo.  App.  117  [1892];  Case  v. 
Inhabitants  of  fity  ff  '^'•enton.  — 
N.  J.  ,  68  Atl.  57   [1907];   Find- 


ley  v.  City  of  Pittsburg,  82  Pa.  St. 
(1  Norris)    351    [1876]." 

-  ln[^e  V.  Board  of  Public  Works, 
135  Ala.  187,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  20, 
33  So.  678  [1902];  Givins  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Raymond,  194  111.  150,  88  Am. 
St.  Rep.  143,  G2  N.  E.  534  [1902]; 
Findley  v.  City  cf  Pittsbur"-,  82  Pa. 
St.     (1    Xo-ri-')     351     [1870]. 

^  City  cf  Denver  v.  Dumars,  33 
Colo.  94,  80  Pac.  114   [1904]. 

*  Case    V.    Inhabitants    cf    City    of 

Trenton,   —   XL    J.    ,    68    Atl.    57 

[1907]. 

"Civins  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond, 
194  111.  150,  88  Am.  St.  Ren.  143,  62 
X.  E.  534  [1902].  (This  remark  in 
this  case  is  in  the  nature  cf  an  obiter 
since  the  assessment  was  ultimately 
held  to  be  valid.) 


769  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  498 

bidder  has  been  delinquent  in  a  former  contract  with  the  city, 
the  city  officials  may  reject  his  bid  even  if  it  is  the  lowest  of 
those  offered/'  The  determination  of  the  'city  on  questions  of 
fact  in  determining  who  is  the  lowest  and  best  bidder  is  regarded 
as  final  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  misconduct/  If  a  contract  is 
awarded  to  one  who  is  not  the  lowest  and  best  bidder  and  there 
is  a  clear  abuse  of  the  discretion  vested  in  the  city  officials,  the 
contractor  has  no  right  to  recover  for  the  work  done  in  any  form 
of  action/  He  cannot  recover  upon  contract  since  the  contract 
is  invalid  as  not  in  compliance  with  the  statute-  He  cannot 
recover  in  quantum  meruit  since  the  work  was  done  under  an 
express  contract  which  is  not  merely  void  for  failure  to  comply 
with  the  statute,  but  is  in  violation  of  the  positive  mandatory  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  necessary  for  the  benefit  of  the  tax 
payer/  Under  a  statute  requiring  contracts  to  be  let  to  the 
lowest  responsible  bidder,  the  city  cannot  by  ordinance  reserve 
the  right  of  rejecting  any  and  all  proposals/"  The  power  to 
reject  all  bids  if  the  city  shall  think  it  wise  so  to  do  is  frequently, 
however,  conferred  by  statute/^ 

§  498.     Form  and  contents  of  bid. 

The  bid  must  conform  to  the  terms  of  the  proposal.  If  the 
proposal  invites  bids  for  the  improvement  of  a  street  as  a  whole, 
bids  for  a  part  of  the  improvement  may  be  disregarded.^ 
Omission  to  distinguish  in  the  bid  between  the  portions  of  the 
improvement  which  are  to  be  paid  by  property  owners  and  those 
portions  which  are  to  be  paid  by  the  city  does  not  invalidate 
the  bid  if  such  portions  have  been  already  fixed  and  the  bid  is 
not  inconsistent  with  such  determination.-  Omission  to  give  the 
formula  of  the  wearing  surface  of  the  paving  and  to  deposit 
samples   may  be   waived   by   the   city   if  the   bidder  names   the 


'  Girvin  v.  Simon,  IIG  Cal.  004,  48  Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Chicago, 

Pac.   720   [1897].  144  111.  391,  33  X.  E.  602  [1893]. 

'Clapton   V.    Taylor,    49    :Mo.    App.  '^Girvin    v.    Simon,    116    Cal.    604, 

117    [1892].             '  -IS   Pac.   720    [1897]. 

"Brady   v.   New   York,    7    Abb.    Pr.  '  Stimson  v.  Hanlcy,   1.51   Cal.   379, 

(N.   Y.)'  234.  90    Pac.    945    [1907]." 

"Brady   v.   New   York.    7    Abb.    Pr.  =  Boniteau  v.  Detroit.  41  Mich.  116, 

(N.  Y.)"234.  1    X.  W.  899    [1879]. 

"  Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern 


^  499  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT,  770 

material  and  refers  to  streets  paved  therewith.  .-».  bid  in  which 
the  name  of  the  bidder  is  omitted  is  invalid.^  Public  officials 
have  no  jurisdiction  to  let  the  contract  to  the  person  who  actually 
presented  such  bid,  and  a  contract  thus  let  is  void.'^  If  the  stat- 
ute requires  each  bid  to  contain  an  affidavit  of  the  bidder  that  the 
bid  is  not  collusive  or  a  sham,  a  bid  made  by  two  persons  con- 
taining the  affidavit  of  but  one  is  insufficient."  The  bid  must 
comply  with  the  ordinance  under  which  the  work  is  done.  If 
the  ordinance  requires  bidders  to  bid  on  each  block  of  a  street 
improvement  separately  a  bid  to  grade  the  entire  street  at  a  cer- 
tain sum  per  cubic  yard  is  improper  and  if  the  contract  is  let 
thereon  the  lot  owner  can  defeat  the  assessment."  A  contract  can 
be  awarded  only  to  one  who  submits  a  bid  thereon.'*  If  a  bid  is 
made  by  Hubbard  Smith  and  Son,  a  contract  cannot  be  awarded  to 
Hubbard  Smith  individually.^ 

§  499.     Method  of  awarding  contract. 

It  is  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  contract  let  on  bids  submitted 
therefor  that  the  contract  be  awarded  in  the  manner  prescribed 
by  law.^  By  statute  in  some  jurisdictions  notice  of  the  award 
must  be  published.  Such  publication  can  be  made  lawfully  only 
upon  the  order  of  the  officials  empowered  to  make  such  order. 
A  publication  of  the  notice  without  such  order  has  no  validity.- 
The  clerk  of  the  board  having  authority  to  make  such  order 
cannot  publish  the  notice  without  the  authority  of  the  board. - 
If  by  statute  the  award  of  a  contract  may  be  approved  in  the 

'Case    V.    Inhabitants    of    City    of  "Whitney    v.    Common    Council    of 

Trenton,    —    N.    J.   ,    (58    Atl.    57  '  the  Village  of  Hudson,  69  Mich.  189, 

[1907].  -'^7  X.  W.  184  [1888]. 

*  Williams  v.  Bergin.   129  Cal.  401,  "Whitney    v.    Common    Council    of 

fi2    Pac.    59    [1900].  the  Village  of  Hudson,  69  Mich.  189, 

MVilliams  v.  Bcrgin.   129  Cal.  401,  37  N.  W.   184    [1888]. 

02  Tac.  59   [1900].  '  Reis  v.  Craff,  51   Cal.  86    [1875];. 

'  Flinn  v.  Strauss,  4  Cal.  App.  Himmelmann  v.  Satterlee,  50  Cal.  08 
245,  87  Pac.  414  [1906].  (Further-  [1875];  Donnelly  v.  Tillman,  47  Cal. 
moi-e,  neither  the  instriiment  or  ex-  40  [1873].  Under  some  statutes  let- 
trinsic  evidence  disclosed  the  official  ting  the  conti'act  is  not  jurisdiction- 
character  of  the  person  before  whom  al  if  notice  has  been  given.  ^Tenzie 
it  was  sworn;    and    the   name  of  the  v.   City  of  Greensburg,  —  Ind.   App. 

purported  signer  thereof  did  not  ap-       ,   85   X.   E.   484    [1908]. 

pear  as  an  affiant  in  the  body  of  the  '  Reis  v.  Graff.  51   Cal.  SO    [1875]; 

affidavit.)  Donnelly     v.     Tillman,     47     Cal.     40 

^  City   of    Stockton   v.    Creanor,   45  [1873]. 

Cal.  043    [1873].  '' Ilimmelniann  v.  Satterlee,  50  Cal. 


68    [1875]. 


I 

II 


771  THE    IMPROVEMENT    C0>4 TRACT.  §  499 

first  instance  either  b^-  the  mayor  or  by  a  three-fourths  vote  of 
the  city  council,  such  award  is  not  required  to  be  presented  in 
the  first  instance  to  the  mayor  for  his  approval.*  Since  the 
object  of  these  statutes  is  to  protect  the  property  owner  by 
securing  competitive  bidding,  the  action  of  the  board  in  award- 
ing the  contract  on  the  day  before  that  fixed  for  receiving  bids, 
renders  the  contract  and  assessment  thereon  invalid.^  If  the 
statute  provides  the  time  and  place  where  the  bids  are  to  be 
opened,  such  provisions  must  be  complied  with  in  at  least  a  sub- 
stantial manner."  A  statute  which  recpiires  that  proposals  or 
bids  shall  be  examined  in  open  session  and  publicly  declared  by 
the  city  council  is  mandatory.  If  the  minutes  of  the  board  do  not 
show  in  such  proceeding,  it  must  be  presumed  that  it  was  not 
done,  and  that  the  assessment  is  thereby  made  void."  If  the 
proposals  are  opened  and  read  in  open  session,  they  are  publicly 
declared  as  required  by  statute.'*  The  proposals  may  be  opened 
and  the  contract  let  at  the  day  mentioned  in  the  notice  or  at  a 
meeting  to  which  such  meeting  is  adjourned,'^  or  if  such  ad- 
journed meeting  does  not  take  place  at  some  subsecjuent  lawful 
meeting.^'^  This  is  true  even  if  the  statute  requires  the  proposals 
to  be  opened  on  the  day  mentioned  in  the  notice  or  upon  such 
other  day  as  the  trustees  may  adjourn  to  for  that  purpose."  A 
record  of  the  vote  of  council  whereby  it  lets  a  contract  is  valid  if 
made  on  sheets  of  roll-calls  especially  prepared  for  that  purpose, 
though  not  set  out  in  full  in  the  general  record  book.'-  If  the  suc- 
cessful bidder  refuses  to  make  a  contract,  the  city  may  re-adver- 
tise without  passing  a  resolution. '■'  So  it  has  been  held  that  if  the 
lowest  bidder  does  not  give  the  guaranty   rec^uired  by  statute. 

*  Greenwood   v.   Morrison,    12S    Cal.  "People  ex   rel.  Knox  v.  Village  of 

350.  (50  Pac.  971    [1900].  Yonkers.     .39     Barb.      (N.     Y.)      20(5 

°N.  P.    Perine   Contracting  &   Pav-  [18().31; 

ing    Company    v.    Quaekcnlmsli,     104  '"  PcojjIc  ex   re).   Knox  v.  Village  of 

Cal.  684,  .38  Pac.  5.33   [1894].  Yonkers,     .39      Harl).      (X.     Y.)      2()ti 

"Edwards  v.   Berlin,    123   Cal.   544,  |lS(i3]. 

56    Pac.    432    [1899];    X.    P.    Perine  '^People    ex    rel.    Knox    v.    tillage 

Contracting    &    Paving    Company    v.  of    Yonkers,    39    Barb.     (X.    Y. )     266 

Qnackenbush,    104    Cal.    684.    38    Pac.  |1863]. 

533    [1894].  ■=Xix<m   v.  City  of  Bnrlingtoon,  — 

■Edwards   v.    Berlin.    123   Cal.   544.        la.  ,   115  X,  W.  239    [1908]. 

56  Pac.  4.32    [1899].  'M  ity   of   Lexington  ex   rel.   Mene- 

"City     Street     Improvement     Com-  fee  v.  Commercial  Bank,  —  Mo.  App. 

pany  v.  Laird,   138   Cal.   27,   70  Pac.       ,  108  S.  \V.   1095   [1908]. 

916    11902]. 


§  500  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  772 

the  engineer  may  let  to  the  next  lowest  bidder.^*  If,  however, 
the  council  accepts  a  bid  as  the  best,  and  then  rejects  it,  it  has 
been  held  that  it  cannot  then  accept  another  bid  without  a  re- 
advertisement.^^' 

§  500.     Method  of  giving  notice  for  bids. 

The  statute  usually  provides  for  the  method  of  giving  notice 
of  the  letting  of  a  contract,  including  both  the  time  for  which 
such  notice  must  be  given,  and  the  means  whereby  it  is  to  be 
given.  Such  statutes  must  be  complied  with  at  least  substan- 
tially.^ Whether  under  such  statutes  it  is  necessary  after  notice 
has  once  been  given,  to  give  a  second  notice  if  the  contract  is 
not  let  on  receipt  of  the  bids,  is  a  question  the  solution  of  which 
depends  upon  the  wording  of  the  particular  statutes.  It  has 
been  said  that  unless  the  original  order  limits  the  time  for  receiv- 
ing bids,  a  re-advertisement  for  bids  is  not  necessary.-  It  will 
not  be  presumed  that  the  time  was  limited  in  the  absence  of 
some  evidence  tending  to  establish  that  fact.'^  Bids  were  adver- 
tised for  and  a  contract  let  to  the  lowest  bidders  for  paving  a 
portion  of  the  street  specified  in  the  advertisements,  with  a 
provision  that  the  contractors  w^ere  to  pave  further,  if  ordered. 
Under  such  contract  it  was  not  necessary  for  the  council  to  re- 
advertise  for  bids  if  they  desired  the  same  contractors  to  pave 
the  rest  of  such  street.^  Proper  notice  of  the  letting  of  a  con- 
tract was  given  and  bids  were  received  therefor.  The  council 
voted  to  reject  all  bids.  Subsequently  it  reconsidered  its  action 
and  accepted  one  of  the  bids  without  re-advertisement  of  the 
bids.     It  was   held   that   such    contract   was   valid    and   that   re- 

"  Gibson    v.    Owens.    115    Mo.    258,  48    N.    E.    1042    [1897];    Mayor    and 

21  S.  W.  1107  [1892].  City   Council   of   Baltimore   v.   John- 

^=Zorn    V.    Warren-Schaaf    Asphalt  son,    62    Md.    225     [1884];     Roth    v. 

Paving  Co.,  —  Ind.  App.  .  84  N.  Forsee,   107   Mo.   App.  471,  81   S.  W. 

E.  509   [1908].  913    [1904];    Wilder   v.   City   of   Cin- 

'Flickinger   v.    Fay.    119    Cal.    590,  einnati,  26  O.  S.  284    [1875]. 

51    Pac.   855    [1893];    Brooks   v.   Sat-  =  Ellis    v.    Witmer.     134    Cal.    249, 

terlee,  49  Cal.  289    [1874];   Hewes  v.  66   Pac.   301    [1901]. 

Reis,    40    Cal.    255    [1870];    Taber   v.  ^  Ellis  v.  Witmer.   134  Cal.  249,  66 

Ferguson,   109  Ind.  227,  9  X.  E.  723  rac.  301   [1901]. 

[1886];     Kretsch    v.    Helm.    45    Tn,i.  *  Brevoort    v.    City    of    Detroit,    24 

438      [1874];      Bozarth     v.     McGilli-  Mich.  322   [1872]. 
cuddy,  19  Ind.  App.  26,  47  X.  E.  397 


773  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  500 

advertisement  was  not  necessary."'  If  a  contract  has  been  let 
to  the  lowest  bidder  on  due  advertisement  but  such  contractor 
subsequently  makes  default  and  it  becomes  necessary  to  relet 
the  contract,  it  is  held  under  some  statutes  that  it  is  as  necessary 
to  advertise  for  bids  for  reletting-  such  contract  as  it  is  in  the 
original  letting  of  a  contract."  Under  other  statutes  where  the 
contractor  is  obliged  to  give  bond  for  the  performance  of  his 
work,  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  advertise  for 
the  reletting  of  a  contract  on  the  theory  that  the  liability  of  the 
contractor  and  his  sureties  is  adequate  indemnity  against  any 
additional  expense  in  performing  the  contract  and  that  if  the 
price  under  the  contract  as  relet  is  excessive,  such  loss  falls  on 
the  defaulting  contractor."  If  alterations  may  be  made  in  the 
contract  after  it  has  been  let,"  it  has  been  held  not  to  be  neces- 
sary to  advertise  for  bids  for  such  alterations  or  additional  work." 
This  holding  is  based  on  the  theory  that  it  would  not  in  most 
cases  be  practicable  to  let  the  contract  to  anyone  but  the  original 
contractor  and  that  to  allow  him  to  put  in  a  bid  without  compe- 
tition would  be  a  violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  statute  requiring 
a'dvertisement  for  bids  and  might  make  the  city  or  the  property 
owners  liable  for  a  contract  price  greatly  in  excess  of  that  which 
could  have  been  obtained  without  such  letting.  On  the  one  hand 
no  more  extended  publication  than  that  specified  by  statute  is 
required.  Under  an  ordinance  refjuiring  advertisement  for  bids 
for  five  days,  the  publication  was  made  on  Saturday,  Sunday, 
Wednesday  and  Thursday.  It  was  held  that  this  was  a  sub- 
stantial compliance  with  the  ordinance  since  the  ordinance  did 
not  specify  publication  upon  consecutive  dates. ^^'  Under  a  stat- 
ute requiring  notice  of  letting  contracts  to  ])e  published  for  three 
weeks,  a  notice  published  May  twenty-fifth,  June  first  and  June 
eighth  for  letting  a  contract  on  June  sixteenth  was  held  to  be 
sufficient."     A  statute  requiring  publication   in   a   newspaper  re- 

'Ross     V.     Stackhouse,      114     Ind.  matter    of    the    Petition    of    Cardner, 

200,  16  X.  E.  501    [1887];   Davies  v.  fi  Hun.    (N.  Y.)    07    [1875]. 

City   of  Saginaw,    87    Mich.    439.    49  "See  §   495. 

N.  W.   667    [1891].  'Hastings    v.    Columbus.    42    0.    S. 

•Meuser    v.    Risdon,    30    Cal.    239  585   [1885]. 

[1868];  Guinotte  v.  EgelhofT,  64  Mo.  '"Roth  v.  Forsee,  107  Mo.  App.  471, 

App.  356   [1895].  SI    S.  W.  913   [1904]. 

Mn  the  matter   of   tlie   Petiti -n   of  "  Bozarth  v.  McOillicuddy,   19  Ind. 

Seeds,  53   X.  V.   400    [187.11:    In   tlie  App  26.  47  X.  E.  397.  48  X.  E.  1042 

I1S97] 


§  500  T.VXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  774 

quired  such  publication  iu  one  paper  only.  If  the  city  by  ordi- 
nance requires  publication  in  two  papers  but  acts  under  a  publi- 
cation in  one  paper  only,  such  publication  is  sufficient,  since  the 
requirement  of  an  additional  news])aper.  being  imposed  by  the 
city  can  be  waived  by  the  city.^-  A  statute  requiring  the  giving 
of  notice  for  a  certain  number  of  days  ordinarily  refers,  not 
to  the  number  of  publications,  but  to  the  time  that  must  elapse 
between  the  publication  and  the  expiration  of  the  time  for  receiv- 
ing bids.^''  Thus  under  a  statute  requiring  at  least  a  week's 
notice  to  be  given  by  five  consecutive  publications,  Sundays  and 
legal  holidays  excepted,  a  publication  from  ]\Iay  fifteenth  to  nine- 
teenth inclusive  of  a  notice  of  a  meeting  of  the  board  of  contract 
to  receive  bids  to  be  held  May  twenty-first  was  insufficient.^"'  So 
a  statute  providing  for  "giving  notice  for  at  least  ten  days  by 
two  publications  in  a  newspaper"  requires  ten  days  between  the 
last  publication  and  the  end  of  the  time  for  receiving  bids.'"' 
Under  a  statute  requiring  three  weeks  notice,  a  notice  the  first 
publication  of  which  was  on  the  first  and  the  last  on  the  twenty- 
second  of  the  month,  the  thirtieth  being  the  last  day  for  receiv- 
ing bids,  was  held  to  be  sufficient.'"  In  the  absence  of  statute 
forbidding  it,  publication  on  Sunday  is  sufficient.'"  Thus  if  a 
publication  is  to  be  given  and  continued  in  a  paper  for  at  least 
ten  days  a  publication  which  began  on  the  twelfth  of  a  month 
and  continued  in  each  successive  daily  issue  of  that  paper  until 
the  twenty-second  inclusive  was  sufficient  although  one  of  the 
intervening  publications  was  in  the  Sunday  issue  and  although 
according  to  the  custom  of  such  paper  no  paper  was  issued  on 
the  Monday  following.'*  So  the  last  publication  may  be 
made   on   Sunday   in   the   absence   of   a    statute   specifically   for- 


«City    of    Conner-sville    v.    Merrill,  X.   E.  242,   79   X.  E.   490   [1906]. 

14    Ind.    App.    303,    42    X.    E.    1112  ^' Carpenter  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  23 

[1895].  Minn.  232  [1876]  ;  City  of  St.  Joseph 

'^  In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of  to    the    use    of   the    Saxton   Xational 

Pennie    to    vacate   an    assessment,    45  Bank    v.    Landis,    54    Mo.    App.    313 

Hun   (X.  Y.)   391   [1887].  [1893]. 

"  In  the  matter  of  the  Petition  of  '*'  Carpenter  v.  City  of  St.  Paul.  23 

Pennie,  45  Hun.   (X.  Y.)   391   [1887];  Minn.   232    [1876].     See  to  the  same 

In  the  Matter  of  Pennie,   19  Abb.  X.  general   effect   City   of   St.   Joseph   ti> 

C.   117.  the  use  of  the  Saxton  Xational  Bank 

"  Comstock    V.    Eagle    Grove    City,  ex   rel.   v.   Landis,   54   Mo.   App.   315 

133  la.  589.  Ill  X.  W.  51   [1907].  [1893]. 

"•Shirk  V.  Hupp,   167   Ind.  509,  78 


775  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  500 

bidding  it.^"  On  the  other  hand  if  it  is  provided  by  stat- 
ute that  Sunday  shall  be  excluded  from  the  computation  of 
the  number  of  days  of  publication,  full  effect  must  be  given 
to  such  statute.-'"  Thus,  under  a  statute  requiring  a  notice 
inviting  proposals  for  work  to  be  published  daily,  Sundays  ex- 
cepted, in  a  daily  newspaper  for  five  days,  the  publication  which 
began  on  Wednesday  and  ended  on  the  following  Sunday  was 
insufficient. -'  The  last  publication  should  have  been  on  the  ]\Ion- 
day  following.--  Under  a  statute  requiring  notice  to  be  pub- 
lished a  given  number  of  times,  publication  on  the  day  on  which 
the  contract  was  to  be  let  should  not  be  counted.-^  If  the  city 
council  has  directed  a  certain  method  of  publication,  the  officers  of 
the  city  must  comply,  substantially  at  least,  with  such  method. 
Under  an  ordinance  directing  the  city  clerk  to  advertise  for  pro- 
posals in  a  newspaper  and  also  by  posting  printed  notices  in  five  of 
the  most  public  places  in  the  city,  pul)lication  by  newspaper  alone 
is  not  sufficient.'-"*  If  a  city  council  has  directed  publication  of  no- 
tices inviting  proposals  for  work  to  be  made  in  two  newspapers, 
publication  in  one  only  is  not  a  compliance  with  such  order.'-"'  So 
if  the  ordinance  requires  publication  in  three  newspapers,  publi- 
cation in  one  only  is  insufficient.'-'"  On  the  other  hand  a  publica- 
tion which  falls  short  of  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute  is  insufficient.'-'  Thus  a  statute  refpiir- 
ing  a  notice  inviting  sealed  proposals  for  a  contract  for  a  street 
improvement  to  be  posted  for  five  days  means  five  official  days; 
that  is.  the  notice  must  be  posted  before  nine  o'clock  a.  m.  of  the 
first  day  and  must  remain  until  four  o'clock  p.  m.  on  the  fifth 
day."-^**  Under  a  statute  which  recjuires  notice  of  proposals  for 
public  work  to  be  posted  for  five  days,  posting  such  notice  for 


'"Clapton    V.    Tavlor.    40    ^r<>.    App.  -■  Taber  v.   Ferjiuson,    100  Tnd.  227. 

117    [18921.  ^   ^-   E.   723    [KSStll. 

="  Alameda       ^lacadaniizinc;       Com-  ="  Mayor   and   City   Council   of  Bal- 

pany  v.  Hutr.  .57  Cal.  3.31    [isSl].  timoro     v.     Joiinson.     02     Md.  22.5 

"Alameda       ^lacadamizinix      Com  I  1SS41. 

pany  v.  HufT.  57   Cal.   331    [18811.  -' Hewes     v.      Heis.      40     Cal.  255 

'^  Alameda       Macadamizinsr      Com-  118701;     Kretscli    v.     Helm.    45  Iiid. 

pany  V.  HufV.  57  Cal.  331   [18811.  438    [18741;    Wilder    v.    (  ity    of  (in 

='Rotli    V.    llax.    08    Mo.    App.    28:!  ciniiati,  20  O.  S.  284    11875]. 

Iisnoi.  -- Himmelmann     v.     Calm.     4!»  Cal. 

-'Kretscli     v.     Helm.     45     Ind.     438  285    [18741;    Brooks    v.    Satterlee.    4!> 

[18741.  Cal.  289    [18741. 


§  501  T.VXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  .  778 

only  three  days  is  insufficient.-''  Under  a  statute  requiring  four 
weeks  advertisement,  advertisement  for  three  weeks  is  not  suffi- 
cient.^" Under  a  statute  requiring  advertisement  in  two  news- 
papers, an  advertisement  in  English  newspapers  is  prima  facie 
required  and  an  advertisement  in  one  English  newspaper  and 
one  German  newspaper  is  insufficient.-"*^ 

§  501.     Contents  of  notice  for  bids. 

Technical  accuracy  is  not  necessary  in  the  contents  and  form  of 
the  notice  inviting  proposals  for  work ;  but  such  notice  must  show 
that  it  is  issued  by  proper  authority,  and  must  give  such  inform- 
ation, either  on  its  face  or  by  reference  to  specifications  and  the 
like,  of  the  nature  and  kind  of  work  to  be  done,  as  to  enable  the 
prospective  bidders  to  bid  thereon  intelligently,  and  to  inform 
them  of  the  terms  of  the  contract  into  which  they  are  invited  to 
enter. ^  Anything  short  of  this  would  not  secure  the  competition 
in  bidding  which  is  necessary  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  pub- 
lic. Under  a  statute  requiring  the  board  of  public  works  to 
advertise  for  bids,  it  has  been  held  sufficient  that  if  the  advertise- 
ment purports  to  issue  from  the  office  of  the  board  and  states 
that  bidders  must  file  a  satisfactory  bond  with  the  board  and  is 
signed  with  the  name  of  the  board.-  The  notice  or  advertisement 
must  contain  the  intended  requisites  of  the  specifications  of  the 
proposed  improvement,  ^  although  it  may  refer  to  specifications 
on  file  for  such  information.*  Under  a  city  ordinance  requiring 
a  notice  to  state  the  time  and  place  where  the  contract  is  to  be 
let  and  the  time  within  which  it  is  to  be  performed,  a  notice  that 
bids  would  be  received  by  the  street  committee  at  the  city  record- 
er's office  until  a  specified  date  according  to  the  ordinance  requir- 

^  Hewes     v.     Reis,     40     C'al.     255  -  Beniteau    v.    City    of    Detroit,    41 

[1870].  Mich.  116,  1  X.  W.  899  [1879].     (The 

'"  Steese    v.    Oviatt,    24    O.    S.    248  board    subsequently    acted   upon   such 

[1873].  advertisement    and    treated    it    as   is- 

^MYildcr  V.   City  of  Cincinnati.   26  sued  bj'  their  authority.) 

O.  S.  284   [1875].'  MVilkins    v.    City    of    Detroit,    46 

1  Owens   V.    City   of   Marion,    Iowa,  Mich.  120,  8  X.  W.  701,  9  X.  W.  427 

127  la.  469,   lOs'x.  W.  381    [1905];  [1881]. 

Wilkins  V.  City  of  Detroit,  46  Mich.  *  Owens    v.   City   of   Marion,   Iowa, 

120,    8    X.    \V.    701,    9    X.    W.    427  127  la.  469,   103X.  W.  381    [1905]; 

[1881];  State,  Ogden,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  Clinton  v.   City   of   Portland,   26   Or. 

and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of  410,  38  Pac.  407  [1894]. 
Hudson,  29  X.  J.  L.    (5  Dutch.)    104 
[I860]. 


II 


I  (  I  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  501 

mg  such  bids  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  and  that  the  grading 
should  be  completed  within  sixty  days  and  the  graveling  within 
ninety  days  from  the  date  of  letting  the  contract  complies  suffi- 
ciently with  the  ordinance.'  If  the  statute  requires  the  adver- 
tisement to  show  the  date  after  which  bids  will  not  be  received, 
it  is  not  necessary  for  council  to  fix  such  date."  Thus  under  a 
statute  requiring  a  notice  and  specifications  to  be  posted  for  five 
days  and  also  to  be  published  in  a  newspaper  for  five  days,  a 
resolution  passed  on  December  the  sixteenth  ordered  such  notice 
and  publication.  On  December  thirtieth  the  council  opened  the 
bids  and  awarded  the  contract.  This  was  held  to  be  a  sufficient 
compliance  with  the  statute.'^  An  advertisement  announced  that 
proposals  would  be  received  up  to  twelve  o'clock  M.  on  Satur- 
day September  nineteenth.  In  that  year  the  nineteenth  came  on 
Sunday.  The  bids  were  opened  and  the  contract  awarded  Satur- 
day September  eighteenth  at  seven-thirty  p.  m.  This  was  held 
to  be  a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  notice.**  A  three  weeks 
notice  that  bids  would  be  received  up  to  five  o'clock  of  a  certain 
day  was  held  sufficient  although  the  resolution  provided  for  giv- 
ing the  bids  up  to  six  o'clock  of  such  day."  The  fact  that  a  notice 
inviting  sealed  proposals  for  grading  a  street  uses  the  term  ''re- 
graded"  instead  of  "graded"  does  not  invalidate  the  notice.'" 
If  a  discrepancy  or  mistake  in  a  notice  is  such  as  to  mislead  bid- 
ders and  prevent  the  competition  which  it  is  the  purpose  of  the 
statute  to  secure,  such  notice  is  insufficient. '^  Thus  a  notice  was 
dated  INIay  thirteenth  and  stated  that  l)ids  would  be  received  up 
to  IMonday  evening  ^May  thirteenth.  ^Monday  came  on  the' 
eighteenth  and  on  ^Monday  the  eighteenth  the  bids  were  opened. 
It  was  held  that  the  notice  was  not  sufficient.'-  If  the  time 
for  completing  the  contract  is  of  the  essence  thereof,  such 
time  should  in  some  way  be  shown  by  the  advertisement."    How- 

"  Roach  V.  City  of  Eugene,   23   Or.  Ind.  110   [1874];  Richardson  v.  Meh- 

376,  31  Pac.  825*  [1893].  ler,    111    Ky.   408.   23   Ky.   Law   Rep. 

•Beckett    v.    Morse.    4    Cal.    App.  017.   fi3   S.   W.   957    [19011;    Ladd   v. 

228,  87  Pac.  408   [1900].  Spencer.    23    Or.     193.    31     Pac.    474 

^Beckett    v.     Morse.    4     Cal.     App.  [1892]. 

228,  87  Pac.  408  [190(1].  '=  Yeakel    v.    City    of   Lafayette,    48 

•Case  V.  Fowler.  6.5- Ind.  29  [1878].  Ind.   llfi    [1874].      (Furthermore,  the 

•Shirk   V.   Hupp.    167   Tnd.   509,   78  notice  was   not   puhlislied   for   the  re- 

X.  E.  242    [1906].  quired   period  of  time.) 

'"Brady     v.     Feisel.     53      Cal.     49  "Richardson    v.    Mehler.     Ill     Ky. 

[1878].    "  408,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  917.  63  S.  W. 

"  Yeakel   v.   City   of   Lafayette,   48  957    [1901]. 


§§  502, 503  r^vxATioN  by  assessment.  778 

ever,  if  no  objection  is  made  to  the  contract  on  this  ground  until 
the  contract  has  been  let  and  performed  and  the  work  accepted 
the  objection  comes  too  late."  A  notice  which  specifies  work 
not  authorized  in  the  ordinance  is  invalid.^'  The  fact  that  an 
erroneous  notice  was  published  does  not  invalidate  a  subsequent 
correct  notice,  at  least  if  there  is  no  showing  that  any  one  was 
misled  by  the  first  notice.^''  Advertisements  for  proposals  for 
materials  for  a  number  of  distinct  improvements  is  held  to  be 
valid  where  the  statute  does  not  require  the  entire  contract  to 
be  let  on  bids.^' 

§  502.     Proof  of  publication  for  bids. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  requiring  proof  of  publication  by 
affidavit,  such  form  of  proof  is  not  necessary.^  The  fact  of  publi- 
cation may  therefore  be  proved  by  oral  testimony.-  In  the  ab- 
sence of  evidence  it  will  ordinarily  be  presumed  that  the  notice 
was  properly  given.'  Thus  if  two  notices  were  published  and 
the  first  notice  was  defective  as  not  stating  the  grade  properly, 
and  as  not  being  published  for  the  required  time,  and  the  award 
was  made  under  the  second  notice,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the 
second  notice  was  valid.*  So  if  there  is  no  satisfactory  evidence 
to  show  that  bids  were  advertised  for  or  received  except  the 
fact  that  the  contract  shows  that  it  was  let  on  bids  had  for  that 
purpose,  it  will  be  presumed  that  bids  were  received  regularly 
in  the  absence  of  further  evidence." 

§  503.     Effect  of  failure  to  give  notice  for  bids. 

The  statute  which  requires  a  notice  inviting  proposals  for  work 
frequently  prescribes  what  effect  shall  be  given  to  a  failure 
to  comply  therewith.     Since  the  legislature  has  power  to  dispense 

"Richardson    v.    Mehler,    111    Ky.  =  City  of  Nevada  to  Use  of  Gilfillan 

408,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  917.  63  S.  W.  v.  Morris,  43  Mo.  App.  586   [1891]. 

957    [1901].  ■■' Himmelman  V.  Carpeiitier,  47  Cal. 

^' C  ity    of    Louisiana    v.     Shaffner,  '42    [1873];    Spanlding  v.   Baxter,   25 

104    Mo.    App.     101.    78    S.    W.    287  Ind.  App.  485,  58  N.  E.  .551    [1900]; 

[1903].  City  of  Marsliall  to  Use  of  Jacoby  v. 

'"Cilmore  v.  City  of  Utica,   131  N.  Rainey,  78  Mo.  App.  416   [1898]. 

Y.  26,  29  N.  E.  841   [1892].  "  Himmelman  v.  Carpentier,  47  Cal. 

"Alberj?er     v.     Mayor     and     City  42    [1873]. 

Council    of   Baltimore,    64   Md.    1.    20  '' City  of  Marshall  to  Use  of  .Jacoby 

Atl.   988    [1885].  v.  Rainey,  78  Mo.  App.  416   [1898]. 

'  City  of  Nevada  to  L^se  of  Gilfillan 
V.  Morris.  43  Mo.  App.  586   [1891]. 


779  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  503 

entirely  with  advertisement,  it  has  i)o\ver  to  prescribe  the  effect 
of  a  defective  or  incomplete  advertisement.'  Accordingly  if  it  is 
provided  that  the  assessment  shall  not  be  void  for  failure  to  ad- 
vertise, but  that  the  increased  cost  due  to  failure  to  secure  compe- 
tition shall  be  deducted  from  the  amount  of  the  assessment  full 
effect  must  be  given  to  such  provision.-  So  if  it  is  provided 
by  statute  that  in  case  of  irregularities  an  assessment  may  never- 
theless be  enforced  to  the  extent  that  expense  has  been  incurred 
which  is  a  proper  charge  upon  the  property,  failure  to  advertise 
does  not  avoid  the  assessment  entirely  but  is  merely  ground 
for  reducing  it  to  the  amount  of  the  proper  charge.^  At  what 
stage  of  the  proceedings  the  objection  can  be  interposed  that 
there  was  no  sufficient  advertisement  is  a  question  upon  which 
there  is  a  conflict  of  authority.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  said 
that  such  objection  cannot  be  made  after  the  work  is  completed.* 
If  no  objection  is  made  to  the  contract  by  reason  of  defective 
advertising  until  after  the  performance  of  such  contract,  it  is 
generally  said  that  objection  is  then  too  late  and  that  the  defects 
nnist  be  regarded  as  waived,  ^'  at  least  in  the  absence  of  fraud  " 
or  of  a  showing  that  the  price  to  be  paid  for  the  work  has  been 
increased  l)y  failure  to  advertise  for  bids."  In  other  jurisdictions 
it  is  said  that  such  objection  cannot  be  made  before  any  taxes 
liave  been  levied  or  assessments  made  to  pay  for  the  work.^  In 
other  jurisdictions  it  is  said  that  a  tax  payer  cannot  raise  such 
()l)jection  at  all  by  an  action  against  the  city  and  the  contractor 
to  restrain  payment  under  such  contract."  In  jurisdictions  where 
the  property  owner  cannot  attack  the  validity  of  the  contract  at 
all,  he  cannot  show  that  a  contract  was  defective  because  proper 
advertisement  for  ])ids  was  not  made.^** 


'  111  the  ^fatter  of  Roscnhniim.   110  '^  Wabasli  Avenue.  2(>  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

N.  Y.  24,  23  \.  E.  172   1 18901.  305    [19041. 

-In  the  IVlatter  of  Rosonliauiii.    119  «  Wabasli  Avenue,  20  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

X.  Y.  24,  23  N.  E.  172  [18901.  30.5    [19041. 

*  Matter    of    McT'orniack,    (JO    Barb.  '^Taylor    v.    Wapakoneta.    2fi    Ohio 

(N.  Y.)    126   [18701;    Matter  of  Mc-  C.  C.  285   [19041. 

Cormack,   10  Abb.   Pr.  N.  S.    (X.  Y.)  « Ballard    v.    City    of    Ajipleton,    2(\ 

234    [18701;    Upinjrton   v.   Oviatt,   24  ^Vis.  (J7   [1870]. 

O.  R.  232  [18731;  Steese  v.  Oviatt,  24  "Brady    v.    Mayor    of    tlie    City    of 

O.  S.  248    [18731;   Taylor  v.  \Vapak-  Xew    York.    35    Howard     (X.    Y.)    81 

oneta,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  285  [19041.  [18081. 

*Bacas   v.    Adler,    112    La.    806.    30  '"  Brientnall    y.    City    of    Philadel- 

So.   739    [1904].  phia.    103   Pa.   St.    15o"  [1883]. 


§  504  TAXATIOxV    BY    ASSESSMENT.  780 

^  504.     Power  to  order  or  dispense  with  advertisement  for  bids.    . 

If  the  statute  reciuires  advertisement  for  bids  and  such  adver- 
tisement is  in  fact  had,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  ordinance 
should  contain  a  provision  therefor.^  The  fact  that  advertise- 
ment is  made  before  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  ordering  the 
streets  to  be  paved  does  not  of  itself  validate  the  contract  and 
assessment  if  the  city  subsequently  acts  upon  such  advertisement, 
treating  it  as  valid.-  If  the  legislature  has  conferred  upon  certain 
specified  public  officials  authority  to  order  advertisement  for 
bids,  such  advertisement  can  be  ordered  only  by  the  officials  speci- 
fied." In  the  absence  of  statutory  authority  a  board  or  council 
having  authority  to  order  adve-rtisement  for  bids  cannot  delegate 
such  power  to  their  clerk  even  by  a  general  resolution  giving 
him  such  authority.*  If  the  board  having  authority  to  provide 
for  advertisement  for  bids  orders  such  clerk  to  advertise  for  a 
specific  improvement,  such  order  is  sufficient,  although  it  does 
not  require  sealed  proposals  or  specify  the  time  or  place  of  giving 
notice. ■"'  Such  general  order  must  be  considered  with  reference 
to  the  requirements  of  statute.  Accordingly  general  authority  to 
advertise  for  proposals  is  construed  as  meaning  authority  to  ad- 
vertise for  the  time  provided  b}'  law."  If  an  order  is  made  for 
advertisement  for  bids  in  a  designated  newspaper,  a  subsequent 
order  to  re-advertise  without  designating  the  newspaper  will  be 
construed  as  meaning  a  re-advertisement  in  the  same  paper.'' 
An  order  by  the  city  council  for  the  publication  of  a  notice  in- 
viting proposals  is  not  invalid  because  the  clerk  of  the  council 
and  not  the  council  has  fixed  the  time  within  which  proposals 
are  to  be  presented.**  If  a  resolution  for  advertisement  for  bids 
contains  the  designation  of  a  newspaper  placed  thereon  with  a 
rubber  stamp,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  clerk  did  his  duty 
and  read  such  name  to  the  council  and  not  the  name  of  another 
newspaper  which  was  subsequently  inserted  after  erasure  of  the 

^Bambrick    v.    Campbell,     37     Mo.  *  Meuser    v.    Risdon,    36    Cal.    239 

App.  460  [1889].  [18081. 

-City  of  Springfield  to  Use  of  Cen-  °  ITinimelnian  v.  Byrne,  41  Cal.  500 

tral   National    Bank   v.   Weaver,    137  [1871]. 

Mo.  650,  37  S.  W.  509,  39  S.  W.  270  "  Sliepard    v.    Colton.    44    Cal.    628 

[1896];     (overruling   in    part    Keane  •  [1872]. 

V.  Cushing,  15  Mo.  App.  96   [1884]).  'Ellis  v.  Witmer.   134  Cal.  240.  66 

'Meuser    v.    Risdon,    36    Cal.    230  Pac.   301    [1901]. 

[1868].  "Belser  v.  Allnian.  1.34  Cal.  399.  66 

Pac.  492    [1901]. 


781  THE  IMPROVEMENT  CONTRACT.  §  505 

former  name.''  Accordingly  if  the  advertisement  was  in  fact 
made  in  such  other  newspaper  and  its  name  was  inserted  later, 
such  publication  is  insutificient.^"  If  by  statute  some  official 
or  board  is  given  authority  to  dispense  with  advertisement  for 
bids,  such  power  can  be  exercised  only  by  such  official  and  not 
by  any  other  person. ^^  Thus,  if  council  is  authorized  to  dispense 
with  advertisement  by  a  three-fourths  vote  it  cannot  by  a  general 
resolution  delegate  such  power  to  any  other  official.^-  Thus,  coun- 
cil cannot  by  a  three-fourths  vote  authorizing  the  commissioner  of 
public  works  to  construct  an  improvement  "by  days  work  or  in 
such  manner  as  the  said  commissioner  may  deem  expedient  for 
the  best  interests  of  the  city  and  the  property  owners"  empower 
him  to  dispense  with  letting  contracts.^^  A  statute  authorizing 
the  mayor  to  give  written  authority  to  dispense  with  advertising 
for  bids  does  not  empower  him  to  ratify  a  contract  by  indorsing 
his  approval  thereon  after  it  is  made.^* 

§  505.     Statutes  requiring  appropriation  or  sufficient  funds  in  the 
treasury. 

By  recent  statutes  in  some  jurisdictions  it  is  provided  that 
contracts  for  improvements  cannot  be  made  unless  there  is  suffi- 
cient money  in  the  treasury  to  pay  the  cost  thereof,  or  under 
some  statutes,  unless  some  designated  official  has  filed  a  certificate 
to  the  oflPect  that  there  is  sufficient  money  in  the  treasury.  Stat- 
utes of  this  class  have  been  enacted  in  order  to  prevent  the  city 
from  plunging  deeper  into  debt.  Such  statutes  do  not  accord- 
ingly apply  to  improvements  which  are  to  be  paid  for  by  a  special 
assessment  and  not  out  of  the  general  treasury.^     Such  a  statute 

°  Californiii   Tniprovcmcnt  Company  New     York.     D     Daly     (X.     V.I      llii 

V.  Moran,   128  Cal.  .373,  GO  Pae.  OfiO  [18791. 
[10001.  "Wanon    v.    Street    Commissioners 

'"California  Improvement  Company  of   the   City  of   I'.oston,    181    Mass.   6. 

V.  Moran,   128  Cal.  373,  fiO  Pac.  9fi9  112  X.   E.  9.31    [1902]. 
[19001.  "Risley    v.    City    of    St.    Louis,    34 

"Warren    v.    Street   Commissioners  Mo.    404     [18641:     Edtly    v.    City    of 

of  the   City   of  Boston,    181    :Mass.   fi.  Onialia.    72    Xeh.    ,550.    101    X.    \V.   2.') 

62   N.   E.   951    [19021.  [19(»41:     i  niodified  on   rehearing,    102 

'^Phelps    V.    ilftyor.    Aldermen    and  X.    W.    70.    103   X"^.   W.   692    [190.51): 

Commonalty    of     the     City     of     Xew  Conistock    v.    Ineorporated   Villajre  of 

York,    112    X.    Y.    216.    2    L.    R.    A.  Xelsonville.    61    Ohio    St.    288,    56    X. 

626,    19   X.   E.   408    [1889].  E.    15    [18991:    City  of  Cincinnati   v. 

"In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition   of  Holmes,    56    Ohio    St.    104,    46    N.    E. 

the    Trustees    of    the    Presbytery    of  514   [1S971. 


§  506  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  782 

is,  however,  applicable  to  so  much  of  the  cost  of  the  improvement 
as  is  to  be  paid  by  the  city  out  of  the  funds  raised  by  general 
taxation.-  The  contractor  must  ascertain  at  his  peril  whether 
such  certificate  has  been  made  and  filed  or  not.^  After  the  city 
has  in  fact  paid  its  share  of  the  cost  of  an  improvement  a  prop- 
erty owner  who  is  assessed  for  his  share  cannot  object  on  the 
ground  that  the  city  had  not  money  in  the  treasury  when  it 
entered  into  such  contract.*  By  some  statutes  it  is  provided  that 
a  public  contract  cannot  be  entered  into  unless  an  appropriation 
of  the  funds  necessary  therefor  has  first  been  made.^  Such  stat- 
utes do  not  apply  to  the  cost  of  improvements  which  are  to  be 
paid  for  by  special  assessment  and  not'  out  of  the  general  treas- 
ury.°  Such  a  provision  does,  however,  apply  to  the  share  of 
an  assessment  to  be  borne  by  the  city.'' 

§  506.     Necessity  of  collecting  assessment  in  advance  of  contract. 

It  may  be  provided  that  public  oifieials  cannot  make  contracts 
for  improvements  unless  the  money  therefor  is  already  in  their 
hands.^  Such  statute,  however,  has  been  regarded  as  applicable 
to  expenses  payable  out  of  funds  raised  by  general  taxation  and 
not  to  expenses  payable  by  local  assessment.-  In  California  the 
constitution  once  provided  that  an  assessment  must  be  levied  and 
collected  for  a  given  improvement  before  a  contract  could  be 
made  for  the  construction  of  such  improvement.  This  provision 
was  held  to  be  self  executing,  to  require  no  legislation  to  enforce 
it;  and  when  it  went  into  eflPect,  to  invalidate  prior  statutes  per- 
mitting the  contract  to  be  made  before  the  assessment  was  lev- 
ied.^ A  constitutional  amendment  which  abrogated  this  provi- 
sion was  attacked  as  invalid  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not  copied 

^Comstock  V.  Incorporated  Village  ley,  159  Mo.  45,  60  S.  W.  114  [1900]; 

of  Nelsonville.  61  Ohio  St.  288,  56  X.  In    the    Matter    of    Lewis,    51    Barh. 

E.  15   [1899].  (X.  Y.)   82  [1868];  In  the  Matter  of 

'  Comstock  V.   Incorporated  Village  Lewis,     35     Howard      (X.     Y.)      162 

of  Nelsonville,  61  Ohio  St.  288,  56  X.  [1868]. 

E.    15    [1899].  'City  of  Ilarrisburg  v.  Shepler,  190 

*Eddy  V.  City  of  Omaha,  72  Xeb.  Pa.  St*.  374,  42  Atl.  893  [1899]. 

550,  101  X.  W.  25   [1904];    (modified  ^Badger  v.   Inlet^wamp   Dmina    • 

on   rehearin-?,    102   X.   W.   70,   103   X.  District,  42  111.  App;  79   [1890]. 

W.  692    [1905]).  -State   of   Kansas   on   the   Relatio:i 

°Hentig   v.    Cihnore.    33    Kan.   234.  of    Young    v.     City    of    Xeodesha.    3 

6  Pac.  304   [18S5].  Kans.  App.  319,  45  Pac.   122   [1896]. 

"Hentio-   v.    Gilmore.    33    Kan.    234,  'McDonald    v.    Patterson,    54    Cal. 

6    Pac.    304    [1885];    Hill    v.    Swing-  245   [1880]. 


783 


THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§507 


on   the  journal   but   was   referred   to   by   title   and   number,   but 
such  amendment  was  held  to  be  valid.* 

§  507.     Constitutional  or  statutory  limit  of  indebtedness. 

By  the  provisions  of  many  recent  statutes  a  limit  of  indebted- 
ness has  been  fixed  for  cities  and  other  public  corporations  beyond 
which  they  have  no  authority  to  go.  Such  provisions  have  no 
application  to  contracts  for  public  improvements  where  no  liabil- 
ity of  any  kind  is  undertaken  by  the  eity,  but  the  contractor  has 
agreed  to  look  solely  to  the  assessments  to  be  levied  and  col- 
lected for  his  compensation  for  such  work.^  A  provision  fixing 
the  debt  limit  is  said  not  to  prevent  a  city  from  being  liable  for 
failure  or  omission  to  collect  an  assessment  where  the  contractor 
has  bound  himself  to  look  to  the  assessments  for  compensation, 
though  such  liability  exceeds  the  debt  limit.-  If  the  contract  for 
public  improvements  causes  a  personal  liability  against  the  city 
such  contract  is  within  the  provision  of  the  statute  fixing  the 
debt  limit.^  If  the  debt  limit  has  been  exceeded,  a  contract  of 
this  sort  made  thereafter  is  invalid  even  if  the  city  is  to  reim- 
burse itself  by  assessment  for  the  expenses  thus  incurred.*  How- 
ever, it  has  been  held  that  a  limitation  of  the  power  of  a  city  to 
borrow  money  for  general  purposes  does  not  restrict  its  power 
to  borrow  monev  for  the  construction  of  sidewalks  for  which  the 


*  Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Tompkins, 
72  Cal.  5,  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  17,  12 
Pac.  801;  (affirmed  in  Thompson  v. 
Ashworth.  73  Cal.  7.3,  14  Pae.  615 
[1887]);  Thomason  v.  Ru.L>-f,des,  00 
Cal.  405,  11  Pae.  20  |1880].  The 
court  had  previously  divided  on  this 
question,  Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Hil- 
ton, 69  Cal.  479,  11  Pac.  3   [1886]. 

'  The  Jacksonville  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  .Jacksonville,  114  111. 
562,  2  N.  "e.  478  [1880];  Quill  v. 
City  of  Indianapolis,  124  Ind.  292,  7 
L.  R.  A.  681,  23  X.  E.  788  [ISOO]; 
fJrunewald  v  City  of  Cedar  Ra])i(ls, 
118  la.  222.  91  X.  W.  10.-,9  [19021; 
Swanson  v.  fity  (if  Ottuiiiwa,  IIS 
Towa  1()1.  .in  T..  i;.  A.  (i2(l.  91  \.  \V. 
1048  [19021:  Ft.  Dod-c  Kl.vtrir 
Ti'jiht  &  Power  ('onii)any  v.  City  of 
Ft.  Dodge.  115  la.  508.  89  X.  W.  7 
[19021:    Citv  of  Clinton   v.  Wallikcr. 


98  la.  655,  68  X.  W.  431  [1896]; 
Tuttle  V.  Polk  &  Hubbel,  92  la.  433, 
60  X.  W.  733  [1S941;  State  of  Kan- 
sas on  tlie  Relation  of  Yoiuig  v.  City 
of  Xeodesha,  3  Kans.  App.  319,  45 
Pac.  122  [1896];  Morrison  v.  Moray. 
146  Mo.  543,  48  S.  W.  629  [1898]; 
Kansas  City  v.  Ward,  134  Mo.  172, 
35  S.  W.  600  [1896];  Little  v.  City 
of  Portland,  26  Ore.  235,  37  Pac.  911 
[1894];  City  of  Galveston  v.  Loonie, 
54  Tex.  517  [1881]  :  Smith  v.  City  of 
Seattle.  25  Wash.  300.  05  Pac.  612 
[1901]. 

-  Addyston  Pipe  &  Steel  Company 
v.  City.f  Corry.  197  Pa.  St.  41,  80 
Am.  St.  Pvcp.  SI  2.  40  Atl.  1035 
I  19001  :   See  S    1508  rt  .srq. 

^  Allen  V.  City  of  Davenport,  107 
la.  90.  77   X.  W.  532    [1898]. 

'  Allen  V.  (  ity  of  Davenport.  107 
Ta.  90.  77  X.  W.  532    [1898]. 


§  507  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  784 

city  was  ultimately  to  be  reimbursed  by  assessment."'  If  the  con- 
tract is  entered  into  after  the  city  has  exceeded  its  debt  limit,  and 
such  contract  imposes  a  personal  liability  upon  the  city,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  property  owner  is  not  entitled  to  any  relief  if 
he  is  not  assessed  more  than  his  proportionate  share  of  the  cost 
of  improvement  and  the  assessment  does  not  exceed  the  benefits 
to  his  property.  The  fact  that  the  city  cannot  be  held  liable  has 
been  said  not  to  invalidate  the  assessment  as  to  the  share  of  the 
property  owners."  Such  assessment  is  invalid  as  to  the  share  of 
the  city  if  the  debt  limit  has  been  exceeded."  The  property 
owner,  however,  cannot  defend  against  liability  on  the  ground 
that  the  city  is  not  liable  for  its  share  as  long  as  no  attempt  is 
made  to  impose  the  share  of  the  city  upon  the  property  owner.** 
It  has  been  said  that  a  general  tax  payer  may  sue  to  restrain  the 
public  corporation  from  paying  its  share  of  the  assessment  if 
the  debt  limit  has  been  reached."  The  question  of  the  power  of 
the  city  to  make  such  contracts  and  incur  such  liability  is  said 
not  arise  until  the  city  seeks  to  borrow  money  or  to  incur  an 
indebtedness  of  some  sort  under  such  contract.^"  The  mere  mak- 
ing of  the  contract  does  not  seem  to  be  regarded  as  the  incurring 
of  such  debt.^^  If  bonds  are  to  be  issued  they  count  as  a  debt 
only  from  the  time  that  they  are  actually  issued.^-  A  statutory 
provision  for  a  re-assessment  precludes  the  property  owner  from 
objecting  that  the  contract  was  originally  invalid  as  exceeding  the 
debt  limit. '^•'' 

°  City    of    Galveston    v.    Heard,    54  "  O'^NIalley    v.     Olyphant     Borough, 

Tex.  420   [1881].  198  Pa.  St.  52.5,  48*  Atl.  483   [lOoh- 

*  City   of    Galveston   v.    Loonie,    54  ^"  The    Jacksonville    Railway    Com- 

Tex.    517    [1881];    Beaser    v.    Barber  pany  v.  City  of  Jacksonville,  114  111. 

Asphalt   Paving   Company,    120   Wis.  562,  2  N.  E.  478    [1886];    Osborn  v. 

599,  98  N.  W.  525   [1904].  Sutton,    108    Ind.    443,    9    N.    E.    410 

^  Cason  V.  City  of  Lebanon,  153  [1886];  Redding  v.  Esplen  Borough. 
Ind.  567,  55  X.  E.  768  [1899];.  Ft.  207  Pa.  St.  248,  58  Atl.  431  [1903]. 
Dodge  Electric  LiTht  &  Power  Com-  '^  The  Jacksonville  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Ft.  Dodsre,  115  la.  pany  v.  City  of  Jacksonville,*  114  HI. 
568,'  89  N.  W.  7  [1902];  O'Malley  v.  562,  2  N.  E.  478  [1886];  Osborn  v. 
Olyphant  Borough,  198  Pa.  St.  525,  Sutton,  108  Ind.  443,  9  N.  E.  410 
48   Atl.   483    [1901].  [1880];    Redding  v.   Esplen  BorouTh. 

« People   ex   rel.   Mannen   v.   Green,"  207  Pa.  St.  248,  56  Atl.  431    [1903]. 

158    111.    594.    42    X.    E.    163    [1895];  ^-Redding   v.   Esplen   Borou'di,   207 

Cason   V.   City  of   Lebanon,    153   Ind.  Pa.  St.  348,  56  Atl.  431   [1903]. 

567,  55  X.  E.  768   [1899];  Huq-hes  v.  '^  State   v.    District    Court    of   Blue 

Parker,    148   Ind.    692.   48   X.    E.    243  Earth  County,  102  Minn.  482.  113  X. 

[1897];    Ft.  Dodge  Elec-t-ic   Li-ht  &  W.  697,   114  X.  \Y.  654  [1907]. 
Power  Company  v.  City  of  Ft.  Dodge, 
115  la.  568,  89  X.  W.  7   [1902]. 


i 


785  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §§508,509 

§  508.     Other  restrictions  on  indebtedness. 

A  constitutional  provision  to  the  effect  that  whenever  any 
county  or  city  is  authorized  to  contract  an  indebtedness  it  shall 
be  required  at  the  same  time  to  provide  for  the  collection  of  an 
annual  tax  therefor,  does  not  apply  to  cities  empowered  prior  to 
such  'Constitution  to  contract  indebtedness,  until  the  legislature 
has  passed  statutes  putting-  such  constitutional  provision  into 
operation  as  to  such  cities.^  Hence,  under  prior  statutes  which 
remain  in  force,  cities  may  incur  debts  for  such  public  improve- 
ments as  streets  and  sewers,  though  they  thereby  exceed  the 
debt  limit.-  A  statute  which  restricts  the  tax  rate  to  a  certain 
prescribed  percentage  applies  prima  facie  to  general  taxation  and 
not  to  special  assessments.^  Authority  to  a  city  to  anticipate  the 
collection  of  a  street  paving  tax  by  borrowing  money  and  pledg- 
ing such  tax  authorizes  a  loan  for  which  it  may  be  necessary  to 
pledge  such  tax  to  be  levied  for  several  successive  years.*  A 
city  may,  by  statute,  be  forbidden  to  spend  more  than  its  annual 
revenue."^  Such  a  statute,  if  made  applicable  to  cities  and  po- 
lice juries  does  not  apply  to  levee  districts.'' 

§  509.     Necessity  of  contractor's  giving  bond  or  security. 

Occasionally  statutes  prescribe  that  a  contractor  must  give  bond 
for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  work.  In  some  jurisdictions 
failure  to  give  bond  invalidates  further  proceedings.^  In  other 
jurisdictions  under  such  statutes,  failure  to  give  bond  is  said  not 
to  invalidate  subsequent  proceedings.-  In  other  jurisdictions 
failure  to  give  bond  is  at  least  admissil)le  in  evidence  as  tend- 
ing to  show  that  no  contract  has  in  fact  been  let.''     If  a  bond  has 

^  City  of  Lexington  on   Appeal,   90  1902].      See    also,    Jone.s    v.    City    of 

Ky.  258,  28  S.  W.  005   [18941:   Hoi/.-  Cincinnati,  IS  Ohio  318. 

hauer  v.  City  of  Newport,  94  Ky.  390,  *  Hughes   v.   Board   of  Comniission- 

22  S.  W.  7.52  [1893].  ers  of  Caddo  Levee  District,   108  La. 

'Holzhauer  v.  City  of  Newport,  94  140,  32  So.  218   [1901-1902]. 

Ky.  390,  22  S.  W.  752   [1893].  '  Bowditch     v.     Superintendent     of 

'Dyer   v.   City  of   Newport    (Ky.),  Streets  of  Boston,   108  Mass.  239,  46 

26  Ky.  L.  204,  80  S.  W.  1127  [1904];  N.    E.    1040     [1897];     (In    this    ca?e 

Kansas   City   v.   Bacon.    147    -Mn.   250,  there  was  also  a  failure  to  advertise 

48  R.  \V.  800  [189S1.  for  bids.) 

*Coggpshall  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  ^  Larned  v.  Maloney,   19   Ind.   App. 

78  La.  235.  41   N.   \V.   617.  42  N.  W.  199,   49  N.  E.   278    [1898]:    Thurston 

650   [1889].  V.  City  of  Elniira.   10  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S. 

"State  ex  rel.  Woulfe  v.  St.   Paul.  I N.   Y.)    119    [18(i8]. 

Judge,  107  La.  777,  32  So.  88   [1901-  'Mannin</  v.   Den,  90   Cal.   010,  27 

Pac.  435   [1891]. 


§509 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


786 


in  fact  been  given,  but  it  is  irregular,  such  irregularities,  if  not 
taken  advantage  of  at  the  time,  are  ordinarily  regarded  as  waived.* 
Thus  the  fact  that  the  preliminary  bond  binding  the  con- 
tractor to  enter  into  the  contract  if  his  bid  should  be  accepted  is  a 
few  dollars  less  than  ten  per  cent,  of  the  aggregate  amount  of 
the  proposal,  ^  or  that  such  preliminary  bond  is  not  filed,  "  or  the 
fact  that  the  contractor  has  not  filed  his  bond  as  provided  by  stat- 
ute, ^  or  the  fact  that  the  superintendent  of  streets  has  not  ap- 
proved t-he  bond  of  the  contractor  ^  or  the  fact  that  under  a 
statute  requiring  one  bond  to  be  given  when  the  bid  is  made  which 
is  to  cover  not  only  the  execution  of  the  contract  but  its  perform- 
ance, council  has  required  two  bonds,  one  to  accompany  the  bid 
binding  the  contractor  to  enter  into  the  contract,  and  the  other 
executed  on  the  award  of  the  contract  and  conditioned  for  its 
performance,**  none  of  them  invalidate  the  assessment.  Un- 
der a  municipal  ordinance  requiring  bonds  to  be  given  by  the 
contractors  for  the  building  of  certain  water  works  in  the 
amount  of  the  contract  ])rice  without  stating  when  such  bond 
was  to  be  given,  it  was  held  that  a  bond  given  on  the  com- 
pletion of  the  contract  and  when  the  first  installment  of  the  con- 
tract price  was  due  was  given  in  sufficient  time.^"  Under  an 
ordinance  requiring  the  city  engineer  to  specify  the  amount  of 
security  to  be  given,  it  is  sufficient  if  in  accordance  with  the  cus- 
tom of  the  engineer's  office,  the  amount  of  security,  based  on  the 
amount  of  the  bid,   is  inserted   in   the   specifications.^^     By  con- 


*  Greenwood  v.  Morrison,  128  Cal. 
350,  60  Pac.  971  [IflOO];  Conde  v. 
City  of  Schenectady,  164  N.  Y.  258. 
58  N.  E.  130  [l<)6o];  The  sureties 
cannot  avoid  liability  by  showing 
that  the  city  authorities  did  not  ap- 
prove the  bond:  People  v.  Carroll.  — 
Mich.  ,   115  N.  W.  42    [1008]. 

^Greenwood  v.  Morrison.  128  Cal. 
350,  60  Pac.  971   [1900]. 

*  Cady  V.  City  of  San  Bernardino, 
—  Cal. ,  94  Pac.  242    [1908]. 

'  Larned  v.  Maloney,  19  Ind.  App. 
199,  49  N.  E.  278    [1898]. 

» Miller  v.  Mayo,  88  Cal.  568,  26 
Pac.  364   [1891].' 

*  Conde  v.  City  of  Schenectady. 
164  N.  Y.  258,  58  N.  E.  130  [1900]; 
<  In   this   case,   however,   another   sec- 


tion of  the  charter  made  valid  every 
assessment  for  the  purpose  author- 
ized by  the  charter  '"notwithstandinp; 
any  irregularity,  omission  or  error  in 
any  of  the  proceedings  relating  to  the 
same." ) 

"•Hallock  V.  City  of  Lebanon,  215 
Pa.  St.  1,  64  Atl.' 362  [1906].  For 
the  construction  of  a  bond  condi- 
tioned to  pay  "any  and  all  persons, 
any  and  all  sums  of  money  which 
may  be  due  for  labor  and  material 
supplied  or  performed  in  and  about 
such  work,"  see  City  of  Philadelphia 
to  Use  V.  H.  C.  Nichols  Company,  214 
Pa.  St.  265,  63  Atl.  886   [1906]. 

"  Gilsonite  Construction  Co.  v.  Ar- 
kansas M'Alester  Coal  Co.,  205  Mo. 
49,   103  S.  W.  93   [1907]. 


787  THE  IMPROVEMENT  CONTRACT.  §  510 

tract,  the  city  may  be  authorized  to  retain  enough  of  the  contract 
price  to  indemnify  the  city  against  all  suits  against  it  due  to  the 
defective  construction  of  the  improvement  or  to  the  negligence 
of  the  contractor.^-  A  bond  given  by  a  contractor  to  indemnify 
persons  damaged  by  reason  of  the  contractor's  failure  to  per- 
form his  contract  through  injuries  arising  in  the  process  of  con- 
struction does  not  enure  to  the  benefit  of  the  owners  of  property 
assessed.^^  By  statute  it  may  be  provided  that  the  bidder  for  the 
construction  of  a  public  improvement  must  advance  to  the  super- 
intendent of  streets  or  some  designated  public  official  the  cost 
of  the  publication  of  notices,  resolutions,  orders  and  other  speci- 
fied expenses.^*  Such  statute  is  intended  for  the  protection  and 
benefit  of  those  to  whom  such  expenses  are  to  be  paid  and  for 
the  protection  of  the  city  and  the  official  to  whom  such  payment 
is  to  be  made.  It  is  not  intended  for  the  benefit  of  the  abutting 
property  owners  and  if  the  persons  entitled  to  the  payment  of 
such  expenses  file  a  Avritten  waiver  of  their  right  to  have  such 
expenses  collected  from  the  contractor  in  advance  and  such  ex- 
penses are  accordingly  not  so  collected,  such  omission  does  not 
invalidate  the  assessment.^"'  In  the  absence  of  special  statutory 
provisions,  it  has  been  held  that  a  provision  that  all  damage  aris- 
ing from  the  nature  of  the  work  should  be  borne  by  the  con- 
tractor and  that  he  should  indemnify  the  city  against  all  suits 
brought  on  account  of  damages  from  the  action  of  the  contractor, 
imposes  conditions  which  tend  to  increase  the  cost  of  the  work 
and  to  add  to  the  burden  of  the  property  owners,  and  is  there- 
fore void."^" 

§  510.     Contract  must  conform  to  resolution  or  ordinance. 

If  a  public  improvement  is  constructed  by  a  city  a  resolution  or 
ordinance  is  usually  made  necessary  by  statute  and  forms  the 
basis  of  subsequent  proceedings.^  Such  resolution  or  ordinance 
is  the  sole  authority  which  the  officers  of  the  city  have  for  enter- 
ing into  such  contract  and  constructing  such  improvement. 
Furthermore,  under  statutes  which  require  a  contract  to  be  let 

'=  Sweeten   v.    City    of    :\IillviIIe.   —  »' Fletclier  v.  Pratlier.   102  Cal.  413 

N.  J.  ,  66  Atl.  92.3   [1^07].  36  Pac.   658    [18941. 

"Grams  V.  IMurpliy.  —  Minn.  ,  '"Wollacott     v.    Meokin.     1.51     Cal. 

114  N.  W.  753   [19081.  701.  91  Pac.  612  [1907]. 

'^Fletcher  v.  Prather,  102  Cal.  413.  'See    §    830  et   seq;   §    837    et   seq_; 

36  Pac.  658   [1894].  §   840. 


§510 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


788 


to  the  lowest  bidder  it  is,  as  has  been  said  elsewhere,  -  essential 
that  the  terms  of  the  contract  into  which  the  bidders  are  invited 
to  enter  should  be  set  forth  in  order  that  the  bidders  may  know 
what  liability  they  are  about  to  assume,  and  in  order  that  the 
city  ofificials  may  be  able  to  determine  who  is  in  fact  the  lowest 
bidder.  From  these  considerations  it  follows  that  the  contract 
which  is  entered  into  must  conform  substantially  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  resolution  or  ordinance.  If  it  does  not  so  conform 
there  is  on  the  one  hand  no  authority  for  entering  into  such  con- 
tract and  on  the  other  hand  it  is  impossible  to  tell  who  is  the  low- 
est bidder  to  whom  the  contract  should  have  been  awarded.  Ac- 
cordingly, if  the  contract  does  not  conform  substantially  to  the 
resolution  or  ordinance,  it  is  invalid  and  cannot  be  the  basis  of  a 
valid  assessment,  and  if  the  contract  is  let  for  a  gross  sum  and  is 
not  separable,  its  invalidity  defeats  the  entire  assessment.-''  Thus,  if 
in  the  contract,  work  is  required  in  addition  to  that  which  is  pro- 
vided in  the  ordinance  or  resokition  and  the  entire  contract  is 
let  at  a  gross  price,  the  contract  and  assessment  based  thereon  are 
both  invalid.*     Thus  under  a  resolution  to  improve  a  street  in  a 


-  See  §  495  et  seq. 

^  Piedmont  Paving  Company  v.  All- 
man,  136  Cal.  88,  68  Pac.  493'[1902]  ; 
Bay  Rock  Company  v.  Bell,  133  Cal. 
150,  65  Pac.  299  [1901];  Kutcliin  v. 
Engelbret,  129  Cal.  635,  62  Pac.  214 
[1900];  Fay  v.  Reed,  128  Cal.  357, 
60  Pac.  927  [1900];  Partridsre  v.  Lu- 
cas, 99  Cal.  519.  33  Pac.  1082  [1893]  : 
Brock  V.  Liming,  89  Cal.  316,  20 
Pac.  972  [1891]^  Frick  v.  Morford, 
87  Cal.  570,  25  Pac.  764  [1«91]  ;  Dyer 
V.  Chase,  52  Cal.  440  [1877];  Him- 
melmann  v.  Satterlee,  50  Cal.  68 
[1875];  City  of  Stockton  v.  Whit- 
more,  50  Cal.  554  [1875];  City  of 
Stockton  V.  Creanor,  45  Cal.  643 
[1873];  Dousrherty  v.  Hitchcock.  35 
Cal.  512.  [1868];  Beaudry  v.  Valdez, 
32  Cal.  269  [1867];  Pepple  ex  rel. 
Price  V.  Bridgeman,  218  111.  568,  75 
N.  E.  1057  [1905];  People  ex  rel. 
Price  V.  Lyon,  218  111.  577,'  75  N.  E. 
1017  [1905];  Town  of  Cicero  v. 
Green,  211  111.  241,  71  N.  E.  884 
[1904];  Young  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond,   106    111.    603,    63    N.    E.    1075 


[1902]  ;  McPike  v.  City  of  Alton,  187 
111.  62,  58  N.  E.  301  [1900];  Pells 
V.  People  ex  rel.  Holmsrain,  159  111. 
580,  42  N.  E.  784  [1896];  Peck  v. 
City  of  Grand  Rapids,  125  Mich. 
416,  84  N.  W.  61  [1900];  City  of 
Boonville  ex  rel.  Cosgrove  v.  Step- 
hens,  —   Mo.   App.    .    95    S.    W. 

314  [1900];  Turner  v.  City  of 
Sprinofield,  117  Mo.  App.  418,  93  S, 
W.  807  [1900];  Barton  v.  Kansas 
City,  110  Mo.  App.  31,  83  S.  W. 
1093  [1904];  City  of  Louisiana  v. 
ShaflFner,  104  Mo.'  App.  101,  78  S. 
W.  287  [1903];  City  of  Trenton  ex 
rel.  Gardner  v.  Collier,  08  Mo.  App. 
483  [1890]  ;  Folmsbee  v.  City  of  Ams- 
terdam, 142  N.  Y.  118,  36  isT.  E.  821 
[1894];  Calm  v.  Metz,  101  N.  Y.  S. 
[1906];  Lutes  v.  Brig'rs,  5  Hun.  (N. 
Y.)  67  [1875];  Mason  v.  City  of 
Sioux  Falls,  2  S.  Dak.  640,  39  Am. 
St.  Rep.  802,  52  X.  W.  770  [1892]; 
McAllister  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  9 
Wash.  272,  37  Pac!  447,  658  [1894]. 
*  Piedmont  Paving  Company  v.  All- 
man,  136  Cal.  88,  68  Pac.  493' [1902]; 


789  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  510 

jurisdiction  where  the  street  is  not  regarded  as  including  gutters, 
a  contract  which  includes  the  construction  of  rock  gutters  and  the 
assessment  based  thereon  are  both  invalid. '^  A  resolution  to 
macadamize  the  street  does  not  give  authority  to  enter  into  a  con- 
tract for  curbing  the  sidewalk."  Under  a  resolution  to  curb  and 
macadamize  a  street,  the  contract  cannot  include  constructing 
sidewalks.'^  An  order  to  pave  a  fifty-four  foot  roadway  with  bitu- 
minous rock  upon  a  six  inch  concrete  foundation  does  not  author- 
ize a  contract  for  the  construction  of  sidewalks  and  curbing.** 
A  resolution  to  construct  a  street  does  not  authorize  a  contract 
including  the  construction  of  a  sewer  for  draining  sewage  from 
abutting  property.*^  A  resolution  to  change  the  grade  of  a  street. 
invalid  because  not  based  upon  the  petition  of  the  property  own- 
ers, does  not  authorize  the  construction  of  a  sidewalk  upon  an- 
other street  and  an  ssessment  therefor  is  invalid. ^°  A  resolution 
for  grading  a  street  at  a  given  grade  does  not  authorize  a  con- 
tract which  provides  for  a  change  of  grade. ^^  A  resolution  for 
grading  a  street  does  not  authorize  a  contract  including  the  curb- 
ing of  such  street.^-  Under  an  improvement  ordinance  provid- 
ing for  certain  described  sewers  the  construction  of  extra  sew- 
ers and  additional  catch  basins  and  the  substitution  of  flush  tanks 
for  lamp  posts  is  not  authorized  even  if  such  items  are  beneficial 
and  desirable.^''  If  the  specifications  are  not  referred  to  in  the 
resolution  so  as  to  make  them  a  part  thereof,  the  spe<3ifications 

Partridge   v.   Lucas,   99   Cal.   519,   33  "  Beaudry    v.    Valdez,    32    Cal.    2i;9 

Pac.   1082   [1893];   Donnelly  v.  How-  [1867]. 

ard,    60    Cal.    291     [1882];    Dyer    v.  '  Dyer  v.  Cliase,  52  Cal.  440  [1877]. 

Chase,  52  Cal.  440    [1877];   Himmel-  *  McAllister   v.   City   of   Taconia,   9 

mann  v.  Satterlee,  50  Cal.  68  [1875];  Wash.  272,  37  Pac.  447,  658  [1894]. 

Beaiulry     v.     Valdez,     32     Cal.     209  » Peck    v.    City    of    Grand    Rapids, 

[1867];   Peck  v.  City  of  Grand  Raj)-  125  Mich.  416,  84  X.  VV.  614   [1900]. 

ids,    125    Mich.    416,    84    N.    W.    614  '"  Folmshee   v.   City  of   Amsterchuii. 

[1900];   Folmshee  v.  City  of  Amster-  142  X.  Y.   118.  36  X.  E.  821    [1894]. 

dam,    142   X.   Y.    118,   36   N.   E.   821  "Mason   v.  City  of  Sioux   Falls,   2 

[1894];  Lutes  v.  Briggs,  5  Hun.    (X.  S.  Dak.  640,  39  Am.  St.  Rej).  802.  51 

V.)    67   [1875];   People  v.  Van  X^ort.  X.   W.   770    |1802]. 

65  Barb.   (X.  Y.)   331;  Mason  v.  City  '-:Ma.son  v.   City  of  Sioux   Falls.   2 

of    Sioux    Falls,    2    S.    Dak.    640,    39  S.    Dak.    640,   39   Am.    St.    Rep.    302. 

Am.    St.    Rep.    802.    51    X.    W.    770  51   X.  W.   770   [1892]. 

[1892];    McAllister    v.    City    of    Ta-  "  People  ex  rel.  MeCormack  v.  ]\I(- 

coma,  9  Wash.  272,  37  Pac.  447,  658  Wethy,    177    HI.    334,    52    X.    E.    479 

[1894].  [1898]. 

''Partridge   v.    Lucas,    99    Cal.    519. 
33   Pac.    1082    [1893]. 


§  510  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  790 

cannot  be  resorted  to,  to  supplement,  or  add  to,  the  terms  of 
the  resolution.^*  A  contract  cannot  provide  for  the  purchase  of 
additional  material  not  fairlj^  included  within  the  description  of 
the  ordinance. ^^  Thus  under  an  ordinance  for  buying  cast  iron 
water  pipe,  water  hydrants  cannot  be  purchased.^"  Different 
material  from  that  specified  in  the  ordinance  cannot  be  con- 
tracted for.^^  Thus  under  an  ordinance  providing  for  cover- 
ing a  street  with  six  inches  of  the  best  quality  of  broken  lime- 
stone, the  board  of  improvements  cannot  change  such  paving 
material  to  seven  inches  of  rolling  mill  slag.^-  Different  work 
from  that  authorized  by  the  ordinance  cannot  be  contracted  for 
even  if  it  is  as  good  as  that  provided  for  by  the  ordinance.^" 
Thus  after  a  paving  contract  has  been  performed  in  an  unsat- 
isfactory manner  a  city  comptroller  whose  power  is  to  settle  and 
adjust  all  claims  in  favor  of  or  against  the  corporation  cannot 
enter  into  a  contract  whereby  the  contractor  is  to  lay  a  new 
pavement  of  a  different  nature  in  consideration  of  receiving  the 
unpaid  balance  of  the  purchase  price.-"  A  contract  which  pro- 
vides for  a  method  of  doing  the  work  different  from  that  speci- 
fied in  the  ordinance  or  resolution  is  invalid."^  Thus  a  resolu- 
tion required  a  course  of  brick  in  street  paving  to  be  rolled  once 
with  the  street  roller.  Such  resolution  was  held  to  mean  the 
roller  then  used  by  the  city.  Subsequently  and  before  the  con- 
tract was  entered  into,  the  city  purchased  a  smaller  roller  and 
the  contract  permitted  such  brick  to  be  rolled  with  such  small 
roller.  Such  contract  was  held  to  be  invalid."  Under  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  bidders  upon  a  grading  contract  to  bid  on  each 
block  separately,  a  bid  and  contract  for  grading  the  entire  street 
at  a  certain  sum  per  cul)ic  yard  is  invalid  and  invalidates  the 
assessment.-"     In   some   jurisdictions    it    is   held   that    a    contract 

"Bay  Rock  Company   v.   Bell,   133  '» Calm   v.  Metz,   101   X.   Y.   S.  392 

Cal.  150,  65  Pac.  299   [1901].     Ques-  [1906]. 

tion  raised  but  not  decided  for  want  -"Calm  v.  Metz,   101   N.  Y.   .S.   392 

of   proper    pleading   in    Fay   v.   Reed.  [1906]. 

128  Cal.  357,  60  Pac.  927   [1900].  "City    of    Boonville    ex    rel.    Cos- 

"Town  of  Cicero  v.  Green,  211   111.       yrove  v.  Stephens,  —  Mo.  App.  . 

241,  71  N.  E.  884   [1904].  05  S.  W.  314   [1906]. 

^^Town  of  Cicero  v.  Green,  211   111.  "-City    of    Boonville    ex    rel.    Cos- 

241,  71  N.  E.  884   [1904].  ^^rove  v.  Stephens.  —  Mo.  App.  . 

"Young  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond.  95  S.  W.  314   [1906]. 

196  111.  603,  63  X.  E.   1075   [1902].  ="  City   of   Stockton   v.   Creanor.   45 

'*  Young  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond,  Cal.  643    [1873]. 
196  111.  603,  63  X.  E.  1075   [1902]. 


791  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.       .  §  510 

for  less  work  than  that  which  is  specified  in  the  resolution  of  in- 
tention or  the  ordinance  is  invalid.-*  This  view  is  based  upon 
the  theory  that  the  only  authority  to  the  city  officials  to  enter  into 
a  contract  or  construct  an  improvement  is  that  found  in  the  reso- 
lution or  ordinance,  and  that  they  have  no  power  to  contract  for 
less  work  than  that  for  which  they  were  retiuired  to  contract. 
Thus  if  a  resolution  provides  for  improving  a  certain  part  of  a 
street,  as  from  one  cross  street  to  another,  a  contract  for  the 
improvement  of  a  part  of  such  street  less  in  length  than  that 
specified  in  the  ordinance  or  resolution  is  invalid.-"'  If  an  ordin- 
ance for  paving  a  certain  part  of  a  street  has  been  passed,  a  sub- 
sequent ordinance  providing  for  paving  a  portion  of  one  of  such 
streets  at  the  entire  cost  of  a  private  corporation  operates  as  a 
repeal  of  a  former  ordinance  and  invalidates  an  improvement 
made  thereunder.-"  An  ordinance  which  provides  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  street  sixty-one  feet  wide  under  which  an  assess- 
ment is  levied  and  confirmed  is  repealed  by  a  subsequent  ordi- 
nance reducing  the  width  of  the  street  to  fifty-five  feet  and  such 
assessment  is  rendered  invalid.'-^  An  ordinance  authorizing  the 
construction  of  a  sewer  for  sanitary  and  drainage  purposes  does 
not  authorize  the  construction  of  a  sewer  for  drainage  purposes 
only  without  any  house  connections.-^  If  it  is  possible  from  the 
terms  of  the  contract  to  separate  the  cost  of  the  unauthorized 
part  of  the  improvement  from  the  cost  of  that  which  is  authorized, 
the  assessment  will  be  valid  as  to  the  latter  and  invalid  as  to 
the  former.-"  Tlius  where  a  sewer  was  constructed  at  a  certain 
rate  per  foot  and  the  plans  and  specifications  recpiired  about  eight 
feet  more  of  sewer  to  be  laid  than  was  provided  for  l)y  the  reso- 

"Kutcliin    V.    Engolbret,    129    Cal.  "*  City  of  Stockton  v.  Whitmoro,  50 
635,    62    Pae.    2U    [1900];     City    of  Cal.  554  [1875 1 :  Doiijrherty  v.  Hitch- 
Stockton    V.    Wliitmore,    50    Cal.    554  cock,  35  Cal.  512    [1868]. 
[18751;    Douirhcrty   v.   Hitchcock,   35  ="McPikc    v.    City    of    Alton.     187 
Cal.   512    [18681;   :McPike  v.  City  of  HI.  62,  58  X.  E.  301    [1900]. 
Alton.    187    111.    62,    58    N.    E.    301  "  Pells  v.  People  ex  rel.  Honigrain. 
[1900];  Pells  v.  Peojjle  ex  rcl.  Holm-  159  111.  580,  42  X.  E.   784    [1896]. 
grain,    159    111.    580,    42    X.    E.    784  =^  Barton   v.   Kansas   City.    110  Mo. 
[1896];    Barton  v.   Kansas  City,   110  App.  31,  83  S.  W.  1093   [1904]. 
Mo.  App.  31,  83  S.  W.   1093   [1904];  ^  Frick    v.    Morford.    87    Cal.    576. 
City    of   Trenton    ex    rel.    Gardner    v.  25  Pac.  764   [1891];    Himmelniann  v. 
Collier,  68  Mo.  App.  483    [1896];   In  Hoadley,   44   Cal.   276    [1872];    Beau- 
re  Scranton  Sevvor,  213  Pa.  St.  4,  62  dry   v.   Valdez.    32    Cal.    269    [1867]; 
Atl.   173    [1905].  Bennett   v.   City   of   Emn:?tsburp.   — 

la.  .   115  X.  W.  582   [1908]? 


511 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


792 


lution  ot  intention,  the  assessment  is  valid  as  to  all  except  such 
eight  feet.""  If  the  cost  of  grading  can  be  ascertained  separate 
from  the  cost  of  unauthorized  curbing,  the  assessment  may  be 
enforced  as  to  the  cost  of  such  grading.^^  If  the  cost  of  the  two 
kinds  of  work  cannot  be  separated,  the  entire  assessment  is  in- 
valid.'^ If  the  board  of  supervisors  has  awarded  a  contract  to 
be  performed  in  a  certain  time,  and  time  is  of  the  essence  of  such 
contract,  the  contract  entered  into  by  the  superintendent  of 
streets  giving  a  longer  time  for  performance  is  invalid  and  an 
assessment  based  thereon  cannot  be  enforced. ^^  If,  by  the  con- 
tract an  assessment  district  is  formed  differing  from  that  laid 
out- by  the  ordinance,  such  contract  is  invalid.-''*  Hence  under  a 
resolution  of  intention  to  improve  a  certain  described  street  the 
city  cannot  give  permission  to  certain  lot  owners  to  construct 
that  part  of  the  improvement  in  front  of  their  respective  lots.-''-"' 
If  the  contract  conforms  substantially  to  the  ordinance  but  in 
the  performance  of  such  contract  additional  work  is  done,  the 
assessment  for  the  improvement  specified  in  the  ordinance  and 
contract  is  valid,  although  the  items  of  extra  work  must  be  elimi- 
nated.^® If  the  contract  conforms  to  the  ordinance  and  the  objec- 
tion to  the  assessment  is  that  the  contract  has  not  been  performed, 
a  different  question  arises  which  is  discussed  elsewhere.-''^ 


§  511.    Substantial  compliance  sufficient. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  contract  should  conform  literally  to 
the  resolution  or  ordinance  authorizing  the  improvement.  It  is 
sufficient  if  there  is  a  substantial  conformity.^     Thus,  under  an 


=»Frick  V.  ^^lorford.  87  Cal.  576. 
25  Pac.  764    [1891]. 

^*  Mason  v.  City  of  Sioux  Falls,  2 
S.  D.  640,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  802,  51 
N.  W.  770   [1892]. 

^-'Partridge  v.  Lucas.  99  Cal.  519, 
33  Pac.  1082   [1893].. 

=«  Brock  V.  Lulling,  89  Cal.  316.  26 
Pac.  972   [1891]. 

5*Kut-hin  V.  Engelbret,  129  Cal. 
635,  62  Pac.  214  [1900];  Haisch  v. 
City  of  Seattle,  10  Wash.  435.  38  Pac. 
1131   [1894]. 

■''=>Kutchin  v.  Ena'elhret.  129  Cal. 
635.  C2  Pac.  214    [1900]. 

""McDonald  v.  Mezt-s.  107  Cal.  492, 
40   Pac.   808    [1895]. 


'"See  §  527  et  seq. 

•  Gage  V.  City  of  Chicago,  201  111. 
93,  66  N.  E.  374  [1903];  Hyman  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  188  111.  462.  59  N. 
E.  10  [1900];  Martindale  v.  Palmer, 
52  Ind.  411  [1875]  ;  Lynch  v.  City  of 
Kansas  City,  44  Kan.  452,  24  Pac. 
973  [1890];'  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore  v.  Raymo,  68  'MA.  569. 
13  Atl.  383  [1888];"  Cole  v.  Skrainka. 
105  Mo.  303.  16  S.  W.  491  [1891]: 
Dunn  V.  McXeely,  75  Mo.  App.  217 
[1898];  Eyermann  v.  Provenchere,  15 
Mo.  App.  256  [1884];  Voght  v.  Buf- 
falo, 133  X.  Y.  463,  31  N.  E.  340 
I  1892] ;  City  of  Spokane  v.  Browne. 
8   Wash.   317.   36   Pac.  26    [1894]. 


793  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  511 

ordinance  providing  for  a  Nicholson  or  wooden  block  pavement, 
a  contract  for  "what  is  known  as  wooden  block  pavement"  is 
sufficient.^  An  ordinance  which  provides  for  grading  certain 
streets  authorizes  a  contract  for  "  grading,  grubbing,  guttering 
and  curbing"  such  streets.''  An  ordinance  for  paving  a  street 
designated  by  its  popular  name  authorizes  a  contract  covering 
the  same  length  of  such  street  though  the  contract  describes  it 
by  its  official  name,  the  street  being  known  officially  by  another 
name  after  the  bend  therein.*  A  resolution  which  refers  to  a 
street  as  forty-two  feet  wide  to  be  improved  according  to  plans 
and  specifications,  authorizes  a  contract  for  paving  thirty-seven 
feet  in  width,  where  the  plans  and  specifications  show  that  a  strip 
five  feet  wide  in  the  center  of  the  street  is  omitted  as  being  a 
part  of  the  street  which  the  railway  company  is  bound  to  pave." 
An  ordinance  for  a  fourteen  foot  sidewalk  authorizes  a  contract 
for  improving  the  sidewalk,  although  the  space  between  the 
building  and  the  curb  is  but  thirteen  feet  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  the  property  owner's  building  extends  over  the  line.'"' 
An  ordinance  for  paving  a  street  with  vitrified  brick  author- 
izes a  contract  for  paving  it  with  "hard  burned  brick  specially 
burned  for  paving."'  An  ordinance  for  paving  a  street  with 
granite  blocks  eight  inches  in  depth  authorizes  a  contract  for 
paving  such  streets  with  granite  blocks  ranging  from  seven  to 
(eight  inches  in  depth. ^  An  ordinance  for  paving  a  street  by  a 
specified  patent  process  authorizes  a  contract  which  differs  from 
the  patent  in  permitting  the  street  to  be  rammed  as  well  as  rolled, 
differs  as  to  the  angle  at  which  the  stones  were  to  be  laid  and 
differs  as  to  the  material  to  be  placed  between  the  joints  of  the 
stone."  If  the  contract  does  not  conform  to  the  ordinance  owing 
to  clerical  errors,  the  assessment  is  nevertheless  valid  if  per- 
formance is  had  according  to  the  terms  of  the  ordinance.^*'  In 
some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  a  variance  Ix'tween  the  ordinance 

-  ATartindalc  v.  rainier,  'il  liid.  411  '  Diuiii    v.    .McXccly.    75    Mo.    Apj). 

[1875].  217  [18981. 

"(ity    cf     SpokaiH"    v.     Browiio.    8  "Cole  v.  Skrninka.   105  Mo.  .^O;}.   IC. 

Wash.  317,  3(5  Pao.  'ili  [1804].  S.  W.  401   [1891]. 

*  Lynch  v.  (  ity  of  Kansas  City.  44  °  ^layor  and  City  Council  of  Balti 

Kan.' 452,   24   Pac.   973    [18901.  more  v.  Raymo.  (IS  Md.  5(59,   13   All. 

"Vojrlit  V.   P.ufrah).    133   X.  Y.   403,  383   [18881." 

31  X.  E.  340  [18921.  "'Kyomian'i  v.   l'rov<MU-lierp,  15  Mo. 

•Hyman    v.    (ity    of    Chicago.    188  App.  25{)   [18841. 
111.  4()2.  59  X.   !•:.   10   11900]. 


Soil 


TAXATION    BV    ASSESSMENT. 


794 


and  the  contract  which  is  not  prejudicial  to  the  property  owners 
does  not  invalidate  the  contract  or  the  assessment  therefor." 
One  reason  given  for  this  view  is  that  if  the  city  had  the  power 
in  the  first  instance  to  make  the  contract  which  it  did  make, 
ratification  of  the  contract  by  the  proper  officials  is  equivalent 
to  a  sul)sequent  grant  of  authority  and  has  the  same  legal  effect.^ - 
Thus,  under  a  resolution  to  pave  a  given  length  of  a  specified 
street  a  contract  to  pave  a  shorter  portion  of  such  street  has  been 
held  to  be  valid  if  the  burden  of  the  property  owners  was  not 
increased  and  property  not  benefited  by  the  improvement  a  i 
actually  constructed  was  not  assessed. ''■  Under  an  ordinance  for 
constructing  a  street  and  a  sidewalk  a  contract  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  street  alone  has  been  held  to  be  valid  and  the  assess- 
ment therefor  has  been  upheld."  So,  under  a  resolution  for  lay- 
ing cross-walks  at  intersecting  streets,  an  assessment  is  valid 
though  walks  were  laid  only  where  the  intersecting  streets  were 
paved  with  Belgian  or  concrete  pavement  as  long  as  only  the 
walks  actually  laid  are  charged  for.^"  If  the  original  notice  of 
intention  to  improve  specifies  a  given  material,  property  owners 
cannot  complain  if  a  different  material  which  is  both  cheaper  and 
more  serviceable  than  that  originally  selected  is  in  fact  used.^'' 
If  the  specifications  require  work  not  named  in  the  ordinance 
but  such  work  is  not  recjuired  by  the  contract  and  no  charge  i.'. 
made  therefor  the  contract  and  assessment  therefor  are  valid. ^' 
Improvements  which  are  incidental  to  the  improvements  speci- 
fied in  the  ordinance  or  resolutioii  and  which  by  construction 
mav  be  regarded  as  a  part  thereof  may  be  provided  for  in  the 


'^Oakland  Paving  Company  v. 
Rier,  52  Cal.  270  [1877];  Field  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  198  111.  224,  64  X. 
E.  840  [1902];  Heman  Construction 
Company  v.  Loevy.,  179  Mo.  455,  78 
S.  W.  613  [1903];  (reversing  Heman 
Construction  Company  v.  Loevy,  64 
:Mo.  App.  430  [1895]  )  ;  In  the  Matter 
of  Pinckney.  22  Hun.  (X.  Y.)  474 
[1880];  Barkley  v.  Oregon  City.  24 
Ore.  515,  33  Pac.  978  [1893];  City  to 
Use  of  O'Rourke  v.  Hays.  93  Pa.  St. 
(12  Xorris)  72  [1881];  Hutchinson 
V.  Pittsburg,  72  Pa.  St.  (22  P.  F. 
Smith)   320. 

'=  Citv  to  Use  of  O'Rourke  v.  Havs. 


93  Pa.  St.    (12  Xorris)    72   [1881]. 

"In  the  Matter  of  Pinckney,  22 
Hun.  (X.  Y.)  474  [1880];  Hutchin- 
son V.  Pittsburg,  72  Pa.  St.  (22  P. 
F.  Smith)   320  [1872]. 

'*  Heman  Construction  Company  v. 
Loevy,  171  Mo.  455,  78  S.  W.  613 
[1903];  (reversing  Heman  Con- 
struction Company  v.  Loevy,  64  Mo. 
App.  430    [1895])*. 

i-' Matter  of  Eager.  12  Abb.  Pr.  X. 
S.   (X.  Y.)   151  [1871]. 

'"  Barkley  v.  Oregon  City.  24  Ore. 
515.  33  Pac.  978    [1893]. 

"  Oakland  Paving  Company  v.  Rier, 
52  Cal.  270  [1877]. 


795  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §511 

contract,  althou<>h  not  expressly  named  in  tlie  resolntion.^'*  Un- 
der a  resolution  to  construct  a  sewer,  a  contract  may  be  made 
which  provides  that  manholes  and  lampholes  shall  be  constructed 
as  a  part  thereof.^''  lender  a  resolution  for  the  construction  of 
a  sewer,  a  provision  in  the  contract  tliat  the  contractor  should 
take  up  the  old  sewer  pipe  alonp;  the  line  of  the  contemplated 
improvement  without  additional  expense  to  the  city  does  not 
invalidate  the  contract  where  it  appears  that  by  reason  of  such 
provision  a  hig^her  contract  price  was  not  necessarily  in  the  bid.-" 
Under  an  ordinance  or  resolution  providing  for  several  improve- 
ments, distinct  contracts  may  he  let  to  different  persons  for 
each  improvement.-^  However,  under  an  ordinance  to  improve 
a  street  between  two  given  points  a  city  engineer  has  no  power  to 
let  the  work  in  sections  and  to  compute  the  cost  thereof  accord- 
ingly.-- In  some  cases  a  much  greater  divergence  between  the 
contract  and  the  ordinance  is  allowed  than  is  indicated  by  the 
authorities  already  discussed.  Thus  it  has  been  said  that  a  dif- 
ference between  the  contract  and  the  ordinance  as  to  the  dimen- 
sions of  the  stone  to  be  used  in  paving  may  permit  the  city  to 
make  such  divergence  a  defense  if  sued  on  the  contract,  but 
cannot  invalidate  an  assessment  levied  for  the  improvement.-'' 
The  repair  of  a  sewer  extending  sixty  feet  beyond  the  distance 
indicated  by  the  ordinance  has  been  held  not  to  invalidate  the 
assessment.-^  TJnder  an  ordinance  and  contract  for  building  a 
street,  the  subsequent  construction  of  a  retaining  wall  which 
proved  to  be  necessary  by  reason  of  tin--  nature  of  the  soil  when 
the  excavation  was  once  made  was  held  not  to  invalidate  the 
contract  or  assessment.'-''  In  case  of  a  conflict  l)etween  two  dif- 
ferent ordinances  with  i-eference  to  street  improvenuuits,  an  or- 
dinance for  improving  a  specific  street  in  a  certain  descrilxnl  man- 
ner prevails  over  a   prior  general  ordinance  which   |)n)vi(l('s  that 


'"Comstock    V.    Eiifilc    Oiovc    City.  "     ^'' Dashiell      v.      Mayor      and      City 

133  la.  580.   Ill    X.  W.  T)!    |1!UI7|.  Council  of  llaltiniorc.  Usio  of  Hax,  45 

'"Comstock    V.    Ea<rlc    (irovc    City.  M.l.   (>].-)    [ISTti]. 

133   Iowa  5S0.   Ill   X.  \V.  51    IIOOT).  -' Wclihcr    v.    (  oninion     Council    of 

="  Comstock    V.    Kaglo    (Jrovc    City.  tlic  (  ity  of  Lockpoit.  4:i  Uowanl  3(iS 

133   Iowa  5Sn.   Ill    X.  \V.  51    110071.  [1S72]. 

=' Bates   V.    Twist.    138    Cal.    52.    70  "' Lonsworth  v.  City  of  Cincinnati, 

Pac.  1023  [10021.  34    O.    S.    101     [1877]":     (The    cost   of 

-- Eyerman    v.    Hardy,    8    Mo.    App.  sucli    wall    was    licld    to    be    a    proper 

311   [1880].  item  of  the  assessment.) 


§  512  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  796 

subsequent  street  improvements  should  be  made  as  therein  speci- 
fied.-" 

§  512.     Effect  of  invalid  terms. 

The  contract  between  the  public  corporation  and  the  contractor 
who  undertakes  to  construct  a  public  improvement  is  controlled 
by  the  rules  with  reference  to  subject  matter  applicable  to  con- 
tracts in  general.  It  is  often  sought  to  incorporate  into  such 
contracts,  terms  which  in  some  form  violate  the  policy  of  either 
the  written  or  the  unwritten  law.  Such  provisions  cannot  be 
enforced.  Their  effect  upon  the  rest  of  the  contract  turns  on 
the  question  whether  such  terms  are  merely  void  or  whether 
they  are  not  merely  void  but  illegal.  If  the  terms  are  merely  void 
their  incorporation  into  the  contract  does  not  affect  the  valid 
terms  of  the  contract  if  such  valid  terms  are  by  themselves  suf- 
ficient to  constitute  a  contract.^  However,  in  some  jurisdictions 
this  rule  is  not  followed.  If  the  void  terms  are  made  the  basis 
of  competitive  bidding  and  the  effect  of  incorporating  them  into 
the  prospective  contract  is  to  restrict  competition  and  to  in- 
crease the  contract  price,  it  is  held  in  some  cases  that  an  assess- 
ment levied  for  the  contract  price  is  invalid.-  If  the  invalid 
terms  are  not  merely  void  but  illegal  their  effect  upon 
the  rest  of  the  contract  turns  upon  the  question  whether 
the  contract  is  entire  or  seperable.  If  the  contract  is 
entire  the  incorporation  of  an  illegal  term  invalidates  the 
entire  contract.  If  the  contract  is  severable  the  incorporation  of 
an  illegal  term  does  not  invalidate  those  terms  of  a  contract 
which  can  be  separated  from  the  illegal  part  thereof.  These 
questions,  however,  can  best  be  discussed  in  connection  with  the 
specific  types  of  void  and  illegal  terms  which  have  been  con- 
sidered by  the  courts.  A  provision  in  a  contract  for  a  street 
improvement  which  attempts  to  relieve  the  street  superinten- 
dent and  his  sureties  from  liability  for  any  delinquency  upon  his 
part  is  unauthorized  by  statute  and  is  apparently  void  but  the 
insertion  of  such  clause  does  not  invalidate  the  rest  of  the  eon- 
tract.^    A  clause  wh^'ch  requires  the  contractor  to  bear  all  loss  or 

^'Holdom   V.   City  of   Chicago,   169  =  See   §§   514,  515. 

111.  109,  48  N.  E.  164  [1897].  'McDonald  v.  Mezes,  107  Cal.  492, 

1  McDonald  v.  Mezes,   107  Cal.  492,  40  Pac.  808    [1895];    Rauer  v.  Lowe, 

40  Pac.  808   [1895];   Raiier  v.  Lowe,  107  Cal.  229,  40  Pac.  337   [1895]. 
107  Cal.  229,  40  Pac.  337   ri895]. 


797  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §§513,514 

damage  resulting  from  the  nature  of  the  work  imposes  an  extra 
burden  on  the  property  owner  in  excess  of  any  benefits  to  him 
and  renders  the  assessment  void.* 

§  513.     Terms  fixed  by  lavv^. 

If  the  law  fixes  the  lial)ility  of  the  parties  as  to  certain  mat- 
ters, such  terms  will  be  implied  in  the  contract  although  not  ex- 
pressed and  accordingly  a  contract  will  not  be  invalid  because 
such  terms  are  not  incorporated  therein  specifically.^  Thus,  where 
the  law  fixes  the  amount  of  the  cost  of  paving  which  shall  be 
borne  by  the  abutting  property  owners  and  the  city,  where  work 
is  done  upon  a  street  in  the  center  of  which  is  a  strip  not  used  for 
ordinary  street  purposes,  it  is  not  necessary  that  said  terms  should 
be  incorporated  in  the  contract.-  The  incorporation  into  a  con- 
tract in  express  terms  of  a  provision  which  the  law  would  imply 
in  the  absence  of  express  terms  cannot  affect  its  validity.^  If  a 
contract  provides  for  the  performance  of  all  the  work  specified 
in  the  resolution  of  intention  but  furthermore  contains  a  provi- 
sion that  the  adjoining  property  should  not  be  assessed  for  im- 
proving the  part  of  the  street  occupied  by  a  railway  company, 
the  contractor  agreeing  to  look  to  the  railway  company  for  pay- 
ment for  such  portion  of  the  work,  the  insertion  of  such  provi- 
sion does  not  invalidate  the  contract.* 

§  514.     Provisions  w^ith  reference  to  labor. 

Contracts  for  public  improvements  often  contain  provisions 
restricting  the  number  of  hours  which  shall  constitute  a  day's 
work  for  those  employed  in  the  performance  of  such  contract. 
Under  modern  statutes,  eight  hours  is  the  number  commonly  se- 
lected as  constituting  a  day's  work.  In  some  jurisdictions  stat- 
utes restricting  the  number  of  hours  which  shall  constitute  a 
day's  work  are  regarded  as  invalid.     Where  such  view  ol)tains 


*  Van   Lopnon   v.   Cillospio,  —   C'al.  v.   Go<rreve,   41    La.    Ann.   251.   5   So. 

,    9G    Pao.    87    [1908];    Hatch    v.  848  [1889]. 

Nevills,    —    Cal.    ,    95    Pac.    43  "Barber   Asphalt   Paving  Company 

[1907];    Blochman   v.   Spreckels,    135  v.   Gogreve,   41    La.   Ann.   251,   5   So. 

Cal.   flG2,   57    L.   R.    A.   213.   07    Pac.  848   [1889]. 

1061;  Woollacntt  v.  Moekin.  151   Cal.  '  Perinc  v.  Forbnsh.  97  Cal.  305,  32 

701,  91    Pac.   012:    Classcll   v.   O'Dea,  Pao.  220  [1P931. 

—  Cal.  App.  .  95  Pac.  44  [1908].  "  Peri  no  v.  Fnrbush,  97  Cal.  305,  32 

Barber   Asphalt   Paving   Company  Pac.  226  [1893]. 


§  51-4  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  798 

it  is  said  that  if  the  specifications  contain  a  provision  restricting 
the  number  of  hours  which  shall  constitute  a  day's  work  and 
bids  are  made  and  the  contract  let  upon  such  terms  as  a  basis,  the 
contract  and  the  assessment  therefor  are  invalid,  since  the  cost 
to  the  propert.y  owner  is  improperly  increased.^  Where  this 
view  prevails,  a  property  owner  in  resisting  the  assessment  need 
not  show  that  such  provision  actually  increased  the  cost  of  the 
work.-  It  is  sufficient  if  he  shows  that  such  provision  forms  the 
basis  of  the  bidding  and  that  its  natural  tendency  was  to  in- 
crease the  amount  of  the  bids  made."  If,  however,  the  provisions 
restricting  the  number  of  hours  which  shall  constitute  a  day's 
work  do  not  form  the  basis  of  the  bidding  or  affect  the  amount 
of  the  bids,  such  provision  does  not  invalidate  the  contract  into 
which  it  is  subsequently  incorporated.*  Thus  if  such  forms  are 
not  found  in  the  specifications  or  the  notice  inviting  proposals 
and  the  contractors  do  not  base  their  bids  thereon,  such  subse- 
quent provisions  do  not  render  the  contract  invalid.''  Even  if 
such  provisions  are  found  in  the  specifications,  the  advertisement 
and  the  bid  as  well  as  the  contract,  it  has  been  said  that  the 
presumption  will  be  that  such  terms  entered  into  and  formed  the 
basis  of  the  competitive  bidding,  but  that  such  presumption  may 
nevertheless  be  rebutted.''  If  the  provision  restricting  tlie  num- 
ber of  hours  in  a  day's  work  is  incorporated  into  the  contract  and 
the  men  employed  to  perform  such  contract  work  a  greater  num- 
ber of  hours  the  property  owner  cannot  resist  the  assessment  upon 
such  ground.^  In  some  jurisdictions  statutes  restricting  the  num- 
ber of  hours  which  shall  constitute  a  day's  labor  to  any  reason- 
able number  are  regarded  as  valid.  Where  such  provisions  are 
held  to  be  valid,  a  contract  containing  such  provision  and  the 
assessment  levied  to  pay  the  cost  of  such  contract  are  both  held  to 

^Glover  v.  People  ex  rel.  llaymond.  '  tliiin   v.   Peters,  3   Cal.  App.   235. 

201    111.    545.    60    N.    E.    820    [1903];  S4    Pac.    995    [1906];    Wells    v.    Peo- 

McChesney    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray-  i)ie  e.v  i-el.  Raymond,  201   111.  435,  66 

mond,    200    111.    146,    65    N.    E.    626  X.    E.    210    [1903];    Treat    v.    People 

[1902];    Bird  ex  rel.  Hudson  v.  City  ex  rel.  Raymond,   195  111.   196,  96  X. 

of    Detroit,    —    Mich.    .    116    X.  E.  891   [1902]. 

W.   1065    [1908].                                       .  =P'linn  v.  Peters,  3   Cal.   Apj).   235. 

^Glover  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond,  84  Pac.  995   [1906]. 

201  111.  545,  66  N.  E.  820   [1903].  "Gage    v.    People    ex    rel.    Hanberg. 

••'McChesney  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray-  207  111.  61,  69  X.  E.  635  [1904]. 

mond,    200    111.    146,    65    X.    E.    626  '  \^■illiams  v.  Savings  and  Loan  So- 

[1902].  ciety,  97  Cal.  122,  31  Pac.  908  [1893]- 


799  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  514 

be  valid.**  By  some  city  ordinances  it  is  provided  that  bidders 
upon  public  improvements  must  employ  union  labor  only.  Where 
such  provision  is  contained  in  a  general  ordinance,  and  not  in  the 
improvement  ordinance,  the  specifications,  or  the  bids,  such  provi- 
sion is  not  regarded  as  entering  into  the  terms  of  the  bidding 
or  affecting  the  amount  of  the  bids.-'  Under  such  circumstances, 
therefore,  as  the  contract  price  is  not  increased  by  such  general 
ordinance,  the  contract  and  the  assessment  levied  therefor  are 
valid. ^^  In  some  contracts  which  have  been  considered  by  the 
courts,  have  appeared  clauses  which  forbade  the  emploj^ment  of 
alien  labor  in  the  performance  thereof.  If  such  terms  do  not  en- 
ter into  the  bidding  and  thus  restrict  competition  and  raise  the 
price  of  the  work  they  do  not  invalidate  the  contract."  If  such 
clause  is  not  found  in  the  ordinance  or  the  advertisement  for 
bids,  it  is  not  regarded  as  affecting  the  bidding.^-  Even  though 
such  clause  is  inserted  in  the  specifications  but  it  is  not  required 
by  the  ordinance  and  is  not  found  in  the  advertisement  for  bids, 
and  it  does  not  appear  that  any  of  the  bidders  Ivuew  that  such 
clause  would  be  inserted  in  the  specifications,  such  clause  does 
not  invalidate  the  contract.^-'  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  provision 
against  the  emi)lovment  of  alien  or  convict  labor  is  found  in  the 
specifications  which  form  the  basis  of  bids  for  a  contract  for  street 
paving  and  such  provision  is  known  to  the  bidders  and  taken  into 
consideration  by  them  in  making  such  bids,  such  provision  is  re- 
garded as  increasing  the  amount  of  the  bid  by  restricting  the 
field  for  the  employment  of  labor.^*     Accordingly  such  contract 

"Curtice   v.    Scliriiidt.    202   Mo.    TO.S.  " 'I'lvat  v.   Pi-oplo  ex   rcl.   Itayniniul, 

101  S.  W.  (il   ri!'<>"l;  St.  Lmiis  Quar-  HI.")    III.    196,    62    X.    E.    sni     11(1021; 

ry     and     Constnu'tion     ('om])<''iiy     v.  ITamilton  v.  Ponplc  ox  rcl.   Ilaynioiid, 

Frost,  90  Mo.  App.  077    [1901). '  191    111.    ]:V^.   i\2   X.   E.  533    [1002]. 

"Treat  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond.  ( ('X])lain('(l    in    Mcf'liosncy    v.    Poojile 

195    111.    19(1.    62   N.    E.    891    [1902);  ex   rcl.   Ilaynioml.  200   111.    ].}(;.  (I.T   X. 

Gray  v.  People  ex  rel.  Pvaymoml.   194  E.  (;2(1   (19021). 

111.  486,  62  N.  E.  894   [1902|;    Fiskc  '-Civins  v.  P.M.pl,.  ex  rcl.  rvaynioiul 

V.   People   ex   rel.   Raymond,    188    111.  1!I4    ill.   l.")0.  SS  Am.  St.  Rcj).   14:5.  (12 

206,  52   L.   R.   A.   291,  58   X.   E.   98.")  X.  E.  rv.U   |  19021. 
[19011.  '■'Ca-rc    V.    People    ex    rel.   IIanl)erji. 

'"Treat  V.  People  ex  rcl.  Raymond.  2(l7    111.    61.    tiO    X.    E.    635    119041; 

195    111.    196.    62    X.    E.    891     |  19021:  Hamilton   v.   People  ex  rel.  Raymond. 

Cray  v.  Peojjle  ex   rcl.   Raymond.   194  194  111.  133.  62  X.  E.  533  [1902]. 
111.  486.  62  X.  E.  894    [1902];    Fiske  "Inge  v.  Board  of  Piildie  Works  of 

V.   Peoi)le   ex   rel.    Raymond.    188    III.  Mobile.     135    Ala.     187.    93    Am.    St. 

206.   52   L.   R.   A.   291.   58   X.   E.   985  Rep.  20.  33  So.  678   [1902]. 
[1900]. 


§  514  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  800 

is  invalid  as  is  the  assessment  based  thereon. ^^'  A  statute  pro- 
hibiting the  employment  of  alien  laborers  if  they  are  to  be  paid 
from  funds  raised  from  taxation  has  been  held  to  be  unconstitu- 
tional.^" Where  this  view  prevails,  the  failure  of  the  city  and  of 
the  contractor  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  such  statute  does 
not  invalidate  the  assessment  proceedings.^'^  In  some  jurisdic- 
tions, clauses  which  prohibit  the  emplovment  of  al'en  or  non- 
resident labor  are  regarded  with  more  favor.  A  contract  which 
required  the  contractor  to  employ  laborers  residing  in  the  city 
was  said  to  be  valid  after  performance  where  thore  was  no  show- 
ing that  the  cost  of  the  improvement  was  therebv  iT^reased.^^ 
The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  held  that  s"eh  a 
provision  can  be  complained  of  as  in  violation  of  the  Federal 
constitution  only  by  a  member  of  the  excluded  class  and  not  by 
the  property  owner.^''  A  contract  for  a  public  imnrovemeut  pro- 
vided that  the  work  of  dressing  stone  should  be  done  within  the 
territorial  limits  of  the  state.  There  was  some  evidence  to  show 
that  the  etfect  of  such  provision  was  to  restrict  competitive  bid- 
ding and  to  increase  the  cost  of  construction  and  the  lower  court 
found  that  such  was  the  effect  of  this  provision.  It  was  held 
that  under  a  statute  requiring  the  letting  of  contracts  on  compe- 
titive bidding,  such  a  contract  was  invalid  and  the  assessment 
levied  to  pay  the  contract  price  could  not  be  enforced.-*^  On 
the  other  hand  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  tending  to  show 
that  such  clause  restricted  competition,  it  was  held  that  such 
clause  was  valid.'^  A  provision  fixing  the  minimum  rate  of  wages 
does  not  invalidate  the  assessment  if  it  is  not  shown  to  have  been  a 
term  of  the  proposal  or  to  have  formed  the  basis  of  the  bids.-^ 

« Inge  V.  Board  of  Public  Works  of  540,   47    L.    293,    23    S.    175    [1903]; 

Mobile,  1,35  Ala.  187,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  (afiirmin<j    Keller    v.    Chadwick,    104 

20,   33' So.   678    [1902].  La.  719,  29  So.  295  [l901])  ;   (In  this 

^°City   of   Chicago   v.   Hiilbert,   205  case   the   contract   provided    that   the 

111.  346,  68  N.  E.  786   [1003].  contractor    should    employ   only    iona 

"fity   of   Chicao-Q  v.   Hulbert,    205  fide  residents  of  the  city.) 

111.  346,  68  N.  E.  786   [1903].  ""St.    Louis    Quarry    and    Construc- 

^*  Edwards    &    Wal=h    Construction  tion  Company  v.  Von  Versen,  81  Mo. 

Co.  V.  Jasper  County,  117  la.  365,  94  Apn.  519   [1F991. 

Am.    St.    Eep.    301,    90    N.    W.    1006  "  It.   Louis   Quarry   and   Construc- 

[1902];     (citing 'People   ex   rel.   Rod-  tion  Company  v.  Frost,  90  Mo.  App. 

gers  V.  Coler,  166  N.  Y.  1,  82  Am.  St.  677   [1901].  ' 

Rep.  605,  52  L.  R.  A.  814,  59  N.  E.  "Flinn  v.  Peters,  3  Cal.  App.  235, 

716).  84  Pac.  995   [1906]. 

'» Chadwick    v.    Kelley,    187    U.    S. 


80]  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT  §  515 

Whether  a  provision  in  the  proposals  to  the  effect  that  preference 
would  be  given  to  a  bidder  who  would  a^ree  to  pay  the  full 
union  schedule  to  his  employes  invalidates  the  assessment,  was 
questioned  but  not  decided  in  a  recent  ^Massachusetts  ease,-^  as  in 
that  case  the  expenses  incurred  for  damage  to  realty  exceeded 
the  amount  of  the  assessment,  which  could  thus  be  sustained, 
irrespective  of  the  validity  of  the  C(uitract. 

§  515.     Patented  or  monopolized  rrticles. 

A' patent  is  a  legal  monopoly  and  there  can  be  no  competition 
in  a  patented  article  unless  the  person  owning  the  patent  vol- 
untarily offers  it  for  sale  in  open  market.^  Under  a  statute  which 
provides  for  competition  and  the  letting  of  contracts  to  lowest 
bidders,  the  question  has  been  presented  in  many  cases  whether 
a  patented  article  can  be  required.  Upon  this  question  there 
has  been  a  conflict  of  authority.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  said 
to  be  improper  under  such  statutes  to  include  patented  articles 
in  the  specifications  and  invite  bids  thereon.-  In  some  cases  the 
question  has  been  raised  but  not  decided.^  In  other  jurisdictions 
it  has  been  said  to  be  proper  to  include  patented  articles.*  One 
of  the  theories  given  for  this  i.s,  that  persons  may  bid  on  such 
contract  and  may  secure  the  consent  of  the  owner  of  the  patent 
to  make  use  thereof.'^  A  special  statute  which  provides  spe- 
cifically for  the  use  of  a  patented  article  has  been  held  to  be 
valid. "^  It  has  been  held  that  if  it  is  proper  to  make  use  of  a 
patented  article,  the  contract  therefor  should  not  be  let. on  com- 

^  Gardiner    v.    Street    Commission-  ^  Yarnold   v.   City   of  Lawrence,    15 

ers  of  City  of  Boston,  188  ^lass.  223.  Kan.  126  [1875]. 

74  X.  E.  341   [1005].  *  Motz  v.  City  of  Detroit,  18  Mich. 
^Barber   Asphalt   Pavin<i  Company  494    [1869];    Hobart   v.    City   of   De- 

V.   Gogreve,   41    La.   Ann.   251,   5   So.  troit,  17  Mich.  246,  97  Am.  Dec.  185; 

848   [1889];   Burgess  v.  City  of  Jef-  Kansas    City    Transfer    Company    v. 

ferson,  21  La.  Ann.  143.  Huling.    22  '  Mo.    App.    654     [188G]; 

^  Nicholson       Pavement       Co.       v.  Matter  of  McCormack,  60  Barb.    ( N. 

Painter,   35   CaL   099    [1868];    Siegel  Y.)     128    [1870];    Matter   of   McCor- 

V.   City  of  Chicago,   223    111.   428,   79  mack.  10  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.   (N.  Y.)   234 

N.  E.  280   [1906];   :M<)naghan  v.  City  [1S70]. 

of    Indianapolis,    37    Ind.    App.    280.  •'Hobart     v.     City     of     Detroit.     17 

76  N.  E.  424.  reversing  on  rehearing  Mich.  246,  97   Am. , Dec.   185. 

75  N.  E.  .33  [1905]:  Lewis  v.  City  of  "Dean  v.  Borohsonins.  30  Wis.  236 
Elizabeth,  25  N.  J.  Eq.  (10  C.  E.  [1872];  Mills  v.  Charleton,  29  Wii. 
Gr.)  298  [1874];  Dolan  v.  Mayor,  400,  9  Am.  578  [1872];  Dean  v. 
etc.,  of  New  York.  4  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  Charlton,  27  ^Vis.  522   [1871]. 

(N.  Y.)   397   [1868] 


§  515  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  802 

petitive  bidding,  since  there  can  be  no  competition  thereon  un- 
less the  consent  of  i;he  owner  of  the  patent  has  been  secured  in 
advance.'  The  fact  that  a  specific  pavement  was  patented  was 
held  to  be  no  objection  to  an  assessment  for  an  improvement  in 
which  such  pavement  is  specified,  if  the  city  has,  before  the  con- 
tracts were  let,  acquired  the  right  to  permit  any  successful  bid- 
der to  make  use  of  such  patent  on  reasonable  terms.*  If  the 
use  of  a  patented  article  is  not  stipulated  for  in  the  contract  the 
fact  that  such  article  is  in  fact  used  does  not  invalidate  the  as- 
sessment.'' If  the  improvement  as  specified  is  to  be  constructed 
in  part  by  the  use  of  patented  articles  and  in  part  by  the  use  of 
articles  which  are  not  patented,  it  has  been  said  that  such  kinds 
of  work  should  be  separated  and  separate  proposals  invited  for 
the  part  which  was  not  patented.^"  Relief  in  equity  has  been 
refused  on  this  ground,  for  the  reason  that  the  complainant  had 
an  adequate  remedy  at  law.^^  Whether  any  patent  exists  has 
been  left  doubtful  by  the  record  in  some  cases. ^-  Even  where  the 
record  has  disclosed  the  existence  of  a  patent  process,  the  con- 
tract has  been  held  valid. ^■'  Many  of  these  cases  involve  paving 
with  grades  of  asphalt  of  which  at  the  time  of  the  contract  one 
corporation  had  a  virtual  monoply.^*  Where  only  one  company 
could  furnish  asphalt  of  the  grade  required  it  was  said  to  be 
proper  to  specify  the  brand  of  asphalt  to  be  furnished,  thus  re- 

'  People    ex     rel.     Tnindy    v.    Van  X.  J.  Eq.    (10  C.  E.  Gr.)   298   [1874]. 
Nort,  65   Barb.    (N.  Y.)    331    [1873].  '-Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company 

*  Lacoste   v.   City   of  New   Orleans,  v.   Gogreve,   41    La.   Ann.   251,   5   So. 

119    La.    469,     44    So.    267     [1907];  848    [1889]. 

Hastings   v.    Columbus,   42   O.   S.   585  '^  N.     P.     Perine     Contracting     and 

[1885].  Paving     Company     v.     Quackenbush, 

"Dunne    v.    Altschul.    57    Cal.    472  104    Cat.    684,    38    Pac.    533    [1894]; 

[1881];    ( Furthermore  while  such  ar-  Swift  v.    City  of   St.   Louis.    180  Mo. 

tides  were  marked   "patented"  there  80,  79  S.  W.   172    [1904]. 
was   no    evidence    to    show   that    they  "  Field  v.    Barber    Asphalt   Paving 

were  in  fact  patented.)    Contra:  Mon-  Co.,  194  U.  S.  618.  48  L.   1142,  24  S. 

aghan    v.    City    of    Indianapolis,    37  784     [1904];      (modifying,     117    Fed. 

Tnd.  App.   280.   76  X.  E.   424.   75  N.  025    [1902]);    Swift    v.    City   of   St. 

E.  33    [1905].  Louis.    180    Mo.    80,    79    S.    W.    172 

"Lewis    v.    City    of    Elizabeth,    25  [1904];   Verdin  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 

N.  J.  Eq.   (10  C.  E.  Gr.)   298  [1874];  131  Mo.   26,  33  S.  W.  480,  36  S.  W. 

Tn    the    ^Matter    of    Eager,    46    N.    Y.  52     [1895];    Barber    Asphalt    Paving 

100     [1871];     Matter  ^of    Ea^er,     12  Co.  v.  Hunt,   100  Mo.  22,   18  Am.  St. 

Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.    (IST.  Y.)    151    [1871];  Rep.  530,  8  L.  R.  A.   110,   13   S.   W. 

Matter  of  McCormack,  10  Abb.  Pr.  N.  98    [1890];    Schoenberg   v.    Field.    95 

S.   (N.  Y.)   234  [1870].  Mo.   App.  241,  68  S.  W.  945. 

"  Lewis    v.    City    of    Elizabeth,    25 


I 


803  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §51') 

stricting  the  specifications  lormally  as  well  as  i)raetically  to  the 
product  of  that  company.^'  So  it  has  been  held  proper  to  select  a 
given  kind  of  cement  in  which  one  company  has  a  monopoly  where 
it  is  not  shown  that  any  other  kind  of  cement  would  answer  the 
purpose  equally  well.^''  This  view  has  not  been  acijuieseed  in  in 
all  jurisdictions,  however.  If  the  city  by  ordinance  has  limited 
the  material  to  be  used  to  one  particular  l)rand  of  asphalt  which 
can  be  supplied  by  only  one  -eoiupany,  siieh  ordinance  has  been 
held  to  be  invalid.^'  In  such  cases  the  proper  form  of  specifi- 
cation is  to  require  an  asphalt  equal  to  a  certain  prescribed 
standard.  A  different  (piestion  arises  where  the  material  to  be 
used  is  one  which  can  be  furnished  by  more  than  one  dealer  or 
manufacturer.  In  such  cases  the  city  has  no  right  to  fix  upon 
the  product  of  a  certain  manufacturer  or  dealer  as  that  which 
is  to  be  furnished  in  the  performance  of  the  contract.^**  Thus, 
where  several  manufa-cturers  each  make  suitable  grades  of  brick 
for  paving,  the  city  under  statutes  which  provide  for  competitive 
bidding,  has  no  right  to  desigiuite  the  product  of  one  manufac- 
turer as  that  which  must  be  furnished  in  the  performance  of  the 
contract-'*'  The  city  has  the  right  to  designate  the  product  of  one 
manufacturer  as  a  standard  to  which  the  material  furnished' un- 
der the  contract  must  conform.  Further  than  this  the  city  can- 
not go.  in  restricting  the  material  furnished  to  the  product  of 
one  manufacturer  where  several  are  able  to  furnish  the  same. 
The  existence  of  a  practical  local  monopoly  in  paving  material 
does  not  seem  to  invalidate  the  assessment  if  the  specifications 
do  not  undnly  restrict  the  nature  of  the  material  to  be  furnished. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  a  street  improveinent  contract  requires  the 
use  of  slag  and  on(^  person  has  acquired  a  monopoly  in  slag  and 


''^  Field    V.    Barbor    Asplmlt   Pavinfr  530,    8    L.    R.    A.    110.    13    S.    W.    ns 

Co.,    194   U.    S.   018,   4S   L.    1142.   24  lisno]. 

S.  784   [1904];    (modifying;.   117   Fed.  '"Swift    v.    City    of    St.    Loui>;.    ISO 

92.1   [19021):   Bar])er  Asphalt  Pavinj,'  Mo.  80.  79  S.  W.   172    [19041. 

Company    v.    Field.    188    Mo.    182.    80  "  Fishburn  v.  City  of  Cliioajro.   171 

S.  W.  8f)0   [190,51):   Swift  v.  City  of  111.   338.  03  Am.  St.    Rep.   230?  39  L. 

St.  Tx)nis.   180  Mo.  80.  79  S.  W.   172  ll.   A.  482.  49  X.   E.  532. 

[19041;   Verdiii  v.   City  of  St.   T.ouis.  '"Curtice  v.  Schmidt.  202  :Mo.  703. 

131   Mo.  20.  33  S.   W.  480.  30   S.  W.  101   S.  W.   01    [19071. 

52  [18951:  Warren  v.  Barber  Asphalt  "Cnrtiee  v.  Schmidt.  202  ;Mo.  703. 

PaviniT   Co..    11.5   Mo.    572.   22    S.    W.  101     S.     W.     01      [19071:     Taylor    v. 

490;    Barber    Asphalt    Pavincr    Co.    v.        Schroeder.  —  Mo.   App.  .   110  S. 

Hunt.   100  :M().   22,   18   Am.   St.   Rep.  W.  20   [1908]. 


§  516  .  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  804 

controls  its  price,  the  fact  that  such  person  is  the  exclusive 
bidder  at  such  street  improvement  contract  and  refuses  to  sell 
to  other  contractors  unless  they  would  agree  not  to  oppose  the  use 
of  slag  upon  streets,  does  not  make  a  defense  to  the  assessment 
unless  it  was  shovai  that  the  price  was  in  fact  unreason- 
able.-" Under  a  statute  providing  that  except  for  repairs, 
"no  patented  pavement  shall  be  laid  and  no  patented  ar- 
ticles advertised  for,  contracted  for  or  purchased,  excopt 
under  such  circumstances  that  there  can  be  a  fair  and  rea- 
sonable opportunity  for  competition,  the  conditions  to  secure 
which  shall  be  prescribed  by  the  board  of  estimate  and  appor- 
tionment," the  city  may  specify  patented  articles  if  competition 
is  secured,  and  it  may  secure  competition  by  giving  to  the  bid- 
ders a  choice  of  material.-^  In  recent  cases  courts  have  passed 
upon  contracts  for  specific  types  of  paving  material  in  which 
a  practical  monopoly  existed,  together  with  possibly  a  patent  on 
the  process  of  construction.  Such  contracts  have  ordinarily  been 
held  to  be  valid  and  asessments  levied  for  such  improvements  have 
been  upheld. -- 

§  516.     Covenant  for  maintenance  of  improvement — Effect  of  spe- 
cific statutory  provisions. 

Provisions  are  frequently  found  in  street  improvement  con- 
tracts or  in  some  cases  in  contracts  for  improvements  of  other 
types,  by  which  the  contractor  agrees  that  the  work  shall  be  in 
good  condition  at  the  end  of  a  certain  time  after  the  completion 
thereof.  The  validity  of  such  provisions  has  frequently  been  at- 
tacked both  upon  constitutional  and  statutory  grounds.  In  states 
in  which  it  is  held  that  the  legislature  cannot  authorize  the  levy  of 
an  assessment  for  repairs,  the  legislature  has  no  power  to  pro- 
vide for  assessments  for  repairs  by  including  them  in  a  contract 

="  Givins  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond,  bush,     104    Cal.     684,    38     Pac.    533 

194    111.    150,    88    Am.   St.    Rep.    143,  [1894];       Barber      Asphalt      Paving 

62  N.  E.  534   [19021.  Company    v.    Gogreve,    41    La.    Ann. 

=MVarren .  Brothers  Co.  v.  City  of  251,  5  So.  848  [1889];  Barber  As- 
New  York,  190  X.  Y.  297.  83  X.  E.  phalt  Paving  Company  v.  Field,  18S 
59   [1907].  Mo.  182,  86  S.  W.  860  [1905];  Swift 

-•=  Field    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,   180  Mo.  80,  70 

Co.,  194  r.  S.  618.  48  L.   1142.  24  S.  S.    W.    172    [1904]:    Barber    Asphalt 

784     [190-1]  ;      (modifvin...     117     Fed.  Paving  Co.  v.  Hunt,    100  Mo.  22,   18 

925    [1902]);   X.  P.  Perine  Contract-  Am.    St.    Rep.    530.    8    L.    R.    A.    110, 

ing  and  Paving  Company  v.  Quacken-  13  S.  W.  98   [1890]. 


805  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  ,  §  517 

for  original  construction,  and  if  the  legal  effect  of  such  contract 
is  to  provide  for  such  repairs,  it  must  in  such  jurisdictions  either 
be  invalid  liecause  not  authorized  hy  statute,  or  the  statute  au- 
thorizing it  must  be  unconstitutional.  In  either  case  such  pro- 
visions in  a  contract  render  it  invalid.^  Whether  provisions  of 
this  sort  will  be  upheld  or  not  is  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  to  be  a  question  purely  for  the  state  courts, 
no  federal  question  of  any  kind  being  involved.-  In  states  in 
which  the  legislature  has  power  to  authorize  assessments  for 
repairs  and  there  is  a  specific  statute  giving  to  a  city  power  to 
require  the  contractor  to  keep  the  improvement  in  repair  for 
such  period  of  time  as  they  see  fit,  a  contract  requiring  the  con- 
tractor to  keep  the  improvement  in  good  condition  and  repair  for 
ten  years  is  valid,  even  if  such  provision  enhances  the  cost  of 
such  improvement  and  even  if  the  terms  of  the  contract  extend 
beyond  a  guarantee  of  the  original  workmanship  and  material 
and  bind  a  contractor  to  make  repairs  for  injuries  or  deteriora- 
tion due  to  other  causes.-''  A  grant  of  authority  to. a  city  "to 
determine  what  work  shall  be  done  or  improvements  made,"  does 
not  confer  power  on  the  city  to  include  the  cost  of  repairs,  not 
arising  from  defective  w^ork  or  material,  in  an  assessment  for 
the  original  paving  of  a  street.*  Accordingly  a  provision  that 
the  contractor  would  keep  the  work  done  in  thorough  repair 
from  injury  by  traffic,  decomposition  and  decay  for  five  years  is 
invalid,  since  in  so  far  as  it  requires  repairs  not  occasioned  by 
mere  defective  work  and  material  it  imposes  an  additional  bur- 
den on  the  property  to  be  assessed  for  the  improvement."' 

§  517.     Covenant  for  maintenance  construed  as  guaranty. 

In  states  in  Avhicli  assessments  I'or  repairs  may  he  levied  with- 
out violating  the  constitution,  but  in  which  there  are  no  specific 
statutes  authorizing  provisions  for  maintenance  and  repairs  as  a 
part  of  the  contract  for  original  construction,  we  find  a  sharp  con- 
flict of  autliority  upon  the  (piestion  of  the  validity  of  such  provi- 
sions.   In  many  jurisdictions,  contracts  for  maintenance  and  repair 

'  See  §   373  ct  /trq.  *  Yoihvj:     v.     City     ..f    Tacoma,     31 

Trench  v.  Barber   Asphalt  Paviirjc  Wasli.  I.",;?.  71  P;,c.  ~A->  fin031. 
Co.,   ISl    U.   S.  324.  45  L.  S-0.  21    S.  •' Youiiir     v.     (  ity     of     Taeoma.     31 

625  [19011.  Wash.  153,  71  Pac.  742  [1903]. 

'La  Veine  v.  City  of  Kansas  City. 
67  Kan.  239,  72  Pac.  774  [1903]. 


S517 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


806 


are  construed  as  in  effect  guarantees  of  the  workmanship  and 
material  of  the  original  construction,  and  hence  as  valid. ^  If  this 
theory  is  correct,  the  contention  of  these  courts  that  such  provi- 
sion does  not  enhance  the  cost  of  the  improvement,  since  it  is 
equivalent  to  a  guaranty  that  the  contractor  will  perform  his 
contract  according  to  the  terms  thereof,  is  correct.-  This  view 
has  been  entertained  both  where  the  city  has  authority  to  levy 
assessments  for  repairs,^  and  where  by  statute  it  is  provided  that 
the  cost  of  repairs  must  be  paid  out  of  the  general  treasury.* 
Where  a  contract  is  thus  construed  the  contractor  is  held  liable 
for   deterioration    or   injury   to   the   property   due   to    defective 


1  Halsey  v.  Town  of  Lake  View,  188 
111.  540,  59  N.  E.  234  [1901];  Gra- 
ham V.  City  of  Chicago,  187  111.  411, 
58  N.  E.  393  [1900];  Latham  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Wilmette,  168  111.  153,  48  N. 
E.  311  [1897];  Cole  v.  People,  161 
111.  16,  43  N.  E.  607  [1896];  Shank 
V.  Smith,  157  Ind.  401,  55  L.  R.  A. 
564,  61  N.  E.  932  [1901];  Allen  v. 
City  of  Davenport,  107  la.  90,  77  N. 
W.  532  [1898];  City  of  Kansas  City 
V.  Hanson,  60  Kan.  833,  58  Pac.  474 
[1899];  (reversing  City  of  Kansas 
City  V.  Hanson,  8  Kans.  App.  290, 
55  Pac.  513  [1898]);  City  of  Cov- 
ington V.  Dressman,  6  Bush.  (69  Ky.) 
210  [1869];  City  of  Louisville*  v. 
Henderson,  5  Bush.  (68  Ky. )  515 
[1869];  Bacas  v.  Adler,  112  La.  806. 
36  So.  739  [1904];  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Company  v.  French,  158  Mo. 
534,  54  L.  R.  A.  492,  58  S.  W.  934 
[1900];  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co. 
V.  Hezel,  155  Mo.  391,  48  L.  R.  A, 
285,  56  S.  W.  449  [1899];  Seaboard 
National  Bank  of  New  York  v.  Woes- 
ten,  147  Mo.  467,  48  L.  R.  A.  279, 
48  S.  W.  939  [1898];  Morse  v.  City 
of  West  Port,  110  Mo.  502,  19  S.  W. 
831  [1892];  St.  Louis  Quarry  and 
Construction  Company  v.  Frost,  90 
Mo.  App.  677  [1901];  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Company  v.  Hezel,  76  Mo. 
App.  135  [1898];  (affirmed.  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Hezel,  155 
Mo.  391,  48  L.  R.  A.  285,  56  S.  W. 
449  [1899]);  Wilson  v.  Inhabitants 
of  tne  City  of  Trenton,  61   N.  J.  L. 


(32  Vr.)  599,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  714, 
44  L.  R.  A.  540,  40  Atl.  575  [1898]  ; 
City  of  Schenectady  v.  Trustees  of 
Union  College,  66  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  179, 
21  N.  Y.  Supp.  147  [1892];  Hastings 
V.  Columbus,  42  0.  S.  585  [1885]; 
McGlynn  v.  City  of  Toledo,  22  Ohio 
C.  C.  34  [1901];  Philadelphia  to  Use 
v.  Pemberton,  208  Pa.  St.  214,  57 
Atl.  516  [1904];  (affirming,  Phila- 
delphia to  Use  V.  Pemberton,  25  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  323  [1904].  It  has  been 
said  of  such  a  provision:  "It  is  re- 
garded as  simply  a  guaranty  of  the 
qviality  of  the  work  contracted  to 
be  done  and  does  not  render  the  con- 
tract void,  as  increasing  the  bur- 
den of  abutting  owners  by  requiring 
them  to  pay  for  keeping  the  pave- 
ment in  repair  for  the  period  of  five 
years  after  its  completion.  It  is  an 
incident  of  the  contract — not  an  in- 
dependent undertaking."  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Watt,  51  La. 
Ann.  1345,  1352,  1353,  26  So.  70, 
(quoted  in  Bacas  v.  Adler,  112  La. 
806,  815,  36  So.  739   [1904]). 

^  Seaboard  National  Bank  of  New 
York  V.  -Woesten,  147  Mo.  467,  48 
L.  R.  A.   279,  48   S.  W.  939    [1898]. 

'Morse  v.  City  of  West  Port,  110 
Mo.  502,  19  S.  W.  831   [1892]. 

*  Seaboard  National  Bank  of  New 
York  V.  Woesten,  147  Mo.  467,  48 
L.  R.  A.  279,  48  S.  W.  939  [1898]; 
St.  Louis  Quarry  and  Constructing 
Company  v.  Frost,  90  Mo.  App.  677 
[1901]. 


807  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  518 

work  and  material  and  not  for  injuries  due  to  other  causes. '"^ 
Thus,  under  such  a  contract  it  was  held  that  the  contractor  was 
not  liable  to  repair  the  streets  if  they  were  injured  by  the  burst- 
ing of  a  water  main  with  the  construction  and  laying  of  which 
the  contractor  had  had  nothing  to  do."  Accordingly,  if  the  con- 
tractor did  repair  the  streets  under  such  circumstances,  he  was 
regarded  as  a  mere  volunteer  and  could  not  recover  from  the  city 
even  if  the  loss  was  due  to  the  city's  negligence-' 

§  518.     Illustrations  of  covenants  for  maintenance  construed  as 
gnaranties. 

Whether  a  contract  is  one  for  the  guaranty  of  materials  and 
workmanship,  or  whether  it  is  one  for  making  repairs  for  de- 
terioration due  to  any  cause,  depends  upon  the  language  used 
in  the  contract  taken  in  connection  with  the  nature  of  the  im- 
provement. The  term  of  years  for  which  the  work  is  to  be  kept 
up,  in  connection  with  the  nature  of  the  improvement,  may  be 
material  in  determining  the  intention  of  the  parties.  The  con- 
tract which  is  to  be  one  of  guaranty  often  suggests  by. its  terms 
that  it  is  really  intended  as  a  contract  of  guaranty.  Thus,  a 
contract  which  provided  that  the  improvement  should  be  so  per- 
fectly made  that  it  would  remain  in  good  repair  for  seven 
years.^  or  one  which  provided  that  the  contractor  should  make 
all  repairs  for  a  period  of  seven  years  that  should  become  neces- 
sary as  a  result  of  unskillful  construction  or  uiisuitable  material 
and  that  a  certain  per  cent,  of  the  contract  price  should  be  re- 
tained as  a  guaranty  fund  for  such  repairs.-  or  tliat  the  work 
should  be  done  in  so  substantial  a  manner  tliat  no  repairs  should 
be  required  for  tive  years  after  its  completion  and  that  in  case 
repairs  becam(>  necessai'y  during  that  time  the  contractor  would 
make  them  without  charge.''  or  that  the  contractor  would  guar- 
antee the  durability  of  the  pavement  for  five  years,^  or  that  the 

"City   of    Kansas    City    v.    Hanson.  'Slmnk   v.  Smith.    157   Ind.  401.  n5 

60   Kan.   833,   58   Pac.   474    1189!)!.  L.  K.  A.  r)(;4.  til   X.  E.  932   [1901  |. 

'Green  River   Asphalt  Company   v.  '' City    of    Schcneetady    v.    Trustees 

City  of  St.  Lemis,  188  Mo.  57(1.  87  S.  of    I'nion    Collejie.    (ii,    Ihni.    179.    21 

W.  985    [19051.  N.  V.  Rupp.   147   [18921. 

'dreen  River   Asplialt   ('omi)any  v.  MVilson  v.  Inhabitants  of  the  City 

City   of    St.    Lcmis.    ISS    Mo.    57(),    87  of  Trenton,  (51  X.  J.  L.   ( .S2  Vr.)   599, 

S.   W.   985    [19051.  ti8    Am.    St.    Rep.    714.    44    L.    R.    A. 

'  Hnstin-.'s    v.    Columl)Us.    42    O.    S.  540.   40   Atl.   575    [1898[. 
585   11885]. 


•  §  518  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  808 

contractor  would  replace  defective  work  at  any  time  within  two 
years  and  that  if  he  failed  to  do  so,  the  city  might  replace  it  and 
recover  the  expense  from  himself  and  his  bondsmen,'^'  has  in  each 
ease  been  held  to  be  a  contract  guaranteeing  materials  and  work- 
manship of  the  original  construction,  The  meaning  thus  given 
to  the  foregoing  contracts  is  probably  in  accordance  with  the 
actual  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  contract.  Contracts  have, 
however,  been  construed  as  contracts  guaranteeing  materials  and 
workmanship  where  the  language  used  by  the  parties  was  sug- 
gestive rather  of  an  intention  to  bind  the  contractor  to  repair 
in  all  cases.  Thus,  a  guaranty  for  maintenance  and  repair,"  or 
a  contract  to  maintain  the  pavement  for  ten  years,"  it  not  ap- 
pearing that  the  cost  of  the  improvement  was  increased  by  such 
provision,"*  or  a  contract  to  maintain  the  street  for  a  period  of 
nine  years,"  or  an  agreement  that  the  contractor  will  keep  the 
pavement  in  repair  for  five  years  where  it  appears  that  the  pave- 
ment, if  laid  in  accordance  with  the  specifications,  would  last  five 
years  without  repairs,^"  or  a  provision  that  the  contractor  should 
keep  the  street  in  repair  for  a  period  of  five  years  after  it  was 
finished  and  that  ten  per  cent,  of  the  contract  price  should  be 
withheld  in  order  to  enforce  such  completion  and  repair,"  or  a 
provision  binding  the "  contractor  to  maintain  and  repair  the 
street  for  five  years, ^-  or  a  provision  that  tiie  contractor  shall 
keep  the  street  in  repair  for  two  years  free  of  charge,^''  or  a 
provision  that  the  contractor  shall  "keep  in  good  order  and  re- 
pair at  his  own  proper  cost  and  expense  all  the  work  herein 
specified   for  the   space   of  one  year,  "^*   or  that   the   contractor 

^  Allen   V.   City   of   Davenport.    107  [1904];     (amrming    Philadelphia    to 

la.  90,  77  N.  W.  532   [1898].  Use  v.  Pemberton,  25  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 

« Graham   v.   City   of   Chicago,    187  323   [1904]). 

111.  411,  58  N.  E.  393  [1900].  '^  McGlynn    v.    City    of    Toledo,    22 

'Morse  v.  City  of  West  Port.   110  Ohio   C.   C.   34    [1901]. 

Mo.  502,  19  S.  W.  831   [1892].  '-Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company 

*  Seaboard   National    Bank   of   New  v.   French,   158  Mo.  534,  54  L.  R.  A. 

York  V.  Woesten,   147  Mo.  467.  48  L.  492,  58  S.  W.  934  [1900]. 

R.  A.  279,  48  S.  W.  939   [1898].  "Latham    v.    Village    of   Wilmette, 

» Barber   Asphalt  Paving  Company  168    111.    153,   48   N.   E.   311    [1897]; 

V.   Hezel,   76   Mo.   App.    135    [1898];  (The  cost   of  repairs  not  being  con- 

( affirmed    in   Barber   Asphalt   Paving  sidered  by  the  commissioners  in  mak- 

Company    v.    Hezel,    155  Mo.   391,   48  ing  the  assessment.) 

L.  R.  A.  285,  56  S.  W.  449   [1900].  "City    of    Covington    v.    Dressman, 

'"Philadelphia    to    Use   v.    Pember-  6  Bush.    (69  Kv.)    210   [1869]. 
ton,    208    Pa.    St.    214,    57    Atl.    516 


11 


809  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  519 

shall  keep  his  work  in  repair  for  one  year/"'  or  a  provision  that 
the  contractor  shall  keep  the  work  in  repair  for  six  months," 
has  each  been  regarded  as  in  effect  a  contract  guaranteeing  the 
materials  and  workmanship  of  the  original  improvement,  although 
the  language  used  suggests  rather  a  contract  for  making  repairs 
due  to  any  cause  whatever.  So  a  provision  in  a  contract  for  a 
system  of  street  lighting  that  the  contractor  should  guarantee 
the  cable  system  for  five  years  and  that  it  should  stand  a  certain 
test  at  the  end  of  that  time  was  held  to  be  valid  and  not  to 
avoid  the  assessment  therefor.^' 

§  519.  Covenant  for  maintenance  construed  as  covenant  to  repair. 
In  other  jurisdictions  contracts  which  by  their  terms  are  much 
like  contracts  of  the  type  already  discussed  are  regarded  as  in 
effect  contracts  for  making  repairs  in  the  future  for  deteriora- 
tion due  to  any  cause  and  are  held  to  be  invalid.^  Such  provi- 
sions have  been  held  invalid  even  where  the  city  has  by  statute 
power  to  make  repairs  and  to  levy  assessments  therefor."  In 
these  jurisictions  power  to  make  repairs  is  construed  as  power 
to  make  repairs  which  in  the  judgment  of  the  city  are  then  neces- 
sary and  not  power  to  collect  in  advance  a  fund  to  be  used  at 
some  indefinite  time  in  the  future  for  the  repair  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  improvement.'^  Thus,  a  provision  that  the  contractor 
shall   give   a    bond   with    sureties   conditioned   "for   keeping    the 

"St.  L{)uis  Quarry  and  Construct-  20  Ky.  Law  Rep.  519,  4G  S.  W.  722 

ing  Company   v.   Frost,  00   Mo.   App.  [1898];     Fehler    v.    Gosnell,    99    Ky. 

677   [1901]."  380,  35  S.  W.  1125   [1890];   State  ex 

'°  City   of  Louisville   v.   Henderson,  rel.    Wheeler    v.    District    Court    of 

5  Bush.    (68  Ky.)    515   [18G9].  Ramsey  County,  80  :\Iinn.  293,  83  N. 

"Halsey    v.    Town    of    Lake    View.  W.  183  [1900|;   Portland  v.  Bitumin- 

188  111.  540,  59  N.   E.  234    [1901].  ous  Paving  Co..  33  Ore.  307,  72  Am. 

^City    Council    of    Montgomery    v.  St.    Rep.    713,    44    L.    R.    A.    527,    52 

Barnett,    —    Ala.    ,    43    So".    92  Pac.  28  [1898]  ;  Boyd  v.  City  of  Mil- 

[1907];        Alameda        Macadamizing  waukee.   92   Wis.   450,   06   N.   W.   603 

Co.  V.  Pringle,   130  Cal.  226.  80  Am.  11896];    Young    v.    City    of    Tacoma. 

St.   Rep.    124,    52    L.    R.    A.    264.    62  31    Wash.    153.   71    Pac.    742    [1903]; 

Pac.    394    [1900];     Brown    v.    Jenks.  McAllister     v.     City     of     Tacoma,     9 

98  Cal.   10,  32  Pac.  701    [1893];   Ex-  Wash.  272.  37  Pac!  658,  447    [1894]. 

celsior   Paving   Co.    v.    T^ach    (Cal.)  ^Portland    v.    Bituminous    Paving 

34  Pac.  110;   Barfield  v.  Gleason.  Ill  Co.,  33  Ore.  307.  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  713. 

Ky.  491,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.   128.  63  S.  44  L.  R.   A.  527.  .'52  Pac.  28    [1898]. 

W.    964    [1901];    City    of    Louisville  'State  ex   rel.   Wheeler  v.  District 

V.    Selva?e.    106    Kv.    730.    51    S.    W.  Court   of    Ramsey    Countv.    80    :\riini. 

447,    52    S.    W.    son    [18991;    Gosnell  293,  83  X.  W.    183    [1900]. 
V.    Citv    of    Louisville,    104    Kv.    201. 


§  519  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  810 

streets  so  improved  in  thorough  repair  for  the  term  of  five  years 
from  the  completion  of  the  contract, "  *  or  a  guaranty  that  the 
contractor  will  keep  the  improvement  in  repair  for  five  years  and 
that  it  will  deposit  bonds  equal  to  ten  per  cent,  of  the  contract 
price  as  a  guaranty  of  the  performance  of  the  same,^  or  a  pro- 
vision that  the  contractor  shall  keep  the  improvement  in  good 
order  and  repair  for  five  years  after  its  completion  and  guar- 
antee that  during  that  period  neither  the  city  nor  the  property 
owners  shall  be  at  any  expense  for  any  repairs  made  neces- 
sary by  defective  workmanship  or  material  or  by  any  other  rea- 
son except  cutting  through  the  pavement  in  order  to  lay  pipes," 
or  a  provision  that  the  contractor  shall  give  bond  guaranteeing 
the  work  for  one  year  from  injur.y  by  ordinary  use,"  has  in  each 
case  been  regarded  as  a  provision  requiring  the  contractor  to 
make  ordinary  repairs  and  hence  is  invalid.  If  the  city  has  no 
authority  to  levy  an  assessment  for  repairs,  provisions  in  a  con- 
tract for  original  construction  requiring  the  contractor  to  make 
ordinary  repairs  are,  of  course,  invalid.^  Such  a  provision  in  a 
contract  is  said  to  increase  the  cost  thereof  and  to  cast  an  extra 
burden  upon  the  owners  of  property  which  is  assessed  for  the 
original  construction."  The  same  rule  applies  where  repairs  are 
to  be  assessed  on  property  owners  different  from  those  on  whom 
the  original  cost  of  construction  is  to  be  assessed.^ '  Where  the 
increase  in  cost  due  to  the  unauthorized  provision  for  future 
repairs  can  be  separated  from  the  cost  of  original  construction, 
it  is  said  that  an  assessment  based  upon  such  a  contract  may  be 
upheld  after  deducting  such  increase."  Thus,  wdiere  the  con- 
tract provides  for  the  deposit  of  bonds  amounting  to  ten  per  cent, 
of  the  contract  price  as  a  guaranty  for  the  performance  of  this 

'Brown    v.    Jenks,    08    C'al.    10.    32  Teliler  v.  Gosnell,  9!)  Ky.  380.  3.3 

Pac.  701   [1893].  S.  VV.   1125   [1896]. 

^Fehler  v.  Gosnell,  99  Ky.  380,  35  '"Brown   v.   Jenks,   98   Cal.    10,   32 

S.  W.  1125  [1896].                "  Pac.  701    [1893]. 

"Boyd    V.    City    of    Milwaukee.    92  "  Barfield  v.  Gleason,   111   Ky.  491, 

Wis.  456,  66  X."  W.  603   [1890].  63  S.  W.  984,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.   128 

"Alameda  Macadamizing   Company  [1901];     City    of    Louisville    v.    Sel- 

V.  Prinsle.   130   Cal.  226,  80  Am.  St.  vage,   106  Ky.  730,  51   S.  W.  447,  52 

Rep.    124.   52   L.   R.    A.   264.   62   Pac.  S.    W.    809    [1899];    Williamsport   v. 

394  [1900].  Hun-hes.     21      Pa.      Super.     Ct.     443 

"Fehler  v.  Gosnell  99  Ky.  380.  35  [1902];  Young  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  31 

S.  W.   1125    [1896];    Bnyd  v.   City  of  Wash.   153.  71  Pac.  742   [1903]. 
Milwaukee,    92    Wis.    456.    66    N.    W. 
603   [1896]. 


tt 


811  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  519 

provision/^  or  provides  for  withholding  ten  per  cent,  of  the  con- 
tract price  as  a  guaranty  for  the  performance  of  such  provision, 
such  amount  may  l)e  deducted  from  the  amount  of  the  assess- 
ment and  the  rest  of  such  assessment  may  be  enforced. ^^  It  has 
been  held  that  the  court  may  determine  from  the  evidence  the 
amount  of  increased  cost  of  the  improvement  due  to  the  covenant 
to  repair,  even  if  the  contract  is  an  entire  contract  for  a  gross 
sum."  In  Missouri  the  view  was  originally  expressed  that  pro- 
visions of  this  sort  amounted  to  a  contract  for  repairs  and  were 
invalid.^'"'  Subsequently,  however,  a  different  view  has  been  en- 
tertained and  contracts  of  this  sort  are  construed  as  contracts 
for  the  guaranty  of  materials  and  workmanship.  In  Louisiana, 
while  it  has  been  conceded  that  the  recent  tendency  of  the  courts 
is  to  regard  contracts  for  maintenance  as  merely  contracts  for 
repairs  and  not  contracts  for  guaranteeing  workmanship  and  ma- 
terial, yet  it  was  said  that  this  view  had  developed  since  the  con- 
tract in  question  was  made  and  that  the  contract  would  be  held 
valid  in  accordance  with  the  view  prevailing  when  it  was  en- 
tered into."  In  some  jurisdictions  the  validity  of  a  clause  for 
maintenance  cannot  be  attacked  successfully  after  the  improve- 
ment has  been  constructed.^''  This  holding,  however,  is  based 
on  the  assumption  that  if  the  contract  is  entire,  it  is  impossible 
to  sever  the  part  of  the  expense  due  to  the  contract  for  mainte- 
nance from  that  due  to  the  contract  for  original  construction. 
A  different  view  prevails  where  such  separation  is  regarded  as 
possible. ^^  In  a  recent  Alal)ama  ease  the  validity  of  a  contract 
for  maintenance  was  questioned  but  not  finally  passed  upon.  The 
advertisement  called  for  a  contract  for  construction  and  ten  years' 
maintenance.  The  contract  as  let  re(|uired  construction  and  oidy 
two  years  maintcsinne'.     It  was  lield  that  under  such  advci-tise- 

'^'Barfield  v.  Gleason,   111   Ky.  491,  '"  Bacas   v.   Adlor.    112   La.   80G.   30 

23  Ky.  Law    Rop.    128.  03   S.  W.  iXU  So.   739    [1904]. 

[1901].  "Fisher  v.  (»eorp:ia   \'itririo(l   Brick 

''City  of  Louisville  v.  Selvajje,  lfl(i  and   (lay  Company,    121   Ga.   621,  49 

Ky.  730,  51  S.  W.  447,  52  S.  W.  809  S.  1^.  679  [19051;  Baeas  v.  Adler,  112 

[18991.  \a.   806,   36   S<}.    739    |  1904]  :    Barber 

"Fair    TTavon    and    W'ostvillo    Rail-  .\s]dialt    Pavinj;    Coni])aiiy    v.    Watt, 

road  Company  v.  City  of  New  Haven.  51   La.  Ann.  135.  26  8o.  73   |  1899]. 

77  Conn.   667,  60  Atl.   651    [1905].  ^^  Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad 

"Verdin   v.  City  of  St.   Lmiis.    131  (  .oni])any   v.   City  of  Xew   Haven,   77 

Afo.   26,   33  S.    W.   4S0.   36   S.   W.   52  (  onn.   667.  60  All.  051    [1905];    City 

[1895].       For    t!ie    present    view    see  of  Louisville  v.  Selvage.  106  Ky.  730, 

§    5 US.  51    S.  W.   447.  52   S.   \V.   809    [1899]. 


§  520  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  812 

ment  such  a  contract  could  not  be  let,  as  it  was  impossible  to 
determine  who  the  lowest  bidder  was."  If  a  method  is  provided 
by  statute  for  objecting  to  such  unlawful  increase  in  cost,  such 
statutory  method  must  be  taken  advantage  of,  or  it  is  held  to 
be  waived.-"  The  fact  that  the  cost  of  keeping  a  street  in  repair 
for  five  years  from  its  completion  is  included  in  the  assessment 
does  not  make  it  so  void  as  to  subject  it  to  collateral  attack.^^ 
The  fact  that  a  provision  requiring  the  original  contractor  to 
keep  the  improvement  in  repair  for  ten  years  is  a  part  of  the 
original  contract,  does  not  relieve  the  property  owners  who  are 
by  statute  liable  to  assessment  for  repairs  from  liability  for 
such  assessment  if  the  original  contractor  becomes  insolvent  and 
is  unable  to  perform  such  contract.^^  If  a  street  railway  com- 
pany is  bound  to  pave  and  keep  in  repair  the  part  of  the  street 
on  which  its  tracks  are  laid  and  a  space  of  two  feet  on  each  side 
of  the  tracks,  such  railway  company  cannot  be  assessed  for  the 
increased  cost  of  a  street  improvement  due  to  a  provision  in  the 
contract  for  keeping  it  in  repair  for  ten  years  if  the  contract  and 
bond  are  so  drawn  that  the  railroad  company  could  not  enforce 
such  provision.-^ 

§  520.    Restrictions  on  contract  price. 

There  is  no  constitutional  provision  found  in  most  state  con- 
stitutions which  requires  the  legislature  to  place  a  restriction  upon 
the  price  to  be  paid  by  the  city  for  a  given  public  improvement.^  If 
no  limitation  is  imposed  by  statute  the  courts  have  no  power  to 
restrict  the  action  of  the  city  in  determining  the  character  of 
the  improvement  or  the  price  to  be  paid  as  long  as  no  fraud 
is  shown  to  exist.-     Accordingly,  the  fact  that  the  public  cor- 


"  C  ity    Council    of    Montgomery    v.  pany  v.  City  of  New  Haven,  77  Conn. 

Barnett,    —    Ala.    ,    43    So!    92  219,  58  Atl.  703   [1904].      (The  rail- 

[1907].  way   company   remains   liable    on   its 

'°  Alexander  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  35  original     obligation     to     repair,    the 

Wash.  360,  77  Pac.  680   [1904].  street  and  gets  no  benefit  from  this 

^Alexander  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  35  provision  in  the  contract.) 
Wash.  300,  77  Pac.  686  [1904].  ^  Rogers   v.    City    of    St.    Paul.    22 

=^  State  ex  rel.  Woulfe  v.  St.  Paul,  Minn.  494   [1870]. 
107  La.  777,  32  So.  88   [1902].  Palmer   v.    City   of   Danville.    166 

^Tair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad  111.  42,  46  N.  E.  629   [1897];   Rogers 

Company  v.   City   of  New   Haven,   77  v.    City    of    St.    Paul,    22    IMinn.    494 

Conn.  607,  60  Atl.  051    [1905];    Fair  [1876]';  Hill  v.  Swingley.  159  Mo.  45, 

Haven    &    Westville    Railroad    Com-  60  S.  W.  114  ['1900]. 


I 


813  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  521 

poration  ordered  the  improvement  to  be  made  at  a  time  of  tht- 
year  when  it  would  cost  more  than  at  other  seasons  does  not 
invalidate  the  assessment.'^  If  by  statute  a  limit  is  placed  upon 
the  amount  which  may  be  expended  for  public  improvement 
such  statute  must  be  obeyed.*  Under  a  statute  fixing  the  limit 
of  the  amount  which  may  be  paid  for  a  park  the  net  amount  of 
damasres  less  benefits  and  not  the  ofross  amount  of  dama^jes  with- 
out dediictins:  benefits  is  to  be  used  in  determiniufj  the  amount 
paid.^  The  contract  price  may  be  limited  to  the  amount  of  the 
estimate  prepared  in  advance.^  A  contract  for  paving  not  per- 
formed within  the  time  fixed  by  ordinance  became  voidable  at 
the  expiration  of  such  time,  and  if  revived  by  the  city  several 
years  later  with  the  consent  of  the  contractor,  is  subject  to  an 
ordinance  passed  in  the  meantime  restricting  the  cost  of  paving 
to  a  certain  maximum  price  per  square  yard.'^ 

§521.  Option  to  property  ovraers  to  do  work  or  to  select  con- 
tractor or  materials. 
Statutes  frequently  provide  that  the  property  owners  must  be 
given  an  opportunity  to  do  the  work  themselves  before  the  city 
has  power  to  provide  for  the  construction  of  given  improvements 
at  the  expense  of  the  property  owners.  Such  statutes  are  held 
to  be  valid,  since  the  notice  to  the  property  owners  and  the 
opportunity  to  be  heard  as  to  the  amount  of  the  assessment  con- 
stitute due  process  of  law.^  The  prescribed  notice  to  the  prop- 
erty owners,  and  an  opportunity  to  them  to  do  the  work  must 
be  given  to  make  further  proceedings  valid.-  Under  a  statute 
providing  that  the  property  owner  may  construct  a  sidewalk  in 
front  of  his  property  and  thereby  relieve  it  from  assessment,  a 
notice  requiring  property  owners  to  construct  the  sidewalks  m 
front  of  their  lots,  and  stating  that  if  they  construct  such  side- 
walks their  property  will  ])e  relieved  from  all  assessment  except 

'Pliiladelphia  to  use  v.  Evans,  13!>  '  Pliila<loli)liia  to  use  v.  .Tewell,  13.3 

Pa.  St.  483,  21  Atl.  200  [18911.  Pa.  St.  3-29.  19  Atl.  947   [1890]. 

*  Andrews    v.   People    ox    rol.    Rum-  '  Heath  v.  Manson,  147  Cal.  694,  82 

sey,   84   111.   28    [1!=^76];    Philadolpliia  Pac.  331    [190,5];  Dyer  v.  Woods,  IttB 

to' use  V.  Jewell,  135  Pa.  St.  329.  19  Ind.   44.   7()   X.   E.   624    [1900];    Bor- 

Atl.  947    [1890].  'ni.^li    of    P.eltzhoover    v.    Maple,    130 

"Andrews  v.  People  ex  rel.  Runisey.  Pa.  St.  335,  18  Atl.  650  [1S89]. 

84  111.  28  [1870].  -Pork  v.  Smith,  55  Wis.  67,  12  N. 

•Ireland   v.   City   of   Rochester,   51  W.    408    [1882];    See    §    52    et    seq.. 

Barb.    (X.  Y.)    414    [18()8].  §   737. 


§  521  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  814 

their  respective  proportionate  shares  of  the  cost  of  intersections 
is  not  sufficient,  since  by  reason  of  such  construction  the  prop- 
erty is  relieved  from  all  assessment.^  If  a  short  time  is  given 
to  the  property  owner  in  which  to  repair  a  sidewalk  and  such 
owner  begins  such  repair  within  the  time  limited  and  the  work 
is  prosecuted  in  good  faith,  the  fact  that  it  is  not  entirely  com- 
pleted at  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  does  not  empower  the 
city  to  have  such  work  done  again  at  the  cost  of  the  property 
owner.*  On  the  other  hand  the  fact  that  the  property  owner  has 
begun  the  work  does  not  relieve  him  from  assessment  unless  it 
is  shown  that  he  has  substantially  complied  with  the  require- 
ments of  the  ordinance.^  If  a  short  time  is  given  to  the  property 
owner  in  which  to  do  the  work  and  the  city  has  required  such 
amount  of  work  to  be  done  in  a  short  time  and  the  available 
working  force  in  that  locality  is  insufficient  to  do  the  work  within 
the  time  limited,  and  the  property  owner  is  accordingly  unable  to 
do  the  work  within  the  time  limited,  it  has  been  held  to  be  fraudu- 
lent for  the  city  to  let  contracts  for  such  work.'"'  Where  a  contract 
is  let  within  the  time  in  which  the  owner  may  do  the  work  himself, 
it  has  been  held  that  such  contract  and  the  assessment  based 
thereon  are  nevertheless  valid  where  the  contractor  does  not 
begin  performance  until  after  the  time  lin'iit  has  expired  and  the 
owner  has  made  no  effort  to  construct  the  improvement  within 
such  time  limit."  lender  such  statute  it  is  not  necessary  for  the 
property  owners  to  aver  that  the  city  surveyor  gave  to  them 
the  certificate  of  the  completion  of  their  work  required  by  law.** 
Under  other  statutes  it  is  provided  that  after  the  improvement 
is  determined  upon,  a  certain  number  of  the  property  owners, 
usually  either  a  majority  or  three-fourths  of  them,  may  elect  to 
do  the  work   themselves."     Under  such   statutes   it   is   held  that 

'  City  of  Chicago  v.  Burkhardt.  22.3  for   the   performance,   such   time  was 

111.  297,  79  N.  E.  82  [1906].  subsequently   extended    for    almost   a 

*  Heman    v.    St.    Louis    Merchants'  year. ) 

Land  Improvement  Company,  75  Mo.  '  City    of    Galveston    v.    Heard,    54 

App.  372   [1898].  Tex.   420    [1881]. 

^  Shrum  v.  Town  of  Salem,  13  Ind.  *  Barber    v.    Board    of    Supervisors 

App.  115,  ,39  N.  E.  1050  [1895].  of  the  City  and  County  of  San  Fran- 

«Foote    V.    City    of    Milwaukee,    18  cisco,  42  Cal.  631   [1872]. 

Wis.    270    [1864].       (Additional    and  "German    Savings   &   Loan    Society 

possible  controlling  facts  in  this  case  v.  Ramish.  138  Cal.   120,  69  Pac.  89, 

were    that    the    work    was    let    at    an  70  Pac.   1067    [1902];   California  Im- 

exorbitant    price,    and    that    while    a  provement     Company     v.     Quinchard, 

short  time  was  fixed  in  the  contract  119  Cal.  87,  51   Pac.  24   [1897];   Ca- 


815  THE  IMPROVEMENT  CONTRACT.  §  521 

public  officers  have  no  power  to  let  a  contract  for  such  improve- 
ment within  the  time  thus  limited.^"  A  contract  let  within  such 
time  is  void  and  cannot  be  the  basis  of  a  valid  assessment.^ ^  This 
holding  is  based  on  the  theory  that  the  city  officials  have  no 
jurisdiction  to  let  the  contract  until  the  time  thus  limited  has 
expired.'-  Such  a  statute  is  not  repealed  bj^  a  subsetiuent  statute 
declaring  a  contract  between  the  city  and  an  officer  thereof  void.'"' 
The  court  in  this  case  expressed  a  doubt  whether  there  was  any 
inconsistency  between  the  two  statutes  and  held  that  if  there 
was  any  inconsistencj^  the  second  statute  repealed  the  first  only 
if  a  city  official  was  one  of  the  majority  of  the  property  owners 
who  elected  to  do  the  work.'*  Where  a  small  street  terminates 
in  an  open  street  and  by  statute  the  owners  of  such  street  are 
held  to  be  assessed  in  part  for  the  improvement  of  the  principal 
street,  the  term  "majority  of  the  owners"  has  been  held  to  mean 
the  owners  of  the  greater  part  of  the  frontage  on  the  principal 
street.''*  Under  such  statutes  a  contract  between  three-fourths 
of  the  property  owners  who  waive  their  right  to  take  the  con- 
tract and  agree  with  the  contractor  for  a  reduced  rate  for  the 
work  to  be  done  and  for  a  corresponding  credit  upon  their  as- 
sessment is  held  not  to  be  fraudulent,  at  least  if  the  other  prop- 
erty owners  have  the  privilege  of  entering  into  such  arrange- 
ment.^* By  statute  the  property  owners  may  have  the  right  to 
select  the  material  to  be  used  in  the  improvement.'^  If  the  stat- 
ute requires  notice  to  be  given  to  the  property  owners  in  order 
to  enable  them  to  make  such  selection,  such  notice  must  be  given.'^ 


pron    V.    Ilitchcnck.    08    Cal.    427,    33  '^  Capron  v.  Hitc-hcock,  98  Cal.  427, 

Pac.    431     [1893];    Mannin<r    v.    Den,  33   Pac.   431    [1S()3|. 

90    Cal.    610,    27    Pac.    435     [18911;  "  Capron  v.  Hitchcock,  98  Cal.  427, 

Burke  v.  Turney.  54  Cal.  480  [18801;  33   Pac.  431    [1893]. 

Betts  V.   City  of  Xaperville,   214   111.  "Cochran    v.    Collins.    29    Cal.    130 

380,   73   N.   E.   752    [19051.  [18(551. 

"'California     Inipiovemont     Co.     v.  '*  German   Savinfrs   &    Loan   Society 

Quinchard,    119    Cal.    87,    51    Pac.   24  v.  Ramish,   138  Cal.    120.  (19   Pac.  89. 

[18971;  Manninji  v.  Den.  90  Cal.  GIO.  70   Pac.    1067    [19021. 

27   Pac.   435    [18911.  "Eddy  v.  City  of  Omalia.   '72   Xeh. 

"California     Improvcnicnt     Co.     v.  550.    101    X.   W.  25    |  19041  ;    modified 

Quinchard.    119    Cal.    87.    51    Pac.   24  on    n-hearin-,'.    102    X.    W.    70,    103   X\ 

[18971:  :Mannin,Lr  v.  Don.  90  Cal.  filO.  W.    092    [19051. 

27  Pac.  435  [18911:  P.nrkc  v.  Turney,  "Eddy  v.   City   of  Omaha.  72  Xeb. 

54  Cal.  480   [1880].                                "  550,    101    X.   W.   25    [19041:    modified 

'-Purke    V.    Turney.    54     Cal.    480  on   rehearinir.   102   X.   \V.  70;    103  N. 

[18801.                            "  \V.    092    [19051. 


§  521  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  816 

If  the  notice  is  waived  by  the  property  owners  the  facts  consti- 
tuting a  waiver  must  be  shown/^  If  the  statute  does  not  pro- 
vide for  notice  to  the  propert}^  owners  to  enable  them  to  select 
the  material,  it  is  said  that  the  property  owners  should  take  the 
initiative  within  a  reasonable  time  and  should  communicate  their 
choice  to  the  proper  city  official.-*^  In  case  of  failure  so  to  com- 
municate their  choice  of  material  the  city  officials  are  justified 
in  assuming  that  the  property  owners  waive  their  right  to  make 
such  choice.-^  Under  a  statute  which  provides  that  the  property 
owners  shall  make  a  selection  from  not  less  than  two  kinds  of 
material  to  be  designated  by  the  board  of  public  works,  the  board 
may  designate  a  certain  specified  kind  of  asphalt  which  can  be 
furnished  by  one  company  only  as  one  of  the  two  kinds  of  mate- 
terial.--  The  designation  by  the  board,  of  macadam,  brick  or  as- 
phalt is  sufficient.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  board  select  two 
kinds  of  each  of  such  materials.-^  Under  a  statute  giving  to  the 
petitioners  for  an  improvement  the  right  to  select  the  material,  the 
board  of  public  works  may  reject  the  material  as  unsuitable,  but 
has  no  further  discretion.-*  Under  some  statutes  or  ordinances 
it  is  provided  that  a  certain  proportion,  usually  a  majority  of  the 
property  owners  to  be  assessed  may  select  the  person  to  do  the 
work  for  which  the  assessment  is  to  be  levied.-^  Under  such  stat- 
utes no  recovery  can  be  had  upon  the  assessment  if  the  work  is 
done  by  some  one  who  has  not  been  selected  by  the  property 
owners.-"  The  property  owners  who  have  selected  a  person  to  do 
the  work  ma.y  withdraw  their  assent  to  such  selection  at  any  time 
before  the  contract  has  been  awarded  by  the  city.^^     A  contract- 

^'Eddy  V.  City  of  Omaha,  72  Xeb.  ==  Reilly    v.    City    of    Philadelphia, 

•  550,   101  N.  W.25    [1904];   moditied  60    Pa.    St.     (10    P.    F.    Smith)     467 

cm  rehearing,   102  N.  W.   70,   103  N.  [1869]. 

W.  692   [1905].  --"City    of    Philadelphia    to    use    v.f 

"°  Moale  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  O'Rourke   v.   Philadelphia   and   Read- 

of  Baltimore,   61   Md.   224    [1883].  ing    Railroad    Company,    88    Pa.    St. 

=*  Moale  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council  (7    Xorris)     314    [1879];    Dickerson 

of  Baltimore,  61   Md.  224   [1883].  v.     Peters,     71     Pa.     St.     (21     P.     F. 

^'Ba-rber  Asphalt  Paving  Company  Smith)    53    [1872];    Reilly  v.  City  of 

V.   Field,    188  Mo.   182,  86   S.  W.  860  Philadelphia,    60    Pa.    St.     (10    P.    F. 

[1905].  Smith)    467    [1869]. 

2^ Ross   V.    Gates,    183    Mo.    338,    81  "City    of    Philadelphia    to    use    of 

S.   W.    1107.  O'Rourke   v.   Philadelnhia   and   Read- 

=*  Rhodes      v.      Board      of      Public  ini  R-^ilrond  -^o.,  88  Pa.  St.    (7  Nor- 

Works,    10    Colo.    App.    99;    49    Pac.  ris)   314  [1879]:  Dickerson  v.'Peters, 

430    [1897].  71    Pa.    St.     (21    P.    F.    Smith)     353 


817  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  ^  522 

or  SO  selected  by  the  property  owners  ma}^  recover  for  the  work 
done  under  his  agreement  with  the  owners  although  the  contract 
with  the  city  called  for  paving  a  greater  extent  of  the  street.-'' 
The  fact  that  the  property  owners  select  the  person  to  do  the  work 
and  enter  into  a  contract  with  him  before  the  ordinance  author- 
izing them  so  to  do  is  passed,  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.-® 

§  522.     Time  of  performance. 

In  the  absence  of  special  statute  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  pub- 
lic corporation  should  fix  a  time  within  which  the  contract  must  be 
performed.^  In  the  absence  of  such  provision  it  will  be  implied 
that  the  contract  is  to  be  performed  within  a  reasonable  time.- 
Under  some  statutes  it  is  provided  that  the  time  within  which  the 
contract  is  to  be  performed  must  be  fixed.  Such  statutes  are  valid 
and  must  be  complied  with  substantially,  at  least.^  If  the  time 
within  which  the  contract  is  to  be  performed  has  been  fixed  by 
the  proper  board,  the  ofBcer  Mdio  is  authorized  to  make  the  con- 
tract cannot  change  the  time  so  fixed.*  If  he  attempts  to  enter 
into  a  contract  by  the  terms  of  which  any  other  time  is  fixed, 
such  contract  is  not  that  which  he  was  authorized  to  make  and  is 
therefore  invalid.'"'  It  is  provided  by  some  statutes  that  some 
specified  officer  must  fix  the  time  at  which  performance  is  to  begin 
and  at  which  performance  is  to  be  completed.  Such  provisions 
are  mandatory  and  a  contract  entered  into  without  complying 
with  such  provisions  is  invalid.'"'  It  is  not  necessary,  however. 
that  a  specific  date  be  fixed  upon  which  performance  is  to  begin. ^ 

[1S72].     Apparently  rovtrn.  Lonj;  v.  .324.    OB    S.    W.    1057    n!>021;    Avers 

O'Rourkc.  10  Phil.   120,  where  it  was  v.  Sclimohl,  80  ^lo.  App.  34!)   [1!)00]. 

held   that   a   seennd    ajipointment   did  (In   this   case   the  ordinance   did   not 

not  revoke  the  first.  fix   any   time   limit  but   the   contract 

*  Fell    V.   Philadelphia    to    the   use  fixed  a  limit  of  sixty  days.) 

of  Cunningham,  81  Pa.  St.   (31  P.  F.  'Brock   v.  Lunin-,',  89  Cal.  31().  21) 

Smith)   58  [187G1.   (In  this  case  that  Pac.  072    [1801]. 

part  of  the   street  contracted  for  by  ^  Brock  v.  Luning,  89   Cal.  310,  20 

the  city  but  not  agreed  upon  by  the  Pac.  072    [1891]. 

property  owners  was  forbidden  to  be  "Brock   v.  Luning,  89   Cal.  310,  20 

opened  by   an   act   of   the   le-xislature  Pac.  972    [1891]. 

and  no  paving  was  there  done.)  "  Treanor  v.  Houghton,  103  Cal.  53, 

'^Fell    v.    Philadelphia    to    the    use  30   Pac.   1081    [18941;    Libbey  v.   Els- 

of    Cunningham,    81    Pa.    St.     (P.    F.  worth.     97     Cal.     310.     32     Pac.     228 

Smith)    58   [18701.  [18931;   Washburn  v.  Lyons,  97  Cal. 

^Carlin    v.    Cavendcr.    50    M.i.    280  311.   32  Pac.   310   [18931. 

[18741;     Strasslioim    v.    .Ternian.    50  MVilliams  v.  B.'Virin.   127  Cal.  578. 

Mo.   104    [18741.  00   Pac.   104   [19001. 

^  Allen    v.   La    Force.    O.i    ^\n.    App. 


§  523  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  818 

It  is  sufficient  if  the  proper  officer  fixes  the  time  for  commencing 
performance  within  a  certain  number  of  days  from  the  time  of 
entering  into  the  contract  not  exceeding  the  number  permitted 
by  statute.^  A  contract  which  provides  that  the  work  is  to  be 
commenced  within  ten  days  from  the  date  of  the  contract  and  to 
be  completed  within  two  hundred  and  forty  days  thereafter  shows 
with  sufficient  accuracy  when  the  performance  is  to  begin  and 
when  it  is  to  be  completed.®  It  has  been  held  that  while  the 
time  at  Avhicli  the  work  is  to  be  completed  should  be  fixed  by  the 
advertisement  inviting  proposals  and  not  after  the  contract  has 
been  let,  yet  such  complaint  comes  too  late  after  the  contract  has 
been  performed.^**  If  in  a  contract  for  street  paving  the  time 
within  which  the  contract  is  to  be  performed  is  left  blank,  the 
provisions  of  a  general  ordinance  requiring  all  contracts  for 
street  paving  to  be  performed  within  two  years  are  regarded  as 
incorporated  in  such  contract.^^ 

§  523.     Separation  and  combination  of  contra-cts. 

The  city  may  let  one  contract  for  two  or  more  distinct  im- 
provements/ as  long  as  no  injustice  is  done  thereby.-  If,  how- 
ever, the  plan  of  letting  a  contract  in  which  two  or  more  distinct 
improvements  are  combined,  results  in  assessing  for  the  cost  of 
one  improvement,  property  Avhieh  is  benefited  solely  by  the  other 
improvement,  such  assessment  is  invalid."  In  the  absence  of  stat- 
ute it  is  not  necessary  that  the  different  items  of  work  should  be 
let  in  separate  contracts.*  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  absence  of 
specific  statutory  provision  to  the  contrary,  separate  contracts 
mav  be  let  for  work  which  is  covered  bv  one  ordinance  or  resolu- 


8  Williams  v.  Bergin,  127  Cal.  578,  [1886];    Bye,  Pros.  v.  Atlantic  City, 

60  Pac.  164  [1900  J  ;  Ramish  v.  Hart-  73  X.  J.  L.  402,  64  Atl.  1056  [1906] ; 

well,     126     Cal.     443,     58     Pac.     920  Wilmington  Avenue,  213  Pa.  St.  238, 

[1899];    White    v.    Harris,    103    Cal.  62  Atl.  848    [1906]. 

528,  37  Pac.  502   [1894].  -State,    Provident    Institution    for 

"Ramish  v.  Hartwell,  126  Cal.  443,  Savings  in  Jersey  City,  Pros.  v.  May- 

58   Pac.   920    [1899].  or.   etc.,   of  Jersey  City,   52  X.  J.  L. 

1"  Richardson    v.    Mehler,    111    Ky.  (23  Vr.)   490,  19  Atl.  1096   [1890]. 

408.  63  S.  W.  957,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  «  Kansas  City  Grading  Company  v. 

917    [1901].  Holden,  32  Mo!  App.  490  [1888].    See 

'^Philadelphia    to    use    v.    Jewell,  §  568  et  seq. 

135  Pa.  St.  329.   19  Atl.  947   [1890].  *  Eyermann    v.     Blakesley.     9    Mo. 

*  Alameda    Macadamizing   Company  App.  231    [1880]. 
V.  Williams.  70  Cal.  534,  12  Pac.  530 


819  THE  IMPROVEMENT  CONTRACT.  §  524 

tion."'  Under  statutes  which  require  improvements  exceeding  a 
certain  amount  in  cost,  to  be  ordered  with  certain  additional  for- 
malities, there  is  an  occasional  tendency  to  evade  complying  with 
such  formalities  by  subdividing  such  improvement  into  sections,  no 
one  of  which  will  in  cost  exceed  the  prescribed  amount.  In  such 
case  the  question  for  the  court  to  determine  is  whether  such  an  im- 
provement is  divided  into  sections  in  good  faith  by  reason  of  the 
necessities  of  the  case  or  whether  it  is  so  divided  merely  to  evade 
complying  with  such  statutory  requirements."  The  public  corpora- 
tion cannot  divide  what  is  actually  one  entire  improvement  into 
subdivisions  so  as  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  advertising  for  bids.^ 
Thus,  if  contracts  for  an  amount  exceeding  five  hundred  dollars 
must  be  let  on  competition,  the  city  cannot  evade  this  require- 
ment by  letting  the  contract  for  a  walk  in  front  of  each  lot,  as  a 
separate  improvement,  each  to  the  same  contractor.^  Thus, 
where  no  adequate  cause  appears  for  dividing  a  street  into  sec- 
tions, but  it  is  so  divided  by  ordinances  which  are  presented  and 
adopted  at  the  same  time,  it  is  assumed  that  such  division  is  mere- 
ly to  evade  complying  with  such  formalities. **  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  ordinances  are  passed  at  different  dates  extending  over  a 
period  of  two  years,  it  will  not  be  assumed  that  such  division  of 
the  improvement  into  sections  was  made  for  the  i)urpose  of  evad- 
ing such  statute.^" 

§  524.     Effect  of  provision  for  liquidated  damages. 

Provisions  are  sometimes  found  in  contracts  to  the  effect  that 
the  contractor  must  pay  a  certain  sum  per  day  as  li(|uidated  dam- 
ages in  case  of  failure  to  perform  within  the  time  limited.  In 
some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  such  penalties  are  inteiulcd  for 
the  benefit   of  the   property   owner  and   that   delay   in    perform- 

» Bates  V.  Twist.  1.38  Cal.  52,  70  2.32  III.  587,  8.3  X.  E.  1070  [1908]. 
Pac.    1023    [10021;    Ede   v.    Cofrswell,  "*  People  ex  rel.  Whitloek  v.  Lamon, 

79    Cal.    278,    21    Pac.    7G7     [1889];  2.32  III.  587,  83  N.  E.  1070  [1908]. 
Eyermann  v.  Blakesley,  13  Mo.  App.  "Nelson  v.  City  of  Chicago,  19G  III. 

407  [1883];   People  e.x  rel.  Thompson  390,  03  X.  E.  738  [1902].     .See  to  the 

V.  Mayor,  etc..  of  the  City  of  Syra-  same   efTect   Kerfoot   v.   City   of   Chi- 

cuse,    6    Ilun.     (X.    Y.)     652    [1870].  cago,    lO.l    III.    229.    (13    X.    E.     101 

•Xelson    V.    City    of    Chicajro,    196  [1902]. 
111.   .390,  63  X.  E.   738    [1902]:    Ker-  »» Ton   v.   City  of  Chicago.   216   111. 

foot  V.  City  of  Chicajro.  195  111.  229,  331,  74  X.  E.  1044  [1905].    For  other 

63  X.  E.  101   [1902].  questions    presented    hy    the    division 

'  People  ex  rel.  Whitlock  v.  Lamon,  of  an   improvement   see   §   574. 


§  525  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  820 

ance  gives  to  the  property  owner  the  right  to  have  a  proportionate 
amount  of  such  penalty  deducted  from  his  assessment.^  Such 
amount  cannot  be  deducted  if  no  delay  in  completing  the 
improvement  is  shown.-  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that 
such  penalty  is  not  intended  for  the  benefit  of  the  property  own- 
er and  has  no  relation  to  the  assessment,  ^  and  that  the  city  may 
enforce  such  penalty  or  not  in  its  discretion.*  If  the  city  elects 
not  to  enforce  such  penalty  it  is  held  that  the  property  owner 
cannot  insist  on  having  a  proportionate  part  thereof  deducted 
from  his  assessment."  Under  either  theory  the  property  owner 
must  be  able  to  show  that  such  provision  for  deducting  a  stipu- 
lated amount  in  case  of  non-performance  could  have  been  en- 
forced and  ought  to  have  been  enforced  or  he  cannot  have  a  pro- 
portionate amount  thereof  deducted  from  his  assessment.^ 

§  525,     Necessity  of  completion  of  improvement. 

Whether  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied 
must  be  completed  before  the  assessment  is  levied  or  whether  the 
assessment  may  be  levied  before  the  improvement  is  completed  is 
a  matter  which  rests  with  the  discretion  of  the  legislature.  Each 
method  of  procedure  has  its  advantages.  If  the  improvement 
is  completed  before  the  assessment  is  levied,  it  is  then  possible 
to  determine,  not  as  a  matter  of  speculation  but  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  what  benefits  are  conferred  bv  tbp  'm'^rovement  iu  question 
and  to  what  extent  each  separate  tract  of  land  is  benefited.  On 
the  other  hand  the  amount  of  benefits  may  then  prove  to  be  so 
small  in  comparison  with  the  cost  of  imnrovement.  that  the  city 
would  not  have  undertaken  such  improvement  if  it  had  known 
how  small  a  proportion  of  the  cost  could  be  exacted  from  the 
property  owners.  It  is  therefore  more  satisfactory,  although  less 
exact,  to  know  before  the  improvement  is  constructed  and  the 
expense  incurred  therefor,  what  proportion  of  the  cost  of  the  uu- 

^Heman   v.   Gilliam,    171    Mo.    258,  [1906];    Cass    Farm    Co.   v.    City   of 

71  S.  W.   163   [1902].  Detroit,  124  Mich.  433.  83  N.  W.  IDS 

^  Heman  Construction  Company  v.  [1900]. 

Loevy,    179    Mo.    455,    78    S.    W.    613  » Gulick    v.    Connely,    42    Ind.    134 

[1904].  [1873];    Lindscy  v.   Brawner,  —  Ky. 

'Cass  Farm  Co.  v.  City  of  Detroit. .  97  S.  W.  1,  29  Ky.  L.  Eep.  1236 

124  Midi.  433,  83  X.  W.'  108   [1900].  [1906]. 

*Culick  V.  Connelv.  42  Ind.  134  '^  State.  Kohler.  Pros.  v.  Town  of 
[1873]:  Lindsey  v.  Brawner.  —  Ky.  (hittenberg,  38  X.  J.  L,  (9  Vr,)  419 
.  97  S.  W.  i.  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1236  [1876], 


821  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  525 

provement  is  to  be  borne  by  the  city  and  what  by  the  property" 
owners.  The  legislature  has  full  power  to  determine  which  course 
of  procedure  it  will  adopt.  It  is  often  provided  by  statute  that 
the  assessment  is  to  be  levied  when  the  improvement  is  con- 
structed.^ It  is  generally  held  in  the  absence  of  specific  stat- 
utory provision  to  the  contrary  that  a  public  corporation  may 
do  the  w^ork  before  the  assessment  is  levied.-  This  power  exists 
even  if  the  public  corporation  is  authorized  to  levy  an  assessment 
before  the  performance  of  the  contract  for  which  the  assessment 
is  levied.^  It  is  especially  necessary  to  defer  the  levy  of  the 
assessment  until  the  construction  of  the  improvement  where  the 
assessment  is  to  be  levied  for  the  cost  of  the  improvement  and  no 
means  is  provided  for  estimating  the  cost  in  advance  as  a  basis 
for  the  levy  of  the  assessment.*  Thus,  if  under  a  street  sprinkling 
contract  the  amount  of  work  to  be  done  and  the  amount  to  be 
paid  therefor  cannot  be  determined  definitely  until  the  end  of  the 
season,  an  assessment  need  not  be  levied  monthly  to  pay  for  the 
work  done  up  to  such  periods  of  time  but  ma^'  be  levied  at  the 
end  of  the  season  for  the  entire  cost  of  the  work.^  In  many  juris- 
dictions it  is  held  that  a  public  corporation  has  no  power  to  levy 
an  assessment  until  the  completion  of  the  improvement  for  which 
the  assessment  is  levied.'''     Such  intention  of  the  legislature  may 

1  Alberger  V.  Mayor  and  City  Coun-  Richardson.    213    111.    90,    72    X.    E. 

cil  of   Baltimore,   64   Md.    1,   20   Atl,  7i)l     [1904];     (supplemental    assess- 

988   [1885];  Alstad  v.  Sim,  15  X.  D.  ment)  ;    People    ex    rel.    Raymond    v. 

l>29,    109   X.   W.   06    [1900].  Grover,    203    111.    24.    07    X.    E.    165 

=  Smith  V.  Duck  Pond  Ditching  As  |  1903]  ;    People    ex    rel.    Raymond    v. 

sociation,      54      Ind.      235      [1870];  Latham,    203    111.    9,    67    X.    E.    403 

Keigher  v.  City  of  St.  Paul,  69  Minn.  [1903]  ;   Craig  v.  People  e.x  rel.  Gan- 

78,   72   X.   W.   54    [1897]    Webber   v.  naway,    193    111.    199,   61    X.   E.    1072 

Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Lock-  [1901];   ilix  v.  People  ex  rel.  Shaw, 

port,      43      Howard      (X.      Y.)      368  100  111.  425   [1883]  ;   Sanborn  v.  City 

[1872];  Elwood  v.  City  of  Rochester,  of  Mason  City,  114  la.  189,  80  X.  W. 

43   Hun.    (X.   Y.)    102    [1887];    Wet-  286    [1901]    State  of   Kansas,  on   the 

more  v.  Campbell,  4  X.  Y.  Supp.  Ct.  Relation    of    Young    v.    Xeodesha.    3 

341    [1849].  Kan.  App.  319,  45   Pac.    122    [1896]: 

'Smith  V.  Duck  Pond  Ditching  As-  City    of    Henderson    v.    Lambert,    77 

sociation,  54   Ind.   235    [1870].  Ky.    (14    Bush.)    24    [1878];    Moody 

*  Keiffher   v.    City   of   St.   Paul,    09  and    Co.    v.    Chadwick,    52    La.    Ann. 

Minn.  78,  72  X.  W.  54    [1897].  ISSS,   28   So.   361    [1900];    Xew   Eng- 

"  Keicher    v.    Citv   of   St.    Paul,    09  land   Hospital    for   Women    and   Chil- 

Minn.  78,  72  X.  W.  54    [1897].  dron   v.   Street   Commissioners  of   the 

"Sargent    and    Company    v.    Tuttle.  f  itv  of   Boston.   188  ^Liss.   88.   74  X. 

67    Conn.    162.   32    L.    R.    A.    822,    34  E.  294  [1905];  Jones  v.  Metropolitan 

Atl.  1028  [1895];   City  of  Chicago  v.  Park   Commissioners.    181   :Mass.   494, 


§525 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


822 


be  expressed  in  a  statutory  provision  which  provides  that  the 
assessment  shall  not  be  levied  until  the  improvement  is  com- 
pleted.' It  may  be  inferentially  provided  by  statute  that  the 
assessment  must  be  levied  before  the  work  is  begun.*  Thus, 
where  a  statute  provided  that  land  owners  might  pay  their  pro- 
portional part  of  the  cost  of  building  a  road  in  labor,  but  that 
the  expense  of  building  the  road  was  to  be  met  by  assessing 
upon  the  lands,  the  value  of  which  Avas  increased  by  the  improve- 
ment, a  sum  sufficient  to  build  a  road,  the  omission  to  levy  such 
assessment  as  a  part  of  the  original  proceedings  in  laying  out  the 
road  was  said  to  invalidate  them."  Such  intention  may  also  be 
found  where  the  statute  provides  for  levying  the  assessment  for 
the  cost  of  the  improvement  and  provides  no  way  for  estimating 
such  cost  in  advance  as  a  basis  of  the  assessment. ^'^  In  such 
cases  the  cost  of  the  improvement  can  ordinaril}^  be  determined 
only  after  the  improvement  has  been  constructed.^^  Even  where 
the  statute  authorizes  an  assessment  to  be  levied  before  the  work 


64  N.  E.  76  [1902];  In  re  Kingman, 
153  Mass.  566,  12  L.  R.  A.  417,  27 
N.  E.  778  [1891];  Prince  v.  City  of 
Boston,  HI  Mass.  226  [1872];  Sher- 
wood V.  Rynearson,  141  Mich.  92, 
104  N.  W.  392  [1905];  City  of  Seda- 
lia  to  Use  of  Sedalia  National  Bank 
V.  Donohue.  190  Mo.  407,  89  S.  W. 
386  [1905];  City  to  use  of  McGrath 
V.  Clemens,  49  Mo.  552  [1872];  He- 
man  Construction  Company  v.  Loevy, 
64  Mo.  App.  430  [1895];  Bellevue 
Improvement  Company  v.  Village  of 
Bellevue,  39  Xeb.  876,  58  X.  W.  446 
[1894];  Hoagland  v.  Wurts,  41  X.  J. 
L.  (12  Vr.)  175  [1879];  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  Wood,  51  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  275 
[1868];  Beekman's  Petition,  19  Abb. 
Prac.  244  [1865];  City  of  Cincinnati 
for  use  of  Wirth  v.  Cincinnati  & 
Spring  Grove  Avenue  Company,  20 
0.  S.  345  [1875];  Taylor  v.  \Vapa- 
koneta,  26  Ohio  Cir'  Ct.  R.  285 
[1904]. 

'  Sargent  and  Company  v.  Tuttle, 
67  Conn.  162.  32  L.  R.'  A.  822,  34 
Atl.  1028  [1895];  Sanborn  v.  City  of 
Mason  City.  114  la.  189.  86  X.  W. 
286  [1901];  Jones  v.  Metropolitan 
Park   Commissioners,    181    Mass.   494, 


64  X.  E.  76   [1902];   City  of  Sedalia 

to  Use  of   Sedalia  Xational   Bank  v. 

Donohue,   190  Mo.  407,  89  S.  W.  386 

[1905]. 

County    Commissioners 
County,     63     Me.     252 


County    Commissioners 
County,     63     Me.     252 


"  Pierce  v. 
of  Franklin 
[1872]. 

®  Pierce  v. 
of  Franklin 
[1872]. 

^^  State  of  Kansas  on  the  Relation 
of  Young  v.  City  of  Xeodesha,  3 
Kan.  App.  319,  45  Pac.  122  [1896]; 
Moody  and  Co.  v.  Chadwick,  52  La. 
Ann.  1888,  28  So.  361  [1900];  New 
England  Hospital  for  Women  and 
Children  v.  Street  Commissioners  of 
the  City  of  Boston,  188  Mass.  88,  74 
X.  E.  294  [1905];  Prince  v.  City  of 
Boston,  111  Mass.  226  [1872];  City 
of  Sedalia  to  use  of  Sedalia  National 
Bank  v.  Donohue.  190  Mo.  407,  89 
S.  W.  386  [1905];  Hoagland  v. 
Wurts,  41  X.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  175 
[1879]. 

'^"It  is  manifest  that  the  ordi- 
nance authorizing  the  work  to  be 
done,  which  is  required  to  be  based 
only  upon  an  estimate  of  the  cost, 
I'ould  not  le\-v-  and  assess  the  special 


■ 


823 


THE    IxMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§525 


is  begun,  a  supplementary  assessment  for  the  excess  of  the  cost 
of  the  improvement  over  the  amount  of  the  original  assessment 
cannot  be  levied  until  the  improvement  is  completed/-  Thus,  if 
an  assessment  for  a  sidewalk  is  to  be  based  upon  cost  bills  show- 
ing the  actual  cost  of  building  the  walk  apportioned  according 
to  frontage,  the  improvement  must  be  constructed  before  such 
cost  bill  can  be  made  out.'^  Under  other  statutes  a  public  cor- 
poration is  authorized  to  levy  an  assessment  for  an  improvement 
before  such   improvement   has  been   constructed.' '     Where   it    is 


tax  for  the  doing  of  the  work,  for 
tlie  council  would  not  at  that  time 
know  what  the  cost  of  the  work 
would  be,  and,  therefore,  could  not 
apportion  it  by  the  original  ordi- 
nance. Until  the  contract  for  the 
doing  of  the  work  was  let,  no  one 
could  know  what  the  cost  of  the  im- 
provement would  be.  The  statute 
clearly  contemplates,  therefore,  that 
the  city  council  shall  authorize  the 
doing  of  the  work,  shall  enter  into 
the  contract  therefor,  and  shall  after- 
wards levy  the  cost  as  a  special  tax." 
City  of  Sedalia  to  use  of  Sedalia 
National  Bank  v.  Donohue,  190  ^lo. 
407,  422,  423,  89   S.   W.  .380    [1905]. 

"An  assessment  of  this  kind  is 
necessarily  subsequent  to  the  widen- 
ing. From  the  nature  of  the  case  it 
cannot  be  made  until  the  completion 
of  the  work.  One  element  in  the  ap- 
portionment, the  net  expense  of  grad- 
ing the  whole  widened  street,  cannot 
be  sooner  asct^rtained."  Whiting  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  106  Mass.  89,  95  [1870]; 
quoted  in  Jones  v.  Board  of  Alder- 
men of  tlie  City  of  Boston,  104  Mass. 
401  [1870],  and  irt  Prince  v.  City  of 
Boston,    111    Mass.   220    [1872]. 

Of  an  assessment  levied  before  the 
im])rovenient  was  constructed,  the 
court  said  that  being  "a  judgment 
of  valuers  founded  on  speculation  in 
l)lace  of  an  assessment  founded  on 
facts  or  by  a  fixed  standard,  it 
seems  to  me  that  such  a  procedure 
is  a  substantial  departure  from  an- 
t'ient  usage  and  on  tliat  account 
cannot   be  sanctioned."      rioa<rland   v. 


Wurts,  41  X.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  175, 
181  [1879];  (affirming  Matter  of 
Commissioners  to  drain  Great  Mead- 
ows, 39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vr.)  433  [1877]. 

'-Sheriffs  v.  City  of  Chicago,  213 
111.  620,  73  X.  E.  367  [1905];  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Richardson,  213  111. 
96,  72  X.  E.  791    [1904]. 

"People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v. 
Grover,  203  111.  24,  67  X.  E.  163 
[1903];  People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v. 
Latham,  203  111.  9,  67  X.  E.  403 
[1903];  Craig  v.  People  ex  rel.  Gan- 
naway,  193  111.  199,  61  X.  E.  1072 
[1901]. 

"  Lawrence  v.  People  ex  rel.  Foote. 
188  111.  407,  58  X.  E.  991  [1900]; 
Craft  V.  Kochersperger,  173  111.  617, 
50  X.  E.  1061  [1898];  Hammond  v. 
People  for  use,  etc.,  169  111.  545,  48 
X.  E.  573  [1897];  Racer  v.  State 
for  use  of  Rhine,  131  Ind.  393,  31 
X.  E.  81  [1891];  Eel  River  Draining 
Association  v.  Topp,  16  Ind.  242 
[1861]  ;  Ross  V.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Wright  County,  Iowa,  128  Iowa 
427,  1  L.  R.  A.  (X.  S.)  431,  104  X. 
W.  500  [1905];  Henderson  v.  Mayor 
and  City  Council  of  Baltimore,  Use 
of  Eschbach,  8  Md.  3.")2  |1855];  Fos- 
ter V.  Park  Commissioners,  133 
Mass.  321;  Germania  Bank  v.  Cit\ 
of  St.  Paul.  79  Minn.  29.  81  X.  W. 
542  [1900]:  McConville  v.  City  of 
St.  Paul,  75  Minn.  3S3.  74  Am.  St. 
Rep.  508.  43  L.  R.  A.  584.  77  X.  W. 
993  11899];  Strickland  v.  City  of 
Stillwater.  63  Minn.  43.  65  X^  W. 
131  [1?95]:  Astoria  Heights  Lum.I 
Company  v.  City  of  Xew  York.  179 
X.  Y.  579.  72  X.  E.  1139  [  190.'  |  -.    (:,f. 


525 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT, 


824 


sought  to  levy  an  assessment  before  the  improvement  has  been 
constructed,  an  estimate  of  the  probable  cost  of  the  improvement 
must  be  made  and  the  assessment  must  be  levied  for  the  amount 
of  this  estimate.'''  Tender  an  ordinance  providing  that  the  granite 
pavement  th^u  Inid  u^on  the  street  should  be  sold  and  the  pro- 
ceeds thereof  applied  upon  the  cost  of  the  improvement,  such  sale 
need  not  be  mndc  before  the  assessment  for  the  improvement  is 
levied.^"  The  fact  that  a  contract  for  the  construction  of  a  ditch 
provides  thnt  no  part  of  the  work  was  to  be  accepted  until  all 
of  the  ditch  down  stream  therefrom  should  have  been  completed, 
does  not  rr<'von[  tbo  l^vv  of  an  assessment  before  the  work  is  so 
comnleted.^'^  Tn  the  same  state  some  statutes  may  provide  for 
levying  assessments  only  after  the  improvement  is  completed, 
or  at  least  contracted  for;  while  other  statutes  passed  at  differ- 
ent times  or  with  reference  to  different  improvements,  may  auth- 
orize assessments  before  the  improvement  is  completed  or  con- 
tracted for.  Thus,  while  in  Massachusetts  under  most  of  the 
assessment  statutes,  the  improvement  must  be  completed  before 
the  assessment  is  levied  '-  the  statute  authorizing  an  assessment 
for  the  laying  out  of  a  park  authorizes  such  assessment  without 
reference  to  the  completion  of  such  improvement.*^  So  in  Michi- 
gan it  was  originally  provided  that  the  assessment  should  be  lev- 
ied before  a  contract  was  let,-**  but  this  rule  was  subsequently 
modified  by  statute.-*  An  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for  work 
no  part  of  which  has  been  or  is  to  be  done.--  To  resist  an  assess- 
ment on  the  ground  that  the  work  has  not  been  done  it  is  neces- 
sary to  show  unef(uivoeally  that  the  work  has  not  been  done.-^ 


firminff.  89  App.  Div.  512,  86  N.  Y. 
S.  651  [19031 )  ;  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Application  of  Beekman,  31  Howard 
(X.  Y.)  16  [1865];  Britton  v.  City 
of  Philadelphia,  32  Pa.  St.  387 
[1859];  Espy  Estate  Company  v. 
Pacific  County,  40  Wash.  67.  82  Pac. 
129  [1905];  Felker  v.  City  of  New 
Whatcom,  16  Wash.  178,  47  Pac.  505 
[1896]. 

"  Davies  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles.  80 
Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771  [1890];  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Singer,  116  111.  App.  559 
[19041;  Douo-hty  v.  Hope,  3  Denio 
(N.  Y.)  249  [18461;  Beekman's  Peti- 
tion, 1  Abb.  Pr.  449  [1865]. 


^°  Aldis  V.  South  Park  Commission- 
ers, 171  111.  424.  49  N.  E.  565  [1898]. 

''  Racer  v.  State  for  Use  of  Rhine, 
131  Ind.  393,  31  X.  E.  81   [1891]. 

*' See   ante,   this   section,   n.    11. 

"  Foster  v.  Park  Commissioners. 
133  Mass.  321. 

^  Lefevre  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit' 
2  Mich.  586    [1853]. 

-1  Butler  V.  Detroit,  43  Mich.  552,  5 
X.  W.  1078. 

'-  In  the  Matter  of  Eager,  58  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  557  [1871].  See  §§  417, 
418. 

"'  Masonic  Building  Association  v. 
B-ow'ipl'.  164  Mass.  306,  41  X.  E. 
306    [1895]. 


825  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  525 

Accordingly,  if  the  pleadings  and  the  agreed  facts  leave  it  doubt- 
ful whether  the  Avork  has  been  performed  or  not  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  work  has  been  performed  if  this  fact  is  necessary 
to  the  validity  of  the  assessment.-*  If  the  improvement  has  been 
substantially  completed  an  assessment  may  ])e  levied  or  tax  bills 
issued,  although  something  yet  remains  to  be  done  under  the  eon- 
tract,-"  at  least  if  the  work  is  completed  before  the  suit  is 
brought,-"  If  an  improvement  is  constructed  in  sections  an  as- 
sessment may  be  levied  when  one  of  such  sections  is  completed 
without  awaiting  completion  of  the  entire  improvement  if  the 
statute  authorizes  such  assessment.-"  Under  an  ordinance  and 
contract  for  improving  a  designated  part  of  a  street,  an  assess- 
ment cannot  be  levied  for  improving  a  part  thereof  only,  even  if 
such  assessment  is  restricted  to  the  property  in  front  of  which 
such  work  is  done.-*  If  one  block  of  an  entire  street  improve- 
ment has  been  rejected  by  a  board,  they  have  no  authority  to 
certif}'  that  the  entire  work  has  been  performed,  although  they 
take  a  bond  from  the  contractor  to  complete  the  Avork  and  with- 
hold a  part  of  his  compensation.-''  An  assessment  may  be  levied 
upon  the  completion  of  the  work  for  which  an  assessment  is  to  be 
levied  though  other  work  to  be  paid  for  in  another  way  has  not 
yet  been  completed. ^'^  Thus,  where  a  street  car  company  was 
to  pay  the  cost  of  paving  between  its  rails,  an  assessment  may  be 
levied  upon  the  abutting  property  owners  when  the  street,  except 
that  part  between  the  rails  of  the  street  car  track,  has  been 
paved.^^  So  if  sidewalks  are  to  be  constructed  at  the  expense  of 
the  city,  an  assessment  for  a  street  improvement  may  be  levied 
when  such  improvement  is  completed,  all  except  the  si  do  walks. "•- 

"Masonic    BuiUling    Association    v.  of  Rotcliford  v.  Do  Xouo,  44  ^lo.   13l> 

Brovvnell,    164    Mass.    300,    41    X.    E.  [18G!)];    which    licld    that   an   assess- 

306  [1895].  ment  could  lie  levied  if  the  work  was 

^  Weber  v.   Schergens,   50   Mo.   389  done    in    front    of    the    property    as- 

[1875].  sessed)  ;  Fowler  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph. 

=«  Filey     v.     Cranor,     51     :Mo.     541  37  IMo.  228    [1866]. 

[1873].  =*In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

="Tuttle   V.   Polk   &    Hubbel,   92   la.  Wood.  51    Barb.    (X.  V.)    275   [1868]. 

433,  60  X.  W.  733   [1894].  ^Stifel  v.  MacManus.  74  Mo.  App. 

*Kiley     v.     Cranor,     51     Mo.     541  558    [1S98]. 

[1873]:  City,  to  Use  of  McGrath  v.  "  St  if  el  v.  MacMamis.  74  Mo.  App. 

Clemens,  49*  Mo.  552    [18721;    (over-  558    [1898]. 

rulinof   City   of   St.   Louis   to   Use   of  "-Whitinir  v.  flavor  and  Aldermen 

McGrath    v.     Clemens,    36    :Mo.    467  of  tiie  City  of  Boston.   106  Mass.  89 

[1865];  and  City  of  St.  Louis  to  Use  [1870]. 


§  526  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  826 

§  526.     Assessment  upon  basis  of  estimated  cost. 

Where  a  preliminary  estimate  is  provided  for  by  statute  to  be 
made  before  the  improvement  is  undertaken,  the  effect  of  such 
estimate  upon  the  amount  for  which  the  assessment  may  be  levied 
depends  entirely  upon  the  provisions  of  the  statute.     Since  an. 
assessment  may  be  levied  before  the  improvement  is  made,  ^  or 
even  before  the  contract  is  let,-  the  amount  of  the  estimate  may 
be  taken  as  a  basis  for  assessment.^     In  some  jurisdictions  this 
amount  cannot  be  exceeded  in  levying  the  assessment.*     Under 
the  practice  in  some  states  the  question  whether  the  estimate  is 
for  the  correct  amount  must  be  raised  by  appeal  or  it  is  regarded 
as  waived."^     If  the  preliminary  estimate  is  merely  required  as  a 
basis  for  bids,  the  assessment  is  not  restricted  by  the  amount  of 
snch  preliminary  estimate  but  may  be  for  the  actual  cost  even  if 
larger  than  the  estimate  in  the  absence  of  fraud."     A  change  in 
the  plans  of  the  improvement  may,  in  such  case,  be  made  after 
the  estimate  but  before   the  contract.^     Under  a  statute  which 
authorizes  a  municipality  to  which  new  territory  has  been  an- 
nexed,  to   proceed   with   assessment   proceedings   already  begun 
except  where  they  have  been  carried  to  a  finality,  if  an  assess- 
ment has  been  confirmed  and  collected  more  than  nine  years  be- 
fore the  annexation  and  the  improvement  has  been  completed  for 
about  the  same  time,  such  proceeding  has  been  carried  to  a  finality 
and  a  further  assessment  cannot  be  levied  even  if  the  original 
assessment  was  for  too  small  a  sum.^     Under  a  statutory  proceed- 
ing  authorizing   the  levy   of   an   assessment   for   "the   probable  _ 
amount  of  expense"  of  public  improvements,  the  city  is  not  re- 
stricted to  an  assessment  before  the  work  is  done  upon  a  basis  of 
preliminary  estimates  only.^     If  the  statute  provides  for  a  hear- 
ing upon  the  estimate  and  provides  that  the  price  fixed  in  the 
estimate  shall  not  be  increased,  an  estimate  which  is  ascertained 
to  be  too  small  in  amount  to  complete  the  work  may  be  abandoned 
and  an   increased   estimate  may  be  filed,   if  notice   and  hearing 

'See  §§  417,  418,  522.  Guttenberg,  38  N.  J.  L.    (9  Vr.)   419 

^^See  §   522.  [1876]. 

'Gilmore  v.   Hrntig,   33   Kan.    156,  'Fuller   v.   City   of   Grand    Rapids, 

5  Pac.  781   [1885].     See  §  813  et  seq.  105  Mich.  529,  63  N.  W.  530   [1895]. 

*Gilmore   v.    Hentig,    33    Kan.    156,  *To\vn    of   Cicero    v.    Hill,    193    III. 

5  Pac.   781    [1885].  226,  61  N.  E.  1020  [1901]. 

"Balfe   V.  Lammers,   109   Ind.   347,  "City    of    Meriden     v.     Camp,     46 

10  N.  E.  92  [1886].  Conn.  284   [1878]. 

'  State,    Kohler,   Pros.    v.   Town    of 


827  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  526 

are  given  upon  such  new  estimate."'  In  jurisdictions  where  the 
statute  does  not  require  that  the  improvement  should  be  com- 
pleted cefore  the  assessments  are  collected,  the  fact  that  the  esti- 
mate for  such  improvement  has  been  exceeded  and  that  the  im- 
provement has  never  been  completed  does  not  enable  the  property 
owners  to  resist  such  assessments.^^  On  application  for  a  judg- 
ment of  sale  for  a  delinquent  special  assessment  the  court  can- 
not reduce  the  assessment  to  an  amount  equal  to  a  proportionate 
part  of  the  cost  of  the  improvement  already  completed  and  the 
estimated  amount  necessarv  to  finish  the  work.^-  If  an  assess- 
ment is  levied  and  collected  before  the  improvement  is  con- 
structed and  such  improvement  is  subsequently  abandoned,  those 
who  paid  such  assessments  may  recover  them  in  an  action  for 
money  had  and  received  on  the  theory  of  failure  of  considera- 
tion." The  amount  which  can  be  recovered  is  the  amount  of  the 
assessment  paid  in,  less  the  amount  of  benefits  received  by  the 
property  of  the  party  seeking  recovery.^*  Furthermore,  if  the 
city  has  expended  in  a  legal  and  honest  manner  the  money  raised 
by  the  assessment,  upon  the  improvement  for  which  assessment 
was  levied,  the  assessment  cannot  be  recovered  even  though  the 
property  of  the  party  seeking  recovery  was  not  benefited  by  such 
expenditure.^''  However,  it  has  been  held  that  when  a  street  was 
to  be  opened,  widened  and  graded,  and  an  assessment  was  levied 
and  the  amount  raised  expended  on  grading,  the  owner  of  pro- 
perty not  benefited  thereby  may  recover  the  amount  paid  in  when 
the  improvement  is  abandoned.^"  It  may  be  provided  by  stat- 
ute that  partial  estimates  may  be  made  of  the  amount  due  on  the 
work  while  such  work  progresses  and  that  assessments  may  be 
levied  based  upon  such  partial  estimates. ^^     The  validity  of  such 

'"City  of  Denver  v.  Kennedy.  33  [1899];  Strickland  v.  City  of  Still- 
Colo.  80,  80  Pac.  122  [1904];  SO  water,  63  Minn.  43,  65  N.  W.  131 
Pac.  467  [1905].  [1895]. 

'1  Felker  v.  City  of  New  Wliatcom,  '*  Strickland   v.   City  of  Stillwater, 

16   Wash.   178.  47   Pac.  505    [1896].  63  Minn.  43,  65  X.  W.   131    [1895]. 

'-Connecticut    Mutual    Life    Tnsur-  '*  Germania    Bank    v.    City    of    St. 

ance    Co.    v.    People   ex    rel.    Kocher-  Pnul.    79    Minn.    29.    81    N.    W.    542 

sperger,    172    111.    31,    49    N.    E.    989  [1900]. 

[1898].  "■  Met  ;)nville    v.    City    of    St.    Paul, 

"Cerniania    Bank    v.    (  itv    of    St.  7o   Minn.   383,   74   Am.   St.   Rep.   508, 

Paul,    79    Minn.    29,    81    N."  W.    542  43  L.  R.  A.  584,  77  X.  W.  993  [1899]. 

[1900]:    McConville    v.    City    of    Si.  "City  of   Indianapolis  v.   Imberry, 

Paul,  75  Minn.  383,  74  Am.' St.  Rep.  17   Ind.   175   [1861];    Fralich  v.  Bar- 

508,  43  L.  R.  A.  584,   77  X.  W.  993  i^)\v,  25  Ind.  App.  383,  58  X.  E.  271 


§  526  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  828 

an  assessment  is  not  affected  by  the  fact  that  the  city  engineer,  in 
signing  an  estimate,  placed  an  improper  title  after  his  name.^^ 
The  objection  that  the  estimate  is  not  for  the  proper  amount  is 
one  which  must  under  the  procedure  in  some  states  be  raised 
on  appeal  and  not  by  injunction.^"  Such  preliminary  estimate 
is  generally  mandatory  where  an  assessment  is  levied  after  the 
work  is  begun  and  before  it  *s  completed.-"  Such  estimate  is  not 
necessary  Avhore  the  cost  of  the  entire  work  has  been  definitely 
ascertained.-^  Whether  council  can  revise  an  estimate  once  made 
is  a  question  which  has  been  raised  but  not  decided."  Confirma- 
tion of  an  assessment  cannot  be  resisted  on  the  ground  that  the 
contract  price  is  less  than  the  estimate. ^^  If  an  assessment  may 
be  levied  upon  the  ba^sis  of  the  preliminary  estimate  before  the 
improvement  is  constructed  and  the  actual  cost  of  the  improve- 
ment is  less  than  the  amount  of  the  assessment,  such  amount  must 
be  repaid  to  the  owner  or  credited  upon  his  assessment.-*  If  the 
property  owner  demands  it.  such  rebate  should  be  made  upon  his 
assessment  before  he  is  obliged  to  pay  the  same  in.^^  The  stat- 
ute providing  that  such  rebate  is  to  be  made  at  once,  means  imme- 
diately upon  ascertaining  the  amount  of  the  surplus  and  not  upon 
the  issuing  of  vouchers.^®  Accordingly,  an  agreement  between 
the  city  and  a  property  owner  that  the  property  owner  shall  al- 
low the  assessment  to  be  confirmed,  and  that  if  the  contract  price 
of  the  improvement  is  less  than  the  estimate,  the  judgment  of  con- 
firmation shall  be  vacated  and  a  judgment  for  the  exact  amount  of 
the  assessment  shall  be  entered,  does  not  invalidate  the  assess- 
ment,  since  such  provision   is  substantiallv   that   which   the  law 

[1900];    State   of   Minnesota   ex   rel.  "  City  of  Indianapolis  v.  Patterson, 

City  of  Duluth   v.   District   Court  of  33  Ind.  157   [1870]. 
St.  Louis   County.   61    Minn.   542,   64  =' Danforth  v.  Village  of  Hinsdale. 

N.  W.  190  [1895].  177  111.  579,  52  X.  E.  478  [1899]. 

^^Heiple    v.     City    of    Wasliinsfton,  "*  Davies  v.  City  of  Los  Angeles,  86 

219  111.  604,  76  N.  E.  854   [1906].  Cal.  37   [1890];   24  Pac.  771    [1890]: 

"Balfe  V.  Lamniers,   109   Ind.  347,  Gage  v.  People  ex  rel.   Hanberg,  219 

10  N.  E.  92   [1886].  111.^634,  76  N.  E.  834   [1906];  Thaler 

="Lammers    v.    Balfe,    41    Ind.    218  v.    West    Chicago    Park    Commission- 

[18721;  Jones  \.  Schulmeyer,  39  Ind.  ers,  174  111.  211.  52  X.  E.  116  [1898]. 
119    [1872];    Landsdale   v.    Xicklaus,  ==  Ga<re   v.   People   ex    rel.   Hnnherg. 

38  Ind.   289    [1871];    Citv  of  Indian-  219    111.    634,    76    X.    E.    834    [1906]'^; 

apnlis      V.      Imberry,      17      Ind.      175  Groesbeck  v.  Cincinnati.  51  0.  S.  365, 

[1861];    In   the   Matter   of   Beekman,  37  X.  E.  707   [1894]. 
31  Howard    (X.  Y.)    16   [1865].  =«  People  ex  rel.  Feeney  v.  City  of 

=^In    the    Matter    of    Beekman,    31  Chicago,    152   111.   546.   38   X.   E.   744 

Howard    (X.  Y.)    16   [1865].  [1894], 


■ 


829  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  526 

would  imply.-'  The  amount  of  the  surplus  of  the  estimate  over 
the  assessment  should  be  credited  upon  the  assessment,  and  when 
enough  has  been  collected  upon  the  assessment  to  equal  the  actual 
cost  of  the  work,  no  further  collection  should  be  allowed.-"*  Under 
some  statutes  the  entire  amount  of  the  assessment  must  be  paid  in 
and  the  excess  subsecpiently  repaid  to  the. property  owners.-"  If 
the  property  owner  has  paid  in  an  amount  upon  the  assessment 
in  excess  of  the  actual  cost  of  the  work  he  may  maintain  assump- 
sit to  recover  such  payment  from  the  city.^'"  After  denying  the 
right  of  the  property  owner  to  such  surplus,  the  city  cannot  be 
allowed  to  raise  the  question  that  the  property  owner  should  not 
have  sued  in  assumpsit  but  should  have  sued  in  mandamus  to  com- 
pel the  council  to  apportion  and  pay  over  such  excess. ^^  Upon  the 
same  principle,  if  the  improvement  is  abandoned  in  whole  or  in 
part  the  owner  may  recover  a  proportionate  share  of  the  amount 
paid  in  by  him.^-  The  surplus  cannot  be  applied  to  other  uses  even 
if  they  are  purposes  for  which  .general  taxes  or  local  assessments 
might  have  been  levied."^  Such  surplus  cannot  be  transferred  to 
the  general  funds,  ''  nor  can  it  be  applied  to  meet  deficiencies  in 
funds  raised  by  assessment  for  other  improvements  undertaken 
at  the  same  time.^-'  An  assessment  for  benefits  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  drainage  ditch  in  excess  of  the  cost  thereof  cannot  be 
applied  to  new  work.^'''  If  the  amount  of  the  assessment  is  less 
than  the  amount  of  the  benefits  conferred  and  the  cost  of  the 
improvement  exceeds  the  amount   of  the  assessment,   it   is   ordi- 

-' Billings  V.   City   of   Chicago,   1G7  1  IB   111.  App.  539    [1904];   Thayer  v. 

111.  337,  47  N.  E.  731   [1897].  (  ity  of  Crand  Rapids,  82  :\Iicli'.  298, 

=»  People  ex  rel.  Hanbeig  v.  :McMa-  4()   X.   W.   228    [1S90];    Cleveland   v. 

hon,    224    111.    284,    79    X.    E.    645  Tripp,    13    R.    I.    50    [ISSO].      See    § 

[19061;    Betts  V.  City  of  Xaperville,  1490. 

214   111.   380,   73   X.   E.   752    [1905];  '^  Thayer  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids, 

People    ex    rol.    :McCornack    v.    Mc-  82  Mich.  298,  46  X.  W.  228   [1890]. 

Wethy,    177    111.    334,    52    X.    E.    479  •''- Germania    Bank    v.    City    of    St. 

[1898];  Thaler  V.  West  Chicago  Park  Paul,    79    :\Iinn.    29,    81    X."  W.    542 

Commissioners,    174    111.    211,    52    X.  [1900]. 

E.  116  [1898];   People  ex  rel.  McCor-  ''Thayer  v.  City  of  Grand   Rapids, 

nack  V.  McWethy.   165   111.  222,  46  X.  82  :Mich.   298.   46  X.   W.  228    [1890]. 

E.  187  [1897].    "  '^  Reamer    v.    Hogg,    142    Ind.    138 

=»  Fisher    v.    City    of    Rochester.    6  41    X.   E.   353    [1895]'. 

Lansing   (X.  Y.)   225  [1872].  '=  Thayer  v.  City  of  Grand  Rapids, 

*'City   of    Chicago    v.    MeCormick,  82  Mich.  298,  46  X\  W.  228   [1890]. 

124    111.    App.    639    [1906];    City    of  '"  Reamer  v.  Hogg,  142  Ind.  138,  41 

Chicago    V.    Fisk,    123    111.    App.*  404  X.  E.  353    [1895]. 
[1905];    City   of   Chicago    v.    Singer, 


§  527  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  830 

narily  provided  by  statute  that  supplemental  assessments  may  be 
levied  to  pay  the  excess  of  the  cost  of  the  improvements  over  the 
assessment  already  levied.-"  Under  a  statute,  however,  authoriz- 
ing a  city  to  proceed  with  public  improvements  in  territory  an- 
nexed to  such  city  where  the  proceedings  have  not  been  carried 
to  a  finality,  a  supplemental  assessment  cannot  be  levied  where 
the  improvement  has  been  completed,  and  the  original  assessment 
collected  several  years  before  the  annexation.^** 

§  527.     Necessity  and  nature  of  substantial  performance. 

If  the  contract  for  the  construction  of  the  public  improvement 
for  which  the  assessment  in  question  is  levied  is  performed  fully, 
no  question  can,  of  course,  arise  as  to  the  validity  of  the  assess- 
ment on  that  ground.^  Serious  questions,  however,  arise  if  such 
contract  is  not  performed  fully.  The  effect  which  non-perform- 
ance shall  have  is  to  a  very  large  extent  in  the  discretion  of  the 
legislature.  Since  the  legislature  has  power  to  determine  the 
nature  and  character  of  the  improvement  and  since  it  may  dele- 
gate this  power  to  the  public  corj)oration  by  which  such  improve- 
ment is  to  be  constructed,  it  follows  that  the  legislature  may  pro- 
vide what  shall  constitute  performance  or  may  delegate  this  power 
to  the  public  corporation  by  which  such  improvement  is  to  be 
constructed.  Under  many  statutes  there  can  be  no  recovery  upon 
a  local  assessment  unless  the  contract  is  performed  in  at  least  a 
substantial  manner.-     In  some  cases  it  is  said  that  the  contract 

•'■See  §  952  cf  se7.  Roberts,     75     Ky.     (12     Bush.)     570 

^Town   of   Cicero   v.   Hill.    193    111.  [1877];    Germania    Bank   v.    City   of 

226,  61  N.  E.  1020  [1901].  St.  Paul,  79  Minn.  29,  81  N.  W.  542 

^Fell    V.    Phila(lel])liia,    to    Use    of  [1900];    City  of  St.  .Joseph   v.  Anth- 

Cunninoham,    81    Pa.    St.     (31    P.    F.  ony,    30   Mo.    537    [I860];    Henian   v. 

Smith)    58   [1876].  Gerardi,  96  Mo.  App.   231,   69   S.  W. 

^  Santa  Cruz  Rock  Pavement  Com-  1069  [1902];  Shoenherg  v.  Heyer,  91 
pany  v.  Bowie,  104  Cal.  286,  37  Pac.  Mo.  App.  389  [1902];  Brady  v.  Rog- 
934*^  [1894];  McVerry  v.  Kidwell,  ers,  63  Mo.  App.  222  [1895];  The 
63  Cal.  246  [1883];  Crawford  v.  King  Hill  Brick  Manufacturing  Corn- 
Mason,  123  Ta.  301,  98  N.  W.  795  pany  v.  Hainilton,  51  Mo.  App.  120 
[1904]  ;  Mason  V.  City  of  Des  Moines  [1892];    Guinotte    v.    Ridge,    46    Mo. 

108  la.  658,  79  N.  W.  389  [1899];  App.  254  [1891];  Kansas  City  ex 
Wingert  v.  Snouffer  &  Ford,  134  la.  rel.  Xeill  v.  Askew,  105  Mo.  App. 
97,  108  N.  W.  1035  [1906]-.  City  84,  79  S.  W.  483  [1904];  Meyer  v. 
of  Lexington  V.  Walby,  —  Ky.  ,  Wright,    19    Mo.    App.    283    [i885]; 

109  S.  W.  299  [1908];  City  of  Hen-  State,  Central  Railroad  Company, 
derson  v.  Lambert,  77  Ky.  (14  W.  Pros.  v.  City  of  Bayoniie.  35  X.  J. 
P.   D.   Bush.)    24    [1878];    Preston   v.  L.     (6    Vr.)     332     [1872];     Calm 


11 


831 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§  o27 


must  be  performed  strictly."  This  rule  is,  however,  more  favor- 
able to  the  property  owner  than  that  in  force  in  the  great  majority 
of  jurisdictions.  It  is  generally  said  that  it  is  sufficient  if  the  con- 
tract has  been  complied  w^ith  in  a  substantial  manner  even  if  lit- 
eral performance  is  wanting.*  If  by  statute  a  specific  method  is 
provided  for  raising  the  question  of  defective  performance,''  as 
by  filing  an  affidavit  stating  the  defects  in  performance,''  failure 
to  raise  such  questions  in  the  manner  prescribed  operates  as  a 
waiver  thereof.  What  amounts  to  substantial  performance  is  a 
((uestion  upon  which  there  is  some  diversity  of  opinion.  The 
j)rineiples  applicable  in  the  ordinary  law  of  contracts  are  not 
always  recognized  in  assessment  cases,  since  it  is  suggested  that 
the  existence  of  benefit  to  the  property  owner  by  reason  of  the 
improvement  should  be  the  test  of  substantial  performance.  If 
the  improvement  does  substantially  the  same  w^ork  as  that  con- 
tracted for  and  confers  substantially  the  same  benefit  upon  the 
property  owner,  it  is  said  that  the  contract  is  performed  sub- 
stantially.'    What  constitutes  sul)stantial  performance  is  a  cpies- 


Metz,  101  N.  Y.  S.  392  [1906];  Stone 
V.  Viele,  38  O.  S.  314  [1882];  City 
of  Cinciniiati  for  Use  of  Wirth  v. 
Cincinnati  and  Spring  Grove  Avenue 
Company,  20  O.  S.  345  [1875];  Tay- 
lor V.  Wapakoneta,  20  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 
R.  285  [1904];  Harrislmrg  v.  Bap- 
tist, 156  Pa.  St.  520,  27  Atl.  8 
[1893];  tity  of  Pliiladelpliia  to  Use 
V.  Ball,  147"  Pa.  St.  243,  23  Atl.  504 
[1892];  Erie  City  for  Use  v.  Butler. 
120  Pa.  St.  374,  14  Atl.  153  [1888]; 
City  of  Pliila(l('li)liia  to  Use  of  John- 
son V.  Rule,  93  Pa.  St.  (12  Xorris) 
15  [1880];  Phila(leli)]iia  to  Use  <if 
Dyer  v.  Brooke,  81  Pa.  St.  (31  P. 
F.' Smith)  23  [1870];  Findley  v.  City 
of  Pittsbur<r  (Pa.),  11  Atl.  078;  Bcr- 
wind  V.  CJalveston  and  Houston  In- 
vestment Comp'any,  20  Te.x.  Civ.  Ap]). 
426,   50   S.   W.  413    [1899]. 

'lleinan  v.  (Jerardi.  90  Mo.  App. 
231,  09  S.  W.  1009  [19021. 

'  Ivcclamation  District  Xo.  3  v. 
(loldnian,  05  Cal.  035,  4  Pac.  070 
[18841;  Sarber  v.  Rankin,  154  Ind. 
236,  50  N.  E.  225  [1899];  Peojde  ex 
rel.  Raymond  v.  (  Inirch.  ■  192  111. 
302,    01"  X.    E.    490    [1901];    Inhabi- 


tants of  Leominster  v.  Conant,  139 
Mass.  384,  2  X.  E.  090  [1885]; 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more V.  Raymo,  08  Md.  509,  13  Atl. 
383  [1888];  Dashiell  v.  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  jialtiniore,  Use  of 
Hax,  45  Md.  (;15  |1S70];  Angell  v. 
Cortright,  111  Midi.  223,  69  X.  VV. 
480  [1890];  Risley  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  34  Mo.  404  [1804];  Saxton 
Xational  Bank  v.  Haywood,  62  Mo. 
App.  550  [1895];  ^[eyer  v.  Wright. 
19  Mo.  App.  283  [1885];  Eyermann 
V.  Provenchere,  15  Mo.  App.  25(i 
[1884];  Voght  v.  '  City  of  BufTalo. 
133  X.  Y.  403,  31  X.  E.  340  [1892]: 
Philadelphia,  to  Use  v.  Jewell,  135 
Pa.  St.  329,  19  Atl.  947  [1890]: 
Pliiladelpliia  to  I'se  v.  Jewell,  140 
Pa.  St.  9.  21   Atl.  239   1  1S91]. 

•'■  In  the  :\Iatter  of  Uridgoford,  05 
Hun  (X.  Y.)  227.  20  X.  V.  Supp. 
2Sl    [1892]. 

'■  III  the  ^Matter  of  Bridgeford,  05 
Hun.  (X.  Y.l  227.  20  X.  Y.  Supj). 
281    [1892]. 

•  Chuicli  v.  People  ex  rel.  Koclier- 
>pci-vr,  179  III.  205.  53  X.  E.  554 
[1899];     Ro^.siter     v.     Citv    of    Lake 


§  527  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  83l 

tion  which  can  be  determined  better  from  specific  illustrations 
than  from  a  statement  of  abstract  principles.  Thus,  a  slight 
change  in  the  location  of  the  improvement  which  does  not  affect 
the  benefit  conferred  upon  the  property  by  such  an  improvement 
does  not  prevent  the  contract  from  being  performed  substan- 
tially.^ So  the  construction  of  a  system  of  sewers  from  which 
were  omitted  two  lateral  sewers  which  were  to  dram  onlv  the 
streets  in  wh^ch  thev  were  laid,  was  hpld  to  be  a  subst^-"""'-^!  r.er- 
formance  authorizing  an  assessment  upon  the  property  drained  by 
the  system  as  constructed. °  If  the  imDrovement  con^itruc^erl  is  in 
an  entirelv  different  location  from  that  contracted  for  so  that  it 
cannot  perform  the  same  functions  or  benefit  the  same  proner+v  as 
]f  i>  ^yore  performed  under  the  contract,  such  rtp^form^'^'^'^  i-^ vali- 
dates the  assessment,  as  it  is  not  a  substantial  performance.^" 
Thus,  if  an  entirely  different  stre'^t  is  improved  fr">m  that  con- 
tracted for  the  assessment  is  invalid. ^^  A  slight  change  in  the 
size  of  the  improvement  does  not  prevent  the  performance  from 
being  substantial.^-  Thns  the  existence  of  slight  inequalities  in 
the  w'dth  of  a  sidewalk/^  or  the  fact  that  a  street  as  paved  is 
slightly  wider  than  its  original  limits/*  or  the  fact  that  in  the 
performance  of  a  contract  to  clean  out  a  ditch  it  is  made  some- 
what wider  than  it  was  originally/^'  or  the  fact  that  the  sewer 
as  laid  out  varies  two  inches  in  diameter  from  that  shown  upon 
the  plan/"  are  all  of  them  variances  so  sPght  as  to  amount  to  sub- 
stantial performance.     Under  a  contract  for  constructing  a  street 

Forest,    151    111.    489,    38    N.    E.    359  "  Windsor  v.  District  of  Columbia, 

[1F94];    Sarher   v.    Rankin.    154    Ind.  7  Mackey    (D.  C.)    96   [18P91. 

236,   56  N.  E.  225    [19001;    Rislev  v.  '-Watson   v.    City   of   Philadelphia, 

City  of  St.  Louis.  34  Mo.  404  [18641;  ti    U=e    of    Adams',    93    Pa.    St.    Ill 

City    of    St.    Joseph    v.    Anthony,    30  [1880];     Inhabitants    of   'Leominster 

Mo".   537    [18601;    Wewell   v.   City   ci  v.    rVnant,    139    Mass.    384,    2    N.    E. 

Cincinnati,    45    0.    S.    407,    15    N.    E.  690   [1885];   An-rell  v.  Co-t-ia;ht,  111 

196    [1887].  Mi-h.  223,  69  N.  W.  486   [189^- 

"Church   V.  People  ex  rel.  Kocher-  "AVat=on   v.   City  ci   P'nladelphia, 

sner^er,    179    111.   205,   53   N.   E.   554  to    Use    of    Adams,    93    Pa.    St.    Ill 

[1899];     Possiter    v.    City    of    Lake  [1880]. 

Forest,    151    111.    489,    38    N.    E.    359  » Duo-f'er    v.    Hicks,    11    Ind.    App. 

[189^].  374,  36  K  E.  1085   [1894]. 

"Wewell   V.   City  of   Cincinnati,   45  '^/nsrell    v.    CoHrisht,    111    Mich. 

O.  S.  407,  15  N.  E.  196   [1887].  223.  P9  N.  W.  486    [18P61. 

'"Windsor  v.  Dist'-ict  '^f  '^olnmhih,  '*  Inhabitants      of      Leominster      v. 

7  Mackev   (D.  C.)   96  [1889];  Schnoi-  rnnn-it,    139  Mass.   384,  2  N.  E.   690 

der  V.  District  of  'olunibia,  7  Mackey  [1885]. 


i 


D.  C.)   252  [1889]. 


i 


833  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  527 

at  a  certain  grade  the  construction  of  a  street  at  a  substantially 
different  grade  is  not  substantial  performance.^^  An  assessment 
for  the  construction  of  such  street  is  invalid  even  if  the  contractor 
in  working  to  such  grade  has  acquiesced  in  the  action  of  the  city 
after  the  contract  was  let  in  reducing  such  grade."  Performance 
aceordiufir  to  the  ordinance  and  according  to  the  true  intention  of 
the  parties  is  sufficient,  although  by  clerical  mistake  the  contract 
does  not  express  such  intention  correctlv."  Failure  to  construct 
an  incidental  part  of  an  imnrovemput  which  is  not  prori^rlv  cov- 
ered bv  the  contract  does  not  invalidate  the  contract  or  the  assess- 
ment.-" Thus,  if  the  erection  of  a  railing  and  barriers  is  not  a 
part  of  a  public  highwav  contracted  for.  the  failure  to  construct 
such  rniling  and  barriers  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.-^  So 
if  curbing  and  guttering  is  not  regarded  as  a  part  of  gradins:  and 
macadamizing  a  street,  the  omission  of  such  curbing  and  gutter- 
ing under  a  contract  to  grade  and  macadamize  does  not  invali- 
date the  assessment.--  If  the  part  of  a  street  covered  entirelv  by 
railway  tracks  cannot  be  paved  at  the  cost  of  the  owners  of  lots 
abutting  on  other  parts  of  such  street,  the  omi.ssion  to  pave  such 
part  does. not  invalidate  the  assessment.^^  If  the  ordinance  and 
contract  required  paving  the  street  with  asphalt  "from  curb  to 
curb,"  the  fact  that  subsequently  a  street  railway  company  whose 
tracks  were  located  therein  was  required  to  pave  that  portion  of 
the  street  between  its  tracks  with  stone,  was  held  not  to  render 
the  assessment  invalid.-*  This  is  true,  especially  if  the  street 
railway  is  not  to  be  laid  upon  the  portion  of  the  street  which  is 
required  to  be  improved.-"'  If  only  a  part  of  the  improvement 
has  been  constructed  and  default  is  then  made  in  the  contract, 
such  performance  is  not  substantial  if  the  part  of  the  improve- 
ment as  constructed  does  not  perform  substantially  the  .same 
functions  as  would  have  been  performed  by  the  improvement  con- 

"  Brady    v.    Rogers,    63    Mo.    App.  ='  Cha^e   v.    Board    of   Aldermpn    of 

222    r  18051.  Rprinufield.    110   Mass.   550    [18761. 

"Bradv    v.    Rogers,    63    Mo.    App.  =- Fox      v.      ^Middlesboroush      Town 

222   [18951.  Company,  96  Ky.  262.  28  S.  W.  776 

"Eyormann  v.  Provenchcro,  15  Mo.  [18941. 

256   [1884].  -■'Saxton    National    Bank    v.    Hay- 

Tox      V.      Middlcsborough      Town  wood.  62  Mo.  App.  550    [18951. 

Company,  96  Ky.  262,  28  S.  W.  776  =^  City   of   Erie   v.   Moody,    171    Pa. 

118941;"  Chase  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  St.   610,   33   Atl.   378. 

of      Springfield,       119       Mass.      556  -■'' Tlionipson      v.      People      ex      rel. 

[1876],  Foote,  184  III.   17.  56  N.  E.  383. 


§  527  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  83-4 

structed  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  contract.  The  fact 
that  an  improvement,  such  as  a  street,  has  been  completed  in 
front  of  certain  property  does  not  show  that  such  property 
has  received  all  the  benefit  that  it  would  have  received  had 
the  improvement  been  completed.-*'  In  many  types  of  im- 
provement, construction  of  that  part  in  front  of  the  given 
tract  of  property  can  be  of  no  benefit  unless  the  entire  im- 
provement is  constructed.  Accordingly,  if  only  a  part  of  a  street 
contracted  for  is  con.structed,  an  assessment  cannot,  in  the  absence 
of  statute,  be  levied  therefor.-'  By  statute  in  some  states  it  is 
provided  that  if  a  certain  proportion  of  a  street  has  been  con- 
structed, a  proportionate  assessment  may  be  levied  for  the  work 
done.-^^  The  benefit  accruing  from  the  construction  of  a  side- 
walk depends  upon  the  continuity  thereof.  Accordingly,  if  under 
a  contract  to  construct  a  sidewalk,  the  contractor  omits  the  side- 
walks in  front  of  property  used  by  the  owners  thereof  as  home- 
steads, this  does  not  amount  to  substantial  performance.-''  If  a 
part  of  the  improvement  which  cannot  in  any  v/ay  affect  the  prop- 
erty assessed,  has  been  omitted  in  performing  the  contract,  such 
omission  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.""  Thus,  in  the  con- 
struction of  a  general  plan  of  sewers,  sewers  were  omitted  on  two 
streets  which  were  not  graded  to  the  established  grade.  These 
sewers  were  to  be  laterals  draining  only  the  streets  in  which  they 
are  laid.     Such  omission  was  held  not  to  invalidate  the  assess- 


=«C'ity,  to  Use  (if  :\I('r,rath  v.  Clem-  John   v.   City  of  East  St.   Loui<.   13(> 

ens,    49    Mo.    552    [1872];    Fowler    v.  111.   207,   214.   27    X.   E.   543    [ISOl]: 

City     of     St.     Joseph,     37     Mo.     228  (citing    Dougherty    v.    Hitchcock,    35 

[186G].  Cal.    512    [18158];    Holmes   v.    Village 

^'  City    of    Cincinnati    for    Use    of  of  Hyde  Park,   121   111.   12S,  13  X.  E. 

Wirth  V.  The  Cincinnati   and  Spring  540   [1889]:    Dora  thy  v.  City  of  Chi- 

Grove    Avenue    Company.    26     0.    S.  cago,  53  111.  79   [1809];   City  of  Hen- 

345     [1875];     St.    John     v.     City    of  derson     v.     Lambert.     77     Ky.      (14 

East     St.     Louis,     130     111.     207,     27  Bush)     2J :     Murray     v.    Tucker,     73 

X.    E.    543    [1892];    City   of   Hender-  Ky.    (10   Bush)    240    [1874];    Pepper 

son     V.     Lambert,     77     Ky.     ( 14     W.  v.    City    of    Philadelphia    to    Use    of 

P.     D.     Bush.)      24      [1878];      State,  Horter.    114    Pa.    St.    96.    6    Atl.    899 

Central   Railroad   Com.pany,   Pros.   v.  [1886]). 

City  of  Bayonne,  35  X.  J.  L.   (6  Vr.)  =^  See  Chapter  XVI. 

332     [1872]:     "A    special    assessment  ™  Berwind  v.  Galveston   and   IIous- 

cannot   be   levied   to   pay  for  part   of  ton    Investment    Company,    20    Tex. 

the   improvement   required  by   an  or-  Civ.  App.  426,  50  S.  W.  413    [1899 1. 

dinance  nor  can  a  special  assessment  ^"  In  the  matter  of  McCormack.  60 

be  levied  to  pay  for  the  whole  after  Barb.    128    [1870]. 


a    part    has    been    abandoned."      St. 


835  THE   IMPROVEMEIsT    COxM'iRACT.  ^  527 

inent  as  to  the  property  draiued  by  the  sewers  as  constructed.'" 
The  use  of  material  in  the  performance  of  a  contract  which  is 
substantial!}^  different  from  that  contracted  for  does  not  amount 
to  substantial  performance  especialh'  if  the  material  as  used  does 
not  perform  the  same  functions  as  that  contracted  for.^-  Under 
a  contract  for  gTadinii:  and  paving  streets,  a  provision  for  crushed 
river  gravel  is  not  performed  substantially  by  the  use  of  gravel 
which  was  not  crushed  where  it  was  shown  that  crushing  was 
important  because  crushed  gravel  would  bind  into  a  solid  body 
while  uncrushcd  gravel  would  not.-''^  XTnder  a  provision  for  con- 
structing a  layer  of  brick  laid  fiat,  the  use  of  broken  rock,  three 
indies  shallower  than  the  presr-ribed  depth,  is  not  a  sui)8tantial 
performance.^*  Under  an  ordinance  and  contract  requiring  pave- 
ment in  part  of  brick  and  in  part  of  crushed  granite,  the  construc- 
tion of  a  pavement  entirely  of  brick  is  not  substantial  perform- 
ance.''^' Tf  a  property  owner  is  required  to  construct  a  brick  side- 
Avalk  in  front  of  his  property  and  he  is  subsequently  by  another 
ordinance  given  the  riglit  to  construct  it  of  granitoid  if  he  pre- 
fers, and  he  does  not  construct  any  sidewalk,  he  cannot  complain 
if  the  city  constructs  a  sidewalk  of  granitoid.""  The  use  of  a 
smaller  amount  of  cement  than  that  required  by  the  contract  which 
makes  the  curbing  constructed  therefrom  inferioi-  to  that  con- 
tracted for  is  not  substantial  performance.'''  If  the  improvement 
as  constructed  can  be  made  to  comply  with  the  contract  by  mak- 
ing repairs,  it  has  been  held  that  this  amounts  to  substantial  per- 
formance so  that  the  eontract  price,  less  the  cost  of  repairs,  may 
be  recovered."^  If  the  material  used  under  the  contract  per- 
forms the  same  functioTis  as  that  contracted  foi-.  but  is  substan- 
tially different  therefi-om.  it  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  this 
nmounts   to   suhstant';!l    performance.''"     Thus,   under   a    contract 

^' Wewell  V.  City  of  (  ineinnati.  45  turinp;  ("ninpany  v.  TTaniilton.  5]   Mo. 

O.  8.  407,  15  N.  E.  in(>  [1887].  App.   120  lISD'il. 

'-Mason  v.  City  of  Des  .Moinos.  lOS  "''City    of    Tvi-xinirton    v.    Walhy    — 

la.  G58,  79  N.  W.  380    [1S091;    Kan-        Ky. •,   100  S.  W.  299   [190S]. 

>!as  City  ex  rel.  Xeill   v.   Askew.   inS  ^Xoll   v.   Power.  —  Ky.  .   107 

Mo.   App.   84.  79   R.   W.   4S.'?    [1904];  S.    \V.   (594    [19081. 

Kinji  Hill  Brick  Manufacturing  Com-  "'  Mason    v.    lity    of    Dos    Moines, 

pany   v.   Hamilton,   .^il    Mo.    App.    120  108   la.  058.  79  N.  W.  389   [1899]. 

[18921.  5*  Hastings    v.    Columbus.    42    O.    S. 

■■'•'Kansas     City     ex     rel.     Xoill     v.  .i8.5   [1885]. 

Askew.    105    Mo.    App.    84.    79    S.    W.  ^"^  Richards    v.    City    of    Cincinnati, 

4S.S    [1904].  :n  ().  S.  506   [1877]. 

"Tlie    King    Hill    Brick    ?il:»nufac- 


§  5^i^  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  83G 

for  filling  with  pure  earth,  sand,  gravel  or  rock,  it  was  held  that 
the  use  of  bricks  and  mortar  in  such  filling  was  a  substantial  per- 
formance, where  this  material  was  shown  to  be  equal  in  durabil- 
ity to  that  specified.^"  In  other  jurisdictions  the  use  of  a  material 
substantially  different  from  that  specified  is  not  substantial  per- 
formance even  if  the  material  used  is  equal  to  or  better  than  that 
specified.  Thus,  under  a  contract  to  lay  an  asphalt  block  pave- 
ment the  construction  of  a  better  pavement  of  sheet  asphalt  was 
held  not  to  be  substantial  performance.*^  If  the  council  has  passed 
invalid  "orders"  after  the  enactment  of  the  improvement  ordin- 
ance, which  are  without  effect  as  amendments  thereof,  and  which 
change  the  requirements  of  the  ordinance  as  to  the  material  used, 
it  will  not  be  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  evidence,  that  such  ord- 
ers were  followed  and  the  ordinance  ignored.'*-  The  contractor 
should  be  allowed  to  show  the  character  and  kind  of  material  used 
by  him  if  it  is  claimed  that  inferior  material  has  been  used.*^  If 
more  work  has  been  performed  than  was  provided  for  by  the  con- 
tract an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for  such  extra  work,**  but 
such  additional  performance  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment 
if  the  cost  thereof  can  be  separated  from  the  cost  of  the  work 
done  under  the  contract.*^  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  said  that  a 
defect  in  performance  must,  in  order  to  affect  an  assessment, 
inflict  a  special  injury  upon  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed.*" 
Under  this  theory  damages  should  not  be  pro-rated  by  deducting 
the  total  damages  from  the  total  amount  of  the  assessment,  but  the 
damages  specially  suffered  by  each  owner  must  be  deducted  from 
his  assessment.*^ 

§  528.    Excuses  for  failure  to  perform. 

A  property  owner  who  has  acquiesced  in  the  performance  of  the 
contract  has  been  held  to  be  estopped  from  resisting  the  enforce- 

^^  Richards    v.    City    of    Cincinnati.  N.  E.  181   [1899];   People  ex  rel.  Mc- 

31   0.  S.  506   [1877].  Cornack    v.    MeWethy,    177    111.    3.34, 

"Calm    V.    Metz,     101     X.    Y.    392  52  N.  E.  479    [1898]'. 

[1906].  '=  McDonald  v.  Mezes,  107  Cal.  492, 

"Gait  V.  City  of  Chicago,   174  111.  40  Pac.  808   [1895];   Shannon  v.  Vil- 

605,  51   N.   E.  653.              "  lage    of    Hinsdale,    180    111.    202,    54 

"City    of    Philadelphia    to    Use    of  X.  E.    181    [1899]. 

Johnson     v.     Enle,     93     Pa.     St.     15  *"  City  of  Pittsburg  v.  MacConnell, 

[1880].  130  Pa!  St.  463,  18  Atl.  645. 

**  McDonald  v.  iMe/es.  107  Cal.  492,  "Creamer    v.    Bates,    49    Mo.    523 

40  Pac.  808   [1895]:   Shannon  v.   Vil-  [1872]:     Merer    v.    Wright,    19    Mo. 

lage    of    Hinsdale.     180    111.    202,    54  App.  283   [1885]. 


i 


887 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§528 


raent  of  the  assessment  under  such  performance.'  This  is  true, 
especially  if  the  property  owner  has  requested  changes  to  be  made 
in  the  improvements  which  have  been  made  in  accordance  with 
such  request.-  and  the  rule  applies  with  especial  force  where  the 
change  in  material,  which  constitutes  the  defect  in  performance, 
was  made  at  the  request  of  the  property  owner  who  now  objects 
to  the  assessment  on  the  uround  of  such  change.^  In  some  juris- 
dictions, however,  it  is  held  that  property  owners  are  not  obliged 
to  watch  the  performance  of  the  work  or  to  protest  because  of 
failure  to  perform  the  contract.*  If  an  abutting  owner  volun- 
tarily makes  performance  of  certain  terms  of  the  contract  impos- 
sible, he  cannot  take  advantage  of  such  non-performance  in  order 
to  defeat  the  assessment."'  Thus,  failure  to  make  a  pavement  as 
wide  as  ordered  in  the  notice  to  property  owners  does  not  invali- 
date the  assessment  where  due  to  the  unlawful  act  of  the  owner 
in  extending  his  fence  into  the  street  beyond  his  line."'  Failure  to 
perform  provisions  in  a  contract,  the  performance  of  which  the 
law  forbids,  does  not  invalidate  the  contract."    Thus,  under  a  coii- 


*  Petaluma  Paving  Co.  v.  Singley, 
136  Cal.  G16,  69  Pac.  426  [1902]; 
Lux  &  Talbott  Stone  Co.  v.  Donald- 
son, 162  Ind.  481,  68  N.  E.  1014 
[1903];  Sliank  v.  Smith,  157  Ind.  401, 
55  L.  R.  A.  564,  61  X.  E.  932  [1901]  ; 
Prezinger  v.  Harness,  114  Ind.  491 
[1887];  Ross  v.  Stackliouse.  114 
Ind.  200.  16  X.  E.  501  [1887];  Citj' 
of  Evansville  v.  Pfisterer,  34  Ind. 
36,  7  Am.  Rep.  214  [1870];  Chig- 
gish  V.  Foons,  15  Ind.  A])]^.  599.  43 
N.  E.  158;  Arnold  v.  City  of  Fort 
Dodge,  Iowa,  111  I:i.  152,  82  X.  W. 
495  [1900];  Mudge  v.  \Yalker,  — 
(Ky.)  — .  90  S.  W.  1046,  28  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  996  [1906];  Brick  &  Terra 
Cotta  Coni])any  v.  Ilnll,  49  Mo.  App. 
433  [1892];  Diisenhnry  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Xewark,  25  X.  J.  Eq.  (10  C.  E.  Gr.) 
295  [1874];  Sandford  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  the  City  of  Xew  York,  33  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)    147   [I860]. 

^Lux  and  Talliott  Stone  Company 
V.  Donaldson.  162  Ind.  481.  68  X.  E. 
1014  [19031;  Pnvin.jTT  v.  Harness. 
114  hid.  491.  16  X.  E.  495  [1887]: 
Ross  V.  Stackhouse,   114   Ind.  200,   16 


X.  E.  501  [1887];  City  of  Evans- 
ville V.  Pfisterer,  34  Ind.  36,  7  Am. 
Rep.  214  [1870];  Cluggish  v.  Koons, 
15  Ind.  App.  599,  43  X.  E.  158; 
Arnold  v.  City  of  Fort  Dodge,  Iowa, 
111  la.  152,  82  X.  W.  495  [1900]; 
Brick  &  Terra  Cotta  Company  v. 
Hull,  49  Mo.  App.  433  [1892];  Dus- 
enbury  v.  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Xewark,  25  X.  J. 
Eq.    (10   C.   e!   (4r.)    295    [1874]. 

'■'  Thus  whei(>  the  change  from  arti- 
ficial to  natui'al  stone  was  made  at 
the  request  of  the  defendant,  he  is 
(•st(ii)ped  fnun  setting  up  such 
clianges  as  a  gi'oiuid  for  invalidat- 
ing the  assessment.  Brick  &  Terra 
Cotta  Company  v.  PIuU,  49  Mo.  App. 
433    [1892]. 

*Wingert  v.  Snoufler.  134  la.  97, 
108  X.  ^Y.   1035    [1906]. 

°  Hood  v.  Trustees  of  Town  of  Leb- 
anon. 12  Ky.  L.  Rep.  813,  15  S.  \V. 
516    [1891]. 

"  Hood  V.  Trustees  of  Town  of  Leb- 
an(m.  12  Ky.  L.  Rep.  813.  15  S.  W. 
516    [1891]." 

'Steflen  v.  Fox.  56  Mo.  Ai>p.  9 
[1893]:    Fell    v.    Philadelphia    to    the 


§  529  TxXXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  838 

tract  to  pav^e  a  certain  portion  of  a  street,  failure  to  pave  a  part 
thereof  which  was  by  statute  forbidden  to  be  opened  was  held  not 
to  invalidate  the  assessment.*  A  contract  for  paving  a  sidewalk 
was  made  under  an  ordinance  regulating  the  slant  of  the  sidewalk 
and  making  a  failure  thereof  a  misdemeanor.  The  sidewalk  con- 
tracted for  was  constructed  at  the  intersection  of  two  streets 
having  different  grades.  It  was  held  that  compliance  with  the 
ordinance  being  impossible,  the  construction  of  a  sidewalk  which 
conferred  the  same  benefit  upon  the  property  assessed  and  was 
equally  convenient  for  public  use  as  that  specified  in  the  ordin- 
ance, amounted  to  substantial  performance." 

§  529.    Amount  of  recovery  in  case  of  substantial  performance. 

If  the  contract  has  been  performed  substantially  but  not  liter- 
ally the  contractor  is  ordinaril^^  allowed  to  recover  the  contract 
price,  subject  to  deductions  for  defective  performance.^  It  is 
sometimes  suggested  that  the  measure  of  his  recovery  is  the  value 
of  the  work  done.^  This  rule,  however,  ignores  the  contract  en- 
tirel}^,  allows  recovery  in  quasi  contract  and  deprives  both  the 
contractor  and  the  public  corporation  of  any  benefit  which  may 
have  been  obtained  by  either  of  them  under  the  terms  of  the 
contract.  Accordingly,  the  rule  generally  adopted  is  that  the 
contract  price  may  be  recovered  less  a  proper  reduction  for  defec- 
tive work,  and  not  the  value  of  the  work  as  done.'^  The  amount 
of  this  deduction  has  been  said  to  be  the  cost  of  repairs  and  work 
necessary  to  make  the  improvement  what  it  would  have  been  had 
the  contract  been  performed.^     Another  form  of  stating  the  rule 

Use  of  Ciinninoliam,   81   Pii.   St.    (31  App.     28.3     [18851;     State,     Watson, 

P.  F.  Smith)    58    [1876];    See  also   §  Pros.   v.  City  of   Elizabeth,   42  N.   J. 

514.  L.   (1.3  Vr.)   508   [1880];  Hastings  v. 

^Fell    V.    Philadelphia    to    the    Use  Columbus,     42     0.     S.     585     [1885]'; 

of   Cunningham   &   McNichol,   81   Pa.  Cony    v.    Campbell,    25    0.    S.     134 

St.   (31  P.  F.  Smith)   58   [1876].  [1874];    Pepper  v.   City  of  Philadel- 

"•^'tpffen    V.    Fox,    56    Mo.    App.    9,  phia  t;)   Use   of  Horter,    114   Pa.   St. 

[1893].  96,  6  Atl.  899    [1886]. 

'  Ktlly   V.   Chadwick,    104   La.    719,  "Barber  Asphalt  Paving   Company 

29  So.  295;    (affirmed  in  Chadwick  v.  v.    Ullman,    137    Mo.    543,    38    S.    W. 

Kelly,   187  U.  S.   540,   47  L.  293,  23  458    [1896]. 

S.  175  [1903])  ;  Barber  Asphalt  Pav-  ^  Corry     v.     Campbell,     25     0.     S. 

ing    Company    v.    Ullman,     137    Mo.  134   [1874]. 

543,    38    S.   "W.    548     [1896.     1897];  *  Hastings    v.    Columbus.    42    0.    S. 

Creamer      v.      Bates,      49      ]\Io.      'rl?,  585   [1885]. 
[1872];     Meyer    v.    Wright,     19    Mo. 


839 


THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§530 


for  the  proper  amount  of  deduction  is  that  it  should  be  the  dif- 
ference between  the  cost  of  the  work  and  materials,  if  furnished 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  contract  and  the  cost  of  the 
work  and  materials  as  actually  furnished."'  Another  method  of 
stating^  the  amount  of  recovery  is  that  the  contractor  should  re- 
cover such  portion  of  the  contract  price,  as  the  value  of  the 
work  done  bears  to  the  value  Avhich  it  would  have  had,  had  it 
been  done  aeeording'  to  contract.^ 

§  530.     Quasi  contractual  rights  in  case  of  defective  performance. 

Tf  the  contract  has  not  l)een  performed  in  at  least  a  substantial 
manner,  the  contractor  cqunot  recover  the  reasonable  value  of  the 
work  done  bv  him.  io-norin<i-  th(>  contract  price,  and  have  an  assess- 
ment levied  for  such  compensation,  in  the  absence  of  some  statute 
specifically  autbori/inn'  such  recovery.^  Thus,  if  tbe  ori^'inal  con- 
tractor A  performs  in  part  and  then  makes  defaidt  and  B  is  em- 
ployed to  fiuish  the  work,  A  cannot,  by  mandamus,  compel  the 
city  to  levy  au  iisspssiment  to  raise  the  difference  ])etween  the 
contract  price  for  which  A  agreed  to  do  the  work  and  the  price 
that  was  paid  to  B.-  Since  the  leg'islature  may  fj-ive  such  effect 
as  it  pleases  to  ])reach  of  contract  on  the  part  of  the  contractor, 
it  may  be  provided  l)y  statute  that  in  case  of  non-performance 
the  contractor  may  recover  reasonable  compensation  for  the  w»;rk 
done  by  him.''  not  exceedinji'  the  contract  price."*  The  mere  fact 
that  the  property  owner  has  made  use  of  an  improvement  such  as 
a  street,"  which  is  situated  upon  proi^erty  the  fee  of  wliich  be- 
lonjrs  to  such  abuttinjr  owner  and  wbich  tlie  owner  cannot  keep 


"  Bond  V.  flavor  and  Common 
Council  of  Newark,  10  X.  .T.  Eq.  (4 
C.  E.  (Jrcen)  37(5  [18G9];  (A  suit 
by  the  j)ropert_v  owner  to  enjoin  the 
city  from  paying  tlie  contractor.) 

"Creamer  v.  Bates,  49  Mo.  523 
[18721. 

'City     and     County    of    Denver    v. 

Hindry.  —  Cohi.  ,  90  Pac.   1028 

[10071;  Citv  of  Auburn  v.  State  cx 
rel.    First    National     Bank,    —    Tnd. 

.   83   N.   E.   907    [19081;    Neill   v. 

Trans-Atlantic  ^lortjiape  Trust  Com- 
pany. S9  :\lo.  App.  (544  [10011: 
Traders"  Bank  v.  Payne.  .'U  ^lo.  Apj). 


.512;  Calbreath  v.  Newton.  30  Mo. 
App.  381    [18871. 

-City    of   Auburn    v.    State    ex    rel. 

Fir.st   National    Bank.    —    Ind. . 

83  N.  E.  007  [10081:  (The  contract 
contained  a  provision  that  the  city 
niiirht  annul  the  contract  if  prot^ress 
by  the  contractor  was  unsatisfac- 
tory.) 

H'ity  of  Davenport  v.  Allen.  120 
Fed.  172  [10031:  (,)u.st  v.  .Tohnson, 
.58  Mo.  App.  54. 

*  (Jiiest  V.  Johnson.  58   Mo.  54. 

"Neill  V.  Trans-Atlantic  ^Fortpajre 
'l"rii^t  Cnnipany.  S!t  Mo.  Ajjp.  044 
119011. 


§  531  TAXATIOX    BY    ASSESSMENT.  840 

from  using  except  by  abandoning  his  property,''  does  not  render 
such  owner  liable  on  the  theory  of  quasi  contract.  If  the  con- 
tractor alleges  performance  and  sues  to  enforce  the  assessment 
upon  the  theory  of  performance  he  cannot  recover  in  that  action 
for  a  reasonable  compensation  for  labor  and  material.'  Under  a 
statute  allowing  recovery  for  only  the  actual  value  of  the  work 
done,  if  performance  is  not  had  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
the  contract,  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  contract  is  wholly  ig- 
nored and  such  contract  is  itself  valid  and  enforceable,  no  recov- 
ery can  be  had  either  on  the  contract  or  in  quasi  contract.*  Thus, 
if  time  is  of  the  essence  of  the  contract  and  the  contract  has  not 
been  performed  within  the  time  limited,  it  has  been  held  that  no 
recovery  for  work  done  can  be  had  in  an  action  for  work,  labor 
and  materials.'' 

§  531.     Acceptance  by  public  corporation  conclusive. 

Under  many  statutes  the  public  corporation  or  some  designated 
officer  or  set  of  officers  thereof  is  made  the  sole  .judge  to  determine 
questions  arising  as  to  the  construction  of  public  improvements 
including  questions  concerning  the  performance  of  contracts  for 
such  construction.^  The  city  council  is  often,  by  statute,  made 
the  sole  .judge  to  determine  questions  of  performance.-  Under 
such  statutes,  if  the  public  corporation  or  the  proper  officer  there- 
of accepts  the  work  done  as  a  full  and  complete  performance  of 
the  contract,  such  acceptance  is  final  and  conclusive  in  the  ab- 
sence of  fraud  and  the  property  owner  cannot  show  in  order  to 
resist  an  asesssment.  that  the  work  has  not  been  performed  in  a 
proper  manner.^     Thus,  it  may  be  provided  by  statute  that  the 

'  Neill   V.   Trans-Atlantic   Mortgage  -  Murray    v.    Tucker,    73    Ky.     ( 10 

Trust    Company,    89    Mo.    App.    644  Bush.)    240    [18741;    Harper   v.    City 

[1901].                "  of  Grand   Rapids,    10,5   Mich.   551.   6.3 

'Henian    v.   Larkin.    108    Mo.    App.  N.    W.    517    [18951;    Weston   v.    City 

392.  83  S:  W.   1019    [19041.  of   Syracuse,   158  N.  Y.  274,   70  Am. 

•mcOuiddy    V.    Brannock.    70    Mo.  St.  Eep.  472,  43*1..  R.  A.  678.  53  N. 

App.  535   [18971.  E.    12    [18991. 

"  McOuiddv    V.    Brannock,    70    ]\[o.  ^  Fitzgerald     v.     Walker,     55     Ark. 

App.  535  [1897].  148,   17   S.  W.   702    [1891];   Lambert 

'  Citv  of  Henderson  v.  Lambert.  77  v.   Bates,   137   Cal.   676,   70   Pac.   777 

Ky.    (14   Bush.^    24    [1878];    Harper  [19021;    City  of   Chica'.'O  v.  Hulbert, 

V."  City  of   Grand   Rani''^.    105   Mich.  205    111.    346.    68    X.    E.    786    [1903]; 

551,  63  iST.  W.  517    [18951;    Haley  v.  Do\vney   v.   People   ex    rel.    Raymond. 

City  of  Alton,  152  HI.  113,  38  N.  E.  205    111.    230.    68    X.    E.    807    [1903]; 

750   [1894].  Gage  v.  People  ex   rel.  Raymond,  200 


841 


THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


531 


property  owner  may  appeal  to  a  designated  board  for  the  deter- 
mination of  the  question  whether  the  contractor  has  performed 
the  contract  in  a  proper  manner  or  not ;  and  the  determination  of 
such  board  may  be  made  final/  Such  appeal  may  be  made  inform- 
ally, as  by  filing'  a  written  instrument  protesting  against  the 
acceptance  of  the  work  for  the  reason  that  it  is  not  performed  in 
accordance  with  the  contract,^  or  remonstrating  against  the  accept- 
ance of  the  contract  on  the  grounds  that  the  "contract  has  not 
been  done  according  to  specifications  on  file  in  the  office  of  the 


111.  432.  65  N.  E.  1084  [1903];  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Whidden,  191 
111.  374,  56  L.  R.  A.  905,  61  N.  E. 
133  [1901];  Shannon  v.  Village  of 
Hinsdale,  180  111.  202,  54  X.  E.  181 
[1899];  Craft  v.  Kochersperger,  173 
[11.  G17,  50  N.  E.  1061  [1898];  Cal- 
lister  V.  Kochersperger,  168  111.  334, 
48  N.  E.  156  [1897];  Haley  v.  City 
of  Alton,  152  111.  113,  38  N.  E.  750 
1 1894]  ;  People  ex  rel.  Mannen  v. 
Green,  158  111.  594,  42  X.  E.  163 
[1895];  Fisher  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Kern,  157  111.  85,  41  X.  E.  615 
[1895]:  Ricketts  v.  Village  of  Hyde 
Park,  85  111.  110  [1877];  Lux  and 
Talbott  Stone  Company  v.  Donald- 
son, 162  Ind.  481,  68'  X.  E.  1014 
[1903];  Leakman  v.  Pritchard,  160 
Ind.  24,  66  N.  E.  153  [1902];  Studa- 
baker  v.  Studabaker.  152  Ind.  89, 
51  N.  E.  933  [1898];  Montgomery  v. 
Wasem,  116  Ind.  343.  15  X.  E.  795, 
19  X.  E.  184  [1888]  ;  Simonton  v. 
Hays,  88  Ind.  70  [1882];  Holloran 
V.  Morman,  27  Ind.  App.  309,  59  X. 
E.  869  [1901];  Darnell  v.  Keller,  18 
Ind.  App.  103,  45  X.  E.  676  [1897]: 
Patterson  v.  Baiimer,  43  la.  477 
[1876];     Ferguson    v.    City    of    Cof- 

feyvillo,  —  Kan.  ,  94  Pac.   1010 

[1908]  ;  City  of  Henderson  v.  Lam- 
bert, 77  Ky."  (14  W.  P.  D.  Bush.)  24 
[L878];  Murray  v.  Tucker,  73  Ky. 
(10  Bush.)  241  [1874];  Whitefieid 
V.  Hippie,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  (Ky.)  150, 
11  Ky.  L.  Rep.  .386  [1889]:  Harper 
V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  105  ^lich. 
551,   G3   X.   W.   517    [1S95];    City   of 


Henderson  v.  Lambert,  77  Ky.  (14 
W.  P.  D.  Bush.)  24  [1878];  Dixon 
V.  City  of  Detroit,  86  Mich.  516,  49 
X.  W.  628  [1891];  Motz  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  18  Mich.  494  [1869];  Lieb- 
stein  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  the  City  of  Xewark,  24  X.  J.  Eq. 
(9  C.  E.  Gr.)  200  [1873];  Haven  v. 
INlayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
the  City  of  Xew  York,  173  X."  Y. 
611,  66  X.  E.  1110  [1903];  (affirm- 
ing Havens  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  Xew 
York,  67  App.  Div.  90,  73  N.  Y.  S. 
678  [1901]);  Weston  v.  City  of 
Syracuse,  158  X.  Y,  274,  70  Am.  St. 
Rep.  472,  43  L.  R.  A.  678,  53  X.  E. 
12  [1899];  Ridenour  v.  Baffin,  1 
Handy  (Ohio)  464  [1855];  Duniway 
V.  Portland,  47  Or.  103,  81  Pac.  945 
[1905];  Chance  v.  City  of  Portland, 
26  Ore.  286,  38  Pac.  68  [1894];  City 
of  Philadelphia  to  Use  of  j\Iack,  v. 
Corgas,  ISO  Pa.  St.  296,  36  Atl.  868 
[1897];  Philadelphia  to  Use  v.  Jew- 
ell, 140  Pa.  St.  9,  21  Atl.  239  [1891]  ; 
McKnight  v.  City  of  Pittsburg,  91 
Pa.  St.  (10  Xorris)  273  [1879];  City 
of  Philadelphia  v.  Wistar,  35  Pa.  St. 
(11  Casey)  427  [I860];  Town  of 
Elma  V.  Carney,  9  Wash.  466,  37 
Pac.  707   [1894]". 

*Girvin  v.  Simon.  127  Cal.  491.  59 
Pac.  945  [1900];  Creed  v.  McCombs, 
146  Cal.  449,  80  Pac.  679  [1905]: 
Lambert  v.  Bates,  148  Cal.  146,  82 
Pac.  767   [1905]. 

'Creed  v.  McCombs.  146  Cal.  449, 
80  Pac.  679   [1905]. 


§  532  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  842 

street  superintendent."  '^  Where  the  public  corporation  has  power 
to  determine  questions  of  performance  conclusively,  the  act  of  such 
corporation  in  determining  that  work  done  by  a  property  owner 
in  front  of  his  property  under  an  ordinance  requiring  him  to  do 
so  was  properly  constructed,  was  held  to  be  conclusive  and  not 
subject  to  be  questioned  by  other  property  owners.'^  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  the  officers  of  a  public 
corporation  act  in  good  faith,  does  not  prevent  the  property  own- 
ers from  bringing  a  suit  to  prevent  the  city  from  accepting  the 
work,  paying  the  city's  proportion  of  the  costs  and  issuing  certi- 
ficates for  the  proportion  due  from  the  property  owners  where 
the  contractors  are  acting  in  bad  faith."  In  a  proceeding 
in  which  pure  questions  of  law  are  presented,  such  as  cer- 
tiorari, questions  as  to  the  performance  of  the  contract,  being 
questions  of  fact,  cannot  be  raised.''  Whether  the  decision  of  the 
city  officials  upon  questions  of  the  performance  of  the  contract 
are  administrative  or  judicial  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is 
some  conflict  of  authority  which  turns  in  part  upon  the  wording 
of  the  different  statutes.  Under  some  statutes  the  city  officials 
in  passing  upon  such  questions  are  said  to  act  judicially.^'  Under 
other  statutes  the  city  officials  are  said  to  act  in  an  administrative 
capacity  and  not  in  a  judicial  capacity." 

§  532.     Effect  on  rights  of  property  owners  of  acceptance  by  pub- 
lic corporation. 

In  accordance  with  the  theory  already  given  as  to  the  effect  of 
the  acceptance  of  work  by  the  city  or  other  public  corporation, 
it  has  been  said  that  if  the  public  corporation  has  accepted  the 
work  as  being  in  proper  performance  of  the  contract  under  which 
the  improvement  has  been  constructed,  the  question  of  actual  per- 
formance as  a  matter  of  fact  is  immaterial,^  if  it  cannot  be  shown 

^Girvin  v.  Simon,  127  Cal.  491.  59  "Town   of   Greenwood   v.   State   ex 

Pac.  945  [1900].  rel.  Lawson.   159   Ind.   267,  64  N.  E. 

'Whitefield    v.    Hippie,    12    S.    W.  849     [1902];     Eyermann    v.    Proven- 
Rep.    (Ky.)    150.   11   Ky.  L.  Rep.  386  chere.  15  Mo.  App.  256   [1884]. 
[1889].  1  Emery    v.    Bradford.    29    Cal.    75: 

"Pleasant    v.    City    of    Shreveport,  People    e\-    rel.    Raymond    v.    Whid- 

110  La.  1046.  35  So.  283   [1903].  den,      191      111.    374'.     56     L.     R.     A. 

"  State,  Wilson,  Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  905.    61    X.    E.    133     [1901];    People 

T'ommon  Council  of  the  City  of  Hnd-  ex    rel.    ]\rannen    v.    Green.    158    111. 

son,  32  N.  J.  L.   (3  Vr.)   365   [1867].  594.  42  X.  E.  163   [18951:   Sarber  v. 

^"Lambert   v.   Rates.   137   Cal.   676,  Rankin,   1.54   Ind.   236.   56  X.  E.  225 

70  Viyp.   777    [1902].  [1899]:     Studabaker    v.    Stiidabaker, 


I 


843 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTKACT. 


§533 


that  in  accepting  the  work  the  public  officials  were  guilty  of  fraud 
or  bad  faith.-  The  suggestion  that  fraud  may  invalidate  the 
action  of  the  city  officials  in  accepting  the  performance  of  the 
contract  is  ordinarily  made  in  cases  where  defective  performance 
is  claimed,  but  there  is  no  showing  of  fraud  or  bad  faith." 

§  533.  Acceptance  by  public  corporation  final  unless  different  im- 
provement is  constructed. 
It  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  if  an  improvement  has  been 
constructed  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  public  authorities  and  has 
been  accepted  by  them,  defects  in  performance  are  no  defense  to 
the  assessment  unless  the  improvement  is  a  different  one  from  that 
which  has  been  contracted  for.^     If  the  improvement  contracted 


152  Ind.  89,  51  X.  E.  9.3.3  11898]; 
Racer  v.  State  for  Use  of  Ivhine,  131 
Ind.  393,  31  N.  E.  81  [1891];  Mayor 
and  City  Council  of  Baltimore  v. 
Raymo,  G8  Md.  5(i9,  13  Atl.  383 
[1888];  Dashiell  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore,  Use  of  Hax, 
45  Md.  615  [1876];  Whiting  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  106  Mass.  89  [1870];  Dixon 
V.  City  of  Detroit,  86  Mich.  510,  49 
N.  W.  628  [1891];  Columbia  Bot- 
tom Levee  Company  v.  ileier,  39  Mo. 
53  [1866];  State,  Vanderbeck,  Pros. 
V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council  of 
Jersey  City,  29  N.  J.  L.  (5  Dutch.) 
441  [1861];  In  the  Matter  of  Lewis, 
35  IlDward  (X.  V.  i  102  [1868];  City 
of  rhiladcli)liia  V>  I'sc  i.f  Mack  v. 
(Jorgas,  180  Pa.  St.  290.  .30  Atl.  808 
[1897];  Schenley  v.  Commonwealth 
for  use  of  City  of  Alle^iheny.  30  Pa. 
St.    (12  Casey^)    64   [1859].  ' 

^Holleran  v.  Morman.  27  Ind.  App. 
.309,  59  X.  E.  809  |1901];  Darnell  v. 
Keller,  18  Ind.  App.  103,  45  N.  E. 
676  [1897];  Patterson  v.  Baumer,  43 
la.  477  [1876];  Whiteliold  v.  Hip- 
pie, (Ky.),  12  S.  W.  Rep.  150,  11 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  386  [1889];  Dixon  v. 
City  of  Detroit,  86  Mich.  516.  49  X. 
W.'628  [1891];  Motz  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 18  Mich.  494  [1869];"  In  the 
Matter  of  Lewis,  35  Howard  162 
[1868];   McGlynn   v.  City  of  Toledo. 


22  Ohio  C.  C.  34  [1901];  Chance  v. 
City  of  Portland,  26  Ore.  286,  38 
Pac.  68    [1894]. 

^  Ilolleran  v.  Morman,  27  Ind.  App. 
309,  59  X.  E.  809  [1901];  Darnell  v. 
Keller,  18  Ind.  App.  103,  45  X.  E. 
670  [1897];  Patterson  v.  Baumer, 
43  la.  477  [1876];  Dixon  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  86  IMich.  516,  49  X.  W.  628 
[1891];  Motz  V.  City  of  Detroit,  18 
Mich.  494  [1869];  In  .the  Matter  of 
Lewis,  35  Howard  162  [1868];  Mc- 
Glynn V.  (  ity  of  Toledo,  22  Ohio  C. 
C.  34  linoi"];  Chance  v.  City  of 
Portland,  20  Ore.  286.  38  Pac.  68 
[1894]. 

'Marsliall  v.  People  ex  rel.  Smith, 
219  111.  99,  76  X.  E.  70  [1905]: 
People  ex  rel.  Price  v.  Bridgenian, 
218  111.  508,  75  X.  E.  1057  [1905]; 
P]iilli])s  V.  People  ex  rel.  Coedtner, 
218  HI.  150,  75  X.  E.  1016  [1905]; 
Eustace  V.  People  ex  rel.  Hanberg, 
213  111.  424,  72  X.  E.  1089  [1905]; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Sherman,  212  111. 
498,  72  X.  E.  396  [1904];  City  of 
Chicago  V.  Aj-ers,  212  111.  59,  72  X. 
E.  32  [1904];  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Ilulbert,  205  111.  340.  08  X.  E,  786 
[1903];  Downey  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Raymond,  205  111.  230,  68  X.  E.  807 
[1903];  Wells  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 201  HI.  -135.  (iO  X.  E.  210 
[1903];  (::\<ro  V.  Pe(,p!,.  ox  rel.  Ray- 
mond.   200     II!.    432.    ('5    X.    E.    1084 


533 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


844 


for  has  been  constructed,  but  the  performance  is  defective,  the 
assessment  is  under  this  theory'  not  rendered  invalid  by  reason  of 
such  defect.-  Thus,  if  a  sewer  is  laid  on  a  line  different  from  that 
prescribed,  in  order  to  avoid  interferinfr  with  water  pipes;  and 
the  improvement  as  eonstrneted  is  as  benpficial  to  the  n^or>prty 
o\vners  as  if  it  had  been  laid  on  the  line  prescribed,  such  devia- 
tion does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.^  "Where  a  sewer  is  not 
constructed  on  the  line  indicated  by  the  ordinance,  in  the  absence 
of  proof  that  the  improvement  as  constructed  was  as  beneficial 
as  it  would  have  been  if  constructed  in  accordance  with  the 
contract  and  ordinance,  the  improvement  should  be  reo^arded 
as  a  different  one  from  that  contracted  for  and  the  assessment 
should  be  held  as  invalid.*  Under  a  provision  that  cobble  stones 
used  should  be  uniform  in  quality,  and  broken  so  as  to  pass 
through  a  rins:  four  inches  internal  diameter,  a  sli^fht  deviation  as 
to  the  size  of  such  cobble  stones  does  not  make  the  improvement 
a  different  one.'  The  fact  that  the  curb  and  fjutter  are  five  inches 
thick  instead  of  six  inches  thick  and  that  the  crushed  stone  which 
by  the  ordinance  was  to  pa.ss  throus:h  a  rin?  of  an  internal  dia- 
meter of  three  inches,  was  some  of  it  a  little  largfer  than  such 
size,  does  not  render  the  improvement  a   different  one.^     So  the 


[1903];  Gage  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 193  111.  316.  56  L.  R.  A.  916, 
61  N.  E.  1045  [1901];  People  ex  rel. 
Raymond  v.  Church.  192  111.  302,  61 
N.  E.  496  [1901]:  People  ex  rel. 
Ravmond  v.  Whidden.  191  111.  374, 
56  L.  R.  A.  905,  61  N.  E.  133  [1901] ; 
McManus  v.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond, 
183  111.  391.  55  X.  E.  886  [1899]; 
Church  V.  People  ex  rel.  Kocher- 
spern-er,  174  111.  36B.  51  X.  E.  747 
[1898]  ;  Craft  v.  Kochersperger,  173 
111.  617,  50  X.  E.  1061  [1898]:  Hein- 
roth  V.  Kochersperffer,  173  111.  205, 
50  X.  E.  171  [18981;  Calli.ster  v. 
Kochersperwr.  168  111.  334,  48  X. 
E.  156  [18971:  Ferris  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 162  111.  Ill,  44  X.  E.  436 
[1896];  Pells  v.  People  ex  rel.  Holm- 
grain,  159  111.  580,  42  X.  E.  784 
[1896];  People  ex  rel.  Mannen  v. 
Green,  158  111.  594,  42  X.  E.  163 
[1895]. 
^Marshall  v.  People  ex  rel.  Smith 


219  111.  99,  76  X.  E.  70  [1905];  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Price  v.  Bridgeman,  218 
111.  568,  75  X.  E.  1057  [1905];  City 
of  Chicago  v.  Sherman,  212  111.  498, 
72  X.  E.  396  [1904];  Wells  v.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Raymond.  201  111.  435,  66 
X.  E.  210  [1903];  People  ex  rel. 
Raymond  v.  Church,  192  111.  302,  61 
X.  E.  496  [1901];  People  ex  rel. 
Raymond  v.  Whidden.  191  111.  374, 
56'  L.  R.  A.  905.  61  X.  E.  133 
[1901];  Churcli  V.  People  ex  rel. 
Kochersperger,  li^4  111.  366,  51  X.  E. 
747   [1898]^ 

^People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Church 
192   111.  302,  61  X.  E.  496   [1901]. 

*  Church  V.  People  ex  rel.  Kocher- 
sperger. 174  III.  366,  51  X.  E.  747 
[189S]. 

^  People  ex  rel.  Price  v.  Bridge- 
man.  218  111.  568.  75  X.  E.  1057 
[1905]. 

"City  of  Chicago  v.  Sherman.  212 
111.  498,  72  X.  E.  396   [1904]. 


i 


845 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§  53a 


use  of  less  cement  than  that  specified  iu  the  contract ;  the  failure 
to  use  Portland  cement ;  the  use  of  lime  screenings  in  place  of 
sand;  and  failure  to  plaster  the  curb  walls  down  far  enough,  do 
not  make  the  improvement  a  different  one/  So  an  improvement 
is  the  same  as  that  specified,  although  the  cement  is  inferior  in 
quality  to  that  provided  for  **  or  the  sidewalk  is  two  or  three 
inches  shorter  than  that  provided  for  and  of  a  softer  stone. ^ 
Under  this  theory,  acceptance  by  the  city  of  an  improvement 
which  is  in  effect  a  different  one  from  that  provided  for,  does  not 
render  the  assessment  for  such  improvement  valid. ^"  Thus,  if  a 
different  street  is  improved  from  that  provided  for."  or  the  width 
is  increased,^-  as  from  fifty  to  sixty-four  feet,'"''  or  if  it  is  reduc(^d 
from  sixty-one  feet  to  fifty-three  feet,^"^  the  improvement  has 
been  held  to  be  in  legal  effect  a  different  one  from  that  contracted 
for.  Under  a  contract  for  macadamizing  a  road,  the  construc- 
tion of  a  road  out  of  a  mixture  of  clay,  gravel,  limestone  and 
slag,  which  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  a  dirt  road,  is  in  effect 
the  construction  of  a  different  improvement.'"'  So  if  in  a  street 
improvement  the  grade  is  changed  several  feet  and  the  cost  is 
thereby  materially  increased,  such  improvement  is  regarded  as 
in  effect  a  different  one.'" 


'People  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Wliid- 
den,  191  111.  374,  56  L.  R.  A.  905, 
61  N.  E.  133   [1901]. 

"Wells  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond. 
201    111.  435.  (it)  N.  E.  210  [19031. 

"Marshall  v.  Poojilc  ex  rel.  Smith. 
219  111.  99,  76  X.  K.  To   |1 !)().-)  |. 

^"Phillips  V.  People  ex  rel.  (ioedt- 
ner,  218  III.  450.  75  X.  E.  lOlG 
[1905];  Eustace  v.  People  ex  j-el. 
Hanberjr,  213  111.  424,  72  N.  E.  1089 
[1905];  City  of  Chicago  v.  Ayers, 
212  111.  59.'  72  N.  E.  32  [1904]; 
Gage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond.  200 
111.  432,  65  X.  E.  1084  [1903]; 
Yonng  V.  Peopl;^  ex  rel.  Raymond, 
196  111.  603,  63  X.  E.  1075;  fJaire  v. 
People  ex  rel.  Raymond.  193  111.  316, 
56  L.  R.  A.  916,  61  N.  E.  1045 
[1901];  Church  v.  People  ex  rel. 
Kochersperger,  174  111.  366.  51  X.  E. 
747    [1898];    Ferris   v.   Citv   of   Chi- 


cago, 162  111.  111.  44  X.  E.  436 
[1896];  Pells  v.  IVoi)le  ex  rel.  Ilolm- 
grain.  159  111.  580,  42  X.  E.  784 
[1890]. 

"  Ferris  v.  City  of  Chicago,  162 
111.   HI.  44  X.   E."  436    [1896]. 

'-(  ity  of  Cliicago  v.  Avers.  212 
111.  59.  72  X.   E.  32    [1904]". 

'Mity  (if  Chicajro  v.  .^\('rs.  212 
111.   59.   72   X'.   E.   32    [1904]. 

"Pells  V.  People  ex  rel.  Ilolm- 
grain.  ].">9  111.  MO.  42  X.  E.  784 
[1891)]. 

'^Cage  V.  Peo])le  ex  rel.  Ravniond. 
200  111.  432.  65  X.  E.  1084  [1903]; 
Cage  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond,  193 
111.  316.  56  L.  R.  A.  916,  61  X.  E. 
1045    [1901]. 

'"Eustace  V.  People  ex  rel.  Ilan- 
le- '.  21:5  111.  424,  72  X.  E.  10S9 
[1905]. 


§  534  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  846 

§  534.     Acceptance  induced  by  fraud  or  mistake. 

It  has  also  been  suggested  that  either  bad  faith  or  probable 
mistake  might  invalidate  the  action  of  the  officers  of  a  public 
corporation  in  determining  that  the  contract  has  been  performed 
but  that  in  the  absence  of  either  bad  faith  or  probable  mistake, 
such  determination  is  final. ^  What  constitutes  fraud  is  a  ques- 
tion upon  which  there  is  some  conflict  of  authority.  If  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  public  officials  who  accepted  the  performance  of 
the  contract  were  acting  in  collusion  with  the  contractor  by  whom 
the  improvement  was  constructed,  fraud  exists.-  If  the  evidence 
falls  short  of  establishing  this  state  of  facts,  it  is  difficult  in  some 
jurisdictions  to  make  it  a  case  of  fraud.  Thus  a  fraudulent  com- 
bination between  the  engineer  and  the  committee  of  the  council 
who  were  influential  members  of  such  body  to  keep  the  facts  from 
the  council  and  thus  to  procure  the  acceptance  of  the  improvement 
by  the  council  has  been  held  not  to  amount  to  fraud,  although  the 
contractor  was  a  party  to  such  combination.^  So  the  combination 
of  the  contractors  and  the  city  engineer  to  make  fraudulent  rep- 
resentations to  the  bdard  of  public  works  with  reference  to  the 
performance  of  the  contract,  which  representations  were  believed 
by  the  board  and  upon  which  the  board  acted  in  good  faith  in 
accepting  performance  was  held  not  to  amount  to  fraud.*  In 
other  jurisdictions  a  false  certificate  by  a  street  commissioner  with 
reference  to  the  rate  at  which  the  work  is  done  under  a  contract 
has  been  held  to  amount  to  fraud  so  as  to  invalidate  the  assess- 
ment.'^ The  acceptance  by  the  public  corporation  of  performance 
which  is  clearly  and  grossly  defective  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions 
to  amount  to  fraud  so  that  an  assessment  for  such  work  is  invalid." 
Thus,  under  a  contract  for  covering  a  road  with  an  even  surface 
of  broken  stone  to  a  depth  of  six  inches  so  as  to  preserve  an  even 
surface,-  putting  on  stone  varying  from  six  inches  to  a  foot  in 
diameter  each,  and  laid  so  roughly  that  teams  could  not  pass  over 

'  Town  of  Elma  v.  Carney,  9  Wash.  '  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

466,  37  Pae.  707   [1894].    "  Beekman,    18    Howard    (N.    Y.)    460 

^  Board    of    Commissioners    of    La-  [1859], 

porte  County  v.  Wolff,  —  Ind.  ,  "  McCain    v.    City    of    Des    Moines. 

72  N.  E.  860  [19041.  128  Iowa  331,  103  k  W.  979  [1905]; 

^Lux   and  Talbott  Stone   Company  Liebstein     v.     Mayor     and     Common 

V.    Donaldson.    162    Tnd.    481,    68    N.  Council    of    the    City    of   Newark,    24 

E.   1014   [1903].  N.  J.  Eq.    (9  C.  E.  Gr.)    200   [1873]; 

'Duniway  v.  Portland.  47  Or.   103,  Haiscli   v.   City  of   Senttle,   10   Wash. 

81  Pac.  94.5   [190,5].  435,  38  Pae.   1131    [1894]. 


847  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §§  535-537 

it,  was  held  to  be  so  gross  a  breach  that  acceptance  thereof  was 
fraudulent."  However,  acceptance  of  a  gutter  three  feet  wide  in- 
stead of  one  fear  feet  wide  as  reciuired  by  contract  has  been  said 
to  be  conclusive.* 

§  535.     Acceptance  by  public  corporation  not  final. 

In  sonu'  jurisdictions  the  acceptance  of  an  improvement  by  a 
public  corporation  is  not  conclusive.^  Under  other  statutes  the 
acceptance  of  work  b.y  the  city  is  only  prima  facie  evidence  that 
the  work  has  been  performed  substantially  in  accordance  with 
the  terms  of  the  contract.- 

§  536.     Acceptance  or  rejection  of  w^ork  as  affecting  contractor. 

The  granting  of  power  to  the  city  to  accept  work/  also  author- 
izes it  to  protect  the  property  owners  by  rejecting  the  work  in  a 
proper  case.-  By  statute  the  contractor  cannot  recover  unless 
the  county  court  finds  that  the  improvement  has  been  completed 
in  substantial  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  ordinance.^  A 
city  cannot  refuse  to  accept  an  improvement  for  immaterial  de- 
fects in  performance.* 

§  537,     Official  certificate  of  performance. 

Under  some  statutes  provision  is  made  for  a  certificate  of  the 
performance  of  the  contract  to  be  issued  by  some  specific  public 
officer  when  he  finds  that  the  contract  has  in  fact  been  performed.^ 
The  purpose  and  effect  of  such  certificate  differs  under  different 


'  Schunini  v.  Seymour,  24  N.  J.  Eq.  '  Li('l)stcin    v.    MavDr    and    Common 

(9   C.  E.  Gr.)    143    [187.31.  Council    of    tlic    City    of    Newark,    24 

«Whitefipl(l    V.    Hii)i)lo,    12    S.    W.  X.  .T.  Eq.    (!)  C.   E.'cr.i    200   [18731. 

■Rop.    (Ky.)    1-iO.   11    Ky.  L.  Rop.  386  =  Sclmiiim     v.     Seymour,    24    N.    J. 

[188ni.    "  K<1.    (!)   C.   E.   (;r.)     143    [18731. 

'City  of  St.  .loscph  V.  Anthony,  30  ''Case  v.  City  of  Sullivan,  222   111. 

Mo.    r)37    IlStid):    Toledo    for    Use    v.  5(1,   78   N.    E.    37    IHtOtll;     (amrniinn;. 

Grassor.    7    Oliio    X.    P.    390    [18831:  Case    v.    City    of    Sullivan.     123    III. 

repj)er    v.    City    of     Pliiladel|)liia    to  A])p.   (i71.) 

Use  of  Horter.  114  Pa.  St.  m.  0  Atl.  MVliitwortli  v.  W CI)!)  City.  204  Mo. 

899     [188(11:     P,('r\vin<l     v.    Galveston  .-)79,    103   S.    \V.   Si;    11!)071. 

and    ITouston     luvestnieiit     Company,  '  Selierm    v.    Short.    77    S.    \V.    3.)7. 

20  T<-\.  Civ.   App.  420.  50  S.  W.  413  i_'.5    Ky.   Law   Pej).    llOS    [19031;    Dix- 

[ISOHl:    Ilaisrh  v.  City  of  Seattle.   I'i  ..n    v.   Lahry,  2r^   Ky.  Law  Rop.   1079, 

Wash.  43.->.  38  Pac.   lisi    [18941.  7S  S.  W.  4.30   [19041. 

=  Culi('l<    V.    Connely,    42    Ind.     l."!l 
[18731. 


§  537  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  848 

statutes.  Under  some  statutes  such  certificate  is  necessary 
as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  validity  of  the  assessment,- 
or  to  the  issuing  of  bonds  which  are  to  be  paid  out  of 
the  fund  raised  by  assessment."  Under  such  statutes,  the 
certificate,  to  be  valid,  must  show  substantially  that  the 
proper  officer  has  determined  as  a  fact  that  the  work  as  per- 
formed is  substantially  that  provided  for  by  the  contract.*  Thus 
a  certificate  of  an  engineer  which  states  that  in  his  office  there  is 
a  record  of  another  certificate  which  shows  that  the  work  of  grad- 
ing in  question  was  examined  and  found  to  be  practically  right  for 
official  line  and  grade  is  insufficient.'  A  certificate  showing  that  a 
contract  as  modified  has  been  performed  is  sufficient,  if  such  modi- 
fication is  valid."  Under  some  statutes  it  is  provided  that  such 
certificate  must  be  recorded.'  Where  such  requirement  exists,  a 
diagram  on  the  back  of  the  certificate  which  is  necessary  to  an 
understanding  of  the  work  performed  and  of  that  unperformed, 
must  be  recorded  and  its  omission  is  fatal.*  If  the  statute  re- 
quires the  certificate  to  be  recorded  with  the  assessment,  record- 
ing it  in  a  small  book  in  which  no  assessments  were  recorded,  with- 
out any  reference  thereto  in  the  assessment  records,  is  insufficient.'' 
On  the  other  hand,  immaterial  omissions  in  recording  the  assess- 
ment are  inoperative.  Thus,  omitting  the  words  "depth  being  0. 
K. "  is  immaterial  where  the  depth  is  shown  in  the  recorded 
certificate.^"  Where  the  certificate  of  record  shows  by  reference 
to  the  page  of  the  record  that  all  the  proper  documents  including 
the  engineer's  certificate  have  been  recorded,  the  fact  that  in 
enumerating  the  documents  recorded  the  engineer's  certificate  is 
omitted  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment. ^^  Only  the  officer 
authorized  by  statute  may  sign  such  certificate.^-     Thus,  a  certi- 

-  Obermeyer   v.   Patterson,    130   Cal.  '  Buckman    v.    Cuneo,    10.3    Cal.    62, 

531,   fi2  Pac.   926    [1900]:    Fvenna   v.  36  Pac.  1025   [1894]. 

Sunnyside    Land    Company,    124    Cal.  *  Buckman   v.    Cuneo,    103    Cal.    62. 

437,    57    Pac.    302    [1899]-,     Case    v.  36  Pac.  1025   [1894]. 

City  of   Sullivan,   222  111.   56,   78  X.  "Bauer  v.  Lowe,    107   Cal.   229,  40 

E.  37  [1906].  Pac.  337   [1895]. 

Kase  V.  City  of  Sullivan.   222   III.  "  Moffit    v.    Jordan,    127    Cal.    622, 

56,  78  N.  E.  37    [1906].  60  Pac.   173    [1900]. 

^Obermeyer  v.   Patterson,    130  Cal.  "Greenwood  v.   Chandon,    130   Cal. 

531,  62  Pac.  926   [1900].  467,  62  Pac.  736   [1900]. 

=  Obermeyer  v.  Patterson,   130   Cal.  ^- Bauer  v.  Lowe,   107   Cal.  229,  40 

531,  62  Pac.  926  [1900].  Pac.   337    [1895];    Frenna   v.   Sunny- 

°^Yeston   v.   City   of   Syracuse.    158  side  Land  Company,  124  Cal.  437,  57 

X.   Y.   274,   70   Am.   St.  Bep.  472,  43  Pac.  302   [1899]. 
L.   K.  A.   678,   53  N.   E.    12    [1899]. 


849 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§537 


ficate  signed  not  by  the  officer  nor  b}'  a  deputy,  but  by  a  mere 
clerk  in  the  office/^  or  by  an  employe  who  did  the  surveying 
and  measuring  certified  to,^*  is  insufficient.  A  certificate  signed 
by  all  the  members  of  the  board  of  public  works  has  been  held  to 
be  sufficient,  although  the  president  and  secretary  also  have  au- 
thority to  sign  such  certificate.^"  If  by  statute  the  deputy  or  depu- 
ties of  the  board  are  authorized  to  receive  and  reject  work,  and 
the  board  in  electing  the  chief  engineer,  authorized  him  to  accept 
or  reject  work,  the  assistant  engineer  appointed  by  the  board  may, 
while  acting  in  place  of  the  chief  engineer,  accept  such  work.^'' 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  proper  officials  arbitrarily  refuse  a  cer- 
tificate the  contractor  may  recover  without  waiting  to  obtain 
same.^'  Thus,  where  out  of  a  board  of  three,  one  examined  the 
work  and  accepted  it.  while  the  other  two  refused  to  examine  it, 
it  was  held  that  the  contractor  might  enforce  the  assessment  there- 
for, if  the  work  was  in  fact  properly  performed."  A  certificate  of 
full  performance  is  not  necessary,  however,  unless  required  by 
statute.^"  If  the  statute  does  not  make  such  certificate  a  condi- 
tion precedent  to  the  validity  of  the  assessment,  the  approval  of 
the  proper  officer  is  sufficient  without  a  formal  certificate  of  per- 
formance.-" Under  some  statutes  certificates  are  to  be  filed  l)y 
certain  officers  for  the  benefit  of  other  officers  to  enable  the  latter 
to  determine  whether  the  contract  has  been  performed  or  not. 
Such  statutes  are  purely  directory  and  not  mandatory.     If  the 

40 


"Raupr  V.  Lnwo.   107   Cal.  220. 
Pac.  337    [1895]. 

'*  Frenna  v.  Sunnysido  Land  Coni- 
pany,  124  Cal.  4.37.  57  Pac.  302 
[1899]. 

1=  AT,.n(.f(.(.  V.  r.ell.  fi2  :\r(i.  A])]).  059 
[1895]. 

"'•  Riehardson  v.  ^lelilor.  111  Ky. 
408,  03  S.  W.  957,  23  Ky.  Law  Pop. 
917  [1901];  (If  his  power  is  doubt- 
ful the  subsoquent  action  of  the 
board  in  approving  liis  report  oper- 
ates  as   a   ratification.) 

"  Xeenan  v.  Donofxhue,  50  ^lo.  493 
[1872];  "If  he  has  performed  his 
contract  he  is  entitled  to  pay.  and 
wliether  there  lias  been  a  perform- 
ance is  a  question  of  fact  to  bo  deter- 
mined upon  by  {sic)  the  evidence. 
It  is  true  that  if  a  party  makes  a 
contract  he  must   abide  by  it  before 


he  can  recover  on  it;  and  if  an  ap- 
pi'oval  by  an  outside  party  is  made  a 
eonrlition  precedent,  such  an  approv- 
al must  be  obtained  in  a  suit  upon 
the  contract.  But  here  the  action  is 
not  founded  upon  the  contract.  The 
contract  is  merely  used  as  an  instru- 
ment of  proof,  and  if  the  plaintiff 
shows  that  he  has  done  the  work  un- 
der the  ajjreement,  lie  should  be  per- 
mitted to  recover  whatever  ho  may 
show  himself  justly  entitled  to." 
Xeenan  v.  Donoghue.  50  Mo.  493, 
495   [1872]. 

"*  Xeenan  v.  Donouhue,  50  !Mo.  493 
[1872]. 

"•Gray  v.  Lucas.  115  Cal.  430,  47 
Pac.  354   [189(;]. 

=°Fell  v.  Philadeljihia  to  the  X'.se 
of  Cunnin-iham.  81  Pa.  St.  (31  P  T. 
Smith)    58    [187«L 


§  537  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  850 

officer,  for  whose  benefit  the  certificate  in  question  was  to  be  filed, 
does  not  refuse  to  act  on  account  of  the  failure  to  file  such  certi- 
ficate the  property  owner  cannot  object  to .  such  failure.^^  A 
statute  requirino:  an  entry  of  the  due  performance  of  a  contract 
for  street  work  upon  the  record  of  the  superintendent  of  streets, 
is  regarded  as  being  for  the  benefit  of  other  public  officials  and  as 
directory  merely.-  Accordingly,  omission  to  make  such  entry 
does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.-"'  Under  some  statutes  the 
certificate  of  performance  is  merely  prima  facie  evidence  of  the 
proper  performance  of  the  contract.-*  Under  such  statutes  the 
amount  of  the  assessment  may  be  reduced  by  the  court,  below 
that  fixed  in  the  certificates,  if  the  latter  amount  is  too  large.-^ 
Under  some  statutes  such  certificates  have  been  held  not  to  be 
binding  upon  the  city  as  conclusive,  and  if  the  city  ignores  such 
certificate  and  decides  that  the  contract  has  not  been  performed, 
such  decision  is  not  binding  upon  the  contractor.-"  Under  some 
statutes,  however,  such  certificate  is  conclusive  unless  it  can  be 
shown  that  it  was  given  in  fraud  and  collusion.-^  Even  under  such 
statutes  the  existence  of  fraud  or  collusion  or  bad  faith  invalidates 
the  certificate.-'*  Thus,  where  the  proper  board  rejected  a  part  of 
the  work,  w^ithheld  part  of  the  compensation,  took  a  bond  from  the 
contractor  to  perform  the  rest  of  such  contract  and  then  gave 
him  a  certificate  of  performance,  such  certificate  was  held  to  be 
invalid.-"  By  statute  in  some  jurisdictions  the  certificate  of  some 
specific  officers,  such  as  the  superintendent  of  streets,^"  is  made 

"^  Duncan  v.  Ramish.   142  Cal.  686.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  the  City  of  New  York, 

76    Pac.    661    [1904];    Reid    v.    Clay,  35    Howard     (N.    Y.)      162     [1868]; 

134   Cal.   207,   66   Pac.   262    [1901].  Ridenour   v.   Baffin,    1   Handy    (Ohio) 

"Brady    v.    Bartlett,    56    Cal.    350  464    [1855];    People   of   the   State   of 

[1880].  New    York    ex    rel.    Ready    v.    Mayor 

-''  Brady    v.    Bartlett,    56    Cal.    350  and  Common   Coimcil   of  the  City  of 

[1880].    "  Syracuse,    65    Hun.    (N.   Y.)    321.   20 

^'Jenkins   v.   Stetler.    118   Ind.   275,  N.  Y.  Supp.  236   [1892]. 

20  N.  E.  788  [1888];  Barber  Asphalt  =' In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

Paving  Company  v.   Gosfreve,   41   La.  Wood,  51   Barb.    (N.  \.)    275    [1868]. 

Ann.   251,   5   So.   848    [1889].  =«  In  the  Matter  of  tlie  Petition  of 

==S.   D.   Moody   &   Co.   v.   Sewerage  Wood,  51  Barb.    (N.  Y.)    275   [1868]. 

and    Water    Board,    117    La.    360,    41  =""  Williams  v.   Bero-in,   116  Cal.  56. 

So.  C49   [1906].  47     Pac.     877      [1897];      Diggins     v. 

"^  Reilly  v.  City  of  Albany,  40  Hun.  Hartsliorne,    108    Cal.    154,    41    Pac. 

405    [1886].          "                     '  283    [1895];    Warren  v.   Riddell,    106 

"Case    V.    City    of    Sullivan.    222  Cal.  352,  39  Pac.  781    [1895] ;  Perine 

HI.   56,   78   N.  e!   37    [1906];    In  the  v.  Forbush,  97  Cal.  305.  32  Pac.  226 

Matter    of    the    Petition    of    Lewis   v.  [1893];     Frick    v.    Morford,    87    Cal. 


851  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  537 

conclusive  upon  questions  of  performance  as  against  the  property 
owners  in  the  absence  of  fraud.  If  the  property  owner  is  dis- 
satisfied with  such  certificate,  his  only  remedy  is  to  appeal  to 
the  body  designated  l)y  statute.  The  determination  of  such  ([ues- 
tion  upon  appeal  is  final  and  if  appeal  is  not  taken  the  certificate 
is  regarded  as  correct. •'''  As  loug  as  the  contract  is  one  which 
the  city  had  power  to  make  and  the  question  is  merely  one  of 
performance,  appeal  is  necessary.''-  Thus,  the  fact  that  unchn-  a 
contract  to  grade  a  .street  the  wrong  grade  is  assumed  as  the  offi- 
cial grade,  does  not  defeat  the  assessment  if  the  work  is  approved 
by  the  .street  superintendent  and  no  appeal  is  taken."'''  The  de- 
termination of  the  city  council  on  appeal  that  the  work  has  been 
performed  is  final.^*  In  case  of  fraud,  however,  acceptance  by 
the  .superint(uident  is  not  controlling.^'^  Thus,  where  under  speci- 
fications requiring  the  use  of  one  barrel  of  cement  to  each  ])arre] 
of  sand,  fifteen  per  cent,  more  sand  was  used  than  the  specifica- 
tions called  for.  acceptance  by  the  superintendent  was  not  con- 
clusive if  fraud  on  his  part  was  shown.'"''  The  acceptance  of 
work  l)y  an  officer  under  such  a  statute  is  said  not  to  l)e  a  judicial 
act.^^  Accordingly,  he  may  subsecpientiy  correct  an  erroneous 
decision  with  reference  to  such  work  which  he  has  ma(h»  in  conse- 
quence of  a  clerical  error."'^  A  certificate  which  sliows  that  the 
work  has  been  accepted  is  not  avoided  by  a  detailed  statement 
of  the  reasons  therefor."''     Thus,  a  street  superintendent  accepted 

576.  2.5  Pac.  704   [18911  ;   .Toniiin^s  V.  busli,     07     (al.     .^O.i.     .^2     Pao.     220 

Le   Breton.    80    (al.    8.   21    Pae.    1127  [18031;     Frick    v.    Morfonl.    87    fal. 

[18801;    Dunne    v.    .\lt-eluil,    57    C'al.  570.    25    Pac.    704    [1801];    Emery    v. 

472    [18811;    Cncliran    v.    Collins.    29  Bradford.  29  (a).   75    [18ti51. 

Cal.  1.30   [18051:   Emery  v.  Bradford,  '^Varren   v.   Piddell,    100  Cal.   ,3.52. 

29  Cal.  75   [18051.  .39   Pac.   781    [18951. 

"Dii^-Tins    V.    TIartsliorne.    108    Cal.  '' Lanihert    v.    Bates.    137    Cal.    070. 

154,  41    Pac.  283    [18951;    Warren  v.  70  Pac.  777. 

Riddell,    100    Cal.    352,    39    Pac.    781  ^»  ^IcVerry   v.    Kidwell.  iV.]   Cal.   240 

[18951;    Perine    v.    Forhn^li.    97    Cal.  [18831. 

305,    32    Pac.    220    [18931;     Krick    v.  '"  MeVerry   v.    Kidwell.   C,:!   Ciil.   240 

Morford.    87    Cal.    570.    25     Tac.    704  [18831;       ( Eurtliermore.      seven      j)er 

[18011;    .Tenniiii's    v.    !.(>    Breton.    80  cent,    of    the    bricks   were    of    inferior 

Cal.    8.    21    Pae.    1127    [1880];    Sliep-  <iuality.) 

ard    V.    McXeill.    38    C;il.    73    IISCOI;  ■■"  Eyermann      v.      Proveneliere.      15 

C<;cliran      v.      Collins.'    29      Cal.      130  Mo.  App.  25t>   [1S841. 

[1S()51;    En;ery    v.    Bradford,   29   Cal.  •'^'*  Eyermann      v.      Proveneliere.      1." 

75    [18051.  Mo.   Ajip.  2.50    [18841. 

'=  Warren   v.    Itiddcll.    100  Cal.   352.  'Mladley    v.    D:\<:uo.    130    Cal.    207, 

39    Pac.    781    [18951;    Perine    v.    For-  02   Pac.   .500    [1900]. 


§  538  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  852 

certain  work.  On  appeal,  the  city  council  vacated  sue",  as.sess- 
ment  and  ordered  the  contractor  to  complete  the  work  required 
by  the  contract  under  the  direction  of  the  city  council  and  ordered 
the  superintendent  to  accept  the  same  when  completed.  When 
the  completed  Avork  was  accented  hv  councd  the  superintendent 
gave  a  formal  written  acceptance  of  the  work,  but  endorsed  upon 
the  assessment  the  statement  that  the  work  was  performed  under 
the  supervision  of  the  council  and  accented  bv  the  council;  that 
it  was  not  done  under  his  control  or  supervision  and  was  not  ac- 
cepted by  him;  that  he  had  no  responsibilitv  therefor.  It  was 
held  that  such  endorsement  could  not  nualifv  the  effect  of  the  for- 
mal acceptance.***  In  the  absence  of  some  specific  statutory  pro- 
vision the  mere  lapse  of  time  between  the  acceptance  of  the 
w^ork  and  the  issuino^  of  the  assessment  does  not  invalidate  the 
assessment.*^  Under  some  statutes  such  certificates  are  binding 
only  as  between  the  city  and  the  contractor  and  have  no  effect  with 
reference  to  the  property  owner  to  be  assessed.*-  The  fact  that 
in  a  suit  between  the  citv  and  the  contractor  the  city  has  alleged 
that  the  certificate  of  expense  of  the  imi^rovement  is  false,  does 
not  conclusively  establish  the  invalidity  of  such  certificate  as  be- 
tween the  city  and  the  property  owners.*^  The  action  of  a  pub- 
lic officer  in  accepting  an  improvement  is  final  only  as  to  the  mat- 
ters which  he  has,  by  statute,  power  to  determine.  To  constitute 
an  accepted  street,  the  street  must  be  accepted  to  the  full  width 
thereof,  when  approved  under  regulations  adopted  by  the  council 
specifying  the  character  of  work  to  be  done.  Acceptance  of  work 
done  on  a  street  is  not  sufficient  to  make  the  street  an  accepted 
street  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  requiring  the  city  to  im- 
prove streets  after  they  are  accepted.** 

§  538.     Necessity  of  performance  within  time  limited. 

"Whether  failure  to  perform  a  contract  Avithin  the  time  specified 
by  the   contract   or  the   ordinance   authorizing   the   improvement 

^'Hadley   v.   Daffue,    130    Cal.    207,  '       "Haven   v.   Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

62  Pftc.  500   [1900].  Commonalty    of    the     City    of    New 

"Williams  v.  "Bergin,   116   Cal.   56,  York,   173  X.   Y.   611,   66  N.  E.   1110 

47   P-c.   S77    [18971.  [19031;     (affirm'ing.    Havens    v.    City 

*=In  tlie  Matter  of  tlie  Petition  of  of   New   York,    73    N.    Y.    S.    678,    67 

BiP-meister,  56  Howard    (N.  Y.)    416  Apn.  Div.  90   [19011). 

[1879].  '^OnHand      Pavin-.-      Company      v, 

Rier,  52   Cal.  270   [1877]. 


853 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§538 


defeats  the  right  of  the  contractor  to  recover,  and  invalidates  an 
assessment  levied  for  such  improvement,  is  a  question  which  de- 
pends upon  the  terms  of  the  statute  authorizing  the  improvement 
and  the  assessment,  and  upon  the  terms  of  the  specific  contract. 
Under  some  statutes  time  is  made  the  essence  of  the  contract,  the 
city  is  bound  upon  entering  into  a  contract  to  fix  the  time  within 
which  such  contract  must  be  performed;  and  failure  to  perform 
within  which  such  time  discharges  the  contract,  prevents  the  con- 
tractor from  recovering,  and  invalidates  an  assessment  levied  for 
the  cost  of  such  improvement.'  Failure  to  perform  in  six  months  - 
and  in  ninety  days''  from  the  time  fixed  for  performance,  has 
been  held  to  be  so  material  as  to  invalidate  the  assessment.  Some 
of  these  statutes  are  so  sweeping  in  their  scope  that  the  city  has 
no  power  to  ratify  the  contract  after  breach  by  failure  to  perforin 
within  the  time  limit.  An  attempt  by  the  city  to  render  such 
contract  valid  by  recognizing  it  as  in  force  and  levying  an  assess- 
ment or  issuing  tax  bills  therefor,  is  a  nullity  and  does  not  make 
the  assessment  valid.*    T'^nder  such  statutes  the  city  cann')t.  after 


John    Kelso    Co.    v.    Cillette.    136 


Cal.  603,  69  Pac. 
V.  Cole,  121  Cal. 
[18081;  Brady  v. 
27  Pac.  52  [1891] 
89    Cal.    304,    26 


296  [19021;  Kelso 
121.    53    Pac.    353 

Burke,  90  Cal.  1. 
Mc\'erry  v.  Boyd, 

Pac.    885     [LSoi]; 


Doiigherty  v.  Nevada  Bank.  81  Cal. 
162,  22  Pac.  513  [1889];  Dougherty 
V.  Collin,  69  Cal.  545,  10  Pac.  672 
[1886];  Fanning  v.  Sclianimcl,  68 
Cal.  428,  9  Pac.  427  [1886];  Mappa 
V.  City  Council  of  the  City  of  Los 
Angeles,  61  Cal.  309  [1882];  Scliibel 
V.  Merrill,  185  Mo.  534,  83  S.  W. 
1069  [1904];  Merrill  v.  Scliibel.  185 
Mo.  551,  83  S.  W.  1133  [1904];  Bar- 
ber Asplialt  Paving  Company  v. 
Pvidge.  169  Mo.  376.  68  S.  W.  1043 
[1902];  Sniitli  v.  (i)y  (if  Westport, 
105  Mo.  App.  221.  79  S.  W.  725 
[1904];  Hilgert  v.  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Company,  107  Mo.  App.  385. 
81  S.  W.  496  1191(11;  llenian  v. 
Gerardi.  96  Mo.  Ajjp.  231.  69  S.  W. 
1069  [1902]:  City  of  Springfield  ex 
rel.  Gilsonite  Construction  Co.  v. 
Schmook.  120  Vn.  App.  41.  96  S.  W. 
257  [1906];  Rhoenbor','  v.  Hever.  91 
Mo.    App.    389     [1902];    Winfrey    v. 


Linger.  89  :Mo.  App.  159  [1901]; 
Ayers  v.  Sehmohl,  86  Mo.  App.  349 
[1900];  Richter  v.  Merrill.  84  :\lo. 
Apj).  150  [1900];  New  England  Safe 
Deposit  and  Trust  Company  of  Mis- 
souri V.  James,  77  Mo.  App.  616 
[1898];  :\lcQuiddy  v.  Brannoek,  70 
Mo.  App.  535  [1897];  Bose  v.  Tres- 
trail,  62  Mo.  App.  352  |  1895]  ;  Phil- 
adelphia to  ITse  v.  Jewell,  135  Pa. 
St.  329,   19   Atl.  947    [1890]. 

"]\IcQuiddy    v.    Brannoek.    70    Mo. 
App.  535    [1897]. 

^Shoenberg  v.   Ileyer.   91    Mo.   App. 
389   [1902]. 

*  Barber  A.sphalt  Paving 
v.  Ridge.  169  Mo.  376,  68  S. 
[1902];  Smith  v.  City  of  Westport. 
105  Mo.  App.  221.  79  S.  W.  725 
[1904];  Hilgert  v.  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Comjjany.  107  Mo.  App.  385. 
81  S.  W.  196  [1904];  Heman  v.  Oer- 
anli.  !)i;  :\li).  App.  231.  69  S.  W.  1069 
[1902];  City  of  SpriuL'field  ex  nd. 
Gilsonite  Const.  Co.  v.  Schmonk.  120 
Mo.  App.  31.  96  S.  W.  257  [1906]: 
Ayers  v.  Sehmohl,  86  Mo.  App.  3-19 
[1900]:  Bichter  v.  Merrill.  84  :\ro. 
Api).   1.50   [1900]:    New  England   Safe 


Company 
W.  1043 


§  538  i.vXATlON    BY    ASSESSMENT,  854 

the  time  limited  has  expired  without  performance,  grant  a  propor- 
tional assessment  under  another  statute,  authorizing  a  propor- 
tional assessment  where  the  contract  has  been  performed  in  part 
and  in  part  abandoned.'  I'pon  the  expiration  of  the  time  limited, 
the  contract  if  unperformed  becomes  a  nullity,  so  that  the  pro- 
perty owner  does  not  waive  anv  rioht  bv  failing  to  file  objections 
thereto."  The  time  wi<^hin  Avhich  tbo  pontvqet  is  to  V>"  r^n^formed 
may  l)e  fixed  by  the  city  council  in  the  improvement  ordinance,'^ 
or  by  passing  a  sreneral  ordinance  annlicjible  to  contracts  of  that 
eharacter."  If  the  time  is  not  fixed  in  the  ordinance  it  is  to  be 
presumed  that  a  reasonable  time  is  intended  and  if  the  time  fixed 
by  the  contract  is  a  reasonable  time  the  contract  must  be  per- 
formed within  such  time  or  the  assessment  is  invalid."  If  the 
time  fixed  is  not  reasonable,  it  is  said  that  the  property  owner 
may  object,  but  that  the  contractor  cannot,  since  he  has  entered 
into  such  contract  voluntarily  and  cannot  be  allowed  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  remaining  terms  of  the  contract  while  repudiating 
the  terms  wdiich  fixed  the  time  of  performance.^*^  In  case  of  a 
conflict  between  the  contract  and  the  ordinance  with  reference 
to  the  time  of  performance  the  ordinance  controls.  If  the  ordi- 
nance does  not  fix  a  time  for  performance,  a  reasonable  time  is 
intended ;  and  if  the  contract  fixes  a  definite  time  for  performance, 
which  is  in  fact  a  reasonable  time,  such  contract  and  the  assess- 
ment levied  for  the  contract  price  thereof  are  valid."  A  certain 
time  may  be  fixed  within  which  the  contract  is  to  be  performed 

Deposit   and  Trust  Company  of  :\Iis-  Schmook,  120  Mo.  App.  41.  9G  S.  W. 

souri    V.    James,    77    Mo.    App.    616  257    [1906]. 

[18981:     Rose    v.    Trestrail.    62    Mo.  "  Schibel    v.    Merrill.    185    Mo.    534, 

App.  352   [ISO.-)!.  83    S.    W.    1069     [1904];    Hilgort    v. 

^Jolm    Kelso    v.    (Mllette,    136    Cal.  Barber     Asphalt     Paving     Company, 

603,   69    Pac.    296    [1902];    Kelso    v.  107    Mo.    App.    385,    81    S.    W.    496 

Cole,     121     Cal.     121,     53     Pac.     353  [1904];    Allen   v.    La    Force,    95    Mo. 

[1898].  App.    324,    68    S.    W.    1057     [1902]: 

"Winfrey    v.    Linger,    89    :\lo.    A])p.  Ayers   v.    Sehniohl,   86   Mo.   App.   349 

159    [1901]:    Pvichter    v.    Merrill,    84  [1900].     For  a  contract  held  to  im- 

Mo.   A])p.    150    [1900].  ply  performance  in  a  reasonable  time 

'  Barber   Asphalt   Paving   Company  because  of  indefinite  provisions  as  to 

V.  Ridge,  169  Mo.  376,  68  S.  W.  1043  time     of    performance,     see    Paul    v. 

[1902];    Smith   v.   City  of  Westport.  Conqueror    Trust    Co.,    125    Mo.   App. 

105    Mo.    App.    221.    79    S.    W.    725  483.  102  S.  W.  1070   [1907].    ' 

[1904].  "Avers    v.    Schmohl.    86    Mo.    App. 

'Rose    v.    Trestrail.    62    Mo.    App.  349    [1900]. 

352    [1895];    City    of    Springfield    ex  "  Hemnn   v.   Hilliam.    171    Mo.   258, 

rel.     Cilsonite     Construction     Co.     v.  71  S.  W.  163   [1902]. 


855  '::iE  improvement  contract.  §  5:^8 

and  provision  ma}'  further  be  made  for  the  payment  of  a  certain 
sum  per  day  either  as  a  penalty  or  liquidated  damages  in  ease  of 
failure  to  perform  within  the  time  limited.  Whether  failure  to 
perform  within  the  time  limited  makes  the  contract  and  the  as- 
sessment levied  therefor  invalid,  or  whether  tlie  only  effect  of  such 
breach  is  to  render  the  contractor  liable  for  payment  of  tlie  speci- 
fied sum  per  day  ai^reed  upon,  depends  upon  whether  the  time 
for  performance  is  fixed  by  the  ordinance  or  merely  l)y  the  con- 
tract. If  the  time  for  performance  is  fixed  by  the  ordinance,  the 
provisions  of  the  contract  are  subordinate  thereto,  the  provisions 
fixing  the  time  for  performance  control  the  stipulation  for  the 
deduction  of  a  certain  sum  per  day  as  liquidated  damages,  and 
failure  to  perform  within  the  time  limited  makes  the  contract  un- 
enforceable and  an  assessment  or  tax  bill  therefor,  void.^-  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  ordinance  does  not  fix  the  time  within  which  the 
contract  is  to  be  performed  but  the  contract  fixes  such  time  and 
further  contains  a  provision  for  deducting  a  certain  amount  per 
day  in  case  of  failure  to  perform,  the  latter  provision  is  reganled 
as  fixing  the  effect  of  failure  to  perform  and  accordingly,  if  the 
contract  is  performed  within  a  reasonalile  time  the  fact  that  it 
is  not  performed  witliin  the  time  limited  does  not  invalidate  the 
contract.'"'  Where  such  a  contract  was  extended  twenty  days 
and  was  not  performed  within  such  time,  it  was  held  that  the 
contract  must  at  least  be  performed  within  a  reasonable  time,  that 
twenty  days  was  a  reasonable  time  and  that  by  reason  of  such  non- 
performance the  contract  ])ecame  invalid.'*  If  a  contract  has  be- 
come unenforceable  through  failure  to  i)erform  within  tlu^  time 
limited,  a  sulisequent  statute  which  attempts  to  revive  such  con- 
tract and  render  it  enforceable  is  unconstitutional.'"'  Whether  a 
city  has  power  to  extend  the  time  for  the  performance  of  a  eon- 
tract  under  statutes  which  render  such  conti-act  unenforceable  if 

''Barber    Asphalt    Pavinp    Co.    v.  stnictinn     Company     v.     TTutfbinson. 

Munn,    1S5    Mo.    552.   83    S.   W.    1062  100    ^fo.    App.    204,    73    S.    W.    31S 

flOO-H;    McQuidily    v.    Rrannock.    70  [100.31. 
Mo.  App.  535  118071.  "  Seliil.cl    v.    Merrill.    1S5    M.^.    534. 

•»(ity  of  Scdalia  ox   rol.  Taylor  v.  S3   S.  \V.   1009    [10041. 
Sniitli,   20G    :\ro.    340.    104    S.    W.    15  "Fanning    v.     Sclinnimol.    (iS     (  al. 

[19071;     Allen    v.    Lahsap.    18S    :Mn.  42S.    9    Pac    427    [ISSOl;    People    v. 

092,    87    R.    W.    920    [10051:    ?Teman  MoCiine,   57   Cal.    153    [ISSOl:    Prady 

V.    Cilliam.    171    ^Mo.    2."iS.    71    S.    W.  v.    Kine.    53    Cal.    44    [18781-.    People 

103      [19021:      Paul      v.      Conqueror  of  the   State  of  California    v.  Lvneh. 

Trust  Co..   125  :^[o.  Ann.  483.   102  R.  51  Cal.  15.  21  Am.  Rep.  677   [18751. 
W.   1070    [19071;    Hill-0'Meara   Con- 


§  538  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  856 

not  performed  within  the  time  limited,  depends  entirely  upon  the 
provisions  of  the  statute  applicable.  Under  some  statutes  the 
city  has  no  power  to  extend  the  time  of  performance  and  the  at- 
tempting so  to  do  is  a  nullity.^'^  Under  other  statutes  the  city 
may  have  power,  if  it  thinks  the  ease  a  proper  one,  to  extend  the 
time  of  performance. 1^  In  California  it  w^as  first  held  that  the  city 
had  power  to  extend  the  time  of  performance  if  such  extension 
were  made  before  breach.^*  Subsequently  it  was  held  that  no 
such  power  existed;^"  and  the  latter  decision  was  held  to  be  ap- 
plicable to  contracts  entered  into  before  such  decision.-'^  A  stat- 
ute which  authorizes  the  marshal  to  fix  the  time  for  the  commence- 
ment of  work  under  all  contracts  entered  into  by  him  and  which 
gives  him  powder  under  direction  of  the  city  council  to  extend 
the  time  "so  fixed"  is  held  to  authorize  him  to  extend  the  time  for 
performance  and  not  merely'  the  time  for  the  commencement  of 
the  work.-^  In  a  resolution  extending  the  time  for  the  perform.- 
ance  of  the  work,  a  description  of  the  work  is  sufficient  if  it  indi- 
cates what  contract  is  to  be  extended.--  If  the  resolution  speci- 
iies  the  streets  on  which  the  work  is  to  be  done,  and  the  nature  of 
the  work,  and  the  number  of  the  contract,  it  is  sufficient  although 
the  contractor  is  mis-named.-'  Under  a  statute  requiring  the  su- 
perintendent of  streets  to  endorse  an  extension  of  time  upon  the 
contract,  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  endorse  sucb  extension  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  the  time  originally  fixed  bj^  the  contract.^* 
Statutory  provisions  requiring  the   superintendent   of  streets  to 

■"Beveridge  v.  Livingstone,  54  Cal.  275,   20   X.   E.    788    [1888];    City   of 

54    [1879];    Spalding   v.    Forsee,    109  Leavenworth    v.    Mills,    6    Kan.    288 

Mo.  App.  675,  8.3  S."w.  540   [1904];  [1870];    People  ex  rel.   Knox  v.   Vil- 

Smith  V.   City  of  Westport,   105  Mo.  lage    of   Yonkers,    39    Barb.    (N.    Y.) 

App.  221,  79  S.  W.  725  [1904].  266   [1863]. 

"Edwards  v.  Berlin,   123  Cal.  544,  «  Taylor  v.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  24L 

56    Pac.    432     [1899];     Buckman    v.  '» Beveridge  v.  Livingstone,  54  Cal. 

Landers,   111   Cal.  347,  43  Pac.   1125  54. 

[1896];   Buckman  v.  Cuneo,  103  Cal.  =»  Wood  v.  Brady,  150  U.  S.  18,  37 

62,   36   Pac.    1025    [1894];    Anderson  L.  981,  14  S.  6  [1893]. 

V.   De  Urioste,   96   Cal.   404,   31   Pac.  "  Oakland      Paving      Company     v. 

266    [1892];    Ede  v.  Knight,   93   Cal.  Barstow,    79    Cal.    45,    21    Pac.    544 

159,    28    Pac.    860    [1892];    Oakland  [1889]. 

Paving  Company  v.  Barstow,  79  Cal.  -Edwards  v.  Berlin,   123  Cal.  544, 

45,    21    Pac.    544    [1889];    Taylor    v.  56  Pac.  432   [1899]. 

Palmer,   31    Cal.   240    [1866];    Hous-  =' Anderson  v.  De  Urioste.   96   Cal. 

ton  v.  McKenna,  22  Cal.  550  [1863];  404,  31  Pac.  266   [1892]. 

Conlin     v.      Seamen,      22      Cal.      546  -*  Buckman    v.    Landers,     111     Cal. 

[1863];    Jenkins   v.   Stetler,    118   Ind.  347,  43  Pac.  1125   [1896]. 


857  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  538 

cause  a  rosolutioii  extendin<i'  the  time  of  performance  of  a  given 
contract  to  be  recorded,  and  to  specif.y  in  his  certificate  of  exten- 
sion the  number  of  the  resolution  granting  the  extension,  are 
intended  for  the  help  and  information  of  county  officers  to  enable 
them  to  refer  quickly  and  readil.y  to  the  resolution  applicable; 
are  directory  merely,  and  the  omission  to  perform  such  acts  does 
not  invalidate  the  contract.-"'  The  city  may  under  such  statute 
grant  a  second  extension,-"  even  before  the  extension  previously 
granted  has  gone  into  effect.-^  Application  for  an  extension 
which  is  refused  does  not  authorize  performance  after  the  time 
originally  limited.-'^  If  a  street  commissioner  has  accepted  the 
work  and  issued  an  assessment  and  warrant,  the  fact  that  the 
city  council  sets  aside  such  assessment  and  warrant  and  directs 
that  further  work  be  done  in  order  to  complete  the  performance 
of  the  contract  does  not  amount  to  an  extension  of  time  for  such 
performance.-"  If  a  property  owner  has  promised  to  waive  de- 
fects and  pay  for  work  done  upon  consideration  that  the  contractor 
will  do  extra  work,  such  contract  is  legal  and  if  the  contract  is 
performed  after  the  time  limited  and  no  extension  of  time  is  ob- 
tained, the  contractor  may  maintain  an  action  upon  such  promise, 
although  he  cannot  obtain  a  legal  assessment. ^°  Under  statutes 
authorizing  an  extension  of  time,  such  extension  must  ordinarily 
be  obtained  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  originally  limited 
by  the  contract  or  in  case  of  a  prior  extension  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  time  as  extended.-''^  After  the  expiration  of  such  time. 
the  contract  has  become  invalid  and  cannot  be  ratified  Iiy  the 
eity,^-  and   a   subsequent   extension   of  time    is  a   nullity. •'•'     The 

="E(le   V.   Knight.    03    Cal.    15!).    2S  »- Kelso   v.   Cole.    121    Cal.    121.   53 

Pac.   800    [18921.  I'ac.    3.-)3     [1S0S|:     liiady    v.    Burke. 

=°Buckniaii    v.   Ciiiico.    103   Cal.    (12,  (lit    Cal.    1.    27    I'ac.    .")2    llSiUh    Me- 

36  Pac.   1025    llS!)-!].  Veiry    v.    I'.ny.l.   S'.l    Cal.    301,   2ii    Pac. 

-^  Puckniaii    v.    Cuiioo,    l(i3    Cal.    02,  885     [1891];     Doir^lierty     v.     Nevada 

30   Pac.    1025    [18041.  Bank,     81     Cal.     102.     22     Pae.     513 

^'Mappa    V.    City    Council    of    the  [  18S9]  ;    Dou.irlieity  v.  Collin.  09  Cal. 

City    of    Los    Angeles.    01     Cal.    309  454.   10  Pac.  072   "[18801;    Fanning  v. 

[18821.  Sc'lianinu"].    08    ('al.    428,    9    Pac.    707 

=M!eft    V.    Payne,    97    Cal.    108.    31  |18891, 

Pac.  844   [1892].  "Kelso    v.    Cole.    121    Cal.    121.    53 

»» Bernstein     v.     Downs.     112     Cal.  I'ac.   353    [1898]  ;    Dougherty   v,   Cof- 

197,  44  Pac.  557   [18901.  lin.  09  Cal.  454.  10  Pac.  072   [1880]-. 

«i  Kelso   V.   Cole,    121    Cal,    121,   53  Fanning  v.  Schaniniel,  G8  Cal.  428,  9 

Pac.  353   [18981:   Brady  v.  Burke,  90  Pac.  427    [1886]. 
Cal.   1,  27   Pac.  52   [l!-911. 


§  538  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  858 

act  of  the  supervisors  in  refusing  to  set  such  contract  aside  on 
appeal  cannot  make  it  valid. ^*  Extension  of  time  does  not  ren- 
der the  contract  a  new  contract  from  and  after  the  time  originally 
fixed  for  performance.-"  Hence  a  constitutional  provision  for- 
bidding an  extension  of  time,  does  not  apply  to  a  contract  enter- 
ed into  before  the  adoption  of  such  provision,  although  an  ex- 
tension of  time  was  obtained  thereon  after  such  constitutional 
provision  took  effect. ^^  The  legislature  may  grant  specific  auth- 
oritv  to  public  officials  to  extend  the  time  for  performance.-'''^  A 
statute  authorizing  county  commissioners  to  grant  further  time 
for  the  completion  of  free  turnpike  roads  is  not  a  sr^ecial  law  since 
it  is  applicable  generally,  although  it  may  be  passed  to  meet  a  spe- 
cial ease.^"  The  fact  that  an  injunction  has  been  allowed  restrain- 
ing the  city  from  levying  and  collecting  assessments  for  an  im- 
provement is  no  excuse  for  a  failure  to  perform  within  the  time 
specified,  where  an  injunction  against  the  performance  of  the  eon- 
tract  was  dissolved.^^  It  has  been  said  that  an  injunction  pre- 
venting the  completion  of  the  work  would  not  be  an  excuse  for  a 
delay  in  the  absence  of  some  specific  provision  covering  such 
case.*"  This  remark,  however,  was  in  the  nature  of  an  ohiter 
since  the  contract  under  consideration  provided  that  in  case  of 
suspension  of  work  for  anv  cause,  the  contractor  should  have  an 
extension  of  time  to  complete  the  contract  equal  to  the  delay 
caused  by  such  extension  and  it  was  held  that  such  provision  in- 
cluded suspension  of  work  caused  bv  an  injunction.*''  Under  a 
provision  in  a  contract  for  an  extension  of  time  for  delay  due  to 
any  hindrance,  the  fact  that  the  city  delaved  the  performance  of  a 
grading  contract  by  constructing  a  culvert  across  the  street,  and 
that  such  performance  was  further  delayed  bv  the  existence,  up- 
on the  ground  taken  for  a  street,  of  the  building  of  the  property 
owner  who  was  resisting  the  assessment,  it  was  held  that  an  exten- 
sion of  time  for  such  hindrances  should  be  given.*^     So  under  a 

^Dougherty    v.    Nevada    Bank,    81  Coimt}%  9  0.  S.  540   [1859], 

Cal.   162,  22  Pac.  513    [18891.  '"' Biitler   v.   Detroit,   43   Mich.   552. 

»"'Ede  V.  Cogswell.  79  Cal.  278,  21  5  N.  W.  1078. 

Pac.   767    [1889].  ^"  Whittemore  v.  Sills,  76  Mo.  App. 

'"Ede   V.    Knight,   93    Cal.    159,    28  248   [1898]. 

Pac.    860    [1892];    Ede    v.    Cogswell,  "  Whitteniore  v.  Sills,  76  Mo.  App. 

79   Cal.   278,   21   Pac.   767    [1889].  248   [1898]. 

"  ^'  Foster  v.  Commissinners  of  Wood  "  Sparks  v.  Villa  Rosa  Land  Com- 

Coiintv,  9  0.  S.  540   [1859].  panv.    99    Mo.    App.    489,    74    S.    W. 

"'Foster  v.  Commissioners  of  Wood  120  [19031. 


859  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  538 

provision  of  a  contract  providing  for  completion  witliin  a  cer- 
tain number  of  days  exoliidin<>f  the  time  during  which  the  work 
was  delayed,  delays  caused  by  the  presence  of  a  building  upon 
the  line  of  a  street,  and  telegraph  poles  thereon;  and  delay  caused 
b}^  failure  of  another  contractor  to  lay  water  pipes  in  time  should 
all  be  deducted  from  the  number  of  days  fixed  for  performance.*' 
However,  the  fact  that  unfavorable  weather  and  failure  to  obtain 
the  use  of  the  city's  roller  caused  delay  in  performance,  does 
not  constitute  an  excuse  unless  an  extension  of  time  was  pro- 
vided.'** If  an  extension  of  time  is  granted  as  a  part  of  a  fraudu- 
lent scheme  against  the  property  owner,  the  assessment  may  be 
invalid,  not  because  of  the  extension,  but  because  of  the  fi-aud.*"' 
Tinder  some  ordinances  which  provide  that  a  contract  shall  be 
void  if  not  performed  within  a  certain  time,  a  city  may  ratify  a 
contract  not  performed  within  the  time  limited ;  and  may  thus 
render  valid  the  contract  and  assessment  levied  therefor.*"  Power 
to  extend  time,  even  if  given  without  authority,  does  not  invali- 
date a  contract  if  such  power  is  not  exercised,  but  the  contract  is 
performed  within  the  time  fixed  by  the  ordinance.*"  If  the  stat- 
utes, ordinances  and  contract  do  not  expressly  make  time  of  tlie 
essence  and  if  the  contractor  is  allowed  to  continue  perform- 
ance after  the  time  limited  by  the  contract,  such  contract  is  held 
to  be  valid  as  is  an  assessment  levied  therefor,***  at  least  if  the 
property  owner  does  not  show  that  he  has  been  injured  by  such 
delay.*-'  If  the  council  declares  the  contract  terminated  by  for- 
mal resolution,  on  the  ground  of  delay  under  a  clause  in  the  con- 
tract reserving  such  power,  its  aetiion  is  final  uidess  it  is  unreason- 
able or  wanton."''  A  contractiud  provision  for  lieginning  perfor- 
mance within  a  certain  tinu»  after  the  contract  was  entered  into 
and  for  completing  performance  within  a  certain  time  thereafter 

*^  F.   V.    Smith    Contvaetinji   Co.   v.  '^  :\Iiiyor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 

City  of  New  York,  100  X.  Y.  S.  750.  nmn-  v.   Raynio.  OS  Md.  .500.   1.3  Atl. 

11.5  App.  Div.  180   [10001.  3S,3    [1888];    ITubbard    v.    Norton,   28 

"  Paul  V.  Conqupior  Trust  Co..  12.5  O.    S.    110    [1875]:    Philadelphia    to 

Mo.  App.  483.  102  S.  \V.  1070  |1007[.  the   Use   of   Dyer    v.    Rrooks.   81    Pa. 

'•'Foote    V.    City    of    Milwaukee    IS  St.     (31     P.    F.    Smith  1     23     [1870]; 

Wis.  270  [1804].  Fass    v.    Sci-hawcr.    00    Wis.    525.    10 

♦"Philadelphia     to    Use    v.    .Fewell.  X.  \V.  .-)33   [1884]. 

1.35   Pa.  St.  3l'0.   10  Atl.  047    |1S0I»|.  '"Fass    v.    Seehawor.    00    Wis.    .525. 

"City     of     Excelsior     Spriii-s,     t.  10  \.  W.  533  [%«84]. 

Use   of   McCormick    v.    Etten^on.    120  ""Miller  v.  Atlaintic  City.  —  X.  J. 

Mo.   App.  215.  96  S.  W.  701    [1906]. ,  68  Atl.  64   [1907]. 


§  539  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  860 

makes  time  of  the  essence  both  as  to  commencement  and  as  to  com- 
pletion.^^ 

§  539,  Remedies  for  defective  performance  if  assessment  held 
valid. 
In  jurisdictions  in  which  the  property  owner  is  precluded  from 
raising  questions  as  to  the  performance  of  the  contract  by  the 
act  of  the  city  in  accepting  performance  an  attempt  has  been 
made  to  find  some  method  of  giving  the  property  owner  relief, 
because  of  the  wrong  done  him  and  to  uphold  the  assessment  at 
the  same  time.  It  seems  unfair  to  assess  a  property  owner  for 
the  cost  of  an  improvement  which  as  performed  is  of  no  benefit 
to  him,  and  to  justifv  such  assessment  noon  the  theoretical  benefit 
which  he  receives  from  the  determination  from  the  city  that  such 
improvement  has  been  constructed  in  a  proper  manner.  In  some 
.jurisdictions  it  is  said  that  the  pror»ertv  owupr  mav  maintain  an 
action  against  the  city.*  or  against  the  specific  officers  who  have 
accepted  such  perform fince.^  for  the  im'urv  which  he  has  sustain- 
ed by  having  a  defective  improvement  instead  of  one  properly 
constructed.  In  the  absence  of  evidence  to  show  that  a  public 
official  is  acting  wrongfullv  or  with  cornmt  motives  he  cannot  be 
held  liable  for  mere  mistakes  in  .ludsTment.^  In  other  .lurisdic- 
tions  it  has  been  said  thRt  no  jnrlD-mpnt  oan  be  rendered  against 
the  citv  for  damae-es  for  accentinsr  defpctive  performance.*  In 
some  jurisdictions  it  is  smVl  that  the  remedv  of  the  property  owner 
is  to  bring  some  action  in  the  nature  of  injunction  to  prevent  the 
city  from  payinsr  the  contractor  until  the  contract  is  performed, 
or  to  prevent  the  defective  performance  of  the  contract.^  or  in 
the  nature  of  mandamus  to  compel  the  city  to  complete  the  con- 


"^Merine  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  v.    Krauss.    53    0.   S.    628,   42   N.   E. 

Co.,    125    Mo.    App.    623,    103    S.    W.  831    [18951. 

508   [1907].  sQi^..^,   of   gt    Joseph   ex   rel.   King 

^Gage    V.    Springer,    211    111.    200,  Hill    Brick   Maniifactiirinsr   Company 

103  Am.  St.  Rep.   191,  71  N.  E.  860  v.  McCabe,  58  Mo.  App.  542   [1894]. 

[1904];     (reversing,   Gage   v.   Spring-  *  City  to  Use  of  McGrath  v.  Clem- 

er,    112    111.   App.    103    [1904]);    As-  ens,  49  :\ro.  552   [1872]. 

toria  Heights  Land  Company  v.  City  ^Pe^ole  ex  rel.  Raymond  v.  Whid- 

of    New    York,    179    N.    Y.    579,    72  den.    191    111.    3'74.   56   L.   R.   A.   905, 

N.  E.   1139;    (affirming.   86  X.   Y.   S.  61   X.  E.    133    [19011:    Pennle  ex  rel. 

651.  89  Ann.  Div.  512   [1904]).  'VTannpTi  v    n,-f.p-n,  i.^s  Jll.  59i.  42  N. 

=* Commissioners  of  Putnam  County  F.  1P3   [18951:  T>icl-ettr.  v.  Village  of 

Hyde  Park,  85  III.  110  [1877]. 


861 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§540 


tract,"  instead  of  resisting  the  assessment  on  the  ground  of  defec- 
tive performance. 

§  540.     Effect  of  abandonment  of  prior  contract. 

In  the  absence  of  specific  statute  a  public  corporation  has  a 
right  as  against  the  property'  owners  to  rescind  a  contract,  entered 
into  with  the  consent  of  the  contractor,  and  to  let  a  new  contract.^ 
The  fact  that  such  contract  is  let  at  a  higher  rate  does  not  invali- 
date the  assessment.-  A  new  contract  entered  into  between  the 
city  and  the  same  contractor  for  the  construction  of  the  same 
public  improvement  is  regarded  as  discharging  a  former  contract 
between  the  same. two  parties.'*  This  is  true  even  if  the  new  con- 
tract is  let  for  a  higher  price  than  the  original  contract.*  It 
will  be  assumed  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary  that 
the  city  had  proper  reasons  for  such  action.  If  a  prior  contract 
for  a  public  improvement  has  been  abandoned  by  the  contractor 
the  public  corporation  has,  in  the  absence  of  some  specific  stat- 
ute, authority  to  make  a  new  contract  for  the  completion  of  the 
improvement  already  under  construction."'  The  public  authori- 
ties have  ordinarily  power  in  such  cases  to  proceed  to  readvertise 
for  bids  without  repeating  the  steps  necessary  to  ol)tain  jurisdic- 
tion." The  jurisdiction  ac'iuired  by  them  to  nuike  the  original 
contract  is  regarded  as  continuing  to  enable  them  to  make  such 
contracts  as  are   necessary  to   secure   the  complete   performance 


■"' P('o]ilo  ox  rol.  Raymonil  v.  Whiil- 
den,  191  111.  374,  .lli  L.  11.  A.  905, 
61  N.  E.  133  [1901];  Shannon  v.  Vil- 
lage of  Hinsdalo,  180  IH.  202,  54  N. 
E.  181  [18991;  Heinroth  v.  Kocher- 
sner-jer,  173  111.  205,  50  N.  E.  171 
I189S1;  Callister  v.  Kochersperger, 
1118  111.  334,  48  N.  E.  150  [1897]; 
People  ex  rel.  Mannen  v.  Ciieen,  158 
111.  594.  42  N.  E.  163  [1895];  Ilack- 
ett  V.  State  for  T'^se  f)f  Martindalo. 
113  Ind.  532,  15  X.  E.  799  [1887]: 
Indianapolis  and  Cunihorland  r.ravol 
Road  Co.  V.  State  o\-  rel.  Flack.  105 
Ind.  37.  4  N.  E.  316  [1885]:  Simon- 
li.n  V.  Hay^,  88  Ind.  70   ri8''2]. 

^  FitzffPrald  v.  Walkpr.  55  Ark. 
148,  17  S.  ^Y.  702  [1891];  Marshall 
V.     Commonwealth     to     the     Use     of 


Mayor,  etc.,  of  Allejiheney  Citv.  59 
Pa.  St.   (9  P.  F.  Smith)   455   [1868]. 

-  Marshall  v.  Commonwealth  to  the 
Use  of  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Allegheny 
City,  59  Pa.  St.  (9  P.  F.  Smith)  455 
[1868]. 

^Spaulding  v.  North  San  Francis- 
co Homestead  and  Railroad  Associa- 
tion, 87  Cal.  40.  24  Pac.  600,  25 
Pac.  249   [1890]. 

*Spauldiiig  V.  North  San  Francis- 
co Ilomcstoad  and  Railroad  Associa- 
tion, 87  Cal.  40.  24  Pac.  600.  25 
Pac.  249   [1890]. 

Temper  v.  King.  11  :Mo.  .\])p.  116 
[1881]. 

•"' Himirclmnnn  v.  Oliver.  34  Cal. 
246  [18671:  Donirliertv  v.  Foley.  .32 
Cal.  403   [1867]. 


§  540  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  862 

of  the  work  originally  contracted  for.'  The  reletting  of  a  con- 
tract is,  however,  in  some  states  a  separate  and  distinct  proceed- 
ing, though  under  jurisdiction  already  acquired.*  Accordingly,  the 
grant  by  a  board  to  its  clerk  of  authority  to  invite  proposals 
under  which  the  original  contract  was  let  does  not  authorize  him 
to  give  notice  inviting  proposals  for  reletting  the  contract.  He 
can  give  such  notice  only  upon  a  new  and  specific  grant  of  au- 
thority from  the  board."  If  a  second  contract  for  an  improve- 
ment is  let  for  an  increased  price  while  the  oriainal  contract  is 
in  force,  it  has  been  said  that  the  remedy  of  the  land-owner  is 
by  appeal  to  the  board  of  supervisors  and  not  by  awaiting  per- 
formance of  the  contract  and  then  resisting  the  assessment.^' 
If  the  city  has  accepted  a  bid  and  a  bidder  has  given  bond  with 
solvent  sureties  and  the  city  subsequently  releases  him,  readver- 
tises  for  bids  and  lets  the  contract  to  the  lowest  bidder  on  such 
second  advertising,  whose  bid  is  higher  than  that  of  the  original 
contractor,  it  has  been  said  that  property  owners  are  entitled  to 
recover  from  the  city  their  proportionate  share  of  such  differ- 
ences.^^ If  a  contractor  has  given  bond  for  the  performance  of 
his  contract  and  he  makes  default  in  performance  and  the  con- 
tract is  relet  at  an  increased  price,  the  city  must  enforce  such 
bond  and  apply  the  amount  recovered  thereon  upon  the  contract 
price  under  the  new  contract  instead  of  assessing  the  property 
owners  for  the  full  amount  of  the  contract  price  under  the  new 
contract.^-  Such  facts  are  said',  in  some  jurisdictions,  to  invali- 
date the  assessment,^^  and  in  other  jurisdictions  to  be  ground 
for  reducing  the  amount  of  the  assessment,  but  not  for  vacating 
it.^*  If,  as  part  of  a  contract  for  an  original  construction,  the- 
contractor  has  agreed  to  keep  such  improvement  in  repair,  the 

'  Himmelmann    v.    Oliver.    34    C'al.  "  Eno     v.     Mayor.     Aldermen     and 

246    [1867];    Dougherty  v.   Foley.   32  Commonalty    of    the     City    of    New 

Cal.  403   [1867].  York.  68  X.  Y.  214   [1877];    (revers- 

^Meuser    v.    Kisdon.    36    Cal.    239  ing    Eno    v.    ^Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

[1868].  Commonalty     of     the     Citv     of    New 

'Meuser    v.    Risdon,    36    Cal.    239  York.   7   Hnn.    (X.  Y.)    320   [1876]). 

[1868].  ''' Spaulding    v.    Xorth    San    Fran- 

"  Spaulding    v.    Xorth    San    Fran-  ciseo  Homestead   and   Railroad  Asso- 

eisco  Homestead   and  Railroad   Asso-  elation.   87   Cal.   40.   24  Pac.   600.  25 

ciation.   87   Cal.   40.   24   Pao.   600.   2.5  Pac.  249    [1890]. 

Pac.  249   [1890].  "  Tn  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

"  Barfield  v.  Oleason.  Ill  Kv.  491.  T>«on  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  89 

23  Kv.  Law  Rep.  128,  63  S.  W.  964  X.  Y.  67   [1882]. 
[1901]. 


863  THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §  541 

fact  that  the  contractor  becomes  insolvent  and  does  not  perform 
such  contract  does  not  prevent  the  city  from  levying  another 
assessment  for  necessary  repairs/^  The  fact  that  a  part  of  the 
fund  raised  by  assessment  has  been  misappropriated  is  no  defense 
as  against  the  collection  of  further  installments  of  such  assess- 
ment.'" The  remedy  of  the  property  owner  is  to  compel  the 
proper  application  of  such  fund.  So,  if  an  assessment  is  levied 
to  pay  bonds,  issued  to  obtain  money  for  the  cost  of  a  public 
improvement,  the  fact  that  part  of  the  fund  has  been  wasted  in 
litigation  is  no  defense.'^  An  assessment  cannot  l)e  levied  for 
work  which  has  been  abandoned  entirely  and  which  is  not  and 
will  not  be  performed.''*  An  improvement  which  has  been  begun 
may  be  abandoned  by  the  city  as  far  as  the  rights  of  the  property 
owners  are  concerned.'^  This  right  exists  even  if  an  assessment 
has  been  levied  for  such  an  improvement  and  confirmed.-"  A 
municipality  to  which  a  smaller  municipality  has  l)een  an- 
nexed has  a  right  to  abandon  an  improvement  commenced 
by  such  smaller  municipality.-'  If  the  city  has  entered  into 
a  contract  for  constructing  the  improvement,  it  has  no  greater 
right  to  terminate  such  contract  than  a  private  individual 
as  against  the  adversary  party  to  the  contract.  Accord- 
ingly, if  the  city  orders  further  proceedings  to  be  stayed 
after  confirmation,  such  order  is  not  a  defense  to  an  application 
for  judgment  for  the  assessment;-^  nor  is  it  ground  for  setting 
aside   at  a   subse(|ueiit  term  such  judgment   of  confirmation.-^ 

§  541.     Modification  of  contract. 

In  the  absem-i'  of  statutory  authority  a  pulilic  corporation  can- 

'^Bacas   v.   Ad  lev.    112   La.   806,   30  App.     501      flOOO].       (Tiiis     decision 

So.  7.39   [1904];   State  ex  lel.  Woulfe  was   based    in    part    upon    tlie    theory 

V.   St.   Paul.   .Tudjre.    107    La.    775.   32  that   in   an  application   for  judgment 

So.    88    [1901-19021.  for  the  assessment,  tlie  abandonment 

"State,     Sigler,     Pros.     v.     Fuller,  of    the    improvement    being   a    matter 

34  N.  J.  L.    (5  Vr.)   227   [1870].  which    had    occurred    since    confirma- 

"  Loesnitz    v.    Seelinger,     127    Ind.  tion,    might    be    interposed    as    a    de- 

422,    25    N.    E.    1037,    20    X.    K.    8S7  fense.) 

[1890].  ='C'ity  of  Chicago  v.  Weber,  94  111. 

"In  the  Matter  of  Eager,  41   How-  App.  561    [1900]. 

nrd  (X.  Y.)    107  [1870]:   In  the  Mat-  ="Clingman   v.   People  ex   rel.  Ray- 

ter  of  Eager,  58  Barb.    (X.   Y.)    557  mond,    183    111.    339,    55    N.    E.    727 

[1871];    In    the  Matter  of   Eager.    10  [1899]. 

Abb.  Pr.  X.  S.    (X\  Y.)    229    [1871].  -''People  ex   rel.  McCornack  v.   Mc- 

"City  of  Chicago  v.  Weber.  94  111.  Wethy.    165    111.    222.    40    X.    E.    187 

App.   501    [1900].  [1897]. 

*>  City  of  Chicago  v.  Weber,  94  111. 


541 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


864 


not  modify  a  public  contract  after  it  has  been  entered  into  be- 
tween the  parties.^  Thus,  a  contractor  cannot  be  authorized  to 
improve  a  portion  of  a  street  not  included  in  his  contract  in  lieu 
of  similar  work  which  he  was  bound  to  do  on  another  street.- 
Under  the  discretionary  power  conferred  by  many  statutes  upon 
public  corporations  with  reference  to  public  improvements,  it  is 
held  that  a  public  corporation  has  the  power  to  modify  a  contract 
for  a  public  improvement  once  entered  into.^  This  result  is 
most  easily  reached  under  statutes  which  specifically  authorize 
a  public  corporation  to  change  a  contract  for  a  public  improve- 
ment already  entered  into.*  If  by  statute  a  contract  is  to  be 
let  to  the  lowest  bidder,  it  is  held  in  many  jurisdictions  that  the 
public  corporation  has  no  power  to  modify  the  contract  so  as  to 
make  a  material  variance  between  the  contract  as  entered  into  and 
the  specifications  and  bids  by  means  of  which  the  contract  was  ori- 
ginally let ;  since  if  the  power  to  make  such  change  did  exist,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  determine  who  was  the  lowest  bidder 
upon  the  contract  as  finally  entered  into.^  It  has  been  held  that 
if  the  city  permits  the  lowest  bidder  to  change  his  bid  in  a  ma- 
terial respect  after  the  contract  is  awarded,  an  unsuccessful  bid- 
der may  maintain  an  injunction  suit  to  restrain  the   city  from 


^  Schneider  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 7  Maclvey  ( D.  C.)  252  [1889]; 
Windsor  v.  District  of  Columbia,  7 
Mackey  (D.  C.)  96  [1889];  Gal- 
breath  V.  Newton,  30  Mo.  App.  381. 

^  Windsor  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
7  Mackey   (D.  C.)   96   [1889]. 

^  Reclamation  District  No.  3  v. 
Goldman,  65  Cal.  635,  4  Pae.  676 
[1884];  Sims  v.  Hines,  121  Ind.  534, 
23  N.  E.  515  [1889];  Jenkins  v. 
Stetler,  118  Ind.  275,  20  N.  E.  788 
[1S8S];  Gulick  v.  C'-nnely,  42  Ind. 
134  [1873];  Hellenkemp  v.  City  of 
Lafayette,  30  Ind.  192  [1868]; 
St'-as-hein  v.  Jerman,  56  Mo.  104 
[1874];  Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse, 
158  N.  Y.  274,  70  Am."  St.  Rep.  472, 
43  L.  R.  A.  678,  53  N.  E.  12  [1899]  ; 
In  the  Matter  i^f  the  Protestant 
Episcopal  Public  School,  40  Howard 
(N.  Y.)    198   [18701. 

*  Reclamation  Dist.  No.  3  v.  OnM- 
man,  65  CM.  635.  4  Pac.  676  [18S41; 
Sims  V.  Hines,  121  Ind.  534,  23  N.  E. 


515    [1889];    Lindenberger   Land   Co. 

V.  R.  B.  Park  &  Co.,  —  Ky.  ,  85 

S.  W.  213,  27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  437 
[1905];  Weston  v.  City  of  Syracuse, 
158  N.  Y.  274,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  472, 
43  L.  R.  A.  678,  53  N.  E.  12  [1899]  ; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Protestant 
Episcopal  Public  School,  40  Howard 
(N.  Y.)    198   [1870]. 

°  Young  V.  People  ex  rel.  Riymond, 
196  111.  603,  63  N.  E.  1075  [1902]; 
Mohr  V.  City  of  Chicacro,  114  111. 
App.  283  [1904];  Steffins  v.  Stewart, 
53  Kans.  92,  36  Pac.  55  [1894];  City 
of  Henderson  v.  Lambert,  77  Ky. 
(14  Bush.)  24  [1878];  A'  ditor  Gen- 
eral V.  Stodrlard,  147  Mich.  329.  110 
N.  W.  944  [1907]:  Butler  v.  Detroit, 
43  Mich.  552.  5  N.  W.  1078:  Ely  v. 
Citv  of  Grand  Ranif^s.  84  Mich.  336, 
47  N.  W.  447  [1890]:.  Snaldinor  v. 
Forsee.  109  Mo.  App.  675.  83  S.  W. 
540  [19041:  Smith  v.  ^ity  of  West- 
port.  105  Mo.  App.  221,  79  S.  W. 
725    [1904]. 


865 


THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


5  541 


entering-  into  sucii  contract/'  Such  a  change  under  statules  which 
provide  for  letting  the  contract  to  the  lowest  bidder  has  been 
held  to  invalidate  the  assessment  levied  for  the  cost  of  such  im- 
provement.' Thus,  if  after  a  contract  is  let,  the  grade  of  the 
street  is  changed  materially  and  the  contract  is  regarded  as 
modified  to  suit  the  grade  thus  fixed  w^ithout  letting  the  contract 
anew,  an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement  is  in- 
valid." So  if  time  is  of  the  essence  of  the  contract,  the  city 
cannot  extend  the  time  after  the  contract  has  been  let  in  the 
absence  of  statutory  authority  therefor.**  If,  by  statute,  power 
is  given  to  a  city  to  make  changes  in  the  plans  of  public  im- 
provements with  the  consent  of  the  contractor,  and  by  another 
statute  it  is  provided  that  the  contract  must  be  let  to  the  lowest 
bidder,  a  question  arises  whether  the  power  to  make  such  changes 
in  public  improvements  extends  to  contracts  which  by  the  terms 
of  the  .statute  are  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder.  If  the  legis- 
lature has  not  provided  specifically  either  that  such  power  to 
make  changes  applies  to  contracts  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  or 
does  not  apply,  we  have  a  case  in  which  the  courts  have  to  de- 
termine the  intention  of  the  legislature  upon  a  question  which 
was  probably  not  in  the  mind  of  the  legislature  wdien  it  enacted 
the  statutes  in  (piestion.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that 
under  such  a  combination  of  statutes  the  public  cor])oration  may 
change  the  terms  of  public  contracts  after  they  are  made.^°  In 
other  jurisdictions,  under  such  a  combination  of  statutes,  it  is 
held  that  the  power  to  make  changes  does  not  extend  to  con- 
tracts which  must  be  awarded  to  the  lowest  bidder.^^     The  fact 


"Mohr  V.  City  of  Chicago.  114  111. 
App.  283  [1904]. 

"  Young  V.  People  ex  rel.  Raymond, 
19(5  111.  (103,  (i3  X.  E.  1075  11902]; 
Steffins  V.  Stewart.  5;}  Kans.  92,  3G 
Pac.  55  [18941:  (  ity  of  Henderson 
v..  Lambert,  77  Ky.  (  14  I?u.sh.)  24 
[1878];  Auditor  (Icneral  v.  Stod- 
<lard,  147  Midi.  ;{i29.  lUi  \.  W.  04  1. 
[19071;  llutiei  v.  Dctn.it.  4:!  Midi. 
552,  5  N.  W.  1078;  Ely  v.  City  of 
Orand  Rapid-^.  84  yWeh.  .33t).  47  X. 
W.  447    [1890]. 

'*Steflins  V.  Stewart.  5.3  Kans.  92, 
36  Pac.   55    [1894]. 

°  Spalding  v.  Forsee.   109  ^lo.  App. 


075,  83  S.  W.  540  [1904];  Smith  v. 
City  of  Westport,  105  Mo.  App.  221, 
79  S.  W.   725    [1904]. 

'"  Lindenberger   Land    Co.   v.    R.    B. 

Park  &   Co.,  —  Ky.  ,  27   Ky.  L. 

Rep.  437,  85  S.  W.  213  [1905];  Wes- 
ton V.  City  of  Syracuse,  158  N.  Y. 
274,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  472,  43  L.  R. 
A.  fi78,  53  N.  E.  12   [1899]. 

"  Auditor  (General  v.  St<ddard.  147 
Midi.  329.  110  X.  W.  944  |1907]; 
Ruth^r  V.  Detroit,  43  Vich.  552.  5 
X.  \\.  1078:  Ely  v.  City  of  Orand 
Ranids,  84  Mich.  336.  47  X^.  W.  447 
[1890]. 


§  541  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  866 

that  the  commissioners  of  public  works  have  reserved  the  right 
to  increase  or  diminish  the  amount  of  work  to  be  done,  has  been 
held  in  the  absence  of  fraud  not  to  impair  the  validity  of  the 
contract.^-  In  some  jurisdictions  it  has  been  said. that  the  fact 
that  the  cofltract  was  changed  after  it  was  made  is  not  a  ground 
for  resisting  a  special  assessment,  but  that  if  the  objection  is 
valid  it  must  be  interposed  by  an  injunction  before  the  work  is 
completed."  In  the  same  jurisdiction  it  has  been  said  in  a  later 
case  that  the  remedv  is  to  enjoin  the  payment  to  the  contractors 
and  not  to  resist  the  assessment.^*  If  the  property  owners  ac- 
quiesce in  the  change,  they  cannot  use  such  change  as  a  means 
of  defeatinsr  the  assessment. ^^  An  immaterial  chance  in  the 
contract  is  held  not  to  affect  its  validity.^"  Thus,  if  a  resolution 
calls  for  grading  and  macadamizing  a  portion  of  a  street  begin- 
ning and  ending  at  certain  specified  limits,  a  contract  which 
provides  for  grading  and  macadamizing  that  portion  of  such 
street,  except  where  already  done,  is  held  to  conform  sufficiently 
to  the  contract  and  to  be  valid.^'^  A  change  in  the  contract  Avhich 
is  intended  to  correct  a  clerical  mistake  in  the  original  ordinance 
does  not  invalidate  the  contract. ^^  Thus,  where  bids  were  re- 
ceived upon  the  understanding  that  the  assessments  were  to  be 
paid  in  ten  annual  installments  the  counsel  may  correct  a  mis- 
take in  a  prior  resolution  which  provided  for  receiving  payments 
in  five  annual  installments.^^  Material  alterations  in  a  contract 
whereby  the  price  of  the  work  is  increased  may  constitute  fraud, 
which  will  invalidate  the  assessment. -"^  If  the  original  contract 
is  regarded  as  rescinded  and  after  a  new  resolution  of  intention 
has  been  published  a  contract  is  let  for  the  same  improvement 
to  the  same  contractor  at  a  higher  price,  the  action  of  the  city 
will,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  be  assumed  to 
be  based  upon  a  sufficient  reason,  and  the  assessment  levied  for 

'-  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  "  Emery  v.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co., 

Merriam    to    Vacate    an    Assessment,  28   Cal.  346    [1865]. 

84  N.  Y.  596   [18811.  "  Emerv  v.  San  Francisco  Gas  Co., 

"Ricketts     v.      ViHajre     of     Hyde  28   Cal.   346    [1865]. 

Park.  85  111.  110   [1877].                 "  "Lister    v.     City    of    Tacoma,    44 

'^Heinroth    v.    Kochersneraer,    173  Wash.   222,   87   Pac.    126    [1906]. 

111.  205.  50  N.  E.  171    [18981.  '"Lister    v.     City    of    Tacnma,     44 

'^Shepard    v.    Barron.     194    U.     S.  Wash.   222,   87   Pac.    126    [1906]. 

553,  24  S.   737.  48  L.   1115    [1904].  =»  Miller's  Case,   12  Abb.  Prac.    (N. 

V.)    121    [1861]. 


867 


THE   IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT. 


§542 


such  improvement  will  be  valid.-*  Aa  inferior  agent  of  the  city 
has  no  power  to  modify  the  terms  of  the  contract  entered  into 
by  proper  authority.-'-  It  has  even  been  held  that  if  such  change 
is  made,  the  city  council  cannot  subsequently  ratify  it,-^  even 
if  the  alteration  is  to  the  benefit  of  the  lot  owmer,-*  so  as  to 
make  valid  an  assessment  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement.  It 
has  been  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  if  the  power  to  modify 
a  contract  exists,  the  property  owner  is  not  bound  by  the  con- 
tract price,  but  that  he  can  be  compelled  to  pay  only  what  the 
work  as  finally  done  was  reasonably  worth.-''  Items  not  covered 
by  the  bid  cannot  be  included  in  the  contract  where  the  contract 
must  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder.-"  Expenses  incurred  and  work 
done  under  a  former  resolution  for  an  improvement  wdiieh  has 
been  abandoned  cannot  be  included  in  an  assessment  for  the  same 
improvement  when  constructed  under  a  subsequent  resolution.^' 
If,  however,  a  pre-existing  corporation,  after  making  a  contract 
for  a  public  improvement,  is  annexed  to  a  city,  such  city  may 
make  a  new  contract  for  the  same  improvement  without  the 
consent  of  the  property  owners.-" 

§  542.     Extras. 

Under  many  statutes  no  allowance  to  a  contractor  can  be  made 
for  extra  work  and  material  not  provided  for  in  the  contract 
or  ordinance.'  The  ordinance  is  the  sole  authority  of  the  city 
officials  for  entering  into  such  contract.  A  contract  in  excess  of 
the  authority  thus  conferred  is  invalid  whether  it  is  express  or 
implied.     Extra   worl<   dnnc  liy   reason  of  a    mistake  of  the  city 


^  Spaulding  v.  North  San  Fran- 
cisco Homestead  and  Railroad  Asso- 
ciation, 87  Cal.  40.  24  Pat-.  tiOO,  25 
Pac.  249  [1890]. 

-Murray  v.  Tiu-ker.  K)  IJusli.  (73 
Ky.)  241  [18741;  In  tlie  Matter  of 
Wood,  51  Barb.    (X.  V.  i    275   [18(58]. 

^Murray  v.  Tucker.  10  Busli.  (73 
Ky.)    241  '[1874]. 

'*  Murray  v.  Tucker.    10   V> 
Ky.)    241  '[1874]. 

^  City  to  the  l^se  of  Peters  v. 
rott,  8  Phil.    (Pa.)    41    [1870]. 

"Smith    V.    City    of    Portland 
Ore.  297,  35   Pac.  fifiS    [1894]. 

^^  Fitzhuph  V.  Ashworth.  119  Cal 
393,  51  Pac.  635   [1897]. 


^h.    (73 


Ar- 


25 


-"  Allejiheny  City  v.  Blair,  74  Pa. 
St.  (24  P.  F.  Smith)  225  [1873]; 
'iliat  the  property  owners  are  not 
parties  to  the  original  contract  see 
Schenlev  v.  Commonwealth  for  Use 
of  City  of  Alleirheny,  3(i  Pa.  St.  (12 
Casey)  29;  and  that  the  consent  of 
the  .property  owners  is  not  necessaiy 
to  the  rescission  of  the  contract,  .see 
Marshall  v.  Commonwealth.  59  Pa. 
St.    19   P.   F.  Smith)    455. 

'Blair  v.  Luiiini:.  7(»  Cal.  134.  is 
Pac.  153  [18SS1:  Donnelly  v.  How- 
ard, no  Cal.  291  [1S82];  State. 
Board.  Pnis.  v.  (  ity  of  Hnhoken,  3!> 
N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  378  [1873]  ;  Smitli 
V.  City  of  Portland.  25  Or.  297,  35 
Pac.   6()5    [1894]. 


§  542  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMrNT.  868 

engineer  cannot  be  the  basis  of  recovery.-  Where  the  statute 
requires  the  letting  of  a  contract  on  competitive  bidding,  the 
purpose  of  such  statute  Avould  fail  if  the  contract  so  let  were 
merely  the  point  of  departure  from  which  the  city  and  the  con- 
tractor could  agree  for  further  expenditures  without  advertising 
for  bids.  For  these  reasons,  extras  can  ordinarily  not  be  included 
in  the  assessments.^  Thus,  under  an  ordinance  for  buying  cast 
iron  water  pipe  the  city  authorities  cannot  make  a  valid  con- 
tract for  cast  iron  hydrants.*  No  authority  exists  for  awarding 
extra  compensation  for  performance  before  the  timt  nxed  by 
the  contract.^  The  extra  work  can  ordinarily  be  severed  from 
the  work  provided  for  by  contract."  Where  this  can  be  done  the 
assessment  is  valid  for  the  work  provided  for  by  the  contract  but 
invalid  as  to  such  extras.'^  Under  statutes  which, leave  public 
officials  a  wide  discretion  after  the  contract  has  been  entered 
into,  extras  may  be  ordered  and  included  in  the  assessment.** 
Even  where  a  contract  is  awarded  to  the  lowest  bidder  a  pro- 
vision that  the  contractor  shall  do  extra  work  as  the  street  com- 
missioner shall  direct  at  a  price  to  be  fixed  by  the  commissioner 
does  not  invalidate  the  contract.^  An  award  against  the  city 
for  extra  work  under  an  agreement  to  arbitrate  has  been  upheld 
and  an  assessment  therefor  has  been  held  valid. ^''  Under  statu- 
tory authority  a  reassessment  may  include  extra  work  not  pro- 
vided for  by  the  original  contract.^^  Even  under  statutes  which 
require   the  letting  of  contracts  on   competitive  bidding,    it   has 

"Wilson  V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  125  'In    the    Matter    of    the    Petition 

Mo.  App.  460,  102  S.  W.  600   [1907].  of    Eager,   41    Howard    (N.    Y.)     107 

•■'Piedmont     Paving     Company     v.  [1870];    Matter    of    Eager,    10    Abb. 

Allman,    136    Cal.    88,    68    Pac.    493  Pr.  N.   S.    (N.  Y.)    229    [1871]. 

[1902];     McDonald     v.     Mezes,     107  "  McDonald  v.  Mezes,   107  Cal.  492, 

Cal.  492,  40  Pac.  808    [1895];    Great  40    Pac.    808    [1895]. 

Falls     Ice    Company    v.    District    of  ^McDonald  v.  Mezes,  107  Cal.  492, 

Columbia,    19    D.    C.    327;    Town    of  40   Pac.   808    [1895]. 

Cicero   v.   Green,   211   111.  241,   71   N.  ^  State,  Vanderbeck,   Pros.  v.  May- 

E.  884    [1904];    Prendergast  v.  Rich-  or    and    Common    Council    of    Jersey 

ards,  2  Mo.  App.  187    [1876];   In  the  City,    29    N.    J.    L.     (5    Dutch.)     441 

Matter   of  the   Petition   of   ^Yood.   51  [1861];     Allen     v.     Rogers,     20     Mo. 

Barb.     (N.    Y.)    275    [1868];    In    the  App.    290    [1885]. 

Matter   of  the  Petition   of   Eager,   41  "Allen  v.  Rogers,  20  Mo.  App.  290 

Howard    (N.    Y.)     107    [1870];    Mat-  [1885]. 

ter  of  Eager,   10  Abb.  Pr.  X.  S.    (N.  "Brady   v.    Mayor,    etc..    of   Brook- 

Y.)    229    [1871].  lyn,    I    Barb.    (N.   Y.)    584    [1847]. 

*Town  of  Cicero  v.  Green,  211   111.  '^  Seattle    v.    Kelleher,    195    U.    S. 

241,   71   N.   E.   884    [1904].  351,    49   L.    232,    25    S.    44    [1904]. 


869  THE    IMPROVEMENT    CONTRACT.  §§543,544 

been  held  that  chanjj^es  may  be  made  in  a  contract  after  per- 
formance is  begun  if  the  city  officials  decide  that  such 
ehangres  are  necessary  to  the  proper  construction  of  the  im- 
provement, and  the  expense  thereof  may  be  included  in  the  assess- 
ment without  advertising  for  bids.^-  So  a  retaining  wall,  the 
necessity  of  which  as  well  as  the  size  and  character  of  which 
could  not  be  determined  until  excavation  had  begun,  was  allowed 
to  be  constructed  at  the  expense  of  the  abutting  property 
owners.^-'  Full  eflPect  is  given  to  a  term  in  the  contract  fixing 
the  compensation  to  be  awarded  for  extra  work.^''  A  provision 
in  a  contract  that  no  recovery  could  be  had  for  extra  work  not 
specified  in  the  contract  unless  done  on  the  written  order  of  the 
commissioner  of  public  works,  which  order  was  to  be  annexed 
to  the  contract,  applies  only  to  extra  work,  which  becomes  neces- 
sary in  the  course  of  the  improvement  for  the  proper  completion 
of  work  previously  done  or  for  its  security. ^^ 

§  543.     Impossibility. 

Provisions  in  a  contract  which  become  legally  impossible  are 
discharged,  and  failure  to  perform  the  same  does  not  invalidate 
an  assessment  levied  for  such  contract.^  Thus,  after  a  contract 
for  a  street  improvement  was  let.  a  railroad  switch  was  con- 
structed in  the  street  with  the  consent  of  the  city,  and  the  con- 
struction of  such  switch  rendered  compliance  with  the  contract 
impossil)"l(\  Tt  was  held  that  the  contractor  could  recover  for 
the  work  and  material  spent  in  performing  the  contract  as  far 
as.  under  the  circumstances,  was  possible.- 

§  544.     Assignment  of  improvement  contract. 

In  the  absence  of  some  specific  statute  to  the  contrary,  it  is 
generally  assumed  that  the  contract  for  the  construction  of  a 
public  improvement  is  assigna])le.     "Whether  assignable  or  not.  in 

"  Haatinpfs   v.   C()liinil)us.    42    O.    S.  "  Roomlicld    v.    City    of    Chicago. 

585    [1885].  231   111.  4(i7.  83  N.  E.  291    [1907. 

"  Lonsrworth     v.     City     of     Ciiu-in-  ^  Fell    v.    Piiiladelpliia    to    the    use 

nati,   30  0.   S.    101    [1877].  of    Cunnin<rhani.    01    Pa.    St.     (31    P. 

"Talbott  V.   Town   of   New   Ciistlo.  F.    Smith)    .58    ri87»)l. 

_   Tnrl.   .   81    X.    E.    724    [19071.  =  Lake    Erie    &    Western    R.    R.    Co. 

transferred     from     Appellate     Court,  v.    Walters,     13     Ind.     App.    275,    41 

81    N.    E.   82.  X.   E.  4()5    [1895]. 


§  544  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT,  870 

case  the  city  objected  to  such  assignment,  the  property  owner 
cannot  object  to  performance  by  an  assignee  if  a  city  has  ac- 
quiesced upon  such  performance  and  the  contract  has  been  per- 
formed by  the  assignee  without  objection.^  This  is  true  even  if 
the  assignee  is  a  corporation  which  possibly  had  no  powder  to 
take  the  assignment  or  to  do  the  work,  but  which  has  neverthe- 
less performed  such  contract.^ 

'Chadwick    v.    Kelley,    187    U.    S.  Mo.   App.   433    [1892];    Gest   v.   City 

540,    47    L.   293,   23    S.'   175    [1903];  of  Cincinnati,  26   0.   S.   275    [18751; 

(affirming   Felley    v.    Chadwick.    104  Ernst  v.  Kunkle,  5  0.  S.  521   [18'56]. 
La.   719,  29   So.  295    [1901]):   Brick  ==  Gest  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  26  0. 

&  Terra  Cotta  Company  v.  Hull,  49  S.  275    [1875]. 


CHAPTER  XII. 
PROPERTY   SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT. 

§  545.     Corporeal  property. 

Corporeal  real  property  is  the  kind  of  property  which  gen- 
erally receives  a  special  benefit  from  the  improvement  for  which 
the  special  assessment  is  levied.  Where  this  is  the  ease,  no  ob- 
jection whatever  can  be  made  to  levying  an  assessment  upon  the 
realty  thus  benefited.^  The  fact  that  by  statute  certain  interests 
in  realty  are  to  be  regarded  for  purposes  of  general  taxation,  as 
personal  property  does  not  prevent  such  interests  from  being 
assessed  as  real  property  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  local  improve- 
ments. Real  property  may  be  assessed  notwithstanding  the  dif- 
ferent estates  and  interests  which  may  exist  therein.-  A  ques- 
tion that  is  raised  under  statutes,  which  authorize  the  assessment 
of  realty  but  make  no  provision  as  to  personalt.y,  is  whether 
improvements  of  a  permanent  nature  constructed  on  such  realty 
so  as  to  become  a  part  thereof  can  be  assessed.  Under  statutes 
of  this  sort  it  has  been  held  that  the  improvements  may  be  as- 
sessed if  the  officials  to  whose  discretion  such  question  is  entrusted 

'  City  of  Seattlo  v.  Board  of  Home  of  the  State  of  New  Jersey  v.  City  of 

Missions     of     Methorlist     Protestant  Elizabeth,  66  N.  J.  Law  ( 37  Vr.)  688, 

Church,    138    Fed.    307,    70    C.    C.   A.  52     Atl.      1130      [1901];      (affirming 

597    [19051;    Piper's    Api)eal    in    the  Chancellor   of  State  v.   City   of   Eliz- 

Matter  of  Wideninjr  Kearney   Street,  abeth,  65  N.  J.  L.    (36  Vr.)    45!3,   47 

32  Cal.  530   [18671;   Cicero  and  Pro-  Atl.    455    [10001);    Clark    v.    Village 

viso  Street  Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Dunkirk.  75  N.  Y.  612;    (affirming 

of   Chicago,    176    111.    501,    52    N.    E.  without   report   Clarke   v.   Village   of 

866  [1898];   Rich  v.  City  of  Chicago,  Dunkirk,  12  Ilun.   181    [1878]);   Hof- 

152    111.    18,    38    N.    E.    255    [1894];  feld    v.    City   of    BufTalo,    130   N.    Y. 

City  of  Chicago  v.  Baer,  41    111.  306  387,   29   N.E.    747    [1892];    City   of 

I  1866] ;    Iliggins  v.   City   of   Cliicago,  Spokane    Falls    v.    Browne,    3    Wash. 

18  III.  276    [18571;    E.xcelsior  Plant-  84,   27    Pac.    1077    [18911;    Heath    v. 

ing   and    Manufacturing    Company   v.  ^McCrea,    20   Wash.   342.   55    Pac.   432 

Green,   39   La.   Ann.   455.    1    So. "  873  [1898]. 

[1887];     Mound     City     Constructi(m  =  Cicero    and    Proviso    Street    Rail- 
Company   V.    Macgurn.    97    !Mo.    .\pp.  way  Company  v.  Citv  of  Chicago,  176 
403.  71  S.  W.  460  [19021:  Chancellor  111.'  .^01.   52  X.   E.  866    [18981. 
871 


545 


TxVXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


872 


decide  as  a  fact  that  such  improvements  are  benefited  by  the 
local  improvement  for  which  such  assessment  is  levied.''  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  such  officials  decide  that  such  improvements  are 
not  so  benefited,  they  may  exclude  them.'*  Accordingly,  if  the 
assessors  assume  as  a  matter  of  law  that  such  improvements  must 
be  excluded,  their  action  is  plainly  erroneous."*  The  propriety 
of  including  improvements  is  especially  clear,  where  by  statute 
it  is  provided  that  the  term  "real  property"  shall  include  all 
improvements  thereon."  On  the  other  hand,  under  a  statute  which 
authorizes  local- assessments  upon  "real  estate  only,"  it  is  im- 
proper to  include  the  permanent  improvements  on  real  property 
in  such  assessment.'  Under  such  a  statute,  including  improve- 
ments invalidates  the  entire  assessment,^  even  if  the  land  and 
the  improvements  thereon  are  valued  separately."  The  act  of 
the  owners  in  carving  different  estalc-s  out  of  the  fee  in  such 
realty  does  not  preclude  the  state  from  levying  an  assessment 
against  the  corpus  of  such  property  if  it  so  desires.^''  The  fact 
that  certain  lands  have  been  conveyed  in  trust,  thus  causing 
a  separation  of  the  legal  and  equitable  titles,  does  not  prevent 
them  from  being  assessed  for  local  improvements.  This  is  true 
even  if  the  title  to  such  property  is  taken  in  the  name  of  a  state 
official.^^ 


*  Kennedy  v.  City  of  Troy,  77  N. 
Y.  493  [1879];  Clark  v.  Village  of 
Dinikirlv,  75  N.  Y.  612  [1878];  (af- 
firming witliout  report  Clarlv  v.  Vil- 
lage "of  Dunkirk,  12  Hun.  181 
[1877]). 

*Hoffeld  V.  City  of  Buffalo.  130  X. 
Y.  387,  29  N.  E.  747   [1892]. 

=  Kennedy  v.  City  of  Troy,  77  N.  Y. 
493  [1879];  Clark  v.  Village  of 
Dunkirk,  75  N.  Y.  612  [1878];  (af- 
firming without  report,  'Clark  v.  Vil- 
lage "of  Dunkirk,  12  Hun.  181 
[1877]). 

*  Mound  City  Construction  Com- 
pany V.  ]\racgurn,  97  Mo.  App.  403, 
71  S.  W.  460  [1902]. 

'Heatli  V.  McCrea,  20  Wash.  342, 
55  Pac.  432  [1898];  City  of  Spo- 
kane Falls  V.  Browne,  3  Wash.  84, 
27    Pac.    1077    [1891].      In    consider- 


ing the  question  of  damages  caused 
by  a  change  of  grade  the  effect  upon 
the  property  as  improved  is  the  ques- 
tion to  he  considered.  City  of  Seat- 
tle V.  Board  of  Home  Missions  of 
Methodist  Protestant  Church,  138 
Fed.  307,  70  C.  C.  A.  597  [1905]. 

*  City  of  Spokane  Falls  v.  Browne. 
3  Wash.  84,  27  Pac.  1077   [1891]. 

"Heath  v.  MoCrea,  20  Wasli.  342. 
55  Pac.  432   [1898]. 

'"City  of  Chicago  v.  Baer,  41  111. 
306  [1866];  Higgins  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago,  18  111.  276 "[1857]. 

"Chancellor  of  State  v.  City  of 
Elizabeth,  65  N.  J.  L.  (36  Vr.)'483. 
47  Atl.  455  [1900];  (affirmed  with- 
out opinion  in  Chancellor  of  the 
State  of  New  Jersey  v.  City  of  Eliz- 
abeth, 66  N.  J.  L.  (37  Vr.)  688,  52 
Atl.   1130    [1901]).  ' 


873  PROPERTY  SLBJECT  TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  546 

§  546    Easements. 

Whether  lan(i  sub.ject  to  an  easement  in  favor  of  a  number  of 
persons  is  so  far  public  that  it  is  exempt  from  assessment  is  a 
(luestion  on  which  there  is  some  conflict  of  authority.  The  owner 
of  certain  land  dedicated  it  as  a  park  for  the  benefit  of  the  owners 
of  lots  fronting  on  the  same,  to  be  ornamented  and  improved  in 
such  manner  as  the  majority  of  such  owners  should  desire.  It 
was  held  that,  although  such  land  was  dedicated  to  the  trustees 
of  the  town,  it  was  not,  by  reason  of  the  peculiarity  of  such 
dedication,  the  property  of  the  town  or  a  public  park,  but  that 
it  remained  private  property  and  as  such  was  subject  to  local 
assessment.^  The  owner  of  certain  land  reserved  a  strip  one 
foot  in  width  along  the  east  and  south  boundary  of  the  given 
lot  until  the  owner  of  such  lot  should  give  ten  feet  along  such 
boundaries  for  an  alley.  It  was  held  that  such  strip  of  ground 
was  not  dedicated  to  pul)lic  use  until  such  condition  was  fulfilled 
and  that  in  the  meantime  such  land  was  subject  to  assess- 
ment.- A  strip  of  land  two  feet  in  width  lying  ])etween  a  street 
and  the  lots  adjoining  was  reserved  for  a  fence.  It  was  to  be 
for  the  use  of  several  lots  along  such  strip.  It  was  held  that 
such  land  could  not  be  assessed  or  sold  for  a  street  improve- 
ment, the  court  regarding  it  by  reason  of  such  dedication  as 
analogous  to  a  sidewalk.^  An  easement  is  not  land  and  is  there- 
fore not  ordinarily  subject  to  local  assessment.  A  right  of  way 
leading  through  an  improved  street  to  property  at  some  distance 
therefrom  is  not  regarded  as  benefited  by  the  improvement  of 
such  street  and  therefore  cannot  be  assessed  for  such  improve- 
ment.* If  property  is  conveyed  subject  to  building  restrictions 
and  subsequently  a  decree  is  rendered  at  the  instance  of  the 
grantee  relieving  such  property  from  the  operation  of  such  re- 
strictions, the  former  existence  of  such  restrictions  cannot  pre- 
vent the  assessment  of  such  property.""' 

'  McChesncy      v.      People     ex  rel.           *  Whiting  v.   >[ayor   and  Aldermen 

Johnson,  99   111.  21(>    [ISSll.  o{   the  City  of  Boston,    100   :Mass.  89 

^Creamer    v.    McC'une.    7    .Mo.  A])j).        |  1870]  ;    Board    of    Ilealtli    v.    (Jloria 

91   [1879].  Dei..  23   Pa.  St.  259   [1854]. 

'Town   of   WoodnitV    IMafc   v.  Ras-            "  (  uniniings  v.   West  Chicajro  Park 

ciiin;,    147    Ind.    517.    40    X.    E.  990       (oin'is..    181    111.    130.   54    X.    E.    941 

[1896],  [1899]. 


§  547  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  874 

§  547.    Interest  of  owner  in  land  subject  to  public  easement. 

If  land  has  been  appropriated  for  a  public  use  by  proceeding 
in  eminent  domain,  and  the  use  for  which  it  is  appropriated  is 
one  which  is  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  a  permanent  one, 
no  assessment  can  be  levied  against  the  land  so  appropriated 
even  if  the  former  owner  of  such  land  is  regarded  as  retaining 
an  interest  therein.^  Thus,  that  part  of  a  lot  which  was  appro- 
priated for  a  street  cannot  be  assessed.-  If  an  assessment,  made 
upon  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  the  improvement,  is  apportioned 
according  to  the  frontage  and  a  part  of  such  frontage  is  subse- 
quently appropriated  by  a  municipal  corporation  for  a  street, 
the  courts  should  not,  in  subsequently  reducing  the  amount  of 
the  assessment  because  the  actual  cost  fell  below  the  estimate, 
subtract  the  amount  of  frontage  thus  appropriated  and  thereby 
cast  an  increased  burden  upon  the  rest  of  the  property.  The 
city  should  pay  the  assessment  upon  such  property.^  Land  which 
has  been  appropriated  for  a  public  drain  cannot  be  assessed.* 
On  account  of  the  presumption  of  the  regularity  of  the  action 
of  public  officials,''  it  will  be  presumed  that  if  a  lot  is  assessed 
by  a  lot  number,  the  part  of  such  lot  which  has  been  appro- 
priated for  a  street  has  not  been  regarded  as  benefited  by  such 
taking,  ahd  the  amount  of  such  assessment  does  not  include  any 
allowance  for  benefits  to  the  parts  so  taken."  If  an  attempt  is 
made  to  assess  the  residue  of  the  land  left,  after  appropriating 
a  part  of  it  for  public  use,  we  find  a  conflict  of  authority  as  to 
whether  such  residue  can  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  taking  the 
part  which  has  been  taken. '^     It  is  well  settled  that  such  residue 

'City    of    Joliet    v.    Sprin<4    Creek  =  See  §   1279. 

Drainage  Dist.,  222  111.  441,  78  N.  E.  « Waggeman    v.    Village    of    North 

836   [1006];   Wagffeman  v.  Village  of  Peoria,    155    111.    545,    40   N.    E.   485 

North  Peoria,   155  111.  545,  40  N.  E.  [1895].     See  to  the  same  effect,  De- 

485    [1895];    Leman  v.  City  of  Lake  Koven  v.  City  of  Lake  View,  129  111. 

View,    131    111.    388,    23    N.    E.    346  399,  21  N.  E.  813   [1890]. 

[1890].  'See   §   308. 

^Rieh   V.   City  of   Chicago,    152   111.  Such   expense   may  be   paid   for  by 

18,  38  N.  E.  255   [1894];  Wa"-<reman  local  assessment  levied  on  the  theory 

V.   Villaee   of  North    Peoria,    155    111.  of  benefits,   Wageeman   v.   Village   of 

545,  40  N.  E.  485   [1895];   I^man  v.  North  Peoria,   1.55   111.  545,  40  N.  E. 

City  of  Lake  View,   131   111.   388,  23  485  [1895];   but  not  by  special  taxa- 

N.  E.  346    [1890].  tion    levied   without   regard    to   bene- 

^  Spansrier  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  35  fits,  City  of  Bloomington  v.  Latham, 

0.  S.  469   [18801.   ■  142  111."  462.   18  L.  R.   A.  487,  32  N. 

♦Citv    of    Joliet    V.    Spring    Creek  E.   .506    [1893]. 
Drainanrp  Dist.,  222  111.  441,  78  N.  E. 
836   [1906]. 


875  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  548 

may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  improving  the  part  which  has 
been  taken,  as  by  grading,  paving  and  the  like.^  This  question 
has  been  discussed  iji  connection  with  the  subject  of  the  im- 
provements for  which  an  assessment  may  be  levied.** 

§  548.     Personal  property. 

From  the  nature  of  the  improvements  for  which  special  as- 
sessments are  levied  upon  the  theory  of  the  benefits  conferred 
by  the  improvement  upon  the  property  assessed,  it  is,  in  the 
greater  number  of  cases,  real  property  which  is  benefited  by  the 
improvement,  while  personal  property  situated  near  such  improve- 
ment usually  derives  no  benefit  therefrom.  In  a  general  discus- 
sion of  the  subject,  we  often  find  the  special  or  local  assessment 
treated  as  if  it  were  levied  upon  the  real  estate  only,  and  occa- 
sionally we  find  remarks  to  the  effect  that  it  must  be  levied  upon 
real  estate  onl}^  in  order  to  be  an  assessment;^  and  that  if  levied 
upon  the  personal  property,  as  well  as  real  property,  it  is  in  its 
essential  nature  a  general  tax  and  not  a  local  assessment.^ 
If  the  improvement  is  one  which  from  its  nature  cannot  benefit 
personal  property,  it  is  proper  to  exclude  personal  property  from 
the  operation  of  the  assessment  and  it  would  be  improper  to 
include  it.^  An  assessment  upon  a  railway,  based  on  a  valuation 
which  includes  personal  property  as  well  as  real  property,  has 
been  held  to  be  invalid  because  of  the  inclusion  of  personalty/ 

"See  §  313  ct  seq.  Spokane    Falls    v.    Browne,    3    Wash. 

«Soe  §  301  (<  seq.  84,   27    Pac.    1077    [1891].      "A   local 

In  Davis  v.  C  ity  of  Newark,  54  N.  assessment  can  only  be  levied  on  land 

J.  L.  (25  Vr.)   144,  23  Atl.  27(;[1S911  .     .     .     ."     They  ''apply  to  land  and 

the  question  was   raised   but  not   do-  are   a   charge   on   land   only."      Town 

cided    whetlier    houses    and   buildings  of  Maeon  v.  Patty,  57  Miss.  378,  34 

damaged  by  a  change  of  grade,  which  Am.  Rep.  451    [1879]. 

damage  had  been  paid  to  tlie  owner,  "Iloiley  v.   County  of  Orange,   106 

could  be  assessed  for  benefits  caused  Cal.   420,   39   Pac.    790    [18951;    Clii- 

by  sucli  change  of  grade.  eago,   ^lilwaukee   and   St.   Paul   Rail- 

^  Holley  V.  County  of  Orange,    lOG  way  Company  v.  Phillips,  111  la.  377, 
Cal.  420,  39  Pac.  790  [1895];   City  of  Si'n.  W.  787  [1900]. 
Chicago  V.  Baer,  41   111.  300   fl8GG];  "City  of  Spokane  Falls  v.  Browne, 
Chicago,   Milwaukee  &   St.   Paul   Ry.  3  Wasli.  84,  27  Pac.   1077   [1891]. 
Co.   V.   Phillips,    111    la.   377,   82   N.  *  Chicago,  Milwaukee  and  St.  Paul 
W.   787    [1900];    Eeecher   v.   City   of  Railway  Company  v.  Phillips,  111  la. 
Detroit,  92  Mich.  2(58.  52  X.  W.*  731  377,  82  N.  W.  787    [1900];   Commis- 
[1892];  Town  of  Macon  v.  Patty,  57  sioners   of   Chatham    County    v.    Sea- 
Miss.  378,  34  Am.  Rep.  451    [1879];  board    Air    Line    Railway    Company, 
State,   King,  Pros.  v.  Duryea,  45  N.  133  N.  C.  216,  45  S.  E.  506  [1903].' 
J.  L.    (16  Vr.)    258    [1883];    Citv  of 


§  548  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  876 

The  assessments  in  these  eases  were,  however,  levied  for  pur- 
poses which,  it  M^as  held,  could  not  confer  benefits  upon  the 
personal  proper!}^,  such  as  the  construction  of  a  sewer,^  or  of  a 
fence  in  a  public  fencing  district/'  Remarks  of  this  sort  are 
generally  obiter  when  they  attempt  to  extend  beyond  the  par- 
ticular case,  and  to  lay  down  principles  applicable  to  all  kinds 
of  assessments.  Probably  in  each  case  in  which  such  observa- 
tions are  found,  the  particular  assessment  under  discussion  was 
one  which  could  be  levied  upon  real  property,  but  not  upon 
personal  property,  because  the  personal  property  was  not  bene- 
fited by  such  assessment  while  the  real  property  was ;  and  an 
attempt  to  levy  such  exaction  against  personal  property,  as  well 
as  real  property,  could  be  justified  only  under  the  power  of  gen- 
eral taxation.  A  tax  levied  upon  realty  and  personalty  alike  at 
a  certain  per  cent,  of  its  value  is  ordinarily  an  example  of  gen- 
eral taxation.'^  On  the  other  hand  a  general  tax  levied  upon 
realty  only  has  been  held  invalid  in  some  jurisdictions.^  Other 
cases  seem  to  assume  the  validity  of  such  form  of  general  tax." 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  improvement  is  one  which  can  confer 
a  special  benefit  upon  personal  property,  we  find  some  conflict 
in  authorit.y,  though  chiefly  a  conflict  in  obiter  dicta.  The  con- 
flict is,  however,  chiefly  confined  to  obiter  and  as  far  as  the  gen- 
eral principles  of  general  law  are  involved,  the  question  should 
seem  clear.  If  the  improvement  is  one  which  can  confer  a  spe- 
cial benefit  upon  personal  property,  no  reason  is  apparent  either 
from  the  nature  of  the  property  or  from  general  principles  of 
assessment  law  for  omitting  such  property  from  the  operation  of 
the  assessment.  It  is  true  that  local  assessments  are,  as  a  general 
rule,  levied  on  land  alone ;  but  this  is  only  because  land  is  the 
kind  of  property  Avhich  is  nsuall.y  benefited.  There  exists  no 
constitutional  or  other  restriction  on  the  legislative  power  in 
this  regard,  and  when  particular  personal  property  has  enjoyed 
a  benefit  from  the  work  to  which  it  owes  its  existence  and  pres- 

^  Chicago,  Milwaukee  and  St.  Paul  '  Oilman   v.    City    of    Sheboygan,    2 

Railway  Company  V.  Phillips.  Ill  la.  Black     (67    U.    S.)     510,    17    L.    305 

377,  82  N.  W.  787    [1900].  [1862];  Cobb  v.  Corporation  of  Eliz- 

^  Commissioners  of  Chatham  Coun-  beth  City,  75  N.  C.  1   [1876]. 

ty    V.    Seaboard    Air    Line    Railway  "Thomas  v.  Leland,  24  Wend.    (N. 

Company,    133   N.    C.    216.    45    s!    E.  Y.)     65:    Barker    v.    State,    18    Ohio 

566    [1903].  514   [1849], 

'  Krumberw   v.    City   of    Cincinnati, 
29  0.  S.  69  [1875]. 


17  ( 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§548 


ervation,  nothing  prevents  the  legislature  from  assessing  it.'" 
There  seems  to  be  no  reason  under  the  constitutional  provisions 
generally  in  force,  or  under  the  general  theory  of  local  assess- 
ments why  a  local  assessment  may  not  be  levied  upon  personal 
propert.y  if  the  improvement  for  which  the  local  assessment  is 
levied  does  in  fact  confer  a  special  benefit  upon  such  personal 
property. ^^  Some  assessments  exist  in  which  the  improve- 
ment for  the  cost  of  which  the  assessment  was  levied  con- 
fers a  benefit  on  certain  designated  personal  pr.iperty,  and  in 
such  eases  assessments  levied  against  the  personal  property  thus 
benefited  have  Deen  upheld  and  regarded  as  local  assessments 
as  distinct  from  general  taxation.^-  A  form  of  assessment  of 
this  type  is  found  in  some  of  the  assessments  for  the  construc- 
tion of  levees.  In  some  of  the  statutes  on  this  subject  it  is  pro- 
vided that  a  tax  or  assessment  of  a  certain  amount  per  bale 
upon  each  bale  of  cotton  raised  upon  the  land  protected  by  the 
levee  shall  be  levied  as  a  means  of  paying  for  such  improve- 
ment. Such  an  exaction  is  held  to  be  a  special  assessment  and 
not  a  general  tax.'"  A  similar  charge  is  made  upon  each  bushel 
of  oysters  grown  in  salt  water  from  which  fresh  water  is  kept 
out  by  levees.'*  Such  a  charge  is  not  affected  by  the  limita- 
tions of  the   constitution   aiiplieable   to   genei'al   taxation.'^'     The 


'"  E.vcolsior  Planting  and  Manufac- 
turing Company  v.  Green,  39  La. 
Ann.  455,  1  So.  873   [1387]. 

""It  is  vain  to  say  tliat  a  bale  of 
cotton  is  personal  property  and  that 
local  assessments  can  only  be  levied 
on  real  estate.  There  e.xists  no  such 
constitutional  or  other  re^^triction  on 
the  legislative  power.  'It  is  true,' 
as  Mr.  Burroughs  says,  'that  as  a 
general  rule  the  local  assessment  is 
solely  on  land,  and  not  on  personal 
procrty.'  |  Citing  Burroughs  on 
Taxation,  p.  473.]  U'licn.  as  in  the 
present  ease,  tlie  i)ai-ticular  jum-^  >n:i] 
property  assessed  has  enjoyed  a  ben- 
efit from  the  works  to  wliieh  i-t  owes 
its  existence  and  preservation,  and 
when  the  letrislatiire  has  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  jiidirment  determined  that 
it  should  contribute  for  such  benefit, 
no  principle  or  precedent  can  be 
found  wliicb  would  justify  a  cnurt 
in    overruling    its    decision."      Excel- 


sior Planting  and  Manufacturing  Co. 
V.  Collector  Green.  39  La.  Ann.  455. 
464,  1  So.  873   [18871. 

'-  Hughes  V.  Board  f)f  Commission- 
ers of  the  Caddo  Levee  District,  108 
La.  146,  32  So.  218  [1901,  1902]; 
George  v.  Young,  45  La.  Ann.  1232, 
14  So.  137  [1K93];  Excelsior  Plant- 
ing and  Manufacturing  Company  v. 
Green,  39  La.  Ann.  455,  I  So.  873 
[1887]. 

"Hughes  V.  Board  of  Commission- 
ers of  the  Caddo  Levee  District,  108 
La.  146.  .32  So.  218  [1901,  1902]; 
George  v.  Youn<.',  45  La.  Ann.  1232, 
14  So.  137  [1893];  Excelsior  Plant- 
ing and  ^lanufacturing  Company  v. 
Green.  Collector,  39  La.  Ann.  455.  1 
So.  873   [1887]. 

"  Board  of  Commissioners  for 
Buras  Levee  District  v.  Mialegvich, 
52  La.  Ann.  1292.  27  So.  790  [1900]. 

"George  v.  Vouuir.  45  La.  Ann. 
1232.   14  So.   137   [1893]. 


.§  548  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  878 

justice  of  such  legislation  is  upheld  as  far  as  third  persons  are 
concerned,  because  the  cotton  is  assessed  not  simply  as  a  bale 
of  cotton,  but  a  bale  of  cotton  which  has  been  produced  on 
lands  protected  by  the  levees,  and  has,  during  the  period  of  its 
cultivation  and  growth,  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  its  protection.  No 
one  dealing  with  such  cotton  can  be  prejudiced,  because  all  are 
advised  by  the  law,  from  the  moment  when  the  cotton  is  planted, 
that  when  it  reaches  the  condition  of  ginned  bale,  it  must  pay 
this  tax.^"  While  such  a  charge  is  undoubtedly  a  local  assess- 
ment, it  is  doubtful  whether  it  is  a  true  charge  upon  personal 
propert}^  or  whether  it  is  not  essentially  a  charge  upon  realty 
based  upon  the  amount  of  the  product  thereof,  different  from 
the  ordinary  assessment  on  realty  only  as  to  the  manner  of  appor- 
tionment. By  some  constitutional  provisions  express  authority 
to  assess  real  property  is  given  without  any  corresponding  refer- 
ence to  personal  property."^^  It  is  often  provided  by  statute 
that  assessments  shall  be  levied  on  "real  property"  or  "real 
estate."^®  Under  statutes  of  this  sort  two  different  classes  of 
questions  may  be  raised.  Such  statute  evidently  excludes  per- 
sonal property  from  local  assessment.  If  the  personal  property 
is  not  in  fact  benefited  by  the  improvement  for  which  the  assess- 
ment is  levied,  there  is  no  impropriety  in  omitting  it  and  the 
assessment  is  not  on  that  account  invalid.^^  Under  a  statute 
which  authorizes  the  assessment  of  all  the  real  property  within 
the  district,  an  irrigation  district  cannot  assess  the  poles  and 
wires  of  a  telegraph  company  which  have  been  constructed  by 
such  company  upon  the  land  of  a  railroad  company  under  a 
contract  whereby  they  are  reserved  as  the  personal  property  of 
the  telegraph  company.^"^  If  the  improvement  is  constructed  and 
the  original  assessment  provided  for  under  a  statute  which  makes 
the  assessment  a  lien  upon  the  real  property  in  the  district,  a 
subsequent  statute  which  authorizes  the  board  of  directors  of 
such  district  to  pledge  the  real,  personal  and  mixed  property  of 
the    district,    without    the    consent    of    the    property    owners,    as 

»' Excelsior  Planting  and  Manufac-  "Rich  v.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111. 

turins    Company    v.    Creen.    39    La.  18.  38  X.  E.  2.55  [1894]. 

Ann.  455.  1  So.  Rep.  873  [18871.  '"See  §  641. 

"Article  XIX..   §   27,   Coni=ititiition  ="  Western   Union   Telegraph   Co.   v. 

of  Arkansas.     Little  Rock  v.  Kat/en-  ^Modesto  Irrigation  Co.,  149  Cal.  662, 

stein,    52    Ark.    107.    12    S.    W.    198  87  Pac.   190   [1906]. 
[1889]. 


879 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§549 


security  for  the  improvement  bonds,  impairs  the  obligation  of 
the  contract  as  affecting  the  property  owners,  and  is  therefore 
unconstitutional.-^ 


§  549.  Property  benefited  subject  to  assessment  in  absence  of 
statutory  restrictions. 
The  general  theory  underlying  the  local  assessment  is,  as  we 
have  seen/  that  such  assessment  is  levied  upon  property  which 
receives  an  especial  and  peculiar  benefit  from  an  improvement 
of  a  public  ciiaracter,  and  that  such  assessment  is  levied  in 
return  for  such  benefits.-  The  general  rule  in  determining  what 
property  may  be  assessed  on  the  theory  of  benefits  conferred  by 
the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  is  that  any 
property  which  is  in  fact  benefited  by  such  improvement  may 
be  subjected  to  assessment  therefor,  if  the  legislature  authorizes 
such  assessment  and  does  not  in  some  way  restrict  the  area  of 
the  property  subject  to  assessment.''     This  statement  of  the  rule 


^  Merchants'  National  Bank  v.  Es- 
condido  Irrigation  District,  144  Cal. 
329,  77  Pac.  937    [1904]. 

*See  §   11. 

'  "Assessments  for  street  and  other 
similar  improvements  are  upheld  up- 
on the  theory  that  each  lot  or  tract 
of  land  assessed  is  benefited  in  a 
special  and  peculiar  manner  in  a  sum 
equal  to  the  amount  estimated  or  as- 
sessed against  it."  Becker  v.  Balti- 
more and  Ohio  Soutii  Western  Rail- 
way Company,  17  Ind.  App.  324.  328, 
46  N.  E.  085  [1897];  (citing  .Jack- 
son V.  Smith,  120  Ind.  520.  22  X.  E. 
431  [1889];  Ross  v.  Stackhouse,  114 
Ind.  200,  10  X.  E.  501  [1887];  Ilcick 
V.  Voight,  110  Ind.  279,  11  X.  E.  300 
[188G];  Lipes  v.  Hand,  104  Ind.  503, 
1  X.  E.  871,  4  X.  E.  160  [1885]; 
City  of  Xcw  Albany  v.  Cook,  29  Ind. 
220  [18671;  Stuart  v.  Palmer,  74 
N.  Y.  183,  30  Am.  Rep.  289  [1878]: 
Chamberlain  v.  Cleveland.  34  0.  S. 
551;  Ilamniett  v.  Philadelpliia,  05 
Pa.  St.  (15  P.  F.  Smith)  146.  3  Am. 
Rep.  615  [1870]). 

"Keighley's  Case.  10  Rep.  139  a.  1).: 
Shoemaker  v.  United  States.  147  I'. 
S.  282.  37  L.   170.   13  S.  361    [1893]-. 


Chadwick  v.  Kelley,  187  U.  S.  540,  47 
L.  293,  23  S.  175  [1903];  (affirming, 
Kelley  v.  Chadwick,  104  La.  719,  29 
So.  2*95  [1901]);  Board  of  Improve- 
ment District  X"uml)er  Five  of  Tex- 
arkana  v.  Offenhauser,  84  Ark.  257, 
105  S.  W.  265  [1907];  Cribbs  v. 
Benedict,  64  Ark.  555,  44  S.  W.  707 
[1897];  Little  Rock  v.  Katzenstein, 
52  Ark.  107,  12  S.  \\.  198  [1889]; 
:Martin  v.  Wagner,  120  Cal.  623,  53 
Pac.  167  [1898];  Boyle  v.  Tibbey,  82 
Cal.  11,  22  Pac-  1128  [1889];  Recla- 
mation District  Xo.  108  v.  Ilagar,  66 
Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945  [1884];  Bixler  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors  of  the  County 
of  Sacramento.  59  Cal.  698  [1881]"; 
Ilagar  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  Yolo 
Co.,  47  Cal.  222  [1874];  Chambers  v. 
Satterlee.  40  Cal.  497  [1871];  Piper's 
Appeal  in  the  Matter  of  Widening 
Kearney  Street,  32  Cal.  530  [1867]; 
Burnett  v.  Mayor  and  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Sacramento,  12 
Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec.  518  [1859]: 
City  of  Denver  v.  Kennedy,  33  Colo. 
80.  80  Pac.  122.  467  [190.5];  Dann  v. 
Woodnifr,  51  Conn.  203  [1883]: 
IIun<j:erford  v.  City  of  Hartford,  39 
Conn.   279    [1872].*  Clapp   v.   City  of 


§549 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


880 


leaves   out   of  consideration  for  the   present  the   fact  that   the 
determination  of  the  legislature   as  to   what   property  is  bene- 


Hartford,  35  Conn.  66  [1868];  Sny- 
dackei-  v.  Village  of  West  Hammond, 
225  111.  154,  80  N.  E.  93  [1907];  The 
Chicago  Union  Traction  Co.  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  204  111.  363,  68  N.  E. 
519  [1903];  Washburn  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  198  111.  506,  64  X.  E.  1064 
[1902];  Shurtleflf  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
190  111.  473,  60  N.  E.  870  [1901]; 
Sanitary  District  of  Chicago  v.  City 
of  Joliet,  189  111.  270,  59  N.  E.  566 
[1901];  Chicago  &  Alton  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Joliet,  153  111. 
649,  39  N.  E.  1077  [1894];  Briggs 
V.  Union  Drainage  District  No.  1, 
140  111.  53,  29  N.  E.  721  [1893]; 
Gau<  n  V.  Moredock  and  Ivy  Landing 
Drainage  District,  No.  1,  131  111. 
446,  23  N.  E.  633  [1890];  Commis- 
sioners of  Highways  of  the  Town  of 
Colfax  V.  Commissioners  of  East 
Lake  Fork  Special  Drainage  District, 
127  111.  581,  21  N.  E.  206  [1890]; 
Murphy  v.  City  of  Peoria,  119  111. 
509,  9  N.  E.  895  [1888];  Himdley 
and  Rees  v.  Commissioners  of  Lin- 
coln Park,  6/  111.  559  [1873];  Trus- 
tees of  the  Illinois  and  Michigan  Ca- 
nal V.  City  of  Chicago.  12  111.  403 
[1851];  (followed  Wright  v.  Chi- 
cago, 46  111.  44  [1867]);  Commis- 
sioners of  Spoon  River  Drainage  Dis- 
trict in  Champaign  County  v.  Con- 
ner, 121  111.  App.'^450  [1905]:  Mittel 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  9  Bradwell  (111.) 
534  [1881];  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Taber,  168  Ind.  419,  77 
N.  E.  741  [1906]  :  Culbertson  v. 
Knight,  152  Ind.  121,  52  N.  E.  700 
[1898];  Zioler  v.  ^^leno-es.  121  Ind. 
99,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  357,  22  N.  E.  782 
[1889];  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
MontTomery  Countv  v.  Fullen.  Ill 
Ind.  410.  12  N.  E.  298  [18871:  Ray 
V.  Citv  of  .Teffersonville,  90  Ind.  567 
[18831;  Bate  v.  Sheets.  64  Ind.  209 
[18781 ;  Citv  of  New  Albany  v.  Cook, 
29  Ind.  220  [18671:  Bvram  v.  Fo1pa% 
17  Ind.  App.  629.  47  N.  E.  .351 
[1897];    Mock   v.   City   of  Muncie,   9 


Ind.  App.  536,  37  N.  E.  281  [1893]: 
Chambliss  v.  Johnson,  77  la.  611,  42 
N.  W.  427  [1889];  Buell  v.  Ball,  20 
la.  282  [1866];  City  of  Kansas  City 
v.  C4ibson,  66  Kan.  501,  72  Pac.  22*2 
[1903];    Morton  v.   Sullivan,  —  Ky. 

,  96  S.  W.  807,  29   Ky.  L.  Rep. 

943  [1906];  Durrett  v.  Kenton  Coun- 
ty, —   (Ky. )   ,  27  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

1173,  87  "S.  W.  1070  [1905];  Hol- 
lingsworth  v.  Thompson,  45  La.  Ann. 
222.  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  220,  12  So.  1 
[1893]  ;  Munson  v.  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Atchafalaya  Basin 
Levee  District,  43  La.  Ann.  15  8  So. 
906  [1891];  City  of  New  Or- 
leans praying  for  opening  of 
Casacaloo  and  Moreau  Streets, 
20  La.  Ann.  497  [1868];  Beals 
V.  James,  173  Mass.  591,  54  N. 
E.  245  [1899];  Holt  v.  City  Council 
of  Somerville,  127  Mass.  408  [1879]; 
Howe  v.  City  of  Cambridge,  114 
Mass.  388  [1874].;  Power  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  139  Mich.  30,  102  N.  \V. 
288  [1905];  Goodrich  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 123  Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255 
[1900];  Warren  v.  City  of  C4ran(\ 
Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874];  Hoyt  v. 
City  of  East  Saginaw,  19  Mich.  39, 
2  Am.  Rep.  76  [1869];  State  ex  rel. 
Hughes  V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey 
County,  95  :\Iinn.  70,  103  N.  W.  744 
[1905];  State  ex  rel.  Eaton  v.  Di.s- 
trict  Court  of  Ramsey  County,  95 
Minn.  503,  104  N.  W.  553  [19051: 
State  of  Minnesota  v.  Robert  P. 
Lewis  Company.  72  Minn.  87.  svh 
nomine;  Ramsey  County  v.  Robert  P. 
Lewis  Company,  42  L.  R.  A.  639. 
75  N.  W.  108  [1898];  State  of  Min- 
nesita  ex  rel.  Cunningham  v.  District 
Conrt  of  Ramsev  Cou^itv.  29  Minn. 
62.  n  N.  W.  133  [18821:  STT.ith  v. 
WilHs.  78  Miss.  243.  28  So.  878 
[19001  ;  Dflilv  V.  Sworie.  47  Miss.  367 
[18721:  South  Highland  Land  and 
Tnini-'i^'PTnpnt  Co.  v.  K3"<!^s  Citv.  172 
Afn.  ^'>'i  72  S.  W.  944  [19021 :  Heman 
V.   Gilliam,    171   Mo.   258,    71    S.   W. 


881 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§549 


fited  by  a  given  type  of  improvement  is  of  great  and  sometimes 
of  controlling  weight.*  In  like  manner  the  effect  of  the  determina- 
tion of  the  city  or  other  municipality  or  of  the  public  officers 
to  whom  the  legislature  has  entrusted  the  duty  of  determining 
what  property  is  benefited,  which  is  of  great  weight  and  which 
sometimes  is  controlling,  is  omitted  from  the  present  discussion. 
These  questions  are  considered  elsewhere.^  The  question  of  what 
constitutes  benefit  in  point  of  fact  and  what  determines  the 
amount  of  benefit  is  also  reserved  for  discussion  elsewhere."  If 
property  is  benefited  by  a  public  improvement  it  may  be  assessed, 
although  it  belongs  to  a  non-resident.'  The  same  principles 
apply  in  cases  of  an  improvement  by  a  drainage  or  levee  cor- 


163  [1902];  Kansas  City  v.  Ward, 
134  Mo.  172,  35  S.  W.  600  [1896]; 
Columbia  Bottom  Levee  Company  v. 
Meier,    39   Mo.    53    [1866];    State   v. 

Several  Parcels  of  Land,  — Xeb.  , 

113  N.  W.  248  [19071;  Hart  v.  City 
of  Omaha,  74  Xeb.  836,  105  N.  W. 
546  [1905];  Medlaud  v.  Linton,  60 
Xeb.  249,  82  X.  W.  866  [1900];  Mc- 
Cormick  v.  City  of  Omaha,  37  Xeb. 
829,  56  X.  W.'626  [1893];  Durrell 
V.  City  of  Woodbury,  —  X.  J.  Sup. 

,  do  Atl.   198    [1906];   DeWitt  v. 

City  of  Elizabeth,  56  X.  J.  L.  (27 
Vroom)  119,  27  Atl.  801  [1893]; 
State,  Agens,  Pros.  v.  ^layor  and 
Common  Council  of  Xewark,  37  X.  J. 
L.  (8  Vr.)  415,  18  Am.  Rep.  729 
[18741;  State,  Morris  and  Essex 
Railroad  Company,  Pros.  v.  Jersey 
City,  30  X.  J.  L.  "(7  Vr.)  56  [1872]; 
State,  Britton,  Pros.  v.  Blake,  35  X. 
J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  208  [1871];  State 
Gregory,  Pros.  v.  ilayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Jersey  City,  34  X.  J.  L.  (5 
Vr.)  390  [1871]; 'Voght  v.  City  of 
BufTalo,  133  X.  Y.  463,  31  X.  E."  340 
[18921;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appli- 
cation of  the  Common  Co\incil  of  the 
City  of  Amsterdam  to  take  Lands  for 
the  E.vtension  of  Grove  and  Jay 
Streets,  126  X.  Y.  158,  27  X.  E.  272 
[1891];  Kennedy  v.  City  of  Troy,  77 
X.  Y.  493  [1879];  In  the  Matter  of 
Broadway  Widening.  03  Barb.  572 
[1872];    Mayor,    etc.,    of    Xew   Y'ork 


v.  Whitney,  7  Barb.  485  [1849]; 
Harper  v.  Commissioners  of  Xew 
Hanover  County,  133  X.  C.  106,  45 
S.  E.  526  [1903];  Erickson  v.  Casa 
County,  11  X.  D.  494,  92  X.  W.  841 
[1902];  Maloy  v.  City  of  Marietta, 
11  0.  S.  636  [I860];  City  of  Toledo 
for  Use  V.  Beaumont,  3  Ohio  X'.  P. 
287  [1895];  Paulson  v.  City  of  Port- 
land. 16  Ore.  450,  1  L.  R.  A.  673,  19 
Pac.  450  [1888];  (affirmed,  Paulsen 
V.  Portland,  149  U.  S.  30,  37  L.  637, 
13  S.  750  [1893]);  Allentown  v. 
Henry,  73  Pa.  St.  404  [1873];  In  re 
Fifth  Avenue  Sewer,  4  Brewster 
(Pa.)  364  [1870];  Kettle  v.  City  of 
Dallas,  35  Te.x.  Civ.  App.  632,  80 
S.  W.  874  [1904];  Violett  v.  City 
Council  of  Alexandria,  92  Va.  561, 
53  Am.  St.  Rep.  825,  31  L.  R.  A. 
382,  23  S.  E.  90f)  [1896];  Meggett 
v.  City  of  Eau  Claire,  81  Wis.  326, 
51  X.  W.  506  [1892];  Robinson  v. 
City  of  Milwaukee,  61  Wis.  585,  21 
X.  W.  610  [1884];  Oilman  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  ^5  Wis.  328,  13  X.  W. 
266  [18821;  Rahel  v.  City  of  Seat- 
tle, 44  Wash.  482,  87  Pac.  520 
[1900];  .Tohnson  v.  City  of  Tacoma, 
41    Wash.    51,    82    Pac.    1002    [1905]. 

*  See  §  553  et  seq. 

"  See  §  555  et  seq. 

"  See  §  652  et  seq. 

'  Dewey  v.  City  of  Des  Moines,  101 
la.  416,  Vo  X.  W.  605   [1897]. 


§549 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


882 


poration.  Under  statutory  authority  land  belonging  to  one  not 
a  member  of  such  corporation  may,  if  especially  benefited,  be 
assessed.*  The  question  of  want  of  especial  benefits  may  also 
be  waived  by  failure  to  raise  it  in  the  proper  way.^  As  has 
before  been  said/"  the  general  theory  which  underlies  the  doc- 
trine of  local  assessments  is  repudiated  in  some  states,  and  it  is 
there  denied  that  there  is  any  essential  and  vital  connection 
between  the  local  assessment  and  the  especial  and  peculiar  bene- 
fits for  which  such  assessment  is  ordinarily  said  to  be  levied. 
Where  this  doctrine  is  expressed  or  is  entertained  in  any  way, 
we  find  it  said  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  land  upon  which 
the  assessment  is  levied  should  receive  an  especial  benefit  by 
reason  of  the  improvement  for  which  such  an  assessment  is 
levied."  The  converse  of  the  foregoing  rule  is  also  true.  If 
property  is  not  benefited  in  an  especial  and  peculiar  manner  by 
the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  it  is  not 
proper  to  assess  the  same  for  such  improvement.^-     This  state- 


*  Columbia  Bottom  Levee  Co.  v. 
Meier,  39  Mo.  53   [1866]. 

'Whiting  V.  Townsend,  57  Cal.  515 
[1881];  Heman  v.  Schulte,  166  Mo. 
409,  66  S.  W.  163  [1902]. 

"See   §    12. 

^•Oliver  v.  Monona  County,  117 
Iowa  43,  90  N.  W.  510  [1902];  Chi- 
cago, Milwaukee  and  St.  Paul  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Phillips,  111  la.  377, 
82  N.  W.  787  [1900].  "Such  an  im- 
provement of  a  street  is  a  public  ob- 
ject which  will  support  such  an  as- 
sessment regardless  of  the  fact  of 
whether  or  not  it  is  a  benefit  to  the 
abutting  property."  Dewey  v.  City 
of  Des  Moines,  101  la.  416.  70  N.  W. 
605  [1897];  (not  affected  by  revers- 
al in  Dewey  v.  Des  Moines,  173  U. 
S.  193,  43  L.  665,  19  S.  379   [1899]). 

i=Case  of  Isle  of  Ely,  10  Rep. 
141  a.;  City  of  Hartford  v. 
West  Middle  District,  45  Conn. 
462,  29  Am.  Rep.  687  [1878]  ;  Benson 
V.  BuntinT,  141  Cal.  462,  75  Pac.  59 
[1903];  Parker  v.  Reay,  76  Cal.  103 
[1888]:  Scltumacker  v.  Toberman.  56 
Cal.  508  [1880];  Allman  v.  Di«tHct 
of  Columbia.  3  Anp.  D.  C.  8  [18941; 
Clark   V.    City    of    Chicago,    214    111. 


318,  72  N.  E.  358  [1905];  West  Chi- 
cago Park  Comrs.  v.  Chicago  Ter- 
minal Transfer  Railroad  Company, 
183  111.  68,  56  N.  E.  1134  [1899]; 
Johnson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kocher- 
sporger.  177  III.  64,  52  N.  E.  308 
[1898];  Culver  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
171  111.  399,  49  N.  E.  573  [1898]; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Adcock,  168  111. 
221,  48  N.  E.  155  [1897];  Rich  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  18,  38  N.  E. 
255  [1894];  Edwards  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 140  111.  440,  30  N.  E.  350 
[1893];  The  Chicago,  Rock  Island  & 
Pacific  Railroad  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  139  111.  573,  28  N.  E.  1108 
[1893];  The  City  of  Bloomington  v. 
The  Chicago  and  Alton  R.  R.  Com- 
pany, 134  111.  451,  26  N.  E.  366 
[1890];  Mascall  v.  Commissioners  of 
Drainage  District,  122  111.  620,  14 
N.  E.  47  [1889];  Parka  County  Coal 
Company  v.  Campbell,  140  Ind.  28. 
39  N.  e";  149  [1894];  Lipes  v.  Hand. 
104  Ind.  503.  1  N.  E.  871,  4  N.  E. 
160  [1885];  Bate  v.  Sheets,  64  Ind. 
209  [1878];  Tillman  v.  Kircher,  64 
Ind.  104  [1878]:  Chicago,  Milwaukee 
and  St.  Paul  Railway  Company  v. 
Phillips.   Ill    Ta.   377,^2  N.  W."  787 


883 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


.§549 


ment  of  this  rule,  like  the  statement  of  the  former  rule,  omits 
for  the  present  both  the  question  of  the  effect  of  proper  determin- 
ation by  the  legislature,  city  or  authorized  public  officers  as  to 
what  land  is  benefited  and  also  the  question  of  what  amounts 
to  an  especial  and  peculiar  benefit.  The  true  reason  that  prop- 
erty which  is  not  benefited  in  an  especial  degree  should  not  be 
assessed  is  to  be  found  in  the  very  nature  of  the  assessing  power. 
The  only  right  which  the  legislature  possesses  by  virtue  of  its 
power  to  assess,  :s  to  assess  property  benefited  by  a  public 
improvement  in  proportion  to  and  not  exceeding  the  benefits 
conferred  by  such  improvement.  To  use  such  a  power  as  a  jus- 
tification for  a  tax  levied  upon  property  which  is  not  benefited 
by  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  would 
be  to  attempt  to  support  by  the  theory  of  the  power  of  local 
assessment,  an  exaction  which  has  none  of  the  elements  of  the 
local   assessment.     Another  reason   that   property   not   benefited 


11900];  Hollingsworth  v.  Thompson, 
45  La.  Ann.  222.  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  220, 
12  So.  1  [1893];  Miinson  v.  Board  of 
Commissioners  of  Tlic  Atehafalaya 
Basin  Levee  District,  43  La.  Ann. 
15,  8  So.  906  [1893];  Yeatman  v. 
Crandall,  11  La.  Ann.  220  [185G]; 
Lincoln  v.  Board  of  Street  Commis- 
sioners of  the  City  of  Boston,  17fl 
Mass.  210,  57  N.  £.35(5  [1900]  ;  State 
V.  Pillsbury,  82  Minu.  3i59,  85  N.  W. 
175  [1901]:  State  of  :Minnesota  ex 
rel.  Cunnin<^liam  v.  District  Court  of 
Ramsey  County,  29  Minn.  ()2,  11  X. 
W.  133  [1882];  Corrigan  v.  Gage. 
68  Mo.  541  [1878];  Hanscom  v.  City 
of  Omaha,  11  Neb.  37,  7  N.  W.  739 
[18811;  Vreeland  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Bayonne,  58  N.  .7.  L.  (29  Vr.)  120, 
.32'Atl.  G8  [18951;  State,  New  Jer- 
sey Railroad  &  Transportation  Co., 
Prog.  V.  Citv  of  Fli-'aheth.  37  N.  J. 
L.  (8  Vr.)  330  ri8751:  State.  Fin-r. 
Pros.  V.  Popd.  43  X.  J.  T,.  (14  Vr.) 
186  nSSll:  Stnte.  Sl-in'sle.  Pvo«.  v. 
Inhabitants  of  the  To\vn«''iri  of  Clin- 
ton. .^9  X.  .7.  7,.  (in  Vrnonil  f.56 
[18777:  State.  Hunt.  Pn^s.  v.  ^hwnr 
and  Comn"-"i  ''"inicil  nf  the  C'\i\  nf 
Rahwav.  .99  X\  .7.  7>.  (10  Vroom ) 
646    [1877]  :    State.    Mann.    Pros.    v. 


Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  Jer- 
sey City,  24  N.  J.  L.  (4  Zab.)  662 
[1855];  People  ex  rel.  Keim  v.  Des- 
mond, 186  N.  Y.  232,  78  N.  E.  857 
[1906];  (reversing,  97  N^.  Y.  S.  795, 
111  App.  Div.  757  [1906]);  Erici<son 
V.  Cass  County,  11  X.  D.  494,  92  X. 
W.  841  [1902]";  Chicago  &  Erie  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Keith,  67  0.  S.  279, 
60  L.  R.  A.  525,  65  N.  E.  1020  [1902] ; 
Ford  V.  City  of  Toledo,  64  O.  S.  92. 
59  N.  E.  779  [1901];  Bl,,ch  v.  God- 
frey, 26  Oiiio  C.  C.  R.  781  [1904]; 
Hiidebrand  v.  Toledo,  27  Ohio  C.  C. 
R.  427  [1905];  Bowler  v.  Biddinger 
""'•ee  Turnpike  Co.,  6  W.  L.  B. 
(Ohio)  404  [1881];  Oregon  &  Cali- 
fornia R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Portland, 
25  Or.  229,  22  L.  R.  A.  713,  35 
Pac.  452  [18941;  Beechwood  Avenue 
Sewer  (1)  Pittsburg's  Appeal  (1), 
179  Pa.  St.  490.  36  Atl.  209  [18971; 
Philadelphia  to  Use  of  Westor  v. 
Spring  Garden  Farmers  ^larket  Com- 
n-'nv.  161  Pa.  St.  522,  29  Atl.  286 
[18941:  Kettle  v.  rif  of  Dallas.  35 
T-ex.  Civ.  Ann.  632.  80  S.  W.  874 
[19041;  Bovden  v.  Village  of  Brat- 
fi-bovo.  (15  Vt.  504.  27  Atl.  164 
[1893]. 


550 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


884 


cannot  be  assessed  is  found  in  the  constitutional  provisions  which 
forbid  the  taking  of  property  except  by  due  process  of  law.^" 
This  reason  is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  the  former  rea- 
son. Taking  by  legitimate  taxation  is  not  a  taking  without  due 
process  of  law.  Taking  under  guise  of  taxation  or  of  that  branch 
of  that  power  of  taxation  known  as  local  assessment,  in  defiance 
of  the  essential  elements  of  such  power,  is  a  taking  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  One  who  resides  upon  certain  land, 
but  has  no  interest  therein,  cannot  be  assessed  for  an  improvement 
which  results  in  benefit  to  such  land.^*  Accordingly,  the  legisla- 
ture cannot  charge  persons  who  reside  upon  a  given  street  with 
the  expense  of  improving  such  street. ^'^  The  rule  that  only  prop- 
erty which  receives  a  special  benefit  from  a  public  improvement 
can  be  assessed,  while  applicable  to  assessments  levied  upon  the 
theory  of  benefits,  has  no  application  to  assessments  which  are 
in  the  nature  of  charges  for  the  performance  of  a  legal  duty 
which  the  owner  of  certain  realty  is  bound  to  perform  for  the 
benefit  of  the  public.  When  charges  of  this  sort  are  involved 
the  land  which  may  be  assessed  is  the  land  with  reference  to 
which  the  owner  thereof  owes  the  legal  dutv  for  the  non-per- 
formance of  which  the  charge  is  exacted.^''  Thus,  while  the  con- 
struction of  a  sidewalk  along  real  property  ordinarily  confers 
a  benefit  upon  i.t,  the  owner  of  such  real  property  may  be  com- 
pelled in  most  states  to  consstruct  such  sidewalk  at  his  own 
expense  without  any  reference  to  the  fact  of  benefits  conferred 
by  such  improvement.^^ 


§  550.     The  assessment  district. 

From  the  nature  of  the  local  assessment  it  is  generally  neces- 
sary that  the  assessment  district  be  laid  out  and  defined  before 
assessment    can    be    apportioned    and   levied.^      Under    a    statute 


1^  Oregon  &  California  R.  "R.  Co. 
V.  City  of  Portland.  25  Ore.  229.  22 
L.  E.  A.  713,  35  Pac.  452  [1894]. 
See  §  118. 

"Creighton  v.  Manson.  27  Cal.  G14 
[18651. 

"Creighton  v.  Manson.  27  Cal.  614 
[18651. 

^^  State,  Aceris,  Pros.  v.  Mavnr  and 
Common  Council  of  Newark,  37  N.  J. 


L.  (8  Vr.)  415.  18  Am.  Rep.  729 
[18741. 

^'  State,  Agens,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Newark,  37  N.  J. 
L.  (8  Vr.)  415,  18  Am.  Rep.  729 
[18741. 

'  Duncan  v.  Ramish,  142  Cal.  686, 
76  Pac.  661  [19041;  German  Sav- 
in-^ s  and  Loan  Society  v.  Ramish, 
138  Cal.  120,  69  Pac.  89,  70  Pac.  1067 


885 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§550 


authorizing  council  to  assess  such  non-abutting  hinds  as  will  in 
their  opinion  be  specially  benefited  and  requiring  the  council  to 
fix  the  amount  to  be  so  assessed,  it  has  been  held  that  non- 
abutting  lands  cannot  be  assessed  unless  the  same  are  fixed  and 
designated.-  It  is  not  necessary,  however,  that  the  assessment 
district  should  be  defined  in  advance."'  This  is  the  general  and 
j)roper  method  of  procedure,  but  special  circumstances  may  make 
it  necessary  to  depart  therefrom.*  Thus,  if  to  define  the  assess- 
ment district  in  advance  would  result  in  placing  the  assessment 
of  damages  and  benefits  in  different  hands  to  be  managed  sep- 
arately, the  district  should  not  l)e  laid  out  in  advance.'^  By  stat- 
ute, however,  it  may  be  provided  specifically^  that  an  assessment 
district  must  be  laid  out  as  a  preliminary  step  in  assessment 
proceedings."  By  statute,  it  may  be  made  necessary  to  divide  the 
entire  city  into  assessment  districts  for  improvements  of  a  given 
character,  such  as  sewers,  before  any  improvement  is  constructed. 
In  the  absence  of  unequivocal  language,  this  construction  will 
not.  however,  be  adopted."^  In  laying  off  such  assessment  dis- 
trict the  legislature  may  ignore  the  boundaries  of  counties,  town- 
ships and  municipalities.^  If  the  city  is  authorized  to  ci-eate 
special  assessment   districts   witliin   the  city,   it  may   include   the 


I  19021  ;  Lake  v.  City  of  Decatur.  91 
ill.  59fi  [1879];  Oliver  v.  Monona 
County,  117  la.  43.  90  N.  W.  510 
[19021;  Edwards  v.  Cooper,  168  Ind. 
54,  79  N.  E.  1047  [19071;  City  of 
Atchison  v.  Price,  45  Kan.  296,  25 
Pac.  605  [18911;  Goodrich  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  12.3  Mich.  559,  82  N.  W. 
255  [19001;  Boohnie  v.  City  of  [Mon- 
roe. 106  Mich.  401,  64  N.  W.  204 
[1895];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appeal 
of  i-'owers.  29  Mich.  504  [18741;  City 
of  Asheville  v.  Wachovia  Loan  & 
Trust  Co..  143  N.  C.  360,  55  S.  E. 
800  [1906];  Raymond  v.  Cleveland, 
42  O.  S.  522  [18851:  K.'lly  v.  City 
of  Cleveland,  34  0.  S.  468  |lS78i. 
Bj'  statute  the  necessity  for  a  dis- 
trict may  be  dispensed  with.  ^Vilson 
V.  City  of  Cincinnati.  5  Oiii)  X.  P. 
68   [1897]. 

=  Kelly  V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34   0. 
S.  468  [1878]. 


^  Boehme  v.  City  of  Monroe.  106 
Mich.  401,  64  N.  W.  204  [18951; 
In  the  ]\Iatter  of  the  Appeal  of  Pow- 
ers. 29  Mich.  504  [1874];  Strow- 
bridfie  v.  City  of  Portlan.l.  8  Ore.  67 
[1879]. 

*  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appeal  of 
Powers,  29  Mich.  504  [18741;  Eyer- 
nian  v.  Blaksley.  78  Mo.  145  [1883]; 
Strowbridjre  v.  City  of  Portland.  8 
Ore.  67  [1879]. 

"In  the  Matter  of  tlie  Appeal  of 
Powers,   29   IMich.   504    [18741. 

*In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Ford  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  6 
Lansinjr   (X.  Y.)    92   [1872]. 

'  Iji  tlie  Matter  of  the  Application 
of  the  Protestant  .Episcopal  Public 
Sc-liool  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  -10 
Howard   198   [1870]. 

"  Board  of  Commissioners  of  County 
of  Monroe  v.  Ilarrell,  147  Ind.  500, 
46  X.  E.  124   [1876]. 


.§550  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  886 

entire  city  in  an  assessment  district.*'  A  city  may  create  a  new 
sewer  district  within  the  limits  of  a  larger  sewer  district.^"  Power 
to  create  sewer  districts  includes  power  to  create  sub-districts." 
The  fact  that  a  city  council  has  fixed  an  assessment  district  for 
the  cost  of  opening  a  street  and  subsequently  the  council  of  such 
city,  after  a  change  of  membership,  fixed  a  slightly  different 
district  for  the  grading  and  curbing  of  such  street  in  which 
two  tracts  included  in  the  first  district  were  omitted,  does  not 
invalidate  the  second  district.^-  Authority  to  grade  and  improve 
streets  at  the  expense  of  the  owners  of  adjacent  lots  impliedly 
confers  power  to  create  assessment  districts  consisting  of  such 
adjacent  lots."  A  statute  giving  specific  authority  to  cities  hav- 
ing a  population  exceeding  a  given  amount  to  create  special  assess- 
ment districts  does  not  give  such  authority  to  cities  having  a 
smaller  population.^* 

The  commissioners  who  are  to  lay  out  the  work  and  report  to 
the  court  upon  the  limits  of  the  assessment  district,  may  change 
the  boundaries  thereof  at  any  time  before  the  court  has  finally 
declared  the  district  established,  subject  to  the  ultimate  approval 
of  the  court.^"*  If  an  assessment  district  has  been  laid  out  and 
subsequently  the  improvement  has  been  extended  so  as  to  benefit 
other  lands,  it  has  been  held  that  the  question  of  the  determina- 
tion of  the  assessment  district  should  be  considered  again  and  that 
it  is  improper  to  leave  the  district  as  it  was  fixed  with  reference 
to  the  original  plan  of  the  improvement.^"  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  remedy  provided  by  law  in  such  a  case  is  mandamus  to  compel 
the  addition  to  the  district  of  the  land  benefited  by  the  extension, 
failure  to  extend  the  district  does  not  make  the  assessment  in- 
valid.^'    Under  a  statute  providing  that  the  subdivisions  of  a  dis- 

» Minnesota    &    M.    Land    and    Im-  "State  v.  Moss,  44  Wash.  1129,  86 

provement  Co.  v.  City  of  Billino-s.  Ill  Pac.  1129  [1900]. 

Fed.  Rep.  972,  50  C.'c.  S.  70  [1901];  »  State  v.  Moss,  44  Wash.  1129,  86 

Grimmell  v.  City  of  Des  Moines.   57  Pac.   1129    [1906]. 

la.  144,  10  N.  W.  330   [1881].  "Gauen  v.  Moredock  and  Ivy  Land- 

'» Shannon    v.    City   of    Omaha,    73  ins;  Drainage  District  No.  1,  131  III. 

Neb.  507.   103  N.  W.  53,   106  N.  W.  446,  23  N.  E.  633   [1890]. 

592   [1905].  '"Edwards  v.   Cooper,   168   Ind.  54, 

"  McCilvery  V.  City  of  Levviston,  13  79   N.   E.    1047    [1907];    City  of  Co- 

Idaho   338,  90   Pac.   348    [1907].  lumhus  v.  Storey,  35  Tnd.  97   [1871]. 

^'Harriman     v.     Citv    of    Yonkers,  ^' Heinroth    v.    Koehersnerger,    173 

181  N.  Y.  24,  73  N.  E.  493;    (affirm-  111.  205,  50  N.  E.  171   [1898]. 
ing  judo-ment,   81    N.   Y.  S.    823,   82 
App.  Div.  408   [1903]). 


887 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§550 


triet,  or  joint  district,  should  not  be  changed  after  a  sewer  has 
been  constructed  therein,  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  number  of 
small  districts  have  been  combined  into  joint  districts,  it  is  still 
possible  to  combine  all  of  such  districts  into  a  larger  joint  district 
in  order  to  construct  a  sewer  which  will  complete  the  drainage 
system  of  all  of  such  districts.^^  A  drainage  district  may  be  laid 
out  within  the  boundaries  of  a  pre-existing  drainage  district.''* 
If  an  improvement  has  not  been  completed,  the  assessment  district 
as  originally  laid  out  may  be  changed. -''  In  the  absence  of  specific 
statutory  provision,  it  is  not  necessary  that  lands  assessed  for  the 
original  construction  of  a  ditch  or  drain  should  be  assessed  for 
the  repair  thereof.-'  Only  lands  benefited  by  such  repair  should 
be  assessed  therefor.--  However,  it  has  been  held  that  the  legisla- 
ture may  provide  specifically  that  the  land  which  is  assessed  for 
the  original  construction  of  the  ditch  or  drain  should  be  assessed 
for  the  repair  thereof.-^  In  case  of  reassessment,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  the  district  as  originally  fixed  for  assessment  purposes, 
should  be  assessed.-*  Land  in  such  district  which  is  not  benefited, 
or  upon  which  the  original  assessment  has  been  paid  voluntarily,-' 
may  be  omitted.  Land  outside  of  such  original  district  which  is 
benefited,  may  be  included.-"  If  the  statute  which  defines  the 
property  which  may  be  assessed  for  a  given  improvement  has  been 
changed  after  the  original  assessment  has  been  made  and  before 


"People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Scott, 
132  111.  427,  23  N.  E.  1119  [1891]. 

"  South  Higliland  Land  Improve- 
ment Company  v.  Kansas  City,  172 
Mo.  523,  72  S'.  W.  944  [1902]." 

*■  The  City  of  St.  Joseph  ex  rel.  v. 
Farrel,  106  Mo.  437.  17  S.  W.  497 
[1891]. 

="  Goodrich  v.  City  of  Minonk,  62 
111.  121  [1871];  Roundenlnish  v. 
Mitchell,  154  Ind.  610,  57  N.  E.  510 
[1900];  Parke  County  Coal  Company 
V.  Camphell,  140  Ind.  28,  39  X.  E. 
149  [1894];  Morrow  v.  Creotine,  15 
Ind.  App.  358,  41  N.  E.  848,  44  X. 
E.  59  [1896];  Dean  v.  Treasurer  of 
Clinton  County.  146  Mich.  645,  109 
N.  W.   1131    [1906]. 

°*  Roundenhush  v.  ^fitclicll.  154 
Ind.  616,  57  X.  E.  510  [1900]; 
Parke  County  Coal  Comj)any  v. 
Campbell,   140  Ind.  28,  39  X.  E.   149 


[1S94];  Morrow  v.  Greeting,  15 
Ind.  App.  358,  41  X.  E.  848,  44  X. 
E.  59  [1896];  Dean  v.  Treasurer  of 
Clinton  County,  146  Mich.  645,  109 
X.  W.   1131   [1900]. 

^  Scott  V.  Strinsiley,  132  Ind.  378, 
31  X.  E.  953  [1892]. 

=*  State  ex  rel.  Eaton  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  Countv.  95  Minn. 
503,  104  X.  W.  553  [1905];  In  the 
Matter  of  Van  Antwerp.  56  X.  Y. 
201  [1874];  In  the  Matter  of  Hroad- 
way  Widenincr,  63  Pari).  (X.  Y.)  572 
[1872];  Cline  v.  Citv  of  Seattle.  ]:^ 
Wash.  444,  43  Pac.  .367   [18961. 

=' State  e\-  rel.  Eaton  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsev  Countv.  9.=;  Minn. 
503.  104  X.  W.  .553  [19051. 

'"State  ex  rel.  Faton  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsev  Countv.  95  Minn. 
503,  104  X.  W.  553   [1905]. 


§  551  T.VXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT.  888 

the  reassessment,  the  reassessment  should  be  made  in  accordance 
with  the  law  in  force  at  the  time  at  which  it  is  made.-' 

§  551.     Description  of  assessment  district. 

It  is  not  necessary  specifically  to  state  that  the  assessment 
district  is  situated  in  the  state,  the  county  or  the  city,  since  it 
will  be  presumed  that  it  is  in  the  city  by  which  such  assessment 
is  levied.^  A  description  of  an  assessment  district  is  sufficient,  if 
it  would  have  constituted  a  valid  description  of  land  in  a  convey- 
ance," or  a  sufficient  description  in  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  a 
political  district  or  municipal  corporation."  Thus,  where  a  street 
called  Sixth  Street  ran  east,  then  turned  in  a  semi-circle  at  almost 
right  angles  and  ran  south,  a  description  of  the  assessment  district 
as  extending  "to  the  easterly  side  of  Sixth  Street"  was  held  to  be 
sufficiently  definite.*  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  assessment 
district  should  be  defined  by  ordinance  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
specifically  requiring  such  definition.-'^  It  is  sufficient,  if  the  entire 
record  of  the  tax  proceeding  clearly  shows  what  property  is  to 
be  assessed. •"'  Where  a  plat  or  diagram  has  been  filed  with  the 
city  clerk,  showing  all  the  parcels  of  land  abutting  on  the  portion 
of  street  to  be  paved,  and  showing  the  relative  location  of  each 
lot.  the  lot  numbers,  the  names  of  the  various  plats  where  the 
land  has  been  platted,  the  frontage  and  boundary  lines  of  each 
lot  and  the  names  of  the  owners  of  each,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
resolution  of  the  city  council,  which  describes  the  assessing  dis- 
trict as,  "all  the  lots,  premises  and  parcels  of  land  fronting  upon" 
the  part  of  the  street  to  be  paved,  "as  shown  by  a  map  of  the 
proposed  district  on  file  in  the  office  of  the  city  clerk,"  is  a  suffi- 
ciently  definite    description    of   the    assessed    district.^     Under   a 

^THne  v.  fitv  of  Seattle.  13  Wash.  296.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106.  14  L.  R.  A. 

444,  43  Pac.  367    [1896].  75.5.  28  Pae.  272.  28  Pac.  675  [1891]. 

^  Kansas  City  v.  Xapiecek,  —  Kan.  *  German  Savings  &  Loan  "Society 
.  92  Pac.  827  [19071.  v.  Ramish.   138  Cal.  120,  69  Pac.  89. 

==  German  Savings  and  Loan  Society  70  Pac.  1067   [1902J. 

V.  Ramish,  138  Cal.  120,  69  Pac.  89.  =  City  of  Atchison  v.  Price,  45  Kan. 

70    Pac.    1067    [1902];    Thomason    v.  296.    25    Pac.    605    [1891];    State    ex 

Cuneo,     119     Cal.    25.     50    Pac.     846  rel.    Peters    v.    Mayor    and    Common 

[1897];    Central    Irrigation    District  Council  of  City  of  Newark,  31  N.  J. 

V.   De  Lappe,   79   Cal.    352,    21    Pac.  L.   (2  Vr.)   360. 

825.  "  Gitv  of  Atchison  v.  Price.  45  Kan. 

*In  the  Matter  of  the  Bonds  of  the  29^.  25  Pac.  605    [18911. 

Madera    Irrigation    District.    92    Cal,  '  Boehme    v.    Citv    of   Monroe.    106 

Mich.  401.  64  N.  W.  204  [1895]. 


889  PROPERTY    STTBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  .§  551 

statute  authorizing'  an  ;!.sse.::snu'nt  to  l)e  levied  upon  the  lots  front- 
ing the  street,  along'  which  a  sewer  is  to  be  constructed,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  city  should  formally  lay  out  an  assessment 
district  for  such  improvement.^  Even  if  the  statute  provides 
that  the  common  council  must  "describe  or  designate  the  lot  and 
premises  or  locality  to  be  assessed,"  it  is  held  that  it  is  sufficient 
to  describe  the  taxing  district  as  the  property  fronting  upon  the 
improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  to  be  levied.^  So  a 
description  of  property  as  "contiguous,"  "adjacent"  and  "abut- 
ting" has  been  held  sufficient  as  fixing  the  assessment  district. ^'^ 
A  description  of  the  improvement,  as  consisting  of  plank  side- 
walks to  be  constructed  upon  a  given  street  between  two  others 
named,  is  held,  when  taken  in  connection  wnth  the  statute  author- 
izing the  property  situated  upon  the  improvement  to  be  assessed. 
to  be  a  sufficient  description  of  the  assessment  district. ^^  At  the 
time  that  a  commissioner  was  appointed  to  lay  out  an  assessment 
district,  the  statute  re(iuired  the  assessment  district  to  be  de- 
scribed by  boundaries.  After  such  appointment,  but  before  the 
assessment  roll  was  filed,  the  statute  was  amended  so  as  to  make 
it  necessary  to  descril^e  the  assessnKMit  district  by  boundaries 
only  in  case  of  sewer  imnrovements.  Tt  has  been  held  that  such 
assessment  roll  was  valid  if  it  described  the  property  to  be 
assessed  Avith  sufficient  accuracy,  although  it  did  not  describe  the 
assessment  district  l)y  boundaries.'-  Tf.  in  the  description  of  the 
assessment  di'^triet  hv  coim-scs  and  distnnrM^s  and  by  monuments. 
the  calls  for  the  angles  and  the  directions  of  the  lines  are  at  vari- 
ance with  the  calls  for  the  streets  and  the  fixed  p'Mnts  nnon  Ihem. 
the  streets  will  l)e  regarded  as  monuments  and  IIk^  calls  th(M*efoi" 
will  control  the  calls  for  angles  and  directions  of  the  boundary 
lines."  The  resolution  of  a  citv  council  described  an  assessment 
district  as  iiiclnding  "Xortli  Fourth  .Avenue,  from  the  north  side 
of  Primrose  Aveinie  to  the  northerly  city  lin(\"  Primrose  Ave- 
nue started  at  Fourth  Avenue  and  ran  east,  but  did  not  cross 
Fourth  Avenue  oi-  extend  west  thereon.     Tt  was  h(dd  that  under 

8Whit^  V.  TT^rvi-;.  lO.S  Tal.  rv28.  .37  '=  FipUI  v.  City  of  riiicnsro.  lOS  TU. 

Pac.  502   ri'^ni].  224.    04    X.    E.    840    [10021;     (distin- 

Titv   of   Knlamazoo   v.    Frnncnisp,  truisliino:  Yagev   v.   City   of   riiicajsro, 

115  Mioh.  .'i.'54.  73  N.  W.  SOI    HSHSl.  104  Til.  88,  62  N.  E.  ,316   [19011). 

I'^TJnvTi.oTKl    V.   ripvplnnd.   42   O.   S.  "Thnmason  v.  Cnnpo,  119  Cal.  25. 

522  r 18951.  50  Pnc.  846  [18071. 

"  Dir'fTiTm  V.  T?iw\Ti.  76  Cal.  318.  18 
Pac.  373   [1888]. 


§  551  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  890 

such  description,  property  on  the  west  side  of  Fourth  Avenue 
north  of  Primrose  Avenue  was  included/*  If  the  statute  requires 
the  assessment  district  to  be  described  by  a  resolution  of  the 
council  "specifying  the  exterior  boundaries"  of  the  district  to 
be  assessed,  an  ordinance  which  described  such  district  as  con- 
sisting of  "all  lots  and  parcels  of  land  fronting"  on  a  certain 
street  between  two  other  specified  streets,  is  not  sufficient.^'  Such 
ordinance  does  not  show  the  extent  of  the  district  either  way 
from  the  part  of  the  street  which  is  to  be  improved.^"  Under 
statutory'  provisions,  it  is  necessary  to  describe  an  assessment 
district,  if  non-abutting  property  is  to  be  assessed,  and  failure 
so  to  do  renders  the  assessment  invalid. ^^  Under  a  statute  fixing 
the  assessment  district  at  a  mile  and  one-half  on  either  side  of 
the  turnpike  for  the  construction  of  which  the  assessment  is  levied, 
a  location  of  the  proposed  turnpike  on  the  route  of  an  exist- 
ing turnpike,  or  "as  near  thereto  as  practicable,"  has  been  held 
to  be  too  indefinite,  since  it  is  not  possible  from  such  description 
to  mark  out  the  boundaries  of  the  assessment  district.^®  That  a 
tract  of  land  connected  voluntarily  with  a  drainage  district  is  so 
described  that  some  of  the  land  therein  cannot  be  identified,  is 
said  not  to  be  a  defense  available  to  those  whose  lands  are 
properly  described.^"  A  drainage  district,  described  as  bounded 
on  the  we.st,  north  and  east  by  the  "summit  of  the  ridge"  forming 
the  water  shed,  and  on  the  south  side  by  the  proposed  canal,  or 
where  the  canal  does  not  extend  by  arable  lands,  was  held  upon  the 
first  hearing  to  be  sufficiently  described  as  to  the  north,  east  and 
west  boundaries  and  on  a  re-hearing  was  held  valid  as  to  the 
south  boundary,  also.-"  If  the  property  abutting  a  street  is 
made  an  assessment  district  for  the  improvement  thereof,  the 
fact  that  the  city  has  constructed  a  portion  of  such  street  with- 
out letting  contracts  therefor,  and  has  paid  for  such  improve- 
ment out  of  its  general  funds,  does  not  show  that  the  assessment 

"  Farrinston    v.    City   of   Mt.   Ver-  •*  Turner  v.  Thorntown  and  Mechan- 

non,    Ififi   N.    Y.    233,    59   N.    E.    826  iesbnror    Gravel    Road    Company,    33 

fl901].  Ind.  317   [1870]. 

''  Dehail    v.   Morford,   95   Cal.   457,  '"  People   ex    rel.   Herman    v.    Com- 

30  Pac.  593    [1892].  missioners     of     Bug     River     Special 

"Dehail   v.   Morford,   95   Cal.   457,  Drainaae  District,  189  111.  55,  59  N. 

30   Pac.  593    [18921.  E.  605. 

"Bennett   v.    Citv   of   Fmmetshiirg,  ^Richard    v.    Cyprernoct    Drninage 

-  Ta.  ,  115  N.  W.  582  [1908].  District.     107    La.     657,    32    So.    27 

[1901-1902]. 


891  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT,  §  552 

district  is  to  be  restricted  to  the  land  abutting  the  rest  of  such 
street.^^  If,  however,  a  street  is  improved  in  sections  under  dif- 
ferent ordinances  and  the  land  opposite  each  section  is  made  an 
assessment  district,  land  opposite  one  section  cannot  be  assessed 
for  the  improvement  of  another  section."  In  the  absence  of  a 
statute  requiring  the  exterior  boundaries  of  an  assessment  district 
to  be  specified,  a  description  of  the  property  assessed  as  that 
fronting  on  the  improvement  is  sufficient.-^  If,  however,  the  stat- 
ute requires  the  council  to  specify  the  exterior  boundaries  of  the 
district  to  be  assessed,  a  description  of  the  land  as  that  fronting 
on  a  given  street  between  two  intei-secting  streets  is  insufficient.-* 

S  552.     Legislative  discretion  in  laying  out  assessment  district. 

The  legislature  has  a  wide  discretion  in  determining  the  area 
of  the  assessment  district  upon  which  an  assessment  is  to  be  levied  ; 
and  it  may  confer  a  similar  discretion  upon  a  city  or  other  public 
corporation.  Accordingly,  unless  such  discretion  is  exceeded,  com- 
plaint cannot  be  made  that  the  assessment  district  does  not  in- 
clude all  the  territory  which  possibly  might  have  been  included 
within  it.^  Thus,  it  may  be  provided  that  only  land  bordering 
upon  the  actual  improvement  is  to  be  assessed.-  Land  which 
borders  upon  a  part  of  a  street  which  has  already  been  improved 
may  be  omitted  from  an  assessment  district  formed  to  pay  the 
cost  of  improving  the  rest  of  the  street.^     If  a  street  is  constructed 

=^Town    of    Tunnviiter    v.    Pix,     18  13!)  :\Iich.  30.  102  N.  W.  288   [1905] ; 

Wash.  153,  51  Pac.  353.  Sinitli    v.    City    of    Toledo,    24    O.    S. 

"Smith    V.    Small,    50    Mo.    App.  12t)    [1873];    Creighton    v.    Scott,    14 

401   [18021.  O.    S.   438    1 18031  ;    Weston   v.    Com- 

^  White  V.  Harris,  103  Cal.  528,  37  missioners  of  Hamilton  Co.,  6  Ohio  C. 

Pac.  502  [18941;  Ronan  V.  People  ex  C.    G41     [18921;     Blount    v.    City    of 

rel.   Shafter,    193    Hi.    (331,   Gl    N.   E.  Janesville,  31  Wis.  G48  [1872]. 

1042  [1901].  -McSherry  v.  Wood,   102  Cal.  647, 

^'^Dehail    v.   Morford.   95   Cal.   457,  3G    Pac.    1010    [1894];    McDonald   v. 

30  Pac.  593    [1892].  Conniff,    99    Cal.    386,    34    Pac.    71 

'McSherry  v.  Wood.   102   Cal.  647,  [1893];   Kendig  v.  Knight,  60  la.  29, 

36    Pac.    1010    [1894];    McDonald    v.  14   N.   W.   78    [1882];    Smith   v.   City 

Conniff,    99    Cal.    386.    .34    Pac.    71  of    Toledo,    24    O.    S.     126     [1873]; 

[1893];   Bacon   v.  :Mayor  and   Alder-  Creitrhton    v.    Scott,     14    0.    S.    438 

men  of  Savannah.  86  Oa.  301,   12  S.  [1863]. 

E.   580    [1890];    Bradford   v.   City  of  ^  :\leSherry  v.  Wood.   102  Cal.  647, 

Pontiae.    165    HI.    612.   46   N.   E.    794  36    Pac.    1010    [1894];    McDonald    v. 

[18971;     rJilerest    v.    McCartney.    97  Conniff.    99    Cal.     386,    34    Pac.    71 

Ta.  138.  66  \t.  W.   103   [1896]:   Ken-  [1893]:  Kendicr  v.  Knight.  60  Ta.  29, 

dig  V.  Knisrht.  60  la.  29,   14  %".  W.  14  X.  W.  78   [1882];   Smith  v.  City 

78  [1882];  Power  V.  City  of  Detroit,  of    Toledo,    24    0.    S.    126    [1873]; 


553 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


892 


in  (liffei'ent  parts  of  different  materials,  assessment  districts  may 
be  formed  of  land  bounding'  on  each  separate  section. ■*  If  the 
street  is  of  different  widths,  each  section  may  be  treated  as  a 
separate  improvement.'  If,  however,  the  statute  provides  for 
levying  the  assessment  for  a  street  as  an  entirety,  the  public  cor- 
poration cannot  levy  separate  assessments  for  separate  sections 
upon  the  property  bounding  on  each  section,  although  the  sections 
are  constructed  of  different  materials.'''  Such  division  into  sec- 
tions for  purposes  of  apportionment  is  not  necessary,  if  not  re 
quired  b,v  statute."  The  action  of  a  city  council  in  boundinii'  an 
assessment  district  for  opening  a  street  b.v  lines  three  hundred 
feet  on  each  side  of  such  street  cannot  be  reviewed  by  the  courts." 
If  the  assessment  district  is  so  small  as  to  impose  an  assessment 
greatl.v  in  excess  of  benefits  upon  the  property  assessed,  a  clear 
abuse  of  discretion  exists  and  the  assessment  is  invalid.^ 

§  553.     Power  of  legislature  to  determine  what  lands  are  bene- 
fited. 

The  question  of  what  propert.y  is  benefited  by  a  public  improve- 
ment is  said  to  be  a  legislative  question.^     This  statement  means 


Creiffhton  v.  Scott.  14  O.  S.  438 
[1863]  ;  Northern  Iiuliana  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Connelly,  10  0.  S.  159  [1859].  See 
to  the  same  effect  Blount  v.  City  of 
Janesville.  31   Wis.  648    [18721. 

*  Bradford  v.  City  of  Pontiac,  165 
111.  612,  46  X.  E.  794  [18971 ;  Gilcrest 
V.  McCartney,  97  la.  138,  66  X.  W. 
103  [1896].  " 

^  Bacon  v.  City  of  Mayor  and  Al- 
dermt^n  of  Savannah.  86  Ga.  301.  12 
S.  E.  580  [18901. 

°  Cossitt  Land  Co.  v.  Xexischeler.  — 
X.  J.  Slip.  — ,  60  Atl.  1128  [19051. 
Where  part  of  the  street  was  paved 
with  brick  and  part  with  asphalt, 
and  each  section  was  treated  as  a 
sep.irate  improvement,  the  court 
said:  "The  basis  they  did  take  is 
evidently  unjustifiable.  It  imposes 
upon  the  owners  of  propei-tv  on  the 
brick  part  an  assessment  for  the  to- 
tal exrtense  of  that  kind  of  navement, 
notwith«tandinsr  those  fronting  on  the 
asphalt  are  also  peculiarly  benefited 
thereby.     Each  person  on  a  street  is 


peculiarly  benefited  by  tlie  entire 
paving  of  tlie  street  and  the  assess- 
ment should  be  laid  with  ielati(m  to 
tlie  benefit  derived  by  the  improve- 
ment as  a  whole.  It  cannot  under 
tlie  conditions  in  this  case  be  divided 
up  and  one-half  assessed  one  way 
and  another  another."     Cossitt  Land 

Co.  V.  Xeuscheler,  —  X.  J.  ,  60 

Atl.  1128   [1905]. 

'  Smith  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  6 
Ohio  X.  P.   175   [1898]. 

« Power  V.  City  of  Detroit,  139 
Mich.  30,  102  X.  W.  288   [1905]. 

"Clay  V.  Grand  Rapids,  60  Mich. 
451,  27  X.  W.  596    [1886]. 

^  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Decatur.  147  U.  S.  190,  197, 
37  L.  132,  13  S.  293  [1893];  Bana/, 
V.  Smith.  133  Cal.  102.  65  Pac.  309 
[19011;  Hadley  v.  Dao-ue,  130  Cal. 
207,  62  Pac.  500  [1900];  Adams  v. 
City  of  Shelbyville,  154  Ind.  467.  77 
Am.  St.  Ren.  484.  49  L.  R.  A.  797, 
57  X.- E.  114  [18991;  Board  of  Com- 
missioners   of   County    of   Monroe   v. 


893 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


553 


that  the  legislature  possesses  a  wide  range  of  discretion  in  deter- 
mining what  property  is  benefited  by  the  imi)r()vement  tor  which 
the  assessment  is  levied.-  It  is  well  settled  that  in  ordinary  cases 
the  legislature  may  determine  what  property  is  benefited  by  the 
improvement,'^    and    may   fix    the    limits    of  the  assessment  district 


Harrell,  147  Iiul.  500.  41)  N.  E.  124 
[1890];  Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa 
Fe  Railroad  Company  v.  Peterson.  5 
Kan.  App.  10.3.  4S  Pac.  877  11897]; 
Pleasants  v.  City  of  Shreveport.  110 
La.  1046,  35  So.'  283  1 1903]  :  Smith 
V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Worces- 
ter, 182  Mass.  232,  59  L.  R.  A.  728, 
65  N.  E.  40  [1902];  Rogers  v.  City 
of  St.  Paul.  22  Minn.  494  [1876]'; 
Meier  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  180  Mo. 
391,  79  S.  W.  955  [1903];  Prior  v. 
Buehler  &  Cooney  Construction  Com- 
pany, 170  Mo.  439.  71  S.  W.  205 
[1902];McMillan  v.  City  of  Butte, 
30  Mont.  220,  76  Pac.  203  [1904]; 
State,  Sigler,  Pros.  v.  Fuller.  34 
X.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  227  |lS7(ri:  Pen- 
pie  ex  rel.  Griffin  v.  Mayor,  etc..  of 
Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec. 
266  [1851];  People  ex  rel.  Crowell  v. 
Lawrence,  36  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  178 
[1862];  Astor  v.  Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  X'^ew 
York,  37  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  539 
[1874];  Weston  v.  Commissioners  of 
Hamilton  Co.,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  641 
[1892];  St.  Benedict's  Abbey  v.  Mar- 
ion County.  —  Or.  ,  93  Pac.  231 

[1908], 

-  French  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Pavin<^ 
Co.,  181  U.  S.  324.  45  L.  879,  21  S. 
625  [1901];  (affirming.  Barber  As- 
phalt Paving  (\)mpany  v.  French, 
158  :Mo.  534.  54  L.  R.  A.  492.  58  S. 
W.  934  [1900]);  Carsons  v.  District 
of  Columbia.  170  V.  S.  45,  42  L. 
943,  18  S.  521  [18981;  Walston  v. 
Xevin,  128  U,  S.  578.  32  L.  544.  9  S. 
192  [1888];  (affinniuii.  Xevin  v. 
Roach,  86  Ky.  492.  5  S.  W.  .laC. 
[1887])  :  In  the  Matter  of  the  Bonds 
of  the  Madera  Irrigation  District, 
92  Cal.  296.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106.  14 
L.  R.  A.  755.  28  Pac.  272.  675 
[1891];   Englisli  v.  Mayor  and  Coun- 


cil of  Wilmington,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  63, 
37  Atl.  158  [1896];  Speer  v.  Mayor 
and  Council  of  Athens,  85  CJa.  49,  9 
L.  R.  A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802  [1890]; 
Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Phillips,  111  la. 
377.  82  X.  W".  787  [1900];  Coates  v. 
X'ugeiit.  —  Kan.  — - — ,  92  Pac.  597 
[1907  1;  Barfield  v.  Oleason.  Ill 
Ky.  491.  63  S.  W.  964.  23  Ky.  L.  R. 
128  [19011;  Broadway  Baptist 
Church  v.  McAtee,  8  Bush  (71  Ky. ) 
508.  8  Am.  Rep.  480  [1871];  Smith 
v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Worcester. 
182  Mass.  232,  59  L.  R.  A.  728,  (io 
X'.  E.  40  [1902]:  City  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Excelsior  Brewing  Company,  96  Mo. 
677.  II'  S.  W.  477  [1888];  City  of  St. 
Louis  v.  Ranken,  96  Mo.  497,  9  S.  W. 
910  [1888]  ;  Simmons  v.  City  of  Mill- 

ville.  —  X.  J.  Sup.  .  66  Atl.  895 

[1907];  State,  Board  of  Chosen  Free- 
holders of  the  County  of  Hudson, 
Pros.  V.  Pet<>rson  Avenue  and  Sec- 
aucus  Road  Commissioners,  41  X.  J. 
L.  (12  Vr.)  83  [1879];  Xorthern  In- 
<liana  Railroad  Company  v.  Connelly. 
10  0.  S.  160  [1859];  '  (followed  in 
Daniels  v.  Keeler.  10  O.  S.  169 
[1859]   and  Fitch   v.  Keeler.   10  0.  S. 

169  11859]).  Such  determinati(m  is 
said  to  be  "a  judgment  not  final  .  .  . 
but  certainly  not  for  judicial  revi- 
sion except  in  clear  cases  of  wrong 
and  oppression  .  .  .  ."  Hill  v.  Fon- 
tenot.  46  La.  Ann.  1563,  1566,  16  So. 
475  [1894].  So  Davies  v.  City  of  Los 
Anwies,  86  Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771 
11890]. 

MVilliams,  Treasurer,  v.  Egsleston, 

170  r.  S.  304.  42  L.  1047.  18  S. 
617  118981:  (affirming  State  ex  rel. 
Bulkeley  v.  Williams,  68  Conn.  131, 
48  L.  R.  A.  465,  35  Atl.  24.  421 
[1896]):  Bauman  v.  Ross.  167  U.  S. 
548,    42    L.    270,    17    S.    966    [1897]; 


§553 


TAX.VTION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


894 


in  accordance  with  such  determination.*  This  is,  in  effect,  a  legis- 
lative declaration  or  adjudication  that  the  land  within  the  assess- 
ment district  so  fixed  will  be  benefited  by  the  proposed  improve- 


( reversing,  District  of  Columbia  v. 
Armes,  8  App.  D.  C.  393  [1896]; 
Bauman  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C.  260 
11S96]  ;  Abbott  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C. 
289  [1896]);  Banaz  v.  Smith,  135 
Cal.  102,  65  Pac.  309  [1901];  HacUey 
V.  Dague,  130  Cal.  207,  62  Pac.  500 
[1900];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Bonds 
of  the  Madera  Irrigation  District,  92 
Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106, 
14  L.  R.  A.  755,  28  Pac. 
272,  675  [1891];  United  States  ex 
rel.  Henderson  v.  Edmunds,  3 
Mackey  (D.  C.)  142  [1884];  City 
of  Ottawa  V.  Macy,  20  111.  413 
[1858];  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
County  of  Monroe  v.  Harrell,  147 
Ind.  500,  46  N.  E.  124  [lh96];  Atch- 
ison, Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Railroad 
Company  v.  Peterson,  5  Kans.  App. 
103.  4b  Pac.  877  [1897];  Pleasants 
V.  City  of  Shreveport,  110  La.  1046, 
35  So."  283  [1903];  Hughes  v.  Board 
of  Commissioners  of  the  Caddo  Levee 
District.  108  La.  146.  32  So.  216 
[1901-1902];  Hill  v.  Fontenot,  46  La. 
Ann.  1563.  16  So.  475  [1894];  George 
V.  Youno:,  45  La.  Ann.  1232,  14  So. 
137  [1893];  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore  v.  Johns  Hopkins  Hos- 
pital, 56  Md.  1  [1880];  Smith  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Worcester, 
182  Mass.  232,  59  L.  R.  A.  728,  65 
N.  E.  40  [1902] ;  Meier  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  ISO  Mo.  391.  79  S.  W.  955 
[1903]:  Smith  v.  Willis.  78  Miss. 
243,  28  So.  878  [1900];  MoMillan  v. 
City  of  Butte,  30  Mont.  220,  73  Pac. 
203  [1904];  State,  Central  Xew  Jer- 
sey Land  and  Improvement  Company, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Council  of  the 
City  of  Bayonne,  56  N.  J.  L.  (27 
Vr.)  297,  28  Atl.  713  [1893];  State. 
Society  for  Establishing  Useful 
Manufactures.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  City  of  Paterson,  42  N. 
J.  L.  (13  Vr.)"615  [1880];  State, 
Board   of .  Chosen   Freeholders  of   the 


County  of  Hudson,  Pros.  v.  Peterson 
Avenue  and  Secaucus  Road  Commis- 
sioners, 41  X.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  83 
[1879];  People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v.  May- 
or, etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  X.  Y.  419,  55 
Am.  Dec.  266  [1851];  People  ex  rel. 
Crowell  V.  Lawrence,  36  Barb.  (X. 
Y.)  178  [1862];  Astor  v.  Mayor,  Al- 
dermen and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of  X.  Y.,  37  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
539  [1874];  Weston  v.  Commission- 
ers of  Hamilton  County,  6  Ohio  C. 
C.  641  [1892];  City  of  Spokane  Falls 
v.  Browne,  3  Wash.  84,  27  Pac.  1077 
[1891]. 
*  Webster  v.   Fargo,   181   U.  S.  394. 

45  L.  912,  21  S.  623,  645  [1901]; 
( affirming,  Webster  v.  City  of  Fargo, 
9  X.  D.  208,  56  L.  R.  A.  156,  82  X. 
W.  732  [1900]):  Bauman  v.  Ross. 
167  U.  S.  548,  42  L.  270,  17  S.  966 
[1897];  (reversing,  District  of  Co- 
lumbia v.  Armes,  8  App.  D.  C.  393 
[1896];    Bauman  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D. 

C.  260  [1896]  ;  Abbott  v.  Ross,  9  App. 

D.  C.  289  [1896]);  Lent  v.  Tillson, 
140  U.  S.  316,  35  L.  419,  II  S.  825 
[1891];  (affirming.  Lent  v.  Tillson, 
72  Cal.  404,  14  Pac.  71  [1887]); 
Spencer  v.  Merchant,  125  U.  S.  345, 
31  L.  763.  8  S.  921  [1888];  (affirm- 
ing, Spencer  v.  Merchant,  100  X.  Y. 
585,  3  X.  E.  682  [1885]);  Duncan 
v.  Ramisii,  142  Cal.  686,  76  Pac. 
661  [1904];  Hadley  v.  Dague,  130 
Cal.  207,  62  Pac.  500  [1900];  Eng- 
lish V.  Mayor  and  Council  of  Wil- 
minoton,  2  Marv.  (Del.)  63,  37  Atl. 
158  [1896];  Oliver  v.  Monona  Coun- 
ty, 117  la.  43,  90  X.  W.  510  [1902]: 
Chicago,  Milwaukee  and  St.  Paul 
Railroad  Company  v.  Phillips,  111 
la.  377,  82  X.  W.  787  [1900];  Olsson 
V.  City  of  Topeka,  42  Kan.  709,  21 
Pac.    219    [1889];    Hill    v. -Fontenot, 

46  La.  Ann.  1563,  1566,  16  So.  475 
[1894];  Smith  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Worcester.   182  Mass.  2.32,  59 


895 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§  553 


nient.^  The  legislature  may  declare  conclusively  that  no  property 
except  that  within  the  assessment  district  as  fixed  by  legislative 
determination,  is  benefited."  In  the  exercise  of  its  wide  discre- 
tion, the  legislature  may  lay  out  an  assessment  district  from  which 
is  excluded  some  property  which  is  in  fact  benefited/  A  city,  in 
the  exercise  of  discretion  delegated  to  it  ])y  the  legislature,  may 
exclude  from  an  assessment  district,  property  which  is  in  fact 
benefited.*  Thus,  under  a  statute  empowering  the  city  to  lay  out 
assessment  districts,  lint  not  restricting  the  assessment  district 
to  the  property  contiguous  to  the  improvement,  the  city  may, 
nevertheless,  in  laying  out  such  district,  restrict  the  property 
assessed  to  the  property  contiguous  to  such  improvement.®  The 
propriety  of  this  exercise  of  power  by  the  legislature,  or  the  city, 
or  public  official,  is  especially  clear  where  it  is  not  shown  that 
there  is  any  property  outside  of  the  assessment  district  which  is 
in  fact  benefited."^  In  tlie  exercise  of  its  discretion  the  legisla- 
ture, or  a  public  corporation,  or  officer  authorized  l)y  statute. 
may  lay  out  an  assessment  district  wliich  contains  property  which 
is  not  in  fact  benefited  by  the  improvement  for  which  the  assess- 


L.  R.  A.  728,  65  X.  E.  40  [1902]; 
State   ex   rel.   Skrainka    Construction 

Co.  V.  City  of  St.  Louis.  —  Mo.  , 

111  S.  "^W.  89  ri908];  Meier 
V.  City  of  St.  Louis,  180  Mo. 
391,  79  S.  W.  955  |  190.31  ;  McMillan 
V.  City  of  Butte.  .30  :\Iont.  220.  76 
Pac.  203  [19041;  State,  Graham, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor,  etc..  of  Paterson.  37 
N.  J.  L.  (SVr.)  380  [18751;  Kelly 
V.  City  of  Cleveland.  34  O.  S.  468 
[187Sl". 

=  Hadley  v.  Dannie,  130  Cal.  207.  62 
Pac.  500  [19001;  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  County  of  Monroe  v.  Ilar- 
rell.  147  Ind.  500,  46  X.  E.  1124 
[18961;  Smith  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Worcester,  182  Mass.  232.  59 
L.  R.  A.  728.  65  X.  E.  40  [19021; 
McMillan  v.  City  of  Butte,  30  Mont. 
220,  76  Pac.  203  [19041.  The  con- 
trary view  denying  the  power  of  the 
legislature  to  lay  out  assessment  dis- 
tricts has  been  entertained,  as  in 
People  ex  rel.  Post  v.  Mayor,  etc..  of 
Brooklyn.  6  Barb.  209  [1849]  but  has 
been    since   abandoned. 


•Adams  v.  City  of  Shelbyville,  154 
Ind.  467,  77  Am"  St.  Rep.  484.  49  L. 
R.  A.  797,  57  X.  E.  114. 

'White  v.  Harris.  103  Cal.  528,  37 
Pac.  502  [18941:  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Bonds  of  the  Madera  Irriiration 
District.  92  Cal.  296.  27  Am.  St.  Rep. 
106.  14  L.  R.  A.  755.  28  Pac.  272. 
28  Pac.  675  [1891];  Bigelow  v.  City 
of  Chicago.  90  III.  49  [18781;  ]\rock 
V.  City  of  :\Iuneie.  9  Ind.  App.  536 
37  X.  E.  281  [18931;  State,  Board  of 
Cliosen  Freeliolders  of  the  County  of 
Hudson.  Pros.  v.  Peterson  Avenue 
and  Secaucus  Road  Commissioners. 
41  X.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  83  [18791;  Wes 
ton  V.  Commissioners  of  Hamilton 
Count  v.  6  Oliio  C.  C.  641   [18921. 

"Lenon  v.  Brodie.  81  Ark.  208.  98 
S.  W.  979  [19061;  Kansas  City 
(Jra(lin<Tr  Compaiiv  v.  Holden,  107  ^lo. 
305.  17  S.  W.  798   118911. 

'Lake  v.  City  of  Decatur.  91  111. 
596   [18791. 

'"  Hennes^y  v.  D f)U"las  County,  99 
Wis.    129.   74  X.   W.  983    [1898]. 


§  553  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  896 

ment  is  to  be  levied."  As  long  as  the  determination  of  the  legis- 
lature or  public  corporation  or  official  is  not  fraudulent,  arbitrary 
or  unreasonable  within  the  limits  already  indicated,  the  validity 
of  such  action  cannot  be  attacked  on  the  ground  that  some  of  the 
property  in  the  district  is  not  in  fact  benefited.^^  If.  however,  it 
appears  that  the  improvement  is  not  intended  for  the  benefit  of 
the  particular  district,  it  has  been  said  in  some  jurisdictions  that 
the  action  of  the  citv  in  laving  out  an  assessment  district  is  not 
conclusive. ^^  Th^'s  conclusion  annears  to  have  been  reached  under 
the  provisions  of  a  statute  which  gave  to  the  citv  the  power  to 
lay  out  an  assessment  district  only  in  cases  where  the  imnrove- 
ment  was  intended  to  benefit  the  property  therein.  While  the 
statements  found  in  many  of  the  cases  would  seem  to  imply  that 
the  legislature  has  sole  and  exclusive  discretion  in  the  determina- 
tion of  this  question,  it  is  nevertheless  clear  that  there  are  some 
limits  to  such  discretion.^*  If  no  such  limits  exist,  the  power  of 
local  assessment  would  be  but  another  name  for  arbitrary  exac- 
tion and  confiscation.  What  these  limits  are  is  not  clearly  estab- 
lished. It  may  be  impossible  to  state  them  in  accurate  and  pre- 
cise terms.  It  has  been  said  that  the  legislature  has  a  wide  range 
of  discretion  in  determining  what  property  is  especially  benefited 
and  that  the  courts  will  interfere  only  when  it  is  shown  conclu- 
sively that  the  legislature  is  wrong  in  making  the  determination 
which  it  has  made."  Another  form  of  stating  the  restriction 
which  exists  upon  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  determine  Avhat 
property  is  benefited,  is  that  the  court  can  ignore  such  legislative 
determination  only  in  a  clear  case.^*"'  It  is  said  to  be  conclusive 
in  anv  ease  admitting  of  a  substantial  difference  of  opinion.^^ 
Another  form  of  expressing  the  same  idea  is  that  the  question  of 
benefit  to  the  property  OAvner  is  not  a  judicial  question  unless  the 
court  c^n  rlainlv  spp  that  no  benefit  can  exist  and  this  absence 

"  Tn  the  Matter  of  the  Bonds  of  the  l^^oore.  6  Harris  and  Johnson    (Md.) 

Madera    Irrigation    District,    92    Cal,  37-5   [182.5]. 

296.   27   Am.   St.   Ren.    106,    14   L.   R.  "  Bowler    v.    Biddin<?er    F^-ee   Turn- 

A.    755,    28    Pac.    272,    28    Pac.    675  pike  <^o..  6  W.  L.  B.  404  [18811. 
[18911:   City  of  Kansas  Citv  v.  Oih-  '=  Barfield  v.  Gleason,  111   Ky.  491. 

son.  66  Fan.  501,  72  P^c.  222  [1903].  63    S.    W.    964,    23    Ky.    L.    R.    128 

'-City    of   Kans!is    Titv    v.    Gibson,  [1901]. 
66  Kan.  501.  72  P-c.  222  [1903].  "'Hill    v.    Fontenot,    46    La.    Ann. 

1' Mayor  and  Hty  Ponncit  of  Balti-  15i)3.  16  So.  475   [1894]. 

more    v.    Hii"-hes's    Adm'r..    1    Gill    6c  '' Goat^s  v.  Xno-ent,  —  Kan.  , 

.TniiTison    (Md.)    480.  19    ^m.  Dec.  243  92  Pac.  597    [1907]. 
[1829];   Mayor,  etc.,  of  Baltimore  v. 


897 


PROPERTV    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§553 


01  benefit  is  so  clear  as  to  admit  of  no  dispute  or  controversy  by 
evidence/^  It  has  been  said  that  the  determination  of  the  legis- 
lature is  conclusive  except  in  extraordinary  cases  presenting  a 
manifest  abuse  of  legislative  authority."  If  the  aregi  which  the 
legislature  has  determ-nerl  to  be  benefited  by  the  improvement  is 
so  small  that  the  benefits  cannot  equal  the  cost,  such  determina- 
tion is  not  conclusive.-"  The  power  of  the  legislature  to  deter- 
mine the  qnes^^ion  of  what  land  is  benefited  is  not,  of  course,  dis- 
cussed e^irefully  in  those  jurisdictions  in  which  the  power  of  local 
assessment  is  assumed  not  to  depend  upon  the  existence  of  bene- 
fits.-^ The  correctness  of  a  legislative  determination  as  to  what 
property  is  benefited  may  be  attacked  upon  either  of  two  distinct 
grounds.  It  may  be  claimed  that  certain  land  is  included  by  the 
leirislfitive  determination,  which  is  not  in  fact  benefited  and  which 
should  not  therefore  be  sub.ject  to  assessment.--  It  may  be 
claimed  by  the  owners  of  ];iud  assessed,  that  by  the  legi.slative 
determination,  land  which  is  in  fact  benefited  is  excluded  from 
the  assessment  district  and  that  the  assessments  of  those  whose 
property  is  included  are  therefore  increased  by  the  omission  of 
such  property.-^     The  general  principles  already  stated  as  to  the 


1"  Duncan  v.  Eamisli,  142  Cal.  086. 
76  Pac.  661    [19041. 

"  Speer  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of 
Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9  L.  R.  A.  402, 
11  S.  E.  802   [18901. 

'■"  State,  Graham.  Proa.  v.  Mayor  of 
Paterson,  37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  380 
[18751. 

"'Oliver  v.  Monona  ('o\inty,  117 
Iowa  43,  90  N.  \V.  510  [19021;  Chi- 
cajjo,  Milwaukee  and  St.  Paul  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Phillips.  Ill  la. 
377,  P2  N.  W.787  [lOOO]. 

--Bauman  v.  Ro.ss.  1(!7  V.  S.  548, 
42  L.  270,  17  S.  9l)6  [18971;  ( revers- 
injr,  Di-tric-t  of  Columliia  v.  Amies, 
8  App.  D.  C.  393  [18961;  Pauman  v. 
Roi=s,  9  App.  D.  C.  21)0  [18961;  Ab- 
bott V.  Ross,  9  App.  D.  C.  289 
[18961);  Duncan  v.  Rnmish.  142 
Cal.  680,  70  Pac.  601  [19041;  Banaz 
V.  Smith,  133  Cal.  102.  ('5  Pac.  309 
[19011;  Hadley  v.  Damp.  130  Cal. 
207,  02  Pac.  500  [19001;  In  the  :\lat- 
ter  of  the  Ponds  nf  the  ^l-idera  Irri- 
gation District,  92  Cal.  290,  27  Am. 


St.  Rep.  106.  14  L.  R.  A.  755. 
28  Pac.  272,  28  Pac.  675 
[18911;  United  States  ex  rel. 
Henderson  v.  Edmunds,  3  Mackey 
(D.  C.)  142  [18841;  Speer  v.  Mayor 
and  Council  of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9 
L.  R.  A.  402,  11  S.  E.  802  [18901; 
Pleasants  v.  City  of  Shreveport.  110 
La.  1046,  35  So.' 283  [19031;  Hujrhes 
V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of  Caddo 
Levee  Di.strict,  108  La.  146,  32  So. 
218  [1901-19021:  Hill  v.  Fontenot. 
40  La.  Ann.  15(i3.  10  So.  475  [18941; 
(leorjie  v.  Youn'r.  45  La.  Ann.  1232, 
14  So.  137  [18931;  Smith  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Worcester,  182 
Mass.  232,  59  L.  R.  A.  728,  65  X.  E. 
40  [19021;  Smith  v.  Willis.  78  Miss. 
243,  28  So.  878  [1900];  McMillan  v. 
(  ity  of  Butte.  30  :Mont.  220,  70  Pac. 
203   [19041. 

-^  In  the  Matter  of  the  Bomls  of 
the  ]^fadera  Irripatioji  District.  92 
(  al.  -290.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  100.  14  L. 
n.  A.  755.  28  Pac.  272.  28  Pac.  075 
[1891]:    City  of  Ottawa   v.  Macy,  20 


§554 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


898 


conclusiveness  of  legislative  determination  seem  to  be  applied 
alike  to  both  classes  of  cases,  as  far  as  can  be  deduced  from  the 
somewhat  vague  and  general  language  used.  However,  in  spite 
of  similarity  between  the  two  classes  of  eases  in  the  abstract  state- 
ment of  the  principles  controlling,  the  legislative  determination 
is  attacked  with  success  in  cases  in  which  it  is  claiined  that  prop- 
erty not  benefited  is  included,  far  oftener  than  in  cases  in  which 
it  is  claimed  that  property  benefited  is  excluded  from  the  assess- 
ment district.-* 

§  554     Legislative    determination   conclusive    as   to   subordinate 
officials. 

If  a  district  has  been  fixed  by  the  legislature,  or  by  public 
corporation,  or  official  authorized  by  statute,  subordinate  officials 
cannot  omit  from  assessment  any  of  the  land  within  such  district, 
if  such  omission  will  materially  increase  the  assessment  upon  the 
rest  of  the  land  assessed.^     This   principle  has  been   applied   to 


111.  413  [1858];  Meier  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  180  Mo.  391,  7!)  S.  W.  955 
[1903];  State,  Society  for  Establish- 
ing Useful  Manufactures,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  City  of  Pat- 
erson,  42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  615 
[1880]  ;  State,  Board  of  Chosen  Free- 
holders of  the  County  of  Hudson, 
Pros.  V.  Peterson  Avenue  and  Secau- 
cus  Road  Commissioners,  41  N.  J.  L, 
(12  Vr.)  83  [1879];  People  ex  rel. 
Crowell  V.  Lawrence,  36  Barb.  178 
[1862]:  Weston  v.  Commissioners  of 
Hamilton  County,  6  Ohio  C.  C.  641 
[1892];  City  of  Spokane  Falls  v. 
Browne.  3  Wash.  84,  27  Pac.  1077 
[1891].  (Where  it  was  claimed  un- 
successfully that  the  legislature 
could  not  provide  for  assessing  the 
land  only,  exclusive  of  the  improve- 
ments thereon.) 

24  "Whether  the  assessment  shall  be 
confined  to  contiguous  property,  or 
whether  all  property  benefited  shall 
bear  a  part  of  the  burden  the  instru- 
ment is  silent,  and  as  the  leofiglature 
has  the  right  to  confer  the  power 
without  restriction  in  this  reo^ard.  we 
are  aware  of  no  reason  why  that 
nower  mav  not  be  exercised."     Lake 


V.  City  of  Decatur,  91  111.  596,  601 
[1879];  (quoted  in  W^est  Chicago 
Park  Commissioners  v.  Farber,  171 
III.  146,  158,  49  N.  E.  427  [1898]). 

^Diggins  V.  Brown,  76  Cal.  318,  18 
Pac.  373  [1888];  People  of  the  State 
of  California  v.  Lynch,  51  Cal.  15, 
21  Am.  Rep.  677'  [1875];  Gauen  v. 
Moredock  and  Ivy  Landing  Drainage 
District  No.  1,  131  111.  446,  23  N.  E. 
633  [1890];  Xevins  and  Otter  Creek 
Township  Draining  Company  v.  Al- 
kire,  36  Ind.  189  [1871];  Greencas- 
tle  and  Bowling  Green  Turnpike 
Company  v.  Albin,  34  Ind.  554 
[1870];"Robbins  v.  Sand  Creek  Turn- 
pike Company,  34  Ind.  461  [1870]; 
Hardwiek  v.  Danville  and  North 
Salem  Gravel  Road  Company,  33  Ind. 
321  [1870];  New  Haven  and  Fort 
Wayne  Turn]iike  Company  v.  Bird. 
33  Ind.  325  [1870];  Drake  v.  Grout. 
21  Ind.  App.  534.  52  N.  E.  775 
[1898];  Beck  v.  Holland,  29  Mont. 
234,  74  Pac.  410  [1903] ;  State,  Cul- 
ver, Pros.  V.  Town  of  Bergen  in  the 
County  of  Hudson.  29  N.  J.  L.  (5 
Dutch.)  266  [18611:  People  ex  rel. 
Connelly  v.  Rei«.  96  N.  Y.  S.  597, 
109  App.  Div.  748  [1905];  People  ex 


899 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


.§554 


assessments  for  streets,-  roads,^  sewers,^  and  drains."  In  this 
respect  local  assessment  (lift'ers  from  general  taxation,  since  the 
improper  omission  of  property  from  general  taxation  does  not 
invalidate  the  tax."  Thus,  where  the  conncil  had  determined  that 
a  certain  specifically  described  district  was  benefited  by  an  im- 
provement and  the  commissioners  appointed  to  apportion  the 
benefits,  divided  such  district  into  two  parts  and  found  that  one 
[)art  was  not  benefited  at  all,  it  was  held  that  such  action  on  the 
part  of  the  commissioners  was  invalid.'  It  the  drainage  com- 
missioners have  determined  what  land  is  benefited,  a  jury  sub- 
sequently appointed  to  assess  damages  and  benefits  has  no  power 
to  determine  that  certain  land  within  the  limits  fixed  by  such 
commissioners  is  not  benefited.  The  determination  of  the  drain- 
age commissioners  is  final  and  cannot  be  ignored  by  the  .jury."* 
The  omission  from  assessment  of  property  within  the  dis- 
trict as  determined  is  not,  however,  ground  for  enjoining  the 
construction  of  the  improvement  in  the  absence  of  a  show- 
ing that  there  is  not  in  existence  a  sufficient  fund  to  pay 
the  cost  of  such  improvement,  outside  of  such  assessment." 
If  an  assessment  is  levied  for  the  construction  of  a  road 
by  a  turnpike  company,  and  the  assessors  are  appointed  by  the 
county  commissioners  and  omit  part  of  the  land  within  the  assess- 
ment district,  such  conduct  is  not  ground  for  an  information 
against  the  company,  since  the  assessors  are  not  appointed  by  the 


rel.  Tietjen  v.  Reis,  Oli  X.  V.  8.  (iOl. 
109  App.  Div.  919  |19()r)|;  City  of 
Scranton  v.  Levere.  200  Pa.  St.  5ti. 
49  Atl.  980  [19011:  Krascr  v.  Mn- 
lany.  129  Wis.  377.  1()!>  N.  NN".  i:i9 
|19niil. 

-"Dralcc  v.  (hoiit,  21  hid.  A])]).  o.'U, 
52  N.  K.  775  |  1S98]  ;  State.  Culver. 
Pros.  V.  Town  of  Berfreu  in  tlie 
County  of  Hudson.  29  N.  ,1.  L.  1 5 
Dutch.)    2tU)    [18011. 

^  CJi'eencastle  and  Bowlinji  (Jreen 
'ruin])ike  Company  v.  Alhin,  34  Tnd. 
554  [18701;  Robbins  v.  Sand  Creek 
Turnpike  Company.  34  Tnd.  461 
ri87ffl:  TTardwiek  v.  Danville  and 
Nortli  Salem  Oravel  Road  Company, 
33  Tnd.  321  [18701;  Xew  Haven  and 
Fort-Wavne  Tiirnni'-'e  Company  v. 
T^ird,  33  Ind.  325  [18701. 


'  People  e\  lel.  Connelly  v.  Reis, 
!l(i  X.  V.  S.  597.  109  App.  Div.  748 
I  19(151  ;  I'eople  ex  rel.  Tietjen  v.  Reis, 
91)  X.  V.  S.  (iOl,  109  App.  Div.  919 
I  1905  1;  City  of  Scranton  v.  T.,evers, 
200  Pa.  St.  56,  49  Atl.  980   [19011. 

■  Xevins  and  Otter  Creek  Township 
Draining  Company  v.  Alkire,  36  Tnd. 
1S9  [18711:  Fraser  v.  Mulany.  129 
Wis.  377,   109  X.  W.   139   [19061. 

"  Van  Deventer  v.  Long  Tsland 
City.  139  X.  Y.  133.  34  X.  E.  774 
[18931. 

'  Elhvood  v.  City  of  Rochester.  122 
X.  Y.  229.  2'5  X.  E.  23S   [18901. 

"Cauen  v.  ^NToredoek  and  Tvy  Land- 
iirr  D'-aina-re  District  X'o.  1.  131  HI. 
446.  23  X.  E.  633   [18901. 

■'  H  >ke  V.  Perdue,  62  Cal.  545 
[1881], 


§  554  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  900 

company  nor  subject  to  its  control.^^'  Since  the  legislature  has 
power  to  provide  that  commissioners  specially  appointed  for  that 
purpose  may  determine  in  the  first  instance  what  land  is  benefited, 
the  legislature  may  provide  for  the  laying  out  of  an  assessment 
district  and  then  permit  the  commissioners  to  determine  what 
property  in  such  district  is  in  fact  benefited.^^  Accordingly,  if 
the  jury  appointed  to  assess  benefits  assesses  certain  land  in  the 
district,  and  further  reports  that  "against  all  property  in  the 
benefit  district  not  herein  specifically  described  and  assessed  with 
benefits,  we  find  and  assess  no  benefits,"  it  has  been  held  that 
such  report  is  proper  and  that  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  jury  has 
omitted  to  assess  propert}^  within  such  district.^-  An  omission  of 
property  within  the  district  as  laid  out  which  does  not  result  in 
materially  increasing  the  assessment  upon  the  rest  of  the  property 
within  such  district,  cannot  be  objected  to  by  such  property  own- 
ers.^^  If  the  omission  of  such  land  within  the  assessment  district 
results  in  an  increase  of  the  assessment  upon  the  rest  of  the 
property  in  such  district,  it  has  been  said  that  the  remaining 
property  owners  cannot  enjoin  the  collection  of  such  assessment 
without  tendering  the  amount  which  is  actually  due.^*  If  the 
legislature  or  public  corporation  or  official  au.thorized  by  statute 
has  determined  what  property  is  benefited,  has  laid  out  an 
assessment  district,  such  determination  cannot  be  revised  by  sub- 
ordinate officials.  Accordingly,  such  subordinate  ofificials  cannot 
include  in  the  assessment,  land  outside  of  such  district,  even  if 
in    fact    benefited. ^^'     If    the    legislature    has    determined    what 

'"State  on  the  Relation  of  Lingen-  ark,    54    N.    J.   L.    (25    Vr.)     144.    23 

felter   v.    Danville    and   North    Salem  Atl.  276   [1891]. 

(Jravel    Road    Company,   33    Ind.    133  "  City    of    Ottawa    v.    Barney,     10 

ri870].                             "  Kan.  270  [1872]. 

'1  Reclamation    District    Xo.    3    v.  ^^  Benson  v.  Bunting,  141  Cal.  462. 

(ioldman,    65    Cal.    635,    4    Pac.    676  75   Pac.   59    [1903];    Miller  v.   Mayo. 

[1884]  ;  City  of  Atchison  v.  Price,  45  88  Cal.  568,  26  Pac.  364  [1891]  ;  Lill 

Kan.  296,  25  Pac.  605   [1891];   Kan-  v.  City  of  Chicago,  29  111.  31   [1861]; 

sas  City  v.   Bacon,   147   Mo.   259,   48  City  of  Ottawa  v.  Macy,  20  111.  413 

S.  W.  860   [1898].  [1858];   State  ex  rel.  Keith  v.  Com- 

"  Kansas   City   v.   Bacon,    147   Mo.  mon  Council  of  the  City  of  Michigan 

259,  48  S.  W.  860  [1898].  Citv,    138    Tnd.    455,    37    N.    E.    1041 

i^Ottumwa    Brick    &    Construction  [1894]  ;  Caldwell  v.  Rupert,  10  Bush. 

Co.  V.  Ainley.  109  la.  386,  80  N.  W.  (73  Ky.)    179   [1873];   People  ex  rel. 

510  [1899]  ;   State.  Humphreys.  Pros.  Nostrand  v.  Wilson.   119  N.  Y.  515. 

V.  Mayor  and  Council  of  the  City  of  23   N.    E.    1064    [1890];    Wheeler    v. 

Bavonne.    60    N.    J.    L.    406,    38    Atl.  Treasurer    of   ^Mu^kingum    County.    3 

761    [1897];    Davis   v.   City   of  New-  Ohio  C.  C.  596   [1889];   Park  Avenue 


J 


901  PROPERTY  SLBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  551 

property  is  benefited,  the  city  cannot  assess  property  outside  of 
the  limits  of  the  district  as  marked  out  by  the  determination  of 
the  legislature.^"  Thus,  if  the  legislature  has  determined  that 
only  land  fronting  on  an  improvement.^'  or  abutting  thereon/- 
or  bounding  and  abutting  thereon,^"  is  benefited  by  such  im- 
provement, the  city  has  no  power  to  assess  the  property  bene- 
fited b}^  such  improvement,  if  any  of  the  property  benefited  lies 
outside  of  the  assessment  district  as  fixed  b}'  the  legislature. 
If  the  council  has  exercised  its  power  to  determine  what  property 
is  benefited,  the  commissioners  or  appraisers  to  apportion  such 
assessment  upon  the  property  benefited  cannot  modify  or  revise 
the  determination  of  the  council  either  by  excluding  property 
which  the  council  has  determined  is  benefited,  or  by  adding  other 
property  thereto.-*^  If  the  exercise  of  discretion  as  to  what 
property  is  benefited  is  given  to  the  council,  it  cannot  delegate 
such  discretion  to  other  oi^cers.-^  Thus,  where  a  city  fixed  an 
assessment  district,  a  contract  which  provides  for  doing  the  work 
and  assessing  the  cost  thereof  upon  a  district  different  from  that 
fixed  by  the  ordinance  of  the  city  council,  is  invalid."  If.  on  the 
other  hand,  the  legislature  has  given  to  commissioners  specially 
appointed  for  that  purjiose.  power  to  determine  Avhat  property  is 
benefited  aud  tlnis  to  lay  out  the  assessment  district,  the  city 
council  cannot,  by  restricting  the  district  to  the  property  contigu- 
ous to  the  improvement,  prevent  the  commissioners  frinn  includ- 


Sewers,  Appeal  of  Parker,  109  Pa.  ''^  Fifty  Fourth  St..  Pittsburgh's 
St.  433,  32  All.  574  flSOol:  Beech-  Ap])cal.  105  Pa.  St.  8,  30  Atl.  503 
wood  Avenue  Sewer,  Pittsburg's  Ap-  1 1894]  ;  Morevvood  Avenue,  Cham- 
peal,  179  Pa.  St.  490.  30  Atl.  209  ber's  Apj>eal,  159  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl. 
[18971;     Mor.'woiul     Avenue,     ("ham-  123    [1893]. 

ber's  Appeal,   159  Pa.  St.  20,  2S  Atl.  •»  Kelly  v.  City  of  Cleveland.  34  O. 

123    [18931;    Fraser    v.    :\rulany.    129  S.   408    [18781. 

Wis.  377,  109  X.  W.  139   [19001.  -*  Kansas  City  Cxrading  Company  v. 

'«:Millpr  V.  Mayo.  88  Cal.  508.  20  Tlolden,  107  Mo.  305,  17  S.  W.  798 
Pac.  304  [18911:  Kelly  v.  Citv  of  [18911;  Ellwood  v.  City  of  Roches- 
Cleveland,  :U  O.  S.  4(;s  (ISTSI-.  U-r,  122  X.  Y.  229.  25  X.  E.  238 
Wheeler  v.  Treasurer  of  Muskiii'nini  118901;  ITassen  v.  City  of  Rochester, 
County,  3  Ohio  C.  C.  590  [18891;  05  X.  V.  510  [18751. 
Fifty  Fourtli  St..  Pittsburgh's  Ap-  -''  Such  as  assessors.  Savaije  v, 
peal,  105  Pa.  St.  8.  30  Atl.  503  City  of  Buffalo,  59  Hun.  00(i,  14  X, 
[18941;  Morewood  Avenue.  Cham-  Y.  Supp.  101  [18911. 
ber's  Apnoal.  159  Pa.  S(.  20.  28  Atl.  "Haisch  v.  City  of  Seattle,  10 
123   [18931.  Wash.  435.  38  Pac.    1131    [18941. 

"Mill.M-   V.    Mmvo,   SS   Cal.    508,   20 
Pac.  304   IlSiin. 


§555 


TiVXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


902 


ing  property  benefited  by  the  improvement  but  not  contiguous 
thereto.^^ 

§  555.     Delegation  of  power  to  public  corporation. 

The  legislature  may  delegate  to  municipal  corporations  the 
power  to  determine  what  property  within  such  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  especially  benefited  by  public  improvements.^  The  deter- 
mination of  the  city,  under  statutes  of  this  character,  is  said  to  be 
final   and   conclusive   in  the   absence   of   fraud,-  or  fraud  or  mis- 


^In  the  Matter  of  Westlake  Ave- 
nue, Seattle,  40  Wash.  144.  82  Pac. 
279   [1905]. 

^  Minnesota  &  M.  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  V.  City  of  Billinf-s.  Ill  Fed. 
Rep.  972,  50  C.  C.  A.  70  [1901];  Eng- 
lish  V.   Territory,   —   Ariz.   ,   89 

Pac.  501  [1907];  Board  of  Improve- 
ment District  No.  Five  of  Texarkana 
V.  Offenhauser,  84  Ark.  257,  105  S. 
W.  265  [1907];  Duncan  v.  Ramish, 
142  Cal.  686,  76  Pac.  661  [1904]; 
Thomason  v.  Cuneo,  119  Cal.  25,  50 
Pac.  846  [1897];  Digdns  v.  Brown, 
76  Cal.  318,  18  Pac.  373  [1888];  Hal- 
lett  V.  United  States  Security  &  Bond 

Co.,    —    Colo.    ,    90     Pac.     683 

[1907];  Spalding  v.  City  and  County 
of  Denver,  33  Colo.  172,  80  Pac.  126 
[1904];  City  of  Denver  v.  Kennedy, 
33  Colo.  80,"  SO  Pac.  12'2  [1904];  80 
Pac.  467  [1905];  Wolff  v.  City  of 
Denver,  20  Colo.  App.  135,  77  Pac. 
364  [1904]  ;  Field  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
198  111.  224,  64  N.  £."^840  [1902]; 
Gray  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  177  111.  459, 
53  N.  E.  91;  Payton  v.  Village  of 
Morgan  Park,  172  111.  102,  49  N.  E. 
1003  [1898];  Lightner  v.  City  of 
Peoria,  150  III.  80,  37  N.  E.  69 
[1894];  Davis  v.  City  of  Litchfield, 
145  111.  313,  21  L.  R.  A.  563,  33  N. 
E.  888  [1893];  State  ex  rel.  Keith 
v.  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Michigan  City,  138  Ind.  455,  37  N. 
E.  1041  [1894];  Grimmell  v.  City  of 
Des  Moines,  57  la.  144,  10  N.  W.  330 
[1881];  City  of  Kansas  City  v.  Gih- 
son,  66  Kan."  501,  72  Pac.  222  [1903] ; 


Gleason  v.  Barnett,  106  Ky.  125,  50 
S.  W.  67  [1899];  Power  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  139  Mich.  30,  102  N.  W. 
2'-^8  [1905];  Goodrich  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 123  Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255 
[1900];  Shimmons  v.  City  of  Sagi- 
naw, 104  Mich.  511,  62  N.  W.  725 
[1895];  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand 
Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874];  Hoyt  v. 
City  of  East  Saginaw,  19  Mich.  39 
2  Am.  "?p.  76  [1869];  Car- 
penter v.  City  of  St.  Paul, 
23  Minn.  232"  [1876];  Rogers 
V.  City  of  St.  Paul,  22  Minn.  494 
[1876];  Kansas  City  Grading  Com- 
pany V.  Holden,  107  Mo.  305,  17  S. 
W.  798  [1891];  Shannon  v.  City  of 
Omaha,  73  Neb.  507,  103  N.  W.  53, 
106  N.  W.  592  [1905];  Har- 
rinian  v.  City  of  Yonkers,  181 
N.  Y.  24,  73*  N.  E.  493  [1905]; 
(affirming  judgment,  81  N.  Y.  S. 
823,  82  App.  Div.  408  [1903]); 
Ellwood  V.  City  of  Rochester,  122  N. 
Y.  229,  25  N.  *E.  238  [1890];  Genet 
V.  City  of  Brooklyn,  99  N.  Y.  296, 
1  N.  E.  777  [1885];  People  ex  rel. 
Griffin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4 
N.  Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851]; 
Coates  V.  Village  of  Norwood,  16 
Ohio  C.  C.  196  [1898];  St.  Bene- 
dict's   Abbey   v.    Marion    County,    — 

Or.  ,  93  Pac.  231   [1908];  Strow- 

bridge  v.  City  of  Portland,  8  Ore.  67 
[1879];  Sta'te  v.  Moss,  44  Wash. 
91,  86  Pac.  1129  [1906];  Haisch  v. 
City  of  Seattle,  10  Wash.  435  [1894]. 
-  Shimmons  v.  City  of  Saginaw, 
104  Mich.  511,  62  N.  W.  725  [1895]. 


903 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT, 


OOO 


take,^  or  unless  sueh  action  on  the  part  of  the  city  is  fraudulent 
or  nnreason'able,"'  or  unless  the  absence  of  benefit  makes  it  mani- 
fest that  the  burden  amounts  to  spoliation  and  not  taxation."'  If 
the  legislature  gives  to  a  municipal  corporation  power  to  deter- 
mine what  land  is  benefited  by  a  public  improvement,  the  exer- 
cise of  this  power  is  most  frequently  lodged  in  the  city  council." 


'  State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  95  Minn. 
70,  10.3  N.  W.  744  [lOOSJ;  State  of 
Minnesota  ex  rel.  Powell  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  47  3Iinn. 
400,   50  X.  W.  476    [1891]. 

*  City  of  Denver  v.  Kennedy,  33 
Colo.  80,  80  Pac.  122,  80  Pac.  467 
11905]. 

=  Preston  v.  Rudd,  84  Ky.  150 
1 1886];  Clay  v.  Grand  Rapids,  60 
Mich.  451,  27  X.  W.  596   [1886]. 

"Lenon  v.  Brodie,  81  Ark.  208,  98 
S.  W.  979  [1906]  ;  Duncan  v.  Ramish, 
142  Cal.  686.  76  Pac.  661  [1904|; 
(Jerman  Savings  and  Loan  Society 
V.  Ramish,  138  Cal.  120,  69  Pac.  89, 
70  Pac.  1067  [1902];  Dann  v.  Wood- 
ruff, 51  Conn.  203  [1883];  Storrs  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  208  111.  364,  70  N. 
K.  347  [19041;  Chicago  and  North- 
western Railway  Company  v.  Village 
of  Elmhurst.  165  111.  148,  46  N.  E. 
437  [1897];  Davis  v.  City  of  Litch- 
field, 155  III.  .384.  40  X.  E.  354 
[1895];  Chicago  and  Alton  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  .Toilet,  153  III. 
649,  39  N.  E.  io77  [1894];  People 
ex  rel.  Thatcher  v.  Village  of  IJyiU' 
Park,  117  111.  462.  6  X.  E.  33  [1887]  : 
Lake  v.  (  ity  of  Decatur.  91  III.  59(1 
[1879];  Wray  v.  Fry.  158  Ind.  92,  62 
N.  E.  1004  [1901]:  State  ex  rel. 
Keith  V.  Common  Council  of  the  City 
of  Michi'/an  City,  138  Ind.  455,  .37 
N.  E.  1041  [18941;  City  of  Fort 
Wayne  v.  Cody.  43  Ind.  197  [1873]; 
Klein  v.  Tuhev.  13  Ind.  Apj).  74.  40 
N.  E.  144  [18951;  Minneapolis  & 
St.  Ivouia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lindouist,  119 
la.  144.  93  X.  W.  103  [1903];  P.uell 
V.  Pall.  20  In.  282  [186ti]:  City  of 
Atc'Msni  v.  P'ip,>,  .);■;  h'lm.  296,  25 
r^c.    C05    [1891];    Blair    v.    City    of 


Atchison.  40  Kan.  353.  19  Pac.  815 
[1883];  Mayor  and  City  Council  of 
Baltimore  v.  Johns  Hopkins  Hospi- 
tal, 56  Md.  1  [1880];  Jones  v.  Board 
of  Aldermen  of  tlie  City  of  Boston, 
104  Mass.  461  [1870];  Power  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  139  Mich.  30,  102  X.  W. 
288  [1905];  Goodrich  v.  City  of  De- 
troit, 123  Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255 
[1900];  Brown  v.  City  of  Saginaw, 
107  Mich.  643,  65  X.  W.  601 ;  Boehme 
V.  City  of  Monroe,  106  Mich.  401,  64 
X.  W.  204  [1895];  Grand  Rapids 
School  Furniture  Company  v.  City  of 
Grand  Rapids,  92  Mich.  564.  52  X". 
W.  1028  [1892];  Beecher  v.  City  of 
Detroit,  92  Mich.  268.  52  X.  W.'731 
[1892];  Davies  v.  City  of  Saginaw, 
87  Mich.  439.  49  X.  W.  667  [1891]; 
Whitney  v.  Village  of  Hudson.  69 
Mich.  189,  37  X.  W.  184  [1888]; 
Beniteau  v.  City  of  Detroit,  41  Mich. 
116,  1  X.  W.  899  [18791;  Warren  v. 
City  of  Grand  Haven,  30  Mich.  24 
[18741;  Carpenter  v.  City  of  St. 
Paul.  23  Minn.  232  [1876]:  :\!eier  v. 
City  of  St.  Louis,  180  Mo.  391.  79 
S.  W.  955  [19031;  Prior  v.  Buehler 
&  Cooney  Construction  Company, 
170  Mo.  439.  71  S.  W.  205  [1902]; 
Ileman  v.  Sdiulte,  166  Mo.  409,  66 
S.  W.  Iti3  11901];  Johnson  v.  Duer, 
115  :Mo.  366,  21  S.  W.  800  [1892]; 
Keith  V.  Bingham,  100  Mo.  300.  13 
S.  W.  683  [1889];  Corri-an  v.  Gage, 
68  Mo.  541  [18781;  Ilcman  v.  Wolff. 
33  Mo.  App.  200;  Beck  v.  Holland. 
29  Mont.  234.  74  P;)c.  410  [1903]: 
Ellwood  V.  City  of  Rochester,  122  X. 
V.  229,  25  X.  E  238  [1890];  Hassan 
V.  Rochester,  67  X".  Y.  528;  Hassen 
V.  City  of  Rochester,  65  X^  Y.  516 
[•1875];  People  ex  rel.  ]VIarvin  v. 
City  (^f   Brooklyn.   23   Barb.    (X.   Y.) 


§  000 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT, 


90-i 


The  decision  of  the  city  council  upon  a  question  of  this  sort  is 
often  said  to  be  final."  This  general  statement  must  be  taken, 
however,  with  the  proper  limitations.  When  the  exact  meaning 
of  the  rule  becomes  material,  it  is  qualified  in  various  ways,  as 
bj^  holding  that  the  determination  of  the  council  is  final  as  long 
as  its  discretion  is  honestly  exercised  and  not  abused,^  or  in  the 
abs'^nce  of  fraud/'  or  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  mistake,^"  or 
in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  such  gross  mistake  as  to  preclude  sound 
judgment."  or  in  the  absence  of  fraud  and  corruption,^-  or  fraud 
and  oppression/'  or  in  case  of  a  clear  abuse  of  such  discretion.^* 
It  has  been  said  that  the  courts  will  not  review  the  decision  of 
the  council  unless  the  property  assessed  is  so  situated  as  to  render 
it  physically  impossible  for  the  improvement  to  benefit  it.^'     It 


166  [1856];  City  of  Asheville  v. 
Wachovia  Loan  &  Trust  Co..  143  X. 
C.  360,  55  S.  E.  800  [1906];  City  of 
Toledo  V.  Ford,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  290 
[1900];  Coates  v.  Village  of  Nor- 
wood, 16  Ohio  C.  C.  196  [1898]; 
Conner  v.  City  of  Cincinnati.  11  Ohio 
C.  C.  336  (affirmed  55  0.  S.  82 
[1896]);  Or.  &  Cal.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Portland,  25  Ore.  229,  22  L. 
R.  A.  713,  35  Pac.  4.52  [1894];  Mieh- 
ener  v.  City  of  Philadelphia.  118 
Pa.  St.  535,  12  Atl.  174  [1888]; 
Brientnall  v.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
103  Pa.  St.  156' [1883]:  Wray  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Pittsburg  for  Use, 
etc.',  46  Pa.  St.  (10  Wright)  365 
[1863];  Commonwealth  for  Use,  etc., 
V.  Woods.  44  Pa.  St.  (8  Wright)  113 
[1862];  Kettle  v.  City  of  Dallas.  35 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  632,  80  S.  W.  874 
[1904];    Northern  Pacific   Ry.   Co.   v. 

City   of   Seattle,   —  Wash.   ,   91 

Pac.  244  [1907];  Haisch  v.  City  of 
Seattle,  10  Wash.  435,  38  Pac.  1131 
[1894];  Messett  v.  City  of  Eau 
Claire,  81  Wis.  326,  51  N.  W.  506 
[1892];  Teegarden  v.  City  of  Racine, 
56  Wis.  545,  14  N.  W.  614  [1883J; 
Oilman  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  55 
Wis.  328,   13  N.  W.  266    [1882]. 

'  Chicago  and  Northwestern  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Village  of  Elmhurst, 
165  111.  148!  46  N.  E.  437  [1897]; 
Davis  v.  Citv  of  Litchfield.  155  111. 
:^S4,    40   N.    E.    354    [ISO.i];    Cliicaso 


and  Alton  Railroad  Company  v.  City 
of  Joliet,  153  111.  649.  39  n'  E.  1077 
[1894];  Wray  v.  Fry,  158  Ind.  92, 
62  N.  E.  1004  [1901];  Klein  v.  Tu- 
hey,  13  Ind.  App.  74,  40  N.  E.  141 
[1895];  Buell  v.  Ball,  20  la.  282 
[1866];  Meier  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
180  Mo.  391.  79  S.  W.  955  [1903]; 
Prior  V.  Buehler  &  Cooney  Construc- 
tion Company,  170  Mo.  439,  71  S.  W. 
205  [1902];  Johnson  v.  Duer,  115 
Mo.  366,  21  S.  W.  800  [1892];  Ell- 
wood  v.  City  of  Rochester,  122  N.  Y. 
229.  25  N.  E.  238  [1890];  Meggett  v. 
City  of  Eau  Claire.  81  Wis.  326^  51 
N.  'W.   566    [1892  I. 

» Oregon  &  California  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
City  of  Portland,  25  Ore.  229,  22  L. 
R.  A.  713,  35  Pac.  452   [1894]. 

^  Heman  v.  Schulte.  166  Mo.  409,  66 
S.  W.  163   [1901]. 

loLenon  v.  Brodie,  81  Ark.  208, 
98  S.  W.  979    [1906]. 

"Beck  V.  Holland,  29  Mont.  234, 
74  Pac.  410  [19031. 

^-City  of  Ft.  Wayne  v.  Cody,  43 
Ind.  197   [1873], 

i^City  of  Toledo  v.  Ford,  20  Ohio 
C.  C.  290   [1900]. 

"Storrs  V.  City  of  Chicago,  208 
111.  364,  70  N.  E. '347   [1904]. 

^=  Paulson  V.  City  of  Portland,  16 
Ore.  450,  1  L.  R.  A.  673,  19  Pae.  450 
[1888];  (affirmed  Paulsen  v.  Port- 
IflTid.  Tfl  J\  S.  30.  37  L.  637.  13  S. 
750  riS9:^i ). 


905  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  556 

has  been  said  that  the  willful,  arbitrary  and  intentional  omission 
by  the  city  council  to  assess  a  part  of  the  property  benefited  by 
local  improvement,  thereby  increasing  the  burden  upon  the  owners 
of  property  assessed,  renders  the  assessment  void.^'"'  Thus,  where 
it  was  physically  impossible  to  drain  certain  property  by  a  sewer 
because  of  the  high  ground  intervening  between  such  property 
and  the  sewer,  it  was  said  that  a  finding  by  the  city  council  that 
such  property  was  benefited  was  "a  fraud  on  its  face."^'  Where 
council  created  an  assessment  district  of  a  frontage  of  one  hundred 
and  forty  feet  and  charged  such  district  with  the  cost  of  what 
the  council  termed  a  street  improvement,  which  consisted  in  real- 
ity of  rebuilding  a  sewer  under  a  street  and  running  diagonally 
across  it.  it  was  held  that  the  action  of  the  council  in  determin- 
ing that  this  property  was  benefited  by  such  improvement  and 
other  property  was  not.  with  the  result  that  the  entire  cost  of 
such  improvement  was  thrown  upon  such  small  district,  was  sub- 
ject to  review  by  the  courts."  This  was  said  to  be  a  very  pecu- 
liar exercise  of  the  power  of  creating  assessment  district  and  soli- 
tary in  the  experience  of  the  court.  Council  determined  to  con- 
struct a  sewer  and  determined  what  property  would  be  benefited 
thereby.  Subsequently,  council  decided  to  construct  such  sewer 
upon  a  larger  scale  and  draining  a  greater  territory,  at  an  in- 
creased expen.se,  without  changing  its  determination  as  to  the 
property  benefited  thereby.  It  was  held  that  such  determination 
of  the  council  as  to  the  property  benefited  was  subject  to  review 
by  the  courts.^'^  The  determination  of  the  council  that  a  side- 
walk benefits  adjoining  property  which  is  vacant  and  unoccupied, 
except  for  one  small  sbanty  and  over  which  there  is  no  travel, 
has  been  held  subject  to  review.-'' 

§  556.     Grant  of  power  to  public  officers  or  boards. 

The  legislature  may  grant  to  some  local  ])oard  or  officer  the 
power  to  determine  what  property  is  benefited  by  a  public  im- 
provement.^    Tliis  power  may  be  granted   to  n   lioard  of  super- 

" Masters   v.   City   of   Portlan.l.  24            ="  Conifran    v.    Gape.    fiS    INto.    .541 

Ore.  Ifil.  3.3  Pap.  540  [18931.  [18781. 

"  Hansponi    v.    City   of   Omalia.  11           ^  Fallbrook    Trriiiation    District    v. 

Neb.  37    [18811.  Tiradloy.    ]fi4    T^    S.    112.    41    L.    369. 

i»  Clay  V.  City  of  niiuid  i;ni. ids.  nn        17    S.    .ifi    [ISflfil:    l^aiiniaii    v.    Ross. 

Mich.  451.  27   X.   W.   590    [1SS(1|.  1(17   V.   S.   548.  42  L.  270.    17   S.  9fi6 

•"City  of  Tolunibus  v.  Storey,  35  [18971:  ( revorsijisr  Distrift  of  Co- 
in.!. 97    [18711.                                 "  lunibia    v.    Amies.    S    .\\^p.   D.   C.    393 


.§556 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


906 


visors,-  as  m  drainage  and  reclamation  improvements.  The  de- 
termination of  drainage  supervisors  is  said  not  to  be  final  where 
they  fraudulently  or  arbitrarily  omit  lands  from  the  assessment 
which  are  directly  benefited  and  assessed  lands  which  are  not 
benefited.''  This  discretion  may  be  conferred  upon  a  board  of 
public  works. ^  The  determination  of  .such  board  is  said  to  bi> 
final  except  in  case  of  fraud,'  or  fraud,  mistake  or  transgression 
of  authority,''  or  fraud,  demonstrable  mistake  of  fact,  or  the  ap- 
plication of  an  erroneous  rule  of  law."  If  the  statute  provides 
for  entering  the  finding  of  the  board  as  to  what  property  is  bene- 
fited, upon  the  records  of  such  board,  it  has  keen  held  that  where 
the  board  has  determined  upon  a  sewer  improvement  and  made 
a  finding  as  to  the  property  benefited,  and  subsequently  changes 


[1896];  Baiiman  v.  Ross,  9  App.  D. 
C.  260  [1896]:  Abbott  v.  Ross.  9 
App.  D.  C.  289  [1896]);  Slioemaker 
V.  United  States,  147  U.  S.  282,  37 
L,  170,  13  S.  361  [1893];  Davis  v. 
Gaines,  48  Ark.  370,  3  S.  W.  184; 
In  re  Change  of  Grade  of  Beale 
Street,  39  Cal.  495  [1870];  Appeal 
of  Piper,  32  Cal.  530  [1867];  Jones 
V.  Town  of  Lake  View,  151  111.  663, 
38  X.  E.  688;  Clinton  Township  v. 
Teachoiit,  150  Mich.  124,  111  X.  W. 
1052  [1907];  Grand  Rapids  School 
Furniture  Company  v.  City  of  Grand 
Rapids,  92  Mich.  564,  52  X.  W.  1028 
[1892];  Hoyt  v.  City  of  East  Sagi- 
naw, 19  Mich.  39,  2  Am.  Rep.  7fi 
[1869]:    State    v.   Several   Parcels   of 

Land.  —  Xeb. .    110  X.   W.   753 

[1907]. 

^  Lower  King's  River  Rechimation 
District  Xo.  531  v.  McCullah,  124 
Cal.  175,  56  Pac.  887  [1899];  Ap- 
peal of  Piper,  32  Cal.  530  [1867]; 
Chambliss  v.  Johnson.  77  la.  611.  42 
X.  W.  427   [1889]. 

'Eraser  v.  Mukiney,  129  Wis.  377, 
109  X.  W.  139  [1906]. 

*  Elliott  v.  City  of  Chicago,  4S  III. 
293  [1808];  Edwards  v.  Cooper,  168 
Ind.  54,  79  X\  E.  1047  [1907]; 
State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  District  Court 
of  Ramsey  County,  95  Minn.  70,  103 
X.  \Y.  744  [1905];  State  ex  rel.  v. 
District  Court  of  Ramsey  County,  33 


Minn.  164.  22  X.  W.  295  [1885]; 
State  of  ^linnesota  ex  rel.  Cunning- 
ham v.  Board  of  Public  Works  of 
the  City  of  St.  Paul,  27  Minn.  442, 
8  X.  W."161  [1881]:  Rogers  v.  City 
of  St.   Paul,   22  Minn.   494    [1876].  " 

=  Elliott  v.  City  of  Chicago,  48  111. 
293    [1868]. 

°  State  V.  Several  Parcels  of  Land, 
—Xeb.  ,   110  X.  W.  753   [1907]. 

"  State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  95  Minn. 
70,  103  X.  W.  744  [1905];  State  of 
Minnesota  ex  rel.  Cunningham  v. 
Board  of  Public  Works  of  the  City 
of  St.  Paul,  27  Minn.  442,  8  X.  W. 
161  [1881].  The  finding  of  such 
board  as  to  what  property  is  benefit- 
ed is  said  to  be  "conclusive  except 
in  case  of  fraud  or  demonstrable 
mistake  of  fact."  State  of  Minne- 
sota ex  rel.  Lewis  v.  District  Court 
of  Ramsey  County,  33  :Minn.  164,  22 
X.  W.  295  [1885];  (Citing  State  of 
Minnesota  ex  rel.  Cunningham  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ramsey  County,  29 
Minn.  62,  11  X.  W.  133  [1882]  ;'state 
of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Cunningham  v. 
Board  of  Public  Works  of  the  City 
of  St.  Paul,  27  Minn.  442,  8  X.  w'. 
161  [1881];  Carpenter  v.  City  of  St. 
Paul,  23  Minn.  232  [1876];  Rogers 
v.  City  of  St.  Paul.  22  Minn.  494 
[1876]". 


907  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  557 

such  improvement  by  constructing  a  branch  of  such  sewer  and 
does  not  make  a  new  finding  as  to  the  propertj'^  benefited  by  the 
improvement  as  modified,  such  failure  to  make  such  finding  is  a 
jurisdictional  defect.'*  Such  power  may  be  conferred  upon  drain- 
age commissioners.''  The  exercise  of  this  power  by  a  board  of 
drainage  commissioners  is  said  to  be  conclusive  in  the  absence  of 
fraud."  Such  power  may  be  conferred  upon  park  commission- 
ers.'^ The  power  to  determine  what  property'  is  benefited  by  a 
levee  may  be  conferred  upon  levee  inspectors.^-  The  power  to  de- 
termine what  property  is  benefited,  may  be  conferred  upon  county 
commissioners.'"'  The  power  to  determine  what  property  is  bene- 
fited may  be  conferred  upon  a  permanent  board  of  street  com- 
missioners.'* The  power  to  determine  what  property  is  benefited 
may  be  conferred  upon  the  board  of  trustees  of  a  village. '^  It 
may  be  conferred  upon  a  board  of  equalization.'" 

vj  557.     Grant  of  power  to  commissioners  or  jury. 

A  common  method  of  determining  what  property  is  benefited 
by  an  improvement  is  found  in  the  statutes  which  provide  that 
such  action  shall  be  determined  by  a  body  of  persons  appointed 
for  that  purpose,  often  by  a  court.  Such  persons  are  frequently 
called  commissioners.'     The  action  of  the  commissioners  is  some- 

"  Edwards   v.   Cooper,    168   Ind.   54,  "Lincoln  v.  Board  of  Street  Com- 

79  N.  E.   1047    [1907].  niissioners  of  the  City  of  Boston,  ]H> 

"City    of    Joliet    v.    Spring    Creek  Mass.  210,  57  N.  E.  356   [1900]. 

Drainage    District,    222    JIl.    441,    78  '"Crawford  v.  People  ex  rel.  Riini- 

N.  E.  836  [1906];  Gauen  V.  Moredock  sey,    83    111.    557    [1876];    People    of 

and    Ivy    Landing    Drainage    District  the  State  of  New  York  ex   rel.  Gage 

Xo.    1,131    111.    44().    23    X.    E.    633  v.    Lohnas,   54    lliin.    {X.   Y.)    604,   8 

[1890];  Alstad  v.  Sim.  15  X.  D.  629,  X.  Y.  Supp.   104    [1889]. 

109   N.   W.   66    [1906];    Tnrn(iuist   v.  "State     ex     rel.     Ashhy    v.     Three 

Cass    County    Drain    Commissioners,  States  Lumber  Co.,   198  Mo.  430.  95 

11  N.  D.  514,  92  X.  \V.  852   [1902];  S.  W.  333   [1906]. 

State  ex  rel.  Baltzell   v.  Stewart,   74  '  Bauman   v.   Ross,    167   U.   S.   548. 

Wis.  620,  6  L.    R.   A.   394.   43   X.  W.  42  L.  270,  17  S.  966  [1897];    (revers- 

947    [1889];    Bryant    v.    Rohbins,    70  ing   District    of    Columbia    v.    Amies. 

^Vi9.  258,   35   X.W.  545    [1887].  8    App.    D.    C.    393    [1896];    Bauman 

'"Turnquist   v.   Cass   County   Drain  v.    Ross,   9    App.   D.   C.   260    [1896]; 

Commissioners,    11   X.   D.   514,   92  X.  Abbott    v.    Ross.    9    App.    D.    C.    289 

W.   852    [1902].  11896]);   Reclamation  District  Xo.  3 

"  Genet    v.    City    of    Brooklyn,    99  v.  Goldman,  65  Cal.  635,  4   Pac.  676 

X.  Y.  296.   1  N.  E.  777   [1885].  [1884];  Trigger  v.  Drainage  District. 

'-McDermott    v.    Mathis,    21    Ark.  193    111.   230,    61    X.    E.    1114;    Allen 

60   [I860].  V.   City  of   Chicago.    176   111.    113.   52 

"Bowen    v.    Hester.    143    Ind.    511,  X.  E.  33   [1898]  ;"^  Latham  v.  Village 

41  N.  E.  330   [1895].  of   \Vilmette.    168    111.    153.   48   X.    E. 


§557 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT, 


908 


times  said  to  be  conclusive.-  This  is  too  broad  a  statement  in 
view  of  the  actual  decisions.'^  Under  a  statute  authorizing  com- 
missioners to  assess  property  benefited  "according  to  your  wis- 
dom and  discretion,"  it  was  held  that  arbitrary  power  was  not 
given,  but  that  such  words  meant  according  to  law  and  justice.* 
It  is  said  that  the  action  of  the  commissioners  is  conclusive  ex- 
cept in  case  of  fraud.^  It  has  been  held  that  the  action  of  com- 
missioners in  determining  what  land  is  benefited,  cannot  be  re- 
viewed unless  their  action  was  so  negligent  or  improper  as  to  be  in 
effect  fraudulent.'''  Under  most  statutes  some  means  is  provided 
for  reviewing  their  determination  and  setting  it  aside  if  clearly 
erroneous.'  The  persons  appointed  especially  to  determine  what 
lands  are  benefited  are  sometimes  known  as  viewers."*  or  assess- 
ors.^    Under  some  statutes  it  is  left  for  some  court  to  determine 


311  [1897];  Jones  v.  Town  of  Lake 
View,  151  111.  663,  38  N,  E.  688 
[1894];  The  People  ex  rel.  Samuel, 
Sr.,  V.  Cooper,  139  111.  461,  29  N.  E. 
872  [1893];  Wright  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 48  111.  285  [1868];  Zumbro  v. 
Parnin,  141  Ind.  430,  40  N.  E.  1085 
[1895];  Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa 
Fe    Railroad    Company    v.    Peterson, 

5  Kan.  App.  103,  48  Pac.  877  [1897]; 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Brown,  155  Mo. 
545,  56  S.  W.  298  [1899];  St.  Louis 
V.  Excelsior  Brewing  Co.,  96  Mo. 
677,  10  S.  W.  477  [1888];  State,  Al- 
dridge.  Pros.  v.  Essex  Public  Road 
Board,  46  N.  J.  L.  (17  Vr. )  126 
[1884];  State,  Johnston,  Pros  v.  In- 
habitants of  the  City  of  Trenton,  43 
N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  166  [1881];  State, 
Board  of  Chosen  Freeholders  of  the 
County  of  Hudson,  Pros.  v.  Paterson 
Avenue  and  Secaucus  Road  Commis- 
sioners, 41  N.  J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  83 
[1879];  State.  Hunt,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Rahway,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vroom) 
646  [1877];  Dyker  Meadow  Land  & 
Improvement  Co.  v.  Cook.  159  X.  Y. 
6,  53  N.  E.  690;  LeHoy  et  al.  v. 
Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 
the  City  of  New  York,  20  John  Sup. 
Ct.   430    [1823];    Murray  v.   Graham, 

6  Paiges  Chan.  Rep.  622  [1837];  In 
the  Matter  of  Extension  of  Churcli 
Street    in    New    York.    49    Barb.    455 


[1867];  In  the  Matter  of  Westlake 
Avenue,  Seattle,  40  Wash.  144,  82 
Pac.  27'9  [1905];  State  ex  rel.  Bait- 
zell  v.  Stewart,  74  Wis.  620,  6  L.  R. 
A.  394,  43  N.  W.  947  [1889]. 

^  Jones  v.  Town  of  Lake  View,  151 
111.  663,  38  X.  E.  688  [1894];  Bige- 
low  v.  City  of  Chicago.  90  111.  49 
[1878]. 

^  City  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Crowther, 
142   Mo.    155,   43   S.   W.   786    [1897]. 

*  Keighley's  Case,  10  Rep.  139  a.  b. 
^  Latham    v.    Village    of    Wilmette, 

168  111.  153,  48  N.  E.  311  [1897]; 
People  ex  rel.  Samuel,  Sr.,  v.  Cooper, 
139  111.  461,  29  N.  E.  872  [1893]; 
Wright  V.  City  of  Chicago,  48  III. 
285   [1868]. 

''Allen  V.  City  of  Chicago,  176  111. 
113,  52  N.  E.  33   [1898]. 

^Hoffeld  V.  City  of  Buffalo,  130 
N.  Y.  387;  29  N.  E.  747  [1892]; 
Copcutt  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  83  Hun. 
(N.  Y.)  178,  31  N.  Y.  S.  659  [1894]; 
In  re  Cedar  Park,  1  How.  Pr.  N.  S. 
257. 

*  Extension  of  Hancock  Street,  18 
Pa.   St.    (6  Harr.)    26    [1851]. 

"  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Cruger  to  Vacate  an  Assessment.  84 
N.  Y.  619  [1881]  ;  People  ex  rel.  Con- 
nelly V.  Rei^.  96  N.  Y.  S.  597,  109 
App.  Div.  748  [1905];  People  ex  rel. 
Tietjen  v.  Reis,  96  X.  Y.  S.  601,  109 
App.  Div.   919    [1905]. 


909 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§  55o 


in  the  first  instance  what  land  is  benefited  by  the  proposed  im- 
provement.^- Provisions  of  this  sort  are  most  frequently  found  in 
drainage  and  reclamation  improvements.  Under  some  statutes 
the  question  of  what  land  is  benefited  by  the  improvement  is 
referred  to  a  jury.^^  The  jury  cannot  lay  out  an  assessment  dis- 
trict arbitrarily,  without  reference  to  the  existence  of  benefits  as 
a  fact.^2 

§  558.    Method  of  reviewing  determination  as  to  land  benefited. 

The  statute  may  provide  a  special  method  of  testing  the  cor- 
rectness of  the  determination  of  the  legislature,  or  public  corpora- 
tion, or  official,  in  deciding  that  the  lands  included  in  the  assess- 
ment district  are  benefited  by  the  improvement.  If  this  ([uestion 
is  not  raised  in  the  manner  pointed  out  by  statute,  the  property 
owner  is  regarded  as  waiving  such  objection.^  It  cannot  there- 
after be  raised  in  a  collateral  proceeding.-  Thus,  if  it  is  held  that 
the  proper  method  of  testing  the  right  of  drainage  commissioners 
to  annex  certain  lands  to  a  drainage  district  is  by  a  proceeding  in 
quo  warranto  to  compel  them  to  show^  by  what  right  they  have 
annexed  such  territory,  the  validity  of  such  annexation  cannot 


"  Stiewel  v.  Fencing  District  No. 
6  of  Johnson  County,  71  Ark.  17,  70 
S.  W.  308,  71  S.  \V.  247  [1903]; 
Gaiien  v.  Moredock  and  Ivy  Landing 
Drainage  District  Xo.  1,  131  111.  44G, 
23  N.  E.  633  [1890];  State  ex  rel. 
Stotts  V.  Wall,  153  Mo.  210,  54  S. 
W.  465   [18991. 

"  Drainage  ('(iniini^sioiicra  of  Dis- 
trict No.  3,  V.  Illinois  (Vntral 
Railroad  Conijjany,  158  111.  'A'y'.i.  41 
N.  E.  1073  [18951:  Kelly  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  148  111.  90,  35  X.  K.  752 
[1894];  Kansas  City  v.  Bacon,  157 
Mo.  450,  57  S.  W.  1045  [1900]  ;  Kan- 
sas City  V.  Bacon.  147  Mo.  259,  48 
S.  W.  860  [18981;  Michael  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  112  Mo.  610,  20  S.  \V. 
666   [1892]. 

"State  ex  rel.  Greeley  v.  City  of 
St.  Louis,  1  Mo.  App.  503  |1S761; 
(except  possibly  in  the  case  of  abut- 
tins  property). 

'  Ilaughawout  v.  Raymond.  148 
Cal.   311,    83    Pac.    53    [1905];    Dun- 


can V.  Raniish.  142  (a..  686,  76  Pac. 
661  [1904];  Spalding  v.  City  and 
County  of  Denver,  33  Colo.  172,  80 
Pac.  i26  [19041;  Trigger  v.  Drain- 
age District  Xo.  1,  193  111.  230, 
61  X.  E.  1114  [1901];  Commission- 
ers of  Mason  and  Tazevi'ell  Special 
Drainage  District  v.  OrifTin.  134  111. 
330,  25  X.  E.  995  [1891];  Rodman 
v.  Lake  Eork  Special  Drainage  Dis- 
trict:  132  111.  439,  24  X.  E.  630 
[1891];  The  People  ex  rel.  Barber 
V.  ■Chapman,  127  111.  387,  19  N.  E. 
872  [18901;  Oliver  v.  Monona  Coun- 
ty. 117  la.  43,  90  N.  W.  510  | 19021 ; 
Clinton  Township  v.  Teachout,  150 
Mich.  124,  111  X.  W.  1052  [1907]; 
Smith  v.  Carhnv,  114  Mich.  67,  72  X. 
\V.   22    11897]. 

-  Ilaughawout  v.  Raymond,  148 
Cal.  311.  S3  Pac.  53  [1905];  Dun- 
can v.  Ramisli,  ]A2  Cal.  (ISli.  76 
Pac.  601  [19041:  Oliver  v.  Monona 
Connfy,  117  la.  43.  90  X.  \V.  510 
[1902]. 


§  559  TAXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT.  910 

be  tested  subsequently  by  a  bill  in  equity.^  On  the  other  hand, 
if  no  means  is  provided  by  which  the  correctness  of  the  determin- 
ation of  the  legislature,  public  corporation  or  public  official  in 
including  certain  lands  in  the  assessment  district  is  to  be  ascer- 
tained, such  questions  may  be  raised  at  the  first  hearing  given  to 
the  property  owner.  Thus,  in  the  absence  of  any  special  pro- 
ceeding of  this  sort  the  question  of  benefits  may  be  determined 
on  confirmation.*  The  method  whereby  such  question  may  be 
raised  seems  to  be  larsrely  in  the  discretion  of  the  leorislature. 
It  has  been  held,  that  where  at  the  time  a  drainage  district  was 
established,  a  means  was  given  for  determining  directly  the  ques- 
tion whether  certain  lands  could  properly  be  included  in  such  dis- 
trict, and  such  question  could  also  be  raised  after  the  assessment 
was  levied  as  a  defense  to  such  assessment,  a  subsequent  change 
of  statute  taking  away  the  right  to  raise  such  question  after  the 
assessment  has  been  levied  as  a  defense  thereto,  is  valid.^  Under 
some  statutes,  which  provide  that  some  local  officer  or  board  shall 
determine  what  land  is  benefited  by  the  proposed  improvement, 
it  is  further  provided  that  by  a  proceeding  in  the  nature  of  an 
appeal  from  the  decision  of  such  officer,  such  question  may  be 
reviewed  by  a  designated  court.*' 

§  559.     By  whom  correctness  of  determination  can  be  questioned. 

The  objection  that  property,  which  is  benefited  by  an  improve- 
ment and  should  have  been  assessed  therefor,  is  omitted,  is  one 
which  can  be  made  only  by  a  property  owner  who  is  able  to  show 
that  the  assessment  levied  against  his  property  is  by  reason  of 

^  Bodman     v.     Lake     Fork     Special  '  Chambliss    v.    Johnson,    77    Iowa, 

Drainage    District,    132    111.    439,    24  611,  42  N.  W.  427    [1889];    Beals  v. 

N.  E.  630   [18911;    Smith  v.  C'arlow,  James,   173  Mass.  591,  54  N.  E.  245 

114   Mich.   67,   72   X.   W.   22    [1897].  [1899];   State  ex  rel.  Greeley  v.  City 

See  to  the  same  effect  People  ex  rel.  of  St.  Louis,  1  Mo.  App.  503   [1876]; 

Wood  V.  Jones,  137  111.  35.  27  N.  E.  Hart  v.  City  of  Omaha,  74  Neb.  836, 

294   [1892];   Evans  v.  Lewis.   121  111.  105    N.    W.    546     [1905];     LeRoy    v. 

478,  13  N.  E.  246   [1889]-,   Osborn  v.  Mayor,    Aldermen    and    Commonalty 

People,   103   111.  224   [1882].  of  "the   City   of  New   York,   20   John 

*Shanley   v.    People   ex    rel.   Goedt-  Sup.     Ct.     430,     11     Am.     Dec.     289 

ner,     225     111.     579,     80     N.     E.     277  [1823];    In    the    Matter   of   the    Con- 

[1907];  People  ex  rel.  Selbv  v.  Dver,  tract    for    the    Fifth    Avenue    Sewer 

205    111.    575.    <i9    N.    E.    70    [1903];  in     the     City     of     Pittsburg,      (Pa.) 

Edwards  v.  City  of  riiicacjo,   140  III.  4  Brewster  364    [18701;    Kirkpatrick 

440.  30  N.  E.  350   [1893L  v.  Tavlor,   118  Ind.  329,  21  N.  E.  20 

''Oliver     v.     Monona     Countv,     117  [1888]. 
Iowa,   43,  90  N.   W.   510    [1902]. 


911  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  %  560 

such  omission  greater  than  it  would  have  been  had  such  property 
been  included  in  the  assessment.^  The  objection  that  land  which 
is  not  benefited  by  an  improvement  is  assessed  for  the  cost  there- 
of, is  one  which  can  be  made  only  by  a  party  prejudiced  by  the 
inclusion  of  such  land.-  The  owner  of  property,  the  benefit  to 
which  is  not  denied,  cannot  object  that  other  property  owners, 
whose  property  has  not  been  benefited  by  the  improvement,  have 
been  assessed  therefor.^  If  it  is  erroneous  to  include  such  other 
property,  it  is  an  error  which  operates  to  the  benefit  and  not  to 
the  prejudice  of  the  property  owner  in  question.* 

§  560.     Assessment  district  consisting  of  property  benefited  in 
fact. 

The  legislature  may  not  attempt  to  exercise  its  discretion  in 
determining  what  land  is  benefited,  and  may  not  attempt  to  de- 
scribe the  assessment  district  specifically,  but  may  provide  that 
land  benefited  by  the  improvement  shall  be  assessed  therefor, 
leaving  it  to  be  determined  as  a  question  of  fact  what  land  is  in 
fact  so  benefited.  Such  method  of  indicating  and  describing  the 
land  which  is  to  be  subject  to  an  assessment  has  been  held  to  be 
valid.^     While  other  methods  of  describing  the  land  to  be  assessed 

^Balfe  V.  Bell,  40  Ind.  337  [1872];  [1894];  Grimes  v.  Coe,  102  Ind.  406, 

State,    Humphreys,    Pros.    v.    Mayor  1  N.  E.  735  [1885];  Johnson  v.  Duer, 

and  Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne,  115  Mo.  366,  21  S.  W.  800   [1892]. 

60  N.  J.  L.  (31  Vr.)   406,  38  Atl.  761  *  White  v.   City   of   Alton,    149   111. 

[1897];    Davis    v.    City    of    Newark,  626,  37   N.  E.   96    [1894]:    Grimes  v. 

54   N.   J.   L.    (25   Vr.)     144,   23    Atl.  Coe,     102    Ind.    406,     1     N.    E.     735 

276   [1891];   State,  Righter,  Pros.  v.  [1885]. 

Mayor   and   Common    Council   of   the  '  Cribbs   v.    Benedict.   64   Ark.   555, 

City    of    Newark.    45    N.    J.    L.     (16  44  S.  W.  707   [1897];  Piper's  Appeal 

Vr.)    104   [1883].  in   the  Matter  of   Widening  Kearney 

=*  Piper's   Appeal    in   the   Matter   of  Street,   32   Cal.   530    [1867];    City  of 

Widening    Kearney    Street,    32    Cal.  Denver  v.   Kennedy,   33'  Colo.   80,   80 

530  [18G7];   Farrell  V.  West  Chicago  Pac.      122      [1904];      80     Pac.     467, 

Park  Commissioners,  182  111.  250,  55  [1905];   Hungerford  v.  City  of  Hart- 

N.  E.  325  [1899];  Corcoran  v.  Board  ford,  39  Conn.  279   [1872];   Clapp  v. 

of  Aldermen  of  Cambridge,  —  Mass.  City     of     Hartford,     35     Conn.     66 

,  85  N.  E.   155    [1908];   Johnson  [1868];     Farrell     v.     West     Chicago 

v.  Duer,   115  Mo.   366,  21  S.  W.   800  Park  Commissioners,   182  111.  250,  55 

[1892].  N.  E.  325  [1899];  Iloldom  v.  City  of 

"Piper's   Appeal    in    tlie   Matter   of  Chicago,    169   111.    109,   48   N.   E.    164 

Widening    Kearney    Street,    32    Cal.  [1897];     Cliicago.    Rock    Island    and 

530   [1867];   Farrell  v.  West  Chicago  Pacific  Railway  Company  v.   City  of 

Park  Commissioners.   182  111.  250,  55  Chicago,   139  111.  573,  28  N.  E.   1108 

N.  E.  325   [lFn91:    White  v.  City  of  [1893];    Murphy    v.   City   of   Peoria, 

Alton,    149    III.    tl'iii,    .37    N.    E."    9(i  119    III.    509,    9    N.    E.    895    [1888]; 


§560 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


912 


for  a  street  improvement  are  more  ecmmon,"  the  land  to  W 
assessed  for  a  street  improvement  is  very  often,  especially  in  re- 
cent statutes,  defined  as  the  land  benefited  by  the  improvement.'' 
This  description  is  also  used  in  the  case  of  land  to  be  assessed  for 


Shirk  V.  Hupp,  167  Ind.  509,  78  N. 
E.  242,  79  N.  E.  490  [1906]; 
C'ulbertson  v.  Knight,  152  Ind. 
121,  52  N.  E.  700  [1898]; 
Nevins  and  Otter  Creek  Towii.ship 
Draining  Company  v.  Alkire,  30  Ind. 
189  [1871];  City  of  Columbus  v. 
Storey,  35  Ind.  97  [1871];  City  of 
New  Orleans  praying  for  opening  of 
Casacaloo  and  vilDreau  Streets,  20  La. 
Ann.  49^  [1868];  Atkins  v.  City  of 
Boston,  188  Mass.  77,  74  K  E.'292 
[1905]  ;  Holt  V.  City  Council  of  Som- 
erville,  127  Mass.  408  [1879]; 
Goodrich  v.  City  of  Detroit,  123 
Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255  [1900]; 
Warren  v.  City  of  Grand  Haven,  30 
Mich.  24  [1874];  Hart  v.  City  of 
Omaha,  74  Xeb.  836,  105 '  N. 
W.  546  [1905];  Durrell  v. 
City  of  Woodbury,  — •  X.  J. 
Sup.  — — ;  65  Ati.  198  [1906]; 
Xorth  Jersey  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jer- 
sey City,  68  XT.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.)  140, 
52  Atl.  300  [1902];  DeWitt  v.  City 
of  Elizabeth,  56  X.  J.  L.  (27  Vroom) 
119,  27  Atl.  801  [1K93];  State,  Mul- 
ler,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Council  of 
the  City  of  Bayonne,  55  X.  J.  L.  (26 
Vr.)  102,  25  Atl.  267  [1892];  State, 
Schulting,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Passaic, 
47  X.  J.  L.  (18  Vr.)'273  [1885]; 
State,  Henderson,  Pros.  v.  ]\Iayor, 
etc.,  of  Jersey  City,  41  X.  J.  L.  (12 
Vroom)  489  [1879];  State,  Hunt, 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bahway,  39 
N.  J.  L.  (10  Vroom)  646  [1877]; 
State,  Peters,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  City  of  Newark, 
31  X.  J.  L.  (2  Vr.)  360  [1865]; 
State,  Culver,  Pros.  v.  Town  of  Ber- 
gen in  the  County  of  Hudson,  29  X. 
J.  L.  (5  Dutch.)  266  [1861];  People 
of  the  State  of  Xew  York  ex  rel.  Le- 
]\'yr]i    Valley     Railway.    Company    v. 


City  of  Buffalo,  147  X.  Y.  675,  42 
X.  E.  344  [189o];  In  the  Matter  of 
Common  Council  of  the  City  of  Ams- 
terdam, 126  X.  Y.  158,  27  X.  E.  272 
[1891];  Kelly  v.  City  of  Cleveland, 
34   0.   S.   468    [1878];    St.   Benedict's 

Abbey  v.  Clarion  County,  —  Or. , 

93  Pac.  231  [1908];  Extension  of 
Hancock  Street,  18  Pa.  St.  (6  Harr.) 
26  [1851];  Johnson  v.  City  of  Ta- 
coma,  41  Wash.  51,  82  Pac.  1092 
[1905]. 

-  See  §  620  et  seq. 

'  Piper's  Appeal  in  the  Matter  of 
Widening  Kearney  Street,  32  Cal. 
530  [1867];  Holdom  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 169  111.  109,  48  X.  E.  164 
[1897];  Chicago,  Rock  Island  and 
Pacific  Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  139  111.  573,  28  N.  E.  1108 
[1893];    Murphy    v.    City    of    Peorin, 

119  111.  509,  9  X^  E.  895  [1888]; 
Shirk  V.  Hupp,  167  Ind.  509,  78  N. 
E.  242,  79  X.  E.  490  .  [1900]; 
City  of  ^\'ew  Orleans  praying 
for  opening  of  Casacaloo  and 
Moreau  Streets,  20  La.  Ann.  497 
[1868];  Goodrich  v.  City  of  Detroit, 
123  Mich.  559,  82  X.  W.  255  [1900] -, 
Durrell   v.  City  of  Woodbury,  —  X^. 

J.    Sup.    ,    65    Atl.    198*  [1906]; 

State,  Schulting,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Pas- 
saic, 47  X.  J.  L.  (18  Vroom)  273 
[1885];  State,  Van  Home,  Pros.  v. 
Town  of  Bergen,  30  X.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.) 
307  [1863];  State,  Culver,  Pros.  v. 
Town  of  Bergen  in  the  County  of 
Hudson.  29  X.  J.  L.  (5  Dutch.)  266 
[1861];  In  the  Matter  of  Common 
Council   of   the   City   of   Amsterdam, 

120  X.  Y.  158,  27  X.  E.  272  [1891]; 
Kelly  V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  0.  S. 
468  [1878];  Extension  of  Hancock 
Street,  18  Pa.  St.  (<6  Harr.)  26 
[1851];  Johnson  v.  City  of  Tacoma, 
41  Wash.  51,  82  Pac.  1092   [1905]. 


913 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§561 


a  viaduct/  or  a  park."'  (.r  boulevard."  Land  to  be  assessed  for  a 
sewer/  or  a  ditch;'*  is  very  often  described  in  this  way.  Land 
to  be  assessed  for  improving  the  navigation  of  a  stream  has  thus 
been  described.'*  Even  if  the  statute  describes  the  property  to  be 
assessed  as  the  property  "benefited"  by  the  improvment,  the 
context  may  restrict  the  meaning  of  the  term  "benefited."'' 
Thus,  if  such  provision  occurs  in  the  statute  which  provides  for 
the  assessment  of  benefits  and  damages  in  one  proceeding,  it  is 
held  that  since  only  the  property  through  which  the  improvement 
passes  can  ordinarily  be  damaged  thereby,  and  since  the  property 
which  may  be  benefited  is  apparently  regarded  by  the  legislature 
as  being  the  same  as  that  which  may  be  damaged,  only  the  proper- 
ty abutting  on  the  line  of  the  improvement  is  to  be  regarded  as 
benefited  and  as  subject  to  assessment. ^^ 


§  561.     Land  benefited  by  street. 

The  property  which  is  benefited  by  a  street  improvement  is  ordi- 
narily the  property  alnitting  on  such  street  which  is  rendered 
easier  of  access  by  such  improvement.^  Property  which  is  bene- 
fited by  the  construction  of  a  street  or  road  may  be  assessed 
therefor.-  The  fact  that  the  property  assessed  does  not  abut  upon 
the  street  does  not  necessarily  prevent  it  from  being  benefited 


*  City  of  Denver  v.  Kennedy,  .33 
Colo.  80,  80  Pae.  122  [1904];  80 
Pac.  467   [1905]. 

°  Holt  V.  City  Council  of  Sonier- 
ville,   127  Mass.'  408   [1870]. 

"Hart  V.  City  of  Omalia.  74  Xeh. 
830,   105  X.  W."  546   [1905]. 

'  Hunji;erfoi(l  v.  City  of  Hartford, 
39  Conn.  279  [1872];  Clapp  v.  City 
of  Hartford,  35  Conn.  66  [1868];  At- 
kins V.  City  of  Boston,  188  Mas.s. 
77,  74  N.  E.  292  [1905];  Warren  v. 
City  of  Orand  Haven,  30  :Mieli.  24 
[1874]:  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand 
Haven,  30  :\Iieli.  24  [1874]:  DeWitt 
v.  City  of  Elizabeth.  50  X.  J.  L.  (27 
Vroom)  119,  27  Atl.  801  [1893]; 
State,  Henderson  v.  Jersey  City,  41 
N.  J.  L.   (12  Vroom)    489." 

*  Cribbs  v.  Benedict.  04  Ark.  555, 
44  S.  W.  707  [1897];  Cnlbertson  v. 
Knight,   152   Ind.    121,  52   X.   E.  700 


[1898];  City  of  Columbus  v.  Storey, 
38  Ind.  97  [1871];  Xevins  and  Otter 
Creek  Township  Draining  Company 
v.  Alkire,  36  Ind.  ISO  [1871]. 

®  People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York 
ex  rcl.  Lehigh  Valley  Railway  Com- 
l)any  v.  City  of  Buflalo,  147  X^.  Y. 
075.  42  X.  E.  344  [1895]. 

''^  Park  Avenue  Sewers,  Appeal  of 
Parker,  169  Pa.  St.  433.  32  Atl.  574 
[1S95]. 

"  Park  Avenue  Sowers,  Ajipeal  of 
Parker.  ICO  Pa.  St.  433,  32  Atl.  574 
I1S951:  Witnian  v.  City  of  Reading, 
109  Pa.  St.  375.  32  Atl".  576  [18951: 
Harriott  Avenue,  24  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
597  [1904]:  Grafius'  Run,  31  Pa. 
Super,  (t.  038  [1900]. 

'See  §  301;   §  657. 

"Board  of  Commissioners  cf  Mont- 
gomery County  V.  Fullcn.  Ill  Ind. 
410.  l'2  X.  E.  29S   [1887]. 


561 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


914 


thereby.^  The  fact  that  property  is  contiguous  to  a  street  which 
is  improved,  does  not  necessarily  establish  as  a  matter  of  law  that 
it  is  benefited  by  such  improvement.''  If  the  grade  of  a  street 
has  been  so  changed  in  approaching  a  viaduct,  that  it  is  twelve 
feet  above  the  adjoining  property,  it  has  been  said  that  said  ad- 
joining property  is  not  benefited  by  such  improvement.''  The 
mere  fact,  however,  that  certain  land  abuts  upon  a  given  street, 
does  not  as  a  matter  of  law  establish  the  existence  of  a  benefit  to 
such  property  by  reason  of  the  improvement  of  such  street  in  the 
absence  of  any  legislative  determination  that  such  property  is 
benefited."  Land  which  fronts  upon  an  improved  street  may  be 
benefited  by  the  improvement  of  a  street  in  the  rear  of  such  land, 
whereby  access  can  be  obtained  from  another  direction.'^  This 
is  true,  even  if  the  street  in  the  rear  of  this  propertv  is  at  a  grade 
considerably  below  that  of  the  front  of  such  land.^  The  fact 
that  land  does  not  abut  upon  a  given  street  and  does  not  receive 
direct  access  from  such  street,  is  not  conclusive  as  to  the  fact  that 
such  land  is  not  benefited  by  such  street.®  If  property  in  a  cer- 
tain section  can  have  access  to  the  heart  of  a  city,  only  by  means 
of  a  certain  street  which  crosses  a  ravine  filled  with  car  tracks, 
an  assessment  for  the  improvement  of  such  street  may  be  made 
upon  the  land  which  will  receive  access  to  the  business  part  of  the 
city  by  means  of  such  street.^''  Property  at  the  end  of  a  street 
to  be  improved  is  benefited  by  such  improvement  and  may  be 
assessed  therefor."  Whether  such  land  is  included  in  the  legis- 
lative description  of  the  land  benefited  and  to  be  assessed,  is  a 
question  depending  upon  the  wording  of  the  statute.  Property 
at  the  end  of  the  street  and  at  right  angles  to  the  street  line  is  not 
regarded  as  "fronting"  upon  said  street,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  property  fronting  upon 


'ShurtlefT  v.  City  of  Chica.so,  190 
111.  473,  00  X.  E.  870  [1901];  Louis- 
ville and  Nashville  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  East  St.  Louis.  134 
111. 'e56,  25  N.  E.  962  [18911;  Rich 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  18,  38  N. 
E.   ?55    [1894L 

♦Holdom  V.  City  of  Chica<To,  109 
111.   109.  48  N.  E.   104   [1897]. 

'McFarlnne  v.  Citv  of  Chicago, 
185  111.  242.  57  X.  E.   12   [1900]. 

"H'^lfloTn  V.  Citv  of  r'hioaqfo,  109 
111.   109,  48  N.  E.   104   [1897]. 


'Johnson  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  41 
Wash.  51.   82  Pac.   1092    [1905]. 

*  Johnson  v.  City  of  Tacoma,  41 
Wash.  51,  82  Pac.  1092   [1905]. 

»Shurtleff  v.  City  of  Chicago,  190 
111.  473,  60  N.  E.  870  [1901]. 

'"  State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  95  Minn. 
70,   103  X.  W.  744   [1905]. 

>' Brooks  V.  City  of  Chicago,  168 
111.  60,  48  N.  E.  136  [18971;  Helm 
V.  Wit7.  35  Ind.  App.  131,  73  N.  E. 
846    [1904]. 


915 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§561 


the  street  improvement.'-  A  tract  of  land  on  either  side  of  a 
river  on  a  part  of  which  a  canal  was  situated,  and  across  which 
canal  a  brick  building  had  been  built,  was  held  to  be 
benefited  by  the  paving  of  a  street  which  crosses  said 
river  on  a  bridge. ^^  If  the  property  which  it  is  sought 
to  assess  for  a  street  improvement  is  a  corner  lot,  the  street  in 
front  of  Avhich  has  already  been  improved,  and  it  is  sought  to 
assess  such  lot  for  the  improvement  of  the  street  along  the  side 
thereof,  the  question  is  presented  whether  such  lot  can  properly 
be  said  to  receive  from  the  construction  of  such  street  any  benefit 
in  addition  to  that  which  if  has  already  received  from  the  con- 
struction of  the  street  in  front.  There  has  been  but  little  speci- 
fic discussion  of  this  question,  as  it  seems  to  be  generally  assumed 
where  it  is  presented  that  a  benefit  is  conferred  by  improvements 
of  this  sort.^*  Still  clearer  is  the  right  of  the  city  to  assess  for 
an  abutting  street,  where  another  abutting  street  has  been  pro- 
vided for  by  an  ordinance  which  has  been  introduced  in  council, 
but  not  acted  upon.^^  The  questions  on  the  subject  of  corner 
lots,  which  have  been  presented  to  the  courts,  concern  the  method 


»- Duncan  v.  Ramish.  142  Cal.  686, 
76  Pac.   661    [1904]. 

"  Powers  V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids. 
98  :Mich.  393,  57  N.  W.  250  [1894]. 
(In  this  case  it  was  possible  to  get 
access  to  such  huihling  from  one  of 
the  footways  of  the  bridge.) 

"  Wolf  V.  (  ity  of  Keokuk,  48  la. 
129  [1878];  Morrison  v.  Hershiro,  32 
la.  271  [1871];  Gleason  v.  Barnett. 
106  Ky.  125.  50  S.  W.  67  [1899]; 
Fox  V.  Middleslxirough  Ttnvn  Com- 
pany, 96  Ky.  262,  28  S.  W.  776 
[1894];  Broadway  Baptist  Church  v. 
McAtee,  71  Ky.'  (8  Bush.)  508,  8 
Am.  Rep.  480  [1871];  Allen  v.  Kren- 
nin?,  23  Mo.  App.  561  [1886];  Cos- 
sitt  Land  Co.  v.  Neuscheler.  —  N.  J. 

Sup.  ,  60  Atl.  1128  [1905];  City 

of  Cincinnati  v.  .Tames,  55  0.  S.  180, 
44  N.  E.  9?5  [1896];  City  of  Toledo 
V.  Sheill,  53  O.  S.  447.  30  L.  R.  A. 
598,  42  N.  E.  323  [1895];  Sandrock 
V.  Columhus,  51  O.  S.  317,  42  N.  E. 
255  [1894];  Findlay  v.  Frev,  51  0. 
S.  390,  38  X.  E.  114  [18941;  Ilavi- 
land  V,   City   of   Columbus,   50   O.   S. 


471,  34  X.  E.  679  [1893]:  Metcalf 
V.  Carter.  19  Ohio  C.  C.  196  [1900]; 
Tompkins  v.  Village  of  Xorwood,  18 
Ohio  C.  C.  883  [1897];  Betz  v.  City 
of  Canton.  18  Ohio  C.  C.  676  [1893]; 
Calkins  v.  City  of  Toledo,  12  Ohio 
C.  C.  202  [1896];  Manns  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati.  10  Ohio  C.  C.  549  [1895]; 
Raker  v.  Schott.  10  Ohio  C.  C.  81 
[1894];  Rooney  v.  City  of  Toledo,  9 
Ohio  C.  C.  267  [1894];  Gibson  v. 
City  of  Cincinnati.  9  Ohio  C.  C.  243 
[1894];  Barney  v.  City  of  Dayton, 
8  Ohio  C.  C.  480  [1894];  Frey  v. 
City  of  Findlay,  7  Ohio  C.  C."^311 
[1893];  Squierv.  City  of  Cincinnati. 
5  Ohio  C.  C.  400  [1891];  Ehni  v. 
City  of  Columbus,  3  Ohio  C.  C.  494 
[1889];  Clements  v.  Village  of  Xor- 
wood. 2  Ohio  X.  P.  274  [1895].  See 
al.so  Cossitt  Land  Co.  v.  Xeuscheler, 

—    X^.    J.    Sup.    ,    60    Atl.    1128 

[1905]. 

"  In  re  Beechwood  Avenue,  Appeal 
of  O'^fara,  194  Pa.  St.  86,  45  Atl. 
127   [1899], 


}§  562,  563 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


916 


of  estimating  the  assessable  frontage  of  such  lot  upon  the  side 
street, ^"^  and  the  method  of  apportioning  the  cost  of  the  improve- 
ment upon  such  lot.^^     These  questions  are  discussed  elsewhere. 

§  562.     Land  benefited  by  sidewalk. 

The  property  benefited  by  the  construction  of  a  sidewalk  is 
ordinarily-  that  property  which  abuts  on  such  walk  and  to  which 
access  is  given  thereby/  Whether  a  corner  lot  in  front  of  which 
a  sidewalk  has  been  constructed  can  receive  a  benefit  from  a  side- 
walk constructed  along  the  side  of  such  lot,  so  that  it  can  be 
assessed  for  the  cost  thereof,  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is 
but  little  specific  authority.  It  seems  to  be  assumed  that  a  corner 
lot,  under  such  circumstances,  can  receive  a  benefit  from  the  con- 
struction of  a  sidewalk  along  its  side.^ 


§  563.     Land  benefited  by  sevv^er. 

In  assessments  for  the  construction  of  sewers,  it  is  usually  pro- 
vided that  land  benefited  by  the  sewer  shall  be  assessed  for  the 
construction  thereof.  This  includes  in  the  assessment  district, 
land  which  receives  an  especial  benefit  from  the  construction  of 
the  sev/er,^  and  ordinarily  means  the  land  which  can  be  drained 
by  the  sewer,  for  the  cost  of  which  the  assessment  is  levied.-  It 
is  accordingly  improper  to  add  the  cost  of  all  the  sewers  con- 
structed in  a  citv  in  a  given  year,  and  pro  rate  the  same  upon 


1^  See  §  704. 

"See  §  704. 

^See  §   323. 

=  Wilbur  V.  City  of  Sprino-field.  123 
111.  395,  14  N.  E."  871  [1889];  Morri- 
son V.  Hershire,  32  la.  271  [1871]; 
City  of  Lawrence  v.  Killam,  11  Kan. 
499  [1873];  Moberly  v.  Hogan,  131 
Mo.  19,  32  S.  W.  1014  [1895];  Tripp 
V.  City  of  Yankton,  10  S.  D.  516,  74 
N.  W.'  447  [1898];  Sands  v.  City  of 
Richmond,  72  Va.  (31  Grattan)  571, 
31  Am.  Rep.  742   [1879]. 

^  Hungerford  v.  City  of  Hartford, 
39  Conn.  279  [1872];'  Clapp  v.  City 
of  Hartford,  35  Conn.  66  [1868]; 
City  of  Chicago  v.  Adcock,  168  111. 
221*,  48  N.  E.  155  [1897]:  Heinroth 
V.  Koehersperger.  173  HI.  205.  50 
N".      E.      171      [1898];      Appeal      of 


Wheeler,   80   N.   Y.   S.   204,   39   Misc. 
Rep.  484   [1902]. 

"Walker  v.  City  of  Chicago,  202 
111.  531,  67  N.  E.  369  [1903];  Duane 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  198  111.  471,  64 
N.  E.  1033  [1902];  Mason  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  178  111.  499,  53  N.  E.  354 
[1809];  Taylor  v.  City  of  Haverhill, 
192  Mass.  287,  78  N.  E.  475  [1906]; 
Atkins-  V.  City  of  Boston,  188  Mass. 
77,  74  X.  E.292  [1905];  Butler  v. 
City  of  Worcester,  112  Mass.  541 
[1873];  Warren  v.  City  of  Grand 
Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874].  "A  lot 
derives  special  benefit  from  a  sewer, 
whether  main  or  lateral,  when  it  is 
so  situated  and  constructed  (as) 
that  connection  can  be  made  there- 
with."    Bennett  v.   City  of  Emmets- 

hiire.   —   la.   ,    115   N.   W.   582, 

589   [1908]. 


917  PROPERTY    SL'BJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  563 

all  the  land  fronting  upon  said  sewer."'  Land  is  Ijenefited  by  a 
sewer  in  the  contemplation  of  the  law,  when  such  land  may  be 
drained  thereby.*  Land  which  is  drained  by  a  sewer  may  be 
assessed,  even  if  the  city  water  works  sj-stem  has  not  yet  been 
extended  to  such  land."'  The  claim  that  the  property  assessed 
it  not  benefited  by  the  sewer  is  usually  based  upon  one  of  two 
grounds.  It  may  be  claimed  that  such  property  is  not  and  cannot 
be  drained  by  the  sewer  in  question ;  or  it  may  be  claimed  that 
the  property  which  it  is  sought  to  assess,  is  already  supplied  with 
sufficient  drainage.  Land  which  is  not  and  cannot  be  drained  b}^ 
a  sewer  cannot  be  assessed  therefor.**  If  certain  land  is  not  per- 
mitted under  the  existing  law  to  drain  into  a  sewer,  such  land 
cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  thereof."  Thus,  if  only  land  in  a 
drainage  district,  or  sewer  district,  can  drain  into  a  given  sewer, 
land  outside  of  such  district  cannot  be  assessed.^  It  is  proper  to 
exclude  from  a  sewer  district,  land  which  the  owner  thereof  is  not 
permitted  by  law  to  connect  with  such  sewer."  The  slope  of  the 
ground  and  the  location  of  the  sewer  may  be  such  that  certain 
hind  cannot  drain  into  it.  It  is  ordinarily  held  that  such  land 
cannot  be  assessed  for  such  sewer.^"*  Land  which  it  is  sought  to 
assess,  may  be  so  situated  that  the  owner  can  connect  it  with  the 
sewer,  but  the  sewer  may  be  constructed  at  such  level  that  such 
land  will  not  drain  into  the  sewer  at  its  present  elevation.  It  is, 
of  course,  possible  for  the  owner  of  such  land  at  greater  or  less 
expense  to  grade  it  so  that  it  will  so  drain.  Under  such  facts  it 
is  held  in  some  jurisdictions,  that  the  owner  of  such  land  is 
liable  for  an  assessment  for  the  construction  of  such  sewer.^^     It 

'State  V.  Pillsbury.   82   Minn.   359,  E.    103.-?    [19021;    CMly   of   Cliicago   v. 

85  N.  VV.   175   [19011.  Adpdck.    1()8    111.   221,   48    X.    E.    155 

*  Mason  v.  City  of  Chica.Ln*.  178  111.  [18971. 

499,  53  N.  E.  354    [18991.  "Clark  v.  City  of  Chica.iro,  214  III. 

■>  Walker  v.  City  of  Aurorn.  MO  111.  318,  73   N.   E.   358    [19051:    Duane  v. 

402,  29  X.  E.   741    [18931.  City  of  Chicago,    198   111.   471.   G4  X. 

"Edwards   v.   City   of   Chicago,    140  E.    1033    [19021;    City   of   Cliicago   v. 

111.   440,   30   X.  E.   350    [1S93|;    Cil-  Adcock,    lf)8    111.    221,    48    X.    E.    155 

more    County    Clerk    v.     Ilontig,    33  [18971. 

Kan.  156,  5  Pac.  781   [18831;  City  of  » Duane  v.  City  of  Chicago,  198  111. 

St.  Joseph  ex  rel.  Danaher  v.  Dillon.  471,  G4  X.  E.  1033  [19021. 

61   Mo.  App.  317    [18951;    Wewell   v.  "  Hanscom    v.    City    of    Omaha.    11 

City  of  Cincinnati,  45  O.  S.   407,   15  Xoh.  37.  7  N.  W.  739   [18811. 

N.  E.   196    [18871.  'Mlildehrand  v.  Toledo.  27  Ohio  C. 

'Clark  V.  City  of  Chicago.  214  111.  C.   R.  427    [19051;    City  of  Toledo  v. 

318,  73  X.  E.  358   [19051;   Duane  v.  Ford,  20  Ohio  C.  C.  290  [19001;  City 

Citv   of  Chicago.    198    III.   471,   64   X.  of    Toledo    for    the    use    of    C.ntos    v. 


.§  563  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  918 

has  been  suggested  that  if  he  has  any  remedy,  it  is  an  action  at 
law  for  damages  for  the  change  of  the  grade.^^  In  other  juris- 
dictions, it  is  held  that  land  which  is  situated  below  the  level  of 
the  sewer  so  that  it  cannot  drain  into  it  cannot  be  assessed.^^ 
Land  which  it  is  sought  to  assess  may  be  separated  from  the  sewer 
by  intervening  private  property,  through  which  a  lateral  sewer 
cannot  be  carried  without  the  consent  of  the  owner  thereof.  Such 
property  cannot  be  assessed  for  such  sewer."  The  fact  that  cer- 
tain property  is  situated  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  the  sewer, 
does  not  establish  as  a  matter  of  law  that  such  property  is  not 
benefited  thereby.^^  Land  which  could  be  drained  by  a  sewer 
according  to  the  recorded  plat  existing  when  the  assessment  was 
made,  is  subject  to  assessment  as  an  entirety,  although  the  owner 
has  sold  the  part  abutting  the  sewer  so  that  his  land  cannot  be 
drained  without  passing  over  the  property  of  his  grantee.^*'  It 
has,  however,  been  held  that  land  so  situated  that  it  cannot  be 
connected  with  the  sewer  except  by  a  drain  passing  through  pri- 
vate ground  belonging  to  another  person,  may  be  assessed  for  the 
cost  of  such  sewer."  However,  the  owner  of  the  land  which  can 
drain  into  such  sewer  cannot  complain  because  other  land,  which 
cannot  drain  into  such  sewer,  is  included  in  the  assessment.^^  A 
property  owner  who  connects  his  land  with  a  sewer  by  means  of 
a  drain  is  benefited  thereby,  if  he  has  a  fixed  license  to  make  such 
connection,^''  but  not  if  he  has  merely  a  revocable  license  to  con- 
nect with  the  private  drain  of  another,  by  means  of  which  his  land 
connects  with  the  sewer.-''  Conversely,  a  property  owner  who  has 
been  assessed  for  a  sewer  has  a  right  to  connect  his  land  there- 
with.-^    It  is  sometimes  sought  to  assess  land  which  may  be  drain- 

Kohn,  2  Ohio  N.  P.  47   [1895];  Rob-  ^' Kelly    v.    City    of    Chicago,    148 

inson  v.  City  of  Milwaukee,  61  Wis.  111.  90,  35  N.  E.  752   [1894]. 

585,   21   N.   W.   610    [1884].  "City    of    Atchison    v.    Price,    45 

1^  Robinson   v.    City   of   Milwaukee,  Kan.  296,  25  Pac.  605. 

61  Wis.  585,  21  N.  W.  610  [1881].  "  Henian   v.   Schulte,    166  Mo.   409. 

"People  ex   rel.   Locke  v.   Common  66  S.  W.   163    [1901].     At  least  in  a 

Council  of   the  City   of   Rochester,   5  collateral  proceeding. 

Lansing   (N.  Y.)    11    [1871].  ''Johnson    v.    Duer,    115    Mo.    366, 

"State  ex  rel.  McKune  v.  District  21   S.  W.  800   [1892]. 

Court   of   Ramsey   County,   90   Minn.  "Butler  v.  City  of  Worcester,  112 

540,    97    X.    W.    425    [1903];    State.  Mass.  541  [1873]. 

New   Jersey  Railroad   and   Transpor-  '""  Fairbanks   v.   Mayor    and   Alder- 

tation    Co.!   Pros.    v.    City   of    Eliza-  men     of     Fitchburg,     132     Mass.     42 

beth,  37  N.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    330:   Peo-  [1882]. 

pie  ex  rel.  Marvin  v.  Citv  of  T^rook-  "  Miller  v.  City  of  Toledo,  12  Ohio 

lyn,  23  Barb.    (X.  Y.)    166   [1856].  C.  C.  706  [1894]. 


919 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§56:5 


ed  by  a  given  sewer  if  the  public  authorities  shall  subsequently 
construct  branch  sewers  so  as  to  drain  such  land.  If  the  con- 
struction of  such  branch  sewers  is  optional  with  the  public  authori- 
ties, the  owner  of  such  land  has  no  certain  right  to  the  use  of 
such  sewer.  Accordingly,  such  land  cannot  be  assessed  there- 
for.'- It  is  often  held  that  if  land  is  properly  tlrained  by  an 
existing  sewer,  it  receives  no  benefit  from  the  construction  of 
another  sewer,  and  therefore  cannot  be  assessed  for  such  new 
sewer.-"*  This  result  is  often  reached  .through  statutory  provisions 
which  provide  for  the  exemption  of  property  which  is  already 
drained.-*  Under  such  theory  of  the  law  the  question  of  what  is 
existing  sufficient  drainage  becomes  material.  Whether  land  is 
supplied  with  drainage  or  not  is  a  question  of  fact.-^  An  existing 
sewer,  without  a  proper  outlet,  cannot  be  said  to  be  sufficient 
drainage.^"  A  pipe  intended  to  drain  a  pond  of  water  is  not  suffi- 
cient drainage  as  a  sewer,  although  it  is  of  sufficient  size.-^  The 
fact  that  the  land  in  question  has  a  sufficient  surface  drainage  and 
is  at  the  time  unimproved,  does  not  constitute  sufficient  drainage 
for  sewer  purposes,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.-^     Land 


'"Bickerdike  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
185  111.  280,  56  N.  E."  10<)6  [1900]; 
Title  Guarantee  and  Trust  Co.  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  162  111.  505,  44  N. 
E.  832  [189'6];  Edwards  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  140  111.  440,  30  N.  E.  350 
[1893];  Vreeland  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of 
Bayonne,  58  N.  J.  L.  (29  Vr.)  126, 
32  Atl.  68  [1895];  State,  King,  Pros. 
V.  Bpod,  43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  180 
[1881].  That  such  land  can  be  as- 
sessed :  Coatps  V.  Nugent,  —  Kan. 
,  92  Pac.  507. 

"State,  Fiacre,  Pros.  v.  JIayor 
and  Common  Council  of  Jersey  (  ity, 
34  N.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  277  [1870]"; 
At  least  it  cannot  be  assessed  at  the 
same  rate  per  front  foot  as  land  not 
already  drained  by  a  sewer:  People 
ex  rel.  Keim  v.  Desmond,  186  N.  Y. 
232,  78  N.  E.  857  [19061;  (revers- 
ine.  97  N.  Y.  S.  795  [1906])  :  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the  Rec- 
tor, Church  Wnrdens  and  Vestry- 
men of  the  Church  of  the  Hnlv 
Sepulcher.  to  ^■acate  an  asses«T>ioTit. 
61     Howard     (X.    Y.)     315     [1880]; 


Potter  V.  Village  of  Norwood,  21 
Ohio  C.  C.  461  [1901];  Toledo  v. 
Potter,  19  Ohio  C.  C.  661  [1893]; 
Miller  v.  City  of  Toledo,  12  Ohio  C. 
C.  706  [1894];  Miller  v.  Toledo,  7 
Ohio  N.  P.  477  [1900];  Ph--ladelpliia 
V.  Meighan,  27  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  160 
[1905]. 

-'City  of  Cincinnati  for  use  of  Asli- 
man  v.  Biekett,  26  O.  S.  49  [1875|: 
Miller  V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio 
C.  C.  869  [1898];  City  of  Toledo  for 
Use  V.  Beaumont,  3  Ohio  N.  P.  287 
|1W)51. 

"■:\Iiller  V.  City  of  Cincinnati.  IS 
Oiiio   C.   C.   869    [1898]. 

="  Sargent  and  Company  v.  City  of 
New  Haven,  62  Conn.  510,  26  Atl. 
1057  [18931;  Wilson  v.  City  of  Cin- 
cinnati. 5  Ohio  N.  P.  68   [1897]. 

"  City  of  Toledo  for  the  use  of 
Oates  V.  BroA\-n,  2  Ohio  N.  P.  45 
[18951. 

"  Ford  V.  City  of  Toledo.  64  O.  S. 
92.  59  N.  E.  779  [1901]:  Citv  of  C\n 
cinnati  for  use  nf  Jonte  v.  Kassc' 
mann.     23     VT.    L.     B.     (Ohio)     392 


§  563  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  920 

drained  by  a  sewer  to  whose  use  the  owner  of  such  land  has  a 
revocable  license  is  not  supplied  with  drainage  within  the  mean- 
ing of  such  provisions.-"  If  land  is  drained  by  a  private  sewer, 
which  has  a  proper  outlet,  some  jurisdictions  hold  that  such  land 
is  sufficiently  drained,  and  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  a 
public  sewer.''"  This  result  is  usually  reached  under  statutes 
which  provide  for  the  exemption  of  land  which  is  properly  drain- 
ed. In  other  jurisdictions,  it  is  held  that  land  drained  by  a  pri- 
vate sewer  is  not  sufficiently  drained,  so  as  to  exempt  such  prop- 
erty from  assessment  for  a  sewer  constructed  by  the  city.^^  This 
result  is  generally  reached  under  statutes  which  provide  for 
assessing  property  benefited,  without  specifically  exempting  prop- 
erty which  is  already  sufficiently  drained.  The  owner  of  land, 
who  voluntarily  connects  a  private  drain  with  a  public  sewer, 
cannot  raise  the  question  of  want  of  notice  or  lack  of  benefits."''- 
A  public  sewer  intersected  a  private  sewer  and  connection  between 
the  two  was  made  at  the  point  of  intersection.  Before  such  public 
sewer  was  constructed,  the  private  sewer  had  an  outlet  upon  mud 
fiats,  about  eight  hundred  feet  from  low-water  mark.  The  pub- 
lic sewer  had  an  outlet  in  deep  water.  It  was  held  that  the  land 
drained  by  such  private  sewer  might  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of 
the  public  sewer  if  the  assessment  did  not  exceed  the  amount  of 
actual  benefit  conferred  by  such  public  sewer.^^  In  the  absence 
of  a  statute,  excepting  from  assessment,  land  which  is  already 
drained  by  a  sewer  or  making  some  specific  provision  for  the 
assessment  of  corner  lots  for  sewer  improvements,  it  is  held  that  a 
corner  lot  which  has  been  assessed  for  constructing  a  sewer  along 
one  street  may  also  be  assessed  for  constructing  a  sewer  along  the 

[1890];   contra.  City  for  use  of  Wil-  '^  City    of    Atchison    v.    Price,    45 

son    V.    Hess.     19    Ohio    C.    C.    252  Kan.   296,  25  Pac.  605    [1891];   City 

[1900];    State,  King.  v.  Reed.  4.3  X.  of  St.  Joseph  v.  Owen.   110  Mo.  445. 

J.  L.    (14  Vr.)    186   [1881].  19    S.    W.    713     [1892];    Johnson  .v. 

^  Fairbanks    v.    Mayor    and   Alder-  Village    of    Avondale,    1    Ohio    C.    C. 

men     of     Fitchburg,     132     Mass.     42  229    [1885];    Philadelphia    to   use   of 

[1882].  Vost    V.    Odd    Fellows    Hall   Associa- 

»°Wewell  V.   City  of  Cincinnati.  -^5  tion,    168    Pa.    St.    105,    31    Atl.    917 

0.  S.  407,  15  N.  E.  196  [1887];  City  [1895]. 

of  Toledo   for  use   of   Gates   v.   Lake  '-Butler  v.  City  of  Worcester,  112 

Shore   and   Michigan    Southern   Eail-  ^lass.   541    [1873]. 

way    Company.    4    Ohio    C.    C.     113  ^^  vSargent  and  Company  v.  City  of 

[1889].             '  New    Haven,    62    Conn.   510,    26    Atl. 

1057   [1893]. 


921  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  563 

other  street.''*  IIo\vever,  under  a  statute  providing  for  assessing 
property  for  a  sewer  improvement  according  to  the  lineal  measure 
of  the  land  along  the  sewer,  it  was  held  that  where  a  sewer  ran 
nearly  across  a  tract  of  land  and  then  turned  at  right  angles  and 
ran  across  the  tract  at  right  angles  to  its  former  course,  such 
tract  was  dou])le  assessed  for  such  improvement  and  the  statute 
was  unconstitutional  with  reference  thereto.^-''  Under  a  statute 
authorizing  the  council  to  exempt  from  special  assessment  such 
portion  of  the  frontage  of  either  lot  which  had  a  greater  frontage 
than  its  average  depth  and  so  much  of  the  corner  lots  as  seemed 
equitable,  such  exemptions  might  be  made  in  the  case  of  sewer 
improvements  and  the  property  owners  assessed  could  not  com- 
plain that  such  assessment  was  not  uniform.^-'  If  a  sewer  has 
already  been  constructed  and  the  land  which  it  is  sought  to  assess 
is  thus  drained,  it  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  such  land  may 
nevertheless  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  a  new  sewer  if  it  can  be 
shown  that  it  is  benefited  thereby.^^  It  has  been  suggested  that 
the  fact  of  existing  drainage  is  to  be  considered  in  determining 
the  amount  of  the  assessment.^"  Under  some  statutes  the  cost 
of  a  main  sewer  which  is  intended  to  connect  with  lateral  sewers 
and  thus  drain  a  wide  area,  must  be  assessed  upon  all  the  property 
drained  by  such  laterals.^"  Under  such  statute  it  is  improper  to 
assess  the  cost  of  the  main  sewer  solely  upon  the  abutting  prop- 
erty.*" Further,  property  which  does  not  abut  the  main  sewer 
may  be  assessed  in  part  for  the  cost  thereof  as  well  as  for  the  cost 

"  Coburn  v.  Bossert.    13   Ind.  App.  Tlie    court    refused     to    disturb    a 

359,   40   N.   E.   281    [18051;    Rich   v.  finding  that  such  property  was  bene- 

Woods,   118   Ky.   865,   82   S.  W.   578,  fited    but   said    that    it   was    liard    to 

26  Ky.  Law  Rep.  799   [1904].  see    how   any   benefit   couhl,    in    fact. 

'"Dexter    v.    City    of    Boston.    176  e.xist;   In  the  Matter  of  the  Contract 

Mass.  247,  79  Am.   St.  Rep.   306,   57  for   the   Fifth    Avenue   Sewer    in    the 

N.  E.  379  [19001.  City  of  Pittsburjr.  4  Brewster    (Pa.) 

_"  Cleneay     v.     Norwood,     137     Fed.  364    [1870].      See   also  Clapp  v.  City 

962   [1906].  of  Hartford,  35  Conn.  66  [1868]. 

"Park     Ecclesiastical     Society     v.  "Clapp    v.    City    of    Hartford,    3") 

Hartford,  47  Conn.  89  [18791  ;  Byram  Conn.  66   [1868]." 

V.  Foley,  17  Ind.  App.  629,  47  X.  E.  "State.    Schlapfer,    Pros.    v.    Town 

351     [18971;    Grunewald    v.    City    of  of  Union,   in  the  County  of  Hudson. 

Cedar   Rapids,    118   Iowa   222,   91    N.  53  X.  ,T.  L.    (24  Vr.)    67.  20  Atl.  894 

W.  1059;   Coates  v.  Nugent,  —  Kan.  11890]. 

,    92    Pac.    597    [1907];    Rich    v.  "  State.  Schlapfer.  Pros.  v.  Town  of 

Woods.    118    Ky.    865.    26    Ky.    Law  l^nion,   in   the  County  of  Hudson,  53 

Rep.  799,  82  S.  W.  578   [1904].  N.    .7.    L.    (24    Vr.)    67.    20   Atl.   894 

[1890]. 


.§  563  TAXxVTION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  922 

of  laterals.*^  It  has  been  held  proper  to  assess  the  cost  of  a  main 
sewer  upon  the  property  abutting  thereon,  as  long  as  such  cost 
does  not  exceed  the  benefits  conferred  by  such  improvement.*- 
Under  such  statutes  property  drained  by  lateral  sewers,  but  not 
abutting  on  the  main  sewer,  need  not  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of 
such  main  sewer.*^'  It  has,  however,  been  held  that  the  amount 
which  can  be  assessed  upon  abutting  property  can  not  exceed  the 
cost  of  a  sewer  which  would  have  furnished  sufficient  drainage  for 
the  property  assessed,  without  including  the  increased  cost  aris- 
ing because  the  sewer  had  been  constructed  of  a  larger  size  to 
provide  for  draining  other  property.**  If  the  statute  so  provides, 
land  which  does  not  abut  upon  the  sewer  but  which  is  connected 
therewith  by  laterals  may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  such  sewer.*'"' 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  that  property  which  does 
not  abut  upon  a  sewer  cannot  be  assessed  for  its  cost.*"  The  new 
sewer  which  is  constructed  may  be  connected  with  the  old  sewer. 
If  such  new  sewer  is  built  to  prolong  the  old  sewer,  as  to  procure 
a  proper  outlet  therefor,  land  drained  by  the  old  sewer  may  be 
assessed  for  the  cost  of  the  new  one.*'  The  new  sewer  may  be  a 
prolongation  of  the  old  sewer  so  as  to  afford  drainage  to  other 
land.  It  has  been  held  that  the  land  already  drained  by  the  old 
sewer  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  the  new  sewer.*'^  In 
other  jurisdictions,  it  has  been  held  that  such  land  is  to  be  assess- 
ed for  the  prolongation  of  the  old  sewer,  but  that  credit  must  be 
given  in  levying  an  assessment  for  the  entire  system  for  the 
amount  paid  upon  the  old  sewer.*"     A  sewer  may  be  constructed 

"Mason  v.  City  of  Chicago,  178  '"  Beechwood  Avenue  Sewer,  Pitts- 
Ill.  499,  53  N.  E.  354  [1899]  ;  DeWitt  burg's  Appeal,  179  Pa.  St.  490,  36 
V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  56  N.  J.  L.  (27  Atl.  209  [1897];  Park  Avenue  Sew- 
Vroom)    119,  27  Atl.  801   [1893].  ers,   Appeal    of   Parker,    169    Pa.   St. 

^^Hungerford  v.   City   of  Hartford,  433,  32  Atl.  574   [1895]. 

39  Conn.  279   [1872];  Ayer  v.  Mayor  "Sargent  and  Company  v.  City  of 

and     Aldermen     of     Somerville,     143  New    Haven,    62    Conn.    510,    26    Atl. 

Mass.  585,   10  N.  E.  457   [1887].  1057    [1893];    State,   Green,   Pros.  v. 

"Ayer  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Hotaling,   44  N.  J.  L.    (15  Vr.)    347 

Somerville,   143  Mass.   585,   10  N.   E.  [1882]. 

457    [1887].  *^Boyden    v.    Village    of    Brattles- 

*'Park   Avenue    Sewers,    Appeal    of  boro,  65  Vt.  504,  27  Atl.  164   [1893]. 

Parker,   169  Pa.  St.  433,  32  Atl.  574  "Mayor    and    Council   of   the   City 

[1895].  <if  Bayonne  v.  Morris,  61  N.  J.  L.  (32 

■•••Byram  v.  Foley,  17  Ind.  App.  629,  Vr.)    127,  38  Atl.  819   [1897];   State, 

47    N.    E.    351     [1897];    State,    Hen-  Vanderbeck,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Com- 

derson.  Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Jersey  mon   Council    of   Jersey    City,   29   N. 

City,   41    N.   J.   L.    (12   Vroom)    489  J.  L.    (5  Dutch.)   441   [1861]. 
[1879]. 


I 


923 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§564 


to  connect  certain  land  with  a  sewer  already  constructed.  Land 
drained  by  such  new  sewer  may  be  assessed  therefor.'^*  Land, 
the  market  value  of  which  is  increased  by  the  construction  of  such 
improvement,  is  benefited  thereby.'''  The  fact  that  land  which 
cannot  be  drained  by  a  sewer  receives  a  l)enefit  from  the  increase 
in  general  health  in  the  neij?hborhood  due  to  the  construction  of  a 
sewer,  does  not  render  such  land  liable  to  assessment  as  such  bene- 
fit is  a  general  and  not  a  special  one."- 

§  564.     Land  benefited  by  ditch  or  drain. 

In  assessments  for  purposes  of  drainage,  it  is  generally  provided 
that  the  district  shall  consist  of  lands  benefited  by  the  improve- 
ment.^ Land  which  merely  receives  the  benefits  from  a  .system  of 
drainage  which  are  general  to  a  whole  community,  cannot  be 
assessed  for  the  cost  thereof."  Increase  of  general  healthfulness 
of  a  community  is  not  an  especial  benefit  within  the  meaning  of 
this  rule.'^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  any  benefit  which 
makes  land  more  valuable  for  tillage,  more  desirable  as  a  place 
of  residence,  or  more  valuable  in  the  general  market,  is  a  benefit 


'^Snytlacker  v.  Village  of  West 
Hammond,  225  111.  154.  80  N.  E. 
93   [1907]. 

"  Warren  v.  (  ity  of  Grand  Haven, 
30  Mich.  24   11874]. 

"-  Beechwood  Avenue  Sewer,  Pitts- 
burg's Appeal,  170  Pa.  St.  490.  30 
Atl.  209   [1807]. 

'  Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555, 
44  S.  W.  707  [1897];  Drainage  Com- 
missioners of  Drainage  District  No. 
2  V.  Drainage  Commissioners  of  Un- 
ion Drain  Dist.  No.  3,  211  HI.  328. 
71  N.  E.  1007  [1904];  (aflirming. 
113  HI.  App.  114);  Gauen  v.  More- 
dock  and  Ivy  Landing  Drainage  Dis 
trict.  No.  l",  131  111.  44(5,  23  N.  E. 
633  [1890];  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v. 
Scott,  132  111.  427.  23  N.  E.  1119 
[1891];  Bodnian  v.  Lake  Fork  Spe- 
cial Drainage  Dist..  132  111.  439,  24 
N.  E.  630  11891]:  People  ex  rel.  Pol- 
lard V.  Swigerf.  l.-^O  111.  (108.  22  N.  E. 
787  [1890]:  K  linger  v.  The  People 
ex  rel.  Conklc.  130  111.  509,  22  N.  E. 
600  [1890]:  Kan'-akee  Drainage  Dis- 
trict V.  Coniniis-^ionevs  of  Lake  Fork 
Special    Drainage    District,    130    HI. 


261,  22  N.  E.  607  [1890];  Commis- 
sioners of  Highwa,va  of  the  Town  of 
Colfax  V.  Commissioners  of  Ea.st 
Lake  Fork  Special  Drainage  District, 
127  111.  581,  21  N.  E.  206  [1890]; 
Streuter  v.  Willow  Creek  Drainage 
District,  72  111.  App.  561  [1897]; 
Roundenbusli  v.  Mitchell,  154  Ind. 
616,  57  N.  K.  510  [1900];  Culbert- 
son  V.  Knight,  152  Hid.  121,  52  N.  E. 
700  [1898];  Drake  v.  Sdioenstedt, 
149  Ind.  90,  48  N.  E.  629  [1897]; 
Oliver  v.  Monona  County.  117  Iowa 
43.  90  N.  W.  510  |1!>02]:  Fraser  v. 
Mulany.  129  Wis.  377,  109  N.  W.  139 
I  19061. 

=  Lipes  V.  Hand,  104  Ind.  503.  1  N. 
E.  871,  4  N.  E.  160  [1885];  State, 
Skinkle,  Pros.  v.  Inhabitants  of  the 
Township  of  Clinton  in  the  Count,y 
of  Essex,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vroom) 
656  [1877];  Tillman  v.  Kircher.  64 
Ind.   104    [1878]. 

'State,  Skinkle,  Pros.  v.  Inhabi- 
tants of  the  Township  of  Clinton  in 
the  County  of  Essex,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10 
Vroom)   656  [1877]. 


564 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


924 


which  renders  such  land  liaiik'  to  assessment,  whether  it  is  actually 
drained  b.y  a  ditch  or  not.*  In  some  jurisdictions,  it  has  been 
held  that  increase  in  general  healthfulness,^  especially  if  coupled 
with  increased  facility  of  access,  due  to  the  improvement  in  the 
cjnditicn  of  the  highways  caused  by  drainage,''  may  be  regarded 
as  a  benefit  for  which  an  assessment  may  be  levied.  Land  which 
is  especially  benefited  by  a  system  of  drainage  may  be  assessed 
for  the  cost  thereof  under  these  statutes.'^  The  benefit  accruing 
from  this  sort  of  improvement  is  usually  the  drainage  of  the 
lands  benefited.'^  Land  which  is  drained  by  the  construction  of 
a  S3^steni  of  ditches  and  drains  is  so  benefited  thereby  that  it  may 
be  assessed  therefor.**  If  land  which  does  not  immediately^  join 
a  drain  or  ditch  is  nevertheless  drained  thereby,  such  land  may 
be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement.^'-  The  drainage  of 
land  is  a  benefit  in  improvements  of  this  sort,  no  matter  from  what 
reason  the  land  is  in  need  of  drainage.^^  By  statute  it  is  pro- 
vided in  some  jurisdictions  that  if  drains  on  land  outside  of  a 
drainage  district  are  connected  with  the  drains  and  ditches  of 
such  district,  such  land  thus  drained  may  be  annexed  to  such 
drainage  district.^-     This  statute  does  not,  however,  apply  to  a 


*  Culbertson  v.  Knight,  152  Ind. 
121,  52  N.  E.  700  [1898]. 

'  Beals  V.  Inhabitants  of  Brook- 
line.  174  Mass.  1.  54  X.  E.  339 
[1899]. 

^Oliver  v.  Monona  County,  117  la. 
43,  90  X.  W.  510   [1902]. 

'  Lipes  V.  Hand,  104  Ind.  503.  1  N. 
E.  871,  4  X.  E.   160  [1885]. 

*  Richard  v.  Cypremort  Drainage 
District.  107  La.  567,  32  So.  27 
[1901-1902]. 

".Reclamation  District  Xo.  108  v. 
Hagar.  66  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945  [1884] ; 
Bixler  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  tlie 
County  of  Sacramento,  59  Cal.  698 
[1881];  Hagar  v.  Board  of  Supervis- 
ors of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal.  222 
[1874];  People  ex  rel.  Davidson  v. 
Cole,  128  111.  158,  21  N.  E.  6  [1890]  ; 
Osborn  v.  Maxinkuekee  Lake  Ice 
Company,  154  Ind.  101,  56  X.  E.  33 
[1899];  Zigler  v.  Menges,  121  Ind. 
99,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  357,  22  X.  E.  782 
[1889];  State,  Skinkle,  Pros.  v.  In- 
habitants of  the  Township  of  Clinton 


in  the  County  of  Essex,  39  X.  J.  L. 
(10  Vroom)    656    [1877]. 

'"Goodrich  v.  City  cf  Minonk,  62 
111.  121  [1871];  Erickson  v.  Cass 
County,  11  X.  D.  494,  92  X.  \V.  841 
[1902]. 

'^  Streuter  v.  Willow  Creek  Drain- 
age District,  72  111.  App.  561   [1897]. 

'-  Shanley  v.  People  ex  rel.  Goedt- 
ner,  225  111.  579,  80  X.  E.  277 
[1907];  Drainage  Commissioners  of 
Drainage  District  Xo.  2  v.  Drainage 
Commissioners  of  L^nion  Drain  Dist. 
Xo.  3,  211  111.  328,  71  X.  E.  1007 
[1904J:  (affirming,  113  111.  App. 
114)  ;  Trigger  v.  Drainage  District, 
Xo.  1,  etc.,  193  111.  230,  61  X.  E. 
1114  [1901];  The  People  ex  rel.  Her- 
man V.  Bug  River  Special  Drainage 
District,  189  111.  55,  59  X.  E.  (>05; 
Drainage  District  Xo.  3  v.  The  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Baron,  147  111.  404,  35 
X.  E.  238  [1894]  ;  People  ex  rel,  etc., 
V.  Drainage  Comrs.  District  X^o.  1  of 
Town  of  Young  America,  143  111.  417, 
32  X.  E.  688   [1893];   Commissioners 


925 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§564 


drainage  district  formed  under  an  independent  statute.  It  is 
limited  to  districts  formed  under  the  act  of  which  it  is  a  part, 
and  the  amendment  thereof.^^  The  fact  that  lands  thus  volun- 
tarily connected  lie  in  an  adjoining  town  does  not  prevent  them 
from  becoming  a  part  of  the  drainage  district.^*  The  drainage 
commissioners  may  be  comDollod  hy  mandamus  to  assess  lands 
thus  voluntarily  connected. ^^'  The  amount  to  be  paid  is  gener- 
ally the  amount  wliich  sueh  land  would  have  had  to  pav  had  it 
been  originally  included  in  the  district.  This  rule  applies  to  an 
entire  drainage  district  where  one  district  connects  its  drains 
with  the  drains  of  another.^"  The  determination  of  the  commis- 
sioners of  the  district  which  annexed  such  land,  that  the  land 
which  is  thus  connected  is  benefited  bv  sueh  conneetion  and  is 
accordingly  subject  to  such  assessment,  is  final  in  a  suit  upon  the 
assessment. ^^  If  the  correctness  of  such  judgment  is  to  be  attack- 
ed and  the  question  of  benefits  tried  as  a  fact,  it  must  be  in  a 
proceeding  in  quo  ivarranto}^  If  a  land  owner  deepens  ditches 
on  his  own  land  so  as  to  connect  with  the  drains  in  a  drainage 
district,  he  thereby  in  fact  annexes  his  own  land  to  sueh  drain- 
age district,^''  but  he  does  not  thereby  annex  the  lands  of  other 


of  Lake  Fork  Special  Drainage  Dis- 
trict V.  The  People  ex  rel.  Bodman, 
138  111.  87,  27  N.  E.  857  [1892]; 
Commissioners  of  Mason  and  Taze- 
well Special  Drainage  District  v. 
Griffin.  134  III.  330.  25  N.  E.  995 
11891];  Bodman  v.  Lake  Fork  Spe- 
cial Drainage.  132  111.  439,  24  X.  E. 
630  [1891];  Kankakee  Draina(,e 
District  v.  Commissioners  of  Lake 
Fork  Special  Drainatre  District.  130 
111.  261,  22  N.  E.  607   [1890]. 

"  Kankakee  Drainage  District  v. 
Commissioners  of  Lake  Furk  Special 
Drainage  District.  130  111.  2(il,  2± 
N.  E.  607   [1890]. 

"  People  ex  rel.,  etc.  v.  Drainage 
Comrs.  District  Xo.  1  of  Town  <if 
Young  America,  143  111.  417,  32  X. 
E.   688    [1893]. 

*°  Commissioners  of  Lake  Fork 
Special  Drainage  District  v.  Tlie 
People  ex  rel.  Bodman,  138  111.  87, 
27  N.  E.  857   [1892]. 

"  Drainage  Commissioners  .'f 
Drainage  District   Xo.   2   of  Town   of 


Mnrdoek  v.  Drainage  Commissioners 
of  Union  Drain  Dist.  Xo.  3,  211  111. 
328,  71  X.  E.  1007;  (affirming,  113 
111.  App.  114  [1904])  ;  People  ex  rel. 
Samuel  v.  Cooper,  139  111.  461,  29 
X.  E.  872   [1893]. 

"  Shanley  v.  People  ex  rel.  Goedt- 
ner,  225  111.  579,  80  X.  E.  277 
[1907];  Trig'.'er  v.  Drainage  District 
Xo.  1,  etc.,  193  111.  230,  61  X.  E. 
1114   [1901]. 

"'  Shanley  v.  People  ex  rel.  Goedt- 
ner.  225  111.  579,  89  X'.  E.  277 
[1907] :  People  ex  rel.  Wood  v.  Jones, 
137  111.  35,  27  X.  E.  294  [1892]; 
Bodman  v.  Lake  Fork  Special  Drain- 
age District,  132  111.  439,  24  X.  E. 
630  [18911;  Evans  v.  Lewis,  121  111. 
478,  13  X.  E.  246  [1889];  Osborn 
V.   People,    103   111.   228. 

"People  ex  rel.  Phillips  v.  Drain- 
age District  Xo.  5.  191  111.  623.  61 
X.  E.  381  [1901];  Dayton  v.  Drain- 
acre  CoTPmis-^i'incrs,  128  111.  271,  21 
X.  E.  198   [1890]. 


§  564  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  926 

owners  which  drain  through  such  deepened  ditches.^''  Other  land 
owners  whose  land  is  not  thus  annexed  to  the  district  have  no 
right  to  the  drainage  of  their  lands  by  such  system  of  ditches.^^ 
The  fact  that  a  land  owner  has  merely  exercised  reasonable  and 
proper  care  of  his  ditches,  does  not  prevent  his  land  from  being 
annexed  to  the  drainasre  district,  if  such  reasonable  and  proper 
care  results  in  fact  in  his  making  use  of  the  ditches  of  such  drain- 
age district.^^  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  owners  of  land  to  be 
benefited  by  connection  with  the  ditches  of  a  drainage  district 
should  make  any  formal  application  for  annexation.^^  In  some 
jurisdictions  it  is  said  that  a  land  owner  whose  land  has  not  been 
assessed  for  a  ditch,  may  be  prevented  from  constructing  drains 
so  as  to  discharge  water  from  his  land  into  the  drainage  system.-* 
A  land  owner  who  has  paid  an  assessment  for  constructing  a 
drainage  system  may  prevent  the  owner  of  land  not  assessed 
from  constructing  ditches  to  drain  his  land  into  such  drainage 
system  where  such  additional  water  cannot  be  carried  by  the 
drainage  system  without  damage  to  the  other  land  owners  whose 
lands  are  drained  by  such  diteh.-^  In  other  jurisdictions,  it  is  held 
that  such  land  owner  cannot  enjoin  the  use  of  such  drainage  sys- 
tem by  land  owners  whose  lands  have  not  been  assess- 
ed.-^ His  remedy  seems  to  be  to  have  such  lands  an- 
nexed to  the  drainage  district  and  thus  made  to  bear 
a  proportionate  part  of  the  cost  of  constructing  the  system  of 
drainage  in  question. ^^  One  ground  of  objecting  to  a  drainage 
assessment  from  the  standpoint  of  benefits  is  that  the  land  assess- 
ed is  not  in  fact  drained  by  the  ditch  for  the  construction  of 
which  the  assessment  is  levied.  Land  which  is  not  drained  by  a 
system  of  drainage  cannot  ordinarily  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of 
such  system,^^  although  land  which  is  not  itself  subject  to  over- 
flow, but  is  subject  to  damage  by  reason  of  the  overflow  of  other 

="  People  ex  rel.  Phillips   v.  Drain-  -*  Yoimg  v.  Gentis,  7  Ind.  App.  199, 

age  District,  No.  5,   191   111.   623,  61  32  X.  E.  796   [1893]. 

N.  E.  381  [1901].  ^  Drake    v.    Sehoenstedt,    149    Ind. 

=^  Dayton  v.  Drainage  Commission-  90,   48   N.   E.   629    [1897];    Young  v. 

ers.     128     111.     271,     21     N.     E.     198  Gentis,    7    Ind.    App.    199;,  32   N.   E. 

[1890].  796    [1893]. 

^-People  ex  rel.  Baron  v.  Drainage  ^^VSpringer     v.     Walters,     139     111. 

District,   No.   3   of   Martinton   Town-  419,  28   N.  E.   761    [1893]. 

ship,     155    111.    45,    39    X.    E.    613  ^^  Springer     v.     Walters,     139     111. 

[1894].  419,  28  X.  E.  761   [1893]. 

^  Streuter  v.   Willow  Creek  Drain-  ^  Klinger  v.  People  ex  rel.  Conkle, 

age  District,  72  111.  App.  561   [1897].  130  111.  509,  22  X.  E.  600   [1890]. 


927  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  564 

land,  may  be  assessed  for  a  ditch  whereby  such  other  land  is 
drained.'-^  Such  objections  must,  however,  l)e  made  at  the  time 
and  in  the  manner  provided  for  by  statute.  If  such  objection 
is  not  made  in  the  proper  way,  it  will  ordinarily  be  regarded  as 
waived.^"  Land  which  is  so  located  that  by  reason  of  the  slope 
of  the  ground  it  cannot  drain  into  the  ditch  in  question,  is  not 
benefited  thereby.^^  Another  ground  for  objecting  to  the  levy  of 
an  assessment  upon  land  which  it  is  claimed  is  drained  by  a  sys- 
tem of  drainage  is,  that  such  land  is  already  drained  and  needs 
no  further  drainage.  Where  the  question  of 'benefits  is  to  be  de- 
termined as  a  fact  it  is  held  that  such  land  cannot  be  assessed. "■- 
If  such  land  drains  into  another  l)asin  and  the  surface  water 
therefrom  does  not  reach  the  ditch  in  question,  the  right  of  such 
land  to  be  free  from  such  assessment  is  clear.^^  Where  it  is  held 
that  the  owner  of  higher  ground  has  a  property  right  in  the  es- 
tablished and  regular  course  of  surface  drainage  from  his  higher 
ground  to  the  lower  ground  of  adjoining  land  owners,  it  is  held 
that  such  higher  land  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  a  ditch 
constructed  to  drain  such  lower  land,  although  the  drainage  of 
such  lower  land  is  to  a  considerable  degree  necessary  because  of 
the  surface  water  which  flows  upon  it  from  such  higher  land.''* 
The  owner  of  the  higher  land  has,  however,  no  right  to  change 
the  natural  course  of  surface  drained,  by  cutting  ditches  so  as  to 
collect  the  water  in  a  channel  and  thus  discharging  it  in  a  body 
upon  the  lower  land.  Where  the  upper  owner  has  done  this,  he 
may  be  enjoined  by  the  lower  one  from  permitting  such  condi- 
tions to  continue.  Accordingly,  his  land  may  be  included  in  the 
drainage  district,  if  the  water  thus  discharged  in  a  body  is  col- 

=»Rohv    V.    ,<^hiin<raniinfj:a    Drainajje  v.    Roed.    43    X.    J.    L.    (14    Vr. )     18(5 

District!   —    Kan. ,   95    Pac.    30!)  118811;    In    the    Matter   of   the   Peti- 

[1908].  tion    of    C'heesbrou<xh    to    Vacate    an 

'"  Oliver  V.  Monona  County.  117  la.  Assessment,    78    N.    Y.    232    [1879]; 

43,   90   N.   W.   510    [19n2];C'onimis-  Blue   v.   Wentz,   54   O.   S.   247,   43   X. 

sioners  of  Putnam  County  v.  Krauss.  E.  403  [189(5]. 
53  O.  S.  628,  42  X.  E.  831    [18951.  "Anselm   v.   Barnard.   2   Keb.   675. 

''  Klinger  v.  People  ex  rel.  Conkle,  ^  /Ann   v.   Board   of  Supervisors  of 

130    111.   509,   22   X.   E.   600    [1890];  Huena  Vista  County.  —  la.  ,  114 

In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Van  X.    \V.    51     [1907];    Beals    v.    James, 

Buren   to   Vacate    an   Assessment.    79  173  Mass.  591.  54  X.  E.  245   [1809]; 

X.  Y.  384   [1880].  Blue   v.   Wentz,   54  O.   S.  247,  43  N. 

'^'Anselm   v.   Barnard,  2    Keb.   675;  E.   493    [1896];    Buckley   v.   Comniis- 

Beals   V.    James.    173    Mass.    591,    54  sioners  of   Lorain   Co.,   1   Ohio   C.  C. 

N.  E.  245  [1899]:   State,  King,  Pros.  251   [1885]. 


§  564  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  928 

leeted  and  carried  off  by  the  drainage  of  such  district. ^'^  Where 
land  is  already  drained  by  artificial  drainage,  the  ques- 
tion of  its  liability  to  assessment  turns  on  the  fact  of  benefit  inur- 
ing to  such  land  from  the  new  system  of  drainage  for  which  it  is 
sought  to  levy  such  assessment.  If  the  previous  artificial  drainage 
does  not  drain  such  land  completely,  such  land  may  be  assessed 
for  a  system  of  ditches  which  will  complete  such  drainage.^"  If 
such  land  is  already  completely  drained,  it  cannot  be  assessed 
further  for  drainage. ^^  However,  if  a  drainage  improvement  has 
been  constructed  in  part  so  as  to  drain  certain  land  and  subse- 
quently is  extended  so  as  to  drain  other  land,  the  owners  of  lands 
drained  by  the  ditch  as  originally  constructed,  cannot  resist  an  as- 
sessment for  the  extension  on  the  ground  that  such  original  ditch 
was  sufficient  for  the  drainage  of  their  own  lands."*  The  assess- 
ment which  such  owners  are  called  upon  to  pay  is  no  greater  than 
it  would  have  been  had  the  entire  improvement  been  made  at 
once  and  all  the  land  drained  been  assessed  by  one  assessment. 
If  a  drain  affords  drainage  to  certain  land,  but  does  not  pass 
through  it,  such  land  is  benefited.^**  The  benefit  accruing  from 
drainage  need  not  be  for  agricultural  or  sanitary  purposes  alone.*'' 
If  land  is  improved  for  purposes  of  travel,  or  for  residence,  or  for 
the  growth  of  timber,  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  benefited.'*^  If  a 
special  proceeding  is  provided  for  by  which  the  question  of  exist- 
ence of  benefits  is  to  be  determined,  a  land  owner  who  does  not 
take  advantnq-e  of  such  proceeding  has  no  right  to  raise  such  ques- 
tion of  benefits  subsequently  in  resisting  the  assessment  levied.*- 
Under  some  statutes  which  provide  for  the  formation  of  draining 
associations,  assessments  can  be  levied  only  upon  the  lands  of 
the  members  thereof.  Accordingly,  under  such  statutes,  land  be- 
longing to  a  married  woman  carnot  be  assessed,  if  under  the  law 
in  force  such  married  woman  cannot,  by  reason  of  her  coverture, 

^'^  Culbertson    v.    Knight,    152    Tnd.  ^"Cribbs  v.   Benedict,   64  Ark.  555, 

121,  52  N.  E.  700  [1898].  44  S.  W.  707   [1897]. 

»8  Commissioners     of     Spoon     River  "Springer     v.     Walters,     139     III. 

Drainage      District      in      Champaign  419,  28  N.  E.  761    [1893]. 

County  V.  Conner,   121   111.  App.  450  '^  Commissioners    of    Highways    of 

[190,5].  the    Town    of   Colfax   v.    Commi«sion- 

="Bow  V.  Smith.  9  Mod.  94,  95.  era  of  East  Lake  Fork  Special  Drain- 

3SBri(Tgs    V.    Union    Drainage    Dis-  use   District.    127   111.   581,   21    K   E. 

trict.   No.    1,    140    111.    53,    29    N.    E.  206   [1890]. 

721   [1893].  "Oliver    v.    Monona    County,     117 

Iowa  43,  90  N.  W.  510   [1902]. 


^ 


929  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT,  §§  565,  566 

(inter  into  a  contract  or  become  a  member  of  sucli  association.*'' 
An  assessment  for  repairing  a  ditch  can  be  levied  npon  land  bene- 
fited by  such  repairs.  Land  benefited  by  the  original  ditch,  but 
not  benefited  by  such  repairs,  cannot  be  assessed  therefor.'** 

§  565.     Land  benefited  hy  water  pipes. 

Property  to  which  water  is  carried  by  water  pipes  may  be  assess- 
ed for  the  cost  of  constructing  such  pipes.  If,  however,  a  tract 
of  propert}''  is  already  supplied  by  water  through  a  system  of 
pipes,  it  seems  to  be  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  such  property 
cannot  be  assessed  unless  a  special  benefit  from  such  additional 
system  of  pipes  can  in  fact  be  sliown.^  Thus,  where  a  lot  had 
been  assessed  for  water  pipes  laid  along  the  front  thereof,  and  it 
was  subsequently  sought  to  assess  such  property  for  water  pipes 
laid  along  the  side  thereof,  such  assessment  was  held  to  be  in- 
valid.^ In  other  jurisdictions,  it  seems  to  be  held  that  property 
may  be  assessed  for  water  pipes  laid  on  three  sides  thereof,  under 
a  statute  apportioning  the  cost  to  the  amount  of  pipe  laid.  In 
this  case,  however,  the  fact  that  the  pipes  were  laid  on  three  sides 
of  the  property  may  have  conferred  a  greater  benefit  than  would 
have  been  conferred  had  the  pipes  been  laid  on  one  side  of  the 
property.^ 

§  566.     Land  benefited  by  levees. 

Land  which  is  subject  to  overflow  in  the  absence  of  a  system 
of  levees,  and  which  is  protected  from  overflow  by  the  construc- 
tion of  a  system  of  levees,  is  undoubtedly  benefited  by  such  sj's- 
tem  so  that  it  may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  thereof.^  If  land  is 
not  subject  to  overflow,  it  cannot  be  said  as  a  matter  of  law  tliat 
such  land  cannot  be  benefited  by  a  system  of  levees."     Incrcasinl 

"Liberty  Township  Draining  Asso-  'State    v.    Trustees    of    Maoalester 

ciation     v.     Watkins.     72     Ind.     4.59  Colle're,  87   Atinn.   10.5.  91   X.  W.  4S4 

[1880].  [1902]. 

"Goodrich  v.  City  of  Minonk,  02  '  Streuter  v.  \Viliow  Creek  Drain- 
Ill.  121  [18711;  Parice  County  Coal  age  District,  72  111.  App.  561 
Company  v.  Campbell.  140  Ind.  28,  [1^971  ;  Hill  v.  Fontenot,  46  La. 
39  N.  e".  149   [18941.  Ann.   156.3,  16  So.  475   [1894];   State 

^  McChesney  V.  C  ity  of  Chicago,  213  ex   rel.   Asliby   v.   Three   States  Lum- 

111.  592,  73  N.  E.  308   [1905];   Baker  ber   Co.,    19s"  :Mo.   4.30,   95   S.  W.   333 

V.    Oartside,    86    (5    Xorris)    Pi.     St.  [1906]. 

498.  -Carson   v.   St.   Francis  Levee  Dis- 

*  Baker  v.  Oartside,   86   Pa.   St.    (5  trict,    59    Ark.    513,    27    S.    W.    500 

Norris)   498.  [1894];     :\IcDermott    v.     Mathis,     21 

Ark.  00    [1800]. 


§  567  '      TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  930 

access  to  such  land  aud  imi)roved  drainage  thereon  may  consti- 
tute benefits  accruing  from  a  system  of  levees  for  which  such  land 
may  be  assessed.^     Land  which  is  at  so  low  a  level  that  it  is  not 
protected  in  any  way  from  overflow,  cannot  be  assessed  for  the 
cost  of  a  levee  which  protects  higher  land  from  overflow.*     Land 
which  lies  between  the  river  and  the  levee  and  is  not  in  any  way 
protected  by  such  levee  cannot  be  assessed  therefor.^     The  fact 
that  the  land  in  question  is  wet  during  the  time  of  the  winter  and 
summer  rains  after  the  construction  of  the  levee,  does  not  prevent 
it   from   being   benefited   by    such    construction/'     Legislative   or 
constitutional  determination  of  the  fact  of  benefit  may  be  conclu- 
sive/    Land  within  a  drainage  district  as  recognized  by  the  con- 
stitution and  not  lying  between  the  levee  and  the  river  is  said  to 
be  subject  to  assessment,  even  if  in  fact  it  is  damaged  rather  than 
benefited  by  such  levee.*  "Where  the  statute  so  provides,  the  deter- 
mination of  the  engineer  as  to  what  land  is  incapable  of  protec- 
tion by  levees  is  final. ^     A  drainage  district  may  construct  a  levee 
outside  of  its  territorial  boundaries,  if  such  levee  is  necessary  to 
prevent  land  within  the  district  from  overflow.^**     In  determining 
what  property  may  be  assessed  for  the  construction  of  a  levee,  the 
statute  may  describe  such  property  as  alluvial  land."     Such  de- 
scription seems  to  be  regarded  as  sufficient.    It  is  necessary  under 
such  description  to   determine  as  a  fact  what  property  is  allu- 
vial.^- 

§  567.    Land  benefited  by  other  improvements. 

Property  which  is  included  in  a  fencing  district  may  be  assessed 
for  the  cost  of  such  fence. ^     It  has  been  held,  however,  that  terri- 

"  Carson      v.      St.      Francia     Levee  '  Hill     v.     Fontenot,    46    La.     Ann. 

District,   59   Ark.   .513,   27   S.   W.   590  1563,   16   So.   475    [1894]. 

[1894];     McDermott    v.     Matins,     2i  "  Hosmer    v.    Hunt    Drainage    Dis- 

Ark.  60  [I860].  trict,     134    HI.     360,    26    N.    E.    584 

*Hill    V.    Fontenot,    46    La.    Ann.  [1891]. 

1563.  16  So.  475   [1894];  Yeatman  v.  "  Hollingsworth    v.    Tax    Collector, 

Crandall,   11  La.  Ann.  220   [1856].  45    La.    Ann.    222,    40   Am.    St.   Rep. 

=  Owens  V.  Yazoo  &  Mississippi  Val-  220,  12  So.  1    [1893]. 

ley    Railroad    Co.,    74    Miss.    821,    21  « Hollingswortli    v.    Tax    Collector, 

So.  244   [1897].  45    La.    Ann.    222,    40   Am.    St.   Rep. 

« Memphis  Land  &  Timber  Company  220,    12   So.    1    [1893]. 

V.     St.     Francis    Levee    District,    64  '^  Busbee  v.  Commissioners  of  Wake 

Ark.  258,  42   S.  W.  763    [1897].  County,   93   N.   C.    143    [1885];    Cain 

''  Hill    V.     Fontenot,    46    La.    Ann.  v.    Commissioners    of    Davie    County. 

1563,   16  So.  475    [1894].  86  N.  C.  8   [1882]. 

« Smith  v.  Willis.  78  Miss.  243,  28 
So.  878   [190U]. 


931  PROPERTY    SIBJECT    T(J    ASSES;  MENT,  §  568 

tory  which  has  been  fenced  out  of  a  fencing  district  is  not  bene- 
fited by  such  fencing  district  and  therefore  cannot  be  assessed  for 
the  cost  of  such  fences.-  Tj;ivd  nn  a  private  ship  canal,  which  is 
connected  with  a  public  canal,  is  benefited  by  the  dredging  and 
improvement  of  the  pul)li(*  caual.' 

§  568.     Land  benefited  by  combination  of  improvements. 

Whether  different  tracts  of  land  may  be  assessed  for  a  combina- 
tion of  improvements  upon  the  theory  that  it  receives  a  benefit 
from  some  part  of  the  combination,  is  a  question  which  depends 
for  i'ts  solution  in  part  upon  the  nature  of  the  improvement,  and 
in  part  upon  the  powers  of  the  public  corporation  and  upon  the 
restrictions  thereon.  With  reference  to  this  question  improve- 
ments are  of  two  general  classes.  (1)  The  city  or  other  public 
corporation  may  seek  to  combine  in  one  improveinent  different 
improvements  which  in  their  nature  are  parts  of  one  united  whole. 
The  city  or  other  corporation  may,  in  the  absence  of  some  speci- 
fic statutory  provision  preventing  the  same,  combine  improve- 
)npnts  <  f  this  class.'  (2)  The  city  or  other  public  corporation  may 
attempt  to  combine  two  or  more  improvements  which  are  not  iu 
their  nature  parts  of  one  united  whole;  but  which  may  be  con- 
structed together  in  a  very  efficient  and  economical  manner.  No 
objection  can  be  made  to  the  act  of  the  city  in  constructing  im- 
provements together  as  long  as  no  injustice  results  and  no  stat- 
ute is  violated.-  No  objection  can  be  made  to  constructing  two  or 
more  improvements  uuder  one  resolution. •'■  or  ordinance.^  or 
under  one  contract,'  if  the  assessment  is  .s(  apportioned  that 
only  the  land  benefited  liy   each   improvement   Is  assessed   therc- 

-  Harper   v.   Coniiiiis-ioiuirs  of  New  iiah    v.    Weed.    !)(5    (in.   670,   2.3    R.    E. 

Hanover   Coiinty,    1.3:3    X.    C.    lOfi,   4.5  OOO    [ISDol;    Haley  v.  City  of  Alton. 

S.  E.  ry>V,   [1!)031.  1.V2    HI.    ]\:i,    '.iS   "x.    E.    7.50    [18941: 

'  Peni)le  v.  City  of   I'.\illalc>.    1(17   X.  County  of  A(lan)s  v.   City  of  Quincy, 

Y.  S.  (i80  [1007].  130  111.  ,5(;ti.  (!  L.  R.  A.  155,  22  N.  E. 

'Stodilard    v.   .Jolinson.    7-5    Ind.    20  ()24      [1890  1:      Wilbur     v.     City     of 

[1881].  Siirin-rfield.     123    111.    39.").    1-1     X.    E. 

n^rout  V.  People  e.\  rel.  Miller.  S3  S71    [18S9]. 
HI.  154  [1870]:  Bye  v.  Atlantic  City.  '  .\lanieda    Macadamizing   Company 

—    X.    .J.    Sup. .    (54    Atl.     1050  V.  Williams,  70  Cal.  534.  12  Pac.  530 

[1900].  [ISSfi]:     Fairbanks     v.     Mayor     and 

^  Bates    V.    Twist,    13S    Cal.    .52.    70  Aldermen  of  Fitchburg,   132  Mass.  42 

Pac.    1023    [1902];    Lewis    v.    Albert-  [1882],    State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel. 

son,    23    Ind.     .App.     147.    53    X.    E.  Powell    v.    District    Court   of   Ramsey 

1071   [1899].  County,  47   Minn.  400.  50  X.  W.  476 

*  Mayor    and    Aldermen    of    Savan-  [1891]. 


§  569  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  932 

J'or.  The  apportionment  of  the  cost  of  each  improvement  to  the 
property  benefited  thereby  and  to  no  other  property  may  be  se- 
cured by  having-  separate  estimates  made  for  each  improvement.'' 
It  may  be  secured  where  the  contract  is  let  at  a  gross  price  for 
all  the  improvements,  by  the  action  of  the  Board  of  Public  Works, 
or  other  similar  body,  in  determining  what  amount  is  neees-sary 
for  the  cost  of  each  separate  improvement,  the  aggregate  amount 
thus  raised  for  each  of  the  improvements  being  equal  to  the  gross 
amount  of  the  contract  price.''  If  an  assessment  is  levied  upon 
the  property  fronting  and  abutting  on  each  street  for  the  cost 
of  such  street,  the  fact  that  the  city  officials  have  purchased  under 
one  contract  a  quantity  of  stone  intended  for  a  number  of  dis- 
tinct improvements  does  not  invalidate  such  assessment.^  A  city 
cannot,  however,  assess  a  part  of  the  cost  of  an  improvement  upon 
propert}^  which  is  in  no  way  benefited  thereby.  If,  by  statute,  it 
is  provided  that  certain  improvements  can  be  made  only  if  the 
property  owners  affected  thereby,  or  a  certain  percentage  of  them, 
petition  for  such  improvement,  the  city  cannot  combine  two  dis- 
tinct improvements  so  as  to  construct  either  of  them  upon  the 
petition  of  a  smaller  number  of  property  owners  affected  by  each 
than  is  provided  for  by  statute." 

§  569.     Combination  of  streets. 

Two  or  more  streets,  or  parts  of  streets,  which  naturally  form 
one  connected  and  entire  whole,  may  be  combined.  The  two 
parts  of  a  street  separated  by  a  parkway  form  an  entire  improve- 
ment.^ The  two  parts  of  a  street,  which  are  separated  by  a  tract 
of  land  which  is  dedicated  to  free  and  unobstructed  public  use,  ex- 
cept for  wheeled  vehicles,  are  parts  of  an  entire  improvement. - 
If  two  or  more  streets  really  form  one  continuous  improvement, 
they  may  be  improved  together  and  one  assessment  levied  there- 

"  Haley    v.    City   of    Alton,    152    111.  '  Cummings  v.  West  Chicago  Park 

113.  38  N.  E.  750   [1894].  Com'rs.,    181   111.    136,   54  N.   E.  941. 

'  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  PoweU  So    with    branches    of    a    street    sur- 

V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County,  rounding  an   open   space   in  a   street 

47  Minn.  406,  50  N.  W.  476   [1891].  and  forming  with  the  street,  one  con- 

^Alherger      v.      Mayor      and      City  tinuous     thoroughfare;      Cuming     v. 

Council    of   Baltimore,    64   Md.    1,    20  City  of  Grand  Eapids,  46  Mich.   150, 

Atl.  988   [1885].  9  N.  W.   141    [1881]. 

'  Hutchin.son  v.  City  of  Omaha,  52  "  Alvey  v.  City  of  Asheville,  —  N. 

Neb.  345,  72  N.  W.  218  [1897]  ;  Her-       C.  ,"  59  S.  E.  999   [1907]. 

see  V.  City  of  Buffalo.  1  Sheldon   (X. 
Y.)    445    [1874]. 


933 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§56:) 


for.''  The  same  rule  applies  to  different  sections  of  the  same 
street,  though  paved  with  different  material  and  under  different 
contracts.*  The  same  principle  applies  to  two  county  roads  which 
form  one  continuous  road.'  Thus,  where  for  any  reason  a  section 
of  a  street  is  left  unimproved,  the  rest  of  such  street,  even  if 
separated  by  such  section,  may  be  improved  as  one  improvement," 
at  least  in  the  absence  of  any  showing  that  property  on  one 
section  of  the  street  was  not  benefited  by  the  improvement  of  the 
other  section.^  So  where  a  street  as  laid  out  is  really  continu- 
ous, but  contains  a  jog,  such  street  may  be  improved  as  one  im- 
provement,^ even  if  the  part  of  the  street  beyond  the  jog  is  known 
by  a  different  name."  The  attempt  is  sometimes  made  to  group 
together  a  number  of  streets  which  do  not  constitute  one  contin- 
uous street  in  reality,  and  to  assess  the  aggregate  cost  of  such 
improvement  equally  upon  all  the  property  benefited  by  any  of 
such  streets.  An  assessment  of  this  sort  is  usually  held  invalid,  as 
it  results  in  assessing  for  the  improvement  of  one  street,  property 
which  is  in  no  material  way  benefited  thereby.^''  I'^^nder  a  statute 
authorizing  a  city  to  grade  "any  street."  it  was  held  that  a  city 
could  not  grade  nine  distinct  streets  and  levy  one  assessment  foi 


'Lewis  V.  City  of  Seattle.  28  Wash. 
639,  69  Pac.  393  [1902].  "The  na- 
ture, cliaracter  and  extent  of  an  im- 
provement must  rest  within  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  city  council.  The  law 
fixes  no  metes  or  bounds  in  this  re- 
spect beyond  which  it  cannot  go,  fur- 
ther than  that  it  may  not  permit  a 
gross  abuse  of  such  discretion. 
Whether,  therefore,  the  work  as  or- 
dered and  performed  consists  of  dis- 
connected portions  or  of  a  continuous 
portion  of  a  street,  or  whether  it 
consists  of  work  done  upon  diirerent 
streets,  furnishes  no  ground  of  com- 
plaint to  the  individual  property 
holder  so  long  as  the  work  confers 
a  benefit  upon  his  property  and  he  is 
not  charged  with  a  cost  exceeding 
such  benefit."  Lewis  v.  City  of  Se- 
attle, 28  Wash.  039.  69  Pac.  393 
[1902]. 

*  In  re  Shady  Avenue,  34  Pa. 
Super.  Ct.  327   [1907]. 

°  Commissioners  of  Putnam  County 
V.  Young.  36  O.   S.  2SS    [ISSO]. 


"Wilder  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  26 
O.   S.   284    [1875]'. 

'  Lewis  V.  City  of  Seattle,  2S  Wash. 
639,  69  Pac.  393    [1902|. 

"Culver  V.  City  of  Chicago,  171  111. 
399,  49  X.  E.  573  [1898];  Lynch  v. 
City  of  Kansas  City,  44  Kan.  452, 
24  Pac.  973    [1890]." 

"Lynch  v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  44 
Kan.  452.  24  Pac.  973   [1890]. 

'"Thayer  v.  City  of  Crand  Ra])ids, 
82  Mich.  298.  46  X.  W.  228  [  1890] ; 
Willard  v.  Ali>erts()n,  23  Ind.  App. 
164.  53  X.  E.  1077.  54  X.  E.  403 
[1S99]:  Xcvin  v.  Allen.  (Ky.)  26 
S.  W.  180,  15  Ky.  Law  Rep.  836 
11894];  Kansas  City  G-rading  Com- 
pany V.  H:>lden.  32  Mo.  App.  490 
[1888]:  Kinealy  v.  Gay,  7  Mo.  App. 
203  [18791;  Hutchinson  v.  City  of 
Omalia.  52  Xeb.  345,  72  N.  W.  218 
[1897];  State,  Kerrigan,  Pros.  v. 
Township  of  West  Holioken,  37  N.  J. 
L.  (8  Vroom)  77  [1874]:  City  to 
use  of  l^rooks  v.  Len.  9  I'liila.  (Pa.) 
IOC,    [  1872]. 


§  569  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  934 

all  upon  the  property  benefited  by  such  improvements.^^  If  the 
work  is  let  as  one  contract  and  there  is  no  competitive  bidding 
as  to  each  street,  separately,  as  required  by  statute,  the  assess- 
ment is  invalid  under  a  statute  providing  for  assessing  "property 
immediately  benefited"  by  the  improvement.^-  If  material  exca- 
vated from  one  street  can  be  used  to  fill  up  others,  and  separate 
contracts  are  let,  the  expense  of  the  work  may  be  estimated  under 
the  principal  contract  with  reference  to  the  existence  of  the 
other  contracts. ^^  A  statute  authorizing  the  grading  of  two  or 
more  streets  as  one  improvement,  when  in  the  proper  prosecution 
of  the  work  the  material  taken  from  one  street  may  be  used  in 
filling  the  others,  does  not  authorize  an  assessment  for  improving 
two  or  more  streets  together  under  any  other  circumstances.^* 
A  city  or  village  may  provide  for  extending  the  improvement  of 
a  street  a  few  feet  into  cross  streets,  if  lateral  extensions  are  to 
be  paid  for  by  general  taxation  and  not  by  the  owners  of  prop- 
erty abutting  on  the  street  improved. ^"^  If  an  ordinance  is  passed 
for  the  improvement  of  two  streets  and  only  one  of  such  streets 
is  improved,  the  cost  of  such  improvement  cannot  be  assessed  upon 
the  land  abutting  on  both  streets.^*'  If  a  petition  signed  by  a 
certain  percentage  of  the  abutting  property  owners  is  necessary 
for  the  construction  of  a  street  improvement  on  the  asses.sment 
plan,  the  city  cannot  improve  two  or  more  separate  streets  upon 
a  petition  signed  merely  by  the  proper  percentage  of  the  aggre- 
gate number  of  owners  of  property  on  all  of  such  streets.  The 
petition  must  be  signed  by  the  proper  number  of  property  own- 
ers on  each  of  such  separate  streets.^^  If  the  petition  is  signed 
for  the  construction  of  a  continuous  pavement  on  two  streets 
which  intersect  at  a  right  angle  and  the  petition  is  insufficient 
as  to  one  of  such  streets  because  it  is  not  signed  by  a  majority  of 
the  owners  of  each  contiguous  block  thereon,  the  improvement  of 
the  other  street  cannot  be  undertaken  unless  the  petition  shows 

"  Hutchin.son  v.  City  of  Omaha,  52  «  White  v.   City  of  Alton,   149   111. 

Neh.  345,  72  N.  W.  218  [1897].  626,  37  N.  E.  66   [1894]. 

"  People     V.     Common     Council     of  i"  Willard     v.     Albertson,     23     Ind. 

City  of   Finoston,    189   N.   Y.   66,   81  App.    164.    53    N.    E.    1077,   54   N.    E. 

N.    E.    557     [19071;      (reversing,    90  403    [1899]. 

N.    Y.    S.    657,     114    App.    Div.    326  "  Hutchinson  v.  City  of  Omaha,  52 

[1906]).  Neb.     345,     72    N.    W.    218     [1S971: 

^■"  Sehenley     v.     Commonwealtli     for  Lathrop    v.    City    of   Buft'alo,    3    Ahb. 

use,  36  Pa.' St.  64.  Ct.  App.    (N.  Y.)    30  [1861]. 

"Mavall    V.    City    of    St.    Paul,    30 
Minn.  294,   15  N.  W.   170   [1883]. 


935  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  570 

on  its  face  that  it  is  in  legal  effect  a  separate  petition  for  each 
street.^**  If  the  construction  of  two  or  more  streets  as  one  im- 
provement results  in  assessing  for  the  construction  of  any  one  of 
the  streets,  property  not  benefited  thereby,  such  assessment  is 
invalid."  Thus,  where  two  streets  of  materially  different  widths 
are  improved,  the  city  cannot  divide  the  total  cost  by  the  entire 
frontage  on  both  streets  and  regard  such  amount  as  the  assess- 
ment per  front  foot.-''  Assessments  were  levied  for  eight  distinct 
improvements  as  to  some  of  which  there  was  a  surplus  and  as  to 
others  a  deficit.  In  such  a  case  the  city  cannot  appropriate  any 
j)art  of  such  surplus  to  apply  to  such  deficit."' 

55  570.     Combination  of  parts  of  entire  street  improvement. 

The  opening  of  a  street  or  road  by  condemning  or  otherwise 
acquiring  a  fee  or  easement  in  the  realty  necessary  therefor  is 
often  conducted  as  a  separate  and  distinct  improvement  without 
any  relation  to  the  surface  improvement  thereof.  Improvement 
of  the  other  forms  of  surface  improvement  are  naturally  and 
most  economically  made  together.  If  they  are  all  parts  of  one 
and  the  same  improvement,  affecting  adjoining  property  owners 
in  similar  ways,  there  is  no  constitutional  objection  to  combining 
them  in  one  general  improvement  for  which  one  assessment  is 
levied.  Accordingly,  assessments  for  opening  and  widening  a 
street,'  opening,  widening  and  grading  a  street,-  opening  and 
extending  a  street,'*  opening,  extending  and  grading  a  street,'' 
opening,  grading  and  paving  a  street,"'  widening  and  extending 
a  street,"  or  acquiring  land  on  the  ocean  front  for  a  street  and 

'"City    of    Rldominfiton    v.    Reeves,  223    [18G61;    Astor   v.   Mayor,   Alder- 

177  III!   161,  52  N.  E.  278   11898].  men  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of 

"Nevin    v.    Allen,     (Ky.)     15    Ky.  New  York.  fi2  N.  Y."  580   11875]-    In 

Law      Rep.      83fi,      20     S.      W.      180  tlie  Matter  of  tlie  Rotition  of  Arnold 

11894];     Thayer     v.    City    of    (Jraiid  to    Vacate   an    Assessment,    60    N.    Y. 

Rapids,  82  Mit-h.  2i)8,  46  N.  \V.  228  26   [1875]. 

11890];    Kansas    City    Gradinji   Com-  MVilmin>:ton  Avenue,  213  Pa.  238. 

pany    v.    Holden.    32    Mo.    Apj).    490  62   Atl.  848   [1906]. 

[1888];     State.     KerriL'an.     Pros.     v.  •■•  Fatran  v.   City  of  Chieafjo,  84   111. 

Township  of  West  lloboken,  37  X.  J.  227   nS7()l. 

I,.    (8  Vroom)    77   [1^74].  *  :Me(]lan(l    v.    Linton.    60    Neb.   249, 

•■"Nevin    v.     Allen,     (Ky.),    26     S.  82  N.  W.  866  [  1900  L 

W.  180,  15  Ky.  Law  Rep.  836  riS'94].  =  Spencer    v.    Merchant.    125    L^.    S. 

-'Thayer  v!  Citv  of  Grand  Ranids.  345.  31  L.  763.  8  S.  921    flSSS];    (af- 

82  Mich.  298,  46  N.  W.  228   flS90].  firminii.  Srencer  v.  Merchant.   100  N. 

'Davies  V.  Citv  of  Los  Anireles.  86  Y.  585.  3  N.  E.  682  [1885]  L 

Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771    [1890]:   Dor?an  '  Cohn   v.   Parcels,   72   Cal.   367.    14 

V.  City  of  Boston,  94  Mass.   (12  All.)  Pac.   26    [1887];    New   England    llos- 


570 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


936 


^ 


erecting  an  elevated  walk  thereon '  have  each  been  upheld  as 
valid  exercise  of  the  power  of  levying  local  assessments.  As 
would  naturally  follow  from  the  nature  of  the  improvement, 
grading  is  usually  effected  in  connecting  with  other  forms  of 
surface  improvements.  Accordingly,  assessments  are  frequently 
made  for  grading  and  paving  undertaken  together  as  part  of  the 
same  improvement,  and  such  assessments  are  held  to  be  valid  as 
an  exercise  of  the  power  to  provide  for  a  local  assessment.*  So 
are  assessments  for  grading,  paving  and  curbing,'-'  grading,  pav- 


pital  for  Women  and  Children  v. 
Street  Commissioners  of  the  City  of 
•Boston,  188  Mass.  88,  74  N.  E.  294 
[1905]. 

■^  Murphy  v.   City  of  Long  Branch, 

—    N.    J.'   Sup.    ,    61    Atl.    593 

[1905]. 

*Schaefer  v.  Werling,  188  U.  S. 
516,  47  L.  570,  23  S.  449  [1903]; 
(affirming  Schaefer  v.  Werling,  156 
Ind.  704,  60  N.  E.  149;  following 
without  opinion  Adams  v.  City  of 
Shelbyville,  154  Ind.  467,  77  Am.  St. 
Rep.  484,  49  L.  R.  A.  797,  57  N.  E. 
114  [1899]  )  ;  Webster  v.  City  of  Far- 
go, 181  U.  S.  394,  45  L.  912,  21  S.  623, 
645  [1901];  (affirming,  Webster  v. 
City  of  Fargo,  9  N.  D.  208,  56  L.  R. 
A.  156,  82  N.  "W.  732  [1900]  )  ;  Tona- 
wanda  v.  Lj^on,  181  U.  S.  389,  45  L. 
908,  21  S.  609  [1901];  (reversing, 
Lyon  V.  Town  of  Tonawanda,  98 
Fed.  361  [1899]);  City  of  Gladstone 
V.  Throop,  71  Fed.  341,  18  C.  C.  A. 
61,  37  U.  S.  App.  481  [1895];  Dun- 
can V.  Ramish,  142  Cal.  686,  76  Pac. 
661  [1904];  German  Savings  and 
Loan  Society  v.  Ramish,  138  Cal. 
120,  69  Pac.  89,  70  Pac.  1067  [1902], 
Dyer  v.  Hudson,  65  Cal.  374,  4  Pac. 
231  [1884];  (following  Emery  v. 
San  Francisco  Gas  Co.,  28  Cal.  346 
[1865]  )  ;  Emery  v.  San  Francisco  Gas 
Co..  28  Cal.  346  [1865];  City  of  At- 
lanta v.  First  Presbyterian  Church, 
86  Ga.  730,  12  L.  R.  A.  852,  13  S. 
E.  252  [1890];  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Savannah,  86  Ga.  301, 
12  S.  E.  580  [1890];  Hayden  v.  City 
of  Atlanta,  70  Ga.  817  [1883]:  Lan. 
phere  v.  City  of  Chicaoo,  212  111. 
440.    72   N.   e"^,    426    [1904];    McChes- 


ney  v.  City  of  Chicago,  201  111.  344, 
66  N.  E.  217  [1903];  Field  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  198  111.  224,  64  N.  E. 
840  [1902];  Lehmers  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 178  111.  530,  53  N.  E.  394 
[1899];  Holt  v.  City  of  East  St. 
Louis,  150  111.  530,  37  N.  E.  927 
[1894];  Woods  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
135  111.  582,  26  N.  E.  608  [1892]; 
Holmes  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Park,  121 
111.  128,  13  N.  E.  540  ["l889]  ;  Flour- 
noy  v.  City  of  Jeffersonville,  17 
Ind.  169,  79  Am.  Dec.  468  [1861]; 
City  of  Burlington  v.  Gilbert,  31  la. 
356,  7  Am.  Rep.  143  [1871];  Motz 
v.  City  of  Detroit,  18  Mich.  494 
[1869];  People  ex  rel.  Griffin  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  419, 
55  Am.  Dee.  266  [1851];  Hurford  v. 
City  of  Omaha,  4  Neb.  336  [1876]; 
Haegele  v.  Mallinckrodt,  3  Mo.  App. 
329  [1877];  People  ex  rel.  Ackerly  v. 
City  of  Brooklyn,  8  Hun.  56  [1876]; 
Jessing  v.  City  of  Columbus,  1  Ohio 
C.  C.  90;  (affirmed,  22  W.  L.  B. 
453  [1885]);  Beaumont  v.  Wilkes- 
Barre  City,  142  Pa.  St.  198,  21  Atl. 
888  [1891]  ;  M'Gonigle  v.  City  of  Al- 
legheny, 44  Pa.  St.  118   [1862]. 

'  Louisville  and  Nashville  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co., 
197  U.  S.  430,  25  S.  466  [1905];  (af- 
firming, 116  Ky.  856,  76  S.  W.  1097, 
25  Ky.  L.  R.  1024  [1903])  ;  Oakland 
Paving  Company  v.  Hilton,  69  Cal. 
479,  11  Pac.  3  [1886];  MoChesney  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  205  111.  611,  69  N. 
E.  82  [1903];  Gage  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 201  111.  93,  66  N.  E.  374 
[1903]  ;  City  of  ^'hica'^o  v.  Sherwood. 
104  111.  549  [18821;  City  of  Chicago 
V.  People  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  56 


937 


PKOPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§570 


ing-,  curbing  and  guttering.^"  grading,  planking  and  constructing 
sidewalks/'  grading',  paving  and  draining,^-  grading  and  the  con- 
struction of  sidewalks, '•'*  grading,  curbing,  i)aving.  guttering  and 
constructing  sidewalks,'*  and  grading  and  the  construction  of 
hewers. ^'^  Paving  is  an  improvement  which  is  generally  effected  in 
connection  with  other  improvements.  In  addition  to  the  illus- 
trations already  given,  grading  and  repaving/"  tilling,  grading, 
flagging  and  draining,'"  and  filling,  paving,  curbnig,  gutter- 
ing and  constructing  sidewalks,'^  have  all  been  treated  as  proper 
exercises  of  the  power  to  levy  a  local  assessment.  Asesssments 
for  paving  and  curbing.'"  paving,  curbing  and  guttering,-"  pav- 

Citv,    o9 


111.  327  [1870];  Richardson  v.  Meh- 
ler,  HI  Ky.  408,  03  S.  \V.  957,  23 
Ky.  L.  R.  917  [1901];  Gleason  v. 
Barnett,  100  Ky.  125,  50  S.  W.  67 
[18991;  Moale  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore,  01  Md.  224 
[1883];  Ulman  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore,  7*2  Md.  587,  11 
L.  R.  A.  224,  32  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp. 
Cas.  228,  20  Atl.  141.  21  Atl.  709 
1 1890] ;  Lewis  v.  City  of  Elizabeth, 
25  N.  J.  Eq.  (10  -C".  E.  Gr.)  298 
[1874];  Fifty  Fourth  Street,  Pitts- 
burg's Appeal,  165  Pa.  St.  8,  30  Atl. 
503  [1894];  Allegheny  City  v.  Blair, 
74  Pa.  St.  (24  P.  *F.  Smith)  225 
[1873]. 

^"City  of  St.  Louis  to  use  of  Mc- 
Grath  v.  Clemens,  36  Mo.  467   [1865]. 

"  Bellingham  Bay  anil  British  Co- 
lumbia Railroad  v.  New  Whatconi, 
172  r.  S.  314.  43  L.  460.  19  S.  205 
[1899  1:  (affirming  City  of  New 
Whatcom  V.  Bellingham  Bay  Im- 
provement Company.  Ki  Wasli.  131, 
47   Pac.  236    11896]). 

"  Brewer  v.  Incorporated  Village 
of  Bowling  Green,  Ohio,  7  Ohio  C.  C. 
489    [1893]. 

"First  National  Bank  of  Kansas 
City  V.  Nelson.  64  y\n.  418  [1877]. 

"  State,  Provident  Institution  for 
Savings  in  .Tcisey  City,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Jersey  Cit^•.  52  N.  J. 
L.   (23  Vr.)   490.  19  Atl.  1096  [1890]. 

"State,  Provident  Institution  for 
Savings  in  Jersey  City,  Pros.  v.  May- 
or, etc.,  of  Jersoy  (jty,  52  N.  J.  L. 
(23  Vr.)  490.  19  Atl.  1096  [1890]  ; 
■Marsliall    v.  Ciminmnwealth   to  use  of 


Mayor,    etc.,    of    Allegheny 
Pa.   St.   455    [1868]. 

'^  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Buhler,  32  Barb.   (N.  Y.)    79   [1859]. 

^'  State,  Moran,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  58  N.  J.  L. 
(29  Vr.)    144.  35  Atl.  284   [1895]. 

"*  State,  Malone,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  Jersey  City, 
28  N.  J.  L.   (4  Dutch.)   500   [1860]". 

*"  Dowling  v.  Hibernia  Loan  and 
Savings  Society,  143  Cal.  425,  77 
Pac.  141  [1904];  Reid  v.  Clay,  134 
Cal.  207,  66  Pac.  262  [1901];'  Will- 
iams V.  Bergin,  116  Cal.  56,  47  Pac. 
877  [18971;  Borland  v.  Bergson,  78 
Cal.  637,  21  Pac.  537  [1889];  Mead 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  186  111.  54,  57 
N.  E.  824  [1900];  Claflin  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  178  111.  549,  53  N.  E.*339 
I1S99];  Chicago  &  Northern  Pacific 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 172  111.  66.  49  N.  E.  1006 
I  1898]  ;  People  ex  rel.  Kochersper- 
ger  V.  :\larkley.  1()6  111.  48,  46  N.  E. 
742  [1897];  Kimble  v.  City  of  Peo- 
ria. 140  111.  157.  29  N.  E.  723  [1893]; 
Wilbur  V.  City  of  Sprinu'field.  123 
111.  395.  14  N.  E.  871  [18991;  City 
of  Topeka  v.  Gage.  44  Kan.  87,  24 
Pac.  82  [1890];  Olsson  v.  City  of 
Topeka.  42  Kan.  709.  21  Pac.  219 
I  1889]  ;  P.]air  v.  City  of  Atchison. 
40  Kan.  353.  19  Pac.  815  [1888]: 
Steckert  v.  East  Saginaw.  22  Mich. 
104  [1870]:  Howell  v.  '"ity  of  Phil- 
adelphia. 36  Pa.  St.  471  [lS(il]: 
Green  v.  Ward.  82  Va.  324   [1886]. 

="Le  Veine  v.  City  of  Kansas  City 
67    Kan.    239.    72    Pac.    774    [1903]; 


§  571  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  938 

ing  and  guttering,-^  for  paving  and  the  construction  of  a  sewer,'-- 
for  grading  and  paving  a  street  and  filling  and  adjusting  so  ^'ers, 
catch-basins  and  man-holes,"''  and  for  grading  a  street,  sodding 
the  center  thereof  and  graveling  the  sides  and  constructing  a 
sewer  thereunder,^*  have  been  upheld.  So  curbing  and  gutter- 
ing,-^ or  curbing  and  the  construction  of  sidewalks,-''  or  curbing, 
guttering  and  the  construction  of  sidewalks  -'  are  improvements 
which  may  be  made  together  and  for  which  one  assessment  may 
be  levied. 

§  571.     Sidewalks. 

Sidewalks  on  each  side  of  the  same  street  may  be  regarded  as 
one  improvement  and  an  assessment  for  the  aggregate  cost 
thereof  may  be  levied  upon  the  property  on  both  sides  of  the 
street.^  It  has  been  held  that  an  assessment  for  sidewalks  on 
two  or  more  streets  is  prima  facie  valid  in  the  absence  of  a 
showing  that  such  streets  are  so  separate  that  a  sidewalk  on 
one  does  not  benefit  property  on  the  other.-  A  property  owner 
whose  assessment  is  less  where  two  or  more  sidewalk  improve- 
ments are  grouped  together  than  it  would  have  been  had  a  sep- 
arate assessment  been  levied  for  each  improvement,  cannot  com- 
plain because  such  improvements  are  grouped."'    It  has  been  held 

City  of  Emporia  v.  Norton,   13  Kan.  Xevada  to  the  use  of  Gilfillan  v.  Mor- 

569    [1874];    Strasshein    v.    Jerman.  ris,  43  Mo.  App.  586   [1891];   In  the 

56  Mo.   104   [1874].  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Auchmuty 

^Burk    V.    Altschul,    66    Cal.    533,  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  11  Hun.  76 

6  Pac.  393  [1885];  Warren  v.  Henly,  [1877]. 

31    la.   31    [1870].  ^^  Mayor  and  Board  of  Trustees  of 

^  Cincinnati  for  use,  etc.,  v.  Jung,  the   Town    of   New    Iberia   v.    Fonte- 

7  Ohio  N.  P.  665  [1900];  Megett  v.  lieu,  108  La.  460,  32  So.  369  [1901]. 
City  of  Eau  Claire,  81  Wis.  326,  51  "Lyon  v.  Alley,  130  U.  S.  177,  32 
N.    W.    566    [1892].  L.    899,   9   S.   480    [1889];     (affirming 

=^  Sawyer   v.   City   of   Chicago,    183  Alley  v.  Lyon,   14  D.  C.    (3  Mackey) 

111.  57,  55  N.  E.  645   [1899].  457    [1885]);    Ryan  v.  Altschul,   103 

"Murphy   v.    City    of   Peoria,    119  Cal.   174,  37  Pac.   339    [1894]. 

111.   509,   9   N.   E.   895    [1888].  ^  Davis    v.    City    of   Litchfield,    145 

»« Arnold    v.    City    of    Fort    Dodge,  111.   313,  21   L.  R.   A.  563,   33   N.   E. 

Iowa,    111    la.    152,    82    N.    W.    495  888    [1893];   W'atson  v.   City  of  Chi- 


[1900];     Rooney    v.    Brown,    21    La.  cago,  115  HI.  78,  3  N.  E.  430  [U 

Ann.   51    [1869];    City   of   Omaha   v.  ==  Storrs  v.  City  of  Chicago,  208  111. 

Gsanter,  4  Neb.  Unoff.  52,  93  N.  W.  .364,   70  N.   E.   347    [1904]. 

407    [1903];    State,    Ward,    Pros.    v.  'City  of  Marionville  to  the  use  of 

Commissioners  of  Streets  and  Sewers  Grubaugli    v.    Henson,    65    Mo.    App. 

of  New  Brunswick,   49  N.  J.  L.    (20  397    [1895]. 

Vr.)  552,  10  Atl.  109  [1887];  City  of 


939  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT,  .§  572 

that  under  a  statute  authorizing  the  same,  sidewalks  may  be 
constructed  on  different  streets  and  the  entire  cost  of  such  side- 
walks assessed  upon  all  property  abutting  any  of  such  streets.* 
This  procedure,  however,  will  result  in  injustice  except  where 
the  benefits  are  substantially  the  same  to  all  the  property  assessed. 
It  is,  on  principle,  wrong,  except  where  the  sidewalks  are  of 
substantially  the  same  cost  and  confer  substantially  the  same 
benefit  to  the  property  in  front  of  which  they  are  laid.  Two  or 
more  sidewalks  on  different  streets  not  forming  a  continuous  or 
connected  improvement  cannot  be  constructed  as  one  improve- 
ment and  the  cost  thereof  levied  upon  all  the  property  fronting 
each  one  of  said  sidew^alks  in  proportion  to  the  frontage  thereof."' 
Such  an  assessment  would  charge  one  tract  of  property  with 
a  part  of  the  cost  of  an  improvement  which  did  not  in  any  way 
benefit  it.  The  construction  of  a  sidewalk  as  an  entirety,  includ- 
ing sidewalk  intersections,  is  proper."  A  title  drain  to  carry  sur- 
face water  away  from  a  street  is  regarded  as  so  essentially  a  part 
of  a  street  improvement  that  it  is  properly  constructed  under  a 
petition  of  property  owners  praying  for  the  improvement  of  the 
street  without  specific  reference  to  such  drain. '^ 

§  572.     Sewers. 

If  two  sewers  are  connected  so  as  to  form  in  fact  one  continu- 
ous improvement,  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for  the  aggregate 
cost  of  the  construction  thereof  upon  the  property  benefited 
thereby,^  even  if  such  sewer  runs  along  two  or  more  different 
streets.-  A  sewer  which  is  bisected  by  another  sewer,  with  an 
outlet  at  the  point  of  bisection,  is  to  be  regarded  as  one  improve- 
ment and  not  as  two  different  sewers  running  from  the  outlet  iti 

*  Parker    v.    Challiss.    9    Kan.     1.").')  Moines,    ;>7     la.    144.    10    N.    W.    .3:]0 

[1872].  riSSl];    ]\:ayor    and    Cnuneil    of    tlie 

°  People  ex  rel.  ITanberp  v.  Stearns,  City    of    Payonne    v.    Morris,    Gl    N. 

213   III.    184,    72   N.    E.    728    [19041;  J.    L.     (.32    Vr.)     127,    38    Atl.    819 

Arnold    v.    City  Of    CamLridjie,    10(!  [18971:    In   the, Matter   of   the   Peti- 

Mass.    352    [1871];    Cist    v.    City    of  tion   of   In^raham   to  Vacate   an   As- 

Cincinnati,  8  Ohio  N.  P.  559   [1901].  sessment,  M  N.  Y.  310    [1S7()1:    (af- 

"Hyman    v.    City    of    Chicajjo,    188  firniinfj  Tn  the  Matter  of  tlie  Petition 

111.  4fi2.  59  N.   E.   10   [1900].  of    Tngraham    to    Vacate    an    Assess- 

^  Taylor    v.    Wapakoneta,    20    Ohio  mont    on    Ei<,'litv-ei'rlith    and    Ninotv- 

C,  C.  285  [1904].  first    Streets.    4    Ilun.     (N.    Y.)     495 

'Church   V.   People  ex   rol.   Kocher-  [187.")]. 
spercer,    179    111.   205;    53    X.    E.    r^'^A  =  Criiiuncll    v.    Citv   of   Do-;   :Moines. 

[1899];     (irimnicll     v.     City    of    Des  57  la.   144.   10  X.  W.   330   [1881]. 


I  572  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  940 

each  direction.-'  A  sewer  with  the  branches  thereof  is  to  be 
regarded  as  one  improvement  for  this  purpose. ■*  The  construc- 
tion of  a  drain  and  the  construction  of  man-holes  thereto  amount 
to  one  improvement.-^  The  construction  of  sewers  and  connec- 
tions therewith  and  the  establishing  of  building  lines  may  be 
regarded  as  one  improvement.*'  If  a  pumping  station  is  neces- 
sary to  secure  the  flow  of  sewage,  such  pumping  station  and  the 
system  of  sewers  may  be  constructed  together  as  one  improve- 
ment.^ Ordinarily  the  construction  of  a  bridge  and  the  construc- 
tion of  a  sewer  would  constitute  two  different  improvements  for 
which  it  would  be  improper  to  levy  one  assessment  covering  the 
aggregate  cost.  However,  if  the  sewer  is  designed  to  drain  the 
surface  water  from  the  street  and  to  prevent  such  water  over- 
flowing the  bridge,  the  two  may  be  regarded  as  one  improve- 
ment.^ If  only  property  abutting  on  a  sewer  can  be  assessed, 
it  has  been  held  to  be  improper  to  levy  an  entire  assessment  for 
the  cost  of  a  connected  system  of  sewers."  Two  or  more  sewers 
draining  different  tracts  of  property  cannot  be  regarded  as  one  im- 
provement, if  they  do  not  naturally  form  one  continuous  improve- 
ment.^" Accordingly,  a  statute  which  provided  for  estimating 
the  aggregate  cost  of  all  sewers  constructed,  relaid  or  extended 
in  any  one  season  and  for  apportioning  the  aggregate  cost 
thereof  upon  the  property  abutting  on  any  of  such  sewers  at  a 
certain  rate  per  front  foot  is  regarded  as  unconstitutional  as 
assessing  for  an  improvement,  property  which  is  not  benefited 
thereby.^^  A  number  of  city  blocks  requiring  different  kinds  of 
drainage  cannot  be  grouped  together  and  subjected  to  an  assess- 
ment for  the  entire  cost  of  draining  such  property  by  improve- 
ments, a  part  of  which  confer  no  benefit  upon  some  of  the  prop- 

^  Church   V.  People  ex  rel.   Kocher-  '  Drexel  v.   Town  of  Lake,   127   111. 

sperger,    179   111.   205.   53   N.   E.   554  54,   20  N.  E.   38    [1890]. 

[1899].  'People  ex  rel.  Knox  v.  Village  of 

'  Payne  V.  Village  of  South  Spring-  Yonkers,   39   Barb.   2&6    [1863]. 

field,     161     111.    285,»  44    N.    E.     105  "  Witnian   v.  City   of   Readino.    169 

[1896];    Lincoln    v.    Street    Commis-  Pa.  St.  375,  32  Atl.  576   [1895]. 

sioners   of    the    City   of   Boston,    176  ^"  State  v.  Pillsbury.  82  Minn.  359, 

Mass.  210,  57  N.  E.  356   [1900].  85  N.  W.  175   [1901];   In  the  Matter 

^Steele  v.  Villasje  of  River  Forest,  of  the  Petition  of  Van  Buren  to  Va- 

141    111.   302,   30  N.   E.   1034    [1893].  cate    an    Assessment.    79    N.    Y.    384 

'Lincoln   v.   Board   of   Street   Com-  [1880]. 

missioners  of  the  City  of  Boston.  176  ^'  State  v.  Pillslmry.  82  Minn.  359, 

Mass.   210,  57   N.   E.'  356    [1900].  85  N.  W.   175    [1901]. 


941  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  57  J^ 

erty  thus  assessed.^-  If  to  add  together  the  cost  of  differenr 
sewers  laid  on  different  streets  and  to  apportion  the  aggregate 
cost  upon  the  property  fronting  on  any  of  such  sewers,  results 
in  assessment  which  is  not  materially  in  excess  of  the  benefits 
conferred  upon  any  tract  of  property,  such  assessment  is  not 
invalid. ^^ 

§  573.     Other  improvements. 

The  construction  of  a  terminal  station  and  the  changes  in 
streets  leading  thereto,  necessary  as  essential  parts  of  the  general 
plan  of  such  construction,  may  be  made  together  and  one  assess- 
ment may  be  levied  for  the  aggregate  cost  of  such  improvement 
upon  any  property  benefited  thereby.^  The  laying  out  of  a  pul)- 
lic  park  and  the  sanitary  improvement  of  the  neighborhood 
thereof  may  be  regarded  as  one  improvement  and  the  aggregate 
cost  thereof  paid  for  by  one  assessment.-  Two  alleys  in  the  same 
block,  one  running  north  and  south  and  the  other  running  east 
and  west,  cannot  be  treated  as  one  improvement.  The  aggregate 
cost  thereof  cannot  be  assessed  upon  all  the  property  in  the  rear 
of  which  (^aeh  alley  is  constructed. -'^  A  connected  system  of  water 
works  may  be  regarded  as  one  improvement  and  an  assessment 
levied  upon  all  the  property  benefited  thereby.*  If  the  proceed- 
ings are  distinct,  by  statute,  the  improvements  cannot  he  com- 
bined even  if  parts  of  an  entire  whole.''  Under  suc-h  statutes 
widening  cannot  be  combined  with  grading  and  graveling. °  It 
has  been  held  that  wliere  gutters  have  been  constructed  on  two 
or  more  streets  under  different  resolutions,  assessments  may  be 
levied  for  the  aggregate  cost  thereof.'  Lands  in  different  water 
sheds,  re(|uiring  diff(M-ent  ditches  for  their  drainage,  cannot  be 
assessed  l)y  onv  assessmeiil   for  a   diteli  which   can  di'ain  l)ut  one 

"  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  :\rass.  274.  ()2  T..   iJ.  A.   144.  (;2  X.   K. 

Van  Buren  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  .307    [li^O^]. 

79   N.   Y.   384    flSSOl.  =  r!ri./._rs   v.   Wliitney.    Ml)   Mass.   <17. 

"Villasre   of    IIins(hih'    v.    Sliannnn.  34  X.  E.   17!)   flS!):{l. 

182    Til.    312.    -r2    X.    E.    327    llSiiOl:  '' Weckler    v.    (  ity    of    (  hiea-o.    fil 

Beach    v.    People    e\    n-l.    Kern.    157  111.    142    [18711. 

111.  f)59.  41  X.  E.   1117   [180.-/1:  John-  M'eople  e.\  r^l.   Miller  v.   Sherman, 

son    V.   Village    of    Avondale.    1    Ohio  S3  111.   Kki    [lS7!i|. 

C.   r.   220    [18851.  -'MenchMi'i:!!!     v.     (  lu-isli.    84     Ind. 

MA^ells  V.   Street  Commissioners  of  04. 

Citv  of  Boston,  187  Mass.  451.  73  X".  "  :\fenilenli:ill  v.  (  Iu2ish.  84  Tn.l.  04. 

E.  554   [lOnSl:   Sears  v.  St'-eet   Com-  •  Fendi-/   v.    Knijrht.    (iO    la.    20.    14 

missioners  of  the  City  of  Boston,  180  X.  \V.  78   [1882].  ' 


§  574  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  942 

of  such  water  sheds.**  A  water  pipe  was  laid  on  one  street  and 
then  turned  at  a  right  angle  and  ran  along  another  street  to  its 
terminus.     It  was  held  that  this  constituted  one  improvement." 

§  574.     Separation  of  improvements. 

Whether  improvements  which  in  their  nature  are  connected 
parts  of  an  united  whole  may  be  constructed  separately,  is 
ordinarily  within  the  discretion  of  the  city,  in  the  absence  of  a 
statute  which  either  expressly  or  in  effect  requires  the  construc- 
tion of  such  improvements  together.^  Thus,  the  planking  and 
grading  of  a  street,-  or  the  macadamizing  and  grading  of  a 
street,^  may  be  constructed  separately.  The  grading  and  macad- 
amizing of  a  street  may  be  constructed  without  providing  for 
curbing  and  gutters.*  An  assessment  for  widening  a  street  does 
not  exhaust  the  power  of  the  city,  but  it  may  assess  subsequently 
for  grading  and  paving.^  If  the  statute  in  force  provides  for 
the  construction  of  a  given  kind  of  improvement  only  as  auxiliary 
to  another  kind  of  improvement,  the  city  or  other  public  cor- 
poration has  no  power  to  undertake  such  auxiliary  improvement 
apart  from  the  kind  of  improvement  which  it  was  intended  to 
aid."  Thus,  if  a  drainage  statute  permits  the  construction  of  a 
levee  as  a  part  of  a  system  of  drainage  for  agricultural  and 
sanitary  purposes,  a  levee  cannot  be  constructed  as  an  independ- 
ent improvement  apart  from  any  system  of  drains  and  ditches.' 
Statutes  are  sometimes  found  restricting  the  amount  of  assess- 
ments to  a  certain  percentage  of  the  value  of  the  land  assessed.** 
Occasionally  an  attempt  is  made  to  evade  the  provisions  of  such 
statute  by  separating  the  improvement  into  a  group  of  improve- 
ments, the  assessment  for  each  of  which  will  be  below  the  statu- 
tory limit.  If  the  improvements  thus  separated  are  really  con- 
stituent parts  of  one  general  improvement,  such  separation  can- 

"  Klinrrer  v.   People  ex   rel.   Conkle.  ^  Dyer    v.    Hudson,    65    Cal.    374,    4 

130   111.  509,  22  N.  E.   600    [1890].  Pac.    231    [1884]. 

•  Ricketts  v.  Village  of  Hyde  Pai'k,  *  Fox  v.  Middlesborough  Town  Co., 

85  HI.   110   [1877].                "  90  Ky.  262.  28   S.  W.  776   [1894]. 

'  For  a  division  of  an  improvement  ^  Krumberg  v.  Cincinnati,  29  0.  S. 

to  evade  the  requirements  as   to   the  69. 

formalities    of    letting    the    contract  "Updike     v.     Wright,     81     111.     49 

see   §   523.  [1876]. 

=  Fnowles    v.    Seale,    64    Cal.    377,  'Updike     v.     Wright,     81     111.     49 

1    Pac.    159    [1883].  [1876]. 

' See  §  679  ct  seq. 


943 


PROPERTY  SrBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§  57  I 


not  be  made.-'  Thus,  a  street  improvement  was  divided  into 
two  parts,  one  for  fjradino-  said  curbing  stones  and  flagging  and 
the  other  for  paving  a  roadway.  It  was  held  that  the  assess- 
ments for  each  of  these  improvements  must  l)e  added 
together  to  determine  whether  the  statutory  limit  had 
been  exceeded.^**  If.  by  the  separation  of  an  improve- 
ment into  two  or  more  distinct  improvements,  a  property 
owner  is  obliged  to  pay  less  than  if  the  improvement  had  been 
made  as  an  entirety,  he  cannot  complain  of  such  action  of  the 
public  corporation.^^  A  city  has,  ordinarily,  in  the  absence  of 
some  statutory  provisions  showing  the  contrary  intention  of  the 
legislature,  the  pow-er  to  divide  a  street  or  similar  improvement 
into  sections  and  improve  each  section  separately.^-  Such  im- 
provement may  be  made,  as  to  each  section,  at  the  cost  of  the 
property  abutting  that  particular  section, ^'^  without  assessing 
property  abutting  on  any  other  part  of  the  street.^*  Such  section 
may  terminate  in  the  middle  of  a  block. ^^  If  certain  property 
is  so  nearly  valueless  that  an  assessment  thereon  would  be  un- 
availing, the  city  may  provide  for  paying  the  improvement  oppo- 
site such  property  out  of  the  general  funds  of  the  city  and  may 
assess  the  rest  of  the  work  against  the  other  property  abutting.^® 


"  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
WaJlter  to  Vacate  Certain  Assess- 
ments, 75  N.  Y.   354    [18781. 

'» In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Walter  to  Vacate  Certain  Assess- 
ments,  75  N.  Y.  354    [1878]. 

"  Ma<i;ee  v.  Commonwcaltli  for  the 
use  of  tlie  City  of  Pittsbvufr.  4(i  Pa. 
St.    358    [1863]. 

'=  Pates  V.  Twist,  138  Cal.  52,  70 
Pac.  1023  [1902];  Treanor  v.  Hough- 
ton, 103  Cal.  53,  36  Pac.  1081 
[1894]  ;  Ede  v.  Cogswell.  79  Cal.  278, 
21  Pac.  767  [1889]-,  Dongiierty  v. 
Hitchcock,  35  Cal.  512  [ISdS]-.  lira.l- 
ford  V.  City  of  Pontiac,  105  III.  (n2. 
46  N.  E.  794  [18971;  Lightner  v. 
City  of  Peoria.  \r>0  111.  SO;  37  X.  E. 
69 '[18941:  Bi^elow  v.  City  of  Chi- 
Cairo.  90  111.  49  [1878]  ;  Bozarth  v. 
:McGillicuddy,  10  Tnd.  App.  26.  47 
X.  E.  397.  48  X.  E.  1042  [18971: 
Kendi-x  v.  Kni'zht.  fiO  Ta.  29.  14  X. 
\V.     78     [18821:     Xetr    v.     Covin-ton 


Stone  &  Sand  Co.,  108  Ky.  457,  55 
S.  W.  697,  50  S.  W.  723  [1900]; 
State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Benz  v. 
District  Court  of  Ramsey  County, 
32  Minn.  181,  19  X.  W.  732  [1884]; 
Eyerman  v.  Blakesloy,  13  yin.  App. 
407  [18831;  Creigliti)n  v.  Scott,  14 
O.  S.  438  [1863];  Commonwealth  to 
use  of  Allegheny  City  v.  Marshall, 
09  Pa.  St.  (19"  P.  F.  Smith)  328 
[1871];  Wabash  Avenue,  26  Pa. 
Super.   Ct.   305    [1904]. 

"Kendig  v.  Knight,  60  la.  29,  14 
X.  W.  78  [18821;  Creighton  v,  Scott, 
14  O.  S.  438  [1863]:  Wabash  Ave- 
inio.  26  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  305    [1904]. 

■•  Creighton  v.  Scott,  14  0.  S.  438 
[18631;  Wabash  Avenue.  26  Pa. 
Super.    Ct.    305    [1904]. 

'^  Brevoort  v.  City  of  Detroit,  24 
Mich.  322   [1872]. 

'"  Ottumwa  Brick  &  Construction 
Co.  V.  Ainley.  109  la.  386.  80  X.  W. 
510   [1899]. 


§  574  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  944 

Under  a  statute  providing  that  all  or  part  of  a  street  may  be 
paved  and  that,  when  such  action  will  allow  the  just  proportion 
of  the  entire  cost  to  be  assessed  uniformly  to  each  abut- 
ting front  foot,  the  cost  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  im- 
provement may  be  levied  at  one  time  and  under  one  plat  and  no- 
tice, it  is  held  that  different  amounts  may  be  levied  upon  dif- 
ferent front  feet  abutting  on  different  parts  of  such  improvement, 
if  a  just  proportion  of  the  entire  cost  is  thereby  assessed  uni- 
formly.^^ A  street  cannot,  however,  be  arbitrarily  broken  up 
into  sections  so  as  to  produce  an  unequal  distribution  of  the 
assessment. ^"^  The  legislature  may  intend  that  each  street  or 
similar  improvement  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  entirety.  If  such 
is  the  legislative  intent,  the  city  cannot  divide  such  improve- 
ment into  sections.^**  Thus,  under  a  statute  providing  that  the 
improvement  of  each  street  or  a  part  thereof  shall  be  under  a 
separate  proceeding,  a  city  cannot  divide  a  street  into  separate 
parts  in  the  same  proceeding,  each  part  of  which  is  to  be  im- 
proved with  different  classes  of  improvements.-'^  A  statute  which 
provides  for  the  consent  of  a  certain  number  of  the  owners  of 
lots  fronting  on  a  given  street  or  road  is  held  to  require  the  im- 
provement of  such  street  or  road  as  an  entirety,  since  otherwise  it 
would  be  impossible  to  obtain  the  necessary  proportion  of  all 
of  the  abutting  property  owners.-^  Where  an  improvement  has 
been  constructed  in  front  of  certain  property  and  such  improve- 
ment is  adopted  by  the  city  or  is  made  by  the  owner  under  a 
statute  which  provides  for  exempting  the  property  in  front  of 
which  an  improvement  is  voluntarily  made,  it  is  proper  for  the 
city  to  divide  an  improvement  into  sections  so  as  to  omit  that 
part  of  the  work  which  has  been  done  already  by  the  property 
owners.--     The  same  rule  applies  where  a  part  of  an  improve- 


"  Gilcrest    v.     McCartney,     97     la.  ^  Town   of   Bowling  Green  v.   Hob- 

138,  66  N.  W.  103  ri896]."  son,  42  Ky.   (3  B.  Mon.)  478  [1843]; 

"Lightner   v.   City   of   Peoria,    150  Elliot  v.  Berry,  41  0.  S.  110   [1884]. 

111.  80,  37  N.  E.  69   [1894].  ^  Diggins   v.   Brown,    76    Cal.   318, 

^•Eyerman   v.   Hardy,   8   Mo.   App.  18   Pac.   373    [1888];    San   Francisco 

311  [1880];  Elliot  V.  Berry,  41  0.  S.  Paving    Company    v.    Dubois,    2    Cal. 

110    [1884];    Oregon   Transfer    Co.   v.  App.  42,  83  Pac.  72    [1905];    Dumes- 

Portland,  47   Or.   1,   81   Pac.   575,   82  nil  v.  Louisville  Artificial  Stone  Co.. 

Pac.    16    [1905].  109    Ky.    1,    58    S.    W.    371     [1900]; 

="  Oregon  Transfer  Co.  v.  Portland,  Beck  v.  Obst,  75  Ky.    (12  Bush.)    268 

47    Or.    1,    81    Pac.    575,    82    Pac.    16  [1876]. 
[1905]. 


945  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  575 

ment  has  been  constructed  under  a  contract  since  abandoned.'^ 
If  a  street  railway  company  is  bound  to  pave  a  part  of  the 
streets  upon  which  its  tracks  are  laid,  it  is  proper  for  the  city 
in  providing  for  an  improvement  of  such  street  to  omit  the 
part  which  such  street  railway  company  is  bound  to  improve  at 
its  own  cost.-*  So  the  contractor  may  be  bound  by  an  agree- 
ment to  look  to  the  street  railroad  company  and  not  to  the  abut- 
ting property  owners  for  that  part  of  the  cost  of  such  improve- 
ment.-'^ In  an  improvement  consisting  of  constructing  a  road- 
way, curbing  and  constructing  a  sidewalk,  one  assessment  was 
levied  for  the  roadway  and  curbing  and  another  for  the  side- 
walk. It  was  held  that  one  assessment  should  have  been  levied 
for  all  of  such  improvements  considered  together  as  in  legal 
effect  one  improvement ;  but  that  if  a  separate  assessment  were 
required  for  each  kind  of  work,  the  assessment  was  invalid,  be- 
cause in  one  of  such  assessments  the  cost  of  curbing  and  paving 
the  roadway  was  included.-" 

§  575.     Lateral  division  of  improvement. 

A  city  or  other  public  corporation  has  ordinarily  a  wide  range 
of  discretion  and  may  improve  a  part  only  of  the  width  of  the 
entire  street.^  A  question  of  this  sort  is  "a  matter  within  the 
discretion  of  the  city  officials."-  If  a  street  is  improved,  the 
land  on  both  sides  thereof  is  beneiited,  and  may,  accordingly, 
he  assessed  for  such  improvement.^  This  is  true  even  if  the 
improvement  is  confined  to  a  part  of  the  width  of  the  street 
improved,  on  one  side  of  the  middle  line  thereof.*  If  there  is 
a  grass  plot  in  the  middle  of  a  street,  and  the  roadway  on  one 

"  Kempor    v.    Kinj;.    11    ^lo.    App.  -ilcGrew  v.   City  of   Kansas   City, 

116    [1881].  lU  Kan.  Gl.  02,  67   Pac.  438   [1902]. 

^  Billinps  V.   Citv  of   Chicafio,    167  ^  Klein  v.  Xufient  Gravel  Company, 

111.   337,  47   X.   E.'731    (1897]-,    Chi-  162   Ind.  509.   70  X.  E.   801    [1903]; 

cago    &    Xorthern     Pacific    Railroad  (reversing    Klein    v.    X'ugent    Gravel 

Company  v.  City  of  Cliicapo.  172  111.  Co.,    66    X.    E.    480    [1903]);    Drake 

06.  49  X.  E.  1006  [1898].  v.    Gront.    21    Ind.   App.    534,    52   N. 

^Perine   v.    Forbusli.   97    Cal.    305,  E.  775   [1898]. 

32  Pac.  226    [1893].  M\lein  v.  Xiigent  Gravel  Company. 

=«Dyer    v.    Harrison,    63    Cal.    447  162   Ind.   509.  70  X.   E.  801    [1903]; 

[1883].  (reversing    Klein    v.    Xneent    Gravel 

^Helm  V.  Witz.   35   Ind.  App.   131,  Co.,  Ind  App.  66  X.  E.  486   [1903])-, 

73    X.    E.    84€    [1904];    :Morrison    v.  :srcGre\v  v.   Citv   of   Kansas   Citv.   64 

Hershire,    32    la.    271     [1871];     Mc-  Kan.   61.  67  Pac.  438    [19021:    //)   re 

Grew    V.    City    of    Kansas    City,    64  Phelps.    96    X\    Y.    S.    862.    110    App. 

Kan.   61,  67   Pac.   438    [1902].  Div.  69  [1905]. 


§  575  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  946 

side  only  of  such  street  has  been  improved,  land  on  the  other 
side  of  the  street  may  be  assessed  therefor.^  If  a  street  is  widened 
by  appropriating  land  on  one  side  of  the  street,  the  cost  thereof 
must  be  levied  upon  the  land  upon  both  sides  of  the  street,  even 
if  owners  of  land  on  the  side  not  assessed  had  voluntarily  dedi- 
cated a  strip  of  land  for  the  street  half  the  width  of  the  street 
appropriated.**  An  assessment  for  a  sewer  upon  one  side  of  the 
street  only  has  been  regarded  as  valid,  unless  it  is  shown  that 
the  land  not  assessed  is  not  supplied  with  drainage  and  is  in 
need  of  drainage,  and  is  therefore  subject  to  assessment.''  By 
statute,  however,  provision  may  be  made  for  assessing  against 
the  property  on  one  side  of  the  street  the  cost  of  the  improve- 
ment of  that  half  of  the  street  divided  lengthwise.*  If,  however, 
the  statute  authorizes  an  assessment  upon  land  on  one  side  of 
the  street  only  if  the  work  for  which  such  assessment  is  levied 
is  opposite  work  of  the  same  class  already  done,  an  assessment 
cannot  be  levied  upon  the  land  upon  one  side  of  the  street  only, 
except  in  strict  compliance  with  the  conditions  of  such  statute." 
Where  one-half  of  a  street  divided  lengthwise  has  been  improved 
at  the  cost  of  the  owners  of  the  land  upon  that  side  of  the  street, 
the  other  half  of  said  street  may  subsequently  be  improved  at  the 
cost  of  the  owners  of  the  land  upon  that  side  of  the  street.^" 
If  the  middle  of  a  street  divided  lengthwise  is  the  dividing  line 
between  two  public  corporations,  each  corporation  may  improve 
its  half  of  the  street  at  the  cost  of  the  owners  of  property  on 
that  side  of  the  street."     Under  a  statute  authorizing  the  city 

°/n  re  Phelps,  96  X.  Y.  S.  862,  110  pany,    24    Ind.    App.    114,    54    N.    E. 

App.  Div.  69   [19051.  1076    [1899];    First    National    Bank 

*  Huntington  v.  City  of  Cincinnati,  v.   Nelson,   64  Mo.   418    [1877];    Lin- 

2  Ohio  N.  P.  35  [1895].     For  a  simi-  denberger  Land  Co.  v.  R.  R.  Park  & 

lar    case    see    City    of    Cincinnati    v.  Co.,   (Ky.)   27  Ky.  L.  Rep.  437,  85  S. 

Batsche,   52    0.   S.   324,   27   L.   R.   A.  W.  213  [1905];  O'Brien  v.  Markland, 

536,  40  N.  E.  21   [1895].  (Ky.)  9  Ky.  L.  Rep.  773,  6  S.  W.  713 

'People  V.  Desmond,  186  N.  Y.  232,  [1888]. 
78     N.     E.     857     [1906];      (reversing  °San    Diego    Investment    Company 

People  V.   Desmond,   97   N.  Y.  S.   795  v.   Shaw,    129   Cal.   273,  61   Pac.    1082 

[1900]);    City   of   Toledo   for   use    v.  [1900]. 
Beaumont.  3  Ohio  N.  P.  287    [1895].  i"  Shirk  v.  Hupp,   167   Ind.   509,  78 

"Perine  v.  Erzgraber,  102  Cal.  234,  N.  E.   242    [1906];    O'Brien  v.  Mark- 

36    Pac.    585    [1894];    Ryan    v.    Alt-  land,    9    Ky.    L.    Rep.    773,    6    S.    W. 

schul,     103     Cal.     174,    37    Pac.     339  713    [1888];    Scully    v.    City   of    Cin- 

[1894];  Shirk  V.  Hupp,,  167  Ind.  509,  cinnati,    1    Cin.    Sup.    Ct.    Rep.    183 

78    N.    E.    242    [19061;    Indianapolis  [18711. 

&    Vincennes    Railway    Company    v.  "  Scully    v.    City    of   Cincinnati,    1 

Capitol  Paving  k  Construction  Com-  Cin.    Sup.    Ct.    Rep.    183    [1871]. 


947  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  575 

to  require  property  owners  to  pave  one-half  of  the  width  of  the 
street  contiguous  to  their  respective  lots,  the  city  cannot  pave 
a  part  in  width  of  the  street  upon  one  side  of  the  middle  line 
thereof,  and  assess  the  entire  cost  of  such  improvement  upon 
the  property  upon  that  side  of  the  street.^-  After  an  improve- 
ment was  ordered,  and  before  the  contract  was  let  and  the  assess- 
ment made,  the  statute,  which  had  previously  provided  that  work 
done  on  one  side  should  be  assessed  on  that  side  only,  except 
curbing  and  grading,  was  modified  so  as  to  provide  that  curbing 
and  grading,  too,  should  be  assessed  against  the  land  on  the  side 
of  which  such  work  was  done,  but  such  change  was  not  to  apply 
to  work  or  proceedings  commenced,  lender  such  statute  it  was 
held  improper  to  assess  against  the  property  on  one  side  of  the 
street,  the  entire  expense  of  such  curbing  and  grading.^^  If 
land  is  appropriated  in  widening  a  street,  the  special  benefit 
from  such  widening  to  that  part  of  the  land  not  taken,  may  be 
deducted  from  damages  sustained  from  such  owner,  although 
land  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  street,  none  of  which  is  taken, 
is  also  benefited.^*  Under  a  statute  providing  that  the  expense 
of  the  paving  to  the  middle  of  a  street  opposite  public  grounds 
of  a  city  shall  be  paid  from  the  ward  fund,  the  owner  of 
property  along  a  part  of  a  street  in  which  the  city  has  constructed 
a  park  forty-two  feet  wide  in  the  center  with  a  roadway  fifty- 
eight  feet  wide  on  each  side  of  it,  cannot  be  charged  with  the 
cost  of  improving  more  than  one-half  of  the  roadway  on  his 
side  of  the  street.^''  The  owners  of  property  across  the  street 
from  county  property  used  as  a  court  house,  which  is  exempt  from 
local  assessment,  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  entire  width  of  the  street.^"  The  city  may,  in  the 
exercise  of  its  discretion,  construct  sidewalks  on  both  sides  of 
the  street."  In  some  jurisdictions  it  has  lieen  said  that  if  the 
city  exercises  its  discretion  to  build  a  sidewalk  only  upon  one 
side   of  the  street,  such   act  is  unreasonable  and   oppressive  to 

"  City    of    Muscatine    v.     Chicago,  "  Boyd    v.    City    of    Milwaukee,   92 

Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Railway  Com-  Wis.  450,  60  N.  W.  60.3   flSJMi]. 

pany,    88    la.    291,    55    N.    W.     100  "Thornton  v.  City  of  Clinton,  148 

[189.31.  Mo.   048,  50  S.  W.  295. 

"Ryan   v.   Altschul.    103   Cal.    174,  '' Lanpan   v.    Bit/er,   —   Ky.   , 

37   Pac.   339    [18941.  26  Ky.  Law  Rep.  579,  82  S.  W.  280 

"Abbott  V.  Inhabitants  of  Cottage  [1904], 
City,    143    Mass.    521.    58    Am.    Rep. 
143,   10  N.  E.   325    [1887]. 


§  57b  TAXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT.  948 

owners  of  land  upon  the  side  of  street  which  is  denied  a  side- 
walk.^« 

§  576.     Property  on  part  of  improvement  for  which  assessment 
is  not  levied. 

If  a  street  is  opened  or  improved,  property  which  fronts  on 
such  street,  but  is  beyond  the  part  which  is  improved  and  does 
not  abut  thereon,  may  be  benefited  by  such  improvement.  If 
it  is  so  benefited  a  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  such 
property  is  valid  and  enforceable.^  Property  a  thousand  feet 
beyond  the  termination  of  planking,  but  on  the  same  street, 
may  be  assessed  therefor.-  Property  abutting  on  a  stream  above 
the  point  of  termination  of  the  widening  and  deepening  of  such 
stream  may  be  assessed  therefor,  at  least,  if,  at  slight  expense, 
the  stream  may  be  rendered  navigable  up  to  said  land.^  A 
statute  providing  for  an  assessment  for  opening  a  street  against 
owners  of  land  on  the  line  of  such  street  is  held  to  include  owners 
of  property  upon  the  part  of  the  street  already  opened  and  not 
merely  the  owners  of  property  upon  that  part  of  the  street  v>^hich 
is  opened.*  A  similar  rule  is  applied  to  assessments  for  widen- 
ing a  street.-  Where,  by  such  statute,  the  expense  of  grading 
a  street  is  to  be  charged  upon  the  lots  on  both  sides  of  such 
street  throughout  its  entire  length,  while  paving  is  to  be  charged 
merely  upon  the  lots  contiguous  to  such  paving,  grading  which 
is  merely  accessory  to  the  work  of  paving  may  properly  be 
charged  upon  the  contiguous  lots  alone.**  In  the  absence  of  a 
statute  providing  for  assessing  land  upon  a  street  as  originally 
constructed,  for  the  extension  thereof,  land  upon  the  original 
portion    of    such    street    cannot    be    assessed    for    the    extension 

^Mlills    V.    Village    of    Norwood,    6  [1890];    Chestnut  Aveniip,  68  Pa.  St. 

Ohio  C.  €.  305   [1892].     See  §   296.  (18   P.   F.   Smith)    81    [1871]. 

1  City   of   Seattle   v.    Kelleher,    195  ■  City   of    Seattle   v.    Kelleher,    195 

U.  S.  351,  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904] :  U.  S.  351,  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904]. 

Kuhns   V.    City    of    Omalia,    55    Neb.  ^  People  of  the  State  of  New  York 

183,    75    N.   W.    562    [1898];    McCor-  ex   rel.  Lehigh  Valley   Eailway   Com- 

mick  V.  City  of  Omaha,  37  Neb.  829,  pany   v.   f  ity   of   Buffalo.    147   N.   Y. 

56  N.  W.  626    [1893];    People  of  the  675,   42   N.   E.   344    [1895]. 

State    of    New    York    ex    rel.    Lehigh  *  Chestnut    Avenue,   C8   Pa.   St.    (18 

Valley  Railway   Company   v.   City  of  P.  F.  Smitli)    81    [1871]. 

Buffalo,  147  N.  Y.  675.  ^2  N.  £.344  =  IMain    Street.    Big    Run    Borough. 

[1895];    Main   Street,   Bi?  Run   Bor-  137  Pa.  St.  590,  20  Atl.  711    [1890]. 

ough,    137   Pa.    St.   590.   29   Atl.    711  "Blount   v.    City   of   Janesville,   31 

Wis.   648    [1872]. 


949  i'KOi'ERTi     SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  577 

thereof.'  This  is  true  even  if  such  street  as  originally  constructed 
terminated  in  a  cul  de  sac  and  the  extension  gh'ns  a  new  outlet 
to  the  land  on  the  original  portion  of  the  street.^  Under  such 
statutes  only  land  abutting  on  the  part  of  the  street  Avhich  is 
extended  can  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  improvement/'  If  the 
l^roperty  beyond  the  improvement  is  not  benefited,  or  if  the  stat- 
ute does  not  authorize  the  assessment  of  such  property,  it  cannot 
be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  an  improvement,  which  does  not  extend 
to  such  property.'"  The  owner  of  land  abutting  on  such  improve- 
ment cannot  complain  because  the  owners  of  land  beyond  such 
improvement  are  assessed.'^  Thus,  land  which  is  beyond  a  sewer 
and  which  is  not  shown  to  be  benefited  thereby  cannot  be  assessed 
therefor.'-  Land  beyond  the  point  to  which  a  street  is  extended 
cannot  be  assessed  for  such  improvement.'^  Land  beyond  the 
point  to  which  a  street  is  widened  is  not  subject  to  assessment 
for  such  Avidening.'*  The  reason  given  for  such  rule  is  that  such 
land  is  liable  to  assessment  when  the  street  is  widened  opposite 
such  land.'"'  The  question,  however,  is  primarily  one  of  statu- 
tory construction.  If  such  land  is  benefited  and  the  statute 
authorizes  its  assessment,  the  fact  that  it  may  be  assessed  su!)- 
sequently  for  further  widening  of  the  street  is  no  defense,  since 
in  the  latter  case  the  land  in  that  part  of  the  street  first  widened 
Avould  be  subject  to  assessment  for  widening  the  second  portion 
of  such  street. 

§  577.     Improvement  of  varying  width  and  cost. 

A  street  which  is  improved  may  be  of  different  widths  at  dif- 
ferent points  in  its  length.     Whether  such  an  improvement  shall 

'State,  .Schulting,  Pros.  v.  City  of  wood.  02  ^lo.  App.  550  [IS<.)5T;   Kyan 

Passaic,  47  N.  J.  L.   (IHVroom)   273  v.    Sunnior.    17    Wasli.    22S.    4!t    Pac. 

[18851;   Smitli   v.  City  of  Toledo,  24  487    11897]. 

O.  S.   120    [1873J:    In  the  Matter  of  "  Ridenour     v.     Sanin.      1      Handy 

the    Opening    of    Orkney    Street.    Ap-  (Oliio)    404    [1855]. 

peal  of  tlie  City  of  Philadelpliia.   104  '- Kdwards  v.   City  of  Chicago.    140 

Pa.  St.  425.  48  1..  K.   A.  274.    15   .\tl.  III.   440.  80   X.  E.   350    [1893]? 

314    [19001.  "l{yan    v.    Sumner.    17    Wash.    228. 

"In   the  Matter  of   tlie   Opening  of  49    Pac.   487    [1897]. 

Orkney  Street.  Appeal  of  the  City  of  '*  Pigelow    v.    City    of    Cjiieago.    90 

Philadelphia.    194   Pa.   St.   425.   48   L.  111.  49   [1878]. 

Pv.  A.  274.   45   Atl.  314    [1900].  •=  Rigelow    v.    City    of    Cliicago.    90 

"Creighton    v.    Seott.    14    O.    S.   438  III.    49    [1878].      a"  similar    question 

[1863].  was  rai-^ed  hut  not  decided  in  Wright 

"Saxton    National    Pank    v.    Hay-  v.  City  of  Chicago.  48  111.  285  [1868]. 


§  578  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT  950 

be  regarded  as  an  entirety  or  .shall  he  divided  into  sections,  each 
section  of  the  same  Avidth  throughout,  rests  within  the  discre- 
tion of  the  public  authorities.'  It  is  proper  to  regard  the  im- 
provement of  such  street  as  an  entirety  and  to  levy  an  assessment 
upon  the  abutting  or  adjoining  property  without  reference  to 
that  part  of  the  street  opposite  such  property.-  On  the  other 
hand  such  street  may  be  divided  into  sections,  each  of  the  same 
width  throughout  and  the  lots  abutting  each  section  assessed  for 
the  cost  of  such  section.^  It  has,  indeed,  been  said  that  if  such 
street  is  improved  as  an  entire  improvement,  it  is  improper  to 
divide  it  for  assessment  purposes  into  sections  of  equal  width, 
but  that  the  entire  cost  inust  be  computed  and  assessed  upon 
the  property  benefited,  irrespective  of  the  width  of  that  portion 
of  the  street  in  front  of  such  property.*  This  view  has  been 
expressed,  however,  in  eases  in  which  the  attempt  was  made  to 
apportion  the  assessment  according  to  the  amount  of  work  done 
in  front  of  each  lot.^ 

§  578.     Peculiar  use  of  land  as  affecting-  benefits. 

Cases  are  not  infrequently  presented  in  which  the  improve- 
ment for  which  it  is  sought  to  levy  an  assessment  would  confer 
an  especial  benefit  upon  the  land  assessed  if  such  land  were  used 
for  ordinary  purposes,  or  for  any  one  of  a  variety  of  purposes 
to  which  it  might  be  put,  but  in  which  the  land  is  used  by  the 
owner  thereof  for  a  special  and  peculiar  use.  and  the  improvc- 

'  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  assessment    thereon    the    same.      The 

Savannali,   8G   Ga.   301,   12   S.  E.   580  method  adopted  was  a  just  one.  Each 

flSnO];     Dunker    v.    Stiefel,    57    Mo.  section  pays  for  the  improvement  on 

App.    375)    [18041;    Smith    v.   City   of  it.     The  same  result  could  have  heen 

Cincinnati,  fi  Ohio  N.  P.   175    [1898].  attained     by     separate     proceedings. 

-  Dunker    v.    Stiefel,    57    Mo.    App.  Tliis,   however,   would   have   added   tt 

379    [18941;    Smith    v.    City    of    Cin-  the   expense,   without   any   compensa- 

cinnati.  6  Ohio  X.  P.  175   [1898].  tion    to    the    property    holders.      No 

^  Bacon  v.  MayQr  and  Aldermen  of  good    reason   is    shown    why   it   could 

Savannah,   8(5  Oa.   301,   12   S.   E.  580  not  all  be  done  in  one,  as  well  as  in 

[1890];     Fiiidlay    v.    Frey,    51    0.    S.  many,   different   proceedings."      Find- 

390,  38  X.  E.  114  [1894];    ( reversin:^  lay    v.    Frey.    51    O.    S.    390,    403,    38 

Frey  v.  City  of  Findlay,  7  Ohio  C.  C.  X."   E.    114    [1894];     (reversing    Frey 

311   [1893] ).  "It  is  also  objected  that  v.    City    of    Findlay.    7    Ohio    C.    C. 

the    assessment    on    Sandusky    Street  311   [1893]). 

is  not  uniform.     The  street  was  im-  ''Davis    v.    City    of    Litchfield,    145 

proved    in    sections,    because    not    of  111.   313.   21    L.   R.    A.   503,   33   X.   E. 

uniform     width.       Each     section     is,  888    [1893]. 
however,   of   uniform   width,   and   the  ''See   §   713. 


951  PROPERTY    Sl'BJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  578 

ment  in  question  does  not  confer  any  benefit  or  any  substantial 
benefit  upon  the  land  in  qaestion  while  devoted  to  such  special 
use.  In  cases  of  this  sort,  the  question  which  is  presented  is 
whether  such  land  is  to  be  considered  as  benefited  by  the  im- 
provement on  the  theory  that  benefit  is  a  (juestion  of  the  use 
which  might  be  made  of  the  land,  or  whether  such  land  is  to  l)i' 
considered  as  not  l)enefited  on  the  theory  that  the  present  and 
actual  use  of  the  land  controls  the  question  of  benefit.  On  this 
question  we  find  a  confiict  of  authority.  Land  which  is  owned  ))y 
the  public  and  used  for  some  public  or  governmental  purpose  may 
be  said  with  some  propriety  to  be  devoted  to  that  use.^  The 
right  to  assess  land  owned  by  the  public  and  occupied  for  a 
public  use  is  discussed  in  detail  hereafter.-  If  the  land  is  owned 
by  a  private  person  or  corporation,  and  is  devoted  to  a  special 
private  use  by  reason  of  which  it  is  not  benefited  by  the  public 
imi)rovement,  the  true  rule  would  seem  to  be  that  the  right  to 
assess  such  land  is  not  restricted  by  the  fact  of  such  special  and 
peculiar  use.  Private  owners  ought  not  to  be  free  at  their  pleas- 
ure to  withdraw  land  from  the  operation  of  the  taxing  power 
and  to  throw  a  corresponding  burden  either  upon  the  other 
property  owners  or  upon  the  general  taxpayers.  If  the  appro- 
priation to  the  peculiar  use  in  question  is  purely  voluntary,  the 
owner  may  change  such  use  at  his  pleasure  and  thus  obtain  the 
benefit  accruing  from  the  improvement.  In  other  cases  the  owner 
is  restricted  either  by  specific  provisions  in  the  conveyance  of 
property  to  him  or  by  the  means  whereby  he  accpiired  title  to 
the  same,  from  making  general  and  unrestricted  use  of  such  proj)- 
erty.  Even  in  such  cases,  however,  the  co-operation  of  the  for- 
mer and  present  owners  of  such  property  could  free  such  land 
from  such  restrictions  as  to  use  and  make  it  available  for  gen- 
eral use.  Accordingly,  it  seems  contrary  to  the  general  policy 
of  the  law  of  assessments  to  permit  a  special  private  use  of 
land  to  withdraw  it  from  the  operation  of  assessment  laws  and 
this  view  is  expressed  in  some  cases."  It  must  Ix'  admitted  that 
this  expression  of  opinion  is  cliiefi\'  obiter,  as  the  use  in  (|ucstioii 

'  Ppople  ox  rel.  Dnylo  v.  Austin.  47  "■  ^Ii'iiipliis   Land   and   Timhpr   f'l.ni- 

Cal.    353    [18741;    Yivsan    v.    City    of  jiany    v.    St.    Francis    Levoc    District. 

Chicapn,  84  111.   227    [187(51:    City  of  fi4    Ark.   2.58.    42   S.    \V.    703    riS!171; 

Frankfort  v.  State  ex   rel.   Ross,   128  Powers  v.  City  of  fJrand   Kapiils.  OS 

Tnd.  438.  27  N.  E.   1115   [18911.  Mich.  393.  57  X.  W.  250  [18941. 

-  See   §   579  it   srcf. 


§578 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


952 


was  a  voluntary  private  use.  Where  the  lise  is  voluntary  and 
private  it  seems  clear  that  the  owner  of  the  land  cannot  by  such 
conduct  prevent  the  legislature  from  levying  an  assessment 
thereon.*  Land  which  is  used  voluntarily  by  the  owner  thereof 
for  a  given  business  may  be  assessed  for  a  local  improvement 
which  benefits  such  land  generally,  even  though  such  improve- 
ment does  not  benefit  such  land  for  the  purposes  for  which  it 
is  actually  used."'  Thus,  lots  owned  by  a  sanitary  district  on 
which  offices  are  built,  which  are  to  be  used  temporarily,  pend- 
ing the  construction  of  a  drainage  canal,  may  be  assessed  for 
the  construction  of  a  sewer,  even  though  such  improvement  may 
not  benefit  such  land  with  reference  to  such  temporary  use." 
Property  used  as  a  wharf  may  be  assessed  for  the  construction 
of  a  sewer."  It  has  been  said  that  property  used  as  a  coal  mine 
should  not  be  assessed  for  the  expense  of  constructing  a  fence 
around  a  fencing  district,  in  which  such  mine  is  situated."*  How- 
ever, if  such  property  can  also  be  used  for  agricultural  pur- 
poses it  may  be  included  in  such  assessment."  The  use  of  prop- 
erty for  a  slaughter  house  was  considered  and  permitted  to 
increase  the  amount  of  benefit  conferred  upon  such  property  by 
the  construction  of  a  sewer  along  a  strip  of  land  which  had  been 
used  as  a  way  through  the  property  thus  employed.^"     The  deci- 


*  Memphis  Land  and  Timber  Com- 
pany V.  St.  Francis  Levee  District, 
G4  Ark.  258,  42  S.  W.  763  [1897]; 
Cliicago  Union  Traction  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  215  111.  410,  74  N. 
E.  449  [1905];  Chicago  Union  Trac- 
tion Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  207 
111.  544,  69  N.  E.  849  [1904];  Chi- 
cago Union  Traction  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  204  111.  363,  68  N. 
E.  519  [1903];  (distinguishing  Illi- 
nois Central  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  141  111.  509,  30  N. 
E.  1036  [1893]  where  the  use  was 
one  fixed  by  Federal  Statute)  ;  Chi- 
cago Union  Traction  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  202  111.  576,  6*7  N. 
E.  383  [1903]  ;  Sanitary  District  of 
Chicago  V.  City  of  Joiiet,  189  111. 
270,  59  N.  E.  566  [1901];  Clark  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  166  111.  84,  46  N.  E. 
730  [1897];  Powers  v.  City  of  Grand 
Rapids.  98  Mich.  393,  57  X.  W.  250 
[1894];  State,  Protestant  Foster 
Home  Society,  Pros.  v.  City  of  New- 


ark, 35  X.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.)  157,  10  Am. 
Pvep.  223;  Dasey  v.  Skinner,  33  N. 
Y.  S.  R.  15,  II  N.  Y.  Supp.  821; 
Ford  V.  City  of  Toledo,  64  0.  S.  92 
59  X.  E.  779  [1901];  Boeres  v. 
Strader,  1  Cin.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  57 
11870]. 

*  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago  v. 
City  of  Joiiet,  189  III.  270.  59  N.  E. 
566    [1901]. 

"  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago  v. 
City  of  Joiiet,  189  111.  270,  59  N.  E. 
566    [1901]. 

'  Boeres  y.  Strader,  1  Cin.  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  57   [1870]. 

*  Stievyel  y.  Fencing  District,  No. 
6  of  Johnson  County,  71  Ark.  17,  70 
S.  W.  308,  71  S.  VV'.  247   [1902]. 

"  Stiewel  y.  Fencing  District,  No. 
6  of  Johnson  County,  71  Ark.  17.  7lt 
S.  W.  308,  71  S.  W".  247   [1902]. 

'"Butchers'  Slaughtering  &  Meltin  • 
Association  y.  Commonwealth.  169 
Mass.   103,  47  N.  E.  599   [1897]. 


953  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  578 

sions  of  the  courts  upon  this  question  depend  so  largely,  how- 
ever, upon  the  nature  of  the  use  and  upon  the  special  statutory 
provisions  applicable  thereto,  that  the  subject  must  be  consid- 
ered in  detail  in  the  following  sections. ^^  If  the  use  for  which 
the  property  is  taken  is  a  quasi  public  use,  as  where  property 
is  appropriated  by  a  railroad  company  under  statutes  which  per- 
mit of  its  being  used  only  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
appropriated,  there  is  some  authority  for  holding  that  such  com- 
pulsory use  prevents  such  property  from  being  subject  to  local 
assessment.^-  Upon  this  question  there  is  a  conflict  of  authority 
and  the  subject  is  discussed  in  detail  subsequently.^''  Where 
the  existence  of  a  special  use  of  the  property  is  said  not  to 
prevent  the  property  from  being  assessed  on  the  theory  of 
special  benefits,  it  is  nevertheless  said  in  some  jurisdictions  that 
the  nature  of  such  use  and  the  probability  of  its  continuance 
are  to  be  considered  in  determining  the  amount  of  benefits  which 
are  to  be  assessed  against  such  property.  If  the  use  in  question 
is  such  that  no  benefit  inures  to  the  property  while  such  use 
exists,  and  if  the  circumstances  are  such  as  to  make  it  probal)le 
that  such  use  will  be  permanent,  it  has  been  said  that  the  assess- 
ment should  be  for  a  nominal  amount.^*  This  principle  is  ap- 
plied especially  to  land  held  by  quasi  public  corporations,  such 
as  corporations  formed  for  general  transportation,  and  devoted 
to  use  in  transportation.^^  While  such  property  is  not  regarded 
as  exempt  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  the  practical  operation 
of  such  theory  often  is  to  reduce  the  assessment  upon  such 
property  to  a  purely  nominal  amount.  If  the  use  is  a  voluntary 
one  and  the  owner  is  free  at  any  time  to  make  such  use  of  tlie 
property  as  he  may  see  fit,  justification  for  this  theory  seems  to 
be  lacking  in  the  law  of  local  assessments.     By  the  operation  of 

"See  §  570  et  srrj.  Mayor  of  Albany.   15  Wend.   (N.  Y.) 

"  Chicagro  and  Alton  Railroad  Com-  374;    Tn    tlie   ^Matter   of   the    Applica- 

pany  v.  City  of  Joliet.   153   111.   r>49,  tion    of    the    Mayor,    Aldermen    and 

39    N.    E.    1077     [18941;     Alle-iheny  Commonalty    of     the     City    of    New 

City  V.  West  Penna.  R.  Co.,   138  Pa.  York   for  the   enlarsring  and   improv- 

375,   21    Atl.    7fi3    [1890].  in<r   a    part   of   Nassau   Street    in   the 

"See  8S  ,594-598.  saiii     city.     11     Johns      (N.     Y.)      77 

"Chicago   &    Alton    Railroad    Com-  [1814);    In    the   ^Matter    of    Westlake 

panv   V.   Citv  of  .Tnliet.    153    111.   (149.  Avenue,    Seattle.    40    Wash.    144,    82 

39  N.  E.  1077   [18941;   State.  Morris  Pac.  279   [19051. 

and    Essex   Railroad    Company.    Pros.  "State,  ^Morris  and  Essex  Railroad 

V.   Jersey  City,   3fi   N.  J.  L.    (7   Vr.)  Company.  Pros.  v.  Jersey  City,  36  N. 

56     [1872];     Owners    of    Ground    v.  J.  L.    (7  Vr.)   56  [1872]. 


§§579,580  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  954 

this  theory,  the  property  owner  is  for  practical  purposes  as  free 
to  withdraw  his  property  from  the  operation  of  local  assessment 
statutes  as  if  such  use  rendered  the  property  entirely  exempt. 
Questions  of  a  different  character  are  of  course  presented  where  the 
legislature  has  provided  that  certain  classes  of  property  shall  be 
exempt  from  local  assessment.^" 

§  579.     Land  belonging  to  United  States. 

The  power  of  the  legislature  to  levy  assessments  on  land  de- 
pends in  part  on  the  ownership  thereof,  and  on  the  use  to  which 
it  is  devoted.  The  United  States  is  a  government  distinct  from 
that  of  each  state,  beyond  the  control  of  individual  states,  in 
no  way  amenable  to  their  authority,  and  possessing  the  right 
to  own  land  for  governmental  purposes.  The  United  States  can- 
not be  sued  without  its  own  consent,  and  no  personal  liability 
can  therefore  be  enforced  against  it.  Its  land  cannot  be  taken 
away  from  it  by  process  issued  by  state  courts,  and  therefore 
no  lien  for  local  assessments  can  be  enforced  against  it.  The 
action  of  United  States  officials  cannot  be  controlled  by  the  state 
courts  by  the  writ  of  mandamus.  For  these  reasons,  property 
owned  by  the  United  States  is  not  subject  to  local  assessments.' 
This  principle  applies  not  only  to  land  t)wned  and  used  by  the 
United  States  for  governmental  purposes,  but  also  to  its  public 
lands,  which  it  has  not  yet  conveyed  to  individuals.-  Thus,  pub- 
lic lands  belonging  to  the  United  States  cannot  be  subjected  to 
assessments  for  drainage  ^  or  for  irrigation.*  Accordingly,  a 
grantee  of  such  lands  does  not  take  subject  to  any  a.ssessment 
levied  upon  them  while  the  United  States  was  the  owner  thereof.'"' 

§  580.     Public  property  not  belonging  to  United  States. 

Public  property  other  than  that  owned  by  the  United  States 
may  be  taxed  or  exempted  at  the   discretion  of  the  State  Leg- 

"■See  §  G18.  140   Cal.    344.    73    Pac.    105fi    [1903]; 

^  Nevada    National     Bank     of    San  E(l<jerton       v.       Huntington       School 

Francisco  v.  Poso  Irrigation  District.  Townsliip,    120    Tnd.    201.    26    N.    E. 

140   Cal.    344,    73   Pac.    1050    [10031:  150   [ISOO]. 

People    ex    rel.    Doyle    v.    Austin.    47  '' EJoerton     v.     Huntington     School 

("al.    353    [18741;    Fagan    v.    City    of  Township.    120    Ind.    201.    20    N.    E. 

Chicago,   84   111.   227    [1870];    Edger-  150   [ISOO]. 

ton   V.   Huntington   School   Township,  *  Xevatia     Natiouiil     Bank     of    San 

120   Ind.   201,  20   N.  E.    150    [1890];  Francisco  v.  Poso  Irrigation  District. 

Corey  v.  City  of  Ft.  Dodge.  133  Iowa  140  Cal.  344.  72  Pac.  1050  [1903]. 

066,   111   N.'W.  0    [1907].  -'Nevada     National     Bank    of    San 

-Nevada    National     l>iink     of     San  Francisco  v.  Poso  Irri^atiion  District. 

Francisco  v.  Poso  Irrigation  District.  140  Cal.  344.  73  Pac.   105!)   [1903]. 


955  iROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  J5  580 

islature,  since  the  legislature  has  full  power  over  the  property 
of  the  state  and  of  the  public  corporations  and  <iuasi  corpora- 
tions existing'  in  the  state  as  far  as  (|uestions  of  taxation  are  con- 
cerned.^ The  effect  of  including  slate  {property  in  a  local  assess- 
ment is  really  to  transfer  a  proportionate  part  of  the  burden 
from  the  property  owners  benefited  by  such  improvement,  or 
from  the  general  taxpayers  of  the  city,  to  the  general  taxpayers 
of  the  state.  The  effect  of  including  property  lielonging  to  a 
city  or  other  public  corporation  in  an  assessment  is  to  transfer 
the  burden  of  taxation  from  the  owners  of  property  benefited 
by  such  assessm.ent  to  the  general  taxpayers  of  the  public  cor- 
j)oration.  Questions  as  to  whelher  public  improvements  shall  be 
paid  for  by  general  taxation  or  by  local  assessment  are  especially 
within  the  discretion  of  the  legislature  where  not  restrained  by 
specific  constitutional  provisions.  The  (piestion  upon  which  there 
is  a  conflict  of  judicial  authority  is  as  to  the  effect  of  a  general 
statute  granting  power  to  levy  assessments  upon  property  bene- 
fited, but  not  specifically  providing  for  the  assessment  of  pub- 
lic property',  together  with  the  absence  of  a  statute  specifically 
providing  for  the;,  exemption  of  public  property  from  the  opera- 
tion of  local  assessment.  According  to  sonu'  authorities,  it  's 
to  be  presumed,  under  such  statutes,  that  the  legislature  intended 
to  iissess  all  the  projierty  which  it  had  tlie  power  t;)  assv's.-i. 
including  public  property.'-  On  the  other  hand  some  au- 
thorities hold  that  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  shift  a 
part  of  the  burden  to  the  general  taxpayer  cannot  l)e  presumed 
in  the  absence  of  some  sp(>eific  provision  to  that  efi'ect.  and 
accordingly  pu))lic  proi)erty  will  be  regarded  as  exempt  in  the 
absence   of   some   sp(HMfi('    provisiou    autliori/ing    its    assessment."' 

'West    Cliiouirn    Park    Coiinni^ision-  Siimx     City     v.      Iridcponilont     Scliool 

crs   V.  City   of  Cliica-io.    I.IJ    III.   3!t2.  District    of    Sioux    City.    55    la.    150 

;iS  N.  E.  G!)7    |1SM)4|:    (DUiitv  of  Me-  |1SF0];    Board    of    Comniissioners   of 

Loan  V.  City  <if  r.lnoininj^tim.   lOi;    111.  I'rankliii    (  oinity   v.    (  ily    of    Ottawa. 

200    flS83].  !'.»    Kail.    717.    X]    Am.    St.    Kc)).    :?0l). 

=  Xi'\v    Orleans    v.    Waiiicr.    175    V.  :il    Pac.   7SS    I1802|;    St.   Louis   Pub- 

S.    120,   44   L.   9(1.   20    S.    4  1    [IS'.iOl:  lie    Scliools   v.    City    of  St.   Louis,   2(» 

West    Chicaj^o   'Park     Coninii-sioners  .Mo.    4(\H    [IFSSl:    Hassan    v.    City   of 

V.    City   of   (liicauro.    152    III.   .'502.    3S  RoHiPstor.  07  N.  V.  52S    [18701:   Va- 

N.  E.'()07    118041:    County  of  Adams  cation    of    Howard    Street.    Pliiladel- 

V.  City  of  Quincy.    ]:W   III.  5li(i.   0  L.  i-liia.    142    Pa.    St.    001.    21     .\tl.    074 

R.    A.'    155,    22    \.    E.    024     I  18001:  [ISOIl. 

County  of  McLean  v.  Citv  of  Plooni-  '•  .Miern    v.    Hoard    of    Iini)rovejnent 

ington,   100   111.   200    []SS:1J:    (  ity   of  District  No.  .1  of  Texarkana.  00  Ark. 


§580 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


56 


This  intention  is  often  deduced  from  a  comparison  of  the  statu- 
tory provisions  with  reference  to  the  enforcement  of  the  assess- 
ment. If  such  statutes  provide  for  enforcing  the  assessment 
either  by  sale  of  the  property  assessed  or  by  the  enforcement 
of  personal  liability  and  make  no  further  provisions  on  this 
sub,jeet,  it  has  been  held  that  since  such  methods  of  enforcing 
the  assessment  are  inapplicable  to  state  properties,  the  intention 
of  the  state  legislature  must  have  been  to  exempt  such  prop- 
erty.^ Under  such  statutes  the  legislature  seems  to  contemplate 
the  assessment  only  of  property  which  can  be  subject  to  ordi- 
nary legal  process.''  Questions  of  this  sort  depend  in  part  upon 
the  ownership  of  the  property  which  it  is  sought  to  assess  and 
are  discussed  in  detail  in  the  folloAving  sections." 


08,  61  S.  \V.  575  [1901];  Board  of 
Improvement  v.  School  District,  56 
Ark.  354,  35  Am.  Rep.  108.  16  L.  R. 
A.  418,  19  S.  W.  969  [1892]:  Witter 
V.  Mission  School  District.  121  Cal. 
350,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  33.  53  Pac.  905 
1 1898]  ;  State  of  Connecticut  v.  City 
of  Hartford,  50  Conn.  81),  47  Am. 
Rep.  622  [1882]:  City  of  Hartford 
V.  West  Middle  District.  45  Conn. 
482,  29  Am.  Rep.  687  [1878];  Edger- 
ton  V.  Huntington  School  Township. 
126  Ind.  261,^26  N.  E.  156  [1890]: 
Lowe  V.  Board  of  Commissioners  of 
Howard  County,  94  Ind.  553  [1883]: 
Edwards  &  Walsh  Construction  Com- 
pany V.  Jasper  County.  117  la.  365. 
94  "  Am.  St.  Rep.  301,  90  X. 
W.  1006  [1902];  City  of  Leaven- 
worth V.  Laing,  6  Kan.  274 
[1870];  City  of  Camden  v.  Camden 
Village  Corporation,  77  Me.  530,  1 
Atl.  689;  County  Commissioners  of 
Baltimore  County  v.  Board  of  Man- 
agers of  the  Maryland  Hospital  for 
the  Insane.  62  Md'.  127  [1884];  Wor- 
cester Agricultural  Society  v.  Mayor 
of  City  of  Worcester,  116  Mass.  193, 
17  Am.  Rep.  159;  City  of  Big  Rap- 
ids V.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  Me- 
costa County,  99  :Mich.  351,  58  X.  W. 
358  [1894];  City  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Brown,  155  Mo.  545,  56  S.  W.  298 
[1899];    City   of    Clinton    to    Use   of 


Thornton  v.  Henry  County,  115  Mo. 
557,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  415,  22  S.  W. 
494  [1893];  State,  Green,  Pros.  v. 
Hotaling,  44  X.  J.  L.  (15  Vr. )  347 
[1882];  Leonard  v.  City  of  Brooklyn, 
71  X.  Y.  498,  27  Am.  Rep.  80;  City 
of  Toledo  V.  Board  of  Education,  48 
0.  S.  83,  26  X.  .E.  403  [1891];  City 
of  Spokane  v.  Security  Savings  So- 
ciety,   —    Wash.   ,    89    Pac.    466 

[1907]. 

*City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Brown.  155 
Mo.  545.  46   S.  W.  298    [1899]. 

°  "Public  property  used  for  govern- 
mental purposes  will  not  ordinarily 
be  deemed  within  the  words  of  a 
statute  delegating  in  general  terms 
authority  to  levy  local  assessments; 
.  .  .  Statutes  conferring  general  au- 
tliority  to  assess  should  be  construed 
as  operating  upon  property  subject 
to  legal  process,  and  not  upon  prop- 
erty held  for  governmental  purposes 
by  the  state  or  any  of  the  local  in- 
strumentalities of  government;  and 
without  a  statute  granting  the  right 
to  make  such  assessments  either  ex- 
pressly or  by  necessary  implicatio;i 
that  right  does  not  exist."  Edwards 
&  Walsh  Construction  Co.  v.  Jasper 
County,  117  la.  365,  373,  94  Am.  St. 
Rep.  301,  90  X.  W.   1006    [1902]. 

*See  §  581  ct  seq. 


957  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  581 

§  581.     Property  belonging  to  state 

There  is  no  (luestion  but  that  the  legislature  has  the  power  to 
authorize  land  belonging  to  the  state  to  be  assessed  for  local 
improvements/  The  method  of  collecting  such  assessment  neces- 
sarily differs  from  that  for  collecting  assessments  against  lands 
of  individuals  and  is  discussed  elsewhere.-  If  no  specific  pro- 
vision is  made  either  for  including  or  excluding  land  belonging 
to  the  state,  we  find  the  same  difference  of  authority  that  exists 
in  the  case  of  public  property  generally.  According  to  some 
authorities,  a  statute  which  confers  the  power  of  levying  local 
assessments  and  which  does  not  provide  for  the  exemption  of 
property  belonging  to  the  state  from  the  operation  of  such  assess- 
ment, authorizes  the  assessment  of  the  state's  property.^  Where 
this  view  prevails,  the  fact  that  the  state's  property  is  exempt 
from  general  taxation  does  not  operate  to  exempt  it  from  local 
assessment.*  Other  legislative  provisions  may  serve  to  render 
clearer  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  assess  state  property.^ 
Thus,  a  provision  in  the  charter  of  a  state  to  the  effect  that 
property  which  is  exempt  from  taxation  by  the  general  law  of 
the  state  may  be  assessed  and  taxed  for  local  improvements, 
has  been  held  to  show  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  assess 
state  property  where  such  property  was  one  of  the  classes  ex- 
empt by  statute  from  general  taxation."  Lands  held  by  trustees 
of  a  canal,  of  which  the  state  is  the  beneficial  owner,  are  sub- 
ject to  assessment.'  Real  property,  the  legal  title  to  which 
is  in  the  chancellor  of  the  state  in  trust  for  private  individuals, 
may  be  subject  to  assessment.*     In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held 

'State    of    Connecticut    v.    City    of  *  Hager   v.   Ga.st,    119    Ky.    502.   27 

Hartford,  50  Conn.   89,  47   Am.   Rep.  Ky.    Law    Rep.    129,    84    S.    W.    556 

1)22   ri882];   Iliggins  v.  City  of  Chi-  [19051;  Hassan  v.  City  of  Rochester, 

cago,  18  111.  27()   riS57];   Trustees  of  07    N.    Y.    528    [1876]-,     (former    ap- 

the   Illinois    and    Micliipan   Canal    v.  l)eal,  Hassen  v.  City  of  Rochester,  65 

City  of  Chicago,   12   111.  403   [18511;  X.  Y.  516   [18751).' 

Hassan  v.   City   of  Rochester,   67   N.  °  Hassan   v.   City   of   Rochester,    67 

Y.  528  [18761.*  N.   Y.   528    [18761. 

*Spe   §   1162.  "Hassan   v.   City   of   Rochester.   67 

MVhitley  v.  Fawsett,  Styles  12   (23  X.  Y.  528   [187(;i.* 

Car.  1)  :  IJ^-^er  v.  Gast,  119  Ky.  502,  'Trustees  of  the  Illinois  and  Mich- 

27  Ky.  Law  Rep.   129,  84  S.  W.  556  igan    Canal    v.    City    of    Chicago,    12 

[19051.  Hassan  v.  City  of  Rochester,  111.  403   [18511. 

67  N.  Y.  528  [18761;    ( former  appeal  «  Chancellor   of    the    State    of   Xew 

Hassen  v.  City  of  Rochester,  65  N.  Y.  Jersev  v.  City  of  Elizaheth.  60  X.  J 

516     [18751);     Webber     v.     Common  L.      (37     Vr.)      688.     52     Atl.      1130 

Council   of  the   City  of  Loekport,  43  [19011;       (affirniin<r     Cluincellor      o^ 

Howard   (X.  Y.)  368  [18721.  •  State  v.  City  of  Elizabeth.  65  X.  .1. 


§581 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


953 


that  unless  the  legislature  clearly  manifests  the  intention  of  in- 
cluding- property  belonging  to  the  state  in  the  operation  of  the 
local  assessment,  such  property  must  be  excluded."  In  some  juris- 
dictions this  view  is  entertained  because  of  the  fact  that  the 
state  cannot  be  a  party  defendant  in  either  law  or  equity  and 
no  means  is  provided  for  collecting  such  assessment  other  than 
by  such  suit."  Property  on  which  is  situated  a  hospital  for  the 
insane,  which  belongs  to  the  state  and  which  is  under  the  direc- 
tion and  control  of  a  board  of  managers  is,  under  this  theory, 
not  subject  to  local  assessment. ^^  Even  where  the  property  of  the 
state  has  been  held  to  be  generally  subject  to  special  assessment, 
it  has  been  held  that  a  constitutional  provision  which  prohibits 
the  state  of  New  York  from  selling,  leasing  or  otherwise  dis- 
posing of  the  Erie  Canal  prevents  the  levy  of  local  assessment 
upon  the  lands  of  such  -canal,  since  the  state  legislature  has  no 
power  to  authorize  the  imposition  of  such  assessment  whereby 
such  land  might  be  sold.^-     This  reason   omits   consideration   of 


L.  (30  Vr.)  483,  47  Atl.  455  [1900]). 
( In  this  case  the  statute  provided 
that  lands  owned  by  an  officer  in  his 
official  capacity  in  trust  should  be 
subject  to  taxation,  and  that  taxa- 
tion should  be  a  lien  thereon  as  in 
the  case  of  other  persons.) 

"People    ex    rel.    D  )yle    v.    Austin, 
47    Cal.    353    [  1874]  ;"  State    v.    Kil- 

burn,    —    Conn.    ,    69    Atl.    1028 

[190S];  State  of  Connecticut  v. 
City  of  Hartford,  50  Conn.  89, 
47  Am.  Re]).  622  [1882];  In  re 
Petition  of  City  of  Mt.  Vernon  to 
assess  cost  of  local  improvements, 
etc.,  147  111.  359,  23  L.  R.  A.  807, 
35  N.  E.  533  [1894];  Williams  v. 
Little  White  Lick  Gravel  Road  Com- 
pany, Wilson's  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  (Ind.) 
7  [1871];  Ottumwa  Brick  &  Con- 
struction Co.  v.  Ainley,  109  la.  386, 
80  N.  W.  510  [1899]";  Polk  County 
Savings  Bank  v.  State  of  Iowa,  69 
la.  24,  28  N.  W.  416  [1886];  Von 
Steen  v.  Beatrice,  36  Neb.  421,  54 
N.  W.  677  [1893].  In  Polk  County 
Savings  Bank  v.  State  of  Iowa,  69 
la.  24,  28  N:  W.  416  [1886]  an  as- 
sessment was  in  fact  levied  against 
state   property,   and   the   state   volun- 


tarily entered  its  appearance  but  as 
no  judgment  against  the  state  could 
be  enforced,  none  was  rendered.  See 
explanation  in  Edwards  &  Walsh 
Construction  Co.  v.  Jasper  County, 
117  la.  365,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  301 
90  N.  W.  1006  [1902].  In  England 
property  bought  for  a  volunteer  corps 
and  so  held  for  the  us«  of  the  crown, 
is  not  liable  to  assessment  under  a 
statute  in  which  the  crown  property 
is  not  named.  Hornsey  Urban  Dis- 
trict Council  V.  Hennell,  [1902],  2 
K.  B.  73,  71  L.  J.  (K.  B.)  479,  86  L. 
T.  423,  50  Weekly  Rep.  521,  06  J.  P. 
613. 

1"  In  re  Petition  of  City  of  Mt.  Ver- 
non to  assess  cost  of  local  improve- 
ments, etc.,  147  111.  359,  23  L.  R.  A. 
807,  35  N.  E.  533  [1894];  Williams 
v.  Little  White  Lick  Gravel  Road 
Company,  Wilson's  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
(Ind)    i  [1871]. 

"  County  Commissioners  of  Balti- 
more County  V.  Board  of  Managers 
of  the  Maryland  Hospital  for  the  In- 
sane, 62  Md.  127   [1884]. 

"  Elvvood  V.  City  of  Rochester.  43 
llun.  102   [1887].  ' 


959  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT  §  582 

the  fact  that  the  state  might  provide  for  an  assessment  and  re- 
rjuire  payment  of  the  same  out  of  the  eanal  funds.  The  question 
has  been  raised,  but  not  decided,  whether  purchasers  of  state 
lands  upon  which  ditch  taxes  have  been  assessed  can  have  such 
taxes  set  aside.^"* 

^  582.     Property  belonging  to  county. 

The  legislature  has  undoubted  power  to  authorize  a  city  or 
(thcr  similar  corporation  to  assess  property  Avithin  its  limits  be- 
longing to  a  county,  when  such  propei-ty  is  espeeially  l)enefit( d  by 
a  local  improvement.  It  is  also  clear,  that  if  the  legislature  speci- 
fically exempts  such  proi)erty  from  local  assessment,  it  has  the 
power  to  do  so.  As  in  the  case  of  other  forms  of  public  property 
the  difficult  question  is  found  v»here  the  legislatur(^  has  given  to 
the  city  a  general  power  to  levy  local  assessments  upon  the  prop- 
erty benefited  by  the  improvement,  without  either  specifically 
excepting  or  including  county  property.  Here  again  we  find  the 
same  conflict  of  authority.  According  to  the  views  entertained 
i?i  some  jurisdictions,  the  city  may  under  such  statutes,  a.ssess 
eounty  property  on  the  theory  that  such  property  is  exempt  only 
if  there  is  some  specific  provision  for  its  exemption.^  Under  such 
statutes  it  is  proper  to  a.ssess  a  cqurt  hoiLse,^  or  a  court  house 
square,''  for  the  expense  of  con.structing  a  street  adjaeent  thereto. 
County  property  may  be  a.ssessed  for  a  water  tax.*  The  fact  that 
eounty  property  is  exempt  from  general  taxation,  does  not  pre- 
vent th('  eity  fi'oin  assessinu-  it  on  tho  theory  of  benefits."     Indeed. 

'■■■Brownoll  v.  l^xinrd  of  Suporvisors  -County     of     Adams     v.     City     of 

of  Gratiot  County.   40   Midi.   414.    IS  Qnincy.   1.30   III.  .'JfHi.  l!  L.   R.   A.   l."),'). 

N.   W.   798    [18S-il.  22   X."  E.  024    [1S!)01. 

'  County  of  Adams  v.  City  of  Quin-  '  Board  of  Commissioners  of  Frank- 

ey,  130  111.  &G(5,  fi  L.  R.  A.  155.  22  X.  lin    County    v.    City    of    Ottawa.    4f> 

E.    624    [18901;    County    of    McLean  Kan.    747,    33    Am.    St.    TJep.    39(i.    31 

V.  City  of  Bloomin<rt(.n.   lOO   111.   20!)  Pac.   788    [1892]. 

[1883]    Cook   County  v.  City  of   Chi-  'Cook    County   v.   City   of   Chicajro. 

oago,    103    111.    (546    [1882];    Trustees  I0.3    IK     (i4(i    [18821. 

of   the    Illinr)is    and    Michij^an    Canal  'Cook    County    v.    t  ily   of   Chicago. 

V.     City     of     Chica,u;o.     12     111.     403  103     III.     n4(i      (18821;      County     of 

[18511;   Edwards  &  Walsh  Construe  Adams    v.    City    of    (Juin  y.    130     III. 

tion  Co.  V.  Jasper  County.   117    Iowa  566.    6    L.    R.    A.    155.    22  "X'.    E.    624 

3(!5.  94    Am.  Pt.  Rep.   301.  9(i  X.  W.  [18901;    E.lwards  &   Walsh   Construe- 

1006    [1902]-.    Board    of   Commission-  tion  Co.  v.  .Tasjier  County.   117   Iowa. 

ers    of    Fr;'nVlin    County    v.    City    of  365.    94    Am.    St.    Rep.    301,    90    X. 

Ottawa.    40    Fan.    747.    33    Am.    .St.  \V.  1006  [  1902]. 
Rep.  39().  31    Pae.  788   [1892]. 


§  582  T.VXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  960 

a  constitutional  provision  that  the  property  of  counties  may  be 
exempt  from  taxation  by  general  law  has  been  held  to  imply  that 
such  property  is  liable  to  taxation  and  assessment  in  the  absence 
of  some  law  specifically  exempting  it."  Real  property  belonging 
to  a  county  and  used  for  governmental  purposes  cannot,  of  course, 
be  sold  to  satisfy  the  lien  of  a  street  assessment/  Where  the 
assessment  of  county  property  is  permitted,  the  county  is  com- 
pelled to  pay  the  amount  of  the  assessment.®  According  to  the 
theory  in  force  in  other  jurisdictions,  a  city  or  other  similar  public 
corporation  cannot  assess  property  unless  the  power  to  levy  such 
assessment  is  clearly  given.  Failure  on  the  part  of  the  legislature 
either  to  exempt  such  property  specifically  or  to  provide  for  its 
assessment,  is  regarded  as  exempting  it  from  the  operation  of 
local  assessments."  Different  reasons  are  given  in  support  of 
this  theory.  One  reason  which  is  applicable  to  all  classes  of 
statutes  is  that  to  permit  a  city  to  levy  assessment  upon  county 
property  is  to  permit  it  to  invade  the  power  and  authority  of 
tlie  county  and  interfere  with  its  governmental  operations;  -a 
result  which  will  never  be  presumed  but  must  be  specifically  pro- 
vided by  the  legislature.^'^  Another  reason  applicable  only  to 
certain  classes  of  statutes  is  that  no  means  is  provided  for  the 
collection  of  local  assessments,  which  is  applicable  to  public  prop- 
erty. Such  property  cannot  be  sold  and  if  the  only  remedy  for 
collecting  a  local  assessment  is  the  sale  of  the  property  assessed, 
it  is  held  by  some  courts  that  such  provision  shows  the  intention  of 
the  legislature  not  to  assess  county  property."     Under  this  theory 

«Cook  County  v.   City  of   Chicago,  545,  56  S.  W.  298   [1899];   Thornton 

103  111.  646   [1882].       '  v.   City   of  Clinton,     48   Mo.   648,  50 

'County    of    McLean    v.     City    of  S.   W.   295    [1898];    City   of   Clinton 

Blooniington,    106    111.    209     [1883];  to  use  of  Thornton  v.  Henry  County, 

Lowe   V.   Board  of   Commissioners  of  115  Mo.  557,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  415,  22 

Howard  County,  94  Ind.  553   [1883].  S.  W.  494  [1893];  Von  Steen  v.  Bea- 

» County    of    McLean    v.    City    of  trice,    36    Xeb.    421,    54    N.    W.    677 

Bloomington,   106  111.  209   [1883].  [1893];    County   of    Harris   v.    Boyd. 

"Stiewel    v.    Fencing    District    Xo.  70  Tex.   237,   7   S.  W.   713    [1888]. 

6  of  Johnson  County,  71  Ark.  17,  7')  ^"County    of    Harris    v.    Boyd,    70 

S.    W.    308,    71    S.    W.    247    [1903];  Tex.  237,  7  S.  W.  713  [1888]. 
City  of  Big  Rapids  v.  Board  of  Sup-    '       "Citv  of  St.  Louis  v.  Brown,   155 

ervisors  of  Meco?ta  County.  99  ^Mich.  Mo.  545.  56  S.  W.  298   [1899];   City 

351,    58   N.    W.    358    [1894];     ^citing  of    Clinton    to    use    of    Thornton    v. 

Worcester   County  v.   Wo'-cester,   116  Henry  County,   115  Mo.  557.  37  Am. 

Mass.  193,  17  Am.  Rep.  159  [1874])  ;  St.  Rep.  415,  22  S.  W.  494  11893]. 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Brown.   155  Mo. 


961  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §§583.584 

i\  i'Aty  cannot  levy  an  assessment  against  a  court  house  for  the 
cost  of  constructing  an  adjoining  street.^-  A  poor  farm  belonging 
to  a  county  cannot  be  assessed  as  a  part  of  a  fencing  district. ^^ 
Even  where  this  theory  is  entertained,  a  provision  exempting 
county  property  from  taxation  does  not  apply  to  local  assess- 
ment.^* 

§  583.     Property  belonging  to  township. 

If  the  statute  specilically  provides  therefor,  property  belong- 
ing to  a  township  may  be  assessed  for  benefits.^  Thus,  by  stat- 
utory authority  an  as"^:essment  for  drainage  may  be  levied  upon  a 
highway  and  the  township  by  wh"ch  said  highway  is  constructed 
may  be  charged  with  the  cost  thereof.-  An  individual  land  owner 
cannot  complain  because  township  property  has  been  assessed.^ 

§  584.     Property  belonging  to  city. 

The  cost  of  a  publ'c  improvement,  which  confers  a  local  benefit 
may  be  charged  aga'nst  a  city  or  town  on  three  different  theories. 
Such  assessment  may  be  levied  against  the  city  or  town  as  a 
property  owner,  treating  the  city  or  town  for  such  purpose  as  any 
private  individual  is  treated.^  Such  assessment  may  be  levied 
against  the  city  or  to"'n  for  benefits  accruing  to  the  city  or  town 
as  a  whole.-  The  third  case  is  not.  correctly  speaking,  one  of 
assessment.  x\fter  the  individual  property  owners  have  been 
assessed  to  the  f'lll  amount  of  the  benefits  conferred  upon  them 
by  the  imrrovement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  the  excess, 
if  any,  may  and  sho^-ld  be  charged  upon  the  town,  not  on  any 
theory  o^'  s-^^ecial  lenefits,  but  because  it  is  the  duty  of  the  city 
or  town  to  pav  by  g-^neral  taxation  for  the  cost  of  the  improvement 
over  and  above  the  amount  of  special  benefits  to  the  property 
owners.^     The  legisl-^^^r'^  has  undoubtedly  power  to  provide  that 

"Thornton  v.  fitv  of  ''Mnton.  148  40  X.  E.   108.5    [18P.">1;   State  ex   rol. 

Mo.  r48.  50  S.  \V.  295  [18081;   Coiin-  Horrall    v.    'I  hnnipson.    109    Iml.    53,3. 

ty  rf  H-^'vis  V.  B-yd.  70  Tex.  237.  7  10  N.  E.  305    [18861. 

S.  W.  713   [ISS"^!.  ^^State   ex    rel.    Horrall    v.    Thonip- 

"Ftiewrl  V.  »i(in'  Di-t-iit  Xo.  fl  son.     109     Ind.    533.     10    X.    E.    30,i 

of   .Johnson    ^oi'ntv,    71      ^'•'•.    17,    70  [18801:    PVa^ant   Townsl'ip  v.   Cook. 

S.  W.  308    71   S.  W.  247    [19031.  IfiO  Inrl.  533.  07  X.  E.  2(52   [19021. 

"Citv  of  Clinton   to  v^o  of  Thorn-  "  Grimes    v.    Coo.    102    Ind.    406,    1 

ton   V.   Fenrv   ^Vnin+v.    1 1  •>   Vn.   55".  X.  E.  735  [18851. 

37   Am.   St.  Eep.   415.   22   S.   W.   494  >  See  post:   tliis  section. 

[1F931.  -  f^pe   §   5S5. 

>Zumbro   v.   raniin,    Itl    Ind.   430,  ="866  §  063. 


§584 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


962 


property  belonging  to  a  city  shall  l.e  assessed  for  local  improve- 
ments in  the  same  way  as  the  property  of  private  individuals/ 
In  the  absence  of  a  statute  which  either  specifically  exempts  or 
includes  city  property,  it  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  city 
property  should  be  included.''  One  reason  which  is  assigned  for 
this  theory  is  that  to  include  city  property  will  tend  to  e(iuality 
rf  as-:essment  in  proportion  to  benefits.''  Since  the  question  in- 
volved is  whether  a  city  has  power  to  assess  its  own  property,  the 
objections  which  may  be  urged  against  allowing  a  city  to  assess 
other  forms  of  property,  are  in  part  absent,  since  there  can  be  no 
question  of  interference  by  the  city  with  the  operation  of  any 
other  corporation.  The  fact  that  city  property  is  exempt  from 
general  taxation  does  not  operate  to  exempt  it  from  local  assess- 
ment. The  constitution  of  Missouri  provides:  "The  general  as- 
sembly shall  not  impose  taxes  upon  counties,  cities,  towns  or 
other  municipal  corporations,  or  upon  the  inhabitants  or  property 
thereof,  for  county,  city,  town  or  other  municipal  purposes 
.  .""  This  provision  does  not  prevent  the  legislature  froni 
authorizing  a  general  judgment  against  a  city  for  its  proportion 
of  a  street  assessment,  based  on  its  ownership  of  realty  abutting 
the  street  for  the  improvement  of  which  such  assessment  is  levied.® 
Under  this  theory,  a  street  improvement  may  be  paid  for  in  part 


*  West  Cliicago  Park  Commission- 
ers V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  392. 
38  N.  E.  697  [1894];  Higgins  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  18  111.  276  [1857]  ;  Trus- 
tees of  tlie  Illinois  and  Michigan 
Canal  v.  t  ity  of  Chicago,  12  111.  403 
[1851];  Barher  Asphalt  Paving  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  183  :\Io. 
451,'  82  S.  W.  64  [19041;  City  of  St. 
Louis  V.  Brown,  155  Mo.  545,  56  vS. 
W.  298  [1899];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Petition  of  Livingston  to  vacate  an 
assessment,  121  X.  Y.  94,  24  N.  E. 
290  [1890];  In  re  City  of  New  York, 
38  Misc.  Rep.  600,  78  N.  Y.  S.  51 
[1902];  People  ex  rel.  Connelly  v. 
Reis,  96  N.  Y.  S.  597,  109  App.  Div. 
748  [19051;  Peojjle  ex  rel.  Tietjen, 
96  N.  Y.  S.  601,  109  App.  Div.  919 
[1905];  Turfler's  Case.  19  Abb.  Pr, 
(N.  Y.)    140   [1865]. 


~  Rcammon  v.  City  of  Chicago,  42 
III.  192  [1866];  Bennett  v.  Seibert. 
10  Inch  App.  369,  35  N.  E.  35,  37  N. 
E.  1071  [1894];  Matter  of  the  Ex- 
tension of  C  hurch  Street  from  Ful- 
ton Street  to  Morris  Street  in  the 
(  ity  of  New  York,  49  Barb.  455 
11867];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Turtler  to  vacate  an  assess- 
ment for  paving  the  Eighth  Avenue 
in  the  City  of  New  York,  44  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  46  [1865];  Dick  v.  (ity  of 
Toledo,    11    Ohio   C.  C.   349    |  1896]. 

"  Scammon  v.  City  of  Chicago,  42 
111.    192    [1866]. 

'Article  X..  S  10.  Constitution  of 
.Missouri    |  1875]. 

■■*  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  C/ompany 
v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  183  Mo.  451, 
82  S.  W.  64  [1904]. 


963 


I'ROPERTY    ST 'EJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§584 


l)y  avscssmeiits  Irvied  on  {)u!)lic  T^arks.''  or  markets/"  or  on  a 
work  house."  Land  owned  Ijv  the  city  may  he  assessed  for  sewer 
purposes.'-  A  i)ul)lic  square  is  sulgect  to  assessment.'"  As  in 
the  case  of  assessnu^nts  ayainst  other  forms  of  puhlic  property, 
such  assessment  cannot  he  collected  by  sale  of  the  public  proper- 
ty, but  some  means  must  he  provided  whereby  the  city  can  be 
compelled  to  pay  the  amount  which  is  assessed  against  its  prop- 
erty.'* However,  a  want  of  power  to  sell  the  property  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  tlic  i>roperty  cannot  be  assessed.  Thus, 
in  Illinois,  it  was  once  hckl  that  city  property  should  be  assessed 
in  the  same  manner  as  property  belonging  to  individuals.^^  Sub- 
sequently, it  was  held  that  a  sale  by  a  city  of  its  own  property 
was  unauthorized  and  absolutely  void.'"  While  the  decision  in 
this  ease  was  based  in  part  upon  the  want  of  power  in  the  city 
to  assess  its  own  property,  these  two  cases  were  subsequently  ex- 
plained as  not  inconsistent,  the  true  ])oint  of  dicisi-^n  of  the 
second  case  being  said  to  be  that  the  city  had  no  power  to  sell 
its  own  proi)erty  which  it  had  assessed.'"  In  other  jurisdictions, 
it  seems  to  be  held  that  a  city  cannot  assess  its  own  pro])erty  for 
local  improvements  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  expressl,y  author- 
izing such   assessment."*      Under  this  th;v:rv   land    h  'Id   h\-   a   citv 


"West  (  Iiieajio  Park  (oniniission- 
pis  V.  City  of  Chicago,  l.)2  III.  392. 
.*?8  \.  E.  607  I18!)41;  Seanimon  v. 
(  ity  of  Chicago,  42  Til.  102  |  18()(il  ; 
]?cnnett  v.  Soibert.  10  lii-l.  App.  :?i;0. 
35  N.  E.  35,  37  N.  E.  1071  I1S041: 
Matter  of  the  E-xteiision  of  t'lmrcli 
Street  from  Fulton  Street  to  Morris 
Street  in  the  City  of  New  York,  40 
Barb.  455  [18(57];  hi  rr  (ity  of  New 
York,  38  Misc.  TJep.  f>(!0.  78  X.  Y. 
51    I  10021. 

'"  Matter  of  the  Extension  of 
Church  Street  from  Fulton  Stieet  t  > 
Morris  Street  in  the  City  of  New 
York.  40  liarb.  (X.  Y.)  4.').i  |18(i71: 
Dick  V.  City  of  Toledo.  11  Oliio  C. 
C.  349    [1896]. 

"  Barber  Asplialt  Paving  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  St.  .Joseph.  183  Mo. 
451,"  82  S.  W.  04   [10041. 

"People  ex  rel.  Connelly  v.  Reis, 
96  N.  Y.  S.  507,  109  App.  Div.  748 
[1905];  People  ex  rel.  Tietjen.  Of) 
X.  Y.  S.  601,  109  App.  Div.  019 
[1005]. 


'•'  In  the  ^Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
Tuiilei-  to  vacate  an  assessment  for 
jiaviiig  t'le  Eightli  Avenue  in  the 
(  ity  of  New  Wn-k.  44  IJarb.  ( N.  Y. ) 
Ui   I  lS(i.-)|. 

"  West  (  liicago  I'ark  Commission- 
ers V.  City  of  (  hicago.  152  111.  302. 
38  X.  E.  607  11804]:  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Company  v.  (ity  of  St.  Jos- 
c))!).  183  Mo.  451,  82  S.  \Y.  64  [1004] : 
llesniett  V.  Seilert,  10  Ind.  App.  360. 
••!.-)  X.  K.  :i5.  ;!7  X.  E.  1071  [18041: 
In  the  Matt-r  of  t'le  Petition  of  Liv 
iiig-ton  ti  vacrit-  an  a'<sessn:ent.  121 
\.   N'.  04.  24   X.   E.  200   [1800]. 

'■'■  Scammon  v.  (ity  of  Chicago.  4i 
111.    102    I  1866]. 

'"Taylor  v.  Tlie  People  ex  rel. 
Pee.l,  m  111.  322    [1872[. 

"See  explanation  of  earlier  cases 
found  in  County  of  ]\leT>\ni  v.  City 
of  Bloomington,   106   Til.   200    [1883]. 

'"  People  ex  rel.  Doyle  v.  Aiistin. 
47  Cal.  353   [1874];   State  v.  Several 

Parcels   of   Land.   —  Neb.   .    113 

N.  W.  248   [1007];   City  of  St.  Louis. 


§  585  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  9G4 

as  a  public  park  cannot  be  assessed  for  benefits  by  reason  of  the 
construction  of  a  boulevard.^''  Accordingly,  since  property  used 
exclusively  for  city  purposes  cannot  be  assessed,  it  should  not 
be  counted  in  determining  whether  the  owners  of  one-half  of  the 
frontage  abutting  upon  a  street  to  be  improved  have  objected  to 
such  improvement.-"  Where  a  city  made  a  contract  for  the  street 
improvement  by  which  it  was  expressly  stipulated  that  the  city 
should  be  under  no  expense  for  such  improvement  except  for  in- 
tersections, it  was  held  that  the  contractor  could  not  charge  the 
city  on  the  ground  that  the  city  ow^ned  a  market  place  in  the 
center  of  the  street  which  was  improved  under  such  a  contract.-' 

§  585.     Assessment  of  city  for  benefits  received  as  a  whole. 

Under  statutory  authority,  it  is  proper  to  charge  a  city  or 
town  with  the  amount  of  benefits  which  the  improvement  for 
v;hich  the  assessment  is  levied  confers  upon  such  city  or  town 
as  a  whole.^  Thus,  such  a  charge  may  be  levied  for  benefits  re- 
ceived from  drainage.^  A  city  or  town  may  be  assessed  for  the 
benefit  which  it  receives  by  reason  of  the  improvement  in  the 
condition  of  its  highways  caused  by  the  local  improvement  f'U- 
which  such  charge  is  exacted.'*  Such  a  charge  is  not  a  lien  upon 
the  property  of  the  town  nor  can  .such  property  be  sold  there- 
for.* The  city  or  town  must  be  compelled  by  proper  proceedings 
to  pay  the  amount  of  such  charge.  In  the  ab.sence  of.  statutory 
authority  empowering  drainage  commissioners  to  attach  to  their 
drainage  district  the  streets  and  alleys  of  a  village  which  have 
connected  their  drains  with  those  of  the  district,  such  drainage 

V.  Brown.  155  Mo.  545,  56  S.  W.  298  -  Commissioners     of     Highways    of 

[1899];     Armstrong    v.    OTclen    City,  Town   of   Dix   v.   Big   Four   Drainage 

12  Utah  476,  4.3  Pac.  119  [1895].  District  of  Ford  County,  207  111.  17, 

''State  V.  Several  Parcels  of  Land,  69    X.    E.    576    [1904];'  State,    King. 

_  Neb. ,  113  N.  W.  248  [1907].  Pros.  v.  Reed,  43  N.  J.  L.    (14  Vr.) 

/""Armstrong    v.     Ogden    City.     12  186     [1881];     Town    of    Muskego    v. 

Utah  476,  43   Pac.    119    [1895].  Drainage  Commissioners,  78  Wis.  40. 

^Howell    V.    City    of    Philadelphia,  47  X.  W.  11   [1890]. 

38  Pa.    (12  Casey)    471    [1861].  ^  Town     of     Muskeeo     v.     Draina'^e 

'  Commi'^sioners     of     Highways     of  Commissioners,  78  Wis.  40,  47  X.  W. 

Town   of   Dix   v.    Big   Four   Drainage  11   [1890]. 

District  of  Ford   County,  207  111.   17,  *  Commissioners     of     Highways     of 

69    N.    E.    576    [1904];    State.    King.  Town   of   Dix   v.   Big   Four   Drainage 

Pros.  V.  Peed.  43  X.  J.  L.    (14  Vr.)  District  of  Ford  County.  207  111.  17, 

186     [1881];     Tov.n    of    Muskego    v.  69  X.  E.  576   [1904]. 
Drainase  Commissioners.  78  Wis.  40, 
47  N.  W.  11   [1890]. 


965  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  586 

commissioners  have  no  power  to   cause   the  assessment  of  such 
village  for  benefits.'' 

§  586.     Public  school  property. 

Whether  land  belonging  to  a  school  board  or  district  can  be 
assessed  for  local  improvements,  is  another  question  upon  which 
the  same  conflict  of  authority  exists.  In  some  jurisdictions,  it  is 
held  that  unless  such  property  is  specifically  exempt,  school  prop- 
erty other  than  that  which  is  given  in  trust  for  school  purposes, 
can  be  assessed.^  Under  this  theory  school  property  can  be  as.sessed 
for  the  cost  of  abutting  streets.-  Where,  by  statute,  property 
which  is  benefited  is  to  be  assessed,  and  the  question  of  determining 
what  property  is  benefited  is  left  to  a  jury,  it  is  held  that  the  court 
cannot  say  as  a  matter  of  law  that  school  property  is  either  bene- 
fited or  not  benefited,  but  that  such  question  must  be  pas.ssed  upon 
by  the  jury.^  The  rule  that  school  property  given  in  trust  for 
school  purposes  is  subject  to  local  assessments,  is  said  to  apply 
equally  to  property  occupied  for  school  purposes,  to  vacant  lots 
and  to  property  occupied  by  buildings  from  which  the  school  dis- 
trict receives  rent.*  Its  application  to  property  belonging  to  a 
school  district,  but  not  used  for  school  purposes  is  especially  clear.'' 
The  fact  that  the  legal  title  to  the  school  property  is  in  the  city  in 
trust  for  the  school  district,  does  not  prevent  the  levy  of  assess- 
ment upon  such  district."  Such  property  cannot  be  sold.  The 
proper  method  of  enforcing  such  assessment  is  to  compel  the 
school   district  to   pay  the   amount   of  its   assessment   out   of  its 

*  Drainage    Commissioners    of    Dis-  1km-    v.    Common    Council   of   the    Citj' 

trict  No.  1  V.  Village  of  Cerro  Gordo,  of  Loekport.  43  Howard    (N.  Y.)    368 

217    111.   488,   75   X.   E.    510    [10O51;  [  1872]  ;/«  re  Howard  Avenue,  North, 

(accordingly  the  village  is  nnt  liable  in  City  of  Seattle,  44   Wash.   62,  86 

even  if  it  fails  to  make  objections  or  Pac.  1117  f  19061. 

to  appeal.)  "/"   re  Howard   Avenue,   North,   in 

'School   District   of   Fort   Smitli   v.  City  of  Seattle,  44  \Yash.  62,  86  Pac. 

Board   of  lmi)rovement,  65  Ark.  343,  1117   [1900]. 

46   S.   W.   418    [1808];    City   of   Chi-  'Kansas    City    v.    Bacon,    157    Ml 

cago   in   trust   for   use  of   Schools   v.  450,  57  S.  W.  1045  [1900]. 

City  of   Chicago,   207    111.   37,   69   N.  *City  of  Chicago   in   trust  for  use 

E.   580    [19041;    Board   of   Education  of    Schools    v.    City    of    Chicago,    207 

of  City  of  Chicaeo  v.  People,  ex  rel.  111.  37,  09  N.  E.  580  [1004]. 

Commissioners   of   Lincoln   Park.   210  "School    District    v.    Board    of    Im- 

111.  83,  76  N.  E.   75   [19051:   City  of  provement,    65    Ark.    343,    46    S.    \V. 

Sioux     City     v.     Independent     School  418    [1808]. 

Di'^t'ict  of   Sioux   City.  55   Iowa    150  "City  of  Chicago   in    trust   for   use 

[18801:    Kansas   Citv    v.    T»nnoii.    1.57  of    Schools    v.    City    of    Chicago,    207 

Mo.  4.-)0.  57  S.  W.  1045  [lOOOl;  Web-  111.  37.  60  N.  E.  580   [1904]. 


§586 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


9G6 


funds.'  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  property  belonging  to 
M  i.thool  district,  hut  not  used  exclusively  for  school  purposes  may 
be  sold  to  satisfy  a  local  assessment.^  If  property  has  been  con- 
veyed by  the  United  States  to  a  state  for  school  purposes,  it  is 
held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  it  can  be  assessed  like  other  school 
property."  In  other  jurisdictions,  it  is  held  that  such  property 
cannot  be  assessed/"  and  this  rule  has  been  applied  even  in  juris- 
dictions where  other  school  property  is  held  liable  to  assessment. 
Under  this  theory  lands  given  by  the  United  States  in  trust  for 
school  purposes,  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  drainage. ^^  In 
other  jurisdictions,  school  property  is  regarded  as  devoted  to  a 
special  use,  inconsistent  with  the  diversion  of  part  of  its  funds  to 
pay  local  assessments.  Under  this  theory  school  lands  which  are 
used  for  school  purposes  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  local 
improvements.^'-  Thus,  school  property  cannot  under  this  theory 
be  assessed    for    the    cost    of    streets,^^'    sidewalks,^*    drainage,''' 


'City  of  Sioux  City  v.  Independent 
School  District  of  Sioux  City,  55 
Iowa  150   [1880]. 

» School  District  of  Fort  Smith  v. 
Board  of  Improvement,  65  Ark.  343, 
46  S.  W.  418  [1808]. 

«St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  City 
of  St.  Louis,  26  Mo.  468  [1858]. 

"The  People  ex  rel.  Little  v.  Trus- 
tees of  Schools,  118  111.  52,  7  N.  E. 
262  [1887];  Edgerton  v.  Huntington 
School  Township,  126  Ind,  261,  26 
N.  E.  156  [1890];  Erickson  v.  Cass 
County,  11  N.  D.  494,  92  N.  W.  841 
[1902];   City  of  Spokane  v.  Security 

Savings   Society,   —   Wash.   ,   89 

Pac.  466    [1907]. 

"  Edgerton  v.  Huntington  School 
Township,  126  Ind.  261,  26  N.  E. 
156  [1890]. 

'^  Board  of  Improvement  v.  School 
District,  56  Ark.  354,  35  Am.  St. 
Rep.  108,  10  L.  R.  A.  418,  19  S.  W. 
909  [1892]  ;  City  of  Hartford  v.  West 
Middle  District,  45  Conn.  462,  29 
Am.  Rep.  687  [1878];  Witter  v.  Mis- 
sion School  District,  121  Cal.  350,  66 
Am.  St.  Rep.  33,  53  Pac.  905  [1808]  ; 
Sutton  V.  School  City  of  Montpelier, 
28    Ind.    App.    315,    62    N.    E.    710 


[1002];  City  of  Butte  v.  School  Dis- 
trict No.  1,  29  Mont.  336,  74  Pac.  869 
[1004];  Von  Steen  v.  City  of  Bea- 
trice, 36  Neb.  421,  54  N.  W.  677 
•[1893];  City  of  Toledo  v.  Board  of 
Education,  48  O.  S.  83,  26  N.  E. 
403  [1891];  Board  of  Education  v. 
City  of  Toledo,  48  O.  S.  87,  26  N. 
E.  404  [1891];  Assessment  of  School 
Property,  7  Ohio  N.  P.  508  [1900]: 
Pittsburgh  v.  Sterrett  Sub-district 
School,  204  Pa.  St.  635,  61  L.  R.  A. 
183,  54  Atl.  403   [1903]. 

"  Witter  V.  Mission  School  Dis- 
trict, 121  Cal.  35C,  66  Am.  St.  Rep  33, 
53  Pac.  905  [1898];  City  of  Hartford 
V.  West  Middle  District,  45  Conn. 
462,  29  Am.  Rep.  687  [1878];  Sut- 
ton V.  School  City  of  Montpelier,  28 
Ind.  App.  315,  62  N.  E.  710  [1902]; 
Assessment  of  School  Property,  7 
Ohio  N.  P.  568  [1900];  Pittsburgh 
V.  Sterrett  Subdistrict  School,  204 
Pa.  St.  635.  61  L.  R.  A.  183,  54  Atl. 
463   [1903]. 

"  City  of  Toledo  v.  Board  of  Edu- 
cation." 48  0.  S.  83,  26  N.  E.  403 
[1801]. 

>■'■  Erickson  v.  Cass  Conntv.  11  N. 
D.  494,  92  N.  W.  841   [1902]. 


i)67  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  '  587 

.■sewers/"  or  sprinkling.'^  A  school  property  held  by  a  school 
board  for  the  use  of  the  state  to  carry  on  a  system  of  common 
schools  is  said  to  be  exempt  from  local  assessment,  because  it  is 
not  subject  to  execution,  or  levy,  or  sale  under  decree  of  court  to 
satisfy  the  lien  of  street  improvement.^*  The  intention  of  the 
legislature  to  exempt  school  property  from  local  assessment,  has 
been  deduced  in  some  cases  from  the  general  wording  of  statutes 
which  do  not  contain  any  such  specific  provision.  Thus,  an  act 
which  provided  for  levying  an  assessment  for  fencing  upon  all 
real  estate  in  the  district  which  was  taxable  by  the  state  and 
county  was  held  not  to  include  school  lands  which  w^ere  gener- 
nlly  not  taxable.'"  It  seems  to  be  held  in  some  of  these  jurisdictions 
that  if  land  is  owned  by  a  school  district,  but  is  not  used  for 
school  j)urposes,  it  can  be  assessed.-**  The  reason  sometimes  given 
for  exempting  school  property  from  local  assessment  is,  that  from 
the  nature  of  its  use,  it  can  not  receive  a  benefit  from  the  im- 
provement for  which  it  is  sought  to  levy  the  assessment.-'  In 
other  cases  the  reason  for  exempting  such  property  from  local 
assessment  is  said  to  be  that  no  means  is  provided  for  enforcing 
the  collection  of  the  same.^- 

§  587,     Streets  and  roads. 

In  the  absence  of  specific  statutory  authority  for  assessing  a 
street,  no  assessment  can  be  levied  against  it.'  This  principle 
applies  even  though  such  street  is  in  fact  benefited  by  the  con- 

'°  Assessment  of  School  Property,  7  School,  204  Pa.  St.  635,  ill   L.  R.   A. 

Ohio  N.  P.  568   [1900].                   *  18:3,  54  All.  46.3   [1903]. 

"  City  of  Butte  v.  Scliool  District,  ^  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of 

No.    1,    29    Mont.    336.    74    Pac.    869  Savannah,   105  Ga.   62,  31   S.  E.   127 

[19041.  [1898];      Cunningham     v.     City     of 

"City  of  Louisville  v.  Loatherman.  Peoria,    157    111.   499.   41    X.   E.    1014 

99  Ky.  213,  .35  S.  \V.  625   [1896].  [1895];  Rich  v.  City  of  Chicago,  152 

"Bradshaw    v.    Board    of    Conimis-  111.   IS,  38  N.  E.  255   [1894];   Holt  v. 

sioners  of  C.uilford  County.  92  N.  C.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,   150  III.  530. 

278    [1885].  37    X.    E.    927     [1894];    Lijrhtner    v. 

=»  Witter     V.     Mission     School     Dis-  City  of  Peoria,   150  111.  80.  37  X.  E. 

trict,   121   Cal.   350,  66   Am.  St.   Rep.  69    [1894];    Lcman   v.    City   of   Lake 

33,  53  Pac.  905    [1898].  View,     131     111.    388.    23    X.    E.    346 

=^  City  of  Hartford  V.  West  Middle  11890]:     DeKoven    v.    City    of    Lake 

District,   45  Conn.  462,   29   Am.   Rej).  \ie\v,     129     111.    .399,    21     X.    E.    813 

687    [1878];    City  of  Butte  v.  School  |1S90];     (followed    in    Wa-,'peman    v. 

District,    No.     l"    29    Mont.    336.    74  Village     of    Xorth     Peoria.     155     III. 

Pac.  869   [1904].  545.  40   X.   E.   485    [1895]);    City  of 

"Pittsburgh  v.  Sterrett  Suhdistrict  Frankfort  v.   State  ex   rel.  Ross,   128 


§  587  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  968 

struction  of  another  street.-  This  principle  depends  in  part  upon 
the  fact  that  streets  are  public  highways.  The  city  may  have  the 
legal  title  to  them,  but  it  holds  such  title  solely  for  the  benefil 
of  the  general  public  and  subject  to  their  use.  Such  property  is 
therefore  devoted  to  a  public  use.  even  more  than  the  other  prop- 
erty belonging  to  a  city.  Another  reason  for  holding  such  prop- 
erty not  subject  to  assessment  is  found  under  statutes  which  pro- 
vide for  collecting  an  assessment  by  sale  of  the  property  assessed. 
A  street  cannot,  of  course,  be  sold  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  the 
intention  of  the  legislature  by  such  a  statute,  to  provide  for  assess- 
ing a  street.^  Special  stress  is  sometimes  laid  upon  the  statutory 
description  of  the  property  to  be  assessed  as  indicating  an  inten- 
tion not  to  assess  streets.  Thus,  if  the  statute  provides  for  the 
assessment  of  "lots,  blocks,  tracts  and  parcels  of  land  contiguou'. 
to  such  improvement,"  such  description  does  not  include  streets 
which  cross  the  improvement.'*  So,  if  the  statute  provides  for 
assessing  abutting  lots,  such  description  does  not  include  \ho 
street  which  crosses  the  improvement.^  Streets  and  highways 
cannot  be  assessed,  even  if  the  description  of  the  land  to  be  assess- 
ed might  seem  prima  facie  to  include  them.  Thus,  under  a  stat- 
ute authorizing  an  assessment  of  land  one  hundred  and  fifty  feet 
back  from  the  line  of  the  improvement,  a  public  highway  within 
that  distance  cannot  be  assessed."  If  the  city  has  merely  acquired 
an  easement  in  the  street  and  the  former  owner  retains  the  fee. 
it  is  said  that  such  fee  is  of  so  little  value  that  the  former  owner 
should    not   be    expected    to    pay    the    cost    of   such    assessment.'' 

Ind.    438,    27    N.    E.     1115     [1801];  Savannah,   105  Ga.   62.  31   S.  E.   127 

\A'hitinii;   v.   Mayor   and   Aldermen   of  [1898]. 

the    City    of    Boston,    106    Mass.    89  ^State  ex  rel.  City  of  Columbus  v. 

[1870];"  Smith    v.    City    of    Buffalo,  Mitchell,  31  0.  S.  592   [1877]. 

159  X.  Y.  427,  54  N.  E.  62   [1899];  *  Cunnineham    v.    City    of    Peoria, 

(affirmin;^,  Smith  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  157   111.   499,  41   N.   E.  'l014    [1895]: 

90     Hun.     lis,     35     N.     Y.     S.     635  Lightner  v.   City  of   Peoria,    150   111. 

[1895]);     City     of     Schenectady     v.  SO,   37  N.  E.  69    [1894]. 

Tru.«tees    of    Union    College,    144    X.  =  Holt    v.    City    of    East    St.    Louis. 

Y.   241,   26   L.   R.   A.   614,   39   X.   E.  150  111.  530,  37  X.  E.  927   [1894]. 

67    [1894];    (reversing,   66  Hun.   179,  "City  of  Frankfort  v.  State  ex  rel. 

21  X.  Y.  S.   147);   In  the  Matter  of  Ross,    128    Ind.    438,    27    X.    E.    1115 

the    Arplicntion    of    Churchill    to   va-  [1891]. 

cate    an    assessment,    82    X.    Y.    288  'City    of    Schenectady    v.    Trustee 

[1F80];   Stiite  ex  rel.  City  of  Colum-  of  Union   College,    144  X".  Y.  241.  2  1 

bus  v.  Mitchell,  31   O.  S.  592   [1877].  L.   R.   A.    614,   39   X.   E.    67    [1894|: 

*  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  (reversing,  66  Hun.  179,  21  X.  Y.  S. 

147). 


969  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  587 

In  this  case,  the  statute  described  the  property  to  be  assessed 
as  "the  lots  and  buildings  lying  upon"  the  improvement  and  this 
description  did  not  include  streets  crossing  the  improvement.  A 
street  which  has  been  closed  and  accordingly  reverts  to  the  prop- 
erty owners  is  not  subject  to  assessment  until  such  a  strip  of  land 
is  placed  upon  the  tax  assessment  rolls. ^  There  is  some  authority 
for  holding  that  a  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  upon  a  cer- 
tain area  authorizes  an  assessment  upon  the  streets  within  that 
area.  Under  a  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  benefits 
according  to  the  area  of  the  land  drained  by  the  improvement  it  is 
held  that  an  assessment  may  be  levied  upon  city  streets.  The 
street  is  not  to  be  sold  for  such  assessment,  but  the  city  must  pay 
the  amount  of  the  assessment  thus  levied  against  it.  One  of  the 
most  celebrated  cases  on  this  proposition  arose  out  of  the  drainage 
improvement  which  was  constructed  in  and  about  the  city  of  New 
Orleans.  When  this  case  first  came  before  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court,  it  was  held  that  the  city  was  probably  liablo 
for  the  amount  of  benefits  conferred  by  such  improvement  upon 
the  streets  of  said  city,  but  that  as  the  city  had  issued  bonds,  the 
proceeds  of  which  had  gone  into  such  fund  in  excess  of  the  amount 
of  benefit  to  the  streets,  equity  would  regard  this  as  in  effect  a  full 
payment  of  such  liability."  "When  the  case  came  before  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  again,  that  court  answered  one  question 
certified  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  and  declined  to  answer 
the  other  and  sent  the  case  back  for  hearing.^^  When  it  next 
came  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  that  court 
held  that  the  city  of  New  Orleans  had  voluntarily  rendered  the 
collecton  of  drainage  assessments  impossible  by  abandoning  the 
improvement,^^  and  thus  destroyed  the  drainage  fund.  By  reason 
of  these  facts,  the  city  was  held  liable  and  it  was  also  held  liable 
for  the  amount  of  benefits  conferred  upon  the  streets  and  squares 
of  the  city.^-  By  the  specific  provisions  of  the  statute,  an  assess- 
ment may  be  levied  upon  streets  to  be  paid  by  the  city,  or  what 

•  Tn  the  Matter  of  f'lmrchill  to  va-  "So  held  in  Davidson  v.  New  Cr- 
eate an  assessment,  82  N.  Y.  288  leans,  34  La.  Ann.  170,  and  see  War- 
riSSOl.  ner   v.   New   Orleans,   167   U.   S.   467. 

"Peake  v.  New  Orleans.   i:?9  U.  S.  42  L.  2.39,   17  S.  892   [1S971. 

342.  35  L.  131,  11  S.  541   [18911;    (nf-  >=  New   Orleans   v.    Warner,    17.5    I', 

firminsr.    Peake    v.    City    of    New    Or-  S.    120.   44   L.   m.   20    S.    44    flS99]: 

leans.  38  Fed.  7T9  riS<^9i  ^  (modified    on    rehearinp;:     176    U.    S. 

»» Warner   v.   New   Orleans.    167   U.  92,  44  L.  385,  20  S.  280  [1900]). 
S.  467,  42  L.  239.  17  S.  892   [1897]. 


§  587  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  970 

is  in  effect  the  same  thing,  it  may  be  provided  that  the  city  shall 
pay  a  part  of  the  cost  of  the  improvement  consisting  usually  of 
the  cost  of  intersections.^^  However,  a  statute  which  provides  for 
apportioning  a  part  of  the  cost  of  drainage  against  any  "public 
or  corporate  road,"  and  providing  specifically  for  the  paj^ment  of 
assessments  against  a  county,  state  or  free  turnpike  road  or  town- 
ship road,  is  held  not  to  empower  the  drainage  district  to  assess 
benefits  to  public  streets  in  the  city  without  the  consent  of  the 
city."  Other  statutes  have  provided  in  specific  terms  for  assess- 
ing highways  for  the  amount  of  benefits  which  they  may  receive 
by  reason  of  drainage  and  imposing  the  cost  of  such  assessments 
upon  the  respective  public  corporations  or  quasi  corporations.^"' 
Under  such  statutes,  such  assessments  may  be  levied  and  must 
be  paid  by  the  respective  public  corporations.  A  public  corpora- 
tion upon  which  such  liability  is  sought  to  be  imposed  may  show, 
however,  that  no  such  highway  exists.^"  A  gravel  road  has  been 
held  to  be  benefited  by  a  drainage  improvement  and  subject  to 
assessment  therefor.^^  Since  the  condition  of  the  property  at  the 
time  that  proceedings  are  instituted  and  the  assessment  is  levied, 
controls  as  to  questions  of  assessment  ^^  the  fact  that  a  part  of  an 
abutting  lot  is  dedicated  for  street  purposes  after  the  assessment 
is  levied,  does  not  entitle  the  property  owner  to  a  reduction  in  the 
assessment.'"  A  plank  road  may  be  improved  by  the  city  within 
which  it  is  situated,  if  it  has  become  a  city  street  and  the  plank 
road  company  may  be  assessed  therefor,  on  account  solely  of  its 
ownership  of  such  road.-' 

"Dick  V.   City  of  Toledo,   11   Ohio  533,  67   N.  E.  262    [1902];    State  ex 

C.  C.  349  [1896].  rel.    Horrall    v.    Thompson,    109    Ind. 

"City    of    Joliet    v.    Spring    Creek  533,  10  N.  E.  305   [1886]. 

Drainage  District,  222  111.  441,  78  N.  ^^  Commissioners  of  Big  Lake  Fork 

E.  836    [190G].  Special    Drainage    Dist.    v.    Commis- 

^^  Commissioners      of       Big      Lake  sioners   of   Highways   of  Sand   Ridge, 

Special    Drainage    Dist.    v.    Commis-  199  111.  132,  64  N.  E.  1094   [1902]. 

sioners  of  Highways  of   Sand   Ridge,  "  Indianapolis       and      Cumberland 

199   111.    132,   64  N.   E.    1094    [1902];  Gravel    Road    Co.    v.    State    ex    rel. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company  v.  Flack.    105    Ind.    37,    4    N.    E.    316 

Commissioners    of    East    Lake    Fork  [1885]. 

Special    Drainage    District,     12D    111.  ^^  See   §  635. 

417,  21    N.   E.   925    [1890];    Commis-  "Wilson    v.    City    of   Cincinnati.    5 

sioners  of  Highways  of  the  Town  of  Ohio  N.  P.  68. 

Colfax     V.     Commi-sioners     of     East  ^People    ex    rel.    Cayadutta    Plank 

Lake  Fork  Special  Drainage  District,  Road    Co.    v.    Cummings,    166    N.    Y. 

127    111.    581,   21    N.    E.    206    [1890];  110,   59  N.   E.   703. 
Pleasant  Township  v.  Cook,  160  Ind. 


971 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§588 


§  588.     Property  owned  by  religious  bodies. 

Property  belonging  to  a  church,  even  if  used  entirely  for  relig- 
ious purposes  is  subject  to  assessment  for  the  benefits  conferred 
upon  such  property  by  a  local  improvement,  in  the  absence  of  a 
statute  specifically  exempting  such  property  from  local  assess- 
ment.^ In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  said  to  be  a  iiuestion  of  fact 
whether  property  used  for  church  purposes  is  benefited  by  the 
improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied.-  In  some  juris- 
dictions it  is  said  that  church  property  is  subject  to  local  assess- 
ment, but  that  the  test  of  the  amount  of  benefit  is  not  the  increase 
in  the  market  value  of  the  property.^  The  question  of  benefit  is 
said  to  depend  upon  the  i>rol)ability  that  such  propei'ty  will  eon- 


'  Ahern  v.  Board  of  Improvement 
District  No.  3  of  Texarkana,  6!)  Ari<. 
68,  61  S.  W.  575  [1901];  City  of  At- 
lanta V.  First  Presbyterian  Church, 
86  fJa.  730,  12  L.  R.  A.  852, 
13  S.  E.  252  [18001;  (over- 
ruling Trustees  v.  Atlanta,  76 
(Ja.  181);  City  of  Ottawa  v.  Trus- 
tees of  the  Free  Church,  20  III.  424 
[1858];  Broadway  Baptist  Church  v. 
McAfee  and  Cassidy,  71  Ky.  (8 
Bush.)  508,  8  Am.  Rep.  480  [1871]; 
Lefevre  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit,  2 
Mich.  586  [1853];  Lockwood  v.  City 
St.  Louis,  24  Mo.  20  [1856];  City  of 
Beatrice  v.  Brethren  Clmrch  of  Bea- 
trice, 41  Neb.  358,  5!)  N.  W.  932 
[18941;  People  ex  rel.  Ilowlett  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  Syracuse.  63  N.  Y.  291 
[18751;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Appli- 
cation of  the  Mayor.  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New  York 
for  the  Enlarijinp  and  Improving  a 
part  of  Nassau  Street,  in  the  Said 
City,  11  John  Sup.  Ct.  77  [1814]; 
People  of  the  State  of  New  York  ex 
rel.  Rector,  etc.,  of  St.  Ann's  Church 
of  Morrisania  v.  Fitch,  87  Hun.  (N. 
Y.)  391,  34  N.  Y.  S.  368  [1895]; 
Webber  v.  Common  Council  of  the 
Citv  of  Lock])ort,  43  Howard  368 
[1872] :  Broad  Street,  Sewickley 
'Methodist  Episcopal  Church's  Ap- 
peal. 165  Pa.  St.  475,  30  Atl.  1007 
[18951:  The  Northern  Liberties  v. 
St.    John's    Church.    15    Pa.    St.    104; 


Northern  Liberties  v.  St.  John's 
Church,  13  Pa.  103  [1850];  Second 
Universalist  Society  in  Providence  v. 
City  of  Providence,  6  R.  I.  235 
[1859];  Thompson  v.  Love,  42  O.  S. 
61  [1884]  is  not  contra.  Wliile, 
cliurch  property  was  omitted  from 
assessment  in  this  case  and  was  als> 
omitted  in  determining  whether  a 
majority  of  the  property  owners  de- 
sired such  improvement  and  had  pe- 
titioned therefor  and  such  omission 
was  held  not  to  invalidate  the  peti- 
tion, it  was  apparently  regarded  as 
erroneous  to  omit  such  property  from 
assessment.  The  theory  on  which 
this  point  was  decided  was  that  the 
commissioners  might  have  referred 
the  report  back  to  the  viewers  for 
correction,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
passing  on  the  sufliciency  of  the  peti- 
tion they  had  a  right  to  accept  it  as 
it  was  made. 

-Kansas  City  v.  Bacon.  157  Mn. 
450,  57  S.  W.  1045  [1900]. 

Mlapp  v.  City  of  Hartford,  35 
Conn.  66  [1868];  People  ex  rel.  How- 
li'tt  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 
of  the  City  of  Syracuse,  63  N.  Y. 
291  [1875];  In  the  Matter  of  the 
Application  of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen 
and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 
York  for  the  Enlarging  and  Improv- 
ing a  part  of  Nassau  Street  in  the 
said  citv.  11  J(din  Sup.  Ct.  77 
[1814]. 


§588 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


972 


tinue  to  be  used  for  religious  puri)oses.  If  such  continuance  is 
likely,  it  is  said  that  the  benefit  to  the  property,  if  devoted  to 
such  use,  will  be  small  in  comparison  with  business  and  residence 
property  and  that  the  amount  of  the  assessment  ought  to  be  pro- 
portionately small.*  This  principle  has  been  applied  in  cases  of 
street  assessments  °  and  sewer  assessments."  Even  if  property 
used  for  religious  purposes  is  by  statute  exempt  from  general  taxa- 
tion, such  exemption  does  not  prevent  such  property-  from  being 
assessed  for  local  improvements.'^  A  constitutional  provision  ex- 
empting property  used  for  religious  purposes  from  taxation  is 
regarded  as  applicable  solely  to  general  taxation.  Such  provi- 
sion does  not  exempt  such  property  from  local  assessment.^  If  a 
church  join  in  a  petition  for  a  street  improvement  and  the  front- 
age of  such  church  property  must  be  included  in  order  to  secure 
a  sufficient  number  of  signers  to  such  petition,  it  seems  likely  that 
such  church  thereby  estops  itself  claiming  an  exemption  from  such 
assessment."  By  some  statutes  the  amount  of  the  local  assess- 
mpnt  to  be  levied  depends  upon  the  valuation  of  the  property 
assessed  upon  the  general  tax  duplicate.  In  some  states  it  is 
held  that  under  such  a  statute  property  which  is  exempt  from 
general  taxation  and  has  not  been  placed  on  the  general  dupli- 
cate at  anv  valuation,  cannot  be  assessed  for  a  local  assessment, 


'  People  ex  rel.  Hewlett  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Syracuse,  63  N.  Y.  291  11875];  In 
the  Matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 
of  the  City  of  New  York  for  the  En- 
larging and  Improving  a  part  of 
Nassau  Street  in  the  said  city,  11 
John  Sup.  Ct.  77   [1814]. 

^  In  the  Matter  of  the  Application 
of  the  Mayor.  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York  for 
the  Enlarging  and  Improving  a  part 
of  Nassau  Street  in  the  said  city,  11 
John  Sup.  Ct.  77   [1814]. 

«Clapp  V.  City  of  Hartford,  35 
Conn.  66  [1868]." 

''  Ahern  v.  Board  of  Improvement 
Dist.  No.  3  of  Texarkana,  69  Ark. 
68,  61  S.  W.  575  [1901]-.  City  of  At- 
lanta v.  First  Presbytcian  Church, 
86  Ca.  730.  12  L.  R.  A.  852,  13  S.  E. 
252  [1?9()]:  (overruling  Trustees 
v.  Atlanta,  76  Ga.  181)  ;   City  of  Ot- 


tawa V.  Trustees  of  tlie  Free  Church, 
20  111.  424  [1858];  Broadway  Bap- 
tist Church  V.  McAtee  and  Cassidy, 
71  Ky.  (8  Bush.)  508,  8  Am.  Rep. 
480  [1871];  Lefevre  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
of  Detroit,  2  Mich.  586  [1853];  Lock- 
wood  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  24  Mo. 
20  [1856];  City  of  Beatrice  v.  Breth- 
ren Church  of  Beatrice,  41  Neb.  358. 
59  N.  ^V.  932  [1894];  Broad  Street, 
Sewick/ley  Methodist  EpiscopaJ 
Church's'  Appeal,  105  Pa.  St.  475,  30 
Atl.  1007  [1895];  The  Northern  Lib- 
erties V.  St.  John's  Church,  15  Pa. 
St.  104;  Second  Universalist  Society 
in  Providence  v.  City  of  Providence, 
6  R.  I.  235    [1859].  " 

"  City  of  Beat'-ice  v.  Bvethren 
Church  of  Ben  trice.  41  Neb.  358.  59 
N.  W.  932    [18941. 

»  Broad  Street.  Sewickley  Methodist 
Fniscnnal  Cliurcli's  Appe:il.  165  Pa. 
St.  47'5,  30  Atl.   1007    [1895]. 


978  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  588 

even  if  not  specifically  exempted  therefrom.^'  The  theory  under- 
lying such  holding  is  that  such  an  assessment  statute  applies  only 
to  property  which  is  already  on  the  tax  duplicate  at  a  valuation. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  under  a  somewhat  similar 
statute  that  the  valuation  of  such  property  is  to  be  determined  by 
extrinsic  evidence,  and  that  the  mere  fact  that  such  property  is 
not  on  the  tax  duplicate  does  not  prevent  its  assessment."  A 
statute  which  specifically  exempts  from  local  assessment  property 
used  for  religious  purposes  is  valid  and  prevents  an  assessment 
for  benefits  against  such  property.^-  A  statute  which  provides 
for  exempting  "churches.  .  .  .with  the  grounds  thereunto  an- 
nexed necessary  for  the  occupancy  and  enjoyment  of  the  same 
.  .  .  .from  all  and  every  county,  city.  .  .  .tax,"  is  held 
to  exempt  from  assessment  for  a  local  improvement  a  church  and 
the  land  upon  which  it  stands. ^^  This  rule  applies  to  every  form 
of  local  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  based  on  the 
theory  of  benefits.^*  Such  statutes  are  rather  strictly  construed. 
Under  a  statute  exempting  property  used  for  religious  purposes 
from  assessments  for  public  improvements,  which  are  levied  during 
three  years  from  January  1st,  1906,  it  has  been  h?ld  that  a  religious 
corporation  is  not  exempt  from  assessments  for  improvements 
wh'ch  were  begun  during  that  time  but  for  which  the  as.sessments 
were  not  levied  until  after  such  period.'"'  T'nder  a  statute  ex- 
empting "places  of  religious  worship  or  burial,"  it  is  held  that  a 
parsonage  in  which  the  rector  of  a  church  resides  is  not  exempt 
from  local  assessment.^^  A  religious  society  had  leased  land  and 
had  erected  a  building  thereon  which  was  occupied  by  them  in  part 
for  religious  worship  and  in  part  was  rented  for  stores  and  other 
similar  purposes,  the  proceeds  of  which  rent  were  appropriated 
exclusively  to  religious  uses.     It  was  held  that  such  property  was 

*»  First     Presbyterian     Church     of  [1F90]  ;  City  of  Erie  v.  First  Univer- 

Fort  Wayne  v.  City  of  Fort  Wayne,  salist  Church,  105  Pa.  St.  278  [1884]. 

36  Ind.  338,  10  Am.  Rep.  35   [1^711;  '*  Assessment   for  seicers.      City   of 

In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the  Frio    v.    Fiist    I'nivcrsalist    Church, 

Second  Ave.  Methodist  Ch\ircli  to  Va-  105   Pa.   St.  '27S    flSS41.     Assessment 

cate    an    Assessment,    66    X.  -Y.    395  for     water     pipes.      Philadelphia     v. 

[18761.  Church  of  St.  Jan^es,  134  Pa.  St.  207, 

'^  Ahorn    v.   Board    of   Improvement  10    ^tl.  40     [IFOOl. 

Di<!trict  Xo.  3.  60  Ark.  68,  61   S.  W.  " />?  re  Oneni'iT  of  Fa^t   176th  St., 

675  noon.  83   X.   Y.   S.   433,   85   App.    Div.   .347 

"Citv  of  Frie  v.  Fi'-^t  FniviM-^alist  [1903]. 

Church.    105  Pa.  St.  278    [18841.  "Wardens,     etc.,     of     St.     Mark's 

"Philaflel'^i'ia     v.     '"hii'-"li     of    Pt.  Chu'ch  v.  ^Mavor.  etc..  of  P'unswick, 

James,   134   Pa.  St.  207.   10   Atl.  497  78  Ca.  541,  3  S.  E.  561    [1887]. 


§  589  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  974 

exempt  from  general  taxation  but  not  from  local  assessment  for 
special  benefits/^ 

§  589.     Property  owned  by  charitable  organizations. 

Property  which  belongs  to  a  charitable  corporation  or  associa- 
tion and  is  used  for  charitable  purposes  is  not,  in  the  absence  of 
a  statute  specifically  exempting  it  from  local  assessment,  exempt 
therefrom/  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  said  to  be  a  question  of 
fact  to  be  determined  by  the  assessing  body,  whether  such  land  is 
in  fact  benefited  or  not.-  The  fact  that  property  held  for  such 
charitable  use  is  exempt  from  general  taxation  does  not  exempt  it 
from  local  assessment.''  Thus,  a  provision  that  property  of  a 
charitable  corporation  shall  be  ''exempted  from  taxation  of  every 
kind,"  *  or  that  it  shall  be  exempt  "from  assessment  and  taxation 
under  the  revenue  laws  of  the  commonwealth  or  under  any  ordin- 
ance, resolution  or  other  act  of  the  city,"  '''  or  "from  all  taxation 
by  state  or  local  laws  for  any  purpose  whatever,"  ^  or  "from  all 
taxation  either  by  the  state,  parish  or  city,"  ^  is  held  in  each  case 
not  to  exempt  such  property  from  local  assessment.  In  some 
jurisdictions  there  is  a  tendency  to  construe  provisions  concern- 

"  Second    Universalis!    Society    in  Baptist   Orphans'   Home,   92   Ky.   89. 

Providence   v.   City   of   Providence,   6  13  L.  R.  A.  668,  17  S.  W.  212  [1891]; 

R.  I.  235   [1859].  City   of   Lafayette   v.   The   Male   Or- 

^  Kilgus  v.   Trustees  of   Orphanage  phans  Asylum,  4  La.  Ann.  1   [1849]; 

of  Good  Shepherd,  94  Ky.  439,  22  S.  Washburn  Memorial  Orphan  Asylum 

W.   750    [1893];    Zable  V.   Louisville  v.  State,  73  Minn.  343,  76  N.  E.  204 

Baptist   Orphans'   Home,   92   Ky.   89,  [1898];    Sheehan  v.  Good  Samaritan 

13    L.    R.    A.    668,     17    S.    W.    212  Hospital,   50   Mo.    155.    11    Am.   Rep. 

[1891];     City    of    Lafayette    v.    The  412     [1872];     Roosevelt    Hospital    v. 

Male  Orphans  Asylum,  4  La.  Ann.   1  JMayor.  Aldermen  and  Commonalty  of 

[1849];   Washburn  Memorial  Orphan  the  City  of  New  York,  84  N.  Y.   108 

Asylum    v.    State,    73    Minn.    343,    76  [1881];  Roosevelt  Hospital  v.  Mayor, 

N.    W.    204    [1898];    Sheehan,   Jr.   v.  Aldermen    and    Commonalty    of    the 

Good     Samaritan     Hospital,    50    Mo.  City    of    New    York,     18    Hun.    582 

155,  11  Am.  Rep.  412   [1872];  Roose-  [1879]. 

velt    Hospital    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen  *  Sheehan   v.   Good   Samaritan  Hos- 

and  Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New  pital,  50  Mo.   155,   11   Am.  Rep.   412 

York,   84   N.   Y.    108    [1881];    Roose-  [1872]. 

velt    Hospital    v.    Mayor,    Aldermen  °  Kilgus   v.   Trustees   of  Orphanage 

and  Commonalty  of  tlie  City  of  New  of    Good    Shepherd,    94    Ky.    439,    22 

York,  18  Hun.  582  [1879].  S.  W.  750  [1893]. 

2  Kansas    City   v.    Bacon.    157    Mo.  'Zable    v.    Louisville    Baptist    Or- 

450,  57  S.  W.  1045  [1900].  phans'  Home,  92  Kv.  89,   13  L.  R.  A. 

n^'ilo-us   V.   Trustees   of   Orphanage  668,   17  S.  W.  212   [1891]. 

of  Good  Shepherd,  94  Ky.  439,  22  S.  '  City  of  Lafayette  v.  The  Male  Or- 

W.    750    [1893];    Zable    v.   Louisville  phans  Asylum,  4  La.  Ann.  1   [1849]. 


975 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§589 


ing  taxation  as  pritna  facie  applicable  to  local  assessment.  Thus, 
a  provision  exempting  property  "from  taxation  except  for  state 
purposes"  has  been  held  to  exempt  such  property  from  local 
assessments  levied  on  the  theory  of  benefits.**  This  exemption, 
however,  is  held  not  to  apply  to  exactions  levied  for  the  non-per- 
formance of  a  legal  duty.  Accordingly,  charges  for  the  construc- 
tion of  side-walks  may  be  levied  against  property  so  exempt." 
Even  where  real  property  which  is  devoted  to  charitable  purposes 
is  exempt  from  local  assessment,  property  which  has  been  de- 
tached from  the  building  used  by  such  charity  by  means  of  the 
opening  of  a  public  street  is  not  regarded  as  exempt,  although 
it  is  occasionally  used  as  a  place  to  hitch  horses  and  carriages.^* 
Full  effect  is  given  to  a  specific  exemption  from  local  assessment." 
A  statute  providing  that  property  of  a  charitable  corporation 
"shall  not  be  subject  to  taxes  or  assessments,"  exempts  such 
property  from  local  assessment.^-  The  subsequent  passage  of  a 
general  act  providing  for  levying  a.ssessments  upon  real  property 
benefited  by  the  improvement  does  not  operate  as  a  repeal  of 


•  Olive  Cemetery  Co.  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 93  Pa.  St.  (12  Norris)  129,  39 
Am.  Rep.  732. 

•  Wilkinsburg  Borough  v.  Home  for 
Aged  Women,  131  Pa.  St.  109,  6  L. 
R.  A.  531,  18  Atl.  937  [1890];  Phil- 
adelphia V.  Pennsylvania  Hospital, 
143  Pa.  St.  307,  22  Atl.  744  [18911. 
"The  defendant  contends  that  this 
footwalk  comes  within  the  reason  of 
the  case  cited,  [Olive  Cemetery  Co. 
V.  Philadclpliia,  93  (12  Norris)  Pa. 
St.  129,  39  Am.  Rep.  732],  holding,' 
that  exemption  from  taxation  ex- 
empts from  assessment  for  building 
a  sewer  and  that  the  charge  for 
its  construction  is  also  a  species  of 
local  taxation.  We  think  there  is  a 
marked  distinction  between  the  two 
cases.  In  the  case  of  borough  foot- 
walks,  the  owners  of  property  are  re- 
quired by  law  to  keep  their  footways 
in  repair  and  if  necessary,  re-lay 
them.  This  is  a  dnty  imposed  di- 
rectly upon  the  property  owner,  and 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regula- 
tion. It  is  no  more  a  tax,  or  a  mu- 
nicipal assessment  in  the  nature  of  a 


tax,  than  would  be  the  imposition  of 
any  other  duty  by  virtue  of  the  po- 
lice powers  of  the  borough,  with  a 
penalty  for  its  violation."  Wilkins- 
burg Bor.  V.  Home  for  Aged  Women, 
131  Pa.  St.  100.  117,  6  L.  R.  A.  531, 
18  Atl.  937    [1890]. 

'"  Pliiladelpliia  to  use  v.  Ladies' 
United  Aid  Society.  1  Penna.  Dist. 
Ct.  249   [1892]. 

"Hudson  County  Catholic  Protec- 
tory V.  Board  of  Township  Committee 
of  the  Township  of  Kearney,  56  N. 
J.  L.  (27  Vr.)  385.  28  Atl.  1043 
[1894];  State  ex  rel.  Benedictine 
Sisters  of  Elizabeth  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth, 50  X.  J.  L.  (21  Vr.)  347,  13 
Atl.  5   [1888]. 

"State,  Protestant  Foster  Home 
Society.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Newark.  36 
N.  J.  L.  (7  Vr.)  478,  13  Am.  Rep. 
404  [1873];  (reversing  State.  Prot- 
estant Foster  Home  Society.  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  the 
City  of  Newark.  35  N.  J.  L.  (6  Vr.) 
157,   10   Am.   Rep.   223    [1871]); 


§  590  TAXzVTION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  976 

such  statutes  specifically  exempting  charitable  property.^^  Under 
some  statutes  the  amount  for  which  property  can  be  assessed  de- 
pends upon  its  valuation  upon  the  tax  duplicate."  This  provi- 
sion does  not,  however,  necessarily  mean  the  last  tax  duplicate. 
If  property  has  been  on  the  tax  duplicate  it  may  be  assessed  even 
though  in  recent  years  it  has  been  exempt  from  taxation  and  has 
not  been  valued.^'  Such  provisions  do  not  operate  to  exempt  such 
property  except  where  there  has  never  been  any  valuation  of  such 
property'  for  taxation.  A  statute  exempting  from  assessment  for 
the  supply  of  water,  any  social  settlement  which  owns  or  leases  for 
at  least  three  years  a  building  devoted  exclusively  to  the  purpos:> 
of  such  settlement,  does  not  exempt  a  building  which  is  used  in 
part  by  a  church  for  its  purposes  and  in  part  for  a  social  settle- 
ment.^" 

§  590.     Property  belonging  to  educational  institutions. 

Educational  institutions  outside  of  the  public  school  system, 
such  as  colleges  are  not  exempt  from  local  assessment  based  on 
the  theory  of  benefits,  in  the  absence  of  some  statute  specifically 
exempting  them  therefrom.^  Statutes  exempting  such  institu- 
tions from  general  taxation,  do  not  operate  to  exempt  them  from 
local    assessment.^     The    property    of    such    institutions    may    b^ 


"  Hudson   County    C'atliolic   Protec-  a    case    in    whieli    it    appeared    that 

tory  V.   Board   of  Township   Commit-  such  property  had  never  been  on  th;' 

tee  of  the  Township   of  Kearney.  56  assessment    roll.)       Roosevelt    Hospi- 

N.  J.  L.    (27  Vr.)    385.  2S  Atl.   1043  tal  v.  MaTOr,  Aldermen  and  Common- 

[1894].             '  alty   of    the    City   of    New   York,    IS 

"In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  Hun.  582   [1879]. 

St.   Joseph's   Asylum    in   the   City   of  ^*  People  ex  rel.  Trustees  of  Amit\- 

New  York  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  Baptist  Church  v.  Monroe.  81   N.   V. 

09  N.  Y.  353   riS77].  S.  972,  40  Misc.  Rep.  286   [1903]. 

'•'''  Roosevelt  Hospital  v.  Mayor,  Al-  ^  President  and  Fellows  of  Harv- 
dermen  and  Commonalty  of  the  City  ard  Colle'Te  v.  Boai'd  of  Aldemien  of 
of  New  York,  84  X.'  Y.  108  [1881].  City  of  Boston.  104  Mass.  470  [1870]: 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the  State  v.  Trustees  of  Macalester  Col- 
Hebrew  Benevolent  Orphan  Asvlum  le^e,  87  Minn.  165,  91  X.  W.  484 
Society  to  Vacnte  an  Assessment,  70  [1902];  In  the  Matter  of  College 
K  Y.  476  [1877];  In  the  Matter  of  Street,  8  R.  I.  474  [1867]. 
the  Petition  of  St.  Jose^ili's  Asylum  ^  President  and  Fellows  of  Harv- 
in  the  City  of  New  Yo^k  to  Vacate  ard  Collegre  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of 
an  Assessment,  69  X.  Y.  353  [1^771;  Citv  of  Boston,  104  Mass.  470 
(distin'mi=hins  In  t^e  Matter  of  the  [18701:  State  v.  Trustees  of  Macal- 
Petitif^n  of  the  Second  Avcme  Meth-  p=t«-  '""-Uoo-p.  §7  Mi^^ri.  1P5  91  N.  W. 
odist  Episcopal  Church  to  V-cate  an  J'^-i  rioooi.  j^  ^^,f,  TVTntt»r  of  College 
Assessment,  66  X\  Y.  395   [1876],  as  Street,  8  R.  I.  474  [1867]. 


977  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  §§591,592 

assessed  for  street  improvements,-^  sewei's,*  and  water  pipes."' 
A  provision  in  the  charter  of  a  society  for  the  establishment  of 
useful  manufactures,  exempting  its  property  from  "taxes,  charges 
or  impositions,"  does  not  exempt  such  property  from  local  assess- 
ment." Under  an  act  of  Congress  exempting  property  of  incor- 
porated educational  institutions,  not  operated  for  private  gain, 
from  "any  and  all  taxes  and  assessments,  national  or  municipal, 
or  county."  such  property  is  exempt  from  local  assessment.'' 

§  591.     Property  used  for  fairs  and  exhibitions. 

Property  belonging  to  an  agricultural  and  horticultural  society 
and  used  for  fairs  and  exhibitions  is  not  exempt  from  local  assess- 
ment in  the  absence  of  a  statute  specifically  providing  for  such 
exemption.^  A  statute  exempting  such  property  from  general 
taxation  does  not  exemi)t  it  from  local  assessment.-  A  statute 
specifically  exempting  such  property  from  local  assessment  is 
strictly  construed.^  Thus,  a  statute  providing  that  the  land  c.i' 
a  state  agricultural  society  should  be  "exempt  from  taxati(m.  and 
from  any  and  all  special  taxes  and  assessments  for  the  year  1891." 
did  not  operate  retroactively  and  did  not  render  sncli  property 
exempt  from  an  assessment  for  an  improvement  which  had  been 
contracted  for  and  completed  during  the  year  1890.  In  such  case. 
the  contractor  has  ac(|uired  a  vested  right  to  compensation  to  be 
collected  by  assessment  levied  against  the  land  and  he  cannot  be 
deprived  by  such  right  from  action  of  the  legislature.* 

§  592.     Cemetery  property. 

The  j)rop('rty  ol  a  coiu'tci-y  association  used  for  cemetery  pur- 
poses is  sul)jcct  to  local  assessment  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
specifically  exempting  it  therefrom.'  A  statute  exempting  sucli 
property   from   gcncriil    taxation   does   not   operate   to   exempt    it 

^  In   tlip   >rattor   of   College   Street.  'Kansas    City    Exposition    Drivinj; 

8   R.   I.   474    [18071.  Park    v.    Kansas   City,    174    Mo.    425. 

♦Dorgan     v.     City     of     Boston.     94  74  S.  \V.  !)79   [1903]. 

Ma«s.    (12   All.)    22.3    [ISOfi].  Msansas    City    p:xposition    Drivirr 

'State    V.    Trustees    of    Macalestor  Park  v.  Kansas  City,  174  Mo.  42o.  7'. 

ColleGre,  S7  Minn.   10.).  91   X.  W.  484  S.  \V.  979  [1903].  ' 

[1902].  M'ates    v.    City    of    Milwaukee.    i)2 

•President  and  Council  of  the  City  Wis.  3.-)2.  C,n  X.  \V.  248   [180(1]. 

of  Pateraon  v.  Society  for  Establish-  '  Yates    v.    City    of    ^lilwukee,    92 

in"  Useful  Mannfnctu'-es.  24  N.  J.  L.  Wis.  352.  66  N.  W.  240   [189*^1. 

(4  '7nV,v5t;V5p^   305  ri«'.5J1.  »  T>l"«or^in'-ton     remet^r'--      Associa- 

•Diatript  of  Colun^bia  v.  Sifters  of  tion   v.  Peonle  of  the  Stnte.   139   111. 

Visitation,   15   App.   D.   C.   300.  16.    28    X".    E.    1070    riSOll;    Buffalo 


§592 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT, 


978 


from  local  assessments  levied  on  the  theory  of  benefits.-  Such 
property  may  be  assessed  for  paving  adjoining  streets,^  or  for 
laying  water  pipe.*  Thus,  a  statute  providing  that  cemetery 
grounds  shall  be  "exempt  from  taxation  and  execution,"^  or 
exempt  from  "all  public  taxes,  rates  and  assessments,"®  does 
not  exempt  such  property  from  local  assessments.  The  fact  that 
such  property  cannot  be  sold  on  execution  to  satisfy  the  lien  of 
the  assessment  does  not  prevent  the  levy  of  the  assessment  as  a 
personal  liability  of  the  cemetery  association."  A  statute  which 
specifically  exempts  cemetery  property  from  assessments  is  valid 
and  is  given  full  effect.*  Thus,  statutes  which  exempt  such  prop- 
erty from  "taxation  and  assessment"  are  ordinarily  held  to 
exempt  such  property  from  local  assessment.®     Such  a  statute  is 


City  Cemetery  Association  v.  City  of 
Buffalo.  46  N.  Y.  506  [1871];  Lima 
V.  Cemetery  Association,  42  0.  S. 
128,  51  Am.  Rep.  809  [1884];  City 
of  Philadelphia  v.  Union  Burial 
Ground  Society  of  the  City  and 
County  of  Philadelphia,  178  Pa.  St. 
533.  36  L.  R.  A.  203,  36  Atl.  172 
[1897];  Beltzhoover  Borough  v. 
Heirs  of  Beltzhoover,  173  Pa.  St. 
213,  33  Atl.  1047  [1896];  Xew  Cas- 
tle City  V.  Jackson.  172  Pa.  St.  86. 
33  Atl."  236    [1895]. 

=  Bloomingtnn  Cemetery  Associa- 
tion V.  People  of  the  State,  139  111. 
16,  28  N.  E.  1076  [1893];  BufTal  ) 
City  Cemetery  Association  v.  City  of 
Buffalo,  46  N.  Y.  506  [1871];  Lima 
V.  Cemetery  Association.  42  O.  S. 
128,  51  Am."  Rep.  809  [1884];  City  of 
Philadelphia  v.  Union  Burial  Ground 
Society  of  the  City  and  County  of 
Philadelphia.  178  Pa.  St.  533.  36 
L.  R.  A.  263,  36  Atl.  172  [1896]; 
Beltzhoover  Borough  v.  Hei^s  of 
Beltzhoover.  173  Pa.  St.  213.  33  Atl. 
1047  [1896];  Xew  Cattle  City  v. 
Stone  Church  Graveyard  and  Jafk- 
son.  172  Pa.  St.  86,  33  Atl.  236 
[189.-,]. 

'New  Castle  Titv  v.  Stone  Church 
Graveyard  and  Jnckson.  172  Pa.  St. 
86.  33  Atl.  236    n8951. 

*  City     of    Philadelphia     v.    Union 


Burial  Ground  Society  of  the  City 
and  County  of  Pliiladelphia,  178  Pa. 
St.  533,  36  L.  R.  A.  263,  36  Atl.  172 
[189G]. 

^  Bloomington  Cemetery  Associa- 
tion V.  People  of  the  State,  139  111. 
16,  28  X.  E.   1076   [1893]. 

^  Buffalo  City  Cemetery  Associa- 
tion V.  City  of  Buffalo,  46  N.  Y.  506 
[1871]. 

'  Buffalo  Cemetery  Association  v. 
City  of  Buffalo,  118  N.  Y.  61,  22  N. 
E.  902  [1889];  Lima  v.  Cemetery  As- 
sociation, 42  0.  S.  128,  51  Am.  Rep. 
809    [1884]. 

*  People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York 
ex  rel.  Rector,  etc.,  of  St.  Ann's 
Church  of  Morrisania  v.  Fitch,  87 
Hun.  (X.  Y.)  391,  34  N.  Y.  S.  368 
[1S95].  Assessment  for  street  open- 
ing. In  re  Perry  Avenue  in  City  of 
Xew  York,  103  X.  Y.  S.  1069  [1907]. 
Sidewalk  assessment.  State  of  Min- 
nesota ex  rel.  Oakland  Cemetery  As- 
sociation V.  Citv  of  St.  Paul,  36 
Minn.  529,  32  X.  W.  781  [1887]. 
Sewer  assessment.  Oakland  Ceme- 
tery V.  City  of  Yonkpr«.  182  X.  Y. 
564.  75  X.  E.  1132  [1905]:  (affirm- 
in":  71  X.  Y.  S.  783,  63  App.  Div. 
448). 

^  Oakland  Cemetery  v.  City  of 
YonVers.  182  X.  Y.  564.  75  X.  E. 
1132   [1905]:    (affirming:   71  N.  Y.  S. 


nin  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  593 

not  repealed  by  subsequent  statute  providing  in  general  terms  for 
levying  assessments  upon  property  benefited.^'  In  Pennsylvania 
a  statute  exempting  the  property  of  a  cemetery  "from  taxation, 
except  for  state  purposes,"  is  held  to  exempt  such  property  from 
local  assessment. ^^  The  exemption  is  not  limited  to  that  ])art  of 
the  cemetery  occupied  by  graves.'-  An  exemption  statute  is  not 
a  contract  and  may  be  repealed  after  its  enactment.^-'  After 
such  repeal,  property  of  a  cemetery  company  may  be  assessed, 
l)ut  land  which  has  in  the  meantime  been  sold  for  burial  lots 
cannot  be  assessed.'^ 

§  593.     Property  of  public  service  corporations. 

Cases  are  occasionally  presented  in  which  the  attempt  is  made 
to  assess  the  property  of  public  service  corporations,  such  as 
street  railway  companies,  telephone  and  telegraph  companies, 
electric  light  companies,  gas  companies,  water  companies  and  the 
like.  If  the  attempt  is  made  to  assess  property,  such  as  tele- 
graph and  telephone  poles,  which  are  situated  in  a  public  street, 
it  is  ordinarily  held  that  such  property  cannot  be  benefited  by 
tlie  improvement  and  therefore  is  not  subject  to  assessment.^ 
Like  principles  apply  to  the  attempt  to  assess  water  pipes,-  and 
ga8  pipes.'  They  are  not  regarded  as  benefited  by  the  improve- 
ment and  therefore  are  not  subject  to  assessment.  This  result  is 
reached  occasionally  by  reason  of  the  special  wording  of  the  stat- 
ute authorizing  the  assessment.     If  the  statute  provides  for  assess- 

783,   63    Apj).    Div.    4A9,).      Tlio    same  "State,   Mount    Plea-^ant   Cemetery 

result    follows    iiiiiliT    a    statute    e\-  Conipany.    Pros.   v.   ]\Iayor   and   Com 

emptinfi  the  pro|)('rty  of  cemetery  as  mon   Council   of  Newark,  50  X.  J.  L. 

sociations  from  "all  public  taxes  and  (21   \'r.)    (iO.   11    Atl.   147    |  1SS71. 

assessments."       State     of     Minnesota  '  Aliern    v.    IJoard    of    Improvement 

ex  rel.  Oakland  Cemetery  Association  District     Xo.     3,    of    Texarkana.     69 

V.  City  of  St.  Paul.  :W  Minn.  'rl'.K  32  Ark.  68,  61   S.  W.  57.1   [lilOll;    In  re 

N.  w!  781    [18871.  West    Farms    Road    in    City    of    Xew 

"Oakland     Cemetery     v.     City     of  York.  0.5  X.  Y.  S.  894,  47  Misc.  Rep. 

Yonkers,    182    X.    Y.    .564.    75    X.    E.  21(i    [19051;    In  re   Anthony   Avenue, 

1132  [19051;    ( adirmin'j;:   71   X.  Y.  S.  95     N.     Y.     S.     77.     46     Misc.     Rep. 

783,  63  App.  Div.  448).  525   [19051;   Elwood  v.  City  of  Roch- 

"Wilkinsburp    Bor.     v.    Home    for  ester.   43    ITun.    (X.    Y.)    102    [18871. 

Aged   Women.    131    Pa.   St.    109,   6  L.  -  Ahern    v.    Board    of    Improvement 

R.   A.  531,    18  Atl.  937    [18901.  District    Xo.     3,    of    Texarkana,    69 

"/n  re  Perry  Ave.  in  City  of  Xew  Ark.  68,  61  S.  W.  575  [19011;  El- 
York.  103  X.  Y.  S.   1069   [19071.  wood   v.   City  of   Rochester,  ,43   Hun. 

"State,   ]Mount    Pleasant    Cemetery  (X.  Y.)    102    [18871. 

Company,   Pros.    v.    Mayor   and    Com-  "  In  re   Anthony   Avenue,  95   X.   Y. 

mon  Council  of  Xewaric.  50  X.  J.  L.  S.  77,  46  Misc.  Rep.  525  [19051. 
(21   Vr.)    66.    11    Atl.    147    [18871. 


§  594  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  980 

ment  on  "lots  and  parcels  of  laud,"  it  is  held  that  gas  and  water 
pipes  and  poles  and  wires  do  not  come  under  the  description  of 
lots  and  parcels  of  land."*  The  right  of  way  for  pipes  and  wires, 
whether  overhead  or  underground,  ordinarily  receives  no  benefit 
from  a  local  improvement  and  is  not  subject  to  assessment."' 
Where  real  property  owned  by  a  public  service  corporation  is 
subject  to  assessment,  if  not  specifically  exempt,  except  so  far  as 
it  is  affected  by  the  peculiar  use  to  which  it  is  put,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  reservoir  of  a  water  works  company  may  be  assessed,  but 
that  the  amount  of  the  assessment  must  be  based  upon  the  proba- 
bility of  the  use  of  such  land  for  building  purposes  or  other  pur- 
poses, which  would  render  the  property  susceptible  to  benefit  by 
the  improvement  in  question.^'  In  this  case  the  court  thought  that 
the  probability  of  such  change  of  use  was  so  slight  that  the  assess- 
ment should  be  a  nominal  one,  but  the  assessor  had  decided  differ- 
ently and  had  made  a  substantial  assessment  against  such  prop- 
erty which  assessment  the  court  had  no  power  to  review, 

§  594.     Railroad  property. 

It  seems  well  settled  that  the  legislature  may  provide  for  the 
assessment  of  property  owned  by  a  railroad  corporation  and  used 
for  railroad  purposes.^  On  the  other  hand,  it  seems  clear  that 
such  property  maj^  be  exempted  from  local  assessment  if  the  legis- 
lature sees  fit  to  exempt  it.  If  the  legislature  has  provided  for 
assessing  property  benefited  or  property  within  certain  territorial 
limits,  and  has  provided  specifically  neither  for  the  exemption,  nor 
the  inclusion  of  railroad  property,  we  find  a  number  of  different 
views  expressed  by  the  courts  as  to  the  propriety  of  assessing  rail- 
road property.  The  discrepancy  is  greater  in  ohiter  dicta  than  in 
the  actual  adjudications.  In  some  cases  the  view  is  expressed  that 
railroad  property  is  in  the  absence  of  specific  exemption,  subject 
to  local  assessment  in  the  same  way  as  the  property  of  indivi- 
duals.-    In  other  cases,  the  same  general  idea  is  expressed  in  a 

^Elwood   V.   City   of   Rochester,   43  ^  The  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Hun.    (N.  Y.)    102   [1887].  Commissioners    of    East    Lake    Fork 

^  Ahern    v.    Board    of    Improvement  Special    Drainage    District,     129    111. 

Dist-i"t     ^^-.     ?.     rf    "^^xarkana,     69  417,  21  X.  E.  925. 

Ark.  68,  61. S.  W.  575   [igon  =  Louisville   &   Nashville   R.   R.    Co. 

Anthonv  Avenue,  95  N.  Y.   S.  77,  46  v.   Barher   Asphalt   Paving   Company, 

Misc.   Rep.   525    [1905].  197       U.       S.       430,       25       S.       466 

"Owners    of    Ground    v.    Mayor    of  [190.51;     (nffirmin'r    116    Ky.    F56,    76 

Alhanv,      15     Wend.      (N.     Y.)      374  S.    W.    1097,    25    Fy.    L.    R.    1024); 

[1836].  Illinois    Central    Railroad    Company 


981 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§594 


more  guarded  way  and  it  is  said  to  be  proper  to  assess  railroad 
property  if  the  property  is  benefited  by  the  particular  kind  of 
improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied,  while  in  the  ab- 
sence of  such  benefit,  it  should  not  be  assessed.^     In  cases  holding 


V.  City  of  Decatur.  147  I".  S.  190, 
37  L.  132,  13  S.  293  [1892];  (af- 
firming Illinois  Central  Railroad  Co. 
V.  City  of  Decatur,  126  111.  92,  1  L. 
R.  A.  613,  18  N.  E.  315  [1890]); 
Pittsburg,  ('.,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Taber,  168  Ind.  419,  77  N.  E.  741 
[1906];  Peru  &  Indianapolis  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Hanna,  68  Ind.  562 
[1879];  Indianapolis,  Peru  &  Chi- 
cago Railroad  Company  v.  Ross,  47 
Ind.  25  [1874];  Pittsburg,  Cincin- 
nati, Cliicago  &  St.  Louis  Railway 
Company  v.  Hays,  17  Ind.  App.  261, 
44  N.  E.  375,  45  N.  E.  675,  46  N. 
E.  597  [1F96];  Lake  Erie  &  West- 
ern Railroad  Company  v.  Bowker,  9 
Ind.  App.  428,  36  ^.  E.  864  [1893]; 
Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Company, 
116  Ky.  856,  76  S.  \V.  1097,  25  Ky. 
L.  R.  1024  [1903];  Figg  v.  Louis- 
ville &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.,  116  Ky. 
135,  25  Ky.  L.  R.  350,  75  S.  W.  269 
[1903];  City  of  Ludlow  v.  Trustees 
of  Cincinnati  Southern  Railway  Co.. 
78  Ky.  357  [1880];  The  Lake  Shore 
&  Michigan  Southern  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Cirand  Rapids,  102 
Mich.  374.  29  L.  R.  A.  195,  60  N.  W. 
767  [1894];  Erie  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 
Paterson,  72  N.  J.  L.  (43  Vr.)  83, 
59  Atl.  1031  [1905];  People  v.  May- 
or of  Syracuse,  2  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  433; 
(overruling  Matter  of  Mayor,  11 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  77);  Comniis-ioners 
of  Chatliara  County  v.  Seabiard  Air 
Line  Railway  Company,  133  N.  C. 
216,  45  S.  E.  566  [1903];  Northern 
Indiana  Railroad  Com])any  v.  Con- 
nelly, 10  O.  S.  160  [1859];  Winona 
&  St.  P.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Water- 
town,  1  S.  Dak.  46,  44 'n.  W.  1072 
[1890]. 

*  Village  of  RIvit  Forest  v.  Chica- 
go &  Northwestern  Railway  Com- 
pany,   197    in.    344,    64    N.    E.    364 


[1902];  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  v.  People  ex  rel.  Seaton, 
189  111.  119,  59  N.  E.  609  [1901]; 
Palmer  v.  City  of  Danville,  166  111. 
42,  46  N.  E.  629  [1897];  Chicago 
&  Northwestern  Railroad  Company 
V.  Village  of  Elmhurst,  165  111.  184, 
46  N.  E.  1152  [1897];  Chicago  & 
Northwestern  Railway  Company  v. 
Village  of  Elmhurst,  165  111.  148.  46 
N.  E.  437  [1897];  Illinois  Central 
Railroad  Comj)any  v.  City  of  Kan- 
kakee, 164  111.  608,  45  N.  E.  971 
[1897];  Payne  v.  Village  of  South 
Springfield,  161  111.  285,  44  N.  E. 
105  [1896];  Drainage  Commission- 
ers of  District  No.  3,  etc.  v.  Illi- 
nois Central  Railroad  Company,  158 
111.  353,  41  N.  E.  1073  [1895]";  Chi- 
cago, Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Railwa\ 
Co^  V.  City  of  Moline,  158  111.  64. 
41  N.  E.  877  [1895];  Chicago,  Rock 
Island  &  Pacific  Railway  Co.  v.  City 
of  :Moline,  158  111.  64,  41  N.  E.  877 
flS95];  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Co. 
v.  City  of  Decatur,  154  III.  173.  38 
X.  E."626  [1894];  Chicago  &  Alton 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  Joliet, 
153  111.  649,  39  N.  E.  1077  [1894]: 
Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  18, 
38  N.  E.  255  [1894];  The  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Company  v.  City 
of  Mattoon,  141  111.  32.  30  N.  E.  773 
11893];  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Co. 
V.  Commissioners  of  East  Lake  Fork 
Special  Drainage  District,  129  111. 
417,  21  N.  E.  925  [1890];  Chicago 
&  Northwestern  Railway  Co.  v.  Pe  )- 
pie,  120  III.  104,  11  N.  E.  418;  State, 
Paterson  &  Hudson  River  Railroad 
Co.  V.  (  ity  of  Passaic,  54  N.  .L  L. 
(25  Vroom)  .340,  23  Atl.  945  [1S921: 
State,  New  Jersoy  "Midland  Railroad 
Company,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  .Tevsev  City,  42  N.  J.  L.  (13 
Vr.)  97  [18S0]:  State.  New  .Tersoy 
Railroad  &  Transportation  Company, 


§594 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


982 


this  view  it  has,  however,  been  said  that  railroad  property  is  primn 
facie  to  be  looked  upcn  as  benefited  by  local  improvement.*  In 
other  jurisdictions  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  railroad  prop- 
erty which  is  used  for  a  right  of  w^ay,  or  is  otherwise  permanently 
devoted  to  public  use  and  such  property  as  is  not  permanently  so 
devoted.  The  courts  drawing  this  distinction  hold  that  property 
which  is  permanently  devoted  to  public  use  cannot  be  assessed  for 
local  improvements,  while  property  not  so  devoted  can  be  assessed.' 
The  fact  that  railroad  property  is  by  statute  exempt  from 
general  taxation  does  not  operate  to  exempt  it  from  local  assess- 
ments levied  on  the  theory  of  benefits."  A  statute  exempting  rail- 
road property  from  taxation  without  showing  any  further  than 
by  the  use  of  the  word  "taxation"  the  intention  to  exempt  from 
local  assessment,   is  regarded  as  applying  only  to   general  taxa- 


Pros.  V.  City  of  Elizabeth,  37  N.  J. 
L.  (8  Vr.)"330  [1875];  People  of 
the  State  of  New  York  ex  rel.  West- 
ern New  York  &  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Adams,  88  Hun. 
122,  34  N.  Y.  S.  579  [1895];  New 
York  &  Harlem  Railroad  Company 
V.  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Town  of 
Morrisania.  7  Hun.  652  [1876];  In 
the  Matter  of  the  Application  of 
Commissioners  of  Central  Park  to 
Confirm  the  Report  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  Estimate  and  Assessment 
for  Opening  Riverside  Drive,  63 
Barb.  282  [1872];  In  re  Cedar  Park, 
1   How.  Pr.  N.  S.  257    [1885]. 

*  In  re  Cedar  Park,  1  How.  Pr. 
N.  S.  257    11885]. 

*  Southern  California  Railway  Co. 
V.  Workman,  146  Cal.  80,  79  Pac. 
586,  82  Pac.  79  [1905];  Nauo^atuck 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  Water- 
bury,  78  Conn.  '  193,  61  Atl.  474 
[1905];  City  of  Bridgeport  v.  The 
New  York  &  New  Haven  Railroad 
Company.  36  Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Rep. 
63  [1869],  Chicago,  Rock  Island  & 
Pacific  Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Ottumwa.  112  la.  300,  51  L.  R.  A. 
763,  83  N.  W.  1074  [1900];  City  of 
Muscatine  v.  Chicago,  Rock  Island 
&  Pacific  Railroad  Comnany,  88  la. 
?91.  55  N.  W.  100  [1893];  Saxton 
National   Bank   v.   Haywood,   62   Mo. 


App.  550  [1895];  MeCutcheon  v.  Pa- 
cific Railroad  Company,  72  Mo.  App. 
271  [1897];  City  of  Philadelphia  v. 
Pliiladelphia,  Wilmington  &  Balti- 
more Railroad  Company,  33  Pa.  St. 
41    [1859]. 

'•  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Decatur,  147  U.  S.  190,  197, 
37  L.  132,  13  S.  293  [1892];  City  of 
Bridgeport  v.  New  York  &  New  Ha- 
ven Railroad  Company,  36  Conn.  255, 
4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869];  Illinois  Cen- 
tral Railroad  Company  v.  Citj'^  of 
Decatur,  154  111.  173,  38  N.  E.  626 
[1894];  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Mattoon,  141  111. 
.32,  30  N.  E.  773  [1893];  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Company  v.  City  of 
Decatur,  126  111.  92,  1  L.  R.  A.  613, 
18  N.  E.  315  [1890];  Lake  Shore  & 
Michigan  Southern  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  102 
:\[ic'h.  374,  29  L.  R.  A.  195,  60  N. 
W.  767  [1894];  State,  New  Jersey 
Midland  Railroad  Company  v.  Mayor 
and  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  42  N. 
.1.  L.  (13  Vroom)  97  [1880];  State, 
New  Jersey  Railroad  &  Transporta- 
tion Company.  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliz- 
abeth, 37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  330 
[1875];  Winona  &  St.  L.  P.  R.  Co. 
V.  Citv  of  Watertown.  1  S.  Dak.  46, 
44   N."W.    1072    [1890]. 


983  I 'RUPERT  V    SiB.JECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  595 

tion.'  Accordingly,  a  statute  which  provides  that  a  certain  form 
of  exemption  against  a  rjiilroarl  is  to  be  "in  lieu  of  all  other 
taxes,"®  or  a  statute  which  provides  that  no  other  tax  or  im- 
post," or  that  no  further  tax  or  imposition/"  shall  be  levied  upon 
the  property  of  a  railroad  company,  does  not  exempt  such  prop- 
erty from  local  assessment.  The  legislature  may  exempt  the 
property  of  the  railroad  company  from  local  assessment  if  it 
sees  fit  to  do  so  and  uses  language  which  expresses  such  mean- 
ing.^^  A  statute  providing  that  the  paj^ment  of  a  certain  percent, 
of  the  gross  earnings  of  a  road  should  be  "in  full  of  all  taxation 
and  assessment  whatever,"  is  held  to  exempt  the  real  property 
of  a  railroad  from  special  assessment.^'-  A  statute  providing  for 
the  sale  of  railroad  property  for  taxes  does  not  authorize  a  sale 
of  such  property  for  an  assessment  for  street  improvements.*-* 
Where  the  land  which  is  subject  to  assessment  is  that  which  is 
benefited  by  the  improvement ;  and  the  question  of  benefit  is  to 
be  determined  as  one  of  fact,  it  is  said  to  be  for  the  jury  which 
decides  such  questions  to  determine  whether  railroad  property  is 
in  fact  benefited.** 

§  595.     Effect  of  use  to  which  railroad  property  is  put — Right 
of  way. 

Since,  in  some  jurisdictions  local  assessments  levied  upon  a 
right  of  way  are  regarded  as  governed  hy  considerations  different 
from  those  which  apply  to  other  forms  of  railroad  property,  it 
is  necessary  to  consider  the  various  uses  to  which  railroad  prop- 
erty is  devoted  by  the  railroad  company  as  affecting  the  right  of 

^Illinois     Central     Railroad     Com-  nf   tlic   (  ity   of  Newark,   27  X.  J.  L. 

pany  v.  City  of  Decatur,  126  111.  92,  Ci  Dutcli.)    185   [185S]. 

1  L.  R.  A.  613,  18  N.  E.  .315   flSSS].  "  Pater.son    v.    Cliieaj^m    R.    I.   &    P. 

"Lake  Shore  &  Miclii]2ran  Southern  Ry.   Co.,   99   Minn.   454;    sub   nomine 

Railway   Conij)any   v.   City   of   Crand  hi  re  Drainajro  Ditch   Xo.  6,   109  X. 

Rapids,   102   Mich.   .374,  29   L.   R.   A.  W.   9'93    [19001. 

195, /jO  N.  W.  707    [1894].  '-(ity    of    St.    Paul    v.    St.    Paul    & 

"State,   New   Jersov   Midland    Rail-  Sioux     City     Railroad     Company,    23 

road    Company,    Pros.    v.    .Mayor    ami  Minn.  409    [18771:    First    Division   of 

Aldermen    of    Jersey    City,    42    X.    J.  the  St.  Paul  &  Pacific  Railroad  Com- 

L.    (13   Vroom)    97    [ISs'oi.  pany   v.   City   of   St.   Paul.   21    Minn. 

'"State,    New    Jersey    Railroad    &  526    [18751. 

Transportation     Company,     Pros.     v.  "  McCutcheon    v.    Pacific    Railroad 

City    of   Elizabeth,    37    X.    J.    L.    (8  Company,   72   Mo.   App.   271    [1897]. 

Vr.)    3.30   [1875];   State,  Xew  .Jersey  "Kansas   City   v.    Bacon,    157    Mo. 

Railroad  &  Transportation  Company.  4.")0.  57  S.  W.   1045    [1900]. 
Pros.  V.  Mayor  and  Common  Council 


§  595  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  984 

assessment.  Property  which  is  used  for  a  right  of  way  is  in  one 
sense  indispensable  to  the  operation  of  the  road  by  the  railway 
company  under  its  franchise.^  Even  from  this  point  of  view 
however,  it  may  be  said  that  the  specific  tract  of  land  used  as  a 
right  of  way  by  the  railroad  at  any  given  time  is  not  indispen- 
sable since  other  land  might  be  obtained.  We  find  that  in  some 
jurisdictions  it  is  assumed  that  it  is  proper  to  assess  the  right  of 
way  of  a  railroad  in  the  absence  of  facts  showing  that  no  benefit 
is  conferred.-  Under  statutes  which  provide  for  assessing  prop- 
erty "fronting  on  or  adjoining  an  improvement,"^  or  which  au- 
thorize the  council  to  determine  what  property  is  benefited  by  the 
improvement,*  the  right  of  way  of  a  railway  may  be  assessed. 
In  other  jurisdictions,  we  find  that  by  statute  the  right  of  way 
is  exempt  from  assessment,  while  other  property  of  a  railway, 
though  used  in  the  business  of  transportation,  is  not  exempt.^ 
Thus,  a  statute  providing  that  "the  offices,  depots,  car  houses 
and  other  real  property  of  railroad  corporation,  situated  in  said 
city  of  Philadelphia,  the  superstructure  of  said  road  and  water 
stations  only  excepted,  are  and  hereafter  shall  be  subject  to  taxa- 
tion by  ordinance  for  city  purposes,"  was  held  to  exempt  the 
road  bed  with  whatever  was  constructed  thereon  and  to  subject 

^  Soiithern   California   Railway   Co.  ville    R.    R.    Co.    v.    Barber    Asphalt 

V.    Workman,    146    Cal.    80,    79    Pac.  Paving    Company,    116    Ky.    856,    25 

586,  82  Pac.  79   [1905].  Ky.    L.     R.     1024,    76     S.'   W.     1097 

2  Louisville  &   Nashville   R.   R.   Co.  [1903];     Lake     Shore     &     Michigan 

V.   Barber   Asphalt  Paving  Company,  Southern   Railway   Company   v.   City 

197    U.    S.    430,    29    S.    466    [1905];  of  Grand  Rapids,   102  Mich.  374,  29 

(affirming      116      Ky.      856,      76      S.  L.  R.  A.   195,  60  N.  W.  767   [1894]; 

W.   1097,   ii5   Ky.   L.   R.    1024);    Ap  Northern   Pacific  Ry.   Co.  v.   Seattle, 

peal  of  North  Beach  &  Mission  R.  R.  —  Wash.  ,  91   Pac.  244    [1907]. 

Co.  in  the  Matter  of  Widening  Kear-  This  qviestion  was  raised  but  not  de- 

ney  Street,  32  Cal.  500   [1867];   Erie  cided    in   City   of   Nevada   to   use   of 

R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Paterson,  72  N.  J.  Gilfillan   v.    Eddy,    123    Mo.    562,    27 

L.   (43  Vr.)   83,  59  Atl.  1031   [1905];  S.  W.  471. 

State,     Paterson     &     Hudson     River  ^  Heman    Construction    Co.   v.   Wa- 

Railroad   Company,  Pros.   v.   City  of  bash  R.  Co.,  206  Mo.  172,  104  S.  W. 

Passaic,   54   N.   J.   L.    (25   Vr.)    340,  67    [1907]. 

23   Atl.  945   [1892];    Illinois  Central  *  Northern  Pacific  Ry.  Co.  v.   City 

Railroad   Company  v.   People   ex   rel.  of   Seattle,   —   Wash.   ,   91    Pac. 

Seaton,    189    111.    119,   59    N.    E.   609  244  [1907].     (The  right  of  way  abut- 

[1901];      Chicago     &     Northwestern  ted  on   the   street  but  was  not  part 

Railway  Company  v.  Village  of  Elm-  of   it). 

hurst,    165    111.    148,    46    N.    E.    437  "City    of    Philadelphia    to    use    of 

[1897];    Pittsburg,    C,    C.    &    St.    L.  McCann    v.    Philadelphia    &    Reading 

Ry.    Co.   V.   Taber,    168    Tnd.    419,    77  Railroad   Company,    177   Pa.   292,   34 

N.  E.  741   [1906];  Louisville  &  Nash-  L.  R.  A.  564,  35  Atl.  610   [1896]. 


985  PROPERTY   STTBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  595 

the  rest  of  the  real  property  of  the  railroad  to  local  assessment  as 
well  as  to  general  taxation.''  In  other  jurisdictions,  it  is  assumed 
that  a  right  of  way  is  ordinarily  not  subject  to  assessment  for  local 
improvements.'^  A  reason  assigned  for  holding  that  a  right  of 
way  cannot  be  assessed,  is  that  such  right  of  way  is  not  subject  to 
sale  on  execution  and  is  necessary  to  enable  the  railroad  company 
to  operate  its  road  under  its  franchise."  In  such  jurisdictions,  it 
has  been  said  that  while  it  is  possible  that  land  occupied  as  a  right 
of  way  might  be  benefited  by  the  improvement  of  an  adjacent 
street,  as  a  rule  it  cannot  be  so  benefited."  The  wording  of  stat- 
utes describing  the  property  which  may  be  assessed,  is  regarded 
in  some  jurisdictions  as  excluding  the  right  of  way  of  a  railroad. 
Thus,  a  statute  which  authorizes  a  tax  on  lots  and  parcels  of  land 
fronting  on  a  street,  is  held  not  to  include  a  right  of  way  in  which 
the  railroad  has  merely  an  easement.^'  The  right  of  way  of  a 
railroad  company  across  a  street  is  held  not  to  be  property  abut- 
ting on  such  street  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  providing 
for  assessment  of  such  property.^^  In  other  jurisdictions,  the 
right  of  way  of  a  railroad  company  appropriated  by  eminent  do- 
main is  regarded  as  a  lot  of  land,'-  or  as  land,'^  within  the  mean- 
ing of  a  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  such  property.  The 
right  of  way  of  a  railroad  company  lying  within  a  street  and  ex- 
tending along  its  length  is  held  not  to  be  abutting  property  with- 
in the  meaning  of  a  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  such 
property.'*     The   right   of  way   of  a   railroad   company.   Iieing  a 

"City   of  Pliiladolpliia    v.   Pliiladel-  'U  hioago,    Rock    Island    &    Pacific 

phia    &    Rcadinw    Railroad    Company,  Railway  Company  v.   City  of  Ottum- 

177    Pn.    202.    34    L.    R.    A.    564,    35  wa,  112  la.  300,  ".il   L.  R.  A.  703,  83 

Atl.   610    [1896].  N.  W.   1074    [1000]. 

^  City   of   Brid<report   v.   New  York  "Cliicajjo,     Burlinfiton     &     Quincy 

&  New  Haven  Railroad  Company,  36  Railroad     Company     v.    South    Park 

Conn.    255,    4    Am.    Rep.    63    [I860];  Commissioners,     U     Bradwell      (111.) 

City  of   Muscatine   v.   Cliicasro.   Rock  502    [1SS2]. 

Island    &    Pacific    Railway    Company,  ^'Louisville  &    Nashville  R.  R.   Co. 

88    la.    201,    55   N.    W.    100    [1803];  v.   Barber  Asphalt  Pavinjj  Company, 

City  of  Philadelphia   v.  Philadelphia,  116   Ky.  856,  25   Ky.   L.  R.   1024.  76 

Wilmincrton     &     Baltimore     Railroad  8.    W.    1007    [1003];    Fiirsr   v.    Louis- 

Companv,    33    Pa.    St.    41    [1850].  ville  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  116  Vy.   135.  25 

•Southern    California    Railway    Co.  Ky.  L.  R.  350.  75  S.  W.  260    [1003]. 

V.    Workman,    14(i    Cal.    80,    70    Pac.  "Northern     Indiana     Railroad     Co. 

586.  82  Pac.  70    [1005].  v.    Connelly,    10    O.    S.    160    [1850]. 

'Village    of    River    Forest    v.    Chi-  '♦  Citv   of    Boston    v.    Boston   &   AI- 

caoro   &    Northwestern    Railwav    Com-  bany    Railroad    Companv.    170    Mass. 

pany.    107    111.    344.    64    N.    E.    364  05,  40   N.   E.  05    [1808];    Boehme  v. 

[1902].  City    of    Monroe,    106    Mich.    401,    64 

N.  W.  204   [1805]. 


§  596  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  986 

mere  easement,  is  not  regarded  as  a  lot  adjacent  to  the  street. 
within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  such 
property.^"'  The  term  "right  of  way,"  used  in  an  ordinance  pro- 
viding for  the  special  taxation  of  railroad  property  for  a  street 
improvement,  means  the  road  bed  and  tracks  lying  in  the  street 
to  be  improved.^"  The  track  of  a  railroad  as  distinct  from  the 
right  of  way,  cannot  be  regarded  as  benefited  by  a  system  of  drain- 
age. ^^  In  determining  the  value  of  a  right  of  way  where  such 
value  is  material,  the  valuation  of  such  railroad  fixed  by  a  state 
board  in  which  both  real  and  personal  property  are  included,  can- 
not be  taken  as  a  basis.^^  Whether  a  right  of  way  can  be  assess- 
ed or  not  is  a  matter  to  be  determined  by  each  state  in  accordance 
Avith  its  statutes  and  ideas  of  public  policy.^''  The  assessment  of  a 
right  of  way  for  a  street  improvement  is  not  a  taking  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law;  does  not  violate  the  Fourteenth  Amend- 
ment ;  and  does  not  present  a  Federal  question  for  which  the  judg- 
ment of  the  State  Supreme  Court  may  ])e  reversed  by  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court.-'  An  assessment  was  levied  upon  land 
owned  by  a  railroad  company,  situated  on  either  side  of  its  right 
of  way.  Such  land  had  formed  an  entire  tract  before  such  right 
of  way  was  opened  through  it.  On  confirmation  the  court  modi- 
fied the  assessment  by  assessing  the  amount  of  the  assessment  on 
each  tract  as  one  amount  upon  the  entire  tract.  It  was  held  that 
this  did  not  amount  to  assessing  the  right  of  way.^^ 

§  596.     Property  other  than  right  of  way. 

In  some  jurisdictions,  it  is  assumed  tliat  railway  property  other 
than  the  right  of  way  is  liable  to  assessment  for  local  improve- 

"  City    of    Muscatine     v.     Chicago,  Line    Railway    Company,    133    N.    C. 

Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Railway  Com-  21l).  45  S.  E.  566   [1903]. 

pany.    88    la.    291,    55    X.    W.     100  ''Louisville  &   Nashville  R.  R.  Co. 

[1S93].  V.    Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co..    197 

^Hhicago,    Rock    Island    &    Pacific  U.  S.  430,  25  S.  466  [1905] ;    (afiirm- 

Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Moline,  ing  116  Ky.  856,   76  S.  W.   1097,  25 

158    IlL   64.   41    X.    E.   877    [1895].  K.  L.  P.   1024). 

"Drainage    Commissioners    of    Dis-  ^Louisville  &  Nashville   R.  R.  Co. 

trict    No.    3,    etc.     v.    Ilinois    Central  v.   Barber   Asphalt  Paving   Company. 

Railroad    Company.    158    111.    353,    41  197  U.  S.  430,  25  S.  466  [1905]  ;    (af- 

N.   E.    1073    [1895].  firming  116  Ky.  856,  76  S.  W.   1097. 

"Chicago,   Milwaukee    &    St.    Paul  25  K.  L.  R.   1024). 

Railway    Company    v.    Phillips.     Ill  ^Chicago,    Rock    Island    &    Pacific 

la.   377,   82   N.   W.    787    [1900].     To  Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Chicago. 

the  same  effect  see  Commissioners  of  139  111.  573,  28  N.  E.  1108  [1893]. 
Chatham     County    v.     Seaboard    Air 


987 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§  596 


ments,  even  if  used  for  railway  purposes.'  The  question  of  bene- 
fit to  such  property  is  said  to  be  a  question  of  fact.-  In  other 
jurisdictions  a  property  which  is  used  for  railway  purposes  ex- 
clusively, seems  to  be  regarded  as  not  subject  to  assessment  for 
local  improvements.''  These  general  propositions  are  aflfected 
both  by  the  purpose  for  which  the  property  is  used  and  the  nature 
of  the  improvement  for  which  it  is  sought  to  levy  an  assessment. 
Thus,  it  is  held  in  many  jurisdictions  that  the  propert}^  used  as  a 
depot  may  be  assessed  for  the  improvement  of  an  adjoining 
street.*  In  some  of  the  jurisdictions  taking  this  view,  the  exis- 
tence of  such  benefit  must  be  proved  as  a  fact  in  each  case."'  So 
property  used  for  a  depot  may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  a  side- 
Avalk."  or   a  sewer.'     Where   this  view  obtains,   it   is  still   clearer 


'  New  York,  otc,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New 
Britain,  49  Conn.  40;  Chicago  Ter- 
minal Transfer  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  178  III.  429,  53  N.  E.  361 
[1R99I;  Cliicago  &  Northwestern 
llailway  Company  v.  Village  of  Elm- 
hurst,  Kio  111.  is4.  4ti  N.  E.  1152 
11897];  Chicago,  Kock  Island  &  Pa- 
cific Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago.  139  111.  573,  28  N.  E.  IIOS 
11893];  Lake  Erie  &  Western  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Rowker.  9  Ind. 
App.  428.  3()  N.  E.  8()4  11893];  Min- 
neapolis &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Limlquist,  119  Iowa  144,  93  N.  W. 
103  119031:  Atchison.  'I'opeka  &  San- 
ta Ee  Railroad  Company  v.  Peters(m. 

5  Kan.  App.  103,  48  Pac.  877  11897]  ; 
State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Minnesota 
Transfer  Railway  Company  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ramsey  County.  fiS 
Minn.  242,  71  X.  W.  27  1189i>l:  City 
of  Nevada  to  use  of  (iilfillaii  v.  l-'ddy. 
123  Mo.  540.  27  S.  W.  471  118941: 
City  of  Philadclpliia  t-i  use  of  Mc- 
Cann  v.  I'iiiladclpliia  &  Heading 
Railroad  ('(mipany.  177  Pn.  292.  34 
L.  R.  A.  5(i4.  35  Atl.  010  |  ISOU]  : 
City   of   Philad(di)liia    v.    Philadclpliia 

6  Reading  Railroad  Company.  177 
Pa.  292.  34  L.  R.  A.  504;  35  Atl. 
010  [1890]:  City  of  Erie  v.  Piece  of 
Land  Fronting  on  State  Street.  175 
Pa.  St.  523.  34  Atl.  80S  \\Sm^  :  Mt. 
Pleasant  Bor.  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
R.  R.  Co..  138  Pa.  St.  3(i5.  11  L.  R. 
A.  520,  20  Atl.   1052    11890]:    Hamar 


V.  Leihy,  124  Wis.  205,  102  X.  W. 
508  [1905];  Chicago,  Milwaukee  & 
St.  Paul  Railway  Company  v.  (  ity  of 
Milwaukee,  89  Wis.  500.  28  L.  R.  A. 
249.    02    N.    W.    417    [1895]. 

^The  Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pa- 
cific Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  139  111.  573,  28  N.  E.  "llOS 
[1893]. 

■'  Xaugatuck  Railroad  Company  v. 
(ity  of  Waterhury,  78  Conn.  19.3,  61 
Atl.  474  [1905];  New  York  &  New 
Haven  Railroad  Company  v.  (ity  of 
X"ew  Haven,  42  Conn.  279.  19  Am. 
Rep.  534    [1875]. 

*  Chicago  &  X'orthwestern  Railway 
Company  v.  Village  of  Elmhurst, 
105  111.  184.  40  N.' E.  1152  [18971; 
Atchison,  Topeka  &  Sante  Fe  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Peterson.  5  Kan. 
App.  103.  48  Pac.  877  [1897];  City 
(  f  Nevada  to  use  of  (Jilfillan  v.  Eddy. 
123  Mo.  546,  27  S.  W.  471  [1894]; 
State,  New  Jersey  Midland  Railroad 
Company.  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Alder- 
men of  Jersey  City.  42  X.  J.  L.  (  13 
Vroom)    97    [ISSO]. 

'■  Chicago.  Rock  Island  &  Pacific 
Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago. 139  111.  573.  28  X.  E.  1108 
[1893]. 

"Mt.  Pleasant  Bor.  v.  Baltimore 
&  Ohio  R.  R.  (?o.,  138  Pa.  St.  305, 
11   L.  R.  A.  520,  20  Atl.  1052  [1890]. 

^  Lake  Erie  &  Western  Railroad 
Company  v.  Bowker,  9  Ind.  App.  428, 
:!(;  X.  E.  804   [18931. 


§596 


TAXATION  BY    ASSESSMENT, 


988 


that  property  which  is  used  in  part  as  a  depot  and  in  part  is 
leased  for  other  purposes,  is  subject  to  assessment.^  It  seems  to 
be  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  the  increased  facility  of  access 
to  a  depot  is  a  benefit  for  which  an  assessment  may  be  levied." 
In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  said  that  the  increased  facility  of  ac- 
cess to  a  depot  cannot  be  considered  in  assessing  such  depot  for 
the  benefits.^'^  The  reasons  given  for  this  are  inconsistent.  One 
is,  that  such  increased  facilities  for  access  do  not  result  in  any  in- 
crease in  the  business  of  the  railroad.^^  The  other  is  that  an 
assessment  based  upon  the  theory  of  an  increase  of  business  is  a 
tax  upon  such  business  rather  than  an  assesment  upon  the  real 
property.'-  The  logical  result  of  these  views  is  reached  in  some 
jurisdictions  which  hold  that  a  depot  cannot  be  assessed  for  the 
cost  of  a  street  improvment.'^  It  has  been  held  that  a  depot  can- 
not be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  fencing  in  a  district  in  which  such 
depot  was  situated.'*  Land  used  for  freight  and  lumber  yards 
may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  an  adjoining  sidewalk.'^  By  stat- 
ute in  Iowa,  real  estate  belonging  to  a  railroad  company,  not  ex- 


*  Chicago  Terminal  Transfer  Co.  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  178  111.  429,  53  N. 
E.  361    [1899J. 

^  C  hicago  Terminal  Transfer  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  178  111.  429, 
53  N.  E.  361    [1899]. 

^°  Naugatuck  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Waterbury.  78  Conn.  193,  61 
Atf.  474  [1905];  New  York  &  New 
Haven  Railroad  Company  v.  City  of 
New  Haven,  42  €onn.  279,  19  Am. 
Rep.  534  [1875];  Old  Colony  &  Fall 
River  Railroad  Company  v.  Inhabit- 
ants of  the  County  of  Plymouth,  80 
Mass.  (14  Gray)  155  [1859];  Boston 
&  Maine  R.  R.  v.  County  of  Middle- 
sex, 83  Mass.  (1  All.)  324  [1861]; 
Hook  V.  Chicago  &  Alton  Railroad 
Compam-.  133  ^Mo.  313,  34  S.  W. 
549  [1895];  State,  Morris  &  Essex 
Railroad  Company,  Pros.  v.  Jersey 
City,  36  N.  J.  L.  '(7  Vr.)    56  [1872]. 

^  "'We  are  unable  to  see  how  the 
land  assessed  is  made  anv  more  val- 
uable to  the  owners^  for  anv  other 
purpose  for  whi'^h  thev  can  l^wfuUy 
use  it.  The  land  WPS  o'-i'Tinally 
taken,  is  now  used,  and  prpsiiTnr>ti'"P- 
Iv  must  continue  to  be  used,  for  rail- 


road purposes.  For  such  purposes 
it  can  be  not  more  benefited  by  the 
improvement  than  land  taken  for  wa- 
ter works,  public  streets,  or  parks. 

"The  fact  that  the  pavement 
makes  access  to  the  railroad  station 
easier  shows  a  benefit  to  the  public 
at  large,  but  not  a  special  benefit  to 
the  corporation.  They  carry  no  more 
passengers,  and  receive  no  greater 
compensat'  ■  ',  in  consequence  of  such 
increased  facilities."  New  York  & 
New  Haven  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  New  Haven,  42  Conn.  279 
284,    19    Am.    Rep.    534    [1875]. 

'=  State,  Morris  &  Essex  Railroad 
Company,  Pros.  v.  .Jersey  City,  36  N. 
J.   L.    (7   Vr.)    50    [1872]. 

"Nau"-atuck  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Waterbury,  78  Conn.  193, 
61  Atl.  474  [1905];  New  York  & 
New  HtivPTi  Pnilroad  Company  v. 
Citv  of  New  Haven.  42  Conn.  279. 
19    Am.    Ren.    534    [18751. 

"  Ptiewel  V.  Fencing  District  No. 
fi.  of  .T.^l,Tier,n  r-nuntv.  71  A'-k.  17, 
70  S.   W.   308.   71   S.  W.   247    [1903]. 

>5  P'^ila'^'<-lnhia  v.  Stevenson,  132 
Pa.   103,   19  Atl.  70   [1S90]. 


989  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  59fi 

cliisively  used  in  the  operation  of  its  road  is  subject  to  local  assess- 
ment and  taxation.  Under  such  statute  it  was  held  that  a  grain 
elevator  belonging  to  a  railway  company  situated  on  its  land  next 
to  its  tracks,  which  was  leased  to  tenants  vA\o  paid  a  nominal  rent 
and  used  it  exclusively  for  storing  grain  for  shipment  over  such 
railroad,  is  not  subject  to  local  assessment.^"  Land  owned  by  a 
railway  in  fee,  which  it  may  use  as  it  pleases,  and  which  it  uses  as 
a  place  for  running  off  freight  cars  and  leaving  them,  has  been 
held  to  be  subject  to  a  sewer  assessment."  A  railroad  company 
owning  a  lot  which  is  divided  by  its  right  of  way  into  two  parts, 
may  be  assessed  for  the  parts  of  such  lot  not  used  for  its  right  of 
way.^^  It  is  not  prejudicial  error  to  assess  such  part  separately.^" 
In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  real  property 
belonging  to  a  railroad  and  nsed  exclusively  in  the  operation  of 
its  road  is  exempt  from  assessment  while  other  real  property  own- 
ed by  the  road  is  subject  to  assessment.-'  In  some  states  it  is  pro- 
vided by  statute  that  any  real  property  belonging  to  a  railroad, 
except  the  right  of  way,  may  be  assessed.-^  Accordingly,  if  it 
is  shown  that  a  railroad  owns  land,  but  it  does  not  appear  how 
sueli  land  is  used,  an  assessment  is  regarded  as  prima  facie  valid." 
Under  such  a  statute  a  tract  of  land  used  in  part  as  a  right  of 
way  and  in  part  for  railroad  yards  was  subject  to  assessment  ex- 
cept as  to  such  part  thereof  as  was  used  as  a  road  bed.-'*  In  some 
jurisdictions,  land  used  for  side  t^^^'ks  n^av  be  a^s'^'^s'^d  ^'^"  '^^eal 
improvements.-*  The  amount  of  the  a«se«sment  is  said  to  depend 
upon  the  probability  that  such  land  may  thereafter  be  devoted  to 

"■•  Herter   v.   (  liicatrn.   Milwaukee   &  pliii   to   Use   of  ^N'^e^ann   v.   Philndel- 

St.   Paul   Railway   Company,    114   lu.  pliia   &    Rpadiug    llailroad    C'onii)any, 

330,  86  X.  W.   2m    linoi].  177  Ta.  •:!)2.  34  L.  \\.  A.  5P4,  35  Atl. 

"i\ew    York,    etc,     II.    R.    Co.    v.  (ilO   |1> !»:;!;(  ity  of  Erie  v.  Piece  of 

New  Britain,  4!)   Cniin.   -JO.  J.and    Krontiuf,'   on    State   Street,    175 

*"  Minneapolis    &    St.    Louis    R.    R.  Pa.  St.  523.  34  Atl.  808   ri8D()l. 

Co.   V.   l^indfjuist.    11!)    la.    144.  93    N.  "Minneapolis    &    St.    Louis    K.    K. 

\N.    103    [1!))3|.  Co.    V.    Lindnuist.    119    Iowa,    144,    !)3 

'".Minneapolis    &    St.    J.ouis    R.    R.  N.  W.  103   11!)0:!|. 

Co.   V.   Lindeuist,    119    la.    144,  93   N.  -M'ity  of  Philadelnliia   v.   Philadel- 

\V.  103   fl!):):n.  pliia    &     Keadi  ig    Railroad    'omnrmv, 

*  Herter    v.    Cliienfru.    .Milwauki'e   &  177  Pa.  202,  34  L.  R.  A.  504.  35  Atl. 

St.   Paul    Railway   Coniimny.    114    la.  (ilO   fl-'nill. 

330,  S(i  N.  W.   2r.r,    [10011.'  ^■' State.   N>w  .Ters-y  :\lidlnd   Rail- 

-''Minneapolis    &    St.    Louis    IL    R.  road    Company.    Pro*,    v.    ^'a\or    and 

Co.    V.    Tind"uist.    110    Iowa    144,    03  .^klermfTi  rf  .Torse-  City,  42  X.  J.  L. 

N.  W.   103   11003);   City  of  Pliiladel-  (1.3  Vrooni )    97   [1880]!' 


§  597  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  990 

other  purposes.-"'  Iii  other  jurisdictions  it  is  said  to  be  doubtful 
whether  a  side  track  can  be  assessed.-'"'  Land  used  for  freight  and 
lumber  yards  may  be  assessed  for  the  construction  of  adjoining 
sidewalks.-^  Land  used  for  warehouses,  roundhouses  and  shops 
is  said  to  be  subject  to  assessment  for  local  improvements.-*^  Land 
which  is  net  used  for  railway  purposes  is  subject  to  local  assess- 
ment, and  the  fact  that  it  is  owned  by  a  railway  company  does  not 
affect  such  liability.-"  The  fact  that  it  is  probable  that  such  land 
will  in  the  future  be  required  for  railroael  purposes  does  not  ex- 
empt it  from  local  assessment."'  If  a  railway  company  has  con- 
structed transfer  tracks  and  stock  yards  on  a  part  of  a  tract  of 
land,  the  rest  of  such  tract  is  not  thereby  rendered  exempt  from 
local  assessment.^^ 

§  597.     Effect  of  interest  held  by  railroad  in  land. 

In  some  jurisdictions  the  I'ight  to  assess  the  right  of  way  of  a 
railroad  seems  to  turn  upon  the  nature  of  the  interest  which  the 
railway  company  has  in  such  land.  If  the  railway  company  has 
appropriated  such  land  l)y  eminent  domain  and  possesses  only  an 
easement  therein,  it  is  said  that  such  easement  cannot  be  assessed.^ 
This  result  depends  in  part  upon  a  fpiestion  of  statutory  construc- 
tion, the  easement  being  held  not  to  be  a  lot  within  the  meaning 
of  the  statute  providing  for  an  assessment  upon  adjoining  lots.- 
In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  said  to  be  immaterial  whether  the  rail- 
road company  has  acquired  the  fee  or  an  easement  in  the  land 

^^' state,    Morris    and    Essex    Kaii-  Assessors,  60  N.  J.  L.    (37   Vr.)    501, 

road  Company.   Pros.  v.  Jersey  City.  49  Atl.  437    [1901]. 

36  N.  J.  L.    (7   Vr.)   56   [1872].  ""  Cliicago,    MUwaukee    &    St.    Paul 

-"  Ahern   v.   Board   of   Improvement  Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Milwau- 

IJistrict  No.  3  of  Texarkana.  69  Ark.  kee,  89  Wis.  506,  28  L.  R.  A.  249,  02 

08,  01  S.  W.  575    [1901].  >J.  W.  417    [1895]. 

'■"  Mt.    Pleasant    Bor.    v.    Baltimore  •"  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Minne- 

&   Ohio  Ry.   Co.,   138  Pa.   St.   305,   11  «ota    Transfer    Railway    Company    v. 

L.  R.   A.    520,   20    Atl.    1052    1 1890] ;  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County,  68 

Philadelphia    v.    Stevenson,     132    Pa.  Minn.  242,  71  N.  W.  27   [1897]. 

103,  19  Atl.  70.  '  ^'hicago,    Rock     Island    &     Pacific 

""Atchison,     Topeka     &     Santa     Ki-  Railway    'Company     v.    City     of    Ot- 

Railroad     Company     v.     Peterson,     5  tumwa,  112  la.  300,  51  L.  R.  A.  763, 

Kan.   App.    103,   48   Pae.   877    [1897].  8.3  N.  W.  1074   [1900]:   City  of  Mus- 

-"  In  the  Matter  of  the  Jersey  City  catine    v.    Chicago,    Rock    Island    and 

and   Bergen   Railway   Company  for  a  I'acific     Railway     Company.     88     la. 

Summary    Determination    as    to    Cer-  291,  55  X.  W.  100   [1893|. 

tain     Property     Assessed     by     Jersey  -  See  §  630. 
City  and  also  by  the  State  Board  of 


991  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  598 

which  it  uses  for  its  right  of  way.  This  theory  leads,  however. 
to  widely  different  results.  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  said  that 
the  right  of  way  cannot  be  assessed  whether  the  railway  company 
has  a  fee  or  an' easement  therein.''  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  said 
that  the  right  of  way  can  be  assessed  even  if  the  railway  company 
has  merely  an  easement  therein  acquired  by  eminent  domain.*  A 
railroad  is  said  to  have  such  an  interest  in  the  soil  that  such  in- 
terest is  subject  to  local  assessment.'^  It  is  real  estate  within  the 
meaning  of  a  statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  real  estate." 
A  railroad  which  has  a  mere  license  to  run  its  trains  over  the 
tracks  of  another  railroad  which  right  is  revocable  on  notice,  has 
no  interest  in  such  right  of  way  which  ma}^  be  assessed.'^  Land 
owned  by  a  railway  in  fee,  without  restriction  in  its  use  is  held  to 
be  subject  to  assessment.^  In  some  jurisdictions,  while  the  prop- 
erty of  a  railway  company  including  its  right  of  way  may  be 
assessed  for  local  improvements,"  land  donated  by  congress  for 
the  sole  use  of  the  railroad  can  be  assessed  only  for  the  benefits 
which  it  receives  if  used  for  that  particular  purpose.^" 

§  598.  Specific  type  of  improvement  as  affecting  assessment  of 
right  of  w^ay. 
Furthermore,  since  in  many  jurisdictions,  the  ((uestion  of  actual 
benefit  to  the  property  assessed  is  regarded  as  material,  it  is 
necessary  to  consider  the  chief  types  of  local  improvement  with 
reference  to  the  right  to  assess  railroad  property  therefor.     This 

*  Allegheny  City  v.  West  Penna.  R.  road  Co.  v.  Hanna,  (iS  Ind.  502 
Co.,    138    Pa.    St    375.    21    Atl.    703       L1S79]. 

|lSi)()J.  'Louisville  and  Naslivilk'  Railroad 

'  J^ouisvillc   &    Xaslivilio    R.    R.   Co.  Coni])any   v.   City   of   East   St.   Louis. 

V.    HarlKM-    Aai)lialt    Paving    Co.,    1  Ki  L'U  111.  (ioti,  25  X.  E.  902   [1S!)1|. 

Ky.  850,  25   Ky.   L.  Rt-p.    1024,  70  S.  "New  York,  Now  Haven  and  Hart 

VV.    1097    [1903];    Figg   v.    Louisville  ford    R.    R.    Co.    v.    New    Britain.    4!1 

&  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  116  Ky.  135,  25  Ky.  Conn.  40. 

L.    R.    350,    75    S.    W."   269     |1903|;  'Illinois     Central     Railroad     Coin 

iNorthern   Indiana   Railroad  Company  paiiy   v.   Decatur,  147   U.  S.   190,   l!t7. 

V.  Connolly,   10  O.  S.  160   [1859).  :{7  L.   132.   13  S.  293  [18911;    (affirni- 

*  Appeal  of  North  Reach  and  -Mis-  Mig  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Com- 
sion  Railroad  Conii)any.  in  the  mat-  pany  v.  City  of  Drcatur.  126  ill.  92. 
ter  of  widening  Kearney  Stn-et.  32  1  L.  R.  A.  613.  IS  X.  E.  315  [18901)  -. 
Cal.    500    [18671.  Illinois    Central     Railroad     Company 

"  Krighton  Ky.  Co.  v.  St.  (Jiles.  4  v.  City  of  Chien./o.  141  111.  509.  30 
L.   R.    (Fvcli.  Div.)    239:    Rieh  v.  Citv        .\.   E.    lO.'iC,    flS92l. 

of  Chicago.    I,"v2   Til.   IS.  38  X".    E.   255  "'Illinois     Central     Railroad     Com- 

11894);    Peru   and    Indianapolis  Rail-       pany  v.  (  itv  of  Chicasjo,  141    111.  509. 

30   X.   E.    ](yM\    I  1S921. 


§598 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


992 


divergence  of  judicial  opinion  i3  evident  when  we  come  to  a  con- 
sideration of  the  specific  types  of  local  improvement.  Under  these 
different  and  inconsistent  theories,  widely  different  results  have 
been  reached  in  different  courts  upon  facts  substantially  the 
same.  Thus,  in  some  jurisdictions  it  is  proper  to  assess  the  right 
of  way  of  a  railroad  for  the  improvement  of  an  adjacent  street.^ 
Even  under  this  theory,  it  has  been  held  to  be  improper  to  assess 
a  right  of  way  for  a  street  improvement  where  the  only  evidence 
as  to  benefit  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  such  property  will 
at  some  time  be  used  for  a  depot  or  a  freight  house.-  In  other 
jurisdictions,  it  is  held  that  the  right  of  Avay  of  a  railway  cannot 
be  assessed  for  a  street  improvement  on  the  ground  that  such  im- 
provement cannot  confer  any  benefit  upon  such  land  while  de- 
voted to  such  use.-^    Thus,  where  the  right  of  way  was  from  twelve 


'Louisvir.e  &  ^.'ashville  R.  R.  ^'o. 
V.  Uarber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  197 
r.  S.  430,  1:5  S.  4(36  [1905]; 
( cillirn-ing,  11(5  i  y.  856,  76  >S.  W . 
1097,  25  Ky.  L.  R.  1024)  :  Appeal  of 
^orth  Beach  and  Mi  sion  R.  R.  Co. 
in  f.e  Matter  of  Widening  Kearney 
Ft-eet,  32  Cal.  500  [1867];  Illinois 
Central  Rai'.road  Ccmpany  v.  People 
ex  rel.  Seaton,  139  111.  119,  59  N.  E. 
609  [1901];  Palmer  v.  City  of  Dan- 
ville, 166  111.  42,  46  X.  E.  629 
[1897];  Chicago  and  Korthwestera 
Railway  Company  v.  Villa<je  of  Elm- 
hurst,  165  111.  148,  46  X.  E.  43/ 
[i;97];  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Kankakee,  164 
ill.  60i,  45  X.  E.  971  [1897];  Chi- 
cago &  Alton  Railroad  Company  v. 
C  ity  of  Joliet,  153  111.  649,  39  N.  E. 
1077  [1S94];  Rich  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 152  1:1.  IS,  33  N.  E.  2:5  [1894] ; 
Pittsburgh  C.  C.  &  ^t.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Taber,  168  Ind.  419,  77  X.  E.  741 
[19U6];  Pittsburgh,  Cincinnati,  Chi- 
cago and  St.  Louis  Railway  Company 
v.  Fish,  158  Ind.  525,  63  X.  E.  454 
[1901];  Peru  and  Indianapolis  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Ha'ina,  68  Ind.  562 
[18791 -.  Tndi^naprPs,  Peru  and  Chi- 
ca-i^o  Rai'road  ( omnany  v.  R-^ss,  47 
Ind.  25  [1874];  Louisville  &  Xash- 
ville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rfirher  Asphalt 
Paving   Co.,    116    Ky.    856,    76    S.    W. 


1097,  25  Ky.  L.  R.  1024  [1903]; 
Fiog  V.  Louisville  &  X.  R.  R.  Co., 
116  Ky.  135,  75  S.  W.  269,  25  Ly.  L. 
R.  350  [PJ03];  City  of  Ludlow  v. 
Cincinnati  Southern  Railway  Com- 
pany, 78  Ky.  357  [1880];  Lake 
.Shore  &  Michigan  Southern  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Grand  Rap- 
ids", 102  Micii.  374,  29  L.  R.  A.  195, 
60  X.  W.  767  [1894];  Xorthern  Indi- 
ana Railroad  C  ompany  v.  t  nnelly, 
10  0.  S.  160  [1859];  Xorthern  Paci- 
fic Ry.  Co.  V.  City  of  Sejtt  e,  — 
Wash.  ,  91  Pac".  244   [1937]. 

-  \  Ulage  of  River  Forest  v.  C  hica- 
g)  and  Xorthwestern  Railway  Com- 
pany, 197  ill.  344,  64  X.  E.  364 
|19("!2J. 

■■  .Southern  California  Railway 
Company  v.  Workman,  146  Cal.  8), 
79  Pac!  586,  82  Pac.  79  [1905]; 
JSaugatuck  Railroad  Comp.nny  v. 
City  of  Waterbury,  78  Conn.  193,  61 
Atl".  474  [1905];  City  of  Rrid  eport 
V.  Xew  York  and  Xew  Haven  Rail- 
road Company,  36  Conn.  £55,  4  Am. 
Rep.  63  [18C9];  Chicago,  R^ck  Is- 
land &  Pacific  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Uttnmwa,  112  la.  300.  51  L. 
R.  A.  763,  83  X.  W.  1074  [1900]; 
Citv  of  Muscatine  v.  Chicago,  Rock 
Island  &  Pacific  Railway  Company, 
88  la.  291,  55  N.  W.  100  [1893] ;  Mc- 
C'.-itcheon    v.    Pacific    Rail-oa  i    Com- 


o.oo 


PROPERTY    SI^BJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§598 


to  fifteen  feet  lower  than  the  level  of  the  adjoining  street  running 
parallel  to  such  right  of  way,  it  was  held  that  sucli  right  of  way 
could  not  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  such  street  improvement.-' 
It  has  been  held  that  a  street  across  a  railway  right  of  way  can- 
not confer  any  benefit  upon  such  railway  and  that  no  asses.s- 
ment  can  be  levied  therefor.-'''  So  it  is  held  proper  to  assess  the 
right  of  way  of  a  railway  company  for  the  improvement  of  high- 
ways." In  some  jurisdictions  an  assessment  may  be  levied  for 
improving  a  street  parallel  to  a  railway.'^  In  other  jurisdictions 
a  special  assessment  cannot  be  levied  for*  improving  a  street  paral- 
lel to  right  of  way  of  railway.^  It  has  been  held  that  a  highway 
across  the  right  of  way  of  a  railwa}^  cannot  confer  any  benefit  and 
that  no  assessment  can  be  levied  therefor.''  A  railroad  cannot 
be  assessed  for  the  cost  cf  a  public  road  crossing  its  tracks.^"     If 


pany,  72  Mo.  App.  271  [1897];  Sax- 
ton  JSation;il  Bank  v.  Hrywoxl,  L'2 
Mo.  App.  550  11895J;  State,  Mew 
Jc'sey  Railroad  &  'J  ransp  ;it:ition 
Con-.pany,  Pr  s.  v.  City  rf  Eiizaleth, 
37  N.  J.  L.  (S  Vr.)  330  [1875];  Kew 
York  &  Harlem  Railroad  "on:pany  v. 
Board  cf  Trustees  rf  the  Town  of 
Morrisania,  7  Hu  i.  GSZ  [187'.)];  City 
of  Erie  v.  Piec3  of  Lan  1  Fronting  on 
Str.te  Street,  175  Pa.  St.  523,  34  Atl. 
808  [1896];  Junction  R.  R.  Co.  y. 
City  of  Philadelphia,  S8  Pa.  St.  424, 

32  Am.  Rep.  417  [1879];  Allegheny 
City  V.  West  Penna.  Railroad  Co., 
138  Pa.  375,  21  Ml.  763  [1890];  Ha- 
mar  v.  Leihy.  124  Wis.  2:'5,  102  N. 
W.  568  [19:15];  Chicago,  .Milwaukee 
&  St.  Paul  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Milwaukee,  89  Wis.  500,  2S 
L.  R.  A.  249,  62  ^.  W.  417  11^95]; 
"A  railroad  cinnot  from  its  nature 
derive  any  benelit  from  tlr-  javing 
while  all  of  the  rest  of  the  nerrhbor- 
hood  may."  Allegheny  City  v.  West 
J'cnna.  Railroad  (  o.,"  138  Pa.  375, 
382,  21  Atl.  763  [1890];  (quoting, 
Citv  of  Philadelphia  v.  Pliilaclelphia, 
Wilmington  and  Baltimore  R.  R.  Co., 

33  Pa.  St.  (9  Casey)   41   [ISriO]). 

*  .Mlecheny  City  v.  West  Penna. 
Railroad  Co.,  138  Pa.  St.  37.'>.  21  Atl. 
763    [1890J. 

^  Saxton  Xationnl  Pnn'-  v.  T^ay- 
wood,  62  Mo.  App.  5.^0  r        -    .  state, 


New  Jersey  Railroad  &  transporta- 
tion Company,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Eliza- 
beth, 37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  330  [1875] ; 
.New  York  &  Harlem  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Board  of  Irustees  of  the 
-lown  cf  Morrisania,  7  Hun.  652 
[1876]. 

"  Fittsburgli,  Cincinnati,  Chicago  & 
St.  L<^uis  R;'ilway  (  ompa;iy  v.  Hays, 
17  Ind.  App.  261,  44  M.  E.  375,  45 
M.  E.  675,  46  N.  E.  597    [1896]. 

'  I'cru  and  Indianapo'is  R:iUroad 
Co.  V.  Hanna,  68  Ind.  5 '2  [1879J; 
Indianapolis,  Peru  and  Chicago  Rail- 
road Comi)anv  v.  Ross,  47  Ind.  25 
[1874]. 

''Alh"''heny  City  v.  West  I'enna. 
Railroad  Co.,  138  Pa.  St.  375,  21  Atl. 
763   [1890]. 

"  C  ity  of  Bridgeport  v.  Now  York 
and  New  Haven  Railroad  Com-  any, 
36  Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Re'i.  63  [18(i9|; 
Hook  V.  Chi  ago  and  Altm  Railroad 
Ccmpany,  133  Mo.  313,  34  S.  W .  549 
1 1895  J. 

'"  Ilxik  V.  '  hica"-o  and  Alton 
Railroad  Company,  133  Mo.  313,  34 
S.  W.  5-19  [1895].  (In  t'is  ca-e  it 
was  suggested  as  a  possible  Lene'it 
tliat  fewer  cattle  wtm'd  be  kill  d  at 
a  public  crossing  than  at  a  firm 
crossing  and  that  tlie  genera]  public 
would  have  better  access  ti  another 
road  leading  from  a  station  on  the 
line  of   the   railway   company.) 


§  598  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  994 

a  right  of  way  is  situated  in  a  street  runniiiy  along  the  length 
thereof,  it  has  been  held  that  such  right  of  way  is  benefited  by  the 
improvement  of  such  street  and  assessment  may  be  levied  there- 
for." Under  the  theory  that  a  right  of  way  is  not  subject  to 
local  assessment  it  has  been  held  that  such  right  of  way  cannot 
be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  constructing  a  sidewalk  along  said 
right  of  way.'-  By  special  statute  a  railroad  company  may  be  re- 
quired to  pave  the  streets  at  a  railway  crossing,'^  or  to  pave  cer- 
tain approaches,'*  or  to  pay  a  certain  proportion  of  the  cost  of 
such  improvement.''  The  percentage  of  the  cost  of  the  improve- 
ment imposed  upon  a  railroad  company  made  in  good  faith  and  in 
the  exercise  of  reasonable  discretion,  will  be  regarded  as  properly 
apportioned.'"  A  statute  imposing  upon  a  railway  company  the 
entire  cost  of  paving  the  street  on  which  its  track  is  laid,  operates 
both  to  impose  such  cost  upon  the  railroad,'"  and  to  relieve  the 
property  owners  from  the  cost  of  such  improvement.^^  If  the 
railroad  company  is  required  by  the  ordinance  granting  its  fran- 
chise to  keep  the  streets  paved  at  railway  crossings,  the  cost  of 
such  pavement  cannot  be  allowed  to  the  railway  company  as  dam- 
ages sustained  by  condemning  a  right  of  way  for  a  street  crossing 
such  track.'"  Where  a  railroad  is  obliged  to  pave  certain  ap- 
proaches, the  city  cannot  include  the  cost  of  such  approaches  in 
the  assessment.-'^*  Such  error  cannot  be  corrected  after  confirma- 
tion by  the  act  of  the  city  in  making  a  new  contract  for  an  im- 
provement  different   from   that   provided   ])y   the   original   ordin- 

"Kich   V.  City  of  Chicago,   1.52  111.  IH.    04,    41    X.    E.    877    [1895J.      The 

18,  38  N.  E.  255   [1894].  question  of  the  apportionment  of  the 

^-JVlt.  Pleasant  Borough  v.  Balti-  cost  of  improvement  and  the  deter- 
more  &  Ohio  R.  E.  Co..  138  Pa.  St.  mination  of  the  share  which  the 
365,  11  L.  R.  A.  520.  20  Atl.  1052  railroad  company  is  to  pay  is  dis- 
L189UJ.  cussed  elsewliere.     See  §  599  et  seq. 

"Kansas     City     v.     Kansas     City  "  Pliiladelpliia   to  Use  of  Nestor  v. 

Belt  Railway  Company,  187  ^lo.  140,  Spring      Carden      Farmers'      Market 

86  S.  W.  190  [1904];  Philadelphia  ti  Company,    161    Pa.    522.    29    Atl.   28(i 

Use  of  Nestor  v.  Spring  Garden  Far-  [1894]. 

mers'  Market  Company,   161  Pa.  522,  ^*'  PhiJadeljjhia  to  Use  of  Nestor  v. 

29  Atl.  286  [1894].  Spring      Garden      Farmers'      Market 

"City   of    Chicago   v.    Nodeek.    202  Company,    161    Pa.    522,   29    Atl.    286 

111.  257.  67  N.  E.  39    [1903].  U894]. 

^*  Chicago,  Rock  Island  and  Pacihc  "  Kansas     City     v.     Kansas     City 

Railway   Co.   v.    City   of   Moline,    158  Belt  Railway  Company,   187  Mo.    iHi 

111.  64.' 41   N.  E.  877    [1895].  86  S.   VV.   190   [1905]. 

"« Chicago,  Rock  Island  and  Pacific  ""  ^'ity   of   Chicago   v.   JSodeck,   202 

Railway   Co.   v.   City   of  Moline,    158  HI.  257,  67  N.  E.  39   |1903]. 


f 


095 


PROPERTY    SLBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§598 


ance  by  omitting  such  aproaehes.-^  A  sidewalk  parallel  to  the 
right  of  way  of*  a  railway  confers  no  benefit  and  no  assessment 
can  be  levied  therefor.-^  In  some  jurisdictions,  it  is  held  to  Ix' 
proper  to  levy  an  assessment  upon  the  right  of  Avay  of  a  railroad 
for  the  cost  of  a  sewer  which  furnishes  drainage  to  such  right  of 
way.-^  If  the  sewer  is  at  such  a  distance  from  the  right  of  way,  that 
it  will  not  furnish  drainage  unless  a  connecting  sewer  is  built  in 
the  future,  such  right  of  way  cannot  be  assessed  even  under  this 
theory.-*  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  to  be  improper  to  assess 
a  right  of  way  for  the  con.struction  of  a  sewer,  on  the  ground  that 
the  property  while  devoted  to  that  use  cannot  receive  any  ap- 
preciable benefit  from  such  improvement.-"'  In  some  of  these  eases 
the  special  facts  of  the  case  show  the  want  of  benefits.  Thus,  it 
is  proper  to  omit  from  assessment  the  right  of  way  of  a  railroad 
through  which  the  sewer  passes  underground.-"  By  special  stat- 
ute, the  right  of  way  of  a  railroad  may  be  assessed  for  the  bene- 
fits conferred  upon  it  by  the  construction  of  a  system  of  drain- 
age.-' Where  by  statute  a  railroad  company  is  i-eciuired  to  con- 
struct its  tracks  below  the  grade  level  and  provide  suitable  bridges 
over  the  tracks  at  street  crossings,  it  has  been  held  that  the  city 
cannot  require  the  railway  company,  at  its  sole  cost,  to  remove^ 
a  bridge  which  is  in  good  condition  and  i)ay  for  the  cost  of  con- 
structing a  new  ])ridge  which  is  strong  enough  to  enabk^  the  cars 


-'  City  of  Chicago  v.  ^ndeck,  '202 
111.  257,  67  N.  E.  -3!)   [UWi]. 

-■■' Mt.  I'leasant  Borough  v.  J?alti- 
more  &  Ohio  K.  R.  Co.,  138  Pa.  St. 
3(55,  11  L.  R.  A.  520.  20  Atl.  1052 
I  i8'.)0J. 

"  Lakp  Erie  and  Western  Railroad 
Company  v.  Bowker.  9  liul.  Apj).  428, 
36  ^.  E.  F-64  [18!)3];  State.  I'ater- 
son  &  Hudson  River  Railroad  Coni- 
l)any,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Passaic,  54 
N.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.)  340.  23  Atl.  n4.-> 
11S<)2T;  State,  New  Jersey  Railroad 
&  Transportation  Company,  I'ros.  v. 
City  of  Elizalieth.  37  X.  .1.  L.  (8 
Vr.")   330  [18751. 

'■'*  State,  New  Jersey  Railroad  & 
Transportation  Company.  Pros.  v. 
City  of  Eli/alieth.  37  X.  .1.  L.  (8 
\r.*)    330  [1875 J. 

"^  Payne      v.      VUlage      of      South 


Sjjringheid,  161  HI.  285,  44  N.  E. 
105  [1896];  Minneapolis  &  St. 
j-iouis  Ry.  Co.  V.  Lindquist,  119  Iowa 
144,  93  "x.  W.  103  [19031;  City  of 
Piiiladclphia  v.  Philadelpliia  &  Read- 
ing Railroad  Comj)any,  177  Pa.  292. 
34  L.  R.  A.  564,  35  Atl.  610   [1896]. 

^"  I'ayne  v.  \  illagc  of  South 
S])nngtield.  Itil  III.  2S5.  44  X.  K. 
105    I  lS9(i|. 

-'  Illinois  C'entral  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Commissioners  of  East  Lake 
Pork  Special  Drainage  District,  129 
111.  417,  21  X.  E.  925  [1890];  Pitts- 
hurgh,  Cincinnati,  Cliicago  and  St. 
Louis  l{ailway  Company  v.  Machler. 
158  Ind.  159."  63  X.  E.  210  11901  i  : 
Louisville.  New  Albany  and  Chicago 
Kailway  C()ni])aiiy  v.  State  for  the 
Cso  of  Beckman.  122  Ind.  443,  24  N. 
E.  350   [1889 J. 


§599 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


926 


of  a  street  railway  company  to  run  over  it.-^  The  right  of  way  of 
a  railway  company  may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  fencing  in  a 
district.^''  The  assessors  cannot,  however,  adopt  the  valuation 
put  upon  the  road-bed  by  the  corporation  commissioners,  since 
this  valuation  includes  elements  of  value  other  than  the  land  and 
improvements.^'  Under  a  statute  providing  for  a  tax  for  con- 
structing fences,  to  be  levied  on  all  the  real  estate  in  the  district 
which  is  taxable  by  the  state  and  county,  it  is  held  that  the  right 
of  way  of  a  railway,  if  exempt  from  general  taxation,  cannot  be 
assessed  for  s^^ch  improvement."^  Whether  railroad  property 
may  be  assessed  for  the  construction  of  a  park  and  a  system  of 
boulevards  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  some  conflict  of 
authoritj^,  some  jurisdictions  holding  that  such  assessments  can  be 
levied,^-  and  others  holding  that  they  cannot.^-^ 


§  599.     Exaction  against  street  railway  based  on  charter  provi- 
sions. 

The  charter  offered  to  a  street  railway  company  operating  its 
cars  on  the  surface  often  requires  such  company  to  pave  between 
its  tracks,  and  in  some  cases  for  a  certain  d' stance  on  either  side. 
If  the  street  railway  company  accepts  and  acts  under  such  char- 
ter it  is  bound  to  pave  or  to  pay  the  cost  of  paving,  as  so  pro- 
vided.^    If,   by   constitutional   or  statutory  provision     franchises 


-•'  People  of  the  State  of  New  York 
ex  rel.  Western  ^ew  iork  &  Penn- 
sylvania Kailroad  Lompany  v. 
Adams,  88  Hun.  122,  34  N.  Y.  S.  579 
I  1895  J. 

-"Commissioners  of  Chatham  Coun- 
ty V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Railway 
Company,  133  M.  C.  216,  45  S.  J^^. 
566  [1903].  Contra:  Stiewel  v. 
Fencing  District  No.  6  of  Johns -n 
County,  71  Ark.  17,  70  S.  W.  308,  71 
S.  W.  247  [1902]. 

*"  Commissioners  of  Chatham 
County  V.  Seaboard  Air  Line  Kail- 
way  Company,  133  N.  C.  216,  45  S. 
K.'5Q6   [1903]. 

="  iJradshaw  v.  Board  of  Commis- 
sioners of  Guilford  County,  92  N.  C. 
278    [18851. 

"^Benefit  is  here  hehl  to  b"  a  ou^s- 
tion  of  fact  as  to  which  contirmntion 
is  conclusive.     Chicago  &  Northwes- 


ern  Kaihvay  Co.  v.  People,  120  111. 
104,  11  N.  E.  418.  It  is  said  that 
railway  property  is  prima  facie 
liable.  In  re  Cedar  Park,  1  How. 
Pr.  N.  S.  257   [1S85]. 

"*  Action  of  commissioners  upheld 
in  omitting  right  of  way  from  assess- 
ment of  benetits  and  damages,  in 
the  Matter  of  tha  Application  of 
Commissioners  of  the  Central  Park, 
to  Confirm  the  Report  of  the  Com- 
missioners of  Estimate  and  Assess- 
ment, for  Opening  Riverside  Park, 
03   Harb.  282   [1872]. 

1  \\  orcester  v.  Worcester  Consol. 
St.  Rv.  Co.,  196  U.  S.  539,  25  S.  327 
liOOol:  (affirming.  City  of  Worces- 
ter V.  Worcester  Consolidated  Street 
Hailwav  Comupnv.  182  INIass.  49,  64 
N.  E.  581  11902J);  >Jew  Orleans 
Citv  and  Lake  Railroad  Company  v. 
Louisiana    ex    rel.    City    of    New    Or- 


Wi 


PROPERTY   SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§599 


granted  to  a  street  railroad  company  are  subject  to  future  legis- 
lative control,  a  railroad  company  which  has  occupied  a  public 
street  under  a  franchise  may  by  subsequent  legislation  be  com- 
pelled in  addition  to  its  former  liabilities,  to  pay  a  part  of  the 
cost  of  paving  such  street.-  If  a  street  railway  company  has  ac- 
cepted a  franchise  containing  a  provision  that  it  should  be  liable 
for  its  share  of  the  cost  of  improving  streets  on  which  it  should 
run,  to  be  assessed  and  collected  as  other  street  assessments,  such 
company  is  liable  for  its  share  of  improvements  whether  made 
under  statutes  then  in  force  or  under  subsequent  statutes.^  If 
the  state  reserves  power  to  modify  the  charter  of  the  street  rail- 
way company,  it  may  subsequently  require  the  railway  company 
to  pave  the  street  between  its  tracks  ;^  and  if  the  railway  company 
does  not  construct  such  paving,  the  city  may  construct  it  and 
charge  the  cost  to  the  railway  company."'  If.  by  change  of  stat- 
ute a  street  railway  company  is  relieved  from  a  part  of  the  cost 
of  paving  a  street  on  which  its  tracks  are  located,  and  the  rail- 
road company  does  not  complain  of  such  statute,  or  of  the  liabil- 
ity imposed  in  lieu  thereof,  the  city  or  the  abutting  property  own- 
ers cannot  object  thereto.''  The  same  rule  applies  where  by 
change  of  city  ordinance  the  railroad  company  is  relieved  from 


leans,  1,57  U.  S.  219,  39  L.  079,  15  S. 
581  [1895J;  (affirming  State  ex  rel. 
City  of  New  Orleans  v.  New  Orleans 
City  and  Lake  Railroad  Co.,  42  La. 
Ann.  550,  7  So.  GOG  [1890]);  Sioux 
City  Street  Railway  Co.  v.  Sioux 
City,  138  U.  S.  98,  34  L.  898,  U  S. 
226;  Springfield  v.  Springfi  Id  Stre.-t 
Ky.  Co.,  182  Mass.  41,  G4  X.  E.  57  7 
[1901,  1902];  City  of  Benton  Harbor 
V.  St.  Joseph  &  Benton  Harbor  Street 
Railway  Company.  102  Mich.  38G.  2G 
L.  R.  A.  245,  GO  N.  W.  758  [1894 1; 
City  of  Rochester  v.  Rochester  Rail- 
way Company.  182  X.  V.  99.  70  L. 
R.  A.  773,  74  X.  K.  n.j;5  |in()5|: 
iStorrie  v.  Houston  City  Street  Rail- 
way Company.  92  Tex.  129,  44  L.  R. 
A.  "710,  40  s!  W.  796   1189SJ. 

'Fair  Haven  and  \\  est'-ille  Rail- 
rond  Company  v.  City  of  X-^w  Hnen, 
203  U.  S.  379  [190Gi;  faffirmin<r.  77 
Conn.  067,  60  Atl.  051  .|19')5|); 
Fair  Haven  and  West'iMe  ''n'road 
I'ompany  v.  City  of  Xew  Haven.   75 


Conn.  442,  53  Atl.  9G0  [1903];  Stor- 
rie  V.  Houston  City  Street  Railway 
Company,  92  lex.  129,  44  L.  R.  A. 
7IG,  40  S.  W.  79G    [189S]. 

•\Schmidt  V.  Market  St.  and  Willow 
CJlenn  Railroad  Company,  90  Cal. 
37,  27  Pac.  Gl    [1891]. 

'  l-air  Havien  and  VVestville  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Xew  Haven,  203  U.  S. 
379  [1900];  (allirming,  77  Conn. 
677). 

"Fair  Haven  and  Westville  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Xew  Haven,  203  U.  S. 
379  I  1900]:  (affirming,  77  Conn. 
G77). 

"(-'ity  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
Consolidated  Street  Railway  Co.,  196 
U.  S.  539,  25  S.  327  [1905]";  (affirm- 
ing City  of  Worcester  v.  Worcester 
L'onsolidated  Street  Ry.  Compiny, 
182  Mass.  49.  64  X.  E.  581  [1902]"). 
J^ouisiana  Imp.  Co.  v.  Raton  Ron  e 
Electric  &  G"s  Co..  114  La.  534,  38 
So.  444  [1905]. 


§  600  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  998 

the  cosi  of  such  paving.'  A  statute  authorizing  the  city  to  assess 
a  street  railroad  for  the  cost  of  paving  nine  feet  of  the  width  of 
the  street  for  every  line  of  track  is  not  repealed  by  a  subsequent 
statute  authorizing  the  assessment  of  benefits  upon  abutting  or 
adjoining  property,  since  the  charge  against  the  street  railway  is 
not  an  assessment  for  benefits.^  A  resolution  by  a  city  council 
provided  that  the  cost  of  an  improvement,  should  be  assessed  upon 
the  "owners  of  abutting  property"  as  provided  for  by  a  certain 
section  of  the  city  charter.  This  section  provided  for  assessing 
part  of  the  cost  upon  the  owners  of  abutting  property  and  for 
charging  the  rest  upon  the  street  railroad  company  occupying  a 
part  of  such  street.  It  was  held  that  the  council  did  not  thereby 
relieve  the  railroad  company  from  liability." 

§  600.     Statutory  duty  of  street  railway  to  pave. 

The  legislature  has  undoubted  power  to  give  a  city  the  right 
to  require  street  railway  companies  to  pave  a  part  of  the  street 
upon  which  the  tracl^  are  laid.  In  many  jurisdictions  the  city  or 
other  public  corporation  is  authorized  to  impose  upon  street  rail- 
way companies  which  may  desire  to  lay  their  tracks  in  public 
streets,  a  liability  for  paving  a  given  portion  of  a  street.^  This 
form  of  liability  differs  from  that  of  a  contract  between  the  city 
and  the  street  railway  company,  because  such  liability  may  be 
imposed  upon  the  railway  company  without  its  consent.  This  is 
said  to  be  an  exercise  of  the  taxing  power,-  although  the  same  re- 
sults are  reached  as  if  it  were  regarded  as  an  exercise  of  the 
police  power.''     Where  local  assessments  were  held  to  be  invalid. 

^Philadelphia  to  Use  v.  Evans,  139  960    [1903];    iitj   of   New   Haven    v. 

Pa.  St.  483,  21  Atl.  200   [1891].  I'air    Haven   and    Westville   Railroad 

"The   Fair   Haven,   etc.,   R.   R.   Co.  L'ompany,  38  Conn.  422,  9  Am.  Rep. 

V.    City    of    Mew    Haven,    75    Conn.  399    [1871];    City    of    Shreveport    v. 

442,  52  Atl.  960  Shreveport    Belt    Railway    Company, 

"Storrie  v  Houston  City  Street  107  La.  785,  32  So.  189  [1901,  1902']. 
Kailway    Company,   92    Tex.    129,    44  -  City    of    Worcester    v.    Worcester 

L.  R.  A.   716,  46   S.  W.   796    [1898].  Consol.   St.   Ry.   Co.,    196    U.   S.   539. 

iCity    of    Worcester    v.    Worcester  25  S.  327  [1905] ;  Sioux  City  St.  Ry. 

Consol.  St.  Ry.  Co..  196  U.  S.  539,  25  Co.   v.   Sioux   City,    138   U.   S.   98,   34 

S.  327  [1905];  Sioux  City  Street  Ry.  U  898,   11  S.  226;   City  of  Rochester 

Co.  V.   Sioux  City,    138   U.   S.   98,   34  v.    Rochester    Railway   Company,    182 

I..  898,   11   S.  226;   City  of  Rochester  M.  Y.   99,  70  L.  R.  A.  773,  74  N.  E. 

V.   Rociiester   Railway   Company,   182  953  [1905]. 

N.  Y.  99.  70  L.  R.  A.  773.  74  N.  E.  "City    of    Rochester    v.    Rochester 

9,53     [1905];     The    Fair    Haven    and  Kailway    Co..    182    M.    Y.    99,    70    L. 

Westville  R-ilroad  Companv  v.   City  l>.    A.    773.   74   N.    K    953    [1905]. 
of  New  Haven,  75  Conn.  442.  53  Atl. 


090  PKOl'ERTV    SriiJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  601 

it  was  also  lield  that  a  railway  compaii\'  which  accepted  a  iran- 
chise  including  in  its  terms  a  provision  that  such  railroad  com- 
pany should  i)ave  between  its  tracks  and  three  feet  on  each  side 
there(»t,  and  in  case  of  failure  to  pave  as  re(iuired,  such  railroad 
company  should  be  liable  to  a  fine  of  five  dollars  a  day,  could  not 
be  compelled  to  i)ay  the  cost  of  such  pavino-  unless  it  had  incurred 
fines  under  such  act  amounting  to  the  cost  of  such  leaving. ^ 

S  601.     Assessment  upon  street  railway  based  on  benefits. 

Cidess  a  street  i-ailway  company  is  protected  l)y  a  charter  which 
cannot  be  altered,  the  legislature  has  undoubted  power  to  provide 
for  assessing  its  j)roperty,  including  its  right  of  way  along  a  street. 
If  the  statute  specifically  provides  for  assessing  such  property,  in- 
cluding such  right  of  way,  full  effect  must  be  given  to  it.^  On 
the  other  hand,  the  legislature  has  undoubted  authority  to  exempt 
from  assessment  proi)erty  belonging  to  a  street  railway  company. - 
It  may,  if  it  sees  fit,  exempt  all  the  property  belonging  to  such 
corporation  and  not  merely  that  which  is  used  for  railway  pur- 
poses. Thus,  a  statute  requiring  street  railway  companies  to  pay 
license  fees  based  upon  their  gross  receipts  and  providing  that 
the  payment  of  such  fees  "shall  be  in  lieu  of  all  other  taxes, 
assessments  and  licenses  of  any  such  corporation;  and  all  personal 
pi-operty,  franchises  and  real  estate  owned  by  such  company  or 
corporation,  shall  be  exempt  I'rom  assessment  and  taxation;  ex- 
cept that  all  land  or  lots  unimproved  or  having  buildings  thereon, 
owned  by  such  person,  company  or  cori)oration,  shall  be  lial)le  to 
taxation  for  state,  county  and  scliool  p.ui'i)oses,"  exempts  all  tlv,^ 
property  of  a  street  railway  company  and  not  mertdy  such  prop- 
erty as  is  used  for  railway  puriK)ses.''  If  the  legislature  has  neither 
specifically  provided  for  assessing  the  I'ight  of  way  of  a  street 
r.iilway  company,  nor  for  exempting  the  property  of  a  street  rail- 
way company  from  assessment,  we  have  a  (juestion  i)res:'nt"<I  as 
to  the  right  of  way  upon  which  there  is  a  divergence  of  judicial 
authority.     In  some  jurisdictions   it    is   held    Ili;it    the   right   of  a 

'Mayor,   A!dprni(>n,   etc.   of    .M<)l)il('  '  .Mctropnlitaii  Railroad  Co.  v.  Mac- 

V.    Koyal    St-i>c-t    Railroad    (  ()iri)anv.  tarland.  20  App.  1).  C.  421    fl!>()2|. 

45   Ala.  322    |1871];    Ware  v.  Willis.  "  .Milwaukoo     Elcot'i:-      K -ilwaN-     & 

45  Ala.  120  flSTlL     This  view  seems  I.iirht  Company  v.  City  of  Milwaukee. 

to    be    abandoned    where    as    in    most  !)5  Wi-;.  42.  (i!)  N.  W.  79G  flSnil. 

jurisdictions  assessments  are  held  to  '  Milwaukee     Electric     Railvay     & 

be  valid.  J^iyht   Company   v.    City   of    .Milwu- 

kee,  95  Wis.  42,  69  X.  W.  79t>  I  1S97I. 


§601 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1000 


street  railway  to  make  use  of  a  public  street  under  its  franchise, 
is  property  within  the  meaning  of  the  statutes  authorizing  the 
assessment  of  property  benefited  and  that  such  right  of  way  is 
therefore  subject  to  asesssment.*  Under  statutes  providing  for 
the  assessment  of  ''real  property"  it  is  held  that  the  right  of  a 
street  railway  company  to  make  use  of  a  public  street  is  real  prop- 
erty."*  It  is  said  to  be  an  easement  and  therefore  a  valuable  right 
in  real  property.**  The  same  result  is  reached  under  a  statute 
authorizing  an  assessment  "upon  the  persons  whose  property  is 
especially  benefited."  '  The  question  of  the  benefit  to  the  right  of 
way  is  in  such  jurisdictions  regarded  as  one  of  fact.^  In  other 
jurisdictions,  it  is  held  or  assumed  that  the  right  of  a  street  rail- 
way company  to  make  use  of  public  streets  is  not  a  property  right 
which  is  subject  to  assessment  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  specifi- 
cally enumerating  such  right  as  among  those  subject  to  assess- 
ment.^ The  reason  given  for  this  holding,  in  some  jurisdictions, 
is  that  the  right  of  a  street  railway  company  to  occupy  a  part  of 
a  public  street  with  its  track,  is  not  real  estate  within  the  meaning 


'Appeal  of  North  Beach  and  Mis- 
sion R.  R.  Co.  in  the  Matter  of  Wid- 
ening Kearney  Street,  32  Cal.  5U0 
L18B7];  City  of  New  Haven  v.  i^'air 
Haven  and  Westville  Railroad  Com- 
pany, 38  Conn.  422,  9  Am.  Rep.  399 
11871];  Cicero  &  Proviso  Street 
Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
176  Hi.  501.  52  N.  E.  866  11898]; 
Kuehner  v.  City  of  Freeport,  143 
ill.  92,  17  L.  R.  A.  774,  32  N.  E.  372 
L1893];  Chicago  City  Railway  Com- 
pany v.  City  of  Chicago,  90  Hi.  573, 
32  Am.  Rep.  54  [1878];  City  of  Chi- 
cago V.  Baer,  41  111.  306  [1866]; 
Little  v.  City  of  Chicago,  46  111. 
App.    534     [1892]. 

"  Appeal  of  North  Beach  and  Mis- 
sion R.  R.  Co.  in  the  Matter  of  Widen- 
ing; Kearney  vStr^iet,  32  Cal.  500 
11867] ;  Cicero  &  Proviso  Street 
Railway  Companv  v.  City  of  Chica- 
go, 176  111.  501,  52  N.  E.  866  [1898]  ; 
Kuehner  v.  City  of  Freeport,  143  111. 
92.  17  L.  R.  A.  774,  32  N.  E.  372 
11893];  Citv  of  Chicago  v.  Baer,  41 
HI.  306   [1866]. 


"Appeal  of  North  Beach  and  Mis- 
sion R.  R.  Co.  in  the  Matter  of  Wide- 
ning Kearney  Street,  32  Cal.  5D0 
11867J. 

^  New  Haven  v.  Fair  Haven  R.  R. 
Co.,  33  Conn.  422,  9  Am.  Kep.  399 
L1871]. 

"  1^'armers'  Loan  &  Trust  Company 
v.  Borough  of  Ansonia,  61  Conn.  76, 
23  Atl.  705   [1891]. 

"  Western  Paving  and  Supply  Com- 
pany  v.  Citizens'  Street  Railroad 
Company,  128  Ind.  525,  25  Am.  St. 
Rep.  462,  10  L.  R.  A.  770,  26  N.  E. 
188,  28  N.  E.  88  [1891];  Sixth  Ave- 
nue Railroad  Company  v.  Mayor,  Al- 
dermen and  Commonalty  of  City  of 
New  York,  63  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  271,  17 
N.  Y.  Supp.  903  [1892];  In  the  Mat- 
ter of  the  Application  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  Public  Parks,  etc.,  Rela- 
tive to  Opening  Railroad  Avenue, 
East,  47  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  302  [1888]; 
Uean  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the 
City  of  Paterson,  67  N.  J.  L.  (38 
Vr.)    199,  50  Atl.  620  [1901]. 


1001  PROPERTY    SITRJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §601 

of  its  statute.^''  Its  franchise  is  said  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a 
contract  between  the  city  and  the  railroad  company  and  not  with- 
in the  scope  of  assessment  statutes/^  even  if  increased  in  value 
by  the  improvement.^-  In  other  jurisdictions,  the  phraseology 
of  the  statute  describing  the  property  which  may  be  assessed,  is 
relied  upon  as  showing  an  intention  to  exclude  such  right  of  way 
of  a  street  railroad.  Under  statutes  providing  for  the  assess- 
ment of  lands  on  both  sides  and  adjoining  a  street,^'^  or  lots  front- 
ing or  abutting  on  a  street/*  or  real  estate  abutting  on  the  im- 
provement,^' or  lands  or  lots  bordering  on  the  street  improved,^® 
or  lands  and  real  estate  bordering  on  the  street, ^^  or  lots  and  par- 
cels of  land  fronting  on  the  street,^^  or  "lots  and  parts  of  lots  of 
[or]  land, "^^  or  "lots,  blocks,  tracts  and  parcels  of  land"  espe- 
cially benefited,-**  it  is  held  that  the  right  of  way  of  a  street  rail- 
way company  in  a  public  street  is  not  subject  to  assessment.  Un- 
der a  statute  providing  that  no  part  of  the  expense  of  an  improve- 
ment can  be  assessed  on  lands  not  bordering  on  or  adjoining  the 
street,  it  is  held  that  the  right  of  way  of  a  street  railway  com- 
pany does  not  border  on  or  adjoin  the  street  and  cannot  be  assess- 
ed.-^ Under  a  statute  providing  for  an  assessment  upon  each  lot 
or  parcel  of  land  specially  benefited,  it  is  held  that  the  right  of 
way  of  a  street  railroad  cannot  be  assessed,  since  it  is  not  a  lot 
or  parcel  of  land.^-     Even  Avhere  the  franchise  of  a  street  railway 

^"'State    of    Minnesota    ex    rel.    St.  "  Uean  v.  ^layor  and  Aldermen  of 

Paul   City  Railway  Company   v.   13is-  the    City    of    I'aterson,    G7    N.    J.    L. 

trict    Court    of    Ramsey    County,    31  (38  Vr.)    199,  50  Atl.  620    [1901]. 

Minn.  354,   17  N.  W.  954   [188.3].  "  Koons  v.  Lucas,  52  la.  177,  3  N. 

"In  the  Matter  of  the  Application  VV.  84  [1879]. 

of     the      Commissioners     of      Rublic  "*  <- ity    of    Maysville    v.    Maysville 

Parks,     etc.,     Relative     to     Opening       St.  R.  and  Transfer  Co.,  —  Ky.  , 

Railroad  Avenue,  East,  47  Hun.    (-N.  108  S.  W.  960   [1908]. 

Y.)   302  [1888J.  '^  In  re  City  of  Seattle,  —  Wash. 

1- Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  An-       ,  94  Pac.  1075  [1908]  ;  Seattle  v. 

sonia,  61   Conn,  76,  23  Atl.  705.  Seattle  Electric   Co.,  —  Wash.  , 

"The    Brick   &    Terra   Cotta   Com-  94   Pac.   194   [1908];    (distinguishing 

pany     v.     Hull,     49     Mo.     App.     433  the   Illinois  cases   cited  onte   in   this 

1 1892] .  section,    as    decided    under    a    statute 

"  Oshkosh   City   Railway    Company  which    made    the    assessment    a    per- 

V.    Winnebago   County,   89   Wis.   435,  sonal  debt  and  a  lien  on  all  the  real 

61  N.  W.   1107    [1895].  property   of   the   owner). 

"Harriott   Avenue,    24    Pn.    Super.  =^  O'Reilloy    v.     City    of    Kinerst^n. 

Ct.  597   [1904].  114  N.  Y.  439,  21  X.  E.  1004  [1889]. 

'"  Indianapolis  and  Vincennes  Rail-  ■•^- North      Jersey      Street      Railway 

way  Company  v.  Capitol  Paving  and  Company  v.  Mayor  and   Aldermen  of 

Construction  Companv.  24  Ind.  App.  Jersey    City,    68    N.    J.    L.    (39    Vr.) 

114,  54  N.  E.  1076  [1899].  140,  52  Atl.  300   [1902]. 


§602 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT 


1002 


company  is  regarded  as  real  property,  it  is  not  "land  and  build- 
ings" within  the  meaning  of  statute  authorizing  the  assessment 
of  "land  and  buildings  benefited  by  an  improvement."-'  How- 
ever, if  specific  provision  is  made  for  charging  a  portion  of  the  ex- 
pense to  a  street  railway,  it  is  liable,  even  though  the  statute 
provides  in  general  terms  that  the  amounts  assessed  as  benefits 
shall  be  collected  against  the  parcels  of  land  benefited.-*  If  the 
power  of  regulating  grade  crossings  is  placed  in  the  hands  of  rail- 
Avay  commissioners,  the  city  cannot  compel  the  street  railway 
company  to  pay  a  portion  of  the  cost  of  constructing  a  bridge  on 
which  the  street  and  the  tracks  of  the  street  railway  company 
were  carried  above  the  tracks  of  a  railway.-"'  Even  if  a  street  rail- 
way is  contiguous  to  the  street  within  which  it  is  located,  it  can- 
not be  assessed  according  to  frontage.-"  An  elevated  railroad  on 
posts  which  are  set  into  a  street  is  regarded  as  benefited  by  the 
improyement  of  such  street  and  subject  to  assessment  therefor.-' 

§  602.     Contractual  liability  of  street  railway. 

A  city  may  make  a  contract  with  a  street  railwa.y  company  by 
which  the  street  railway  company  agrees  to  pave  a  i)art  of  the 
street  upon  which  its  tracks  are  located  at  its  own  expense,  or  to 
pay  for  the  cost  of  paving  such  part,  if  the  improvement  is  con- 
structed bv  the  citv.^     Such  a  contract  often  takes  the  form  of  an 


==  Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Company 
V.  Borough  of  Ansonia,  01  Conn.  70, 
23  Atl.  705  [1891]. 

-'  Metropolitan  Railroad  Co.  v, 
Macfarland,  20  App.  D.  C.  421. 

^'  Fair  Haven  &  Westville  Railroad 
Co.  V.  City  of  New  Haven,  77  Conn. 
494,  59  Atl.  737    [1905]. 

^^Lightner  v.  City  of  Peoria,  150 
ill.  80,  37  X.  E.  09. 

'"  Lake  Street  Elevated  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  183  HI. 
75,  47  L.  R.  A.  624,  55  N.  E.  721 
[1899]. 

'Washington  and  Georgetown  Riil- 
road  Company,  108  U.  S.  522,  27  L. 
807,  2  S.  865  [1882]  ;  Chicago  v.  Shel- 
don, 76  U.  S.  (9  Wall.)  50, 
19  L.  594  [1869];  Ferine  v.  Fovinish, 
97  Cal.  305,  32  I'ac.  226  |1<S93J; 
Schmidt  v.  iNlarket  Street  and  Wil- 
low   Glenn     Railroad     Company,     90 


Cal.  37.  27  P;'c.  61  11891];  McVerry 
v.  J^oyd,  89  Cal.  304,  26  Pac.  885 
11891];  City  of  .\ew  Haven  v.  Fair 
Haven  and  Westville  Railroad  Com 
pany,  38  Conn.  422,  9  Am.  Rep.  3!)'t 
[1871];  West  Chicago  Street  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  178 
111.  339,  53  J\.  E.  112  [1899  J: 
State  ex  rel.  Iveitli  v.  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Michigan  City,  138 
Ind.  455,  37  X.  E.  1041  [1S94J; 
Marshal Itown  Light,  Power  &  Rail 
way  Company  v.  City  cf  Marshall- 
town,  127  la.  637,  103  N.  W.  10!!5 
[1905];  People  (f  the  State  of  .New 
Vork  ex  rel.  Troy  and  Lansin-jbur'ili 
Railroad  Company  v.  Coffey,  P6  Hun. 
100.  21  X.  Y.  "Supp.  34  118921; 
Philadelphia  v.  Kidge  Avenue  Pas- 
senger Ry.  Co..  143  Pa.  St.  444,  22 
Atl.   695    1 1891 1. 


1003 


PROPERTY    SL'B.JECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§60. 


ordinance  enacted  by  the  city  granting  such  franchise  to  the  street 
railway  company  upon  certain  terms,  one  of  which  is  the  assump- 
tion of  this  liability  by  the  street  railway  company,  which  ordin- 
ance is  accepted  by  the  street  railway  company.-  The  considera- 
tion for  such  a  contract  may  be  the  granting  of  a  franchise,^  or 
the  extension  of  the  time  of  a  pre-existing  franchise.*  The  accep- 
tance of  such  franchise  by  the  street  railway  company  completes 
the  contract,  since  such  acceptance  amounts  to  an  acceptance  of 
the  entire  offer.'  The  acceptance  may  be  made  formally,  as  by 
entering  into  a  written  contract.*'  In  the  absence  of  acceptance 
of  such  an  offer,  as  where  the  railway  company  has  not  formally 
assumed  liability  and  has  not  exercised  the  franchise  by  building 
its  track,  no  liability  exists.^  A  contract  by  which  a  street  rail- 
way company  agrees  to  pave  a  part  of  the  street  is  binding  upon 
its  successors  in  interest.'^  If  a  street  railway  company  is  per- 
mitted to  lay  its  tracks  upon  a  street  already  paved,  under- a  con- 
tract expressly  relieving  such  railway  company  from  any  liability, 
the  city  cannot  subsequently,  after  the  railroad  company  has  laid 
its  tracks,  impose  a  liability  upon  it  for  such  prior  paving.® 

i;  603.     Ccnstraction  of  liability  of  street  railway. 

If  the  statute  is  not  mandatory  in  recpiiring  the  city  to  impose 
a  part  of  the  cost  of  paving  upon  the  street  railroad,  the  city 


''Washington  and  Georgetown  "Rail- 
road Company  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 108  U."  8.  522,  27  L.  807. 
2  S.  805  [18831:  'Schmidt  v.  Market 
Stroot  and  Willnv  (ilenn  Kailrond 
Company,  90  Cal.  H7.  27  I'ae.  (il 
[1S!)1];  City  of  New  Haven  v.  Fair 
Haven  and  Westvillp  Railro:nI  Com- 
I'any,  38  Conn.  422.  0  Am.  Kep.  300 
[18711;  West  Chicagr>  Rtreeet  R:iil- 
way  Company  v.  C  ity  <  f  (  hic:i<,'n.  178 
111."  330.  53.  X.  F.  112  [ISfiOl;  Par- 
malee  v.  City  rf  Chicago.  CO  111.  207 
[18711:  ^.larshalltown  Li'.'ht.  Power 
&  Railway  Company  v.  (  itv  of 
Marshalltown.  127  1;».  037.  103  X.  W. 
1005  [10051:  People  (f  the  Ptnte  of 
Xew  York  ex  rel.  Troy  and  Lansing- 
hnrgh  Railroad  Company  v.  Coffey, 
fifi  Hun.  100.  21  X.  Y.  Siipp.  34 
[1?021. 

'  People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York 


ex  rel.  Troy  and    Lansimrhurrrh   Rail- 
road Company  v.  Cofley.  (U!  Hun    160, 

21  X.  Y.  Snpn.  30   [lSiV2|. 

M  liicaeo  Street  Raihvav  Company 
V.  City  of  Cliicasjo.  17S  III.  339.  53 
X.  F.   112   [1S091. 

'Schmidt  v.  Market  Street  and 
^\■illow  Clenn  Railroad  Company.  90 
Cal.  37.  27   Pac  (H    [18911. 

"  Philadelphia  v.  Riiltre  Avenue 
Passen'jer   Ry.    Co..    H3    Pa.   St.    444. 

22  All.   (■)95    [18911. 

Mlairi^  v.  (itv  cf  Macomb.  213 
Til.   47.   72   X.  E.   7()2    [19041. 

**  l"ent  v.  Common  Council  of  City 
<  f  Pin"-hampton.  94  Apit.  Div.  522. 
88  X.  Y.  S.  34  [19041:  Philadelphia 
V.  Ridfje  Avenue  Passen^'p'-  Rv.  Co.. 
1  !3  Pa.  fit.  444.  22  Atl.  095    [1891]. 

".Atlanta  Consolidated  Street  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Citv  rf  U'anta.  11" 
Ca.  255.  30  S.  E.  007   |  19001. 


§  603  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1004 

may  relieve  the  said  railroad  from  its  proportion  of  the  cost 
of  paving  if  it  believes  that  such  paving  is  not  a  benefit  to  the 
railroad.^  Under  a  statute  providing  that  the  city  "shall  have 
the  power"  to  compel  a  street  railway  company  to  pave  a  certain 
part  of  the  street,  it  was  held  that  the  exercise  of  such  power 
was  discretionary  with  the  city,  and  if  it  was  thought  advisable  it 
could  relieve  the  street  railroad  company  from  such  liability.^ 
Contracts  imposing  upon  a  street  railway  a  liability  for  paving 
are  subject  to  the  ordinary  rules  of  construction  as  the  means  of 
determining  the  intention  of  the  parties  from  the  language  used 
in  such  contract.  A  contract  to  pave  a  certain  part  of  the  street 
upon  which  the  railroad  might  run  does  not  bind  the  railroad 
company  to  pay  any  part  of  the  improvement  of  a  street  upon 
which  it  has  a  right  to  lay  its  tracks,  but  upon  which  it  has  not 
in  fact  laid  them.^  If  the  railroad  is  bound  to  keep  a  certain 
part  of  the  street  in  good  repair,  it  is  not  thereby  bound  to 
repave  such  part  of  the  street,*  especially  if  such  part  of  the 
street  is  in  good  condition  when  such  repavement  is  made.^ 
The  question  whether  in  estimating  the  number  of  square  feet 
for  which  a  street  railroad  must  pay  the  space  occupied  by  the 
rails  is  to  be  considered  was  raised,  but  not  decided,  because  the 
attention  of  the  city  council  was  not  called  to  such  question  in 
the  first  instance,  as,  under  the  statute  concerning  procedure 
in  assessment  cases,  should  have  been  done.®     Under  a  contract 

'^Lightner    v.    City    of   Peoria,    150  ^  Lacey    v.    CiT.    of    Marshalltown, 

111.  80,  37  N.  E.  69   [18941;   State  ex  99  la.  367,  68  N.'w.  726  [1896]. 

rel.  Keith  v.  Common  Council  of  the  ^Harris  v.  City  of  Macomb,  213  111. 

City  of  Michigan  City,  138  Ind.  455,  47,    72   N.   E.   762    [1904]. 

37    N.    E.    1041     [1894];    Ft.    Dodge  *  Chicago   v.   Sheldon,   76   U.   S.    (9 

Electric  Light  &  Power   Company  v.  Wall.)      50,      19      L.      594      [1869]; 

City   of   Ft.   Dodge,    115    la.   568,   89  Western  Paving  &  Supply  Co.  v.  Citi- 

N,  "w.   7    [1902];    Lacey   v.    City   of  zens    Street    Railroad   Co.,    128    Ind. 

Marshalltown,  99  la.   367,  68  N.  W.  525,  25  Am.  St.   Rep.   462,   10  L.   R. 

726    [1896];    State   of   Minnesota   ex  A.   770,  26   N.   E.    188,   28   N.   E.   88 

rel.  Benz  v.  District   Court  of  Ram-  [1891];  'State  ex  rel.  City  of  Kansas 

sey  County,  32  Minn.  181,  19  N.  W.  v.  Corrigan  Consolidated  Street  Rail- 

732   [1884];   People  ex  rel.  Davidson  way  Co.,  85  Mo.  263. 

V.   Gilon,    126   N.   Y.    147,   27    N.    E.  » City    of    Binghampton    v.     Bing- 

282  [1891];    (reversing  People  of  the  hampton   &   Port   Dickinson   Railway 

State  of  Xew  York  ex  rel.  Davidson  Company,    61    Hun.    479,    16    N.    Y. 

V.  Gilon,  58  Hun.    (N.  Y.)    76,  11  N.  Supp.  225    [1891]. 

Y.    S.    439    [1890]);    People    ex    rel.  'Marshalltown     Light,      Power     & 

Markey  v.  City  of  Brooklvn.  65  N.  Y.  Railway    Company    v.    City   of    Mar- 

349    [i875];    City  of  Philadelphia  ti  s^^nlltown.    127    la.    637,    io3    N.    W. 

use  of  O'Rourke'v.  Bowman,  175  Pa.  1005    [19051 
St.  91,  34  Atl.  353   [1896]. 


1005  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  603 

by  which  a  street  railroad  agrees  to  pave  a  given  part  of  th.' 
srtreet  no  further  assessment  can  be  levied  upon  such  railway 
company.'  A  statute  providing  that  a  street  railway  company 
must  pay  a  certain  part  of  the  cost  of  paving  any  street  on 
which  its  tracks  are  situated  "which  the  council  may  direct  to 
be  paved"  is  prospective  in  its  operation,  applies  only  to  paving 
laid  subsequently  and  does  not  authorize  the  city  to  require  a 
street  railroad  company,  as  a  condition  precedent  to  laying  its 
tracks  upon  a  street  already  paved,  which  it  has  a  right  to  occupy, 
to  pay  the  cost  of  siich  paving.^  A  contract  by  which  a  street 
railway  company  is  to  keep  in  repair  so  much  of  the  street  as  it 
occupies,  but  such  company  is  exempted  from  assessments  for 
grading,  paving,  macadamizing,  filling  or  planking  such  street, 
does  not  exempt  such  railway  company  from  an  assessment  for 
the  cost  of  widening  such  street.^  If  the  city  has  power  to  require 
a  street  railway  company  to  repay  to  the  abutting  property  own- 
ers the  cost  of  the  paving  between  the  rails  Avhere  street  rail- 
road tracks  are  laid  iipon  a  street  already  paved,  such  provision 
does  not  require  the  company  to  pay  to  the  city  the  cost  of 
paving  at  street  intersections."  If  the  street  railway  company 
is  to  pave  that  part  of  the  street  occupied  by  its  rails  the  com- 
pany has  a  right  to  a  hearing  upon  the  question  of  the  amount 
of  space  thus  occupied. ^^  If  the  street  railway  company  is  to  do 
the  work  in  the  style  which  council  might  order  notice  to  the 
street  railway  company  to  do  such  work  is  necessary  in  order 
to  charge  it  Avith  the  cost  thereon.^-  A  street  railway  company 
was  to  bear  all  the  expense  of  a  pavement  between  the  rails 
and  for  two  feet  on  each  side  thereof.  In  paving  such  street 
it  was  necessary  to  place  expensive  blue  granite  stone  along 
each  exterior  rail  l)y  reason  of  the  existence  of  such  track.  Such 
stone  was  more  expensive  than  the  average  cost  of  paving  such 
street.     It  was  held   that   the  railway  company   must  bear  such 

'West  Chicairo  Street  Railwnv  Co.  and  BridL'e  Conipany.  114  la.  141,  Sfi 

V.   City   of   Chicaco,   178   111.   339.   .53  X.   W.   222    finnn.' 

N.  E.   112    [18991.  "City    nf    Sliroveport    v.    Prescott, 

*0skaloosa  Street  "Railway  &  Land  51    La.   Ann.    1895.  4()   L.   R.   A.    193. 

Company    v.    City    of    Oskalnosa,    99  26   So.   604    [18991. 

la.  490,  68  N.  W.  808  [18961.  "People  of  the  State  of  Xew  York 

"Parmalee  v.  City   of  Chicajjo,   60  ex  rel.  Troy  &  LansinorbnrGrh  Railroad 

111.  207    [18711.  Company  v.  CofTey.  6fi  Hun.   160,  21 

i»ritv  nf  Council  Bluffs  v.  Omaha  N.  Y.  Supp.  34   [1892]. 
and    Council    Bluffs    Street    Railway 


§  603  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1006 

extra  cost.^'  Under  a  contract  by  a  railroad  company  to  repave 
and  repair  it  is  for  the  city  to  determine  the  necessity  of  repay- 
ing or  repairing  and  material  with  which  it  is  to  be  done.^'  Lia- 
bility of  a  street  railway  company  to  pave  and  keep  in  good 
condition  and  repair  a  certain  space  in  each  street  on  which  its 
tracks  are  situated  does  not  make  such  company  liable  for  the 
cost  of  laying  a  water  pipe  on  one  side  of  the  street.^'"'  If  a 
railroad  company  is  liable  to  pave  and  keep  in  repair  a  certain 
part  of  a  street  it  cannot  be  held  liable  for  an  assessment  for 
a  street  improvement  which  includes  as  a  part  thereof  the  cost  of 
the  improvement  and  an  agreement  to  keep  in  repair  for  a  long 
term  of  years  if  the  bond  of  the  contractor  to  maintain  such 
repairs  does  not  inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  street  railway  com- 
pany, since  otherwise  such  company  might  be  obliged  to  pay 
twice  for  such  repairs  in  case  the  contractor  made  default.^" 
If  it  is  sought  to  assess  the  street  railway  on  the  theory  of  bene- 
fits, it  is  necessary,  in  the  absence  of  legislative  determination, 
to  ascertain  whether  the  railw^ay  is  benefited  by  the  improve- 
ment in  question.  Whether  the  right  of  a  street  railway  com- 
pany can  be  said  to  be  benefited  by  widening  the  street  is  a  ques- 
tion upon  which  there  is  a  difference  of  authority.  The  greater 
number  of  jurisdictions  hold  that  such  widening  can  benefit  such 
property.^'  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  the  widening  of 
a  street  confers  no  benefit  upon  the  right  of  way  of  a  street 
railway. ^^  The  construction  of  a  sewer  in  a  street  upon  which 
a  railroad  has  laid  its  tracks  is  regarded  as  a  benefit  to  such 
road.^''     It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the  grading  of  a  street 

"Washington   &   Georgetown   Rail-  Company  v.   City  of  New  Haven,   77 

road   Company  v.   District  of  Colum-  Conn.  219,  58  Atl.  703   [1904]. 

bia,   108   U.   S.   522,   27   L.  807,   2   S.  "Appeal  of  North  Beach  and  Mis- 

865   [1883].  sion    R.    R.    Co.    in    the    Matter    of 

"  Philadelphia     v.     Ridse     Avenue  Widening    Kearney    Street,    32     Cal. 

.Passenger   Ry.  Co.,    143   Pa.   St.   444,  500    [1867];    Chicago    City    Railway 

22   Atl.   695    [1891];     (apparently    to  Company  v.   City  of  Chicago,   90  111. 

the  same  effect  Fair  Haven  and  West-  573,  32  Am.  Rep.  54   [1878];   Parma- 

ville   Railroad   Company   v.  New   Ha-  lee    v.    City    of    Chicago,    60    111.    267 

ven,    203    U.    S.    379    [1906]:    affirm-  [1871]. 

ing   77    Conn.   667 ) .  "  /"   re  Anthony  Avenue.  95  N.  Y. 

'5  MoChe'snev    v.    Citv    of    Chi^-ago,  S.  77.  46  Misc.  Rep.  5?5    [1905];    In 

213  111.  592.   73  N.  E.  368    [190.i]!  re  Fast   133rd  Street  95  N.  Y.  S.  76 

'«Fair   Haven    and    Westville   Rail-  [1904]. 

road  Companv  v.  City  of  New  Hiv^n,  "Troy    &    LansinTbursrh    Railroad 

77    Conn.    667,    60    Atl.    651    [1905]:  Comoanv  v.    Kane.   9   Hun.    (N.  Y.) 

Fair   Haven   and    Westville   Railroad  506  [1877]. 


1001 


I'HD.'LIRTV    SrBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§604 


does  not  confer  any  benelit  upon  a  strip  of  land  in  the  middle 
of  such  street  belonpring  to  a  street  railroad  company  whose 
cars  are  drawn  hy  liorses,  so  as  to  make  it  liable  to  as.sessment.^" 


§  604.  Liability  of  street  railw-ny  enures  to  benefit  of  property 
owners. 
If  a  street  railroad  company  is  liable  for  part  or  all  of  the 
cost  of  paving  its  street  on  which  the  tracks  are -situated,  the 
adjoining  property  owner  can  interpose  such  liability  as  a  de- 
fense if  the  city  attempts  to  assess  upon  such  property  owner 
any  part  of  the  cost  which  should  be  borne  by  the  street  rail- 
way company.^  One  who  pays  his  assessment  in  full,  not  know- 
ing of  the  ordinance  which  imposes  a  part  of  the  cost  upon  the 
street  railway  company,  may  recover  a  proportionate  part  thereof.^ 
If  the  contractor  who  constructs  the  improvement  has  agreed  to 
look  to  the  street  railway  company  for  compensation  for  paving 
the  part  of  the  street  which  the  street  railway  company  is 
bound  to  pay,  he  clearly  cannot  enforce  compensation  for  pav- 
ing from  the  abutting  property  owners.-''  Property  owners  cannot 
take  advantage  of  an  agreement  to  pave  a  part  of  the  street 
entered  into  by  the  street  railroad  company  after  the  contract 


=*  Davis  V.  City  of  Newark.  .54  N.  J. 
L.   (25  Vr.)    144,  2.3  Atl.  270  [ISni]. 

1  Ferine  v.  Forbush.  97  Cal.  305, 
32  Pac.  226  [18fl31;  American  Hide 
&  Leather  Com])any  v.  City  of  Chi- 
catjo,  203  111.  451.  07  N.  E.  979 
[19031:  City  of  Chieairo  v.  Nodeck, 
202  111.  257.  (i7  X.  E.  39  [1903]:  Mc- 
Farlane  v.  City  of  Cliicapo.  185  111. 
242,  57  N.  E.  12  [19001;  Sawyer  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  183  111.  57.  55  N.  E. 
645  [18931:  City  of  Chicago  v.  Cum- 
mings,  144  111.  446.  33  X.  E.  34 
[18931:  State  ex  rel.  Keith  v.  Com- 
mon Council  of  the  Citv  of  Michigan 
Citv.  138  Ind.  455.  37  X.  E.  1041 
118941:  City  of  Sh'-eveport  v.  Pres- 
cott,  51  La."  Ann.  1895.  40  L.  P.  A. 
193,  26  So.  664  [18991:  Wales  v. 
Warren.  Or  Xeb.  4."i5.  92  X.  W.  590 
[19021:  Oilmore  v.  Citv  of  Utica.  55 
Hun.  (X.  Y.)  514.  9  X.  Y.  S.  912: 
In  the  Matter  of  innleby  to  Vacate 
an  A^sessmp'it.  20  Hun.  (N.  Y.)  427 
[18821:      Philadelphia      to      use     of 


O'Rourke  v.  Bowman,  106  Pa.  St. 
393,  31  Atl.  142  [1895];  Philadel- 
phia to  use  V.  Spring  Garden  Farm- 
ers' Market  Company,  154  Pa.  St.  93, 
25  Atl.  1077  [18931;  contra  People 
ex  rel.  Markey  v.  City  of  Brooklyn, 
05  X^  Y.  .349  [1875].  "Such  question, 
cannot,  however,  be  raised  in  a  pro- 
ceeding in  which  the  only  questions 
for  determination  are  whether  the 
j)roperty  will  be  a^aessed  for  more 
than  it  will  be  benefited  and  whether 
it  is  assessed  more  than  its  share  of 
the  cost  of  the  improvement ;  Wells 
V.  City  of  Chica"o.  202  111.  448,  66 
X.  E.   1056    [1903]. 

'  Delano  v.  ]\rayor.  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  X^ew 
York.  32  Hun.   (X.  Y.)    144  [18841. 

'Perine  v.  Fo'lin^'i.  97  Cal.  305, 
32  Pac.  220  [18931;  State  ex  rel. 
Feith  V.  Common  Council  of  the  City 
of  Michinran  Citv.  138  Ind.  455.  37  X\ 
E.    1041    [18941. 


§  604  TAXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT.  1008 

and  ordinance  for  paving  the  entire  street  have  gone  into  effect  ;^ 
nor  can  the  property  owners  take  advantage  of  a  subsequent 
ordinance  authorizing  the  street  railway  company  to  occupy  a 
part  of  the  street  and  requiring  it  to  pave  the  part  so  occupied.^ 
If  the  city  has  entered  into  a  contract  for  paving  a  street,  includ- 
ing part  of  the  strip  wh^ch  the  street  railway  comnanv  is  bound 
to  pave,  the  city  is  liable  to  the  contractor  under  its  eon+ract 
and  the  city-,  not  the  contractor,  has  a  right  over  against  the 
street  railway.*'  The  benefit  of  the  paving  by  the  street  railway 
enures  to  all  the  property  owners  liable  for  the  improvement 
and  not  merely  to  those  whose  property  abuts  on  that  part  of 
the  street  on  which  the  track  is  situated.^  If  the  city  is  given 
power  to  compel  a  railway  company  to  pave  a  certain  portion 
of  the  street,  it  is  discretionary  with  the  city  whether  it  exer- 
cises such  power  or  not,  and  it  may  impose  the  entire  cost  upon 
the  property  owners.^  If  the  street  railway  company  has  been 
relievd  properly  from  liability  for  paving  a  part  of  the  street, 
the  abutting  property  owner  must  pay  his  share  of  such  im- 
provement without  any  deduction  for  the  share  which  the  rail- 
way company  would  have  been  obliged  to  pay  had  it  not  been 
released.®  Property  owners  cannot  complain  that  the  street  rail- 
way company  has  been  relieved  from  liability  in  an  improper 
way  where  the  assessment  of  such  property  owners  is  less  in 
amount  than  it  would  have  been  if  it  had  been  made  upon  the 
basis  claimed  by  them.^'  as  where  a  part  of  the  expense  in  excess 
of  the  charge  upon  the  street  railway  company  is  borne  by  the 
city.^^  If  a  street  railroad  company  occupies  a  portion  of  the 
street  with  its  tracks,  it  seems  to  be  assumed  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions that  such  company  is  prima  facie  liable  for  the  cost  of 
paving  a  part  of  such  street  in  the  absence  of  any  showing  that 
such   company   is   exempt.^-     In   other  jurisdictions   it   seems   to 

'  City  of  Erie  to  use  of  Erie  Pav-  "  Lacey  v.  City  of  IMarshalltown,  99 

ing  Company   v.   Moody,    171   Pa.   St.  la.   367,   68  N.  \v.   726    [1896];    City 

610,  33  Atl.' 378    [1895].  of   Philadelphia   to   use   of   O'Rourke 

^Thompson  v.  People  ex  rel.  Foote,  v.   Bowman,    175   Pa.   St.   91,   34   Atl. 

184   111.    17,   56  X.   E.   383.  353   [1896]. 

^  Warren    Bros.    Co.    v.    Tavlor,    —  ^"  Bowditch  v.  City  of  Xew  Haven, 

R.  I.  ,  69  Atl.  303    [1908].  40  Conn.  503    [1873]. 

'Scranton  v.   Koehler,   200  Pa.    St.  "  O'Eeilly  v.   City  of  Fingston,  39 

126.  49  Atl.   792.  Hnn.    (X.  Y.)    285    [1886]. 

*  Lacey    v.    City    of    !\Iarshalltown,  ^^  Sawyer   v.    Citv   of    Piii'^acro,    183 

99  la.  367,  68  X.' W.  726.  111.  57.  55  X.  E.  645   [1F991:  P^ore  v. 

City  of  Chicago,  60  111.  441   [1871]. 


1009  PROPERTY   SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  604 

be  held  that  the  mere  fact  that  the  company  occupies  a  part 
of  the  street  with  its  tracks  does  not  make  out  a  prima  facie 
case  in  favor  of  the  liability  of  such  company.'"-  A  property 
owner  who  objects  to  an  assessment  on  the  ground  that  the 
assessment  aerainst  him  includes  a  part  of  what  should  have  been 
assessed  against  a  street  railroad  company  must  be  able  to  show 
not  merely  that  the  railway  company  is  liable,  but  also  that 
the  assessment  includes  a  part  of  the  cost  for  which  the  railway 
company  was  liable.'*  The  street  railway  is  not  liable  for  paving 
a  street  on  which  it  is  authorized  to  operate  its  line,  but  on 
which  it  has  not  laid  any  tracks;  but  the  entire  cost  may  be 
charged  upon  the  property  owners.''^  If  the  cost  of  the  improve- 
ment is  apportioned  among  the  abutting  property  owners  and  no 
part  thereof  is  apportioned  upon  the  street  railway,  it  is  not  wrong 
to  exclude  the  cost  of  paving  that  part  of  the  street  which  the 
railroad  company  is  bound  to  pay.'"  It  is.  on  the  other  hand, 
wrong  to  include  the  cost  of  improving  such  part  of  the  street 
in  an  assessment  against  abutting  property  owners.'"  In  order 
to  assess  the  property  owners  it  is  not  necessary  to  wait  for 
completion  of  the  paving  between  the  rails  at  the  expense  of  the 
railroad  company.'^  Indeed,  it  has  been  said  to  be  proper  to 
omit  entirely  such  paving  between  the  rails  if  the  city  thinks 
it  advisable.'^  The  abutting  property  owners  cannot  complain 
of  such  exercise  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  city.^^  If  a 
street  railway  company  does  not  object  to  the  levy  of  an  assess- 
ment upon  its  right  of  way  for  a  street  improvement  the  owner 

"State  ex  rel.  Wheeler  v.  District  "Bowditch  v.  City  of  New  Haven, 

Court   of   Ramsey   County.    80    Minn.  40  Conn.  503  [1873];  Billings  v.  City 

293,   83   X.   W.    183    [19001.  of  Cliicajro,  107  III.  337,  47  X.  E.  731 

"McVerrj    v.    Boyd,    89    Cal.    304,  [1897]:    State   of   M.nnesota   ex    rel. 

26  Pac.  885    [1891].  Benz    v.    District    Court    of    Ramsey 

"Harris   v.    City   of   Macomb.   213  County,  32  INIinn.   181,  19  X.  W.  732 

HI.  47,  72  X.  E.  762  [1904].  [1884];    City    of    Sprinefield    to    use 

"  Chicaeo  &  Xorthern  Pacific  Rail-  of  Central  Xational  Bank  v.  Weaver, 

road    Company    v.    City    of    Cliicafj'.  137  Mo.  650,  37  S.  W.  509.  39  S.  W. 

172   HI.   66,   49   X.   E.1016    [1S9S];  276    [1896];    Matter   of   Mc<ormack, 

Li-rlitner  v.   City  of   Peoria,   150   III.  10  Abb.  Pr.  X.  R.  (X.  Y.)  234  [1870]. 

80,    37   X.    E.    69    [1894];    Vojrbt   v.  =»  City  of  Sprinsrfied  to  use  of  Cen- 

City  of  Buffalo,  133  X.  Y.  463,  31  X.  tnil    Xational    Bank   v.    Weaver,    137 

E.   340    [1P92].  Mo.  6.50,  37  S.  W.  .509.  39  S.  W.  276 

*' '  itv    f>f    Chica<TO    v.     Cn"imincr9,  [1896];     ^fatter    of    McCormack.     10 

144  T11.  446,  33  X.  E.  34  [1893].  Abb.  Pr.  X.  S.  (X.  Y.)   234  [1870]. 

i''Ftifpl  V.  MacManus,  74  Mo.  App. 
558    [1898]. 


§§  605,  606  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1010 

of  contiguous  property  cannot  complain  that  such  railway  com- 
pany ought  not  to  be  assessed.-^  If,  under  the  local  practice,  only 
a  party  taking  an  appeal  can  have  his  rights  passed  upon,  a 
street  railway  company  which  has  not  taken  an  appeal  cannot 
be  heard  in  answer  to  the  claims  of  a  property  owner  that  the 
street  railway  company  should  pay  for  paving-  the  street  be- 
tween the  tracks. -- 

§  605.    Method  of  enforcing  liability  of  street  railway. 

If  the  liability  of  the  street  railway  rests  on  its  charter  or 
on  other  statutory  provisions,  such  liability  must  be  enforced 
in  accordance  with  such  statute.^  A  contract  liability  must  be 
enforced  as  such.  The  liability  of  a  street  railway  company  to 
a  city  under  a  contract  by  which  the  street  railway  company 
agrees  to  pave  a  certain  part  of  the  street  cannot  be  enforced  in 
a  proceeding  to  apportion  an  assessment  on  the  theory  of  bene- 
fits.^ It  is  held  that  a  railway  company  may  be  compelled  to 
pave  its  part  of  the  street  by  a  proceeding  in  mandamus.^  If. 
however,  the  railway  company  has  no  money  and  no  credit  it 
has  been  said  that  mandamus  wnll  not  lie,  since  such  company 
is  unable  to  perform.* 

§  606,     Street  railway  property  other  than  right  of  way. 

Land  owned  by  a  street  railway  company  other  than  its  right 
of  way   may   be   assessed   in    the   absence   of   some    statute   spe- 

''^  White   V.   City  of   Alton,    149    111.  against      the      railroad      corporation, 

626,  37  N.  E.  96  [1894].  l)a.sed  on  a  mere  contract  obligation." 

-Berry    v.    City    of    Des    Moines,  Farmers'   Loan   &   Trust   Co.   v.   Bor- 

115  la.  44,  87  N.  W.  747  [1901].  ough  of  Ansonia,  61  Conn.  76,  87,  23 

'See  §  60.  Atl.  705  [1891]. 

^The  Oshkosh  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  ^  New  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail- 
Winnebago  County,  89  Wis.  road  Company  v.  Louisiana  ex  rel. 
435,  61  N.  W.  1137  [1895].  "So  far  City  of  New  Orleans,  157  U.  S.  219. 
as  the  committee  were  influenced  by  39  L.  679,  15  S.  581  [1895];  (affirm- 
the  fact  that  the  borough  had  done  ing  State  ex  rel.  City  of  New  Orlean-* 
work  on  the  street  which  the  railroad  v.  New  Orleans  City  and  Lake  Rail- 
company  was  bound  to  pay  for,  they  road  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  550.  7  So.  606 
misconceived  the  scope  of  legitimate  [1890];  under  a  special  statute  au- 
inquiry  and  virtually  converted  a  thorizing  such  remdy).  See  §  1162. 
mere  appeal  from  the  doings  of  the  *  City  of  Benton  Harbor  v.  St.  Jos- 
warden  and  burgesses  in  the  matter  eph  &  Benton  Harbor  Street  Railway 
of  the  assessment  of  benefits  under  Company,  102  Mich.  386,  26  L.  R.  A. 
the  borough  charter  into  an  action  245,  60  N.  W.  758  [1894]. 
at    law     in     favor     of    the    borough 


1011  PROPERTV    Sl'BJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT,  §  607 

cifically  exempting  it.^  Land  occupied  by  street  car  barns  may 
be  assessed  for  local  improvements.-  Under  a  statute  exempting 
property  which  is  used  for  railroad  purposes,  property  belonging 
to  a  street  railroad  company  and  leased  as  a  resort  for  public 
amusement,^  or  for  business  and  manufacturing  purposes,*  is  not 
exempt  from  assessment.  The  fact  that  such  leases  are  subject 
to  termination  upon  six  months'  notice,  or  the  fact  that  the 
attorney  general  may  require  the  railroad  company  to  sell  such 
realty  as  devoted  to  ordinary  business  or  manufacturing  pur- 
poses does  not  make  it  necessary  to  tr(^at  sueh  property  for  pur- 
poses of  local  assessment  as  devoted  to  railroad  purposes,  and  does 
not  prevent  such  property  from  being  subject  to  local  assessment.'' 

§  607.     Homestead. 

Property  used  as  a  homestead  and  exempt  from  sale  on  exe- 
cution is  not  for  that  reason  exempt  from  assessment  for  bene- 
fits conferred  by  a  local  improvement.^  Accordingly,  a  home- 
stead set  off  to  a  widow  and  child,  which  is  by  law  exempt  from 
liability  for  debts,  is  liable  to  assessment  for  a  street  improvement.^ 
A  different  principle  applies  where  the  property  is  exempt  from 
sale  for  non-payment  of  taxes.  In  Texas  at  one  time  it  was  held 
that  a  local  assessment  was  within  the  meaning  of  the  provision 
of  the  state  constitution,^  providing  for  the  sale  of  the  home- 
stead for  taxes  due  thereon.*  This  holding  was  based  on  the 
theory  that  within  the  meaning  of  this  constitutional  provision 
no  difference  was  to  be  drawn  between  general  aiul  special 
taxes.'"'  Tliis  decision  was  subs(M|uent]y  overruled  and  it  waj 
held   that    a    homestead    was   not   liable   to   a    forced   sale   for   an 

'Chicago     riiioii    Traction    Co.    v.  City  of  Cliicafro.   202   111.  .570,  67  N. 

City  of  Chicajro.  21.5    ill.  410,  74  N.  E.  383   [1*1031. 

E.  449   [19051;   ChicufTo  Union  Trac-  *  Aliern    v.    Hoard    of    Improvement 

tion  Co.  V.  City  of  Cliicafio.  207   111.  Dist.    No.    3.    (in    .-^rk.    fiS.    01    S.   W. 

.544,  09  N.  E.  849  [1904];  The  Chica-  .57.5;    Ferine  v.   Korhush,  97  Cal.  305, 

go  ITnion  Traction  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi-  32  Pae.  220   [18931;   Kevin  v.  Allen, 

cago,    204     111.     303.    ()S    N.     E.    519  15   Ky.   Law  Rep.   830,  20   S.  W.   ISO 

[19031.  [18941. 

^Chicajro     Union    Traction    Co.    v.  ^  Nevin   v.  Allen,   15   Ky.  Law  Rep. 

City  of  Chicajzo.  207   III.   544.  09  N,  830,  20  S.  W.    180   [1S941. 

E.  849   [19041.  'Article    XVI..    §    50,   Constitution 

'Cliicajro     Union     Traction     Co.     v.  of  Texas. 

City  of  Chicafri).   215    111.   411.   74   N.  *  Lufkin    v.    City    of    Galveston,    58 

E.   449    [19051.  Tex.  545   [18831. 

*  Chicajro     l^nion     Tr.Tction     Co.     v.  "Lufkin    v.    City    of    Galveston,    58 

City  of  Chicago,   202   111.   576,   67   N.  .Tex.   545    [18831:    Kettle  v.   City  of 

E.  383   [19031.  Dallas.  35  Tex.  Civ.  App.   032,  80  S. 

"Chicago     Union     Traction     Co.     v.  W.  874  [1904], 


§608 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1012 


assessment  for  local  benefits."  Under  such  theory  a  homestead 
is  for  practical  purposes  exempt  from  local  assessment.  Subse- 
quently a  case  was  presented  in  which  a  contractor  had  con- 
structed a  street  improvement,  looking  for  his  compensation 
to  the  assessments  upon  the  property  benefited,  a  part  of  which 
was  occupied  as  a  homestead.  His  contract  was  entered  into  and 
his  rights  acquired  after  the  earlier  decision  and  before  the  later 
decision.  It  Avas  held  that  this  change  of  judicial  decision  did 
not  impair  the  liability  of  his  contract ;  that  the  later  decision 
applied;  and  that  he  could  not  enforce  the  lien  of  such  assess- 
ment against  such  homestead  property.'^ 

§  608.     Vacant  land. 

Land  situated  within  the  limits  of  a  city,  which  is  not  occu- 
pied by  buildings  or  used  for  residence  purposes,  may  never- 
theless be  assessed  for  local  improvements  which  would  confer 
a  benefit  upon  such  property  under  any  use  to  which  it  is  rea- 
sonably probable  that  such  premises  might  be  put  if  the  owner 
saw  fit  to  make  such  use  of  them.^  Thus,  vacant  property  may 
be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  improving  a  street,-  or  constructing 
a  sidewalk,'^   or   constructing   sewers,*   or  laying  water  pipe.^   if 

*  Higgins  V.  Bordages,  88  Tex.  458, 
53  Am.  St.  Eep.  770,  31  S.  W.  52, 
803  [1895];  Lovenberg  v.  City  of 
Galveston,  17  Tex.  Civ.  App.  162.  42 
S.  W.   1024   [1897]. 

'  Storrie  v.  Cortes,  90  Tex.  283,  35 
L.  R.  A.  666,  38  S.  W.  154  [1896]. 

^Town  of  Monticello  v.  Banks,  48 
Ark.  251,  2  S.  W.  852;  Clapp  v.  City 
of  Hartford,  35  Conn.  66  [1868]: 
Washburn  v.  City  of  Chicago,  198 
111.  506.  64  N.  E.'  1064  [1902];  Da- 
sey  v.  Skinner,  33  N.  Y.  S.  R.  15; 
11  N.  Y.  Supp.  821;  Ford  v.  City  of 
Toledo,  64  0.  S.  92.  59  N.  E.  779 
[1901];  Borough  of  Beltzhoover  v. 
Maple,  130  Pa.  St.  335,  18  Atl.  650 
[1P891:  Allen  v.  Drew,  44  Vt.  174 
[1872].  The  same  pT-inoinle  has  been 
applied  in  sreneral  taxation.  Vacant 
land  mav  be  taxed  for  t^'-e  cost  of 
iTr>prr,vements  vehich  will  confer  m 
tepofit  unnn  such  land  ps  lonQr  as  it 
rer^piis  vacant.  ■>Tit'''^°u  v,  Titv  <^f 
Xegaunee,  113  Mich.  359,  67  Am.  St, 


Rep.  468,  38  L.  R.  A.  157,  71  N.  W. 
646   [1897]. 

It  seems  to  be  assumed  tliat  va- 
cant land  cannot  be  assessed  for 
sprinkling  streets  on  which  it  fronts: 
Corcoran    v.    Board    of    Aldermen    of 

Cambridge,  —  Mass.  ,  85  N.  E, 

155  [1908]. 

^  Town  cf  Monticello  v.  Banks,  48 
Ark.  251,  2  S.  W.  852. 

^  Borough  of  Beltzhoover  v.  ^Maple, 
130  Pa.  St.  335,  18  Atl.  650   [1889]. 

*  Clapp  V.  City  of  Hartford,  35 
Conn.  66  [1868];  Ford  v.  City  of 
Toledo,  64  0.  S.  92,  59  N.  E.  779 
[1901].  It  is  said  that  the  amount 
of  the  assessment  is  affected  by  the 
fa?t  tliat  the  property  is  vacant.  Ap- 
peal of  Wheeler,  80  N.  Y.  S.  204,  39 
Misc.  Rep.  484  [1902];  Allen  v. 
Drew,  44  Vt.  174  [1872]. 

'  Jones  V.  Board  of  Water  Com- 
missi'^ners  of  Detroit,  34  Mich.  273 
[}P7P1:  Dns"v  V.  Skinner.  33  N.  Y. 
S.  ^.  15.  11  X.  Y.  Snpp.  8?1:  Craw- 
ford's Estate,  14  Pliila.   (Pa.)   323. 


1013  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  609 

such  improvement  would  confer  a  benefit  upon  such  property, 
did  the  owner  thereof  see  fit  to  use  it  for  business  or  residence 
purposes.  If  the  exaction  is  not  based  upon  the  theory  of  bene- 
fits, but  is  a  charge  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  such  charge 
cannot  be  laid  upon  the  vacant  land  upon  which  such  property 
is  not  used.  Thus,  a  charge  in  the  nature  of  water  rates  for 
water  used  upon  premises  cannot  be  levied  upon  vacant  land." 

§  609.     Unplatted  land. 

Land  within  a  city  which  has  not  been  platted  or  divided  into 
city  lots  may  be  assessed  for  an  improvement  even  if  such  im- 
provement confers  but  little  benefit  upon  such  land  while  unplat- 
ted, if  the  improvement  would  benefit  such  land  were  it  platted 
and  used  as  city  property  ordinarily  is.^  The  owner  of  such  land 
cannot  insist  upon  having;-  the  necessity  and  reasonableness  of 
such  improvement  determined  solely  with  view  to  the  condition 
in  which  he  has  voluntarily  left  his  own  land.-  If  a  special  stat- 
ute provides  for  the  method  of  assessing  unplatted  property, 
such  property  must  be  assessed  in  the  manner  provided  for  by 
statute.-'  By  statute,  in  some  jurisdictions,  it  is  provided  that 
"lots"  of  land  are  to  be  assessed.  Whether  a  large  tract  of 
unplatted  land  is  a  lot  within  the  meaning  of  such  a  statute  is 
a  question  upon  which  there  is  a  difference  of  authority.  In 
some  jurisdictions  "lot"  is  said  to  be  synonymous  with  "tract" 

"State,  Culver,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  87,  75  X.  W.  108;  sub  nomine,  Ram- 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  45  N.  J.  L.  sey  County  v.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co., 
(16  Vr.)  256  [1883];'  State,  Vree-  42  L.  R.  A.  639  [1898];  Mediand  v. 
land,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  Linton,  60  Neb.  249,  82  X.  W.  866 
of  Jersey  City,  43  X.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  [1903];  Van  Waf^oner,  Pros.  v.  INlay- 
135  (affirmed  43  N.  J.  L.  (14  Vr.)  or  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pat- 
638  [1881]);  State,  United  New  Jer-  erson,  67  X.  J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  455.  51 
sey  Railroad  &  Canal  Co.  v.  Mayor  Atl.  922  [1902];  Kohler  Brick  Co.  v. 
aiid  Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  41  N.  City  of  Toledo.  29  Ohio  C.  C.  599 
J.  L.  (12  Vr.)  471  [1879];  Provident  [1907];  Bailey  v.  City  of  Zanesville, 
Institution  for  Savin?-;  v.  Allen.  37  20  Ohio  €.  C.  236  [1900];  Wilson  v. 
X.  J.  Eq.    (10  Stew.)    36   [1883].  Hall.  6  Ohio  C.  C.  570  [1892]. 

^  Connectient     ^Mutual     Life     Insur-  =  Washburn  v.  City  of  ('i)ica"().  198 

ance    Company    v.    (  ity    cf    Chicacro.  111.     506.     64     X.     E.     1064     [1902]. 

217   111.   352.   75   X".   E.   365    [190.1]:  (Such  land  was  divided  into  five  and 

Washburn  v.  Citv  of  ChieaTo.  198  Til.  ten   acre   tracts.) 

506.  64  X.  E.   1064   [1902];   McGrew  '  McOrew   v.   City  of  Kansas  Citv, 

V.  Citv  of  Kan^^as  Citv.  64  Fan.  61,  64    Kan.    61.    67    Pac.    438     [1902]; 

67  Pac.  438   [1902];   State  of  "VTinne-  Bailey  v.  Citv  of  Zanesville.  20  Ohio 

sota  V.  Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  72  Minn.  C.  C.  236  [1900]. 


§  609  T.\XA'I[(>N     BV    ASSESSMENT.  •  1014 

or  "parcel''  aiici  to  include  a  large  tract  of  unplatted  land/ 
Under  a  statute  i:)rovidinu;  for  assessing  "town  lots"  it  was  held 
that  a  large  tract  of  land  not  subdivided  into  city  lots  could 
not  be  assessed.'  Whether,  for  purposes  of  improvement,  the 
city  may  regard  a  large  tract  of  land  as  subdivided  into  smaller 
lots,  and  whether  the  city  may  make  such  assessment  a  lien 
upon  such  separate  lots  into  which  it  has  seen  fit  to  treat  the 
entire  tract  as  divided,  are  questions  upon  which  there  is  some 
conflict  of  authority.  A  city  has  no  power  to  divide  a  tract  of 
land  or  dictate  to  the  land-owner  how  he  shall  divide  it.^  Ac- 
cordingly, where  sewer  connections  were  to  be  constructed  every 
twenty  feet  on  both  sides  of  a  sewer  running  through  land  used 
for  agricultural  purposes,  it  was  held  that  such  ordinance  was 
unreasonable.'  In  later  cases,  however,  where  the  assessment  is 
made  against  the  property  as  an  entire  tract,  it  has  been  held 
not  unreasonable  to  provide  for  sewer  connections  every  twenty 
feet,^^  or  twenty-five  feet."  If  the  owner  of  a  large  unplatted 
tract  of  land  has  for  some  time  acquiesced  in  assessing  it  as  if 
divided  into  city  lots  he  cannot  subsequently  object  to  an  assess- 
ment for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  with  connections  in  antici- 
pation of  a  subsequent  division  of  such  tract  of  land.^''  Unsur- 
veyed  land  lying  within  the  boundaries  of  a  levee  district  may 
be  taxed  for  levee  purposes  under  a  statute  providing  that  all 
property,  except  that  declared  to  be  specifically  exempt,  shall  be 
subject  to  taxation. ^^ 

*  State   of   Minnesota   v.    Robert    P.  t)2  N.  E.  806   [1902]):   People  ex  lel. 

Lewis    Co.,    72    Minn.    87,    75    N.    VV.  Kochersperger   v.    Cook,    180   HI.   341. 

108;    svb    nomine.   Ramsey  County  v.  54  N.  E.   173    [1899];    (distinguished 

Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  42  L.  R.  A.  639  in  Vandersyde  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 

[1898].  mond.    195    111.    200.    62    N.    E.    806 

■^Town    of    (hoendale    v.    Suit,    163  [1901]). 
Ind.  282,  71   X.  E.  658    [1904].     See  '  Bickerdike  v.  City  of  Chicago,  185 
also  Minnesota  &  M.  Land  Improve-  111.  280.  56  N.  E.   1096   [1900]. 
ment    Company    v.    City    of    Billings,  **  Vandersyde  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
Ill    Fed.    Rep*.    972,    50    C.    C.   A.   70  mond,    1!)5     III.    200,    62    N.    E.    80ft 
[1901].      In    this    case,    however,    the  [1901]. 

real    (pustion    involved    was    whether  '•Washington  Paik  Club  v.  City  of 

any  pro})erty  owner  who  had  not  ob-  (  liipago.   219   111.    323.   76    N.    E.   383 

jected  at  the  proper  time  to  the  omis-  1  1906]. 

sion  of  unplatted  land  from  the  as-  '"  Van  Wagoner,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
sessment  could  object  subsequently  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pater- 
after  the  assessment  was  made.  son,  67  N.  J.  L.   (38  Vi.)   455.  51  Atl. 

«Biokerdike    v.     City    of    Chicago,  922    [1902]. 

185   111.   28r>,   56  N.   E.    1096    [1900];  "  Buckner    v.    Sn<jg.    79    Ark.    442, 

(distinguished  in  Vandev^vde  v.  Peo-  96  S.  W.   184   |19.)6]. 
pie    ex    rel.    Raymond,    195    111.    200, 


i 


1015  I'ROPERTV    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  610 

§  610.     Agricultural  property. 

If  land  situated  within  the  limits  of  a  city,  used  as  agricul- 
tural pr()i)ert3',  is  assessed  for  improvements  which  are  urban  in 
character,  it  is  lu-ld  in  most  jurisdictions  that  such  hind  may  l)e 
assessed  if  such  improvement  does  in  fact  confer  a  benefit  upon 
such  property.^  Thus,  property  within  the  limits  of  a  city  used 
as  farm  property  may  be  assessed  for  the  construction  of  a  street,- 
or  a  sidewalk,^  or  a  sewer/  Under  a  statute  providing  for  the 
exemption  of  farm  land  within  a  city  from  taxation  it  is  gen- 
erally hekl  that  such  statute  refers  to  local  taxation  unless  it 
contains  language  showing  an  affirmative  intention  to  exempt  such 
property  from  assessments  for  local  improvements.'  Thus  a  stat- 
ute exempting  lands  occupied  and  used  in  good  faith  for  agri- 
cultural purposes  from  any  taxation  for  city  purposes  is  held  not 
to  exempt  such  land  from  local  assessments,"  such  as  assessments 
for  paving,'^   or  curbing.'^     A   statute  providing  that   "no  more 

'Washburn  v.  City  of  f'hicago.  198  '  Duker   v.   Barber   Asphalt   Paving 

111.  .506,  04  N.  E.  1004   [1D02|;   Clark       Co.,  —   (Ky.)   ,  74  S.  W.  744,  25 

V.  City  of  Chicago,  100  111.  84,  40  X.  Ky.    Law    Rep.    13.5    [  H)03] ;     Barber 

E.   730    [1897];    Leitch    v.   LaCraiige,  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Gaar,   115  Ky. 

138    111.    291,    27    N.    E.    917    [18921;  334,    24    Ky.    Law,    2227,    73    S.    W. 

Taber    v.    Grafmillcr.    1(I9    Ind.    200.  1100    [1903]. 

9  X.  E.  721   [1880];  Duki-r  v.  Barber  ''Taber  v.  Grafniiller.   109  Ind.  200, 

Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  —   (Ky.)   — ,  74  9   X.   E.   721    [1880];    Hood   v.   Trus- 

S.    W.    744,    25    Ky.    Law    Rep.    135  tees  of  the  Town  of  Lebanon    (Ky.), 

[1903];    Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.  15   S.  W.  516,   12   Ky.  Law  Rep.   813 

V.  Gaar,  115  Ky.  334,  73  S.  W.  1106,  [18911. 

24  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2227    [1903];   Hood  *  Leitch   v.  LaCrange,    138   111.  291. 

V.  Trustees  of  the  Town  of  Lebanon.  27  X.  E.  917   [1892]. 

—    (Ky.)    — ,    15   8.   W.   510,    12   Ky.  "  Kalbrier   v.   Leimard,  34   Ind.   497 

L.   Rep.   813    [1891].     Benefit   in   this  [1870]-.    Allen   v.  City  of  Davenport. 

sense  ordinarily  and   properly   means  137    la.    90,    77    X.    W.    532    [1898]; 

an    increase    in    the   market    value   of  Farwell    v.   Des   Moines   Brick    Maiui 

such  property.     See  S  053.  The  same  facturing    Company.    97    Ta.    2S(i.    35 

princii)le    has    been    api)lied    to    gen-  L.  R.  A.  03,  60  X.  W.   17()   |  189(1]. 

eial  taxation  of  farm  lands  within  a  "Allen    v.    City    of    l):iveni>i)rt.    !07 

city.      Kelly   v.   Pittsl)urg.    104   U.    S.  la.  90.  77  X.  \V.  532  |1S9S];   Farwell 

78.' 26  L.  658;   Kelly  v.  City  of  Pitts-  v.    Des    Moines    Briek    .Manufacturing 

burg.    85    Pa.    St.    i70.    27    Am.    Rep.  Company,    97    la.    280.    35    L.    R.    A. 

033     [1877].       In    a     Kentucky    case  03.    00   X.    W.    170    |  ls90]. 

it    has    been    said    that    farm    lands  '  Allen    v.    (  ity    of    Davenport.    107 

within  the  limits  of  a  town  could  n.t  I;-,.  9(1.  77  X".  W.  532   [1898]. 

l.e  taxed  for  a  street  improvement  if  '"  Farwell  v.  Des  Moines  Brick  Man 

there  was  no  city  population  on  such  ufacturing   Company.   97    la.   280.   35 

land  or  near  thereto.     Town  of  Park-  L.  R.  A.  63,  66  X.  W.  176  [1890]. 

land  v.  Gaines,  88  Ky.  502.   11   S.  W. 

049  [1889]. 


610 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1016 


than  five  acres  of  farming  land  shall  be  subject  to  taxation 
within  such  city"  does  not  prevent  local  assessments  for  the  con- 
struction of  streets  and  sidewalks.^  If  rural  land  situated  in 
a  city  is  benefited  by  an  improvement  which  is  not  urban  in 
its  character  it  may  be  assessed  therefor.^-  Thus,  agricultural 
lands  of  a  city  may  be  assessed  for  irrigation."  Where  an  assess- 
ment is  levied  in  proportion  to  frontage  and  according  to  bene- 
fits received,  an  unplatted  forty-acre  tract,  only  a  portion  of 
which  abuts  on  the  improvement,  which  is  all  used  for  farm 
purposes  exclusively,  cannot  be  assessed  as  an  entire  tract.^- 
In  Pennsylvania  land  used  for  farm  purposes  may  be  assessed 
upon  the  basis  of  benefits,  even  if  the  improvement  is  one  which 
is  urban  in  character,^^  but  such  assessment  cannot  be  levied  in 
proportion  to  frontage.^^  Thus,  assessments  for  street  improve- 
ments," such  as  for  the  extension  and  grading  of  a  street,^^ 
or  the  paving  thereof,^'  an  assessment  for  the  construction  of 
sewers,^^  or  laying  water  pipe,"  cannot  be  apportioned  upon 
rural  property  in  accordance  with  the  frontage  thereof.  Whether 
property  is  urban  or  rural   within  the  meaning  of  such  rule  is 


*  Kalbrier  v.  Leonard,  34  Ind.  497 
[1870]. 

'"  C  ity  of  San  Diego  v.  Linda  Vista 
Irrigation  District,  108  Cal.  189,  35 
L.  R.  A.  33,  41   Pac.  291    [1895]. 

"  City  of  San  Diego  v.  Linda  Vista 
Irrigation  District,  108  Cal.  189,  35 
L.  R.  A.  33,  41   Pac.  291    [1895]. 

'=Ryan  v.  Sumner,  17  Wash.  228, 
49   Pac.  487    [1897]. 

I'McKeesport  v.  Soles,  165  Pa.  St. 
628,   30  -Atl.   1019    [1895]. 

"  Philadelphia  to  use  v.  Gowen. 
202  Pa.  St.  453,  52  Atl.  3  [1902]; 
City  of  Philadelphia  to  use  of  Mack 
V.  Gorgas,  180  Pa.  St.  296,  36  Atl. 
868  [1897];  City  of  McKeesport  v. 
Soles,  178  Pa.  St.  363,  35  Atl.  927 
[1896];  MoKeesport  v.  Soles,  165 
Pa.  St.  628,  30  Atl.  1019  [1895]; 
Philadelphia  to  use,  etc.,  v.  Sheridan, 
148  Pa.  St.  532,  24  Atl.  80  [1892]: 
Pepper  v.  Citv  of  Phi^adelnhia  to 
use  of  H-^T-ter.  ]14  V^.  St.  96.  6  Atl. 
899  flSPPT-  Citv  of  Phil-'dplnhia  v. 
Keith,  (Pal  2  Atl.  P"ti.  207; 
Citv  of  Scrpnt'^n  v.  Pein«v1va- 
nia  Coal  Co.,  105  Pa.  St.  445  [1884] ; 


Person's  Appeal,  96  Pa.  St.  14D 
[1880];  City  of  Philadelphia  to  use 
of  Johnson  v.  Rule,  93  Pa.  St.  15 
[1880];  Craig  v.  City  of  Philadel- 
phia, 89  Pa.  St.  265  [1879];  Kaiser 
V.  Weise,  85  Pa.  St.  366  [1877]; 
Seely  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  82  Pa. 
St.  360,  22  Am.  Rep.  760  [1876]. 

^=  Craig  V.  City  of  Philadelphia,  89 
Pa.  St.  265  [1879];  Seely  v.  City  of 
Pittsburgh,  82  Pa.  St.  360,  22  Am. 
Rep.  760   [1876]. 

^*  City  of  Scranton  v.  Pennsylva- 
nia Coal  Co.,  105  Pa.  St.  445   [1884]. 

"City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Keith. 
Pa.,  2  Atl.  Rep.  207;  Phila- 
delphia to  use  V.  Gowen,  202  Pa.  St. 
453,  52  Atl.  3  [1902];  City  of  Phila- 
delphia to  u.se  of  Mack  v.  Gorgas, 
180  Pa.  St.  296,  36  Atl.  868  [1S97]; 
City  of  Philadelphia  to  use  of  John- 
son v.  Rule.  93  Pa.  St.  15  [1880]. 

"  Beechwood  Avenue  Sew^r.  (2) 
Pitt=hurn-ii's  Anneal.  (2),  179  Pa.  St. 
494.  ?(\  Atl.  210  [1897]. 

*'' '""itv  of  jAUent'^w'i  V.  Adams,  5 
Sadler    (Pa.)    253    [1887]. 


1017  PROPERTY    SL'BJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  i  611 

a  question  of  fact,  depending  upon  the  character  of  the  locality, 
its  streets,  the  subdivsion  of  the  property,  the  neighboring  build- 
ings and  improvements  and  the  market  value  of  the  property 
assessed  as  well  as  all  propert}^  in  the  neighborhood.-**  If  the 
facts  are  undisputed  the  question  is  said  to  be  one  of  law.-^ 
It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  land  at  one  time  rural  in  character 
may  lose  that  character  and  become  urban  property.--  Accord- 
ingly, an  adjudication  that  land  is  rural  in  character  is  not  con- 
clusive as  to  the  question  of  the  character  of  such  property  four 
years  later.-^'  The  owner  of  real  property  within  a  city  may  be 
estopped  to  deny  its  urban  character,-*  as  by  his  conduct  in 
signing  a  petition  for  the  improvement  and  inducing  the  city 
authorities  to  make  the  same,-"'  or  by  his  act  in  making  specific 
objections  to  the  passage  of  the  improvement  ordinance  without 
raising  the  question  of  the  rural  character  of  such  property.-*"' 
In  Rhode  Island  rural  property  cannot  be  assessed  if  the  assess- 
ment is  apportioned  to  the  frontage.-^  Such  assessment  is  said 
to  be  "so  plainly  unfair  or  extortionate  that  it  could  not  be 
sustained."-^  This  rule,  however,  does  not  apply  to  suburban 
property  near  the  compact  part  of  the  city  the  land  about  which 
has  been  built  up,  even  though  no  houses  have  been  erected  in 
the  immediate  vicinity  of  such  property.-" 

§  611.     Power  of  legislature  to  exempt  from  assessment. 

The  legislature,  unless  restrained  l)y  some  specific  constitutional 
provision,  has  power  to  decide  what  general  classes  of  property 

»City    of    Philadelphia    to    use    of  use  of  Horter,  114  Pa.  St.  flO.  C>  Atl. 

Mack  V.  Gorgas,   180  Pa.  St.  2!)().  30  S!)!)   [18SG1;    Person's  Ai)peal,  9(5  Pa. 

Atl.     868      [1897];      :McKeesport     v.  St.    140    [18801:    Bidwell    v.  .City    of 

Soles,   16,5  Pa.  St.   628,  30  Atl.   1019  Pittsburpjh.   P.5    Pa.   St.   412,   27    Am. 

[18951;    Philadelphia   to   use,   etc.   v.  Rep.  662    [18771. 

Sheridan,  148  Pa.  St.  532,  24  Atl.  80  ==  Person's   Appeal,   9t)    Pa.   St.    140 

[1892];    Keith    v.    City    of    Philadel-  |  1880] ;  Pidwell  v.  City  of  Pittsburg, 

phia,    126    Pa.   St.    575.    17    Atl.    883  85    Pa.    St.    412,    27    Am.    Rep.    662 

[1889].      For     a     discussion     of     the  [1877]. 

elements    involved    see    City    of    Mc-  -'"Pepper    v.    City    of    Philadelphia 

Ke<'sport    v.    Soles,    178    Pa'    St.    363,  to   use  of   Horter,    114   Pa.   St.   96,   6 

35   Atl.   927    [1896].  Atl.  899   [1886]. 

="City  of  Reading'  v.  O'Reilly.   169  =^  Bishop    v.    Tripp,    15    R.    T.    466. 

Pa.   St!    366.    32    Atl.    420    [1895].  8     Atl.     692     [1887];     Cleveland     v. 

"Philadelphia  to  use,  etc.    v.  Rher-  Tripp,   13   R.  I.   50   [1880]. 

idan.     148    Pa.    St.    532,    24    Atl.    80  =*  Bishop    v.    Tripp.    15    R.    I.    466. 

[1892].  467.  8  Atl.  692   [1887]. 

"  Feith    V.    City    of    Pliiladelphia.  ^  Sewer      assessment.       Bishop      v. 

126  Pa.  St.  575.    17  Atl.  883    [1889].  Tripp,     15     R.     I.     466.     8     Atl.     692 

»  Pepper  v.  City  of  Philadelphia  to  [1887]. 


§611 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1018 


shall  be  exempt  from  local  assessment.'  A  constitutional  pro- 
vision authorizing-  the  legislature  ''to  provide  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  cities  and  incorporated  villages  and  to  restrict  their  power 
of  taxation,  assessment,  borrowing  money,  contracting  debts  and 
loaning  their  credit  so  as  to  prevent  abuses  in  assessments  and 
taxation  and  in  contracting  debts  by  such  municipal  corporations," 
does  not  restrict  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  provide  by  general 
statute  for  exempting  the  property  of  street  railroad  companies 
from  assessments  for  local  improvements.'  A  constitutional  pro- 
vision requiring  uniformity  of  taxation  does  not  prevent  the 
legislature  from  exempting  property  from  local  assessment.^  A 
con.stitutional  provision  forbidding  the  exemption  of  property 
from  taxation  does  not  prevent  the  legislature  from  exempting 
property  from  assessment  for  local  improvements.'*  A' specific 
grant  of  power  to  the  legislature  to  exempt  property  of  the 
5tate  and  of  counties  and  property  which  the  general  assembly 
may  deem  necessary  for  school,  religious  and  charitable  pur- 
poses has  been  held  to  prevent  the  legislature  from  granting 
exemptions  other  than  as  therein  specified.'^  Accordingly,  since 
such  provision  refers  to  general  taxation,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  legislature  cannot  exempt  property  of  a  religious  or  chari- 
table corporation  from  assessment  for  local  improvements.''  In 
the  absence  of  constitutional  provisions  restricting  the  power  of 
the  legislature  a  statute  specifically  exempting  certain  classes  of 
real  property  from  local  assessment  is  valid. ^     Where  the  legis- 


'  Zable  V.  Louisville  Baptist  Or- 
phans' Home,  92  Ky.  89,  13  L.  R.  A, 
668,  17 -S.  W.  212;  City  of  Erie  v. 
Griswold,  184  Pa.  435,  39  Atl.  231 
[1898];  Philadelphia  to  use  of  Nes- 
tor V.  Spring  Gariien  Farmers'  Mar- 
ket Company,  161  Pa.  St.  522,  29 
Atl.  286  [1894];  Milwaukee  Electric 
Railway  &  Light  Company  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  95  Wis.  42,  69  N.  W. 
796  [1897]. 

-  Milwaukee  Electric  Railway  & 
Light  Company  v.  City  of  Milwau- 
kee. 95  Wis.  42,  69  N.  W.  796  [1897]. 

'Citv  of  Erie  v.  Criswold.  184  Pa. 
435.  39   Atl.  231    [1898]. 

'Citv  of  Erie  V.  Oriciwold.  184  Pa. 
435.  39  Atl.  231    [1898]. 

•'City   of   Chicago    v.   Baptist   The- 


ological Union,  115  111.  245,  2  N.  E. 
254    [1886]. 

"City  of  Chicago  v.  Baptist  Theo- 
logical Union,  115  111.  245,  2  N.  E. 
254    [1886]. 

'  District  of  Columbia  v.  Sisters  of 
Visitation,  15  App.  D.  C.  300  [1899]; 
Hudson  County  Catholic  Protectory 
V  Board  of  Township  Committee  of 
the  Township  of  Kearney,  56  N.  J.  L. 
(27  Vr.)  385,  28  Atl.  1043  [1894]; 
R.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Lynch- 
burg, 81  Va.  473  [1866];  Quirk  v. 
City  of  Seattle,  38  Wash.  25.  SO  Pac. 
207  [1905];  Milwaukee  Electric 
Railway  &  Lip-ht  Company  v.  Citv 
of  Milwaukee.  95  Wis.  42.  69  N.  W. 
796  [1897]:  Smith  v.  Sherry.  54  Wis. 
114,  11  N.  W.  465  [1896]. 


1019 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§612 


lature  has  power  to  grant  special  charters  to  corporations,  the 
property  of  a  charitable  corporation  may  be  exempted  from  local 
assessraient  by  a  provision  inserted  in  its  charter.* 

§  612.     Necessity  of  express  exemption. 

If  property  is  of  a  class  which  would  ordinarily  be  included 
within  the  scope  of  a  statute  providing  for  local  assessments, 
such  property  is,  as  a  general  rule,  to  be  assessed,  unless  the 
legislature  has  exempted  the  same  by  some  statute  showing  such 
intention.'  In  case  of  assessments  against  the  public  property 
we  find  some  divergence  of  judicial  opinion  on  this  question. 
Property  belonging  to  the  United  States  is,  of  course,  be^'ond 
the  reach  of  the  state  legislature.-  In  case  of  other  property 
belonging  to  the  public  and  used  for  public  purposes  we  find 
two  theories.  One  is  that  property  is  exempt  from  local  assess- 
ment unless  by  the  provisions  of  some  statute  which  specifically 
exempts  such  property.'^     Even  where  this  theory  obtains  land 


"Hudson  County  Catholic  Protec- 
tory V.  Board  of  Township  Commit- 
tee of  the  Town  of  Kearney,  56  X. 
.1.  L.  (27  Vr.)  385,  28  Atl.  1043 
[1894]. 

^  Ford  V.  Delta  and  Pine  Land  Co., 
164  U.  S.  662,  41  L.  500,  17  S.  230 
[1897];  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Lindquist,  119  la.  144,  93 
N.  W.  103  [1903]  City  r,f  Ludlow 
V.  Trustees  of  the  Cincinnati  South- 
ern Railway,  78  Ky.  357  [1880]: 
Crowley  v.  Copley,  2  La.  Ann.  329 
[1847];  Lockwood  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  24  Mo.  20;  State,  New  .Jersey 
Midland  Railroad  Company,  Pros.  v. 
ilayor  and  Aldermen  of  .Jersey  City, 
42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  07  [ISSOJ; 
Matter  of  Mayor  of  New  York,  11 
.Johns  (X.  Y.)  80;  City  of  Phila- 
delphia to  use  of  McCann  v.  Philadel- 
phia &  Readinjr  Railroad  Co..  177 
Pa.  202,  34  T..  R.  A.  504,  35  Atl.  610 
[1806];  Northern  Lil^erties  v.  .St. 
.John's  Church.  13  Pa.  St.  107. 

=  See  S  570. 

'  Board  of  Education  of  City  of 
Chicago  V.  People  ex  rel.  Commis- 
sioners of  Lincoln  Park,  210  111.  S3. 
76  N.  E.  75  [1005]:  City  of  Chicago 
in  Trust   for  Use  of  Schools  v.   Citv 


of  Chicago,  207  111.  37,  09  X.  E.  580 
[1904];  County  of  Adams  v.  City  of 
Quincy,  130  111.  566,  6  L.  R.  A.  155. 
22  X.  E.  624  [1890];  County  of  Me 
Lean  v.  City  of  Bloomington,  106  111. 
209  [1883]";  Cook  County  v.  City  of 
Chicago.  103  111.  646  [1882];  Ed 
wards  &  \Yalsh  Construction  Com 
pany  v.  .Jasper  County,  117  la. 
305,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  .3oi,  90  X.  W. 
1000  [1902]  ;  Hassan  v.  City  of  Roch 
ester,  07  X.  Y.  528  [1876];  (for 
mer  appeal.  Hassen  v.  City  of  Roches 
ter.  65  X.  Y.  516  [1875])  ;  lu  n 
Howard  Avenue,  Xorth,  in  City  of 
Seattle.  44  Wash.  62,  86  Pac.  1117 
[1900].  "If  there  he  any  exemption 
it  must  be  one  implied  by  law  for 
the  statute  authorizing  the  assps^^- 
ment  is  broad  enough  to  cover  all 
owners  of  property.  Tlie  reason  for 
exempting  property  belonging  to  the 
state  or  any  of  its  instrumentalities, 
as  counties  and  cities,  from  general 
taxation,  does  not,  as  it  appears  to 
lis,  apply  to  special  assessments." 
Edwards  «S:  Walsh  Construction  Com- 
pany V.  .Jasper  County.  117  la.  305, 
380.'  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  301,  90  X.  W. 
1000   [1902]. 


§  613  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT,  1020 

which  has  been  conveyed  in  trust  for  school  purposes  only,  is 
regarded  as  impliedly  exempt.*  It  is  not  to  be  presumed  that 
the  legislature  would  commit  a  breach  of  trust  by  diverting  such 
funds  from  their  proper  use.  By  the  other  theory  public  property  is 
presumed  to  be  exempt  in  the  absence  of  some  provision  showing 
affirmatively  that  the  legislature  intended  to  make  it  subject  to 
local  assessment.''  In  these  jurisdictions  the  distinction  is  made 
between  laws  exempting  the  property  of  private  persons  or  cor- 
porations from  local  assessment  and  taxation  and  the  rules  ap- 
plicable to  public  property.  It  is  said  that  if  the  taxing  power 
seeks  to  impose  a  tax  upon  public  property  it  must  be  able  to 
justify  its  authority  by  some  legislative  or  constitutional  pro- 
vision.^ 

§  613.     Effect  of  exemption  from  taxation. 

Exemption  acts  are  in  most  jurisdictions  construed  strictly.^ 
If  property  which  it  is  sought  to  assess  falls  within  the  general 
description  of  the  property  assessed  by  authority  of  the  legis- 
lature, the  person  claiming  that  such  property  is  exempt  must 
be  able  to  show  some  provision  which  clearly  manifests  the 
intention  of  the  legislature  to  exempt  the  same.-    Exemption  from 

*  The  People  ex  rel.  Little  v.  Trus-  °  City   of   Big   Rapids   v.   Board   of 

tees  of  Schools,   118  111.  52,  7  N.  E.  Supervisors  of  Mecosta  Co.,  99  Mich. 

262;    Edgerton  v.  Huntington  School  351,  58  X.  W.  358   [1894]. 

Township,  126  Ind.  261,  26  N.  E.  15G  ^  Paine    v.    Spratley,    5    Kan.    525 

[1890];   City  of  Louisville  v.  Leath-  [1870];    Atchison,    Topeka    &    Santa 

erman,    99    Ky.    213,    35    S.    W.    625  Fe  Railroad  Company  v.  Peterson,  5 

[1896].     "Being  state  property  there  Kan.  App.   103,  48  p'ac.  877    [1807]; 

is  no  need  of  an  exception  in  the  law  Reeves      v.       Treasurer      of      Wood 

to  exempt  the  property  held  in  trust  County,  8  O.  S.  333   [1858]. 

by   the   school   board   from   subjection  -  City  of  Chicago  in  Trust  for  Use 

to   a   lien  for   taxes  or   assessments."  of  Schools  v.  City  of  Chicago,  207  111. 

City  of  Louisville  v.  Leatherman.  99  37,  69  N.  E.  580   [1904];    County  of 

Ky".  213,  216,  35  S.  W.   625    [1896];  Adams    v.    City    of    Quiney,    13o"  111. 

(citin<?    City    v.    Commonwealth.     1  566.   6   L.   R.   A.    155,   22   N.   E.   624 

Duv.  296,  17  Ky.  Law  Rep.  445).  [1890];   Erie  R.  Co.  v.  City  of  Pat- 

=  County    Commissioners    of    Balti-  erson.   72   N.  J.   L.   83,   59   Atl.   1031 

more   CountA'   v.    Board    of   Managers  [1905]:     Buffalo     City    Cemetery    v. 

of  the  Ma-vland  Hasr.ital  for  the  In-  City  of  Buffalo.  46  X.  Y.  506  [1871]; 

sa^e.  62  Md.  127  [1P841  :  •^itv  of  Bi^r  People  ex  rel.  Trustees  of  Amity  Bap- 

Ranids     v.     Simerviaors     of    y^ppnsti  tist   Church   v.   Moni-oe.   81    X.   Y.   o. 

CmiTitv.  99  ATich.  351.  58  N.  W.  358  972.  40  Mi«c.  Reu.  286   [1903];  Lima 

[1P0J1-     '"if'    of    ninton    V.    Wpn'-y  v.    Cp^-'et^ry    Association.    42    0.    S. 

Cr-.'^^f-    n.f;  ATn.  557.  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  128,  51  Am.  Rep.  809   [1884]. 
415,  22  S.  W.  494. 


1021 


PROPERTY   Sl'BJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§613 


taxation  in  general  terms  is  regarded  as  pr//?ia  facie  an  exemp- 
tion from  general  taxation  and  not  from  local  assessment.''  A 
statute  providing  that  no  property  which  shall  have  been  found 


*  Ford  V.  Delta  and  Pine  Land 
Company,  164  U.  S.  662,  41  L.  590, 
17  S.  230  [1897];  (amrming  Ford 
V.  Delta  and  Pine  Land  Co.,  43  Fed. 
181  [1890]);  Illinois  Central  Fvail- 
road  Company  v.  Decatur,  147  U.  S. 
190,  37  L.  132,  13  S.  293  [1893]; 
(aliirming  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Decatur,  126 
111.  92,  1  L.  R.  A.  613,  18  X.  E.  315 
[1890]  )  ;  Board  of  Improvement  Pav- 
ing District  No.  5  v.  Sisters  of  Mercy 
of  Female  Academy  of  Ft.  Smith,  — 

Ark.   ,    109   S.   W.    1165    [1908]: 

City  of  San  Diego  v.  Linda  Vista  Ir- 
rigation District,  108  Cal.  189,  35 
L.  R.  A.  33,  41  Pac.  291  [1895 J; 
City  of  Bridgeport  v.  New  York  and 
New  Haven  Railroad  Company,  36 
Conn.  255,  4  Am.  Rep.  63  [1869]; 
City  of  Atlanta  v.  First  Presbyterian 
Church,  86  (la.  730,  12  L.  R.  A.  S52, 
13  S.  E.  252  [1890];  (overruling 
Trustees  of  Firsl,  Methodist  Episco- 
pal Church,  South  v.  City  of  Atlan- 
ta, 76  Ga.  181  [1886]);  Board  of 
Education  of  City  of  Chicago  v.  Peo- 
ple ex  rel.  Commissioners  of  Lincoln 
Park,  219  111.  83,  76  X.  E.  75  [1905] ; 
City  of  Chicago  in  Trust  for  Use  of 
Schools  V.  City  of  Chi^aijo,  207  111. 
37,  69  X.  E."  580  [1904];  Illinois 
Central  Railroad  Company  v.  (  ity  of 
Decatur,  154  III.  173.  38  X.  E.  626 
[1894]  ;  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
Company  v.  City  of  Mattmn,  141  111. 
32,  30  X.  E.  773'  [  1893]  :  Bloomington 
Cemetery  Association  v.  People  of  the 
State  of  Illinois,  139  111.  16,  28  X.  E. 
1076  [1893];  County  of  Adams  v. 
City  of  Quincy.  130  ill.  566,  6  L.  R. 
A.  155.  22  X.  E.  624  [ISOO];  County 
of  McLean  v.  City  of  Blooniinirton. 
106  111.  209  [1883];  Cook  County  v. 
City  of  Chicago.  103  111.  646  [1882]; 
Mix  V.  Ross,  57  111.  121  [1870]; 
Wright  V.  City  of  Chicago.  46  111.  44 
[1867];  Scammon  v.  Citv  of  Chicago. 
42    111.    192    [1866];    Peoria    v.    Kid- 


der, 26  111.  351;  City  of  Chicago  v. 
Colby,  20  111.  614  [1858];  City  of 
Ottawa  V.  Trustees  of  the  Free 
Church,  20  111.  424  [1858];  Hig- 
gins  V.  City  of  Chicago,  18  111.  276 
[1857];  Trustees  of  the  Illinois  and 
.Micliigan  Canal  v.  City  of  C  hicago, 
12  III.  403  [1851];  Edwards  &  Walsh 
Construction  Company  v.  Jasper 
County,  117  la.  365,  94  Am.  St.  Rep. 
301,  90  X.  W.  1006  [1902];  Paine  v. 
Spratley,  5  Kan.  525  [1870];  Atchi- 
son, Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Railroad 
Company  v.  Peterson,  5  Kan.  App. 
103,  48  Pac.  877  [1897];  Ilager  v. 
Gast,  119  Ey.  502,  84  S.  W.  556, 
27  Ky.  Law  Rep.  129  [1905]  ;  Gosnell 
V.  City  of  Louisville,  104  Ky.  201, 
20  Fy.  S.  Rep.  519,  46  S.  W.  722 
[1898];  Levi  v.  Louisville,  97  Ky. 
394,  28  L.  R.  A.  480,  30  S.  W.  97.3; 
I  ilgus  V.  Trustees  of  Orphanage  of 
Good  Shepherd,  94  Ky.  439,  22  S.  W. 
7.50  [1893];  Holzha'uer  v.  City  of 
Xewport,  94  Ky.  396,  22  S.  W.'  752 
[1893];  Zable  V.  Louisville  Baptist 
Orphans'  Home,  92  Ky.  89,  13  L.  R. 
A.  668,  17  S.  W.  212  [1891];  Broad- 
way Baptist  Church  v.  McAtee,  8 
Bush.  (71  Ky.)  508,  8  Am.  Rep.  480 
[1871]:  Rooney  v.  Brown,  21  La. 
Ann.  51  [1869]*;  City  of  Lafayette  v. 
Male  Orphans  Asylum.  4  La.  Ann.  1 
[1849]:  Crowley  v.  Copley,  2  La. 
Ann.  329  [1847];  Boston  Seamen's 
Friend  Society  v.  Boston,  116  Mass. 
181,  17  Am.  Rep.  153;  Lefevre  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Detroit,  2  Mich.  586 
[1853];  State  v.  Trustees  of  Macal- 
ester  College,  87  Minn.  165.  91  X.  W. 
484  [1902];  Washburn  Memorial 
Orphan  Asylum  v.  State,  73  Minn. 
.343.  76  X.  E.  204  [1898]:  Daily  v. 
Swope.  47  Miss.  367;  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving'  Com])any  v.  City  of  St. 
JostM.h.  183  Mo."  451,  82  S.  W.  64 
[1904];  Kansas  City  Exposition 
Drivintr  Park  v.  Kansas  City,  174 
Mo.  425,  74  S.  W.  979   [1903]  i   Kan- 


§613 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESi^MKNT. 


102-2 


to  be  damaged  by  an  improvement  shall  be  assessed  for  benefits 
does  not  apply  to  a  tract  a  part  of  which  has  been  taken,  but 
the  rest  of  which  has  been  found  not  to  be  damaged.*  In  Penn- 
sylvania the  original  view  of  the  courts  was  that  exemption  from 
taxation  did  not  exempt  from  local  assessment.'^  At  one  time, 
however,  the  courts  of  this  state  differed  from  those  of  most 
jurisdictions  as  to  what  language  showed  an  intention  to  exempt 
from  local  assessment.  A  statute  providing  that  certain  property 
should  be  exempt  from  taxation,  "except  for  state  purposes,"" 
or   that    certain    property    was   "exempted    from    all    and    every 


sas  City  v.  Bacon,  147  Mo.  259,  48  S. 
W.  860  [1898];  City  of  Clinton  to 
Use  of  Thornton  v.  Henry  County, 
115  Mo.  557,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  415, 
22  S.  W.  494  11893];  State  ex  rel. 
Chicago,  Burlington  &  Quincy  Rail- 
road Company  v.  City  of  Kansas,  89 
Mo.  34,  14  S'.  W.  515  [1886];  Shee- 
han  V.  Good  Samaritan  Hospital,  50 
Mo.  155,  11  Am.  Rep.  412  [1872]; 
Lockwood  V.  St.  Louis,  24  Mo.  20; 
City  of  Beatrice  v.  Brethren  Church 
of  Beatrice,  41  Neb.  358,  59  N.  W. 
932  [1894];  State,  Paterson  and 
Hudson  River  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Passaic,  54  X.  J.  L.  (25  Vr.) 
340,  23  Atl.  945  [1892];  Roosevelt 
Hospital  V.  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Commonalty  of  the  City  of  New 
York,  84  N.  Y.  108  [1881];  (affirm- 
ing Roosevelt  Hospital  v.  Mayor,  Al- 
dermen and  Commonalty  of  the  City 
of  New  York,  18  Hun."  (N.  Y.)  582 
[1879]);  Hassan  v.  City  of  Roches- 
ter, 67  N.  Y.  528  [1876];  (former 
appeal,  Hassen  v.  City  of  Rochester, 
65  N.  Y.  516  [1875]);  People  ex  rel. 
Griffin  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  Brooklyn,  4 
N.  Y.  419,  55  Am.  Dec.  266  [1851]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Application  of 
the  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Common- 
alty of  the  City  of  New  York  for  the 
enlarging  and  improving  a  part  of 
Nassau  Street  in  the  said  city.  11 
Johns  (N.  Y.)  77  [1814];  Lima  v. 
Cemetery  Association,  42  O.  S.  128, 
51  Am.  Rep.  809  [1884];  Reeves  v. 
Treasurer  of  Wood  County,  8  O.  S. 
.333      [1858];     Beals     v.     Providence 


Rubber  Company,  11  R.  I.  381,  23 
Am.  Rep.  472  [1876];  Tn  the  Mat- 
ter of  College  Street,  8  R.  I.  474 
[1867];  Second  Universalist  Society 
In  Providence  v.  City  of  Providence, 
6  R.  I.  235  [1859];  Winona  &  St. 
P.  R.  Co.  V.  City  of  Watertown,  1  S. 
Dak.  46,  44  N.  W.  1072  T1890]  ;  fn  rt 
Howard  Avenue,  North,  in  City  of 
Seattle,  44  Wash.  62,  86  Pac.  'lll7 
[1906];  Yates  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 
92  Wis.  352,  66  N.  W.  248  [1896]. 
"Although  an  assessment  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  tax  and  is  authorized  by 
or  is  a  branch  of  the  taxing  power, 
yet  a  general  statute  exempting  cer- 
tain property  from  taxation  by  any 
law  of  the  state  does  not  exempt  it 
from  liability  for  a  street  assessment 
levied  for  the  improvement  of  a 
street  upon  which  it  abuts  or  is  con- 
tiguous." County  of  Adams  v.  City 
of  Quincy,  130  HI.  566,  6  L.  R.  A. 
155,  22  N.  E.  624  [1890].  "It  has 
been  expressly — almost  universally — 
held  that  exemptions  from  taxation 
do  not  include  exemption  from  as- 
sessments for  local  benefits."  Atchi- 
son, Topeka  &  Santa  Fe  Railroad 
Company  v.  Peterson,  5  Kans.  App. 
103,  107".  48  Pac.  877  [1897]. 

*  Quirk  v.  City  of  Seattle,  38  Wash. 
25,   80   Pac.   207    [1905]. 

■"'  Northern  Liberties  v.  St.  John's 
Church,   15  Pa.  St.   104. 

"  Olive  Cemetery  Co.  v.  City  of 
Philadelphia,  93  Pa.  St.  (12  'Nor- 
ris)    129,  39  Am.  Rep.   732. 


1023 


PROPERTY    8UBJECT    i  ^    ASSESSMENT. 


§613 


county,  city,  burrough,  county  road,  school  and  poor  tax,"'  ex- 
empted such  property  from  local  assessments  levied  on  the  theory- 
of  benefits.  Even  under  such  holding,  however,  assessments  lev- 
ied under  the  police  power  for  the  cost  of  performing  a  legal 
duty  resting  upon  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed,^  such  as 
the  construction  of  sidewalks  in  front  of  such  property,"  were 
held  not  to  be  included  within  such  provision,  since  such  charge 
was  not  "in  any  proper  sense  of  the  word  a  tax."'"  and  such 
property  was  according!}-  not  exempt  from  assessments  of  this 
kind.''  In  a  subsequent  case,'-  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsyl- 
vania seems  to  have  reconsidered  its  original  holding  and  to 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  "the  constitutional  exemption 
relates  to  taxes  proper,  or  general  public  contributions  levied 
and  collected  by  the  state,  or  by  its  governmental  purposes,  as 
distinguished  from  peculiar  forms  of  taxation  or  special  assess- 
ments imposed  upon  property  within  limited  areas  by  which  the 
property  assessed  is  specially  and  peculiarly  benefited  and  en- 
hanced in  value  to  an  amount  at  least  ecjual  to  tlie  assessment."  '" 
At  present  the  Pennsylvania  courts  seem  to  hold  in  accordance 
with  the  general  weight  of  authority  that  exemption  from  taxa- 
tion in  general  terms  does  not  include  exemption  from  local 
assessment."     By  force  of  the  peculiar  statutes  in  some  jurisdic- 


'  City  of  Erie  v.  First  Uiiivorsalist 
Churcli,   105   Pa.   St.   278    |18S4]. 

"Philadelphia  V.Pennsylvania  Hos- 
pital. 143  Pa.  St.  3()7.  22  Atl.  744 
[1891];  Wilkinshur<r  Borough  v. 
ITome  for  Aged  Women.  131  Pa.  St. 
ino.  fi  L.  K.  A.  531.  18  Atl.  937 
I  1890]. 

"  Pliiladelphia  v.  Pennsylvania  Hos- 
pital, 143  Pa.  St.  3(17.  22  Atl.  744 
F1891];  Wilkinshurg  rJoroujrh  v. 
Home  for  Aged  Women.  131  Pa.  St. 
10!).  0  L.  R.  A.  531.  18  Atl.  937 
11890]. 

'"  i'hiladel|)l!ia  v.  Pennsylvania 
Hospital.  143  Pa.  St.  3(17.  374,  22 
Atl.  744  [1891].  (It  was  said  to  he 
rather  "in  the  nature  of  a  poliee  reg- 
ulation.") 

"  Wilkinsburg  P)or(nigh  \ .  Hhiik^ 
for  Aged  Women.  131  Pa.  St.  109, 
6  L.  R.  A.   531.    IS   Atl.   937    [1890]. 

'-City  of  Philadelphia  v.  l^nion 
Burial    Ground    Societv    of    the    (  itv 


and  County  of  Philadelpliia.  17S  Pa. 
St.  533.  36  L.  R.  A.  203.  30  Atl. 
172    [1890]. 

'■■'Ri-oad  Street,  Sewickley  Metho- 
dist Episcopal  Church's  Appeal,  105 
Pa.  St.  475,  30  Atl.  1007  [1895]: 
(quoted  in  City  of  Philadelphia  v. 
riiioii  Riirial  (Jround  Society  of  the 
City  and  County  of  Philadelphia.  178 
Pa.  St.  533.  538.  30  L.  R.  A.  203.  3(i 
Atl.  172  [1890],  in  which  the  court 
says  that  this  (piestion  was  not 
raised,  considered  or  decided  in  Phil 
a(Ielj)hia  v.  Pennsylvania  Hosjiital 
for  t!ie  Insane.  154  Pa.  St.  9,  25  Atl. 
1070:  Philadelphia  v.  Church  of  St. 
•  Fames.  134  Pa.  St.  •2(»7.  19  Atl.  497 
1890] ). 

"City  of  Philadelphia  v.  Union 
Burial  Ciround  Snciety  of  the  City 
and  County  of  Philadelphia.  178  Pa. 
St.  533.  3()'  L.  R.  A.  203.  30  Atl.  172 
[ISOC)]:  Belt/hoover  Borough  v. 
Heirs    if    Belt/hoover.     173     Pa.    St. 


§  613^  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1024 

tions,  exemption  from  general  taxation  may  operate  as  exemp- 
tion from  local  assessment.^"  Thus,  a  provision  for  assessing 
all  the  real  estate  which  is  taxed  by  the  state  and  county,  in 
effect  exempts  property  which  is  not  taxed  by  the  state  or 
county  because  it  is  exempt  from  general  taxation. ^"^  A  statute 
which  provides  that  the  collection  of  an  assessment  shall  be 
suspended  "when  an  assessment  is  made  for  a  parcel  of  land  for 
which  the  owner  is  by  law  exempt  from  being  taxed,"  extends 
exemptions  from  general  taxation  to  local  assessment.^'  A  stat- 
ute authorizing  local  assessment  may  provide  for  ascertaining  the 
amount  thereof  by  the  valuation  of  such  property  upon  the  tax 
duplicate. ^^  An  assessment  statute  may  restrict  the  amount  of 
assessment  to  a  certain  percentage  of  the  valuation  of  the  prop- 
erty on  the  tax  duplicate.^"  Under  such  statutes  it  is  impossible 
to  levy  an  assessment  upon  property  which  is  exempt  from 
general  taxation  and  for  that  reason  has  no  valuation  on  the 
tax  duplicate.-"  Under  such  statutes,  however,  the  legislature 
does  not  intend  to  exempt  such  property  from  assessment  and 
the  exemption  of  such  property  follows  only  from  the  inability 
to  assess  it  in  the  manner  provided  by  statute.-^  Accordingly, 
if  property  has  been  placed  on  the  tax  duplicate  at  a  valuation 
in  prior  years,  but  has  been  omitted  in  recent  years  as  exempt 
from  taxation,  it  may  be  assessed  upon  the  basis  of  its  former 

213,  33  Atl.   1047    [1896];   New  Cas-  of  the  Petition  of  the  Rector,  Church 

tie   City  V.  Jackson,   172  Pa.   St.   86,  Wardens     and     Vestrymen     of     the 

33    Atl.    236    [1895];    Broad    Street,  Church  of  the  Holy  Sepulcher,  to  Va- 

Sewiekley         Methodist         Episcopal  cate   an  Assessment,   62  Howard  315 

Church's"  Apneal,  165  Pa.  St.  475,  30  [1880]. 
Atl.   1007    [1895].  ""In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

"  Bradshaw   v.    Board   of    Commis-  the  Second  Avenue  Methodist  Episco- 

si-ne-s  of  Guilford  County,  92  N.  C.  pal    Church    to    Vacate    an    Assess- 

278   [1885].  "  nient,   66   X.   Y.   395    [1876];    In   the 

"Bradshaw   v.    Board   of    Commis-  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  the  Eector, 

pi-^ne's  ri  Guilford  County,  92  X.  C.  Church   Wardens   and   Vestrymen   of 

278   [1885].  the    Church    of   the   Holy    Sepulcher, 

"Boston  V.  Boston  &  Albany  Rail-  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  61  Howard 

road  Co.,  170  Mass.  95,  49  X.  E.  95.  315    [1880];    Bradshaw  v.   Board   of 

"  First     Presbyterian     Church     of  Commissioners    of    Guilford    County, 

Fort  Wayne  v.  City  of  Fort  Wayne,  92  X.  C.  278   [1885]. 
36  Tnd.  338,  10  Am.  Rep.  35   [1871].  ^  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

"In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of  St.   Joseph's   Asylum   in   the   City  of 

the  Second  Avenue  Methodist  Episco-  Xew  York  to  Vacate  an  Assessment, 

pal  Church  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  69  N.  Y.  353   [1877]. 
66  X.  Y.  395   [1876];   In  the  Matter 


1025 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§614 


valuation  if  the  statute  does  not  specifically  provide  for  basing 
the  assessment  upon  the  valuation  of  the  current  year.-- 

§  614.     Construction  of  exemptions. 

Since  exemption  from  general  taxation  does  not  exempt  from 
local  assessment/  the  question  whether  a  given  exemption  stat- 
ute exempts  from  local  assessment  or  not  turns  on  the  determina- 
tion of  the  question  whether  the  language  used  can  fairly  be 
construed  to  include  local  assessments.  If  the  statute  provides 
for  the  exemption  of  certain  property  from  "taxation,"  such 
property  is  not  exempted  from  local  assessment.^  Thus,  pro- 
visions that  certain  property  shall  be  "exempt  from  taxation  and 
execution,"^  or  exempt  from  "all  taxation,"*  or  exemot  from 
"taxtion  of  ever^^  kind,"°  or  from  "all  parliamentary  taxes. "^ 
that  certain  property  shall  be  exempted  from  taxation  for  state, 
county,  city  or  other  municipal  purposes,"  that  such  property  shall 
not  be  "taxed  by  any  law  of  the  state,"  ^  that  a  specific  tax 
shall  be  "in  lieu  of  all  other  taxes,"'*  that  "no  oth?r  or  further 
tax  or  impost  shall  be  levied,"^**  that  "no  further  tax  or  impost 
shall  be  levied  or  assessed,"  ^^  or  a  provision  exempting  property 


^In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 
St.  Joseph's  Asylum  in  the  C  ity  of 
Kew  York  to  Vacate  an  Assessment, 
69  N.  Y.  353  [1877]. 

iSee   §§   42,  613. 

-  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Decatur,  147  U.  S.  190, 
37  L.  132,  13  S.  293  [1S931;  (anTirm- 
ing  Illinnis  Central  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Decatur,  120  111.  92, 
1  L.  R.  A.  613,  18  N.  E.  315  [1899])  ; 
Falhrier  v.  Leonard,  34  Ind.  497 
[1870];  Boston  Seamen's  Friend  So- 
ciety V.  Boston,  116  Mass.  181,  17 
Am.  Rep.  153;  Lefevre  v.  flavor,  etc., 
of  Detroit,  2  Mich.  586  [1853]  ;  Lima 
V.  Cemetery  Association,  42  0.  S.  128, 
51  Am.  Rep.  809  [1884];  fn  re  How- 
ard Avenue,  North,  in  Citv  of  Se- 
attle, 44  Wash.  02,  80  Pae.  1117 
[1900];  Yates  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 
92   Wis.   352.   66   N.   W.   248    [1890]. 

*  Bloomineton  Cemetery  Associa- 
tion V.  People  of  the  State  of  Tlli- 
n"i=i.  139  111.  10.  28  X.  E.  1070 
[1893]. 

*  Winona  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  City  of 


Watertown,  1  S.  Dak.  46,  44  N.  W. 
1072  [1890]. 

^  Sheehan  v.  Good  Samaritan  Hos- 
pital, 50  Mo.  155,  11  Am.  Rep.  412 
[1872]. 

'  Bedford  L^nion  v.  Commissioners 
of  Bedford,  7  Exch.  777. 

'  Kansas  C  ity  Exposition  Driving 
Park  V.  Kansas  City,  174  Mo.  425,  74 
S.  W.  979  [1903]. 

*  In  the  Matter  of  the  Application 
of  the  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Com- 
monalty of  the  City  of  New  York  for 
the  enlarging  and  improving  of  a 
part  of  Nassau  Street  in  the  said 
city,  11  Johns   (N.  Y.)   77  [1814]. 

•  Lake  Shore  &  Michigan  Southern 
Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Grand 
Rapids,  102  Mich.  374.  29  L.  R.  A. 
195.  60  N.  W.  767  [1894]. 

'"  State,  New  Jersey  Railroad  and 
Transportation  Company,  Pros.  v. 
City  of  Fli7al)eth,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.) 
330    [1875]. 

"  State,  New  Jersey  Midland  Rail- 
road Company,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Aldermen  of  Jersey  City,  42  N.  J.  L. 
(13  Vr.)    97   [1880]. 


§614 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1026 


from  "taxes,  charges  or  imposts,'"^-  or  from  a  tax  ""for  any 
city  purposes, "^^  or  from  "all  taxation,  state,  county,  municipal 
and  special,"  ^*  none  of  them  operate  as  an  exemption  from  local 
assessments.  Constitutional  provisions  exempting  property  from 
"taxation"  are  construed  in  the  same  way  as  are  similar  statu- 
tory provisions  and  are  held  not  to. exempt  such  property  from 
local  assessment. ^"^  A  provision  exempting  property  from  general 
and  special  taxation  is  not  an  exemption  from  liability  for  local 
assessments  based  on  the  theory  of  benefits.^"  If  the  word  "as- 
sessment" is  used  in  the  exemption  statute,  the  question  whether 
it  refers  to  local  assessment  or  to  assessment  as  one  of  the  steps 
of  general  taxation,  is  a  question  the  solution  of  which  depends 
largely  upon  the  intention  of  the  legislature  as  deduced  from 
the  context.  The  exemption  of  certain  property  from  the  impo- 
sition of  any  tax  or  assessment,^'  or  from  "all  public  taxes  and 
assessments,"^^  or  from  "anj^  and  all  taxes  and  assessments, 
national  or  municipal  or  county,"^"  or  a  provision  that  certain 
property    "shall    not    be    subject    to    taxes    or    assessments."-" 

'^President     and     Council     of     the       !>93    [190(3]  ;    State  ex  rel.  Minnesota 

Tran.sfer  Co.  v.  District  Court  of 
Ramsey  County,  68  Minn.  242.  71 
X.  W.  27;  City  of  St.  Paul  v.  St. 
Paul  &  Sioux  City  Railroad  Com- 
pany. 23  Minn.  469  [1877];  First 
Division  of  the  St.  Paul  and  Pacific 
Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  St. 
Paul,  21  Minn.  526  [1875]';  Hudson 
County  Catholic  Protectory  v.  Board 
of  Townsliip  Committee  of  the 
Townshi]!  of  Kearney,  56  N.  J.  L. 
(27  Vr.)  385,  28  Atl.  1043  [1894]; 
Oakland  Cemetery  v.  City  of  Yonk- 
ers,  182  X.  Y.  564.  75  X.  E.  1132 
[1905];  (iiffirmino-  71  X.  Y.  S.  783, 
63  App.  Div.  448  [1901]);  Swan 
Point  Cemetery  v.  Tripp,  14  R.  I.  199 
[1883]. 

'■'*  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  Oak- 
land Cemetery  Association  v.  City  of 
St.  Paul.  36  ;\rinn.  .529,  32  X."  W. 
781    [1887]. 

'"District  of  Colunihia  v.  Sisters 
of  Visitation,  15  App.  D.  C.  >'0 
[1899]. 

-"  State.  Prot^^stant  Foster  Home 
Society.  Pros.  v.  ^Mayor  and  Com- 
mon Council  of  City  of  Xewark.  36 
X.   .T.   L.    (7   Vr.)    478,   13   Am.   Rep. 


City  of  Paterson  v.  Society  for  es- 
tablishing Useful  Manufactures,  24 
X.  J.  L.    (4  Zabriskie)    385   [1854]. 

'^ Allen  V.  City  of  Davenport,  107 
la.  90,  77  X.  W.  532  [1898];  Far- 
well  V.  Des  Moines  Brick  Manufac- 
turing Company.  97  la.  286,  35  L.  R. 
A.  63,  66  X.  W.    176    [1896]. 

''  Board  of  Improvement  Paving 
District  Xo.  5  v.  Sisters  of  ^lercy  of 
Female  Academy  of  Ft.  Smith,  — 
Ark.  ,   109  S.  W.   1165    [1908]. 

"  Washburn  Memorial  Orphan  Asy- 
lum V.  State,  73  Minn.  343,  76  X.  E. 
204  [1898];  Barber  A.sphalt  Paving 
Company  v.  City  of  St.  Joseph,  183 
Mo.  451",  82  S.  W.  64  [1904];  Kan- 
sas City  Exposition  Driving  Park  v. 
Kansas'  City,  174  :Mo.  425.  74  S.  W. 
979  [1903]:  Cily  of  Beatrice  v. 
Brethren  Cliurch  of  Beatrice,  41  Xeb. 
358,  59  X.  W.  932  [1894]. 

"State  e.x  rel.  Chicago,  Burling- 
ton &  Quincy  Railroad  Company  v. 
City  of  Kansas  City,  89  Mo.  34.  14 
S.  W.  515   [1886]. 

"Patterson  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P. 
R.  Co.,  99  Minn.  454;  sub  nomine  In 
vr  Drainage  Ditch  Xo.  6,   109  X'.  W. 


I 


1027  PROPERTY    SriUECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §614 

operates  to  exempt  siu  h  property  from  local  assessments.  If  the 
statute  provides  that  eertain  jiroperty  shall  be  exempt  from  local 
assessment  or  special  assessment,  the  intention  of  the  legislature 
to  exempt  from  local  assessment  is  unambiguous.-'  The  use  of 
the  word  "assessment"  is  not  regarded  as  conclusive  in  all  juris- 
dictions. The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  pointed 
out  that  the  special  or  local  assessment  was  not  in  general  use 
a  century  ago  and  that  the  word  "assessment."  used  in  an  exemp- 
tion statute,  was  often  synonymous  with  jjiiblie  rates  or  taxes 
and  referred  to  general  taxation.--  A  statute  providing  that  cer- 
tain property  should  be  exeiupt  froin  "public  taxes,  rates  and 
assessments"  has  been  held  to  apply  to  general  taxation  only 
and  not  to  local  assessments,  which  are  said  to  be  local  and 
private,  rather  than  public,  within  the  meaning  of  this  statute.-'' 
The  word  "assessed"  as  a  verb,  is  regularly  used  in  connection 
with  general  taxation.  Accordingly,  a  provision  that  "no  other 
tax  or  impost  shall  be  levied  or  assessed"  ui)on  a  corporation, 
does  not  exempt  it  from  local  assessment.-*  A  statute  providing 
that  property  wliieh  is  exempt  from  taxation  l)y  the  general  law 
of  the  state  may  be  assessed  and  taxed  for  local  improvements  in 
a  state,  is  held  to  give  such  city  power  to  assess  for  local  improve- 
ments lands  belonging  to  the  state.^^  A  statute  providing  that 
railroad  property  shall  be  exempt  from  taxation,  "except  thnt 
the  same  shall  be  subject  to  special  assessment  for  loi-al  im- 
provements in  cities  and  villages,"  was  held  to  restrict  such 
exemption  to  general  taxation,  but  not  to  confer  any  aflRrmativi' 
power  of  special  assessment.-'"  Accordingly,  where  property  such 
as  the  right  of  way  of  a  i-a  li-ojid  is  i-egardcd  ;ts  jtrinid  facie  exempt 
from  local  assessment,  it  remains  exejnpt  utuler  such  statute.-'" 
A  statute  j)roviding  that  certain  ]iroperty  shall  be  exempt  from 

4()4  [1S731:  ( icvcrsiiij,'  Slate.  Prot-  tcry  Ass,.ci;iti.m  v.  (  ity  of  Huiralo. 
("stant  Foster  Home  Society  v.  ;>[ayor  118  X.  V.  (II.  -ll  N.  E.  9(i2  |  188<11. 
and  Common  Couneil  of  (ity  of  Xew-  "'State,  New  Jensi'v  Midland  Rail- 
ark,  35  X.  T.  T..  (<)  \'r.)  \'u .  10  Am.  road  Comi)any,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Rep.  223    [18711  ).  Aldermen  of  .Jersey  (ity.  42  X.  J.  T.. 

^  Yates    V.    City    cf    Milwiiukee.    92  (13  Vr.)    97    [18801. 

Wis.  352.  6(!  X.  \V.  24H   [189r.l.  -^^  Hassan    v.   City   of    Roeiiester.   C? 

--"Wells  V.  Savannah.  181  U.  S.  531.  N.   V.  528    [187(11. 

45   L.  9S{!.  21    S.  (i97    [19011.  -'' Chicafro.    :\Iil\vaukee    &    St.    Paul 

'^Buflalo    (ity    Cemetery    Assoeia-  Railway  Com])any  v.  City  of  .Milwau- 

tion    V.    City    of    Bnffalo.    4fi    X.    Y.  kee.    8!)    Wi^.    .>(l(l.    28    L.    R.    A.   249, 

506    [18711.      See  aLso   RufValo  Ceme-  (52  X.  W.  417   [1S9.-)1. 

-"^S.M.   §5   394.  .iOo. 


§  615  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  1028 

"civil  impositions,  taxes  and  rates,"  has  been  held  to  include 
local  assessments  for  benefits.--  The  fact  that  no  means  is  pro- 
vided for  selling  certain  kinds  of  property,  such  as  public  prop- 
erty or  the  right  of  way  of  a  railroad,  does  not  render  such  property 
exempt  from  local  assessment  if  a  means  for  compelling  the 
owner  of  such  property  to  pay  local  assessments  is  provided.^" 
If  no  other  means  of  compelling  the  owner  of  such  property  to 
pay  such  assessment  is  provided,  the  fact  that  such  property 
cannot  be  sold  is  ordinarily  regarded  as  exempting  such  property 
from  local  aBsessment.^°  Thus,  the  fact  that  public  property 
cannot  be  sold  is  sometimes  regarded  as  exempting  it  from  assess- 
ment, if  sale  is  the  only  means  of  collecting  such  assessment.^^ 

§  615.     Power  of  legislature  to  authorize  contracts  for  exemption. 

It  was  once  held  that  the  legislature  could  not  confer  upon  a 
city  the  power  to  make  a  valid  contract  for  the  commutation 
of  local  assessment.^  This  decision  was  rendered  upon  a  con- 
tract which  provided  that  a  property  owner  who  should  con- 
tribute towards  the  expense  of  public  improvements  should  be 
exempt  from  assessment  for  the  cost  thereof.-  Tbis  decision  was 
rendered  subsequent  to  a  line  of  decisions  upholding  similar 
contracts  in  which  decisions  the  constitutional  question  was  not 
raised.^  Before  the  decision  holding  such  contracts  invalid,  a 
street  railway  company  had  accepted  a  franchise  by  which  it 
was  to  keep  "in  good  repair  and  condition"  eight  feet  of  the 
street  where  one  track  of  such  railroad  should  be  laid  and  six- 
teen feet  where  two  tracks  should  be  laid.  It  was  held  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  that  the  subsequent  deci- 
sion of  the  state  court  holding  such  contracts  invalid  could  not 
annul  such  pre-existing  contract  and  that  such  contract  was  there- 
fore enforceable.*  x^fter  this  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  the  validity  of  such  contracts  was  recognized 

=*  Harvard    College    v.    Boston,    104  [1866];    City  of   Chicago   v.   Larned, 

Mass.  482.  34  111.  203  [1864]. 

=»See  §   580  et  seq.;   §   594  et  seq.  ==  Chicago     v.     Baer,     41     111.     300 

3»Elwood  V.   City   of  Rochester,  43  [1866]. 

Him.  102  [1887].  -^Neustadt  v.  Illinois  Central  Rail- 

^City  of  Clinton   to  use  of  Thorn-  road,     31      111.     484;      Hunsaker     v. 

ton,  V.  Henry   County,   115  Mo.   557,  Wright,  30  111.   146;   Illinois  Central 

37   Am.   St.   Rep.  415,  22   S.  W.  494  Railroad   v.    County   of   McLean,    17 

[1893].  111.  291. 

1  Chicago     V.     Baer,     41     111.     306  *  Chicago   v.   Sheldon,   76   U.   S.    (9 

Wall.)    50,  19  L.  594  [1869]. 


1029 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§616 


by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois,  following  such  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States."'  By  the  great  weight 
of  modern  autliority  a  city  may  make  a  valid  contract  for  ex- 
emption from  a  local  assessment  or  commutation  thei"eof  if  it  is 
authorized  so  to  do  by  the  legislature."  Contracts  of  this  sort 
assume  a  number  of  different  forms.  One  type  which  is  often 
found  is  that  of  a  contract  by  which  the  owner  of  land  conveys 
the  land  necessary  for  a  public  improvement,  under  an  agree- 
ment that  his  adjoining  property  shall  not  be  assessed  for  the 
cost  of  such  improvement."  Such  dedication,  however,  does  not 
exempt  the  owner  unless  it  is  made  under  a  contract  with  the 
city,  or  under  a  statute  providing  for  such  exemption.^  Another 
form  of  contract  for  exemption  or  commutation  exists  where  the 
owner  of  land  damaged  by  an  improvement  surrenders  his  right 
to  damages  in  consideration  of  exemption  from  assessment  for 
such  improvement." 

§  616.     Necessity  of  statutory  authority  for  exemption  contract. 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  authorizing  a  city  to  maive  contracts 
for  exemption  or  commutation  from  local  assessment  a  city  has 
no  power  to  make  such  contract.^     Thus,  in  the  absence  of  such 


"  Parmalee  v.  City  of  Chicago,  60 
111.  2li7  [1871];  City  of  Chicago  v. 
People  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  56 
III.  327    [18701. 

'Shelby  v.  City  of  Burlington,  125 
Iowa  343,  101  N.  VV.  101  [1904]; 
Coit  V.  City  of  Grand  Rapids,  115 
Mich.  493,  "^73  N.  W.  811  [1898]; 
State  ex  rel.  City  of  Minneapolis  v. 
District  Court  of  Fourth  Judicial 
District,  83  Minn.  170,  86  N.  W.  15 
[1901];  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel. 
^Merrick  v.  District  Court  of  Henne- 
pin County,  33  Minn.  23.),  22  X.  W. 
625  [18851;  Browne  v.  Palnior.  60 
Neb.  287,  92  N.  W,  315  [19021;  City 
of  Omaha  v.  :\Iog('atii.  46  Xeb.  502, 
64  N.   W.   1091    [lS9.ll. 

'Coit  V.  City  of  (Jiaiid  Rapids, 
115  Midi.  493.  73  N.  W.  311  |  1898]  -. 
State  e\  rel.  City  of  ^rinnea])olis  v. 
District  Court  of  Fourtli  .Tmlicial 
District,  83  Minn.  170,  86  X.  W.  15 
[19011:  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel. 
^lerrick,  v.  District  C^iu^t  of  Henne- 
pin County,  33  Minn.  235,  22  N.  W. 


625  [1885];  Browne  v.  Palmer,  66 
Xeb.  287,  92  N.  \V.  315  [1902];  City 
of  Omalur  v.  Megeath,  46  Neb.  502 
64- N.  W.  1091    [1895]. 

»  Terrell   v.  Hart,  —  Ky.  ,   9.) 

S.  W.  953,  28  Ky.  L.  K.  901  [1906]; 
State,  Moran,  Pros.  v.  City  of  Hud- 
son, 34  N.  J.  L.  (5  Vr.)  25  [1869]: 
State  V.  Dean.  23  X.  .T.  L.  (3  Zab.) 
.•535   [1852]. 

"Shelby  v.  City  of  Burlin-zton. 
125  Iowa  343,  101  N.  \V.  101    [1904 J. 

Miilbert  v.  City  of  New  Havon,  40 
Conn.  102  [18731;  Whitcomb  v. 
City  of  Boston.  192  Mass.  211.  78 
X.  E.  407  [1906]:  Pittsburgh.  (  in- 
cinnati,  (  hic.igo  &  St.  Louis  Railway 
Co.  V.  Oglesby,  165  Ind.  542,  76  N. 
E.  165  [1905];  Leggett  v.  City  of 
Detroit.  137  :Mich.  247,  100  N."  W. 
566  [1904]:  Vrana  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis.  1(;4  :sro.  146,  64  S."  W.  180 
[19011:    Raekliffe  v.  Duncan.  —  Mo. 

Ai)p.    ,    108    S.    W.    1110    [1908]: 

Richards  v.  '  ity  of  Cincinnati,  31  O. 
S.  506   [1877].' 


§  616  TAXATION    BV    ASSESSMENT.  1030 

•statute,  the  city  eaiiiu)t  make  a  contract  ])r()vidiiig'  that  if  thi; 
owner  of  certain  lands  shall  deed  a  part  thereof  for  a  street, 
the  remaining:  land  of  such  grantor  shall  be  exempt  from  assess- 
ment for  opening,  extending  or  improving  such  street,"  or  a 
contract  exempting  from  local  assessment  an  owner  of  property 
who  should  open  and  grade  certain  streets. ■'  Where  the  stat- 
ute in  force  provides  for  assessing  the  cost  of  an  improvement 
upon  the  land  benefited,  such  a  contract  on  the  part  of  the  city 
is  invalid,  as  its  effect  ordinarily  is  to  cast  upon  the  public  at 
large  that  proportion  of  the  assessment  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  imposed  upon  the  property  exempted  by  such  con- 
tract.* A  conveyance  of  land  for  streets  and  alleys  on  condition 
that  the  abutting  lots  shall  be  exempt  from  assessment  unless  a 
majority  of  the  abutting  owners  shall  assent  thereto  in  writing, 
is  valid  as  to  the  conveyance  but  unoperative  as  to  the  condition."' 
Even  if  the  city  have  no  power  to  make  such  contract,  however, 
such  contract  is  binding  until  repudiated.  Thus,  the  owner  of 
land  conveyed  to  the  city  land  for  laying  a  sewer  on  considera- 
tion that  his  adjoining  property  should  not  be  assessed  for  the 
cons'truetion  of  said  sewer,  and  that  no  charge  should  be  made 
for  the  right  to  connect  with  such  sewer.  Subsequently  the 
owner  of  such  land  connected  with  such  sewer  without  paying 
for  such  privilege.  The  grantee  of  such  owner  was  subsequently 
injured  by  the  overflow  of  such  sewer  caused  l)y  the  negligence 
of  said  city.  In  an  action  brought  by  him  the  city  interposed 
as  a  defense  that  the  payment  of  two  cents  per  square  foot 
for  land  benefited  by  the  connection  with  the  sewer  which  was 
required  by  the  city  ordinance,  had  not  been  paid.  It  was  held 
that  even  if  the  city  had  a  right  to  repudiate  such  contract, 
the  owner  or  his  grantee  had  a  right  to  make  such  connection 
until  the  city  repudiated  such  contract." 

=  Pittsburgh.  Cincinnati,  Chicago  &  *  Aver  v.  City  of  Chicago.   149   111. 

St.  Louis  Railway  Company  v.  Ogles-  262,    37    X.    E.    57;    State,    Gregory, 

by,  165  Ind.  542,  76  N.  E.  165  [1905]  ;  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jer- 

Leggett  V.  City  of  Detroit,  137  Mich.  sey   City,   34   X.   J.   L.    (5   Yr.)    390 

247,    100   N.   W.   566    [1904];    Vrana  [1871];    In    re    City    of    Seattle.    — 

V.    City    of    St.    Louis,    164   Mo.    146,       Wasli.  .   94   Pac.    1075    [1908]. 

64    S.    W.    180    [1901];    Rackliffe    v.  ''Vrana   v.    City    of   St.    Louis.    164 

Duncan,  —  Mo.   App.  ,   108  Mo.  Mo.  146,  64  S.  W.  180  [1901];  Rich- 

App.   1110    [1908];    Richards  v.   City  ards  v.   City   of   Cincinnati.   31    0.   S. 

of  Cincinnati.  31   O.  S.  506   [1877].  506   [1877]. 

"Gilbert    v.    City    of    New     Haven  "Hendrie    v.    City    of    Boston.    179 

40  Conn.   102   [1873].  Mass.  59.  60  X.  E.'  386   [1901]. 


1 


1031  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  617 

§  617.     Construction  of  contracts  for  exemption. 

A  contract  for  exemption  from  taxation  or  local  assessment 
or  for  the  commutation  of  by  payment  of  an  eipiivalent  therefor 
is  not  to  be  implied.  A  statute  exempting  propert\'  from  local 
assessment  or  providing  for  a  commutation  thereof  is,  accord- 
ingly, not  a  contract  and  may  be  modified  by  subsequent  action 
of  the  legislature.^  An  ordinance  providing  that  an  elevated 
railroad  company  may  construct  its  tracks  over  a  street  and  that 
it  shall  restore  the  pavements,  gutters,  sidewalks  and  water,  gas 
and  sewer  pipes,  if  they  are  disturbed  by  the  construction  of 
.said  road,  to  as  -.rood  a  condition  as  they  were  before  such  con- 
struction, does  not  amount  to  a  contract  exempting  such  com- 
pany from  assessment  for  street  improvements.-  A  conveyancv^ 
iu  consideration  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  to  be  paid  by 
exempting  from  asse-ssment  contiguous  land  of  the  grantor  to 
the  extent  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  includes  not  only 
assessments  already  made  and  due,  but  assessments  which  have 
been  made  that  are  not  yet  entered  upon  tliL^  tax  l)()nk.s 
for  collection,  installments  of  prior  assessments  to  come 
due  in  the  future  and  assessments  which  may  be  made  in  the 
future.-'  Under  a  statute  authorizing  the  value  of  land  donated 
for  a  street  to  be  set  off  against  assessments  for  the  improvement 
of  such  street  the  value  of  land  donated  but  not  used  for  the 
street  for  wliieli  tlie  assessment  in  question  was  levied,  since  it 
was  several  blocks  away,  cannot  be  set  off  against  such  assess- 
ments.* A  stri[)  of  land  which  surrounded  a  track  intended  for 
a  public  jjark  was  conveyed  upon  condition  tliat  the  city  shouM 
improve  such  strip  as  a  street  and  keep  it  in  good  order  and 
repair  at  its  own  expense.  TTnder  such  contract  it  was  held  that 
the  adjoining  land  belonging  to  the  grantor  of  such  striji  couM 
not  be  assessed  foi"  a  sti-eet  improvement,  even  in  the  hands  ol' 
owners   to   whom    lie   had    subsecpiently   conveyed    it."'    nor   coidd 

*  Stato,    Moiiiil     IMciisanl    C'cjiietery  ('nnipany  v.  Tity  of  Cliicafxo.   IS!?  111. 

(.'onipany,  Pios.   v.   Mayor   and   Com-  75,   47   L.    K.    .A.   (124.   .i.t    X.    K.    721 

nion  Council  of  Newark.  50  X.  J.  L.  [1899]. 

(21    Vr.)     Gfi,    11     Atl.     147     118871;  '  State  ox   id.  City  of   Minn. -apoli-^ 

City  of  Rochester   v.   llochester   Hail-  v.   Di.-^trict  Court   of    Kourtli   .Imiicial 

way  Company.  182  X.  Y.  99.  70  L.  H.  District,  83  Minn.   17(i.   SC.  X.   W  .    I.") 

A.  77:^.  74  n!  E.  953  [19051;  Ladd  v.  |  19011. 

City    of    Portland.    32    Ore.    271.    (>7  *  Shurtleff   v.   City   of   Cliicaao.    I'-H) 

Am.     St.     Kep.     52().     51      Pac.     f.54  111.  473.  60  X.   E.  870    [19011. 

[189S1.  -'(ity    of    Omaha    v.    MeL'eatli.     1i". 

-Lake     Street      Elevated      Hailroad  Xeh.  502,  04   X.  W.    1091    |1S951. 


§  617  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1032 

such  land  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  constructing  a  sidewalk."' 
A  contract  with  reference  to  the  assessment  of  land  outside  of 
the  city  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer  when  such  land  should 
be  connected  with  such  sewer  does  not  affect  the  liability  of  the 
owners  thereof  as  to  other  property  owned  by  them  within  the 
city.'  A  deed  from  the  state  reciting  that  lands  had  been  sold 
to  the  state  for  taxes  due  such  state  and  that  the  grantee  has 
paid  two  cents  an  acre  in  full  of  all  state  and  county  taxes  due 
thereon  to  the  present  date,  does  not  show  payment  of  an  assess- 
ment for  a  levee,  although  such  assessment  is  referred  to  as  a 
special  tax.^  Another  form  of  a  contract  for  exemption  from 
local  assessments  or  commutation  thereof  is  found  in  contracts 
between  a  city  and  a  street  railroad  by  which  the  street  railroad 
is  to  pave  a  certain  portion  of  a  street  in  return  for  which  it  is 
relieved  from  other  assessments."  The  transfer  by  a  street  rail- 
way company  of  its  estate,  property  rights,  privileges  and  fran- 
chises, does  not  pass  to  the  grantee  the  benefit  of  an  exemption 
contract."*  Another  form  of  exemption  from  local  assessment  or 
commutation,  is  found  where  provision  is  made  that  the  property 
owners  may  do  part  or  all  of  the  work  and  receive  credit  there- 
for upon  their  assessments.^^  If  the  property  owners  act  in  re- 
liance upon  such  provision,  the  transaction  may  amount  to  a  con- 
tract. In  the  absence  of  such  action  in  reliance  on  such  provisions, 
it  is  at  least  a  statute  for  exemption  or  commutation  and  is  valid 
until  amended  or  repealed. ^^ 

« Browne    v.   Palmer,    06    Neb.   287,  "  McDonald  v.  Conniff,  99  Cal.  386, 

92  N.  W.  315    [1902].  34     Pac.     71      [1893];     Dumesnil     v. 

■^  State,   Estate  of   Brown,   Pros.   v.  Louisville    Artificial    Stone    Co.,    109 

Town  of  Union,  62  N.  J.  L.   (33  Vr.)  Ky.   1,  58  S.  W.  371    [1900];   In  the 

142,  40  Atl.  632   [1898].  Matter  of  the  Assessment  for  Improv- 

*  Ford    V.     Delta     and     Pine     Land  ing    Erst    Eigliteenth    Street    in    the 

Company,   164  U.   S.   662,   41   L.   590,  Town  of  Flatbush,   75  Hun.    (N.  Y.) 

17  S.  230   [1897].  603.  27  X.  Y.  Supp.  591    [1894]. 

"Chicago  V.   Sheldon,   76   U.   S.    (9  '-Barber    v.    Board   of    Supervisors 

Wall.)    50,   19   L.   594    [1869];    West  of  the  City  and  County  of  San  P^ran- 

Chieago  Street  Railroad  Company  v.  cisco,    42    Cal.    630    [1872];    Digging 

City  of  Chicago,   178   111.  339,  53  N.  v.   Brown,   76   Cal.   318,    18   Pac.^  373 

E.   112   [1899];   Western  Paving  and  [1888];   City  of  Connersville  v.  Mer- 

Supply    Company    v.    Citizens    Street  rill,  14  Ind.  App.  303,  42  N.  E.  1112 

Railroad   Company,   128   Ind.   525,  25  [1895];    Beck   v.   Obst,   12   Bush.    (75 

Am.   St.  Rep.   462,    10  L.   R.  A.   770,  Ky.)    268   [1876];   State,  King,  Pros. 

26  N.  E.  188,  28  N.  E.  88   [1891].  v.  Duryea,  45  N.  J.  L.    (16  Vr.)    258 

"Rochester  Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  [1883]. 
Rochester,    205    U.    S.   236    (affirming 
182  N.  Y.  99). 


1033  PROPERTY   SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  618 

§  618.  Construction  of  special  statutes  for  exemption  and  com- 
mutation. 
In  JMassachusetts  a  city  may  assume  assessments  for  betterments 
against  the  portion  of  the  land  not  taken  on  condition  that  the 
owner  releases  claims  for  damages  caused  by  b'.ying  out  the  street. 
The  board  of  street  commissioners  of  a  city  cannot  make  a  con- 
tract for  exemption  from  assessment,  except  under  such  statute.^ 
A  property  owner  who  has  settled  with  the  city  for  damages, 
cannot  take  advantage  of  a  statute  authorizing  a  property  owmer, 
a  part  of  whose  property  is  taken,  to  surrender  the  rest  and  re- 
cover the  full  value  of  the  property.-  If  such  statute  applies  to 
abutting  property,  property  which  is  separated  by  a  street  from 
that  which  is  taken  cannot  be  surrendered  under  such  statute.'* 
In  New  York  under  the  charter  of  Greater  New  York,  the  owmer 
of  land  within  the  lines  of  a  street  laid  out  on  the  map,  may  con- 
vey his  interest  in  such  land  to  the  city  without  compensation. 
and  if  his  title  is  good,  such  conveyance  shall  prevent  assessment 
upon  lands  fronting  on  the  portion  of  the  street  so  conveyed,  ex- 
cept a  fair  proportion  of  the  awards  made  for  the  value  of  build- 
ings destroyed  in  opening  such  street.*  Und(^r  such  statute,  such 
conveyance  may  be  made  after  the  application  of  the  city  to  open 
the  street,  at  least  up  to  the  time  that  commissioners  are  appoint- 
ed."' Tender  such  statute  the  ow^ner  of  land  is  liable  for  a  fair  pro- 
portion of  the  costs  of  l)uildings  removed  in  opening  such  street." 
Under  such  statute,  other  land  owners  who  do  not  accjuire  their 
title  from  the  donor  of  the  street  and  whose  land  does  not  front  on 
the  portion  of  the  street  so  conveyed,  cannot  claim  exemption  from 
assessment  by  reason  of  such  conveyance."  The  United  States 
has  conveyed  swamp  lands  to  the  different  states,  the  proceeds  of 
which  are  to  be  applied  to  reclaim  such  swamp  lands.  The  en- 
forcement of  such  i)rovisi()ns.  is  left  to  the  good  fnitli  of  the  re- 

MVhitcomb  v.   City   of  Boston.   192  tion    Counsol     of    the    City    of    New 

Mass.  211,  78  X.  E.  407    [IflOti].  York,    18.5   X.   V.  ,5:}9,   77   X.    K.    1108 

^Holt    V.    City    Coiuicil    of    Sdiiici-  |l!)f)(il;         ( aHiriiiin<i,        Wt'stniinster 

ville,  127  Mass."  408    [18791.  Hci.ulits    Co.   v.    Delaiiy.    9.)    X.    Y.    S. 

»Holt    V.    City    Council    of    Sonior-  247.   107  App.  Div.  577    [190.51). 

ville,  127  Mass.  408    [1879].  "In  re  Avenue  L.   in  City  of  Xcw 

♦Laws   1897,  p.  355,  c.  378,   §   992.  Yorlv,    95    X.    Y.    S.    245,    107    App. 

Amended   Laws,   1901,  p.  421,  c.   46(5.  Div.  581   [1905]. 

*  In  the   iMatter  of  the  Application  'In  re  flavor,  etc.,  of  ('it,v  of  Xew 

of    the    Westminster     Hei-zhts    Com-  York.  93  X.  Y.  S.  84,  103  App.  Div, 

pany  for  a  Peremptory  Writ  of  ^lan-  49()  [1905]. 
damus    Against    Delany    as    Corpora- 


§619 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1034 


spective  states  and  an  individual  only  who  buys  such  land  from 
the  state,  cannot  take  advantage  of  such  statute  as  exempting 
such  land  from  subsequent  local  assessments.  Furthermore,  if  it 
is  a  contract,  it  is  a  contract  between  the  United  States  and  the 
state  to  which  the  United  States  has  conveyed  such  lands.  The 
individual  who  purchases  such  land  from  the  state,  cannot  take 
advantage  thereof.-  However,  where  such  land  was  conveyed 
by  such  state  under  a  statute  providing  that  such  land  should  be 
exempt  from  taxation  for  the  term  of  ten  years,  or  till  it  should 
be  reclaimed,  it  was  held  that  such  statute  amounted  to  a  con- 
tract which  could  not  be  impaired  by  subsequent  legislation  and 
that  local  assessments  known  as  special  taxes  were  included  in 
such  exemption."  The  state  may  provide  for  the  reclamation  of 
swamp  and  overflowed  lands,  even  if  the  title  was  derived  from  a 
Mexican  grant. ^" 

§  619.     Property  not  in  physical  contact  with  improvement. 

In  order  to  receive  a  benefit  from  a  public  improvement,  land 
need  not  abut  or  front  thereon  in  the  absence  of  a  determination 
b}'  the  legislature  or  some  public  corporation,  or  official  author- 
i/ced  by  statute,  that  only  the  abutting  or  fronting  property  is 
benefited.'     Accordingly,  non-abutting  land  may  be  benefited  by 


*  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  Sti!),  4 
S.  663  [1884];  (affirming  Reclama- 
tion Dist.  No.  108  V.  Hagar,  4  Fed, 
366  [1880]);  Ritter  v.  Drainage 
Dist.  No,  1,  Poinsett  County,  78  Ark. 
580,  94  S,  W.  711  [1906];' Reclama- 
tion District  No.  108  v.  Hagar,  66 
Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945  [1884];  contra 
Mason  v.  Austin,  46  Cal.  385   [1873]. 

"McGee  v.  Mathis,  71  U.  S.  (4 
Wall.)  143,  18  L.  314  [1866];  (re- 
versing, McGehee  v.  Mathis,  21  Ark. 
40   [1800]). 

^^  Hagar  v.  Reclamation  District 
No.  108,  111  U.  S.  701,  28  L.  569,  4 
S.  663  [1884];  (affirming,  Reclama- 
tion Dist.  No.  108  y,  Hagar,  4  Fed. 
366  [1880]);  Hagar  v.  Board  of 
Supervisors  of  Yolo  County,  47  Cal. 
222  [1874];  People  of  the  State  of 
California  v.  Hagar,  52  Cal.  171 
[1877]. 


^  Rooke's  Case,  5  Rep.  99  b.  ( Hil. 
40  Eliz.);  City  of  Seattle  v.  Kelle- 
her,  195  U.  S.  351,  25  S.  44  [1904]; 
Cribbs  v.  Benedict,  64  Ark.  555,  44 
S.  W.  707  [1897];  Little  Rock  v. 
Katzenstein,  52  Ark.  107,  12  S.  W. 
198  [1889];  German  Savings  and 
Loan  Society  v.  Ramish,  138  Cal.  120, 
69  Pac.  89,  70  Pac.  1067  [1902];  Mc- 
Gilvery  v.  City  of  Lewiston,  13  Ida. 
338.  90  Pac.  348  [1907];  Roberts 
v.  City  of  Evanston,  218  111.  296,  75 
N.  E.  923  [1905];  Walker  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  202  111.  531,  67  N.  E. 
369  [1903];  Shurtleflf  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 190  111.  473,  '60  N.  E.  876 
[1901];  Mason  v.  City  of  Chicago. 
178  111.  499.  53  N.  E.'  354  [1899]; 
Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  18. 
38  N.  E.  255  [1894];  Louisville  and 
Nashville  Railroad  Company  v.  Ea'^t 
St.  Louis,  1.34  111.  656,  25  N.  E.  962 
[1891] ;  Guild,  Jr.  v.  City  of  Chicago. 


1035 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§619 


the  improvement  of  a  street,-  or  by  the  construction  of  a  sewer,"' 
or  a  system  of  drainage,*  or  by  a  park,'*  so  that  it  may  be  assess- 


82  111.  472  [1870];  Coodricli  v.  City 
of  Minonk,  62  111.  121  11871J;  Cul- 
bertson  v.  Knight,  152  Ind.  121,  52 
N.  E.  700  [1898]  ;  Ray  v.  City  of  Jef- 
fersonville,  90  Ind.  5(57  [1883];  Mock 
V.  City  of  Muncie,  9  Ind.  App.  536, 
37  N.  E.  281   [1893J;   Kansas  City  v. 

Napiecek,  —  Kan.  ,  92  Pac.  827 

[1907];  Olsson  v.  City  of  Topeka,  42 
Kan.  709,  21  Pac.  219  |  1889]  ;  City 
of  Ottawa  V.  Barney,  10  Kan.  270 
[1872];  Pfaffinger  v.  Kremer,  115 
Ky.  498,  74  S.  W.  238,  24  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  2368  [1903];  Goodrich  v.  City 
of  Detroit,  123  :\Iich.  559,  82  N.  W. 
255  [1900];  Warren  v.  City  of 
Grand  Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874]; 
State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  95  Alinn. 
70,  103  N.  W.  744  [1905];  Kansas 
City  V.  Ward,  134  Mo.  172,  35  S.  W. 
600   [1896];   State  v.  Several  Parcels 

of   Land,   —   Neb.   ,    113    X.    W. 

248  [1907];  Hart  v.  City  of  Omaha, 
74  Neb.  836,  105  X.  W^  546  [1905]; 
Lansing  v.  City  of  Lincoln,  32  Xeb. 
457,  49  N.  W.'  650  [1891];  Allison 
I^nd  Co.  V.  Borough  of  Tenafly,  69 
N.  J.  L.  (40  Vr.)  587,  55  Atl.  39 
[1903];  (affirming  on  rehearing  Al- 
lison Land  Co.  v.  Borough  of  Ten- 
afly, 68  N.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.)  205.  52 
Atl.  231  [1902]);  State,  Henderson. 
Pros.  v.  Mayor,  etc..  of  Jersey  City, 
41  N.  J.  L.  "(12  Vroom)  489  [1879]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Ap^jlication  of 
tlie  Common  Conncil  of  tlie  City  of 
Amsterdam  to  take  lands  for  the  ex- 
tension of  Grove  and  Jay  Streets.  55 
Hun.  (N.  Y.)  270.  8  X.  Y.  Supp. 
234  [18891;  KpHy  v.  City  of  Cleve- 
land, 34  O.  S.  468  [1878];  Coates  v. 
Villaq-e  of  Norwood,  16  Ohio  C.  C. 
196  [18981;  Miller  v.  City  of  Toledo, 
12  Ohio  C.  C.  706  [1894];  In  the 
Matter  of  Westlnke  Avenue.  Seattle, 
40  Wash.  144,  82  Pac.  279  [1905]. 
==  Roberts  v.  City  of  Evanston.  218 
111.  296,  75  N.  E.  923  [I90.=;i; 
ShurtlefT  v.  Citv  of  Chicago.   190  111, 


473,  60  N.  E.  870  [1901];  I^ui.sville 
and  Nashville  Railroad  Company  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  134  111.  656,  25  N. 
E.  962  [1891];  Ray  v.  City  of  Jef- 
fersonville,  90  Ind.  567  [1883];  Mock 
V.  City  of  :\luncie,  9  Ind.  App.  536, 
37  N.  E.  281  [1893];  Olsson  v.  City 
of  Topeka,  42  Kan.  709,  21  Pac. 
219  [1889];  City  of  Ottawa  v.  Bar- 
ney, 10  Kan.  ^70  [1872];  Pfaffinger 
V.  Kremer,  115  Ky.  498,  74  S.  W. 
238,  24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  2368  [1903]; 
Goodrich  v.  City  of  Detroit,  123 
Mich.  559,  82  N.  W.  255  [1900]; 
State  ex  rel.  Hughes  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  95  Minn. 
70,  103  X.  W.  744  [1905];  Allison 
Land  Co.  v.  Borough  of  Tenafly,  69 
N.  J.  L.  (40  Vr.)  587,  55  Atl.  39 
[1903];  (affirming  on  rehearing  Al- 
lison Land  Co.  v.  Borough  of  Ten- 
afly, 68  N.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.)  205,  52 
Atl.  231  [1902]);  In  the  Matter  of 
the  Application  of  the  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Amsterdam  to 
take  lands  for  the  e\t<^nsion  of 
Grove  and  Jay  Streets,  55  Hun.  (N. 
Y.)  270,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  234  [1889]; 
Kelly  V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  0.  S. 
468  [1878];"  In  the  Matter  of  West- 
lake  Avenue,  Seattle,  40  Wash.  144. 
82   Pac.  279    [1905]. 

*McGilvery  v.  City  of  Lewiston. 
13  Ida.  338,  90  Pac.  348  [19071; 
Walker  v.  City  of  Chicago,  202  111. 
531,  67  N.  E.  369  [1903];  Mason  v. 
(  ity  of  Chicago,  178  111.  499,  55  N. 
E.  3.'j4  [1899];  Warren  v.  City  of 
Grand  Haven,  30  Mich.  24  [1874]: 
State,  Henderson,  Pros.  v.  flavor, 
etc.,  of  Jersey  City,  41  N.  J.  L.  (12 
Vroom)  489  [1879];  Miller  v.  City 
of  Toledo,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  706   [180^]. 

♦Rooke'a  Case.  5  Rep.  99  b.  (Ilil. 
40  Eliz.)  ;  Goodrich  v.  City  of  Min- 
onk. 62  111.  121  [18711:  Culbertson 
V.  Knio-hi.  1,V2  Ind.  121.  52  N.  E. 
700    n8981. 

"Fnnsps  Citv  v.  Wovrl.  ]^i  :vf,,. 
172.    35    S.    W.    600    [18961:    ITart    \. 


§  620  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT,  1036 

cd  for  the  expense  thereof.  The  fact  that  property  to  be  assessed 
for  a  park  or  boulevard  is  three-quarters  of  a  mile  away  there- 
from does  not  justify  the  court  as  a  matter  of  law,  in  saying  that 
such  property  is  not  benetited.''  By  statute,  assessments  for  local 
improvements  were  to  be  made  upon  the  contiguous  property  bene- 
fited. After  an  ordinance  for  appropriating  land  for  a  street  was 
passed  but  before  the  supplementary  petition  was  filed,  such  stat- 
ute was  modified  by  omitting  the  word  "contiguous."  It  was 
held  that  under  such  statutes  it  w^as  proper  to  assess  any  prop- 
erty actually  benefited  though  not  contiguous  to  the  improve- 
ment.^ In  Illinois,  under  the  constitutional  provision  authoriz- 
ing the  construction  of  public  improvements  by  general  taxation, 
by  special  assessment  or  by  special  taxation  of  contiguous  prop- 
erty, it  has  been  held  that  the  phrase  "of  contiguous  property" 
is  connected  only  with  the  grant  of  the  power  of  special  taxation 
and  does  not  limit  the  power  of  special  assessment.^  Accordingly, 
an  assessment  based  on  the  theory  of  benefits  may  be  levied  upon 
property  benefited  but  not  contiguous  to  the  improvement." 

§  620.     Abutting  property. 

The  assessment  district  is  often  described  as  consisting  of  prop- 
erty which-  bears  a  certain  relat'on  in  space  to  the  improvement. 
Property  which  abuts  ^  on  the  improvement  for  which  the  assess- 
ment is  levied  is  frequently  made  into  an  assessment  district  by 
the  legislature  or  public  corporation  or  officer  duly  authorized  to 
determine    what    property    is    benefited    and    to    lay    out    the 

City  of  Omaha,  74  Xeb.  83G.   105  X.  '  City  of  Seattle  v.  Kellelier,  195  U. 

W.  546    [1905].  S.   351*,   49  L.  232,  25   S.  44    [1904]; 

«Hart  V.   City  of  Omaha.   74  Xeb.  Chadwick   v.   Kelley,    187   U.   S.   540, 

836,   105  X.  W.  546   [1905].  47  L.  293,  23  S.  175  [1903];    (affirm- 

'  In   the   Matter   of   Westlake   Ave-  ing,    Kelley    v.    Chadwick,     104    La. 

nue,  Seattle,   40  Wash.   144,  82  Pac.  719,    29    So.    295    [1901]);    City    of 

279  [1905].  Denver  v.  Londoner,  33  Colo.  104,  80 

« Guild,  Jr.  V.  City  of  Chicago,  82  Pac.  117  [1904];  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and 

111.   472    [1876];     (construing  Article  Aldermen   of   Savannah,    91    Ga.   500, 

IX.,  §  9,  of  the  Constitution  of  Illi-  17  S.  E.  749  [1893];  Speer  v.  Mayor 

nois. )  and  Council  of  Athens,  85  Ga.  49,  9 

"Roberts  v.  City  of  Evanston.  218  L.  R.   A.  402,   11   S.  E.   802    [1890]; 

111.  296,  75  X'.  E.  923  [1905];  Shurt-  Vandersyde    v.    People    ex    rel.    Ray- 

leff  V.  City  of  Chicago,   190  111.  473.  mond.    i95    111.    200,    62    X.    E.    806 

60  X.  E.  870   [1901]^  Louisville  and  [1902];    Bass    v.    South    Park    Com- 

Xashville  Railroad  Company  v.  City  missioners,    171    111.    370,    49    X.    E. 

of   East   St.   Louis,    134   111!   656,   25  549    [1898];    Thorn  v.  West  Chicago 

X\  E.  962   [1891];   Guild.  Jr.  v.  City  Park  Commissioners,  130  111.  594,  22 

of  Chicago,  82  111.  472  [1876].            "  X^  E.   520    [1890]-,   Green  v.  City  of 


i 


1037 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT 


§620 


assessment  district.     Districts  consisting  of  the  abutting  properi; 


Springfield,  130  111.  515,  22  X.  E. 
()02  [1890];  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St. 
L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Taber,  108  Ind.  419,  77 
N.  E.  741  [1906];  Klein  v.  Nugent 
Gravel  Company,  162  Ind.  509,  70  X. 
E.  801  [1903];  Deane  v.  Indiana 
Macadam  &  Construction  Company, 
161  Ind.  371,  68  X.  E.  680  [1903]; 
Leeds  v.  Defrees,  157  Ind.  392,  61  X. 
E.  930  [1901];  Martin  v.  Wills,  157 
Ind.  153,  60  X.  E.  1021  [1901];  Tay- 
lor V.  City  of  Crawfordsville,  155 
Ind.  403,  58  X.  E.  490;  Adams  v. 
City  of  Shelbyville,  154  Ind.  407,  77 
Am".  St.  Rep.'  484,  49  L.  R.  A.  797, 
57  X.  E.  114  [1899];  Helm  v.  Witz, 
35  Ind.  App.  131,  73  X.  E.  846 
[1904];  Byram  v.  Foley,  17 
Ind.  App.  629,  47  X.  E.  351 
[1897];  Rawson  v.  City  of  Des 
Moines,  133  la.  514,  110  X.  W.  918 
[1907];  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Lindquist,  119  Iowa  144, 
93  X.  W.  103  [1903];  Edwards  & 
Walsh  Construction  Company  v.  Jas- 
per County,  117  Iowa  365,  94  Am.  St. 
Rep.  301,  90  X.  W.  1006  [1902]; 
Hackworth  v.  City  of  Ottumwa,  114 
la.  467,  87  X".  W.  424  [1901];  Ot- 
tumwa Brick  &  Construction  Co.  v. 
Ainloy,  109  Ta.  380,  80  X.  W.  510 
[1899];  Gilcrest  v.  McCartney,  97 
la.  138,  66  X.  W.  103  [1896];  Amery 
V.  City  of  Keokuk,  72  la.  701,  30  X. 
W.  780  [1887];  Kendig  v.  Knight, 
60  la.  29,  14  X.  W.  78  [1882]:  Mor- 
rison V.  Hershirc,  32  la.  271  [1871]; 
Warren  v.  Henly,  31  la.  31  [1870]; 
McGrew  v.  City  of  Kans^as  City,  64 
Kan.  61,  67  Pac.  438  [1902];  Morton 
V.  Sullivan.  (Ky.)  29  Ky.  L.  Rep. 
943.  96  S.  W.  807  [190()"l;  (  ity  of 
Covington  v.  ^latson,  —  Ky.  — .  34  S. 
W.  897,  17  Ky.  L.  R.  1323  [1890]; 
Slocum  v.  Selectmen  of  Brooklino,  KiS 
Mass.  23,  39  X.  E.  351  [1895];  Ayor 
v.  flavor  and  Aldermen  of  Sonior- 
villo.  143  Mass.  585.  10  X.  E.  457 
[1887];  Barber  Asnhalt  Paving  Co. 
v.  Vunn.  185  Mo.  552.  83  S.  W.  1062 
[19041;  Meic»r  v.  Citv  of  St.  Louis. 
180  Mo.   391.   79   S.   W.   9.-)5    [1903]; 


Heman  v.  Gilliam,  171  Mo.  258,  71 
S.  W.  163  [1902];  City  of  Spring- 
field to  Use  of  Central  Xational 
Bank  v.  Weaver,  137  :Mo.  650,  37  S. 
W.  509,  39  S.  W.  276  [1896];  Heman 
Construction  Company  v.  Mcilanus, 
102  Mo.  App.  649,  '77  S.  W.  310 
[1903];  City  of  Omaha  v.  Gsanter, 
4  Xeb.  Unolt.  52,  93  X.  W. 
407  [1903];  Kuhns  v.  City 
of  Omaha,  55  Xeb.  183,  75 
X.  W.  562  [1898];  Hutchin- 
son V.  City  of  Omaha,  52  Xeb.  345, 
72  X.  W.  218  [1897];  McCormick  v. 
City  of  Omaha,  37  Xeb.  829,  56  X. 
W.  626  [1893];  Farrington  v.  City 
of  Mt.  Vernon,  166  X.  Y.  233,  59  X. 
E.  826  [1901];  Parsons  v.  City  of 
Rochester,  43  Hun.  (X.  Y.)  258 
[1887];  Hilliard  v.  City  of  Ashe- 
ville,  118  X.  C.  845,  24  S.  E.  738 
[1896]-.  Kelly  v.  City  of  Cleveland, 
34  O.  S.  468  [1878];  Meissner  v. 
City  of  Toledo,  31  O.  S.  387  [1877]; 
Smith  V.  City  of  Toledo,  24  0.  S. 
126  [1873];  'creighton  v.  Scott,  14 
0.  S.  438  [1863];  Maloy  v.  City  of 
Marietta,  11  0.  S.  630  [I860];  Xorth- 
ern  Indiana  Railroad  Company  v. 
Connelly,  10  0.  S.  100  [1859];  Sco- 
ville  V.  City  of  Cleveland,  1  O.  S. 
126  [1853];  (followed  in  Clark  v. 
City  of  Cleveland,  1  0.  S.  139 
[1853]);   Oliver  v.  City  of  Xewberg, 

—  Or.  .  91  Pac.  470   [1907];   In 

the  Matter  of  the  Opening  of  Ork- 
ney Street,  A])peal  of  the  City  of 
Philadelphia,  194  Pa.  St.  425,  48  L. 
R.  A.  274,  45  Atl.  314  [1900]  ;  Beech- 
wood  Avenue  Sewer,  Pittsburg's  Ap- 
l)eal,  179  Pa.  St.  490,  36  Atl.  209 
[1897];  Park  Avenue  Sewers,  Appeal 
of  Parker,  169  Pa.  St.  433,  32  Atl. 
574  [1895];  City  of  Reading  v.  0'- 
Reillv,  169  Pa.  St.  300.  32  Atl.  420 
[1895];  Fiftv-Fourth  Stieet,  Pitts- 
burg's Appeal.  165  Pa.  St.  8,  30  Atl. 
503  [1894];  Morewood  Avenue. 
Chamber's  Anpeal,  159  Pa.  St.  20.  28 
.Atl.  123  [19931;  Main  Street.  Big 
Run  Bnrou-h.  137  Pa.  St.  590.  20 
Atl.   711    [1890];    Magee   v.  Common- 


§620 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1038 


are  most  frequently  found  in  assessments  for  street  improvements,- 
but  may  also  be  found  in  assessments  for  sewers,^  as  where  the 
assessment  is  levied  upon  the  property  abutting  the  street  in  which 
the  sewer  is  located.*  Assessment  districts  of  this  sort  are  also 
found  where  the  improvement  is  the  construction  of  a  gutter,"^ 
or  the  construction  of  a  curb  or  gutter,"  or  the  improvement  of 
an  alley.'  Property  is  ordinarily  said  to  abut  on  an  improvement 
or  a  street  when  it  is  so  situated  with  reference  thereto  that  it  is 
not    separated    therefrom    by    any    intervening    property,^    or    at 


wealth  for  the  Use  of  the  City  of 
Pittshurgh,  46  Pa.  St.  358  [1863]; 
Wabash  Avenue,  26  Pa.  Super.  Ct. 
305  [1904];  Bishop  v.  Tripp,  15  R. 
I.  466,  8  Atl.  692  [1887];  Taylor  v. 
Boyd,  63  Tex.  533  [1885]  ;  Ryan  v. 
Sumner,  17  Wash.  228,  49  Pac.  487 
[1897];  Schintgen  V.  City  of  La 
Crosse,  117  Wis.  158,  94  N.  W.  84 
[1903];  Hennessy  v.  Douglas  County, 
99  Wis.  129,  74  N.  W.  983  [1898]; 
Chicago,  Milwaukee  &  St.  Paul  Rail- 
way Company  v.  City  of  Milwaukee, 
89  "wis.  506,"  28  L.  R.  A.  249,  62  N. 
W.  417  [1895];  Johnson  v.  City  of 
Milwaukee,  40  Wis.  315   [1876].  " 

^'City  of  Seattle  v.  Kelleher,  195 
U.  S.  351,  49  L.  232,  25  S.  44  [1904]  ; 
Chadwii-k  V.  Kelley,  187  U.  S.  540, 
47  L.  293,  23  S.  175  [1903]  (affirm 
ing,  Kelley  v.  Chad  wick,  104  La.  719, 
29  So.  295  [1901]);  Green  v. 
City  of  Springfield,  130  111.515,  22  N. 
E.  602  [1890];  Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  & 
St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Taber,  168  Ind.  419, 
77  N.  E.  741  [1906];  Hackworth  v. 
City  of  Ottumwa,  114  la.  467,  87 
N.  W.  424  [1901];  Ottumwa  Brick 
&  Construction  Co.  v.  Ainley,  109  la. 
386,  80  N.  W.  510  [1899];  Amery  v. 
City  of  Keokuk,  72  la.  701,  30  N.  W. 
780  [1887]:  Morrison  v.  Hershire,  32 
la.  271    [1871];    Morton  v.  Sullivan, 

—  Ky.  ,  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  943,  96 

S.  W.  807  [1906];  Barber  Asphalt 
Paving  Co.  v.  Munn,  185  Mo.  552,  83 
S.  W.  1062  [1904];  City  of  Spring- 
field to  Use  of  Central  National  Bank 
V.  Weaver,  137  Mo.  650.  37  S.  W. 
509,  39  S.  W.  276  [18961:  Hilliard 
V.  Citv   of   Asheville,   118  N.   C.  845, 


24  S.  E.  738  [1896];  City  of  Cincin- 
nati v.  Batsche,  52  0.  S.  324,  27  L. 
R.  A.  536,  40  N.  E.  21  [1895];  Kel- 
ly V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  0.  S.  468 
[1878];  In  the  Matter  of  the  Open- 
ing of  Orkney  Street,  Appeal  of  the 
City  of  Philadelphia,  194  Pa.  St. 
425,  48  L.  R.  A.  274,  45  Atl.  314 
[1900];  Fifty-fourth  Street,  Pitts- 
burg's Appeal,  165  Pa.  St.  8,  30  Atl. 
503  [1894];  Fifty-fourth  Street, 
Pittsburg's  Appeal,  165  Pa.  St.  8,  30 
Atl.  503  [1894];  Morewood  Avenue, 
Chamber's  Appeal,  159  Pa.  St.  20,  28 
Atl.  123  [1893];  Main  Street,  Big 
Run  Borough,  137  Pa.  St.  590,  20 
Atl.  711  [1890];  Magee  v.  Common- 
wealth for  the  Use  of  the  City  of 
Pittsburgh,  46  Pa.  St.  368  [1863]; 
Taylor  v.  Boyd,  63  Tex.  533   [1885]. 

^  Vandersyde  v.  People  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 195*111.  200,  62  N.  E.  806 
[1902]:  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Lindquist,  119  Iowa  144, 
93  N.  W.  103  [1903];  Beechwood 
Avenue  Sewer,  Pittsburg's  Appeal, 
179  Pa.  St.  490,  36  Atl.  209  [1897]; 
Park  Avenue  Sewers,  Appeal  of  Par- 
ker, 169  Pa.  St.  433,  32  Atl.  574 
[1895]. 

*Byram  v.  Foley.  17  Ind.  App.  629, 
47  n".  E.  351   [1897]. 

=  Kendig  v.  Knight,  60  la.  29,  14 
N.  W.   78   [1882]. 

*  City  of  Omaha  v.  Gsanter,  4  Neb. 
UnoflF.  52,  93  N.  W.  407   [1903]. 

^Heman  v.  Gilliam,  171  Mo.  258, 
71  S.  W.  163   [1902]. 

*  "To  speak  of  propertv  as  abutting 
unon  a  street,  has  a  well  understood 
and  definite  meaning,  as  well  in  legal 


1039 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§620 


least  only  by  intervening  property  which  is  subject  to  a  public 
easement,  for  the  use  for  which  the  improvement  has  been  con- 
structed." It  is  said  that  property  cannot  be  abutting  an  improve- 
ment if  it  does  not  touch  it.^"  "Abutting  is  sometimes  used  as 
equivalent  to  "adjoining"  or  "fronting.""  The  context  of  the 
statute  or  ordinance  in  which  the  term  is  employed  may,  how- 
ever, suggest  a  different  meaning  for  each  of  these  respective 
terms.^^  In  Illinois,  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions  auth- 
orizing the  assessment  of  contiguous  property  are  held  to  author- 
ize assessment  by  the  city  of  property  abutting  on  the  street  or 
improvement.  Within  the  meaning  of  these  provisions  "contig- 
uous" is  regarded  as  synonymous  with  or  including  "abutting."  " 
In  most  jurisdictions  the  question  whether  property  abuts  on  an 
improvement  or  not,  is  to  be  determined  by  the  actual  use  made  of 
it  at  the  time  of  the  assessment  proceedings  and  not  by  the  platted 
lines,  if  the  property  is  actually  used  and  occupied.^'*  Accord- 
ingly, if  a  platted  lot  has  been  divided  in  actual  use  into  two 
distinct  tracts,  one  of  which  is  separated  from  the  street  by  the 
other,  the  one  in  the  rear  is  not  regarded  as  abutting  on  the  im- 


as  in  common  parlance.  It  means 
property  which  lies  adjacent  to  and 
is  bounded  by  the  lines  of  the  street, 
the  street  line  and  property  line  be- 
ing coincident."  Chicago,  Burlington 
&  Quincy  Railroad  Company  v. 
South  Park  Commissioners,  11  111. 
App.     562,     5(53      [18821.  " -Ahnt' 

means  the  same  as  'bound'  that  is  tn 
terminate  or  border;  to  be  contig- 
uous; to  meet."  Barney  v.  City  of 
Dayton,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  48o",  481   [181)4]. 

•  Allman  v.  District  of  Columbia,  '.i 
App.  D.  C.  8  [18941;  City  of  Joj)- 
lin  ex  rel.  Kee  v.  Freeman.  —  Mo. 
App.  — ,  10.3  S.  W.  1.30  [11)071; 
Richards  v.  'ity  of  Cincinnati.  31  O. 
S.   50()    [18771.' 

*"  Holt  V.  City  Council  of  Somer- 
ville,   127  Mass."  408   [187D1. 

I'Moberly  v.  Hogan.  131  Mo.  11). 
32  S.  W.  1014   [ISD.ll. 

la  "\Ye  have  reached  this  conclusion 
(i.  e.  that  a  lot  adjoining  a  street 
on  its  side  is  not  one  fronting  on 
such  street)  after  a  due  considera- 
tion of  tlic  autlioritics  in  otlier  juris- 


dictions construing  the  statutes  on 
germane  subjects  in  which  the  words 
'fronting,'  'adjoining,'  'abutting'  and 
similar  expressions  are  held  to  be 
synonymous,  but  in  none  of  them 
liave  these  diderent  words  been  so 
carefully  distinguished  as  tliey  ap- 
pear to  be  in  the  framing  of  these 
amendments.  We  cannot  regard  these 
<linVrent  words  'adjoining,'  'fronting' 
and  'abutting,'  apparently  so  care- 
fully did'erentiated  with  reference  to 
tlieir  context  in  the  charter,  as  mere- 
ly tautological  or  as  synonymous." 
Collier  Estate  v.  Western  Paving 
Supply  Company,  180  Mo.  302,  383, 
71)  .S.  W.  947    [1904]. 

'■*  Vandersyde  v.  Peoi)le  ex  rel.  Ray- 
mond, 195  111.  200,  (i2  X.  E.  806 
[1902]:  Thorn  v.  West  Chicago  Park 
Cf)mmissioners,  130  III.  594.  22  N.  E. 
520  [1890]:  C.reen  v.  City  of  Spring- 
field. 130  III.  515.  22  X.  K.  602 
[1890]. 

"  Langlois  v.  CamtTon.  201  111. 
301.   66   X.   E.    332    [1903]. 


§  620  TxVXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1040 

provement.^^  The  authorities,  however,  are  not  unanimous  on 
this  question.  Where  two  lots  are  used  together  as  a  single 
tract,  it  has  been  held  that  they  cannot  be  regarded  as  one  tract 
abutting  upon  an  improvement,  upon  which  only  one  of  such  lots 
as  laid  out  in  the  plat  actually  abuts.^** 

In  determining  the  scope  and  meaning  of  the  term  "abutting," 
a  number  of  interesting  questions  have  been  discussed.  One  of 
them  is  whether  property  can  be  said  to  abut  on  an  improvement, 
if  the  improvement  touches  the  property  at  the  side  along  its 
greatest  length  and  not  at  the  end  which  is  used  as  a  front.  It 
is  ordinarily  said  that  property  which  touches  an  improvement 
upon  its  side  is  to  be  regarded  as  abutting  property.^'  In  Ohio, 
under  a  statute  provided  for  assessing  abutting  property  in  pro- 
portion to  the  number  of  front  feet,  it  has  been  held  that  while 
a  lot  could  abut  an  improvement  upon  its  side,  the  depth  of  such 
lot  to  be  assessed  depended  upon  the  width  of  the  front  of  the 
lot  and  not  upon  its  depth  abutting  on  the  improvement  for  which 
the  assessment  was  levied.^^  These  decisions,  however, -turn  on 
the  meaning  of  "front  foot"  and  not  on  the  meaning  of  "abut- 
ting."^® Somewhat  similar  results  have  been  reached  in  New- 
Jersey  under  a  statute  providing  for  apportioning  assessments 
according  to  benefits.-*'  In  Pennsylvania  it  was  held  that  prop- 
erty in  the  front  of  which  a  water  pipe  had  been  Laid  could  not 
be  assessed  for  laying  a  pipe  along  the  side  thereof.-^  The  deci- 
sion of  this  case,  however,  turned  rather  upon  the  question  wheth- 
er such  improvement  was  in  fact  a  benefit  to  the  land  thus  as- 
sessed than  on  the  question  of  what  abutting  property  was.-- 
Whether  part  of  a  sidewalk  at  the  corner  of  two  streets  meeting  at 
right  angles,  which  is  bounded  by  the  prolongation  of  the  side  and 
front  lines  of  the  corner  lot,  can  be  said  to  abut  upon  the  corner 
lot   which  it  touches  only  at  one  point  has  been  discussed  but  not 


'^Langlois     v.     Cameron,     201     111.  ^'^  Sandrock   v.    Columbus,    51    Olii  > 

301,  66  N.  E.  332  [1903];   Clapton  v.  St.  317,  42  N.  E.  255    [1894];   Havi- 

Tavlor,  49  Mo.  App.  117   [1892].  land  v.   City  of   Columbus,   50   0.   S. 

"Smith  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  106  471,  34  N.  E.  679  [1893]. 

la.  590,  76  N.  W.  836   [1898].  "See  §  625;  §  704. 

I''  City  of  Springfield  v.  Green,  120  ^  Cossitt   Land    Co.    v.   Neuscheler. 

111.  209,   11  X.  E.  261;    Citv  of  Law-       —  N;  J.  ,  60  Atl.    1128    [1905]. 

reice  v.  lillam,  11  Fan.  499  [1873];  =*  Baker  v.  Gartside,  86  Pa.  St.    (5 

Mobe-lv  V.  TToo-an,  131  Mo.  19,  32  S.  Norris)    498. 

W.  1014  [1895].  "Baker  v.  Gartside.  86   Pa.  St.    (5 

Norris)   498. 


1041  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT  §  620 

decided.-^  Property  which  is  separated  from  the  .mprovement 
by  intervening  land  over  which  neither  the  public  nor  the  owner 
of  the  tract  in  question  possesses  an  easement  giving  access  to 
the  improvement  for  which  the  easement  is  levied  is  not  regarded 
as  abutting  property.-*  However,  a  tract  of  land  which  was  sep- 
arated from  a  street  by  a  small  stream  over  which  were  two 
bridges  giving  access  to  such  tract  was  said  to  be  abutting  on 
such  street.-"  If  the  strip  of  land  intervening  between  the 
land  in  question  and  the  improvement,  has  been  conveyed  fraudu- 
lently in  order  to  prevent  the  property  in  question  from  being 
assessed,  it  has  been  held  that  the  existence  of  such  intervening 
strip  does  not  prevent  the  property  back  of  it  from  being  regard- 
ed as  abutting  property.-'*  This  principle  has  been  applied  where 
the  property  back  of  such  strip  has  been  conveyed  to  a  grantee, 
who  had  notice  of  such  fraudulent  conveyance.-'  The  intervening 
strip  may  have  been  conveyed  after  the  time  at  which  the  condi- 
tion of  the  property  is  regarded  as  tixed.  In  such  case,  the  exis- 
tence of  such  intervening  stri])  does  not  prevent  the  property  from 
being  regarded  as  abutting.-"*  The  intervening  strip  may  in  some 
way  have  become  the  property  of  the  owner  of  the  tract  which  is 
separated  from  such  imi)rovement  by  such  strip.  In  such  case, 
the  tract  back  of  such  strip  is  regarded  as  abutting  on  the  im- 
provement.-" Thus,  where  a  city  in  straightening  a  street  va- 
cated a  strip  of  ground  on  one  side  and  by  ordinance  provided  that 
the  portion  of  such  strip  in  front  of  each  lot  should  be  donated  to 
the  owner  thereof,  to  become  a  part  of  each  lot  and  further  pro- 
vided that  the  mavor  should  execute  conveyances  accordingly,  it 
was  held  that  although  such  conveyances  were  not  executed,  yet 
if  the  portion  of  such  strip  in  front  of  each  lot  was  enclo.sed  there- 
with for  years,  with  the  knowledge  of  the  owner,  he  became  at 
least  the  equitable  owner  of  the  portion  of  such  strip  and  the  en- 


=^('ity   of    Laiironcc    v.    Killniii.    11  flSSTl:    Fass    v.    Rcpliawer.    GO    Wi.s. 

Kan.  40!)   [1873].  o-J.").  10  X.  W.  533  [1884]. 

^  Daniknehlor    v.    City    of    ^Hlwau-  -'  Eai;le  Manufacturing  Company  v. 

kee.    124    Wis.    144.    101    N.    W.    706  City   of   Davenport.    101    la.   403.    38 

[10051.  L.  R.  A.  480,  70  N.   W.  707    riS071. 

^Wakefield  Local  Board  of  Health  ^Donirlass   v.    City    of    Cincinnati, 

V.  Lee.  1  Ex.  Div.  330.  20  O.  S.  IfiS  [187fil." 

^^Eade  ]\Ianufactuiin'r  Company  V.  =»  Ottumwa    Brick    &    Construction 

Citv   of   Davenport.    101    Ta.    403.   38  Co.  v.  Ainlev,  109  la.  386,  80  N.  W. 

L.  R.  A.  480.  70  N.  W.  707   [18971:  510   [1899].' 
Stifel    V.    Brown.    24    Mo.    App.    102 


§  620  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1042 

tire  lot  was  to  be  regarded  as  abutting  on  the  improvement.^" 
The  intervening  strip  may  be  one  in  which  the  public  or  the  own- 
er has  such  an  easement  that  he  can  have  free  access  to  the  im- 
provement. In  such  cases  the  existence  of  such  strip  does  not 
prevent  the  property  back  of  it  from  being  abutting  property.^^ 
Thus,  a  city  encroached  upon  grounds  which  were  dedicated  to 
the  county  as  a  public  square,  by  using  a  strip  on  the  side  of  such 
square  as  a  part  of  the  street.  Subsequently  the  city  obtained  a 
decree  preventing  the  county  from  interfering  with  the  city's 
possession  of  such  strips.  It  was  held  that  the  existence  of  such 
strips  did  not  prevent  the  public  square  owned  by  the  county  from 
abutting  on  such  street.^-  The  existence  of  a  public  parking 
between  a  lot  and  the  sidewalk  in  front  of  it  does  not  prevent  such 
lot  from  abutting  on  such  sidewalk.''"  A  strip  of  land  ninety-one 
feet  in  width  was  dedicated  for  a  street.  The  city  improved  a 
street  thereon  ninety  feet  in  width,  leaving  one  foot  upon  one  side, 
used  only  for  sloping  embankments  and  excavations.  It  was  held 
that  the  existence  of  such  strip  did  not  prevent  lots  abutting  on 
such  strip  from  abutting  on  the  street.^*  The  property  including 
the  right  of  way  of  a  railway  company  which  touches  a  street 
may  be  regarded  as  abutting  thereon.^^'  If  such  property  is 
held  not  to  be  subject  to  assessment,  it  is  not  because  it  is  held  not 
to  abut  upon  the  improvemnt.  but  because  it  is  held  to  be  exempt 

™  Ottumwa    Brick    &    Construction  vening  foot  of  land  deprives  them  of 

Co.  V.  Ainley.  109  la.  386,  80  N.  W.  full,   free,   and   lawful   access   to   the 

510  [1899].  street    improved;    but    such    depriva- 

^^  Allman  v.  District  of  Columbia,  tion  could  result  only  when  the  right 
3  App.  D.  C.  8  [1894];  Edwards  &  and  exclusive  use  thereto  have  re- 
Walsh  Construction  Company  v.  Jas-  verted  to  the  original  dedicators  and 
per  Coimty,  117  Iowa  365,  94  Am.  their  heirs.  If  the  public  right  to 
St.  Rep.  301,  90  N.  W.  1006  [1902]:  its  use  still  continues,  or  if  the  right 
City  of   Joplin   ex   rel.   Kee   v.   Free-  to  the  strip  has  vested  absolutely  in 

man,  —  Mo.   App.   ,    103   S.   W.  the  owners  of  lands  abutting  upon  it, 

130  [1907];  Richards  v.  City  of  Cin-  after     abandonment     by     the     public, 

cinnati,  31  0.  S.  506  [1877].  then,  in  either  case,  their  liability  to 

'-  Edwards    &    Walsh    Construction  assessment   is   certain."      Richards  v. 

Company  v.  Jasper  County,  117  Iowa  City  of  Cincinnati,  31  0.  S.  506,  514 

365,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  301,  90  N.  W.  [1877]. 
1006  [1902].  5' Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co. 

=^  Allman  v.   District   of   Columbia,  v.  Taber,  168  Ind.  419.  77  N.  E.  741 

3  App.  D.  C.  8  [1894].  [1906];     Chicago.    ^Milwaukee    &    St. 

^  "It  seems  to  us  that,  in  order  to  Paul    Railway    Company    y.    Citv   of 

exempt  these  proprietors  from  assess-  Milwaukee,  89  Wis.  506.  28  L.  R.  A. 

ment    as    abuttors    on    the    imnvnve-  249,  62  N.  W.  417  [1895], 
ment,  it  must  appear  that  this  inter- 


1043  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  620 

from  assessment  generally,'""'  or  because  it  is  held  not  to  l)e  a  lot 
of  land  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.  The  tracks  of  a  rail- 
road which  are  situated  in  a  street  and  run  along  the  length  there- 
of are  not  regarded  as  abutting  on  such  street.^^  The  right  of  way 
of  a  railroad  company  running  across  a  street  has  been  held  not  to 
be  abutting  property.^^  One  street  which  intersects  another  is 
not  regarded  as  property  abutting  on  such  street.^**  Thus,  under 
an  ordinance  providing  that  where  railroad  tracks  are  laid  in  a 
street  already  paved,  the  owners  shall  pay  the  property  owners  for 
the  paving  between  the  rails,  the  railway  company  is  not  obliged 
to  pay  the  city  for  the  paving  opposite  intersecting  streets.***  If 
part  of  an  undivided  tract  abuts  upon  an  improvement,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  entire  tract  is  liable  to  assessment.*^  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  said  that  a  tract  of  forty  acres  unplatted  and 
used  for  farm  purposes,  a  part  of  which  abuts  upon  a  street  im- 
provement, cannot  be  assessed  for  such  improvement  as  an  entire- 
ty.*- If  the  property  belonging  to  one  owner  consists  of  two  or 
more  different  tracts,  the  fact  that  one  of  the  tracts  abuts  upon 
the  improvement  does  not  constitute  the  other  tract  abut- 
ting property  within  the  meaning  of  the  assessment  statute.*'' 
"Where  the  improvement  consists  of  a  part  of  the  width  of  a  street, 

^Chicago,    Milwaukee    &    St.    Paul  ject  to  the  reasonable  supervision  of 

Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Milwau-  the  police  powers  of  the  city."    Chi- 

kee,  89  Wis.  500,  28  L.  R.  A.  249,  62  cago,    Burlington    and    Quincy    Rail- 

N.  W.  417    [1895].  road   Company   v.   South   Park   Com- 

'^  South  Park  Commissioners  V.  The  missioners,    11    Bradwell     (111.)     5(32, 

Chicago,      Burlington      and      (,)uincy  5(i4   [1882]. 

Railroad      Company,      11)7      111.      105  ^  City  of  Council    Blutls  v.   Omaha 

[1883] ;  City  of  Boston  V.  Boston  and  &    Council    IMull's    Street    Railway    & 

Albany  Railroad  Company,  170  Mass.  Bridge  Company.    114    la.    141.  80  X. 

95,   49   N.   E.   95    [1898];'   Boehme   v.  W.  222    [1901]. 

City   of   Monroe,    100    Mich.   401,   64  "City  of  Council   Blulls  v.  Omaha 

N.  W.  204   [1895];   Harriott  Avenue,  &    Council    Blufl's    Street    Railway   &. 

24  Pa.  Super.  Ct.  597  [1904].  Contra^  Bridge  C<mipany,   114   la.    141.  86  N. 

Pittsburgh,  C.  C.  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co.  v.  W.  222   [1901]. 

Taber,    168    Ind.    419,    77    N.    E.    741  ^'Bishop  v.  Tripp,   15  R.   I.  406,  8 

[1906].  Atl.  692  [1887]. 

^Chicago,    Burlington   and    Quincy  "Ryan  v.   Sumner,    17   Wash.  228, 

Railroad     Company    v.     South    Park  49  Pac.  487   [18971. 

Commissioners,     11     Bradwell      (111.)  "This    was    held    under    a    statute 

502   [1882].     "The  right  of  way  of  a  making   unplatted   property   abutting 

railroad  company  across  a  street  can  on  a  street  subject  to  assessment  to 

in    no    proper    sense   of    the    term    be  a   depth  of  three   hundred   feet.     Mc- 

classed   as   property   abutting  on   the  Grew    v.    City    of    Kansas    City,    64 

street.     It  is  merely  a  rieht  of  occu-  Kan.  61,  67  Pac.  438   [1902]. 
pancy  of  a  portion  of  the  street,  sub- 


§  620  TAXATION    PA'    ASSESSMENT.  1044 

property  abutting  on  the  side  of  the  street  not  improved  is  re- 
garded as  abutting  on  the  improvement.**  Property  which  abuts 
upon  a  private  way  through  which  a  sewer  runs,  which  private 
way  is  subsequently  laid  out  into  a  public  way  becomes  property 
abutting  on  a  public  way  through  which  a  sewer  runs,  and  is  lia- 
ble to  assessment  under  a  statute  providing  for  assessing  such 
property.*''  Property  abutting  on  a  lateral  sewer  is  not  regarded 
as  abutting  on  the  main  sewer  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute 
providing  for  levying  an  assessment  upon  property  abutting  the 
sewer  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied.*"  A  tract  of  land  which 
as  originally  platted  abutted  on  one  street  but  which  as  actually 
used,  is  severed  from  the  rest  of  such  tract  and  is  separated  from 
the  street  by  such  residue,  is  not  a  lot  abutting  on  such  street.*^ 
If,  in  the  exercise  of  proper  discretion,  the  assessment  district  is 
made  to  consist  of  abutting  property,  other  property  cannot  be 
assessed  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement,  even  if  it  is  in  fact 
benefited  thereby.*^  Under  a  statute  authorizing  an  assessment 
upon  land  bounding  and  abutting  upon  a  street,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  city  could  not  provide  by  ordinance  for  assessing  the  cost 
of  an  improvement  "upon  all  the  lots  and  parcels  of  land  benefited 
thereby."*''  So  under  a  statute  restricting  the  assessment  to 
abutting  property,  if  made  in  proportion  to  frontage,  non-abutting 
property  thouf^h  benefited  cannot  be  assessed.^**  Land  abutting 
upon  one  improvement  cannot  be  treated  as  abutting  upon  an- 
other improvement  by  the  process  of  providing  for  constructing 
the  two  improvements  together  and  assessing  the  property  abut- 

"  Klein  V.  Nugent  Gravel  Company,  21  [1895];  Kelly  v.  City  of  Cleve- 
162  Ind.  509,  70  X.  E.  801  [1903];  land,  34  0.  S.  468  [1878];  Beech- 
Helm  V.  Witz,  35  Ind.  App.  131,  73  wood  Avenue  Sewer,  Pittsburg's  Ap- 
N.  E.  846  [1904];  City  of  Cincinnati  peal,  179  Pa.  St.  490,  36  Atl.  209 
V.  Batsche,  52  0.  S.  324,  27  L.  R.  A.  [1897];  Park  Avenue  Sewers,  Appeal 
536.  40  N.  E.  21   [1895].  of  Parker,   169   Pa.   St    433,   32   Atl. 

"Slocum    v.    Selectmen    of    Brook-  574      [1895];      Fifty-fnurth      Street, 

line,    163    Mass.    23,    39    N,    E.    351  Pittsburg's  Appeal,  165  Pa.  St.  8,  30 

[1895].  Atl.   503    [1F94];    Moreivood  Avenue, 

*^  Aver  V.   ]\Iayor   and   Aldermen  of  Chamber's    Appeal,    159    Pa.    St.    ^0, 

Somerville,   143   Mass.  585,   10  N.   E.  28  Atl.   123    [1893]. 

457   [1887].  «Fellv  v.  Tity  of  Cleveland,  34  0. 

"Lann-lois     V.     Cameron,     201     111.  S.  468    [1878]. 

301.  Pfi  N.  E.  332  119031.  °"  Cincinnati    v.    Batsche,    52    0.    S. 

'nm    V.    r-itv   of   ^licacro.   29   111.  324,   27   L.   R.   A.   536,  40   N.   E.   21 

31    [18P21:   Hncinnati  v.  Batsche.  ,52  [1895]. 
0.  S.  324,  27  L.  R.  A.  536,  40  N.  E. 


1045  PROPERTY    STJBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT,  §  620 

ting  upon  either."^^  This  is  especially  true  if  only  one  of  the 
streets  provided  for  in  the  ordinance  has  been  improved."'-  If 
two  alleys  are  established  in  one  block,  a  separate  district  must 
be  made  for  each  alley,  consisting  of  the  property  abutting  on 
each.^^  On  the  other  hand,  a  break  or  jog  in  a  street  does  not 
make  the  parts  thereof  distinct  streets.  A  tract  of  land  abutting 
upon  one  part  of  such  street  may  be  said  to  abut  on  the  entire 
street  and  may  be  assessed,  although  the  improvement  is  upon 
the  other  part  of  such  street.^''  The  statute  or  ordinance  for 
assessing  abutting  property  often  describes  such  property  as  abut- 
ting on  the  improvement.  Under  such  a  statute  or  ordinance, 
only  property  which  abuts  upon  that  part  of  the  street,  sewer 
and  the  like  which  is  being  improved,  and  for  the  improvement  of 
which  the  assessment  is  levied,  can  be  assessed. '*■"'  Under  a  stat- 
ute providing  that  abutting  property  is  to  be  assessed  for  a  street 
improvement,  part  of  a  tract  which  abuts  upon  a  bridge  in  a 
street,  which  bridge  is  not  improved,  cannot  be  assessed.^**  How- 
ever, under  such  a  statute  it  was  held  that  where  a  street  improve- 
ment consisted  of  grading  and  planking,  property  al)utting  on 
the  street  as  improved  by  either  of  these  means,  might  be  assessed 
for  the  improvement,  although  some  of  the  land  assessed  was  a 
thousand  feet  beyond  the  termination  of  the  planking."^  In  this 
ease,  it  was  suggested  as  possible  that  the  cost  of  the  grading  at 
that  end  of  the  street  might  have  been  the  most  expensive  part 
of  the  work  and  that  the  owner  of  such  land  might  not  there- 
fore be  paying  more  than  a  nroportionate  share  of  the  cost  of  such 

'^'City    of     Covington     v.     Matson,  14  0.  S.  438   [1863];   Northern  Indi- 

(Ky.),    34    S.    W.    897,    17    Ky.    L.  ana    Railroad   Company   v.    Connellv. 

R.   1323    [18961;    Hutchinson  v.  City  10  O.  S.  160  [18,59];  Scoville  v.  City 

of    Omaha,    52    Xeh.    345.    72    N.    W.  of    Cleveland,    1    0.    S.    126    [1853]: 

218    [1897];    City   of   Reading  v.  O'-  (followed    without   opinion   in    Clark 

Reilly,   169   Pa.    St.   366,   32   Atl.  420  v.    City    of    Cleveland,    1    O.    S,    139 

[1895].  11853]")  ;   In  the  Matter  of  the  Open- 

"■Willard     v.     Albertson,     23     Ind,  in<j;  of  Orkney  Street,  Appeal  of  the 

App.    164,   53   X.   E.    1077,   54   X.   E.  City  of  Philadelphia,  194  Pa.  St.  425. 

403    [1899].  46  L.  R.  A.  274,  45  Atl.  314   [1900|: 

'"City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Rrinekwirth.  Fifty-fnurth    Street,    Pittsburg's    Ai>- 

204  Mo.  280.   102  S.  \V.   1091    [1907].  p.-al.     165     Pa.    St.    8,    30    Atl.     503 

"' Kuhns  v.  City  of  Omaha.  55  Xel).  (1894]:      Wabash     Avenue,     26     Pa. 

183,  75  X.  W.   562    [1898].  Super.  Ct.  305   [1904]. 

"Cincinnati    v.    P.atsche,    52    0,    S.  "Town  of  Salem  v.  Henderson.    13 

324,   27   L.   R.    A.   536,   40   X.   E,   21  Ind.  App.  563,  41  X.  E.  1062  [1895]. 

[1895];    Smith  v.  City  of  Toledo,  24  "  Citv   of   Seattle   v.    Kellehor.    195 

O.  S.  126  [1873]  ;  Creighton  v.  Scott,  U.  S.  351,  49  L.  232.  25  S.  44  [1904]. 


§  621  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1046 

improvement.  Some  statutes  or  ordinances  provide  for  assess- 
ing property  which  abuts  upon  the  line  of  the  street  improved. 
Under  such  provisions  it  is  not  necessary  to  assess  merely  the 
property  abutting  on  that  part  of  the  street  which  is  improved. 
Propert}'  abutting  on  the  street  beyond  the  part  thereof  which 
is  improved,  may  be  assessed.'*^ 

§  621.     AdjointDg-  property. 

In  the  exercise  of  its  .discretion,  the  legislature  or  public  cor- 
poration or  officer  to  whom  is  given  by  statute  the  power  to  deter- 
mine what  property  is  benefited  in  laying  out  an  assessment  dis- 
trict may  provide  for  levying  an  assessment  upon  "adjoining" 
property.^  A  district  consisting  of  adjoining  land  is  not  looked 
upon  as  unduly  restricted  in  boundary.-  A  statute  authorizing 
an  assessment  "upon  the  property  adjoining  and  to  be  specially 
benefited  by  the  improvement"  is  held  to  amount  to  a  legislative 
determination  that  the  property  adjoining  is  specially  benefited, 
and  not  to  mean  that  the  adjoining  propert}^  is  to  be  assessed 
only  if  it  is  benefited.''  The  term  "adjoining"  with  reference  to 
property  means  that  such  property  is  in  immediate  contact  with 
the  improvement  and  not  separated  therefrom  by  intervening 
property.*  The  term  "adjoining"  is  said  to  be  the  equivalent  of 
"fronting."^  Accordingly,  under  a  constitutional  provision  al- 
lowing an  assessment  to  be  made  "upon  the  property  fronting  such 

^*  McCormick  v.  City  of  Omaha,  37  visdrs   of   Rock   County,    15    Wis.    11 

Neb.    829,    56    N.    W.    626     [1893J;  [1862]. 

Main     Street,      Big     Run      Borough,  -  Hennessy    v.    Douglas   County,    99 

137   Pa.  St.  590,  20  Atl.  711    [1890].  Wis.  129,  74  N.  W.  983   [1898]. 

^  Johnson  v.  District  of  Columbia,  *  United    States   ex   rel.    Henderson 

6  Mackey   (D.  C.)   21   [1887];  United  v.  Edmunds,   3   Mackey    (D.   C.)    142 

States  ex  rel.  Henderson  v.  Edmunds,  [1884]. 

3  Mackey   (D.  C.)    142   [1884];  Casey  *  Johnson  v.   District  of   Columbia, 

V.  City  of  Leavenworth,  17  Kan.  189  6  Mackey   (D.  C.)   21   [1887];  In  the 

[1876];    Scott    County   v.    Hinds,    50  Matter   of   the   Petition   of   Ward   to 

Minn.    204,    52    N.    W.    523    [1892];  Vacate    Certain    Assessments,    52    N. 

Forry    v.    Ridge,    56    Mo.    App.    615  Y.    395    [1873].      "The   word   adjoin- 

[1893];    In   the   Matter   of   the   Peti-  ing   in   its   etymological    sense  means 

tion  of  Ward  to  Vacate  Certain  As-  touching     or     contiguous     as     distin- 

sessments,  52  N.  Y.  395  [1873];  City  guished    from    lying    near    or    adja- 

Council     V.     Pinckney,     1     Treadway  cent."    Hennessy  v.  Douglas  County, 

(S.  C.)  -^2    11812];  Schintgen   v.  City  99    Wis.    129,   *137,    74    N.    W.    983 

of   La   Crosse,    117   Wis.    158,   94   N.  [1898]. 

W.   84    [1903];    Hennessy  v.  Douglas  'Scott  County   v.   Hinds,   50   Minn. 

County,  99   Wis.   129,   74  N.  W.   983  204.  .52  N.  W.  523    [1892]. 
[1898];    Jenkins  v.   Board  of   Super- 


1047  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  621 

improvements,"  a  statute  providing  for  assessing  "lots  and  par- 
eels  of  land  adjoining  said  sidewalks"  has  been  upheld.''  The 
context  may,  however,  show  that  the  word  "adjoining"  has  a 
meaning  different  from  "fronting."'  Thus,  luider  a  statute  pro- 
viding that  assessments  for  improvements  of  streets  shall  be  lev- 
ied upon  "grounds  fronting  upon  or  adjoining  the  improvement," 
it  has  been  held  that  the  word  "fronting"  refers  to  the  end  of  the 
lot  used  as  the  front  wliifli  touches  upon  an  improvement,  while 
the  term  "adjoining"  refers  to  a  side  street  which  touches  the 
property  assessed.**  Property  separated  from  an  imj)rovement  is 
ordinarily  held  not  to  l)e  adjoining  thereto.''  Thus,  where  a  pub- 
lic square  intervened  between  a  lot  and  a  street  which  was  im- 
proved, it  was  held  that  wliile  such  lot  might  be  adjacent  to  such 
street,  it  was  not  adjoining  thereto.^"  However,  where  a  street 
ninety-five  feet  wide  was  paved  in  the  middle  for  a  width  of 
twenty-five  feet  leaving  room  for  travel  on  each  side  between  the 
pavement  and  the  curb  stone,  it  was  held  that  such  improvement 
adjoined  the  lots  whieli  touched  the  street  as  laid  out.^^  The 
tracks  of  a  railroad  company  within  a  street  and  running  along 
the  length  thereof  do  not  adjoin  such  street  witliin  the  meaning 
of  a  statute  providing  for  assessing  adjoining  property.^-  Wheth- 
er property  adjoins  a  street,  is  to  be  determined  by  the  use  made 
thereof  at  the  time  of  such  improvement  or  assessment,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  way  in  which  such  property  is  laid  out  by  th" 
lines  of  a  plat,  if  such  tract  is  in  fact  occupied  and  used.^^  Thus, 
where  two  lots  were  occupied  and  used  as  one,  it  was  held  that  th  - 
entire  tract  was  adjoining  to  a  street  which  touched  one  of  such 
lots.^*  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  lot  has  been  divided  in  fact  and  i- 
used  as  two  dis-tinct  tracts,  the  one  which  is  separated  from  the  im- 
provement b.v   the   otlicr  cannot   l)e   regarded    as  adjoining  su  \\ 

'Scott  €onntv  v.   Hinds.   50   Minn.  '"  Jnhnson  v.  District  of  Columbia 

204,  52  N.  W.  523   [1S<)2I.  0  Mackcy   ( D.  C.)   21   [1887]. 

^Collier  Estate  v.  Western  Pavin.<;  "  Bowditcli  v.  City  of  New  Haven 

&   Supply  Company.   180  Mo.   302.  7!)  40  Conn.   503    [1873]. 

S.   W.   947    [19041.  '^O'Reiiley     v.    City    of    Kingston 

"Collier  Estate  v.  Western  Pavin.i,'  114  X.  Y.  439,  21  N.E.  1004  [1889J. 

&  Supply  Company,   180  ]iIo.  302,  79  Brick    &    Terra    Cotta    Company    v. 

S.  W.  947    [19041;    Meier  v.   City  of  Hull.  49   Mo.   App.  433    [1892].  " 

St.    Louis,    180    Mo.    391,    79    S.'  W.  'M^omig   v.- Lafayette,    33    Ind.    30 

955  [1903].  [1870]. 

•In   the  flatter  of  the   Petition  of  "*  Wolfort  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,   115 

Ward     to     Vacate     Certain     Assess-  Mo.    139.  21    S.    \\.   912    [1892]. 
monts,  52  X.  V.  395   [1873]. 


S622 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1048 


improvement.^''  The  expression  "adjoining  the  locality  to  be 
affected"  includes  property  adjoining  the  improvement  or  near 
thereto,  which  is  aft'ected  physically  or  the  value  of  which  is  af- 
fected commercially  by  the  improvement.^" 

§  622.    Adjacent  property. 

The  legislature,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  or  the  public 
corporation  or  officer  authorized  by  statute  to  determine  what 
property  is  benefited  by  an  improvement  and  to  lay  out  an  assess- 
ment district  therefor,  may  provide  for  levying  an  assessment 
upon  "adjacent"  property.^  Assessment  districts  of  this  sort  are 
most  frequently  laid  out  in  assessments  for  street  improvements,- 
but  may  be  laid  out  in  assessments  for  a  park,^  or  a  drain.*     The 


I'Romig  V.  Lafayette,  33  Ind.  30 
[1870]. 

'®  Little  Rock  v.  Katzenstein,  52 
Ark.  107,  12  S.  W.   198   [1889]. 

^  Chambers  v.  Satterlee,  40  Cal. 
497  [1871];  Burnett  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  the  Ci'y  of  Sac- 
ramento, 12  Cal.  76,  73  Am.  Dec. 
518  [1859];  Town  of  Woodruff  Place 
V.  Raschig,  147  Ind.  517,  46  N.  E. 
990  [189(3];  Wormley  v.  Board  of 
Supervisors  of  Wright  County,  Iowa. 
108  la.  232,  78  X.  W.  824  [1899]; 
Nevin  v.  Allen,  (Ky.),  26  S. 
W^  180,  15  Ky.  Law  Rep.  836 
[1894];  Municipality  Xumber  Two, 
Praying  for.  the  Opening  of  Benton 
Street  v.  White,  9  La.  Ann.  446 
[1854];  Walker  v.  City  of  Ann  Ar- 
bor, 118  Mich.  251,  76  N.  W.  394 
[1898];  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel. 
Merchant  v.  District  Court  for  St. 
Louis  County,  66  Minn.  161,  68  X. 
W.  860  [1890];  City  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Speck,  67  Mo.  403*  [1878];  Mound 
City  Construction  Company  v.  Mac- 
gurn,  97  Mo.  App.  403,  71  S.  W.  460 
[1902];  Kuhns  v.  City  of  Omaha.  55 
Xeb.  183,  75  X.  W.  562  [1898];  Mc- 
Cormick  v.  City  of  Omaha,  37  Xeb. 
829,  56  X.  W\"  626  [1893];  Matter 
of  the  City  of  Xew  York,  190  X. 
Y.  350,  sub  nomine;  In  re  Water 
Front  in  City  of  Xew  York,  83  X.  E. 
299  [19071;  (modifying  judg- 
ment.       105        X.        Y.        S.        750. 


120  App.  Div.  849);  Raymond 
V.  Cleveland,  42  O.  S.  522  [i885]; 
Meissner  v.  City  of  Toledo,  31  0.  S 
387    [1877];    St.   Benedict's  Abbey  v. 

Marion  Comity,  —  Or.  ,  93  Pac. 

231  [1908]-  Vranklin  v.  Hancock. 
204  Pa.  St.  110,  53  Atl.  644  [1902]; 
State  V.  Moss,  44  Wash.  91,  86 
Pac.   1129   [1906]. 

"Town  of  Woodruff  Place  v.  Ras- 
chig, 147  Ind.  517,  46  X.  E.  990 
[1896];  Xevin  v.  Allen.  (Ky.)  15 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  836,  26  S.  W.  180 
[1894];  Municipality  Xumber  Two, 
Praying  for  the  Opening  of  Benton 
Street  v.  White,  9  La.  Ann.  446 
[1854];  Walker  v.  City  of  Ann  Ar- 
bor, 118  Mich.  251,  76  X.  W.  394 
[1898];  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Speck, 
67  Mo.  403  [1878];  Mound  City 
Construction  Company  v.  Macgurn. 
97  Mo.  App.  403,  71  S.  W.  460 
[1902];  Fuhns  v.  City  of  Omaha,  55 
Xeb.  183,  75  X.  W.  562  [1898];  Ray- 
mond v.  Cleveland,  42  0.  S.  522 
[1885];  Meissner  v.  City  of  Toledo, 
31  O.  S.  387  [1877];  State  v.  Moss, 
44  Wash.  91,  86  Pac.  1129   [1906]. 

^  State  of  ]\finnesota  ex  rel.  Mer- 
chant V.  District  Court  for  St.  Louis 
County,  60  :\linn.  161,  68  X.  W.  860 
[1896]. 

*  Wormley  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Wright  County,  Iowa,  108  la.  232, 
78  X.  W.  824  [1899]. 


1049 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§622 


term  "adjacent"  as  ordinarily  nsed  means  that  the  property  is 
near  the  improvement  so  as  to  be  affected  thereby  and  so  as  to 
enjoy  the  nse  thereof,  but  not  necessarily  touching  such  improve- 
ment.-' Accordingly,  it  is  possible  that  land  which  is  separated 
from  an  improvement  by  intervening  land  may  be  adjacent." 
Thus,  where  an  intervening  strip  of  land  two  feet  in  width  .separ- 
ated a  tract  of  land  from  a  street,  such  tract  was  nevertheless 
held  to  be  adjacent  to  such  street.'  The  context  of  some  stat- 
utes may  make  necessary  a  narrower  meaning  for  the  term  "ad- 
jacent.'"* Thus,  under  a  statute  requiring  a  petition  for  a  ditch 
to  be  signed  by  "a  majority  of  persons  resident  in  the  county 
owning  land  adjacent  to  such  improvement,"  it  was  held  that 
the  terra  adjacent  meant  abutting  on."  The  term  "adjacent"  is 
frequently  found  in  combination  with  other  terms  which  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent  modify  its  primary  meaning.  Thus,  a  pro- 
vision may  be  made  that  an  assessment  shall  be  levied  on  property 
"abutting  on  or  adjacent"  to/^  or  lots  and  lands  that  are  "con- 
tiguous and  adjacent  as  well  as  those  that  abut,"^^  or  "adjacent 


"Town  of  WoodrtifT  Place  v.  llas- 
ohiir,  147  Ind.  517,  46  N.  E.  990 
[1890];  In  the  M<atter  of  the  Peti- 
tion of  Ward  to  Vacate  Certain  As-, 
sessments,  52  X.  Y.  395  [1873].  "The 
meaning  of  these  words  ( i.  e.  contig- 
uous and  adjacent)  especially  'adja- 
cent' cannot  be  limited  by  any  abso- 
lute or  fixed  measurement,  but  in 
each  case  mu«t  be  determined  by  cir- 
cumstances; yet  for  all  jtrnctical  pur- 
poses they  may  be  said  to  embrace 
lots  and  lands  'near  to'  tlio  improve- 
ment: and  all  such  when  specially 
benefited  are  liable  to  be  char<.'ed  with 
the  costs  and  expense."  Moi^sner  v. 
City  of  Toledo.  31  O.  S.  387,  395. 
396  [1877].  "Xot  only  the  real  es- 
tate abutting  on  tbe  street  but  adja- 
cent real  estate  may  be  included  in 
such  taxinjT  district  and  so  assessed 
for  the  contemnlnted  work  nnd  im- 
provement. 'Adiacent'  signifies,  in 
this  conipotion.  'IviriT  neir.  close  to, 
or  conti"nioTs'  1>i'f  ii"t  ■T'tmllv 
'tnuehin"^.'  Tlie  dietinntion  bet'vnen 
'adjacent'  and  'adjoining'  seems  to  be 


that  the  former  implies  that  the  two 
bodies  are  not  widely  separated 
though  they  may  not  actually  touch, 
while  'adjoining'  indicates  that  they 
are  so  joined  or  united  that  no  third 
body  intervenes."  Ilennessy  v.  Doug- 
las County,  99  Wis.  129,  130,  137. 
74  X.  W.  983    [1898]. 

"Town  of  WoodruiV  Place  v.  Pas- 
chig,  147  Ind.  517.  4ii  X.  K.  990 
[189(5]. 

^  Town  of  Woodrull'  Place  v.  Ras 
chig,     147    Ind.    517.    4(5    X.    E.    990 

[i.'"^9r)i. 

"  Worniloy  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Wright  County.  Iowa,  108  la.  232. 
78  X.  W.  824  [1899]. 

"  Wormlev  v.  Board  of  Supervisors 
of  Wri',rht  Countv.  Iowa,  108  la.  232. 
78  X.  W.  824   [1899]. 

'"  Kuhns  V.  City  of  Omaha.  5.'j 
X>b.  183.  75  X.  W".  562  [1898];  Mc- 
Cormick  v.  City  of  Omaha,  37  Xeb. 
829.  50  X''.  W.  626    [1893]. 

"Pfivmnnd  V.  Cleveland.  42  0.  S. 
522  [1885]:  Meissner  v.  City  of  To- 
ledo, 31  0.  S.  387  [1877]. 


§  G23  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1050 

to  or  fronting,"'-  or  "immediately  upon  and  adjacent  to,"^'  or 
"specially  benefited  and  adjacent,"'^  to  the  improvement  for  which 
the  assesvsment  is  levied.  A  statute  providing  for  assessing  property 
"adjacent"  to  an  improvement,  means,  with  reference  to  the  im- 
provement of  a  street  which  has  been  improved  in  sections,  ad- 
jaaent  to  that  part  of  the  street  upon  which  has  been  done  v/ork 
for  which  the  assessment  is  levied.'"'  The  legislature  may,  of 
course,  authorize  property  adjacent  to  the  street  at  any  part  of 
its  length  to  be  assessed  for  an  improvement  upon  one  section 
thereof.'"  By  statute,  it  may  be  provided  that  if  an  improvement 
is  constructed  upon  one  side  of  a  street,  the  property  adjacent  to 
such  side  shall  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  such  improvement.'' 
In  the  absence  of  such  specific  provision,  however,  property  may 
be  adjacent  to  an  improvemejit,  although  the  work  is  done  on  the 
side  of  the  street  not  immediately  next  to  such  property."* 

S  623.     Contiguous  property. 

The  legislature  or  the  public  corporation  or  officer  authorized 
to  determine  what  property  is  benefited  by  an  improvement  and 
to  lay  out  an  assessment  district,  may  provide  that  such  assess- 
ment district  shall  consist  of  property  "contiguous"  to  the  im- 
provement.' Such  determination  is  ordinarily  conclusive  and 
cannot  be  invalidated  by  showing  that  property  other  than  that 
which  is  contiguous  is  in  fact  benefited.-  F'urthermore,  contigu- 
ous property  is  not  as  a  matter  of  law,  benefited.     If  property 

'"Municipality  Number  Two,  Pray-  '"Marion  Trust  Co.   v.   City   of   In- 

ing  for  the  Opening  of  Benton  Street  dianapolis,  37  Ind.  App.  672,  700,  75 

v.Vhite,  9  La.  Ann.  440  [1854].  N.  E.  834,  836    [1905]. 

"Town   of  Woodrufl'  Place  v.  Ras-  '  Langlois  v.  Cameron,  201  111.  301. 

chin-.    147    Tnd.    517,    40    N.    E.    990  00   X.   E.   332    [1903];    West  Chicago 

[1890].  Park    Commissioners    v.    Farber,    171 

^Hhambers    v.    Satterlee,    40    Cal.  III.   146,  49  X.  E.  427   [1898];   Davis 

497    [1871];    St.    Louis   v.    Speck,    67  v.  City  of  Litchfield,  145  111.  313,  21 

Mo.  403   [1878];   Meissner  v.  City  of  L.  R.  A.  503,  33  X.  E.  888   [1893]; 

Toledo,  31  O.  S.  387   [1877].  Chicago,      Burlington      and      Quincy 

'"  CIa])ton   V.    Taylor,    49    Mo.    App.  Railroad  Company  v.  City  of  Quincy. 

117    [1892].  '  130  111.  503,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  334.  27 

'"  Kuhns  V.  City  of  Omaha,  55  Xeb.  X.   E.    192    [1892];    Lake   v.   City   of 

183,    75    X.    W.   562    [1898];    McCor-  Decatur,    91    111.    590    [1879];    Meiss- 

mick  V.  City  of  Omaha,  37  Xeb.  829,  ner  v.   City  of  Toledo,   31    O.   S.   387 

50  X.  W.  620  [1893].  [1877];   Raymond  v.  Cleveland,  42  O. 

'^Marion   Trust  Co.  v.   City   of  In-  S.   522    [1885]. 
dianapolis,  37  Ind.  App.  072,'  700,  37  ^Lake   v.    City   of    Decatur,   91    111. 

Ind.    App.    700.    75    X.    E.    834,    836  590   [1879], 
[1905]. 


1051  PROPERTY    .SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  623 

is  omitted  from  assessments,  the  mere  faet  that  it  is  c.)nti;4uous 
does  not  show  that  it  is  benefited  and  therefore  is  improperly 
omitted.''  If  by  statute  it  is  necessary  at  the  time  that  the  ordin- 
ance provided  for  an  improvement  is  adopted  to  assess  "contigu- 
ous property  benefited"  bi:t  before  the  assessment  is  made,  the 
statute  is  amended  by  omitting  the  word  "contiguous,"  it  is  pro- 
per to  assess  any  property  benefited  though  not  contiguous.*  The 
term  "contiguous"  is  generally  used  in  statutes  in  its  popular 
meaning,  which  is  said  to  be  "in  actual  or  close  contact."  "touch- 
ing" or  "near."'  It  seems  to  be  regarded  in  some  eases  as  equi- 
valent to  "al)utting"  or  "bounding.""  In  othei-  cases  the  term 
"contiguous"  has  been  regarded  as  equivalent  to  "near."'  Land 
separated  from  an  im[)rovement  by  an  intervening  strip  of  land 
over  which  the  owner  of  the  tract  in  question  has  no  easement 
and  which  is  not  subject  to  a  jmblic  easement  is  not  contigujus 
thereto."  If  a  lot  as  originally  platted  touched  the  line  of  a  street 
but  in  its  subsecpient  use  it  has  been  divided  into  two  lots,  one 
of  which  is  separated  from  such  street  by  the  other,  the  tract 
thus  separated  from  such  street  is  not  contiguous  thereto."  If  th  ' 
intervening  strip  of  land  is  subject  to  a  public  easement,  its  ex- 
istence does  not  prevent  the  ijroperty  separated  from  the  street 
thereby  from  being  contiguous  to  a  street.^"  Thus,  jjroperty  sep- 
arated from  a  street  by  a  strip  of  ground  used  for  a  sidewalk  is 
contiguous  to  \ho  street."  Property  lying  at  the  end  of  a  street 
which  is  to  be  improved  may.  if  contiguous  thereto,  be  assessed 
under  a  statute  providing  for  the  assessment  of  contiguous  prop- 
erty.^-    Lender  the  provisioii   of  the  Illinois  constitution  authoriz- 

'TToldom    V.    City    of    C'liu-a,un.    KJO  '  .Mcissnor  v.  City  of  Toledo.  .31   O. 

111.    109,  48   X.    E."  104    [18071:    (  lii-  S.  :?S7    [18771. 

f-ago.  Rock   Island  &   Pacific   Kailway  "  Lanfrlois  v.  (  aiiici-on.  201    111.  .SOI, 

Company  v.  (  ity  of  Cliieafio.   i:!!)   111.  (1(>   X.   E.  .^•^2. 

573.  28  X.  E.    1108    [IFO.-^].  "  Lanjjiois  v.  Canioron.  201    ill.  :?01. 

-Tn    the    :\Iatt(>r    of    Wcstlako    Ave-  (Wi  X.  E.  332   [19031. 

nui".   Soattlo.    40   Wash.    1.J4,   82   Pac.  '"  Chicafro.     IJurlinjjtoii     A     Qiiincy 

279    [19051.  Railroad  Coniiiany  v.  City  of  Qiiinc.v, 

"County  of  AdaTiis  v.  (  ily  .  f  (Juiii-  13()   111.  5li3.  29  .\in.  St.  Rep.  334.  27 

cy.    130   Til.   5(!(>.   (1   E.    R.   A.    155.   22  X.  E.   192   |1S921. 

X.  E.  024   [18901.  "  Chicajr,,.     Rurlin-ton     .<t     Qnincy 

""The  wiiid  'ciiiitiLinnus'  as  w-n]   in  Kailicad   Company   v.  City  of  Quincy. 

tlie    statnto    and    fnr<>uoin^r    ordinance  Kit;    111.   5i;:S.  29  Am.   St.  Rep.  334.  27 

means    "in    actual    or    (dose    contact.'  X.    E.    192    [1F9-?1. 

'toucliinu.-.'      'adjacent'      or      'lu-ar.' "  '-Brooks    v.    (ity    of    (  hicafro.    168 

Langlois    v.    Camenni.    2(tl     III.    301.  111.  (10.  48  X.  E.  13(i  [  18971. 
306,   66  N.   E.   332   [1003]. 


§623 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1052 


ing  public  improvements  to  be  made  by  general  taxation,  special 
assessment  or  special  taxation  of  contiguous  property,  the  term 
"contiguous  property"  refers  only  to  special  taxation.^^  Ac- 
cordingly, a  special  assessment  based  on  the  theory  of  benefits 
may  be  levied  on  property  benefited  whether  contiguous  or  not.^* 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  exercise  of  the  city's  discretion  a  special 
assessment  may  be  levied  upon  contiguous  property  only.^^  The 
fact  that  an  ordinance  confines  an  assessment  to  abutting  or  con- 
tiguous propert.y  is  not  conclusive  that  the  charge  is  a  special 
tax.  It  may  also  be  a  special  assessment. ^"^  A  right  of  way  of  a 
railroad  which  touches  an  improvement  ma.y  be  regarded  as  con- 
tiguous thereto.^'  A  railroad  situated  in  a  street  and  running 
along  the  length  thereof  has  been  held  to  be  contiguous  to  such 
street,  within  the  meaning  of  constitutional  and  statutory  provi- 
sions authorizing  assessment  or  special  taxation  of  contiguous 
property.^^  A  different  result  may  be  reached  if  other  terms  are 
combined  in  the  term  statute  or  ordinance  with  the  word  "contig- 
uous." Thus,  a  statute  authorizing  assessments  or  special  taxes 
upon  "contiguous  property  abutting"  upoi  the  street  or  avenue 
improved,  does  not  authorize  an  assessment  upon  the  right  of  way 
of  a  railway  company  in  a  street  on  the  theory  that  a  street  or 
avenue  cannot  be  said  to  abut  on  itself  and  accordingly  an  in- 
corporeal right  in  such  street  cannot  be  said  to  abut.'°  While  con- 
tiguous it  does  not  front  on  the  improvement,  and  cannot  be  assess- 


'^  Guild,  Jr.,  V.  City  of  Chicago, 
82   111.   472    [1876]. 

"  Farr  v.  West  Chicago  Park  Com- 
missioners, 167  111.  355,  46  N.  E.  893 
[1897];  Guild,  Jr.  v.  City  of  Chi. 
cago,   82   111.   472    [1876]. 

'^Lake  v.  City  of  Decatur,  91  111. 
596   [1879]. 

"  Bass  V.  South  Park  Commission- 
ers, 171  111.  370,  49  N.  E.  549  [1898]. 

'"Palmer  v.  City  of  Danville,  166 
111.  42,  46  N.  E.  629  [1897];  Chicago 
&  Northwestern  Railway  Company  v. 
Village  of  Elmhurst,  165  111.  148,  46 
N.  E.  437  [1897];  Illinois  Central 
Railroad  Company  v.  Citv  of  Fan- 
kakee.  164  Til.  608,  45  N.  E.  971 
[1897]:  Indianapolis,  Peru  &  Chica- 
go Railroad  Company  v.  Ross,  47 
Ird.  25   [1874]. 


'*  C  hicago,  Rock  Island  "  &  Pacific 
Railway  Company  v.  City  of  Moline, 
158  111.  64,  41  N.  E.  877  [1895]; 
Freeport  Street  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Freeport.  151  111.  451,  38  X, 
E.  137  [1894];  Kuehner  v.  City  of 
Freeport,  143  111.  92,  17  L.  R.  A.  774, 
32  N.  E.  372  [1893];  The  Jackson- 
ville Railway  Company  v.  City  of 
Jacksonville,'  114  111.  562,  2  IST.  E. 
478   [1886]. 

'"South  Park  Commissioners  v. 
The  Chicago,  Burlington  fe  Quincy 
Railroad  Company,  107  111.  105 
[1883].  (The  result  reached  in  this 
case  depends  primarily  upon  the  use 
and  meaninif  of  t^ie  word  "ahut"  and 
not  noon  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"contiguous.") 


1053 


PROPERTY   SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT. 


624 


ed  according  to  its  frontage.-^  A  public  street  or  alley  is  not  prop- 
erty contiguous  to  an  improvement.-^  It  seems  to  be  held  that 
where  several  streets  are  improved  together,  property  contiguous 
to  any  one  of  them  may  be  regarded  as  contiguous  to  the  entire 
improvement. -- 

§  624.     Property  fronting  on  improvement. 

In  the  exercise  of  ils  discretion,  the  legislature,  or  the  public 
corporation  or  official  authorized  to  determine  what  property  is 
benefited  and  to  lay  out  an  assessment  district,  may  i)rovide  for 
assessing  the  property  ''fronting"  upon  an  improvement.^  Such 
a  determination  is  not  an  undue  restriction  of  the  assessment  dis- 
trict, even  tliough  it  excludes  some  propert}"  which  is  in  fact  bene- 
fited.- This  is  true,  even  if  the  council  in  its  resolution  of  inten- 
tion, declares  that  the  contemplated  Avork  is  of  more  than  ordin- 
ary or  local  public  benefit  and  the  statute  under  which  such  an 
assessment  is  levied  provides  that  if  the  contemplated  work  is 
of  more  than  ordinary  or  public  local  benefit,  the  council  may 
make  the  expense  of  such  improvement  chargeable  upon  the  dis- 


™Lightner  v.  City  of  Peoria,  150 
111.  80,  37  N.  E.  69. 

^  Lightner  v.  City  of  Peoria,  150 
111.  80,  37  N.  E.  69. 

^  County  of  Adams  v.  City  of 
Quincy,  130  111.  566,  6  L.  R.  A.  155, 
22  N.  E.  624. 

^O'Dea  V.  Mitchell,  144  Cal.  374, 
77  Pac.  1020  11904];  San  Diego  In- 
vestment Co.  V.  Shaw,  129  Cal.  273, 
61  Pac.  1082  [1900];  White  v.  Har- 
ris, 103  Cal.  528,  37  Pac.  502  [1894]; 
Dougherty  v.  Miller,  36  Cal.  83 
[1868];  Emery  v.  San  Francisco  Gas 
Co.,  28  Cai.  346  [1865];  Parker  v. 
Challis,  9  Kan.  155  [1872];  Barber 
Asphalt  Paving  Co.  v.  Watt,  51  La. 
Ann.  1345,  26  So.  70  [1899];  Surgi 
V.  Snetchman,  11  La.  Ann.  387 
[1856];  Municipality  Number  Two, 
Praying  for  the  Opening  of  Benton 
Street  v.  White,  9  La.  Ann.  446 
[18541;  Weller  v.  City  of  St.  Paul. 
5  Minn.  95  [18611;  State  ex  rel. 
Barber  Asphalt  Pavin<r  Company  v. 
City  of  St.  Louis.  183  Mo.  230*.  81 
S.  "W.  1104  [1904];  Vp\or  v.  City 
of  St.  T.-^uis.  ISO  Mo.  391.  79  vS.  W. 
955    [1903];   Collier  Estate  v.  West- 


ern Paving  &  Supply  Company,  180 
Mo.  362,  79  S.  W.  947  [1904];  City 
of  Sedalia  v.  Coleman,  82  Mo.  App. 
560  [18<)9];  Erisman  v.  Board  of 
Chosen  Freeholders  of  the  County  of 
Burlington,  64  N.  J.  L.  (35  Vr.)  516, 
45  Atl.  998  [1900];  State,  Society 
for  Establishing  Useful  Manufac- 
tures, Pros.  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen 
of  the  City  of  Paterson,  42  N.  J.  L. 
(13  Vr.)  615  [1880];  State,  Gobisch, 
Pros.  V.  Inhabitants  of  the  Township 
of  Xorth  Bergen  in  the  County  of 
Hudson,  37  X.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  402 
[1875];  State,  Graham,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Paterson,  37  X.  J.  L. 
(8'Vr.)  380  [1875];  Franklin  v. 
Hancock.  204  Pa.  St.  110,  53  Atl. 
644  [1902];  Violett  v.  Alexandria. 
92  Va.  5fil.  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  825,' 
31  L.  R.  A.  382.  23  S.  E.  909  [1896] : 
Megeett  v.  City  of  Eau  riaire.  81 
Wi>!.  326.  51  X\  W.  566  [1892]. 

=  0'Dea  V.  :\Titchell.  144  Cal.  374, 
77  Pac.  1020  [19041;  State.  Society 
for  Establishint  Useful  Manufac- 
tures, P'-os.  V.  Al^avor  and  .Aldermen 
of  the  Citv  of  Paterson.  42  X'.  J.  L. 
(13  Vr.)    615   [1880]. 


§  624  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1054 

trict  which  the  council  shall  decide  to  be  benefited.'^  Under  a 
statute  authorizing  an  assessment  to  be  levied  upon  property 
fronting  an  improvement,  property  not  fronting  upon  the  im- 
provement cannot  be  assessed  even  if  benefited.*  If  the  statute 
authorizes  the  grading  of  a  street  at  the  expense  of  the  property 
fronting  thereon  and  the  construction  of  sewers  at  the  expense  of 
the  property  immediately  benefited  thereby,  the  assessment  for 
grading  is  limited  to  the  property  fronting  on  such  improvement.^' 
The  action  of  the  council  in  determining  that  property  fronting 
upon  the  improvement  is  benefited  is  conclusive."  Under  a  stat- 
ute authorizing  assessments  for  .street  improvements  upon  prop- 
erty fronting  on  the  street,  property  at  the  end  of  the  street  and 
at  right  angles  thereto  is  not  regarded  as  fronting  on  the  street, 
within  the  meaning  of  such  provision."  However,  such  property 
may  be  included  under  a  statute  which  specifically  provides  that 
where  one  street  terminates  in  another,  a  certain  part  of  the  cost 
may  be  assessed  urton  lots  fronting  upon  su'^h  termination.* 
A  statute  providing  for  the  assessment  of  lots  fronting  on  a  given 
street  does  not  authorize  the  apportionment  upon  each  lot  of  the 
expense  of  that  part  of  the  work  done  immediately  in  front  there- 
of.^ Under  a  statute  providing  for  assessing  property  fronting 
on  an  improvement,  ordinarily  only  property  which  fronts  upon 
that  part  of  the  street  or  other  public  improvement  for  the  cost 
of  which  the  assessment  in  question  is  levied  can  be  assessed. ^'^ 
Accordingly,  where  an  improvement  is  to  be  constructed,  except 
where  the  work  is  already  done,  property  fronting  upon  accepted 
w^ork  already  done  cannot  be  assessed.'^  Property  fronting  on 
one  side  of  a  street  is  to  be  assessed  even  if  the  greater  part  of 
the  work  is  done  upon  the  other  side  of  the  street.'-     Under  a 

^O'Dea   V.   Mitcli<^11.    144    Cal.    374.  *  Beckett    v.    Mor«e,    4    Cal.    App. 

77  Pac.  1020   [10041.  228.  87   Pac.  408   [1906];    San  Fran- 

*  Miller    v.    Mayn.    88    Cal.    568,    26  cisco    Pavins:    Co.    v.    Dubni.s,    2    Cal. 

Pac.    364    [18911^    Harriman   v.    City  App.  42,  83  Pac.  72  [19051. 

'of  Yonkers.  95  N.  Y.  S.  816,  109  App.  » Weller    v.    City    of    St.     PauL    5 

Div.    246    [19051;    Ryan    v.    Sumner,  Minn.  95    [18611. 

17  Wash.  228,  49  Pac.  487    [18971.  '"McDonald  v.  Conniff,  99  Cal.  386. 

''People  V.  Common  Council   of  the  34  Pac.  71    [18931;    Ryan  v.  Sumner. 

City   of   Kino-ston,   99    K   Y.    S.    657.  17  Wash.  228.  49  Pac.  487   [18971. 

114   App.  Div.   326    [19061.  "McDonald  v.  Conniff,  99  Cal.  386. 

«Me?oett    V.    City    of    E;ni    Claire.  34   Pac.   71    [18931. 

81  Wis.  326.  51   X.  W.  566   [18921.  '^  San    Die<ro    Investment    Company 

■Duncan   v.   Ramish.    142   Cal.   686.  v.  Shaw.   129   Cal.   273.  61   Pac.   1082 

76  Pac.   661    [190^].  [1900]. 


1055  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  624 

statute  which  shows  such  specific  intention,  an  assessment  may  l)e 
levied  upon  property  fronting  upon  a  street  for  an  improvement 
at  some  distance  from  the  property  assessed.^-'  Thus,  under  a 
statute  providing  therefor,  property  fronting  on  a  street  may  be 
assessed  for  the  cost  of  one-half  of  the  street  intersections  at  each 
end  of  the  block  in  which  such  property  is  situated.^*  The  term 
"fronting"  ordinarily  means  that  the  improvement  at  some  point 
touches  the  property  assessed.'^'  A  lot  situated  at  the  corner  of 
two  streets  crossing  each  other  at  an  oblique  angle,  which  lot  is 
triangular  in  shape  and  is  situated  almost  entirely  outside  of  a 
line  drawn  at  right  angles  to  the  part  of  the  street  improved  has 
been  held  to  front  on  such  improvement  where  one  side  of  the  lot 
touches  the  street  improved.^''  "Fronting"  is  said  in  some  juris- 
dictions to  be  eipiivalent  to  "adjoining."^'  Ilenee,  under  a  con- 
stitutional provision  authorizing  the  assessment  of  property  front- 
ing upon  an  improvement,  the  legislature  may  i)rovide  for  the 
assessment  of  property  adjoining  an  improvement.^^  In  other 
jurisdictions,  while  it  is  conceded  that  the  word  "front"  often 
is  synonymous  with  "adjoin."  the  context  is  held  however,  to 
show  a  different  intention.'"  Thus,  a  provision  for  assessing  land 
fronting  upon  or  adjoining  an  improvement  has  l)een  construed 
to  mean  by  "fronting"  the  land  which  faces  the  street  improved 
at  the  end  of  the  lot  used  as  a  "front,"  and  by  the  word  "ad- 
join" the  land  which  touches  an  improved  street  upon  the  side  of 
the  lot.-"  A  somewhat  similar  result  has  been  reached  in  Ohio 
under  provisions  for  assessing  abutting  property  according  to  the 

"City    of    Rodalia    v.    Coleman.    8'2  ""Tlicrc  is  no  donbt  tliat  tlie  word 

Mo.  Ann.  560  flSHO].  "front'  may  in  some  circumstances  be 

"City    of    Sodalia    v.    ColcMnan,    S'2  interpreted   to  mean   and   include  the 

Mo.  App.  560   nS!)!)].  word     'adjoin.'"      Collier     Estate     v. 

'^Erisman     v.      F.oard     of     Chosen  Western  Pavinfj;  &    Supply  Company. 

Freeholders    of    the    County    of    15ur-  ISO    Mo.    362,    377.    70    S.    W.     947 

linfiton.  64  X.  .1.  L.   ( :?5  Vr.)    aKi.  45  [1904]. 

Atl.   998    finoo].  -"Meier    v.    City    of    St.    Louis.    ISO 

'"Felt  V.  City  of  P.allard.  3S  Wash.  Mo.    :!(n .   7!l    S.    W.   !):)5    flOit.Sl-      "In 

300.  80  Pac.  532    |  in()5|.  our    <i]iininn    the    wurds    •fioiitinu    on 

'"Scott  County  V.  TTinds.  .lO   Minn.  the    side    to    he    iinprove<F    taken    in 

204,  52   N.  W^  523    [18921.  their   natuial    and   ordiiniry   sense  do 

"State    of    ^Minnesota    e\    rel.    City  nut     mean    adjoininiT    such    street    on 

of    Dulutli    V.    District    Court    of    St.  tlie    side.    ])ut   the   side   on   which    the 

Louis    County.    61    :Minn.    542.    64    X.  huildin.L'-s    fnmt."      ('(dlier    F:state    v. 

W.     190     [18951:     Scott     County     v.  Western   Paving'  &    Snpi>ly  Company. 

Tlinds.   50   :Minn.   204.   52   X.   W."  523  ISO  :\r...  3(i2.  3S2.  383.  79  S.  W.  947 

[1892].  [1904]. 


§  624  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1056 

front  foot.-^  The  term  "fronting"  implies  that  the  land  in  ques- 
tion touches  the  improvement.  Accordingly,  the  existence  of  a 
strip  of  land  between  certain  property  and  the  improvement  pre- 
vents such  property  from  fronting  upon  the  improvement.--  A 
lot  which  is  separated  from  a  highway  by  a  railroad  which  runs 
parallel  to  the  highway  does  not  front  thereon.-^  The  condition 
of  the  property  at  the  time  the  improvement  was  begun  deter- 
mines whether  the  property  fronts  on  the  improvement  or  not.^* 
Accordingly,  if  after  the  assessment  ordinance  has  been  passed 
and  the  work  commenced,  the  owner  of  a  tract  of  land  conveys 
away  a  narrow  strip  fronting  upon  the  street,  such  conveyance 
does  not  relieve  the  entire  tract  from  assessment.^^  So,  after 
jurisd'ction  to  assess  has  once  attached,  the  division  of  a  lot  which 
originally  fronted  upon  the  improvement  does  not  relieve  from 
assessment  that  part  of  the  lot,  which  no  longer  touches  the  im- 
provement.-*' If  a  lot  is  actually  used  and  occupied,  the  actual 
method  of  use  and  not  the  platted  lines  control  in  determining 
whether  such  lot  fronts  an  improvement  or  not.-^  So,  if  a  lot  has 
been  in  fact  divided,  though  the  division  has  not  been  platted,  the 
part  of  such  lot  which  is  separated  from  a  street  by  the  rest  there- 
of cannot  be  said  to  front  on  said  street. ^^  However,  under  a 
statute  providing  that  in  case  of  platted  lots,  the  assessment  can 
cover  only  "the  depths  of  such  lots,"  the  fact  that  a  lot  in  the 
rear  of  one  which  fronts  a  street  is  in  fact  us'ed  in  connection  with 
such  lot  fronting  of  the  street,^ as  an  entire  tract  does  not  cause 
such  entire  tract  to  front  upon  the  street  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute.-"  Ordinarily,  a  street  cannot  be  said  to  front  upon  a 
cross  street.  However,  where  lots  fronting  on  a  short  cross  street 
were  properly  assessed  for  a  part  of  the  improvement  of  the  main 
intersecting  street,  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that  on  the  diagram, 

^See  §  620;   §  625;   §  704.  ""  State,    Gobish,    Pros.    v.    Inhabit- 

^^^City  of  New  Albany  v.  Cook,  29  ants  of  the  Township  of  North  Ber- 

Ind.    220    [1867];    Crane   v.    French,  gen  in  the  County  of  Hudson,  37  N. 

50  Mo.  App.   367    [1892];    Damkoeh-  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    402    [1875]. 

ler   V.   City   of   Milwaukee,    124   Wis.  ^^  Dougherty   v.   Miller,   36   Cal.   83 

144,   101    N.   W.   706    [1905].  [1868]. 

=^City     of     Philadelphia     v.     East-  ^  City  of  New  Albany  v.   Cook,  29 

wick,  35  Pa.  St.  75    [1860].  Ind.   220    [1867]. 

='  Dougherty  v.   Miller,   36   Cal.   83  "^  City  of  New  Albany  v.  Cook,  29 

[1868];^ State,   Gobisch,  Pros.  v.   In-  Ind.  220    [1867]. 

habitants  of  the  Township  of  North  "  State  ex  rel.  Barber  Asphalt  Pav- 

Bergen    in    t'ie    County    of    Hudson,  ing    Company    v.    Citv    of    St.    Louis, 

37  N.  J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    402    [1875].  183  Mo.  230,  81   S.  W.   1104    [1904]. 


1057  PROPERTY    ST'R.TECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  625 

such  cross  street  was  also  referred  to  as  a  lot  fronting  on  the  main 
intersecting  street,  did  not  invalidate  the  assessment.'"'  By  stat- 
ute, it  may  be  provided  that  an  assessment  for  a  street  improve- 
ment may  be  levied  upon  land  fronting  on  cross  streets  or  streets 
forming  a  junction  with  the  im])rovement  for  which  the  assess- 
ment is  levied. "•'  I-nder  such  a  statute,  an  improvement  was  or- 
dered to  be  made  on  a  given  street  from  a  specified  street  to  an- 
other specified  street.  It  was  held  that  land  fronting  on  the 
latter  street  could  not  be  assessed.^- 

§  625.     Effect  of  assessment  according  to  frontage. 

Provisions  are  frequently  found  for  assessing  property  in  pro- 
porlion  to  its  frontage.  Such  provisions  ordinarily  restrict  the 
assessment  district  to  property  abutting  upon  such  improvement 
and  bounded  by  the  lines  thereof.^  Property  separated  from  the 
improvement  by  other  property  is  not  subject  to  assessment  under 
such  provisions.-  Under  a  provision  for  assessing  property  ac- 
cording to  frontage,  any  abutting  property  may  be  subject  to 
assessment.^  A  provision  for  assessing  abutting  property  in  pro- 
portion to  its  frontage  or  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  front 
feet  of  such  property  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  to  apply  to  a 
street  improvement  which  adjoins  such  property  upon  the  side 
thereof.*  In  Ohio,  under  such  provisions  a  different  result  has 
been  reached.  It  has  been  held  that  if  a  lot  abuts  an  improvement 
upon  the  side  of  such  lot,  but  fronts  upon  another  street,  such 
lot  may  be  assessed  for  the  improvement  of  the  street  upon  its 
side;  but  that  for  purj-nses  of  determining  the  amount  of  front- 
age, such  lot  should  be  regarded  as  fronting  breadthwise  upon 
the  improvement  and  should  be  assessed  for  the  number  of  feet 
it  would  have  if  it  so  fronted."'     Accordingly,  a  triangular  corner 

'"Dyer  v.  Martinovic-li,  03  f'al.  353  '' Inli:il)itants  of   Looniinstor   v.   Co- 

[1SP31.  iifint,    130    Mass.    3S4.    2    X.    K.    000 

^' Selnnnackor  v.  TolxMinan,  50  Cal.  [1885]. 

508    [18801.  MIoborly    v.    Ilogan.    131    IMo.    10. 

"Rclniniackcr  v.  Tobpriiian,  50  Cal.  32   S.    W.    1014    [1805]. 

508  [18801.  ^Tlie  leading  case  on  this  point  is 

MVilbur  V.  City  of  SprinL'fif'lil.  123  Ilaviland    v.    City    of    Columbus,    5» 

111.   395.   14  X.   E.   871    [1880]:    Bar-  O.  S.  471,  34  X.  E.  679  [1893].     The 

ber     .^snbalt     Pavincj     Company     v.  same  view  has  been  taken  in  a  num- 

Kiono.  00  Mo.  App.  528,  74  S.  \V.  872  bor   of  other  cases:      City  of  Toledo 

[1003].  V.   Sheill.   53   O.   S.  447.  30  L.   R.   A. 

MViilnir  V.  Citv  of  Sprin-fiold.  123  508.  42  X.  E.  323    [1805];    Sandrock 

111.  305,   14  X.  E.  871    [1889].  v.  Columbus,  51   Ohio  St.  317,  42  X. 


625 


T.VXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1058 


lot  should  be  assumed  as  having  an  assessable  frontage  not  ex- 
ceeding the  length  of  its  base  or  rear  line  on  its  greatest  frontage 
along  its  breadth.*^  If  a  corner  lot  abuts  upon  one  street  a  dis- 
tance materially  greater  than  the  distance  which  it  abuts  on  the 
other,  the  presumption  is  that  it  fronts  upon  the  street  upon  which 
its  abutting  distance  is  least/  However,  a  finding  of  fact  that  a 
lot  fronts  thirty  feet  on  one  street  and  lies  lengthwise  one  hundred 
and  forty  feet  upon  another  street,  is  not  sufficient  as  a  finding 
of  fact  that  it  does  not  front  upon  the  latter  street.^  The  actual 
use  which  is  made  of  a  lot  prevails  over  the  platted  lines  in  deter- 
mining what  its  front  is.'-'  What  is  the  front  of  a  lot  is  a  question 
of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  way  in  which  it  is  laid  out  or  the 
way  in  which  it  is  used  and  occupied.^"'  If  a  fence  runs  along  the 
side  of  a  lot  without  any  opening  therein,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the 
side  is  not  used  as  a  front. ^^  Even  if  there  are  entrances  on  the 
side  for  giving  access  to  a  barn  or  some  such  purpose,  such  en- 
trances  do   not   show  that   the   side   is  used   as  a  front. ^^       If  a 


E.  255  [18941;  McMaken  v.  Hayes, 
29  Ohio  C.  C.  535  [1907];  Metcalf 
V.  Carter,  19  Ohio  C.  C.  196  [1900]  : 
Wolfe  V.  Villafre  of  Avondale,  14 
Ohio  C.  C.  375  [1897];  Calkins  v. 
City  of  Toledo,  12  Ohio  C.  C.  202, 
[1890];  Manns  v.  City  of  Cincinnati, 
10  Ohio  C.  C.  549  [1895];  Baker  v. 
Schott,  10  Ohio  C.  C.  81  [1894]; 
Rooney  v.  City  of  Toledo,  9  Ohio  C. 
C.  267  [1894];  Gibson  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati.  9  Ohio  C.  C.  243   [1894]. 

^Tompkins  v.  Village  of  Norwood, 
18   Ohio  C.  C.  883    [1897]. 

'  City  of  Toledo  v.  Sheill.  53  0.  S. 
447.  30  L.  R.  A.  598,  42  X.  E.  323 
[1895]. 

^Findlay  v.  Frey.  51  O.  S.  390,  38 
N.  E.   114    [1894]." 

»  Citv  of  Toledo  v.  Sheill.  53  0.  S. 
447.  30  L.  R.  A.  598,  42  N.  E.  323 
[1895];  Betz  v.  Citv  of  Canton,  18 
Ohio  C.  C.  676  [1893].  "A  lot  may 
be  bnilt  iinon,  used,  and  occupied 
with  reference  to  a  street  on  which 
it  lies  lenothwise,  and  in  such  case, 
for  the  navment  of  an  imnrovement 
on  the  st'-eet.  should  he  assessed  for 
its  full  lenf^th,  where  the  mode  of 
apportionment     adopted     is    by    the 


front  foot.  Where  it  does  not  front, 
but  lies  lengthwise,  upon  the  im- 
provement, its  real  front  must  be 
taken  as  the  length  of  the  frontage 
tliereon,  as  to  exonerate  it  entirely 
would  be  to  carry  a  principle  beyond 
the  limits  of  reason,  for  every  lot 
abutting  on  a  street  improvement 
must,  as  a  general  rule,  be  benefited 
to  some  extent  by  it,  and  should, 
therefore,  upon  the  principle  of  equal- 
ity, be  made  to  contribute  propor- 
tionately to  the  cost  of  the  work." 
Haviland  v.  City  of  Columbus,  50 
Ohio  St.  471,  474,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  679 
[1893]. 

'"Betz  V.  City  of  Canton,  18  Ohio 
C.  C.  676  [1893];  Schmidt  v.  City  of 
Cincinnati.  1  Ohio  X.  P.  48  [1894]. 

^^  Barney  v.  City  of  Dayton,  8  Ohio 
C.   C.   480    [1894]'. 

^- f^ide  entrance  1o  ham:  Daiber  v. 
Toledo.  7  Ohio  N.  P.  389  [1900]. 
Side  entranee  for  driveway:  Manns 
V.  Citv  of  Cincinnati,  10  Ohio  C.  C. 
549  [1895].  f'ide  entravre  to  unrd 
oitd  kitchen:  Wehaorp  v.  Citv  of  Cin- 
cinnati. 1  Ohio  N.  P.  8?  n8941.  An- 
pn'-entlv  contra :  Shatt"cV  v.  Citv  of 
Cincinnati.  1  Ohio  N.  P.  394  [1895], 


• 


'if 


1059 


PROPERTV  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§626 


building  be  constructed  which  in  appearance  fronts  on  the 
street  which  touches  the  lot  on  wndth  thereof,  the  fact  that 
such  building  has  a  side  entrance  which  is  often  used  by 
the  occupants  thereof,  does  not  constitute  the  length  of  such  lot 
an  additional  front. ^•'  The  use  of  the  property  at  the  time  at. 
which  the  improvement  is  made  determines  what  its  front  is." 
Accordingly,  if  after  the  making  of  such  improvement  a  building 
has  been  built  on  the  rear  of  a  corner  lot  fronting  on  the  side, 
the  construction  of  the  building  does  not  give  the  city  a  right 
to  assess  such  additional  frontage.^"'  If  several  platted  lots,  one  of 
which  is  a  corner  lot,  are  owned  by  one  person,  the  corner  lot 
should  be  assessed  for  the  numlier  of  feet  of  its  platted  frontage, 
unless  the  property  as  a  whole  has  been  so  improved  as  to  make 
it  front  in  fact  upon  the  side  street.^"  On  the  other  hand,  if  one 
lot  has  been  divided  into  two  hy  a  line  running  lengthwise,  the 
corner  lot  can  be  assessed  only  to  a  depth  equal  to  its  frontage 
as  actually  used.^'  The  mere  fact  that  the  owner  of  a  corner 
lot  has  signed  a  petition  for  the  improvement  of  the  street  upon 
the  side  of  his  lot,  does  not  estop  him  from  claiming  that  only  the 
number  of  feet  of  the  breadth  of  his  lot  is  to  be  assessed  for  such 
improvement.^® 

5^  626.     Bordering,  bounding  and  binding  property,  and  property 
in  neighborhood  of  improvement. 
It  is  sometimes  provided  that  an  assessment  shall  be  levied  upon 
propert}'  "bordering"  upon  the  improvement.'     The  term  "bor- 


where  gates  in  tho  fonoc  aldiig  the 
length  of  tlie  lot  and  substantial 
patliways'  from  sncli  fences  to  the 
Iniilding  were  held  to  constitute  such 
side  an  a(Uiitional  front. 

•=City  of  Toledo  v.  Slieill,  53  0.  S. 
447,  30  L.  R.  A.  ."jOS.  42  X.  E.  323 
[1895]. 

"  Sandrock  v.  C'ohinihus,  51  O.  S. 
317,  42  N.  E.  255  [1804]  (reversing 
Sandrock  v.  City  of  Columbus.  S 
Ohio  C.  C.  79  [18941);  Metcalf  v. 
Carter,  19  Ohio  C.  C.  19(5  [19001; 
Rurfrgreve  v.  City  of  Cincinnati.  1 
Ohio  N.  P.  80  [18941. 

'"Sandrock  v.  Columbus.  51  Ohio 
St.  317,  42  X.  E.  255  [1894];  (re- 
versins  Sandrock  v.  Citv  of  Colum- 
bus, 8  Ohio  C.  C.  79   [18041). 


'"Wolfe  V.  Village  of  Avondale,  14 
Ohio  C.   C.   375    [1897]. 

'•  Bentley  v.  Toledo,  7  Ohio  N.  P. 
388  [1900].  (The  original  frontage 
was  sixty-seven  feet;  the  frontage  of 
each  lot  as  used  was  thirty-three  and 
one-half  feet  for  which  the  depth 
could   be  assessed.) 

'Mlaker  v.  Schott.  10  Ohio  C.  C. 
81  [1894];  Rooney  v.  City  of  Toledo, 
9  Oliio  C.  C.  207  [1894]";  Gib.son  v. 
Citv  of  Cincinnati.  9  Ohio  C.  C.  243 
11894].  For  a  case  in  which  estop- 
pel exists  see  Raker  v.  Schott.  10 
Ohio   C.   C.   81    [1894]. 

'  Voris  V.  PittsburjT  Plate  Ola.ss 
Comnany.  lt)3  Tnd.  599.  70  X.  E.  249 
[19041:  Flpin  v.  XuTpnt  Oravel  Co., 
102   Tnd.   509.   70  X.   E.   801    [1903]; 


§626 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1060 


dering"  implies  that  the  property  must  at  some  point  touch  the 
improvement.-  Laud  Avhich  touches  an  improved  street  upon  the 
section  thereof  which  is  improved,  borders  on  the  im- 
provement, even  if  the  improvement  is  situated  entirely 
on  one  side  of  the  middle  line  of  such  street.^  The  right 
of  way  of  a  railway  which  lies  within  a  street  and  which  extends 
along  the  length  thereof,  does  not  border  upon  such  street  within 
the  meaning  of  these  statutes  and  cannot  be  assessed  under  such 
statutes  for  the  improvement  thereof.*  In  Maryland  it  is  frequently 
provided  by  statute  that  property  "binding"  upon  the  street  im- 
proved is  to  be  assessed  for  the  cost  thereof."'  The  exact  meaning  of 
"binding"  has  been  discussed  but  little;  but  it  is  ordinarily  re- 
garded as  equivalent  to  "fronting.""  An  assessment  district  may 
consist  of  land  "bounding"  on  the  improvement.'^  "Bounding" 
as  used  in  this  sense  is  synonymous  with  "abutting"  and  is  fre- 
quently used  in  connection  with  that  term  in  the  statutes.^  Un- 
der such  a  statute  an  ordinance  which  provides  for  assessing  lots 
and  parcels  of  land  "benefited"  by  the  improvement  is  invalid, 
since  it  provides  for  assessing  land  other  than  that  bounding  on 


( reversing    Klein    v.    Xugent    Gravel 

Co.,  —  Ind.  App.  ,  66  N.  E.  486 

[1903])  ;  Helm  v.  Witz,  35  Ind.  App. 
131,  73  N.  E.  846  [1904];  City  of 
Terre  Haute  v.  Mack,  139  Ind.  99, 
38  N.  E.  468  [1894];  City  of  New 
Albany  v.  Conger,  18  Ind.  App.  230, 
47    N.    E.    852    [1897];    Anderson    v. 

Cortelyou,  —  N.  J.  ,  68  All.  118 

[1907];  (reversing  Coltelyou  v.  An- 
derson, 73  N.  J.  L.  (44  Vr.)  427,  63 
Atl.  1095   [1900]). 

-  Erisman  v.  Board  of  Chosen  Free- 
holders of  the  County  of  Burlington, 
64  N.  J.  L.  (35  Vr.)  516,  45  Atl. 
998   [1900]. 

*  Klein  v.  Nugent  Gravel  Company, 
162  Ind.  509,  70  N.  E.  801  [1903]; 
(reversing    Klein    v.    Nugent    Gravel 

Co.,  —  Ind.  App.  .  66  N.  E.  486 

[1903]). 

*  Indianapolis  and  Vincennes  Rail- 
vpay  Company  v.  Capitol  Paving  and 
Construction  Comnanv.  24  Ind.  App. 
114,  54  N.  E.  1076  [1899]-.  O'Reilley 
v.  City  of  Kingston.  114  N.  Y.  439, 
21  N.  E.  1004  [1889]. 


'Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more V.  Ulman,  79  Md.  469,  30  Atl. 
43  [1894];  Ulman  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore,  72  Md.  587,  11 
L.  R.  A.  224,  20  Atl.  141,  21  Atl.  709, 
32  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  228 
11890];  Alberger  v.  Mayor  and  City 
Council  of  Baltimore,  64  Md.  1,  20 
Atl.  988  [1885];  Moale  v.  Mayor  and 
City  Council  of  Baltimore,  61  Md. 
224  [1883];  Mayor,  Recorder  and 
Aldermen  of  the  City  of-  Annapolis 
V.  Harwood  and  Wife,  32  Md.  471. 
3  Am.  Rep.  151    [1870]. 

®  Moale  V.  Mayor  and  City  Council 
of  Baltimore,  61  Md.  224  [1883]: 
Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Baltimore 
V.  Johns  Hopkins  Hospital,  56  Md.  1. 

"  Smith  V.  City  of  Des  Moines,  106 
la.  590,  76  N.  W.  836  [1898];  Kelly 
V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  0.  S.  468 
[1878]. 

*  City  of  Cincinnati  v.  Batsche,  52 
0.  S.  324,  27  L.  R.  A.  536,  40  N.  E. 
21  [1895].  " 'Boimd'  is  synonymous 
with  'limit'  or  'border.'  "  Barney  v. 
City  of  Dayton,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  '480, 
48l'  [1894]." 


I 


1061  PROPERTY    Sl'BJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  626 

the  street.-'  Under  a  statute  providing  that  the  assessment  shall 
be  a  lien  on  the  lots  or  lands  bounding  or  abutting  on  the  street 
improved,  it  has  been  held  that  the  platted  boundaries  eontroL^" 
Accordingly,  if  two  or  more  lots  which  are  platted  so  that  only 
one  of  them  touches  the  improvement,  are  used  together  as  a 
single  tract,  it  has  been  held  that  only  that  lot  bounds  on  the 
street  which  is  so  platted  as  to  touch  such  improvement."  Under 
a  statute  which  provides  for  assessing  the  property  "abounding" 
on  the  improvement,  it  has  been  held  that  this  term  was  erroneous- 
ly used  for  the  term  "l)ounding.  "'- 

The  legislature,  or  the  pul)lic  corporation,  or  officer  authorized 
to  determine  the  property  benefited  and  to  lay  out  the  assessment 
district  may  provide  that  pi'operty  "in  tlu^  vicinity"  or  "in  the 
neighborhood"  of  the  improvement  should  be  assessed.'-'  Under 
such  statute,  land  may  l)e  assessed  which  does  not  front  on  a  pro- 
posed street,  or  toiu'h  it  at  any  point. '^  Tlu'  t(M'm  "vicinit}^" 
does  not  denote  any  particular  or  definite  distance  from  the 
improvement.'-'  Whether  property  is  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
improvement  or  not  is  a  question  of  fact.'"  Thus,  where  property 
was  sitnatd  mor"  than  thre;'  thousand  feet  from  a  pro]iosed 
street  improvement,  it  was  held  that  the  question  whether 
such  property  was  in  tlu^  vicinity  of  such  improvement  should 
be  submitted  to  the  jury.'"  Other  provisions  of  the  assessment 
statute  may,  however,  operate  to  give  a  different  meaning  to  the 
terms  "neighborhood"  ov  "vicinity"  from  those  which  they  pri- 

•  Kelly  V.  City  of  Cleveland,  34  0.  fTliis  Imldiiifi  \vas  made  in  a  pro- 

S.  468   [1878].  feeding   to   open   a   .street.     The   stat- 

'"  Smith  V.  City  of  Des  Moines.  100  ute  provided  that  in  case  of  gradin"- 

la.  590,  70  N.  W.  830   [1898].  or  paving  a  street  the  lands  fronting 

"Smith  V.  City  of  Des  Moines.  100  on    the    portion    thereof   so    improved 

la.  590,  70  X.  W.  830   [1898].  should  constitute  an  assessment  dis- 

*- Barney  v.  Citv  of  Dayton.  8  Ohio  trict.     Such  restriction  did  not.  how- 

C.  C.  480   [1894].  ever,    apply    to    proceedings    to    open 

"Board    of    Improvement    District  streets.] 

No.    5    of   Texarkana    v.    DlTcTiIiauser.  '"Mock    v.    (  ity   of   Muncie.   9   Tnd. 

84  Ark.  257,    105   S.  W.  -iliri    |1907|:  Api-.  53(>.  37   X."  E.  281    [1893]:    Ex- 

(loodrich     v.     (ity     of     Detroit.     123  tension  of  Hancock  Street,  18  Pa.  St. 

Mich.    559,    82    X.    \V.    255     [1900];  (0  Harr.)    20    [1851]. 

Extension  of  Hancock  Street.   18  Pa.  ""•  ^fock   v.   City  of   Mjincie.   9   Ind. 

St.   (6  Harr.)   20   [1851]:   In  rr  TTow-  .\pp.  530.  37  X.  E.  281    [1893];    Ex- 

ard  Avenue,  Xorth.  in   Citv  of  Seat-  tension  of  Hancock  Street.  18  Pa.  St. 

tie.     44     Wash.     02,     80     Pac.     1117  (0  Harr.)    20    [1851]. 

[19001.  '"Mock   v.   City   of   Muncio.   9   Tnd. 

"Oooflrich   V.   Citv  of  Dnt-nit.    123  App.  530.  37  X.  E.  281    [1893]. 
Mich.  559.  82  X.  W.  255    [1900]. 


§  627  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1062 

marily  bear/"*  Under  statutes  providing  for  assessing  property  in 
the  neighborhood  or  vicinity  of  the  improvement  but  containing 
other  provisions  for  levying  the  assessment  against  the  owners  of 
land  along  the  line  of  such  streets,  it  is  held  that  only  property 
abutting  on  the  street  can  be  assessed.^"  This  result  has  been 
reached  even  where  another  provision  of  the  assessment  statute 
has  provided  for  visiting  and  inspecting  the  properties  in  the 
"neighborhood"  supposed  to  be  damaged  or  benefited  by  the  im- 
provement.-^ By  statute  it  may  be  provided  that  land  "near" 
the  improvement  may  be  assessed  therefor.-^  By  statute  or  by 
constitutional  provisions,  it  is  sometimes  provided  that  property 
adjoining  the  locality  to  be  affected  may  be  assessed."  Under 
such  constitutional  provision  the  decision  of  the  city  council  as  to 
what  property  adjoins  the  locality  to  be  affected  is  said  to  be  final, 
except  in  case  of  fraud  or  demonstrable  mistake,  where  the  stat- 
ute authorizes  the  council  to  define  the  boundaries  of  the  assess- 
ment district.-^ 

§  627.     Other  methods  of  describing  property. 

Under  some  statutes  it  is  provided  that  land  along  an  improve- 
ment is  to  be  assessed.  Such  provisions  are  followed,  if  not  coupled 
with  an  improper  rule  as  to  the  apportionment  of  benefits.^  Such 
a  statute  is  in  effect  an  adjudication  that  the  property  along  the 
improvement  is  benefited  thereby.^  Under  some  statutes  it  is  pro- 
vided that  land  in  front  of  which  the  improvement  is  constructed  is 
to  be  assessed.^     By  statute,  it  may  be  provided  that  land  through 

1^  Chestnut  Avenue,  68  Pa.  St.    ( 18  '  City    of    Kansas    City    v.    Gibson, 

P.F.Smith)   81   [1871].  GG    Kan.    501,    72    Pac.    222    [1903]; 

"Fifty-fourth     Street,     Pittsburg's  Dexter  v.  City  of  Boston,   176  Mass. 

Appeal,    165   Pa.   St.   8,   30   Atl.   503  247,  79  Am.  sit.  Rep.  306,  57  N.  E.  379 

[1894];     Morewood    Avenue,     Cham-  [1900];   City  of  Scranton  v.  Levers, 

ber's  Appeal,  159  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl.  200  Pa.   St."  56,   49   Atl.   980    [1901]. 

123  [1893];  Chestnut  Avenue,  68  Pa.  'City    of    Kansas    City    v.    Gibson, 

St.    (18   P.   F.   Smith)    81    [1871].  66  Kan.  501,  72  Pac.  222  [1903]. 

^Morewood      Avenue,      Cliamber's  ^  City  of  Xapa  v.  Easterby.  61  C'al. 

Appeal,   159   Pa.   St.  20,  28   Atl.   123  509    [1882];   City  of  New  Orleans  v. 

[1893].  Elliott,     10     La."    Ann.     59     [1855]; 

^Scoville   V.   City  of   Cleveland,    1  O'Leary  v.  Sloo,  7  La.  Ann.  25  [1S52]. 

0.  S.   126    [1853];    (followed  without  In  the  Matter  of  the  Application  of 

opinion  in  Clark  v.  City  of  Cleveland,  the  Board  of  Street  Opening:  and  Im- 

1   O.   S.    139).  provement  of  the  City  of  New  York 

="  Little    Rock    v.    Katzenstein,    52  to    Acquire    Title    to    Forest    Avenue. 

Ark.  107,  12  S.  W.  198   [1889].  64  Hun.    (N.  Y.)   59,  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 

23  Little    Rock    v.    Katzenstein.    52  72"    [1892]. 
Ark.  107.  12  S.  W.  198   [1889]. 


1063  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  627 

which  an  improvement  passes  is  to  be  assessed  therefor.*  Under 
such  statute  a  tract  of  land  was  separated  from  a  street  by  a  nar- 
row strip  a  few  inches  in  width.  It  was  held  that  the  action  of  the 
lower  eo'-rt  in  excepting  such  property  from  assessment  was  not 
reviewable.''  Assessments  are  sometimes  found  in  which  the  prop- 
erty assessed  is  described  as  on  the  line  of  the  improvement.** 
Such  a  method  of  describing  an  assessment  district  seems  to  be  re- 
garded as  proper.  Such  statute  is  a  valid  exercise  of  the  power  of 
assessment  and  amounts  to  an  adjudication  that  real  property  on 
the  line  of  the  improvement  is  benefited  thereby.''  A  statute 
reciuiring  an  assessment  to  be  made  against  the  owners  of  land 
on  the  line  of  the  street,  does  not  restrict  such  assessment  district 
to  land  touching  the  part  of  the  street  for  the  improvement  of 
which  the  assessment  is  levied.^  "While  a  statute  providing  for 
assessing  property  on  the  line  of  the  street  opposite  the  improve- 
ment has  been  held  to  be  invalid,  it  was  not  from  any  considera- 
tion of  the  propriety  of  the  assessment  district,  but  because  the 
statute  did  not  in  any  way  restrict  the  amount  of  the  assessment 
to  the  benefits  conferred.**  The  term  "on  the  line  of  the  improve- 
ment" is  substantially  synonymous  with  abutting.^**  Property 
not  on  the  line  of  the  improvement  cannot  be  assessed  under  such 
statute."  Under  some  statutes  it  is  provided  that  the  assess- 
ment district  shall  consist  of  the  lots  and  lands  upon  the  street 
to  be  improved.'-  Under  such  statute  only  the  lots  bounded  by 
the  lines  of  the  street   to  be  improved   can  be  assessed.'-''     Lots 

*  In  re  Openin;^  of  Park  Avenue,  [  187(!1 ;  ( revoif^inji  Bogprt  v.  City 
Huulekoper's  Appeal,  83  Pa.  St.  (2  of  Elizabeth,  25  X.  J.  Eq.  (10  C.  E. 
Norris)    107    [1870].  Green)    420    [1874]). 

' /n   re    Openint^   of    Park    Avenue.  '" /n   re  Grafius   Run,    218    Pa.   St. 

Huidekoper's   Appeal,   83   Pa.   St.    (2  032,  67  Atl.  982  [1907];  Fifty-fourth 

Norris)    167    [1870].  Street,    Pittsburfr's    Appeal,    165    Pa. 

"Smith  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  St.  8,   30  Atl.   503    [1894]. 

Worcester,    182   Mass.   232,   59   L.   R.  "Fifty-fourth     Street,     Pittsburg's 

A.   728,  65  N.  E.   40    [1902];    Butler  Appeal."  105    Pa.    St.   8,   30   Atl.   503 

V.   City  of  Worcester,    112   Mass.   541  [18941;     Morewood     Avenue,     Cham- 

[1873];   Chestnut  Avenue,  08  Pa.  St.  bor's  Appeal.    1,')!)  Pa.  St.  20,  28  Atl. 

(18  P.  F.  Sniitli)   81   [1871].  123   [1S93|. 

'Smith  V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  '-Wilbur  v.  City  of  Sprin;rfield,  123 

Worcester,  182  Mass.  2.32,  59  L.  R.  A.  111.   395,    14   N.   E.   871    [1889] ;    City 

728.  05  N.  E.  40  [1902].  of  Schenecta.ly  v.  Trustees  of  Union 

*  Chestnut  Avenue,  08  Pa.  St.  (18  College,  144  X.  V.  241,  26  L.  P  A. 
P.  F.  Smith)   81    [1871].  014.  39  X.  E.   (!7    [1894]. 

•Roirert    v.    City    of    Elizabeth,    27  "  Wilbur  v.  (  ity  of  Sjirinefield,  123 

X.    J.    Eq.     (12     C.    E.    Green)     508        111.   39.1.    14   X.   E.  871    [1889]. 


628 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1064 


back  of  the  lots  abutting  upon  the  street  cannot  be  assessed  under 
such  statute,  even  if  benefited  by  the  improvement.^*  Under  a 
statute  providing  for  assessing  the  lots  and  buildings  lying  upon 
a  street  in  which  the  public  had  an  easement,  the  ultimate  fee  be- 
ing in  the  original  owner  could  not  be  assessed/^  This  decision, 
however,  turns  upon  the  proposition  that  such  land  is  not  a  "lot," 
rather  than  upon  the  construction  of  the  term  "lying  upon." 


§  628.     Assessment  district  consisting  of  blocks  or  parts  of  blocks. 

Under  some  statutes  it  is  provided  that  the  assessment  district 
shall  consist  of  the  squares  or 'parts  thereof  which  adjoin  the 
improvement.^  This  has  been  held  a  proper  method  of  laying  off 
assessment  districts,  both  in  assessments  for  streets,^  and  in 
assessments  for  wells  and  cisterns.^  Statutes  in  Kentucky  pro- 
vide that  streets  shall  be  improved  at  the  cost  of  the  owners  of  lots 
in  each  fourth  of  a  square.*  This  method  of  determining  what 
property  is  benefited  and  is  hence  subject  to  assessment,  is  not  a 
violation  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.''  Within  the  meaning  of 
such  a  statute  a  square  is  a  subdivision  bounded  on  all  sides  by 
principal  streets."  While  it  may  be  possible  that  a  tract  of  land 
surrounded  on  all  sides  by  principal  streets  is  so  large  that  it 
must  be  presumed  that  the  legislature  did  not  intend  to  treat  such 

Ky.  498,  74  S.  W.  238,  24  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  2368  [1903];  City  of  Louisville 
V.  Selvage,  106  Ky.  730,  51  S.  W.  447, 
52  S.  W.  809  [1899];  Gleason  v.  Bar- 
nett,  100  Ky.  125,  50  S.  W.  67 
[1899];  Washle  v.  Nehan,  97  Ky. 
351,  41  S.  W.  1040  [1895];  Nevin  v. 
Eoach,  86  Ky.  492,  5  S.  W.  546 
[1887];  Caldwell  v.  Rupert,  73  Ky. 
(10  Bush.)    179   [1873]. 

=  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co, 
V.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving  Co.,  197 
U.  S.  430,  25  S.  466  [1905];  (affirm- 
ing 70  S.  W.  1097,  25  Ky.  L.  R 
1024). 

*  City    of    Loviisville    v.    American 

Standard   Asphalt   Co.,  —  Ky.  , 

102  S.  W.  806  [1907];  Pfaffinger  v. 
Kremer,  115  Ky.  498,  74  S.  W.  238, 
24  Ky.  L.  Rep.  2308  [1903];  Cald- 
well V.  Ruuert,  73  Ky.  (10  Bush.) 
179  [18731;  Broadway  Baptist 
Church  V.  McAtee,  71  Ky.  (8  Bush.) 
508.   8   Am.   Rep.   480    [1871]. 


"  Wilbur  V.  City  of  Springfield,  123 
111.  395,  14  N.  E.  871   [1889]. 

'^  City  of  Schenectady  v.  Trustees 
of  Union  College,  144  N.  Y.  241.  26 
L.  R.  A.  614,  39  N.  E.  67    [1894]. 

^  City  of  Louisville  v.  Osborne,  73 
Ky  (10  Bush.)  226  [1874];  City  of 
Lexington  v.  McQuillan's  Heirs,  39 
Ky.  (9  Dana)  513,  85  Am.  Dec.  159 
[1840]. 

-  City  of  Lexington  v.  McQuillan's 
Heirs,  39  Ky.  (9  Dana)  513,  35  Am, 
Dec.  159   [1840]. 

^  City  of  Louisville  v.  Osborne,  73 
Ky.  (10  Bush.)  226  [1874].  So  as  to 
the  cost  of  intersections.  Parker  v. 
Reay,  76  Cal.  103,  18  Pac.  124 
[1888]. 

*Holt  V.  Fiffg,  —  Ky.  ,  94  S. 

W.  34,  29  Kv.  L.  Rep.  613  [1900]; 
Specht     V.     Barber    Asphalt     Paving 

Company,    —    Ky.    ,    80    S.    W. 

1100,  26  Ky.  Law  Rep.  103 
[1904];     Pfaffinger    v.    Kremer,     115 


1065  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  628 

subdivision  ol"  territory  as  a  sijuare  within  the  ineaniny,'  oi'  such 
statute,  the  mere  fact  that  a  square  is  materially  larger  than  the 
usual  squares  of  the  city  docs  not  withdraw  it  from  the  operation 
of  the  statute.'  It  has  been  said,  however,  that  while  the  fore- 
going meaning  of  the  term  "square"  is  its  ordinary  meaning,  it 
is  not  of  universal  application,  but  that  each  case  must  be  deter- 
mined by  its  own  peculiar  facts,  and  that  one  of  the  controlling 
considerations  is  that  the  property  benefited  by  the  improvement 
should  bear  the  expense.**  In  doubtful  cases  the  court  has  some 
discretion  in  determining  what  a  sfpiare  is."  A  tract  of  land 
which  was  the  size  of  two  ordinary  city  s(iuares,  which  was  sur- 
rounded by  streets  and  opposite  the  middle  of  which  on  eitlier 
side  a  street  had  l)een  opened  but  did  not  extend  through  the  large 
tract  in  question  was  treated  as  consisting  of  two  sipiares  by  re- 
garding such  street  as  opened  so  as  to  extend  through  such  tract. ^'^ 
Where  it  is  shown  that  cross  streets  on  the  north  side  of  the 
street  improved  were  not  extended  to  intersect  the  streets  on  the 
:south  side,  because  of  the  existence  of  an  intervening  right  of  way, 
such  cross  streets  will  be  regarded  as  extended  for  the  purpose 
of  the  assessment."  A  tract  of  land  which  is  bounded  on  three 
sides  by  streets,  and  on  the  fourth  side  of  which  is  a  street  which 
extends  part  waj'  across  such  tract,  but  which  does  not  connect 
with  the  other  street  so  as  to  complete  the  enclosure,  there  being  a 
gap  of  over  two  hundred  feet  where  no  street  exists,  is  regarded  as 
a  square.'-'  Where  a  tract  of  land  is  bounded  by  principal  streets 
which  do  not  meet  at  right  angles  so  that  the  enclosed  tract  is  not 
a  right  angled  parallelogram,  the  quarter  square  which  is  to  be 
the  assessment  district  is  to  be  determined  by  ascertaining  what 
is  one  quarter  of  the  entire  area  of  the  square.'"'     Under  such  a 


'Cooper    V.    N"viii.    !)()    Ky.    8.5,    1.'?  "  Six^clit  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Pavitip 

S.   W.   841    [18!)(»|;    Ncvin    v.    Roacli.        ('i>iiii)aiiy.    —    Ky.    ,    SO    S.    W. 

8(5    Ky.    492,    5    S.    W.    r)4()    [18871:  IHMI.   2(1    Ky.   l.aw   Rep.    1!);5    1 10041. 

See    also    Watson    v.    Xevin,    80    Ky.  '-IIi.lt    v.    Fijif:,    —    Ky.    .    04 

4!)5,    5    S.    W.    540,   where    the    ci.urt  S.  W  .  34,  29  Ky.  L.  Rep.  013   [1900 1. 

treated  a  tract  of  land  seven  huiidreil  I  The    land    which    would    he    covered 

and  forty  feet  dee])  as   an    undivided  hy  the  street  were  tlie  street  extend- 

squar  ed    should    be   excduded    from    the   as- 

*Dumesnil   v.   Shanks.   97    Ky.   3;)4.  assessment  district.) 

30  S.  W.  054,  31   S.  W.   804    [18951.  ''' R.    B.    Park    &    Co.    v.    Cane,    — 

'Dumesnil  v.   Shanks,  97   Ky.   354,       Ky.  ,  73  S.  W.  1121.  24  Ky.  Law 

30  S.  W.  654,  31   vS.  W.  804    [1895].  Rep.   2294    [1903]. 

"Dumesnil  v.  Shanks,  97  Ky.  354, 
30  S.   W.   054,   31    S.  W.   804    [18951. 


§  628  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1066 

statute,  land  is  not  within  the  assessment  district  unless  the  fourth 
of  the  square  in  which  it  lies  is  contiguous  to  the  improvement.^* 
It  is  the  location  of  the  fourths  of  the  squares  and  not  the  loca- 
tion of  the  lots  assessed  which  determines  whether  property  is  sub- 
ject to  assessment  or  not.^^  Under  such  statute,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  the  property  to  be  assesed  should  abut  upon  the  im- 
provement.^" A  lot  within  a  square  contiguous  to  the  improve- 
ment may  be  assessed  although  such  lot  does  not  itself  abut  upon 
the  improvement,^^  or  although  the  improvement  extends  along 
only  a  part  of  its  face.^^  However,  it  has  been  held  that  a  pro- 
vision in  an  ordinance  which  provides  for  assessing  the  property 
fronting  the  street  does  not  render  the  entire  ordinance  invalid 
since  the  statute  will  control  as  to  the  apportionment.^^  Such  a 
statute  is  not  applicable  to  territory  which  is  not  divided  into 
squares.-**  In  the  absence  of  some  specific  provision  as  to  assess- 
ing territory  not  divided  into  squares  it  cannot,  under  such  stat- 
ute, be  assessed,  by  regarding  it  as  divided  into  squares  although 
it  is  not  in  fact  so  divided.-^  It  is  provided  by  statute  that  if 
property  is  not  divided  into  squares  the  council  is  to  fix  the 
depth  to  which  the  property  is  benefited  and  is  to  be  assessed. -- 
Under  such  provision  in  connection  with  the  preceding  provi- 
sions, the  council  has  no  power  in  fixing  such  depth  to  fix  a  depth 
which  will  cross  another  street.-^  Under  such  statutes  an  assess- 
ment may  be  invalid  because,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  property 
on  one  side  of  an  improved  street  is  divided  into  blocks  and  on 
the  other  side  is  not  so  divided,  gross  inequality  in  assessments  is 
thus  produced.-*     In  such  case  the  assessment  should  be  equalized 

i*Washle    v.    Nehan,    97    Ky.    351,  71    S.    W.    332,    24    Ky.    L.    R.    1193 

41   S.  W.   1040   [1895].  [1902];    Caldwell   v.   Rupert,   73   Ky. 

i^Washle  v.  Nehan,  97  Ky.  351,  41  (10   Bush.)    179   [1873]. 

S.  W.   1040   [1895].                "  =' Button   v.   Kremer,    114   Ky.   463, 

'^Pfaffinger    v.    Kremer.     115    Ky.  71   S.   W.   332,   24   Ky.  L.   Rep.    1193 

498,  74  S.  W.  238,  24  Ky.  L.  R.  2368  [1902];    Caldwell   v.-  Rupert,  93   Ky. 

[1903].                                "  (10  Bush.)    179   [1873]. 

"  Pfaffinger    v.     Kremer,     115     Ky.  '^  Gleason  v.  Barnett,   106  Ky.   125, 

498,  74  S.  \v.  238,  24  Ky.  L.  R.  2368  50  S.  W.  67  [1899].     See  §§  6()9,  629. 

[1903].  -^Louisville   Ry.   Co.   v.   Southwest- 

"  Boone    v.    Nevine,    —    Ky.    ,  ern  Alcatraz  Asphalt  &  Construction 

23    S.   W.    512,    15    Ky.   L.   Rep.   547       Co.,  —  Ky.  ,   74   S.   W.   237,  24 

[1893].  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2380  [1903]. 

'^  Fox     V.      Middlesborough     Town  '-'  City  of  Louisville  v.  Selvage,  106 

Company,  96  Ky.  262,  28  S.  W.  776  Ky.  730,  51  S.  W.  447,  52  S.  W.  809 

[1894].                 "  [1899];    Preston  v.   Roberts,   75   Ky. 

="  Button   V.   Kremer,   114  Ky.  463,  (12  Bush.)    570   [1877]. 


1067  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  628 

by  fixing  the  depth  of  the  assessment  district  so  as  to  include 
territory  of  equal  depth  on  both  sides  of  the  street.^^  Inequality, 
resulting  from  different  sizes  of  squares,  where  the  adjoining  land 
is  all  divided  into  sijuares  does  not,  however,  invalidate  the  assess- 
ment.^" Since  these  statutes  are  to  be  construed  so  that  the  cost 
of  an  improvement  will  be  assessed  upon  property  benefited  there- 
by as  far  as  this  can  be  done  in  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the 
statute,*^  an  alley  which  is  situated  entirely  in  one-fourth  of  a 
square  and  which  benefits  only  property  situated  in  that  one- 
fourth  must  be  paid  for  by  assessments  upon  that  fourth  alone.-'* 
There  is,  however,  no  arbitrary  rule  that  an  alley  lying  exclusive- 
ly in  two  quarters  of  a  square  must  be  paid  for  by  an  assessment 
upon  those  two  quarters  alone. -**  If  an  alley  is  situated  in  a 
square,  eighty  feet  on  one  side  of  the  middle  line  thereof,  but  the 
lots  in  such  square  are  so  laid  out  that  all  of  them  touch  the  alley 
at  the  edge,  it  is  proper  to  assess  all  the  lots  in  such  square.^**  If 
an  alley  lies  entirely  in  two  quarters  of  a  square  and  the  lots  in 
the  other  two  quarters  do  not  touch  such  alley,  it  is  proper  to 
assess  the  cost  of  such  alley  upon  the  two  quarters  through  which 
it  runs.-''^  If  an  alley  divides  two  quarters  of  a  square  from  each 
other  and  extends  a  short  distance  into  the  other  two  quarters,  it 
has  been  held  proper  to  assess  the  cost  of  that  part  of  the  alley  ex- 
tending into  such  other  two  quarters  upon  such  two  quarters, 
while  the  rest  of  the  cost  of  such  alley  should  be  assessed 
upon  the  two  quarters  between  which  the  rest  of  such  length 
runs.^^  A  right  of  way  fifty  feet  wide  had  been  improved  as  a 
highway  and  buildings  had  been  erected  fronting  upon  it.  It  was 
held  that  although  not  formally  dedicated,  it  was  a  public  street 
and  not  an  internal  improvement,  and  hence  that  it  was  not  neces- 
sary to  charge  its  cost  on  tlic  entire  square.^^     Such  street  did  not 

^City  of  Louisville  v.  AnKnican  -^Dunie>ii)i]  v.  Shanks,  07  Fy.  354, 

Standard  Asphalt  Co.,  —  Ky.  .  30  S.  \V.  (i.54,  31  S.  W.  864  [1895]. 

102  S.  W.  8()G  [19071.  ="'SchmoIz  v.  Giles,  75  Ky.  (12 

="  Cooper  V.  Xovin,  90  Ky.  85.  13  Bush.)  491  [18771. 

S.  W.  841  [18901;  Nevin  v.  Roach,  "'Wagner  v.  Gast,  —  Ky.  ,  71 

86  Ky.  492,  5  S.  W.  546  [18871;  Ba-  S.  W.  533,  24  Ky.  L.  R.  1401  [19031. 

ker  V.  Selvase,  7  Ky.  L.  R.  838.  '-Wajrner  v.  Gast,  —  Ky.  ,  71 

"Dumesnil  v.  Shanks.  97  Ky.  354,  S.  W.  533,  24  Ky.  L.*  R.  1401 

30  S.  W.  (554,  31  S.  W.  804  [18951.  [1903]. 

=»Washle  V.  Xehan.  97  Ky.  351.  41  "  Steinacker  v.  Gast.  —  Ky.  , 

S.  W.  1040  [1S951;  (cited  in  Du-  89  S.  W.  481,  28  Ky.  Law  Rep.  573 

mesnil  v.  Shanks,  97  Ky.  354.  30  [19051. 
S.  W.  654,  31  S.  W.  864  [18951  as 
a  manuscript  opinion). 


§  628  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1068 

run  through  the  block  but  terminated  in  an  alley.  It  was  held 
that  the  land  on  either  side  could  not  be  regarded  as  divided  into 
blocks  by  such  street,  and  it  was  accordingly  proper  for  the  city 
to  charge  the  cost  of  improving  such  street  upon  the  property  ly- 
ing north  and  south  of  it  to  the  points  midway  to  the  next  streets.^* 
If  property  is  not  divided  into  squares  but  is  assessed  as  if  it  were 
so  divided  and  the  amount  of  such  assessment  is  less  than  it  would 
be  if  assessed  properly,  the  owner  of  such  land  cannot  complain.^^ 
So.  if  the  council  has  fixed  the  depth  of  the  property  to  be  assessed 
and  such  action  is  erroneous  because  the  assessment  should  have 
been  levied  upon  the  adjacent  quarter  squares,  j^et  if  the  depth 
is  so  fixed  as  to  assess  the  quarter  squares  in  point  of  fact  though 
not  by  that  description,  the  property  owners  cannot  complain.^** 
Such  statute  if  made  applicable  only  to  streets  is  not  applicable 
to  curbing,  which,  in  this  jurisdiction  is  regarded  as  part  of  the 
sidewalk,  and  non-abutting  property  cannot  therefore  be  assessed 
therefor.^'  By  statute  it  may  be  provided  that  for  certain  im- 
provements only  the  blocks  opposite  which  the  street  is  improved 
are  to  be  assessed.^^  Under  this  statute,  an  improvement  may 
stop  in  the  middle  of  the  block  and  the  assessment  district  may 
end  there.^"  I'^^nder  such  statutes  it  is  erroneous  to  limit  the 
assessment  for  other  kinds  of  improvements  to  the  blocks  opposite 
which  the  improvement  has  been  constructed.  Thus,  under  a  stat- 
ute which  provides  that  the  cost  of  street  openings  where  no 
buildings  are  to  Ije  taken,  is  to  be  assessed  upon  the  blocks  op- 
posite the  part  of  the  street  opened,  it  is  error  so  to  restrict  the 
assessment  if  buildings  are  taken.***  On  the  other  hand,  if  build- 
ings are  taken  it  is  error  to  assess  more  than  a  proportionate  part 
of  the  cost  of  the  buildings  taken  upon  the  propertj^  bej'ond  the 
block  opposite  which  the  street  is  opened.^^  Under  a  group  of 
pi'^ilar  s'^fi^^ufes.  it  is  provided  that  land  may  be  assessed  on  either 

^*  Steinacker  v.  Gast,  —  Ky.  ,  wliicli  modified  52  S.  W.  1117,  21  Ky. 

89  .S.  W.  481.  28  Ky.  Law  Rep.  573  L.  R.  712). 

[1905].  -"Diggins    v.    Brown,    70    Cal.    318. 

^McHenry  v.  Selvage.  99  Ky.  232,  18  Pac.   373    [1888]. 

.35   S.   W.   645    [1896].                '  «"  Breevort  v.  Detroit.  24  Mich.  322 

^'Zender    v.    Barber    Asphalt    Pav-  [1872]. 

ing  Co.,   24   Ky.   Law  Rep.   2279,   74  ">  In  tlie  Matter  of  Board  of  Street 

S.  W.  201    [19U3I.  Opening,  74  Hun.  561,  26  N.  Y.  Supp. 

^'Marshall  v.  Barber  Asphait  Pav-  855    [1893]. 

ins   Co.,   —    (Ky.)    .    66    S.    W.  "In    the   Matter   of   the    Board   of 

734,  23  Ky.  L.  R.  1971  [1902]:    (sub-  Street    Openins.    64    Hun.    59,    18   N. 

stitute  for  opinion  in  66  S.  W.   182,  Y.  Supp.  727   [1892]. 


1069 


PROPERTY    SIBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§628 


side  of  the  improvement  ])ack  to  the  center  of  the  block  on  eithe  • 
side  thereof,  or,  which  is  substantially  the  same  thin<r,  half  waj' 
back  to  the  next  street  on  either  side  of  such  improvement.  This 
is  held  to  be  a  proper  way  of  laying  out  and  describing  an  assess- 
ment district.*-  The  land  on  either  side  of  the  improvement  up 
to  the  lines  thus  described  constitutes  the  assessment  district.*''' 
While  it  has  been  said  that  a  block  is  any  portion  of  the  city  en- 
tirely enclosed  by  streets,"  the  same  court  has  subsequently  held 
that  land  can  be  called  a  "block"  even  when  surrounded  by  streets 
only  when  it  is  platted  into  lots.*"^  Under  a  statute  providing  that 
the  land  on  either  side  of  a  street  to  the  center  of  a  block  is  to  be 
assessed,  land  within  such  distance  is  to  be  assessed  whether  it 
abuts  on  the  improvement  or  not.*"  Under  a  statute  providing 
for  assessing  platted  lots  which  front  on  the  improvement  and  for 
assessing  unplatted  land  to  the  midway  line  between  the  street  im- 
proved and  the  next  parallel  street,  the  whole  of  a  platted  lot 
fronting  on  the  street  improved  may  be  assessed,  although  it  ex- 
tends beyond  such  midway  line.*'  On  the  other  hand,  if  ground 
is  platted  into  lots,  the  fact  that  the  OAvner  has  used  a  number  of 
such  lots  as  an  entire  tract  does  not  justify  the  assessment  on  any 
lots  except  those  that  front  upon  the  street  imi)roved  where  they 


**  Olsson  V.  City  of  Topeka,  42 
Kan.  70!»,  21  Pac.  219  [1889];  Blair 
V.  City  of  Atchison,  40  Kan.  35.3,  19 
Pac.  815  [1888];  City  of  Ottawa 
V.  Barney,  10  Kan.  "270  [1872]; 
State  ex  rcl.  Barber  Asphalt  Pavinj^ 
Company  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  183 
Mo.  230,  81  S.  \V.  1104  [1904]; 
Meier  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  ISO  Mo. 
391.  79  S.  \V.  055  flOOSI  :  Citv  of 
Spokane  v.  Security  Sav.  Society,  — 

Wash. .  89  Pac.  460  [1907]  :  Felt 

V.  City  of  Ballard.  38  \Vash.  300.  80 
Pac.  532  [1905]. 

"Olsson  V.  City  of  Topeka.  42 
Kan.  709.  21  Pac.  219  [1889];  Blair 
V.  City  of  Atchison.  -10  Kan.  353.  19 
Pac.  815   [1888]. 

"Blair  v.  City  of  Atchison.  40 
Kan.  353.  19  Pac.  815  [1888];  City 
of  Ottawa  V.  Barney.  10  Kan.  270 
[1872]. 

"  ^TcOrew  V.  Citv  of  Kansas  Pity. 
64    Kan.    61.    67    Pac.    438     [1902]. 


"A  block  is  a  portion  of  platted 
ground  in  a  city  surrounded  by 
streets,  and  the  term  is  not  ordina- 
rily applied  to  a  tract  of  unplatted 
land."  McGrew  v.  City  of  Kansas 
City,  64  Kan.  61,  63,  67  Pac.  438 
[1902].  "In  the  absence  of  any- 
thinir  showing  a  contrary  intent,  the 
ordinary  signification  should  be  given 
to  terms  employed  in  the  statutes 
and  according  to  this  interpretation 
'lots'  and  'blocks'  as  used  in  the 
statute  in  question  must  be  regarded 
as  the  subdivisions  ordinarily  made 
i.i  ])latting."  McCi-ew  v.  City  of 
Kansas  Citv.  64  Kan.  61.  64,  67 
Pac.  4.38    [1902]. 

"Olsson  v.  City  of  Topeka,  42  Kan. 
709,  21  Pac.  219  [1889] ;  City  of 
Ottawa  V.  Barney,  10  Kan.  270 
[18721. 

*'  State  ex  rel.  Barber  Asplialt 
Paving  Company  v.  City  of  St.  Louis, 
183   Mo.  2.30,  81    S.   \Y.    1104    [1904]. 


§  628  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1070 

extend  back  to  the  midway  line.*®  If  property  is  not  platted  into 
lots,  it  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  an  entire  tract  fronting  or  adjoin- 
ing the  street  improved,  but  it  can  only  be  assessed  back  to  the 
midway  line  between  the  street  improved  and  the  next  street.'*^ 
Under  such  statute  the  assessment  district  cannot  be  extended 
to  the  next  street.^**  A  private  way,  the  title  to  which  is  in  cer- 
tain trustees  for  the  abutting  property  owners  is  not  a  street  with- 
in the  meaning  of  such  statutes,  though  it  has  been  used  by  the 
public  as  a  street  for  over  ten  j^ears,'^^  and  accordingly  the  area 
to  be  assessed  may  extend  beyond  such  private  way.^-  Under  a 
statute  providing  that  property  fronting  on  the  street  improved 
should,  if  platted  into  blocks,  be  assessed  back  to  the  center  of  the 
blocks,  it  was  held  that  a  triangular  corner  lot  which  touched  the 
improvement  only  at  the  apex  of  the  lot  and  was  entirely  or  al- 
most entirely  outside  of  a  line  drawn  at  right  angles  to  the  part  of 
the  street  improved,  was  nevertheless  subject  to  the  assessment, 
since  it  lay  between  the  street  improved  and  the  center  of  a  block 
which  abutted  thereon.^^  Some  statutes  provide  for  assessing 
property  up  to  the  next  street  adjacent  to  the  improvement.-''* 
Land  between  which  and  the  improvement  there  is  a  street,  can- 
not be  assessed  under  such  statute.^^  Under  a  statute  providing 
for  assessing  land  back  to  the  next  adjoining  street,  land  may  be 
assessed,  although  an  alley  lies  between  it  and  the  improvement.^*' 
Thus,  under  a  statute  providing  that  half  the  cost  of  street  and 
alley  intersections  shall  be  apportioned  upon  the  lots  abutting 
upon  the  intersecting  streets  or  alleys  to  the  first  street  parallel 
to  the  street  or  alley  improved,  land  which  abuts  upon  an  alley 

*^  State     e\     rel.     Barber     Asphalt       Louis  Shovel  Co.,  —  Mo.  App.  , 

Paving  Company  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  110  S.  W.  86  [1908]. 

183  Mo.  230,  81   S.  W.   1104   [1904].  "^  Collier's  Estate  v.   Western  Pav- 

*''  State     ex     rel.     Barber     Asphalt  ing   and    Supply    Company,    180   Mo. 

Paving  Company  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  362,  79   S.  W.  947    [1904]. 

183  Mo.  230,  81  S.  W.   1104   [1904];  ^=  Collier's  Estate   v.   Western   Pav- 

Meier  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,   180  Mo.  ing    and    Supply    Company,    180   Mo. 

391,  79  S.  W.  955   [1903].  362,  79  S.  W.  947   [1904]. 

^  Collier  Estate  v.  Western  Paving  ^  Felt     v.     City     of     Ballard,     38 

and   Supply   Company,    180   Mo.   362,  Wash.  300,  80  Pac.  532  [1905]. 

79    S.   W.   947    [1904].      If   the   next  "In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

street  is   at  different  distances   from  Van   Buren,   79  N.  Y.   384    [1880]. 

the     street     improved     at     different  "  In  the  Matter  of  the  Petition  of 

places,  the  assessment  di«trict  is  nee-  Van   Buren,   79  N.  Y.   384   [1880]. 

essarily   of   different  widths.      Fruin-  ^  Praigg    v.    Western    Pavin?    an-l 

Bambrick     Construction     Co.     v.     St.  Supply    Companv,    143    Ind.    358.    42 

N.  E.'750   [1895]. 


1071 


PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§62y 


which  intersects  a  street  improved,  which  land  is  located  between 
such  street  and  the  next  parallel  street  may  be  assessed,  although 
between  such  land  and  the  street  improved  is  a  cross  alley,  which 
is  wide  enough  to  be  recognized  in  some  states  as  a  street.-'^' 

§  629.  Assessment  district  consisting  of  land  within  certain  dis- 
tajice  of  improvement. 
Under  some  statutes  it  may  be  provided  that  land  is  to  be  assess- 
ed if  within  a  certain  number  of  feet  of  the  improvement  for  which 
the  asssesment  is  levied/  In  assessments  or  special  taxes  for 
county  roads  it  is  often  provided  that  land  within  a  certain  dis- 
tance of  the  road  is  to  be  assessed  for  the  cost  thereof.-  What 
this  distance  shall  be,  depends  largely  upon  the  discretion  of  the 
legislature.    It  may  be  two  miles,^  a  mile  and  one-half,*  or  one 


and 

Supply  Company,  143  Ind.  358,  42 
N.  E.  750  [1895].  [This  case  arose 
concerning  a  street  improvement  in 
Indianapolis  where,  the  Supreme 
Court  said  with  an  outburst  of  local 
pride,  "The  wide  streets,  avenues 
and  even  the  universal  wide  alleys 
are  the  pride  of  the  whole  state."] 

^  City  of  Frankfort  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Ross,  128  Ind.  438,  27  N. '  E.  1115 
[1891];  Niklaus  v.  Conkling,  118 
Ind.  289,  20  N.  E.  797  [1888];  Ray 
V.  City  of  Jeffersonville,  90  Ind.  567 
[1883];  Rawson  v.  City  of  Des 
Moines,  133  la.  514,  110  N.  W.  918 
[1907];  McGrew  v.  City  of  Kansas 
City,  64-  Kan.  61,  67  Pac.4.38  [19021; 
Power  v.  City  of  Detroit,  139  Mich. 
30,  102  N.  W.  288  [1905];  Asphalt 
Granitoid  Const.  Co.  v.  Ilauessler, 
201  Mo.  400,  100  R.  W.  14  [1907]; 
(affirminir,  Asplialt  &  Granitoid 
Const.  Co.  V.  llauf's-lpr.  —  Mo.  App. 

,  80  S.  W.  5   [1904])  :  Wnlfort  v. 

City  of  St.  I^iuis.  115  Mo.  139.  21 
S.  VV.  912  [18921;  Stifel  v.  Brown. 
24  Mo.  App.  102  [1SS71:  State  ex 
rel.  V.  Hoffman.  35  O.  S.  435  [1880]; 
Coates  V.  Villajje  of  Norwood,  10 
Ohio  C.  C.  190  [1898]  ;  St.  Bene- 
dict's Abbey  v.  Marion  County.  — 
Or.  ,  93  Pac.  231    [1908]. 


^Bowen  v.  Hester,  143  Ind.  511, 
41  X.  E.  330  [1895];  Greencastle 
and  Bowling  Green  Turnpike  Com- 
pany V.  Albin,  34  Ind.  554  [1870]; 
Robbins  v.  Sand  Creek  Turnpike 
Company,  34  Ind.  461  [1870];  New 
Haven  and  Fort  Wayne  Turnpike 
Company  v.  Bird,  33  Ind.  325  [1870]; 
Hardwick  v.  Danville  and  North  Sa- 
lem Gravel  Road  Company,  33  Ind. 
321  [1870];  Turner  v.  Thornton  and 
^Mechanicsburg  Gravel  Road  Com- 
pany, 33  Ind.  317  [1870];  State  on 
the  relation  of  Lingenfelter  v.  Dan- 
ville and  North  Salem  Gravel  Road 
Company,  33  Ind.  133  [1870];  Cor- 
nell V.  Commissioners  of  Franklin 
County,  67  O.  S.  335,  65  N.  E.  998 
[1902];  Carlisle  v.  Hotherington.  47 
0.  S.  2.35,  24  N.  E.  488  [1890]; 
Commissioners  of  Putnam  County  v. 
Young.  30  0.  S.  288  [1880];  Lear  v. 
Halstead,  41  0.  8.  506   [1885]. 

'Spaulding  v.  Mott.  107  Ind.  58, 
76  N.  E.  020  [  19001 ;  Bowen  v.  Hes- 
ter, 143  Ind.  511,  41  N.  E.  330 
[18951;      St.      Benedict's     Abbey     v. 

Marion  County,  —  Or.  ,  93  Pac. 

231    [1908]. 

*  New  Haven  and  Fort  Wayne 
Turnpike  Company  v.  Bird,  33  Ind. 
325  [1870];  Turner  v.  Thornton 
and  Mechanicsbursi  Gravel  Road 
Company.  33  Ind.  317  [1870]. 


§629 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1072 


mile.^  Under  a  statute  providing  for  taxing  land  "within  one 
mile  on  each  side  of  the  road,"  land  within  a  radius  of  one  mile 
from  the  end  of  the  road  or  beyond  the  termination  of  such  road 
cannot  be  taxed.''  Under  such  statutes,  all  the  land  within  the 
prescribed  area  must  be  taxed."  Land  within  the  limits  of  a  mun- 
icipal corporation,^  such  as  a  village,^  may  be  taxed  for  such  road 
if  within  the  prescribed  distance.  Under  such  statutes  it  is  occa- 
sionally provided  that  if  another  road  runs  on  either  side  of  the 
proposed  road,  the  assessment  district  is  to  extend  half  way  from 
the  proposed  road  to  such  other  road.^'-  Thus,  where  the  assess- 
ment district  is  to  be  one  mile  on  either  side  of  the  proposed  road, 
the  boundaries  to  such  district  are  to  be  reduced  in  ease  another 
road  runs  substantially  parallel  to  the  proposed  road  within  two 
miles  thereof."  This  exception  does  not,  however,  exist  Avhere  a 
road  crosses  the  proposed  road  but  is  not  connected  with  it  and 
does  not  run  in  a  course  substantially  parallel  to  it.^-  It  has  been 
held  that  the  legislature  does  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  finding 
that  a  district  within  three  hundred  feet  of  the  improvement  is 
benefited  and  that  such  assessment  district  is  not  too  small."  Pro- 
vision is  made  for  the  adjustment  of  the  assessment  in  land  in- 
cluded within  two  overlapping  districts.^*  To  what  distance  from 
the  improvement  the  assessment  district  may  extend  has  been 
determined  variously  by  diiferent  legislatures,  assessment  dis- 
tricts   extending    three    hundred    feet,^'^    one    hundred    and    fifty 

Kauffman,    35    0.    S.    444 


^  Carlisle  v.  Hetlierington.  47  0.  S. 
235,  24  X.  E.  488  [1890]:  Lear  v, 
Halstead,  41    0.   S.   560    [1885]. 

"Lear  v.  Halstead,  41  0.  S.  506 
I1S85]. 

■^  Greencastle  and  Bowling  Green 
Turnpike  Company  v.  Albin,  34  Ind. 
554  [1870];  Robbins  v.  Sand  Creek 
Turnpike  Company,  34  Ind.  461 
[1870];  New  Haven  and  Fort  Wayne 
Turnpike  Company  v.  Bird,  33  Ind. 
325  11870];  Hardwick  v.  Danville 
and  North  Salem  Gravel  Road  Com- 
pany, 33  Ind.  321  [1870];  Turner 
V.  Thornton  and  Mechanicsburg 
Gravel  Road  Company,  33  Ind.  317 
[1870]. 

*  Commissioners  of  Putnam  County 
V.  Young,  36  0.  S.  288    [1880]. 

*  Commissioners  of  Putnam  County 
V.  Young,  36  0.  S.  288   [1880];  Mak- 


emson 
[1880]. 

^"Cornell  v.  Commissioners  of 
Franklin  County,  67  0.  S.  335,  65 
X.  E.  998  [1902];  Carlisle  v.  Hetlier- 
ington, 47  0.  S.  235,  24  X.  E.  488 
[1890]. 

"  Carlisle  v.  Hetherington,  47  0. 
S.  235,  24  X.  E.   488    [1890]. 

^-  Cornell  v.  Commissioners  of 
Franklin  County,  67  0.  S.  335,  65  N. 
E.  998   [1895].  " 

"Power  V.  City  of  Detroit,  139 
Mich.  30,  102  X'.  W.  288   [1905]. 

"  St.    Benedict's   Abbey    v.    Marion 

County,    —    Or.    ,    93    Pac.    231 

[1908];    (adjustment  to  be  made  by 
the  county  court. ) . 

'^McGrew  v.  City  of  Kansas  City, 
64  Kan.  61,  67  Pac.  438  [1902J; 
Power  V.  City  of  Detroit,  139  Mich. 
30,  102  N.  W.  288  [1905]. 


1073 


PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT. 


§629 


feet/"  oue  hundred  feet,''  and  fifty  feet/-  from  the  im- 
provement having  been  held  to  be  valid.  In  some  cases 
it  is  left  for  the  council  to  fix  the  depth  to  which  the 
land  shall  be  subject  to  assessment/"  Under  the  statutes 
of  Kentucky  authorizing  the  council  to  fix  the  depth  to  which  prop- 
erty may  be  assessed  where  the  land  is  not  divided  into  blocks 
by  principal  streets,  it  has  been  held  that  council  cannot  fix  such 
a  depth  as  will  extend  the  assessment  district  across  a  principal 
street.-'*  Where  the  land  on  one  side  of  the  improvement  is  di- 
vided into  blocks  and  on  the  other  side  is  not,  the  inequality 
caused  by  fixing  the  depth  to  which  the  land  is  to  be  assessed  may 
invalidate  the  assessment.-'  Under  such  statutes  land  cannot  be 
assessed  to  a  greater  depth  on  one  side  of  tlie  improvement  than 
on  the  other.--  If  the  assessment  district  is  made  to  extend  to  a 
greater  distance  on  one  side  than  on  the  other  it  is  said  that  such 
irregularity  does  not  avoid  the  entire  assessment  but  that  it  is 
invalid  as  to  the  excess  distance  included  on  the  one  side.-^  If 
by  statute  the  council  is  to  fix  the  depth  of  the  laud  to  be  assess- 
ed not  more  than  one  hundred  fifty,  nor  less  than  twenty  feet, 
such  provision  does  not  exempt  laud  less  than  twent.y  feet  in 


-■."Rawson  v.  City  of  Des  Moines, 
133  la.  514,  110  X.  \V.  918  [1907]; 
City  of  Frankfort  v.  State  ex  rel. 
Ross,  128  Ind.  438,  27  X.  E.  1115 
[1891];  Asphalt  &  Granitoid  Const. 
Co.  V.  Hauessler,  201  Mo.  400,  100 
S.  W.  14  [1907];  (affirming.  Asphalt 
&  Granitoid  Const.  Co.  v.  Haues- 
sler, —  Mo.  Ai)p.  ,  80   S.  W.   5 

[1904]);  Wolfort  v.  City  of  8t. 
Louis,  115  Mo.  139,  21  S.  W.  912 
[1892];  Stifel  v.  Brown,  24  Mo.  App. 
102  [1887];  Coates  v.  Village  of 
Norwood,   16  Ohio  C.  C   190   [1898). 

'■  State  ex  rel.  v.  Iloll'man,  35  0. 
S.  435   [1880]. 

"Xiklaus  V.  Conklinir.  118  Ind. 
289,  20  X.  E.  797  [1888]:  Kay  v. 
City  of  Jeflersonville,  90  Ind.  .Ii'h 
[1883]. 

"  Louisville  Ry.  Co.  v.  S(nit]iwest- 
ern  Alcatraz  Asphalt  &.  Construc- 
tion Co.,  —  Ky.  .  74  S.  W.  237. 

24  I'y.  Law  Rep.  2380  [1903]:  Fi- 
delity Tru-t  and  Safety  Vault  Com- 
pany   V.    Voris,    Exrs..    110    Ky.    315, 


01  S.  W.  474  [1901];  City  of  Louis- 
ville V.  Selvage,  10(i  Ky.  730,  51  S. 
\V.  447,  52  S.  \V.  809  |  1899]  ;  Glea 
son  V.  Barnott,  100  Ky.  125,  50  S. 
\V.  07  [1899];  Loeser  v.  Redd  & 
Bro..  77  Ky.  (14  Bush.)  18  [187S]; 
Koliler  Brick  Co.  v.  City  of  Toledo. 
29  Ohio  C.  C.  599   [1907]. 

="  Louisville   Ry.   Co.  v.   Soutluve-l 
ern  Alcatraz  Asphalt  &  Construct!. iti 

Co.,  —  Ky.  ,   73   S.   W.   237.  24 

Ky.  Law  Ifep.  2380  [1903];  Fidelity 
Trust  and  Safety  Vault  Company  v. 
Voris'  Executors,  110  Ky.  315,  (51  S. 
W.  474   [1901]. 

^  City  of  Louisville  v.  Selvage.  100 
Ky.  730.  51  S.  \V.  447.  52  S.  W.  809 
[lS99i:  Preston  v.  Roberts.  75  Ky. 
(  12   Busli.)    570   [1877]. 

"  Loeser  v.  Redd  &  Bro..  77  Ky. 
(14  Bush.)  18  [1878]:  Preston  v. 
Roberts.  75  Kv.  (12  Bush.)  570 
[1877]. 

°  Preston  v.  Roberts.  75  Ky.  (12 
Bush.)    570  [1877]. 


§  629  -  TAXATION  BY   ASSESSMENT.  1074 

depth. ^*  Statutes  restricting  the  depth  to  which  property  can  be 
assessed  often  apply  only  to  unplatted  land.-^  Under  such  a  stat- 
ute a  highway  cannot  be  assessed,  nor  can  land  separated  from  the 
improvement  by  a  highway,  be  assessed.^"  The  provision  re- 
stricting the  depth  to  which  land  may  be  assessed  is  often 
inserted  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  the  assess- 
ment exceeds  the  percentage  of  the  value  of  the  property 
assessed  to  which  it  is  restricted  by  statute.^^  Under  such 
statutes  the  value  is  to  be  calculated  only  to  the  specified 
depth. -^  It  may  be  provided  that  land  abutting  upon  the 
'  improvement  is  to  be  assessed  to  a  certain  depth ;  and  that, 
if  this  is  insufficient,  back  lying  land  to  a  certain  depth  fur- 
ther may  be  assessed. ^^  The  fact  that  the  owners  of  the  land 
abutting  on  the  improvement  have  signed  a  waiver  of  irregulari- 
ties and  have  promised  to  pay  the  assessment  does  not  relieve  the 
owners  of  the  back  lying  land  from  assessment.^"  By  statute  it 
is  sometimes  provided  that  unplatted  property  is  to  be  assessed  to 
the  average  depth  of  lots  in  the  neighborhood,^^  or  to  the  average 
depth  to  which  assessments  on  subdivided  lots  are  levied.^-  Un- 
der such  statutes  an  assessment  cannot  be  levied  beyond  such 
depth. ^^  It  seems  to  be  held  that  the  failure  of  the  council  to  fix 
such  average  depth  of  lots  in  the  neighborhood,  does  not  invali- 
date the  assessment  if  the  law  fixes  such  depth,^*  and  the  court 
is  given  power  on  hearing  to  determine  the  depth  to  which  the 

'*  City   of   Denver   v.   Londoner,    33  burg  Plate   Glass   Co.,    163   Ind.   599, 

Colo.   104,  80  Pac.   117    [1904];    (not  70  X.   E.   249;    City   of   Terre   Haute 

affected  on  this  point  by  reversal   in  v.  Mack,   139  Ind.  99,  38  N.  E.  408; 

Londoner  v.  City  and  County  of  Den-  Diven    v.    Burlington    Savings    Bank, 

ver,  210  U.  S.  373,  28  S.  708  [1908]).       —    Ind.    App.    ,    82    N.    E.    1020 

=«City  of  Frankfort  v.  State  ex  rel.  [1907]. 

Ross,    i28    Ind.    438,    27    N.    E.    1115  ^  Voris    v.    Pittsburg    Plate    Glass 

[1891].  Co.,     163    Ind.    599,    70    N.    E.    249 

-"City  of  Frankfort  v.  State  ex  rel.  [1904];   Diven  v.  Burlington  Savings 

Ross,    i28    Ind.    438,    27    N.    E.    1115       Bank,  —   Ind.   App.   ,   82   N.   E. 

[1891].  1020   [1907]. 

="  Stifel  V.  Brown,  24  Mo.  App.  102  ''  Barber    Asphalt    Paving    Co.    v. 

[1887].  Watt,  51    La.  Ann.    1345,  26   So.   70; 

**  Rawson    v.    City    of    Des    Moines,  Baltimore    and    Ohio    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

133  la.  514,   110  N.  W.  918   [1907];  City  of  Bellaire,  60  O.  S.  301,  54  N. 

Stifel    V.    Brown,    24    Mo.    App.    102  E.  263  [1899]. 

[1887].  '^=Cain  v.   City  of  Omaha,  42  Neb. 

» Cleveland,   Cincinnati,   Chicai^o  &  120,  60  N.  W.  368   [1894]. 

St.  Louis  Ry.   Co.   v.   Porter,  210  U.  "Cain  v.   City  of  Omaha,  42   Neb. 

S.    177,    28    S.    647    [1908];     (affirm-  120,  60  N.  W.  368   [1894]. 

ing  S.  C.  38  Ind.  App.  226,  74  N.  E.  *^  Wilson   v.   City   of   Cincinnati,   5 

260,   76  N.   E.   179);    Voris   v.  Pitts-  Ohio  N.  P.  68   [1887]. 


1075  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  630 

assessment  is  to  extend.-^'  If  no  such  power  were  given  to  the 
court  it  would  seem  that  the  failure  of  the  council  or  other  assess- 
ing body  to  fix  the  depth  would  invalidate  the  assessment.  Un- 
der such  statutes  land  further  away  from  the  improvement  than 
the  distance  indicated  cannot  be  assessed.^^  Whether  property 
assessed  must,  under  such  statutes,  touch  the  improvement  or  not, 
depends  upon  the  wording  of  the  statute.  If  the  statute  merely 
provides  that  lands  Avithin  a  certain  distance  of  the  improvement 
are  to  be  assessed,  lands  within  such  distance  may  be  assessed 
though  they  do  not  touch  the  improvements.^^  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  statute  provides  that  abutting  property  is  to  be  assessed  to 
a  certain  depth  from  the  improvement,  property  within  such  dis- 
tance but  not  abutting,  cannot  be  assessed.^*  Under  a  statute  of 
the  latter  class  in  determining  what  property  adjoins  or  touches 
the  improvement,  the  use  of  the  property  and  not  merely  the  plat- 
ted lines  are  to  be  considered.'"'  Thus,  under  a  statute  providing 
that  the  adjoining  property  is  to  be  assessed  to  a  depth  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  feet,  a  tract  of  land  bordering  on  the  street  and 
running  back  from  it  a  depth  of  sixty  feet  is  subject  to  a.ssess- 
ment  if  used  by  the  owner  as  an  entire  tract,  although  as  platted 
such  tract  consists  of  two  lots,  one  of  which  does  not  adjoin  the 
improvement.*" 

§630.     Meaning  of  "lot." 

In  statutes  describing  the  land  which  is  subject  to  assessment, 
the  term  "lot"  is  often  used.  There  is  a  divergence  of  authority 
as  to  the  meaning  of  this  term.  In  some  jurisdictions,  it  is  said 
that  the  term  "lot"  is  synonymous  with  the  term  "tract"  or  "par- 
cel,"' and  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  land  is  platted  into 

"^  Baltimore  and  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v.  'MYolfort  v.  City  of  St.  Louis?,  115 

City  of  Bellaire,  00  0.  S.  301.  54  X.  Mo.  1.3!),  21  S.  W.'912   [18921. 

E.  263    [1899].  '"Wolfort  v.  City  of  St.  Louis,  115 

'"Niklaus    v.     Conklinfr,     118    Ind.  Mo.  139,  21  S.  W.  912   [1892]. 

289,   20   N.   E.   797    [1888];    Asphalt  'State    v.    Robert    P.    Lewis    Com- 

&  Granitoid  Const.  Co.  v.  Hauessler,  pany,  82  ]Minn.  390,  402;  sub  nomine, 

201    Mo.   400,    100   S.   W.    14    [19071;  Ramsey    County    v.    Robert    P.    Lewis 

(affirming,      Asplialt      &       (iranitoid  Co.,  5.3  L.   R.  A.  421,  85   X.   W.   207, 

Const    Co.  V.  Hauessler,  —  Mo.  App.  80    X.     W.     611,     [1901];     State    of 

,  80  S.  W.  5    [19041);    State  ex  Minnesota   v.    Robert    P.    Lewis   Com- 

rel.  V.  HofTnian.  35  O.  S.  435   [18801.  pany,    72    Minn.    87,    75    X.    W.    108; 

"  Ray  V.   City  of  Jeffersonville.  90  sub   nomine,   Ramsey  County  v.   Rob- 

Ind.  567  [18831;  Coates  v.  Village  of  ert   P.   Lewis   Co..    42   L.    R.    A.    639 

Norwood,    16   Ohio  C.  C.   190    [1898|.  [1898]. 

"*  McGrew  v.   City  of  Kansas  City, 
64  Kan.  01,  67   Pac.  438   [1902]. 


§630 


TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1076 


small  divisions  suitable  for  residence  or  business  purposes.-  The 
term  "parcel"  is  said  to  be  equivalent  to  lots  as  subdivided.^  So 
the  word  "lot"  has  been  said  to  apply  to  any  portion,  piece  or 
division  of  land.*  Under  a  somewhat  similar  theory  as  to  the 
meaning  of  the  term  "lot,"  it  has  been  said  that  the  terms  "lots, 
blocks,  tracts  and  parcels  of  land"  is  as  broad  as  the  term  "real 
estate."'  In  other  jurisdictions,  the  term  "lot"  is  held  to  be  ap- 
plicable only  to  land  which  has  been  platted  into  small  tracts 
suitable  for  business  and  residence  purposes."  This  result  has 
been  reached  under  a  statute  requiring  the  owners  of  "town  lots" 
to  grade  and  pave  or  plank  sidewalks.'  If  it  is  specifically  pro- 
vided that  only  land  which  has  been  subdivided  into  lots  and 
blocks  can  be  assessed,  such  terms  exclude  unplatted  land.^  A 
street  which  intersects  the  improvement  is  not  a  "lot"  abutting 
or  fronting  thereon  within  the  meaning  of  statutes  providing  for 
assessing  lots.®  The  right  of  way  of  a  railroad  which  lies  wholly 
within  the  street  and  runs  along  the  length  thereof  is  not  a  "lot" 
within  the  meaning  of  such  statutes,^'^  neither  is  it  a  "lot  and 
parcel  of  land,"^^  "lots,  blocks,  tracts  and  parcels  of  land,"^- 


^  State  of  Minnesota  v.  Robert  P. 
Lewis  Co.,  72  Minn.  87,  75  N.  W. 
108;  sub  nomine,  Ramsey  County  v. 
Robert  P.  Lewis  Co.,  42  L.  R.  A. 
639   [1898]. 

^  City  of  Terre  Haute  v.  Mack,  139 
Ind.  99,  38  N.  E.  468. 

*  Warren  v.  Hopkins,  110  Cal.  506, 
42  Pae.  986  [1895];  Buell  v.  Ball, 
20  la.  282   [1866]. 

'Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111. 
18,  38  N.  E.  255   [1894]. 

*  Town  of  Greendale  v.  Suit,  163 
Ind.  282,  71  N.  E.  658   [1904]. 

'Town  of  Greendale  v.  Suit,  163 
Ind.  282,  71  N.  E.  658   [1904]. 

®  Minnesota  &  M.  Land  &  Improve- 
ment Co.  V.  City  of  Billings,  111 
Fed.  Rep.  972,  50  C.  C.  A.  70  [1901]. 

^  Cunning-ham  v.  City  of  Peoria, 
157  HI.  499,  41  N.  E.  1014  [1895]; 
Holt  V.  City  of  East  St.  Louis,  150 
HI.  530,  37  N.  E.  927  [1894];  City 
of  Schenectady  v.  Trvistees  of  Union 
Colle-e,  144  N.  Y.  241.  26  L.  R.  A. 
614,  39  N.  E.  67  [1894];  Lowerre 
V.  Mayor.  Aldermen  and  Commonalty 
of  the  Cit^'  of  Npw  York,  46  Hun. 
(N.  Y.)    253   [1887]. 


^''  Indianapolis  and  Vincennes  Rail- 
way Company  v.  Capitol  Paving  and 
Construction  Company,  24  Ind.  App. 
114,  54  N.  E.  1076  [1899];  Chicago, 
Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Ottumwa,  112  la. 
300,  51  L.  R.  A.  763,  83  N.  W.  1074 
[1900];  City  of  Muscatine  v.  Chi- 
cago, Rock  Island  &  Pacific  Railway 
Company,  88  la.  291,  55  N.  W.  100 
[1893];  City  of  Maysville  v.  Mays- 
ville  St.  R.  and  Transfer  Co.,  — 
Ky.  — ,  108  S.  W.  960  [1908]; 
Xorth  Jersey  Street  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Jer- 
sey City,  68  N.  J.  L.  (39  Vr.)  140, 
52  Atl.  300  [1902];  Chicago,  Mil- 
waukee &  St.  Paul  Railway  Company 
V.  City  of  Milwaukee,  89  Wis.  506, 
28  L.  R.  A.  249,  62  N.  W.  417 
[1895]. 

"  Chicago,  Rock  Island  &  Pacific 
Railway  Company  v.  Citv  of  Ot- 
tumwa, 112  la.  300.  51  L.  R.  A.  763, 
83  N.  W.  1074  [1900].  (However, 
the  statute  also  added  "fronting  on 
the   street"). 

'-/n  re  City   of   Seattle,  —  Wash. 


1077 


PROPERTY    Sl'B.JECT   TO    ASSESSMENT. 


§631 


" lands, "^•■*  or  "real  estate.""  A  right  of  way  by  the  side  of  an 
improvement  and  tonching  the  same,  even  thongh  acquired  by 
eminent  domain  and  amounting  to  an  easement  only,  has  been 
held  to  be  a  "lot"  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  authorizing  the 
assessment  of  lots.^'^'  If  the  statute  provides  for  assessing  the 
"lots  and  land,"^"  or  for  assessing  "land,"^'  the  propriety  of 
assessing  the  right  of  way  of  a  railway  is  still  more  clear.  Water 
mains  and  surface  pipes  belonging  to  the  city  and  the  pipes  of 
gas  and  light  companies  and  the  poles  and  wires  of  telegraph, 
telephone  and  electric  light  companies  are  not  included  in  the 
term  "lots. "^'^  Neither  are  they  parcels  of  land  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statute  providing  for  assessing  lots  and  parcels  of  land.^'' 

§  631.     Effect  of  platted  lines. 

In  determining  what  area  of  land  constitutes  a  lot  the  general 
rule  is  that  the  platted  lines  control  unless  the  property  is  actually 
used  and  occupied  in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  the  platted  lines, 
in  which  case  the  actual  use  and  occupation  controls.^     Thus,  it 


,    94    Pac.    1075    [1908];    Seattle 

V.  Seattle  Electric  Co.,  —  Wash. 
,  94  Pac.    194    [1908]. 

"Brick  &  Terra  Cotta  Co.  v.  Hull, 
49  Mo.  App.  433  [18921.  (Lands  on 
both  sides  of  and  adjoining  the 
street.)  O'Reilly  v.  City  of  King- 
.ston,  114  X.  Y.'439,  21  N.  E.  1004 
[1889];  ("bordering  or  adjoining" 
the  street). 

'*  State  of  Minnesota  ex  rel.  St. 
Paul  City  Railway  Company  v.  Dis- 
trict Court  of  Ramsey  County,  31 
Minn.  354,  17  N.  W.  954  [18841.  See 
also  §§  594-GOf). 

"Figg  V.  Louisviik-  &  X.  R.  R. 
Co.,  116  Ky.  135,  75  S.  W.  2G9,  25 
Ky.  L.  R.  '350  [1903].  "Under  the 
statute  governing  street  improvement 
a  lot  is  any  piece  of  land  within  tlie 
territory  defined  by  the  statute,  or 
the  general  council  where  the  terri- 
tory to  be  assessed  is  not  bounded  by 
principal  streets.  The  use  or  nonuse. 
or  the  character  of  the  use  to  which 
the  parcel  of  land  is  put  does  not  de- 
termine the  question  whether  it  is  or 
is  not  a  lot.  The  strip  of  land  used 
by  the  railroad  company  the  day  be- 


fore it  was  appropriated  by  it  as  a 
right  of  way  was  a  lot,  in  the  mean- 
ing of  the  statutes  and  to  tiius  ap- 
propriate it  cannot  change  its  char- 
acter." Figg  V.  Louisville  &  Xash- 
ville  R.  R.  Co.,  116  Ky.  135,  143,  75 
S.  \V.  269,  25  Ky.  L.  R.  350  [1903]: 
quoted  in  Louisville  and  XasliviHe 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Paving 
Co.,  116  Ky.  856.  76  S.  W.  1097 
[1903]. 

^"Indianapolis  and  N'incenncs  Rail- 
waj'  Company  v.  Capitol  Paving  and 
Construction  Company,  24  Ind.  App. 
114.   54   X.   E.    1076    [1899]. 

'"Northern  Indiana  Railroad  Com- 
pany V.  Connelly.  10  O.  S:  160 
[1859].  (Where  the  railroad  crosses 
the   street   at   right   angles.) 

"*Elwood  V.  City  of  Rochester,  43 
Hun.   (X.  Y.)   102  [18871. 

'"Elwood  V.  City  of  Rochester.  43 
Ilun.   (X.  V.)    102  [1887]. 

'Warren  v.  Plopkins,  110  Cal.  50(i. 
42  Pac.  986  [1895];  Lanclois  v. 
Cameron.  201  111.  301.  66  X.  E.  332 
[1903]:  Hamilton  v.  City  of  Fond  du 
Lac,  25  Wis.  490   [1870]'. 


§631 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1078 


the  owner  of  two  or  more  tracts  of  land  which  as  platted  are  separ- 
ate lots,  uses  them  together  as  one  entire  lot,  they  may  be  treated 
as  one  lot.-  The  owner  of  such  tracts  need  not  have  acquired  the 
title  thereto  from  the  same  source  or  hold  the  same  estate  therein. 
Thus,  one  in  possession  of  two  tracts  of  land,  one  of  which  he  owns 
in  fee  and  the  other  of  which  he  holds  by  perpetual  lease  with  the 
privilege  of  purchase,^  or  one  who  holds  two  tracts  of  land,  one 
by  the  legal  title  and  the  other  by  an  equitable  title,*  may  so 
use  such  tracts  as  to  make  them  for  assessment  purposes  one  lot. 
A  tract  of  land  of  over  six  hundred  feet  frontage,  five  hundred 
feet  of  which  is  from  one  hundred  to  two  hundred  feet  deep,  while 
the  rest  is  twelve  feet  deep,  may  if  used  as  an  entire  lot,  be  so  re- 
garded for  assessment  purposes.^  However,  three  lots  which  are 
used  together,  two  of  which  belong  to  the  wife  and  the  third  of 
which  belongs  to  the  husband,  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  one  lot 
for  assessment  purposes.®  If  a  tract  of  land  which,  as  platted, 
constitutes  one  lot,  is  actaully  occupied  and  used  as  two  or  more 
distinct  lots,  it  must  be  treated  for  assessment  purposes  as  con- 
sisting of  different  parcels  according  to  the  use  made  of  them.' 
This  view  is  not  entertained,  however,  in  all  jurisdictions.  In 
some  cases  the  platted  lines  prevail  over  the  use.^  Thus,  where 
land  which  as  platted  composed  two  lots  was  used  as  one  entire 


*  Ottumwa  Brick  &  Construction 
Co.  V.  Ainley,  109  la.  386,  80  N.  W. 
510  [1899];"^  Wolfort  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis,  115  Mo.  139,  21  S.  W.  912 
[1892];  Heman  Construction  Co.  v. 
Loevy,  64  Mo.  App.  430  [1895]; 
Kemper  v.  King,  11  Mo.  App.  116 
[1881];  Clements  v.  Village  of  Nor- 
wood, 2  Ohio  N.  P.  274  [1895]. 
"Where  property  is  unimproved  and 
vacant  the  divisions  thereof  on  plats 
of  survey  may  generally  be  regarded 
as  the  basis  for  such  assessments  as 
these;  but  where  the  owner,  by  the 
manner  of  his  use  and  improvement 
of  his  land  has  discarded  such  arti- 
ficial divisions  and  has  practically 
made  one  l-^t  of  several,  he  cannot 
justlv  comnlain  if  the  taxing  author- 
itv  t'^ects  his  nrorvertv  ss  one  n'oce, 
jtiat  pt!  lip  himself  has  d'^i"."  W^^l- 
ifort  V.  ntv  of  St.  Louis,  115  Mo.  139, 


144  [1892];    (citing  Kemper  v.  King, 
11  Mo.  App.   116   [1881]). 

*  Clements  v.  Village  of  Norwood,  2 
Ohio  N.  P.  274   [1895]. 

*  Ottumwa  Brick  &  Construction 
Co.  V.  Ainley,  109  la.  386,  80  N.  W. 
510   [1899].' 

'Moale  V.  Mayor  of  Baltimore,  61 
Md.  224  [1883]*;  (even  if  it  is  all 
assessed  at  a  uniform  rate  per  front 
foot. ) 

"M'Maken  v.  Hayes,  29  Ohio  C.  C. 
53^  [1907]. 

^Lanorlois  v.  Cameron,  201  111.  301, 
66  N.  E.  332  [1903];  Romi-j  v.  City 
of  Lafayette,  33  Ind.  30  [1870];  City 
of  New  Albany  v.  Cook,  29  Ind.  220 
[18671;  Brennan  v.  Citv  of  St.  Paul, 
44  Minn.  464.  47  N.  W.  55  [1890]; 
Clar.ton  V.  Taylor,  49  Mo.  App.  117 
[l^'O"!. 

«  S-ith  V.  Citv  of  Dps  AT'-ines,  106 
la.  590,  76  N.  W.  836  [1898]. 


1079  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  631 

tract,  it  was  held  that  onl}'  the  lot  which  as  platted  abutted  on  tin- 
street,  could  be  used  under  a  statute  which  provided  that  the 
assessment  should  be  limited  to  the  lots  or  lands  bounding  or 
abutting  on  such  street.'-*  If  the  statute  shows  that  the  legisla- 
ture in  providing  i'or  the  assessment  of  property  had  in  mind  the 
property  as  platted,  as  distinct  from  the  use  made  of  it,  full  ef- 
fect must  be  given  to  such  intention,  and  the  platted  lines  will 
control  the  use.^'  So,  if  a  division  of  a  large  platted  lot  has  been 
made  in  fact,  but  such  division  does  not  appear  on  the  city  plan, 
the  lot  may  be  assessed  as  an  entirety,  as  it  appears  on  such  plan.^^ 
Such  intention  has  been  found  where  the  legislature  provided 
that  platted  property  was  to  be  assessed  to  the  depth  of  the  lots 
fronting  on  the  improvement  while  unplatted  property  was  to  be 
assessed  to  a  line  drawn  midway  between  the  street  improved  and 
the  next  street.^-  Where  the  legislature  thus  makes  the  lines  as 
platted  the  material  factor  in  determining  what  a  "lot"  is,  a  divi- 
sion of  property  in  a  partition  suit,  which  has  not  been  approved 
by  the  board  of  public  improvements  or  recorded  in  the  record- 
er's office,  does  not  constitute  a  division  by  recorded  plat.^''  If 
an  improvement  extends  in  front  of  a  part  of  an  entire  tract,  it 
has  been  said  that  the  entire  tract  should  be  assessed  and  that  it 
is  error  to  attempt  to  subdivide  it.^*  A  somewhat  diflferent  view 
has,  however,  been  expressed  where  the  assessment  district  is  to 
include  the  property  fronting  on  the  improvement,  and  it  has  been 
held  that  if  the  improvement  extends  over  a  part  of  the  frontage 
only,  the  lot  should  be  assessed  only  for  an  amount  based  on  such 
frontagc.^^'  If  a  city  has  appropriated  land  for  opening  a  street 
and  has  thereby  severed  what  was  originally  an  entire  tract  into 
two  distinct  tracts,  such  tracts  are  to  be  treated  as  separate  lots 

•Smith  V.  Citv  of  Dps  Moinos.  106  City  of  St.  Louis.  —  Mo.  .    Ill 

la.  590.  76  N.  W.  836  [1898].  S.  W.  89   [1908]. 

"State     ex     rel.     Barber     Asphalt  "Hutchinson   v.   Pittshur<:.   72    Pa. 

Pavinjr  Company  V.  City  of  St.  Tvouis,  St.    (22  P.   F.   Smith)    320   [18721. 
183  Mo.  230,  8i   S.  W.   1104    [19041;  "State  ex  rel.  Barlx»r  Asphalt  Pav- 

Meior  v.   City  of  St.   Louis,    ISO  Mo.  ini;    Company    v.    City    of    St.    Louis, 

391,    79    S.    W.    955    [19031:    ITutoh-  183  Mo.  230.  81   S.  \V.   1104   [1904L 
inson  v.  Pittshur'^.  72   Pa.  St.    (22  P.  'H'ollier  Estate  v.  Western  Paviny; 

F.   Smith)    320    [18721.  &   Supplv  Company,   ISO  Mo.  362.  79 

If    a    lot   is    Hiviripd    bv   fleeds.    the  S.   W.   947    [1904]. 
new  lot  thus  created   must  he  tpoot-  "  Soott  r'ountv  v.  Hinrls.  50  :Minn. 

nized    in    lev^in?   f,s<=essn>P"ts:    «tate  204.   52   N.   W.   523    [18921. 
ex  rel   Skrainka   Construction   Co.   v.  '»  Frick  v.  Morford.  87  Cal.  576.  25 

Pae.  764  [1891]. 


§631 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1080 


or  parcels  for  the  purpose  of  assessment/'^  even  if  they  still  stand 
on  the  duplicate  for  general  taxation  as  one  tract.^'  Land  which 
is  platted  into  separate  tracts  and  which  is  not  in  effect  used  as  an 
entire  tract  cannot  be  treated  by  the  taxing  officials  as  an  entire 
tract  for  the  purpose  of  assessment. ^'^  Each  separate  lot  must  be 
assessed  separately.^''  Hence  the  lieu  of  the  assessment  is  not  an 
entirety,  but  may  be  released  as  to  one  of  the  lots  without  affect- 
ing the  others.-'  If  land  is  platted  and  used  as  an  entire  tract, 
the  taxing  officials  cannot  in  assessing  it  regard  it  as  subdivided 
into  smaller  tracts.-^  Ordinarily,  however,  if  the  amount  of  the 
assessment  is  not  increased,  the  owner  cannot  complain  because 
the  assessment  is  levied  upon  a  smaller  portion  of  his  property 
than  it  should  have  been  levied  upon.--  The  charge  is  properly 
made  upon  the  entire  tract.--'  The  property  owner  cannot  insist 
"  Younglove  v.  Hackman,  43   0.  S.       Contra :    that    sixteen    lots    may    be 


69,  1  N.  E.  230  [1885];  Spangler  v. 
City  of  Cleveland,  35  0.  S.  469 
[1880].  Contra:  that  such  tract  is 
to  be  regarded  as  an  entirety.  Watts 
V.  Village  of  River  Forrest,  227  111. 
31,  81  N.  E.  12  [1907];  DeKoven 
V.  City  of  Lake  View,  129  111.  399, 
21  N.  E.  813  [1890];  (followed  in 
Waggeman  v.  Village  of  North  Peo- 
ria, 155  111.  545,  40  N.  E.  485 
[1895]).  So  a  tract  of  land  belong- 
ing to  a  railroad  and  divided  by  the 
right  of  way  has  been  regarded  as 
one  lot;  the  assessment  not  to  be  in- 
creased thereby.  The  Chicago,  Rock 
Island  and  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago, 139  111.  573,  28  N.  E.  1108. 

^''  Younglove  v.  Hackman,  43  0.  S. 
69,  1  K  E.  230  [1885];  Spangler  v. 
City  of  Cleveland,  35  0.  S.  469 
[1880]. 

1*  Sharp  v.  Johnson,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.) 
92,  40  Am.  Dec.  259  [1843];  McGrew 
v.  City  of  Kansas  City,  64  Kan.  61, 
67  Pac.  438   [1902]. 

"•Reeves  v.  Grottendick,  131  Ind. 
107,  30  N.  E.  889  [1891];  Balfe  v. 
Johnson,  40  Ind.  235  [1872];  Becker 
v.  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Southwestern 
Railway  Companv.  17  Ind.  App.  324, 
46  N.  E.  685  [1897];  Ross  v.  Gates. 
117  Mo.  App.  237,  93  S.  W.  856 
[1906];  Sharp  v.  Johnson,  4  Hill. 
(N.  Y.)   92,  40  Am.  Dec.  259  [1843]. 


assessed  together  as  an  entire  tract; 
State,  Mann,  Pros.  v.  Mayor  and 
Common  Council  of  Jersey  City,  24 
X.  J.  L.   (4  Zabriskie)   662   [1855]. 

-"Ross  v.  Gates,  117  Mo.  App. 
237,  93  S.  W.  856   [1906]. 

^  People  ex  rel.  Kochersperger  v. 
Cook,  180  111.  341,  54  N.  E.  173 
[1899];  Barber  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
152  111.  37,  38  N.  E.  253  [1894]; 
Cram  v.  City  of  Chicago,  139  111.  265, 
28  N.  E.  758  [1893]  ;  Warren  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  118  111.  329,  11  N.  E. 
218  [1888];  Scott  County  v.  Hinds, 
50  Minn.  204,  52  N.  W.  523  [1892]; 
Forry  v.  Ridge,  56  Mo.  App.  615 
[1893];  State,  Coward,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  North  Plainfield,  63 
X.  J.  L.  (34  Vr.)  61,  42  Atl.  805 
[1899];  State,  Muller,  Pros.  v.  May- 
or and  Council  of  the  City  of  Bay- 
onne,  55  N.  J.  L.  (26  Vr.)  102,  25 
Atl.  267  [1892];  Council  v.  Moya- 
mensing,  2  Pa.  St.  224  [1845]; 
Bishop  V.  Tripp,  15  R.  I.  466,  8  Atl. 
692   [1887]. 

-  Barber  v.  City  of  Chicago,  152 
111.  37,  38  X.  E.  253  [1894];  Forry 
V.  Ridge,  56  Mo.  App.  615  [1894]; 
State,  Aldridge,  Pros.  v.  Essex  Public 
Road  Board,  46  X.  J.  L.  (17  Vr. ) 
126   [1884]. 

=^  Scott  County  v.  Hinds,  50  Minn. 
204,  52  X.  W.  523   [1892]. 


1081  PROPERTY    SUBJFX'T    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  632 

upon  having  the  tract  divided  for  purposes  of  assessment.  It  is 
the  right  and  the  duty  of  the  taxing  officials  to  assess  such  tract 
as  an  entirety.-'* 

§  632,     Assessments  of  strips  of  land. 

In  laying  out  city  lots  and  in  constructing  buildings,  long 
and  narrow  strips  of  land  are  sometimes  left  which  border  upon 
a  subsequent  improvement.  By  reason  of  their  shape,  little  use 
can  be  made  of  such  strips  of  land  unless  the  owner  of  such 
strip  bu3's  the  land  back  of  it.  or  unless  he  sells  to  the  owner 
thereof.  Neither  party  can,  of  course,  be  compelled  to  sell  or 
buy  and  there  is  accordingly  no  assurance  that  the  ownership 
of  the  two  tracts  of  land  will  be  combined  in  one  person  so 
that  the  entire  tract  will  be  benefited  by  the  improvement.  Such 
strip  of  land  may  or  may  not  be  subject  to  an  easement.  Even 
if  not  subject  to  an  easement  and  if  conveyed  in  good  faith  before 
assessment  proceedings  are  begun,  it  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions 
that  a  long,  narrow  strip  of  this  kind  is  not  benefited  and  there- 
fore cannot  be  assessed.^  In  some  jurisdictions  it  seems  to  be 
held  that  a  long,  narrow  strip  of  this  sort  may  be  assessed  for 
an  adjoining  improvement  without  reference  to  the  absence  of 
special  benefits.-  This  holding  may  be  justified  upon  the  theory 
that  land-owners  cannot  by  voluntarily  severing  their  interests 
withdraw  their  lands  from  the  operation  of  local  assessments. 
If  property  al)ut  upon  the  street  improved,  the  fact  that  such 
property  consists  of  a  long,  narrow  strip,  which  has  by  convey- 
ance been  severed  from  the  rest  of  the  original  trnr-t.  does  not 

=*Schropder    v.    Overman.    18    Ohio  =  Whiting  v.   Quackenbusli,   54   Cal. 

C.  C.  385  [1899].  "^^^    [188;)1;    City   of   Denver   v.   Lon- 

'City   of   Atlanta    v.    Ilanlcin.    101  doner,    33    Colo.     104,    80    Pac.     117 

Ga.    697.    29    S.    E.    14    [1897];    City  [1904];    Terry    v.    (  ity    of    Hartfonl. 

of   Atlanta   v.   Hanilein.   90   Ga.   381,  39  Conn.  286   [1872]:   Aniery  v.  City 

23     S.     E.     408     [1895].       (A     strip  of  Keokuk,  72  la.  701,  30  X.  W.  780 

three  feet  deep  on  one   street,   seven  [1887];    Moale    v.    ilayor    of    Ualti- 

feet  deep   on   another   and   four   hun-  more,   61    :\Id.   224    [1883];    Creamer 

dred    seven    feet   lon^r   alom?   a    third  v.   McCune,   7   Mo.   App.   91    [1879]: 

street.)      Citv  of  Atlanta  v.  Gabhett,  (a    strip    one    foot    wide);    City    of 

93  Gi    ''66    90  R    E    306  [1893].  Roe  Williamspnrt    v.    Beck.    128    Pa.    Rt 

also   Bner^n   v.   Mavor   and    Aldermen  147.  18  Atl.  329  [1889]  :  City  of  Har- 

of   Rnvannah.   91    Ga.   500.    17    R.   E.  risburg    v.    M'Cormiek.    129    Pa.    Rt 

749     [1803]-     Rpeor    v.    Mavor    and  213,    18    Atl.    126:    Tripp   v.   City   of 

Council    of   Athens.   85   Ga.   49.   9   L.  Yankton.    10    R.    D.    516.    74    N.    U. 

R     \    402.   11   R.  E.  802   [1890].  447  [1898]. 


§  632  TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT.  1082 

prevent  an  assessment  from  being  levied  upon  such  property.'' 
In  some  jurisdictions,  however,  it  is  held  that  the  value  of  such 
narrow  strip  must  be  considered  in  determining  whether  the 
assessment  thereon  exceeds  the  benefits.*  If  the  long,  narrow 
strip  of  land  in  question  receives  an  especial  benefit,  in  fact 
such  strip  may  undoubtedly  be  assessed  in  proportion  to  such 
benefits.-'"'  If  a  strip  of  land  along  the'  front  of  a  larger  tract 
is  conveyed  fraudulently  in  order  to  prevent  such  larger  tract 
from  being  assessed  for  an  improvement  upon  which,  as  an  en- 
tirety, it  abuts,  such  conveyance  is  regarded  as  of  no  effect  for 
purpose  of  assessment,  and  does  not  prevent  an  assessment  from 
being  levied  upon  the  whole  of  the  original  tract.*'  The  exist- 
ence of  fraud  is  especially  clear  where  such  conveyance  is  made 
without  consideration  under  an  agreement  to  reconvey  on  re- 
quest and  in  anticipation  of  a  proposed  improvement.''  The  sub- 
sequent conveyance  of  the  property  separated  from  the  improve- 
ment by  such  strip,  to  a  third  person  does  not  prevent  such 
property  from  being  subjected  to  assessment;  at  least  if  such 
third  person  has  knowledge  of  the  purpose  of  such  convey- 
ance.^ If  a  long,  narrow  strip  of  land  is  subject  to  an  easement, 
it  is  held  in  some  jurisdictions  that  such  strip  cannot  be  assessed 
if  it  is  not  benefited  by  the  improvement  Avith  reference  to  its  sub- 
jection to  such  easement.**  Thus,  where  the  owner  of  certain  prop- 
erty in  platting  it  reserved  the  strip  of  land  along  a  street  two 
feet  in  width  to  be  used  by  the  owners  of  the  several  lots  for  a 
fence,  such  strip  is  not  subject  to  assessment. ^^  If  a  strip  of  land  is 
conveyed  after  the  improvement  proceedings  have  begun,  such 
conveyance  is  ineffectual  and  does  not  prevent  the  entire  tract 
from  being  assessed."  This  result  seems  to  be  reached  whether 
the  conveyance  is  made  in  order  to  defeat  the  assessment  or  not. 

'Amery  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  72  la.  N.  W.  533   [1884];    (a  strip  one  foot 

701,  30  N.  W.  780  [1887].  wide). 

•*  Bacon  v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  ol  '  Fass  v.  Seehawer,  60  Wis.  525,  19 

Savannah,  91   Ga.  500,   17   S.  E.  749  X.  W.  533  [1884]. 

[1893].  'Eagle  Manufacturing  Company  v. 

^  Terry    v.    City    of    Hartford,    39  City   of   Davenport,    101    la.    493,   38 

Conn.  286   [1872]'.  L.  R.  A.  480,  70  N.  VV.  707    [1897]. 

«  Eagle  Manufacturing  Company  v.  *  Tovi^n  of  Woodruff   Place  v.  Ras- 

City   of   Davenport,    101    la.   493,'  38  chig,    147    Ind.    517,    46    N.    E.    990 

L.  R.  A.  480,  70  N.  W.  707   [1897]  ;  [1896]. 

(a    strip    two    feet    wide);    Stifel    v.  "Town  of  Woodruff  Place  v.  Ras- 

Brown,    24    Mo.    App.    102     [1887];  chig,    147    Ind.    517,    46    N.    E.    990 

Fass   V.    Seehawer,    60   Wis.   525,    19  [1896]. 

"Doughertv   v.   Miller,   36   Cal.   83 


1083  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §§633,634 

§  633.    Property  benefited  by  future  improvement. 

Property  which  is  not  benefited  by  the  improvement  as  con- 
structed and  will  be  benefited  thereby  only  if  a  subsequent  im- 
provement is  constructed,  which  the  public  corporation  is  free 
to  construct  or  not  as  it  chooses,  cannot  be  assessed  for  the  pos- 
sible benefits  which  may  inure  to  it  in  the  future.^  The  same  re- 
sult is  reached  in  some  states  under  a  different  procedure.  Thus, 
it  has  been  held  that  where  a  trunk  sewer  is  constructed  which  will 
benefit  certain  property  if  a  connecting  sewer  is  built,  and  the 
city  is  free  to  build  such  sewer  or  not  as  it  chooses,  such  prop- 
erty may  be  assessed  for  the  cost  of  such  trunk  sewer,  and  such 
assessment  is  to  be  levied  at  the  same  time  and  in  connection  with 
that  levied  for  benefits  caused  by  the  building:  of  the  trunk  sewer 
alone,  but  the  lien  of  such  assessment  does  not  come  into  exis- 
tence until  the  connecting  sewer  or  drain  is  l)uilt.- 

§  634.     Land  on  which  improvement  is  not  located. 

Since  an  assessment  for  benefits  is  levied  ui)on  the  theory  that  a 
special  benefit  is  conferred  by  the  improvement  upon  the  prop- 
erty assessed,  and  since  such  benefit  may  be  conferred  in  most 
cases,  as  well  upon  property  on  which  such  improvement  is  not 
located  as  uj)on  property  on  which  such  improvement  is  located, 
it  is  not  necessary  that  the  improvement  be  located  upon  the  land 
assessed  in  order  to  sustain  the  assessment.'  While  the  location  of 
the  improvement  upon  the  land  assessed  has  been  said  in  obiter 
to  be  necessary  to  justify  an  assessment,'-  this  obiter  has  subse- 
quently been  overruled  and  it  has  been  held  not  necessary  that 

[1808];    State,  (iobiscli,   Pros.   v.   In-  \r.)    29!),   1    Mini.   Corp.  Cas.  299,  21 

habitants  of  the  Township  of  North  Atl.  45;}  [1891];  State,  Kellopg,  Pros. 

Bergen  in  the  County  of  Hudson,  .37  v.  City  of  Eii/.alx>th.  40  X.  ,J.  L.   (11 

N.  J.  L.   (8  Vr.)    402   [1875];   Doug-  Vrooni)     274    [1878];    Park    Avenue 

lass  V.   City  of  Cincinnati,   29   0.   S.  Sewers,    Appeal    of    Parker,    169    Pa. 

165   [1876]!  St.  43,3,  32  Atl.  574   [1895]. 

'Title  Guarantee  and  Trust  Co.  v.  *  Seaman  v.  City  of  Canulon,  66  N. 

City  of  Chicago,   162  111.  505,  44   N.  .1.    L.     (37    Vr.)"  516,    49    Atl.    977 

E.  832   [1896];   Hutt  v.  City  of  Chi-  [1901].       For    a    discussion    of    this} 

cago,    132    111.    352,    23    N.K.    1010  subject  see  §§  417,  418. 

[1891];    (distingui.shed   in   Harris   v.  'City  of  New  Orleans  Praying  for 

City  of  Chicago,   162   111.  288,  44  X.  Opening    of    Casacaloo    and    Moreau 

E.  437   [1896];   and  in  Clark  V.  City  Streets.    20    La.    Ann.    497     [1868]; 

of    Chicago,    166    111.    84,    46    N.    E.  State,  Sigler,  Pros.  v.  Fuller,  etc.,  34 

7.30    [1897])  ;    State,  Morris.  Pros.  v.  X.  J.  L.   (5  Vr.)   227  [1870]. 

Mayor   and    Coninion    Council    of   the  'State  ex  rel.  Chouteau  v.  Leffing- 

Citv    of    Ravonno.    53    X.   J.    L.    (24  well,  54  Mo.  458   [1873]. 


§  635  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1084 

the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied  should  be  lo- 
cated on  the  land  assessed.^ 

§  635.  Condition  of  property  when  proceedings  are  begun  con- 
trols. 
In  determining  what  land  may  be  assessed  for  a  given  improve- 
ment, the  question  is  not  as  to  the  condition  of  such  land  at  the 
time  the  assessment  is  collected,  but  as  to  its  condition  at  the 
time  of  undertaking  the  improvement  and  levying  the  assess- 
ment.^ At  what  precise  stage  of  the  proceedings  this  question  is 
to  be  determined  we  find  a  diversity  of  opinion.  It  has  been  said 
that  the  condition  of  the  land  is  to  be  determined  when  juris- 
diction attaches,^  when  the  proceedings  are  begun, -^  when  the 
ordinance  is  passed,*  v/hen  the  improvement  is  made,'^  when  the 
assessment  is  made,*'  and  when  the  lien  attaches.'^  Hence,  if  land 
has  been  subdivided  into  smaller  parcels  during  the  assessment 
proceeding,  it  is  liable  to  assessment  as  an  entire  tract.^  In 
Ohio,  with  reference  to  the  determination  of  the  frontage  of  a 
lot  and  the  amount  of  the  depth  thereof  for  which  a  corner  lot 
may  be  assessed  for  the  improvement  of  the  street  along  its  side, 
a  change  in  the  condition  of  the  lot  during  the  assessment  proceed- 
ing is  ineffectual.  The  original  condition  of  the  lot  determines." 
If,  during  the  assessment  proceedings  the  owner  of  a  tract 
conveys  that  part  of  it  upon  the  street,  he  does  not  thereby 
relieve    the    entire    tract    from    assessment    to    which    it    would 

*  Kansas  City  v.  Ward,  134  Mo.  ^Sandrock  v.  Columbus,  51  Ohio 
172,  35  S.  W.  600   [189(1].                             St.  317,   42   N.   E.   255    [1894];    Met- 

Kity  of  Atchison  V.  Price,  45  Kan.  calf    v.    Carter,    19    Ohio    C.    C.    196 

296,  25  Pac.  605;   Barron  v.  City  of  [1900];   City  of  Philadelphia  to  Use 

Lexintrt-^u.   — -   Ky.  ,    105   S.   W.  of  Mack  v.  Gorgas,   180  Pa.  St.  296 

395    [1907].           '  36  Atl.  868   [1897];   Keith  v.  City  of 

=  Dougherty    v.   Miller,    36    Cal.    83  Philadelphia,  126  Pa.  St.  575,  17  Atl. 

[1868].  883   [1889]. 

"Brennan  v.   City   of   St.   Paul,   44  « Preston    v.    Roberts,    75    Ky.    (12 

Minn.  464,  47  N.  W.  55  [1890];  City  Bush.)   570  [1877]. 

of  Cincinnati  v.  .James,  2  Ohio  N.  P.  '  Clapton   v.    Taylor,    49   Mo.   App. 

345   [1895].  117   [1892]. 

*  State,  Gobisch,  Pros.  v.  Inhabi-  » Dougherty  v.  Miller,  36  Cal.  S3 
tants  of  the  Township  of  North  Ber-  [1868];  Shiner  v.  Village  of  Nor- 
gen  in  the  County  of  Hiulson,  37  N.  wood,  17  Ohio  C.  C.  631    [1898]. 

J.  L.    (8  Vr.)    402    [1875];    Douglass  » Sandrock    v.    Columbus,    51    Ohio 

V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  29  0.  S.  165  St.  317,  42  N.  E.  255  [1894];  Met- 
[1876];  Shiner  v.  Village  of  Nor-  calf  v.  Carter,  19  Ohio  C.  C.  196 
wood,  17  Ohio  C.  C.  631    [1898].  [1900];   City  of  Cincinnati  v.  James. 

2  Ohio  N.  P.  345    [1895]. 


1085  PROPERTV    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  636 

be  liable  in  its  original  condition/"  If  the  owner  of  a  tract 
conveys  the  rear  of  such  tract  before  the  lien  attaches,  it  is  said 
that  the  part  of  the  lot  abutting  on  the  street  is  to  be  assessed.'^ 
Thus,  if  the  condition  when  the  work  is  done  determines,  it  was 
held  where  a  tract  which  was  entire  when  the  ordinance  was 
passed,  was  divided  into  smaller  lots  when  the  improvement  was 
made,  such  division  could  be  considered  in  determining  whether 
the  property  is  urban  or  rural. ^-  It  has,  however,  been  held  that 
each  parcel  into  which  the  lot  has  been  divided  after  the  assess- 
ment is  liable  for  a  proportionate  part  of  the  assessment. ^^ 

§  636.     Improvement  outside  of  taxing  district. 

Whether  a  public  corporation  or  a  taxing  district  can  levy  an 
assessment  for  an  improvement  constructed  by  it  outside  of  the 
territorial  limits  of  such  public  corporation  or  taxing  district,  is  a 
question  frequently  presented  for  judicial  consideration.  If  the 
improvement  in  question  is  one  which  can  confer  a  special  local 
benefit  upon  the  property  in  such  public  corporation  or  taxing  dis- 
trict, and  if  there  is  statutory  authority  for  constructing  an  im- 
provement outside  of  such  district,  no  valid  objection  exists  to 
levying  assessments  upon  land  in  such  corporation  or  district  for 
improvements  without  the  limits  thereof.^  A  public  corporation, 
in  constructing  a  system  of  sewerage,  may  provide  for  an  outlet 
outside  of  the  limits  of  such  public  corporation.-  A  drainage 
district  may,  as  a  part  of  its  own  system  of  drainage,  maintain 
and  repair  drains  outside  of  the  drainage  district  wliicli  ai'e  neces- 

'"  State,  Gobisch,  Pros.  v.  Tnlmbi-  of  Maywnod,  140  111.  21G,  20  X.  E. 
tants  of  the  Township  of  Nortli  Ber-  704  [1893];  Briggs  v.  Union  Drain- 
gen,  in  the  County  of  Hudson,  37  N.  age  District  No.  1,  140  111.  53,  29 
J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  402  [18751;  Douglass  N.  E.  721  [18!)3];  Shreve  v.  Town  of 
V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  29  0.  S.  165  Cicero,  120  111.  226;  sub  nomiuc,  A\- 
[1876].  bertson  v.  Town  of  Cicero,  21    X.   E. 

"Clapton    V.   Taylor.    49    Mo.    A])p.  815    [IFOO]-.    People   ex    rel.   lluck    v. 

117   [1892].  f!age,    83    111.   486    [1876];    Kittinger 

i=Citv    of    Philadclpliia    to    I^se    of  v.    City    of    Buffalo,    148    X.    Y.    332, 

:Mack  V.  Gorgas,   ISO  Pa.  St.  290,  36  42  X.  E.  803   [1896]. 
Atl.    868    [1897].  -' ^liiiiicsota   and   M.   Land    and    Im- 

'M  ity  of  Cincinnati   v.  Wvnne.   19  |.rovenient    Co.    v.    City    of    Billings, 

Oliio  C".  C.   /47    [1900].  "  111    Fe<l.  972,  50  C.  C.  A.  70  [1901]; 

1  Minnesota   and   M.  Land   and    Ini-  :\laywo()d  Co.  v.  \'illage  of  Maywood, 

provement    Co.    v.    City    of    Billings,  140    111.    216.    29    X.    E.    704    [1893]; 

111   Fed.  972,  50  C.  C.  A.  70   [1901];  Shreve    v.    Town    of    Cicero.    129    111. 

Latruna  Drainage  District  v.  (  harlos  226;   sub  nomine,  Alhertsin  v.  To\vii, 

Martin    Co.,    14^4    Cal.    209,    77    Pac.  of  Cicero.  21  X.  E.  815  [1890]. 
9.33   [1904];   Maywood  Co.  v.  Village 


§  636  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1086 

sary  as  an  outlet  for  such  system.'*  It  has  been  held  that  cor- 
porate authorities  of  a  town  may  levy  an  assessment  for  an  appro- 
priation for  park  purposes  of  a  tract  of  land  a  part  of  which  is 
without  the  corporate  limits  of  such  town.*  A  park  board,  which 
has  exclusive  power  to  pave  roads  and  places  within  the  park  may 
levy  an  assessment  for  such  paving,  though  work  included  in  the 
assessment  is  done  upon  streets  outside  the  park,  where  such  work 
is  necessary  to  complete  the  paving  in  such  park  and  furnish  access 
thereto,  and  drainage  therefor,  even  though  the  city  council  has 
jurisdiction  outside  of  such  park.^  In  the  absence  of  statutory 
authority  a  public  corporation,  or  assessment  district,  cannot  levy 
an  assessment  for  an  improvement  outside  of  its  limits.''  Under 
a  statute  which  provides  with  reference  to  an  assessment  for  a 
sewer,  "the  cost  and  expenses  of  constructing  the  same  shall  be 
assessed  against  the  lots  or  pieces  of  ground  contained  in  the  dis- 
trict in  which  the  same  is  situated,"  a  city  cannot  construct  a 
discharging  sewer  outside  of  a  sewer  district  drained  thereby,  and 
assess  the  cost  of  such  sewer  against  the  land  within  such  sewer 
district.'^  However,  if  monej^  raised  in  one  district  has  been 
expended  in  another,  the  taxpayers  of  the  first  district  cannot 
compel  the  second  district  to  repay  such  amount.*'  In  the  ab- 
sence of  such  statutes,  a  drainage  district  extending  over  more 
than  one  township  may  raise  money  by  special  assessment  within 
its  area  and  expend  it,  without  restricting  the  expenditure  of  the 
amount  raised  in  one  township  to  that  part  of  the  improvement  in 
that  township.''  After  the  repeal  of  a  statute  which  provided  for 
apportioning  the  expense  of  maintaining  a  highway  or  a  bridge 

^Laguna      Drainage      District      v.  "City   of    Fort   Scott   v.   Kaufman. 

Charles  Martin  Co.,  144  Cal.  209,  77  44  Kan.  137,  24  Pac.  64  [1890].     For 

Pac.    933     [1904];     Briggs    v.    Union  decisions    under    similar    statutes    see 

Drainage  District  No.   1,   140  111.  53,  Crescent    Hotel    Co.    v.    Bradley,    81 

29  N.  E.  721    [1893].  Ark.  286,  98  S.  W.  971    [1906];   Rec- 

*  People  ex  rel.  Huck  v.  Gage,  83  tor  v.  Board  of  Improvement,  50  Ark. 
111.   486    [1876].      See   also,   Hundley  116,  6  S.  W.  519  [1887]. 

and    Rees    v.    Commissioners    of    Lin-  *  Crescent  Hotel  Co.  v.  Bradley,  81 

coin   Park,   67   111.   559    [1873].  Ark.  286,  98  S.  W.  971   [1906]. 

'^  Kittinger  v.   City  of  Buffalo,   148  "  Commissioners     of     Highways     of 

N.  Y.  332,  42  N.  E.  803   [1896].  the   Town   of   Colfax   v.   Commission- 

*  Rector  v.  Board  of  Improvement,  ers  of  East  Lake  Fork  Special  Drain- 
50  Ark.  116,  6  S.  W.  519  [1887];  age  District,  127  111.  581,  21  N.  E. 
City  of  Fort  Scott  v.  Kaufman,  44  206  [1890].  See  also  Oilman  v.  City 
Kan.  137,  24  Pac.  64  [1890];  Town  of  Milwaukee,  55  Wis.  328,  13  N.  W. 
of    Underhill    v.    Town    of    Essex,    64  266   [1882]. 

Vt.  28,  23  Atl.  617    [1891]. 


1087  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  636 

not  wholly  within  the  limits  of  any  given  town  upon  the  towns 
benefited  by  the  maintenance  thereof,  it  was  held  that  no  town, 
even  though  benefited  by  the  maintenance  of  a  highway  or  bridge, 
could  be  compelled  to  contribute  to  the  expense  thereof.^''     So  a 
city  cannot  assess  for  the  construction  of  a  sidewalk  outside  of  its 
boundaries  ;^^  but,  if  the  city  constructs  the  walk  with  reference 
to  a  well  recogniz;ed  and  undisputed  line  bounding  such  city  the 
correctness  of  such  line  cannot  be  questioned  in  a  collateral  pro- 
ceeding.^-    If  an  improvement  is  constructed  partly  within  and 
partly  without  the  assessment   district,   and   no   authority  exists 
for  assessing  land  within  the  district  for  an  improvement  without 
it,  an  assessment  may  nevertheless  be  levied  for  so  much  of  the 
improvement  as  is  within  the  district  where  the  cost  of  such  im- 
provement can  be  separated  from  the  rest.^^    An  ordinance  for  an 
improvement  need   not  specifically  state   that   the   improvement 
proposed  is  within  the  city.     The  omission  of  such  affirmative  and 
specific  statement  does  not  necessarily  render  the  ordinance  in- 
valid;'* but  if,  from  a  fair  construction  of  the  entire  ordinance  it 
appears  that  the  improvement  is  Mnthin  the  city,  the  ordinance  will 
be  regarded  as  sufficient.    Any  statement,  no  matter  how  informal, 
which  shows  that  the  improvement  is  within  the  given  city,  is 
sufficient.     Thus,  an  ordinance  which  provided  that  "Davis  street 
in  the  city  of  Evanston,  from  the  west  line  of  IMaple  avenue  to  the 
east  line  of  Wesley  Avenue  in  said  city,  be  paved."  shows  that 
the  improvement  in  (piestion  is  located  within  the  city.''"'     If  the 
ordinance    provides    for    an    improvement    upon    certain    named 
streets,  but  does  not  state  that  they  are  within  the  city,   it  will 
ordinarily   be   presumed   that    they    are   within    such    city."'     An 

^"Town    of    Underbill    v.    Town    of  and  Iron  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  158 

Essex,  64  Vt.  28,  23  Atl.  U17  [1891];  111.  9,  41   N.  E.   1102    [1895];    Beach 

(citing   and   following   Wardsboro   v.  v.   People  ex   rel.  Kern,   157   111.  (559, 

Jamaica,    59    Vt.    514;    Tunbridge    v.  41   X.  E.   1117    [1895];   City  of  Chi- 

Royalton,  58  Vt.  212).  cago   v.    Silverman.    150    111.    GOl,    41 

"  Bloomington    Cemetery     Associa-  X.  E.   1B2;    Bliss  v.  City  of  Chicago, 

tion   V.   People   of   the   State   of    llli-  loli    111.   5S4.   41    X.    E.    IGO    [1895]; 

nois,     139    111.     16,    28    N.    E.     11)76  Zcigicr    v.    People   ex    rel.    Kern.    156 

[1893].  Ill-   133,  40  X.  E.  607   [1895]. 

"  Bloomington     Cemetery     Associa-  "Sargent  v.  City  of  Evanston.   15-4 

tion   V.    People   of   the   State    of    llli-  111.  268,  40  X.  E.  440    [1894]. 
nois.     139     111.     16,    28    X.    E.     1076  '« Chicago    West    Division    Railvay 

[1893].  Company  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern.   154 

'M'rendergast    v.    Richards.    2    Mo.  111.  256.  40  X.  E.  342    [1894]-.    Stan- 

App.  187   [1876].  ton    v.    City   of   Chicago.    154    111.    23, 

"Philadelphia    and    Reading    Coal  39  X.  E.  987. 


§  637  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1088 

ordinance  for  a  public  improvement  which  shows  upon  its  face  that 
it  was  enacted  by  a  city  council  of  a  certain  city,  will  be  regarded 
prima  facie  as  being  within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  council,  since 
it  will  not  be  presumed  that  the  city  council  exceeded  its  statu- 
tory jurisdiction  and  violated  its  legal  duty.  Accordingly,  if  the 
city  council  has  no  authority  to  provide  for  an  improvement  out- 
side of  the  city  limits,  it  will  be  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  any- 
thing to  show  a  contrary  intent,  that  the  improvement  was  within 
the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  couneil.^^  If  the  party  who  re- 
sists an  assessment  wishes  to  interpose  the  objection  that  the  street 
improved  is  outside  of  the  territorial  limits  of  the  municipality,  he 
must  show  such  fact  by  affirmative  proof,  even  if  the  ordinance 
does  not  state  that  the  improvement  is  within  the  city/^ 

§  637.  Property  outside  of  public  corporation  which  levies  as- 
sessment. 
The  power  of  a  taxing  district,  or  a  public  corporation,  to  levy 
an  assessment  for  benefits  upon  land  which  is  situated  outside  of 
the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  such  public  corporation,  or  taxing 
district,  has  been  presented  for  judicial  consideration.  If,  under 
the  statutes  in  force  a  benefit  is  positively  secured  by  such  im- 
provement to  the  owners  of  the  land  assessed,  there  seems  to  be 
no  constitutional  objection  to  authorizing  the  levy  of  an  assess- 
ment upon  land  outside  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  public  corpora- 
tion which  constructs  such  improvement  and  levies  such  assess- 
ment.^ Accordingly,  if  the  statute  provides  for  the  levy  of  such 
assessment,  such  lands  may  be  subjected  to  assessment  for  such 
improvement.-     A  common  illustration  of  this  is  found  in  the  case 

^^Philadelphia    and    Eeading    Coal  ^*  Kansas    City   v.    Block,    175    Mo. 

and  Iron  Co.  v.  City  of  Chicago,  158  433,  74  S.  W.  993   [1903]. 

111.  9,  41  N.  E.   1102    [1895];   Beach  ^  Reclamation    District   No.    108   v. 

V.  People  ex  rel.  l>ern,   157  111.  659,  Hagar,  66  Cal.  54,  4  Pac.  945  [1884]; 

41  N.  E.  1117  [1895];  Wisner  v.  Peo-  Watkins  v.  State  ex  rel.  Van  Auken, 

pie  ex  rel.  Kern,   156  111.   180,  40  N.  151  Ind.  123,  49  N.  E.  169,  51  N.  E. 

E.  574   [1895];   West  Chicago  Street  79    [1898];    Hudson    v.    Bunch,    116 

Railway   Company   v.   People   ex   rel.  Ind.  63,   18  N.  E.  390   [1888];   Crist 

Kern,    158    111.    18,    40    N.    E.    605  v.    State   ex    rel.    Whitmore,   97    Ind. 

[1895];    West    Chicago    Street   Rail-  389    [1884];    State    for    the    Use    of 

way  Company  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern,  Cram  v.  Elliott,  32  Ind.  App.  605,  70 

155   111.   299,   40   N.   E.   599    [1895];  N.  E.  397   [1903]. 

Wheeler  v.  People  ex  rel.  Kern,   153  ^Watkins   v.   State   ex   rel.   Auken, 

111.  480,  39  N.  E.   123   [18941;   Fan-  151  Ind.  123,  49  N.  E.  169,  51  N.  E. 

sas  City  V.  Block,  175  Mo.  433,  74  S.  79    [1898]. 
W.  993   [1903]. 


1089 


PROPERTY   SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT. 


§637 


of  ditches  and  drains,  whore  it  is  held  competent  for  the  lef^ishi- 
ture  by  statute  to  authorize  a  county  to  construct  drains  and  to 
assess  a  part  of  the  expense  thereof  upon  hinds  in  other  counties 
benefited  by  such  improvement.^  The  board  of  supervisors  of  one 
count./  may  be  authorized  by  the  legislature  to  include  within  a 
reclamation  district,  lands  which  are  situated  in  another  county.* 
Another  example  of  the  operation  of  this  principle  is  found  in  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  a  city  to  furnish  water  to 
persons  outside  of  the  city  limits,  and  to  enforce  the  collection  of 
water  rents  by  the  entry  of  a  lien  therefor,  in  substantially  the 
same  way  as  Avater  rents  charged  against  real  property  within  the 
city  limits  are  enforced.^  The  converse  of  this  proposition  is 
found  where  the  legislature  requires  a  city  to  furnish  water  to  per- 
sons or  to  public  corporations  outside  of  the  city  limits.  If  such 
rates  thus  fixed  are  reasonable,  such  statutes  have  been  held  to  be 
valid."  A  city,  however,  has  "no  extra  territorial  jurisdiction 
without  some  special  statute  authorizing  it,"'  and  without  some 
special  provision  authorizing  a  city  to  levy  an  assessment  upon 
land  outside  of  its  territorial  jurisdiction;  no  such  assessment  can 
be  levied  under  a  grant  of  power  to  construct  an  improvement  at 
the  expense  of  the  property  benefited.®  The  grant  of  power  to  one 
corporation  may  impliedly  exclude  all  other  corporations  from 
exercising  the  same  power  in  the  same  territory.''  Two  dis- 
tinct municipal  corporations  cannot  exercise  the  same  powers, 
jurisdiction  and  privileges  in  the  same  territory  at  the  same  time." 


''Watkins  v.  State  ex  rel.  Van  Au- 
ken,  151  Ind.  123,  49  N.  E.  1G9,  51 
N.  E.  79  [18981;  Ilmlson  v.  P.unch, 
116  Ind.  03,  18  \.  E.  390  |18SS]; 
State  for  the  Use  of  C  ram  v.  Elliott, 
32  Ind.  App.  G05,  70  N.  E.  397 
119031. 

*  Roclaniation  District  Xo.  108  v. 
Ilairar,  (ili  Cal.  54.  4  Pac.  945  [1884]. 

''Pittsburg  V.  Brace  Bros.,  158  Pa. 
St.   174,  27  Atl.  854   [1F931. 

'  City  of  C'liicapo  v.  Town  of  Cicero, 
210  111'.  290,  71  N.  E.  35fi   [19041. 

'Gilchrist's  Appeal.  109  Pa.  St. 
600. 

*  City  of  Chica'.'o  v.  Carpenter.  201 
111.  402,  60  N.  E.  302  [19031;  Bishop 
V.  People  of  the  State  of  Illinois.  200 
111.  33.  65  N.  E.  421  [19021;  Billings 
V.   City  of  Chicago,   107   111.   337,  47 


N.  E.  731  [18971;  West  Chicago 
Park  Commissioners  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago, 152  111.  392,  38  x".  E.  697 
[18941;  Hundley  and  Rees  v.  Com- 
missioners of  Lincoln  Park,  67  111. 
559  [18731;  Spaulding  v.  Mott,  107 
Ind.  58,  76  X.  E.  020  [1900];  Ahas- 
cal  V.  Bouny,  37  La.  Ann.  538 
[18851;  In  the  Matter  of  the  Assess- 
ments of  Lands  in  the  Town  of  Flat- 
bush,  00  X.  Y.  398  [18751;  In  the 
Matter  rf  the  City  of  Brooklyn  v. 
Lott,  2  Hun.  (X.  Y.)   028  [1874]. 

'  West  Chicago  Park  Commission- 
ers V.  Citv  of  •'hicago.  152  111.  392, 
38  X.   E.  097    [18941. 

'"West  ChicaiY)  Park  Commission- 
ers V.  Citv  of  Chicago,  152  111.  392, 
38  X.  E.  097   [1894]. 


§637 


TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT. 


1090 


Thus,  under  statutes  which  authorize  a  board  of  park  commission- 
ers to  levy  an  assessment  for  the  improvement  of  streets  of  which 
they  have  assumed  jurisdiction,  the  city  has  no  power  to  levy 
assessments,  either  upon  lands  in  tho  park,"  or  for  the  improve- 
ment of  streets  running  along  the  park  of  which  the  park  com- 
missioners have  assumed  jurisdiction.^-  It  is  not  that  park  lands 
are  exempt  from  assessment,  but  because  the  exclusive  power  of 
levying  assessments  is  in  the  board  of  park  commissioners.^^  So, 
if  a  city  assumes  jurisdiction  and  control  for  drainage  purposes  of 
streams  and  ditches  within  the  city  limits,  such  streams  and 
ditches  cannot  be  made  a  part  of  a  drainage  district  organized  out- 
side of  the  city.^*  So,  if  assessments  for  constructing  a  highway 
may  be  levied  on  property  within  two  miles  of  such  highway,  it 
has  been  held  that  if  a  highway  is  within  two  miles  of  the  county 
line,  the  assessment  district  cannot  extend  beyond  such  county 
line.^^  So,  land  included  in  a  city  levee  district  cannot  be  made 
a  part  of  another  levee  district.^"  The  acts  of  the  park  commis- 
sioners in  constructing  a  curb  on  one  side  of  a  street  which  adjoins 
the  park,  building  a  concrete  walk  and  constructing  catch  basins, 
show  that  the  park  board  has  assumed  jurisdiction  and  control 
over  the  street,  notwithstanding  the  improvements  are  all  on  one 
side  thereof.^'  The  fact  that  the  park  commissioners  hav6  ac- 
cepted and  used  a  viaduct  built  by  a  city  and  railroad  company, 
in  a  part  of  the  street  which  the  commissioners  had  already  form- 
ally determined  to  improve  does  not  show  that  the  park  commis- 
sioners have  relinquished  control  to  the  city.^^  If  the  authorities 
of  two  towns,  each  having  in  its  limits  a  part  of  one  entire  park, 
are  authorized  to  levy  assessments  therefor,  the  supervisors  and 
assessors  of  the  two  towns  should  not  act  as  one  body  in  assessing 


"  Billings  V.  City  of  Chicago,  167 
111.  337,  47  N.  E.  731  [1897];  West 
Chicago  Park  Commissioners  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  152  III.  392,  38  X.  E. 
697   [1894]. 

'-City  of  Chicago  v.  Carpenter.  201 
111.  402,  66  N.  E.  362  [1903]. 

"  West  Chicago  Park  Commission- 
ers V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  392, 
38  X.  E.  697   [1894]. 

"  Bishop  V.  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  200  111.  33,  655  N.  E.  421 
[1902]. 


'^Spaulding  v.  Mott.  167  Ind.  58, 
76  N.  E.  620   [1906]. 

^®  A  statute  attempting  so  to  in- 
corporate such  land  was  held  uncon- 
stitutional as  causing  unequal  taxa- 
tion. Abascal  v.  Bounj',  37  La.  Ann. 
538   [1885]. 

'"  City  of  Chicago  v.  Carpenter,  201 
111.  402,  66  N.  E.  362  [1903]. 

^*  West  Chicago  Park  Commission- 
ers V.  Sweet,  167  111.  326,  47  N.  E. 
728  [1897]. 


1091  PROPERTY    SrB.TECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  638 

lands  in  both  towns.''  Under  a  statvite  which  provides  that  a  lien 
may  be  acquired  and  enforced  upon  a  lot  in  front  of  which  street 
improvement  work  has  been  done  "in  an  incorporated  city,"  no 
lien  can  be  acquired  where  street  improvement  work  has  been  done 
in  front  of  a  lot  outside  of  the  limits  of  an  incorporated  city.-''  If 
a  statute  could  be  so  construed  as  to  permit  an  assessment  upon 
lands  outside  of  a  city  for  a  prior  debt  incurred  by  such  ,city  in 
appropriating  lands  inside  its  limits  for  a  park,  it  has  been  said 
that  under  such  construction,  such  statute  would  be  unconstitution- 
al.-^ A  statute  authorizing  an  assessment  for  an  improvement  by 
which  the  property  assessed  could  not  be  benefited,  would  be  as 
we  have  seen,  unconstitutional.--  Accordingly,  if  the  fact  that  the 
property  assessed  is  outside  of  the  taxing  district  or  public  corpor- 
ation, prevents  the  owner  of  such  property  from  having  any  fixed 
right  in  the  use  of  the  improvement  for  which  suc^  assessment  is 
levied,  the  same  facts  render  such  assessment  invalid.  The  owner 
of  land  outside  of  the  limits  of  a  city  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay 
special  assessments  for  a  sewer  constructed  hy  the  city  in  the  street 
in  front  of  his  land  where  the  owner  of  such  lot  is  not  given  the 
right  to  connect  his  lot  with  such  sewer.-''  If  land  is  outside  the 
city  limits  when  a  street  improvement  is  begun,  and  accordingly  it 
is  omitted  from  assessment,  although  it  abuts  on  one  side  of  the 
street,  but  before  the  improvement  is  completed  such  land  is  taken 
into  the  city,  it  is  proper  to  extend  the  assessment  district  so  as  to 
include  such  land.-* 

§  638.     Land  in  two  or  more  assessment  districts. 

The  courts  are  occasionally  called  upon  to  determine  whclhei- 
one  tract  of  land  can  be  situated  in  two  or  more  different  assess- 
ment districts,  and  can  be  subjected  to  two  or  more  distinct 
assessments,  levied  by  each  of  said  districts.  The  (juestion  thus 
presented'  is  in  part  constitutional,  and  part  statutory.  I;  th( 
land  in  question  can.  under  the  rules  for  determining  the  ques- 
tion of  benefits,'    be  legally   said   to   receive   a    ])enefit   from   each 

"Hundley  and  Rws  v.  Commission-  "See   §S    118,  284. 

ers    of    Lincoln    Park.    (17     HI.    550  =»  Farlin   v.   Hill.   27    Mont.   27.   HO 

[1873].  I'i'f?-  237   [19021. 

^Durrell   v.  Dooncr.   111>  Cal.  411.  =>* /n   re   Hollist^r.    180   N.    Y.   518, 

51  Pac.  628   [1897].  72  N.   E.   1143;    (affinninp  SO  N.  Y. 

^In  the  Matter  of  tlio   Assessment  S.  518,  96  App.  Div.  501). 

of   Lands    in    the   Town    of    Flatlmsh.  'See    §§    561-567. 
60  N.  Y.  398  [1875]. 


§  638  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1092 

of  such  improvements,  there  seems  to  be  no  constitutional  '-b- 
jection  to  allowing  a  given  tract  of  land  to  be  subjected  to  two 
or  more  assessments  levied  by  different  assessment  .listricts  for 
different  improvements.-  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  benefit  con- 
ferred by  one  improvement  is  such  that  no  further  benefit  enures 
to  the  land  in  question  by  reaso]i  or  the  other  improvements,  no 
assessment  can  be  levied  lor  the  improvemeat  which  does  not 
enure  to  the  benefit  of  the  land  Jhus  assessed.  J^iiliji^ct  to  the 
constitutional  restricti  )ns  Hhx'.H>\y  given,  tlie  remaining  ques- 
tions are  purely  those  of  statutory  construction.  If  the  legisla- 
ture, either  expressly  or  by  implication,  has  provided  that  the 
jurisdiction  of  one  assessment  district  shall  exclude  the  juris- 
diction of  another  assessment  district,  the  tract  of  land  which  is 
situated  in  the  first  cannot  be  subjected  to  an  assessment  lev- 
ied b.y  the  second  district,  even  if  it  falls  within  the  geographical 
limits  thereof,  since  it  is  within  it  from  a  territorial  standpoint, 
but  not  from  a  standpoint  of  jurisdiction.^  Thus,  if  the  legisla- 
ture gives  exclusive  control  over  streets  and  boulevards  situated 
within  a  park  district  to  the  commissioners  of  such  park  district, 
a  city,  within  the  limits  of  which  such  land  is  situated,  cannot 
levy  an  assessment  upon  the  same  land  for  the  same  purposes.* 
Thus,  a  city  cannot  levy  an  assessment  for  a  street,^  or  for  the 
cost  of  boulevard  lamps,^  upon  land  of  which  the  park  com- 
missioners have  exclusive  jurisdiction.  Under  the  same  prin- 
ciple, if  the  effect  of  a  statute  is  to  give  to  a  city  exclusive  juris- 
diction over  the  subject  of  drains  and  sewers  within  the  terri- 
torial limits  of  a  city,  land  within  such  city  cannot  be  subjected 
to  an  assessment  levied  for  drainage  purposes  by  a  county,^  or 

==  People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Scott,  132  v.   City  of  Chicago,    167   111.   337,  47 

111.  427,  23  N.  E.   1119   [1891].  N.    E.     731     [1897];     West    Chicago 

''City  of  Chicago  v.  Carpenter,  201  Park  Commissioners  v.  City  of  Chi- 
lli. 402,  66  N.  E.  362  [1903] ;  Bishop  cago,  152  111.  392,  38  N.  E.  697 
V.    People    of    the    State    of    Illinois,  [1894]. 

200    111.    33,    65    N.    E.    421    [1902];  ^  City  of  Chicago  v.  Carpenter,  201 

Billings  V.  City  of  Chicago,   167   111.  111.  402,  66  N.  E.  362    [1903];   Bill- 

337,  47  N.  E.  731   [1897];  WesfeChi-  in:Tg  v.  City  of  Chicago,  167  111.  337, 

cago  Park   Commissioners  v.  Cily  of  47  N.  E.  731   [1897]. 

Chicago,   152  111.   392,   38  N.   E.   697  'West   Chicago    Park   Commission- 

[1894];    Village  of   Pleasant  Hill   v.  ers  v.  City  of  Chicago,   152   111.  392, 

Commissioners,  71  0.  S.  133,  72  N.  E.  38  N.  E.  697   [1894]. 

896;   City  of  Dayton  v.  Taylor's  Ad-  ''Village  of  Pleasant  Hill  v.   Com- 

ministrator,    62    0.    8.    11,   56   N.   E.  missioners,   71    0.    S.    133,   72    N.   E. 

480.  896;    City  of  Dayton  v.  Taylor's  Ad- 

*City  of  Chicago  v.  Carpenter,  201  ministrator,    62    0.    S.    11,    56    N,    E. 

Til.  402,  66  N.  E.  362  [1903] ;  Billings  480. 


1093  PROPERTY    SLBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  639 

by  a  drainage  district,*'  within  the  territorial  limits  of  which 
the  land  in  such  cit}^  is  situated.  If  the  land  in  question  can 
legally  be  said  to  be  benefited  by  the  improvements  constructed 
by  each  of  the  assessing  districts,  the  legislature  may  authorize 
the  levy  of  assessinents  ])y  each  district  upon  such  land.  Thus, 
under  the  Illinois  Drainage  Act  of  1885,  a  new  and  independent 
drainage  district  could  be  organized  and  maintained  within  the 
limits  and  boundaries  of  another  drainage  district  theretofore 
organized,  maintained  and   in   full  operation." 

§  639.     Unauthorized  omission  of  land  benefited. 

Land  is  sometimes  omitted  from  the  effect  and  operation  of 
assessment,  although  such  land  is  benefited  by  the  improvement 
for  which  the  assessment  is  levied ;  is  not  excluded  from  the 
operation  of  the  assessment  by  any  legislative  determination 
that  it  is  not  benefited,  or  by  the  determination  of  the  public 
corporation  or  other  public  body  by  which  such  assessment  is 
levied;  and  is  not  omitted  for  reasons  peculiar  to  the  character 
of  such  property,  which  make  it  exempt  from  assessment.  If 
the  entire  cost  of  the  improvement  has  been  assessed  upon  the 
property  benefited  by  such  improvement,  the  fact  of  such  im- 
proper omission  of  property  benefited  is  not  only  to  exempt  the 
omitted  property  from  the  burden  of  the  assessment  which  it 
ought  to  bear,  but  also  to  increase  the  burden  of  the  assessment 
upon  the  rest  of  the  property  which  has  been  benefited.  If  the 
assessm^ent  is  to  be  paid  in  part  by  the  owners  of  the  property 
benefited  and  in  part  by  general  taxation,  the  eflPect  of  such  im- 
proper omission  is  to  increase  the  burden  cast  upon  the  general 
tax  payer.  In  either  case  such  omission  operates  unfairly  and 
if  taken  advantage  of  in  the  proper  manner  invalidates  such 
assessment.^     Such   action   is  said   to   be   "arbitrary   and   unlaw- 

'  Bishop  V.   People   of   the   State  of  |  1X941  ;    Dnvies  v.  (  ity  of  Los  Aiipe- 

Illinnis,    200    111.    3.3,    G5    X.    E.    421  les,  80  Cal.  37,  24  Pac.  771    [18!)0|; 

[1902].  l^iggins   v.    Brown,    7(5    Cal.    318,    18 

"People  ex  rel.  Miller  v.  Scott.  132  Pac.   373    [1888];    Dyer   v.   Harrison, 

111.  427,  23  N.  E.  lilt)  [1891].  (i3    Cal.    447    [1883];    People    of   the 

^Rooke's  Case,  5  Rep.  99  1).    (llil.  State  of  California  v.  Lynch,  51  Cal. 

40  Eliz.);    Davis  v.   Gaines,  48   Ark.  15,  21   Am.  Rep.  677    [1875];   People 

370,    3    S.    W.    184    [1880];    Town   of  ex  rel.  Davidson  v.  Cole,  128  HI.  158, 

Monticello  V.  Banks,  48  Ark.  251,  25  21     X.    E.    6     [1890];     Gilkerson    v. 

S.  W.  852;  Kutchin  v.  Enirelbret,  129  Scott,    7G    111.   509;    Pa-re   v.   City   of 

Cal.  635,  62  Pac.  214   [1900];    Ryan  Chicaixo,  60  111.  441    [1871];   City  of 

V.  Altschul,  103  Cal.  174,  37  Pac.  339  Chicago  v.  Baer.  41    111.  .306   [1866]; 


§639 


TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT. 


1094 


ful. "-  Thus,  the  omission  of  vacant  property  from  assessment, 
when  such  property  is  benefited  in  the  same  way  that  occupied 
property  is  benefited,  invalidates  the  assessment.^  In  some 
jurisdictions  it  has  even  been  held  that  the  legislature  cannot  con- 
fer upon  a  city  the  power  to  exempt  certain  benefited  land 
from   local    assessments,    or   to    make    valid    contracts    for    that 


Forgey  v.  Northern  Gravel  Road  Co., 
37  Ind.  118  [18711;  Nevins  and 
Otter  Creek  Township  Draining 
Company  v.  Alkire,  36  Ind.  189 
[1871];  City  of  Columbus  v.  Storey, 
35  Ind.  97  [1871];  Greencastle  and 
Bowling  Green  Turnpike  Company  v. 
Albin,  34  Ind.  554  [1870];  Robbing 
V.  Sand  Creek  Turnpike  Company,  34 
Ind.  401  [1870];  Hardwick  v.  Dan- 
ville and  North  Salem  Gravel  Road 
Company,  33  Ind.  321  [1870];  New 
Haven  and  Fort  Wayne  Turnpike 
Company  v.  Bird,  33  Ind.  325  [1870]  ; 
Law  V.  Madison,  Smyrna  and  Graham 
Turnpike  Company,  30  Ind.  77 
[1868];  Helm  v.  Witz,  35  Ind.  App. 
131,  73  N.  E.  846  [1905];  Drake  v. 
Grout,  21  Ind.  App.  534,  52  N.  E. 
775  [1898];  City  of  Ottawa  v.  Bar- 
ney, 10  Kan.  270  [1872];  Clay  v. 
City  of  Grand  Rapids,  60  Mich.  451, 
27  N.  W.  596  [1886];  Minnesota 
Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Palmer,  20  Minn. 
468  [1874];  Beck  v.  Holland,  29 
Mont.  234,  74  Pae.  410  [1903];  Sim- 
mons   V.   City   of   Millville,   —   N.    J. 

L.   ,    66   Atl.   895    [1907];    State 

ex  rel.  Wilson  v.  Longstreet,  38  N. 
J.  L.  (9  Vr.)  312  [1876];  State, 
Kilburn,  Pros.  v.  Essex  Public  Road 
Board,  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vr.)  273 
[1874] ;  State,  Van  Home,  Pros.  v. 
Town  of  Bergen,  30  N.  J.  L.  (1  Vr.) 
307  [18G3];  State,  Culver,  Pros.  v. 
Town  of  Bergen,  in  the  County  of 
Hudson,  29  N.  J.  L.  (5  Dutch.)  266 
[1861];  State,  Vanderbeck,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Common  Council  of  Jer- 
sey City,  29  N.  J.  L.  (5  Dutcher) 
441  [1861];  State  Water  Commis- 
sioners of  Jersey  City,  Pros.  v.  Mayor 
and  Common  Council  of  the  City  of 
Hudson,  27  N.  J.  L.  (3  Dutcher)*  214 
[1858]  ;  Van  Deventer  v.  Long  Island 


City,  139  N.  Y.  133,  34  N.  E.  774 
[1893];  Hassan  v.  City  of  Roches- 
ter, 67  N.  Y.  528  [1876];  (reported 
on  former  appeal,  65  N.  Y.  516 
[1875]);  Hassen  v.  City  of  Roches- 
ter, 65  N.  Y.  516  [1875];  Hassan  v. 
City  of  Rochester,  6  Lans.  (N.  Y.) 
185  [1871];  Savage  v.  City  of  Buf- 
falo, 59  Hun.  606,  14  N.  Y.  Supp. 
101  [1891];  People  ex  rel.  Connelly 
v.  Reis,  96  N.  Y.  S.  597,  109  App. 
Div.  748  [1905];  People  ex  rel.  Tiet- 
jen  V.  Reis,  96  N.  Y.  S.  601,  109  App. 
Div.  919  [1905];  Webber  v.  Common 
Council  of  the  City  of  Lockport,  43 
Howard  (N.  Y.)  368  [1872];  In  re 
Cedar  Park,  1  How.  Pr.  N.  S.  257 
[1885];  Copcutt  v.  (!ity  of  Yonkers, 
83  Hun.  178,  31  N.  Y.  S.  659  [1894]; 
Bell  V.  City  of  Yonkers,  78  Hun. 
196,  28  N.  Y.  S.  947  [1894];  In  the 
Matter  of  the  Application  of  the 
Board  of  Street  Opening  and  Im- 
provement of  the  City  of  New  York, 
Relative  to  Acquiring  Title  to  Forest 
Avenue  in  tlie  Twenty-third  Ward  of 
the  City  of  New  York,  74  Hun.  561. 
26  N.  Y'.  Supp.  855  [1893];  Parsons 
V.  City  of  Rochester,  43  Hun.  258 
[1887];  Kennedy  v.  City  of  Troy,  14 
Hun,  308  [1878];  City  of  Asheville 
v.  Trust  Company,  143  N.  C.  360,  55 
S.  E.  800  [1906]  ;  Upington  v.  Oviatt, 
24  O.  S.  232  [1873];  Huntington 
V.  City  of  Cincinnati,  2  Ohio  N.  P. 
35  [i895];  City  of  Scranton  v. 
Levers,  200  Pa.  St.  56,  49  Atl.  980 
[1901];  Fulkerson  v.  City  of  Bris- 
tol, 105  Va.  555,  54  S.  E.  468  [1906]  ; 
Fraser  v.  Mulany,  129  Wis.  377,  109 
N.  W.  139   [1900]. 

^  Friedrich    v.    City    of    Milwaukee. 
114  Wis.  304.  90  N.  W.  174   [1902]. 

"Town  of  :Monticello  v.   Banks,  48 
Ark.  251.  2  S.   W.  852. 


1095  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  639 

purpose.*  In  this  respect,  there  is  a  marked  difference  be- 
tween the  local  assessment  and  general  taxation.  A  per- 
son whose  property  has  been  assessed  and  taxed,  cannot 
resist  the  payment  of  such  tax  because  other  property  liable  to 
such  taxation  has  been  omitted."'  That  omission  of  land  which 
should  have  been  assessed  results  in  an  unfair  apportionment 
was  noticed  at  an  early  date.  Thus,  where  800  acres  of  land 
belonging  to  the  King  was  omitted  from  assessment,  such  assess- 
ment was  held  invalid,  the  court  sa.ving,  "The  tax  is  unjust  be- 
cause by  the  not  taxing  of  them  (i.  e.  the  lands  belonging  to  the 
King)  a  greater  burden  was  laid  upon  the  rest  of  the  land  than 
of  right  ought  to  be."**  In  some  jurisdictions,  the  reason  as- 
signed for  holding  that  assessments  are  rendered  invalid  b,y  the 
improper  omission  of  benefited  property  is  that  such  assess- 
ment violates  the  constitutional  provisions  of  uniformity  and 
equality.^  While  the  correct  result  has  undoubtedly  been  reach- 
ed in  these  cases,  the  propriety  of  such  reason  is  doubtful,  as  it 
is  ordinarily  held  that  the  constitutional  provision  requiring  uni- 
formity and  equality  applies  to  general  taxation  only  and  not 
to  local  assessments.  However,  this  reason  may  be  justified  on 
the  theory  that  the  provision  requiring  uniformity  and  equality 
of  taxation  applies  to  local  assessments  in  the  special  sense  of 
re{[uiring  a  fair  apportionment  according  to  benefits.  There  is 
some  authority  for  sa.ving  that  the  omission  of  propert,y  which 
should  be  assessed  invalidates  a  charge  levied  for  the  non-perfor- 
mance of  a  legal  duty,  which  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed 
is  bound  to  perform.'*  Thus,  it  has  been  said  that  an  ordinance 
requiring  property  owners  to  construct  sidewalks  must  apply  in 
a  uniform  manner  to  all  land  similarly  situated."  This  view, 
however,  seems  contrary  to  the  weight  of  authorit.v.  Such 
charges  have  nothing  to  do  with  benefits  and  in  the  absence  of 
special   constitutional   restrictions,    the   power   of   the   legislature 

*City    of    Cliicago    v.    Baor.  41    HI.  cclln  v.  Banks,  48  Ark.  251,  2  S.  VV. 

306    [18(561.      See    §    616.  852:   Peay  v.  City  of  Little  Rock.  32 

"Van     Deventer     v.     Long  Island  Ark.    31    118771:    Flctclicr    v.    Oliver. 

City.    139   N.    V.    133,   34   N.  E.   774  25  Ark.  281. 

118931.  Mames  v.  Pine  BhilV.  49  Ark.   199. 

« Whitley     v.     Fawsett.     Styles      12  4  R.  W.  760   [18871. 

(23  Car.  i).  "James  v.  Pine  BlulV,  49  Ark.   199. 

'Davis   V.    Gaines.    48    Ark.  370.    3  4  S.  W.  760   [1887]. 

S.    W.    184    [18861:    Town    of  Monti- 


640 


TAXATION    BY   ASSESSMENT, 


1096 


or  the  city  to  determine  the  necessity  of  the  performance  of  such 
legal  duties  is  final. 


§  640.     Omission  to  impose  proper  charge  on  street  railway. 

A  case  analogous  to  that  of  the  omission  of  benefited 
property  is  found  where  a  part  of  the  cost  of  a  street  improve- 
ment should  be  borne  by  a  railroad,  the  tracks  of  which  occupy 
a  part  of  the  street,  but  the  entire  cost  of  such  improvement  has 
been  assessed  upon  the  owners  of  property  abutting  on  such  a 
street.  By  such  a  method  of  assessing,  not  only  is  the  railway 
company  relieved  from  the  burden  which  in  justice  it  ought  to 
bear,  but  the  owners  of  abutting  property  are  assessed  in  excess 
of  the  amount  which  in  justice  they  ought  to  pay  Omission  to 
require  the  railway  company  to  pay  its  proportionate  share  of 
the  cost  of  such  improvement  will,  if  properly  taken  advantage 
of,  invalidate  the  assessment.^  Whether  the  presumption  is  that 
a  street  railway  company  is  bound  to  pay  a  part  of  the  cost  of 
paving  the  street  upon  which  its  tracks  are  situated,  or  whether 
such  liability  is  never  presumed  to  exist,  but  must  be  shown 
affirmatively,  is  a  question  upon  which  there  is  a  conflict  of 
authority.-  It  has  been  said  to  be  at  least  necessary  to  show 
that  the  company,  when  it  obtained  the  right  to  lay  its  tracks, 
had  agreed  to  pave  a  part  of  the  street.^  If  it  is  shown  that 
the  company  entered  into  a  contract  to  pave  a  part  of  the  street, 
such  liability  will  be  presumed  to  exist,  unless  it  is  shown  that 
the  company  has  been  released  in  some  way.*  If  the  city  is  giv- 
en the  power  to  require  a  street  railway  company  to  pave  a 
part  of  the  street  upon  which  its  tracks  are  located  within  the 


^  American  Hide  &  Leather  Com- 
pany V.  City  of  Chicago,  203  111.  451, 
67  N.  E.  979  [1903];  City  of  Chi- 
cago V.  Nodeck,  202  111.  257,  67  N.  E. 
39  [1903];  McFarlane  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  185  111.  242,'  57  N.  E.  12 
[1900];  Sawyer  v.  City  of  Chicago, 
183  111.  57,  55  N.  E.  645  [1899]; 
State  ex  rel.  Keith  v.  Common  Coun- 
cil of  the  City  of  Michisan  City.  138 
Ind.  455,  37  N.  E.  1041  [1894]; 
State  ex  rel.  Wheeler  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  Countv.  80  Minn. 
293,  83  N.  W.  183  [1900]-.  Wales  v. 
Warren,  66  Neh.  455.  92  N.  W.  590 
[1902];   Philadelphia  to  Use  of  Nes- 


tor V.  Spring  Garden  Farmers  Mar- 
ket Company,  161  Pa.  522,  29  Atl. 
286   [1894]. 

^  Presumption  in  favor  of  liability 
of  railway  company.  Pase  v.  City 
of  Chicago,  60  111.  441  [1871].  Pre- 
sumption against  liability  of  rail- 
way company.  State  ex  rel.  Wheeler 
V.  District  Court  of  Ramsey  County, 
80  Minn.  293,  83  N.  W.   183   [1900]. 

'  State  ex  rel.  Wheeler  v.  District 
Court  of  Ramsey  County,  80  Minn. 
293,  83  N.  W.  183   [1900]. 

*  Sawyer  v.  City  of  Chicago,  183 
111.  57,  55  N.  E.  645   [1899]. 


1097  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  641 

city,  and  is  given  a  discretion  as  to  the  exercise  of  such  power, 
a  property  owner  cannot  complain  because  the  city  has  not 
seen  fit  to  impose  such  charge  upon  a  street  railway  company,^ 
nor  because  the  city  has  seen  fit  to  release  a  street  railway  com- 
pany from  such  liabilit}^"  It  has  been  held  that  a  property 
owner  who  attacks  an  assessment  because  no  charge  is  imposed 
upon  a  street  railway  company  must  show  that  the  expense  of 
improving  the  part  of  the  street  occupied  by  the  tracks  of  the 
railway  company  was  included  in  the  assessment  against  such 
property  owner/  An  ordinance  giving  to  a  street  railway  com- 
pany a  power  to  occupy  a  part  of  the  street  and  requiring  it  to 
pave  the  part  so  occupied,  imposes  no  liability  until  accepted 
by  the  company.  Accordingly,  such  an  ordinance  does  not  of 
itself  repeal  a  prior  ordinance  for  improving  such  street  at  the 
cost  of  the  property  owners.^ 

§  641.     Omission  of  land  not  subject  to  assessment. 

The  omission  of  land  which,  under  the  circumstances  of  the 
particular  case  it  is  not  proper  to  assess,  does  not,  of  course,  in- 
validate the  assessment.^  The  omission  of  property  which  is 
legally  exempt,  either  by  the  provisions  of  a  specific  statute,^ 
or  by  reason  of  its  peculiar  use,^  or  by  reason  of  its  being  pub- 
lic property*  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.  Since  land 
belonging  to  the  United  States  cannot  be  assessed,  the  omission 
of  such  land  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment.^  Cases  are 
found  in  which  the  public  improvement  has  been  constructed  in 
front  of  part  of  the  property  by  the  owners  thereof  at  their  own 

*Ft.     Doclge     Electric     Light     and  {)83    [ISnOl;    Dnmosnil    v.   Loui.sville 

Power  Company  v.  City  of  Ft.  Dodge,  Artificial  Stone  Co.,  109  Ky.  1,  58  S. 

115  la.  5158,  89  N.  W."  7   [19021.  W.  371    [19001;    Ford  v.  City  of  To- 

«Lacey    v.    City    of    :Marsliallt()\vn.  Icdo.    64    O.    S.    92.    59    X. "  E.    779 

99  la.  367,  68  N.  W.  726   [1896].  |I9()11. 

"McVerry  v.  Boyd.  89  Cal.  304.  26  =  See   §   618. 

Pac.  885   [18911.    "  'See  S  578  ct  scq. 

'Thomson  v.  People  ex  rel.   Foote,  ^  Smith  v.   City  of  Buffalo   159  N. 

184  111.  17,  56  N.  E.  383   [1900].  Y.   427,  54  N.   E.   62    [18991:    Smith 

1  People  ex  rel.  Doyle  and  Ralston  v.   City  of  Buffalo,  90   Ilun.    118.   .35 

V.  Austin,  47   Cal.  3.53    [18741;    Sny-  X.  Y.'s.  635    [18951;    In  the  Matter 

dacker  v.  Villa'^e  of  West  Hammond,  of    the    Application    of    Churchill    to 

225    111.    154,    80    X.    E.    93    [19071;  Vacate  an  Assessment,  82  X.   Y.  288 

Rich  V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.   18,  [18801. 

38  X.  E.  255  [18941;  Oanen  v.  More-  '^^  People  ex   rel.   Doyle  and   Ralston 

dock  and  Ivy  Landing  Drainage  Dis-  v.  Austin.  -47  Cal.  353   [18741. 
trict.   Xo.    l'    131    111.    446,   23    X.   E. 


§  641  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1098 

expense,  either  under  the  precedent  authority  of  the  public  cor- 
poration, or  with  its  sanction  and  adoption.  Provision  is  often 
made  in  such  cases  for  constructing  the  improvement  in  front 
of  the  rest  of  the  property  and  for  exempting  from  the  operation 
of  such  assessment  land  in  front  of  which  such  improvement  was 
already  constructed."  On  the  same  principle  the  legislature  may 
provide  for  an  assessment  for  laying  water  pipe,  excepting  there- 
from property  to  which  water  is  supplied  and  against  which  wa- 
ter rates  are  charged.^  After  assessment  proceedings  have  been 
initiated  by  a  resolution  of  intention  to  order  a  certain  street  im- 
provement, the  council  has  no  power  to  permit  individual  lot  own- 
ers to  construct  the  improvement  in  front  of  their  property  and 
to  omit  such  improvement  from  the  contract  and  such  property 
from  the  assessment.^  Cases  are  found  in  which  an  assessment 
has  been  levied  in  a  manner  so  defective  that  it  has  subsequently 
been  set  aside.  Before  such  judgment  vacating  the  assessment, 
owners  of  part  of  the  land  assessed  have  paid  such  assessments 
voluntarily.  In  providing  for  a  re-assessment  the  land  of  those 
who  have  paid  such  assessment  voluntarily  is  often  omitted  from 
the  operation  of  such  re-assessment.  The  omission  of  such  land 
does  not  invalidate  such  assessment.^  A  different  rule  applies 
where  such  credit  is  given  for  some  reason  other  than  prior  pay- 
ment. If  certain  land  is  credited  with  the  amount  assessed 
against  it  on  the  theory  that  such  land  is  not  benefited,  this  is  in 
legal  effect  the  omission  of  such  land  from  assessment  and  if  no 
power  exists  to  omit  such  land  from  assessment  directly  it  can- 
not be  done  indirectly.^  ' 


•Barber    v.    Board    of    Supervisors  [1898];   Blount  v.  City  of  Janesville, 

of  the  City  and  County  of  San  Fran-  31   Wis.   648    [1872]. 

Cisco,    42  "Cal.    630    [1872];    City   of  '  R.    &    A.    R.    R.    Co.    v.    City    of 

Connersville  v.  Merrill,  14  Ind.  App.  Lynchburg,  81  Va.  473   [1866]. 

303,   42  N.   E.    1112    [1805];    Dumes-  Mvutchin    v.    Engelbret,    129    Cal. 

nil  V.  Louisville  Artificial  Stone  Co.,  635,  62  Pac.  214   [1900]. 

109  Ky.  1,  58  S.  W.  371  [1900] ;  Beck  *  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 

V.    Obst,    75    Ky.     (12    Bush.)     268  more  v.  Ulman,  79  Md.  469,  30  Atl. 

[1876];    Warren    v.    Street    Commis-  43,   165  U.  S.   719   [1894];    (original 

sioners  of  Boston,   187  Mass.  290,  72  assessment  held  invalid  in  Ulman  v. 

N.  E.  1022  [1905];   In  the  Matter  of  Mayor    and    City    Council    of    Balti- 

the   Assessment    for    Improving    East  more,   72   Md.   587,    11   L.  R.  A.  224, 

Eighteenth    Street    in    the    Town    of  32  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cases    228,  20 

riatbush,    75    Hun.    603,    27    N.    Y.  Atl.  141,  21   Atl.  709   [1890]). 

Supp.    591    [1894];    City    of    Erie    v.  "  The    People    ex    rel.    Davidson    v. 

Griswold,    184   Pa.   435,    39   Atl.   231  Cole,  128  111.  158,  21  N.  E.  6  [1890]. 


1099 


PROPERTY    ST.^BJECT   TO   iVSSESSMENT. 


§§642,643 


§  642.     Omission  by  legislative  determination. 

The  legislature,  the  public  corporation  levying  the  assessment, 
and  the  like,  have  a  wide  discretion  in  determining  the  limits  of 
the  assessment  district.  If  such  discretion  is  not  abused,  the 
assessment  is  not  invalid  by  the  fact  that  in  the  exercise  of  such 
discretion  the  legislature  or  corporation  has  omitted  land  which 
the  evidence  may  intend  to  show  was  in  fact  benefited.^ 

§  643.     Presumption  of  propriety  of  omission. 

Every  reasonable  presumption  is  made  in  favor  of  the  regu- 
larity and  propriety  of  the  action  of  public  officers.  According- 
ly, a  property  OAvner  who  complains  of  the  omission  of  land  from 
a  local  assessment  must  show  affirmatively  that  such  land  was 
benefited  by  such  improvement  and  that  the  omission  thereof 
was  improper.^  The  mere  fact  that  certain  land  was  omitted 
from  the  assessment  is  not  sufficient  to  invalidate  the  assess- 
ment unless  the  complainant  further  shows  that  such  property 


'  Clencay  v.  Norwood,  137  Fed. 
962  [1905];  O'Dea  v.  Mitchell,  144 
Cal.  374,  77  Pac.  1020  [1904]; 
In  the  Matter  of  the  Bonds  of 
the  Madera  Irrigation  District,  92 
Cal.  296,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  106, 
14  L.  R.  A.  75.5,  28  Pac.  272, 
28  Pac.  675  [1891];  Reclamation 
District  No.  3  v.  Goldman,  65  Cal. 
635,  4  Pac.  676  [1884];  Duane  v. 
City  of  ChicajTo,  198  111.  471,  64  X. 
E.  1033  [1902];  Gauen  v.  Moredock 
and  Ivy  Landinj;  Drainage  District 
No.  1,  131  111.  446,  23  N.  E.  633 
I  1890]  ;  Lake  v.  C  ity  of  Decatur,  91 
111.  .596  [1879];  Bigelovv  v.  City  of 
Chicago,  90  111.  49  [1878];  Wright 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  48  111.  285 
[1868];  Bowen  v.  Hester,  143  Ind. 
511,  41  N.  E.  330  [1S95];  Ricketts 
V.  Spraker,  77  Ind.  371  [1881];  Mock 
V.  City  of  Mvincie.  9  Ind.  App.  536, 
37  N.  E.  281  [1893];  City  of  Kan- 
sas City  V.  Gibson.  66  Kan.  501,  72 
Pac.  222  [1903];  Lincoln  v.  Board  of 
Street  Commissioners  of  the  City  of 
Boston,  176  Mass.  210.  57  N.  E.  356 
[1900];  State  ex  rel.  Ashhy  v. 
Three  States  Lumber  Company,  198 
Mo.     430,     95     S.     W.     333     [1906]; 


Kansas  City  v.  Bacon,  147  Mo. 
259,  48  S.  W.  860  [1898];  State, 
Central  New  Jersey  Land  and  Im- 
provement Co.,  Pros.  V.  Mayor  and 
Council  of  the  City  of  Bayonne,  56 
N.  J.  L.  (27  Vr.)"297,  28  Atl.  713 
[1893];  State,  Society  for  Establish- 
ing Useful  Manufactures,  Pros.  v. 
Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of 
Paterson.  42  N.  J.  L.  (13  Vr.)  615 
[1880];  State,  Board  of  Chosen  Free- 
holders of  the  County  of  Hudson, 
Pros.  V.  Peterson  Avenue  and  Secau- 
cus  Road  Commis«;ioners,  41  N.  J.  L. 
(12  Vr.)  83  [1879];  State,  Hunt, 
Pros.  V.  ilayor  and  Common  Council 
of  the  City  of  Railway,  39  N.  J.  L. 
(10  Vroora)  646  [1877];  Weston  v. 
Commissioners  of  Hamilton  County, 
6  Ohio  C.  C.  641  [1892];  City  of 
Spokane  Falls  v.  Browne,  3  Wash. 
84,  27  Pac.   1077   [1891]. 

'Culver  V.  City  of  Chicago,  171 
111.  399,  49  N.  E.  573  [1898];  Rich 
V.  City  of  Chicago,  152  111.  18,  38 
N.  E.  255  [1894];  Chicago.  Rock  Is- 
land and  Pacific  Railway  Company  v. 
City  of  Chicago,  139  111.  573,  28  N. 
E.   1108   [1893]. 


§  644  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1100 

should  have  been  included.-  The  fact  that  after  an  assessment 
has  been  levied,  the  city  confesses  in  court  that  certain  property 
is  not  benefited  thereby,  and  the  court  accordingly  sets  aside 
such  assessment  as  to  such  property  does  not,  in  the  absence  of 
fraud  or  of  a  showing  that  the  omitted  property  was  in  fact 
benefited,  invalidate  the  assessment  as  to  the  remaining  proper- 
ty.^ The  mere  fact  that  contiguous  property  is  not  assessed  does 
not  invalidate  the  assessment  in  the  absence  of  a  showing  that 
such  property  is  benefited,  where  the  assessment  is  to  be  levied 
on  property  benefited  and  there  has  been  no  determination  that 
contiguous  property  has  been  benefited.*  The  fact  that  land  bene- 
fited by  the  original  construction  of  a  ditch  is  not  assessed  for  the 
repairs  thereof,  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment  unless  it  is 
further  shown  that  such  land  is  benefited  by  such  repairs.^ 

§  644.     Omission  not  operative  if  not  prejudicial. 

A  property  owner  who  complains  of  the  omission  of  other  prop- 
erty, must  show  that  by  reason  of  such  omission  his  own  assess- 
ment will  be  increased  disproportionately  and  unfairly.^  In  some 
jurisdictions,  it  is  held  that  the  omission  of  property  which  should 
have  been  assessed  does  not  invalidate  the  assessment  unless  the 

"Holdom   V.   City   of   Chicago,    169  ^Culver  v.  City  of  Chicago,  171  111. 

111.  109,  48  N.  E.  164  [1897];  Payne  399,  49  N.  E.  573  [1898]. 

V.   Village   of   South   Springfield,   161  *  Holdom   v.    City   of   Chicago,    169 

111.  285,  44  N.  E.  105  [1896];  Holt  v.  111.   109,  48  X.   E.   164    [1897];    Chi- 

City  of  East  St.  Louis,   150  111.  530,  cago,   Rock   Island   and   Pacific   Rail- 

47    N.    E.    927    [1894];    Lightner    v.  way  Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  139 

City  of  Peoria,   150  111.  80,  37  N.  E.  HI.  573,  28  N.  E.  1108  [1893]. 

69   [1894];   Illinois  Central  Railroad  ^Goodrich    v.    City    of   Minonk,   62 

Company  v.  City  of  Chicago,  141  111.  HI.  121   [1871]. 

509,    30   N.   E.    1036    [1893];    Fagan  ^  Bowditch  v.  City  of  New  Haven, 

V.     City     of     Chicago,     84     HI.     227  40  Conn.  503  [1873] ;  Gilbert  v.  City 

[1876];   Goodrich  v.  City  of  Minonk,  of  New  Haven,  39  Conn.  467   [1872]; 

62  111.  121   [1871];  Warren  v.  Street  Balfe   v.    Bell,    40    Ind.    337    [1872]; 

Commissioners   of   Boston,    187   Mass.  State,     Humphreys     v.     Mayor     and 

290,  72  N.  E.  1022   [1905];   Beals  v.  Council  of   the   City  of   Bayonne,   60 

James,   173  Mass.  591,  54  N.  E.  245  N.   J.  L.    (31   Vr.)    406,   38   Atl.   761 

[1899];    Whiting  v.   Mayor   and   Al-  [1877];  Davis  v.  City  of  Newark,  54 

dermen    of    the    City   of 'Boston,    106  N.   J.   L.    (25  Vr.)    144,   23   Atl.   276 

Mass.    89    [1870];    Dooling,    Pros.    v.  [1891];      State,     Righter,     Pros.     v. 

Ocean  City,  67  N.  J.  L.  (38  Vr.)  215,  Mayor   and   Common   Council   of   the 

50  Atl.   621    [1901];    Dean  v.  Mayor  City  of  Newark,  45  N.  J.  L.   (16  Vr.) 

and  Aldermen  of  the  City  of  Pater-  104     [1883];     Bloch    v.    Godfrey,    26 

son,   67    N.   J.   L.    (38   Vr.)    199,   50  Ohio  C.  C.  R.  781   [1904]. 
Atl.    620    [1901];    Bloch    v.    Godfrey, 
26  Ohio  C.  C.  R.  781    [1904]. 


1 101  PROPERTY  SUBJECT  TO  ASSESSMENT.  §  6-44 

party  complaining  thereof  can  show  that  the  result  of  such  omis- 
sion has  been  to  impose  upon  his  land  an  assessment  greater  than 
it  otherwise  would  have  been  called  upon  to  bear.-  Thus,  the 
omission  to  assess  a  part  of  the  cost  of  a  street  improvement 
against  a  street  railway  company  does  not  invalidate  the  assess- 
ment if  the  property  owners  are  assessed  less  than  they  would 
have  been  had  the  assessment  been  made  with  strict  regularity.'' 
The  omission  to  assess  two  small  lots  has  been  held  to  be  too  un- 
important a  matter  to  authorize  the  court  to  set  aside  the  entire 
assessment,  it  not  appearing  that  substantial  injustice  was  done.* 
It  seems,  however,  to  be  assumed  elsewhere  that  the  omission  to 
assess  sixteen  feet  of  land  might  invalidate  the  entire  assess- 
ment.^ It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the  fact  that  the  assess- 
ment upon  the  property  included  in  the  operation  of  the  assess- 
ment, does  not  exceed  the  benefits,  does  not  of  itself  prevent  the 
omission  of  certain  land  which  should  have  been  assessed,  from 
invalidating  the  assessment."  If  it  is  shown  that  certain  land 
which  should  have  been  assessed  has  been  omitted,  the  presump- 
tion will  be  that  such  omission  has  resulted  in  a  substantial  in- 
crease of  the  assessment  upon  the  property  included  in  the  opera- 
tion of  such  assessment.'  While  such  omission  will  not  be  al- 
lowed to  affect  the  assessment  if  the  amount  is  trifling,  such  fact 
will  not  be  presumed,  but  must  be  established.'  One  who  seeks 
relief  on  the  ground  that  certain  land  which  should  have  been 
assessed  has  been  omitted,  must  be  able  to  show  that  he  has  suf- 
fered some  material  pre.iudice  thereby.  If  all  the  land  which 
should  have  been  assessed  has  in  fact  been  included,  but  some 
of  it  has  been  included  as  belonging  to  one  who  is  not  its  owner, 

=  Bo\vditch  V.   City  of  New  Ilavon,  -Cilbert  v.  City  of  Xew  Haven.  3!) 

40  Conn.  503   [1873];  Gilbert  v.  City  Conn.  4G7  [1872]. 

of  New  Haven,  39  Conn.  4(57   [1872];  "State    ex    rel.    Wilson    v.    Long- 

Balfe   V.    Bell.    40    Ind.    337    [1872];  street,    38    N.    J.    L.     (9    Vr.)     312 

State,     Humi)lireys     v.     ilayor     and  [187G].       [The    real    point    involved, 

Council   of   the   City   of   Bayonne,   60  however,  was  tliat  as  the  commission- 

N.   J.  L.    (31   Vr.)    400,   38   Atl.   761  ers    could    not    amend    their    report 

[1897];   Davis  v.  City  of  Newark,  54  mandamus   would    not   lie   to   compel 

N.   J.   L.    (25  Vr.)    144,  23   Atl.  276  them  to  include  such  land.] 

[1891];      State,     Eightor,     Pros.     v.  "blasters    v.    City    of    Portland,    24 

Mavor    and    Common'"  Council    of    the  Ore.    161,    33    Pac.    540    [1893]. 

Citv  of  Newark,  45  N.  J.  L.  (1(1  Vr.)  'Hassan   v.   City   of   Rochester,   67 

104    [18831.  X.   Y.   528    [1876]. 

'Bowditch  v.   Citv  of  Now   Haven,  "Hassan   v.   City   of   Rochester,   67 

40  Conn.  503    [1873].  N.  Y.  528  [1876]. 


§  645  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1102 

and  no  advantage  is  taken  by  such  owner  of  such  defect,  another 
property  owner  cannot  resist  such  assessment  on  the  ground  that 
property  which   should   have   been   assessed   has   been   omitted.® 

§  645.    Remedies  for  improper  omission. 

If  the  legislature  has  provided  a  method  for  attacking  the  local 
assessment  and  has  given  an  opportunity  for  a  full  hearing  an*! 
ample  relief,  the  aggrieved  property  owner  must  ordinarily  pur- 
sue such  remedy  and  if  he  does  not  take  advantage  of  the  defect 
in  the  manner  indicated  by  the  legislature,  he  cannot  raise  the 
question  subsequently.  Accordingly,  omission  to  assess  land  bene- 
fited by  the  improvement  for  which  the  assessment  is  levied, 
must  be  taken  advantage  of  by  the  other  property  owners  in  the 
manner  indicated  by  statute,  or  such  objection  is  to  be  regarded 
as  waived.^  Thus,  if  such  objection  is  to  be  taken  advantage  of 
by  appeal,  omission  to  appeal  prevents  the  aggrieved  property 
owner  from  raising  such  objection  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  such 
assessment.-  So,  if  the  remedy  of  the  property  owner  is  manda- 
mus to  compel  the  assessment  of  the  omitted  property,  equity  will 
not  restrain  the  collection  of  such  assessment  for  such  omission.-' 
If  the  court  has  power  on  finding  that  certain  land  which  should 
have  been  assessed  has  been  omitted,  to  reduce  the  assessment 
upon  the  land  which  is  assessed  to  the  amount  it  would  have 
borne  had  no  land  been  omitted  improperly,  it  may  exercise  such 
power  and  refuse  to  treat  the  assessment  as  a  nullity.*  Under 
some  systems  of  assessment,  the  Court  has  no  power  to  reduce  the 
amount  of  the  assessment  to  the  amount  which  the  assessors 
would  have  assessed  against  the  land  in  question,  had  they  in- 
cluded land  which  should  have  been  included  but  was  in  fact 
omitted.     Where  the  power  of  the  court  is  thus  limited,  the  court 

"Cohen    v.    City    of    Alameda,    124  sioners?   of    the    City    of    Boston,    176 

Cal.   504,  57   Pac.   377    [1899];    Hen-  Mass.    210,    57    N.    E.    356     [1900]; 

drici--9     V.     Gilchrist,     76     Ind.     369  Butler    v.    City    of    Worcester,     112 

[1881].  Mass.  541    [1873];   Downs  v.  Village 

^Minnesota  &  M.  Land  &  Improve-  of  Irvington,  66    (N.  Y.)   Howard  93 

ment  Co.  v.  City  of  Billings,  111  Fed.  [1883]. 

Rep.    972,    50    C.    C.    A.    70    [1901];  ^Buckman    v.     Landers,     111     Cal. 

Buck-man   v.   Landers,    111    Cal.    347,  347,  43  Pac.  1125  [1896]. 

43    Pac.    1125    [1890];    McDonald    v.  '  Heinroth     v.     Ivochersnerger,     173 

Conniff,    99    Cal.     386,    34    Pac.    71  111.  205,  50  N.  E.  171   [1898]. 

[18931;  T'he  People  ex  rel.  Barber  v.  *  Creamer   v.  MeCune,   7   Mo.   App. 

Chapman.  127  Til.  387.  19  N.  E.  872;  91    [1879]. 
Lincoln  v.   Board   of  Street   Commis- 


1103  PROPERTY   SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  645 

can  only  set  aside  the  assessment  where  land  which  should  have 
been  assessed  is  omitted.''  If  a  board  of  commissioners  appointed 
to  assess  benefits,  omits  certain  land  and  has  no  power  to  amend 
its  report,  the  effect  of  such  omission  is  to  invalidate  the  assess- 
ment.® Improvements  are  sometimes  constructed  by  corporations 
which  are  in  outward  form  private  corporations,  such  as  turn- 
pike companies.  If  the  appraisers  who  are  to  assess  lands  bene- 
fited are  appointed  by  the  county  commissioners,  their  omission 
of  land  within  the  assessment  district  is  not  regarded  as  the  act 
of  the  company  in  the  sense  that  it  is  ground  for  an  information 
against  such  company.'^  The  omission  of  property  which  should 
be  assessed  is  said  to  be  sufficient  ground  for  enjoining  the  col- 
lection of  the  assessment,  but  not  for  enjoining  the  improvement, 
since  there  may  be  a  sufficient  fund  in  the  treasury  to  pay  the 
expense  of  such  improvement.^  Cases  are  found  in  which  prop- 
erty which  is  benefited  by  a  public  improvement  is  unintentional- 
ly omitted  from  the  assessment.  Thus,  notice  may  be  given  to 
certain  property  owners  but  omitted  as  to  others,  whereby  the 
lands  of  the  latter  class  of  owners  are  relieved  from  such  assess- 
ment. In  such  case,  if  the  power  of  levying  a  supplemental 
assessment  exists,  the  omission  of  such  land  does  not  invalidate 
the  assessment  as  to  the  rest  of  the  property  benefited.^  The 
proper  procedure  is  said  in  other  states  to  be  to  set  aside  the 
entire  assessment  without  prejudice  to  the  right  of  the  city  to 
make  a  reassessment  in  which  all  the  land  benefited  may  be  in- 
cluded." If  no  power  exists  to  levy  another  assessment,  which 
will  include  the  omitted  property'-,  the  omission  of  such  property 
is  said  to  invalidate  the  entire  assessment.     An  assessment  was 

"In  tho  Mattor  of  tlio  Petition  of  "State    ex    rol.    Wilson    v.    Long- 

Auchmuty  to  Vacate  an  Assessment,  street,    38    N.    J.    L.     (9    Vr.)     312 

18   Hun.   324    [1879].      "There   is   no  [18761. 

fixed  sum  or  criterion  for  the  court  '  State  on  the  Relation  of  Linj^en- 

to  act  upon.    The  court  would  occupy  felter   v.   Danville   and   North   Salem 

the  position  of  assessors  and  the  as-  Gravel   Road   Company,   33    Ind.    133 

sessment   would   be    according   to    its  [1870]. 

judgment  instead  of  the  judgment  of  '  Hoke     v.     Perdue,     62     Cal.     545 

the  assessors.     Besides,  it  would  have  [18811. 

no    power    to    make    the    assessments  •  State  of  Washington,  on  the  Rela- 

upon    the    omitted    parcels   and    thus  tion    of    the    Barber   Asphalt   Paving 

make  a  valid  assessment  for  the  im-  Company  v.  City  of  Seattle,  42  Wash, 

provement.     I   think   that   the  whole  370.  85  Pac.  11    [19061. 

assessment  is  void."    Matter  of  New  "' I'pington  v.  Oviatt,  24  0.  S.  232 

York  Protestant  Episcopal  School,  75  [1873]. 
N.  Y.  324.  329  [1878]. 


§  646  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1104 

levied  in  Virginia  before  the  adoption  of  the  recent  constitution 
forbidding  assessments  for  such  purposes.^^  This  assessment  was 
perfected  as  to  some  of  the  property  to  be  assessed,  but  not  as 
to  the  rest,  when  the  new  constitution  was  adopted,  making  it  im- 
possible to  proceed  to  perfect  the  incomplete  assessments.  It 
was  held  that  the  assessments  already  perfected  could  not  be 
enforced  as  this  would  violate  the  principle  of  apportionment  ac- 
cording to  benefits. ^^ 

§  646,     Effect  of  construction  of  improvement  by  property  owner. 

If  a  property  owner  has  done  a  part  or  all  of  the  work  of  con- 
structing an  improvement  of  a  public  character,  adjoining  his 
property  in  substantial  compliance  with  the  plans  adopted  by  the 
public  corporation,  some  allowance  must  ordinarily  be  made  to 
such  property  owner  for  the  value  of  such  work,  if  the  same  is 
used  by  the  city  as  a  part  of  a  subsequent  improvement.^  On  the 
other  hand,  the  fact  that  a  property  owner  has  done  a  part  of  the 
work  which  is  used  ought  not  to  exempt  him  from  all  assessment 
for  the  work  actually  done.-  In  such  cases,  the  relief  given  to 
the  property  owner  ordinarily  takes  the  form  of  a  credit  upon 
his  assessment.^  If  the  property  owner  has  constructed  the  en- 
tire improvement  in  front  of  his  property,  credit  of  some  sort 
should  be  made.  The  method  of  crediting  such  property  owner 
is  a  matter  of  legislative  discretion.  It  nsnally  assumes  one  of 
two  forms.  The  property  owner  who  has  constructed  the  whole 
of  an  improvement  adjoining  his  property  may  be  entirely  reliev- 
ed from  assessment  when  the  city  or  other  public  corporation 
completes  such  improvement."*  It  is  proper  to  omit  from  assess- 
ment, land  in  front  of  which  an  improvement  has  been  construet- 

»See    §§    107,    IGl.  '  People  ex  rel.  Barber  v.  Chapman, 

"Fulkerson  v.  City  of  Bristol,  105  128    111.   496,   21    N.   E.   507    [1890]: 

Va.  555,  54  S.  E.  468   [1906].  In     the     Matter     of     Auchmuty,     18 

^Holloran  V.  Merman,  27  Ind.  App.  Hun.    (X.  Y.)    324   [1879]. 

309,    59    N.    E.    869     [1901];     State,  *  McDonald  v.  Conniff.  99  Cal.  386. 

Mann,   Pros.  v.  Mayor   and   Common  34  Pac.  71  [1893];  Diggins  v.  Brown. 

Council   of  Jersey  City,  24  N.  J.  L.  76    Cal.    318,    18    Pac.    373     [1888]: 

(4  Zab.)    662    [1855].     See  §   641.  Dumesnil      v.      Louisville      Artificial 

^In   the   Matter    of   Auchmuty,    18  Stone  Co.,   109  Ky.   1,  58   S.  W.   371 

Hun.     (N.    Y.)     324    [1879];    In    the  [1900]  ;   In  the  Matter  of  the  Assess- 

Matter    of    Auchmuty,    11    Hun.    (N.  ment  for  Improving  East  18th  Street, 

Y.)    76    [1877];    State  ex  rel.  Chris-  75  Hun.   (N.  Y.)   603,  27  N.  Y.  Supp. 

topher   V.    City  of   Portage,    14   Wis.  591   [1894];  Hutchinson  v.  Pittsburg, 

550  [1861].  72    Pa.    St.     (22    P.    F.    Smith)     320 

[1872]. 


1105  PROPERTY    SUBJECT    TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  646 

ed  by  the  owner  thereof  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  a  stat- 
ute authorizing  property  owners  to  construct  the  improvement 
at  their  own  expense  and  thus  relieve  such  property  from  assess- 
ment, if  such  improvement  is  in  accordance  with  the  plan  adopted 
by  tha  city.'*  Land  in  front  of  which  an  improvement  is  con- 
tracted for  b}^  one  who  has  no  authority  to  bind  the  owner  of  the 
land,  is  not  exempted  from  the  operation  of  a  contract  entered 
into  by  the  city  for  improving  the  street  except  such  part  as  the 
owners  and  representatives  of  the  property  had  already  contract- 
ed for.**  In  other  jurisdictions,  the  property  owner  in  front  of 
whose  property  the  work  is  done  is  assessed  for  his  share  of  the 
cost  of  the  entire  improvement  and  then  the  cost  of  the  work 
done  by  him  is  credited  upon  his  assessment."  The  result  reached 
by  these  two  methods  is  substantially  the  same.  Accordingly, 
under  a  statute  which  provides  that  where  a  property  owner  has 
already  made  an  improvement  similar  in  character  to  the  one 
proposed,  his  lot  shall  be  excluded  from  assessment,  it  has  been 
held  proper  to  assess  the  cost  of  setting  new  curb  stones  upon  lots 
in  front  of  which  curb  stones  had  already  been  set  by  the  prop- 
erty owner  and  then  to  credit  such  property  owner  with  the  cost 
of  setting  such  curb  stones.^  In  the  absence  of  statute,  the  prop- 
erty owner  cannot  by  voluntarily  constructing  an  improvement 
preclude  the  city  from  constructing  a  different  style  of  improve- 
ment and  assessing  the  abutting  property  therefor."  If  the  work 
done  by  the  property  owner  is  not  authorized  by  statute,  is  not 
in  accordance  with  the  general  plan  of  the  improvement  adopted 
by  the  public  corporation'"  and  is  not  adopted  and  used  by  the 
city,  the  property  owner  who  has  made  such  improvement  volun- 
tarily, cannot  claim  exemption  from  assessment  by  reason  thereof, 
nor  can  he  claim  a  credit  on  the  amount  of  his  assessment  for  the 

^MoSherry  v.  Wood.   102  Cal.  (i47,  '  Pooplo    ox    vol.    'Barber    v.    Cliap- 

36     Pac.     1010     [18941;     Di^sjins    v.  man,    128    111.    49().    21    N.    E.    507 

Brown,    76    Cal.    318,    18    Pac.    373  [1890];     Holloran     v.     Mornian.     27 

[1888];   San  Francisco  Paving  Co.  v.  Ind.  App.  309,  59  X.  E.  8G9   [1901]; 

Dubois,   2   Cal.    App.   42,   83   Pac.   72  Johnson  v.  City  of  Taconia.  41  Wasli. 

[1905];  Dnmesnil  v.  Louisville  Arti-  51.  82  Pac.   1092   [1905]. 

ficial  Strtne  Co.,  109  Ky.  1.  58  S.  W.  "Blount    v.    City    of    Janesvillc.    .'Jl 

371   [19001;  Beck  v.  Obst,  75  Ky.   (12  Wis.  648   [1872]. 

Bush.)    268    [18761.  'Parsons   v.   Citv   of   Cohinibus.   50 

«Chica<TO  V.  Sherwood.  104  111.  549.  0.  S.  460.  34  N.  E.  677   [18931. 

[The      si-nnturo      "Newton      Burke,  '"Lux    &    Talliott    Stone    Company 

Asent    f--    '^poh'v    Estate"   was    here  v.  Donaldson.  162  Ind.  481,  68  N.  E. 

held   insulTKMcnt.l  1014  [1903]. 


§§647,648  TAXATION   BY   ASSESSMENT.  1106 

cost  of  such  improvement.  If  the  statute  provides  for  exempt- 
ing such  property  from  assessment  if  the  city  approves  the  kind 
and  quality  of  the  work  done,  the  mere  construction  of  such  work 
without  obtaining  the  approval  of  the  city  does  not  prevent  the 
city  from  levjnng  an  assessment  against  such  property  for  the 
cost  of  the  subsequent  improvement.^^ 

§  647.     Property  on  which  owner  has  paid  invalid  assessment. 

Where  an  invalid  assessment  has  been  levied  and  some  of  the 
property  owners  have  paid  such  assessments  on  their  property, 
it  has  been  held  that  in  case  of  re-assessment,  it  is  proper  to  omit 
the  property  upon  which  such  prior  invalid  assessment  has  been 
paid  voluntarily.^ 

§  648.     Land  already  assessed  for  similar  improvement. 

It  is  often  sought  to  assess  for  benefits  from  an  improvement, 
land  which  has  already  been  assessed  for  the  same  or  a  similar  im- 
provement. No  inflexible  rule  of  law  can  be  laid  down  for  de- 
termining whether  such  property  can  be  assessed  or  not.  The 
question  is  primarily  whether  the  improvement  for  which  it  is 
sought  to  levy  the  assessment  confers  a  benefit  upon  the  prop- 
erty assessed  or  not.  If  such  benefit  is  conferred,  payment  of  the 
prior  assessment  does  not  prevent  levy  of  the  subsequent  assess- 
ment.^ If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  improvement  for  which  it  is 
sought  to  levy  the  assessment,  does  not  confer  any  special  benefit 
upon  the  property  assessed,  such  assessment  cannot  be  levied.^ 
In  most  cases,  therefore,  the  question  of  the  existence  and  pay- 
ment of  a  prior  assessment  is  immaterial.  Thus,  an  assessment 
may  be  levied  for  a  local  sewer  upon  property  which  has  already 
been  assessed  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer.^  In  most  jurisdic- 
tions, the  power  to  improve  and  to  levy  local  assessments  is  a  con- 
tinuing power  and  assessments  may  be  levied  for  repairs  and  re- 

"  Philadelphia  to  Use  v.  Baker,  140  '  Park     Ecclesiastical      Society     v. 

Pa.  St.  11,  21  Atl.  238  [1891].  City  of  Hartford,  47  Conn.  89  [1879] ; 

'Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti-  Byrani   v.    Foley,    17    Ind.    App.    629. 

more  v.  Ulman,  79  Md.  469,  30  Atl.  47   X.  E.  351    [1897]. 

43   [1894]:    (original  assessment  held  =  Toledo    v.    Potter,    19    Ohio    C.    C. 

invalid   in  I'lrr^an  v.  Mavor  and   City  661    [1893]. 

Council    nf    Baltimore,    72    Md.    587,  ^  Park      Ecclesiastical      Society      v. 

11  L.  R.  A.  2-^4.  32  Am.  &  En<r.  Corn.  City  of  Hartford,  47  Conn.  89  [1879]  ; 

Cases   228,   20   Atl.   141.   21   Atl.   709  Bvram    v.    Folev.    17    Ind.   App.   629. 

[1890]).      See   also    §    64.  47  N.  E.  351   [1897]. 


1107  PROPERTY    SUBJECT   TO   ASSESSMENT.  §  648 

construction  where  such  improvements  confer  a  benefit  upon  the 
property  assessed.*  Statutes  are  occasionally  found  which  pro- 
vide that  property  may  be  assessed  but  once  for  a  given  kind  of 
improvement.  A  provision  in  a  city  charter  that  a  street  may 
be  improved  at  the  expense  of  the  owners  of  abutting  property 
and  that  if  so  improved  it  shall  not  be  improved  again  at  their 
expense,  has  been  held  to  constitute  a  contract  when  such  owner 
has  paid  such  assessment  and  he  cannot  be  assessed  for  a  recon- 
struction under  a  subsequent  statute  which  attempts  to  authorize 
such  assessment."  Under  a  statute  which  provided  that  no  prop- 
erty fronting  on  any  street  should  be  exempt  from  assessment  on 
account  of  paving  such  street  with  a  permanent  pavement  having 
a  concrete  foundation,  until  such  property  should  have  paid  for 
the  street  pavements  thereon  the  sum  of  three  dollars  per  square 
yard,  and  under  another  statute  providing  that  when  a  street 
has  once  been  paved  at  the  cost  of  the  owners  of  adjoining  prop- 
erty, the  expense  of  construction  should  be  paid  out  of  the  gen- 
eral fund,  it  was  held  that  where  a  street  had  once  been  paved 
at  the  expense  of  the  owners  of  adjoining  property  at  a  cost  of 
less  than  three  dollars  a  square  .yard,  an  assessment  should  not 
be  levied  for  a  reconstruction  unless  it  was  shown  that  the  pave- 
ment for  which  the  assessment  had  been  levied  had  a  concrete 
foundation.*"  In  Pennsylvania,  the  courts  have  held  that  property 
owners  cannot  be  assessed  for  reconstruction  where  the  assess- 
ment is  levied  on  the  theory  of  benefits.''  This  doctrine  is  ap- 
plied in  this  state,  however,  whether  the  original  improvement 
was  paid  for  by  local  assessment  or  by  general  taxation.  If  the 
assessment  is  one  levied  under  the  theory  of  an  exaction  for  the 
performance  of  a  public  duty,  such  assessment  may  be  levied  for 
reconstruction.^  If  an  assessment  has  l)een  levied  and  is  proved 
to  be  defective,  it  has  been  held  proper  on  re-assessment  to  omit 
the  property  of  those  who  have  voluntarily  paid  the  original 
assessment."     Indeed,   it  is  improper  to   assess  such  property  a 

*  Williams  v.  ^rayor,  etc..  of  De-  ^  As.te.tftmoif  for  reconstruciion  of 
troit,  2  Mich.  560  [18531;  Dunker  sidewalk.  Wilkinsburg  Bor.  v.  Home 
V.   Stiefel,   57   Mo.   App.   379    [1894 J.       for  Aj^ed  Women,   131   Pa.  St.   109,  6 

"Ladd  V.  City  of  Portland,  32  Ore.  L.   R.   A.  531.   18  Atl.  937    [1890]. 

271,    67    Am.    St.    Rep.    526,   51    Pac.  'Spencer    v.    Merchant.    125    U.    S. 

654   [1898].  345.  31  L.  763,  8  S.  921   [1888]:    (af- 

*  Schintjren  v.  City  of  La  Crosse.  firminfj  Spencer  v.  ^lerchant.  100  N. 
117  Wis.  158,  94  N.  W.  84   [1903].  Y.  585.  3  N.  E.  682  [1885])  ;  ^^layor 

^  See  §  382.  and  City  Council  of  Baltimore  v.  Ul- 


§  649  TAXATION    BY    ASSESSMENT.  1108 

second  time  unless  the  city  has  repaid  to  such  owners  the  amount 
of  the  assessment  thus  paid  by  them."  If  property  benefited  is 
exempted  by  the  legislature  because  the  owner  thereof  has  al- 
ready contributed  his  share  toward  the  cost  of  such  improvement, 
it  is  generally  held  that  such  exemption  does  not  invalidate  such 
assessments.^^  It  has,  however,  been  held  in  some  jurisdictions 
that  such  exemption  invalidates  the  assessment.^^ 

§  649.     Title  not  involved. 

In  determining  what  property  may  be  assessed  on  the  theory 
of  benefits  for  the  cost  of  constructing  a  legal  improvement,  the 
question  of  the  title  or  ownership  of  such  property  is  not  involved 
in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision  making  questions  as  to 
such  ownership  material.^  Thus,  an  action  to  have  special  tax 
bills  paid  out  of  the  proceeds  arising  from  the  condemnation  of 
land,  does  not  involve  the  title  of  land  within  the  meaning  of  a 
statute  giving  to  the  Supreme  Court  jurisdiction  of  such  eases 
irrespective  of  the  amount  involved.-  If,  however,  the  question 
of  personal  liability  of  the  owner  of  the  property  assessed  is  in- 
volved, a  person  who  is  charged  with  the  payment  of  an  assess- 
ment may  show  that  he  is  not  in  fact  the  owner  of  the  property 
assessed.^  Thus,  an  alleged  owner  of  property  may  show  that 
he  possesses  merely  an  easement  in  the  nature  of  a  right  of  way 

man,  79  Md.  469,  30  Atl.  43   [1894];  Zion    Church    of    the    City   of    Balti- 

State  ex  rel.  Eaton  v.  District  Court  more  v.   Mayor   and   City  Counci]   of 

of  Ramsey  County,  95  Minn.  503,  104  Baltimore,   71   Md.   524,    IS   Atl.   895 

N.  W.  553  [1905].  [1SS9];     Masonic    Building    Associa- 

"  State,    Norris,    Pros.    v.    City    of  tion  v.   Brownell,   164  Mass.   306,  41 

Elizabeth,  51  N.  J.  L.    (22  Vr.)   485,  X.  E.  306   [1895];    Smith  v.  Carney, 

18  Atl.  302   [1889].  127    Mass.     179     [1879];     Brewer    v. 

"  Warren   v.   Street   Commissioners  City    of    Springfield,    97    Mass.    152 

of  the  City  of  Boston.  187  Mass.  290,  [1867];   Ross  v.  Gates,   183  Mo.  338, 

72  N.  E.   1022    [1905]:    Citv  of  Erie  81    S.    W.    1107    [1904];    Roberts    v. 

V.  Griswold,  184  Pa.  St.  435,  39  Atl.  First  National  Bank  of  Fargo,  8  N. 

231   [1898].  D.  504,  79  X.  W.   1049    [1899];   Vil- 

"Davis  V.   Gaines,   48   Ark.  370,   3  lage   of   St.   Bernard   v.    Kemper,    60 

S.  W.   184    [1886].  0.  S.  244,  45  L.  R.  A.  662,  54  N.  E. 

iffimmelmann   v.    Steiner,   38    Cal.  267  [1899].     See  §  887  et  seq. 
175    [18691;    MurpheA'  v.   Mayor   and  2;ross  v.  Gates,  183  Mo.  338,  81  S. 

Coimcil    of    Wilmino-ton,    5    Del.    Ch.  W.  1107  [1904]. 

281     [18791:     ]VTcGill    v.    Bruner,    65  ^  Dashiell      v.      Mayor      and      City 

Ind.   421    [1879]:    Ball    v.    Balfe,   41  Council  of  Baltimore,  Use  of  Hax,  45 

Ind.   221    [1872];    Fe^di^  v.   Knight,  Md.  615    [1876];   Board  of  Health  v. 

60  la.  29.  14  N.  W.  78   [18821:   Gil-  Gloria   Dei.,   23    Pa.    St.    (11    Harr.) 

more  v.  Norton,  10  Kan.  491   [1872];  259   [1854]. 


1109  PROPERTY   SUBJECT   TO    ASSESSMENT.  §  650 

over  such  property  and  the  legal  title  thereto  is  not  in  such  al- 
leged owner.*  The  fact  that  the  owner  of  property  is  under  legal 
disabilit}^  does  not  prevent  such  property  from  being  assessed  on 
the  theory  of  benefits."'  Thus,  where  coverture  constitutes  a  dis- 
ability, land  belonging  to  a  married  woman  may  nevertheless  be 
assessed  for  its  share  of  the  cost  of  a  street  improvement.*' 

§  650.     Change  of  statute  pending  assessment  proceedings. 

If  the  statute  which  provides  what  property  may  be  subject  to 
assessment  is  changed  after  the  commencement  of  the  proceed- 
ings which  will  result  in  an  assessment,  such  statute  is  ordinarily 
regarded  as  not  retroactive.^  Where  the  law  in  force  when  the 
improvement  ordinance  was  passed  required  council  to  fix  the 
front  of  the  land  assessed  to  the  usual  depth  of  the  lots  in  the 
neighborhood  in  case  among  others  "there  be  iots  numbered  and 
recorded  ....  lying  lengthwise"  along  such  street,  and  be- 
fore the  assessment  was  made  the  law  was  amended  omitting  re- 
ference to  lots  lying  lengthwise,  it  was  held  that  the  assessment 
should  be  levied  in  accordance  with  the  law  in  force  when  the  im- 
provement ordinance  was  passed.-  At  the  time  that  the  work 
was  done  the  statute  in  force  allowed  onlj^  abutting  lots  to  be 
assessed.  Before  the  assessment  Avas  levied,  the  statute  was 
changed  so  that  other  property  than  that  abutting  might  be 
assessed,^  but  it  was  held  that  the  assessment  for  this  work 
could  be  only  upon  abutting  lots.*  A  different  view  has  been 
entertained  in  some  jurisdictions. ''  At  the  time  of  the  adoption 
of  the  improvement  ordinance,  the  statute  in  force  limited  the 
assessment  to  contiguous  property.  Subsequently  this  statute 
was  amended  omitting  the  Avord  "contiguous"  and  allowing  any 
property  benefited  to  be  assessed.  Subsequently,  a  supplemen- 
tary petition  was  filed  in  the  assessment  proceedings.  It  was 
held  that  the  assessment  might  be  made  under  the  law  as  it 
stood  when  the  assessment  was  made  and  might  therefore  include 

*  Board    of   Hoaltli   v.    Gloria    Dei.,  -Cincinnati    v.    Seasono;ood,    4(1    O. 

23  Pa.  St.   (11  Harr.)   2.59  [18.54].  S.  206,  21  X.  E.  6.30  [1889]. 

''Ball  V.  Balfe.  41  Ind.  221   [1872].  *  Ray  v.   City  of  Jenersonvillc   00 

«Ball  V.  Balfe,  41  Ind.  221   [18721.  Ind.  567  [1883]. 

^  Durrett     v.     Kenton     County,    —  *  Balfe   v.   Lamniers,    109    Ind.   347, 

(Ky.)    ,  87   S.  W.   1070,  27   Ky.  10  X.  E.  92   [1886]. 

Law  Rep.   1173    [190.5];   Jones  v.  Al-  'In    the   Matter   of    Westlake    Ave- 

dermen  of  Boston.    104  Mass.   461.  nne.   .<?oattle.   40   Wash.    144.   82   Pac. 

279  [1905]. 


§  650  TAXATION   BY    ASSESSMENT.  1110 

property  which  was  benefited  but  not  contiguous.'^  If  the  assess- 
ment ordinance  as  originally  passed,  provided  for  assessing  only 
contiguous  property  and  a  subsequent  ordinance  with  reference 
to  the  same  improvement  provided  for  assessing  all  property 
benefited,  the  owner  of  property,  which  is  contiguous  to  the  im- 
provement, cannot  object  to  an  assessment  levied  under  the  new 
ordinance.^  Under  a  statute  providing  for  assessing  lands  on 
both  sides  of  and  adjoining  the  streets  improved,  a  street  railway 
company  whose  track  is  wholly  within  a  street  running  along 
the  length  thereof  cannot  be  assessed.^ 

«In   the  Matter   of   Westlake   Ave-  Commissioners,  182  111.  250,  55  N.  E. 

nue,   Seattle,  40   Wash.    144,  82   Pac.  325   [1899]. 

279   [1905].  *  Brick  &  Terra  Cotta  Company  v. 

^Ferrell     v.     West     Chicago    Park-  Hull,  49  Mo.  App.  433  [1892]. 


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